

Fundamental Reinforcement of Japan's Defense Capabilities : Why Now?

To defend the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals in the midst of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII

Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces

National Security Strategy of Japan, National Defense
Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program

<https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/index.html>

National Defense Strategy Ministry of Defense



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In order to fully defend the lives and livelihoods of Japanese nationals, we must first and foremost prioritize diplomatic efforts to create an international environment that is desirable for Japan.

While continuing to place emphasis on the universal values and principles of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, it is essential to engage in active diplomacy that promotes multilateral cooperation and has the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone.

At the same time, we need defense capabilities that will underpin diplomacy.

As I vowed to do here last year, we have formulated the National Security Strategy of Japan, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program.

In the face of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II, we ran extremely realistic simulations to determine if we would be able to fully defend the lives of Japanese nationals.

Based on the simulations, we have compiled a list of the necessary defense capabilities.

Examples include having counterstrike capabilities, reinforcing our defense architecture for the southwest part of the country, responses to new domains such as space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum, and enhancing war sustainability. They are all matters of urgency.

Over the next five years, we will urgently reinforce our defense capabilities and further increase Japan's deterrence and response capabilities.

Address by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio
at the Graduation Ceremony of the National Defense Academy (excerpt)

Fundamental Reinforcement of
Defense Capabilities
Why Now?

To prevent war

Preventing war through diplomacy with other countries is of utmost importance. In some cases, however, war may occur even if all diplomatic efforts have been exhausted.

Militarily, Ukraine was perceived by Russia as lacking sufficient capabilities to defend itself and was unable to deter Russia from launching an aggression.

In order to prevent war, Japan must have capabilities to reliably defend itself and make other countries realize that goal of attacking Japan is not achievable.

Japan

The police deals with criminal acts.
Criminal acts are punished based on domestic law.

International community

There exists no organization with coercive enforcement powers, such as police or domestic courts.
Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, launched an aggression against Ukraine.



As a result of not being able to deter Russia, tens of thousands of people have been killed or injured



Residential complex in Dnipro destroyed by a Russian military missile attack (January 2023) [Dnipropetrovsk Main Directorate, State Emergency Service of Ukraine]




Mykolaiv Regional State Administration building destroyed by a Russian military missile attack (April 2022) [Mykolaiv Main Directorate, State Emergency Service of Ukraine]

As the international community faces its greatest challenge since the end of World War II...

The security environment around Japan is particularly severe, even compared to other parts of the world. What is occurring in Europe can also occur in the region.

In order to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force, Japan must pinpoint the capabilities of opponents and possess defense capabilities that can deal with new ways of warfare



Situated on the frontline of military strengthening and intensification of military activities

Faces issues concerning the East and South China Seas


02 Underlying Circumstances for Fundamentally Reinforcing Defense Capabilities

Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II.

China, North Korea, and Russia are **enhancing their military capabilities and stepping up military activities**. Japan is **situated on the frontline** of these developments.

We need to take a close look at how the intensification of military activities in the Indo-Pacific will affect the region and the international community as a whole. The way Japan's security and defense policies shape out will have **direct link to regional and international peace and stability**.


Russia




Improved Kilo-class submarine
Deployed since 2021, equipped with Kalibr cruise missile

Surface-to-ship missile Bastion
Deployed since 2016, deployed to Etorofu Island, Chishima Islands, and Southern Sakhalin


New models of equipment deployed in the Far East, including the Northern Territories [Ministry of Defence of Russia]




New ICBM-class ballistic missile Hwasong-17 launched by North Korea (November 2022) [Korean Central News Agency]



North Korea




Joint navigation by Chinese and Russian vessels (October 2021)




Number of ballistic missiles, etc. launched by North Korea

The number of missile launches



Missile launches, including practical training launches, have surged under the Kim Jong-Un regime


Number of scrambles



The number in the FY2010s quadrupled compared to the FY2000s

China


Issues concerning the Senkaku Islands
Continued persistent attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force



PLA's Jiangwei II-class frigate operating around the Senkaku Islands

Taiwan

Issues concerning the South China Sea
Unilateral changes to the status quo by force and creation of a fait accompli




Of the nine ballistic missiles that China fired near Taiwan, five made impact within Japan's EEZ (August 2022)


Comparison of Japan and China

China surpasses Japan in number of modern vessels and fighter aircraft as well as defense spending.

China's disclosed defense spending and Japan's defense-related spending in FY2023




Modern submarines




※ Total number of Jin-class, Shang-class, Song-class, Yuan-class and Kilo-class submarines

Modern destroyers and frigates



※1 Total number of Renhai-class, Luhai-class, Sovremenny-class, Luyang-class and Luzhou-class destroyers, and Jiangwei-class and Jiangkai-class frigates
※2 Additionally, China also has 72 Jiangdao-class corvettes (2022).

Fourth- and fifth-generation fighters



The respective year's figures are based on *Military Balance*, *Jane's Fighting Ships*, and other sources.

03 Challenges of Adapting to New Ways of Warfare

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine combines different ways of warfare. They include traditional weapons, such as fighter aircraft, vessels, and tanks; **large-scale missile attacks**; **asymmetric attacks using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other means**; and **information warfare**.

Emerging new ways of warfare

Large-scale missile attacks using ballistic and cruise missiles



Russia used **over 5,000*** ballistic and cruise missiles against all of Ukraine
*As of Feb. 23, 2023



Residential complex in Zaporizhzhia destroyed by a Russian military missile attack (March 2023) [State Emergency Service of Ukraine]

Asymmetric attacks using space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains, UAVs, and other means



Threats to the stable use of outer space



The Russian military’s Iranian-made UAV origin that was shot down according to the Government of Ukraine (October 2022)[Office of the President of Ukraine]

Hybrid warfare and information warfare



Caption of a video posted by President Zelensky, taken in front of the presidential office, to dispel the disinformation that he had left Ukraine (February 2022) [President Zelensky’s Facebook]



Image released by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense to deny the disinformation that Taoyuan International Airport had been attacked by the Chinese PLA (August 2022) [Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan]

Whether or not we can adapt to such new ways of warfare poses a major challenge for defending Japan.

Challenges

To **intercept incoming missiles** and prevent them from making impact in Japan.

To constrain the opponent from launching missiles and **make it difficult to carry out missile attacks**.

To engage in warfare tenaciously even if missiles hit facilities, runways, etc., such as by **minimizing damage and quickly restoring them**.

To urgently enhance Japan’s **response capabilities, such as detecting and protecting** against attacks in the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic.

To introduce a **range of unmanned equipment** that can be operated on land, in the sea, and in airspace and have **capabilities to deal with opponents’ UAVs**.

To **quickly detect** suspicious signs and **share that information as real-time as possible**.

To **send Self-Defense Forces units** to locations which an adversary is expected to attack **beforehand**. To have **transportation capability to immediately evacuate citizens from dangerous areas**.

To **respond to information warfare**, such as the spread of dissemination of disinformation, and avoid confusion and turmoil.

04 Japan's Basic Security and Defense Policies

On December 16, 2022, Japan finalized three documents, the National Security Strategy of Japan, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program.

National Security Strategy of Japan

The supreme national security document which represents Japan's strategic guidelines for policy in areas related to Japan's national security strategy, including diplomacy, defense, economic security, technology, cyber, and intelligence.

National Defense Strategy

Strategic guidelines for defense that present defense objectives and the approaches/means for achieving them

Three defense objectives

(1) Shape a security environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force

(2) Deter and respond to unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts, in cooperation with Japan's ally, like-minded countries, and others

(3) Take primary responsibility for dealing with invasions of Japan should they occur, and disrupt and defeat them with the support of Japan's ally and others



Prime Minister Kishida attending the G7 Summit (Mar. 2022)



Joint exercise with U.S. Air Force strategic bombers and other aircraft (Sep. 2021)



Training for amphibious and other operations (Oct. to Nov. 2020)

Three approaches

» Approach (1)

Strengthening Japan's defense architecture

- Fundamentally reinforcing Japan's defense capabilities
- Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country

» Approach (2)

Strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

» Approach (3)

Strengthening collaboration with like-minded countries and others

Japan must resolutely defend the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese citizens as well as Japan's territorial land, waters, and airspace.

By fundamentally reinforcing our defense capabilities targeted at the

Defense Buildup Program

A medium- to long-term buildup plan, including the organization of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in the next decade and the five-year total expenditures and procurement quantities of key equipment

Main points of the SDF organizational strengthening

Joint operational architecture	Reorganize the existing structure and establish a permanent Joint Headquarters Consider defense equipment systems that contribute to joint operations
Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)	Reinforce the land defense posture, focusing on the southwestern area Reinforce stand-off defense capabilities to deal with opposing forces from a distance
Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)	Possess surface units capable of responding quickly and continuously to an increasing number of duties Strengthen air defense capabilities, including against ballistic missiles
Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)	Strengthen air defense forces, e.g., having sophisticated and enhanced fighter aircraft units Strengthen space domain functions and rename the "Air Self-Defense Force" to "Air and Space Self-Defense Force"

Total expenditure

Annual expenditure necessary over five years to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities from FY2023 to FY2027

Approx. 43 trillion yen


capabilities of opponents and new ways of warfare, Japan will make opponents realize that we have the intention and sufficient capability to resolutely defend our nation, which will discourage opponents from launching an aggression against Japan.

Japan will fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities across the following seven key pillars, which constitute the functions and capabilities required for the defense of Japan.

Stand-off Defense Capabilities

01

Reinforce capabilities to deal with opposing forces from a safe distance beyond the reach of their attacks



Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities

02

Reinforce capabilities for responding to increasingly diverse and complex air threats, such as missiles



Unmanned Defense Capabilities

03


Reinforce capabilities for using unmanned equipment to gather information and provide combat support, among other purposes



Cross Domain Operational Capabilities

04

Reinforce space, cyber, electromagnetic, land, sea, and air capabilities, which are required for operations that integrate capabilities across all domains.



Priorities for the next five years

- Accelerate investment in improving mobility, securing ammunition and fuel, and improving the resiliency of key defense facilities **to maximize the use of existing equipment.**
- **Strengthen future core capabilities**, such as stand-off and unmanned defense capabilities.

Command and Control / Intelligence-related Functions

05


Reinforce command and control and intelligence-related functions for quick and accurate decision-making



Mobile Deployment Capabilities / Civil Protection

06

Reinforce maritime and air transport capabilities to swiftly maneuver and deploy necessary forces. Utilize these capabilities for civil protection.



Sustainability and Resiliency

07

Swiftly stock up on sufficient and necessary ammunition, guided missiles, and fuel. Secure expenditures for acquiring **equipment parts, equipment** repairing and improving the resiliency of facilities.



» Counterstrike capabilities: Key to deterring invasion against Japan

The military developments in Japan's surroundings have made missile attacks against Japan a palpable threat. Under these circumstances, **strengthening missile defense capabilities alone is becoming insufficient for fully dealing with the threat.**

For this reason, Japan needs counterstrike capabilities: capabilities which enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent to **prevent further attacks, while defending against incoming missiles by means of missile defense.**

Counterstrike capabilities will complicate the calculations of an adversary who would attempt a missile attack or other types of aggression against Japan, **prompt them to thinking that attacking Japan will not be easy and should be avoided.**

06 Examples of Equipment and Other Assets to be Procured in the Next Five Years (conceptual image)

Stand-off Defense Capabilities 5 trillion yen

01

Development of upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship missile

Acquisition of Tomahawk missile

Development of hypersonic guided missile

Development of Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile

Introduction of JASSM

Introduction of JSM

Diversification of platforms

Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities 3 trillion yen

02

Replacement and deployment of radars (FPS-7)

(FPS-5)

Shipbuilding of Aegis system equipped vessel

Acquisition of interceptor missiles with upgraded capability (PAC-3 MSE)

Development of upgraded Type 03 medium-range surface-to-air guided missile (modified conceptual image)

Acquisition of interceptor missiles for ballistic missile defense (SM-3 Block IIA)

Acquisition of long-range ship-to-air missiles (SM-6)

Unmanned Defense Capabilities 1 trillion yen

03

Deployment of medium-altitude reconnaissance UAV (conceptual image)

Deployment of Utility /Attack UAV (conceptual image)

Utilization of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft (Global Hawk)

Deployment of unmanned underwater vehicle for mine search (OZZ-5)

Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities 8 trillion yen

04

Space domain

Electromagnetic domain

Cyber domain

Land, sea, and air domains

Development of SDA satellites (conceptual image)

Acquisition of vehicle-mounted laser equipment (conceptual image)

Development of stand-off electronic warfare aircraft (conceptual image)

Acquisition of network electronic warfare system

Strengthening of cyber personnel training and research base

Acquisition of Armored Modular Vehicle

Acquisition of upgraded patrol helicopter (SH-60K)

Construction of escort ship (FFM)

Acquisition of fighter aircraft (F-35)

Command and Control / Intelligence-related Functions 1 trillion yen

05

Analyze images with AI technology.

Utilization of images using AI technology (conceptual image)

Acquisition of signals intelligence aircraft (RC-2)

Mobile Deployment Capabilities / Civil Protection 2 trillion yen

06

Acquisition of utility helicopter (UH-2)

Acquisition of transport vessel (conceptual image)

Acquisition of transport aircraft (C-2)

Acquisition of aerial refueling and transport aircraft

Sustainability and Resiliency 15 trillion yen

07

Approx. 40% Shortage

Approx. 60% Sufficiency

Built in 1966

Built in 1942

Sufficiency rate for BMD missiles

*Percentages based on certain preliminary estimates.

JGSDF Camp Higashichitose

JGSDF Camp Kurihama

Renewal of aging facilities and improvement of protective measures

Operational

Under maintenance

Non-operational

Classification of equipment availability

Elimination of non-operational equipment (aircraft from which parts were removed for cannibalization maintenance)

F-2 fighter with parts removed

P-1 engine with parts removed

07 Reinforcement of the Defense Architecture of the Whole Country

Indivisible initiatives that complement the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities

We need a strong SDF to defend Japan. However, at the same time, defense of Japan requires a **whole-of-country approach**.

Enhancement of the comprehensive defense architecture that draws upon Japan's national power

Japan will take the necessary measures to ensure that the combined budget allocation FY2027 budget level for both the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and complementary initiatives (initiatives for reinforcing the comprehensive defense architecture, such as maritime law enforcement capabilities, peacekeeping operations, research and development (R&D), and public infrastructure development) reaches 2% of the current GDP.

R&D

To promote R&D in science and technology that contributes to the enhancement of the comprehensive defense architecture, a whole-of-government mechanism will be established to **match R&D based on the views of the Ministry of Defense, with the appropriate technological seeds possessed by relevant ministries and agencies**.

Public infrastructure

Japan will **establish a cross-governmental mechanism to develop and enhance the functions of public infrastructure, such as airports and seaports, based on the needs of the SDF and the Japan Coast Guard**. The mechanism will facilitate their smooth utilization and deployment onto such infrastructure for purposes such as civil protection, peacetime training, and contingency response. **Rules will also be established for ordinary utilization of airports and seaports** with a view to responding to contingencies.

These efforts will be promoted in cooperation with local governments, residents, and others.

Cybersecurity

Japan is taking further steps to develop our information gathering and analysis capabilities in the field of cybersecurity and establishing systems to implement **active cyber defense**.

International cooperation

Japan will establish a new cooperation framework for the benefit of the armed forces, which will provide equipment and supplies as well as infrastructure development assistance to like-minded countries for **strengthening their security capacities and improving their deterrence capabilities**.

In addition to fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities, Japan will build an overall national defense architecture by integrating Japan's national power and systematically combining all policy means.

Promotion of cooperation between the national government and local governments/private entities

The whole Government, along with our ally, like-minded countries, and others, will improve and reinforce the **Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) and strategic communication, which are adopted according to situation** to continue to demonstrate Japan's intention and capability.

The Government as a whole will continue to **strengthen its response capabilities to integrated information Warfare** with special regard to cognitive dimension. **Establish collaborative process between SDF and the police/Japan Coast Guard (JCG)** with a view to responding to contingencies.



Strengthened collaboration between the SDF and the police/JCG

Work closely with the relevant ministries and agencies to facilitate the **use of the sea and airspace** by SDF as well as the **transportation and storage of ammunition and fuel**

Strengthen whole-of-government civil protection training, etc.

Enhance cooperation and collaboration with local governments and residents



Emblem symbolizing cooperation between the MOD and regional society

» Diplomatic efforts underpinned by Japan's enhanced defense architecture

Diplomatic efforts underpinned by Japan's enhanced defense architecture are important for not tolerating unilateral changes to the status quo by force.

Japan will cooperate and coordinate on security issues with our ally, like-minded countries, and others, as well as promote efforts to achieve the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). In addition, Japan will work to proactively create a peaceful, stable, and predictable international environment and prevent unilateral changes to the status quo by force.

Through these efforts, Japan will ensure our peace and security and the peace, stability, and prosperity of the region and the international community.

08 Cooperation and Collaboration with Japan's Ally, Like-minded Countries, and Others

No single country alone can defend its security in the current international society.

Cooperation with our ally **Strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance**

Continuously deepening Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Alliance plays a significant role in peace, stability, and prosperity in not only Japan but also the Indo-Pacific region and the international community. Japan will continue to further cooperate with the United States.

Strengthening Japan-U.S. joint deterrence and response capabilities

To prevent attacks against Japan and, furthermore, to disrupt attacks in the event that Japan is attacked, we will cooperate with the United States in various fields and enhance our capabilities through bilateral/multilateral exercises and other means.

Reinforcing Japan-U.S. coordination functions

Japan and the United States will further work for smooth coordination to ensure integrated response to any situation at any time.

Reinforcing joint response infrastructure

Japan and the United States will share all levels of information and conduct joint activities, such as research and development of equipment.

Measures to support the stationing of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ)

Japan will implement support measures for the stable stationing of the USFJ, which constitutes the core element of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. In particular, Japan will work to mitigate the impact of the USFJ on Okinawa, located in an area critically important for the security of Japan, including relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, while fully addressing the severe security environment.



Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (January 2023)

Landing and takeoff trial of the U.S. Marine Corps' F-35B aboard the MSDF's JS Izumo destroyer (October 2021)

The defense of Japan will be ensured by strengthening cooperation with the United States, our ally, and collaboration with like-minded countries and others that share our values and interests.

Collaboration with like-minded countries and others **Strengthening collaboration with like-minded countries and others**

Efforts to contribute to realizing the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)

FOIP envisions maintaining and strengthening a free and open international order based on the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific in order to ensure peace and prosperity across the entire region and the world.

Under this vision, Japan will proactively promote multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges, taking into account the characteristics of the respective areas as well as the situation of each country.

Australia

Japan and Australia, as "Special Strategic Partners," will build the closest defense cooperative relationship second only to the Japan-U.S. relationship.

India


Japan and India, as "Special Strategic and Global Partners," will carry out exchanges in a broad range of fields, including maritime security.

United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and others

Japan will cooperate with each country on global and the respective regional issues.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) / European Union (EU)

Japan will reinforce collaboration regarding international rulemaking and security of the Indo-Pacific.



*Map, etc. are a conceptual image.

Republic of Korea (ROK)

Japan will enhance coordination among Japan and the ROK collaboration in view of dealing with North Korea.

Canada and New Zealand

Japan will reinforce collaboration to address challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.

Southeast Asian countries and others

Japan will promote measures according to the situation of each country, such as consultations at various levels, bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, and transfer of defense equipment.

In addition to the above, Japan will strengthen collaboration with **Nordic-Baltic states, Central and Eastern European countries, Mongolia, Central Asian countries, Pacific Island countries, coastal states of the Indian Ocean, Middle Eastern countries, African countries, and others.**

09 Defense Production and Technology Bases

Defense production and technology bases are in and of themselves integral parts of defense capability

Rapid advances in science and technology are **fundamentally changing the nature of national security**. Against this backdrop, countries are working to stem technology outflow.

Defense production and technology bases are in and of themselves integral parts of defense capability. To ensure a stable procurement of equipment, Japan must ensure that such bases remain in Japan and are reinforced domestically.



Reinforcing the defense production base

Building a strong and sustainable defense industry

Challenge The defense business is not very profitable, according to some companies. However, the **defense production base will be lost** if companies continue to withdraw and if new investments or new entrants cannot be expected.

- Measures**
- Adopt equipment acquisition methods that further emphasize the importance of maintaining and strengthening domestic bases.
 - Establish a system that enables companies to secure appropriate profits through their efforts.
 - Create a certification system and implement fiscal measures and financial support for ensuring stable production of equipment, etc.

Dealing with a variety of risks

Challenge The defense industry is **exposed to various risks**, such as theft of important data through cyberattack.



- Measures**
- Support cybersecurity measures taken by companies.
 - Strengthen collaboration with Japan's ally and others to build relationships that complement each other's supply chains.

Promoting transfer of defense equipment and technology

Challenge Transferring equipment overseas is a key policy instrument to create a desirable security environment for Japan, and is effective in ensuring the growth of the defense industry through the expansion of defense equipment market. Nevertheless, **there has only been one case of transfer of finished products** from Japan.

- Measures**
- Facilitate transfers by establishing a new fund and providing corporate assistance as necessary. Alleviate excessive burden on companies.
 - The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and other systems are to be considered for revisions.

Reinforcing the defense technology base

Research and development that lead to fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities at an early stage



Challenge **Advanced civilian technologies have the potential to change drastically the nature of future warfare**. To keep pace with these changes, Japan needs to **seamlessly launch research and development to operationalize deployment, and to acquire defense equipments earlier**.

- Measures**
- **Intensive** investment in equipment/technology that are directly linked to future battles.
 - Shorten research and development periods to realize early deployment.
 - Strategic dissemination to increase company's predictability.

Proactively utilizing civilian advanced technologies

Challenge Japan needs to **incorporate a wide range of advanced commercial/basic technologies for securing technological superiority in the future and acquiring cutting-edge capabilities earlier than other countries**.


- Measures**
- Promote the finding, developing, and incorporating the innovative commercial/basic technology.
 - Establish a new research institution to conduct R&D that realize innovative equipment and technology.
 - Collaboration with relevant Ministries and make proactive use of R&D funds and outputs.

*Submitted during the ordinary Diet session in 2023

Bill on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology bases

I. Clarification of the position of the defense industry

- ▶ Clarify the increasing importance of maintaining and strengthening the bases for developing and producing equipment, etc.
- ▶ The Minister of Defense will establish and release the basic policy regarding the strengthening of the bases.



- ▶ The Government will conduct surveys to directly grasp supply chain risks
- ▶ Companies have an obligation to make efforts to respond to the survey
→ The Government will take stock of the survey results to strengthen the bases


II. Supply chain surveys

III. Measures to reinforce the bases

- ▶ For the efforts of companies that contribute to strengthening the bases, the Government will directly pay the expenditures (to suppliers as well) with the authorization of the Minister of Defense.
→ Address supply chain risks and promote the strengthening of bases



- (1) Response to supply chain risks
- (2) Improving manufacturing process efficiency
- (3) Cybersecurity enhancement
- (4) Support for business succession




- ▶ Necessary expenses may be granted when modifying such as specifications and performance of equipment to be transferred as required by the Government of Japan for such transfer.

IV. Measures to facilitate equipment and technology transfers

V. Lending of funds

- ▶ The Japan Finance Corporation may give considerations for lending funds necessary for the manufacturing of equipment, etc.





- ▶ In cases where stable manufacturing of defense equipment is difficult even with the above measures, the Ministry of Defense itself will own the manufacturing facilities and outsource the management and operation to companies.
→ Ensure manufacturing and proper procurement of equipment, etc.

VI. Government ownership of manufacturing facilities

VII. Security measures in defense equipment contracts

- ▶ Legal security obligation in addition to security obligation based on contract, which will further strengthen the security of sensitive information on defense equipment and technologies.



Certification of suppliers' efforts, payment of expenses, etc.

Potential supply chain risks, etc.

A vast no. of companies comprise the supply chain

Ripple effects on supporting industries

Specialized & advanced skills/equipment

10 Human Resource Base and Medical Function

Reinforcing the human resource base: SDF personnel demonstrate our defense capabilities

No matter how much advanced equipment we procure, our defense capabilities cannot be brought to bear without personnel to operate them. Japan will promote efforts to strengthen our defense capabilities **from a human resource dimension**.

Enhance Recruitment Efforts

Challenge

In order to secure excellent human resources in the severe recruiting environment with a declining number of people eligible for recruitment due to a declining birthrate, it is necessary to strengthen our recruitment efforts, and to secure the necessary number of high-quality human resources from a wide range of sources, including the private sector.

Measures

- Promote recruiting measures such as digitalization of recruitment PR, and strengthen the functions of Provincial Cooperation Offices.
- Review the SDF scholarship student system which covers undergraduate/graduate students in science and engineering who choose to work for the SDF.
- Establish a new SDF personnel system in order to incorporate human resources with specialized knowledge and skills who are expected to be active in fields such as cyber domain.



Online information session for people eligible recruitment

Utilization of SDF Reserve Personnel and Others

Challenge

In order to effectively supplement regular SDF personnel, it is necessary not only to improve the sufficiency rate but also **to review and reinforce the system of SDF Reserve Personnel and Others..**

Measures

- Review the current system, such as expanding the recruitment for civilians with no experience in the SDF, easing the age limits, and imposing appropriate training periods in order for the personnel to combine their main business and training.



Disaster relief operations by SDF Reserve Personnel and Others (Great East Japan Earthquake)

Improving the living/working environment and treatment

Challenge

It is necessary to create an **environment where all SDF personnel can demonstrate their abilities while maintaining high morale and pride**

Measures

- Develop an organizational environment with zero tolerance for harassment.
- Take measures against the aging of barracks and housing, and secure the required number of living and working equipment, daily consumables, and other supplies.
- Properly treat personnel, taking into account the special nature of SDF personnel's missions and working environment



Before renovation



Renovation of housing



After renovation



Effective use of human resources

Challenge

To make effective use of human resources to improve organizational performance, it is necessary to **promote the active participation of female SDF personnel**, make **effective use of skilled expertise**, and **curb mid-career retirements**.

Measures

- Create an environment which promotes the active participation of female personnel
- Raise the retirement age to leverage personnel with abundant knowledge, skills, and experience.
- Consider effective measures to curb mid-career retirements.



Active participation of female personnel



Childcare facility (at JGSDF Camp Kumamoto)

Human resource development

Challenge

Reinforce educational infrastructure to be able to address security challenges.

Measures

- Strengthen the education on joint operations -in the educational institutions, such as Joint Staff College and the staff college of each service.
- Strengthen the education and research content for cyber domain and others at each SDF services, the National Defense Academy, and National Institute for Defense Studies.
- Transform the Japan Self-Defense Force High Technical School into a combined school of each service, as well as a coeducational school by accepting female students to secure skilled human resources at an early stage etc.



Systems and Cyber Specialization Course at JGSDF High Technical School

Enhancement of Re-employment Support

Challenge

For the SDF personnel who retire at a younger age than general public officials, it is important to **improve and strengthen reemployment support** to recruit high-quality human resources and ensure that they can work without any concerns while they are in service.

Measures

- **Strengthen** the career guidance and job training opportunities for SDF personnel scheduled for retirement to realize their re-employment with good wages.
- To enhance reemployment support measures and to help the companies accept the retired SDF personnel smoothly, strengthen cooperation with local governments, relevant organizations, the private companies and others.



Company information session for SDF personnel scheduled for retirement

The award of honors for more SDF personnel

Challenge

To boost the morale of SDF personnel, it is necessary **to promote measures concerning honors and privilege** for those well-deserved for achievement through many years of diligent services for their duties as the personnel.

Measures

- Confer decorations befitting the achievements of the personnel



Decoration ceremony awarded by Minister of Defense

Transformation of the medical function: Protecting lives of SDF personnel

Personnel injured in combat must be promptly provided medical aid and care for the SDF to continue their activities in difficult situations. MOD/SDF will strengthen measures to protect the lives of SDF personnel in combat.

Challenge

Personnel injured in combat must be promptly provided medical aid and care in order for the SDF to continue their activities in difficult situations.

Measures

- To save the lives of personnel who carry out missions in a contingency in spite of danger, **establish a seamless posture for medical care and evacuation** from the front line to the destination hospital.
- Enhance National Defense Medical College's education and research on combat trauma care.



Training for aircraft (rotary wing) transportation of patients

11 Necessary Expenditures in the Next Five Years

Field		Previous (FY2019–2023)	Latest (FY2023–2027)
Stand-off Defense Capabilities		0.2 trillion yen	5 trillion yen
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities		1 trillion yen	3 trillion yen
Unmanned Defense Capabilities		0.1 trillion yen	1 trillion yen
Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities (equipment in Space, Cyber, Ground/Maritime/Air Domains, etc.)		3 trillion yen	8 trillion yen
Command and Control / Intelligence-related Functions		0.3 trillion yen	1 trillion yen
Mobile Deployment Capabilities / Civil Protection		0.3 trillion yen	2 trillion yen
Sustainability and Resiliency	Ammunitions and Missiles	1 trillion yen	2 trillion yen
	Equipment Repair, etc.	4 trillion yen	9 trillion yen
	Improving the Resiliency of Facilities	1 trillion yen	4 trillion yen
Reinforcing Defense Production Bases		1 trillion yen	0.4 trillion yen
Research and Development			1 trillion yen
Other		4.4 trillion yen	6.6 trillion yen

Planned amount for FY2019–2023
17.2 trillion yen (contract-based)



Necessary expenditures in the next five years
43.5 trillion yen (contract-based)

Expenditure Needs

The **performance** of other countries' missile radars is **improving** → Reinforce capabilities to **deal with opposing forces from a safe distance beyond the reach of their attacks**

Increasingly diverse and complex air threats, e.g., missiles flying at extremely high speeds (hypersonic), at low altitudes, and on irregular trajectories → Reinforce interception capabilities against air threats

Adapt to the new nature of warfare that makes use of **unmanned equipment**

Strengthen the information gathering functions for missiles and other assets through the use of satellites
 Strengthen the organization to deal with **increasingly advanced and sophisticated cyberattacks**
 To **respond to the rapid buildup of military capabilities of surrounding countries and others**, need to improve the capabilities of various equipment and acquire them more rapidly.
Gather information on the intensifying military activities of other countries seamlessly, constantly, and continuously.
Strengthen intelligence functions to win information warfare, as seen in the aggression against Ukraine.

Strengthen maritime and air transport capabilities to enable **swift deployment of forces to island areas** and other locations → Take steps such as **acquiring transport vessels**

Eliminate the shortage of ammunition and missiles to deter an invasion of Japan in a contingency → **Replete**








Equipment cannot be available due to a **shortage of parts, etc.** → Securing adequate maintenance budget to **avoid situations where equipment cannot be available due to a shortage of parts, etc.**

20% of all SDF facilities have taken protective measures against attacks and **60%** have taken measures against earthquakes.
 ↓
100% of SDF facilities will have taken protective and earthquake measures by a decade from now.

The defense industry is in and of itself an integral defense capability. Need to **appropriately address a range of challenges**, such as business withdrawals, discontinuation of raw material supply from overseas, and cyberattacks on companies.

If R&D for future equipment falls behind, a **recovery will be difficult** to achieve amid rapid advances in science and technology. → **Enhance investment in advanced technologies** required for future ways of warfare

Secure necessary budgets for the education and training of personnel, equipment fuel, etc.

Fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities

12 Organization of the SDF Services a Decade from Now


The joint operation and SDF service structure will be strengthened by enhancing capabilities in seven focal areas.

Joint operation structure

- Establish a **permanent Joint Headquarters** to reinforce joint operations
- Expand the **SDF Cyber Defense Command** and enhance cyber defense capabilities (Increase the number of personnel belonging to MOD/SDF cyber specialization units from approx. 890 to approx. 4,000 by the end of FY2027)
- Create a maritime transport unit to strengthen the **integrated transport architecture** of the SDF


Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

- Build up forces in charge of **defense in the southwestern region** (the 15th Brigade will be reorganized into a division)
- Deploy **stand-off missile units** for launching missiles from ground to disrupt and defeat the invading opponent from a distance
- Build up units to **disrupt and defeat invasion by the opponent's vessels** (establish 2 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments [deployment location undecided])
- Establish units to **defeat the opponent's landing forces** (establish 2 hyper velocity gliding projectile battalions for defense of remote islands and 2 long-range guided missile units [deployment location undecided])
- Change the number of active-duty SDF personnel to **transfer personnel to cyber and other units** (approx. 151,000 ⇒ approx. 149,000)



Key units to be deployed

GSDF	MSDF	ASDF
1 surface-to-ship guided missile regiment 2 hyper velocity gliding projectile battalions for defense of remote islands 2 long-range guided missile units 1 anti-aircraft artillery group 1 anti-aircraft electronic warfare unit 1 multi-purpose unmanned aerial vehicle unit 1 information warfare unit	Some surface vessel unit commands and divisions Unmanned vehicle unit MSDF Information warfare unit	1 fighter unit squadron Space domain mission unit Operational intelligence unit



Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)

- Establish an **MSDF information warfare major unit** to reinforce integrated information warfare capabilities
- In addition to ballistic missiles, procure two more **Aegis equipped destroyers**, which excel in countering air attacks (10 destroyers)
- Procure two **Aegis system equipped vessels** mainly for ballistic missile defense (2 vessels)

Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)

- To strengthen space operations capabilities, establish a **specialized space domain missions unit** commanded by a general or a lieutenant general (deployment location undecided), and rename the "Air Self-Defense Force" to "**Air and Space Self-Defense Force**"
- Increase the number of **fighter aircraft** (approx. 290 ⇒ approx. 320) to boost air defense capabilities quantitatively (consider replacement with UAVs)
- To tenaciously continue combat, build a system for mobile and dispersed operations



13 Q&A on Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities

Q1. Shouldn't Japan make diplomatic efforts before fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities?

Answer. The need for diplomatic efforts goes without saying. At the same time, however, Japan is in a situation in which we must make serious efforts to fundamentally reinforce our defense capabilities.

The National Security Strategy of Japan lists "carrying out vigorous diplomacy" as the first strategic approach. Defense capabilities are the ultimate guarantee of national security. Demonstrating that we can fully defend the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals will also enhance credibility of our diplomacy.

Q2. Will Japan not trigger an arms race among its surrounding countries?

Answer. Fundamental reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities is necessary to protect the lives and peaceful livelihoods of our nationals.

Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II. Under these circumstances, we must fundamentally reinforce our defense capabilities to deal with the situation and have listed up the defense capabilities necessary to protect our nationals.

To prevent an arms race, we will clarify our specific defense policy intentions to other countries and take other proactive measures to ensure transparency of our national security policy.

Q3. Having counterstrike capabilities would not violate the Constitution?

Answer. Counterstrike capabilities are exercised as a minimum necessary measure for self-defense against attacks on Japan by ballistic missiles or other means. The capabilities fall within the purview of the Constitution and international law and adhere to Japan's exclusively defense-oriented policy.

On February 29, 1956, the Government of Japan expressed the view that, under the Constitution, "as long as it is deemed that there are no other means to defend against attack by guided missiles and others, to hit the bases of those guided missiles and others is legally within the purview of self-defense and thus permissible." However, the Government has chosen not to acquire counterstrike capabilities until now as a matter of policy.

Ever since this view was presented, counterstrike capabilities have consistently been regarded as falling within the purview of the Constitution.

Q4. Will the deployment of additional personnel or enhanced capabilities to a region make it a target for attack?

Answer. The fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities will strengthen Japan's defense posture and contribute to ensuring security in all areas of Japan, including that region.

The objective is to strengthen our deterrence capability to discourage military attacks against Japan.

In the extreme situation where an attack against Japan is anticipated, we will take all possible safety measures, including evacuating residents. It is essential that defense capabilities are exercised in coordination with activities to protect our nationals.

Q5. Are the measures bearing China, North Korea, and Russia in mind?

Answer. Our measures do not deem any specific country or region as a threat and are not being implemented for the purpose of militarily countering them.

It is important to have deterrence capability which will make states realize that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are difficult to achieve. For this reason, Japan is reinforcing its defense capabilities to demonstrate our intention and ability to defend our nation.

Q6. How much must be budgeted for the five-year period from FY2023 to FY2027?

Answer. The total amount of payment made between FY2023 and FY2027, including expenses such as salaries and food costs of SDF personnel (personnel and provisions expenses), is approx. 43 trillion yen (expenditure-based) **A**. The total amount of allocated costs (program expenses) for the contracts awarded between FY2023 and FY2027 is approx. 43.5 trillion yen (contract-based) **B**.

