International Peace & Security Symposium 2018

"Trends in Modern PKO and Capacity-Building
Assistance of Peacekeepers
-Japan's contribution to PKO Capacity-Building
of Conflict-affected African states-"



Friday, November 30, 2018 Belle Salle Tokyo Nihonbashi, 5th Floor

Joint Staff College, MOD

(Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center)

The views expressed at the Symposium are those of the participants, and do not necessarily represent the views of their Organizations.

PROGRAM

13:05-13:10 (P.4)

OPENING ADDRESS: Vice Admiral Katsuto DEGUCHI
(Commandant, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense)

13:10-13:50 (P.5 – P.19)

KEYNOTE SPEECH: AVM Griffiths S. EVANS

(Commandant, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Ghana)

14:10-16:55 (P.20 – P.69)

PANEL DISCUSSION:

Moderator - Dr. Hideaki SHINODA

(Professor, Graduate School of Global Studies, Tokyo Univ.

- Panelists Ms. Sumie NAKAYA (Political Affairs Officer, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations)
 - LTC Shigeki MATSUI (Executive Officer, 4th Civil Engineer Group, JGSDF)
 - Mr. Scott A. WEIDIE (GPOI Program Manager, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, USA)
 - Mr. Shahedul A. KHAN (Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Public Administration, Bangladesh)
 - Dr. Emmanuel K. ANING (Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Ghana)
 - Ms. Tomoko MATSUZAWA (Peacekeeping Operations Trainer)

16:55-17:00 (P.70)

CLOSING ADDRESS: Vice Admiral Katsuto DEGUCHI
(Commandant, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense)

OPENING ADDRESS: Vice Admiral Katsuto DEGUCHI

(Commandant, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense)

Ladies and gentlemen, I am Katsuto Deguchi, Commandant of Joint Staff College of Ministry of Defense. On behalf of the organizer of the International Peace & Security Symposium 2018, I would like to make a few words. First of all I would like to join with all of you here to extend our deepest condolence to Mr. Kofi Annan former United Nations Secretary General who made an enormous contribution to improve world peace and security and passed away last August.

Today, we are happy to have Air Vice Marshal Griffiths Evans from Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Center established in Mr. Annan's home country Ghana under his name as our keynote speaker and Dr. Emmanuel Aning as one of the panelist. For the moderator of the panel discussion we have Dr. Hideaki Shinoda of University of Foreign Studies. For other panelists, according to the order of presentations, we have Ms. Sumie Nakaya of the United Nations, Lt. Col. Shigeki Matsui of the 4th Engineer Battalion of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. Mr. Scott Weidie of US Indo-Pacific Command. Mr. Shahedul Khan of the Police Staff College Bangladesh, and Ms. Tomoko Matsuzawa, a peacekeeping operations trainer. Being able to hold the symposium with such wonderful experts is a great joy for not just myself but also to all the faculty of the Joint Staff College. I am also grateful to all those who have come here today. Thank you very much.

This International Peace & Security Symposium which the Japan Peacekeeping and Training Center of the Joint Staff College organizes every year is an occasion in which not only the Ministry of Defense and Japan's Self-Defense Post members come but also bureaucrats, people from private sector and academics get together to talk about the current state and issues of the activities pertaining to international peace and security and on the future directions. Here we share insight and deep mutual understanding and connected to quality international contributions. Currently, 80% of the United Nations peacekeeping operations are conducted in Africa, making Africa the main venue for the United Nations peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, in recent United Nations peacekeeping operations, we see a wide gap between the capacities that are expected to the PKO members and the actual capacities on the ground. This has become a major problem and the international communities are required to provide assistance in order to raise their level of peacekeeping operators.


We have set the theme of the symposium this year 'Trends in Modern PKO and Capacity-Building Assistance of Peacekeepers: Japan's Contribution to PKO Capacity-Building in Conflict-Affected African States.' To discuss the contributions Japan is expected to make in supporting the capacity-building of the PKO. We asked the experts from both inside and outside of Japan to discuss and give advice from their own perspectives. The outcome of the symposium will be utilized as an asset for education and research activities of the Japan Peacekeeping and Training Center of the Joint Staff College and it is also special to be shared with related organizations in and out of Japan.

Today, for the audience we not only have colleagues from the Ministry of Defense but also military attachés from embassies in Tokyo. The heads of international organizations that have offices in Japan from the cabinet office the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, universities, and other educational organizations as well as NGOs. I hope you all find today's lectures and discussion informative to your work and research in addressing the changing United Nations peacekeeping operations and Japan's efforts.

I would like to close my remark by once again thanking all of you who are here today, November 30, 2018. Thank you very much.

KEYNOTE SPEECH: AVM Griffiths S. EVANS

(Commandant, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Ghana)





INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Professor Shinoda; director Mr. Iwai, Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation headquarters; deputy director Mr. Kano, Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation headquarters; Deputy Director General Mr. Kiya, African Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Members of the Japanese Cabinet, Commandants of the Japanese Joint Staff College, and Kondo of the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center, Your Excellencies, fellow panelists, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon.

It is a great honor to be invited to this important annual International Peace and Security Symposium and to deliver the keynote address reflecting the theme 'Trends in Modern Peacekeeping Operations and Capacity-Building Assistance of Peacekeepers: Japan's Contribution to PKO Capacity-Building of Conflict-Affected African States.' I bring fraternal greetings from the people of Ghana, the Executive Committee, as well as the staff of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center.

Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, before I proceed to the substantive topic for this symposium, let me first and foremost indicate that a discussion on peacekeeping operations and the related capacity building in Africa is important and topical at any given time. This is because of the existing conflict situations on the continent and the need to deploy and sustain UN and AU peacekeeping presence to restore peace and stability in the conflict affected countries. Such discussion is even much more important given the financial support Japan has been giving to African countries over the past years and particularly the sustained capacity-building assistance to the existing peacekeeping training institutions including the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center of which I am the commandant.



THE AIM OF THIS PRESENTATION IS TO HIGHLIGHT JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO PKO CAPACITY-BUILDING OF CONFLICTAFFECTED AFRICAN STATES.

At this juncture, let me pay a special tribute to the government of Japan for the continued assistance to the KAIPTC in research, training, and capacity-building in the areas of Border Security Management, small arms and light weapons, peacekeeping, terrorism among many others. The current project on 'Improving the Response Capacities to Terrorism in Peacekeeping Theaters in Africa,' which is being implemented by KAIPTC and the UNDP is financially supported by the government of Japan. Your Excellencies, it is interesting to note that the preliminary findings from the field research relative to the ongoing Japanese-funded KAIPTC-UNDP project reflects the theme of this symposium, making it relevant in the current peacekeeping context.



SCOPE

- AFRICA'S CHANGING SECURITY LANDSCAPE
- CURRENT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DYNAMICS IN AFRICA
- CAPACITY BUILDING CHALLENGES
- CAPACITY GAPS
- JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO PEACEKEEPING AND CAPACITY BUILDING ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA
- JAPAN'S SUPPORT TO KAIPTC
- NEW RESEARCH AND CAPACITY-BUILDING AREAS REQUIRING JAPANESE ASSISTANCE

In this regard, my address will highlight the following key thematic areas. Africa's changing security landscape, current peacekeeping operations and dynamics in Africa, capacity-building challenges, Japan's contribution. First capacity gaps and then Japan's contribution to peacekeeping and capacity-building assistance in Africa, Japan's support to KAIPTC, and new research in capacity-building areas requiring Japanese assistance.



- CHANGING NATURE OF SECURITY LANDSCAPE FROM INTER STATE TO INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS
- CONVERGENCE OF STATE ACTORS, REBEL GROUPS, ARMS MERCHANTS AND CRIMINAL GROUPS IN EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES A DOMINANT FEATURE OF NEW CONFLICTS
- CONFLICT BETWEEN FARMERS AND HERDERS DRIVEN BY EXCLUSION AND DISPOSSESSION
- TENSIONS THAT UNDERPIN CONFLICTS DRIVEN BY POPULATION GROWTH AND URBAN EXPANSIONS
- MOST IMPORTANT IS THE RISE OF INEQUALITIES

Let us now look at the African's changing security landscape. Mr. Chair, there is no doubt that Africa's security landscape has changed dramatically over the past two decades and will continue to change taking different forms and different dimensions. From interstate conflicts during the adversarial decades of the Cold War to intrastate conflicts beginning from the 1990s, the continent of Africa is currently witnessing the emergence of multiple but complex hybrid threats.

The increasing convergence of state actors, rebel groups, arms merchants, and criminal groups in the exploitation of natural resources is a dominant feature of the new conflicts. Natural resources are being exploited either to fuel or sustain wars and conflicts. Examples include the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. There are also conflicts between farmers and herders driven by narratives of exclusion, victimhood, and dispossession.

However, the tensions that underpin and create the tensions and conflicts listed above are increasingly driven by population growth and unplanned urban expansions leading to challenges for law enforcement amongst others. Most important is the rise of inequalities between rich and poor landless farmers, between rich ranchers and poor cattle owners. These changes have led to a considerable competition for the scarce resources of land, including water. Corporate interests and activities in Africa have also contributed to exploitation, conflict and poverty for ordinary people while enriching African and foreign elites.

AFRICA'S CHANGING SECURITY LANDSCAPE (CONT)



AFRICA'S CHANGING SECURITY LANDSCAPE (CONT)

- AFRICAN CONFLICTS CHARACTERIZED BY NON-STATE ACTORS STRUGGLING FOR POWER AND CONTROL OF THE
- WEAK STATE STRUCTURES AND WEAK ENFORCEMENT CAPACITIES HAVE ENABLED THE PROLIFERATION OF SALW AND ARMED GROUPS
- SALW UNDERLINES THE INTRACTABILITY OF MOST CONFLICTS WITH 79% OF SMALL ARMS IN CIVILIAN HANDS
- RECENT CONFLICTS IN AFRICA ARE NOT LIMITED TO GEOGRAPHIC SPACE
- MERCENARIES AND WAR CONTRACTORS INVOLVED IN CROSS BORDER ATTACKS (EG 2011 IVORIAN CRISIS)

African conflicts are characterized by the increasing participation of non-state actors struggling for power and control of the states. Weak state structures and weak enforcement capacities have also enabled the proliferation of armed conflicts, small arms and ammunitions which fuel and exacerbate even low-intensity conflicts. arms and light weapons have been found to underline the intractability of many conflicts in the region, with an estimated 79% of small arms in the hands of civilians in Africa. Small arms have arguably been the weapons of choice for all the eight currently active conflicts on the African continent.

Recent conflicts in Africa are not limited by geographic space, no never. They transcend borders and rapidly escalate to neighboring countries, accompanied by increasing civilian casualties. Additionally, mercenaries and rebels have been found to participate in wars across borders, acting as war merchants and war contractors in the region. For instance, during the 2011 Ivorian crisis, mercenaries from Liberia were said to have crossed over to attack several villagers in Cote d'Ivoire.

AFRICA'S CHANGING SECURITY LANDSCAPE (CONT)



• THE DYNAMICS COMBINE WITH OTHER THREATS TO PRODUCE A COMPLEX SECURITY DILEMMA







AFRICA'S CHANGING SECURITY NAMED TO SECURITY NAM LANDSCAPE (CONT)

- THE DYNAMICS COMBINE WITH OTHER THREATS TO PRODUCE A COMPLEX SECURITY DILEMMA.
- NEW THREATS INCLUDE:
 - DRUG TRAFFICKING
 - HUMAN TRAFFICKING
 - PIRACY
 - MONEY LAUNDERING
 - PANDEMICS (EBOLA)
 - YOUTH BULGE
 - YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT
 - VIOLENT EXTREMISM
 - THREAT OF TERRORISM

The above dynamics in conflicts combine with two other contemporary threats to produce an explosive cocktail of complex security dilemmas that require equally, if not more, differentiated response measures. Among others, the new threats include, drug trafficking, human trafficking, piracy, money laundering, health pandemics such as Ebola, youth bulge and youth unemployment, radicalization, violent extremism and increasing threats of terrorism.

AFRICA'S CHANGING SECURITY (S) KAIPTO LANDSCAPE (CONT)

- MUTATION OF EXTREMIST GROUPS INTO TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS A MAJOR CONCERN NOT ONLY FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS BUT ALSO INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS.
- KEY TERRORIST GROUPS OPERATING IN AFRICA INCLUDE:



AFRICA'S CHANGING SECURITY KAIPTO LANDSCAPE (CONT)

- MUTATION OF EXTREMIST GROUPS INTO TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS A MAJOR CONCERN NOT ONLY FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS BUT ALSO INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS
- KEY TERRORIST GROUPS OPERATING IN AFRICA INCLUDES:
 - AL-SHABAAB
 - AL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB
 - BOKO HARAM
 - GROUPS OPERATE BOTH INDEPENDENTLY AND AS A NETWORK
 - POSING A CHALLENGE TO THE RESILIENCE OF REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURES

Let me indicate that, the continued mutation of extremist groups into terrorist networks and the complexities of their manifestations are a major concern for national governments but also for the international and regional organizations such as the United Nations, African Union, and Economic Community of West African States, the ECOWAS. Key among the terrorist groups operating in Africa includes Al-Shabaab in East Africa, Al-Queda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North and West Africa and Boko Haram in North Eastern Nigeria within the West African sub-region.

AFRICA'S CHANGING SECURITY RAIPTC LANDSCAPE (CONT)

- AL-SHABAB'S PERSISTENT ASYMMETRIC ATTACKS AGAINST AMISOM
- AQIM, ANSAR DINE AND MUJAO ATTACKS ON PEACEKEEPERS IN MALI (MINUSMA)
- UN MISSIONS IN SOUTH SUDAN, DR CONGO AND CAR ALSO NOT IMMUNE TO ASYMMETRIC ATTACKS ON PEACEKEEPERS
- THESE DEVELOPMENTS RAISES QUESTIONS ON HOW UN APPROACHES THREAT OF TERRORISM AND THE CAPACITY NEEDED TO PROTECT PEACEKEEPERS

Mr. Chair, these groups continue to operate both independently and as a network, posing enormous challenge to the resilience of regional and global security architectures. For instance, while Al-Shabaab has carried out persistent asymmetric attacks against African Union Mission in Somalia, the AMISOM, AQIM continues to undermine the territorial integrity of states within the Sahel. Together with the other extremist groups such as Ansar Dine and Movement for the Unity in Jihad in West Africa, the MUJAO, hither to democratic Mali has now become epicenter of instability with multiple extremist and terrorist groups targeting the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali otherwise known the MINUSMA, and killing peacekeepers especially in Gao, Timbuktu, and Mopti. The missions in South Sudan, Congo DRC, and Central African Republic are also not immune from the asymmetric attacks as peacekeepers are increasingly being targeted. These developments are worrying and raise questions about how United Nations approaches the threat of terrorism and what capacity is needed for peacekeepers to be safe and secure in the difficult mission environment. While the issue of capacity will be addressed much later in this presentation, let me now turn my attention to the dynamics of peacekeeping operations in Africa.

CURRENT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DYNAMICS IN AFRICA

- ALTHOUGH IDEA OF PEACEKEEPING NOT ORIGINALLY IN UN CHARTER
- REMAINS AN IMPORTANT TOOL MANAGING CONFLICTS AROUND THE GLOBE
- PEACEKEEPING TRANSFORMED FROM TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING TO PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
- THESE TRANSFORMATIONS TRACEABLE TO THE REALITIES OF THE POST-COLD WAR DYNAMICS MARKED BY INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS
- THESE CONFLICTS CALLED INTO QUESTION TRADITIONAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PEACEKEEPING

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Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, to understand the current dynamics of peacekeeping operations in Africa, it is important to trace and situates the discourse within the broader global context. Although the idea of peacekeeping was not originally articulated in the UN Charter, it remains an important tool for managing conflicts and restoring stability in war torn countries across the globe and from the first deployment of peacekeepers to the Middle East in 1948, to the Congo crisis in the 1960s, peacekeeping has increasingly been transformed from the traditional peacekeeping in which military observers were deployed to peace support operations and to complex multidimensional peace support operations, where military, police, and civilian actors play diverse roles to achieve mission objectives. These transformations are traceable to the realities of post-Cold War dynamics which was marked by intrastate conflicts as exemplified by conflicts in Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, and Rwanda. These conflicts called into question the traditional conceptualization of peacekeeping which mostly involved observational tasks by the military and the police. Since the new thinking for multidimensional peacekeeping operations came to the fore, there has been the need for a shift in the direction of multidimensionality.

CURRENT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DYNAMICS IN AFRICA (CONT)

- THE THINKING OF MULTI-DIMENSIONAL PEACEKEEPING CALLS FOR A SHIFT IN THE DIRECTION OF MULTI-DIMENSIONALITY
- TWO CRITICAL EVENTS:
 - THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN AND US TROOPS FROM SOMALIA IN 1993
 - APPARENT LACK OF UN INTEREST IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE
- FROM THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE, AU PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO PROTECT POPULATIONS EVEN WHEN 'THERE'S NO PEACE TO KEEP'

Thus, with respect to the current peacekeeping dynamics in Africa, it is important to highlight two critical incidents. The first was the withdrawal of United Nations and United States from the Somali conflict after the killing of 18 US soldiers in October 1993. The second was the apparent lack of UN interests in the Rwandan genocide, which resulted in the death of 800,000 people. As a consequence of the Rwandan incident in particular, the African Union Peace and Security Architecture emphasized the need to intervene to protect populations even when "there is no peace to keep" a doctrine commonly referred to as the transition from noninterference to non-indifference, as espoused in Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act of 2000.

CURRENT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DYNAMICS IN AFRICA (CONT)

- THIS DOCTRINE IS REFERRED TO AS THE TRANSITION 'NON-INTERFERENCE TO NON-INDIFFERENCE' (ARTICLE 4 OF AU CONSTITUTIVE ACT 2000)
- PEACEKEEPERS REQUIRED TO ASSUME DIFFICULT TASKS IN THE FIELD DUE TO CHANGING DYNAMICS OF WARFARE
- CURRENTLY THE AFRICAN CONTINENT ACCOUNTS FOR HALF OF 14 UN MISSIONS WORLD WIDE
- MONUSCO THE LARGEST AND COSTLIEST MISSION AT \$1.1 BILLION PER ANNUM
- MINUSMA THE DEADLIEST UN MISSION WITH 168 FATALITIES AND 493 INJURED AS AT JUNE 2018

Beyond the African Union, it has become apparent that peacekeepers are increasingly required to assume difficult and often unanticipated tasks in the field due to the changing dynamics of warfare. Currently, the African continent accounts for half of the 14 UN peacekeeping operations in the world. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) is the largest and costliest UN peacekeeping mission, operating on a budget of about \$1.1 billion per year. Mali has undoubtedly become the deadliest active UN mission in the world, accounting for highly conservative estimates of about 168 fatalities and 493 injuries as at June 2018. These fancy descriptions have not come by accident. One factor that is common to these missions is the veritable threats confronting peacekeepers in these conflict theaters.

CURRENT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DYNAMICS IN AFRICA (CONT)

- ONE COMMON FACTOR IS THE THREAT CONFRONTING PEACEKEEPERS
- INSPITE OF THESE THREATS, RESPONSE MECHANISMS HAVE HAPHAZARD AT BEST
- A UN HIGH LEVEL REPORT (2015) ADMITTED 'CHANGES IN CONFLICT OUTPACING UN PEACE OPERATIONS TO RESPOND'
- FIRSTLY, UN PEACE OPERATIONS ARE SLOW TO ADAPT TO NEW CIRCUMSTANCES
- SECONDLY, DESPITE THE ASYMMETRICAL LANDSCAPE, PEACEKEEPING TRAINING REMAINS 'STANDARDIZED'
- THERE IS THE NEED TO RE-EXAMINE THE CAPACITY NEEDS OF PEACEKEEPERS TO MAKE THEM RESPONSIVE TO THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND

Notwithstanding these increasingly mutating threats, response mechanisms have been haphazard at best if not flawed. The UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations admitted in 2015 report that "changes in conflict may be outpacing the ability of UN peace operations to respond." Several reasons account for this situation. Firstly, UN peace operations are slow to adapt to new circumstances and hence struggle to achieve their objectives. Essentially, peacekeepers are unable to deliver what is being demanded of UN peace operations. Secondly, despite the asymmetrical security landscape and increasing casualties in places like Central African Republic and Mali, peacekeeping training has remained standardized or unchanged for many years. In other words, there is urgent need to reexamine the capacity needs of peacekeepers to make them responsive to the situation on the ground.

CAPACITY-BUILDING CHALLENGES KAIPTC

- CAPACITY BUILDING A MAJOR PRE-REQUISITE FOR EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS
- APART FROM UN APPROVED CPTM AND STM UN ALSO ORGANIZES INDUCTION AND REFRESHER TRAININGS TO PREPARE PEACEKEEPERS
- NONETHELESS CAPACITY OF PEACEKEEPERS TO RESPOND TO THREATS REMAINS A CHALLENGE ESPECIALLY IN MINUSMA (MALI), MINUSCA (CAR) AND MONUSCO (DR CONGO)
- HOWEVER APART FROM THE TRADITIONAL TRANSNATIONAL THREATS, VIOLENT EXTREMIST AND TERRORIST GROUPS CONTINUE TO CHALLENGE THE RESPONSE CAPACITIES OF PEACEKEEPERS

Let us briefly look at the capacity-building challenges that we have in Africa. Capacity-building is a major prerequisite for efficient and effective peacekeeping operations. As such, apart from the UN-approved Core Pre-Deployment Training Manual and Specialized Training Manual, the STM, used to prepare personnel before deployment, the UN also organizes induction and other refresher training programs to enhance the capacity of peacekeepers and other peace operation officers in the conflict theaters. Nonetheless, capacity of peacekeepers to respond to the dynamic and ever changing threats remains a challenge in the various mission environments such as MINUSMA in Mali. MINUSCA in the Central African Republic, and MONUSCO in Congo DR.

CAPACITY-BUILDING CHALLENGES KAIPTC (CONT)

- WHILE ASYMMETRIC NATURE OF THE THREAT PART OF THE CHALLENGE, THE CURRENT UN PEACE OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK DOES NOT ALLOW TROOPS TO ENGAGE IN COUNTER-TERRORISM
- AS A RESULT WHEREAS SOME TCC/PCC PROVIDE VARIOUS STRANDS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM TRAINING FOR THEIR CONTINGENTS OTHERS DO NOT DEEM IT CRUCIAL PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT
- IN MINUSMA, A KAIPTC RECENT STUDY SHOWED A CLEAR CAPACITY GAP AS ONE OF THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF INCREASING PEACEKEEPER CASUALTIES

Mr. Chairman, what is worrying is the fact that apart from the traditional transnational organized crimes such as drug and human trafficking that exist in such environments, the ever mutating nature of violent extremists and terrorist groups continue to challenge the efficacy and response capacities of peacekeepers. Indeed, while the asymmetric nature of the threats is part of the challenge, it is important to highlight the fact that the current UN peace operations framework does not allow peacekeepers to engage in counter terrorism. As a result, whereas some troop and police contributing countries provide various strands of counter terrorism training for their contingents, others do not deem it crucial prior to the deployment.

CAPACITY-BUILDING CHALLENGES KAIPTC (CONT)

- THE STUDY IDENTIFIED WEAKNESSES WITH REGARDS TO SEARCH AND DETECTION OF MINES AND IEDS AND WEAK INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
- ACCORDING TO THE JOINT MISSION ANALYSIS CENTRE (JMAC) OF MINUSMA HQ, IEDs AND SUICIDE-BORNE VEHICLES (SVB) ATTACKS CONSTITUTE ABOUT 75% OF PEACEKEEPER CASUALTIES IN MALI
- OTHER FORMS OF ATTACKS INCLUDE MORTAR AND ROCKETS
- AS A RESULT THE UN HAS DESCRIBED THE MALI MISSION AS THE DEADLIEST WITH 200 PEACEKEEPERS KILLED BETWEEN 2013 TO 2018

Let me indicate that in the case of MINUSMA in Mali where a team of KAIPTC researches recently undertook a study, the findings show a clear capacity gap as one of the underlying causes of increasing peacekeeper's causalities. In terms of specifics, the study identified weaknesses with regards to search and detection of mine and IEDs, limited knowledge about the country context, and weak intelligence gathering. According to the Joint Mission Analysis Center at MINUSMA headquarters, IEDs and Suicide Vehicle-Borne attacks constitute about 75% of peacekeepers casualties in Mali. Other forms of attacks are mortar, rockets, which are basically used to rush the troops, killing many peacekeepers in Kidal, southern part of Mopti and Timbuktu. As a consequence, the UN has described the Mali mission as the deadliest, resulting in the death of nearly 200 peacekeepers between 2013 and 2018.

CAPABILITY GAP













- LIMITED CAPABILITIES IN TERMS OF EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS EXPOSES PEACEKEEPERS TO ATTACKS
- INADEQUATE INVESTMENT BY AFRICAN TCCs HAS HAD DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR PEACEKEEPERS
- MOST COUNTRIES USE PICK-UPS TRUCKS FOR QUICK INTERVENTION FORCES (QIFs) INSTEAD USING TANKS AND ARMOURED VEHICLES
- AN EXAMPLE IS WHEN IN 2012 IN UNMISS (SOUTH SUDAN)
 JANJAWEED MILITANTS AMBUSHED NIGERIAN
 PEACEKEEPERS WITH ANTI-AIRCRAFT WHEREAS
 PEACEKEEPERS WERE ALLOWED ONLY TO DEPLOY WITH AK47 RIFLES

Limited capability in terms of equipment and logistics is another challenge that exposes African police and troop-contributing countries to multiple and complex attacks, especially when convoys are used in patrols during peacekeeping. The UN policy on Contingents Own Equipment allows TCCs to bring in their equipment. However, inadequate investment by African TCCs to buy standard equipment over the years has repeatedly had disastrous consequences on the ground for most peacekeepers. Countries for instance sign up to Quick Intervention Forces and instead of bringing tanks and armored vehicles for patrols some countries rather bring inadequate vehicles and physically expose their troops to danger especially when they hit an IED or are met with hostile fire on patrols. For instance, one experience recounted in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) in 2012 stated that the Janjaweed militants ambushed Nigerian peacekeepers with anti-aircraft weapons whereas the peacekeepers were only allowed to bring in AK 47s by the host nation Sudan. In such confrontations the casualty list becomes skewed towards the peacekeepers.

CAPABILITY GAP (CONT)



- IN MALI, OPERATION BARKHANE (MULTI-NATIONAL COUNTER-INSURGENCY MISSION) WITH STANDARD LOGISTICS HAS RECORDED FEWER CASUALTIES THAN AFRICAN TROOPS
- THE STATISTICS SHOW THAT WITH THE RIGHT RESOURCES CASUALTY LEVELS CAN BE REDUCED

Your Excellencies, with reference to Mali, permit me to draw example between Operation Barkhane and African contingents. Indeed, while Operation Barkhane operating in the same area with standard logistics has had fewer casualties, most African troops suffer many casualties whenever there was terror, IED and other explosive attacks. Between 2013 and 2018, the casualty level among African troops were high (Chad 53, Burkina Faso 28, Niger 23, Togo 19, Guinea 15) compared to Sweden, Germany, and Netherland which had 0, 2, and 5 respectively. These varying statistics clearly show that with the right attitude to deploy standard logistics and resources the casualty levels can greatly be reduced.

JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO KAIPTO PEACEKEEPING AND CAPACITY BUILDING ASSISTANCE

- JAPAN'S COMMITMENT TO AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT, PEACE AND SECURITY IS REFLECTED IN THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT (TICAD)
- IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERLINE THE DIRECT PARTICIPATION OF JAPAN IN COUNTER-PIRACY OPERATION IN THE GULF OF ADEN AND THE SELF DEFENSE FORCES PARTICIPATION IN SOUTH SUDAN
- JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT REFLECTS GROWING REPUTATION IN AFRICA
- JAPAN HAS ALSO BEEN PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTERS ACROSS AFRICA TO IMPROVE THE CAPACITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF AFRICAN PEACEKEEPERS

Let us look at Japan's contributions to peacekeeping and capacity-building assistance. Japan's longstanding commitment to human security including African development, peace and security is reflected in the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), which is aimed at promoting multilateral cooperation and partnership with Africa. For the record, it is important to underline the direct participation of Japan in an international counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden, the subsequent build-up of its first overseas military base in Djibouti, and the Self-Defense Force's participation in a UN mission in South Sudan between 2012 and May 2017. This increased security contribution has been driven by a need to react to various events including the increase in terrorist attacks and piracy in Africa in order to assure investors to continue to invest in that continent. Indeed, Japan's contribution to infrastructure development in Africa during crisis periods such as was done in South Sudan, reflects on its growing reputation in Africa as a genuine human centered actor in peacekeeping theaters.

JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO KAIPTO PEACEKEEPING AND CAPACITY BUILDING ASSISTANCE (CONT)

- JAPAN CURRENTLY SUPPORTS NINE (9) PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTERS IN AFRICA
- JAPAN'S CUMULATIVE SUPPORT TO PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTERS AMOUNTS TO \$46M
- THE IMPACT OF JAPAN'S SUPPORT TO THESE CENTERS REFLECTS IN THEIR ABILITY TO DELIVER TRAINING COURSES
- JAPAN'S SUPPORT TO THE KAIPTC CONSTITUTES A SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT TO THE ENTIRE CONTINENT
- IT IS ALSO NOTED WITH A SIGH OF RELIEF JAPAN'S INTENTION TO CONTINUE WITH ITS EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE TO THE PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTERS

Additionally, and based on Japan's recognition that capacity building is essential in implementing effective peacekeeping operations, Japan has been providing assistance to peacekeeping training centers throughout Africa for the promotion of the capacity of African countries to respond to conflicts generally, but also, to enhance their effectiveness in peacekeeping. In that regard, Japan currently supports nine such peacekeeping training centers in Africa and these are the Cairo Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding in Africa (CCCPA) in Egypt, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana, the International Peace Support

Training Center in Kenya, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia-Peace support Training Center in Ethiopia; National Defense College and Martin Luther Agwai International Leadership Center both in Nigeria. Others include Rwanda Peace Academy, South Africa National Peace Mediation Center, Ecole de la Maintien de la Paix, Mali; and the center in Benin. Between 2008 and 2017, Japan's cumulative support to peacekeeping training centers in Africa amounted to \$46 million.

The impact of Japan's support to these centers reflects in their ability to deliver training courses on such themes as disaster management, counter terrorism, and extremist radicalization and peacekeeping. In a little while, I will stress on Japan's support to the KAIPTC which in actual fact, constitutes significant support to the entire African continent particularly West Africa by virtue of the distribution of the audience that access the training courses offered at the KAIPTC. That said, we know with a sigh of relief that Japan intends to continue with its effective assistance to these peacekeeping training centers, including the dispatch of resource persons to support the delivery of the activities that Japan supports on the continent.

JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO PEACEKEEPING AND CAPACITY BUILDING ASSISTANCE (CONT)

- WORTH STRESSING THAT JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO PEACEKEEPING NOT ONLY LIMITED TO TROOP DEPLOYMENT AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT
- SINCE 2015, JAPAN HAS TRAINING AFRICAN PERSONNEL IN THE TRIANGULAR PARTNERSHIP PROJECT FOR AFRICAN RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF ENGINEERING CAPABILITIES (ARDEC)

Your Excellencies, it is worth stressing that Japan's contribution to peacekeeping is not only limited to sending troops to peacekeeping missions and offering technical supports. It is also important to note that since 2015, Japan has been offering training for personnel from Africa, in the Triangular Partnership Project for African Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities, for operational maintenance of heavy equipment.

JAPANESE SUPPORT TO KAIPTC

- SINCE 2004, JAPAN THROUGH UNDP HAS SUPPORTED THE KAIPTC
- BETWEEN 2012-2017 -\$3.87M
- INCLUDED \$2M FOR SAHEL PROJECT AFTER ARAB SPRING
- THIS PROJECT TRAINED OVER 700 PERSONNEL
- ANOTHER \$700,000 PROJECT FOR LIBERIA IN 2016
- CURRENTLY
 JAPAN
 ASSISTING KAIPTC TO EXPLORE
 HOW 9 AFRICAN TCC/PCCs CAN
 ENHANCE CAPACITIES
- BETWEEN 2008-2010 S3M FACILITY FOR A 3 YR PROGRAMME ON SALW
- ABOUT 300 PERSONNEL TRAINED



Let us briefly look at the Japanese approach to my center, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center. Since 2008, Japan through its global partnership framework with the United Nations Development Program has supported the KAIPTC through a number of projects and training interventions meant to reduce armed violence in West Africa through research, policy engagements and training. Between 2012 and 2017, the cumulative support to the KAIPTC through the UNDP framework amounted to \$3.87 million. This assistance included \$2 million for an extensive project in the Sahel after the Arab Spring in Libya. The Sahel Project trained over 700 personnel in five broad areas. Small arms and light weapons proliferation in the Sahel; collaborative policing, security sector governance, maritime piracy and transnational organized crime and border security management in Mali; Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, and Burkina Faso.

Additionally, the above-mentioned assistance included \$700,000 project that targeted Liberia in 2016 where the KAIPTC developed a senior command course package for the Liberian National Police. The package included modules on elections management and gender at a time that the country was preparing to organize the last general elections in October 2017. Currently, through the assistance from Japan, the KAIPTC is exploring with nine leading African police and troops contributing countries the best options for enhancing the capacity of African peacekeepers to respond to effectively to terror attacks during peacekeeping operations. In that regard, the center is working with these countries to provide a guide that would be used to enhance terrorism prevention during peacekeeping.

Earlier on between 2008 and 2010, Japan provided a total of \$3 million facility to enable the center commence a 3-year regional training program on small arms and light weapons. About 300 personnel were trained under this initiative. Indeed, monitoring and evaluation reports done so far on the various projects indicates a profound appreciation by the various security agencies on the capacity building training given so far especially as it has resulted in great improvements in their job.

POSSIBLE NEW AREAS FOR SAIPTC JAPANESE SUPPORT AND ENGAGEMENT

- ONE KEY AREA IS ADVANCED POLICY AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH INTO EXTREMISM
- STUDY WILL INFORM THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERVENTIONS
- ANOTHER AREA IS THE MENACE OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIMES
- IN MALI TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIMES IDENTIFIED AS KEY SOURCE OF SUSTENANCE FOR TERRORIST GROUPS
- A STUDY ON STATE RESPONSE CAPACITIES CRUCIAL IN CRAFTING MULTILATERAL INTERVENTIONS TO ADDRESS ORGANISED CRIME
- CRISIS IN SAHEL HAS WEAKENED AN ALREADY POROUS BORDER SECURITY

POSSIBLE NEW AREAS FOR A KAIPTC JAPANESE SUPPORT AND ENGAGEMENT (CONT)

- KEY IDENTIFIED WEAKNESSES REQUIRE JAPANESE ENGAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN AREAS OF INFORMATION GATHERING AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING
- AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF EXCHANGING INTELLIGENCE ON HUMAN AND MATERIAL FLOWS WOULD CURTAIL THE EASE WITH WHICH ILLICIT NETWORKS CIRCUMVENT BORDER CONTROLS
- ANOTHER CATEGORY OF ACTORS THAT REQUIRE ATTENTION IS PROVINCIAL SECURITY PROVIDERS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
- THESE FRONTLINE ACTORS REQUIRE CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO SPECIFIC THREATS
- A SUSTAINED INTERVENTION COULD HELP MINIMIZE THE ESCALATION OF ISSUES

Finally, let us look at the possible new areas for Japanese supports and engagement. One key issue area where Japanese engagements would be crucial is in supporting advanced policy and empirical research into the menace of extremism especially in West Africa. With its far reaching consequences and often inseparable connections to terrorism, more efforts should be made to understand and appreciate how extremism combines with existing conflicts fault lines to impact society. Such study will inform the design and development of grounded capacity-building interventions for affected communities and agencies to prevent its manifestations.

Another issue that often underlines most of the security threats in Africa is the menace of transnational organized crimes (TOC). Oiling the wheels of conflicts and occupying ungoverned spaces across the Sahel, Gulf of Guinea and Mano River enclaves, transnational organized crimes present a potent threat to state and regional stability. In Mali for instance, TOCs have been identified as key sources of sustenance for terrorist groups, who exploit the porousness of borders to propagate their illicit activities. Interestingly, while a lot is said about the menace, not much is known about its dynamics and impact on peace and security. In this regard, a study on state response capacities would be crucial in crafting multilateral cross border interventions to address the problem of organized crimes.

Mr. Chair, while I acknowledge the contribution of Japan to improving border security management in West Africa, I must also emphasize the need for continued support to reinforce existing capacities of border agents and border communities to respond to related security threats. The crisis in the Sahel has drastically weakened an already porous border security over the years, allowing terrorists to exploit such weakness to perpetrate attacks within countries and across borders. The key identified weakness in effective border security that would require Japanese engagement and technical assistance are in the areas of information gathering and intelligence sharing among border security agencies, as well as improving community policing in border areas. While national borders cannot be completely immune to unlawful circumvention as has been demonstrated in many parts of the world an effective system for exchanging intelligence on human and material inflows and outflows, as well as engaging border communities would significantly curtail the ease with which illicit networks circumvent existing border controls.

Last but not the least, another category of actors that require attention is group of provincial security providers in local government arrangements in countries across the sub-region. The experience of the KAIPTC in Liberia as already mentioned shows that these are the frontline actors that require capacity to respond to specific threats

that are not of a national nature as quickly and effectively as possible. A sustained intervention in this regard could help minimize escalation of issues to levels of conflicts around the continent.





CONCLUSION



I would like to end by expressing my profound appreciation to the government of Japan for the years of demonstrated commitment to African peace, security and development as reflected vividly in the technical and financial assistance that enables very important interventions to be channeled towards research and capacity building off state and non-state actors. These have enabled the KAIPTC to stay engaged with governments, civil society actors, regional and sub-regional structures and the United Nations on matters that are essential to human security. I thank you for your attention.

PANEL DISCUSSION

Moderator: Dr. Hideaki Shinoda

(Professor, Graduate School of Global Studies, Tokyo University of Foreign Studdies)

(Dr. Shinoda) Thank you very much. I am Shinoda from the University of Foreign Studies. Today, we have wonderful panelist members, and I am assuming a great responsibility. I am very much looking forward to the panel discussion.

We have six panelists seated, but first of all, we will have four of them to take about 15 minutes to make a presentation. After that, Dr. Aning and Ms. Matsuzawa will join as commentators, and probably before break or after the break, they can give us comments. That will be the procedure. Already at the keynote speech, Vice Admiral Evans talked about the situation regarding the peacekeeping operations. In a very tough situation and environment, there are training centers, and they are playing a very important role. The political support by other countries is very important in concentrating a very intellectual asset to the training centers. We were able really to find that out through the keynote speech.

The Japanese government as well for more than 10 years, has been providing support to the training centers in Africa. This is for Japan a very important activity. Also, from the diplomatic policy of Japan, this is a very valuable intellectual property I believe. That is my belief, and I believe this is shared by many other people. Today, on this very important issue, we would like to tell this from various angles with your comments, with your insights and deepen our discussion.

We have such a wonderful members of panelists, so why do not we start with the presentations. Our first speaker is Ms. Nakaya. According to the order written in the program, we will have four presenters. Let us start with Nakaya-san, please. For her background, I think it is already written on the hand-out, so I am not going to spend time. I am just going to call out the name. Please refer to the programs if you need to know the background in detail. Everyone has such experience, and Ms. Nakaya also has rich experience in United Nations. Ms. Nakaya, the stage is yours.

Panelist: Ms. Sumie Nakaya

(Political Affairs Officer, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations)

(Ms. Nakaya) Good afternoon, I am Nakaya. Nice to see you. I am going to speak in English.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak today. I am from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations where I have covered Sudan, South Sudan, in addition to crisis management, mission planning and so forth for other missions. Today, based on the keynote speech, I would like to situate the peacekeeping capacity building in a wider context of conflict resolution, particularly pertaining to Africa and emerging challenges, opportunities that the Japan should and can capitalize on.




First, just let me go through the current framework of UN Support for Peace and Security in Africa. Institutionally, the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission hold regular discussions as decision-making bodies to discuss issues of mutual concern and oversee joint operations such as the mission in Darfur, and also UN support for AU peacekeeping efforts such as in Somalia. Operationally, the UN and African regional bodies support each other in the area of peacemaking, peacekeeping, including conflict prevention, mediation, support for national dialog, and peacekeeping operations.

Today's topic, the peacekeeping capacity building is part of this wider peace and security architecture. Currently, as keynote speaker mentioned, the most active peacekeeping missions in Africa, and the most dangerous ones, and in the Central African Republic, Mali and Sahel, Somalia and so forth. To support these African contingents in these missions, the Secretariat has provided or supported pre-deployment or in-mission training, particularly on issues related to the mandate, protection of civilians, human rights, and gender and so forth.

In New York, the Secretariat, where I work, has also worked with donor countries such as the US and Canada and also peace troop and police contributing countries, the representative of those countries are here today with us to identify the needs and shortfalls of the contingents deployed to peacekeeping environments and identify the areas that require external support, particularly with regard to equipment and other capabilities. We also have engaged AU and other African regional bodies to increase capacity for a conflict assessment, mission planning, management and overall conflict resolution.

TRENDS IN MODERN PKOS

- > No peace to keep
- Ambitious agendas (e.g., protection of civilians, conducive conditions for peace negotiations, security restoration amid extremist tactics) without necessary resources
- > Asymmetric attacks
- Division of labor between African stabilization forces and UN peace operations
 - AU Mission in Somalia (with UN logistic support)
 - Intervention Brigade/UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
 - Regional Protection Force/UN Mission in South Sudan
 - Group of Five/UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali



However, despite these ongoing efforts, as emphasized in the keynote speech, the gaps between the evolving conflict dynamics and the capacities of these missions on the ground have never been greater. The standard treatment for conflict resolution since the end of the Cold War, as mentioned in the keynote speech, has been three-fold: 1) is to support the mediation to arrive at a peace agreement; 2) to deploy peacekeeping missions to implement the peace agreement; and 3) to protect civilians caught in the warfare.


Now it is often said that peacekeepers are deployed without peace to keep. From the Central African Republic to Mali to South Sudan, the peacekeeping missions are established while negotiations for peace agreements still continue. The function here is that deploying peacekeeping mission on the ground would help restore stability on the ground and therefore, it creates conditions conducive for dialog. However, this remains a theory. The evidence shows that the linkage between mediation and peacekeeping has been modest if not weak.

Parties to conflict do not compromise at negotiating table because peacekeepers on the ground are protecting civilians. There are two different dynamics. Even when there is a national peace agreement, usually, it remains contested in other parts of the country like Eastern Congo or Northern Central Mali. These dynamics particularly involves non-state armed groups that are not part of the political process. Therefore, the fighting continues and different groups emerge, realign, and break off on a range of issues, including local disputes, as mentioned in the keynote speech, over the control of land and other aspects like trafficking routes.


In this context, the peacekeepers are increasingly tasked with ambitious agendas in the midst of insecurity. They are asked to conduct long-range patrols in very difficult terrains. You have seen some photos, the deserts, with no roads and so forth without sufficient capabilities including air and ground protection assets. Peacekeepers now face the threats of asymmetrical attacks. The graph shows an overall increase in attacks against peacekeepers.

The UN, unfortunately, does not have answers to these emerging dynamics, except to say that peacekeeping is not equipped to tackle terrorism, to emphasize the primacy of political solution to resolve the conflict, and to task peacekeepers to address, both national and local conflicts. As a result, what has emerged is the division of labor between UN missions and stabilization tasks carried out by African troops. Examples include the UN support

for AMISOM operations against Al Shabab, the Intervention Brigade, alongside the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Regional Protection Force in South Sudan.



These changes in peacekeeping environments are the symptoms of larger evolving conflict dynamics, to which African peacekeepers are exposed on the frontline. First, the data show that the nature of conflict is shifting from insurgency to political and criminal violence. On this map, the orange line is the political violence or criminal violence, including riots and crackdowns on demonstrations. The blue is the battlefields. The blue is the armed conflict between two parties that we think of but already one-third of all conflicts in Africa derive from political violence. In this hybrid conflict, different actors with different agendas and different geo-political focus are involved. The way in which conflict manifests in Juba or Bangui or Tripoli are different from dynamics in other parts of the country. Gao and Kidal in Mali, or Aleppo and suburbs of Damascus, have different conflict narratives and different sets of actors and different level of extremist influence in each location.



One more data. Of particular note in this regard is the rise of militias, especially the pro-government militias to whom the regimes have often subcontracted counter-insurgency operations, and they are now the main perpetrators of violence against civilians. We peacekeepers face main threats from these militias, but their status or role in the political process such as disarmaments, the electoral reforms, or security sector reform remains unaddressed. The focus remains on the government and opposition forces.

On the side of the opposition forces, their fragmentation is another main feature of the current armed conflict. The distinction between rebels, clan-based militias, criminal networks, extremist elements has blurred, and the national political divide is fused with local tensions. As mentioned in the keynote speech, transnational terrorist networks do not appear overnight. They are fused with local dynamics, local tensions, marrying into communities and families on the ground, and they appear decades later as one of the main challenges of today's peacekeepers.

TRENDS IN AFRICA'S PKOS 3. Urban fragility • Wars in cities (e.g., Bangui, Juba) • neighborhood-based mobilization • Population growth and density • Income and infrastructure gap (horizontal inequality) • Connectivity 4. Local-national-global nexus • Mali/Sahel • Eastern DRC

Looking to the future, we can already see the growing trends of urban fragility, which is exacerbated by population growth and density. As the map shows, the latest data and research point to hotspots as "mega cities" along the coastlines, this is where people, assets, goods, services, and also extremists and criminal elements tend to gather. These cities are also vulnerable to natural and man-made disasters, and therefore vulnerable to violent, political and criminal violence, and mobilization.

CAPACITY-BUILDING TO WHAT END? Emerging needs and opportunities Challenges · Integrated governance approach for · Gaps between the evolving nature of violence management (linking to wider conflict and conventional peacekeeping risk reduction strategies) tools · Location-specific intervention and · Deployment issues that remain local ownership (data-driven focus on unresolved (readiness, equipment, etc) hotspots and community outreach and · Engagement of non-state armed groups monitoring) outside the political process (e.g., · Use of technology for protection counter-terrorism) purposes

Against this background that evolves as we speak, we need to revisit the issue of peacekeeping and capacitybuilding support. The conventional peacekeeping missions, as emphasized in keynote speech, are still based on national peace agreement which, more often than not, does not end local tensions, does not disarm militias, and does not respond to political and criminal violence. On top of that, in this current climate, the peacekeeping itself is on decline. The current Secretary-General has initiated UN-wide reforms to focus on prevention and development and that reflects the mood. In the meantime, the deployment challenges, that again emphasized in keynote speech, remain, the gaps between the UN standards and equipment and other capabilities of the troop and police-contributing countries and so forth. It takes years to deploy a mission on the ground.

Therefore, the starting point for discussing peacekeeping capacity-building may not be peacekeeping, per se, but what is it that you are trying to achieve and resolve. Is it counter-terrorism, is it resolution of conflict, and if so, how and with whom? Peacekeeping is a tool, not an end.

The emergence of extreme elements has taken the center stage of peace and security discussion these days. Although a mandate related to counter-terrorism is still an exception than a rule in peacekeeping terms, questions pertaining to the engagement of non-state armed groups pose a fundamental challenge to the UN and its conflict resolution framework that we know. In the context, by the time I go back to New York, there would not be Department of Peacekeeping Operations anymore. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Special Protocol Missions would merge. The UN is in search of a new framework.

So far, the capacity-building associated with non-state armed groups has been dominated by the law enforcement approach like the counter-terrorism and border security. However, if we were to accept data and research that transnational extremist or criminal elements are fused with local tensions or local, political and economic divisions, then we may consider needs and opportunities for developing capacities from different perspectives. For instance, integrated governance approach for violence management, such as combining law enforcement with infrastructure development which has been tested in some cities like Medellin, Colombia, for instance, may offer some examples that we might want to look at. Building capacities to carry out wider risk reduction strategies or initiatives could reduce vulnerabilities in the new hotspots, and thereby preventing the escalation of violence. This is somewhat a departure from the conventional peacekeeping capacity building discussions, but might be worth exploring further.

Because the conflict environments have become diverse and multi-layered, our response also has to adapt. If today's conflicts are no longer driven from local insurgency but political and economic violence in urban settings, our capacity-building and its focus should also shift from infantry-based heavy footprint model and associated engineering and other logistical requirements to security from the lens of urban planning and governance. Or if today's conflicts are fueled by instant technological connections, then we should also consider technological solutions, such as the use of high-tech visual equipment for protection purposes, like perimeter defense of large camps for internally displaced persons.

If you widen the conversation a little further, Japan has a lot to offer, especially in the context of emerging conflicts. I look forward to discussing further with you during the Q&A. Thank you.


(Dr. Shinoda) Ms. Nakaya, thank you very much for your presentation explaining to us the very difficult situation concerning the peacekeeping operations with very easy-to-understand manner. We were able to grasp the overall picture of DPKO, it started working and that will be developed into DPO. She has been working at the final one-month period of that organization before it is to be renamed. The United Nation itself has been working to improve its own capacity, whereas exploring ways to support other member nations to improve their own capacities.

I would like to invite the next speaker, Lieutenant Colonel Shigeki Matsui. As was said already, Japan has been involved in various support activities including the one providing the support to peacekeeping operation, the training centers, as well as sending out the Japanese instructors. Lieutenant Colonel Matsui is going to focus upon ARDEC project.


Panelist: LTC Shigeki Matsui

(Executive Officer, 4th Civil Engineer Group, JGSDF)

(LTC Matsui) Thank you very much. My name is Shigeki Matsui, Lieutenant Colonel, Executive Officer of the 4th Engineer Group of the Ground Self-Defense Force. Please allow me to make my presentation in Japanese. I am going to outline the Current Status and Challenges of ARDEC.



These are the four points that I am going to cover today.




Let me give you the outline of ARDEC in deploying PKO missions. It is important to have the engineering capacities in order to build the necessary infrastructures such as encampment and roads. However, oftentimes, there is a severe shortage of equipment and manpower who are skilled to operate them.


Prime Minister Abe expressed Japan's willingness to support the early deployment of peacekeeping operations at the first PKO Summit in September 2014 and the Government of Japan provided the expenses to United Nations to start this project, ¥3.83 billion. This is the United Nations' first triangular partnership program between Japan and the recipient African countries, as well as the United Nations and the United Nations' headquarters. This has received a very high reputation.

Summany	 Training of book operation and maintenance of equipment of International Peace Support Center located in Nakobi Trial training in FY2015 and Full-scale training (30 participants of east African army engineers each year) since FY2016 							
区分	Trial training		The first training		The second training	The third training	g	The fourth training
Fiscal year	FY2015		FY20		016	FY2017		
Season	Sep.7 to Oct.16		Jun8 to Jul29		Aug 22 to Oct 14	May29 to Jul 21		Jul. 24 to Sep.15
Period	6weeks		8weeks					An observation
Assigned unit	ESch (Al Japan)		2EGp(lizuka)/WA		4EGp (Zama) / EA	9EGp (Ogoori) / WA		5EGp (Takada) / EA
Instructors	Major Okazaki 11 SDF officers		tines: Major Tamaki. 17 SDF Officers (3) Landon for PKO secretarial		Lt Col Tamaki 17 SDF officers 1 civilan	Major Hamada 17 SDF officers (X)1 celler from PHD secretaria		Lt. Col Ota 17 SDF officers # (3) Louise # dos PKO recester
Trainees	10 31		31 M	è	29	30	ê	31
	Kenya(3),Uganda(3), Rwanda(2),Tanzania(2)		Ken		a Tareania			Tanzania(21),Burundi(4 Kenya(3),Uganda(3)
Equipment	Dozer :X1	13	Dozer ×2		13 13		Vari	participant countries
	Bucket loader ×1	100	Bucket loader X2		No No	ar they can	Ugar Ugar	
	Hydraulic excavator ×1		Hydraulic excavator ×2		12 12	Reand	di.	er-rox Nerodal
	Grader ×1 do		Grader ×2		60 to 60 to	Burundi		THERE
		_	Roller × 1			1	10016	(Dec es Sa


We provided training sessions to teach the basic operation and the maintenance of the heavy equipment at the Humanitarian Peace Support School at the International Peace Support Center in Nairobi, Kenya. A trial started in 2015, and full-scale training started in 2016, and every time, we trained 13 engineers from East African countries. So far, up to last year, we educated 130 engineers in Africa.




Up to last fiscal year, we have identified this as future directions in which to go. First, we will have elementary or basic and intermediate course. In the basic course, three easier equipment will be used. At the intermediate level, more difficult two heavy equipment will be taught for higher skills.



I am going to give you the snapshot or the outline of this fiscal year's training which was the fifth round. We had two training sessions for 12 weeks each, and I was responsible for the first one. That was 13-week period from 26th of May until 29th August at the Humanitarian Peace Support School at Kenya's International Peace Support Training Center in Nairobi. We had the trainees from three countries, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria.




This shows the schedule we had, both at the elementary and the intermediate courses. We had introductory courses for familiarization and the training period to improve the operational level and completion level. This is the finish-up stage. We took a phase-by-phase or step-by-step approach. Every week we checked the proficiency of the trainees so that additional teaching was given if necessary.



This is the profile of our students. They are from Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria. These engineers are in 20s and late 40s and average age was 36.7 years old. They included lieutenant and private first classes. We had one woman engineer as well.

Educational Consideration								
Leafters Education	Proporation	Implemented rehearsal of lecture education and practical education with interpreters and improved them before the beginning of education so that the trainees could better understand. Arranged detailed meetings with lecture instructors to ensure a smooth transition from lecture to practical stage.						
	I sel countation	Conducted examinations in local languages through interpreters for trainees who are not good at reading and writing English. As an alternative education in rainy weather etc., conducted mini tests to prepare for an exam.						
Practical education	Preparation	Carried out maintenance on a devastated training ground within one week after arrival to make it ready for training. Assigned one instructor, one interpreter and four trainees to one equipment and established a system to manage trainees skill individually.						
	I up I new et affice.	Implemented supplementary training for a trainee who does not reach the target or who wants to learn more after class everyday. Implemented maintenance and expansion of training grounds for 1 hour after class for 2 months.						

These are the points that we particularly paid attention to, particularly in the practical and hands-on courses. We managed the proficiency of trainees on individual basis and we gave additional teaching of one hour every day. We also had maintenance of the training ground every day for smooth training programs.



This is the flow of our training. At the bottom, as you can see, at the basic course, the engineers handled this three equipment and at the intermediate courses, they operated these two types. For each of these different types of equipment, we took about one week and we operated all of them on a rotation basis. Each teacher taught four trainees at each group and eight people in total two groups so that proficiency levels of the trainees were understood and followed by teachers on an individual basis.



These are some of the photographs that we took during the 5th training sessions. At first, we explained the structures and functions of equipment, and then we taught preliminary inspections. At left bottom, we taught the outline of the operations and particular considerations that they pay attention to. Then the students were given the equipment for hands-on sessions with advice from instructors.




If they got familiarized to some degree, as you can see here, they are now taught how to give the signals to the equipment from outside. We employed local interpreters. On the finish-up stage, we examined whether they acquired necessary skills before we conducted examinations.



This shows the photographs that we took at the intermediate courses and examinations. We started as we did in the elementary course. For each of the stages, we evaluated the proficiency of the students together with them.

Training Snapshots Intermediate course operational exam(Excavator) Intermediate course operational exam(Grader) Trailer loading operation Road repair work(Grader)

Then a test was given to them, and after the exam or test, we also taught them how to load and unload the equipment from the trailers. We actually repaired the road within the Humanitarian Peace Support School.



Before I conclude, I would like to discuss the outcome and challenges for the future. These are the achievements that we have obtained as a result of this training course. First, we were able to develop the engineers to acquire basic procedures for infrastructure development and now they were able to maintain and build necessary encampments and roads for PKO missions.

Secondly, we also provided educational materials to the engineers. That included the lesson plans, the materials we actually educated as well as master plans and charts that explains the relationship between each different places so that they can use back home. Based on their experience they were able to teach their colleagues and their country members to develop the capacity further on.


Challenges

- O Maintaining the acquired capability to operate heavy equipment
 - → Continuous training required to maintain skills
 - → Some countries lack heavy equipment needed for continuous training
- O Received request for operational training using cranes and forklifts
 - → Requested on the questionnaire at time of training completion
 - → Possible if we can extend training period and obtain funds to buy equipment

These are challenges that we identified. During the training sessions, we were able to give them necessary skills and knowledge, so this was fine.

For the future, as you can see at the bottom, on the completion of the courses, we conducted questionnaire surveys. Some wanted to learn how to operate cranes and forklifts. I think that training would be possible with necessary financial resources and time.

More importantly, I think that the first challenge is important because some of the trainees said that when they back home, they would not be able to have opportunities to operate this equipment. Even though they acquired skills during the courses, their skills would be lost if they do not have opportunities to use the equipment back home. They need to have opportunities to continue using this equipment.



30 NOV 2018 LTC MATSUI,4th Engineer Group, JGSDF

This concludes my presentation about the current status of ARDEC and their challenges. Starting tomorrow, I am going to move to the Ground Self-Defense Forces Engineering School. For further information, please contact the Engineering School of the Ground Self-Defense Force. Thank you.

(Dr. Shinoda) Lieutenant Colonel Matsui, thank you very much for very succinct presentation of ARDEC.

Next presentation is from Mr. Weidie. Obviously in the US, they are providing capacity building support to African countries and other countries for over 10 years. The program that has been conducted is called GPOI, Global Peace Operations Initiative, which has been positioned as one of the most important programs by the government. Mr. Weidie is going to explain about this.

Panelist: Mr. Scott A. Weidie

(GPOI Manager at J37, HQ INDOPACOM, USA)

(Weidie) Thank you very much. Vice Admiral Deguchi, Colonel Kondo, thank you for the invitation to participate in this very worthwhile symposium. Director, Iwai; Deputy Director, Kano, from the Secretariat of International Peace Cooperation Headquarters; and Deputy Director, Kiya from the African Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Air Vice Marshall, Evans; Dr. Shinoda, thank you for the introduction; fellow panelists; distinguished guests; ladies and gentlemen. Peacekeeping capacity building is a very important subject. It is very broad and one that can involve a great deal of details in many aspects of the topic. Given the short amount of time to address the subject, I will definitely get on with the remarks and undertake a scoping of the topic to address some key points and share thoughts on options for capacity building for the future. These views are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Government, the U.S. Department of Defense, or U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.



My presentation will provide an overview of the topic of capacity building, share some information on US Government efforts through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, and provide some options on how nations and organizations can plan and conduct peacekeeping capacity building efforts.



- > What is the need?
 - Peacekeeping operations capacity building (PKOCB) (i.e., information specific to peacekeeping; information in UN Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTMs) and Specialized Training Materials (STMs); mission-specific information, etc.) or
 - · Non-peacekeeping specific (i.e., basic military skills applicable to any mission or operations)
 - Training, equipping and institutional learning capability
- > Who needs assistance?
 - African Troop Contributing Countries / Police Contributing Countries (TCCs / PCCs)
 - Other TCCs / PCCs supporting missions in Africa
 - . The conflict affected nation


UNICLASSIFIED 3

We must make some quick distinctions when asking what is the need? And who needs the assistance? Peacekeeping Operations Capacity Building, or PKOCB, are efforts that are focused on peacekeeping-specific needs such as providing training in the UN Core Pre-deployment Training Materials and the specialized training materials. Examples of such topics are: basic principles of peacekeeping, guidelines and policies of peacekeeping, and crosscutting themes and priorities such as conduct and discipline, sexual exploitation and abuse, the protection of civilians, human rights, gender mainstreaming, conflict-related sexual violence, child protection, and environmental protection. These peacekeeping materials can be found on the UN Peacekeeping Resource Hub. This, however, is not an all-inclusive list. For example, mission-specific information also falls into this category.

Non-peacekeeping specific capacity building focuses on basic skills and tasks that peacekeepers must perform such as communications and signaling, intelligence and information sharing, navigation and transportation, weapons handling, sustainment and protection. It is essentially staff officer skills, basic soldier skills, and general unit task performance which is required in any mission.

Finally, the needs are usually addressed though efforts (1) to improve or deliver better training, (2) to provide equipment in the form of either training equipment or deployment equipment, and (3) in building the institutional capacity of a troop or police-contributing country to meet the needs themselves more effectively.

When addressing the question of who needs assistance in conflict-affected African states, there are really three options: the African troop and police-contributing countries, other nations that are providing troops and police contributions to African missions, and the conflict-affected state itself.





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- > Challenges for the recipient
 - · Broad governmental and security institutional shortfalls
 - Budget
 - · Educational capability / capacity
 - · Human resources planning and management
 - Logistics and sustainment
 - Leadership challenges
 - · Political will
- > Challenges for the capacity builder
 - Pure peacekeeping focused efforts or broader strategic / national interests
 - · Policy and statutory issues / authorities
 - · Properly assessing institutional capability and capacity of the recipient
 - · Assessing one's own capability and capacity subject matter expertise

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After addressing the general topic of needs, those involved in capacity building must address the challenges in order to better plan and ensure a much better chance of achieving efficiency and success. There are challenges for the recipient as well as for the provider.

Some of the more challenging issues are those faced by many developing nations with under-developed governmental institutions. When focusing on providing capacity building to foreign security forces, major institutional challenges include: insufficient budgets for proper training and equipping, under-developed training programs, planning and management challenges in the areas of recruitment, induction training, career planning and management, inadequate logistics and sustainment and so on. Often the leadership is not fully aware of all the challenges and there is often a lack of political will to address these and many more challenges.

For the capacity builder, trying to determine what to do and how can be a significant challenge. Examples include, determining whether to focus purely on the need or whether to target efforts in a more strategic manner, such as providing support to nations where donors have national interests that are very important. There is a balance required, but to do this effectively, it requires addressing all the factors. Another key factor is the absorptive capacity of the nation to which assistance is being considered. Can this country actually benefit or is the level of effort so great that focusing on one area like peacekeeping will fall short due to broader institutional challenges. Finally, effective capacity building requires the right tools and that often requires a high degree of subject matter expertise. Subject matter expertise is a function of a significant degree of education and knowledge and training, as well as the requisite amount of practical experience.



- Needs assessment and cooperative plan development
 - Transparency
 - Subject Matter Expertise
- > Basic military skills requirements
 - Language skills
 - Staff officer skills (military planning; writing and preparing briefs, papers, etc.; presentation skills, etc.)
 - Basic soldier skills (weapons handling; communications; navigation; transportation; maintenance and repair, etc.)
- Requirements gaps
 - · UN policies, guidelines, procedures, manuals, etc.
 - "Current and Emerging Uniformed Capability Requirements for United Nations Peacekeeping" (published by UN DPKO on a quarterly basis); as of September 2018
 - · Training and capacity building activities
 - Mission specific gaps
 - · General capability gaps

UNICLASSIFIED 5

When trying to identify what type of capacity building to undertake, a broad assessment should be done with the partner nation and a plan should be developed together to ensure it addresses all the necessary perspectives. This assessment and plan development requires two essential components: a complete degree of transparency where there is an honest, realistic, and accurate assessment that can be made of existing capabilities and capability gaps, capacity shortfalls in the various capabilities, and accurate assessment of the resources required and available from both the recipient and the donor. All assessments require a range of subject matter experts in required functional areas. Without transparency and expertise, the probability of developing an accurate assessment diminishes greatly and efforts will likely be inefficient and ineffective. An assessment must be done to first identify any shortfalls in basic military, non-peacekeeping-specific skills.

Finally, when it comes to addressing UN requirements, all efforts should be guided by UN standards in the areas of policy, standards, procedures, and the like. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations publishes a document called, the "Current and Emerging Uniformed Capability Requirements for United Nations Peacekeeping" on a quarterly basis. Without getting into the specifics, these requirements are broken down into the areas of (1) training and capacity building, (2) mission-specific gaps, and (3) general capability gaps.



This slide has some information on efforts under the United States Global Peace Operations Initiative. I can sum it up by saying that GPOI is the most significant peacekeeping capacity building program in the world and we are currently engaged in PKO capacity building efforts in 53 nations around the world. The main focus, since inception of the program, is on building the institutional capacity of nations to train themselves. GPOI has a very systematic approach to strengthening the training capacity of partner nations, and it starts with an assessment that helps inform the design and planning of a cooperative strategy. Finally, GPOI has very rigorous metrics and evaluation effort to assess the efficiency and effectiveness not only of GPOI efforts but the necessary efforts of the partner nation.



- Equipment
 - · Appropriate training equipment and aids
 - Deployment equipment
- Genderintegration

UNCLASSIFIED

I have mentioned the need to conduct an assessment of capabilities and capacities in order to develop capacity building plans. On this slide, I simply wanted to provide you with an overview of some of the main items that we examine in our program. The ability to train, the learning environment, and the equipment have always been major components of our assessments. Recently, we have added a need to look at the integration of women as gender mainstreaming is recognized as such a vital component of peacekeeping and peace building efforts.



- > Determining priorities
 - · International request for assistance serves as starting point
 - Assistance requests for new capabilities only considered for pledges registered in the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS)
 - Requests are weighed against U.S. national security priorities; current GPOI capacity building priorities;

Tier 1	Support for MINUSMA and AMISOM TCCs
Tier 2	Support for TCCs to other UN missions in Africa (MINUSCA, MONUSCO, UNMISS, UNAMID, UNISFA)
Tier 3	Support for current TCCs to other UN missions; Support for future TCCs, especially those willing to deploy high demand enablers

- UN-produced Current and Emerging Uniformed Capability Requirements for UN Peacekeeping further informs prioritization
- Consideration is given to the availability of other resources (country's national resources, other donor contributions, etc.)

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My last slide on GPOI simply addresses the fact that we have had to develop a method by which we prioritize our efforts. There are many needs and we simply cannot address every need. Early in the program, our priorities were more focused on institutional capacity building. As we have achieved a good degree of success in this area, we have evolved our priorities to also look at in-mission requirements, particularly focusing on operational readiness and mission performance.







9

> Focus on:

- Weighing capacity building efforts versus systemic challenges of TCCs / PCCs
- · Basic military skills shortfalls
- . PKO-specific capacity building by PKO SMEs
- African TCCs / PCCs
- . Non-African TCCs/ PCCs in African missions
- Conflict-affected nations
- > Strategic partnerships in capacity building

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Finally, there are a number of options for Japan to consider in the area of peacekeeping capacity building, and I have listed a few. Since this is a much more involved conversation, the examination of efforts would benefit greatly through consultations with others also involved in PKO capacity building. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the GPOI Program implementers would welcome the opportunity to have more in-depth discussions with the Government of Japan, with officials from the Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs, and the Self-Defense Force planners investigating future PKO capacity building efforts. Subject to your questions, that is all I have.

(Dr. Shinoda) Thank you very much, Mr. Weidie. A major country like the U.S. for long years has been involved in capacity building and he has concisely presented the program, and there was also a message for Japan towards the end which we appreciate.

Mr. Khan is the next presenter. As you can see in your paper, Mr. Khan is now Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Public Administration of Bangladesh, but as explained, before assuming this post, he was the Deputy Director of Public Staff College, Bangladesh, and he also he is an experience in UNMIS in PKO. And also he teaches at the Police Staff College. He has a lot of experience of education, and so probably he will speak from that experience and also from the perspective of police sector.

Panelist: Mr. Shahedul A. Khan (Additional Superintendent of Police, Bangladesh)

(Mr. Khan) Mr. Chairman, respected Commandant of Japan Staff College, respected Air Vice Marshall Evans, and distinguished participants, good afternoon. I am really delighted to have this opportunity to be here. My presentation is on Capacity Building of Peacekeepers In Africa from the Viewpoint of Bangladesh Police. How Bangladesh police has one of the largest troops-contributing country can contribute further in peacekeeping in African missions.



Before I go into detail, I would like to give an overall about Bangladesh's peacekeeping venture over the last few decades. Bangladesh is the second biggest contributor of military and police in the UN peacekeeping missions. Bangladesh started participating in the UN peacekeeping mission by sending 15 peacekeepers to Iraq to join the United Nations Iraq-Iran Observation Group in 1988. Bangladesh police, on the contrary, started its journey in peacekeeping in 1989 by participating in the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia. The performance of Bangladesh in UN peacekeeping created a lasting impression to the UN. As such Bangladesh is regularly receiving requests for participating in almost all the UN Peacekeeping Missions. We have our troops, police officers in almost all the peacekeeping missions nowadays. As of December 2017, there were 7,246 Bangladeshi troops and police personnel in 10 missions around the world.

4 The Argument ...

- Although Bangladesh has been an active participant in peacekeeping missions, her engagement at the policy level, alike many other top troops contributing countries, has been surprisingly limited. Often countries engaged in peacekeeping policies, including Japan, are not fully aware of the strength of the troops contributing countries.
- However, there remains critical need to assess the capacities of the troops contributing countries to explore the possibilities of peacekeeping mandate. Therefore, I argue, if the UN policy making countries are 'A' and the troops contributing countries are 'B' and the country in conflict is 'C'; there has to be a transparent understanding of 'B''s strengths to successfully implement peacekeeping mandate to sustain peace in 'C'.



In my presentation, I would like to have an argument that although Bangladesh has been an active participant in peacekeeping mission, her engagement at the policy level, like many other top troops-contributing countries, has been surprisingly limited. Often countries engaged in peacekeeping policies including Japan are not fully aware of the strengths of the troops-contributing countries but I fully believe that that is very, very important. However, there remains critical need to assess the capacities of the troops contributing countries to fully explore the possibilities of peacekeeping mandate. Therefore, I argue, if the UN policy making countries are 'A' and the troops-contributing countries are 'B' and the country in conflict is 'C', there has to be a transparent understanding of 'B's strengths to successfully implement peacekeeping mandate to sustain peace in 'C'. That is the basic argument of my presentation.



- Following are the four (4) focal areas where future peacekeeping in Africa can facilitate from Bangladesh's experience:
 - □ 1. Refugee protection
 - □ 2. Counter terrorism
 - \square 3. Community policing &
 - □ 4. Women police




From Bangladesh's point of view, I have identified four areas where Bangladesh can truly contribute in future African peacekeeping missions: 1) in refugee protection, 2) in counterterrorism, 3) in community policing, and 4) in terms of empowering women in women policing.

+ 1. Refugee Protection

- The August 2017's unprecedented influx of Rohingya refugees in the south-eastern district of Bangladesh, Cox's Bazar, has been one of the most critical refugee challenges in Bangladesh's recent history. The issue raised global concern and Bangladesh was forced to provide shelter to nearly 800,000 refugees who fled from Myanmar when a military crackdown in Myanmar forced many of the Muslim minority to cross the border into Bangladesh and seek shelter in crowded camps.
- To protect the refugee population, police was immediately mobilized along with the military and the Border Guard of Bangladesh (BGB). The camps located in remote areas (i.e., Kutupalong, Lada) were secured by police deployment and constantly monitored by a complex chain of command system. A triangular security network was established with the engagement of the civil administration and the local communities
- (shown in figure 'A').



We all know that the August 2017's unprecedented influx of Rohingya refugees, or I should say Rohingya population in the southeastern district of Bangladesh, Cox's Bazar, has been one of the most critical refugee challenges in Bangladesh's recent history. The issue raised global concern and Bangladesh was forced to provide shelter to nearly 800,000 refugees who fled from Myanmar when a military crackdown in Myanmar forced many of the Muslim minority to cross the border into Bangladesh and seek shelter in crowded camps in Bangladesh. To protect the refugee population, the police was immediately mobilized along with the military and the Border Guard of Bangladesh (BGB). The camps located in remote areas, for example, in Kutupalong and Lada, were secured by police deployment and constantly monitored by a complex chain of command system. A triangular security network was established with the engagement of the civil administration and the local communities, I repeat the civil administration and the local communities.





Now if you look at the diagram -I will try to make as simple as possible, in the diagram you can see that you have the police, military, the border guard, and the community with the coordination of the civil administration.

4 Continued ...

- Although initially Bangladesh police and BGB (at the border) were deployed to provide security to the refugees, with the dramatic rise of refugees, it became almost impossible for police to work alone to ensure safety and security. Therefore, government immediate took initiative to deploy military. District civil administration coordinated the work of all the three organizations. Senior civil servants were freshly appointed to increase the capacity of the civil administration. However, the involvement of these organs proved to be inadequate as the threat of trafficking, insurgency and terrorism continued to mount.
- Hence, government planned to integrate local communities to strengthen its effort to ensure safety of the refugees. Representatives from the local as well as the Rohingya population were selected by local Magistrates to ensure the distribution of relief and information gathering. These freshly recruits were called 'Majhis'. They became highly effective in interpreting the local dialect and an important source for valuable information. With the effort of the local community, refugees and security organizations, Bangladesh has provided a unique model to the world in refugee protection. Bangladesh's experience, could be an excellent framework to combat refugee crisis in other post-conflict environment that can build capacities of future peacekeeping missions.





Let me explain this diagram a little bit. Although initially Bangladesh police and BGB, which works at the border area of Bangladesh, were deployed to provide security to the refugees, with the drastic rise of refugees from Myanmar, it became almost impossible for police to work alone to ensure safety and security. Therefore, Bangladesh Government immediately took initiative to deploy military. It was necessary at that stage because of the influx. District civil administration coordinated the work of all these three organizations: the military, police, and the BGB. Senior civil servants were freshly appointed to increase the capacity of the civil administration. However, the involvement of these three organs proved to be inadequate as the threat of trafficking, insurgency, and terrorism continued to mount in that region.

Hence, the government planned to integrate local communities to strengthen its effort to ensure safety of the refugees. Representatives from the local as well as the Rohingya population were selected by the local magistrates to ensure the distribution of relief and information gathering. So there was an effort to integrate the local community and the Rohingya community. These fresh recruits were called *majhis*. They became highly effective in interpreting the local dialect and an important source for valuable information. These *majhis* were selected from the local community and the Rohingya population. With the effort of the local community, refugees, and security organizations, Bangladesh has proved a unique model in the world in refugee protection. Bangladesh's experience could be an excellent framework to combat refugee crisis in other post-conflict environment that can build capacities of future peacekeeping missions.

2. Counter Terrorism

- Peacekeeping missions are generally not engaged in counter terrorism activities. However, the strong linkages between intrastate conflicts and terrorism have put this framework into question. Therefore, there has been a demand to introduce a new peacekeeping doctrine to engage peacekeeping in counter terrorism activities. Over the last few years, Bangladesh has been successful in fighting terrorism. The role of police was critical in mitigating threats of terrorism.
- I should mention that the use of force has not been the only tool utilized by police to fight terrorism. Rather, Bangladesh police was engaged in multipronged counter-radicalisation strategies, including:
 - community involvement (engaging local communities through community policing)
 - social awareness building about the scourge of extremism (using the media)
 - campaign against misinterpretation of religion (support from local mosques, imams etc.)
 - de-radicalisation and integration of radicals to counter terrorism
- Together, these strategies proved effective in deescalating terrorist threats in Bangladesh that could also be effective in other fragile state settings.



Now the second area where Bangladesh can help Africa UN peacekeeping is counterterrorism. Although Mr. Evans has explained that peacekeeping missions are generally not engaged in counterterrorism activities, however, the strong linkages between intrastate conflicts and terrorism have put this framework into question. Therefore, there has been a demand to introduce a new peacekeeping doctrine to engage peacekeeping in counter terrorism activities. Over the last few years, Bangladesh has been successful in fighting terrorism. The role of police – I repeat the role of police was critical in mitigating the terrorist threats in Bangladesh, not the military, the police.

I should mention that the use of force has not been the only tool utilized by police to fight terrorism. Rather, Bangladesh police was engaged in multi-pronged counter-radicalization strategies, including: 1) community involvement that engaging the local communities in terms of creating awareness, 2) social awareness building about the scourge of extremism using the media, 3) campaign against misinterpretation of religion by the support of the mosques and imams, and 4) de-radicalization and integration of radicals to counter terrorism. These are the four strategies that Bangladesh police took to face terrorism. Together these strategies proved effective in deescalating terrorist threats in Bangladesh that could also be effective in other fragile social settings.

3. Community Policing


Community policing is institutionalized in Bangladesh. It has become a success story through integrating police with the community. Once or twice in each month community policing meetings are held to integrate local people with the police and civil administration. It also provides a platform for the NGO workers to voice the difficulties they face during work. Community policing helped to bridge gap between the local communities and the government bureaucracy. Through community effort, police has been integrated as an effective tool to address social and political disorder, terrorism, extortion, bomb blasts, murder for gain, gruesome rape, persecution of women etc.




The third area where Bangladesh can help African peacekeeping is the community policing. policing is institutionalized in Bangladesh. It has been a success story through integrating police with the community. Once or twice in each month community policing meetings are held to integrate local people with the police and civil administration. It also provides a platform for the NGOs, NGO workers to voice the difficulties they face during their work. Community policing helped to bridge gap between the local communities and the government bureaucracy in Bangladesh. Through community effort, police has been integrated as an effective tool to address social and political disorder, terrorism, extortion, bomb blasts, murder for gain, gruesome rape, persecution of women, etcetera.

+ Continued.

Figure 'B': Community Policing Strategy in Bangladesh





+ General People

- Police stations are seen as the focal point to conduct community
 policing activities. People from all social status, including women,
 participate in these meetings. They share their experiences, make
 queries or place complains. They also provide recommendations to
 improve the performances of the police personnel.
- In post-conflict environment, local populations have profound understanding on the causes and consequences of conflict. For example, in Darfur local communities have developed unique capacities to adapt with drought or erosion of land. They also have knowledge on the conflict that arises from climate change. Therefore, during post-conflict recovery phases integrating local communities with the security personnel could prove valuable in achieving peacekeeping mandate.



General people: The police stations are generally seen as the focal point to conduct community policing activities in Bangladesh because we have police stations spread all over Bangladesh. Different districts in Bangladesh we have police stations, multiple police stations. People from all social status, including women, participate in these meetings. They share their experiences, make queries or place complaints. They also provide recommendations to improve the performances of the police personnel.

If you look at post-conflict environment, local populations have profound understanding of the causes and consequences of conflict. For example, in Darfur, local communities have developed unique capacities to adapt with drought or erosion of land. They also have knowledge of the conflict that arises from climate change. Therefore, during post-conflict recovery phases, integrating local communities with the security personnel could provide or could prove valuable in achieving peacekeeping mandate.

+ Police Personnel

- Once or twice each month, a community meeting is held in each rural and urban police stations. The meeting is presided by the local police station. Additional superintendent of police of a district (a small administrative unit), assistant superintendent of police; often the superintendent of police participate in these meetings. Through these meetings a complex network is developed between the local communities and the members of the security sector. Crimes including, theft, burglary or sexual violence have successfully been mitigated through community engagement.
- Though limited, in South Sudan peacekeepers conduct patrolling to ensure safety for women who go out for work or to collect fire-wood. It has made a huge impact on women's confidence building and gradually assisting to build women's participation in income generation. Keeping this in context, I argue, community policing model of Bangladesh that integrates the law enforcing agencies with the local communities to support safer work environment for women can have greater impact during peacekeeping stages.



Police personnel: How do they work in the community system? Once or twice each month, a community meeting is held in each rural and urban police stations. The meeting is presided by the local police station. Additional superintendent of police of a district, which is a small administrative unit, assistant superintendent of police, and often the superintendent of police participate in these meetings. They interact with the local community. Through these meetings a complex network is developed between the local communities and the members of the security sector. Crimes including theft, burglary, or sexual violence have successfully been mitigated through community engagement in Bangladesh.

Though limited, in South Sudan, peacekeepers conduct patrolling to ensure safety for women who go out for work or to collect firewood. It has made a huge impact on women's confidence building and gradually assisted to build women's participation in income generation. Keeping this in context, I argue, community policing model of Bangladesh that integrates the law enforcing agencies with the local communities to support safer work environment for women can have greater impact during peacekeeping stages.

+ NGO Workers

- Bangladesh have huge number of national and international NGO's working in various development sectors who regularly participate in community policing meetings.
- Local and international NGO's are also active in South Sudan or Darfur. However, often there remains lack of coordination between the NGOs and the local security personnel.
- I argue, providing a strong community policing platform can be an effective strategy to mitigate tension amongst the NGO workers working in the field.



The third paradigm is the NGO workers. Bangladesh has huge number of national and international NGOs working in various development sectors who regularly participate in community policing meetings. Local and international NGOs are also active in countries like South Sudan or Darfur. However, often there remains lack of coordination between the NGOs and the local security personnel. I argue, providing a strong community policing platform can be an effective strategy to mitigate tension amongst the NGO workers while working in the field.

Public Organization Members

- Successful policing work requires collaboration with different organs of the government. Hence, member representatives of local civil administration regularly participate in community policing meetings. The collaboration with the police and civil administration ensures accountability and transparence in public work. Traditionally, war ravaged countries lack institutions that can sustain goodgovernance.
- However, for the success of community policing, strengthening civil administration through institution building is a critical challenge. Without any doubt democratic institution building is a complex process that requires human and financial resources. Japan can play a greater role to build institutions that can have greater impact in building social stability.



Finally, the fourth paradigm in that pyramid is the public organization members. This is the area where Japan or countries like United States of America can truly help. My previous speaker has highlighted some of that. Successful policing work requires collaboration with different organs of the government. Hence, member representatives of local civil administration regularly participate in community policing meetings. The

collaboration with the police and civil administration ensures accountability and transparency in public work. Traditionally, war-ravaged countries lack institutions that can sustain good governance.

However, for the success of community policing, strengthening civil administration through institution building is a critical challenge. Without any doubt, democratic institution building is a complex process that requires human and financial resources. Japan can play a greater role to build institutions that can have greater impact in building social stability which in turn can help that community-building strategy at home.


+ 4. Women Police

Bangladesh is one of the largest contributors of female police officers in the UN peacekeeping missions as formed police unit (FPU). However, the role of female FPU's has been limited to stereotype activities: reducing gender-based violence, conflict and confrontation, providing sense of security especially for women and children, mentoring female police officer in the local area and thus empowering women in the host country and promoting social cohesion.

Finally, women police, in terms of empowering women. Bangladesh is one of the largest contributors of female police officers in the UN peacekeeping missions as Formed Police Unit. However, the role of female FPUs has been limited to stereotype activities, for example, reducing gender-based violence, conflict and confrontation, providing sense of security especially for women and children, etcetera.

+ Continued ...

- Female FPU's can be a great inspiration in raising social awareness and mobilization in African peacekeeping missions.
- Female police officer are role models in gender empowerment in Bangladesh. For example: victim support centers in various key police units have been hugely successful in combatting crimes against women including: rape, battering for dowry, kidnapping, exploitation and extortion.
- Because of social stigma many of the crimes committed against women remained unrecorded. However, with the introduction of victim support centers headed by female officers, the number of crimes recorded has increased dramatically. Women from rural areas feel more comfortable expressing their sorrows to female officers in these specialized victim support centers. Similar approaches could also be effective in combatting crime against women in conflict environment.





Female FPUs can be a great inspiration in raising social awareness and mobilization in African peacekeeping missions. Female police officers are role models of gender empowerment in Bangladesh. For example, victim support centers in various key police units in Bangladesh have been hugely successful in combating crimes against women including rape, battering for dowry, kidnapping, extortion, and exploitation.

Because of social stigma, many of the crimes committed against women remained unrecorded. However, with the introduction of victim support centers headed by female officers, in Bangladesh recently, the number of crimes recorded has increased dramatically. Women are coming forward to record the extortion, exploitation that has been done against them. They are feeling more comfortable now doing it. Women from rural areas feel comfortable expressing their sorrows to female officers in these specialized victim support centers. Similar approaches could also be effective in combating crime against women in conflict environments.

I think I have said enough. With that I will conclude my presentation. Thank you very much. Thank you for your patient hearing.

(Dr. Shinoda) Mr. Khan, thank you very much. Bangladesh is a very major country in dispatching the police personnel and also the troops. Thank you very much for your exciting presentation, and thank you very much for referring to Japan.

PANEL DISCUSSION:

Dr. Emmanuel K. Aning (Director of the Faculty of Academic Affairs & Research, KAIPTC)
Ms. Tomoko Matsuzawa (Subject Matter Expert/ Trainer, UN Peacekeeping Operations)

(Dr. Shinoda) We just had four panelists make presentations. Including the keynote speech by Vice Air Marshall Evans, we had five presentations. You have a question sheet in the handout. So if you have any questions to make, please fill in this question sheet, and please hand it to one of the staff. We are going to take a break shortly, so please hand in the questions during the break. We would like to take them up in the latter half of the panel discussion session.

We have just heard presentations from four speakers and they are very efficient and effective in keeping time so we still have a little bit of time. Now, I would like to invite later on, Dr. Aning and Ms. Matsuzawa for their comments and discussions but as I said, we still have a little bit of time. First, I would like to therefore invite Dr. Aning and Ms. Matsuzawa for some remarks, perhaps with the questions or the comments for the keynote speech and four speeches as well. You may have questions or clarifications so not very severe or tough questions, but rather lighter, easier questions if you could. Dr. Aning first.

(Dr. Aning) Let me thank the organizers for the invitation. As we say in West Africa, 'all protocols observed.'

Let me start by making one key point. We need to challenge ourselves and ask a fundamental question, why are we talking capacity building 50 years after most African countries got independence? There must be something fundamentally either different or transformative or wrong in terms of how we do capacity building, because capacity building by itself useful as it is, I think from the conversations today, raises quite a number of fundamental points that we need to grapple with.

Let me start with Ms. Nakaya's extremely fascinating representation that raises fundamental challenges relating to what Air Vice Marshall Evans spoke about much earlier on. The hybridity of the challenges that we see, the collusion between criminal, political, social, economic elites and powers, the trans-nationality of these challenges, and the need to use a newer lens, first in understanding the challenges that hybrid threats pose, but also in asking ourselves the tools that we need to respond to this hybridity. Two quick questions to Ms. Nakaya: what do you think, based on your good points, are the national and regional dynamics that firstly produces and secondly reproduce these hybrid threats? That's number one. Number 2, if we look on the tall list of police and troopcontributing countries, quite a number of them come from fairly fragile states with fairly minimal capacities. What do you expect them to bring to the table? Because we are looking at population explosion, limited law enforcement, advanced flaud and crime.

Let me take another minute to speak to Mr. Weidie's very fascinating points, particularly as colleagues from similar training institutes, probably we need to share some experiences. I like the what-is and who-needs question that you posed, very pertinent. But I think in terms of the challenges with capacity building, I like you to share your experiences with us about how should it be done, because in training, those that we train, I want you to share with us some of the contextual issues that you consider either on a regional basis or in terms of the 54 countries, your pedagogy for adult learning, the role of contrast sensitivity and diversity in designing the teaching materials and in how they are taught.

Finally, capacity building is not always an innocent humanitarian intervention. Security force assistance

sometimes has unintended consequences. We have seen it in Mali. We have it in another areas where you build capacity and it is turned onto itself. I would very much like you to share some of your experiences around these issues with us. Thank you.

(Dr. Shinoda) Thank you very much, Dr. Aning. Before asking the speakers to answer, I would like to invite Ms. Matsuzawa first.

(Ms. Matsuzawa) Thank you for the very informative presentation. I would like to ask Lieutenant Colonel Matsui. I am happy to hear that the ARDEC activities are going forward as I believe that Japan could make a new contribution through this. From this perspective, after the training is over, I assume that there is a lot of knowledge and experience that has been accumulated and you may have identified challenges while achieving some results. My question is, have you had any opportunities to share the information with those countries which are also providing capacity building trainings? Not just Japan, but US and other countries are making a lot of contribution, therefore it is important to exchange the information on to which country and what sort of contribution is being made, so that there would not be any duplicated efforts.

(Dr. Shinoda) Ms. Nakaya and Mr. Matsui, in the interest of time, maybe I will give you 3 minutes each to answer the questions, and if you have not fully exhausted your answers, then you could have another chance after the break. Can you just give me the initial impression?

(Ms. Nakaya) Thank you for the question and very difficult ones actually. What the national, the regional dynamics that are reproducing the issue. I think what we are facing is the clash between the connectivity of conflicts and conflict dynamics that transcend borders on the one hand and the state-based solution that we have adopted so far from Boko Haram to the Lake Chad Basin to all the current conflicts, from Syria to Iraq and to Libya, these are regional and pan-regional dynamics that are not only influenced by local dynamics on the ground, even at the tribal level all the way to the influx of the extremist tactics and elements from wider region. However, in contrast, our solution has been state-centric based on the national level peace agreement or peacekeeping deployment within a specific country. Never before we had a peacekeeping mission that transcends borders. Therefore, the regional dynamics can be not only reproducing conflicts, but also the regional governments can be spoilers in these dynamics.

Very quickly on the second question, what TCC and PCC can bring to the table against the long list of requirements? It is a very difficult one, but I must say, the peacekeeping framework was also developed by countries that do not host conflicts in their territories. The P5s, as well as the Security Council, they do not really know the local dynamics. Their concept of conflicts is somewhat removed from the dynamics on the ground. More than before, we think we need to listen to the peacekeepers from African countries that are actually aware of the local dynamics. I think I agree with the speaker from Bangladesh that we need to actually look at the local civil administration to govern land, water resources, the livelihood. People actually need to survive in the context of peace and security. We tend to segregate peacekeeping discussion from development or disaster relief or the emergency assistance. I think Japan, in this context, can have a lot to offer in terms of the disaster management, disaster assistance, the risk reduction and so forth that we have not even started talking about in the peacekeeping

context.

(Dr. Shinoda) Thank you very much. Lieutenant Colonel Matsui, would you like to answer the question?

(LTC Matsui) First of all, the question from Ms. Matsuzawa. For ARDEC, the process and machine maintenance and also measurement process, those three areas have been provided and each of those different processes were provided by different countries. We have provided operator training course for facility process and also training trainer course. Train the trainer course was also provided at the same time. After our training program was over, this train the trainer course was provided. We have not had opportunity to share information with the instructors engaged in other training programs, but next batch of instructors after us, the train the trainer program was done by the Swiss people, and so the machine adjustment was used as training material was done together as I heard.

For the first question with regard to education, it is very difficult but the training program that we have done is for individual trainees separately. We have looked at attributes of each of the trainees and provided tailor-made training programs. I do not believe that they will be able to applied in every country as they are but the trainees that we have taught, they spent 3 months receiving this training in Kenya, and they have this memory and they can bring this back home and spread that information and knowledge, hopefully.

With regard to educational materials, as I said, we have looked at each of the trainees and decided what sort of training should be provided and trainers were coming up with the training materials on the spot. For example, hydraulic excavator model was used and the arm of the excavator movement was able to be understood with simple material. They explained to the trainees about how to move that arm. That is one example. This is just a simple answer, but I would like to have another opportunity to explain in more detail. Thank you.

(Dr. Shinoda) Thank you very much. Please fill in the question sheet. We would like to take about 10-minute break. Please fill in your question sheet, and once you have filled it in, please give it to the staff. Why do not we resume at 3:55.

DISCUSSION:

(Dr. Shinoda) Sorry, it was a very short break. It was hectic but thank you very much for coming back. Before the break I asked for questions. Dr. Aning and Matsuzawa-san asked some questions who were like commentators and both have very deep knowledge. Based on that we also will start this second half session by having a comment. First of all, Dr. Aning, please.

(Dr. Aning) Thank you very much. It is good to have 2 more extra minutes to comment and then to ask a couple of questions. I think I would like to take the context from what Air Vice Marshal Evans said and what Ms. Nakaya also said. I mean if we take the African context, which is the focus of our conversation this afternoon and the changing dynamics, there are couple of things that I would like to speak to that probably relates to all the five speakers.

One relates to the issue of the demographics. The demographics of the continent are changing so dramatically and so rapidly that they are having an impact on advanced basis and the design and planning of those advanced basis and by extension the capacities and the capabilities of law enforcement to keep law and order.

The second relates also to providing adequate livelihoods and those livelihoods or the lack of it leads to as Air Vice Marshal Evans said to perceptions of exclusion, of isolation, of victimhood. These narratives create a groundswell of frustration and anger against those who govern and precisely because of the rapid growth of populations and urban spaces and the frustrations that arise thereof. People fall within the cracks and it is within those cracks that those who want to recruit, provide an alternative narrative, then get a groundswell of people whom they then listen to radical ideas and by extension become extremists. That then leads to other challenges for states because most African states do not have enough police officers. The percentage of support to the security forces are fairly low.

Therefore, by the time states recognize the challenges that they face, more often than not it is a little too late and therein lies the critical questions around the capacities that we need to provide in a rapidly changing political, economic, and social context and by extension context and for a long time these conversations have been overlooked or pushed to the very edges.

The African union and I like Mr. Khan's points about the role of women, counter terrorism and here I would like to share and ask Mr. Khan specific questions about what Bangladesh and African Union and ECOWAS can do together. On refugees, I think the African Union and ECOWAS have had some experience over the last couple of years because of the boundless that we have seen both refugees and internally displaced persons, so how best can Pakistan share these experiences with the African counterparts?

Number two, on counterterrorism, the African Union has the African Center for Study and Research on Terrorism located in Algiers Algeria, that tries to develop the skillsets of what we term as national focal points. It has developed some institutional frameworks for response. We from the Kofi Annan Center partner them in doing courses on extremism, de-radicalization and I think it is important that probably to work with them.

On community policing in West Africa, for example, in southern Africa we have both WAPCO and SARPCCO and West African Police Chiefs Organization and South African Police Chiefs Organization. I want you to provide us some insights as to how you think these partnerships or aspects of collaboration can take place?

Then, finally to, Lieutenant Colonel Matsui, heavy equipment has always been a problem for African

peacekeepers. You provided a very fascinating and interesting presentation but I am little bit concerned about how these skills that have been acquired can be kept so that when you need those skills and you invite these people, they can actually come into the mission area and use their skills that you have provided. Because as you correctly said, if these skills are not used over time, those skillsets will begin to fade. Have you considered how Japan can support these individuals when they go home to keep their skillsets fresh? Thank you.

(Dr. Shinoda) Thank you very much. May we ask Matsuzawa-san to respond?

(Ms. Matsuzawa) From my side, I would like to share my thoughts on desirable peacekeeping training for peacekeepers, from field experience as a humanitarian worker and also as a trainer for peacekeepers, from two aspects. First desirable capacity building training from content's perspective and second is from format.

In terms of contents, I strongly believe that all peacekeepers should be well trained, firstly on the very fundamental elements. This fundamental means that they all should be aware what is UN first and then what is PKO, and what does protection of civilians means. When you ask peacekeepers on the ground, nowadays, they know the main mandate for them is protection of civilians. But if you ask them what POC- protection of civilians- means, not many of them can answer, because they have a different interpretation. Also, they should be aware what is human rights and what are dos and don'ts if they encounter victims of sexual violence, or if they encounter a child soldier on the ground. Equally, they should be aware how important it is for them to interact with local community. And, discipline. All peacekeepers should be well trained on discipline, and they should be fully aware what is going to happen to them if they commit sexual exploitation and abuse on the ground. These are what I believe as fundamentals. Regardless of wherever you are deployed, regardless in which capacity, it does not matter. Even if you go as an engineer, you should be aware of these fundamentals.

These fundamental training should be combined with mission specific training. As mentioned by Commandant Evans, in Mali, for example, many causalities are due to IED. However, it is not the case for other peacekeeping missions. Before we send them to the field, by providing mission-specific training, each peacekeeper should be aware what kind of risk they would face on the ground, is it IED or is it ambush? And also, they should be aware what kind of a context is waiting, what is the dynamics, who are the key stakeholders on the ground, and who are the main non-state armed groups so that they can prepare the mindset. This is the desirable contents of the training.

And the second, format. When we train them, desirably it should be combined with lectures in a classroom and scenario-based exercises, ideally in the actual field like environment by preparing holistic field setting. In this, I would like to introduce my experience in Zambia. I trained a Zambian battalion several months ago. Zambia has deployed 1,000 military personnel to peacekeeping operation in Central African Republic. This comprehensive intensive training was programmed and funded by GPOI. This training was very much interesting because it is composed of weeks of lecture in a classroom where they all learned what I just mentioned, and after that, the second part of the training was fully scenario-based exercise.

Zambia has a huge training center, outskirts of the Lusaka. They have plenty of space for the exercise. Each morning we provided a task to platoon leaders, for example, to make foot patrol, to make a security convoy for top UN officials visiting their counterparts, or it can be conducting interactive dialogue with the local community leader. During their movement or during their duty, somethings happen. For example, they would encounter ambush

attack, or, there could be an illegal checkpoint where they would see child soldiers, or, there could be a protest from local community, or they would encounter victims of sexual violence. We prepared all these realistic scenarios and conducted them.

You may think that they would be fully prepared to how to deal with them after weeks of lecture in a classroom, but sometimes it was not the case. Some of them were not yet prepared and some lacked confidence to make a decision in the field. But if we continue this, on second and third week, they became much better. At the end of their training, they were well prepared and confident.

After the completion of this kind of training, it is preferable to equip them well. For example, to Zambian battalion, US government provided them with equipment.

Also, there is another type of contribution. While the Zambian trainers are qualified and motivated, the facility itself lacks enough equipment such as office supply, radio and vehicles which impacted scenario-based exercise.

I believe there are many areas that Japan can contribute. It can be direct provision of the training or it can be support to the institutional capacity building. Some say Japan lacks human resource as there are not many Japanese who are qualified to train peacekeepers. But in such a case, I consider it is possible to combine Japanese trainers with non-Japanese trainers. The important thing is to have well qualified trainers with solid field experience.

In this, as Scott mentioned there is a challenge in terms of subject matter expertise which he can maybe elaborate more on how the GPOI deals with this issue. Meanwhile, again I believe that Japan can play a good role in this area. Thank you.

(Dr. Shinoda) Thank you very much, Ms. Matsuzawa. Ms. Matsuzawa and Dr. Aning gave us their comments and questions, which have given us fresh perspectives and a lot of food for thought and basis for discussions. Now Air Marshal Evans and also Mr. Weidie and Mr. Khan, I did not give you three for make comments beforehand. I would like to first invite these three speakers to make some comments. Lieutenant Colonel Matsui have further questions, so I would like to ask Mr. Matsui and Ms. Nakaya further for responding. Marshal Evans, do you have any comments having listened to all these presentations and discussions that we have had so far?

(AVM Evans) Thank you very much. Let me comment on the last speaker's ideas and what they have been doing. As a matter of fact, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center has been doing a lot of what she just said. For over 10 years, we have been training lot of participants that come from the whole of West Africa on PKOs and the protection of civilian courses. We are very experienced in training in those areas. Human rights as well as the dos and don'ts of what these people should do when they get to the operational area and especially the sexual exploitation abuse, we take this very seriously. We have been training a lot of West Africans, especially those going to the operational aspect of AU, UN, and ECOWAS missions.

However, what we lack is the scenario-based experiences. We have a little bit of the scenario-based experiences, but not as detailed as she just enumerated. With assistance and collaborations with other organizations, I think, we should be able to come out with detailed scenarios in these courses to augment what we have been doing.

One of the things I would like to talk about is the lack of ideas as to what to do with the free areas that are ungoverned in the Sahelian areas and the countries that do not have so much authority over the spaces that are ungoverned. We have to come up with real ideas as to how to do that because if we do not take care of those areas, then the terrorists and the militants will be able to take hold of those areas, train more terrorists, more

militants and export them to western countries because ideally and originally, their idea is to destabilize the Western countries. They just use our countries as a means of training. In order to quell these kind of thing, it is very necessary for us to tackle those areas. Africans or West Africans, we are not so rich in those areas to get the modern technology to combat them. In these areas, we are open to suggestions and support to do that.

In Kofi Annan, with the scenario-based courses, we are planning and we will execute it by March, hostage taking scenarios and that would be based on scenarios. After about a week in class, we just go into the bush for about a week to undertake this hostage taking course. With that, we will try as much as possible to also follow the footsteps of the last speaker. I think I will pause here for some time.

(Dr. Shinoda) Thank you very much. Mr. Weidie would you like to answer the question addressed to you?

(Mr. Weidie) Thank you Sir. Dr. Aning you asked some very challenging questions and we certainly welcome those. To address the issue of the changing dynamics in the African context, the issue of the changing demographics, the challenges that exist with a lack of livelihood and all the frustrations that that leads to and to the potential radicalization and not having security forces, this is a huge challenge that is being faced. It is certainly one which is well beyond the scope of any peacekeeping capacity building efforts.

It really gets to much more development issues. I know development is not the only solution but it gets to rule of law, governance. It gets to education, food and economic security, health issues, disaster management, emergency response, infrastructure and things like that. It certainly well beyond the preview of military to be able to help. I think we all are aware of that. Our peacekeeping capacity building efforts can be good or they can be significantly challenged. One of the things that I think that we need to recognize is when we are going to take a look at peacekeeping capacity building efforts we have to make sure that we have a good understanding of the larger defense institution of that particular country.

While we have had success out here and in other parts of the world, in our GPOI efforts, it is certainly not without our share of some failures and we learned from those. We have picked some countries to do capacity building efforts in but they have not been very successful because of the defense institution is not really functional and the broader government is not really functional. We have worked with countries that have a significant amount of corruption. There were larger governance and rule of law issues and so our efforts, even though they are very focused, suffer because there is an inability because of the larger institutions. And so, I do want to point out the importance of defense institution building, of defense reform in those areas and how it has to link to much broader development efforts in the areas of economics and health and education and governance, justice, etcetera.

You also asked before the break related to the question of what is the need, who needs it and you asked the question how is it done? There were three very important elements of your question in terms of how can it be done contextually? That is a wonderful question to start with because it has to be done within the context of the country that you are working with and it also has to be done within the context of where they are going to work.

I mentioned that our program really works through partnerships. When we agree to work with a country we sit down and we have a discussion about what does the country want to do? Where does it want to do it? What resources does it have? How much can they do it? How soon can they do it? Do they have any goals? We do a really good assessment of what they have and what they do not have and what we might be able to provide. We might not be able to provide everything that that country wants to do. We also when we developed these

initial program design and development visits bring those subject matter expertise with us. We tried to get subject matter experts from that country that we are going to be partnering with and we also try and bring in those subject matter expertise from the areas where they are going to go to.

As Ms. Matsuzawa pointed out we do not solely rely on Americans. Americans do not do a lot of peacekeeping. Many other countries do and so a large pool of our subject matter expertise exists from folks of many nations. We have former military advisors to secretary generals. We have former force commanders. We have folks that have worked at DPKO in the integrated training service. Former commandants of peacekeeping training centers, contingent commanders, folks that have been UNMOs and staff officers and CIMIC officers and logistics officers from around the world. And so that is how we bring that expertise together and we certainly try and bring in those experts from those particular countries. It is important that we get that context right and it is important that it be a partnership.

We mentioned and I mentioned a metrics and evaluation program. It is very, very important. We are held to a very high standard by the state department who funds the program to ensure that we are actually delivering what it is that we intend to deliver. And so, we have got very extensive metrics. Annually we are updating to see whether we are progressing in those particular areas? Where are we on track? Where are we off track? Do we even continue partnering with a country where we might not be making progress?

The questions about pedagogy and cultural sensitivity and diversity are very important. I would go back and say that this is where it is important to us to bring in experts on adult education and learning. It is a learning program. We did not always have that but we are increasingly building in expertise from organizations and subject matter experts in adult learning and pedagogy. I would point to an example of where we are working with the US Institute of Peace that has experts in adult learning. We are incorporating aspects of that into the design and our materials for our courses.

Finally, you mentioned the fact that when we do security force training that there can be unintended consequences, we realize that. The United States government is very attuned to human rights issues. Before we even conduct any training with anybody, all of the personnel, all of the commanders of the units and things like that must pass human rights vetting requirements. We have got very stringent human rights vetting requirements. Every time they participate in that training we continue to monitor and track as much as we can. We work closely with the United Nations in that particular aspect. And then, where there are instances of misconduct there are consequences. The United States government does take action to either prohibit people from participating in that training, whether it be at an individual level or an entire unit level. Where countries have not done a good job in peacekeeping, we have ended our partnerships with those countries. We have also worked with the United Nations to try and get those countries repatriated back home if they are not doing what they should be doing and they are engaging in serious misconduct in missions.

I could talk for days and days about this topic. I wanted to try and address them because they are great questions and I hope I was able to address it in some degree.

(Dr. Shinoda) Thank you very much. Mr. Khan would you like to comment or answer the question addressed to you?

(Mr. Khan) Thank you. I would like to make a few comments on the issue that has been raised. I think all of

them are very important issues, but what you have said about radicalization and extremism, I think it depends on each country. It is very essential to contextualize the individual countries before coming up with a policy on how to fight these issues. For example, if you take Bangladesh as an example, Bangladesh was liberated in the year 1971. Since 1971 till to date, the military has played a very precarious role in terms of the democratization process of Bangladesh. If you look closely, there are similarities between how the military metrics works in Bangladesh and in many other African countries, how the democracy has proceeded or not been able to proceed the way it should have been because of the influence of military.

Now, as a police officer, I worked for the special branch of Bangladesh for a number of years. We were engaged in how to make policies that could effectively address extremism detouring the presence of military because we have seen that when military in countries like Bangladesh where democracy is still in the process of maturing, if military comes out of the barrack, sending them back to the barrack sometimes becomes quite problematic. If you look at my presentation I have clearly pointed out that we have engaged the police force of Bangladesh to address extremism or terrorism in Bangladesh. I emphasized in my presentation that we have made sure that the use of force was as much as limited as possible. In order to do so what we did we tried to engage the local community, build their awareness in terms as far as terrorism is concerned. We tried to use the media because the media plays a greater role in Bangladesh. We have a huge population. We have 180 million population and growing population, young population. We tried to use the media and we also tried to use the religious institution like the mosques and the imams as well because imams in countries like Bangladesh, they play a greater role in terms of building the capacities of the general people. In terms of using the military, in terms of using force, we took a detour, which could be defined more as humane approach towards terrorism. I think that could be an effective tool in terms of fighting terrorism in African countries and addressing the changing demographics as we have stated

Another point that has been raised here is the question of partnership. Partnership, in a country like Bangladesh, where Bangladesh is playing critical role in terms of peacekeeping, in terms of global terrorism, who should Bangladesh go with? What should be the international policy of Bangladesh government in terms of addressing these critical issues? Should it be Japan? Should it be the United States of America or should it be China? Which country should be there? I work with the policy of Bangladesh government and I found that when policies are being made, there are different policies on the table. Now what is the best policy for Bangladesh? Which country should we collaborate with or should it be combination? I think it is also rational in terms of African countries. I think these are the issues that could be discussed much in detail to have a much substantial solution to it. Thank you.

(Dr. Shinoda) Thank you very much. To Mr. Matsui, again, we have a question and could you briefly respond to that?

(LTC Matsui) Yes, briefly speaking, how to maintain the skills of the trainees after the training? I would like to respond to this. This I do not have any definite answer but what we can do in order to maintain individual skills, I think there are two things that we must do. One is in terms of the software, we continuously must provide them with knowledge and also on the hardware aspect, their skills must be maintained. These two are very important. In terms of the software, first, the lesson plan needed for the training, for example, the textbooks are given to

the trainees. While looking at the lesson plans, they can train themselves. On other things that are needed, we tell them they have our email address. We can provide them with information anytime.

The issue is the hardware aspect. How to always keep up with the changes and this is very difficult. ARDEC project, when this was launched providing education and also providing the equipment were decided to be the package. That is my understanding. However, because of the restraint in the budget, the equipment cannot be provided. These days we are leasing the equipment to provide the training. The provision of the equipment, this has to be solved. If this can be solved I believe that the training can continue in each country but this is faced with many restraints. I think this is a very difficult aspect. That is all from me. That is all I can answer. Thank you.

(Dr. Shinoda) Thank you very much.

(LTC Matsui) I believe I have one more question to answer. About the software, right now, we are only training the operators. In addition to this, right now Swiss army provides a training course for the instructors. Probably we can provide some assistance on this aspect as well. The Swiss, which are training the instructors and with other countries that are providing the logistics, probably we can work together so that we can have the skills toward the equipment maintained. That is all. Thank you.

(Dr. Shinoda) Thank you very much. Within the remaining time, we again would like to ask to have word from each one of you. Probably we can read the questions that we have got from the floor and answer to the panelists. But we have got so many questions from the floor. I am also jumping into this, so I am sorry, but I chose the very comprehensive one. I am sorry. I would like to apologize to those who asked questions but are not taken up here. I would like to have the panelists respond to this. In the order of the presentation, I would like to start with Vice Marshal Evans.

Mr. Evans you have already touched upon this. I have already told the question, but what is the most prioritized support that you asked from Japan? What do you expect very much from Japan? That is the question. Listening to the discussions, Mr. Evans, you have more specific ideas on how to run the training courses, I believe. You can focus on Japan or anything away from Japan, anything that you would like to do in the future, please.

(AVM Evans) Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Africans do not need much. We just need the support. The support is not financial per se although every kind of request is based on finance. However, what we require, the support that we require for with Africa in Africa are just capacity. The capacity is you coming to sit with us or we sitting with you to lock our heads and come out with plausible and workable plans just to address the violence in West Africa.

It is always said that the problem with the conflicts in West Africa is governance and poverty. These two, we can easily overcome but with governance it is difficult for a country to walk into somebody else's country and try to dictate how to govern the country. However, as powerful as the advanced countries are, they can pull strings from outside to assure that the governance is done in the appropriate and correct way. In that case, we will be able to sit down, work together and come out with designs and development that will help. We do not need heavy equipment to come into the country. We do not need money to come in, do something extraordinary. We just

need capacity and we need to sit down, knock our heads and come out with what we have to do.

I would like to dovetail this into one of the things that Mr. Weidie said. The question I would like to ask is a rhetoric question. It is in the course of your planning to assist Africans in their peacekeeping, do you contact the host country in question as to their needs and what they require? Also, do you contact the peacekeepers who are on ground for you to know what they need to achieve the objectives set by the United Nations or the African Union or ECOWAS per se. The reason why I am asking this question is simple, let us take Mali, for example. There are lot of ungoverned spaces in Mali and the terrorists they have adopted the villages in the ungoverned area. They provide them with medical care. They provide them with education. They provide them with everything that they needed. How can they then inform on the people who give them all these things for you to peace keep and keep them out.

If we take the Chadians, for example, they do not have a very regular and good army but the Chadian soldiers that are in Mali are able to kick the terrorist out with nothing per se. They kick them out with the little things that they have. They do not need so much. Now, when we contact, if we are able to contact these Chadians and you ask them what they need, it will surprise you that they do not need anything. The only thing they need are few education in how to use weapons or how to get those little bit of weapons and just well-done and they will achieve their aim.

I do believe that if we contact these people, if we contact the peacekeepers, if we contact the RTAC armies that are kicking out the terrorists from their country, we will be able to provide them with the little things that they need and we will not look for heavy equipment. We will not look for – all those heavy equipment and things that are required post conflict, just to rebuild a country, but to survive and kick terrorists out, we just need capacity and just cooperation. Thank you.

(Dr. Shinoda) Thank you very much. Now I would like to invite Ms. Nakaya for your final remark before we conclude, but here is the question to you. In Africa, EU, the G5s are held and the others are engaged in stabilization operations. I think these are the troops that receive the capacity building support. How are they working together with United Nations and other regional organizations in order to improve their capacity building? There are many peace building organizations in Africa, but from your personal or your perspective, what kind of cooperation and coordination are further necessary? I appreciate if you could limit your speech to 2 minutes from here.

(Ms. Nakaya) The robust African operations against extremist elements and the UN peacekeeping missions, they operate side by side. The cooperation framework is not so much about joint operation or even joint planning, but merely information sharing and technical advice from the UN side to African contingents carrying out the robust operations. That will be the current framework. To go a little further – I think this is something that UN and you have been discussing for quite some time and have not been able to figure out how to finance African operations out of the UN peacekeeping budget or not? How to establish a trust fund type of financial support for African countries? The framework is there but realistically and practically we only have \$45 million out of much larger financial requirement for the African contingents.

How do we move from here? Looking at the Security Council dynamics and looking at how the countries with capacities namely the developed countries have no longer been contributing personnel to the most dangerous

missions in the road. Personally, I am not quite optimistic that we can actually move further to joint operations between the UN protection mandate and the anti-counter terrorism operations carried out by African countries. I think my take is that we can discuss how to do capacity building vis-à-vis the extremist elements and separate conversation is why we do this capacity building? We seem to assume that yes, we do capacity building support to increase the peacekeeping effectiveness vis-à-vis protection of civilians and human rights and gender and so forth. Does it actually lead to peace?

I think what we have seen from Somalia to Congo, to Mali, to Darfur, to name a few, I am not quite sure that peacekeeping is a right tool or even answer to the challenges that we face. Fusing, therefore, the current peacekeeping operation with the robust African operations to counter terrorism, whether that is the direction that we need to go or whether we need to look a little further and see what peace means in the current and evolving conflict dynamics? I think we probably would need to head to a different conversation altogether, whatever merging the frameworks we already have.

(Dr. Shinoda) Thank you very much. Next Lieutenant Colonel Matsui, in fact, you already answered this question previously about how to maintain the skills that you taught? Together with the foreign ministry, you provide the equipment in order to maintain the skills of the trainings you taught. Do you have any additional comments? Perhaps, in 2 minutes, please.

(LTC Matsui) About the equipment, as was said previously, after the peace is achieved then we would be able to continue providing equipment but in the short term perhaps we need to develop people, education. I think this is the highest priority or the area that we can help them most. As I said we educate the presently operators of equipment but we can help African nations to develop instructors and also, we can help them acquire the knowledge about the construction and surveillance so that their engineering capacity can be more effective. There can be better infrastructure builders in rural areas as well as the PKO missions. That is exactly what we intend to do in ARDEC, that is to help African engineers to improve their peacekeeping mission operations. What we can do is to teach people, educate people. If we have more opportunities, we would like to continue providing what we have. Thank you.

(Dr. Shinoda) Thank you very much. Next, Mr. Weidie, you have the following question. In the United States, the Obama administration for the APRRP started stabilization of Africa, what is going on right now? What happened to this program right now? Is it different from GPOI? With the change of the administration in the United States, what change has occurred to these programs? We appreciate your updated information on this.

(Mr. Weidie) That is a great question. The United States has been working PKO capacity building in a number of different ways. Prior to the existence of GPOI, the Global Peace Operations Initiative, we had a long running peacekeeping capacity building program in Africa called the ACOTA program. That was working primarily in a force generation mode, I would think. ACOTA was doing a lot of basic military training and providing equipment to try and help African contributing countries raise peacekeeping forces. It was also very, very expensive. While there were some efforts to build institutional capacity, ACOTA was not significantly focused on a lot of train the trainer capability. It was really focused on force generation.

During the Obama administration, there was a program that was announced called APRRP, you just mentioned that. APRRP activities still continue. There was a significant investment in the program and a lot of those efforts, particularly in the form of equipping are still being processed to deliver a lot of the equipment to those countries that were originally in the program. APRRP was never intended to be a continuous long running program. A lot of what was being done in ACOTA, a lot of the management that was being done in APRRP has just been subsumed into the GPOI program. A lot of those activities continue. The equipment purchases and training and things like that still continue. However, what we found is the approach that GPOI has taken has generally been determined through our metrics and evaluation program to be more effective and more efficient.

It does not mean that what ACOTA was doing was not good, it certainly was very good. It does not mean that how things were been done by APRRP were not very good. They are very good and they still continue to be good. However, we felt at the State Department the need to bring all of those together into one unifying effort under our political military bureau instead of running separately out of the African Bureau and things like that. It is more of a unity of effort type thing. I hope that answers the question.

(Dr. Shinoda) Thank you very much. Now, Mr. Khan, there is a question to you. The question to Mr. Khan is, in Bangladesh, it has been contributing greatly to dispatch of female police officers and the background for that, what other reasons for the increased number of female police officers? Also, if there is any idea to help increase the female PKO personnel in Japan going forward if you can share with us your thoughts that will be appreciated.

(Mr. Khan) Thank you very much for the questions. Before I jump to the questions, I just want to make one point regarding the training and capacity building activities that are going on. When I went for peacekeeping in South Sudan in the year 2010, when I landed in Juba, I had no idea whatsoever the reason behind the conflict that was going on in South Sudan, but I was there. So much training capacity building is going on but I think that there is a need to store the experiences that the peacekeepers are gathering.

For example, in Bangladesh, as I told Bangladesh has been going in peacekeeping missions from the year 1989. In 1988 the military went to peacekeeping missions. Now, starting from 1989 to 2018, the wealth of experience that the police officers have in Bangladesh, where is that experience? Has it anyhow being documented? The experiences that we have, has that been shared? Any publication, any research work, has that been done? I would suggest like Japan has a scholarship program of *Monbukagakusho*. Why not bring some officers from Bangladesh, police officers or military officers and ask them to do research specifically on peacekeeping or on conflict resolutions and stuff like that. That will help to store the wealth of experiences that they have. During the data collection process, they can store all those experiences and maybe in future peacekeeping missions, in capacity of the activities, those information could be very, very valuable. I think that that could be a way to strengthen the overall capacity building activities of the UN.

In terms of why Bangladesh has so many women police officers that was the first question. I am not sure. I do not know the answer to that question. Why Bangladesh has so many women peacekeepers? I do not know, maybe Bangladeshi women, they love thrill. They love to work for the UN. I do not know. Maybe recently Bangladesh government has taken policies to encourage women to come forward. There are quota systems like if there are 10 places to work with the UN, women are encouraged to come forward, maybe 3/4 quotas are stored for them for the UN peacekeeping maybe that has encouraged them to come forward. I forgot the second

question.

(Dr. Shinoda) What kind of advice do you provide to Japan in order for us to increase the number of female peacekeepers?

(Mr. Khan) I do not have any advice to the Japanese government. I can only advice Bangladesh government that encourage women more, have some quotas for Bangladeshi women and I think that is the way forward. To me, if you ask me, I think women are more professional in some areas. Women are a bit more professional. They are more diligent. If you look at the different activities that has been done by the peacekeepers, the crimes that has been committed over the years by male peacekeepers, I think that also opens up scope for women to come forward to do peacekeeping. If women come forward for peacekeeping, as I said, that can act as a source of empowerment, encouraging African women. Africa and Bangladesh, the social structure, the social hierarchy is more similar. I think we both understand that and that has been one of drivers to send more police officers from Bangladesh. I think that answers your question.

(Dr. Shinoda) Thank you very much, Mr. Khan. Thank you very much for a wonderful answer but you are being a bit modest, I would assume. Of course, the increasing female PKO personnel on the UN and Bangladesh has been answering that request probably, but 1325 the UN Security Council resolution which is quite well known, describing the role of the females. Bangladesh was the president of the council back then and Bangladesh government was quite proud of that and has been quite proactive in that. I would like to emphasize that on his behalf.

Ideally, Mr. Aning and Ms. Matsuzawa, I would like to ask them to make comments but in the interest of time there is not much time left but if you have any burning comments that you would like to make. If not, we are approaching the time to end this discussion. I would like to make my final comment and then give the microphone over to moderator of the total symposium. There is not much time left, so just one comment.

There are lot of issues and perspectives in terms of capacity building that were raised. That means really that capacity building has become a really important issue. In 2015, a report was issued. We, at the UN, HIPPO Report, High-level Panel on Peace Operations Report, was issued. We have been referencing this repeatedly. What was raised in this report as an important issue, there were two relevant ones that I would like to highlight.

The first one is primacy of politics. In the international peacekeeping activities currently, the things are quite complex and they are facing complicated issues. Anti-terrorism fight is ongoing on a worldwide basis. In this context they have to do peacekeeping activities. This is a structural difficulty that is being posed. Also, there are known state actors that are increasing. They are increasing in various parts of the world as Ms. Nakaya said. It has become quite complicated. There is no easy optimum answer. From the political perspective, you have to do political adjustment to ensure the actual specific activities. When we discuss and can perform capacity building, political perspective and importance of political adjustment has to be something that we are mindful of. Also, we have to create new personnel engaged in activities and we have to continue to work harder. Personally speaking, this is something that has been left in mind.

In HIPPO Report, partnership peacekeeping is being referenced. Partnership has been regarded as very important. In the report from the Secretary General, the peacekeeping activities start to embrace partnership is

not an exception but has become a norm. That was the emphasis that we have seen in the report from Secretary General. That point was also something that was raised throughout the discussions today.

We have focused on Africa when we discussed capacity building today but it is not something that has happened by chance. In Africa, the capacity building has been regarded as most important and in a very dense manner, it has been performed. There are so many issues that cannot be described in a short sentence. There are so many conflicts that are happening in Africa. It is not just Africa that there are conflicts, but there are other parts where there are more conflicts. For example, in Middle East, the conflicts are becoming more intense in recent years. However, still we are talking about Africa because capacity building has been actually performed in a very dense manner. In other words, in more conflict prone areas, the capacity building support has not been done that much. Why we are able to do the capacity building in Africa, there are so many training centers and AU, ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, and other regional and sub-regional organizations are having quite active to support UN and working hand in hand with UN or sometimes taking over the responsibility from UN to create partnerships in various forms and to get that reflected in the actual operations. That wonderful fact is there. That is the reason.

Therefore, we are focusing on Africa not from negative point of view but there are more advanced activities that are ongoing in Africa because various partnerships are already under way and in place. That is something that I have been reminded of and I would like to emphasize that to conclude this panel discussion today. Thank you.

CLOSING ADDRESS: Vice Admiral Katsuto DEGUCHI (Commandant, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense)

Probably you want to shortcut my address and continue with the panel discussion but please allow me to say a few words. Thank you very much for your cooperation. We have been able to end this symposium in a success.

I would like to express my gratitude particularly Vice Admiral Evans and Dr. Shinoda who was the moderator and all the panel members, thank you very much for your very informative discussion. Now today's keynote speech as well as all the panel discussions they were very informative. I was able to listen to all the significant opinions. Also, in dealing with our activities on international peace and safety, I think the issues that we have to put focus and also the direction of the solutions have become clear for the Ministry of Defense as well as the Self Defense Force.

Of the valuable comments that we have received today, we would like to have them reflected in our education, training, and research studies at the peacekeeping training and research center. Also, I hope that you will find what has been discussed today very informative and you will reflect it on your operations.

Once again, I would like to thank all the moderator, panelists, and all the people who are here today and also would like to ask for your understanding and support to our research center. Thank you very much indeed.

The views expressed at the Symposium are those of the participants, and do not necessarily represent the views of their Organizations.

