

International Peace Cooperation Activities of the Self-Defense Forces From the Viewpoint Primarily of Humanitarian Assistance

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1. Introduction: Changes of the SDF's International Peace Cooperation Activities

The Ministry of Defense (MOD) / Self-Defense Forces (SDF) has been actively engaged in international peace cooperation activities, based on the International Peace Cooperation Act, the International Disaster Relief Law and various special measures acts.¹ International peace cooperation activities refer to activities the international community works on together to improve international security environment such as response to unconventional security issues including UN peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (2013 National Defense Program Guidelines- III. Japan's Basic Defense Policy), which used to be regarded as supplementary activities of the SDF, but in 2007 they were upgraded to one of the primary missions alongside the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order (Article 3 of the SDF Law).²

What became a turning point for the SDF to conduct an active duty overseas was the 1990 Gulf War after the end of which minesweepers of the Maritime SDF was dispatched for mine clearance of the Persian Gulf in April 1991. Later, in June 1992, "The Law Concerning Japan's Cooperation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations" (International Peace Cooperation Act) was enacted, and in September the same year, the first ever unit of the SDF based on the act was dispatched to Cambodia.

Since then, the SDF has carried out a total of 41 international peace cooperation activities (as of Jul 30, 2020) including 15 based on the International Peace Cooperation Act, 23 on the International Disaster Relief Law, and others on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, etc., steadily accumulating experience.

However, the SDF has not dispatched any unit to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (hereinafter "UN PKO") since it withdrew from the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in May 2017, and is currently dispatching 4 personnel to the UNMISS headquarters and 2 to the Multinational Force and Observers (MOF) that operates in the Sinai Peninsula.

On the other hand, the SDF's Japan Disaster Relief Team could be dispatched anytime for such events as a large-scale disaster, and is required to conduct rapid and effective humanitarian assistance when deployed.

This article explains the SDF's overseas activities, mainly humanitarian assistance. Please note that what is described here is my personal opinion based on my own experience of international peace cooperation activities.

2. Need for humanitarian assistance by military organizations in terms of global trends

Coordination between civil and military organizations in humanitarian assistance activities are thought to differ vastly depending on the situation of the field where it operates, that is, whether the field is (a) a conflict zone, (b) a site of emergency relief in a large-scale disaster, or (c) another situation. This section mainly describes the case of a conflict while touching on humanitarian assistance in emergency relief operations such as disaster relief operations.

(1) In the international community, political/civil tasks were added to UN PKO after the end of the Cold War, marking a shift from traditional PKO which were mainly mandated with limited military tasks aimed at ceasefire monitoring and force separation in inter-state conflicts as operational environments. The new tasks include relief of refugees, monitoring of human rights situation, humanitarian assistance activities, maintenance of public order, reconstruction of administrative organizations, election support and DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration), which has led to the shift to large-scale and multidimensional complex PKO as those tasks require engagement of civilian experts.

In other words, the operational environments have changed from inter-state to intra-state where operational targets are reconstruction of a nation or problems within a nation.

(2) After the end of the Cold War, the form of conflicts has changed from between countries to between ethnic groups within a country or government versus opposition force, leading to more unstable security situation in the field of humanitarian assistance and increased number of casualties and refugees/IDPs. As a result, there have been many cases which is difficult to respond to only with civilian humanitarian organizations, and the environment has changed so that military organizations with combat power, mobility and deployment capabilities often take part in humanitarian assistance activities.

Especially under dangerous situations, there have been more and more cases where the military has to provide protection and support for civilian humanitarian groups. Moreover, military organizations' capabilities of transportation, organization and self-sufficiency are great advantages that civilian organizations do not have. Thus, situations have arisen where civilian organizations can't help coordinating with the military, making it difficult to follow the international norm that "humanitarian assistance should be provided by civilians in accordance with humanitarian principles."

That is, in the current situation of increasingly changing environmental factors such as (a) prolonged and complicated humanitarian crises, (b) increased frequency and scale of natural disasters, (c) diversified form and actor of conflicts, and (d) diversified form of humanitarian assistance, it is hard to implement humanitarian assistance only

by civilians, and military capabilities play a role to some extent there.³

(3) Since the operations in Cambodia, Rwanda, Former Yugoslavia East Timor, etc., due to such changes of the times and the drastic changes of operational environments in international peace operations after the end of the Cold War, it's been a trend of the international community to incorporate the military in addition to civilian organizations in civil/humanitarian assistance within a series of activities aimed at building full-fledged nations.

Civilian organizations, especially NGOs that rapidly deploy for conflicts and natural disasters take various standpoints on civil-military relations. OSA Yukie, representative of board of directors for Japan Platform, says in her “NGO の視点から見た民軍関係 [Civil-military relations from a viewpoint of NGOs]” that NGOs can be classified into the following three types depending on their relationship with the military.

Type	Characteristics
NGOs that <u>don't coordinate</u> with the military in any circumstances *Common in European NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Denies the presence of the military itself (Rarely operates in the field. Proposes opinions in the UN, etc. • Operates in dangerous areas where even the military don't. Adheres to neutrality without coordinating with the military.
NGOs that <u>coordinate</u> with military in any circumstance *Common in U.S. NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unfamiliar with politics and the military. Does not problematize coordination itself. • Focuses on superiority of the military (logistics and mobility), or coordinates with the military in order to acquire government fund.
NGOs that judge coordination on a case-by-case basis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inexperienced in operations. Conforms to the atmosphere and the behaviors of other NGOs • Experienced in operations. Carefully considers pros and cons of coordination with the military, makes a judgement according to circumstances.

OSA Yukie, “NGO の視点から見た民軍関係”

It is essential to understand and acknowledge that, as described above, NGOs take substantially different positions and actions from each other although they share a common goal of humanitarian assistance.

This is probably because of concerns that coordination with the military might impair neutrality, impartiality or independence of the operation, which would also make it difficult to ensure the security of civilian personnel. Moreover, in general, military organizations tend to engage in humanitarian assistance which has an immediate effect (so-called Quick Impact Projects⁴) owing to the duration of their

operations, creating a gap in approaches to humanitarian assistance between civilian humanitarian organizations such as UN bodies and NGOs which focus on assistance from a medium- to long-term viewpoint.

Therefore, it is important to acknowledge the difference between civilian and military organizations in planning or deciding on a need for civil-military coordination in order to effectively exercise capabilities and functions of the both organizations and implement effective humanitarian assistance activities.

(4) Now, I would like to clarify the definition of the term “humanitarian assistance”, which I have used so far. In this essay it refers to “assistance intended to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and after contingencies”⁵ and implemented by international organizations, non-government organizations (NGOs), and the International Committee of the Red Cross.⁶

Humanitarian assistance has four core principles. The emergence of humanitarian crisis of Kurdish refugees in the 1991 Gulf crisis made the international community realize the need for coordination in humanitarian assistance, pushing the General Assembly into adopting Resolution 46/182 on emergency relief and humanitarian assistance which endorsed three principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality, then the principle of independence was added under General Assembly Resolution 58/114 adopted in 2004 as the war in Iraq broke out. These four principles are explained as follows.

① Humanity	Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings.
② Impartiality	Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions of the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions.
③ Neutrality	Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.
④ Independence	Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

Source: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs website

However, UN PKO uses different definitions for impartiality and neutrality of the four principles noted above as it takes appropriate measures against so-called spoilers who interfere with execution of a mandate. In UN PKO, neutrality means non-intervention, and impartiality means non-allegiance. On the other hand, in humanitarian assistance, neutrality means “not taking sides” and impartiality means non-discrimination. These differences can be summarized as follows.

	Neutrality	Impartiality
UN PKO	Non-Intervention	Non-allegiance
Humanitarian assistance	Not taking sides	Non-discrimination

Source: UN CMCoord Field Handbook ver2.0

Therefore, it is imperative to pay close attention to the fact that even when UN PKO and humanitarian assistance activities use the same term for humanitarian assistance, it may have different meanings and that unless you are well aware of these differences when in operation, it may cause unnecessary misunderstandings and conflicts which adversely affect the activity itself.

Another term often used along with the four core principles is “humanitarian space.” Humanitarian space refers to “an environment that ensures safety of civilian humanitarian actors and allows for access to people who are a target of support.”⁷ Ensuring it is a precondition for unarmed civilian actors to implement humanitarian assistance in dangerous conflict zones and the term was first used by Rony Brauman, former president of “Doctors without Borders.”

The reason why civilian organizations such as NGOs follow four humanitarian principles is because by asserting that they operate just for humanitarian assistance without taking side of any party, they are guaranteed humanitarian space by parties to conflicts, in other words, NGOs who don’t carry any weapon try to protect their security by following the four principles.

On the other hand, for civilian humanitarian organizations, operating with the military or a UN PKO risks being regarded as integrated with the military and losing humanitarian space. In some cases, they could be regarded as an enemy, which would be a major hindrance of an operation. And in the worst case, harm could be done to them. Therefore, it is natural that there is a certain number of civilian organizations which try not to coordinate with the military.

3. Civil military relations in conducting humanitarian assistance activities

(1) In this trend, international guidelines were developed that show how civilian organizations should coordinate with the military without collapsing the humanitarian principles. Some of the major ones are the following three.

The first one is the Oslo Guidelines, the guidelines for UN humanitarian organizations and others to request cooperation from foreign countries’ forces in the field of humanitarian assistance in response to natural disasters and human induced accidents. The second one is the MCDA (Military and Civil Defense Assets) guidelines. It’s the guidelines for requesting cooperation from the military in the field of humanitarian assistance under armed conflicts. The third one is the IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee) reference paper, which also sets out

principles for requesting cooperation from the military in the field of humanitarian assistance under armed conflicts. From here this essay explains the ICSC paper as an example. This paper provides major principles on how humanitarian organizations should interact with the military in the field of conflicts, taking into consideration the need to coordinate with the military in case they need military capabilities to ensure security of personnel and access to affected people while stressing observance of the humanitarian principles. However, it states that it has to be “exceptional” and the “last resort.” For reference, the followings are the “Principles and Concepts” described in the paper.⁸

- ① Humanity, Neutrality and Impartiality
- ② Humanitarian Access to Vulnerable Populations
- ③ Perception of Humanitarian Action
- ④ Needs-Based Assistance Free of Discrimination
- ⑤ Civilian-Military Distinction in Humanitarian Action
- ⑥ Operational Independence of Humanitarian Action
- ⑦ Security of Humanitarian Personnel
- ⑧ Do No Harm
- ⑨ Respect for International Legal Instruments
- ⑩ Respect for Culture and Custom
- ⑪ Consent of Parties to the Conflict
- ⑫ Option of Last Resort
- ⑬ Avoid Reliance on the Military

Also, the paper indicates appropriateness of coordination with the military from a civilian perspective with a matrix, with assistance tasks of the military arranged in columns and military missions in rows, and with “Yes” meaning appropriate, “No” inappropriate, and “Maybe” it depends on the case. As you can see from this matrix shown below, it gives “Yes” (appropriate) only to coordination in infrastructure maintenance even with the military that engages in a PKO, suggesting that coordination in direct and indirect assistance should be considered carefully in accordance with the situation.

Military Mission \ Assistance Tasks	Peace Time	Peace-Keeping	Peace-Enforcement	Combat
Direct	Maybe	Maybe	No	No
Indirect	Yes	Maybe	Maybe	No
Infrastructure maintenance	Yes	Yes	Maybe	Maybe

*Civil-Military Guidelines & reference for Complex Emergencies P24

What I would like to clarify now so that there will not be a misunderstanding is that even though UN PKO’s mandates can include support to humanitarian assistance but the military component doesn’t carry out direct humanitarian assistance itself.

The major reason for it is said to be maintenance of “neutrality” and “independence” of humanitarian assistance. Military component of UN PKO is comprised of armed forces belonging to the UN or troop contributing countries, and if such forces conduct humanitarian assistance, there will be a risk of impairing the image of neutrality and independence. Some of the tasks of UN PKO such as transportation of goods and establishment of refugee camps seem quite similar to humanitarian assistance, but these are actually indirect support to humanitarian assistance.⁹

(2) This section sorts out civil-military coordination in humanitarian assistance from a viewpoint of the United Nations’ operations.

Military and civilian organizations have different concepts on civil-military coordination depending on their aims, objectives and motives. Within the framework of the UN, civilian organizations think of civil-military coordination with the concept of UN-CMCoord, positioning it as activities they conduct to avoid harmful effects that could be caused by failing to coordinate operations of the both sides although they do not necessarily share the aim of operations with the military. On the other hand, the military has a concept of UN-CIMIC, under which military component of UN missions promote contact with civilian component and humanitarian/development organizations with an aim to help achieve the objective of the mission. These can be summarized in a table as follows.

Term	Actor	Definition	Purpose
UN-CMCoord (UN Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination)	Humanitarian Organizations such as UNOCHA *Main person in charge: Civilian CMCoord Officer	Essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, <u>avoid competition,</u> <u>minimize inconsistency,</u> and when appropriate pursue common goals.	To pursue common goals when appropriate
UN-CIMIC (UN Civil Military Coordination)	UN peacekeepers *Main person in charge: Military CIMIC Officer	Military staff function in UN integrated missions that <u>facilitates the interface</u> between the military and civilian components of the mission, as well as with the humanitarian, development actors in the mission area in order to <u>support UN mission</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To support coordination between civilians and military in each operational stage • To help build advantageous operational

		<u>objectives</u>	environment
<p>【Reference】 CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation)</p>	NATO, etc.	Co-ordination and co-operation, <u>in support of the mission</u> , between the NATO Commander and civil actors	To build and maintain relationship with civilians which is necessary to accomplish the mission of a commander
<p>【Reference】 CMO (Civil Military Operation)</p>	U.S. Forces	Activities of a commander that establish, maintain, <u>influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civilian organizations</u>	To align military power and non-military national resources and support operations especially ones that deal with asymmetric or irregular threats such as stabilization operations

Cited from the website of the Cabinet Office's Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation HQ

【Reference】 Coordination of activities between international organizations, humanitarian organizations such as foreign governmental organizations, NGOs and the SDF in the international disaster relief activities in response to natural disasters and other humanitarian crises is classified as UN-CMCoord, which is humanitarian civil-military coordination.

4. Forms of humanitarian assistance conducted by the SDF

As mentioned earlier, the SDF has conducted a total of 41 international peace cooperation activities (as of July 30, 2020), among which this chapter focuses on international disaster relief activities and humanitarian reconstruction assistance in Iraq from the viewpoint of humanitarian assistance.

(1) International disaster relief activities in which the SDF participated

In 1992 the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law was amended, which gave the SDF a basis for dispatch, leading to the first ever Japan Disaster Relief Team being dispatched to Honduras. The history of the team's dispatch is shown below. The main activities of the team have been medical treatment, transport and water supply, and the SDF has always maintained readiness for dispatch.

	Period	Mission name	Principal Task	Type of Disaster
1	Nov. - Dec. 1998	International Disaster Relief Activities in Honduras	Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics Transport	Hurricane
2	Sep. - Nov. 1999	Transportation of materials required for International Disaster Relief Activities in Turkey	Transport	Earthquake
3	Feb. 2001	International Disaster Relief Activities in India	Technical instruction and transport	Earthquake
4	Dec. 2003 - Jan. 2004	Transportation of materials required for International Disaster Relief Activities in Iran	Transport	Earthquake
5	Dec. 2004 - Jan. 2005	International Disaster Relief Activities in Thailand	Search and rescue activities	Earthquake /Tsunami
6	Jan. - Mar. 2005	International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia	Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics Transport	Earthquake /Tsunami
7	Aug. 2005	International Disaster Relief Activities off Kamchatka Peninsula, Russia	Rescue	Submarine accident
8	Oct. - Dec. 2005	International Disaster Relief Activities in response to an earthquake in Pakistan, etc.	Transport	Earthquake
9	Jun. 2006	International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia	Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics Transport	Earthquake
10	Oct. 2009	International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia	Medical treatment	Earthquake
11	Jan. - Feb. 2010	International Disaster Relief Activities in Haiti	Transport and medical treatment	Earthquake
12	Aug. - Oct. 2010	International Disaster Relief Activities in response to floods in Pakistan	Transport	Floods
13	Feb. - Mar. 2011	Transportation of materials and personnel required for the implementation of International Disaster Relief Activities in New Zealand	Transport	Earthquake
14	Nov. - Dec. 2013	International Disaster Relief Activities in the Philippines	Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics Rescue Transport	Typhoon
15	Mar. - Apr. 2014	International Disaster Relief Activities for the missing Malaysian airplane	Search and Rescue	Airplane accident
16	Nov. - Dec. 2014	Transport of materials necessary for International Disaster Relief Activities in response to Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa	Transport	Infectious disease

17	Dec. 2014 - Jan. 2015	International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia	Search and rescue	Airplane accident
18	Apr.- May 2015	International Disaster Relief Activities in response to Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa	Epidemiological study support	Infectious disease
19	Apr. - May 2015	International Disaster Relief Activities in Nepal	Medical treatment Transport	Earthquake
20	Nov. 2016	International Disaster Relief Activities in New Zealand	Evaluation of damages	Earthquake
21	Oct. 2018	International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia	Transport	Earthquake /Tsunami
22	Nov. - Dec. 2019	International Disaster Relief Activities in Djibouti	Drainage, Function recovery, Transport	Heavy rain/ Flood
23	Jan. - Feb. 2020	International Disaster Relief Activities in Australia	Transport	Bush fire

Source: Defense White Paper and MOD website

As you can see from this list, the majority of the SDF's dispatch areas for international disaster relief activities are in Asia and the Middle East, and these areas are expected to continue to be main areas for dispatch. Also, 13 out of 23 dispatches were in response to the earthquake, and many of the activities are transportation of relief supplies and medical treatment. In other words, what is most urgent or highest priority from the humanitarian perspective in the affected country is medical assistance and water/food supply to the injured and the sick, and the SDF's international disaster relief activities are, so to speak, medical activities for the locals from a humanitarian point of view under severely unsanitary environment where the infrastructure is damaged. Also, there should be need for epidemic prevention activities from the viewpoint of sanitary environment.

(2) Humanitarian assistance of the SDF's Japan disaster relief team in Sumatra

In response to the disaster caused by the magnitude 9.1 earthquake that occurred in the Indian Ocean off the coast of northwestern Sumatra, Indonesia on December 26, 2004 and the ensuing massive tsunami, the SDF dispatched Japan Disaster relief team in January the next year. On this occasion, the SDF could dispatch its units including a research team in a relatively speedy manner based on lessons learned from the international disaster relief activities in the past. The main activities of the dispatched SDF units were medical assistance to affected people, preventive vaccination for coastal areas cut off and isolated by the tsunami and transportation support by aircraft, and so forth.

On the other hand, JICA's medical team (three persons: doctor, nurse and logistics support personnel (former SDF member)) started medical assistance in one corner of a local hospital in Banda Aceh on the island of Sumatra before the SDF units arrived. My understanding is that in this dispatch there wasn't coordination between the SDF's units and JICA's medical team on a local level. However, for Japan to carry out rapid

and effective humanitarian assistance activities, it is necessary that such organizations as JICA which quickly arrives at the site with light equipment, conducting so-called immediate relief support and the SDF which starts operation with self-sufficient equipment in the transition period when the primary assistance is medicine and prevention of epidemics closely coordinate and share information with each other.

Taking medical support as an example, civilian medical teams arriving at the site in the early stage of a disaster carry out urgently needed medical support activities, so they possibly grasp the urgent needs and the needs expected to arise afterwards on the site. Therefore, from the perspective of efficiency and preventing duplication of support activities, the SDF should not only cooperate and share information in the field, but also build its network on a regular basis while keeping working-level coordination within Japan, which will directly lead to smooth information sharing in the field of support activities.

(3) Humanitarian assistance in Iraq

One typical example of the SDF's overseas civil-military coordination is reconstruction assistance in Iraq. That was so-called civil-military cooperation, which aimed to support Iraqi nationals' autonomous efforts toward stabilization and improvement of their lives, establishment of a governing institution through democratic means and so forth.

Main activities of the Ground Self-Defense Force in reconstruction assistance in Iraq included water supply, medicine, maintenance and restoration of public facilities such as schools, clinics and community roads, and protection of heritage sites of historical significance. The SDF carried out humanitarian reconstruction through these activities, in which the SDF could fortunately give the locals a good impression and it resulted in security of dispatched units throughout the period of activities.

At the core of these humanitarian activities was the Civil-Military Coordination Section set up in the Iraq Humanitarian Support Expeditionary Unit, which kept in mind that when implementing various projects, they should patiently uncover needs of the local population and governments, never forcing projects on them. And they realized detailed and rapid humanitarian assistance by selecting feasible choices from a variety of needs and prioritizing them, and closely coordinating with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the field from halfway through to promptly and effectively use the Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects. The MOFA's operation speed in Iraq was extremely high. These humanitarian assistance activities in Iraq saw "two wheels of a car"-like coordination between the MOD and MOFA, and the procedure for this coordination is thought to have become a model case for overseas humanitarian assistance activities. The SDF also tried to coordinate with JICA and actually did contact them on several reconstruction / restoration projects, which sadly did not materialize at that time. However, I believe that good lessons were learned from these attempts which will come in handy in considering our future humanitarian

assistance activities abroad.

5. For the future

(1) Coordination between the “public, private, and military (SDF)”

As described so far, when the SDF conducts activities abroad, especially humanitarian assistance, coordination and cooperation with local civilian organizations like the case in Iraq is important, and for the SDF units to operate smoothly in international disaster relief activities, it is essential to coordinate, cooperate and share information with international organizations such as the UN, and humanitarian organizations such as NGOs which have accumulated experience over many years.

Also, in some situations, it would be necessary to have a perspective of coordinating with or receiving information from Japanese corporations based in dispatch area in order to secure a foundation for smooth activities. Let me give you an example from my own experience. In the dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Team to the Island of Sumatra, Indonesia, we could fortunately secure a local Japanese-Indonesian translator for providing medical care to the affected people and collecting accurate information. I heard that a Japanese private company which had a business foundation in Indonesia made referrals in this case. When deployed to a non-English speaking country, it is vital to solve linguistic problems for smooth unit actions, and securing local translator is an urgent issue. In that sense, this lesson will serve as a useful reference for future activities.

(2) Humanitarian assistance “with a Japanese flag”

As a matter of course, humanitarian assistance, especially medical support, is an important activity immediately after a disaster, and what I personally think is that the international community would expect Japan to carry out more proactive humanitarian assistance in which the country continues engagement in the medium and long term until the phase of general social recovery following restoration and maintenance of social infrastructure.

There's a limit to the duration in which the SDF can operate in international disaster relief activities, so it's unlikely that the SDF will be expected to provide restoration support aimed at reconstruction of an affected area within that duration as an activity of the SDF, but it may be necessary to continue engagement in assistance until the final recovery and independence of the country “with a Japanese flag” from the perspective of humanitarian assistance.

Such an activity would be appropriate for international organizations and NGOs to demonstrate their ability in. Also, for such seamless humanitarian assistance, it is desirable to closely coordinate with such organizations as the MOFA and JICA in the field from the initial phase of the activity, and to grasp each other's strength while striving for mutual understanding under normal circumstances, thereby ensuring the posture to implement assistance activities as an “All Japan” effort.

¹ “International Peace Cooperation Activities” Ministry of Defense

https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/kokusai_heiwa/about.html

² ditto

³ ditto

⁴ Quick Impact Projects (QIPs): Short-term, low-cost projects (maximum implementation time:180 days, maximum Budget: \$50,000) used by UN peacekeeping operations which aim to gain support of the populace to the PKO and contribute to smooth implementation of the mandate

source: “Policy: QIPs”

⁵ “平和構築活動における民軍関係に関するリファレンスガイド” (Reference guide on civil military relations in peacebuilding activities) commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

⁶ UENO Tomoya, researcher at Hyogo Earthquake Memorial 21st Century research Institute

⁷ “平和構築活動における民軍関係に関するリファレンスガイド” (Reference guide on civil military relations in peacebuilding activities) commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

⁸ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs New York, 2008

Civil-Military Guidelines & reference for Complex Emergencies

“緊急・人道支援 我が国の人道支援方針” (Emergency assistance / humanitarian assistance Humanitarian assistance policy of Japan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oct 5, 2020

⁹ “PKOなう 第38回 国連PKOのQIPと緊急人道支援” (PKO Now! No.38 Quick Impact Projects of UNPKO and Emergency Humanitarian Relief) Cabinet Office, Jan 11, 2013

http://www.pko.go.jp/pko_j/organization/researcher/atpkonow/article038.htm