Japan Maritime Self Defense Force in the New Maritime Era  
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During the time of the Imperial Army and Navy, the fundamental principle which guided its leadership and operations can be summed up in the adage “The existence of a military is about battle, so every point of reference is based upon the notion of battle”. In modern times, the Self-Defense Force (SDF) Law states, “The prime mission of the SDF is to defend Japan from direct and indirect aggression”. I believe the SDF exists to “defend Japan by power” and there is no other option but “to fight in case of national emergency.”

(The 11th Maritime Chief of Staff, Admiral Teiji Nakamura)

Forward

The end of the Cold War reduced the likelihood of a large scale armed conflict. As such, it is necessary to review the role armed forces and the necessity of alliances amongst global partners. Given the changes in a post Cold War environment, the time has come for armed forces to make purposeful contributions to world peace.

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is no exception. Since the deployment of the mine sweeping forces to the Arabian Gulf in 1991, its operating area has expanded past Japan’s national borders. It has been almost seven years since JMSDF joined the War on Terrorism in the Indian Ocean. The professionalism and dedicated effort of officers and sailors participating in this endeavor have been well received and highly praised both at home and abroad. However, the emphasis of the JMSDF has been on major equipment development, rather than on personnel. As such, critical areas of manning and education and training have been neglected. The long-term effects of this approach remain to be seen, but could be linked to recent mishaps on the part of the JMSDF.
As outlined in the report released by the Ministry of Defense Reform Committee, the JMSDF must address accident prevention as well as safety, and set a renewed course of objectives for its future.

Two crucial questions must be answered. One, has the JMSDF changed given the complicated international climate of post 9-11? And two, what is the purpose of JMSDF operations in the Indian Ocean?

During the Cold War, the objectives for armed forces were clearly defined. In this post Cold War era, the role of the armed forces is more fluid and globally involved. Response to regional conflict and prevention of the proliferation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are but two ways in which armed forces are engaged in the current post Cold War landscape. On the other hand, the organizational identity of each service is strong, so as to foster a sense of purpose and mission for each service member.

JMSDF has been gradually adjusting its course to navigate the changes within the international security environment, but it is now time to set a more permanent course. This paper will examine the evolving mission of the JMSDF, the modern challenges it faces and its proposed course of action given these challenges.

I Essence of JMSDF

Generally, naval power was born from the need to preserve freedom of the seas, enabling sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) and economic growth to prosper and expand. Navies have been the tool by which nations expand and protect overseas interest, as well as carry out diplomatic initiatives when necessary. Basically, the roles of naval power are Military, Diplomatic and Constabulary. Its military role is to deter aggression and protect guarantee freedom of the seas. Gunboat diplomacy and goodwill visits to foreign countries by naval ships are examples of naval diplomacy. Its constabulary role is tied closely to its military objectives of peaceful sea lanes and Maritime Security Operation. Regardless of national background and historical background, these three basic roles will not change. For example, navies of the former Soviet Union and other land power nations mainly serve to prevent power projection by others, and have recently received attention internationally in its constabulary response to global concerns.
Japan's naval build up began after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. In the beginning, the mission of the Japanese navy was purely national defense. It gradually transitioned to the fleet battle doctrine which continued until the dismantlement of Imperial Navy in 1945. The major players (Allied Powers) isolated Japan not only through battleships engagements, but also through air and submarine warfare which decimated Japan’s merchant fleet. The submarines destroyed about 60% of the fleet and the airplanes destroyed about 30%. More than 10,000 mines were laid in Japanese harbors and ports, and remained there long after the war. Prior to the War in the Pacific (World War II), Japan possessed 10 million tons of merchant vessels. By the end of the war, only about 1,660 thousand tons remained. Of that number, 500 thousand tons were not operable and many were pinned down in ports due to mines. Japan lost 60,000 merchant mariners, more than 43% during the war. Despite these losses, cessation of merchant marine activities was simply not an option for Japan because of its national dependence on imported resources essential to the country’s very survival.

Its wartime defeat provided a turning point in Japan’s naval doctrine. At the onset of the Cold War, once the East-West confrontational posture had been clearly delineated, the JMSDF formally emerged from its predecessor of two years, the Coastal Safety Force or Kaijo Keibitai. Despite taking on the U.S. strategy of deterrence against the Soviet Union as part of its core mission: the JMSDF continued to incorporate “Protection of SLOC” and “Defense of Surrounding Waters”, into its overall operational mission, drawing lessons learned during World War II.
Japan’s national survival relies on unimpeded economic activities via SLOCs. Its geography, lack of natural resources and vast population are characteristics which will remain unchanged. For example, even with nuclear produced energy, Japan can only meet 18% of its own energy demand. Without its nuclear capacity, this number 4%. Put another way, Japan relies on overseas imports for over 80% of its energy needs. This rate has remained unchanged for over 10 years. 43% of Japan’s oil, coal and natural gas come from the Middle East and 31% from Southeast Asia and Australia. Oil supplies 44% of all energy needs; 89% of this oil comes from the Middle East. Therefore, maintaining free and unimpeded SLOCs from the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and the Strait of Malacca to the Sea of Japan is also critical to Japan’s survival.

Most of the food supplies consumed in Japan come from overseas. At present, Japan is only able to produce 40% of its own food, a rate which has not improved since 2000. 40% of Japan’s food imports come from Asia-Pacific region and 30% from North America.

Much like food and energy, Japan draws on overseas engagement to bolster its domestic economy. In 2006, seaborne trade occupied 72% in profit base and 99.7% in quantity base. From a national security standpoint, Japan’s reliance on international trade and engagement leaves the country vulnerable. In this regard, the access to Japan afforded to U.S. forces is no longer limited to strategic and security purposes, but socio-economic ones as well.

Japan, as an island nation, will continually encounter threats from the sea. Toward the end of World War II, over a period of 5 months, the U.S. conducted mine warfare and laid more than 10,000 mines in all of Japan’s major ports and channels. While effective at the time, subsequent clearings operations were quite difficult. During the Korean War, U.S. conducted mine clearing operations in the mouth of Tokyo bay, to protect shipping of personnel and goods from Japan to the Korean Peninsula for three years. This swift and exhaustive effort speaks to the importance of Japan’s shipping lanes to both foreign and domestic shipping. Expanding JMSDF’s role in maritime protection to include protection of cargo transport and natural resources should be considered.

Mission of JMSDF is to “fight with force in case of national emergency.” However, a post Cold War, post 9-11, modern JMSDF must also take three
additional roles. “Protection of maritime traffic”, “defense of Japanese boundary waters” and “defense exchange” are key tools of foreign policy which is crucial to Japan’s national security in today’s ever changing fluid strategic climate.

II International Situation over Ocean

1. Adjustment of National Security Policy to International Situation

National Security Policy can be compared to fabric and the wool of the international situation. International situation may vary in thickness and color and as time goes by it softens with various patterns. Accordingly, the national security policy must adjust to meet the international situation.

The National Defense Program Guidelines of 1976 defined East-West relations as those centered on U.S./Soviet Union standoff as the heart of all international engagement. The guidelines noted both countries had attempted to avoid large scale confrontation through mutual nuclear deterrent as well as continued negotiation to improve understanding. Given these parameters, the SDF exercised two defense concepts, the “prevention of aggression” and an “aggression response”. Minimum defense build up was required to maintain a peace time warning posture and limited response to small acts of aggression. Specifically, the role of the JMSDF was to respond to maritime aggression, mainly protection of domestic and international shipping, surveillance/reconnaissance around Japan and overall strait protection. In 1981, in the midst of the Cold War, as directed by then Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki, JMSDF would also expand its operations several hundred miles area and 1,000 miles SLOCs defense after the U.S. 7th Fleet move to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.

Following the end of the Cold War, the National Defense Program Guidelines of 1995, pointed out the reduced likelihood of a worldwide armed conflict. The report projected religious and ethnic conflicts and the transfer and proliferation of WMD were more likely to emerge as the major threat to world security and stability. The role of defense capabilities would continue to include national emergency and self-defense, but also expand to include “response to various situations such as large scale natural disasters”. Since then, the SDF, in its response to peacetime crises such as the Hanshin-Awaji Great Earthquake, the Subway Sarin Incident and other contributions to stability and security, has learned valuable lessons and is positioned to take
on greater international responsibilities.

The National Defense Program Guidelines of 2004 was developed in the backdrop of 9-11: a scenario in which a non-government aligned organization executed a serious strike against another government/nation. Given interdependency and globalization between nations, an organized global response to modern terrorism and its situation effects on peace and stability is required to address such issues as ballistic missiles and proliferation of WMD. The Guidelines of 2004 outline three roles of defense capabilities as one, “Effective response to new threat and diverse contingencies”, two, “Preparation for response to a full-scale aggression” and three, “Proactive efforts, on Japan’s own initiative, to improve the international security environment.”

The National Security Policy also states the international environment has shaped defense capabilities and present guidelines are more focused on peace time activities. There will be no shift in JMSDF’s posture of self-defense to one of forward operational initiatives in boundary waters defense and maritime traffic safety. However, it is time for JMSDF to expand its participation in peacetime activities which are beyond its long self-imposed limits.

2. Situation of Maritime Traffic – Line Defense in national emergency to stability during peacetime

Guaranteeing the safety of maritime traffic is a pressing priority for most nations, and as such, multinational cooperation is crucial.

To begin, consider the growing interdependence between nations regarding maritime interests. On one hand, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea designated 60% of the world ocean free of national control. On the other hand, nearly all energy transport routes pass through boundary waters within jurisdiction of coastal countries. Nations still independently and jointly influence world events, but transnational issues have moved front and center, accelerated by technology, globalization and deepening crises over ethnicity, religion, geography and natural resources.

Over time, various merchant fleets have become internationalized and maritime industries more liberalized. Throughout Japan’s international sector, the number of Japanese flagged ships crewed by Japanese merchant
mariners has decreased significantly, since the mid 1970s to only 95 ships and 2,650 sailors at last count in 2006. It is estimated Japan requires approximately 450 Japanese flagged ships and 5,500 Japanese sailors to meet demand, but numbers lag far behind. Compounding this problem is the tendency of multinational owned ships to re-flag vessels at will, depending on need, will or convenience, and to operate under more liberal maritime practices than those employed by single nation designated vessels.

In its report on “Maintain maritime traffic and international shipping in case of national emergency”, the Japanese government outlines a foreign ship’s right to self defense correlates directly to the flag under which it sails and operates. In a case of a national emergency, by which both Japan and said ships come under threat from a third party, the Government of Japan recognizes the SDF can defend these ships as part of Japan’s self defense. Given that only 95 Japanese flagged ships participate in international shipping, in such a scenario it is likely third party ships will be the primary beneficiaries of the SDF’s self-defense efforts.

A second challenge to maintaining the safety of maritime traffic is the emergence of China and India as strategic consumers of energy and resources. Resources destined for both nations pass mainly through the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca and Strait of Lombok. Coupled with Japan’s high level of maritime traffic, these shipping lanes have become crucial to the entire region, and as such are a vulnerable security point for all three nations.

Chart II-1 shows the area where war and terrorism have occurred since the end of the Cold War. These areas overlap the energy routes to Japan. The Middle East is the largest producer of energy resources, but it is routinely unstable. Moreover, insurance costs have increased by a factor of 10 due to armed piracy around the coast of the Arabian Peninsula, especially in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Other factors such as drug trafficking, illegal immigration and the surge in rogue nation states make this area unpredictable and dangerous to any vessel moving through.

The third challenge of maritime traffic security is growing international demand for increased Maritime Security along energy routes during peace time.

Protecting maritime interests and preserving shipping lanes in today’s security climate has become more challenging due to increased demand for
technologically enhanced natural resources and unimpeded access to secure shipping routes to transport them to destinations further and further away from their country of origin. Furthermore, mitigating factors such as proliferation of WMD, maritime terrorism, piracy and a constantly changing global climate compound the security problems surrounding maritime interests. Faced with such pressures, emerging governments often struggle or fail, leaving a vacuum often filled by rogue or terrorist-affiliated organizations. The world's oceans have become a global commodity for which nations compete for influence. In such a climate, Maritime Security essential during peacetime as well as times of national emergency, must be pursued and achieved through cooperation and collaboration among maritime oriented nations.

The U.S. Navy along with the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Coast Guard announced “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” in October 2007. The strategy presumes U.S. Seapower will prevail in the nation’s wars, prevent further aggression by securing the U.S. homeland and citizens from direct attack, and advance U.S. interests around the world. The strategy also states a credible presence will remain in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean. This indicates to the Middle
East, Southeast Asia and East Asia where the strategic focus of the War on Terrorism will remain in terms of overall Maritime Strategy. Since premiere energy route pass through these areas, Japan will continue to focus its strategy here as well.

The U.S. Navy is trying to foster and sustain cooperative relationships with additional international partners particularly in the areas of Maritime Security, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response. The War on Terrorism has expanded beyond early estimates of time and resources given the fluid nature of the war; this was unavoidable. As such, peacetime humanitarian assistance missions will be undertaken not only by the U.S., but also with partner nations. To be successful, participating partners must work cooperatively to improve joint service operations, and interoperability between international maritime partners. Maritime Security is protecting international system from peacetime piracy response and humanitarian assistance to high intensity situation such as war on terrorism. In the long run, all issues related to maritime security, whether in peacetime or international crisis will come under an internationally unified umbrella.

During the Cold War era, Japan’s assessment regarding safe maritime traffic was the “line (SLOCs) defense”, centered on national emergency. Japan must change its emphasis as mutual interdependency among countries increases and freedom of the seas remains a priority during peacetime. Specific direction is necessary to secure maritime traffic by “Surface (Area) stability” through multilateral cooperation for Maritime Security to secure free use of area including the SLOCs.

3. Situation of regional area –Balance between Commitment and Vigilance-

The U.S. will remain a military and economic superpower, but the sustained War on Terrorism will take a toll on its position. Parts of the world will become multipolarize and the U.S. could address global issues more effectively through increased cooperation with alliances and international partners.

One aim of U.S. policy toward China has been to engage the country as a responsible stakeholder. In many ways, China finds itself at a strategic crossroad. Their long range options are threefold: ① To peacefully integrate and fairly compete within the international area, ② To exercise greater
influence in wider area, ③ To focus on domestic issues with decreased integration and legitimacy of Chinese Communist Party. The U.S. recognizes China as a potential technological and military competitor. Therefore it is in the U.S. military’s best interest to foster a constructive and peaceful role for China within Asia-Pacific Region, to lay the groundwork for its full partnership in the international community. The U.S. is also pragmatically preparing for alternate scenarios should this endeavor fail.

Stable economic growth plays an important role in the stability of Chinese society. China makes great effort to secure resources and energy from a wide area, particularly the Middle East and Africa. Over 80% of resources pass through the Strait of Malacca, giving China a common stake with its regional neighbors for stability along the regions’ energy routes.

The modernization of the Chinese military has been remarkable. In the Inshore Defense Strategy, the Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) defines the concept of inshore as the area to which military power extends. PLAN’s primary aim is to intercept hostile operation as far away from its territory as possible and to deny a hostile approach through use of the sea, long before opposing navy reaches the Second Island chain. China is also in the process of developing and constructing its own aircraft carrier. Regarding Taiwan Unification, the National Policy, often decrees the possibility of military intervention to deny Taiwan’s independence.

The overall force level of Far East Russian forces has declined since the Cold War era, but they still possess a formidable military contingent including a nuclear arsenal. The recovery of political and economical power, drawn in large part from crude oil profits, has enabled the military to once again become active in the region. The U.S. has shared its aims for the War on Terrorism and Proliferation of WMD and expressed concern over the dissolution of democratic ideas such as heightened restriction of a free press and a re-centralization of power in the Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 (QDR 2006). Many of the U.S.’s concerns came to fruition during the recent between Russia and Georgian in August 2008 and during the events that followed.

China and Russia are deeply involved in the international economy, so it is unlikely either country will pose a direct and urgent threat as in the Cold War era. However, both countries are not necessarily inclined to make accommodations within the current international system or coexist
peacefully, especially is a swing in Chinese movement.

Within the region, several historical trouble spots still remain which threaten the overall security of the Pacific region. They include the divided Korean Peninsula, nuclear development by North Korea, PRC-Taiwan relations and unresolved territorial disputes. JMSDF must develop greater trust among regional navies through defense exchanges and encourage greater transparency of military power, while at the same time prepare its own well balanced defense posture in case these efforts fail.

4. Expected Defense Situations

In the foreseeable future, the world order will continue to be largely U.S. centric with countries choosing to align for or against the superpower. Regional conflicts and incidents of international terrorism are likely to continue, as will the War on Terrorism and heightened tensions on the open seas.

The international community continues to be more economically interdependent in the coming years. Overall, stability of such closely connected systems correlate to the national security of individual nations, reducing the likelihood of sustained armed conflict on a global scale. Moreover, if war were to breakout, the scale, scope and duration of such a conflict will likely be diminished in comparison to past global and regional conflicts. The operational tempo of such conflict will also differ significantly given the tremendous advances in military and communication technology in the past decade.

Access to WMD and progress in network technology will offer international terrorism organizations inexpensive and convenient tools of attack to carry out their aims. It is also possible the fields of psychology and informational warfare will play significant roles on future battlefields.

Today’s international climate is fluid and rapidly changing. From one day to the next, stability and security can swiftly be unseated by conflict and uncertainty. As such, a defense strategy set in stone will be ineffective. Regional and international security depends on individual nations being able to quickly assess, coordinate and respond to differing crises as they arise.

The general use of military force by individual countries, alliances and by United Nations and coalition forces may increase, as will military use for the purposes of conflict prevention and reconstruction support.
As for the defense of the world’s oceans, there is likely to be incidental military confrontation over maritime interests and resources, as well as sustained disputes over historically sensitive territories. Threats to international shipping lanes, potential missile attacks and maritime terrorism will continue to be areas of concern for Japan. Coastal countries along SLOCs from Middle East to Japan will continue to be unstable given the religious and territorial conflict endemic to the region. Economic crises, large scale natural disasters, and the fear of the pandemic spread of disease will also weaken security and stability for states with struggling leadership. Terrorist organizations will attempt to expand its influence in these areas, resulting in increased demand for regional security assistance.

Considering these scenarios, it is necessary for Japan to foster an improvement of international security environment during peacetime. As for conflict prevention, Japan must strengthen cooperation with like-minded partners. The Japan-U.S. alliance is the standard for future efforts towards improved security around Japan’s surrounding waters and major SLOCs.

III JMSDF Targets and Strategy

1. JMSDF Targets

The National Defense Program Guidelines of 2004 define two objectives for security. The first is “to prevent any threat from reaching Japan, and, should such a threat occur, repel it and minimize any damage” and second is “to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the likelihood any threat will reach Japan.” In order to achieve these goals, Japan’s defense capability must provide an “effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies,” “prepare to deal with full-scale invasion” and “work proactively, on its own terms, to improve the international security environment.”

New threats including Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) are arising during peacetime with greater frequency. In order to achieve its first security objectives it is necessary to maintain a warning/surveillance system to deter any potential threat and maintain high level of readiness for contingency response. As such, JMSDF requires sufficient resources to respond to any crisis effectively.

Generally, naval forces possess unique authority under International
Law during peacetime. Such authority represents national sovereignty under which it can operate freely without interfering with the interests of regional countries as well as display national colors. Naval forces with their long-term self-sustaining capacities provide a wide range of options to achieve national objectives both peacetime and times of national emergency. This is the JMSDF’s operations posture as well.

Given Japan’s second objective the JMSDF must work proactively, on its own terms, to protect international trade and maritime cargo shipping, with the cooperation of partner countries who share the same aims of international and maritime security.

Accordingly, Japan’s national security objectives can be summarized into three basic goals: to defend Japan and its territorial waters, to guarantee freedom of the seas and to establish a more stable international security environment.

2. Strategy to achieve objectives

In order to achieve these objectives, JMSDF must not only work on its own accord, but also in cooperation with allies, partner nations and military forces who share common values and security goals. Continued cooperation with the U.S. Navy is the cornerstone of this strategy, given both navies aims in the War on Terrorism and the overall stability of Japan’s sea lanes and boundary waters.

I propose a dual faceted approach to advance these objectives, defined as “Commitment Strategy” and “Contingency Response Strategy.”

“Commitment Strategy” can be defined as the peacetime agenda based on cooperation with the U.S. Navy to maintain the necessary security posture around Japan. Working with other countries, particularly those bordering the SLOC to the Middle East, this strategy can also prevent any potential threat from escalating and interrupting the stable international security environment for ocean based activities.

“Contingency Response Strategy” is the agenda and policy for when deterrence does not work. Should such a threat occur, JMSDF will respond immediately.

3. Commitment Strategy – Peacetime activity

Under its limited defense-oriented policy, Japan must take steps to
prevent aggression.

**JMSDF's strategies**

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“Commitment Strategy” is designed to establish a more stable international security environment, and to deter armed attacks. Generally, the navy has one important peacetime mission which forms the basis for its existence. Friend and foe were clearly defined during the Cold War, but in this rapid changing international climate, enemies are not so apparent. Tacit understanding of this climate is critical and will lead to the “Win without fight.”

Stable use of SLOCs, undersea resource development and fisheries must be protected during peace time. These will be achieved directly and indirectly by means of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises, defense exchanges with like minded countries and positive contributions to the multilateral cooperation for the Maritime Security. In the past years, regional maritime security was maintained by coastal countries. However, in today’s unpredictable climate, responsibility for maritime security must also be assumed by the greater international community.

Japan’s fundamental priorities regarding freedom of the seas are the energy routes from Japanese territorial waters through South East Asia
arriving at the Middle East. While singularly focused, it is beneficial to divide the routes into four regions: Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Middle East, in accordance with the regional situation.

To further the goal of increased international security, the aforementioned strategies work in partnership towards a common purpose. In other words, when JMSDF work for its national defense and freedom of the seas, it also positively contributes to the overall international security environment.

(1) Defense of Seas surrounding Japan

The seaborne threat to Japan has a long history. In order to address this head-on and present a strong deterrence posture, JMSDF must share its operational philosophy and standardize its equipment and procedures and improve interoperability.

In order to respond to national emergencies and prevent possible escalation, multi-source Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capabilities are vital. It is necessary to collaborate with domestic agencies and reinforce Japan’s ISR peacetime posture and emphasize detection of ballistic missile attacks, incidents of terrorism and suspicious maritime activity.

At present, the Triangle Area (TGT Triangle) connecting Tokyo, Guam and Taiwan are key to peace and stability of East Asia including Japan.

To begin, most merchant vessels carrying crude oil and natural gas from the Middle East and Southeast Asia pass through the Bashi Channel eastward or the sea lanes east of Philippines northbound before heading to Japan, Korean Peninsula and Far East Russia. The Triangle Area is crucial to the economic growth and
prosperity, because the SLOCs to Honshu converge in the Triangle Area.

Moreover, the military play a vital role in the defense of the region. In the years to come a large segment of U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa will be relocated to Guam. This move coincides with significant expansion of existing bases in Guam and will transform the island into a strategic stronghold for the Asia-Pacific region. As the U.S. Forces in Korea and Japan relocate, we can expect the strategic value of Okinawa and Guam to increase significantly as staging points for the reinforcements from mainland U.S. in the event of a crisis in the region. In other word the TGT Triangle Area will become a major bridgehead for the U.S. forces to deploy forces into East Asia.

In order to keep the triangle unencumbered during peacetime, the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy must continue their commitment to the area by means of the combined Japan-U.S. operations and a sustained multi-layered ISR. This outwardly visible presence is vital to deterrence and security of the region.

To enhance mutual understanding and bring about military transparency, it is important to foster defense exchanges, including combined exercises, with other regional navies including China.

(2) Protection for Freedom of the Seas

This is an era in which SLOCs are regarded as international public property whose safety should be jointly secured by the international community. Stable maritime traffic is the cornerstone of national existence.

Key to maintaining maritime security is rapid response to maritime crises as they arise, such as providing escort support in the face of piracy, with the cooperation of domestic agencies and international navies along SLOCs. Preserving peace and stability through international cooperation in the region will also promote maritime security.

For Japan specifically military support for maritime security along the routes leading to the Middle East go hand in hand with the diplomatic initiatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A pro-active defense strategy whose goal is friendship and confidence must be integrated into Japan’s foreign policy.

A Northeast Asia Region
Japan's neighbors also have a vested interest in the sea surrounding Japan. Specifically, Japan, China and the Republic of Korea compete for seabed resources and fishing rights in the East China Sea. Presently, disputed areas do not present Japan from pursuing its fishing claims or resource development. However, it is important to continue a combined ISR posture with the U.S. Navy, the Japan Coast Guard and other domestic agencies to create a stable environment.

Northeast Asia is the convergence point for SLOCs to Japan from all over the world. This area is relatively free from piracy and terrorism, but the other concerns remain. Accordingly, JMSDF must conduct combined exercises with the U.S. Navy whenever possible and maintain a continuous presence throughout the region utilizing surveillance, reconnaissance and operational exercises. At the same time, Japan should also pursue its defense exchanges with regional partners to foster a greater mutual understanding.

B Southeast Asia Region

The geographic domain of the Southeast Asia Region are south of the Bashi Channel, all of Southeast Asia and Oceania. Many factors contribute to instability in the region such as Islamic militarism, terrorism and armed pirates. Countries in this region rely not only on trade with Japan, but are also heavily dependent on energy resources from the Middle East, China and South Korea.

The countries of Southeast Asia are striving to maintain security and stability through bilateral and multi-national cooperation. With a few exceptions most Southeast Asian countries are reluctant to accept foreign assistance or military engagement. However, progress is being made in the PSI exercise, multinational cooperation with U.S. and Australia, and maritime security issues.

Accordingly, in this region, JMSDF must collaborate with like-minded nations to form an integrated commitment with domestic agencies such as Japan Coast Guard to take modern maritime concerns in the region such as piracy and territorial water violations. Through these commitments, JMSDF can demonstrate support capacity of its neighboring navies and maintain the safety of crucial SLOCs throughout the region.

C South Asia Region
The geographic region of the South Asia runs from the western tip of the Strait of Malacca to the Middle East, with its western theater at the heart of the War on Terrorism. In some areas, radical Islamic Fundamentalism is rampant, complicating existing issues such as border disputes and religious strife. As the regional economies evolve, so does military expansion. Nuclear development and the threat of proliferation of ballistic missile technology have also contributed to instability and insecurity in the region. At present, the Pakistan Navy is the only Islamic country to participate in the War on Terrorism and host multilateral exercises. The Indian Navy hosts multilateral naval exercises and launched an initiative to host an Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) for regional stability. India’s national influence has increased in recent years, and as such the country will take the leading role in regional security affairs.

Accordingly, the JMSDF’s commitment to this region will begin with participation in multilateral exercises and continue through ship and aircraft visits when possible.

**Middle East Region**

The war on terrorism has transferred into a sustained conflict in the Middle East. We can not rule out the possibility of a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz brought by continued nuclear development by Iran. Activities by Islamic Fundamentalist groups’ small vessel maritime terrorism and regional hostility over the Palestinian issue also contribute to instability in the region. Piracy activity based in Somalia has expanded from the eastern shore of Arabian Peninsula through Bab al Mandab to the Suez Canal.

In the Mediterranean Sea, NATO navies are conducting Operation Active Endeavor. Cooperation with NATO member nations and coalition partners will be essential to JMSDF commitment in the region. With U.S. and European diplomatic support, the JMSDF will continue to make its annual Training Squadron ship visit to further expand NATO and coalition relations and contribute to international peace and stability.
(3) To contribute to international security environment

The international community has long recognized the need for cooperation to address regional and transnational conflict. Given its constitutional restrictions, there are concrete ways in which the JMSDF can contribute to the International Peace Cooperation Activities and humanitarian initiatives, including medical and logistic support, ground troop transport, and intelligence gathering. Such activities fill voids left through civil war and natural disaster which might otherwise be filled by extremist groups.

4 Contingency Response Strategies —Managing Aggression—

The mission of the JMSDF is “to defend with force in case of national emergency.” In the interest of national security, JMSDF must operate in a joint environment in achieving the objectives of “Defense of Japan and its territorial waters” and “Protection of the freedom of the seas.”

(1) Defense of Japan and its territorial waters
Any invasion of Japan will come from the sea. Armed conflict over maritime interests and territorial sovereignty are two possible scenarios given Japan’s geographic and economic positions.

Any response will be based on Japan-U.S. bilateral cooperation. However, in the event the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement may not be immediately executed, JMSDF must be self-sufficient.

Enhanced ISR and mine detection in Japan’s ports and in the seas surrounding Japan will improve early detection of aggression. If the situation arises, de-escalation through rapid mobility and concentration of forces to intercept enemy actions are critical.

The JMSDF must maintain its own strategic defense through its own initiative relative to each situation as it emerges and sea control in order to achieve military superiority within its own area of responsibility. Defense of key straits and SLOCs, sea control of the TGT Triangle area, and elimination of potential submarine threat is vital for the bilateral operation with the U.S. Navy.

(2) Freedom of the seas and Protection of Maritime Traffic

In the face of armed aggression against Japan, maritime traffic must be maintained.

During times of national emergency merchant traffic in and out of Japan will be secured through the U.S. alliances as in previous decades. If maritime transport is threatened outside Japan’s boundary waters, JMSDF will be dispatched under government policy of Japan’s Commitment Strategy and with the cooperation of international partners.

5 Future JMSDF Position

In light of the aforementioned strategies, what should be the future position of the JMSDF? The future JMSDF position can be postulated as follows:

First, conduct its Commitment Strategy, through forward deployment during peacetime, and carry out International Disaster Relief Operations, as necessary. Like Maritime Intercept Operation in the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF-MIO), maritime security operations and the War on Terrorism will be conducted on a sustained basis, with no definite timeline.

ISR around Japan can be achieved through cumulative effect of
multi-faceted sustained activity by multiple platforms. The results must be tracked and developed for accurate future utilization.

The Contingency Response Strategy is focused on JMSDF-USN bilateral operational capability to enhance deterrence and respond to unexpected crises immediately through improved readiness. The JMSDF tradition of “power and readiness,” must be maintained.

From the point of Joint Operations, it is necessary to develop a joint operational posture for rapid long distance deployment for three service personnel and equipment by transport ships, destroyers and aircrafts including civilian aircraft.

IV Direction for the Defense Buildup

JMSDF was established for the purposes of self defense and national emergency. The JMSDF has focused its defense build up on Anti-Submarine Warfare and Anti-Mine Warfare based on Japan’s experience during World War II. As a maritime force JMSDF is defensively self-sufficient, but offensively dependent on U.S. Navy. It is a ”shield and spear” complimentary relationship like no other in the world. This symbiosis is the backbone of the Japan-U.S. maritime alliance. Given Japan’s geography and internationally dependent economy, JMSDF’s emphasis on superior Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Mine Warfare (MW) are non-negotiable.

The JMSDF must maintain the effectiveness of its Commitment Strategy in the event of national emergency from multi-layered ISR within Japan’s territorial waters and its Contingency Response Strategy to improve international stability and security.

To be the most effective, JMSDF must direct defense resources to mission readiness and joint Japan-U.S. operations. However, in a climate of decreasing resources, greater efficiency in training and logistical capacity is critical.

1. C4ISR Capability

C4ISR capability should be emphasized to achieve information superiority, an indispensable condition, to win modern warfare. C4ISR capability is the foundation of ISR that JMSDF conducts in its territorial waters during peacetime, and the command and control exercised by warfare
commanders. Operational Commanders and Command headquarters must utilize a Common Operational Picture (COP) in the face of international terrorism, piracy and other international crises.

2. **Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Capability**

   Many countries, including Japan’s neighbors and the countries along the SLOCs to the Middle East, operate submarines as part of their naval forces. One vulnerability in Japan’s national security is its total dependency on maritime shipping. Submarines will pose the greatest threat to Japan’s maritime interest. Safety of SLOCs and the seas surrounding Japan requires a rapid response to Japan’s national emergency by U.S. forces. In late 1990s, JMSDF spread itself think directing resources to suspicious maritime activity at the expense of ASW. However, policy in this regard has JMSDF shifted back to ASW in the areas of training, operations, research and development.

3. **At Sea Logistics Support Capability**

   In self defense situations, JMSDF is responsible for the transport of Ground Self-Defense Force and Air Self-Defense Force personnel and equipment. Lacking a comprehensive anti-ballistic missile defense, JMSDF must sustain Sea Basing Capability including aircraft, logistical support and potential joint operational command. This also applies to domestic and forward deployment for disaster relief and peacekeeping activities.

4. **Educating people and enhance capability**

   In the age of diversity, internationalization and advances in technology, each service member must possess strong vocational and professional skills and a clear understanding of his or her mission.

   Improved recruiting and training will better prepare personnel for 21st century challenges. It is incumbent upon the JMSDF to balance equipment and personnel demands, directing resources to education and training.

**Conclusion**

The JMSDF has been conducting ongoing operations as a partner in the “front line of defense” since the end of the Cold War. However, personnel and equipment problems have created challenges within the organization.
This paper raised several question. What is the core mission of the JMSDF? How does the JMSDF carry out its mission in today’s international climate?

As an island nation, Japan depends on overseas trade for its food and energy resources. The mission of the JMSDF remains constant, the defense of surrounding waters and protection of maritime traffic. Japan’s defense from direct and indirect aggression also remains unchanged. Training for a state of high readiness and rapid response to national emergency is more important now than ever before.

Japan’s peace and stability are bolstered by its maritime economy, which in turn bolsters stability and security within the international community. Economies have become globalized, therefore stability is a universal shared by international community. In this climate, the JMSDF must not lose sight of its core values and mission as it operates both domestically and internationally.

It is vital to maintain strength and readiness in peacetime, to guarantee the safety of maritime traffic and stability of the area including the SLOCs.

It is time for JMSDF to set sail in the new era with confidence and pride to defend Japan’s survival and prosperity for the future.

The new Mid Term Defense Program will be promulgated within the Ministry of Defense. For fellow “Hatou” readers, consider the future of JMSDF using this paper as a trigger for further discussion. As former Maritime Chief of Staff, Admiral Teiji Nakamura outlined in his farewell message, “tradition is built upon the continuing endeavors of its followers.”

“Admiral Soukichi Takagi taught us the tradition is the continuation of creation. In its 25 years history, the JMSDF has built upon the legacy of the Imperial Navy and our forefathers. Do not follow in the same steps, but please bring the JMSDF forward to meet expectations of Japanese people. Let the improvement be timely with optimism and confidence.”