Abstract

The Context of the “AirSea Battle”

YAGI Naoto

The term of “Anti-access, Area-denial (A2/AD)” or “AirSea Battle” has been popular among security community since QDR 2010 (Quadrennial Defense Review) was published from US Department of Defense. The A2/AD threat means the counter-power-projection abilities of US enemies, and “AirSea Battle” is a new concept to cope with these threats. The concept, however, is not clear to the public; no contents are in the official documents at present. We only know that the US military strategy is in the process of change and the AirSea Battle concept is obviously the countermeasure for geopolitical threats to US and her allies. This essay tried to identify the context of “AirSea Battle” concept. First, it examined the context of A2/AD, and then analyzed the US perspectives for Chinese military strength. Finally, it concluded that the power projection ability of US is going to “RECONQUISTA” through the concept of “AirSea Battle.”

Chinese engagement to Oceanic island countries: Strategic impacts and Way ahead for existing powers

YOSHIKAWA Naonori

Compared with South China Sea or East China Sea, generally speaking, few pay attention to Oceania area. It is true in Oceania area, different from SCS or ECS, there is no “clear and present danger”. There is only “possible and future danger”.

However, considering the history of Asian Pacific Area and wide variety of Chinese activities in Oceania area, especially in the last decade, it is highly
possible that Chinese expansion to blue water, which was clear in Asia so far, will go forward to Oceania in the near future.

On the other hand, in view of current international situation such as economic interdependence, it is impossible and inappropriate to exclude or enclose Chinese influences in this area. In the real world, we have to accept certain level of Chinese influences. Then, it is necessary to form some safeguard for Chinese influences not to be too prominent in this area.

In order to achieve this objective, we will welcome China to join international frameworks, and at the same time, we have to control Chinese influences inside these international frameworks to prevent these frameworks to be “Chinalized”. We can call this strategy as “Anti-Chinalization”.

For fruitful “Anti-Chinalization”, we have to lead China into voluntary cooperation and to maintain counter influences against her growing influences.

Once fruitful “Anti-Chinalization” works well, following good balance of influences between China and existing powers will make relatively long-term strategic stability in Asian Pacific and Oceania area.

**Strategic meaning of Arctic ocean and participation of China**

**ISHIHARA Takahiro**

The Arctic Ocean has been valued geopolitically by the effect of global warming in recent years, and is becoming a region where the world’s large attentions are concentrated.

Active use of resource development there and the Northen Sea Route etc. influence widely around the world.

China also shows the strong interest in the Arctic. China, as a new big Power, piling up the results of her scientific and environmental surveillance, is clarifying her intention of active participation in, such as Arctic Council that is expected to become the kernel of an Arctic problem
solving. China will try to demonstrate her influence as a big power to form preferable rules and regulations for her. Japan’s active participation is also necessary.

**Dissect “The Battle of Tsushima” scientifically**

: Decision making of Heihachiro Togo

KURATANI Masashi

Admiral Heihachiro Togo went into the 1905 Battle of Tsushima with an ardent desire to destroy the Russian Baltic Fleet. He is remembered in history for having done just that, to a degree rarely achieved in naval warfare. The geographical environment of the Tsushima Strait was an important factor of the nearly complete destruction of the Russian Baltic Fleet by the Japanese Combined Fleet.

CDR Tetsutaro Sato insisted that Combined Fleet should move to the central part of sea of Japan to wait for the Baltic Fleet because Baltic Fleet might come from another straight, while Mahan praised Togo’s choice of a central location in Tsushima Straight, where he can wage decisive battle. But did Togo choose to fight in the Tsushima Strait, and if so, how did he choose the location? And was Tsushima the right location Togo should have chosen, or was it just a gamble based on intuition, ignoring the results of precise calculation?

This essay analyzes whether Togo’s decision was appropriate or not from the perspective of game theory.
A Han-class submarine's invasion of Japanese territorial waters:
Reading the Dutton's "Scouting, Signaling, and Gatekeeping"

MINEMURA Yoshito

Chinese naval buildup under the economic development has been quite impressive in recent years. They have greatly expanded the scope of activities from coastal waters to blue waters.

A case to symbolize the Chinese naval deployment to the blue water is a Han-class submarine invasion into Japanese territorial waters around Sakishima Islands in November 2004.

Peter Dutton, associate professor of U.S. Naval War College is using this event as a test case to understand how China sets the rivalry between expanding navy and her restrictive interpretation of freedom of navigation.

In his paper, Dutton introduced a summary of the event and explained the relationship between the PLA Naval activities and the Chinese understanding on international law. Basing on his discussions, this essay analyzes the additional cases after this event, and re-evaluates the relation between Submarine operations and the international law.

Establishing ‘the styles of warfighting’:
Implication from “CMSI Chinese Mine Warfare”

NAKAYAMA Kentarou

For the maritime operations launched from the sea, not just for operations at sea, free access to important strategic bases or foundations is critical. Mines are a serious threat to prevent access to there.

Mines severely restrict the naval forces from utilizing her critical advantage of “proximity” and “maneuverability” by moderate cost. Thus, continuous study of mine warfare is an essential issue for us.
This study was motivated by that recognition. In the first section, the nature of contemporary armed conflict, namely “complexity”, and the conflict models based on that nature are shown. Then the styles of warfighting adapted to these models are picked up from the doctrines of these countries, and tried to verify Mine Warfare is clearly defined with firm role in these styles. In the second section, the main document “the Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy 'Assassin's Mace' Capability” (China Maritime Studies Number3) by China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S.Naval War College, is analyzed considering the perspective gained in the previous section. In the final section, the role of mine warfare in a series of operations based on the Chinese style of warfighting is reaffirmed, and the most suitable measure against this is suggested.