

英文要旨／Abstracts

Contribution to Nuclear Deterrence by Non-Nuclear Weapons Nations from the Example of NATO Nations

YOKOTA Daichi

Nuclear weapons have only been utilized twice in history, both in 1945 during WW2 and both on Japan. Therefore, Japan is the only country to have suffered the impact of nuclear weapons.

Over many years nuclear deterrence has been discussed around the world. Additionally, discussions around extended nuclear deterrence, which nuclear nations provide to Non-nuclear nations also exist. Japan's nuclear weapons policy, the "three non-nuclear principles" is also no exception. While the security environment becomes increasingly challenging, doubt arises as to whether it is enough for Japan to be reliant on the nuclear umbrella provided by the U.S. and questions arise as to what other actions Japan could conduct in the interest of their national security.

This paper attempts to derive how non-nuclear weapons nations contribute to the nuclear deterrence by evaluating NATO arrangements where non-nuclear nations conduct nuclear deterrence with nuclear nations. In particular this paper develops an argument from the point of view of activities and programs, for example, "Nuclear Sharing", "SNOWCAT", and "BMD" in which non-nuclear nations are involved. It concludes by deriving security implications for non-nuclear weapons nations that contribute to NATO's nuclear deterrence, and extend these considerations to Japan.

How Did the UK Forces Contribute to the National Interests in the Middle East?

SAKAI Hiroyuki

The United Kingdom kept its territories all over the world after the World War II, and deployed its military forces to protect them. However, U.K forces began to withdraw from overseas from 1960s as its power of economics declined relatively.

The UK forces were still deployed in the middle east, although the Prime minister Harold Wilson declared to withdraw from East of Suez in 1968.

As many previous researches showed, there were some reasons why they kept operating in the middle east.

The aim of this document is trying to figure out how UK military forces contributed to the national interests through their deployment in the middle east by using a “Ends-Ways-Means” framework.

The Houthis’ Naval Forces and Its Evolution: Naval Forces as a Tool of Struggle for Statehood

YOSHIDA Tomoaki

The Houthis have survived the war against the Saudi-led coalition and the internationally recognized government, even had leeway to develop its weaponry including drones and missiles. In 2022, they have revealed new naval weapons such as ASMs, sea mines, and WBIEDs. The Houthis’ devotion to the improvement of their naval forces is worth noting, because the battle on land essentially overrides the one on sea in vying for the dominance of Yemen.

In theoretical studies, it was found that naval activities by non-state actors would bring them quasi-statehood, since the exploitation of maritime domain is closely related to the sovereignty.

This paper argues that the naval evolution is related to, and consists of the Houthis’ political goal to be recognized as a state. The Houthis have developed the discourse that they were the Yemeni national army and resisted the land, air and naval aggression to recover the sovereignty. In this discourse, the significance of each domain is equivalent, thus encourages them to improve the naval capabilities.

The author also argues that the six-month ceasefire in 2022 contributed to the naval development. Through the ceasefire, major clashes on land have not been reported. This means that the Houthis afforded to spare time for their navy, which is tactically less important and thus has been ignored, but politically important to acquire statehood.

The Feature of the U.S./British Army's Counterinsurgency from a View of the Comparative Analysis of COIN Doctrines

YAMAMOTO Yoshihiro

In 2010, the Whitehouse and the European Parliament published the assessments about the Afghanistan policy severally, but these two assessments announced the opposite opinions each other. The Whitehouse said the policy went well, but the European Parliament said the policy was unsuccessful. At the time, NATO was doing the counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan, but the operation was turning into a swamp.

I wondered that there was the serious difference in the COIN operations between US and EU , and I set the question of this research the difference of each COIN doctrines. I tried to analyze two COIN doctrines, the U.S. Army's doctrine published in 2006 and the British Army's doctrine published in 2009 as a sample of EU.

Then I made clear that these two doctrines were almost the same substance, but these two countries had serious different circumstances to get the COIN doctrines. The British Army has experienced the COIN operations on many occasions for over a century and has continued to remake the doctrine many times, but the US Army didn't make the COIN doctrine positively because US had an awareness that the COIN will be hard to deal with. These doctrines don't show this difference clearly, but these two countries have different spirits of COIN certainly.

Yamamoto Isoroku as a Successor of the Imperial Japanese Navy's Strategy

TAKAHASHI Hideki

In recent years, it has been pointed out that Yamamoto Isoroku's policies on short-term decisive warfare are inconsistent with the overall doctrine of war, which derives from the lack of understanding of the concept of all-out war. However, is this a fair assessment? The purpose of this paper is to show Yamamoto's perception of all-out war and its relationship to his grand strategy and military strategy.

It also indicates that Yamamoto should be positioned as the successor of a legitimate view on strategy, rather than as the owner of a heterodox idea in the Imperial Japanese Navy since his view is consistent with the Japanese naval officers' views on military strategy against the U.S. from a higher viewpoint.