

constructing artificial island in the South China Sea and correspondence of U.S. forces. These are analyzed and considered from the angle of the strategic message.

Case Notes

: An Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Arbitration between The Republic of The Philippines and The People’s Republic of China, PCA Case N° 2013-19, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (29 October 2015).

YOSHIDA Yasuyuki

On 29 October 2015, the Tribunal constituted under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the arbitration instituted by the Republic of the Philippines (RP) against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has issued its Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility. This arbitration concerns the role of historic rights to justify so-called “Nine-Dash Line” claimed by PRC, and the source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, the status of certain maritime features in the South China Sea and the maritime entitlements they are capable of generating, and the lawfulness of certain actions by PRC in the South China Sea that are alleged by RP to violate UNCLOS. This Article introduces summary of the Award and examines some points of argument, as well as future perspectives.

The Reality of The Vietnam's "Hard-Line Approach" to China over The South China Sea Issues : Reasons for emphasis on stable relations with China

ICHIYANAGI Kimihiro

General supposed view of Vietnam's foreign policy toward China over the South China Sea issues, symbolized by the aggressive campaign of the "H.Y.S.Y. 981" incident in 2014, is that Vietnam has taken an offensive against China. However, from the "offensive stance against China" in 2014 in Vietnam ended up in the same development and pattern that has been repeated many times since the two countries normalized diplomatic relations in 1991. While showing a seemingly hard-line stance against infringement of Vietnam's sovereignty by China, Vietnamese officials have visited China and after a certain period of time has elapsed, the crisis has been soon resolved. There is a question that should be made clear here. Why has Vietnam, while taking an hard-line stance against China over the South China Sea issues, always preferred a stable relationship with China in reality? The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the reasons for this question.

This paper shall clarify three factors that determine Vietnam's foreign policy in which Ho Chi Minh has little choice but to compromise over the South China Sea issues.

The first factor is distinctive characteristics of the historical relationship. By looking at the Vietnam and China history, especially the two countries peculiar historical and cultural relations, bilateral relation between the two countries parties is the cornerstone of legitimacy.

The second factor is the Vietnam's threat perception. This is further divided into two elements. One is a delay in the economic development, the second is an alertness to the "peaceful regime-change executed by hostile forces".

For the delay of economic development, through the data analysis of Vietnam's industrial and trade structure, there found a dilemma that

Vietnam's economic development and economic dependency on China are inseparable.

For "peaceful regime-change executed by hostile forces", by tracing the history of the of civil society development in Vietnam, there found that the Vietnamese government needs a proper management of anti-Chinese nationalism in order to stabilize socio-political situation in Vietnam.

The third factor is the existence of a crisis management mechanism between the two countries. The interactive channels of different levels between Vietnam and China revealed that they had worked as a crisis management mechanism in various situations.

These factors illustrate the reality of the "hard-line stance against China" by the Vietnamese government. The reality is that the stance that looks to strengthen the offensive stance to increase the bargaining power has been implemented within the extent does not impair the stable relationship with China. Also as part of the strategic approach based on a reasonable judgment of the contribution to the stability of the internal affairs has been taken into account.

The results of this study suggest while seemingly increasing the offensive stance against China, even Vietnam in the future, the reality is that taking advantage of the crisis management mechanism, a stable relationship with China takes the highest priority. For Japan facing the issues surrounding East China Sea between China, it is necessary to understand that "hard-line approach against china" is very real and rational strategy for Vietnam.

The Japanese Army and Navy's Oversea Landing Operation : Reassessment from perspective of Amphibious Warfare

NINOMIYA Atsushi

Previous studies gives the low value to the Japanese oversea landing operation as amphibious operation. But, according to primary sources I

researched, the Japanese military had developed advanced amphibious capability based on the army and naval cooperation through its experience since 1890's and conducted expeditionary military operation with modern amphibious landing capability successfully many times.

The initial amphibious capability had developed in order to send Japanese expeditionary forces to Chinese continent near Japan.

Japan was the first power to develop modern "ship to shore landing attack" technique and "aero-amphibious operation" doctrine which enabled close cooperation among naval, air and landing components. At the early stage of WWII in the Pacific theater, The Japanese forces carried out "Maritime Blitzkrieg" on their own doctrine and equipment, and seized their plural objectives in the remote and vast area in very short period.

Nevertheless, there was a limitation. Because the Japanese amphibious operation had developed in overwhelming sea-air superiority at neighboring sea, the Japanese doctrine and equipment for amphibious operation did not fit the remote ocean under the air-sea battle situation. Therefore, in Guadalcanal battle at the distant ocean, the problem mentioned above was actualized by failure in the strategy instruction that exercised recapture operation passively as an opportunity. As a result, the Japanese amphibious operation was defeated without showing the real power.