Abstract

Challenges for JMSDF after Post Cold War Era

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The world order is changing; this paper examines how future global security order poses new challenges to Japan and how JMSDF should reshape its *modus operandi* to meet them.

Sovereign states are re-emerging as main actors in international arena. There are serious challenges to freedom of navigation by emerging game-changers. Internet and media are transforming battlefields and we have to be legal, lethal and legitimate force for “Justice” on global media network. We have no crystal ball to foresee future but it is clear that our future is full of uncertainty. Role of powers, namely US in the turning point, emerging China and India, troubled EU, unstable Middle East will shape the uncharted waters.

This paper proposes drastic shift of Japan’s maritime defense policy. JMSDF’s center of efforts had been national defense during the Cold War, and end of CW make JMSDF operate globally i.e. support operation for war on terrorism and anti-piracy mission off Somalia. However, its complementary nature with US Navy was and still is adamant.

This paper concludes that JMSDF should play greater role for both national defense and regional/global security since US would be no longer strong enough to maintain global maritime order unilaterally. JMSDF should not be little brother of US Navy; it should be more self-reliant, capable and responsible.

--- An English translation of this paper will be posted later. ---
Theoritical Analysis of Deterrence for China and AirSea Battle
: Based on an Idea of Toshi Yoshihara & James Holmes

Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes wrote in their paper titled “Asymmetric Warfare, American Style” about China’s reaching out to the blue water and AirSea Battle (ASB), quoting the limited war theory which was inherited from Clausewitz to Corbett and Wylie’s cumulative strategic theory.

Many other analysts have also published papers about China’s recent expansion to the sea, referring to classic maritime strategic theories as ideas which lie in the background. For example, a Japanese analyst says that waters around Japan are now “waters of fear” in which ghosts of Mahan and Corbett are wandering.

China has been building a Blue-water Navy and aiming to reach out to the blue water by adopting Mahan’s theory. To confront rising China, some analysts have an extreme suggestion that the US could conduct an air raid on China’s mainland by its Air Force’s long-range bombers, which is called “Networked Integrated Attacks-in-Depth” as a core of ASB.

However, Yoshihara and Holmes oppose the idea and claim that the US should try to influence the Chinese Communist Party and the PLA to calculate profits and losses rationally to avoid armed conflicts.

To materialize their idea, the US needs to closely coordinate Japan’s new concept of dynamic defense force with ASB concept and improve the US-Japan cooperative AirSeaLand Battle (ASLB) capability.
Trend of U.S. Amphibious Operations
: Focusing on Comparison with Joint Doctrines

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On March 11, 2011, the Great East Earthquake brought catastrophic damage upon the nation of Japan. In the wake of the earthquake, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps carried out disaster relief operations. They mainly operated “from the sea,” sending relief forces ashore directly into the disaster zone from ships positioned off the coast nearby. The accesses from the sea were remarkably effective under the situation where land transport infrastructure was extensively damaged.

Military operations such as these, conducted towards the land from the sea, are known as, “amphibious operations.” Amphibious operations used to be at the core of the grand strategy for such maritime nations as Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, and have historically enabled these nations to deploy ground forces into hostile territory from the sea. Now, amphibious operations can be applied to operations other than war, such as security cooperation operations and foreign humanitarian assistance operations.

In the Number 2, Volume 1 of this Review, YAMAMOTO Yoshinobu argued that functions or roles of military forces have been influenced by characteristics or structures of international systems and future military engagements may require the functions of the Modern, the Post-Modern and the Post-Modern part II.

This paper compares the old doctrines with the post-Cold War doctrines of U.S. amphibious operations, analyzes some historical amphibious operations, changes in amphibious shipping, and references to amphibious operations in strategic documents, and argues that the military
should maintain the functions of the Modern, the Post-Modern and the Post-Modern part II together, not only at a level of the international system but also at a level of the operation.

**Amphibious Operation Capability Required for Japan and Operational Challenges**

*: Based on Analysis on Amphibious Operation Capability of the United States Navy and Marine Corps*

**NAKAYA Jun**

Since the 2010 National Defense Program Guideline stipulates that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will respond to attacks on Japan’s offshore islands, we need to discuss our country’s amphibious operation capability which is suitable for its characteristics.

Studying related materials of the United States military and interviewing several unit commanders of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, I summarize the concept and analyze cases of the U.S. amphibious operation, consider amphibious operation capability required for Japan and examine operational challenges of Japan’s amphibious operation.

As a result of my research, I conclude that the SDF needs to develop amphibious operation capability equivalent to the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). But it doesn’t have to be designed for expedition. Unlike the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, the SDF needs to not only maintain existing capability but also strengthen capability of land attack and access to land from sea for the limited purpose of responding to attacks on Japan’s offshore islands. In addition, how the SDF should maintain and improve the performance of a unit equivalent to the ARG will be a future challenge.
The Deterrence Revised
: New Challenges and Ability of the “Tailored” Deterrence

YAGI Naoto

Deterrence is “Back,” although the Cold War situation lost its centrality in security policy for longtime, one officer, USAF reported on the Joint Force Quarterm, the United States embraced its modified concepts of deterrence. Following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, many scholars and experts argued the deterrence was irrelevant to the new security challenges. During the war on terrorism, however, some experts reported the US could in fact establish a new and effective posture of “deterrence” against the new challenges.

Moreover, one scholar has analyzed the Cross-domain Operations on the Strategic Forum, NDU, and emphasis on the “deterrence” at the space and the cyberspace realms.

In this article, I rethink about the concept of deterrence and analyze its abilities for new challenges. I hope, although my expertise is limited, this article would be an intellectual renaissance and an answer to Professor Brian McAllister’s assumptions.

Approaches to Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the East China Sea between Japan and China
: In View of Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin

YOSHIKAWA Naonori

China and Vietnam have made peaceful maritime delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin successfully, in spite of their bitter history of dispute and confrontation. From analyses of their way to the peaceful maritime delimitation, we can find many positive factors in Sino-Vietnam relations,
such as political, economic and historical background, common perception for jurisdiction of islands and strong leadership of high rank officials. Then, if we can make equal positive conditions in the East China Sea (ESC), could it be possible to make certain progress for peaceful solution of antagonism between Japan and China, concerning Senkaku islands and median line? As a result, this analysis indicates severe realities of ECS. There are many players, instead of two. Jurisdiction of islands is one of the hardest confrontations. Military buildups make potential instability. Historical dispute often comes to the surface emotionally. All of these unsolved problems in ECS make everything more difficult and complex compared with the Gulf of Tonkin. In ECS, there is little possibility for Japan and China to make peaceful maritime delimitation successfully in foreseeable future.

What we have to do now is to maintain status quo. It means indication of strong national will to protect our advantage, “effective governance,” in spite of unstable environment. Probably, this “maintenance of the status quo” must be kept for a long period of time. Under these circumstances, we have to fix present strategic environment although it is unstable, and make cool diplomatic efforts to obtain understanding from international society. As a sovereign state, there are a lot of things to do.