International Peace & Security Symposium 2011

—Challenges in Multi-dimensional PKO and Integrated Peace Missions—

7(Wed) and 8(Thu) December 2011

Mita Tokyo

Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center

Joint Staff College
The views expressed at the Symposium and in this publication are those of the participants, and do not necessarily represent the views of their organizations.
Preface

The "Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center" (JPC) was commissioned under the Joint Staff College in March 2010. After a preparatory period of about one year, it is a great honor and pleasure of all members of the JPC and the Joint Staff College to announce that the memorable first "International Peace and Security Symposium 2011” is held on 7 and 8 December in Tokyo.

This symposium will have significant meaning as the first step toward the series of "International Peace and Security Symposium". The series is designed to enhance and facilitate knowledge, understanding, and perspectives on cutting edge issues among the most recent Peace and Security Activities conducted by the United Nations or relevant international frameworks. In each symposium, prominent experts and eminent scholars will be invited to present their insights and discuss the challenging issues, from the urgent and specific to latent and cross-cutting. Emergent interdisciplinary approaches from practical experts and academics are expected to bring the more profound perspectives to all participants on the current or future peace operations in the broad contexts in international societies.

This year's symposium will highlight the general perspective of current UNPKO as the theme "Challenges in Multi-dimensional PKO and Integrated Peace Missions". The first symposium will extract the key challenges from this exhausted expression toward the following symposia. The keynote lecture for this symposium will be presented by specially invited lecturer MajGen(Ret) Patrick Cammaert on current challenges, novel doctrinal progress and concepts of the UN peace operations. Another invited lecture will be presented by Prof. Toshiya Hoshino (Osaka University) on the new environment and political frameworks of UN peace and security activities. In the panel-discussion,
based on the keynote lecture, panelists will present comments and report their opinions on the current and future UN Peace Operations. For this symposium, Prof. Sukehiro Hasegawa (Hosei University) will preside at the discussion. Gen. Cammaert, Prof. Hoshino and Dr. Vesselin Popovski (United Nations University) will also participate.

This symposium has also two theme sessions for specific issues related to the main theme. The first session will be held for “Protection of Civilians” (POC) which is the core issue of robust peacekeeping operations. We invite Ms Kanae Doi (Attorney at Law, Human Rights Watch, Japan) and Prof. Nanako Shimizu (Utsunomiya University) for this session. The second session covers DDR / SSR which are the critical issues in peace building. We invite Prof. Hiromi Fujishige (Hosei University) and Dr. Tatsuo Yamane (Osaka University) and Prof. Masako Yonekawa (Utsunomiya University) to the second session. In the closing of this symposium, Prof. Hasegawa will give the concluding lecture and round up all aspects of presentations and discussions.

On behalf of the Joint Staff College and JPC, we would like to give our sincere thanks for your participation to this symposium.

7 December, 2011

Organizing Committee Chair: RADM Masato Nakanishi
Program Committee Chair: Col. Katsunobu Ishibashi
Editorial Committee Chair: CAPT(Navy) Hideki Hayashi
Program

Day 1:  7th (WED) December
13:10-13:20 Opening Address:
   Mr. Mitsu Shimojo (Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense)

13:20-13:30 Opening Remarks:
   LTG Kazuya Hayashi
   (Commandant, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense, Japan)

13:30-14:50 Keynote Speech:
   MajGen(Ret) Patrick Cammaert

15:05-16:20 First Theme Session ~ Protection of Civilians (POC)
   · Ms. Kanae Doi (Attorney at Law, Human Rights Watch, Japan),
   · Prof. Nanako Shimizu (Utsunomiya University)
   Commentator: MajGen(Ret) Patrick Cammaert

16:20-16:30 Closing Remarks

Day 2:  8th (THU) December
13:00-13:55 Invited Lecture:
   Prof. Toshiya Hoshino (Osaka University).

14:00-15:50 Panel Discussion
   Moderator: Prof. Sukehiro Hasegawa (Hosei University)
   Panelists: MajGen(Ret) Patrick Cammaert
             Prof. Toshiya Hoshino (Osaka University).
             Dr. Vesselin Popovski (United Nations University)

16:00-17:20 Second Theme Session ~ DDR / SSR
   · Prof. Hiromi Fujishige (Hosei University)
   · Dr. Tatsuo Yamane (Osaka University)
   · Prof. Masako Yonekawa (Utsunomiya University)

17:25-18:10 Concluding Lecture and Round up:
   Prof. Sukehiro Hasegawa (Hosei University)

18:10-18:15 Closing Address:
   RADM Masato Nakanishi
   (Vice Commandant, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense, Japan)
Biography

Major General (Ret) Patrick Cammaert

Major General (Ret) Patrick Cammaert has a distinguished military career in both The Netherlands with the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps and the United Nations, where he served as Sector Commander in Cambodia (UNTAC), as Assistant Chief of Staff in Bosnia/Herzegovina (UNPROFOR), as Force Commander in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), as Military Advisor to the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO), and as General Officer Commanding the Eastern Division in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC).

Since his retirement from the military in 2007, he has been an effective expert advocate with regard to issues such as leadership in crisis circumstances, international peace and security, civil-military cooperation in peace support operations, peacekeeping, and security sector reform. Major General Cammaert has advised the senior management of UN Department for Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO), UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UN WOMEN on strategic planning issues such as Integrated Training Development, the protection of civilians under immediate threat of physical violence and the sexual gender based violence (SGBV) in armed conflict. He was the lead consultant for the drafting and implementation of scenario based training on sexual violence in armed conflict. His responsibilities have included carrying out fact
finding/assessment and evaluation missions to several UN Missions such as in DRC, Lebanon, Sudan, Haiti, Liberia and Chad and as Special Envoy to Sri Lanka for the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children in Armed Conflict. Major General Cammaert also has advised the Dutch Government on strategic planning for peace support operations in Africa and Afghanistan and the Vietnamese Government on peacekeeping and SGBV. He is a regular senior mentor at UN Senior Leadership Courses.

In 2008, Major General Cammaert was awarded the Carnegie-Wateler Peace Prize in the Peace Palace in The Hague. He serves as Chairman of the Dutch Foundation for Refugees, and is a member of the advisory board of the Mukomeze Foundation, which helps women and girls who survived rape and other forms of sexual violence in Rwanda and he is a Senior Fellow at the Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA). He is also member of the Consortium Advisory Group of the Justice and Security Research Program of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Patrick Cammaert graduated at the Dutch Higher Command and Staff College and the Top Management Course at the Armed Forces War College in The Hague. He is a member of the Speakers Academy in the Netherlands.
Kanae Doi works to encourage the Japanese Government to prioritize human rights in its foreign policy and practices. She also works on media outreach and the development of Human Rights Watch’s profile in Japan.

Prior to joining Human Rights Watch in 2006, she worked as a practicing attorney, based in Tokyo. Her practice included refugee law, immigration law, constitutional law and criminal defense, and she frequently gave media interviews and published on these issues in the Japanese press from the perspective of international human rights law.

In 2011 Doi was chosen as a member of the Young Global Leaders of the World Economic Forum. She received her law degree from the University of Tokyo and her Master’s degree in the International Studies from the New York University School of Law. She speaks English and Japanese.
Dr. Fujishige was born and raised in Osaka, Japan. After graduating from Doshisha University (B.A. in Law) in Kyoto, she attended postgraduate schools at the University of London, receiving a postgraduate diploma in War Studies from King’s College London, a M.Sc. in International Relations and Development Studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and a Ph.D. in Political Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). Her doctoral thesis was titled: ‘Constricting a More Active Role: The Norm-Shift and the Rise of Activism in Japan’s Security Policy after the Cold War 1990-2004.’

Immediately after completing her Ph.D. in 2006, Dr. Fujishige served two years as a research associate at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), a think-tank closely linked with the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Following JIIA, she lectured for two years at Nagoya University of Business and Commerce. An associate professor at Hosei University in Tokyo, she teaches a wide array of international relations subjects, including ‘Security Studies,’ ‘Conflict Studies’ and ‘Japan’s Foreign Policy.’

In addition to her expertise in Japanese security policy, which was the focus of her Ph.D. thesis, Dr. Fujishige is also a specialist in conflict resolution studies. For nearly a decade, she has been tackling issues related to Security Sector Reform (SSR). She approaches SSR-related issues from a variety of viewpoints, delving into and analyzing such issues as coordination problems and gender-relations.

Her unique academic background in security studies and development studies has Dr. Fujishige focusing her forte on ‘the Security-Development Nexus’ in SSR while presiding over an international research project on the topic. She is currently co-editing the first-ever Japanese book focusing on SSR (forthcoming, Kokusa-Shoin). Dr. Fujishige’s familiarity with the role demarcation plays in relations between the police and the military in peacekeeping operations has her actively engaged in using her expertise and making policy recommendations that shape Japan’s ‘policekeeping’ role.
Professor, Faculty of Law, Hosei University, Adjunct Professor of the United Nations University and Former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Timor-Leste (2004-2006)

Dr. Hasegawa held senior positions within the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) and United Nations peacekeeping operations. He was Deputy Resident Representative of UNDP in Nepal from 1978 to 1980 and in Indonesia from 1980 to 1984. He later served as UNDP Resident Representative and Resident Coordinator of the United Nations operational activities for development in Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau. In 1987, he was appointed Deputy Executive Coordinator of the UN Volunteers Programme. In 1993, Dr. Hasegawa managed the United Nations Volunteer electoral supervisors assigned to plan and administer general elections in Cambodia. In April 1994, he was appointed Director of Policy and Planning of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia, and in January 1995, he became the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Rwanda. He subsequently served as the Deputy Assistant Administrator and Deputy Regional Director for Asia and the Pacific at UNDP in New York from 1996 to 1999.

From July 2002 to September 2006, he served as the United Nations Resident Coordinator for Timor-Leste since July 2002 and also served as Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Timor-Leste and Deputy Head of UNMISET from 1 July 2002 to 20 May 2004. Dr. Hasegawa was appointed as Head of the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste, UNMISET and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Timor-Leste on 21 May 2004 and served in that capacity until September 2006. In October 2006, he was appointed as a Goodwill Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (RDTL) and in 2007 the Special Adviser to the President of the RDTL.
Since April, 2007, Professor Hasegawa has been teaching in undergraduate and graduate classes on peacekeeping and peacebuilding, international organizations, foreign policy and global governance. He has been an invited speaker and a senior mentor at many meetings, conferences and seminars held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 2009, Cairo, Egypt in 2009 and 2010, Hiroshima, Kobe and Japan in 2007~2011 on peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.

Dr. Hasegawa holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science from the University of Michigan, a Master of Arts degree in public administration from the International Christian University, of Tokyo, and a Ph.D. in international relations from Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. He is Director-General of the Hosei University for International Strategic Planning, member of the Board of Directors of Japan Association of United Nations Studies and member of the Earth Charter Commission for Asia and the Pacific.

He is married and has three children.

November 2011
Dr. Toshiya Hoshino

Dr. Toshiya Hoshino is a professor and presently the Dean at Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University. In August 2011, he was appointed the Advisor to the President of Osaka University in charge of international affairs. From August 2006 to August 2008, he served as a Minister-Counselor at the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations (UN) in the field of international peace and security issues. He graduated from Sophia University, Tokyo, completed a Master’s at the University of Tokyo, and Doctorate (Ph.D.) from Osaka University. His previous positions included: Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs; Guest Scholar at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University; Fellow at Stanford Japan Center, Stanford University; Visiting Fellow, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University; and a Special Assistant (Political Affairs) at the Embassy of Japan to the United States.

He is a specialist in diplomacy and security in the Asia-Pacific region, and Japan-U.S. relations as well as international peace and security issues in the UN context, human security and humanitarian issues. He also serves as a board member of the United Nations Association of Japan, Japan for UNHCR and Okinawa Peace Cooperation Center.

Publications include: Nanbu Asia (Southern Asia) (Minerva Shobo, 2011), Regional Dynamics and Institution Building in East Asia (co-authored, Kyung Hee University Press, 2010), ”Peacebuilding & Human Security in Fragile States,” Japan Spotlight, Vol.28-No.6 (November/December 2009, Japan Economic Foundation), ”Fusoyobo to Kokuren—Kokuren Heiwa-kochiku-iinkai no Katsudo wo chushintoshite (Conflict
Dr. Vesselin Popovski is Senior Academic Programme Officer at the Institute for Sustainability and Peace, United Nations University in Tokyo, Japan. He develops research, teaches and publishes in peace and security, international law, human rights, global governance.

Nanako SHIMIZU is Associate Professor of the Faculty of International Studies, Utsunomiya University in Tochigi Prefecture, Japan from October 2007. She teaches international organizational law classes for undergraduate and graduate students. She is a member of Japanese Society of International Law, Japanese Association of World Law and Asian Society of International Law.

She studied international law and international organizational law and received M.A. in 2000 and Ph. D. in 2006 from the Graduate School of Public Administration of International Christian University (ICU) in Tokyo, Japan. Prior to joining Utsunomiya University, she was teaching international law class for undergraduate students at ICU as a part-time lecturer and also was appointed as a part-time assistant of the ICU Pease Research Institute.

Her main research interests are the change of UN collective security system after the cold war, humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect, the possibility of the East Asian Community and Asian regionalism. She wrote several book chapters and journal articles on these issues in Japanese. She has just published her first book with a title *The United Nations Security System and the Protection of Civilians: in search of a normative order through new multilateralism* on February this year (in Japanese).
Dr. Tatsuo Yamane is currently a Specially Appointed Researcher at the Office for Promotion of East Asian Collaboration in Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University. He also serves a Visiting Researcher in the Institute for Peace Science Hiroshima University (IPSHU). His main areas of interests are International Relations on international security and peace studies, especially on armed conflicts and peacebuilding. After receiving his Ph.D. from OSIPP, he served as a Researcher (from August 2005 to June 2007) and then an Assistant Professor (from July 2007 to June 2011) at Graduate School of International Development & Cooperation (IDEC) in Hiroshima University. His previous positions include a Special Assistant (Political Affairs) at Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, Field Director of “Project of Peacebuilding through Health Activities in Sri Lanka” at Association of Medical Doctors in Asia (AMDA) and Visiting Fellow at Department of Political and Economic Studies in University of Helsinki.

Prof. Masako Yonekawa

Associate Professor, Utsunomiya University

After serving as United Nations Volunteer for 4 years in Cambodia, Liberia, South Africa, Somalia, Tanzania and Rwanda, Masako Yonekawa joined UNHCR in 1996, working first as Field Officer in Rwanda, followed by Roving Field Officer in Kenya, Field Officer in DRC, Executive Assistant to the High Commissioner in Geneve (Headquarter), and Head of Field Office in Goma, Democratic Republic of Congo. Since October 2008, she worked as Visiting Senior Adviser (peacebuilding in Africa) at JICA Headquarter and presently working as Associate Professor at Utsunomiya University (international career and cooperation).

She holds a M.Sc in international relations from University of Cape Town in South Africa.

Abstract

Keynote speech

Major General (Ret) Patrick Cammaert

The transformation of the international environment with the change of inter-state conflict to an intra-state conflict, has given rise to a new generation of “multi-dimensional” United Nations peacekeeping operations. These operations are typically deployed in the dangerous aftermath of a violent internal conflict and may employ a mix of military, police and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement. Since the failure of UN Missions in Rwanda, Somalia and Srebrenica in the nineties, most UN peacekeeping missions have been deployed with a Security Council mandate to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. All UN Peacekeeping Missions established since the mid-nineties have been mandated “to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” and since 2008 “including sexual violence”. More than a decade later and missions continue to struggle with the implementation of its protection tasks. There are a number of challenges at the strategic and operational levels. At the strategic level three challenges are mentioned: the implications of the global financial crisis on peacekeeping, second, the consensus for peacekeeping between member states of the UN has never looked so uncertain and the political divisions in the Security Council. At the operational level challenges are discussed on the consent of the host government, robust peacekeeping, lack of enabling forces, management of expectations, lack of military capabilities and finally the civil-military relations. To address these challenges doctrine and policies have been developed and are in progress. Leadership plays a crucial role for the success in a mission starting at the senior level in UN HQ and in the mission.
As Human Rights Watch’s mission statement says we stand with victims to “prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice,” protection of civilian population under armed conflict is a priority area among our broader work of human rights protection. We rigorously monitor and report the conduct of hostilities in light of international humanitarian law, though our general position on armed conflict remains neutral, like other major humanitarian organizations.

There are multiple ways to protect civilian population under armed conflict. We expose human rights abuses by highlighting the findings of our research, and work to hold abusers accountable. In cases of most serious crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, we try to bring perpetrators to international justice such as the International Criminal Court. We also encourage and press democracies around the world, including the Government of Japan, to use their leverages on behalf of human rights.

We often call on the UN to take necessary action to protect civilian population, ranging from pushing peace keeping operations to have means and mandates to protect civilians, to giving practical recommendations such as giving cell phones to villages or increasing the number of UN military helicopters. In few cases, Human Rights Watch has specifically called on the Government of Japan to use its political leverages and equipments to strengthen and support peace keeping operations.

Human Rights Watch has been a strong proponent of the Responsibility to Protect. While the dimension of humanitarian interventions has been debated often, we should note that the 2005 UN Outcome Document says “[t]he international community should use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State fails to protect its populations or is in fact the perpetrator of crimes, the international community must be prepared to take stronger measures, including the collective use of force through the UN Security Council.” In calling on states to uphold their Responsibility to Protect, Human Rights Watch starts by
suggesting a range of responses within our mandate – such as targeted sanctions, arms embargoes and other measures short of armed conflict – to address the threat to the civilian population.

Historically, the Japanese government has been extremely cautious in taking stands on various human rights issues that arise throughout the world. Now is the time for Japan to revise its foreign policy in order to be a promoter of human rights in a more public and vocal manner. Protection of human rights -- protection of civilian population in particular -- should be a priority of the Japanese government. In order to prevent future attacks on civilians, focus on fight against impunity should also be an area of focus for Japan. While the respect of international human rights and humanitarian law is important in itself, it is also in Japan's national interest to promote regional stability. It is obvious that neighbors lacking in stability will in turn make it difficult to predict their future stance towards Japan. The world ruled by law is a foundation for Japan to promote its business and trade interests.

As the biggest aid donor to many Asian countries and some African countries, Japan is in a unique position to become a nation that advocates for human rights including civilian protection. Its words carry weight with recipient countries. Further, with Japan being a credible and legitimate global human rights promoter, Japanese domestic population should become more convinced in an important role the Japanese defense force can play in international peace keeping operations.
Protection of Civilians by UN Peacekeepers: lessons from the past 12 years

Nanako Shimizu
Associate Professor, Utsunomiya University

Since 1999, the UN Security Council has authorized 13 peacekeeping operations (UNAMSIL, MONUC, UNMIL, UNOCI, MINUSTAH, ONUB, UNMIS, UNIFIL, UNAMID, MINURCAT, MONUSCO, UNISFA, UNAMISS) with the explicit mandates of protection of civilians (POC). These operations are not only expected but also officially tasked to protect vulnerable local populace of the conflict-torn societies, many of which are on the African Continent. Accordingly, for the last twelve years, so much effort has been made to turn words of protection mandates into deeds by the peacekeepers on the ground as well as by the policy makers, UN officials, international and local NGOs and many other devoted individuals.

In spite of some notable achievements, there are still many civilians left victimized as a result of gross violations of human rights amount to genocide or crimes against humanity in the areas where UN peacekeepers are mandated to afford protection. Drawing on the past experiences and lessons, it is required today to examine closely what causes the remaining gap between the protection mandates and its outcomes, especially in troop-contributing countries including Japan.

Although we can observe a number of problems behind this gap, the following three issues are to be discussed here: objectives, means and methods and legitimacy of the operations with the protection mandates.

The first point is about the very objective of the operations, which is POC. Why has the protection of the local population become the obligation of peacekeepers? Sending troops to protect civilians in conflict-affected areas has anything to do with the national interests of the troop-contributing countries? These are the questions often raised in the examination of political will or more correctly, unwillingness of UN Member States to send their personnel to the missions in the deteriorating security environment such as DRC or Sudan.

In order to understand the reason why POC is now given priority over many other mandates of the peacekeeping operations, it is necessary to look back at least to early
1990s when the UN operations were not able to live up to the expectations of the local people as well as the international community to protect civilians from grievous attacks and serious human rights abuses. These “failures” of the early 90s’ operations continue to remain as a “organizational trauma” in the UN until today and result in numerous endeavors to alive to the intricate challenges; a pile of Security Council resolutions and thematic meeting records on the issues of POC including the special needs of women and children, researches and studies made by both UN and non-UN bodies, and above all, the “mainstreaming” the protection mandates in peacekeeping operations (S/RES/1674, S/RES/1894). On the other hand, a sharp debate over the “responsibility to protect” is still up in the air, especially after the controversial air raids by NATO forces on Libya from March to October this year.

Second point is concerning the means and methods of protection on the ground. It is well acknowledged that the abilities and capacities of each operation are defined in the Security Council resolutions. However, as many have critically observed, the wording of the resolutions is not clear enough to the commanders and privates in the field as to what extent and in what ways they are allowed to carry out their mandates, in some cases, by using force. For the purpose of clarifying the content and scope of the protection mandate, DPKO recently developed a pre-deployment training module on POC called “Specialized Training Materials on Protection of Civilians and Prevention and Response to Conflict-related Sexual Violence.” The material explains a range of POC including protection through political process, protection from physical violence and the establishing a protective environment. It also provides some instructive case studies on how to distinguish civilians from combatants or when and to what extent it is allowed to use force, to cite a few. These practical and pragmatic approaches to improve the performance of protection mandates are essential for the future development of UN security system in general.

Lastly, the legitimacy issue of the peacekeeping operations must be considered. One of the reasons why POC is prioritized is that any failure to provide protection may undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the mission in the eyes of the local community. Additionally, there is a widespread concern that peacekeepers may by themselves to be a threat to civilian population through exploitations and abuses
violating international human rights laws. It can be said that these misconducts belong only to a minority. However, as is the case with the mission in DRC, joint military operations with governmental forces may put the impartiality of the mission into question. Although there are allegations insisting that the governmental forces are violating international humanitarian laws by targeting civilians, it is often difficult for the peacekeepers to take decisive actions against the governmental authority, for it may lead to a withdrawal of the consent of the national authority to the deployment of the mission. Moreover, multinational nature of the UN mission can cause operational discrepancies and inefficiencies fatal to the effective operation. These difficulties in the implementation of POC reflect the tension between the imperative and universal nature of the principle of POC and the nationally-divided nature of the Westphalia System which constitutes the basis of the Unite Nations System.
New environment and issues surrounding UN Peace Missions: How to “Integrate” the “multidimensional” activities?

Toshiya Hoshino
Professor, Osaka University

The year 2012 marks the 20th anniversary of the release of the landmark UN Secretary-General Report *An Agenda for Peace* in New York and the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation in Tokyo, which opened the door for the participation of the Self-Defense Forces of Japan in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, among others. During the past two decades, the nature of the threats to international peace and security has diversified. The rise of civil conflicts, often with the tragic and violent actions of mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing, the proliferation of weapons of destruction, the mass movement of refugees and internally displaced persons, the spread of terrorism and crime networks across borders, and the fear of infectious diseases. They have caused human security challenges, beyond the traditional threats to national security. The weakening of the governance system of many states – the issue of “fragile states” – has made the situation more complex. The deterioration of global environment problems has contributed to enhance the magnitude of natural disasters around the world.

The international community has boldly attempted to tackle these matters, though the result is far from satisfactory. Nonetheless, the military interventions to humanitarian emergencies, with or without the authorization from the UN Security Council and with trials and errors, have paved the avenue to today’s discussion on “responsibility to protect.” Conflict prevention is now preferred to the more reactive dynamics to conflicts. The peace operations of date encompasses in longer perspective
to envision “consolidation” of peace beyond the simple maintenance of status quo.

As to the UN Security Council mandated peace missions, we can identify at least three new trends. They are: the frequent approval of PKO actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the increase of multifunctional and multidimensional nature of their activities, and the sequencing of the DPKO-planned Peacekeeping missions and the DPA-led special political missions, including peacebuilding missions.

These are of course useful international efforts to support the local stakeholders who have chosen to take the path of peace and to foam a new unified country to live. But the more liberal use of Chapter VII signifies a rather large departure from the traditional style of PKOs characterized by the principles of consent, neutrality and the limitation of use of weapons. Missions’ mandate today involves more robust actions when situation requires. The multifunctional and multidimensional missions are effective in the sense that they are tasked to promote post-conflict peacebuilding, reconstruction and longer-term development. These efforts are only successful when the expertise of civilians and militaries are combined effectively.

Having said that, however, it is not always correct to take the recent trend of multifunctional and multidimensional nature of peace missions as the matter of course. It is simply because the role of UN mission is not the only actor on the ground. On the contrary, it is useful to place the role of the UN mission in the broader “UN presence” on the ground. In this way, we can 1) closely scrutinize the level of integration between the Mission and the rest of the actors on the ground and 2) build the capacity of the host government and its people so that the authority and responsibilities can be effectively transferred to them.

The role of the UN missions on the ground is undoubtedly indispensable. But
it’s existence is supposed to be a temporary one. In other words, it is a paradoxical body whose final objective is to eliminate its role in favor of self-sustaining governance, reconstruction, peacebuilding, and development. The figure below tries to visualize the 6 phases that typical post-conflict countries might gone through, in which the roles of UN headquarters (New York) and field organs, those of UN PKO and special political missions as well as the international financial institutions (the World Bank and the IMF), the process of handing over of authority and responsibility, and the role that NGOs/civil society and business sector can play. In sum, the tasks of bringing self-sustaining peace on the ground require multidimensional and multifunctional activities by many stakeholders. But what is most important is the political process and leadership that bring together and integrate all these necessary activities for the benefit of host government and its citizens.
Responsibility to Protect and Protection of Civilians: ‘Sisters, but not Twins’

Vesselin Popovski
UNU-ISP
Tokyo

Two related, but distinct concepts have risen on the international agenda in the last decade: the duty for Protection of Civilians (PoC) in armed conflict, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) people from mass atrocities. There is a close relationship between them - they share the same concern—civilian suffering from mass human-induced violence—and both have underpinned international policy and calls for interventions. But there are also important differences to their scope and the situations and ways in which they can be applied. One can argue that they are ‘sister’ concepts: it is important to keep in mind their differences, as to avoid confusion and gaps in responsibilities; but also it is important to exploit the commonalities between the two as to bring mutual reinforcement and co-operation among actors. The UN Security Council Res.s 1970 and 1973 on Libya utilized both concepts.

Differentiating R2P and PoC

The two concepts have a similar origin, they share the same initial humanitarian impulse, but they have different scope and applicability. Not all war crimes would fall under PoC, because some of them are not committed against civilians—for example, mistreatment of prisoners of war. But all war crimes would fall under R2P, as they represent one of the four atrocity crimes. War crimes against civilians, as well as crimes against humanity committed during armed conflict, would fall under both R2P and PoC and in these situations the two circles of R2P and PoC would overlap.

A situation that would fall under PoC, but not R2P, for example would be protection of civilians threatened from escalating armed conflict, if mass atrocities are not planned and committed as part of such armed conflict. A situation that would fall under R2P, but not PoC, would be, for example, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity without nexus to an armed conflict. On one hand, PoC is narrower than R2P—if all war crimes trigger R2P, not all war crimes would fall under PoC—some are not committed against civilians. On another hand, R2P is narrower than PoC—it would not apply in every armed conflict, but only in those, in which mass atrocities have been systematically planned and committed.
Interestingly, a situation that originally was not an armed conflict, can escalate into an armed conflict and engage PoC. The first UN Security Council Res. 1970 (26 February 2011) on Libya describes atrocities against peaceful demonstrators—not yet an armed conflict—and activates R2P (crimes against humanity), but is technically not yet a PoC situation. The second UN Security Council Res. 1973 (17 March 2011) already describes the situation in Libya as a civil war, not simply protests and riots, and PoC comes to life (in parallel with R2P) as it applies in non-international armed conflict. Another interesting element, emphasised in Res. 1973, is that PoC is an obligation of all parties in conflict, therefore it urges not only the Gaddafi regime, but the rebels also to protect civilians. If R2P is a matter for states only, PoC can be an obligation for non-state actors.

The comparison between the legal sources of R2P and PoC can be illustrated as follows:

**Table 1. Comparison of Legal Sources for R2P and PoC.**

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<tr>
<th>R2P Legal Sources</th>
<th>PoC Legal Sources</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948 Genocide Convention (genocide)</td>
<td>1949 Fourth Geneva Convention (PoC), International Humanitarian Law (IHL), <em>jus in bello</em> traditions</td>
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<tr>
<td>1949 four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols (war crimes)</td>
<td>UN Security Council Res.s: thematic (Res. 1894) and country-specific mandates to PoC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Domestic Law</td>
<td>Ottawa protocol banning land-mines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bilateral, Regional Law</td>
<td>2010 Convention on Cluster Munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Charter, Chapter VI, VII, VIII measures</td>
<td>Relevant Human Rights Laws—prohibition of recruitment of children in armed forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevant Human Rights Laws—non-discrimination of ethnic minorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If all four Geneva Conventions are relevant to R2P, only the last (fourth) Geneva Convention will be relevant to PoC. The whole volume of human rights laws would be too large for both R2P and PoC, and some will be relevant—for example non-discrimination of minorities would be relevant to R2P, if minorities rights are gradually abused, this can escalate into ethnic cleansing or genocide. In another example, children’s rights may be relevant to PoC in case of a serious impact of armed conflicts on children. The legal sources for PoC also would include refugee laws, some disarmament treaties, prohibiting certain weapons, like chemical weapons, landmines or cluster munitions, that cause excessive civilian suffering.

Table 2 indicates the similarities and differences between R2P and PoC in terms of which actors are engaged in various types of protection:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R2P Actors</th>
<th>PoC Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Secretary General Special Advisors</td>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police, law enforcement institutions (Pillar 1)</td>
<td>Peace operations, UN Security Council, Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional actors: African Union, European Union, League of Arab States, others</td>
<td>UN Agencies: UNHCR, OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO, UNHCR, High-Commissioner for Human Rights, Peacebuilding Commision, UNICEF, Special Rapporteur on Children; Aid donors, capacity builders, NGOs (Pillar 2)</td>
<td>ICRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediators, fact-finding missions, Secretary-General (non-coercive measures); UN Security Council (coercive measures, Pillar 3)</td>
<td>Humanitarian NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Criminal Tribunals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some actors would engage in both R2P and PoC, but others will have specific mandate in just one type of protection. Although R2P may have the ambition to engage almost everyone, illustrated in the formula ‘narrow, but deep response’, some actors—PKO, UNHCR, ICRC, OCHA—that are very willing to apply PoC, are reluctant to engage with R2P, considering it as a potential jeopardy for their mandates. Agencies, that acknowledge and engage in PoC, have been reluctant to attach their mandate to R2P, seeing the concept as too interventionist. In fact one needs to remind that R2P contains very little interventionism - even within the pillar 3 machinery, the military intervention forms only a last option. Adding that R2P came to existence as a counter-point of intervention it is about helping potential victims of atrocities. Although technically not a firm international legal obligation, it has reached global acceptance and every General Assembly debate proves this. R2P, as the ‘younger sister’, does not undermine action, rather it catalyses it, it can mobilise political will and serve the PoC agenda well. The ‘sister’ concepts R2P and PoC can reinforce each other, but also can compete with each other.

R2P and PoC: Libya 2011

R2P and PoC merge closer, when it comes to very critical situations, as in February-March 2011 in Libya, where the R2P has been rapidly developed from pillar 1 reminder of the obligations of Libya in Res. 1970, to the whole scope of pillar 3 ‘timely and decisive response’, when Libya manifestly failed to protect. In parallel, the categorisation of the situation as civil war brought PoC language into Res. 1973 and it became a textbook Res. for a parallel application of both PoC and R2P.

Libya 2011 is not the first time when R2P was referred to by the UN Security Council—previous Security Council Res.s on Sudan and Cote d’Ivoire also used R2P language. Also Libya is not the first time when the Security Council has authorised use of force to protect civilians—the bombing of Bosnian Serb military targets around Sarajevo in 1995 was aimed mostly to protect Bosnian Muslim civilian population and was under a solid authorisation by the Security Council. I would even question that Res. 1973 is the first time the Security Council has authorised the use of force for human protection against the wishes of a functioning state, and as Bellamy and Williams argue, that the closest the Council came to doing so in the past, was in Security Council Res. 794 (1992) in Somalia and Res. 929 (1994) in Rwanda. Let us not forget the Security Council Res. 688 (1991) in the aftermath of the first Gulf War that established a no-fly zone to protect the Kurdish minority in Northern Iraq, certainly against the wishes of a functioning state (Iraq) and in a very similar situation to that in Libya—Saddam Hussein was threatening
with massacre a huge part of the Kurdish population. Although 688 did not use the language ‘all necessary means’, the no-fly zone in Northern Iraq was not a paper-tiger—it was supported with limited air strikes several times in the 1990s, with the intervening states referring to 688 as a justification of their military actions. The Res. 688 was adopted when the R2P did not exist yet as a defined concept, and when PoC was simply a legal requirement from the Fourth Geneva Convention, therefore one can regard the two Security Council Res.s 1970 and 1973 on Libya as the first real test of utilizing the two ‘sister’ concepts R2P and PoC to stop a potential mass slaughter of civilian population.

**Res. 1970**

The Security Council invoked R2P immediately when on 26.02.2011 it considered the deadly risk and the urgent need to protect the Libyan population from atrocities, and adopted Res. 1970, condemning the use of force against civilians, deploring the gross systematic violations of human rights, expressing deep concerns at the deaths of civilians and the incitement to hostility by the Libyan Government. The Council considered that the systematic attacks against civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity—referring to one of the atrocity crimes, triggering the applicability of R2P. In explicit text and in a separate paragraph, Res. 1970 recalled the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population.

There was no positive reaction, rather the opposite, Gaddafi not only ignored Res. 1970, but committed clear breaches of it, refusing to permit humanitarian aid convoys, a clear failure to exercise R2P. The search for a peaceful solution through the UN Special Envoy and AU High-Level Committee continued, but gradually most governments and regional organisations realised that the use of diplomatic efforts only would not protect the Libyan people in lethal danger. Acknowledging Gaddafi regime’s manifest failure to protect people, the international community shifted into enforcement measures: on 12.03.2011 the League of Arab States (LAS) called on the Security Council to impose immediately a no-fly zone on Libyan air force and to establish safe areas as a precautionary measure to protect civilian people.

**Res. 1973**

The demand for no-fly zone by the LAS proved to be crucial. The UK, France and Lebanon introduced a new Security Council Res. 1973 which urged the parties to armed conflict to “bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure protection of civilians”. In Res. 1973 the PoC came to life, as the situation moved from a riot—which does not qualify as ‘armed conflict’—to a civil war, or a non-international
armed conflict. This was an important development, as the Security Council could now strengthen its decisions based on obligations under international humanitarian laws, applicable only in time of (civil) war and add war crimes jurisdiction to what has already been established as R2P obligations in Res. 1970 on the basis of potential crimes against humanity. In Res. 1973 all the force of PoC (applicable to armed conflict) is added into the force of R2P, previously activated in Res. 1970. The ‘sister’ concepts R2P and PoC in Res. 1973 were synergized, their forces merged to urge the Security Council to utilise all its overwhelming power under Chapter VII—including use of force—to protect the civilian population and civilian-populated areas. This timely and determined decision of the Security Council—a body often accused of being obsolete—can be regarded as a triumph of both PoC and R2P.

Paragraph 4 of Res. 1973 under the sub-title ‘Protection of Civilians’ contained the authorisation of the use of force in the well-known formula ‘to take all necessary measures’. Paragraph 5 added into the authorisation of the use of force the establishment of a no-fly zone. Paragraph 13 of Res. 1973 added an additional authorisation to use force—after calling upon all vessels and aircraft of flag States to co-operate with the inspections of the arms embargo, the Council also authorised Member States, to use “all necessary measures commensurate with the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections”. This additional and limited authorisation of use of force in Res. 1973 does not, curiously, target Libya only, it can apply against any other state (including its vessels and aircraft) that may violate the arms embargo. Here comes probably the most controversial issue: Res. 1970 and 1973 not only prohibited the supply of any weapons to Libya, but also authorised limited use of force to intercept such supplies. When in late June 2011 the French parachuted machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and munitions to the Libyan rebels, could, Russia, officially protesting this as a violation of Res. 1970, use force against the French aircraft, delivering such weapons to rebels in contravention of the Resolutions? Ironically, such use of force by Russia to prevent the French supplies of weapons to Libyan rebels would have been in compliance with Par. 13 of Res. 1973.

**R2P and PoC after Libya**

Security Council Res. 1970 and 1973 represent a triumph of R2P and PoC. It would have been a defeat of R2P and PoC, if Qaddafi could massacre the citizens of Benghazi. The Resolutions are a triumph of R2P, because for the first time since the concept emerged ten years ago, the full and deepest scope of its implementation was utilized. The pillar I domestic responsibility to protect was referred to in Res. 1970, and when this
responsibility was manifestly flouted and the regime threatened its own population with massacre, the responsibility shifted to the international community—and both the UN and the regional organisations engaged in the full scope of pillar 3 measures: negotiations, diplomatic pressure, sanctions, and use of force. The removal of Gaddafi from power was nowhere stated as an aim in the Resolutions. Also, the military action was only one part of the whole coercive regime. A common mistake is to see R2P simply as a military intervention—in fact the international community has a lot of options before it comes to military intervention. What the responses to the crisis in Libya show, is that the Chapter VI and the Article 41 measures could be shortened to move faster towards a ‘timely and decisive’ military response. Libya showed that consensus could be difficult, particularly when it comes to the last resort. It was the extraordinary coincidence of many factors in Libya that allowed the triumph of R2P and PoC.

If Libya demonstrated the full opportunity of R2P and PoC, Syria showed the opposite—the limits of the concepts. The difficult question from Kosovo in 1999 (that triggered the debates and gave birth to R2P) ‘How to save people from mass atrocities, when a state manifestly fails to protect them and the UN Security Council is paralysed?’—is back on the table. The biggest R2P triumph so far—in Libya, could be followed by probably the biggest R2P failure so far—to protect people in Syria and elsewhere. If the UN and the regional organisations would not act with the same determination, as they did in Libya, the danger of selectivity in the application of R2P and PoC will continue to cloud international law in doubt. In the words of Dr. Simon Adams, Executive Director of the Global Center for the R2P “while tanks, troops and even warships have been unleashed against ordinary Syrians, the Security Council has so far failed in its responsibility to protect civilians. Syria has become a stain upon the conscience of the world’

Professor Ed Luck, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on R2P, when I interviewed him in July 2010, named the two concepts ‘cousins, but not sisters’, but this was before the Res.s 1970 and 1973 on Libya. After Libya, which demonstrated how important is the progress in development of awareness, adoption and implementation of both R2P and PoC concepts, I would not hesitate to define R2P and PoC as ‘sisters, but not twins’. The two concepts may exist separately in normal circumstances, but when people’s life is deadly threatened in critical situations, such as Libya in February-March 2011, they should reinforce each other, merge closer as to avoid gaps in protection of innocent people at risk.
1. What is Security Sector Reform?

In recent years, Security Sector Reform (SSR) has attracted wide attention as a key to achieving peace in war-torn nations. In the aftermath of civil war, the indigenous security sector (e.g. military, police) hardly functions in maintaining law and order, thereby increasing the probability of another war. For this reason, the international community, represented by the UN, EU and the governments of advanced nations, has become keener to support SSR in post-conflict environments.

Nevertheless, contemporary SSR is essentially different from traditional defence aid. First, it aims at not only improving the practical capability of local security organs but also causing profound change in their ways of thinking, behaviours and attitudes towards their citizenry. In those countries, the security forces cannot prevent internal conflict because they lack the ability to do so. Even worse, their problematic nature often fosters the causes that result in conflict, where they intensify and develop into wars. In those countries, the local security sectors often repress the minorities, protecting the power-wielders and the stakes of majority. Cruelty, greed and unfairness causes fear and depression among the oppressed, an open invitation to armed resistance. If such serious problems remain unresolved, the chances for sustainable peace will be dim. Contemporary SSR therefore aims at both improving their practical application and transforming their character into ‘more people-centred’ organs.

Second, the targets of SSR are not only the forces (e.g. military, police) but also extend deeply into the civilian sector, affecting the judiciary, the legislative and civilian administrations (e.g. Ministry of Defense). Strengthening civil oversight is an indispensable part of SSR of the indigenous security sector. In so doing, a successful SSR operation is supposed to be a comprehensive approach to bridging the gap between the forces and civil society.

2. Security Sector Reform and the UN Peace Operations

With the increasing attention paid to SSR since the late 1990s, the UN has expressed its interest and willingness to promote SSR in its peace operations. From early 2000s, UN Security Council Resolutions began mentioning SSR when new peace operations were implemented. More significantly, the UN’s commitment to SSR has
become institutionalised since 2005, when the UN Security Council Presidential Statements began highlighting the importance of SSR in peace operations. In 2006, the UN Peacebuilding Commission referred to SSR as one of its tools for reforming the security sector in Sierra Leone. The UN Security Council Presidential Statements went further in 2007, reaffirming UN support for SSR, following the UN Secretary General’s report that year. In 2008, ‘the Capstone Doctrine,’ a new guideline for UN peacekeeping operations, further emphasised the importance of SSR. Given these developments, it is reasonable to say that SSR is now one of the key components in contemporary UN peacekeeping operations.

In practice, however, the UN still faces a mountain of issues in making its SSR policy more effective and functional. First, an intra-UN coordination mechanism has not yet been developed to promote the ‘One UN Approach.’ With the comprehensive nature of SSR, the close cooperation among UN agencies is a prerequisite for successful SSR in UN peacekeeping operations. In reality, however, the development of a holistic approach still suffers from stovepiping. For example, the SSR Unit, which was created to coordinate the UN’s SSR-related sections, is understaffed and suffers from a lack of influence while the Police Division and the DDR Section are much larger and more powerful. Second, another concern is that the UN has been historically reluctant to engage in defence reform. Reforming the armed forces is one of the most important components in SSR operations. Without implementation in the field, UN SSR policy only has a slim chance for success. Third, costs may impede UN peace operations, affecting the ability of peacekeepers to stay in the field long enough to complete SSR operations. Transforming the nature of a local security sector usually takes an extended period of time, but UN member states may wish to withdraw the peacekeepers prior to the completion of an SSR operation. Fourth, the UN commitment to SSR seems rather unclear today. Support for SSR operations has been largely led by the Slovakian government since 2005. Having experienced SSR in the 1990s, the nation was very keen to deepen the UN’s involvement. As one of the non-permanent Security Council member states in 2007-2008, Slovakia championed SSR. Since Slovakia’s departure from the council, the UN’s attention to SSR has gradually declined.

In short, SSR in UN peacekeeping operations has suffered from a number of flaws and still needs a long way to go before achieving the ‘One UN Approach’ for more effective and productive SSR in post-conflict nations.
Reintegrating ex-combatants into local societies is a vital component of peace support missions, which is commonly referred as the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants program (DDR). This presentation will focus on arguing the meaning of DDR component in recent peace support missions and aim to provide analytical views on importance and limitation of “integrated DDR” in response to nationally-owned statebuilding strategies along with expanded roles of integrated peace support missions.

Multiple operations constitute comprehensive DDR components, which promote reintegration of ex-combatants to peaceful society after end of armed conflict as well as reinforce security by conducting immediate disarmament and demobilization right after peace agreement. The past experiences include post-conflict areas such as Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Haiti, Burundi, Sudan, Afghanistan, Indonesia (Aceh), Nepal and others. Since the 1990s, the origin of “DDR” has been formulated as one of the critical components of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). Thereafter, it has also been practiced by multiple international stakeholders such as donor countries, regional organizations, the UN agencies, civil societies as well as UNPKO itself, in accordance with relevant issues such as security, development, social matter, gender, protection of children, and economic governance.

Responding to this expansion of the role, in 2006, the UN published an overall manual
entitled “the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-combatant Standard (IDDRS)” for integrated peace support missions. The four years later, the IDDRS was revised shortly (however, still nearly 300 pages) for DDR practitioners as “Operational Guide to the IDDRS.” This integrated guide in 2010 has made to give the technical arrangements for DDR practices covering the overall challenges. However, the “human-centered approach” on DDR has its intrinsic difficulty to cope with both longer-term security and reintegration of ex-combatants by democratic way. Even after the second national election since peace agreement, the problems such as high rate of unemployment, unsolved reconciliation, and impunity/amnesty would remain unintended confrontation among political identities in terms of ex-combatants. In this regards, this presentation is an attempt to examine the challenges between “integrated DDR” and the expanded role of “integrated peace missions.” In addition, this also seeks to explore the related dimensions; the special characteristics of DDR with state failure; relation between DDR and SSR; and historical views on demobilization.
Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was the location of three continuous and inter-related conflicts beginning in 1994, following the spillover of Rwandan genocide, and two successive wars in 1996 and 1998. DRC has experienced the deadliest war in terms of statistics in the post-Second World War era, resulting in 6 million deaths between late 1990s and today. The United Nations (UN) responded to Congo’s conflicts by authorizing the creation of a peacekeeping force MONUC in 1999 (known as MONUSCO since 2010), which became the largest force in the world. Although the Congo war is known to have ended “officially” in 2003 with the formation of transitional government, the conflict is still ongoing. This is due to the fact that the peacekeeping force has had to deal with the complicated multi-layered conflict involving an array of different forces and factions, both national and foreign.

According to the UN Security Council Resolution 1856 (2008), MONUC has the following mandate in order of priority working in close cooperation with the Government of the DRC: protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and UN personnel and facilities; disarmament demobilization, monitoring of resources of foreign and Congolese armed groups; training and mentoring of FARDC in support for security sector reform; and territorial security of the DRC. Nevertheless, in reality, the top priority of peacekeepers’ mandate, the protection of civilian, is not well respected, and as a result, serious human rights violations are taking place until today, such as massive civilian displacement, killing and sexual violence.

In order to protect civilian and eventually to bring positive and sustainable peace in the DRC as well as in the Africa’s Great Lakes region, how can the peacekeeping force work with DDR and SSR?

My presentation will raise DDRRR (disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration) issue of foreign combatants and argue that there are flaws in DDRRR’s implementation and contradiction in the peacekeeping force’s mandate. My argument focuses on perception of Congo’s war, foreign and government troops’ position, relationship between foreign troops and their governments, use of military action against foreign troops as well as culture of impunity.
Summary of Concluding Statement

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Since the Brahimi panel called for more robust rules of engagement and more realistic mandates from the Security Council in 2000, the United Nations has entered a new era of peacekeeping as the international community attempts to address a multitude of complex demands placed on peacekeeping operations and on the human resources required to implement complex multidimensional operations. Several initiatives have been taken to improve the performance of UN peacekeeping operations, most notably the effort made by UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support to renew UN peacekeeping with the publication of a joint report entitled “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping.

New Horizon provides a common vision of the new role of peacekeeping missions as well as the political strategy underpinning each of peacekeeping missions. For any new multidimensional mission to succeed it is imperative to secure the political cohesion, sound structures and effective operating procedures at headquarters and in the field along with critical capabilities necessary to deploy, sustain, and transition peacekeeping operations successfully. The renewed emphasis on the need for supporting a comprehensive peace process presupposes the involvement of all stakeholders, underpinned by national ownership and the commitment of the international community. More systematic triangular consultation mechanism should be developed to enable the Security Council, the UN Secretariat and troop and police contributing countries. In addition, there is increased recognition of the importance of the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, even though the primary responsibility to protect civilians rests with the host Government.

The development of a strategy for early peacebuilding tasks is recognized essential to enable peacekeepers and peacebuilders to be engaged in the immediate aftermath of conflict, in such critical areas as police, justice, rule of law, DDR, SSR, and reconstruction work. It is now widely recognized that root causes of conflict should be addressed in a coherent, coordinated and comprehensive manner, using political, economic and social means. Those peacebuilding efforts should start well before and continue after the departure of peacekeepers, so as to ensure a smooth transition to
lasting peace and development.

New emerging consensus is that peacekeeping missions must have legitimacy, credibility and national ownership. While the articulation of mission mandates by the Security Council is a necessity, the role of the Security Council should be to offer a broad mandate, establish legitimacy and provide capabilities to a mission on the ground. Any peacekeeping intervention requires legitimacy accorded by the Security Council. The security of civilians in conflict-prone and post-conflict environments is critical to maintaining the credibility of the international community in general and UN peacekeeping missions in particular. The role of peacekeeping missions in protection of civilians requires the political support of the international community represented by the Security Council and the main parties to the conflict on the ground. Peacekeeping missions should be empowered to enforce, keep and build peace with the establishment of clear line of command and control and the appointment of quality leadership that can encourage and convince national and local leaders that they are responsible for achieving sustainable peace and development.