

# International Peace & Security Symposium 2019

New Trends in Peacekeeping Operations  
by the International Community including the  
United Nations

International Trends in Peacekeeping Operations



## MINUTES OF THE SYMPOSIUM

December 2, 2019

Hotel Grand Hill ICHIGAYA

Joint Staff College, MOD  
Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center

## PROGRAM

**13:05-13:10 OPENING ADDRESS** LTG KİYOTA Yasushi ( P.4 )  
(Commandant, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense)

**13:10-13:45 KEYNOTE SPEECH** LTG Carlos H. LOITEY of Uruguay ( P.6 )  
(Military Adviser, Department of Peace Operations, United Nations)  
Proxy: COL Tim Wildish  
(Special Assistant to the Military Adviser, Department of Peace  
Operations, United Nations)

**14:05-15:35 PANEL DISCUSSION:** ( P.31 )  
Moderator Dr. SHINODA Hideaki  
(Professor, Graduate School of Global Studies, Tokyo Univ. of Foreign Studies)  
Panelists Dr. YAMASHITA Hikaru ( P.33 )  
(Head, Government and Law Division, Security Studies  
Department, National Institute for Defense Studies)  
LTC Peter CONROY ( P.44 )  
(Commanding Officer, ADF Peace Operations Training Centre)  
LTG(Ret.) MATSUMURA Goro ( P.61 )  
(Former Commanding General of Northeastern Army, JGSDF)

**15:55-16:55 DISCUSSION** ( P.77 )

**16:55-17:00 CLOSING ADDRESS** LTG KİYOTA Yasushi ( P.87 )  
(Commandant, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense)

The views expressed at the Symposium are those of the participants,  
and do not necessarily represent the views of their Organizations.

## **Opening Address**

### **LTG KIYOTA Yasushi (Commandant, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense)**

Ladies and gentlemen, I am Lieutenant-General KIYOTA Yasushi, the Commandant of the Joint Staff College or the Ministry of Defense. I would like to make a few remarks as the organizer at the opening of the 9th International Peace and Security Symposium.

I must begin with a very disappointing news. We had asked Lieutenant-General Carlos Loitey of Uruguay, the Military Adviser of the Department of Peace Operations of the United Nations, to be a keynote speaker today, to which the lieutenant-general kindly agreed, but given the deterioration in the situation in the African nation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, he had to cancel his visit to Japan at the very last moment. I apologize to all of you who were looking forward to his presentation. I am very sorry about that. On his behalf, Colonel Tim Wildish, Special Assistant to the Military Adviser of the Department of Peace Operations of the United Nations, who is visiting Japan, will read his keynote speech.

At the panel discussion, following last year, Professor SHINODA Hideaki of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies will serve as the moderator. For the panelists, we have Dr. YAMASHITA Hikaru, the Head of the Government and Law Division of the Security Studies Department of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS); Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Conroy, the Commanding Officer of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) Peace Operations Training Centre (POTC); and Mr. MATSUMURA Goro, the former Commanding General of the Northeastern Army and retired Lieutenant-General of the JGSDF. Being able to welcome such well-known experts to this 9th International Peace and Security Symposium is a great honor to all of us at the Joint Staff College, including myself. I would like to extend my gratitude to all of you who have come today.

The International Peace and Security Symposium organized by the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center of the Joint Staff College is aimed to share the current situation issues and the future direction on activities for international peace and security with not just the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Force members, but with bureaucrats, private sector, and academia; deepen mutual understanding and connect it to implementing quality international contributions.

Japan has been involved in International Peace Cooperation operations in various regions for more than 25 years. Currently, Japan is extending its dispatch of staff members to the United Nations South Sudan mission command. Also, we have started sending senior JGSDF officers to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) as International Peace Cooperation activities.

As a part of the United Nations Triangular Partnership Project, since 2015, Japan has been providing training of heavy machinery to the engineering personnel from African countries. We have been expanding this project to Asian and surrounding countries since 2018. Also, starting from this year, we have been dispatching Self-Defense Force officials as instructors for education and training on hygiene areas to Uganda, thus Japan is working actively towards capacity-building of PKO staff.

On the other hand, the international community has been making various efforts, including the PKO reform in the United Nations. As a few years have passed since Japan last sent troops for PKO, the international community is paying attention to how Japan will make contributions in the future.

The theme of this year's symposium is "New Trends in Peacekeeping Operations by the International Community including the United Nations: International Trends in Peacekeeping Operations."

First, in the keynote speech by the Military Adviser of the Department of Peace Operations of the United Nations, from Uruguay, Lieutenant-General Carlos Loitey, it will talk about the efforts taken by Japan in response to the expectations by the international community based on the latest trends and the future vision of the United Nations PKO. This will be read by Colonel Wildish. Then in the following panel discussion, Professor Hideaki Shinoda of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies will serve as the moderator and the panelists from inside and outside of Japan will report from their own perspectives as researchers and practitioners, and then will discuss and make recommendations on efforts related to the future PKO activities.

The results of this symposium, we want to utilize them for the education and research studies at the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center of the Joint Staff College and share them widely with the concerning departments in and out of the Ministry of Defense.

Today, we have audience not just from the Ministry of Defense, but also people from embassies in Tokyo, United Nations organizations, the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters of the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as universities and other educational institutions and NGOs. I hope today's lecture and panel discussion on the changing United Nations PKO and the future efforts of Japan will contribute to your work and research efforts.

Last but not least, I would like to extend my gratitude to all of you again for coming to this symposium despite your busy schedules.

Lieutenant-General KIYOTA Yasushi, Thank you.

## Keynote Speech

**LTG Carlos H. Loitey of Uruguay (Military Adviser, Department of Peace Operations, United Nations)**

**Proxy:**

**COL Tim Wildish (Special Assistant to the Military Adviser, Department of Peace Operations, United Nations)**



Thank you very much. Excellencies, commandants, senior officers, colleagues, and ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to speak with you today United Nations peacekeeping operations. I am speaking, as you have heard, on behalf of the United Nations Military Adviser, Lieutenant-General Loitey, who would have been here today had he not had to travel to the Democratic Republic of the Congo at very short notice, last Thursday, for operational reasons. I am standing in for him today.

He apologizes of course for his absence. At the moment, he is in Goma in eastern DRC, as I said, for operational reasons, and I am sure everyone here will understand that those operational reasons in the UN do unfortunately have to take priority.

I am his special assistant, a job I have been doing for one year. Prior to that, I was the Chief of Staff of the UN operation in Cyprus, UNFICYP. I did that for three years. Previously, I served with the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as Chief Planning Officer, and I also worked for two years in Africa very closely with the UN clearing mines in mine-affected countries in Africa; a very rewarding job. I know Lieutenant-General Loitey was very disappointed not to be here. He has huge responsibility, as I am sure you will hear from this presentation, and that is responsibility that he takes very, very seriously. He works, I would say, extremely hard. I am sure he would like to, in the future,

travel to Japan and to take an opportunity like this, but for me today, it is a great privilege to represent him, so thank you very much.



## Agenda

- Facts and Figures
- UN Peacekeeping Overview
- Challenges of Peacekeeping
- Action For Peacekeeping (A4P)
- Safety and Security of Peacekeepers
- Performance and Discipline
- Gender
- Japan and Future Requirements
- Vision for the Future



I will focus my remarks on where we stand with UN peacekeeping, the challenges we face, and how we are addressing them most importantly. I will also talk about the future of peacekeeping and where we collectively need your help. You can see the agenda on this slide. I will take about 30 minutes to cover that. I have also got a short video. We may not have time. Maybe we can show it at some other stage.

Before I go further, I would like to just thank Japan and the Joint Staff College for hosting this outstanding symposium. It is fantastic to see so many people here today, so thank you for that. I welcome the opportunity to address such an esteemed audience, all of whom of course – all of the 35 countries represented here today – are member states of the UN of course. Without further introduction, let me turn to peacekeeping. I will welcome any thoughts and discussion at the panel discussion.



## Facts and Figures

- ✓ 13 Peacekeeping Missions led by DPO
- ✓ US \$ 6.8 billion budget (FY July 2019 – June 2020)
  - ✓ Less than 0.5% of global military spending
- ✓ 76,400 Military personnel deployed
- ✓ 9,551 Police & approx 18,000 civilians (international + local) deployed
- ✓ 122 Contributing countries
- ✓ 3884 Fatalities in PKO since 1948



We currently have 13 peacekeeping operations with over 76,000 military personnel deployed and 10,000 police. You can see the statistics [here](#). This is a significant effort in some of the most troubled regions of the world where civilians are in desperate need of help, without of course, in those countries, the State apparatus to help them. The expectation we have of our peacekeepers is enormous, with tasks as diverse and challenging as protecting civilians, training and operating with indigenous forces, disarming militias, monitoring human rights abuses, protecting elections, and providing emergency relief, to name just a few of the tasks that our people have. So the demands are considerable and they are unrelenting, and of course this is in areas of the world where enduring chaos has defied progress, often for decades.





## Japanese Contributions



- ✓ Third largest financial contributor to Peacekeeping
- ✓ Triangular Partnership Project:
  - ✓ In support of enabler rapid deployment (Engineers, Signallers & Medics)
  - ✓ Japan \$83 million since 2014; overall project trained 458 engineers, 175 signallers & 29 field medics
- ✓ Other training Support:
  - ✓ Japan to host UN Senior leadership course in 2020
- ✓ Chair of the Engineer Manual Working Group
  - ✓ Manual about to be published
  - ✓ Important milestone
- ✓ Staff officers in UNMISS (South Sudan)
- ✓ Pending Japanese pledge to PCRS of Engineering Company




I would like to recognize – it has already been mentioned – the significant contribution to Japan to the United Nations. As the third highest financial contributor to peacekeeping operations, you are of course at the core of everything that we do. The Japanese commitment to the Triangular Partnership Project, or the Rapid Deployment of Enabling Capabilities (RDEC) as it is sometimes known, has been very significant. The investment of \$83 million since 2015 has made an enormous difference in training engineers, medical personnel, and signalers. The project brings together the United Nations, supporting member states with the expertise and resources, and troop-contributing countries to strengthen peacekeeping. Highly skilled Japanese Self-Defense Force personnel have trained military personnel from Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda in the operation and maintenance of heavy engineering equipment. Many of those trainees have already deployed to some of our most challenging missions in the Central African Republic, DRC, Mali, Lebanon, South Sudan, and Somalia.

Whilst the physical deployment of Japanese personnel is limited to staff officers in South Sudan, I know there is an intended pledge of an engineer company to our Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) and we hope to see that being formalized.

Japan also chaired and sponsored the work to develop the military engineer manual, which has now been finalized. We are very grateful for that work and support because production and publication of these manuals is vital in ensuring standards. Of course there are many other additional requirements, and maybe we can come back to those a little bit later.


I would also like to recognize the contribution of the other 34 countries represented here today. Without your strong support, we would not be able to provide the resources to our peacekeeping operations across the world. Your commitment of troops, equipment, training support, and firm political support to the military component is deeply appreciated and hugely important, so thank you.



Notably, the United Nations has the second largest deployed military force in the world, second only to the United States. This deployed force is commanded and supported by an almost entirely flat command structure, if you understand what I mean by that. That is to say that the 13 missions are run directly from UN Headquarters in New York. The Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) report directly to UN Headquarters – in theory, directly to the Secretary-General himself – with no layers in between. This is in stark contrast to other alliances and indeed national military structures which are very layered. The structure we have has its advantages and disadvantages.

Our Force Commanders in our missions report directly to the SRSGs. The Military Adviser – you can see him here – has no executive authority over military forces, but the dotted line you see down to the Force Commanders can become very joined up. Of course, the Military Adviser, Lieutenant-General Loitey, does have a very close and actually rewarding relationship with all of our Force Commanders.


To coordinate, plan, force generate, issue policy, and provide military assessments for all of those missions and 76,000 personnel, we have 103 officers in the Office of Military Affairs (OMA). By any measure of military organization, this is a small headquarters for a deployed force of, as I said, over 76,000. So it is very important that we have high quality officers in the Office of Military Affairs, and we have 72 nations contributing to those 103 officers, and we have a very strong staff for which we are very grateful.



## UN Peacekeeping Overview

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- ✓ Fundamental change in Peacekeeping from 1999 onward
- ✓ Some 'traditional' Chapter 6 Peacekeeping missions
- ✓ Many Peacekeeping missions now Multidimensional Integrated Missions - often with Chapter 7 mandates
- ✓ Peacekeeping grounded in 3 principles:
  - ✓ Consent of the parties to the conflict to the deployment of the mission;
  - ✓ Impartiality in mandate implementation; and
  - ✓ Non-use of force except in self-defense and in defense of the mandate




As I am sure you know, the end of the Cold War saw a step change in peacekeeping and there was a further major change in 1999 when the UN realized it had to rethink its approach to avoid failures of the past, such as the massacres in Rwanda of 1994 and Srebrenica of 1995. Also, what happened in 1999, was that leaders in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the DRC finally reached peace agreements and asked for the UN's help in implementing them. So we have seen an evolution of peacekeeping in the last 20 years, and it is significant in evolution.

Today, our missions vary enormously, ranging from the more "traditional" Chapter 6, you could say "old-fashioned," peacekeeping missions which basically involve the separation of forces, through to the more modern and highly complex Chapter 7 missions involving a range of armed groups and threats which are typically found in Africa.

Whilst there remain many shortfalls and challenges in UN peacekeeping operations, we are focused on solutions and improvements, and by working together with member states, many represented here today, and other partners, we can make those improvements. We seek your collective and individual support in helping us as much as you can.

Whilst we recognize the challenges and shortcomings, it is important to remember that no one else can do what the UN does. No one else can do what the UN does in protecting the most vulnerable in areas affected by long-standing intractable conflict between state actors, armed groups, criminals, and others, in which civilian casualties are unfortunately commonplace. Peacekeeping operations have had a direct impact on the lives of countless children, women, and men across the globe. Every day, our peacekeepers are working hard to deliver on their mandates, in places putting their own lives at risk to protect the most vulnerable. There must be no doubt that the UN has so far saved thousands of lives.

## **Threats & Targeting of Peacekeepers**



Peacekeeping is facing a multitude of challenges, including increasing threats, diminishing consent, complex mandates, staggering protection tasks, unclear exit strategies, and a lack of progress in political processes. In too many instances, peacekeepers are no longer shielded by the UN flag. Instead, far too many are being laid to rest beneath it. Already this year, 22 peacekeepers have been killed by hostile acts. This slide shows the aftermath of some of those attacks, particularly the attack on the base in Semuliki in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2017, which resulted in 15 killed in action, 43 wounded in action, and one unfortunately still missing in action, presumed dead. More recently, you can see here on the slide the result of an improvised explosive device on one of our vehicles in Mali. I would just like to take the opportunity to pay tribute to all those who have fallen in the cause of peace, and to salute their bravery and dedication to the ideals of the United Nations.






## Challenges Overview

- ✓ Political uncertainty – lack of endstates
- ✓ Highly complex and volatile environments
- ✓ Reducing budgets
- ✓ Direct threats against peacekeepers - asymmetric threats, such as IEDs
- ✓ Lack of leadership and discipline and misconduct, in particular SEA
- ✓ Vast spaces – lack of troop density
- ✓ Caveats from Troop Contributing Countries
- ✓ Some units lack training, equipment, mindset
- ✓ Military aviation gaps, including CASEVAC
- ✓ Information collection leading to intelligence
- ✓ Low numbers of female peacekeepers
- ✓ Host nation consent/support slow or lacking



The problems peacekeepers are facing today are exacerbated by the changing nature of conflict. Intrastate conflicts are coupled with the rise of transnational movements of weapons, armed groups, new technology, and organized crime that flows across borders, leading to new forms of warfare and violence, including asymmetric threats. Weak governance and insufficient responses to grievances can feed the cycle of violence and complicate the path to peace. We face longer-running conflicts today where achieving sustainable peace depends on tackling multiple dimensions of conflict, as operations in Mali, the DRC, and the Central African Republic demonstrate. We must also be alive to the fact that new peacekeeping missions may be needed in the future to protect the most vulnerable and provide the required security for their most basic needs. The trend over the last few years actually is for peacekeeping to have gone down in numbers. We were at over 100,000 deployed troops until recently, but just one or two missions would spike that back up again. So the trend is downwards, but it could go back up.



We must be aware that our peacekeepers are typically introduced into environments of unresolved conflict between highly capable non-state and state armed groups, with complex mandates designed to address deeply contentious issues, often across vast distances without the necessary enablers, particularly transport helicopters. In the last 20 years or so, the UN's job has become more complex, difficult, and dangerous. Moreover, cycles of violence, fueled by unhelpful regional actors supplying steady streams of weapons, ammunition, and cash, have exacerbated conflicts and have made them increasingly transnational in character. Such conflicts pose clear threats to international peace and security, and pose a direct threat to civilians in those countries. The number of displaced persons in some of the missions runs into millions. In the absence of political progress and State control, the reliance on the military tool to protect civilians is at an all-time high. So the challenges to peacekeeping are profound, but we are looking at solutions.



## Action for Peacekeeping (A4P)

### What is Action for Peacekeeping?

Launched by the Secretary-General on 28 March 2018. **"It is now time to take action together to improve UN peacekeeping operations"**, which is facing unprecedented challenges.

### A4P focuses on three areas:

- Refocus peacekeeping with realistic expectations;
- Make peacekeeping missions stronger and safer;
- Mobilize greater support for political solutions and for well-structured, well-equipped, well-trained forces.

In line with our commitments through the Secretary-General's Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative, we continue to work to strengthen our peacekeeping performance, including in key aspects such as protection of civilians, and preventing and addressing conduct and discipline issues, including sexual exploitation and abuse. The transformation of peacekeeping missions into the new integrated, multidimensional missions is, in itself, a characteristic of the new peacekeeping paradigm: complexity of the crisis led to complexity of the tools to solve the crisis and the need to align improvement initiatives under A4P.



Essentially, this involves the introduction of a “comprehensive approach,” joining up all components in our missions. Action for Peacekeeping refocuses peacekeeping with more targeted mandates to make our operations stronger and safer, with better equipped and better trained forces, whilst mobilizing support for political solutions. A4P represents the core agenda for our action and is a driver for change permeating all aspects of the UN’s peacekeeping work, as you can see on this slide.

I would also like to mention that we have seen progress in some of our missions. Just a few years ago, that progress seemed unlikely. Successful elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have led to refocusing of the mission to the east and a certain downsizing of the force. Next year, we will close our mission in Darfur. In UNDOF, the UN Disengagement Observer Force in Israel and Syria, we have seen a return to the Syrian side, which seemed unlikely because of the war there, but we have now reoccupied vacated camps and observation posts.

All our missions are adapting in a far more dynamic and responsive manner than ever before, due in part to the system of strategic reviews and associated military capability studies we now have in place; all that within the context of A4P.





## Protection of Civilians



We are being smarter about the implementation of protection of civilian mandates as a whole mission responsibility. The mission's protection strategy must be fully integrated, creating a unity of effort to identify civilians at risk, and prevent and respond to threats against them.

The focus must first be on prevention by engaging in dialogue and by helping establish a protective environment, including by supporting the presence of state authority. However, when efforts at prevention fail or violence is ongoing, our military operations play an indispensable role in protecting and providing physical protection to civilians, sometimes using force; and we must not be afraid to use force when it is necessary to do so. Of course, use of force is strictly controlled, in line with rules of engagement tailored to each mission.

Over the past several years, we have strengthened our ability to deploy bespoke protection strategies for the places where we are deployed, such as the deployment of early warning networks in the DRC, and in all missions with a Protection of Civilians (POC) mandate, we are employing a strategy of protection through projection by expanding our footprint to make a security bubble in the areas for which we are concerned. That is driven by intelligence and analysis. However, to achieve this, we require mobility assets, particularly helicopters, to ensure we can cover the large distances involved and in a manner to intervene on time.



## Improving Peacekeeper Safety and Security



The link between performance and the safety and security of peacekeepers is clear, and enhancing both is an utmost priority. This includes a renewed commitment together with our highest-risk missions to implement the action plan on improving the security of peacekeepers, which is part of Action for Peacekeeping.



On this slide, you can see the key areas of this action plan, stemming from the Cruz Report. For those that do not know the Cruz Report, it was a seminal report written by General Carlos Santos Cruz on safety and security in 2018. That was in response to a terrible year in 2017 where we had so many casualties in the UN. Of the total 122 identified actions, we have already completed 75 and have 47 remaining. The action plan is a living document and something we are working on every single day due to its importance.





## **Training – Foundation of Military Professionalism**

- ✓ Training underpins military performance and professionalism
- ✓ The core task of undeployed military is training for deployment
- ✓ Basic military skills, collective training, and training for a specific mission must be complementary
- ✓ Troop Contributing Countries and partners must deliver high quality, up to date, tailored training to prepare individuals and contingents
- ✓ 'Train hard - fight easy'



In peacekeeping, a lack of proper training undermines our performance, hinders our efforts to implement mandates, and puts our peacekeepers at risk. We are placing special emphasis on strengthening our pre-deployment training and enhancing leadership training and in-mission training, including table-top and command-post exercises.

We look to our member states to fulfill their commitments, including to provide full pre-deployment training to train contingents in accordance with the standards and guidance issued by the UN Secretariat. This includes areas as vital as weapons handling and first aid, as well as a good understanding of human rights and protection issues. Training is at the very core of police and military professionalism, and it underpins performance. We need troop-contributing countries to take training for peacekeeping very seriously and to ensure a holistic approach. Some countries need help getting this right, and it is important that we identify mechanisms through partnerships to provide this help. We look to many of the nations represented here today with well-developed militaries, such as Japan and many others, to consider providing this assistance. It is in the interests of all of us to ensure quality training is delivered to all peacekeepers and that all deploying United Nations personnel are fully prepared for the challenges they will face.



## Performance Evaluation

- ✓ Develop standards for all categories of military units;
- ✓ Validate military skills training during pre-deployment visits;
- ✓ Manage the production and quality control of Military Unit Performance Evaluation Reports;
- ✓ Design and implement a Force and Sector HQ evaluation process;
- ✓ Consolidate, automate and analyze Military Individual Performance Evaluation Reports;
- ✓ Collect, secure and analyze data; manage information processes; and share military performance data.



So, we are placing special emphasis on strengthening our pre-deployment training. We have put in place a comprehensive system to assess military performance and established a clear framework of performance standards and assessments based on regular evaluations, including on command and control, protection of civilians, conduct and discipline, and training. We have also stepped up our efforts to make sure that units joining our missions meet our operational readiness standards before they are deployed, including through the development of a new methodology for pre-deployment evaluations which includes tests of both individual and collective skills. Units with shortfalls in those skills can now be identified and engaged proactively to receive targeted training and equipment support. I would emphasize that there has never been a greater focus and emphasis on military performance on peacekeeping operations; and that is already paying dividends. It is vital because more and more is being expected of our military personnel in our missions.



## Performance - Pre-Deployment Visits PDVs

### Individual Military Skills



Firing

Navigation



First Aid



### Collective Military Skills

Command  
Post  
Exercise



Field  
Training  
Exercise



Ambush

### Mission Specific Skills



Illegal Checkpoint



Exchange of fire



Crisis related sexual  
violence



Civil disturbance


This slide provides a flavor of this new and vigorous assessment which assesses individual military skills and collective military skills where exercises are based on the framework exercise that the troop-contributing country is developing, and that is in line with the Operational Readiness Preparation guidelines produced by the UN. Depending on the mission mandate, the scenario usually includes Protection of Civilians elements. During the field training exercise, the execution of the tasks at company and platoon level are then validated, and then during the exercise execution, the ability of the unit to react to mission-specific scenarios is also validated. This evaluation is critical in improving performance. I do have a video of this evaluation. If we have time during the afternoon, it would be good to play that.





## Gender

### Increased participation of military women



I must stress of course the importance of female peacekeepers. We need more women to be trained and available to deploy. This is not a matter of political correctness. It has been demonstrated comprehensively that the deployment of women at all levels in peacekeeping strengthens our ability to plan and conduct peacekeeping on the ground. Also, our ability to communicate with the local population is enhanced with women peacekeepers on the ground. We have set targets for the inclusion of women peacekeepers and we are already making good progress towards those targets, though the challenge must not be underestimated because we are dependent upon troop-contributing countries fully supporting our initiatives.

Just to give you a rough idea of where we stand in terms of the figures, military women currently make up 14.5% of staff and military observer positions in the field. In the United Nations Headquarters, we currently have 21.5% military women in positions in the Office of Military Affairs. We have 4.4% military women in troop contingents. Today, we have one female Force Commander and two female Deputy Force Commanders. Until very recently, we had two female Force Commanders. That level of female leadership in our missions is unprecedented. We also have 19 military gender and protection advisers in the field. So the number of military women peacekeepers is improving, but we need support of member states to meet future challenging targets; and those targets are challenging. In 2020, we have a target of 5.25% of military women in contingents, and that rises to 15% by 2028. So we need your help on that.



## Discipline and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA)

- ✓ The discipline and conduct of Peacekeepers is critical to operational success
- ✓ Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) is a dreadful stain on Peacekeeping
- ✓ SEA cases reducing but even one is too many
- ✓ Good Leadership is critical

Decreased SEA allegations



I must mention discipline and particularly sexual exploitation and abuse. You will be aware of the Secretary-General's steadfast commitment to addressing, preventing, and responding to all forms of misconduct, particularly with regard to the elimination of sexual exploitation and abuse. Across the United Nations system as a whole, we maintain a policy and position of "zero-tolerance."

Every case of sexual exploitation and abuse is a contravention of our highest values. We are continuing our strenuous efforts to ensure that personnel conduct themselves in accordance with the highest standards of conduct. As you would expect, there is a clear link there to leadership. Those units with the best disciplinary records tend to be those that perform best and are best led. At its heart, conduct and discipline is a command responsibility which is as important as the ability to deploy a company on night operations or to conduct protection of civilian tasks.





## Leadership → Performance




We have done much more to focus on the performance of leaders and support this by running courses such as the sector commander's and infantry battalion commander's courses. We aim to have every sector and battalion commander trained on these courses without exception, as it sets a baseline of knowledge and what is expected from those critical leaders in the field. Sponsoring these important courses is an area where we need more help, and we would look to look to perhaps provide that help.



## Pledging and Resourcing

- ✓ Peacekeeping Readiness Capability System (PCRS) – Single entry point for member states to commit to Peacekeeping
- ✓ Specialized and high-performing capabilities for United Nations peacekeeping are in short supply

Deployment of units from the PCRS



To adapt to more complex and high-risk conflicts, our peacekeeping missions must become more mobile and more proactive. In terms of force generation – that is generation of the capabilities that we need – the United Nations now has verified military units on standby that can be deployed in less than 60 days. That is on the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System, the PCRS. The PCRS is the single entry point for member states to commit to UN peacekeeping, and the mechanism through which the UN Secretariat, where I work, will make the selection for deployment. While we have many units available on the PCRS, we must still work hard to generate specific capabilities, especially for our most challenging missions such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Specialized and high-performing capabilities for United Nations peacekeeping are in short supply, particularly enablers, rapidly deployable capabilities, intelligence units, and women peacekeepers. We ask all member states to consider committing these critical resources.

In Mali, there is an urgent need for armored personnel carriers that improve the chances of surviving an attack. In the Central African Republic and other missions, we need helicopters that can operate 24/7 for medical and casualty evacuations from remote areas. We also need armed utility helicopters, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) units, quick reaction forces, and air medical evacuation teams. These are all areas where we would appeal for more support from countries represented here today.



## Partnerships

- ✓ Strategic/Operational Partnerships:
  - ✓ EU, NATO, CSTO, AU, OSCE, League of Arab Nations.....
- ✓ Operational support
- ✓ Training
- ✓ Liaison Capacity
- ✓ Information sharing
- ✓ Mentoring
- ✓ Light Coordination Mechanism
  
- ✓ Linking capabilities/expertise with needs

We also need more partnerships to fill capability gaps, including through joint contingents, as well as by connecting governments providing equipment and training with others providing troops. The UN “light coordination mechanism,” as it is known, engages training and capacity-building providers, both Secretariat entities and member states, to communicate training gaps, identify training opportunities, and facilitate partnerships to improve performance. The success of the “light coordination mechanism” depends on member states providing details of their bilateral training programs and training needs.



## Future Support from Japan

- ✓ Continued support to field missions:
  - ✓ Staff Officers
  - ✓ Specialist capabilities: Engineers; Strategic Airlift
- ✓ Continued support to the Triangular Partnership Project
- ✓ Support to OMA Training:
  - ✓ Possible sponsorship of leadership courses in Entebbe:
    - ✓ Sector Commanders, Force Chief of Staff and Infantry Battalion Commanders
- ✓ Assistance with the development of manuals and training materials and translation



Finally, let me address areas where Japan may consider supporting us in the future. The first is continued support to our field missions with the provision of staff officers and, if you are able, contingents, particularly high-end specialist capabilities such as engineers, strategic airlift; and that could occur through your air base in Djibouti.

Secondly, of course we would also request continued support to the very successful Triangular Partnership Project and we, in the Secretariat, would like to assist this project by ensuring that more of those that are trained actually deploy on UN peacekeeping operations. I think at the moment it is less than 20% actually deploying.

Thirdly, continued support to the Office of Military Affairs training initiatives, perhaps, if you are able, expanding to sponsorship of leadership courses in Entebbe and other training centers for our sector commanders, force chiefs of staff, and infantry battalion commanders.

Finally, after the excellent work on the engineer manual, further assistance with the development of manuals and training materials in a similar vein, as I said, to the excellent support to the engineer manual. These are the areas perhaps we can discuss later on.



## Summary – Vision

- ✓ High standard of **performance** and mindset
- ✓ **Expansion** in the base of major troop and police contributing countries
- ✓ **Rapid deployment** to the mission
- ✓ **Mobility** strategy
- ✓ **Gender-balanced** force
- ✓ Capability **modernization**
- ✓ Extension of **state authority**
- ✓ **Cooperation** with regional actors
- ✓ Combating **SEA**



To conclude, the challenges on UN peacekeeping operations are profound, but we must not let this deter us, and, as I hope I have explained, we have strategies to address the many challenges, all now focused under Action for Peacekeeping, A4P. However, we can only succeed in implementing these strategies with the full support of member states and other organizations. I therefore appeal to all member states represented here today to support UN peacekeeping through strong political support and with contributions of capabilities.

Finally, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. My final message is that UN peacekeeping operations constitute a unique tool of multilateralism, which we are working collectively to improve and adapt to today's needs.





## **Thank you for your attention**



Thank you for your attention. Please allow me to pass on the highest regards of Lieutenant-General Loitey, the UN Military Adviser who, as you know, would have wished to be here today, but is Goma, but hopefully will come here in the future. Excellencies, sir, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much.

## **Panel Discussion**

### **Moderator:**

**Dr. SHIONDA Hideaki (Professor, Graduate School of Global Studies, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)**

### **Panelists:**

**Dr. YAMASHITA Hikaru (Head, Government and Law Division, Security Studies Department, National Institute for Defense Studies)**

**LTC Peter Conroy (Commanding Officer, ADF Peace Operations Training Centre)**

**LTG (Ret.) MATSUMURA Goro (Former Commanding General of Northeastern Army, JGSDF)**

**COL Tim Wildish (Special Assistant to the Military Adviser, Department of Peace Operations, United Nations)**

(Shinoda) Thank you very much. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much for coming to this symposium. We will start the panel discussion. I am the moderator. I am Shinoda. Nice to see you all.

First of all, to the panelists, I will ask each panelist to make a presentation for about 20 minutes, and then after that, we will also be showing some videos. After we watch that, at around 3:35 p.m., 75 minutes from now, we will take a break. If you have any questions that you would like to ask to the panelists, please fill in the question sheet and please hand it in during that break. After the break, we will resume at 3:55 p.m. and respond to the questions, and also we would also like to proceed with a free discussion. We are scheduled to end at about 4:55 p.m. While you are listening to the presentations, I hope that you think about the questions that you would like to ask and hand them in during the break.

Today, we have three panelists, but also we are very fortunate to have Colonel Tim Wildish. Colonel Tim Wildish has come on behalf of Lieutenant-General Loitey and he has read his speech on behalf, but Colonel Wildish has ample experience. He has been helping Lieutenant-General Loitey, so he has a lot of experience, as well as knowledge. So if you have any questions regarding the keynote speech, I believe he is well-equipped to answer, and also if you have any questions regarding him or based on his career, I am sure he will be able to answer to all those questions. If Colonel Wildish wants to add something not as a representative – would you like to make a comment not on behalf of Lieutenant-General Loitey, but anything that you would like to say as yourself?

(Wildish) Yes, thank you very much. I think the one observation that I would make, if I may, is ever since I have been in UN Headquarters and indeed in my previous job as Chief of Staff of the UN mission in Cyprus is the overriding primacy of politics over everything that we do. I mean that is usually important, but it is usually important as military personnel to bear that in mind. My boss, Lieutenant-General Loitey, is forever under the Secretary-General's office, having political discussions with various ambassadors. Everything that we do of course has a political element, so it is very important as military personnel, particularly when you go into that environment, to bear in mind that this is overriding political primacy. Actually that permeates down all the way into a selection of

personnel and some of our operations, and it is something that we must always bear in mind.

I was fortunate enough in my previous job to be involved in the peace talks between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots on the island of Cyprus. Again, that was a fascinating lesson in politics. So as a military person, you have to lift yourself out a little bit and get into that political world, which for some of us, it can be a little bit uncomfortable for a while, but it is a fascinating world. But it is a very, very good lesson. It is something I have learned in the Headquarters and something that I have come to value and deeply appreciate.

That is my one observation that I may share with you at the moment, but I am very happy to take any questions later. Thank you very much, Dr. Shinoda.

(Shinoda) Thank you very much. The primacy of politics. The analytics of policy or politics will be very important. In 2015, what we call a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report, on PKO, it was emphasized as an important thing. Ever since then, in the industry of peacebuilding and peacekeeping, it has been emphasized. Colonel Wildish once again referred to this.

Currently, Lieutenant-General Loitey is in the DRC. Because of the situation there, he cannot come unfortunately. He is right now analyzing the situation on the ground and trying to get information. Mr. Lacroix, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations of the United Nations, is also there. The two gentlemen are there in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, so the situation is quite fluid over there. In that situation, you have to proceed with the United Nations peacekeeping operations. That is the latest situation, so I hope that Colonel Wildish can also refer to that later on.

We would like to proceed as the program is written, so we would like to have each panelist make a presentation. Our first panelist is Dr. Hikaru Yamashita, the Head of the Government and Law Division of the Security Studies Department of the National Institute for Defense Studies. You have about 20 minutes. Dr. Yamashita, please.



JPC International Peace and Security Symposium 2019  
December 2, 2019

# State-building Unraveled?: Peace Operations **after** the Post-Cold War Period

Hikaru Yamashita

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\*Views expressed in this presentation are personal and do not  
represent those of the NIDS, MOD or Japanese government.

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(Yamashita) I am Yamashita of NIDS. As a researcher I plan to address the theme of this symposium from a conceptual perspective.

## Key points

- The idea of state-building has served as the guiding discourse of post-Cold War peace operations.
- And yet the underlying assumptions of this discourse appear to be unraveling in contemporary international relations, with uncertain consequences for the idea/practice of peacekeeping/building.

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Particularly, what I am going to talk today will be focused on state-building. The paradigm of state-building is the focus of my analysis. Basically, what I want to say is twofold. One is that in the post-Cold War period the paradigm of state-building has been a powerful driver of international action in this field. The second point is that this idea of state-building seems to be changing these days. And with these changes, I suggest that peacekeeping may also be changing in some fundamental manners. These are the two points I would like to share with you.


# Peace operations as state-building

Major mandated tasks and missions in UN peacekeeping			
Mission management	Mission logistics, support and training	Political engagement/ good offices	Protection of UN personnel and facilities
	Public information	Deterrent operations	Public order / local security
Traditional	Ceasefire/ Monitoring	Mine action	Rule of law assistance
	Development coordination & assistance	National dialogue & reconciliation	Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)
Multi-dimensional	Electoral assistance/ democracy promotion	Peace process management	Security sector reform (SSR)
	Human rights protection & promotion	Protection & assistance to refugees and IDPs	Governance support/ institution building
	Humanitarian support	Protection of civilians (PoC)	Transitional administration
"Exceptions"	Preventive deployment		Coercion/ Pacification
	Sources: Jake Sherman and Benjamin Tortolani (2009), Paul F. Oehl and Daniel Drudman (2018) and various UN peacekeeping mandates.		


Multidimensional missions are effectively engaged in state-building.

The post-Cold War state-building modelled on liberal statehood.

First, let me conduct a brief review of peacekeeping. What kind of peacekeeping operations have we come to have? Well, the slide here is an exhaustive list of peacekeeping mandates. What I want you to focus on is this pink part and the red part. The activities mentioned here, unlike traditional ones, they are multifunctional missions. The insertion of these tasks into peacekeeping missions means that they are effectively oriented towards the goal of state-building.



However, one might wonder, what kind of state are we talking about? It cannot be any type of state. When we talk about statehood in contemporary state-building, it is usually the liberal and democratic state. As this slide shows, the modern model of statehood revolves around several key norms: sovereign statehood, human rights, democracy, and international participation. That is the kind of state whose creation the international community has been supporting in the post-Cold War period.



Why was this “liberal democratic” state-building persuasive in the post-Cold War period? What I would suggest is that this form of state-building was very much supported by related discourses in security, development, and politics. In the field of security, it was the idea of “failed state.” In politics and ideology, it was the “democratic peace” thesis, and in development it was good governance or fragile statehood. All these supported the liberal and democratic state-building.

## State-building: post-Cold War building blocks

### Security: state failure

- Reduced threats from interstate, systemic wars
- Prominence of “new wars”, OOTW, “war among the people”
- State failure as a new risk

### Development: good governance


- State incapacity and fragility as the primary cause of the development “failure”
- Promoting good governance
- Conflict as the obstacle to development

### Politics/ ideology: democracy and the “end of history”

- End of the Cold War and the “victory” of democracy
- Political transition in former Socialist countries
- Democratic (liberal) peace thesis: beyond the academic world


Building liberal statehood and state-society relations: solution to the challenges of post-conflict insecurity and chronicle poverty

The slide here explains how these sectoral discourses worked to prop up the state-building ideology.




And the slide here suggests that all these building blocks are beginning to crumble in recent years.






This diagram is the one that I have already shown.



And as a result of the unravelling of the supporting discourses, contemporary peacekeeping, which forms part of the state-building ideology, is bound to be affected by the changes.



Then, what does it mean?

**Implications for peace operations**

**Diversity in operational scope**

- Comprehensive (state-building) operations
- Militarily robust, stabilization operations
- Civilian, peacebuilding, capacity-building operations (e. g., EU)

**Disappearing "blueprint"**

- Replacement or muddling thorough?
- No evidence of new paradigm from emerging donors and TCCs
- Proliferation of operations with specific focuses
- Competitions and revisions within the current paradigm

**Need for "a view from afar"**

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This is a very difficult question to answer. I cannot readily give you a decisive answer, but at least two things suggest themselves from the preceding discussion. One is that the range of the peace operations is going to be diverse. If the state-building paradigm is losing its steam, peace operations may not have to be as comprehensive as that paradigm might suggest. Another, more fundamental implication is that the blueprint for the post-Cold War peace operations is beginning to disappear. On



the other hand, we do not yet have a new paradigm that replaces the old paradigm. This uncertain situation might continue for a while. Within state-building, for instance, some actors may try to use or even develop some parts of the paradigm, and yet some others might simply ignore or discard the other parts.

Peace operations have been undergoing some deep changes, and will continue to change. What we need is an attitude whereby we can take a step back and try to view the broad changes from afar. I think that is really necessary. With this, I would like to end my presentation. Thank you very much.

Thank you

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(Shinoda) Thank you very much, Dr. Yamashita. In the case of Dr. Yamashita, he works for the National Institute for Defense Studies, but he is a researcher and he has an academic background that is quite broad. He has written multiple English papers and books. He does have quite an exchange with us, academics, as well, so he has made introductory remarks based on that. After the Cold War was over, the peacekeeping operations have expanded both in numbers and in contents. In our academic circle, liberal democratic value was the framework that we should look at. The failed state theory, as he said, is actually related to development theory like OECD-DAC or New Deal school of thoughts. He talked about vulnerability as a concept to provide and renovate the development aid. Liberalism was the foundation for that framework, but that may be now in a shaky state. That is the big question that he has posed. As the background, what has been discussed is the liberalistic statehood. There is a huge architecture of nations beyond this concept. I was not able to mention this at the outset, but the theme of this symposium is new trends. Dr. Yamashita has given us quite an insight into that.

Amongst his books, if you look at the titles of his books, they are indicative. There are a lot of peace operation actors aside from the UN. That is what he has been researching. Well, the theme today is the United Nations peacekeeping operations, but if possible, we can ask him about the actors other than the United Nations and the relationship between the United Nations and those actors in a later discussion.

Let me introduce the next speaker, Lieutenant Colonel Conroy, the Commanding Officer and leader of the ADF Peace Operations Training Centre. From a practical point of view, he will be sharing with us the actual peacekeeping operations and how we can make contributions to peace operations. Lieutenant Colonel Conroy, over to you.



## **ADF Peace Operations Training Centre**

Japan Peacekeeping and Security Symposium  
02 Dec 19



Prepared by: LTDCOL Peter Conroy, CO ADF ROTC

(Conroy) Excellencies, Commandant, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, I feel very honored to be here in Japan to speak to this symposium on the very important topic of peacekeeping. As the Commandant or the Commanding Officer of the Australian Defence Force Peace Operations Training Centre, I am acutely aware of the importance of supporting peace operations around the world in an effort to maintain global security and stability. In my capacity as the Commanding Officer, I have participated in many forums like this one in the last two years. It has been amazing to see so many countries represented, who all share a similar interest in working hard together and sharing ideas in order to try and maintain global peace and security.



## The Brave Blossoms



Before I continue however, I would like to tell you a quick story. I am a very passionate rugby player and supporter. I have been playing for the last 36 years, so almost my entire life. I have played alongside some of our current Australian Wallabies. On the 19th of September 2015, I was deployed to Kandahar, Afghanistan. I was responsible for mentoring a very senior officer in the 205th Afghan National Army Corps Headquarters, which is about a division in size. At about 11 p.m. in the evening, I was watching television with one eye and working very hard preparing for the next day's mentoring activities. I happened to be watching your very proud rugby team take on the mighty South Africa, and then this happened.

---Video---

As you can see in the middle of the board, Japan won 34:32. I was shouting so loudly that the Australian security detachment came running into my office wondering had something happened, but I was cheering for Japan. Then, something wonderful happened this year when Japan hosted the World Cup and you beat two other very strong countries, Scotland and Ireland. So I want to congratulate Japan on putting on such a wonderful Rugby World Cup, one of the best in history, and for one of the greatest upsets in the history of rugby. Congratulations to the Brave Blossoms. I only think they will get better and better, and Ambassador, sir, congratulations on your success over Fiji in the Rugby World Cup, but to more important things.



## Australia's Contribution to Peace Operations



- Active participant in UN institutions
- 11th largest contributor to the UN budgets
- 1947 – Australians were first into the field as part of the very first group of UN military observers anywhere in the world, assisting in the de-colonisation of the Dutch East Indies
- Over 65,000 personnel to more than 60 UN and other multilateral peace and security operations worldwide, including in Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands, Lebanon, Sudan, Cyprus, Korea, Somalia, Rwanda and Afghanistan.
- Commanded 12 multi-national peace operations since 1947.



- 42 deaths serving on peace operations world wide.
- 14 serving on UN missions



AJPF Officers participating in the first UN Organised Peace Operation Indonesia - 1947



AJPF medical support in Rwanda



AJPF Infantry securing contact from post referendum militia violence - 1999

Australia considers peacekeeping an essential component to maintaining regional and global peace and security. Australia has been actively involved in peace operations for over 70 years. We have provided military and police personnel to 62 United Nations and other multilateral peace and security operations since 1947, when we sent a small team to Indonesia to assist in the decolonization of the Dutch East Indies. We are the 11th largest contributor to the UN regular and peacekeeping budget, and have commanded 12 multinational peace operations since 1947.



## Regional Support


- Leading role in regional missions in:
  - Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)
  - Bougainville
  - Papua New Guinea
  - East Timor/ Timor Leste
- Other efforts:
  - Cambodia, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Afghanistan



In our own neighborhood, Australia has played a leading role in successful regional missions in the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, and East Timor. Australia was instrumental in the diplomacy that led to the Cambodian Peace Settlement. We made a major contribution to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, including sending the first military contingent and providing the commander of that military component of that mission. Australia has also contributed to Commonwealth missions in Zimbabwe and Uganda, and international stabilization efforts in Afghanistan.



## Recent Australian Peace Operations



Our commitment to peace operations continues today, with Australian peacekeepers currently serving in the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Israel, the UN Mission in South Sudan, and although not a UN mission, we have troops serving as part of the Multinational Force and Observers. In fact, the current Commander of the MFO is an Australian officer, Major-General Simon Stuart. He is about to complete his third and final year as the Commander of the MFO. We also have an Australian Army officer, Major-General Cheryl Pearce, who is the Commander of the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus. We also have Rear Admiral Stuart Mayer as the Deputy Commander of the UN Command Headquarters in the Republic of Korea.



## Australian Policy/Strategy



- UN Peacebuilding Architecture
  - UN Peacebuilding Commission
  - UN Peacebuilding Fund
    - \$10m (2016-2018)
    - Supported projects in Myanmar, PNG (Bougainville), Sri Lanka and Solomon Islands
  - UN Peacebuilding Support Office
- UN Country Programs
  - Support political, security and development activities contributing to sustainable peace, and preventing re-lapse into conflict
- Leading advocate Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle
  - Member of the Group of Friends of R2P (New York/ Geneva)
  - Co-facilitator – Global Network of R2P Focal Points
  - Partner – Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes Initiative
  - Funding – Asia Pacific Centre for R2P, Global Centre for R2P, and Joint Office of the UN Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide

Australia believes addressing the root causes of conflict and building the foundations for peaceful, inclusive societies is critical to preventing and resolving conflict. Australia provides significant support for UN peacebuilding efforts through the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and through UN country programs which support political, security, and development activities focused on contributing to sustainable peace and preventing countries' relapse into conflict. The UN Peacebuilding Architecture, which consists of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the UN Peacebuilding Fund, and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, was established in 2005 to support countries trapped in the cycle of conflict and relapse.

Australia committed \$10 million over three years, between 2016 and 2018, to the UN Peacebuilding Fund which provides fast and flexible funding to meet critical conflict prevention needs in fragile and conflict-affected areas. In our region, the Fund has supported peacebuilding projects in Myanmar, Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and the Solomon Islands.

Australia is a leading advocate for the international implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, which addresses the responsibility of states to protect populations from the mass atrocity of crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Australia is a member of the Group of Friends of R2P in both New York and Geneva, a co-facilitator of the Global Network of R2P Focal Points, and a partner of the Global Action Against Mass Atrocity Crimes (GAAMAC) initiative. The Australian Government provides funding to the Asia-Pacific Centre for R2P, the Global Centre for R2P, and the Joint Office of the UN Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide.



## Australian Policy/Strategy



- UN Charter underpins the rules based international order
- UN often only place relevant states can be convened to tackle global challenges
- Member of the UN Security Council 2013/14
- Support to Peace Operations including Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement and Peace Building under UN Chapters VI, VII (Timor Leste), and VIII (RAMSI – Solomon Islands)
- Maintain reputation as effective contributor to Peace Operations and Peacebuilding systems
  - provide trained personnel, equipment support, logistics support and SME training
  - From Niche contributions to formed Force Elements
  - Integrated WoG approach – not just military – police and civilian where possible
  - Financial contributions – as determined by Government

Australia recognizes that the UN underpins the rules-based international order and is often the only place that relevant states can be convened to tackle global challenges. Our membership on the UN Security Council in 2013 and 2014 reinforces the importance of that institution.

Australia is a strong advocate for peace operations and will support operations and activities under UN Chapter VI, Chapter VII such as the mission in Timor-Leste, and Chapter VIII such as the mission in the Solomon Islands, RAMSI. Australia wants to maintain its reputation as an effective contributor to peace operations and peacebuilding systems. Some of the ways we intend to do this are through the provision of trained personnel, equipment and material support, logistics support, and subject matter expert training. Other capabilities could include niche contributions such as strategic airlift, intelligence, or mine clearing, right through to formed teams or groups.

An integrated, Whole-of-Government Approach will always be applied to any consideration for peace operations contributions. The Government is always committed to provide specific financial contributions where they are best suited and they serve the national interest.





## Recent Efforts in PKO



Acknowledging the strain on the peacekeeping system, Australia pledged at the September 2015 Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping to provide strategic airlift support for UN peacekeeping operations in crisis situations, where and whenever we can. We also pledged to build the capacity of UN troop-contributing countries in our region and increase regional expertise in areas such as countering improvised explosive devices. I will now cover in more detail some of our efforts in providing support, equipment, training, and capacity-building.





## Support to Vietnam



- **‘ADF supports deployment of critical Vietnamese health capability to UN Mission in South Sudan’**
- 16 Oct 18 – South Sudan
- 2 x C17 Strategic lift, a power generator, two ambulances
- Training in Role 2 Hospital (R2H) conduct
- Specialist peacekeeping training
- English
- First time the Vietnam People’s Army had partnered with another nation to transport its forces overseas
- Nov 2019 – assisting in 2<sup>nd</sup> rotation deployment



As I stated previously, Australia is committed to providing specific capabilities in support of peace operations and to enable our partners, and/or build their capacity for deployments. One recent example is our support to Vietnam. Australia provided equipment and training to Vietnam in order to assist them in deploying a Role 2 hospital (R2H) to South Sudan. Between 2015 and 2018, we provided training in the conduct of a R2H, specialist peacekeeping training, and English language training. On the 16th of October 2018, we provided strategic lift support and equipment to deploy the R2H to South Sudan. I can also proudly announce that Australia is currently assisting Vietnam with the deployment of the second rotation of personnel and equipment for the R2H right now.



## Support to Fiji



Australia has been working closely with Fiji in building their capacity to contribute to peace operations. In 2017, Australia worked with Fiji to enable the Royal Fijian Military Force (RFMF) to acquire 10 Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicles – you can see in the bottom-right corner – in order to send them to UNDOF in support of their operations there. We have also been conducting training in how to operate and maintain those vehicles. Australia is undertaking a huge project to develop the Blackrock Peacekeeping Training Centre in Fiji so that the RFMF have a better training facility to prepare their troops for deployment. We have recently had a request from Fiji to co-host the Association of Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Training Centers (AAPTC) in Fiji in 2021. It is Australia's turn to host that in 2021 and Fiji would like to co-host that in Fiji to coincide with the official opening of the Blackrock Peacekeeping Training Centre.



## UN Pre-deployment Training



### ADF POTC (UN Ops Trg)

UN Certification Training



- 3 x PDT per year
- 1/19 – 25 students – 12 ADF, 13 International (African Union x2, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar x 2, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam)
- 2/19 – 26 students – 17 ADF, 9 International (Bangladesh, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Timor Leste, Ukraine)
- 3/19 – Japan Student

2020 PDT – 1/20 – 3-19 Feb 20, 2/20 – 25 May  
– 10 Jun 20, 3/20 – 28 Sep – 14 Oct 19



The Australian Defence Force Peace Operations Training Centre is responsible for delivering UN-certified pre-deployment training mostly to individuals in the Australian Defence Force and our international partners. We deliver the UN Staff Officer Course and the UN Military Expert on Mission Course. We deliver them simultaneously. Everyone attends the UN Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials in the first week, and then they go onto to do their specific training. We have excellent international representation from countries around the world, which brings a great level of diversity to our courses. The dates for our courses for next year, you can see are on the bottom here. We are very fortunate to have a Japan student attend our recent pre-deployment course, the third of 2019.





## Gender Advisor Course



- 8 day course, 48 students, 3 courses per year from 2020
- 1/19 – 48 Students – (29 F, 19 M) 12 Army, 9 RAAF, 6 Navy, 2 APS, Intl – 2 Cambodia, 4 Fiji, 2 Indonesia, 2 Iraq, Jordan, Laos, 2 Malaysia, NZ, 2 Philippines, 2 Vietnam
- 2/19 – 3-12 Dec 19
- 1/20 – 28 Apr – 7 May 19, 2/20 – 1-10 Sep 20, 3/20 – 1-10 Dec 20
- **Aim** – to graduate ADF and international personnel with skills, knowledge and attitude required to effectively perform the duties of a Gender Advisor in support of ADF (coalition) policy development, planning, operations or exercises.
- **Course**
  - UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions
  - Role of a Gender Advisor and Gender Focal Point
  - Key stakeholders, agencies and actors
  - Gender analysis in the area of operations
  - Integrating a gender perspective into staff and operational planning
  - Gender consideration in operational documents and policies
  - Gender sensitive reporting and evaluation

The ADF Gender Advisor Course is eight days long and this is a wonderful course. Women, Peace and Security (WPS) is an important agenda, and applying a gender perspective to military operations is an essential consideration. The course will provide personnel with the skills, knowledge, and attitude to perform the duties of a gender advisor on operations or exercise. The dates for the Gender Advisor Course for next year are up there.

Australia is keen to be a world leader in the Women, Peace and Security agenda, and we are conducting a great deal of work in this space. Our Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) announced on the 29th of March 2019 that the Australian Defence Force will increase its female representation on UN peace operations to 25%, which, as you heard earlier, is greater than the 15% expected by troop-contributing countries in the UN Strategy 2018-2028.

We have been working with numerous regional partners as well to enhance their training and education in what is known as the cross-cutting themes: Women, peace and security, protection of civilians, children affected in armed conflict, sexual exploitation and abuse, and gender-based sexual violence.



## Training and Capacity Building



- **POTC Seminar Series**
  - Peace Operations Seminar – Apr 20
  - Humanitarian Operations Seminar – Jul 20
  - Gender & Protection Seminar – Aug 20
- **Mobile Training Teams (MTT)**
  - 2-3 x three week MTT
- **Instructor Exchanges & Seconded Officers – Fiji, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand (rotates with Vietnam 2021) (Indonesia 2021)**
- **Regular Bi-lateral Exercises**
  - Thailand – Ex PIRAP JABIRU – 2020
  - Indonesia – Ex GARUDA KOOKABURRA 2019
- **Multi-lateral Activities**
  - UN CAPSTONE exercise – Mongolia or Bangladesh
  - Exercise VIKING
- **Regional/ Global Peacekeeping Training Associations – Forums**
  - Association of Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Training Centres (AAPTC)
  - International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC)
  - Regional Peacekeeping Operations Capability and Capacity Building Technical Working Group (PKOCB TWG)

Other training and capacity-building we conduct includes three professional military education seminars. The seminars are one week long each and they address contemporary challenges faced by the modern peacekeeper and challenges in humanitarian operations and emerging issues in Women, Peace and Security.

The Peace Operations Training Centre also conducts critical Mobile Training Teams (MTT), usually two to three per year. They are usually two to three weeks long and are determined by our international policy division. We have previously conducted Mobile Training Teams in Kenya, Timor-Leste, Vietnam, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, and Rwanda. We also contribute to the UN ITS Mobile Training Team system, and we contribute instructors to support when required.

POTC conducts a number of instructor exchanges each year, and we have been to a number of countries including Canada, Chile, China, Germany, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and the Republic of Korea.

We are also very fortunate to have four seconded officers at POTC. They are from Fiji, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. In 2021, we will receive a fifth seconded officer from Indonesia. Those seconded officers come to POTC and they learn how we deliver our courses, and then take those skills back to their own training centers, which is another way of building capacity in those respective countries. Australia currently has our own seconded officers in Malaysia and Fiji, and we are considering sending officers to Indonesia and Thailand in the future.

We also conduct two key bilateral exercises in order to enhance interoperability, better understand other cultures, and to share Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). We conduct one exercise in Indonesia in one year, and one in Thailand the following year. We also participate in key multilateral



exercises like Exercise VIKING and the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative's (GPOI) Capstone Exercise. POTC also attends key regional and global peacekeeping training associations to understand contemporary challenges faced by peacekeepers and apply best practice methodology to our training and education. We also use these forums to network and identify opportunities to build capacity in our international partners.

One comment that I would make that is not on the slide is we also have worked with the Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI), operating out of Virginia in the U.S. They have developed an online learning platform for all Australians and international partners to use. It is free and there is access to at least 29 courses relating to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.



## Australia Japan Cooperation



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- AS/JPN forces have worked with and alongside each other on several peace operations and humanitarian operations

**Peace Operations**

- Cambodia 1992
- Timor Leste 2002
- Currently South Sudan

**Humanitarian**

- HA/DR Dec 2004 – response to Indian ocean tsunami
- Mar 2011 following significant earthquake in Japan
- Humanitarian Reconstruction efforts in Iraq 04-06

Australia and Japan have worked with and alongside each other on several peace operations and humanitarian operations. For peace operations, we worked together in Cambodia in 1992, Timor-Leste in 2002, and we are currently working together in South Sudan. We have also worked together on other humanitarian activities, you can see on this slide.



## Australia Japan Cooperation - East Timor



- 2002 – 2004 - 2,300 Staff Officers and Engineers
- 4 x Engineer units
- 680 at one time
- Repairing Roads, Bridges, Water Supply, projects, and schools
- Engineer units – 1<sup>st</sup> women to deploy



From a personal perspective, I have proudly worked alongside Japan Ground Self-Defense Force personnel in East Timor in 2003, and in Iraq in 2005 and 2006. Between 2002 and 2004, Japan deployed over 2,300 staff officers and engineers to East Timor. It was Japan's largest commitment of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations at the time. I personally remember seeing many of the great projects the engineers completed across the country. From memory, it was the first time women had deployed in engineer units, recognizing the importance of women and their role in peacekeeping operations.





## Australia Japan Cooperation - Iraq



- Al Muthanna Task Group (AMTG)
- JSDF Reconstruction Task Force (2004-2006)



Whilst I was working in the Multinational Division Headquarters in Basra, Iraq, I visited As-Samawah on several occasions and saw some of the great reconstruction work conducted by the Japan Reconstruction Task Force in the Al-Muthanna Province in Iraq.



## Australia Japan Cooperation – South Sudan



Today, we continue to work together on peace operations in South Sudan.

# Questions



Prepared by: LTCOL Peter Cennedy, CO ADF POTE

Ladies and gentlemen, in closing, Australia has a proud history of contributing to peace operations and working with our international partners to maintain peace and stability in the region and around the world. Australia is receptive to opportunities to work bilaterally and multilaterally in order to enhance our relationships with like-minded nations in the interest of maintaining a rules-based global order.

We are always looking for opportunities to work together and learn from each other. We are currently investigating co-deployment opportunities with regional partners to further enhance our contributions to UN peace operations and enhance our relationships and reputation across the international community. We would like to continue working closely with Japan, learning from each other and finding opportunities to train and work alongside each other in the future.


I was honored to host the delegation from the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center earlier this year. It has been my privilege to speak here today, and I hope the ADF Peace Operations Training Centre can maintain a close professional relationship with your Peacekeeping Training and Research Center in the future. Excellencies, Commandant, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your time.

(Shinoda) Thank you very much, Lieutenant Colonel Conroy. As the Commanding Officer of the POTC, he has shown deep knowledge and insight, but he is quite pro-Japan which was quite welcome to us as well. It is also related to peacekeeping operations. In his presentation, Cambodia and Timor-Leste are where Japan was deeply involved in peacekeeping operations. Australia was always there getting deeply involved, and also they worked with us in Iraq and South Sudan, and he also talked about Bougainville and the Solomon Islands.

In our peacekeeping community, the UN and regional partnerships would remind us of NATO, the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as Colonel Wildish referred to in his presentation. Those are the major regional alliances, but there is the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in the Pacific. Australia is working with New Zealand to lead this organization. Through this framework, they are involved in peacekeeping operations. The Government of Japan has the Indo-Pacific initiative. So Australia's involvement like this, not just in UN peacekeeping, but in broader areas, give us more opportunities to work together.

I will now invite another member of the panel, Mr. Goro Matsumura, the former Commanding General of the Northeastern Army of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, with deep knowledge about Japan, as well as the international community. He often speaks up in the media area in Japan on the topics that he is interested in. You have the floor.





(Matsumura) Thank you very much. My name is Matsumura. As active duty, I was the Commanding General of the Northeastern Army of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, and I commanded the 3rd Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group. Not the PKO of the United Nations, but also I was the Director of the 2nd Operation Division of the Joint Staff Office, responsible for PKOs and other international operations. Since then, I have been deeply involved and very much interested in the peacekeeping operations in practice and theory. Since retirement, I have continued my study in this area.


This is my presentation today, “How should Japan contribute to Peacekeeping Operations.” It sounds rather grandiose, but based on my personal knowledge, I would like to share with you my suggestions, so to speak.



These are my talks today. First, the discussion in Japan of the gap between the PKO and the ideal image. We need to understand the challenges facing UN peacekeeping operations today and we need to review what Japan has done so far, in order to identify areas in which Japan can contribute in the future. To that end, what we need to make the international peace activities genuinely the primary mission for the Self-Defense Force.




I would like to first identify the gap between the PKO discussions in Japan and what really has to be discussed.




As you are aware of, in 1991, the Gulf War started discussions about Japan's participation in peacekeeping operations. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was condemned unanimously in the international community. The second largest economy, Japan, made only financial contributions, while many other countries formed multilateral forces to liberate Kuwait. In 1992, the International Peace Cooperation Law was legislated and started the sending of engineer units from Japan to be followed by successive troop contributions. But Japan's discussion on PKO remains the same in essence.

We are first and foremost concerned about what Japan should do as the second largest economy in the world. We have to do something as the second largest economy in the world, but we have the constitutional and the political constraints, so what can Japan do within such limitations? The United Nations started peacekeeping operations, so Japan started to search what can Japan could do before deciding on participation. We did not discuss how the United Nations peacekeeping operations should be and can be, we simply accepted what the situation is at the time as a given.



However, this is not a desirable discussion because we have to get rid of such passivism in order to identify Japan's role in an effective way, so we need to identify the challenges of the United Nations peacekeeping operations for us. Then, we start to find out the challenges that Japan can help address. Under the constitutional and various constraints, Japan needs to find what Japan can do practically. So instead of starting with domestic constraints, we need to start our discussions with what is required of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Because Japan is the third largest financial contributor to the United Nations peacekeeping operations, Japan needs to have a sense of ownership as a major participant to the UN peacekeeping operations.



## 2 現在国連PKOが抱えている課題 Challenges facing the UN peacekeeping operations

This is the line that I would like to follow in my presentation. As the keynote speaker mentioned, I first would like to review very briefly the challenges of UN peacekeeping operations.





As was already mentioned, under Secretary-General Guterres, Action for Peacekeeping is underway. In August 2018, the “Declaration of Commitments” was announced. This identified seven areas for action.

First, strengthen coordination with political solutions, as was already mentioned repeatedly by previous speakers, including the members of the panel and the keynote speaker. Second, strengthen the protection of civilians. The issue from the Brahimi Report, and the security of peacekeepers. This is the other side of the coin of the second one, the protection of civilians. The security of peacekeepers is necessary in order to strengthen the protection of civilians. Fourth, capacity in quality and quantity through personnel training and also provision of proper equipment. Fifth, connection to the sustainment of peace. It is not a temporary ceasefire, but sustainable peace is necessary, backed up with political settlements and reconciliations. Sixth, partnerships with relevant governments and organizations. The United Nations Headquarters, UN or specialized organizations, AU, EU, the host nations, NGOs, as well as troop contributors and capability contributors. Seventh, the conduct and the discipline of personnel.

In order to address these areas, political and domestic support is essential, but in addition, capacity-building in personnel and equipment is necessary in order to back the political and diplomatic support. The protection of civilians, the security of peacekeepers, and the sustainable peace; in order to meet these objectives, we need to pay attention to the effective partnerships amongst the nations necessary to develop peacekeepers capable of achieving these objectives.

## 政治外交以外の能力面で各国ができること

What each country can do in areas other than politics and diplomacy

- ・ 人的・物的に質が高い**部隊**の提供  
Provision of high-quality **units** in terms of both personnel and equipment
- ・ **市民保護・要員の安全確保・持続的平和に資する**  
**国連PKOドクトリン開発のための知的貢献**  
Intellectual contribution to develop **UN PKO doctrines** that contributes to **POC**,  
security of peacekeepers and sustaining peace
- ・ これに資する**技術及び装備**の開発・提供  
Development/provision of **technology equipment** to above end  
： 情報・作戦・作戦支援(通信・工兵・航空)・後方支援  
Intelligence, operation, operation support (communications, engineering, air) and logistics support
- ・ 能力向上のための**教育訓練**の提供 (能力構築支援)  
Provision of **educational training** for capability enhancement (capacity building assistance)  
： 多国間・二国間・トライアングル  
Multilateral, bilateral and triangular

In addition to political and diplomatic support, what can the countries do? As you can see here, well-trained and well-equipped troops need to be provided, but in reality, most contingents are far less equipped than those forces of advanced nations. But that does not mean that the peacekeepers should be provided with state-of-the-art weapons for intensive combats like developed nations. For the security of personnel and the protection of civilians, as well as the sustainment of peace, a different operational doctrine is necessary from that of the ordinary military operations to defeat military aggression and corresponding equipment.

For a country to develop its military capability, state goals are identified such as territorial defense and the protection of interests, and then operational doctrines are formulated to show the way they are expected to fight. Then, you need some forces and equipment acquired, but the UN peacekeeping operation's ultimate objective is the achievement of sustainable peace, so political settlements, the protection of civilians, and the security of peacekeepers; these objectives are often discussed, but the operational doctrines, in order to meet these objectives, are not clear and the equipment necessary for these objectives are not procured.

There is a major gap, therefore, between the goals and the means available to achieve them, so operational doctrines and the equipment necessary for that have to be developed and provided. For example, let us say we are going to build a school building. We have the necessary functions clarified like classrooms and music rooms, but nobody has drawings or construction machines to build them. We have only old timber and the people in the field have difficulties. The tactics as old as those of the Second World War are obsolete today in order to meet the objectives of modern peacekeeping operation objectives. There is a major mismatch. We need to fill the gap by the development and provision of

future doctrines and equipment.

First and foremost, we need to develop our future operational doctrine for UN peacekeeping operations. Please do not misunderstand. I use the word “doctrine.” This is different from the “Capstone Doctrine” formulated in 2008. The Capstone Doctrine is an overall doctrine. My word of doctrine does not mean Rules of Engagement (ROE). I intend to discuss the future military operational doctrine, identifying necessary equipment and training. The Capstone Doctrine declares the non-use of force, except for self-defense and the defense of mandates, but the future operational doctrine identifies ways in which peacekeepers use force for the protection of mandates.

The United Nations has not done this work because that might violate the sovereignty of troop-contributing nations, but irregular forces and terrorists now have IT technology and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The United Nations needs to have proactive measures, otherwise UN peacekeeping operations would end up being preempted all the way. So the highly technologically-developed nations should develop and provide future operational doctrines and the corresponding equipment to the United Nations.

For the protection of civilians and the security of peacekeepers, as well as sustainable peace, intelligence is necessary. Not a major destructive force, but non-lethal suppression and temporary barriers to mobility of the hostile forces are necessary. Signaling, engineering, air power, and other operational support are necessary, as well as transport supply and medical forces are necessary. So high-tech countries should provide UAVs and command and control systems by customizing them for UN peacekeeping operations for the significant improvement of the United Nations’ capabilities.

Triangular, bilateral, and multilateral programs should be used to provide training from the advanced to the developing troop-contributing nations under the capacity-developing program. The developed nations’ willingness to support will decide the future PKO capability.



What did Japan do?

## 国連P K O工兵マニュアルの作成・改訂 Development and revision of UN Engineer Unit Manual



2014～15年  
日本が議長国となり  
工兵マニュアルを**作成**  
Chair country Japan  
**develops** the engineer unit manual

2018～19年  
日本が議長国となり  
工兵マニュアルを**改訂**  
Chair country Japan  
**revises** the engineer unit manual

引き続きマニュアルの**普及・訓練**実施において積極貢献  
Continues active contribution in **spreading** the manual and implementing **training**

Japan was the chair to develop the engineer unit manual between 2014 and 2015. In 2017, the manual was revised successfully. The total work was completed within a year under the strong leadership of Japan which was appreciated highly.



## 国連PKO支援部隊早期展開プロジェクト（RDEC）への支援

Support to the UN Project for Rapid Deployment of Enabling Capabilities(RDEC)



2015年以降、国連活動支援局が実施する三角パートナーシップとしての「国連PKO部隊早期展開プロジェクト（RDEC）」に教官を派遣

Since 2015, Japan has dispatched instructors to the UN Project for Rapid Deployment of Enabling Capabilities(RDEC)

アフリカに加えアジアへ、施設に加え医療分野に拡大

Expansion to Asia in addition to Africa, to medical area in addition to engineering area.

For capacity-building, since 2015, as was mentioned, we provided support. Specifically, we sent trainers under the RDEC program under the UN Department of Peace Operations' Triangular Partnership Project. Since last year, we expanded recipients from Africa to Asia. This year, the medical field also became a part of this program. This is the desirable direction that Japan has been going to support UN peacekeeping operations in quality and quantity.





4 今後日本が取り組んでいくことが望まれる分野  
Areas in which Japan's **future** efforts are desired

What can we do in the future?


国連PKO部隊の質的向上への寄与  
Contribution to qualitative improvement of UN peacekeepers

- ・ 市民保護・要員の安全確保・持続的平和に資する  
国連PKO作戦ドクトリン開発への知的貢献  
Intellectual contribution to develop **UN PKO doctrines** that contributes to  
**POC, Security of Peacekeepers** and **Sustaining Peace**
- ・ 上記ドクトリンに適した国連PKO用情報収集・処理  
装備の開発、提供及び能力構築支援  
Capacity-building assistance and development & provision of **intelligence  
gathering/processing equipment** for UN PKOs consistent with the above doctrine
- ・ 上記ドクトリンに適した装備（非致死性の鎮圧手段や  
応急機動障害等）の開発・提供及び能力構築支援  
Capacity-building assistance and development & provision of **equipment (e.g. non-lethal  
way for repression, emergency obstacles for mobility)** consistent with the above doctrine
- ・ 国連PKO部隊の後方支援能力を向上させるため  
にカスタマイズした物流システムの提案・装備提供  
及び能力構築支援  
**Logistics system** customized to enhance the logistics support capability of UN  
peacekeepers, provision of **equipment** and capacity-building assistance

I think this is not limited to Japan, but for the protection of civilians, the security of peacekeepers, and sustainable peace, a future operational doctrine should be developed. This is an intellectual contribution, but Japan cannot do it by itself, we need to work with the UK and other like-minded countries and other high-technology countries in order to develop how to improve capability and how to provide the necessary training. We will contribute in that way to the United Nations. Also, staff officers and contingents can be considered to be provided or not within the overall framework of the support that I mentioned previously. That way, we can make systematic and coherent contributions.



So far, such consistent effort and systematic programs have not been provided by Japan. Why? Let me discuss this.



12 years ago, the Self-Defense Forces Act was revised so that the Self-Defense Forces can, as a primary mission, participate in peacekeeping operations led by the United Nations and other organizations, but our approach has been ad hoc and piecemeal because even though this has become the primary role of the Self-Defense Forces, our government has not provided to the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces clear missions, in an explicit manner. The Self-Defense Forces are ordered only in a temporary manner to participate in Self-Defense Forces, so there is no incentive on the part of the Self-Defense Forces and the Ministry of Defense to actively engage in international developments in peace time.

Last December, the National Defense Program Guidelines were revised, and the creation of desirable security environments, deterrents, and responding to contingencies are the major roles expected of the Self-Defense Forces, but there is no basic policy on how to use the Self-Defense Forces for the creation desirable security environments.

## 望ましい安全保障環境創出のための 国際秩序形成に防衛力をどう使うか？

How to employ defense capability for **formation of international order**  
to create desirable security environment

### 国際秩序形成における防衛力の3つの役割

3 roles of defense capability in formation of international order

#### ① 国際規範の形成と維持

Formation and maintenance of international norms

(海洋、極地、宇宙、サイバー、電磁波の監視等)

e.g. Surveillance of oceans, polar regions, space, cyber and electromagnetic waves

#### ② 軍事的な脅威形成の未然防止

Prevention of military threat formation

(軍備管理、不拡散、信頼醸成、共同訓練等)

e.g. Arms control, non-proliferation, trust building, joint exercises

#### ③ 国際的な不安定要因の排除


Elimination of international destabilizing factors

(**PKO**、テロ等違法活動取締り、HA/DR等)

e.g. **PKO**, crackdown on illegal activities such as terrorism, HA/DR

What can the Self-Defense Forces of Japan do in order to help develop and maintain desirable international order? Well, first, surveillance of oceans, polar regions, space, cyber, and electromagnetic waves in order to shape and develop norms. Also, the prevention of threats. For example, arms control, non-proliferation, confidence-building, joint exercises, and the prevention of threats. Also, the PKO, the suppression of terrorism and crimes, and high availability/disaster recovery (HA/DR), meaning the elimination of factors of instability in the international community.





Even in the peace time, the Self-Defense Forces and the Ministry of Defense can play their roles for these objectives. I would like to make three suggestions.

First, the basic policy on shaping orders through the Self-Defense Forces has to be settled. Our model is the UK's International Defence Engagement Strategy. The Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the UK formulated this jointly in 2013, and revised it in 2017. This clarifies how to engage military forces for the formation of international order, consistent with UK diplomatic policy. Under that, the military forces of the UK can play a proper role, so Japan should follow the same so that the Self-Defense Forces can have a clear, authorized role for the international community in peace time, consistent with Japan's diplomacy.

Second, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense need to have a standing coordination mechanism, not only in an ad hoc manner when we participate in UN peacekeeping missions and the Iraq operations. As I said previously, GPOI, the U.S. program, is the program to provide capacity-building to troop-contributing nations, organized and budgeted by the State Department, but conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces. We need to have such a standing coordination mechanism between foreign policy authorities and defense authorities.

Third, even now, as part of the primary role in peace time for international operations, the Self-Defense Forces' research of equipment and development of equipment is only for territorial defense and other traditional missions, not for peacekeeping operations. If this can be changed, then we can identify and develop and procure the necessary equipment for the peacekeeping operations, as well as the operational research necessary for the peacekeeping operations.

By working on these three areas, we can become more engaged in United Nations peacekeeping



operations more proactively, with a sense of ownership. Thank you for your attention.

(Shinoda) Mr. Matsumura, thank you very much indeed for your very forceful and cogent presentation to the mostly Japanese audience, providing much food for thought.

It is time to break, so I wonder how we are going to use the video. We are going to run a video provided by Colonel Wildish before taking a break.

(Wildish) If I may just explain what this video is before we show it. Basically, in my presentation, I talked about pre-deployment visits. This really shows the process for those pre-deployments and what new units undergo before they deploy on peacekeeping operations. This is important because this is a new process, and any country that is deploying troops on UN peacekeeping operations needs to understand this process because this is the kind of evaluation that will take place in the home country before those troops can deploy. It may be a case where a contingent does not meet the standard and therefore will not be allowed to deploy, so an understanding of this process is important, and this video provides that. Thank you.

---Video---

(Shinoda) We did not have a Japanese translation, but I believe that you were able to capture the environment. Capacity-building, in all the presentations, I believe has been one of the key words.

## Discussion

(Shinoda) Now, we would like to start the latter part of the panel discussion. We are going to have a discussion and this will last until 4:55 p.m. hopefully. Now, we are going to respond to the questions and have the panelists respond to the questions, but because of the time restraint, probably one person has only like seven or eight minutes, or less than eight minutes. This is what we want to remind you. Now, to some questions to Lieutenant-General Loitey. Probably we would like to have Colonel Wildish to answer on behalf.

First of all, to Lieutenant-General Loitey. Recently in United Nations PKO, we see some reduction in the budget, and I am sure you know that. What will be the impacts of the reduction of the budget? Briefly, probably in a minute or two, may I ask Colonel Wildish to answer this?

(Wildish) Thank you. It is an important question and it is a difficult challenge. It is a challenge I think that will become more difficult in the future as some countries draw down their contributions to peacekeeping. The question is about the impact. The impact is really on our missions. The missions have to refocus their budgets, prioritize, and as that budget goes down, there are only so many ways that they can address the reducing budget. Quite often, it means reducing capabilities, and often of course that will be military capabilities because military capabilities are expensive. Just to give you an example. To keep an infantry battalion deployed on a UN operation for a year, it costs in the region of \$25 million, so it is a lot of money.

One of the ways is to reduce the capabilities, but there are only so many capabilities that you can reduce where you get to the point where you cannot fulfill the mandate and the military mission and the tasks. So it is a major challenge, but what it requires I think is, going back to Action for Peacekeeping, a refocusing on the key priorities and making sure that we are able to address those key priorities. I think if we come to a stage in a mission where we cannot address the core of the mandate and key priorities, then there has to be some sort of remedial action applied to get more money to increase the budget in the mission. So overall, the answer to the question is that it does impact on capabilities in our missions.

(Shinoda) Thank you very much. Now, we go to another question. In the United Nations PKO, the number of casualties is increasing. As you said, killed in action; the Santos Cruz Report. I think it was mentioned there. Also, in the United Nations PKO community, I think it is widely talked about. As the United Nations DPO, through pre-dispatch training and through evaluations, you tried to improve the situation, but do you think those are proving to be effective in reducing the number of killed in action? What is the current situation? That is the question.

(Wildish) Yes, thank you. It is another very important question. What we found since the publication of the Cruz Report and the remedial action that has been taken is that casualties have gone down. Of course it does depend on exactly what is happening in our missions. Most of our casualties unfortunately are taken in one mission, and that is the mission in Mali, MINUSMA. That is by far the

most dangerous mission. 21 of the 22 casualties due to hostile acts this year have occurred in that one mission. We would like to think – well, statistics prove that casualties have gone down.

One of the key tenets of this is not just in terms of pre-deployment training, but also in improvement in intelligence. We did not used to speak about intelligence on peacekeeping operations before. We do now talk about intelligence. Good intelligence is absolutely vital. We think we are doing everything we can to bear down on casualties, but particularly after the publication of the Cruz Report, which was absolutely seminal and very important; and actually that report is referred to nearly every single day in the Headquarters. I hope that answers the question.

(Shinoda) Yes, thank you very much. So in order to reduce the casualties, I think there are a number of ways. One thing is the intelligence function to gather information to improve the capability to gather information. I think that was referred to by Mr. Matsumura, the retired Lieutenant-General. It is one of the areas that the Japanese SDF may be able to work on. I think it has to do something with that. Lastly, probably you can talk about the things you expect to Japan.

I also would like to pick up other questions because we have so many questions and I do not think we can cover all of them, but we will try to cover as much as possible. Before we run out of time, I would like to take up some other questions and if we have time remaining, I would like to ask the questions.

The next question is to Mr. Yamashita. Mr. Yamashita, you can read Japanese. You have about eight minutes, so if you can just sort them out and try to answer them, I would appreciate it very much.

(Yamashita) I would like to respond to some of the questions. One question is related to the implications of the emergence of new powers and new institutions for future peacekeeping.

I think this is a very good question. Up until recently, peacekeeping used to belong to the United Nations: not any more. Various regional organizations and coalitions are actively engaged into peacekeeping. One consequence of this is the blurring of the very idea of peacekeeping. For example, the AU and African sub-regional organizations are very much actively engaged and pushing for a form of peacekeeping that is militarily very active and robust.

A second question is related to troop-contributing countries' responses to peacekeeping changes. Probably there are positive aspects and negative aspects. The diversity of mission types means the diversity of contribution types for the countries. But on the other hand, they could be selective in getting involved in particular types of peacekeeping operations.

Several questions are related to the broad drivers behind the current changes. The rise of new powers like Russia and China is certainly one factor, but troubles within in the liberal international order are also responsible for the current situation. One thing I might emphasize is a change in the basic texture of international relations. The world right after the end of the Cold War was characterized by consensus on international cooperation, especially amongst major countries. As I hinted in my presentation, international competition, rather than international cooperation, appears to be more prevalent nowadays. Given that peacekeeping evolves in the context of international cooperation rather than competition, current changes in international politics might affect the global posture of

peacekeeping.

(Shinoda) Thank you very much. Next, Lieutenant-Colonel Conroy, there are two questions to you. Three or four minutes per question, if you can answer spending that much time. The first question is about communication. The background for this question is that Lieutenant-Colonel Conroy, yourself, has been to Afghanistan and also went through peacekeeping training. You have experienced a lot of international sites and different languages and different cultures, so facilitating communication would have been probably difficult because the Japanese people would have faced those difficulties. In communications, if there is any secret to success, then if you can share that with us, that would be appreciated.

(Conroy) Thank you very much for the question. In my experience, there are some things that can assist in overcoming challenges in language. One of the key things that Australia is doing with many of our regional partners is we have an international English language training program that is very important. It is a key enabler for a number of our regional partners and troop-contributing countries. One of the things from personal experience is the value of translators and their skills, particularly translators that understand military terminology. My experience in Iraq and Afghanistan were very positive where we had linguists that were highly competent in understanding military terminology. That enabled me personally to assist in mentoring Afghan National Army officers and Iraqi officers.

So I would say two things. Firstly, linguists, if they are available, are a critical enabler. Particularly local-country linguists, linguists who have grown up in the country, are a very important force-protection measure because they do not just translate for you, they in fact give you key intelligence information that you may not even know yourself because they understand the atmospherics or the situation that is taking place a lot better than some international partners or even may Australians understand, so they are critical, but the other thing I would say is, particularly under peacekeeping, I understand that mostly English is the common language, or French is a common language that is used. Those are probably the two key things that I would recommend.

(Shinoda) Thank you very much. Now, the next question, a very important, crucial question. In the peacekeeping operations area, the collaboration between Australia and Japan, especially in the POTC in Australia, there is a Mobile Training Team that is being operated. A very detailed question. The portable training team that you provide; in these specific activities, is there any possibility for Japan to collaborate with Australia, or is there any opportunity for Australia to receive a collaboration from Japan, or are there any specific ideas about a personnel exchange between the two countries?

(Conroy) This is an excellent question and part of the reason that I am here, so thank you for the question. Absolutely, there is a lot of opportunity for collaboration. Australia is looking – at the end of my presentation, I said that Australia is currently looking right now at co-deployment opportunities. What I mean by that is deploying with international partners in UN peacekeeping operations. We are engaging with several countries at the moment to consider options. As a consequence, that will

improve our relationships, but that aside, what we do right now with the Peace Operations Training Centre is fundamental to capacity-building with many of our regional partners.

The question about Mobile Training Teams. Mobile Training Teams are somewhat flexible, in the sense that countries have approached Australia before and they have identified what their shortcomings or what their weaknesses or what training requirements they have. If it is within POTC's capability to deliver that, we can tailor a specific peacekeeping-related package to then deploy a Mobile Training Team for two to three weeks and deliver that training in that country to a reasonably-sized audience.

That is what we do in Kenya for example, and we reach a very large audience from across Africa. A number peacekeepers attend those Mobile Training Teams, as one example. Another example is Vietnam. You would have seen in my presentation. That training package was not just focused on peacekeeping. It was specifically about running a Role 2 hospital, and POTC had the lead in that, so we have actually been involved in many Mobile Training Teams like that. So the short answer is absolutely yes, there are opportunities for POTC to bring a Mobile Training Team to Japan.

One of the other things I would say is we are currently in conversation with countries like Malaysia and Fiji and Indonesia to provide a combined Mobile Training Team where Australia may have the lead to go to a particular country, and we have representatives from countries such as Malaysia, Fiji, Indonesia, and Japan all coming together to create a combined Mobile Training Team. This is akin or similar to some of the UN ITS Mobile Training Teams right now, so it is a very similar concept. We have not done that yet, but we are in conversation with other countries about conducting that and where we might take those Mobile Training Teams.

I mentioned in my presentation that we had a student on our latest pre-deployment course. The reason I am here, besides the invitation, is to invite Japan to send your officers to our courses, not just as students, but your instructors. We welcome your instructors to the ADF Peace Operations Training Centre. We would absolutely love to have an exchange where we send an instructor to your Peacekeeping Training and Research Center, and you reciprocate and send an instructor each year. That is absolutely possible. Thank you.

(Shinoda) Thank you very much indeed, Lieutenant Colonel Conroy.

Now, I would like to invite, Mr. Matsumura, your response to questions. Well, time is short unfortunately, but you are encouraged to speak slowly for the sake of the interpreters.

(Matsumura) Thank you for many questions to me. Well, I believe I have so many questions so I will categorize them into four groups.

First, more than ten years ago, peace operations have been part of the primary mission of Self-Defense Forces of Japan, but, as I said, it has not been effectively the real mission and it has not been accepted by the public at large. Why?

Second, the peace operations consideration has to be considered in Japan's national defense build-up program, as I said, but I think the defense capabilities should be used more and not only for peacekeeping operations, right? The question says.

Third, what kind of equipment should be considered for peacekeeping operations, maybe for



intelligence purposes?

Fourth, the constitutional constraints of Japan, and the PKO can be dangerous, so it is still rather difficult for Japan to participate fully in peacekeeping operations.

Well, let me try to answer. Peace operations have not been part of the primary mission in effect, only in theory, but, as I said in my presentation, the beginning of all this – this might sound negative, but Japan has searched for the way that the SDF could contribute as a part of an alibi, to show that Japan has been doing something. It is not a part of the overall strategy or the Japan Self-Defense Force Guidelines. As I said, in December last year, the national defense program guidelines were revised, and the creation of the desirable security environment, so there is the parts and portions of the defense document, in addition to the deterrents and also response to aggression to Japan. As a part of these three primary missions, the creation of the desirable security environment is the role of the Self-Defense Forces. It is not the role of the security establishment, but it is the role of the Self-Defense Forces according to the former document of the Japanese Government. So the security environment should be created first of all, and then try to deter and attempt to aggression on Japan, and then in a contingency, Japan should respond to aggression. So these are the three layers of the roles that the Self-Defense Forces should play in Japan.

For the creation of the desirable security environment, as I said, I think Japan play more for the formation of the norms of the international environment. Well, the government is discussing and sending troops to the Strait of Hormuz. Also, the surveillance in the ocean, the maritime space, space, cyber, the polar regions, and electromagnetic space; these are the areas that the Japan Self-Defense Forces should do, and also non-proliferation is another example. Ship-to-ship transfer of the contraband of North Korea. They are now monitored by the Self-Defense Forces. Also, the United Nations, the PKO capability needs to be improved in order to reduce the tension in the world and reduce the threat of terrorism and reduce the possibility of a generation of refugees. In this part of the world, Northeast Asia, the North Korean peninsula, and the Taiwan straits; there might be some conflicts in the future, and then the PKO capability acquired by the Self-Defense Forces should be and can be very useful. So in that way, the defense capability of the Self-Defense Forces should be and can be helpful for the creation of desirable security environment, and this has to be well-understood by the public at large through publicity and educational programs.

I used the word defense capability build-up. This might be misleading to some of you. Well, Japan's capability is being developed in order to respond to full-scale aggression on Japanese territories. This is the primary role, but when it comes to the budget, there is a two-digit difference in terms of the money. For responding to aggression, let us say we need 100% of the budget, then only a one-digit scale of the budget would be necessary for the peacekeeping operations or the operation and capabilities.

In Iraq for example, well, for the protection of the encampment, we installed a privately-produced security system and we used UAVs produced for private industry purposes for the security of the encampment. Also, our vehicles are equipped with GPS, a private civilian product, for real-time monitoring at the base, but after that, all of these equipment have been disregarded after the withdrawal from Iraq, instead of considering an improvement of ongoing bases for the future. So we could utilize the civilian products. That way we can save the budget as well. Then, what kind of equipment would

be necessary? One promising area is intelligence. It is critical for the protection of peacekeepers, and UAVs and satellites are utilized more fully in the military area for intelligence. So I think intelligence has very good potential.

Also for the protection of civilians, to separate civilians and hostile forces or to stave away hostile forces, I think temporary barriers could be established, or more tools to protect civilians, and also non-lethal tools to suppress temporarily, I say, hostile forces for the protection of civilians. I think that way we can prevent full-scale conflicts. That will be helpful for sustainable peace because full-scale conflicts between peacekeepers and local hostile forces would create a cycle of hate and grievances amongst local civilians, so non-lethal means would be more desirable in order to protect the civilians from hostile forces.

As I said, these products for civilian use; I do not mean that these civilian products should be purchased immediately for the provision to peacekeepers. We need to ensure the reliability and usefulness of these equipment through training. Before deployment of these equipment, there is of course nothing surprising, so we need full-scale testing of the equipment and the proficiency of using these equipment should be trained beforehand, instead of simply buying and giving out such equipment to the contingents. That is what the UK, Australia, the U.S., Japan, and the technologically-developed countries should do.

About the Constitution, Professor Shinoda has been making comments in various places. I think we should understand the Japanese Constitution within the framework of international law. Only after we do that, we can debate what we should be doing or how the PKO should be within the framework of the Constitution. So there are many things that we can do, even without amending the constitution, but dispatching personnel has a lot to do with ensuring the safety of the personnel, so we should ensure the safety of the personnel. That is all from me. Thank you.

(Shinoda) Thank you very much. Now, we would like to make a second round. This is going to be the second round of questions and answers, but this is going to be the last. You have two minutes. If you have something left unsaid or something you would like to add, please utilize this. Not just things that you prepared, but you can respond to other speakers' opinions or comments or anything that you feel like adding.

Colonel Wildish. Well, I asked you to wait a little while. It was in the presentation, but probably you can tell us your expectations to Japan and what Japan can do. You can respond to what you heard today and you have two minutes.

Also, we would like to ask Dr. Yamashita. You did not really talk about what Japan can do, but I am sure that you have many ideas, so within two minutes, if you can give us your idea, please tell us.

To Lieutenant Colonel Conroy and Mr. Matsumura, you have already talked about what you expect to Japan, so if you have anything else to add, we would like to welcome that.

Why do we not start with Colonel Wildish? Your last comment.

(Wildish) Thank you very much. Maybe just one final point that I would like to make before going on to what Japan may wish to do in the future to support UN peacekeeping. That point is referring

back to the complex environments that we now work in, particularly in Africa. It is worth saying that there is only one mission where we have any mandate to conduct counterterrorist operations. That is in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In all other missions, even the most dangerous ones, we rely on partners to conduct that mission to effectively target the armed groups which are causing so much problems in the country. So there is only one mission, as I said, which is the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and actually it is only a small area of that mission and that is restricted to what is called the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). So it is quite important to understand that that the UN generally does not have any mandate to conduct offensive operations against armed groups in a pre-emptive manner.

In terms of what Japan could do more in the future to support UN peacekeeping, I think there are three areas, all of which have been discussed to some extent already. The first is provision of specialist capabilities. I think particularly UAVs which have proved hugely successful in the time that we have used them on UN operations. Engineers is another one. Strategic airlift, another specialist capability. Also, medical, and one project which we have not mentioned today, I think which is being proposed by Japan, which is this telemedical where personnel or doctors in a mission have the ability to reach back to specialists in a country to assist them with cases. This has worked on high-intensity operations that NATO has conducted in the past, particularly in Afghanistan, and it saves lives, so I think that is an important area for assistance.

The second area again, which we have talked about already, is training and development of manuals I think is very important getting that doctrine right, but also sponsoring or hosting some of our UN courses. Assistance with that. I think other nations have done it. It has proved very successful.

Finally, maybe partnering with less developed militaries, both in terms of training, but also equipment support, because they may have the personnel and they may have the political mandate to be able to deploy on peacekeeping operations, but they may not have the expertise and they may not have the equipment, so that is another area perhaps that Japan could help.

Finally, I will just mention, in the Office of Military Affairs, we have, I said, 103 officers. We have got one Japanese officer at the moment, Lieutenant Colonel Arai, but my boss, Lieutenant-General Loitey, would always say that high-quality officers are always welcome to apply and he would encourage Japan to try and get more officers into the Office of Military Affairs.

The last officer that we had, which I think he is here today, Lieutenant Colonel Atsushi Tominaga. Is he here still somewhere? Yeah, so he is here. He had an excellent reputation in the Office of Military Affairs, so Japan has got a very good baseline and a high standard to match in the future, with Lieutenant Colonel Atsushi who did a great job in our military planning service. That is it. Once again, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today. Thank you.

(Shinoda) Thank you very much. Dr. Yamashita, on Japan.

(Yamashita) Well, the future direction of Japan. I basically agree with Mr. Matsumura and would like to add one thing to his observation.

Japan might need a sense of global geopolitics. What I mean by this is that Japan's geopolitical scope

appears to be extending from Northeast Asia towards the Indo-Pacific, but contemporary peacekeeping is very much centered in Africa, beyond the Indo-Pacific. If we can have a geopolitical compass, we can assess relations among actors and thereby consider what Japan should do in that context.

How can we start thinking toward that direction? How should we come up with the vision? I believe a good starting point might be by the sea. In thinking globally through seas Japan can develop a vision of global geopolitics. Although peacekeeping missions take place mostly on land rather than the sea, having such vision will produce an angle from which to consider Japan's peacekeeping posture. That is all from me. Thank you.

(Shinoda) Thank you very much. Now, Lieutenant Colonel Conroy, one last word.

(Conroy) Thank you very much. I do have some other observations or recommendations. Last night, I was very fortunate to have dinner with some of the members here today. One of the questions was, is there a possibility of Japan attending some of the bilateral exercises that Australia shares, such as the one with Thailand. I am literally flying to Bangkok this evening in order to participate in an initial planning conference for the next exercise in Thailand next year. My recommendation is that Japan takes part in both exercises, the exercise in Thailand and the exercise in Indonesia. These are both valuable exercises for skills and training for Japanese officers.

I would also recommend, if you do not already, participation in the GPOI Capstone Exercise, and continued participation in regional and global peacekeeping training associations. My experience in the last two years is these have been really good opportunities for networking, but really good opportunities for identifying other training opportunities and capacity-building opportunities as well, so continue to participate in those and engage with Australians at those forums.

Finally, I believe you have a very good English language training program already, and obviously if you continue that, that would enable more members to participate in peacekeeping operations. Thank you, sir.

(Shinoda) Thank you very much. Now, Mr. Matsumura, one last word please.

(Matsumura) Thank you very much for having me today. I am very happy. I learned a lot from Colonel Wildish and also from Lieutenant Colonel Conroy and also from Dr. Yamashita.

Particularly, the issues that the United Nations is facing is the protection of civilians, connecting to political solutions, and also sustainable peace contributions. I was able to identify that, but how to implement them? What I always say or what I feel strange when I talk with other people is that well, generally people have different viewpoints from me. That is on the international peace cooperation or those engaged in the United Nations PKO. Well, they are engaged in the current activities so they are focusing on what should be done in order to improve what they are implementing, but to improve something that they are doing or for example, to purchase some civilian products and just give it to the PKO, I do not think it is going to empower them immediately.

In the military community, in any military, there is research and development capability in any

country. It is not just equipment or assets, but what sort of strategies and operations that you should take. Actual strategy operation research, and then based on that, you develop the equipment, and then introduce that and try using that to see the effect. That capability is held by any military, but unfortunately and sadly that is lacking in peacekeeping operations by the UN because it would be difficult for them to own that. Then, how should we address that?

Japan, Europe, and Australia; those countries can contribute in this area by collaborating with each other, not just for the sake of the UN, but for peacekeeping operations as a whole. This doctrine would be necessary. For instance, joint research could be done by various countries to modernize the peacekeeping operations. So it is not just the present timeframe, but you have to look at future five years' time or ten years' time in terms of timeframe. That is what I thought.

(Shinoda) Thank you very much. Everybody has shared with us a lot of insights, even with the time constraint. I would like to appreciate their comments. Let me just summarize what I have heard by giving you one comment or two to close out this session.

There has been a lot of different topics picked up. Colonel Wildish, when I asked him to make some additional comments at the beginning of the discussion, the primacy of politics was mentioned. This was mentioned in the UN report, and many people quote this. Why is that? Because everybody agrees with that idea.

Why do you think you agree? Because the political situation is quite complicated and quite fluid. At the highest level, international politics as a whole has changed significantly, compared to 10 years ago or even compared to five years ago. Both scholars and practitioners are having a lot of discussions and you may not be able to say to the point what is really changing, but it is changing. Peacekeeping operations and other international peace operations are actually changing in their nature, and also it is forced to change. We could be at a loss, but we cannot, so what should we do in order to proceed looking ahead? First, you have to analyze what the political situation is currently. It may be just a given, but you cannot really emphasize the importance of that analysis. Everybody has accepted that and is trying very hard.

In this political analysis, in terms of very specific operational issues, there are several keywords that were mentioned. What Japan can do from that perspective? Including the expectation, if you pick up some keywords, well, it is very difficult, but intelligence or intelligence gathering. Well, this is not related to the constitution at all, so we could do more. In relation to that, conventional engineering experience can be made use of in order to expand defense equipment or in order to make more developments, for example, unmanned aerial vehicles or drones. Well, in the UN community, we call this UAV, but commercial products could be used. There were some people who would say that, but you may be able to use that, so you cannot just send personnel, but you can contribute in that way as well from Japan.

There are a lot of casualties increasing, so we could provide medical assistance. For example, we can provide helicopters to help medicine. Whether Japan can do something, because casualties are happening in the sites so it is not that easy, but is there any room for us to improve ourselves and our ingenuity? Those were the insights that were mentioned.



Currently, the peacekeeping operations by the UN are declining. On the other hand, sub-regional peacekeeping operations are increasing. As Dr. Yamashita said toward the end, you have to look at the total international political trends, and of course you need to come up with some suggestions for improvements, but if it is too far out into the future or too off the mark, that would be impossible, so you have to analyze the current status and then take actions. That has been important always, but it is going to be even more important. Even in the areas where there is less presence by the UN, the UN is focusing on prevention. So as the country of Japan, we could broaden our perspective to make contributions.

The EU, NATO, AU, or PIF; those regional organizations that have operations, Japan does not belong to any of those organizations. That is a major constraint for Japan, but taking advantage of partnerships, can we do more or better? Can we do more of what we can do? To that end, we have to look at primacy of politics and then make the right judgements by looking at the current status. That was my observation and I think we are running over the scheduled time so I would like to ask the Commandant to give us closing remarks. This concludes the panel discussion. Thank you.

## **Closing Address**

### **LTG KIYOTA Yasushi (Commandant, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense)**

At the closing of this 9th International Peace and Security Symposium, I would like to give you a few words. Thanks to the contribution of all members, we had a wonderful symposium today. I would like to thank Colonel Wildish, the Special Assistant to the Military Adviser of the Department of Peace Operations of the United Nations, who has made the keynote speech on his boss's behalf, and all the speakers. I would like to thank all of them. The keynote speech and the discussions today have given us a lot of insightful views and comments. As we engage in our activities at the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center, we have identified the issues that we have to focus our resources on as the Self-Defense Forces and the Ministry of Defense.

So with regard to the valuable comments that we received today, we would like to incorporate them into the training programs and research and development at our center and the Joint Staff College. I hope you in the audience can find something useful in your future activities as well.

On a more personal note, I have learned a lot and there are a lot of lessons that we were able to learn today, but as a member of the international community, we have to identify what we can do and what our strengths are, and in those areas, we have to engage in activities. That is important. For example, information, intelligence gathering, equipment, and medicine. So there are a lot of capabilities that we can provide, but how we can contribute is an issue. We would like to learn from what we have discussed today and incorporate them.

I would like to thank Colonel Wildish who has come all the way, and Lieutenant Colonel Conroy from Australia, and all the panel members, and all the participants in the audience for their attendance. Unfortunately he has not been able to make it, but Lieutenant-General Loitey, who was supposed to be here, I would like to thank him as well. I would like to ask for your kind cooperation and understanding to the Joint Staff College and the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center going forward. Thank you very much once again for your attendance.

