

英文要旨／Abstracts

Net Assessment as a Method of Drafting Strategy in the Cold War Era:

Expectation and achievement in former competition era

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In recent years, there has been a growing awareness that the international community is in competition not seen since the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It is said that during the Cold War, the U.S. used a method known as Net Assessment to formulate U.S. strategy.

This paper confirmed an overview of net assessment through previous research, then analyzed three specific examples of net assessment to derive their characteristics and implications for the present day.

In the Cold War United States, the Net Assessment was used primarily to analyze "major imbalances," "trends," "elements of a long-term military competition strategy for military balance," "issues relevant to strategy and requiring better understanding," and "short-term strategic elements" in U.S. and Soviet military power in order to identify areas where national resources should be intensively invested. By advising the Secretary of Defense directly on guidelines for areas, independent of the military services, the Net Assessment was providing an intellectual assistant to the Secretary of Defense in strategic thinking and helping to strengthen civilian control.

Now, as the U.S., U.K., and Australia are considering how to optimize mutual resource allocation through Net Assessment, the Net Assessment during the U.S.-Soviet Cold War provides important implications for Japan in this competitive era.

U.S. NAVCENT at a crossroads:

May 12, 2023 as a turning point

KAWANAMI Tasuku

Since 1983, The United States has stationed US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) in the Middle East as its resolve to the region. While the Biden Administration embarked new Middle East policy which aimed to alleviate the burden to engage the Middle East, and NAVCENT followed the policy until May 12, 2023. However, NAVCENT has changed its activities since the day.

This paper is to reveal why NAVCENT has changed its activities and role since the day.

For answering the question, this paper researched changes of NAVCENT activities and roles from its establishment to today, and investigated relations among the changes and Biden's Middle East policy, change of the situation in the Middle East. Through the research, this paper concluded NAVCENT recognized a true nature of the Middle East' situation worsened by Biden's "Words and Deeds Match" policy, therefore it has taken responses to deal with the situation proactively.

This paper is to share what lies in the today's Middle East context to readers and pose anew a question, that is, how JMSDF protect SLOC in the Middle east.

The Policy Process of the U.S. Navy's Development of Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles

UEMURA Masayuki

The U.S. Navy is seeking to acquire a number of Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles (LUSVs) to counter China's Anti-Access and Area Denial: A2/AD capability. This paper analyzes the status of the U.S. Navy's LUSV development based on a Congressional Research Service Reports for period 2019-2023. As a result, problems and solutions in LUSV development were derived in terms of CONOPS (Concept of Operation), reliability and manpower saving, and cost risk. In conclusion, in LUSV development, a small number of prototypes should be built first, and CONOPS should be matured and reliability improved through demonstration tests. Then, it is important to gradually transition to unmanned operation without reducing the number of personnel for the time being. Furthermore, the hypothesis that the best solution is to actively incorporate advanced technologies from the private sector to reduce prices and ensure reliability.

Analysis of the Japanese and U.S. Amphibious operations process:

Reassessing the realities of the Pacific War

SEKI Kentaro

Looking back at history, both Japan and United States prepared for amphibious operations between the wars by studying the Gallipoli landings of World War I. Even though both Japan and the United States made similar preparations for amphibious operations during the

interwar period, why was the Japanese military unable to achieve results in real warfare?

The reason why the Japanese military was unable to achieve results in amphibious operations during the Greater East Asia War was that issues of supreme command. Then Navy and Army were unable to carry out integrated operations under unified command, and there was a lack of operational flexibility.

On the other hand, the United States developed amphibious warfare doctrine as a Joint doctrine. Joint operations and pre-training were conducted by the Joint commander.

Amphibious operations have developed through a series of failures and successes. We must not forget the lessons learned from the Greater East Asia War and must train amphibious forces so as not to repeat the same mistakes.