Abstract

Overviewing JMSDF Strategy
-Its Directionality and Challenges-
(Executive Summary)

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Introduction: The necessity of JMSDF's strategic transition

> "Great games" occurs around world order?

Multipolarity in international system and diversification of sense of values cause unstable globe with frequent confrontation and conflict.

> Japan's position

Japan stands by the side, which wishes for "maintaining status-quo" in the context of freedom, human rights, democracy, rules of the law, etc. In addition, Japan's critical effort should be paid for deterrence against the power, which pursues changing status-quo and international order.

> JMSDF as advance-party in Japan's security

JMSDF has taken an active part as advance-party in Japan's security and international burden sharing efforts after the end of the Cold War Era, through various non-traditional military missions such as counter terrorism, peacekeeping operations, humanitalian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, or dealing with North Korea's threat.

Recently, traditional security issues (inter-state confrontation) emerge again. For example, China's maritime expansion, changing status-quo or Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy causes serious impact on Japan's security environment and the Asia-pacific Region security.

> JMSDF's various missions and limited resources

It is necessary to re-investigate as to resource distribution and strategic priority, with an eye to the 2030s.

Chapter 1: The context of deterrence

(1) Definition of deterrence concept

　A normative idea, "rules of the law" and the definition of deterrence aiming at "maintaining status-quo" are "two sides of the same coin."

(2) Switchover from "engagement and hedging" to deterrence

　It is crtical that detering factors which destabilize current international order.

Chapter 2: Trends in security environment

> By recent security and military trends, such as nuclear deterrence, enhancement of human rights, securing legitimacy/fairness on the states practice, there are high hurdles to get over for "use of force," so that there is a very low probability to occur high intensive conflicts.

> On the contrary, recent trends show that high intensive nuclear/conventional military power cannot deter low intensive or limited conflicts and confrontation.

> A2/AD strategy prevents U.S. Forces' power projection capability which has secured its military superiority in the globe. It is critical to maintain our escalation dominance in each escalation ladders to affect deterrence mechanism from high intensive conflict to low intensive conflict/confrontation.

Chapter 3: Strategic ends of Japan's maritime defense

> Strategic ends of maritime defense and their order of priority are consistent as follows. On the other hand, balance of resource distribution between these three elements is variable in response to the change of security environment.

　1. Homeland and Territorial Defense

　2. Securing Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)

　3. Constructing Desirable Security Environment

Chapter 4: Ways for attaining strategic ends

(1) Self-help in two directions: Japan's own ways and Japan-U.S. cooperation

> Securing maritime superiority (restrictive in space and time)

> Maritime denial (conforming "maritime no-man's land)

> Establishing all-domain access

> Possessing Sea-Basing capability

(2) Cost -imposing to overcome long-term competition

> Preserving asymmetrical superiority in "command, control, computer, communication and intelligence (C4I)" capability/infrastructures, and superiority in the under-water domain, etc.

> Performing political presence

> Strategic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) mission

> Promoting bi/multilateral joint exercise

> Facilitating confidence building measure

(3) Strengthening "friends and allies"

> Maritime security

> Defense cooperation and exchange

> Capacity building support

> HA/DR

Chapter 5: Commitments as to relating areas and states

(1) Three variation of action area

> Dominant area

  Securing maritime superiority and U.S' power projection capability

> Contested area

  Competition by "maritime denial" in wartime

> Cooperative area

  Developing cooperation for enhancing our political/military influence

(2) The course of cooperation relating countries

  Australia, South Korea, India, ASEAN countries, China, Russia, EU/NATO, and Middle East countries

Chapter 6: Means

(1) The essential points

> Developing readiness

> Securing flexibility and sustainability for executing operations

> Developing integrated operational capability

(2) Establishing infrastructure for robust defense posture

> Strengthen personnel, operation, equipment/technological infrastructure

(3) Important operational capabilities

> Develop interoperability, C4I system and network

> Strengthen electromagnetic spectrum, space and cyber warfare capability

> Securing specialty in the under-water domain

> Developing offshore air defense capability

Appendix: The range and limitation in this article

(1) JMSDF's capability and limitation

　　Preventing "strategic over-stretch" and the importance of "scrap and build"

(2) Limit of deterrence

　Political decision-making and ambiguity surrounding deterrence strategy

(3) Necessity of re-investigating, revising and reconstructing

　Adapting to the change of security environment

Extended Deterrence and Security in the East Asia

YAGI Naoto

United States and China, are trying to do someting that has never been done in history, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State observed at Beijing China in 2012, world politics need a new answer to the question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet. A one of these challenges is "Extended Deterrence," for US allied in Asia-Pacific region; they present a unique challenge, which Washington has begun to recognize. The United States has relied on extended deterrence, assurance for ally and reassurance for adversary as means of strategy since the Cold War. Are their relations offset or tyranny for US strategy, ally and challenger? This report would be analized with an overview of extended deterrence, assurance and re-assurance in regional security that between established power and a rising power. Furthermore, this report would be recommended that assurance for allied power; status quo; and reassurance for adversaries; rising power, will have new value and significance in regional security.

Freedom of Navigation for U.S.A.

ISHIHARA Takahiro

The United States of America has developed as a Maritime Country, Sea Power.　The United States has recognized FON as Vital National Interest.

FON is watched from people of the world now.
I analyze the FON reports by DOD, and make its feature and tendency clear.