

英文要旨／Abstracts**The Evaluation of Decision to Wage War Against the United States:
A View Point from the Prospect Theory**

KOBAYASHI Tomonori

Why did Japan decide to wage war against the United States in 1941—a decision that is often regarded as utterly insane considering the extreme disparity in national power between the two countries. This paper applies Prospect Theory to evaluate this decision, which would be impossible if Japan were assumed to be a rational decision-making entity.

Specifically, focusing on the Imperial Army as the decision-making body and examining the first stage of Prospect Theory from the perspective of desires and emotions, it becomes clear that the Imperial Army could not accept the central demand of the Hull Note—withdrawal from China—given the course of events following the Manchurian Incident. In other words, from the perspective of Prospect Theory, Japan's decision to wage war against the United States was an inevitable decision.

Disinformation as Wedge Strategy

TSUBOYA Yu

While interest in and demand for research in disinformation has been increasing, there can be also aspects that are insufficiently conceptualized. This paper proposes the following hypothesis: there can be disinformation operations that can be categorized as being aimed at achieving a specific goal based on “wedge strategy”, to gain a relative superiority.

Based on this hypothesis, this paper analyzes the case of Field Manual 30-31 Supplement B which has been in circulation since 1975, in particular the case in Italy.

As a result, the assassination of Aldo Moro that existed in advance to spread of disinformation was an event that could lead to prevent, break up, or weaken the alliance. In addition, it can be analyzed that the carrying out this disinformation operation was intended to divide, weaken or prevent further strengthening the alliance between the United States and Italy through exploiting the event, and ultimately to lead to a relative superiority of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the hypothesis can be concluded as having been proven.

Success and Failure of Coercive Diplomacy (“Reassurance” Perspective): A case study of the Washington, London and the 2nd London Naval Conference

MIURA Hiroyuki

Coercive diplomacy theory was introduced by Alexander L. George and developed by others during the Cold War, and “reassurance” theory was also developed after the WW II.

The Washington Naval Treaty (1922) and the London Naval Treaty (1930) which are cited as successful examples of naval arms control may have aspects of coercive diplomacy by the United States and United Kingdom toward Japan.

In this article, I apply George’s theory into the Washington, London Naval Conference and the 2nd London Naval Conference (1934-36) that has never come to agreement.

And I analyzed the major factors that contributed to the success or failure of coercive diplomacy from the perspective of whether there was a “reassurance” in the negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom, and what Japan’s “relief” is.

As a result, it was found that the Washington Treaty was a typical coercive diplomacy, the London Treaty was a coercive diplomacy but its coercion was weaker than the Washington and the 2nd London Treaty failed because coercion itself had no effect.

Lastly, I derived that Japan’s “relief” was in “Japan-US cooperation” in all negotiations.

The Accommodation of the “Basic Defense Force Concept” by Uniformed Officials: A Study Based on Oral History

TANAKA Yoshikazu

This paper clarifies how the “Basic Defense Force Concept,” introduced in “The National Defense Program Outline for FY 1977 and Beyond (the 1976 NDPO),” was gradually accommodated and conditionally accepted by the uniformed officials of the Japan Self Defense Force, using oral history as the primary source material. While previous studies have argued that the concept was ultimately determined by civilian officials—such as Michita Sakata, Director-General of the Japan Defense Agency and Takuya Kubo, Administrative Vice-Minister of the Defense Agency—this study focuses on the perspective of the uniformed side, tracing changes in their policy preferences and revealing the process through which they came to accept, albeit incrementally, the precursor idea of a “Constantly Maintained Defense Force.”

This study elucidates the struggles, dilemma, compromises, and accommodation of the uniformed officials during the formation of the 1976 NDPO, offering a perspective that complements existing scholarship.

The Turning Point of Italy's Economic Policy toward China: The Background of Withdraw from Belt and Road Initiative

KASAHARA Kenji

The G7 Hiroshima Summit held in Japan in May 2023 focused on economic security and reached various agreements. However, it cannot be said that economic policies, particularly those towards China, were entirely aligned among the G7 member countries. In particular, while Italy adopted an appeasing economic policy towards China by joining China's Belt and Road Initiative in March 2019, it has significantly shifted its policy in recent years, announcing its withdrawal from the initiative in December 2023. The reasons for Italy's shift in its economic policy towards China, as well as the turning points and factors behind this shift, remain unclear.

This paper aims to clarify the turning points and factors behind Italy's shift in its economic policy towards China, primarily from the perspective of economic policy.

The structure of this paper is as follows. First, it provides an overview of the economic policies towards China of various countries over the past several years, with a focus on understanding the uniqueness of Italy's policy. Next, it traces the changes in Italy's economic policies from the late 2010s to the Hiroshima Summit, identifying the initial factors and turning points that influenced the shift in Italy's policy towards China. Finally, the paper analyzes the factors that contributed to the change in Italy's economic policy towards China at these turning points.