Abstract

U.S. Defense Budget Reduction and the Forward Presence in Asia-Pacific

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This paper has two purposes. The first is to explain what the recent U.S. defense budget reduction is like, and the second is to analyze the trend of the U.S. forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region mainly from the viewpoint of its defense spending cut.

The Obama Administration has made hard efforts to reduce defense budget. One of such efforts was “Defense Efficiencies Initiative” proposed by Robert Gates, former Secretary of Defense. Since President Obama signed the bill of Budget Control Act in August 2011, the Department of Defense was forced to reduce more defense spending in the years to come.

Despite such budgetary pressure, many U.S. officials have emphasized the significance of the Asia-Pacific region. “Fiscal Year Budget Request 2013” says that strengthening the U.S. presence in the Asia Pacific region is one of key elements in its new defense strategy.

This paper analyzes the contradiction between the severe financial condition and the policies for strengthening its presence in Asia-Pacific, which reveals that the recent U.S. policies in the region result from the U.S.’s interest in “prosperous stability” and “threat” in the area and its financial condition.

Finally, this paper concludes that the budgetary aspect is becoming more important in considering the U.S. security policies. We need to pay more attention to the U.S. defense budget as well as its strategy, military strength, equipment and facilities.
EU’s Decision on the Arms Embargo on China

: The U.S. Influence on the EU’s Decision

MATSUZAKI Miyuki

This paper examines the reason why the EU did not or could not lift the arms embargo on China in the period between 2003 and 2005 by focusing the U.S. pressure. The purpose of this paper is to analyze how the U.S. pressure affected the EU’s decision that the EU shelved the arms embargo issue.

Many previous studies concluded that the U.S. pressure was the main factor of the EU’s decision. Those studies, however, do not clearly show how the U.S. put pressure on the EU and how the U.S. pressure concretely affected the EU’s decision.

This paper analyzes the effectiveness of the arms embargo both from the EU and the U.S. perspectives. Then this study examines the reason why EU proposed to lift the arms embargo and the reason why the U.S. opposed it. Concrete U.S. pressure on EU by executive and legislative branches was described in this paper.

Finally, this paper concludes that the U.S. pressure by executive branch made the EU understand that the arms embargo issue was the national security issue rather than old “symbolic” issue for the U.S. Additionally, the US pressure by legislative branch had direct influence on the EU’s decision not to lift the arms embargo.
PLAN’s Influence on PLA’s Decision Making System
: Perception Gap between PLA and PLAN over Sea

YAMAMOTO Katsuya

Watching China’s military activities from the sea, we tend to believe that People’s Liberation Army Navy’s activities embodies People’s Liberation Army’s interests are heading towards the ocean. Certainly, the Chinese Communist Party declares maritime development and advance into waters as one of their major policies for developing the nation. In addition, the nation invests resources in the naval power as a means to achieve maritime development and is gaining capability of PLAN. It is no doubt that their activities have been expanding and increasing. However, these facts are not PLA’s major concerns. There is a perception gap between PLA and PLAN over the sea.

The central decision making authority of PLA as Chinese Communist Party’s military power is from Central Military Committee and 4 General Departments. The decision making authority still mainly consists of Army members hence the influential power by PLAN is still limited. Major military interest of Army-centric PLA is domestic issues and relatively has less interest in the maritime issue. Military diplomacy by PLA which is independent from State Council and Army-dominated diplomacy cannot cast aside concerns for PLAN’s expansion to neighboring countries including Japan.

This paper compares their activities and expansion, and concludes that there is little influence on PLAN activities within PLA resulting from such perception gap between PLA and PLAN over the sea, which makes it difficult for us to predict Chinese response in Asia-Pacific region and maritime security.
Background of the Development of Oil-gas Field in the East China Sea

: The Role of CNOOC Seen as "Interest Groups"

ENDO Akihiko

In 1968 ECAFE (the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) conducted the oceanographic activities in the East China Sea, and it announced that there would be a possibility of a huge amount of oil deposit in the shelf floor.

The issue first arose in August 2003 when China undertook Chunxiao oil-gas field projects exploration for oil in the East China Sea. The issue surfaced when Japan confirmed that China has started constructing a drilling facility in the area within China's EEZ, 5 kilometers from Japan's claimed center line between each country's coasts.

What is the key to the development of Chunxiao oil-gas field?

On the one hand, as well as involvement in the South China Sea, there is a view of China's hegemony in the ocean. On the other hand, NOC (National Oil Company) is referred to as "interest groups" to be pointed out in China, and has had a major impact in determining foreign policy. Chunxiao oil-gas field was developed by CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corp).

This paper analyzes the following hypothesis: CNOOC has grown to "interest groups", to have the influence with foreign policy decision.

It concludes development of Chunxiao oil-gas field is considered to be one of the businesses of CNOOC rather than a China's hegemony in the ocean.
The Future of Seabasing

: Defense Capability after NDPG and post the GEJE

SHIMODAIRA Takuya

One of the lessons we learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake was the necessity of transportation and amphibious operation capabilities. The needs of those capabilities to confront rising China is also stated in “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and beyond (NDPG)”.

The U.S.’s seabasing is an informative way to improve those capabilities. However, seabasing is still a vaguely defined term. This paper tries to clearly define its meaning and to suggest the vision of seabasing in the future.

First, this paper examines the function of seabasing and analyzes the U.S.’s strategic documents on seabasing. Seabasing has been developed and met to the growing needs of flexible and mobile sites that are available wherever and whenever needed under unstable and complex security environment.

Second, it analyzes “Sea Power 21” which introduced seabasing and sought its significance for the first time.

Finally, it suggests new defense capabilities to be required in the future. This paper concludes that seabasing is a flexible operating concept for projecting and sustaining naval power and improving joint operation capabilities.