Abstract

**Japan Maritime Self Defense Force and NGO**

*Focusing on HA/DR*

**SHIMODAIRA Takuya**

When a huge disaster occurs, the whole of government approach is essential. In many cases, we have to overcome Civil-Military gap when we conduct Disaster Relief Operations. In response to the unprecedented catastrophe of the Great East Japan Earthquake, the SDF made efforts to fulfill its responsibility through cooperation with other civil actors. Information, manpower, funds and resources were gathered at that time. It showed the importance of the role of platform and coordination among different agencies and local governments to manage the disaster.

Smooth collaboration with NGOs and NPOs is essential to support local residents because NGOs have comprehensive knowledge and a broad network through overseas emergency relief activities.

What relationship between the JMSDF and NGOs is required under devastated situation? From the viewpoints across full range of military operations and of its strategic, operational and tactical levels, Civil-Military Operation which synchronizes with military and nonmilitary organizations is the most effective way and should be a primary instrument as all-out national power. U.S. Chiefs of Staff updated Operational Doctrine which defines the foundations and key considerations regarding Civil-Military Operation and Interorganizational Coordination.

This paper analyzes these doctrines and proposes ideal relationship between the JMSDF and NGOs to demonstrate the importance of mutual understanding and knowing the differences. It clarifies our roles and capabilities and how we should prepare for the future disasters.
Challenges of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force
Public Affairs
: Comparison with the US Forces public relations

MAEYAMA Ippo

This paper is trying to seek out the issues of Japan Maritime Self Defense Force’s public affairs, and finding the direction of its improvement.

1 The Outline of Joint Publication 3-61
This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for public affairs support to joint operations. It also addresses public affairs operations and the role of public affairs in strategic communication.

2 Joint Public Affair Support Element: JPASE
The JPASE improves the ability of joint forces to operate successfully in today’s complex information environment.

3 Combat Camera: COMCAM
COMCAM provides visual information in support of the commander’s operational and planning requirements. It has a technological capability for the timely transmission of images during fast-moving operations.

4 Challenges and problems of the maritime self-defense force
JMSDF has been organizing in Public Affairs as the administration function. Recently days, the society of Japan is developing quickly to the information society. The key of adapting ourselves to new environment is that PA resources should reform from Administrational placement to the part of naval operation. JMSDF should apply the function of JPASE and COMCAM that will lead to progress of JMSDF’s fascination, justice, and confidence to Japanese people and International society as the soft power.
Mobilization of the military domestically in the United States: What Katrina revealed

INOUE Takashi

Hurricane Katrina, one of the largest hurricanes in recorded history, hit the east coast of the United States in August 2005, and destroyed urban areas and killed many people.

It can hardly be said that the US government handled this disaster quickly and efficiently. Many people expected FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency, established by president James E. Carter Jr. in 1979) to handle this disaster well, but its handling of the disaster revealed many problems, including a complex chain of command caused by the merge with DHS (Department of Homeland Security, established in 2003, following the 9.11 series of terrorist attacks) and the ensuing reorganization. Lack of training in the handling of such disasters also contributed to the poor response. Katrina also triggered an argument about whether the president should dispatch the military into disaster-hit areas to save citizens’ lives and property when national disasters occur inside the country. Some argued that dispatching the military immediately was practical, and others argued the military shouldn’t be dispatched internally.

The US traditionally has a notion that the military should mainly handle external threats, and civilians mainly handle internal ones. In 1878, the “Posse Comitatus Act” was established to clearly ban the mobilization of the military domestically. However, the change in security environment after 9.11 meant that a reasonable argument could be made for a change in this policy, and during national disasters such as Katrina, the fact that quick mobilization of the military can save lives and maintain security can’t be ignored.

This paper concludes that the analysis why there was such a big debate about internal use of the military, and how the 9.11 attacks caused the American public’s attitude toward security and use of the military internally to change.
This paper also concludes that the analysis how city officials and state and federal government responded to the disaster conditions following Katrina and discussions related to 2007 and 2008 defense authorization bills to consider how American public’s attitude toward internal use of the military changed these days.

Post Conflict Strategy in the Iraq War
:The Surge and its background analysis

YOSHIOKA Takeshi

In the Iraq war which stated in 2003, the U.S. made a remarkable success in military campaign. However, its post conflict operations including stabilization and recovery did not go so smooth.

In 2007, the U.S. changed its post conflict strategy and adopted “The Surge.” As its name tells, the new strategy calls for additional troops for improving Iraq’s local security. But changes can been seen not only in number of troops but also in filed tactics and civ-mil cooperation. This new strategy played a significant role in finishing the war without being assessed as a defeat of the U.S.

There are numbers of arguments analyzing and describing the reasons of the failures of the U.S. post conflict operation. This essay examines these arguments from a viewpoint of “the role of military in post conflict operations” and verifies the analysis through checking the factors of success made by the Surge.

Current global security environment demands the U.S. to be involved in humanitarian assistance and nation building operations. The post conflict analysis of the Iraq war has a lot of beneficial lessons in considering post conflict operations which the U.S. will have to face in the future.

Historically, post conflict operations have been regarded as the civilian organizations’ business and military organizations have inherent hesitation in being involved in those operations. However, while carrying out successful post conflict operation is mandatory for winning a war, the post
conflict operation becomes more and more difficult for civilians to accomplish. Therefore, the military has to have a thorough understanding about own role in post conflict operations in order for the nation to win a war.

Substance and the present significance of Offshore Balancing:
Forward deepen USJ alliance

MASAHIRO Sato

US decline has been pointed out for a long time which, Christopher Layne has argued US hegemony ended, became “unipolar illusion”. In addition, Layne insisted Obama administration’s new Defense Strategic Guidance (known as DSG) reflects the reality that offshore balancing has jumped from the cloistered walls of academe to the real world of Washington policy making.

To deal with various balancing from other states, US tries to balance/rebalance itself for a decade. Offshore balancing is a self-restraint strategy, based on burden shifting. Other states would have to become responsible for providing their own security and for the security of the regions in which they are confined to, rather than looking to the US to do it for them. Only if other states failed to balance effectively against a rising Eurasian hegemon, US will a commit militarily option over the ocean. Offshore balancing has been chosen in response to situations within US history.

Layne has argued from 1997-2012 about offshore balancing, basic concept is no change, but he is aware of reflecting policy making by emphasizing importance of air-sea power as well as US defense strategy while emphasizing these ideas within his reports. The root of offshore balancing which Layne argues is comparable to Kenneth Waltz’s ideas, substances of the offshore balancing are self-restraint, burden shifting and commit
militarily by power-projection on vital cases. Japan must prepare for changing US strategy including choice of offshore balancing, conduct “Balance & Synergy” strategy, the present significance of offshore balancing is the warning of US hegemony, the warning and expectation for allies including Japan.

Features and Limitations of Admiral INOUE Shigeyoshi’s Intelligence Analysis Method: In Comparison with Analysis of Competing Hypotheses

TAKAHASHI Hidemasa

Admiral Inoue Shigeyoshi commanded the Japanese Forth Fleet and served as Vice-Minister of the Navy during WWII. He was also known for his thesis entitled “Shingunbi Keikaku Ron (Modern Military Procurement Planning),” which foresaw the realities of the Pacific War and sought radical restructuring Japanese Fleet.

When he was a professor of Imperial Japanese Naval War College, he taught how to estimate the enemy’s situation and wrote two documents about it. Even though he had no experience of serving as an intelligence analyst, we can find some elements of intelligence analysis methods today in his documents. This paper examines the features and limitations of Admiral Inoue’s intelligence analysis method in comparison with Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) which is one of most popular methods today.

The features of Admiral Inoue’s method are summarized in three points. First, it took into accounts of the limitations of Intelligence. Second, it pursues the rational and logical thinking. Finally it focuses on the importance of follow-up phase comes after what the analyst drew as a provisional conclusion.

On the other hand, Admiral Inoue’s method has two limitations. First, Admiral Inoue had little understanding of human cognitive capability
limitation. He could not make use of the knowledge of cognitive psychology when he developed his method. Second, it requires great efforts and long period of time to employ his method.