Press Conference by Defense Minister Kihara On Friday, April 12, 2024, at 9:19 AM

(Provisional translation by an external company for reference purpose only)

 

Q: At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting on April 10, the two leaders shared the view to expand and deepen security and defense cooperation, including strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and upgrading their command and control frameworks. Could you share your thoughts on this? In addition, the joint statement refers to the “2+2.” What kind of discussions do you hope to hold at the next “2+2” meeting? If you know around when the meeting will be held, please share that as well.

 

A: The former question was about my thoughts on the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting on the 10th. At the meeting, various efforts were discussed and included in the joint statement, such as the upgrading of their respective command and control frameworks whose importance was underscored by Prime Minister Kishida and President Biden, as well as cooperation with regional partners with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being the key pillar, including Japan-U.S.-Australia cooperation, Japan-U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) cooperation, and Japan-U.S.-UK cooperation. The two leaders also discussed new efforts, such as equipment and technology cooperation, including the establishment of the Forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS) co-led by the Japan Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the U.S. Department of Defense, which was included in the joint statement as well. The two leaders reaffirmed the urgent need to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and announced these efforts as new strategic initiatives in defense and security cooperation. At a time when the international community is at a historic turning point, I believe the efforts are very meaningful for launching a new era of Japan-U.S. strategic cooperation. The latter question was about the “2+2.” I am unable to answer about the meeting’s date at this time. Based on the instructions from the two leaders, we hope to advance discussions at all levels, which will include myself and Secretary of Defense Austin. We will endeavor to translate the discussions into concrete outcomes to fundamentally enhance Japan’s defense capabilities and strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

 

Q: I would like to ask about the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting. Cooperation on a networked air defense architecture among Japan, the U.S., and Australia was included in the joint statement. Please explain the significance of this cooperation and what it is assumed to entail.

 

A: The question was about the vision of cooperation. In recent years, along with the improvement of the capabilities of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft, the emergence of anti-ship ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, and unmanned aerial vehicles has diversified, complicated, and advanced airborne threats. In particular, in Japan’s surroundings, missile forces in the region have significantly improved in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and missile attacks against Japan have become a palpable threat. This time, at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting, the two countries shared this recognition and decided to explore air defense cooperation, including information sharing on missile defense not only between Japan and the U.S., which have been working together closely on missile defense, but also trilaterally among Japan, the U.S., and Australia. Going forward, we will be coordinating the details of the trilateral cooperation in response to the growing air threats. In this sense, the word “vision” was used in the joint statement. In any case, to ensure Japan’s air defense, we will continue to strengthen Japan’s air defense capabilities, as well as take steps to strengthen Japan-U.S. response and deterrence capabilities and enhance collaboration with like-minded countries.

 

Q: I just have one more question about the Japan-U.S. joint statement. It also states that the two countries will explore co-development and co-production of common jet trainers for next-generation fighters as part of the bilateral cooperation. However, Japan does not plan to partner with the U.S. on the next-generation fighter. Please tell us what kind of common jet trainer you have in mind. Is it correct to assume that this will be the T-4’s successor aircraft for Japan?

 

A: First of all, the co-development and co-production of common jet trainers has not been decided. That being said, the two countries concurred to explore opportunities for the co-development and co-production and thus made this announcement.

 

Q: I would like to ask about North Korea’s military reconnaissance satellite. The ROK’s Minister of National Defense has indicated that North Korea may launch another satellite as early as in the middle of this month. Please tell us what analysis MOD has made and the current state of vigilance.

 

A: I am aware of the remarks made by the Minister of National Defense of the ROK from the news reports. The Government constantly strives to collect and analyze intelligence on North Korea’s military activities with serious concern. However, you will understand that I am unable to answer about each intelligence due to the nature of the matter. That being said, North Korea has announced that it will launch three more reconnaissance satellites this year, and we believe North Korea may force through launches for the purpose of launching satellites. MOD will continue to collect and analyze necessary intelligence in close coordination with the United States, the ROK, and other countries and monitor the situation vigilantly. In addition, to be ready should satellites fall on Japanese territory, the Self-Defense Forces’ (SDF) Aegis destroyers and PAC-3 units in Okinawa Prefecture maintain the necessary posture.

 

Q: Yesterday, you announced that you instructed the cancellation of the plan to build a training ground on the site of a golf course in Ishikawa, Uruma City, Okinawa Prefecture, as well as the reconsideration of the trainings and the like involved in turning the 15th Brigade into a division. I believe MOD will be reviewing this matter in further depth. However, on the main island of Okinawa where land is already limited, I imagine it will be extremely challenging to find an area that meets the training needs and harmonizes with the surrounding residents’ daily lives. What is your opinion on this? Do you think it is possible to meet the training needs and harmonize with the surrounding residents’ daily lives on the main island?

 

A: As I stated during my press conference yesterday evening, by FY2027, we plan to reorganize the 15th Brigade of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) on the Okinawa main island into a division, and as part of this, establish a second infantry regiment on the island. The resulting increase in personnel will cause a shortage of training grounds on the Okinawa main island. Therefore, while we are cancelling the plan to build a training ground in Uruma City, efforts to meet GSDF’s additional training needs are necessary for defending the lives and properties of not only the people of Okinawa Prefecture but also of Japanese citizens. Accordingly, I have decided to reconsider the trainings involved in the conversion of the 15th Brigade into a division from a wide range of perspectives. As I only made this decision yesterday evening, I am unable to answer about its details at this time based on speculation. MOD considers it important to harmonize with the surrounding residents’ daily lives for the stable operations of SDF facilities and the smooth implementation of unit activities. As I also briefly mentioned yesterday, if you look at the bases, camps, training grounds, and exercise grounds across Japan, there are several training grounds that are located in areas with relatively large populations and are near residential and other areas. In these locations, trainings are conducted with consideration for such land characteristics so that people in the area are unaffected as much as possible. If we pay careful and sufficient consideration to the surrounding environment in reviewing the site, we believe it is not impossible to meet the training needs and harmonize with the residents’ daily lives, even on the Okinawa main island. In any case, the matter will be reconsidered through close coordination within the ministry. We will consider all options based on a thorough and detailed understanding and analysis of the local situation, including the neighboring residential environment, and arrive at an appropriate conclusion.

 

(Abridged)

 

Q: I would like to ask about the Uruma training ground. In your press conference yesterday, you explained that the plan was cancelled based on the severe opinions increasingly voiced from locals of wide-ranging backgrounds. Such severe views and opposition by the locals are reminiscent of, for example, the issue of the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Henoko. In both issues, there is strong opposition, and many people have expressed their opposition in prefectural referendums and other opportunities. While it is difficult to revise the Henoko relocation plan with the U.S. forces also being involved, it seems you have taken seriously the local opposition to the GSDF training ground and cancelled the plan. I would like to ask what you think is the difference between the two issues.

 

A: Yesterday’s press conference was about the cancellation of the plan to acquire the site of a golf course in Ishikawa, Uruma City. Other issues are separate issues. Therefore, at the press conference, I was stating my opinion on the situation in Uruma City and the reason for cancelling the plan. With regard to other matters, the respective defense bureaus in Okinawa Prefecture and the rest of Japan are addressing the various views and severe critiques we receive about MOD/SDF, and decisions will be made individually.

 

Q: I would like to ask a few questions about the jet trainers mentioned in the joint statement from the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting. Can I confirm again whether the jet trainers for co-development and co-production in the joint statement are the successor aircraft of the Air Self-Defense Force’s (ASDF) T-4 jet trainer?

 

A: We currently use the T-4 as a jet trainer and for the Blue Impulse. Some time has passed since we introduced the T-4 now in use, and from this stage we need to constantly explore the latest equipment, the successor to not only the T-4 but also other equipment. While the co-development and co-production of common jet trainers has not been decided, the T-4 situation is naturally being taken into account. Japan and the U.S. concurred to explore opportunities for co-development and co-production from a wide range of perspectives.

 

Q: Related to that, please tell us if the co-development of the successor aircraft to the ASDF’s T-4 trainer is being requested by ASDF or by the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA).

 

A: First, I would like to reiterate that the co-development and co-production of common jet trainers has not been decided yet. That being said, the fact that the joint statement included exploring opportunities for co-development and co-production means Japan concurred on this with the U.S. and made the announcement, taking into account the outcomes of MOD’s various reviews.

 

Q: Even while MOD and ASDF had not finalized their intentions for the T-4’s successor aircraft, the Japan-U.S. joint statement worded that the two countries will explore co-development. Was this done out of consideration to the U.S. in one way or another?

 

A: Since it was a joint statement, items on which the two countries reached a shared view were actively included in the statement. Earlier, there was also a question on air defense among Japan, the U.S., and Australia. It was decided that its details will be coordinated, and the word “vision” was used. Items on which Japan and the U.S. reached a shared view may be included in the joint statement with forward-looking prospects, even if they have not been decided.

 

Q: I would like to ask one last question. You routinely emphasize reinforcing the defense production base. I would assume then that Japan would first explore the production of an entirely indigenous successor aircraft to the T-4. What is your opinion?

 

A: As is the case for this next-generation fighter, jets and fighter aircraft in particular are becoming extremely sophisticated and costly. Therefore, their international joint development is becoming mainstream to share the risks and costs. Even in the case of co-development with the U.S. or co-development with another country, Japan can still act as an integrator. For example, Japan can take the lead in incorporating freedom of modification or the aircraft’s performance requirements, and international joint development can be pursued within such a scope. As a matter of course, I believe that the pursuit of international joint development which incorporates Japanese technology or what Japan seeks will contribute to its defense production and technological base.