Abstract

US Strategic “Rebalance” and the Geopolitics in East Asia: Rebalance, Grate Power Relations, and Regional Security

YAGI Naoto

Obama administration, upon taking office in January 2009, proclaimed the US “return to Asia.” The strategic “rebalance to Asia” announced in November 2011 builds on these earlier actions to deepen and institutionalize US commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. The INSS has reported the “Rebalance” that responds to the Asia-Pacific region’s increased economic and strategic weight seeks to bring US global diplomatic, economic, and military resource commitments into balance with expanding US regional interests, therefore, rebalance is a comprehensive approach for this region. For the US and Chinese leaders, preventing unwanted strategic rivalry is the most important regional agenda, and both great powers should increase cooperation on common interests and seek to manage competitive aspects of US-China relations. Chinese military, however, upgrades their A2/AD capabilities and US develops new strategic concept, for example, “AirSea Battle”, or “Offshore Control.” US-China relations and regional security, in the future, will be able to make both an optimistic view and a pessimistic view, since the situation is extremely complicated. When the Cold War was over, a famous realist stated “we will soon miss the Cold War!” I’ll try analysis, in this article, US “Rebalance” and Chinese “New Type of Major Power Relations,” from geopolitical view. And I would examine the contrasting interests of maritime and continental powers, of course I warn it not to fall into prastabilierte harmonie, the strategic characteristics of regional status quo, or not.
Transformation of Air-Sea Battle
from the full scale war with China to limited concept against A2/AD

HIRAYAMA Shigetoshi

Air-Sea Battle is controversial concept and there are quite active discussions about it and consequently, there is quite a number of papaers about it. However not a small number of them have failed what Air-Sea Battle concept they are talking about. As far as I concern, there are four major papaers about Air-Sea Battle, namely CSBA's “AirSea Battle” in 2010, Schwartz and Greenert’s “Air-Sea Battle” in 2012, Greenert and Welsh’s “Breaking the Kill Chain” in 2013, and Air-Sea Battle Office’s “Air-Sea Battle” in 2013. Therefore, if one wishes to discuss about Air-Sea Battle, he has to define what Air-Sea Battle concept he is talking about.

This paper studies those concept papaers and clarifies transforming nature of Air-Sea Battle concept. The paper tries to articulate that conceptual level in strategic structure, adversaries and even desired endstates in Air-Sea Battle has changed. CSBA proposed AirSea Battle as full spectrum operational concept to fight and win a war with China, but Air-Sea Battle concept that DOD finially adopts is limited to maintain access against A2/AD threats (no specific states/non-state names).

Chinese Submarine Threat and the U.S. Navy
How does U.S. Navy evaluate and counter Chinese Submarine Warfare?

AOI Shigaku

On September 2011, Admiral Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations gave a guidance for maintaining the superiority in Undersea Warfare. He
urged 'dominate of the undersea domain' in order to meet A2/AD challenges posed by submarines.

This paper analyzes the strategic shift of the U. S. Navy toward Chinese submarines to find out when the U. S. Navy’s threat recognition has changed to meet the present security environment. U. S. Navy needed almost a decade to recognize emerging challenges posed by Chinese undersea capability, then they initiated capacity shift from Atlantic to Pacific Ocean. However, now the United States is facing the verge of a financial plight, the U. S. Navy asked JMSDF to share more duties, such as the ISR mission in this theater. The U. S. Navy in concert with its allies continues their efforts to maintain undersea edge over PLA Navy.

Iran’s A2/AD and “Outside-In”
: In View of Mine Warfare

NOHJOH Masashi

Western Countries strengthened economic sanctions against Iran because of their nuclear program. On the other hand, Iranian navy chief transmitted the word “Shutting down oil exports is easier than drinking a glass of water.” At the same time, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) published a brand new operational concept “Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats”.

In addition to host the International Mine Countermeasure Exercise 2012(IMCMEX 12) of the largest ever, the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) invited Mine Countermeasure Force of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) officially and obstinately. What on earth is happening to NATO countries and the United States? In my mind that has been involved in the field of Mine Warfare, the doubt their forces might not be able to deal with the situation with “mines threats”
expected in the Persian Gulf region has occurred. In this article, I make it clear the challenges that must be faced and met by JMSDF in the trend of the U.S.-Japan alliance by solving the question, and I also rethink about the future relationship between Iran and Japan based on a legacy from the Gulf War in 1991.

**Japan-Australia security cooperation**

*From the point of view of security and defense policy be seen in official documents*

**SHIOMI Chikara**

March 13, 2007, Australian Prime Minister Howard MP and Prime Minister Abe entered into "Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation" in Tokyo. By this Declaration, Japan strengthened its efforts on security. If you think in Japan alone, this Declaration is on the road to switch to multilateral security arrangements from the US-Japan security treaty system of the Japanese conventional security policy, or exist together. It is intended to clarify the background of the Japan-Australia cooperation and contents of the "Japan-Australia Joint Declaration", through the change in the security policy and matching points found by analyzing the official archives of Japan and Australia, and the published documents like as the joint communiqué that have been agreed at the Bilateral (US-Japan, US-Australia) and the Trilateral (US-Japan-Australia).
An amphibious operation in early-modern times
: The invasion of Korea 1592 (Bunroku-no-eki)

KURATANI Masashi

The great maritime transport capability is necessary to convey and unload a large size of forces and supply them across the sea.

During the battle of Bunroku in 1592, a large amount of food, weapons and other supplies were transported repeatedly.

In the paper, I discussed how the Japanese prepared and conveyed supplies for the first battle of Bunroku. I featured extraction and issues, in light of each phase of the modern amphibious operation.