

Abstract

Educational Reform in JMSDF Command and Staff College

TERADA Hiroyuki

Since its foundation in 1954, the JMSDF Command and Staff College has been making every effort to maintain excellent, up-to-date education and research. Specifically from FY2011 downward College has been carrying on total reform including the revision of course curricula and structural reorganization.

This paper introduces reform process in these past 7 years. There was a consensus among faculty from the beginning of the process that officers need higher abilities to think logically in the realm of social science. However, College found that it needed to get over lots of practical difficulties to design and embody desirable course format.

This reform did not go smoothly and required trial and error. After twists and turns, College reached brand new curricula in the course from FY 2018. This includes improved curriculum coordination method, broader application of seminar, and introduction of new subjects such as academic thesis, operational art and strategic communication.

Impedimentary factor of the continuity of reform in the Imperial Japanese Navy : Implication for contemporary Military Organization

IWAMURA Kentaro

The Imperial Japanese Navy reformed the military professional education at the end of the 19th century and the Japanese Naval War College education would have shifted its emphasis from the technical

education to academic education. However, the Navy Veterans regret that education at the Japanese Naval War College has been placed excessive emphasis on tactics. This means that the Navy's own interest was biased toward tactics.

Prior research pointed out that the rationality of the Imperial Navy was lost in the process of Tetsutaro Sato's thought replacing Saneyuki Akiyama's thought and that the Imperial Navy had problems in terms of continuity of reform there.

Why was the Imperial Japanese Navy unable to maintain the continuity of the reform?

This paper is to obtain implications for contemporary Military Organization by means of reconsidering the factor that hindered the continuity of the Imperial Japanese Navy from the perspective of war and military thought.

Education in the Royal College of Defence Studies : Training of strategic leaders

SHINOMURA Yasuhiko

The Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) is a part of Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, an educational institution for international politics and international security issue. It locates in London and accepts overseas members from more than 40 countries in addition to UK members both from military and non-military organizations.

This paper introduces uniqueness of educational method in RCDS based on author's experience as one of overseas members in 2005 RCDS Course. It offered RCDS members valuable opportunities for study and discussion over issues which international society was facing at that time from the viewpoint of security, stability and prosperity.

The significance of RCDS course is sharing members' knowledge and experience, thereby connecting to global network. Its aim is to train

strategic leaders in various organizations and military knowledge, and experience is not essential.

RCDS always tries to create more sophisticated and up-to-date program, since it has the mission to train leaders who can adapt to future strategic environment.

Reform of the US JPME/PME : Introduction of Operational Art and reinforcement of Strategic Thinking as lessons

NAKAMURA Daisuke

This paper follows the transition of the US Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)/ Professional Military Education (PME) from the late 19th century when the US PME was formed to the present, and by considering why such a change occurred, from the viewpoint of education, the US military continues to self-innovate as a learning organization.

Following the transition of the US JPME/PME, the paper found that Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) and the War on Terror had major impacts on the change. And the paper confirmed that “Operational Art”, which is driven from the lessons of the Vietnam War, became the origin of the GNA became one of the focuses of intermediate officer education. In addition, “Strategic Thinking” is one of the lessons of the War on Terror was emphasized in senior officer education.

In the viewpoint of education, the US military continues to be a learning organization in order to self-innovate, since it is making use of the lessons they learned and leading to reform.

Anti-Mine Warfare : New agenda for Japan, U.S. and ROK Trilateral Security Cooperation

**John Bradford
MICHISHITA Narushige
Dan Fillon**

This paper explains the importance of trilateral security cooperation among Japan, U.S. and ROK considering the situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Authors understand the nature of difficulties of cooperation and point out the Anti-Mine Warfare can be extremely low cost, but high value area of cooperation.

Authors also point out that encountering North Korean mines by Japan-U.S. or U.S.-ROK are inefficient, and expecting other countries like European nations, Australia and New Zealand are not too realistic due to the distance and capabilities.

Accordingly, the trilateral security cooperation is extremely important. Authors recommend the coordinating mechanism and utilizing Japan-U.S. bilateral, mine exercise as basis of cooperation, and encourage U.S. Navy to utilize the region as the testing ground for the most advanced capability equipment to gain the experience in the region.

At the same time, authors recommend for tri-navies to participate in multinational exercise together.

Authors also recommend decoupling the political issues and the security issues, and trilateral countries must focus on indispensable military cooperation. Anti-Mine Warfare shall be the way to go and strengthen the cooperation and influence other area of the security cooperation.

The direction of U.S Navy strategy in the 21st century : Why does the U.S Navy aim to return to Sea Control ?

OTANI Miho

This Paper is an attempt to clarify why the U.S Navy now aims to return to Sea Control. For the U.S navy, Sea Control is a condition to sustain the continuous power projection, maintain the freedom for navigation throughout the integral Sea Lanes of Communications, and the persistent visible naval presence. In other words, it is the military superiority of the theater. After the 911 terrorist attacks in the United States, due to the large-scale military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the global financial crisis, the Federal fiscal balance got worse. No longer the United States had become possible to deal with all the global missions by herself. Accordingly, her reliability and superiority declined. Obama Administration's China policy with emphasis on economy allowed China's military build-up in a short period of time. A2/AD capabilities of China steadily expanded in the South China Sea. Russia is also threatening the security environment by expanding and modernizing its military capabilities. It means that the U.S navy cannot maintain the Sea Control of their strategic responsible areas, and forced to awaken to contribute to return to the Sea Control again. For the U.S navy, the reason of returning to Sea Control is to indicate the military superiority with maintaining their Sea Control and secure the budget required to increase the number of surface ships in order to counter Sea Control by new threat.