

## **A New Role for Armed Forces in a Non-permissive Environment**

### **- On the Coordination between the Japan Self-Defense Forces' International Peace Cooperation Operations<sup>1</sup> and the Official Development Assistance in Iraq -**

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#### **1. Introduction**

It is difficult for foreign armed forces to have friendly relation to local civilians. Especially, occupying armed forces after the war as the coalition forces including the armed forces of the United Kingdom and the United States after the Iraqi War are one of typical examples. However, the results of a joint survey which was carried out in 2006, by one of leading Japanese newspapers (Asahi Shimbun) and a local Iraqi newspaper (Uruk), argues that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) operations as part of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance (HRA) were well received by the Iraqi people. Considering the situation in Iraq at that time, the results are staggering and interesting ones. However, there are several underlying reasons for this remarkable result:

First, Japan has a climate to accept other cultures due to its geographical characteristics that Japan is located in the Far East. Therefore, Japanese are religiously receptive and non-aggressive towards other religions.

Second, Japan was the first industrialized nation in Asia, and had been at war against some developed and powerful countries in modern history, such as World War II, Russo-Japanese War, and so forth. Especially, former opponents included the United Kingdom, which was suzerain of Iraq, and the United States, which had been major enemy in the Iraq War.

Third, Japanese products, including automobiles and electronics, are known for their extreme reliability and high quality. Not surprising, the Iraqis love them, which means the Iraqis were predisposed to accept the armed forces from Japan favorably.

The HRA in Iraq was the first attempt for Japan to combine the SDF's overseas operations and the Official Development Assistance (ODA) activities<sup>2</sup>. Both the operations and the assistance activities faced various challenges in terms of integration. Initially, coordination between the SDF International Peace Cooperation Operations (IPCO) and the ODA activities—that is, the provision of operations and assistance—presented various challenges. The SDF contingent in cooperation with the MOFA detachment had to overcome these challenges contributing to enhancing reconstruction in Iraq and Japan's exemplary reputation abroad.

This paper establishes “A New Role of Armed Forces in a Non-permissive Environment” as its main theme by addressing the relations of armed forces with civilians as one factor of international peace operations. It also examines the possibility to employ the military in development field while closely cooperating with civil actors for the reconstruction assistance based on the HRA in Iraq. This was regarded as the first case in which nature of collaboration between the SDF field operations and

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<sup>1</sup> According to the Defense of Japan 2012, an Annual White Paper, the Japanese Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces (MOD/SDF) normally uses the term “International Peace Cooperation Activities” when referring to these activities. However, using “Activities” to describe these actions seems to be unfamiliar to foreigners. Therefore, since the actions of armed forces are normally referred to as “operations,” to ensure clarity this paper will use International Peace Cooperation “Operations” rather than “Activities” throughout.

<sup>2</sup> IMAMURA Eiziro. *Jieitai-no-kokusaiheiwakyouryokukatsudou-nikansuru-ichikousatsu* [Study Concerning the International Peace Cooperation Operations by the Japan Self-Defense Forces]: November 2005, Land Warfare Research, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Staff College, Tokyo, Japan. p.6; and SATO Masahisa. *Iraku-zieitai-sentouki* - [The SDF Operations Diary in Iraq]: Kodansha, Tokyo, Japan, 2007. pp.148-152

the ODA was improved from “coordination” into “cooperation.” To this end, this paper traces the Japanese role in Iraq. It will focus on the history of Japan’s ODA to Iraq, Japanese action after the Iraq War, Japan’s HRA in Iraq, and discusses the effectiveness of coordination of Japan’s ODA activities and the SDF operations in Iraq, and proposes a new role for armed forces in a non-permissive environment. The main focus will be on describing the relations between the SDF operations and the ODA activities that contributed toward reconstruction in southeast Iraq.

## 2. History of Japan’s ODA to Iraq

### 2.1. Overview of Japan’s ODA<sup>3</sup>

Japan’s ODA consists of grants or loans that have relaxed conditions and are provided by public institutions mainly to contribute to economic development and improve welfare. These grants or loans are directed toward developing countries and regions that appear on the list of countries and regions that are eligible for aid. This list is created by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Japan’s ODA provides two types of assistance: Bilateral Assistance and Multilateral Assistance (Assistance through Multilateral Institutions).

Bilateral Assistance consists of two types of assistance: Grants and Government Loans. Grants are “Grant Aid,” in which no repayment obligation is undertaken by recipient countries; and Technical Assistance, the purpose of which is to enable strengthening of the foundation of the recipient country and its labor force in future. This is achieved through, for example, human resource development, technology transfer, and so forth. Government Loans are Loan Aid (ODA Loan) in which the grant element is greater than or equal to 25% of the total loan.

Multilateral Assistance provides assistance through funds given to international organizations. For example, funds are given to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-HABITAT); the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the World Bank Group; and so forth<sup>4</sup>.

Currently, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) plays a role in almost all of the ODA, Grant Aid, and Technical Assistance, and has also played a role in most of the Loan Aid<sup>5</sup>.




Figure 2.1. Function of the ODA system

### 2.2. ODA activities until the 1980s and Japan-Iraq relations concerning oil

After World War II, for Japan, which had been poor in natural resources, to secure energy in particular oil, has been a matter of life and death for its economic development and reconstruction.

<sup>3</sup> Japan’s Official Development Assistance White Paper 2011, See

<<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2011/html/honbun/b0/enjo.html>>, accessed Aug 27, 2012.

<sup>4</sup> In the case of the Iraq HRA, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) provides assistance through funds given to the UNDP as Iraq Reconstruction and Employment Program (IREP) I, II, and III. Other Japanese operations by the SDF contingent included those with the UNDP, concerning public welfare; the UN-HABITAT, to secure repairs of school facilities; the UNESCO, and to ensure timely repairs to the facilities for the Ur excavation (Ur was one of city-states of ancient Mesopotamia). The World Bank Group is one of the main international organizations providing Multilateral Assistance.

<sup>5</sup> The law concerning JICA activities was amended in 2008 to make JICA responsible for loan assistance as well.

Therefore, to build a good relationship with Middle East which has a large amount of oil reserves, has been given high priority in its energy security policy.

Japan's ODA started after World War II as reparation for the war. However, in the face of the oil crisis in the 1970s, which shook the entire Japanese economy, ODA's focus shifted to assisting oil-producing countries in order to ensure the energy source.

Iraq's rich oil resources have been confirmed as the world's fifth largest<sup>6</sup>. Not surprisingly, Iraq has been (since the 1980s) and continues to be one of the major oil exporters to Japan<sup>7</sup>. This means that Japan has been supporting Iraq economically through ODA for a long time.

Japan's ODA supports the self-help efforts of countries that receive grants from it by focusing on "Yen Loan," a part of Loan Aid. This means that ODA assistance, because it is given to developing countries, sometimes contributes indirectly to preserving authoritarian regimes such as that which was in Iraq at the time.

### **2.3. Stagnation of the ODA after the Gulf War**

During the Gulf War in 1991, even though Japan provided US\$1.3 billion to support the multinational forces, it received little credit or international recognition for its effort. The ODA to Iraq might have been a part of funding that enabled the Saddam to save and prosper his regime.

When the Gulf War ended, Japan's ODA to Iraq was canceled to maintain good relations with the international community, particularly the United States. The ODA Charter was also approved by the Japanese Cabinet in 1992. This Charter is the first official document that clearly stipulates the basic principles of Japan's ODA, changing its concept from funding the "self-help efforts of the countries that received the assistance" to funding "assistance in which Japan participates proactively."

### **2.4. Economic situation in the southeastern Iraq**

During the 1970s, the Iraqi government led by Saddam Hussein, who was a Sunni, did not distribute sufficient funding from the ODA to southeastern Iraq, which is predominantly Shia. (There is a historical conflict between the Sunni and the Shia.) For example, in Al-Muthanna Province, which is Shia, ODA funds were only used in development projects for four major hospitals.

By the mid 1990s, almost all foreign aid to Iraq, including Japan's ODA, was canceled following the Gulf War. This meant that the little development funding that had been provided to southeastern Iraq was no longer available, among it aid from Japan's ODA.

## **3. Japan's Response to Post-War Iraq**

### **3.1. Iraqi situation after the "Mission Accomplished" speech<sup>8</sup>**

"Mission Accomplished" was printed on a banner that was displayed on board the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln during a televised address by the US President George W. Bush on May 1, 2003. The President announced "Major combat operations in Iraq have ended."

At that time, the mass-media said that almost people throughout the world believed that a peaceful Iraq would follow the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime. However, the security situation in post-war Iraq became unstable, and the anti-Hussein functions were converted to anti-United States functions.

The multinational forces, virtually headed by the United States, struggled to restore security. It was at this time that the United States requested the world to provide HRA to Iraq.

### **3.2. The Posture of the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning Japan-US relations**

The Japanese government, which did not want to repeat the mistake of the Gulf War, felt it must do something to strengthen Japan-US relations. So, to provide for HRA funding assistance in Iraq, the

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<sup>6</sup> The BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2012; also per the CNN Website, Oct 4, 2010, extractable Iraqi oil reserves amounted to 143.1 billion barrels. p.6, "Oil" and "Reserves"

See <<http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/10/04/iraq.oil.reserves/index.html>>, accessed Aug 27, 2012.

<sup>7</sup> Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. *The General Energy Statistics 1980*, Ministry of International Trade and Industry (is that of the current Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry), Tokyo, Japan.

<sup>8</sup> See <<http://geogewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html>>, accessed Aug 27, 2012.

Japanese government set aside US\$5 billion in Grant Aid and Loan Aid. The government also tried to satisfy a request from the United States for “boots on the ground”<sup>9</sup>.

However, the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) warned Japanese nationals against entering Iraq because of security concerns after the Iraq War. This meant that civilian organizations, including the Japanese staff of the JICA and other Japanese international NGOs, were virtually prohibited to undertake activities in support of HRA in Iraq<sup>10</sup>.

### 3.3. The revised ODA Charter

Japanese government approved the first ODA Charter in 1992. Based on “Basic philosophy”<sup>11</sup> of the former ODA Charter, its principles are 1) Compatibility between preservation of the environment and development, 2) Avoidance of the use of ODA funds for military purposes and for purposes liable to inflame international conflicts, 3) Monitoring of military spending of developing countries, their activities of developing and producing weapons of mass destruction, and the export or import of weapons, and 4) Monitoring of activities for the promotion of demobilization in developing countries, and their efforts to introduce a market-oriented economy and protect basic human rights and freedoms of their citizens<sup>12</sup>.

The ODA was revised in 2003 by the Japanese government. This revised Charter ensures that peace-building is one of the central missions of ODA, lined with poverty reduction, sustained growth, and approach to global issues. This meant the revised ODA Charter would further engage with international peace operations than previous one did.

That ODA activities could further the promotion of the peace process through, such activities as, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration for ex-combatant” (DDR), and so forth.

### 3.4. Legal framework for IPCO in Iraq

At that time, Japan dispatched its Ground Self-Defense Force engineer unit to the United Nations Mission Support in East Timor (UNMISSET), as well as its contingent to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in Golan Heights to which Japan had kept contributed since the mid 1990s.

However, the SDF contingent could not be dispatched for HRA in Iraq because the situation in Iraq did not meet the condition required the framework of the International Peace Cooperation Law<sup>13</sup>. The Japanese government therefore needed to structure another legal framework that would allow the dispatch of Japanese troops in support of HRA in Iraq.

In 2003, the Japanese government enacted the Iraq Special Measures Law<sup>14</sup>, which was designed specifically to permit dispatch of the SDF contingent to Iraq. This law allowed Japan to act on its own initiative and not serve under the auspices of the United Nations. In this way, the Japanese contingent could implement HRA and support ODA activities as “a pair of wheels” through the legal framework

<sup>9</sup> “Boots on the ground” is an all-purpose term used to describe ground forces actually fighting in a war or conflict at the time of speaking, rather than troops not engaged or being transported to the fighting.

<sup>10</sup> At the time, the Japanese MOFA had banned its citizens from traveling to Iraq. However, in fact, Japanese nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) had been active in northeast Iraq, leading to the abduction of Japanese citizens working for these various organizations.

<sup>11</sup> The Basic Philosophy of the ODA Charter is 1) Humanitarian considerations, 2) Recognition of interdependence among nations of the international community, 3) Environmental conservation, and 4) Support for self-help efforts of recipient countries. (a) Basic Philosophy, (1) Approaches of Japan’s ODA (philosophy and principles), Japan’s Official Development Assistance Annual Report (Summary) 1995. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/summary/1995/1basic.html>>, accessed Sep 5, 2012.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., (b) The Four Principles of the ODA Charter.

<sup>13</sup> The Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations. See <[http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO\\_data/law/law?data02.html](http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_data/law/law?data02.html)>.

<sup>14</sup> The Law is known as the Concerning Special Measures on the Implementation of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities and Support Activities for Ensuring Security in Iraq. The law contained supplementary provisions to the SDF Law, that described the major roles the Japanese military could assume in Iraq. In addition, it specified that the SDF’s major operation was HRA in Iraq. Therefore, it differed from the PKO regulations of the UN concerning the position in the SDF Law at that time.<sup>15</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. *Japan’s Assistance for the Reconstruction of Iraq (July 2006)*. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle\\_e/iraq/issue2003/assistance/index.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/iraq/issue2003/assistance/index.html). Accessed May 10, 2013.

of the Iraq Special Measures Law and the revised ODA Charter of 2003. Given the state of political unrest in Iraq, Japan would have its troops to support HRA without ensuring the safety of those troops through security provided in the operational area.

#### **4. Japan's Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq**

##### **4.1. Overview**

The Japanese Government perceived assisting Iraq was important for Japan<sup>15</sup>, Government began to implement four main projects who consisted of “maximum US\$5 billion in reconstruction assistance,” “personnel contributions by the SDF,” “debt relief” and “capacity building<sup>16</sup>.” The HRA in this paper means cooperation between “maximum US\$5 billion in reconstruction assistance” mainly by the ODA activities and “personnel contributions by the SDF,” as one of the Japan's assistance for the reconstruction of Iraq. It is considered that effective cooperation between the SDF operations and the ODA activities was the key to the success of the HRA. The SDF contingent was dispatched to Al-Samawah, an Iraqi city within Al-Muthanna Province that had been left out of earlier development, which meant the basic livelihoods of locals there had been highly compromised. In fact, Al-Muthanna Province was the poorest province in Iraq and had the highest unemployment rate<sup>17</sup>.

This chapter addresses the posture the MOFA took in Al-Samawah and in cities in neighboring provinces; how the ODA was implemented in Iraq; and how the SDF contingent was organized, how it operated, and why it produced good results in cooperated with to the ODA activities.

##### **4.2. MOFA's posture in Al-Samawah in and around**

The MOFA set up a liaison office<sup>18</sup> within the camp Al-Samawah of the SDF. The office, headed by the chief, had a few members who took charge of economic cooperation.

The office had worked in cooperation with the Embassy in Kuwait, Jordan, and neighboring countries. The office staffs were rotated so they worked in Al-Samawah one month, in the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait during the next month<sup>19</sup>, and so on.

##### **4.3. ODA activities for Al-Samawah**

The Japanese government provided US\$1.5 billion in grants as a whole to entire nation of Iraq; more than US\$200 million of that was earmarked for Al-Muthanna Province. Specifically, most of this funding supported the reconstruction of Al-Samawah<sup>20</sup>. Assistance was provided in three stages. The first stage came in the form of emergency humanitarian assistance, including the provision of a water truck, water supplied by the French NGO, provision pharmaceutical and medical products, and so forth.

The second stage expanded the breadth of assistance. In this stage, water purification machines and water tanks were provided, as was medical equipment and ambulances; garbage and sewage treatment equipment was rehabilitated; special vehicles, such as police cars and so forth, were also provided; roads were paved; primary and secondary schools and higher education facilities were rebuilt; jobs were created; the police were trained; and so forth.

The third stage witnessed the start of large-scale projects. Among these were the construction of large-scale power plants in Al-Samawah, refurbishment of the Samawah General Hospital, and assistance given to the construction of bridges and irrigation sources, and so forth, all of which was supported via ODA loans. Human resource development support was likewise provided in various

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<sup>15</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. *Japan's Assistance for the Reconstruction of Iraq (July 2006)*. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle\\_e/iraq/issue2003/assistance/index.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/iraq/issue2003/assistance/index.html). Accessed May 10, 2013.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. *Assistance to Al-Samawah by Japan –Summary and Future Prospects - (May 2007)*. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/index/whats/060922\\_02.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/index/whats/060922_02.html). Accessed Oct 3, 2012.

<sup>18</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. *Economic Cooperation Projects for the Reconstruction of Iraq (January 2005)*. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2005/1/0113.html>. Accessed May 13, 2013.

<sup>19</sup> Interviews with the staff, the Liaison Office in Al-Samawah of the MOFA.

<sup>20</sup> The Japanese government provided to Al-Muthanna Province, which was made up of about 2% of the overall Iraqi population and 13% of the total ODA given the entire nation of Iraq. *Assistance to Al-Samawah by Japan –Summary and Future Prospects - (May 2007)*. p.3. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/index/whats/060922\\_02.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/index/whats/060922_02.html). Accessed Oct 3, 2012.

sectors, such as healthcare sector, local government, polices, elected administration, mass media, and so forth.

#### 4.4. SDF operations based on the Special Measures Law

According to the Iraq Special Measures Law, Japan's provision of HRA by the assigned to the SDF encompassed four major operations: medical services, water supplies, public facilities restoration and rehabilitation, and transportation specifically in support of HRA activities.

The SDF contingent was made up of two major units. One was the Reconstruction Support Group (RSGp), whose primary responsibility was the implementation of operations; and the other was the Task Planning and Liaison Unit (TP&LU), which supported operations. The TP&LU was under the control of the command of the RSGp commander in Al-Samawah City. The RSGp consisted of Headquarters (HQ), a Support Unit, an Engineer Unit, a Medical Unit, a Water Supply Unit, a Guard Unit, and so forth, all of which were stationed in Al-Samawah City (see Figure 4.4.1).




Figure 4.4.1. The RSGp chain of command<sup>21</sup>

The TP&LU consisted of HQ, a Surgeon, some liaison offices, the Kuwait detachment, and so forth. The HQs and some sections were stationed in Al-Samawah City; the rest was deployed in Baghdad, Basra, or Kuwait. The staff in charge of operations of the TP&LU included the project management team, known as the “CIMIC<sup>22</sup>” team within its operational area. This team implemented plans and control concerning projects for HRA in Iraq, and its members coordinated, negotiated and mediated, as needed, among local authorities, tribe leaders, and so forth (see Figure 4.4.2).




Figure 4.4.2. The TP&LU chain of command<sup>23</sup>

#### 4.5. Achievement of SDF operations in Iraq

Members of the SDF contingent trained and counseled medical personnel at four major hospitals<sup>24</sup>, gave technical training to ambulance personnel, and provided technical training in

<sup>21</sup> This chart is based on the Defense of Japan 2007 (Annual White Paper) and interviews with Iraq experiences.

<sup>22</sup> Civil-Military Cooperation.

<sup>23</sup> This chart is based on interviews with Iraq experiences.

<sup>24</sup> Al-Samawah General Hospital, Al-Samawah Maternal and Child Hospital, Al-Rumaytha Hospital, and Al-Khidr Hospital.

managing pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical warehouses. These operations led to the development of a basic medical infrastructure; reducing the newborn mortality rate<sup>25</sup> to one third in Al-Samawah Maternity Hospital, the only specialized hospital for maternity in Al-Muthanna Province; and improved overall emergency medical capability in Al-Samawah.

Water supply services provided through the SDF contingent camp included water purification and fueling up vehicles. As a result, the SDF contingent supplied approximately 53,500 cubic meters of water in total, and water shortage at early stage of the aid program was almost resolved.

The restoration and rehabilitation of public facilities entailed the repair of walls, floors, electrical circuits, and so forth for schools; laying the groundwork and paving roads for use by local citizens; and repair work on other facilities, including a medical clinic (the primary healthcare center (PHC)), water purification plants and related facilities, and other cultural facilities. In total, the SDF contingent restored 36 schools, rehabilitated 29 roads, and completed 66 other facilities. School maintenance in roughly one third of the schools was completed. The construction work performed on major roads made access easier. And purification flow increased twice, locals could become to keep water safely for drinking. As a result of its activities, the SDF contingent laid a foundation that would enable Iraqis in Al-Muthanna Province to restore the country for themselves.

Transporting supplies for HRA, which was undertaken at the first stage, had provided locals with medical equipments, water coolers, and so forth to meet immediate requirement of those survived.

The SDF contingent employed local people in mainly two areas: the management of the SDF contingent's camp and the reconstruction of public facilities. Inside the camp, local people worked as interpreters and mechanics to maintain and repair the facilities and equipment. Outside the camp, in reconstructing public facilities, locals were hired as technical engineers, interpreters, coordinators between the SDF contingent and local authorities or contractors. Through their work with the SDF contingent, these local companies improved their techniques, selection methods, materials, and so forth and are today succeeding in reconstructing public facilities<sup>26</sup>.

#### **4.6. Cooperation between SDF operations and ODA activities**

##### **4.6.1. Reconstruction of the water supply system<sup>27</sup>**

Water supply services right after initial development in February 2004 included water purification by the SDF contingent in Al-Muthanna Province, and distribution of purified water by one of international NGOs which was funded by Japan's ODA.

Water purifiers were also donated by Grant Aid, one of the ODA functions. At the same time, the SDF contingent assisted in giving technical guidance regarding the installation and operation of these water purifiers. Upon completion of their installation and start of water production, the contingent finished water supply services in February 2005<sup>28</sup> (see Box 1).

#### **Box 1**

##### **Collaboration for water trucks donated by the ODA**

The Japanese contingent pasted stickers where the Japanese flag and the Iraqi flag were painted, in order to have a good understanding of the local people that the water trucks donated by the ODA were from Japan. Moreover, stickers of famous Japanese cartoon football characters in the world were pasted so that the locals felt kinship with Japan. Receiving the request of the Japan MOFA Al-Samawah Liaison Office, the SDF contingent supported planning and implementation for the grant ceremony that was from the Al-Samawah Liaison Office to the local water authority.

<sup>25</sup> This rate means an infant mortality rate of less than 28 days after birth.

<sup>26</sup> SAKAEMURA Yoshiyuki. *Practical Activities and Lessons Learned of the JGSDF's Civil-Military Cooperation on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq*, Volume 38 Number 4 March 2011, The Journal of International Security, Japan Association for International Security (JAIS). Chapter 3, Section 3.

<sup>27</sup> *Practical Activities and Lessons Learned of the JGSDF's Civil-Military Cooperation on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq*. Chapter 4, Section 4.

<sup>28</sup> The Defense of Japan 2007 (Annual White Paper). III, Chapter 3, Section 1.

As a result, the Japanese contingent could be seen by the local people as contributor who assisted useful these water, for example, these water trucks were donated by the Japanese contingent.



Water trucks grant ceremony



Water supply using the water truck  
donated by the ODA

Photographs by the TP&LU

However, a comprehensive water supply system for entire Al-Muthanna Province was yet to be developed. There was still room for improvement. Water treatment plants and related facilities urgently needed. Thus the “CIMIC” staff of the TP&LU, in cooperation with actors related to ODA activities, planned a rehabilitation of the comprehensive water supply system in Al-Muthanna Province. Accordingly, the SDF contingent rehabilitated water treatment plants, the water pumping system, the water mains and so forth. The water pipeline chart in Al-Samawah and other facilities, including the terminal water pipeline, were built by UNDP as Assistance through Multilateral Institutions (Multilateral Assistance), an ODA function. As a result, due to the operations of the SDF contingent and the ODA activities it supported, treatment and purification the safe water increased from approximately 70,000 cubic meters to 130,000 cubic meters per day.

These collaborative activities vastly improved the water supply system in Al-Muthanna Province. The SDF contingent and MOFA staff in Al-Samawah City complemented each other through mutual cooperation (see Box 2).


#### **Box 2 Development of the water supply system**

Ensuring safe water was one of the major requirements of the local people. At the time, there was a chronic shortage of water for life in Al-Muthanna Province. Therefore, based on the request of the local water authority, the SDF contingent implemented restoration and rehabilitation of terminal water pipeline, while the MOFA liaison Office donated water trucks and water purifiers by the ODA and the office established water pipeline through the UNDP. However, in order to ensure a stable water supply to the local people, it was difficult to achieve it in such a way that corresponded to their individual needs only. It was necessary to develop a whole water supply system that included intake pump, water treatment plant, re-pressurization pump, water main and terminal water pipeline.

Therefore, the SDF contingent was planning the development of the whole water supply system with the MOFA liaison Office. It was possible in the framework for “restoration and rehabilitation” by the SDF contingent to rehabilitate intake pumps, water treatment plants, re-pressurization pumps and water main. But it was impossible to “develop” the terminal water pipeline by the SDF contingent because the operations based on the Iraqi Special Measures Law were only “restoration and rehabilitation” for public facilities, the SDF contingent could only restore and rehabilitate the terminal water pipeline. The installation condition of the terminal water pipeline in Al-Samawah City was unclear, therefore firstly the MOFA liaison

Office implemented the creation of a chart for terminal water pipeline through the UNDP by the ODA. Based on the chart, the SDF contingent implemented restoration and rehabilitation of the terminal pipeline, and the MOFA liaison Office developed them by the ODA.

As a result, the SDF contingent and the MOFA liaison Office have been able to contribute to the development of the whole water supply system in Al-Muthanna Province, to ensure stable and safe water for the local people .



Water supply system in Al-Muthanna Province

Source: author



The SDF personnel to check the condition of the facilities related to the intake pump



Technical inspection for the completion of the water treatment plant

Photographs by the TP&LU

#### 4.6.2. Overall rehabilitation of the medical system<sup>29</sup>

Immediately after the deployment in February in 2004, the medical team of the SDF contingent provided technical assistance for local medical staff to help build their capacity. Meanwhile the MOFA liaison team donated medical equipment, ambulances, and a radio system for a medical network, which were all funded by Grant Aid, one of the ODA functions. The local doctors and nurses learned the latest medical techniques. In addition the SDF “CIMIC” team of the TP&LU assisted rehabilitation of 30 PHCs and supervised local constructors.

The SDF medical team visited local hospitals and clinics, which were donated, and taught local medical staff how to operate them. Meanwhile, the SDF engineer team installed power generators to sustain the medical equipment.

These four teams built up fruitful relations mutually, examined the cooperation procedure, and had a good collaboration for a big purpose as HRA. As the result, they were able to implement comprehensive medical support (see Box 3).

<sup>29</sup> *Practical Activities and Lessons Learned of the JGSDF's Civil-Military Cooperation on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq*. Chapter 4, Section 3.

**Box 3**

**Collaboration between the operations by the SDF contingent  
and donation of the medical equipment by the ODA**

The operations by the SDF contingent and the ODA activities cooperated for medical support in Al-Muthanna Province. The SDF contingent could implement the restoration and the rehabilitation of the facilities and the training for medical technique, however it was beyond its mandate to grant the supplies, for example, medical equipment and ambulances. Therefore, the Japanese MOFA could implement to grant them by the ODA.

The SDF contingent implemented the restoration and the rehabilitation of 30 PHCs. The MOFA granted the medical equipment, medicine, ambulances, radio system for medical, generators for the PHC, and so forth. And the SDF contingent implemented to offer the hands on training for the medical equipment that have been granted by the ODA for Iraqi medical staffs working in the PHCs.

Thus, by combining the each advantage of the operations by the SDF contingent and the donating the medical equipment by the ODA, they created synergy to improve overall health care environment in Al-Muthanna Province.



The SDF personnel checking the progress of construction of PHC



Ambulances donated by the ODA



The SDF surgeons training of the local medical staffs for the operation of the ultrasonic diagnostic apparatus granted by the ODA



Photographs by the TP&LU

#### 4.7. Various survey results

##### 4.7.1. Summary of each survey

This section addresses the results of three surveys: the joint survey by the Japanese newspaper (Asahi Shimbun) and the Iraqi newspaper (Uruk), the SDF contingent's periodic survey, and the Japanese government's official survey. All of these concluded that the positive reputation of the Japanese was enhanced among locals and Japanese citizens.

##### 4.7.2. Periodic surveys performed by the SDF

The SDF contingent, to effectively implement its support of HRA, conducted monthly surveys among the local people in three major cities: Al-Samawah; Al-Rumaytha, which is located north of Al-Samawah; and Al-Khidr, which is located east of Al-Samawah.

This monthly survey found that local people in Al-Samawah City gave a less than 50% positive rating to the work of the SDF contingent (see Figure 4.7.2). However, it can be safely surmised that the SDF contingent received a good rating as foreign forces stationed there.




Figure 4.7.2. Result of a monthly survey by the SDF contingent concerning its impact on the locals in Al-Samawah

Source: TP&LU, June 2005<sup>30</sup>

The result of another survey indicated that more than 80% of the local people in Al-Samawah City were interested in the operations of the SDF contingent, which means that its activities gained local recognition. When people expressed an interest in the operations of the SDF contingent, they viewed the contingent in a slightly more positive light. But when people were not interested, they viewed the work of the SDF contingent in a far less positive light. These surveys were reflected in the effective operations by the SDF contingent and paying special attention to those who were not interested in HRA work by the SDF contingent.

##### 4.7.3. Joint survey by Asahi Shimbun and Uruk

Despite the presence of foreign forces in Al-Samawah, the SDF contingent stationed there was viewed positively by local people in 2006 (see Figure 4.7.3). The total of locals favoring the stationing of a foreign force, specifically the SDF contingent, in their area is more than 70%. This is a phenomenal number.

And the HRA provided by the SDF contingent was also highly regarded by locals in Al-Muthanna Province (see Figure 4.7.3).

<sup>30</sup> This chart is based on the independent survey conducted in June 2005 by the TP&LU at Al-Samawah City in Iraq.




Figure 4.7.3. Results of joint survey to the locals in Al-Samawah concerning the SDF contingent  
 Source: Asahi Shimbun and Uruk, November 2006<sup>31</sup>

#### 4.7.4. Official 2006 survey concerning the SDF's HRA in Iraq

According to the official survey implemented in 2006, Japanese citizens regarded the operations of the SDF contingent highly (see Figure 4.7.4).




Figure 4.7.4. Result of an official survey to the Japanese citizens concerning the SDF's HRA in Iraq  
 Source: The Cabinet Office, September 2006<sup>32</sup>

## 5. Coordination between the ODA Activities and the SDF Operations in a Non-permissive Environment

### 5.1. Limitations of the ODA

Japan has been one of the leading donors in the world as a "financial resource" from the point of view of post-conflict developing countries<sup>33</sup>. However, the ODA activities are generally limited under non-permissive environment such as in the post-war Iraq. Thus, actively and effectively utilizing this resource is very important for Japan to contribute to build a sustainable peace through IPCO. As those

<sup>31</sup> This chart was created using information derived from the joint survey conducted in 2006 by the Asahi Shimbun and the Uruk, a local newspaper in Iraq.

<sup>32</sup> This chart is created based on the official survey conducted in 2006 concerning the SDF's role for the HRA in Iraq by the Office of Governmental Public Affairs, the Cabinet Office, Japan.

<sup>33</sup> The performance of the Japan's ODA was the largest in the world until 2000, it is still one of the leading ODA donor countries in the world.

See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/pamphlet/future/odae4.html>>, accessed Jan 15, 2013.

activities depend on civilians, they are likely to be disrupted by armed groups such as “spoilers<sup>34</sup>” who oppose peace process in post-conflict areas.

When Japan started the plan in Iraq, the MOFA officials had difficulties in implementing identification and receiving feasibility of on-site development. Its activities were thus limited, and the JICA staffs were not able to even enter the country. Unless overcoming this difficulty, the MOFA officials and the JICA staff could not perform the ODA activities effectively.

### 5.2. Advantage of the SDF as a “development facilitator”

In the HRA for Iraq, the SDF contingent could succeed in implementing several operations including simultaneously supervising and confirming the HRA projects and protecting their own personnel in operational areas (see Box 4).

#### Box 4 HRA and protection by the SDF contingent

The SDF dispatched a guard unit<sup>35</sup> for own personnel and the local employees in the HRA for Iraq, it was the first time in IPCO history. The dispatch in order to implement the HRA projects in unstable areas of security was essential, which was a clear difference from the activities of civilian only.

The SDF personnel in charge of restoration and rehabilitation of public facilities implemented confirmation and inspection for public facilities with the local people under the control of the guard personnel. At the time, the guard personnel were able to provide the physical of the local employees of the SDF contingent, as being under their control according to the Iraq Special Measures Law.



The SDF personnel checking facilities and the guard personnel (right side)



“Under the control” of the guard personnel

Photographs by the TP&LU

In addition, the SDF contingent in Iraq, as a member of the “coalition”, was able to share the military information with the Multinational Force that the MOFA could not access which was very important for secure to implement its activities. And the SDF contingent was able to mediate the relationship between the MOFA and the foreign armed forces.

These operations by the SDF contingent as a “development facilitator” supported to the ODA activities. Thus, through cooperation between the ODA and the SDF, the personnel were able to work more safely. In addition, although the SDF contingent was as one of the armed forces, it was able to leave a positive impression on the local people. Therefore, the SDF contingent contributed to improving security indirectly, in spite of did not have a direct security mission.

<sup>34</sup> "Spoiler" refers to a part of the parties to the conflict that interfere with agreeing cease-fire or the other armed groups that oppose cease-fire in PKO.

<sup>35</sup> See Figure 4.4.1.

### 5.3. Effectiveness of coordination

At that time in Iraq, the United States and the United Kingdom had been carrying out civil-military operations. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) team and the Department for International Development (DfID) team were deployed to the area of responsibility of the US Armed Forces and the UK Armed Forces. However, its operations were implemented by operating a civilian-military division of labor, the operations by the forces did not attempt to relate with the activities by the development teams.

This similar system was carried out in Afghanistan, for example, with the PRT<sup>36</sup>, in an attempt to develop new civilian-military coordination. In this case, the civilians were in charge of implementing and developing the HRA while the armed forces were in charge of security for these civilian activities.

Cooperation between the SDF contingent operations and the ODA activities was fundamentally different from that practiced by the operations and activities of the United States, the United Kingdom and the PRT in that the military was deeply involved in the details of the “development.” Its cooperation was able to effectively promote development which was difficult even when and where. And such cooperation has become one of the good examples that have produced a good circulation as a factor to stabilize the security.

It is in this respect that the SDF contingent was able to develop its role as a part of an armed force while at the same being perceived in a generally favorable light, not only by the Japanese people but by Iraqi locals as well. This is unusual in that foreign armies generally do not have a good reputation among local people, even in international peace operations.

In the world post the Cold War, conflicts between two countries became decrease and domestic conflicts became increase. Environment post these conflicts needed “development” for peacekeeping, peace-building or conflict prevention. And they have also led to an expansion of the scope of protection given by the international community post conflict, leading to developments such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs<sup>37</sup>). In situations in which only civilians are involved, there is a very real possibility that these activities could not be carried out as smoothly. Whether there is room for improvement or a willingness on the part of nations to deal with this issue is unclear.

Moreover, although the cooperation of armed forces and civilians was successfully implemented, many points still needed improvement. In particular, initial coordination of reconstruction assistance was insufficient despite the fact that the SDF contingent was involved in planning the details of reconstruction from the outset. Clearly, an SDF contingent cannot be dispatched to a future post-conflict area before careful preparations are made at the ministry level<sup>38</sup>.

## 6. Conclusions

The HRA for Iraq, as it was undertaken in the unstable period immediately after the war ended, was totally different from previous United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO<sup>39</sup>) in terms of security and stability. In the previous UNPKO, cooperation between the SDF operations and the ODA activities was weak, however, the HRA for Iraq was the operations to cooperate with the ODA

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<sup>36</sup> The composition of the PRT varies according to the troop contribution from each country. According to the MOFA Website, the definition of PRT is “A civil-military organization that is composed of military personnel and civil staff that administers the HRA that each country sends.”

See <[http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/afghanistan/josei\\_shien.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/afghanistan/josei_shien.html)>, accessed Aug 30, 2012.

<sup>37</sup> The aim of MDGs is to encourage development by improving social and economic conditions in the world’s poorest countries. These goals are derived from earlier international development targets, and were officially established following the Millennium Summit in 2000.

United Nations Millennium Declaration (UN Doc. A/RES/55/2, Sep 2000)

<sup>38</sup> KOSHIZUKA Hiroki. *Funsougo-no-heiwakouchiku-heno-torikumi-niokeru-jieitai-no-kadai-to-taiou* [Challenges and Action of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force concerning efforts to peace-building post conflict]: April 2009, Land Warfare Research, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Staff College, Tokyo, Japan. p.38

<sup>39</sup> “UNPKO are deployed with the consent of main parties to the conflict in a post-conflict environment”. 3.1, Chapter 3, Part 1, Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support, the United Nations. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines*, 2008.

activities that supported the peace-building for Iraq under the framework of the Iraq Special Measures Law.

In post-conflict peace-building, security and development are key elements as the basis to create necessary conditions for a sustainable peace. In less-developed areas and in areas immediately affected by conflicts, it is critical to facilitate developments implemented by civilians while maintaining secured condition by armed forces in theory<sup>40</sup>. However, in practice there are particular circumstances, which hinder civilians from implementing development on the ground. To extend that civilian cannot operate in these cases, military could be empowered as only alternative to implement development works, as the operations by the SDF contingent in this study. Moreover, if the armed forces are capable of fostering development in such an environment, they will also be able to break the vicious cycle of deteriorating security and delays in development. In the past, roles that armed forces had played in international peace operations had been generally limited to those civilians cannot do; such as maintaining security and monitoring cease-fires. However, in a non-permissive environment, there may be a case that civilians cannot provide development assistance even supported by military. This is one of the challenges that must be met to effectively implement peace operations like cases in Iraq.

Though civilian development actors ideally supervise and survey on-site of construction works by themselves, they become unfit in a non-permissive environment. Therefore, as illustrated in this paper, development works by armed forces, such as the SDF contingent, become effective complement to fill the gaps of civilians' absence. As mentioned in the previous section, armed force is able to share military information closely related to security that is impossible to obtain by the civilians. Therefore, it is safer for civilian actors to implement operations with military support than to do them alone.

On the other hand, foreign armed forces are essentially disapproved by local civilians. As foreign armed forces often assume security tasks in peace operations, they deserve alienation from locals, which may become a negative factor to destabilize peace and security. In a non-permissive environment, if the armed forces implement development assistance, specifically during starting phase of the operations, they can foster a good relationship with local people as well as effectively support civilian partners.

On that account, this paper proposes direct involvement in development assistance as an option for military operations in the context of international peace operations as Japan attempted to ensure its armed forces cooperated with civilian measures in Iraq. However, as pointed out in the previous section, the success or failure of this cooperation hinges on careful preparations in advance. The procedures adopted must be addressed through interagency coordination at the ministry level, especially between defense and other agencies that are seeking to involve the armed forces in activities that will lead to contribute development and peace-building<sup>41</sup>.

<p>The views expressed in this paper are those of the author to publish as part of the research in the Joint Staff College, it does not represent the views of the Ministry of Defense or the Joint Staff Office.</p>
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<sup>40</sup> “Humanitarian work should be performed by humanitarian organizations. Insofar as military organizations have a role to play in supporting humanitarian work, it should, to the extent possible, not encompass direct assistance, in order to retain a clear distinction between the normal functions and roles of humanitarian and military stakeholders”. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations and so forth (2003) *Guidelines on The Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies* [MCDA Guideline], p9.

<sup>41</sup> KOSHIZUKA Hiroki. *Funsougo-no-heiwakouchiku-heno-torikumi-niokeru-jieitai-no-kadai-to-taiou* [Challenges and Action of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force concerning efforts to peace-building post conflict]. pp.148-152

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