International Peace & Security Symposium 2012

Challenges in UN Integrated Mission
— Function, Structure and Framework —

Saturday, 17 November, 2012
Hotel New Otani, Tokyo

Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center
Joint Staff College
The views expressed at the Symposium and in this publication are those of the participants, and do not necessarily represent the views of their Organizations.
Preface

It is a great honor and pleasure of all members of the Joint Staff College (JSC) to announce that the “International Peace and Security Symposium 2012”, hosted by Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC) under JSC, is held following to last year’s first symposium. The JSC and JPC would express our heart-felt thanks to all of you for your great support given to us since the establishment of JPC in March 2010.

This year, 2012, is the memorable twentieth year since Japan first participated in the United Nations’ Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). The circumstances surrounding the UN missions changed drastically and the UN missions themselves have developed through many attempts during these twenty years. The main task of the traditional UN PKO was to monitor a ceasefire between nations but it has developed to a multi-dimensional one which mixes several functions complexly. Because of its multi-functionality, modern PKOs involve a wide range of actors, not only within military but also to police and civilians from various countries and organizations. Unless these actors are coherently integrated, it is impossible to achieve UN purposes of “To Maintain International Peace and Security”, “Protection of Human Rights” and “Development and Reconstruction”. The series of symposiums is designed to discuss various challenging issues, from the imminent and specific to the potential in the latest UN missions with experienced experts by a cross-cutting approach and to enhance the profound outlook for the future peace operations.

In last year’s symposium, “Challenges in Multi-dimensional PKO and Integrated Peace Missions” was discussed, especially with focus on “Protection of Civilian”. This year, we will highlight “Multi-functioning of UN PKO and Integration of UN Missions”. To discuss “Integration of Mission” diversely from various points of view of UN Secretariat, UN mission headquarters, fields activities and academic organizational behavior, we invite Mr. Kiyotaka Kawabata from UN Department of Political Affairs, Major General (Retd) Robert Gordon, a former Force Commander in the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), Ms. Yukie Osa, President of Association for Aid and Relief, Japan, and Associate Prof. Tomoya Kamino from Gifu University. And we also invite Prof. Toshiya Hoshino (Osaka University) as the moderator in the panel discussion. Prof. Hoshino will give the concluding lecture and round up all aspects of presentations and discussions at the end of the symposium.

On behalf of the Joint Staff College, we would like to give our sincere thanks for your participation in this symposium.

17 November, 2012

Organizing Committee Chair; RADM Satoshi KIKUCHI
Program Committee Chair; COL. Katsunobu ISHIBASHI
Editorial Committee Chair; CAPT(Navy) Hideki HAYASHI
Program

“Challenges in UN Integrated Mission -Function, Structure and Framework-”

09:30 – 09:45 Opening Remarks:
Lt Gen Tsugio ISHINO
(Commandant, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense)

09:45 – 10:50 Keynote Speech: Maj Gen (Retd) Robert Gordon

11:00 – 12:05 Presentation: Mr. Kiyotaka KAWABATA
(Political Affairs Officer, Department of Political Affairs, UN)

12:05 – 13:15 Break

13:15 – 14:50 Panel Discussion
Moderator: Prof. Toshiya HOSHINO (Osaka University)
Panelists : Maj Gen (Retd) Robert Gordon
Mr. Kiyotaka KAWABATA(DPA/United Nations)
Prof. Tomoya KAMINO (Gifu University)
Ms. Yukie OSA (Association for Aide and Relief, Japan)

15:00 – 15:40 Concluding Lecture and Round up:
Prof. Toshiya HOSHINO (Osaka University)

15:40 – 15:50 Closing Remarks: RADM Satoshi KIKUCHI
(Vice Commandant, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense)
MAJOR GENERAL (Retired) RDS GORDON
CMG CBE MA

Major General Robert Gordon was educated at Wellington College from where he won a scholarship to study Modern History at St. Catharine’s College, Cambridge University. He was commissioned into the 17th/21st Lancers in 1970, and served after graduation as a young officer in reconnaissance, armour and on foot in the Sudan, Cyprus, Germany, Northern Ireland and on exchange with Lord Strathcona’s Horse in Canada.

After 2 years weapon and staff training at the Army’s Staff Colleges in Shrivenham and Camberley, his early staff appointments were as Chief of Staff of 4th Armoured Brigade in West Germany; as a weapons staff officer in the UK MOD; and, on promotion to Lieutenant Colonel, as Military Assistant to the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army of the Rhine and the Commander of NATO’s Northern Army Group (1988-1990) in West Germany. From 1990-1992 he commanded the 17th/21st Lancers in Germany, an armoured regiment deployed in that time to Cyprus, Canada, Belize and the 1st Gulf War.

On promotion to Colonel in 1992 he was appointed Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee in the UK MOD, responsible for managing the Chiefs’ of Staff joint business. In 1994 he took command, on promotion to Brigadier, of the 19th Mechanised Brigade in which post he went to Bosnia in October 1994 to assume command of UN Sector South West Bosnia (United Nations Protection Force: UNPROFOR) and the British Forces in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. He subsequently deployed with elements of his brigade to Malaysia and the Oman.

He was Director of Army Public Relations in the UK MOD London from January 1997 to April 1999, responsible for developing and delivering the Army’s new Corporate Communications Strategy. He commanded the 2nd (UK) Division in York in the rank of Major General in 1999 and subsequently took command, until late 2002, of the British Army in the North of England and Scotland, as well as becoming the Governor of Edinburgh Castle.

He gained a Master’s Degree from Cambridge University in Modern History in 1976, graduated from the UK Higher Command and Staff Course in 1994 and the UK’s Royal College of Defence Studies in 1996.
Recent Peacekeeping Experience.

He was appointed Force Commander of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in October 2002 and served there on contract with the UN until late 2004. He retired from the British Army in March 05, formed his own consulting company and since then has worked on numerous contracts around the world for UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), the World Bank, the European Union and the British Government and others as a specialist, lecturer, mentor and trainer on peace support operations. He is the Senior Adviser to the Challenges Forum and their Secretariat at the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) of Sweden and Special Adviser to the Pearson Centre of Canada in support of their peace operations programmes.

In 2005 he helped develop UN DPKO’s senior mission leadership (SML) training programme and since then has been the lead mentor on all 17 UN courses. He is the senior facilitator of DPKO’s Senior Leadership Induction Programme and UN Department of Field Support (DFS)’ SMART training programme. In 2006-7 he co-wrote and helped develop the UN’s first strategic level doctrine (the “Capstone Doctrine”) for peacekeeping. He has been the Director of Studies for all the African Union (AU) SML courses up to 2010 and their regional equivalents in East and West Africa. From 2007-9 he was the senior mentor for the training and development of the African Standby Force’s capability in East Africa (EASBRICOM). In 2009 –2010, and within the Challenges Partnership, he led the study called “Considerations for Mission Leadership in UN Peacekeeping Operations” published in early 2011. Currently he is working with UN OIOS to evaluate DPKO’s traditional peacekeeping mission and has just returned from Lebanon.

When not overseas, he lives in Wiltshire, England with his very patient wife Gina. He has two sons, aged 30 and 27. The eldest is now a lawyer in the City of London, and the youngest is a commissioned officer in his father’s old Regiment, currently serving in Afghanistan. He became a grandfather for the first time on 28 October 2012.
Dr. Toshiya HOSHINO

Professor and the Dean at Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University.

Dr. Toshiya Hoshino is presently a Professor and the Dean at Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University. As for August 2011, he assumes the position of the Advisor to the President of Osaka University in charge of international affairs.

From August 2006 to August 2008, he served as a Minister-Counselor in charge of political affairs at the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations (UN). At the UN, he was a principal advisor to the Chair of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) when Japan assumed its Chairmanship.

He graduated from Sophia University, Tokyo, completed a Master’s at the University of Tokyo, and Doctorate (Ph.D.) from Osaka University.

His previous positions include: Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA); Guest Scholar at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University; Fellow at Stanford Japan Center, Stanford University; Visiting Fellow, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University; Visiting Fellow, the United States Institute for Peace (USIP); Visiting Fellow, The University of Woolongong, Australia; Consultant to the United Nations University; and a Special Assistant (Political Affairs) at the Embassy of Japan to the United States.

Currently, he is serving as a board member of the United Nations Association of Japan, the Japan Association for UNHCR, the Japan Association for United Nations Studies, the Okinawa Peace Cooperation Center, respectively and a visiting professor at the Inner Mongolia University, China, as well as a member of International Advisory Panel of Experts of the Global Peace Index (GPI), among others.

He is a specialist in UN peace and security policies (conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding), human security and humanitarian issues, security in the Asia-Pacific region, and Japan-U.S. relations.

His recent publications include:
- Heiwakochiku Nyumon (Introduction to Peacebuilding) (Yuhikaku, 2012).
- “How We Can Share Hope with Africans,” Japan Echo, No.9 (December-January 2011/2012).

Japan needs to provide support for South Sudan and Somalia
- Nanbu Asia (Southern Asia) (Minerva Shobo, 2011).
- Regional Dynamics and Institution Building in East Asia (co-authored, Kyung Hee University Press, Seoul, Korea, 2010).
- “Japan in an East Asia Community,” in Hoon and Morii eds., Cooperation Experiences in Europe and Asia (Tokyo, DESK, the University of Tokyo, 2004).
- Nihon no Anzenhosho (Japan’s Security) (co-authored in Japanese) (Tokyo, Yuhikaku, 2004).
- Nihon no Higashi-Ajia Koso (Japan’s Conception for East Asia) (co-authored in Japanese) (Tokyo, Keio University Press, 2004).

Contact Information:
Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
1-31 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, 560-0043, Japan
Tel: +81-6-6850-5844, fax: +81-6-6850-5844, Email: hoshino@osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp

As of October 1, 2012
Yukie OSA, PhD.

President, Association for Aid and Relief (AAR), Japan; Professor, Rikkyo University, Director, Japan Platform (JPF), Advisory board member, Soma City Reconstruction Council (Fukushima Pref.); Vice President, Soma Follower Team to provide psycho social care to the victims of 3.11 Triple disasters.

She was appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as one of seven new members of the Advisory Group of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), the United Nations humanitarian fund. As a head of emergency assistance operations, she was involved in AAR’ programs in Cambodia, Former-Yugoslavia, Mozambique, Kosovo, Chechenia, Afghanistan, etc. As a member of International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), she led the Japanese Mine Ban Campaign during and after the Ottawa Process. She received her PhD in Human Security Studies at the graduate school of the University of Tokyo (2007). Her publications include, *Srebrenica –Analysis of a genocide*, Toshindo Publishers 2009 and “The Role of Japanese NGOs in the pursuit of human security: limits and possibilities in the field of refugees”, *Japan Forum*, Volume 15, Number 2, 2003.
Mr. Kiyotaka KAWABATA

------------------------------------

Political Affairs Officer, Division of Security Council Affairs, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations
Guest Professor, Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University

He was born in Osaka, Japan. He earned a Master of Arts degree from Columbia University. He joined United Nations in 1988, and served as Political Affairs Officer in the Special Working Group for Security Council Reform and Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations. He also served for Afghanistan Peace Negotiation and Iraq crisis response. Currently, he serves in charge of the Syrian civil war in the Division of Security Council.
He is also invited as to Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University as Guest Professor.

Publications include: “Why we could not prevent Iraq crisis? 600days of UN diplomacy” (Iwanami Shoten, 2007), ”Afghanistan-PKO and local conflict-”(Misuzu Shobou, 2002), etc.
Dr. Tomoya KAMINO

Associate Professor, the Faculty of Education, Gifu University
Research interests: international humanitarian assistance and human rights, international organizations and security studies

EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCES: Bachelor of Law (Tohoku University) on March 1999; Master of Law (Tohoku University) on March 2001; From October 2003, the Master Course of the Graduate School of International Politics, the University of Wales, and MSEcon. (the University of Wales) on March 2006. Doctor of Law (Tohoku University) on March 2007.

WORKING EXPERIENCES: the JSPS Fellow (PD) from April 2007 to March 2010. Researcher in the Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation Center from April 2010 to March 2012. When the East Japan Earthquake occurred on March 2011, the Center sent researchers to the Emergency Operations Center of Miyagi Prefectural Government and the Local Emergency Operations Center of the Central Government in order to make an advice about emergency responses on public officials. From November 2011 to March 2012, the Miyagi Prefecture and the Center reviewed the disaster responses in the earthquake and tsunami, and published “The East Japan Earthquake: the Disaster Responses of Miyagi Prefecture for the First 6 Months and its Review.”

RESEARCH WORKS:
• War and Humanitarian Assistance, Sendai: Tohoku University, 2012.
The UN integrated Approach

Toward to Effective Humanitarian Assistance

Tomoya KAMINO (Gifu University)

○ The UN Multifunctional Peacekeeping Operations and its Coherence

- The UN Multifunctional PKOs
  The UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War mainly focused on activities that separate forces in buffer zones and monitor ceasefire. Since the end of the Cold War, the veto of the Big Five has been suppressed in the UN Security Council. Many peacekeeping operations have been built to support peace building such as implementing disarmament, demining, returning refugees, managing elections, this is known as multifunctional peacekeeping operations.

- Toward to Efficient PKOs: Structural Integration
  Political and military missions worked with a little coordination with the UN development and humanitarian agencies in the multi-functional PKOs, and the United Nations began to be required to ensure consistency and efficiency in the peacekeeping operations. The UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) takes the command of the peacekeeping operations to integrate political and military missions with the UN development and humanitarian organizations. The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) began to serve as the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) in most of the UN peace operations.

- Toward to Efficient PKOs: Strategic Integration
  Because the UN political leaders come to have a power over the UN humanitarian agencies, the structural integration comes to raise serious concerns for non-political nature of humanitarian assistance. Considering the humanitarian concerns, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon set forward strategic integration without necessarily structural integration in the UN peace operations.
The UN Strategic Integrated Approach

- The UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee Decision (2008/24)

The Policy Committee decision of 2008/24 was an opportunity to advance the strategic integration of the United Nations peace operations. The strategic integration means that the UN political and military mission and the UN Country Team (UNCT) build a common strategic framework. More specifically, the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) is intended to share the goals of the military and humanitarian organizations, to coordinate or unite their action plans, and to make an agreement on their schedules, outcomes and liabilities.

The UN Integrated Approach and Humanitarian Assistance

- Questions from Humanitarian Community

According to the decision of UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee, the strategic integration will respect for humanitarian space and humanitarian principles, and promote the coordination of humanitarian agencies. But the UN and non-UN humanitarian organizations raise a question that the UN integrated approach will promote humanitarian benefits.

- Structural Problems in the UN Integrated Approach: Division of Humanitarian Community

The UN Integrated approach is an approach within the UN agencies, and it is not enough to mention the implications over non-UN actors. However, whether the UN integrated approach advances humanitarian benefit depends on the relationship between the UN and non-UN actors.

Humanitarian assistance in armed conflict is often influenced by the relationship among armed parties, local communities, regional organizations, the UN peacekeeping force, the UN development and humanitarian organizations, and other non-UN humanitarian agencies. The UN integrated approach does not always promote and strengthen humanitarian assistance. For example, if the UN humanitarian agencies use the UN peacekeeping force as an escort, local armed groups and people may have raised doubts on the neutrality of the UN’s humanitarian action, and many of non-UN humanitarian agencies will be reluctant to coordinate with the UN peace operations.

In addition, the UN strategic integration aims to unite the goals and strategies in the UN peace operations and the UNCT, and political goals in the
UN peace operations may take priority over humanitarian goals to save people.

- **The UN Integrated Approach: Toward a reflective integration to respond local community**

  The UN Integrated approach needs to develop a reflective mechanism to change the form of integration to respond the relationship between the UN and other actors. If humanitarian crisis occurs and large emergency humanitarian assistance is required, the UN integrated approach should have a proper form to respect for the independence and neutrality of humanitarian agencies to the utmost extent.
Challenges in UN Integrated Missions
the perspective of Non-UN humanitarian agencies

Yukie OSA
Association for Aid and Relief (AAR) Japan, Rikkyo University

1. Current status of UN Integrated Missions (as of Nov. 1, 2012)
   - The # of countries where RCs (resident coordinator) are stationed: 129
   - Among 129, where RC holds the post of HC (humanitarian coordinator): 32
   - Among 32, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) holds the post of RC/HC = Integrated Missions: 11

2. Definitions in this presentation: Who are the humanitarian actors?
   - Agencies related to humanitarian assistance
     - UN agencies: UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, UNDP, OCHA, FAO
     - IOM (Int’l organization)
     - Non-UN agencies: International Red Cross (ICRC, IFRC, national societies)
       - NGOs

3. Different interpretations of humanitarian principles: esp. “independence”
   - FOR ICRC and NGOs: “Code of Conduct” 1994
     - Humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence
     - These principles are not primarily moral values, but rather a means to secure access to those who suffer the brunt of conflict and violence and to enhance the effectiveness of aid.

   - UN Agencies: UNGA/RES/46/182 (ANNEX I.2) 1991
     - Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.

   - The Government of Japan respects the basic principles of humanitarian assistance, which are humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence…….
   - The principle of independence is to maintain autonomy
4. Challenges in Integrated Mission
   - The perspectives of non-UN Humanitarian agencies
   - The push for coherence within integrated UN missions
   - The hierarchy of priorities inherent in the coherence agenda
   - Blurring boundaries between humanitarian action and military action
     ➞ sacrificing /shrinking / erosion of humanitarian space in the name of “greater good”
     ➞ declining respect for International Humanitarian Law
     ➞ Insecurity of humanitarian aid workers

5. Measures taken by non-UN Humanitarian agencies
   - ICRC: not take part in the cluster system as well as integrated mission from the onset (the need to maintain the ICRC’s independence)
   - NGOs: not take part in/secede from the integrated mission or
     ➞ Negative consequences:
       In practice, marginalizing humanitarian agenda in the integrated mission

   - Safety and security measures
     - To avoid misbehavior(obvious displays of “rich” equipment, clothing)
     - Sensitive nationalities of expatriates /delegates
     - Religious, gender sensitivities
     - Low profiles (↔ High Profiles)
     - Defense walls, armed military escort(last resort)
     - Remote management system with local staff
       → causing serious ethical /accountability problems
     - ICRC: Acceptance
       ✓ Act only with the agreement of all parties
       ✓ Open dialogue with all weapons bearers
       ✓ In close proximity to the NSAs

6. Positive impacts of being inside of the integrated mission?
   - Possibilities of humanising political space
     mainstreaming humanitarian agenda
   - Access to the CERF pooled funding, which are targeting UN agencies and their respective NGO implementing partners.
Decision No. 2008/24 – Integration

i. Building on existing guidance, the Secretary-General re-affirms integration as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office, whether or not these presences are structurally integrated. A list of situations where the principle should be applied is attached. The following are endorsed as defining elements of integration:

a. The main purpose of integration is to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN’s response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace.

b. To achieve this main purpose at the country level, there should be an effective strategic partnership between the UN mission/office and the Country Team, under the leadership of the SRS (or ERSG), that ensures that all components of the UN mission/office and the Country Team operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner, and in close collaboration with other partners.

c. The country level arrangements should reflect the specific requirements and circumstances and can take different structural forms. In all cases they should include (i) a shared vision of the UN’s strategic objectives, (ii) closely aligned or integrated planning, (iii) a set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace, and (iv) agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation.

d. An integrated approach and integration arrangements can yield significant benefits for humanitarian operations. Integration arrangements should take full account of recognized humanitarian principles, allow for the protection of humanitarian space, and facilitate effective humanitarian coordination with all humanitarian actors.

ii. To ensure that the elements listed in recommendation (i)(c) are in place, all integrated UN presences should have a shared analytical and planning capacity, as well as an integrated strategic framework that should be reflected in and draw on all other UN planning, programming and budget instruments. (Action: all integrated UN presences, supported by relevant HQ entities)

iii. Lead departments will maintain Headquarters level task forces for each integrated UN presence to ensure coherent and consistent support and policy guidance. The PBSO will support the lead departments, as appropriate, particularly in relation to countries before the PBC. The task forces will include relevant Secretariat departments and offices, agencies, funds and programmes and consider all issues that have strategic significance or programmatic impact for the UN presence in the relevant country. They will meet at the Director level as needed. (Action: DPKO, DPA)
iv. An Integration Steering Group, convened by DPKO, consisting of the key UN entities and meeting at the ASG level at least on a quarterly basis, should help ensure implementation and progress on integration related issues. Initial follow-up recommendations will be presented to the Policy Committee by December 2008. (Action: DPKO)

v. DPA, in coordination with relevant UN Country Teams and UN entities at headquarters, will review current arrangements in countries with DPA led missions/offices and agree on steps to implement the above and other relevant guidance, as necessary, by the end of 2008. (Action: DPA)

***

cc: Deputy Secretary-General  
Mr. Nambiar  
Mr. Kim  
Mr. Pascoe  
Mr. Guéhenno  
Mr. Holmes  
Ms. Arbour  
Mr. Akasaka  
Mr. Sha  
Mr. Michel  
Mr. Dervis  
Mr. Duarte  
Mr. Guterres  
Ms. Venemen  
Ms. Sheeran  
Ms. McAskie  
Mr. Orr
Draft Outline:
DRC Integrated Strategic Framework
9 September 2009

Shared vision

1. **Situation analysis:** Narrative analysis (no more than 2 pages) on conflict factors along with associated assumptions, risks, and contingencies. This aims to ensure that the document is sufficiently dynamic and, therefore, flexible enough to address issues in the peace consolidation process as they arise. A reflection on the different phases of the conflict throughout the DRC (e.g. east, west) should be included.

2. **Legacy of the UN in DRC and the road ahead in the next three years:** Narrative analysis (no more than 1 page) of the main accomplishments of MONUC and the UNCT since 1999, parameters for MONUC’s reconfiguration and scaling-up of UNCT, and expectations for an enhanced role of local actors. Likewise, this section should also highlight the key requirements to maintain the UN’s legacy and move forward to transitional arrangements.

3. **Summary:** Description of the peace consolidation end state that the UN seeks to achieve over the next three years (2010-2012) expressed as a measurable, achievable, sustainable change in country situation and people’s lives. This may broadly reflect the contributions of the entire UN system in DRC (e.g. peacekeeping, human rights, development, and humanitarian aspects).

Example end state: “A state that controls its borders with public administration, basic services, security, and justice deployed in all provinces”

**Strategic Objectives, Results, Timelines, Responsibilities**

4. **Overall approach:** The strategic objectives and results are the main element of the ISF (maximum 10 pages) and collectively represent the peace consolidation scope of the strategy. Thus, the ISF’s strategic objectives and results should not represent the sum total of the UN's activities in DRC, but rather are limited to the peace stabilization/consolidation priorities for the next three years. Moreover, concerns about humanitarian space should be taken into consideration. This section should also explain the need for a varied approach for conflict-affected vs. recovery areas and refer to the collaborative development process for the ISF.

4. **Strategic Objectives:** Each of the four thematic areas (e.g. governance and state authority, security and territorial integrity, protection of civilians, recovery and development) should be expressed as a strategic objective. Each strategic objective should have a unique narrative of no more than 1.5 pages explaining **what** is to be achieved, **why** it is a priority, and **how** it will be done. The following should be included in this narrative:
   - **What:** description of what is to be achieved under this objective
   - **Why:**
     - basis for its prioritization, including how it builds on or reinforces priorities in existing strategies, where relevant
     - description of the UN's comparative advantage and operational capacity
     - the complementary work of other national/international partners
   - **How:**
     - a statement of “strategy” addressing how the objective will be pursued using the political and operational mandate of the UN (may specify different approaches for conflict-affected vs. recovery areas)
     - how this strategic objective is linked to other elements of the ISF
     - key risks/challenges and how they will be addressed/mitigated
     - description of arrangements for a joint UN approach in this area (e.g. joint programmes, coordination structures, joint offices/teams, pooled funds), as appropriate
5. **Results**: Each Strategic Objective should have related set of results pitched at the strategic level (e.g. using a similar methodology as an UNDAF “outcome” or RBB “expected accomplishment”). Each result should also have 1-3 priority outputs. These results may, in some circumstances, be specific for certain geographic areas of DRC. Key operational partners should be identified for each result and each priority output. In some cases, special or joint implementation arrangements may also be presented, in particular when new arrangements are to be undertaken.

### Coordination and Implementation

6. This section should describe (one page maximum) the overall coordination and implementation arrangements for the ISF and the role of the ISF vis-à-vis other strategies and planning tools currently in use by the UN (diagram suggested). Coordination arrangements should reflect the various levels of the IMPT and/or thematic groups and recommend the frequency of meetings for these groups.

### Monitoring Progress

7. This section should establish the frequency for reporting against the ISF (e.g. monthly, quarterly), how progress reports will be reviewed (e.g. IMPT, IMTF), how data and analysis will be collected, and how existing capacities will be leveraged to collect this data and analysis. An agreed monitoring framework should be annexed to the ISF.