(Press Release)
July 28, 2024
Ministry of Defense
On July 28, commencing at 3:15 p.m. for approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (Japan-U.S. “2+2”) was convened in Tokyo. The meeting was attended by Ms. KAMIKAWA Yoko, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. KIHARA Minoru, Minister of Defense, from the Japanese side, and the Honorable Antony Blinken, Secretary of State, and the Honorable Lloyd Austin, Secretary of Defense, from the U.S. side (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the Ministers”). The overview of the meeting is as follows (a Joint Statement was released following the meeting).
- Overview
- Regional Security Environment
- Modernizing the Alliance
- U.S. Force Posture
(1) At the beginning of the meeting, the Japanese side stated that the foundations of a free and open international order based on the rule of law continue to be shaken, that we are at a critical juncture where and the decisions we make today will determine our future, and that we must continuously strengthen the Alliance and increase its deterrence in order to protect and defend the existing international order. The U.S. side celebrated the extraordinary progress in enhancing our alliance’s roles, missions, and capabilities, which supports our ability to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
(2) Recognizing the Prime Minister Kishida’s Official Visit to the U.S. in April was historic, bringing the Japan-U.S. alliance to unprecedented level, Japan and the U.S. reaffirmed their intent to implement new strategic initiatives following the Official Visit, with the vision to build a global partnership for the future, including upgrading Alliance command and control, deepening defense industry and advanced technology cooperation, and enhancing cross-domain operations.
(3) The U.S. side restated its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan under Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear, and reaffirmed Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. The Japanese side reaffirmed its role in maintaining peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region by seamlessly responding to any situation from peacetime to contingencies.
The Ministers held candid exchange of views and aligned their recognition on the security environment of the region.
(1) Japan and the U.S. concurred that the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) foreign policy seeks to reshape the international order for its own benefit. Japan and the U.S. highlighted that the PRC employs political, economic, and military coercion of countries, companies, and civil society, as well as facilitates its military modernization through the diversion of technology to achieve these objectives. Japan and the U.S. shared the understanding that such behavior is a serious concern to the Alliance and the entire international community and represents the greatest strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.
(2) Japan and the U.S. reiterated their strong opposition to the PRC’s intensifying attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion in the East China Sea, including through actions that seek to undermine Japan’s longstanding and peaceful administration of the Senkaku Islands, as well as escalatory behavior around the Southwest Islands.
(3) Japan and the U.S. recognized that their basic positions on Taiwan remain unchanged, and reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international community and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.
(4) Japan and the U.S strongly condemned North Korea’s continued conduct of ballistic missile launches. Japan and the U.S. condemned North Korea’s continued nuclear weapons program and nuclear rhetoric and reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea. In addition, the U.S. side expressed its full support for the abductions issue.
(5) Japan and the U.S strongly condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Japan and the U.S also highlighted with concern Russia’s growing and provocative strategic military cooperation with the PRC and the PRC’s support for Russia’s defense industrial base. Japan and the U.S strongly condemned deepening Russia-North Korea military cooperation and expressed deep concern about the potential for transfer of weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missile-related technology to North Korea.
The Ministers discussed measures to further strengthen Alliance deterrence and response capabilities.
(1) Japan and the U.S affirmed the need to strengthen Alliance policy and operational coordination at all levels through exercise and discussion, and to foster a shared understanding of Alliance processes from peacetime through contingencies and reaffirmed their intent to upgrade respective C2 frameworks. Japan and the U.S concurred on establishing working groups and discussing counterpart relationship between JSDF Joint Operations Command (JJOC) and U.S. forces and others, recognizing as one of the principles that the existing Alliance Coordination Mechanism remains the mechanism that facilities bilateral policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the United States Armed Forces and the Self-Defense Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies.
(2) Japan and the U.S welcomed Japan’s advances in developing stand-off defense capabilities. Japan and the U.S highlighted progress on U.S.-Japan cooperation towards the effective operation of Japanese counterstrike capabilities in close coordination with the United States.
(3) Japan and the U.S reaffirmed the Alliance’s goal to increase bilateral presence in Japan’s Southwest Islands. Japan and the U.S underscored the importance of continued coordination with local communities of the region for these efforts, including support for strong relationships with them through enhanced communication about the importance of Alliance activities.
(4) To maintain and enhance Alliance readiness, which underpins the credibility of Alliance deterrence, Japan and the U.S affirmed bilateral efforts to improve and expand the scope of realistic cross-domain training and exercises.
Japan and the U.S welcomed the establishment and first meeting of Working Group for Future Fighter Training and Readiness (WG-FFTR), which will explore opportunities for future fighter pilot training and readiness.
(5) Japan and the U.S confirmed steady progress in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Cooperation. Japan and the U.S welcomed achievements of the Bilateral Information Analysis Cell (BIAC) and concurred to enhance and expand the BIAC through continued discussion on future cooperative efforts.
(6) Japan and the U.S committed to strengthening bilateral coordination on cross-domain operations, including cyber, space, electromagnetic and information warfare, recognizing the importance of all these domains to future concepts of deterrence and response capabilities.
(7) Emphasizing that cyber and information security is the foundation of the Alliance, Japan and the U.S discussed promoting cooperation to strengthen response capabilities in the cyber domain to improve the Alliance deterrence capabilities.
(8) Japan and the U.S reiterated the President and Prime Minister’s aim to maximally align our economic, technology, and related strategies to advance innovation, strengthen our industrial bases, promote resilient and reliable supply chains, and build the strategic emerging industries of the future. In this regard, Japan and the U.S welcomed the inaugural Forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustainment (DICAS) meeting. Japan and the U.S welcomed the high-priority efforts to pursue mutually beneficial co-production opportunities to expand production capacity of AMRAAM and PAC-3 MSE. The Japanese side stated that in promoting co-production, it is essential for cooperation to be mutually beneficial, including further technological disclosure from the U.S. side.
(9) Japan and the U.S reaffirmed the Japan-U.S. Alliance is at the core of both countries’ efforts to deepen and expand multilateral cooperation with countries and international organizations like Australia, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, ASEAN, Pacific Island Countries, and NATO.
The Ministers discussed U.S. Force Posture, from the perspective of mitigating the impact on local communities including Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence of the Alliance.
(1) Japan and the U.S emphasized the importance of optimizing Alliance force posture to address increasing security challenges in the region and be better postured to meet these challenges in the future. To this end, Japan and the U.S welcomed the U.S. plan to modernize its tactical aircraft laydown across Japan.
(2) To maintain deterrence and mitigate impact on local communities, Japan and the U.S reiterated their firm commitment to the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan and other existing bilateral arrangements, including construction of relocation facilities and land returns in Okinawa. Japan and the U.S underlined the importance of accelerating bilateral work toward the total return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma as early as practicable including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko. Japan and the U.S confirmed the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam beginning in 2024.
(3) The Japanese side requested the U.S. side for safe operations of the U.S. forces with utmost consideration to the impacts on local communities, appropriate responses to incidents and accidents including sharing information in a timely manner, and cooperation on environmental issues. Both sides confirmed that Japan and the U.S. will work in close cooperation. Japan and the U.S welcomed the efforts to be implemented by USFJ to prevent unacceptable incidents and behavior.
Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (Japan-U.S. “2+2”)(PDF)
[LINK] Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”)(PDF)