

International Peace & Security Symposium 2024



MINUTES OF THE SYMPOSIUM (English Version)

December 6, 2024

At the Hotel Grand Hill Ichigaya

Joint Staff College (JSC), Ministry of Defense (MOD)

Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC)



The views expressed at the Symposium are those of the participants and do not necessarily represent the views of their organizations.



PROGRAM

Challenges in the International Peace Operations: - Toward Strengthening Partnerships -

14:00 – 14:10 Opening Remarks:

Lieutenant General YAJIMA Masahito, Commandant, Joint Staff College

14:10 – 14:20 Opening Presentation:

Colonel WATANABE Kuniyoshi, Director, Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center

14:20 – 15:05 Keynote Speech:

Major General (Retired) Raja Aftab Khan, Principal, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies,
National University of Sciences and Technology, Pakistan

15:15 – 16:35 Panel Discussion:

Moderator:

Dr. SHINODA Hideaki, Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

Panelists:

Mr. Ahmed Sameh, Senior Policy Coordinator, Cairo International Center for Conflict
Resolution, Peacekeeping & Peacebuilding, Egypt

Colonel Esther Barbara Wanjiku, Defence Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Kenya

Lieutenant General (Retired) MATSUMURA Goro, Former Commanding General of the
Northeastern Army, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

16:45 – 17:45 Discussion:

Moderator:

Dr. SHINODA Hideaki, Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

Commentator:

Dr. NAKAYA Sumie, Assistant Professor, Hitotsubashi University on special leave from the
United Nations Department of Peace Operations

* The Opening Remarks and the presentation by Lieutenant General (Retired) MATSUMURA Goro were made in Japanese. Therefore, these parts of the minutes were edited from the simultaneous interpretation made at the venue. Please refer to the original speech in Japanese on the Japanese website.

(<https://www.mod.go.jp/js/jsc/jpc/english/event/proceedings/>)

Opening Remarks

Lieutenant General YAJIMA Masahito, Commandant, Joint Staff College

(The presentation has been edited from the simultaneous interpretation. Please refer to the original speech in Japanese on the Japanese website.)

Good afternoon, I am YAJIMA, the Commandant of the Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense. As the host of the symposium, I would like to say a few words before we begin.

It is the 13th Symposium and, as with last year, we are holding it in a hybrid format to allow for online participation.

This year, we are honored to have as a keynote speaker, Major General (Retired) Raja Aftab Khan, Principal, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, National University of Sciences and Technology, Pakistan. Professor Hideaki SHINODA of the Graduate School of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies will act as a moderator, as he did last year, while Dr. Sumie NAKAYA, an assistant professor at the Hitotsubashi University, will serve as a commentator. As panelists, we have Mr. Ahmed Samad, Senior Policy Coordinator at the Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, Egypt; Mr. Goro MATSUMURA, Former Commanding General of the Northeastern Army, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, and Colonel Esther Barbara Wanjiku, Defence Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Kenya.

It is great pleasure for me and all the staff at the Joint staff College to hold the International Peace and Security Symposium 2024 with such distinguished experts, and I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all of you, including those who joined online from across the globe.

The purpose of the International Peace and Security Symposium is to share knowledge and promote mutual understanding not only among the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces, but also the government, private sector, and academia regarding the current and future challenges of international peace and security activities, resulting in leading to the implementation of high-quality international contributions.

For more than 30 years, Japan has conducted international peace operations in various regions. Japan has continuously dispatched staff officers to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula. This year, two additional personnel were dispatched to the UNMISS for the position of Deputy Chief of Staff and his Personal Assistant.

Japan is continuing to dispatch personnel to the United Nations Secretariat in order to contribute to international peace and security. Also, Japan has actively engaged in capacity building of peacekeepers. Since 2015, as part of the United Nations Triangular Partnership Programme (UNTPP), it has provided training in heavy machinery operation for engineers from African Troop Contributing Countries, and in 2018 it expanded the project to Asia and its surrounding regions. In 2019, the scope of support was expanded to the field of sanitation.

Furthermore, Japan is making international contributions through capacity building projects in our fields of expertise. It helps partner countries in the Indo-Pacific region improve their capacity in such fields as military band training and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR).

This symposium focuses on partnership, which is an important concept in the field of international peace operations, and discusses best practices and future challenges in efforts to promote global partnerships. The discussions here will provide suggestions for the international community and Japan's future efforts to address the recent challenges.

Professor SHINODA as the moderator will facilitate discussions among the panelists, while there will be Q&A sessions where everyone in the audience can interact with them. We will share the results of this symposium widely with relevant departments within and outside of the Ministry of Defense, and make use of them for future education and research.

Finally, I'd like to take this opportunity to thank everyone who has taken the time to attend today's symposium. Thank you very much.

Opening Presentation


Colonel WATANABE Kuniyoshi, Director, Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center



Good afternoon excellencies, distinguished guests, Generals, Admirals and all participants, I am Colonel WATANABE, Director of Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center. Being in charge of organizing the International Peace and Security Symposium, I would like to extend my sincere appreciation for your attendance and your support. I am delighted to present the concept of today's symposium.

Looking at worldwide peace operations, partnership has been a critical concept in the field of international peace and security activities including peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In July 2023, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres made recommendations for an action “Strengthen peace operations and partnerships” in his policy brief “A New Agenda for Peace.”

Based on this, we put the theme of this symposium as “Challenges in the International Peace Operations: Toward Strengthening Partnerships,” to discuss the best practice on efforts and future challenges to promote the global partnership for worldwide peace and security. Before the keynote speech, I will explain an overview of the background of the theme to introduce further discussion.



Having the importance of partnership in worldwide peace operations in mind, numbers of milestones can be observed.

A move to require the strengthening of partnerships in the international peace operations is not a new one. We have already seen examples of “partnership” in Brahimi Report in 2000.

Since 2007, characteristic cases of partnership peacekeeping missions have been established. UNAMID in Darfur, MINUSMA in Mali and MINUSCA in Central African Republic are those examples.


In 2009 the United Nations Secretariat released “New Horizon,” offering their vision to strengthen partnerships to tackle various challenges together with the UN, Member States, regional and other partners.

In 2014, the summit of peacekeeping was held in New York where Japanese Prime Minister announced the Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP) and its support. The following year 2015, TPP commenced Heavy Engineering Equipment course in Nairobi, Kenya. Also, the same year, the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations issued their assessment report, in which the Panel empathized partnership for uniting the strengths for peace.

In 2018, the Secretary-General, António Guterres launched “Action for Peacekeeping (A4P),” which announced its goal “to improve peacekeeping partnerships.” It intended to enhance collaboration and planning between the UN and regional organizations including the African Union and the European Union.

The last year 2023, “New Agenda for Peace” made recommendations for an action “Strengthen peace operations and partnerships.”

This year, 2024, UN Secretariat and independent panel published an independent study titled “The Future of Peacekeeping, New Models, and Related Capabilities.”



The graph on the left indicates the number of non-UN peace support missions in time series. We can identify the number has increased since 2003. They have been responding to crises for the same purposes of the UN peace operations. That is to say, the outstanding feature of partnership for peacekeeping has been observed.

Some researches indicate that parallel deployments of the UN and non-UN partner missions are more effective than individual peacekeeping missions by the UN or other organizations. While the UN has a broad toolbox and takes a multidimensional approach to peace support, non-UN missions have primarily been composed of troops and supported the military approach of the crisis response. That being said, they both define respective strategies and work through their own mechanisms. As a result of this, the respective organizations can reinforce each other in parallel deployments. This is presumably one reason why the UN has placed importance on the partnership with non-UN missions.

Looking at the right graph, the number of UN peacekeeping missions has been decreasing since 2017. If the tendency continues, it would be predicted that peacekeeping would depend on non-UN missions more than the status quo.

“A New Agenda for Peace” and UNSCR 2719 in 2023

- **A New Agenda for Peace**

- **Action 8: Strengthen peace operations and partnerships**

- **Action 9: Address peace enforcement**

- **Action 10: Support to African Union and subregional peace support operations**

- ⇒ Outsourcing peacekeeping to the regional partners?
- ⇒ Enough capacity to deploy multidimensional peacekeeping operations?
- ⇒ What specific forms of support are required for the AUPSO?
- ⇒ Possibility of developing multilateral actions within the UN framework?

- **UNSCR 2719 (2023.12.21)**

- ⇒ Including a cap of 75% financing (the remaining 25% gap)
- ⇒ UN-AU coordination mechanisms should be improved.


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Being aware that the UN peacekeeping was amid of a crossroads, you can recognize 2 landmarks in 2023.

First, UN secretariat issued “A New Agenda for Peace”, aiming at promoting the following three actions concerning peace operations and peace enforcement. This raises awareness on so called outsourcing peacekeeping to the regional partners, accountability for requirement of capacity development, and support for AU peace support operations and feasibility.

Second, in December, the Security Council adopted resolution 2719, which is an important step to further implementation of the partnership between the United Nations and African Union. Then, the United Nations can finance up to 75% of the AU peace support operations, but the remaining question is pointed out how to cover the 25% burden-sharing gap. Also, in order to successfully implement resolution 2719, some researches recommend that the UN-AU coordination mechanisms should be improved for more practical use.

“The Future of Peacekeeping, New Models, and Related Capabilities” in October 2024



The Future of Peacekeeping, New Models, and Related Capabilities

October 2024



Figure 1: Models for Future UN Peacekeeping

1. Preventive Deployments	11. Election Security and Assistance	21. Natural Disaster Response
2. At-Risk Prevention	12. Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration	22. Humanitarian Accompaniment / Protection
3. Protection of Civilians	13. Security Sector Reform and Governance	23. Cultural Heritage Protection
4. Creative Monitoring and Observation	14. Rule of Law / Law Enforcement Support	24. Natural Resource Protection
5. Monitoring, Observation, and Reporting	15. Police Assistance	25. Border Management
6. Verification	16. Support to Accountability Mechanisms	26. Infrastructure Security
7. Support of Peace Agreements	17. Counter-Organized Crime	27. Cybersecurity
8. New State Support	18. Mine Action / Explosive Ordnance Removal	28. Regional Security
9. Transition Assistance	19. Emergency Humanitarian Response	29. City Security
10. Transitional Administration	20. Public Health Support	30. Maritime Security

- Could be designed and combined to the tasks in the field
- Could offer flexibility by helping to design different phases of an operation
- Not rigid templates, but a flexible list of options (to use them and do planning)
- The need for investments in key capabilities
- Would not deliver the desired results if the Council is divided, unwilling or unable

Finally, I would like to touch upon a recent study to illustrate this. In October this year, the UN Department of Peace Operations published an independent study titled “The Future of Peacekeeping, New Models, and Related Capabilities.” The authors mention “This study’s vision for UN peacekeeping is a politically focused, people-centered, modular tool that can unite the Security Council around effective multilateral responses to a broad range of threats and challenges.”

The study offers 30 models to inform future UN missions, as shown in this slide. There are the traditional tasks and the activities for future UN peacekeeping. These models could be designed and combined to implement related clusters of tasks in the field. And then, the Security Council and Secretariat could develop nimble, flexible, and adaptable modalities to sustain and improve peacekeeping missions. This modular approach could also offer flexibility by helping to design different phases of a peacekeeping operation across its life cycle.

Also, I would like to mention that the study highlights the need for investments in key capabilities to strengthen current and future peacekeeping missions, irrespective of the precise combination of models and mandates. They relate to planning, personnel, leadership, and support capabilities.

Last but not least, the UN peacekeeping has remained as one of the most effective existing tools for creating safe and stable environments and for facilitating peace processes. Because of this, peacekeeping operations are valuable for working on with the UN, Member States, regional organizations, peacekeeping training centers, and other partners to make peace operations more effective and feasible.

This concludes my presentation. Thank you very much for your attention.

Keynote Speech

Major General (Retired) Raja Aftab Khan, Principal, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, National University of Sciences and Technology, Pakistan




Thank you very much. Respected Commandant Joint Staff College, General YAJIMA, Excellencies, members of the panel, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, I wish you all a very good morning and Konnichiwa. It is a matter of great honor and pride that I am here among the galaxy of intellectuals and academia and so many bright minds. I'm really humbled to be asked to speak at this august forum right at the outset. I must accept that I am no expert on this subject and I'm here to learn from your experience and your knowledge. Therefore, my presentation will be very generic in nature and I will leave the specialist part to the panel. As it is said that for a cobbler, the shoemaker, the solution to all problems is one precision and highly technical piece of equipment that he has: a hammer. Likewise, for all problems, for a military man, the solution is war and violence. But then, who else would know the actual meaning of peace? Who else would appreciate actual peace other than the one who is involved in peacemaking and fighting day in, day out with a hope to eventually find peace in the world? My deepest thanks to the Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense, Japanese government for the invite, as coming to Japan has brought so many pleasant memories of the time. As you asked, Sir, about 33 years ago when I was a young captain undergoing advanced officer training at *Fujigakko*, it has brought a lot of good memories for me. So, I'm very, very happy to come back to Japan. Thank you so much for your assistance.

During my 36 years of military career, I served as a military observer in East Timor and a battalion commander in Sierra Leone. Incidentally, both are classic examples of partnership peacekeeping and, fortunately both were very successful UN missions. Thereafter, I've been involved in planning and

conducting a number of counter-terrorism operations back home and currently, as I've been introduced, I am heading an institution which is involved in training the peacekeepers from across the world.



My format of presentation will be something like this. First of all, I will give you our humble participation of Pakistan in peacekeeping operations. Thereafter, we will discuss the prevailing situation, prevailing environment in which the UN and the peacekeeping missions find themselves in the mission area. Then we'll talk about partnership peacekeeping and lastly, not exactly a way forward but some suggestions about how we should go about it.




Pakistan has been involved in peacekeeping missions for the last 64 years. Our journey started back in 1960 when our first mission was deployed in Congo.



Thereafter, we continued and still continue to support peace missions under the flag of the UN. All told, Pakistan has so far deployed 235,000 troops in 29 countries. Pakistan remained the top troop-contributing country in the 2000s and now also remains in the top three troop-contributing countries for 18 years. We have contributed a number of troops as shown on the slide: 149 infantry battalions, engineer companies, logistic companies, artillery regiments, aviation assets, and so on, and the journey, as I said, still continues.





After the repatriation of our 1600 plus soldiers from Congo this year, we still have deployed around 2,600 personnel and infantry battalions and assets as shown.




Since 2017, over 450 female Pakistani peacekeepers have served under the UN flag. Pakistan meets the Uniform Gender Parity Strategy. We have 20% of all our staff officers and military observers. It was a great achievement when in 2019 Pakistan deployed the first all-female engagement team with 15 female peacekeepers in DRC Congo. Two of our female peacekeepers, Major Komal and Major Sonia Safdar, received the Gender Advocacy Award from the UN.

In Service of Humanity
The Ultimate SACRIFICE

 **181** Pakistani Peacekeepers

 **Dag Hammarskjold Medal**
 Commissioned 6 Oct 1998
102 held by Pakistan

The medal is a posthumous award by the UN to peacekeepers who lost their lives for the noble cause of global peace.



Now the ultimate sacrifice: 181 peacekeepers have so far given the ultimate sacrifice in the service of humanity, which includes 23 officers, and we have received 102 medals for our participation, contribution, and sacrifice.

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF SECRETARY GENERAL
6 Pakistani Peacekeepers & Diplomats have Served in the Leadership Roles


 Lt General Maqsood Ahmad, HI(M) Military Advisor to UNUSG 2013 -16	 Syed Iqbal Riza SRSG Bosnia 1996-97	 Sheharyar Khan SRSG Rwanda 1994-96
 Sahibzada Yaqub Ali SRSG Western Sahara 1992-97	 Jamsheed Kai Kobad Special Advisor to UNSG 1997 - 99	 Ashraf Jehangir Qazi SRSG Iraq & Sudan - 2004 -10



A number of senior diplomats and officers have held various senior positions in the UN.




Seven Pakistani army officers have remained force commanders in various UN missions as shown.



And eight chief military observers and deputy force commanders have served in UN missions.

LEADERSHIP
ROLE

DEPUTY FORCE
COMMANDER



Brigadier Amer Umrani is the present Dy Force
Commander in Abyei

And right now, we have one deputy force commander, Brigadier Amer.



UN POLICE
PARTICIPATION



MR FAISAL SHAHKAR

UN POLICE ADVISOR

Appointed as the **Police Adviser** in the **UNDPO**
since **Nov 2022**



HELENA IQBAL SAEED


UN POLICE COMMISSIONER

First Pakistani woman appointed as **UN Police
Commissioner in Khartoum Sudan till 2023**

In police participation, Mr. Faisal Shahkar has been the police advisor in UNDPO since May 2022. We had Ms. Helena Iqbal Saeed; she was the first woman from Pakistan to be appointed as UN police commissioner in Khartoum.



Let me introduce the Center for International Peace and Stability where I'm working right now.




Though it is a relatively new center, we have so far conducted 218 different courses.

We have trained 4,000 plus peacekeepers, which included 894 allied officers from 47 different countries. In instructor exchange programs, our 24 instructors have gone to different training institutions to impart education.

REVISION OF UN TRAINING MANUALS	
2020/24	Revision of UN Staff Officer Course Training Material Revision of Counter EOD Manual Revision of Counter IED Manual
2018/19	Co-Chaired & Hosted the revision of Peacekeeping Int Handbook Revision of UN Manual on Health Care Quality & Patient Safety Chaired the Revision of UN Aviation Unit Manual Revision of UN Infantry Battalion Manual Updation of Leadership Toolkit for Challenges Forum Updation of Combat Medics Curriculum Updation of UNMO Manual
2017	Revision of UN Manual of Engineer Units
2016	Co-Chaired and hosted the revision of UN Int Handbook Chaired the revision of IED Survivability Handbook
2015	Chaired the revision of UN Aviation Unit Manual

Pakistan has actively contributed to the Revisions of 17 UN Manuals

Pakistan is the Author of UN Manual on Aviation



Now Pakistan has actively contributed to the revision of 17 UN manuals. Pakistan is the author of the manual on aviation. This is a great achievement for us.

Conferences and Meetings

Let me talk about conferences and meetings that we have conducted.



Last year we conducted the UN Ministry Prep Meet in August.



This year, last month, we had the annual conference of IAPTC in November.

***Pakistan will be hosting the UN Ministerial
Prep Meet in Islamabad in March 2025***



We plan to host the UN Ministerial Meet in Islamabad in March 2025.




Ladies and gentlemen, Pakistan is committed to playing an active role in bringing peace and stability to the most troubled parts of the world under the UN flag.




Now coming over to the actual theme that has been given. We are living in a constantly and rapidly changing world. Peacekeeping was a relatively easy task in yesteryear.

THE **BEGINNINGS** OF UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

 **UNTSO (1948): 1ST UN Peacekeeping Mission in the Golan Heights**
UN Truce Supervision Organization


- To monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Arab neighbors.

 **UNMOGIP (1949):**
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

- Deployed to monitor ceasefire between India & Pakistan
- To observe and report ceasefire violations.

Operational & Structural Features (Early Missions)

- Limited Scope: Monitoring, reporting & confidence-building
- Small-scale, **male-dominated** contingents
- Contributions primarily from a few countries
- Composed of **MOs and lightly armed troops**



It started with a simple ceasefire monitoring supervision organization in 1948 and UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) in 1949. So, Pakistan was by default involved in peacekeeping right from its independence in 1947. The first mission that came to Pakistan was in 1949. UN peacekeeping goals were very limited at that time as you can see that it was only monitoring and reporting and confidence building. It was basically male-dominated contingents from very few countries, and military observers and lightly armed troops were employed.



The UN has always been and continues to be looked upon as a symbol of hope for the most vulnerable people around the world. All said and done, the UN, as we see, has fared indeed very well in keeping the hopes and smiles alive.

A Symbol of **HOPE**



UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

- 
OVER 2 Million PEACEKEEPERS
TROOPS, POLICE AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
- 
OVER 125 COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTED
- 
71 PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS | IN 40 States

UN Peacekeeping: Saving Lives, Providing Hope,
Empowering the Vulnerable.

Since its first peacekeeping mission, the UN has deployed over 2 million peacekeepers, police, and civilian personnel from 125 countries in 71 peacekeeping missions in 40 states.

The journey though has not easy and smooth. The UN peacekeeping had to constantly adapt to meet the demands of the diverse, complex scenarios and ever-changing political landscape.

THE EVOLUTION IN UN PEACEKEEPING

ADAPTING TO DYNAMIC CONFLICT LANDSCAPES

- Peacekeeping has continuously evolved to address diverse conflict scenarios and shifting political contexts.
- Modern peacekeeping extends beyond traditional roles to include multifaceted mandates.

MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS


- Facilitate the Political Process
- Protect Civilians
- DDR & SSR
- Supervise Elections
- Protect Human Rights
- Rebuilding Infrastructure
- Restoring the Rule of Law

United Nations had entered an **“Era of partnership peacekeeping.”**
UNSG Ban Ki-moon (2015)

Today's peacekeeping operations are called upon not only to maintain peace and security but also to facilitate a long list. Some of them are to facilitate political processes, protect civilians, disarm combatants, supervise elections, monitor human rights, rebuild infrastructure, restore the rule of law, and the list goes on and on. As the proverbial ‘Christmas Tree’ referred to by some, the multiplicity of the mandate and enormity of the implied tasks weighed heavily on the traditional peacekeeping missions. It is therefore, in a 2015 report, that the then-Secretary General announced that a new “Era of partnership peacekeeping” had started.



Let me explain the prevailing environment in which the UN itself and all the peacekeeping missions and the troops find themselves. In a very short way, I would describe the prevailing environment.



Since the end of the Cold War era, we have seen an increase in conflicts around the world. Out of the total 71 missions that the UN has authorized, 56 have been launched in the post-Cold War era. So only 15 were launched during the Cold War and 56 were launched after the Cold War era finished. So, we see a remarkable increase in the mission areas and the conflicts around the world.

On the one hand, the conflict zones increased, and we see on the other hand the funding and deployment of troops going down from 8.3 billion and 104,000 peacekeepers in 2014-15 to around 6.1 billion budget and 68,000 peacekeepers deployed now. There has been no UN mission authorized since 2014 and only 11 missions remain active under the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Five missions have been closed since 2017. On a lighter note, I was talking to someone that the fiscal budget of the New York Police Department is something like 5.6 billion, and we have here 6.1 billion for the entire UN peacekeeping.

UN PEACEKEEPING IN A COMPLEX WORLD

- **SHIFT IN GLOBAL TRENDS (POST-COLD WAR ERA)**

- **P5 and Global Power Contestation**



- **Regional players (e.g, AU, ECOWAS, EU) entering peacekeeping**



Another thing that we see is the global power contestation, which has divided the P5 and has affected the strategic decision-making at the Security Council level. So, this is a new thing that has come up as the transition from a unipolar world to a multipolar world. The superpowers have their own interests at stake, so there is a divide in the Security Council which is impacting the decisions.

The growing number of players, regional and subregional players, are entering the arena and though it is a helping hand to the UN, we can't rule out that there could be some vested interest or conflict of interest.

UN PEACEKEEPING IN A COMPLEX WORLD


- **Emergence of Private Military Security Companies (PMSCs)**
 - Highly trained & well equipped
 - Cost efficient
 - Rapid reaction capability
- **Expanding Threat Landscape**
 - Terrorist groups, religious extremist groups, human weapon & drug traffickers, mercenaries and so on.
 - Increased use of Asymmetric Tactics; IEDs, terrorist attacks, ambushes, exploit human shields etc.

"To keep the environment vitiated"

The emergence of private military and security companies, though they are highly trained, well-equipped, cost-effective, and have rapid reaction capability, but with little or no oversight and accountability, it certainly tends to dent the standing and repute of the United Nations if operating in the same zone.

Then the widening of the threat spectrum. This has hit the UN missions very badly, including terrorist groups, religious extremist groups, human, weapon, and drug traffickers, mercenaries, and so on. Interestingly, all with a unified motive to create turmoil and keep the environment vitiated for their own interest. Though it suits their agenda, it has serious implications for our peacekeeping missions.

Now the use of asymmetric tactics; the use of IEDs, terrorist attacks, raids, and ambushes of UN convoys, exploiting human shields, and very difficultly. The impact is that the UN blue helmets have themselves become a target of these terrorist actions by these terrorist and religious extremist groups.



We can see that since its inception, the UN has had over 4,000, to be precise, 4,398 peacekeepers who have given their lives in the line of duty. However, the impunity and aggressiveness with which the peacekeepers are being attacked now are unprecedented. Just to give an idea, from 1948 to 1991, in 43 years, 886 peacekeepers lost their lives, and just in the last 32 years, 3,332 peacekeepers have lost their lives. So, there's a drastic increase in the action against our peacekeepers by these terrorist elements.

UN PEACKEEPING IN A COMPLEX WORLD

- **Climate & Environmental Challenges**
 - Impact of climate change
 - Natural disasters exacerbating instability in conflict zones
- **Eroding Trust & Perceptions**
 - **MDMH** – Damaging the perception of UN peacekeeping missions, leading to trust deficit.
- **Diversity & Operational Challenges**
 - Multinational peacekeeping forces with different languages, training, equipment and motivation level; yet striving to bring peace amidst immense challenges




The emergence of private military companies, climate, and environmental challenges have impacted the lives and livelihoods of common people, forcing them into forced migration, relocation, and food shortages. This ultimately results in a security situation and impacts our peacekeepers deployed in the mission.

Another aspect is MDMH that we have been talking a lot about: misinformation, disinformation, malformation, and hate speech. This is creating effects beyond proportion by forming negative perceptions about the intent, working, and efficiency of the UN mission, and thus it is creating a gulf between the common people and the UN personnel. Bond and trust between local people and personnel is one of the most important aspects for a successful mission. I will not hesitate to regard it as the most important at the operational and tactical level, since it has strategic implications. When a peace operation loses popular support, the support of the people, it is less likely to fulfill its mandate. Now among all this, we find our peacekeepers from different countries, speaking different languages, having different training standards, using different equipment, and having different motivation levels, yet striving hard to bring and maintain peace and stability. One can witness the landscape of the mission area is overcrowded with a variety of players.



Now imagine there are two football teams on the ground with a few linemen and an old referee. Things may still seem manageable though they are working hard to meet the mandate, but still, things seem to be manageable.



But now imagine the same football ground with six football teams inside and eight linemen, two referees, no goalkeeper, and a host of crowds. It is a sure recipe for disaster that is actually what peacekeepers and UN missions are facing right now in the mission area.

PARTNERSHIP IN PEACEKEEPING: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Post-Cold War Dynamics Two major developments:

1. **Increase in Conflict Zones:** Abruptly rising numbers of conflict zones necessitated immediate responses
2. **Split within P5:** A major split within the Permanent Five (P5) resulted in gridlocks, affecting consensus required for strategic decisions.

Whereas the former stretched the capacity of the UN to its limits; the later necessitated looking for other options

Two things that came up after the Cold War. One was an increase in conflict zones as we discussed and the second was a split in the P5, which impacted the decision-making process where the first one stretched the capacity of the UN to its limit. The latter necessitated looking for other options. Partners were needed to fill the gap and address the situation.

INTERNATIONAL DAY OF UN PEACEKEEPERS | 29 MAY

PEOPLE PEACE PROGRESS
THE POWER OF PARTNERSHIP

“PARTNERSHIP in Peacekeeping more than a choice; it is a **Strategic Necessity**”

“We cannot succeed alone. Under the Action for Peacekeeping initiative, and its A4P+ implementation plan, we will work to cultivate and develop these partnerships and to further improve the effectiveness and impact of peacekeeping.”

JEAN-PIERRE LACROIX
Under-Secretary-General
for Peace Operations

UN

Therefore, as it is said, partnership in peacekeeping is not only a choice but now a strategic necessity.

***UN has never been the only peacekeeper,
nor is partnership peacekeeping a novel concept***

40% peacekeeping deployments were non UN

Authorized Endorsed Supported

The UN has never been the only stakeholder, has never been the only peacekeeper, nor partnership is a novel idea. 40% of the deployments so far were non-UN missions, though authorized, endorsed, and supported by the UN Security Council. So peacekeeping is not a novel idea. It was already and it has still been there.

Now in partnership peacekeeping, the non-UN elements, mostly military, take on the violent warring factions, bring a semblance of stability, and create space for the UN multidimensional prong to address the political, developmental, social, economic, and administrative issues. This combination works well as they complement each other's efforts to bring peace and stability in the conflict zone.



**FORMS OF PARTNERSHIP
PEACEKEEPING**

- 1. Non-UN/Regional Forces Led Operation; UN in Support Role:** Provision of financial, technical and logistical assistance to bolster regional or non-UN forces.
- 2. UN Led Operation; Non-UN Forces in Support Role:**
 - Sequential Deployment
 - Contemporaneous Deployment
- 3. Tradition UN Peacekeeping Operations**

Partnership peacekeeping can take many forms. It can be a non-UN-led operation and the UN provides supports like logistical assistance and technical assistance to the regional or non-UN forces. Second would be that the UN leads the operation and non-UN forces support the operation by sequential deployment or contemporaneous deployment. Both have been done in the past. And third is the traditional UN peacekeeping operations.

The UN has undertaken numerous peace operations, as I said, in partnership with regional organizations, coalition states, and even individual member states, with varying degrees of success in bringing stability.

Timor-Leste (1999)




- Post-referendum violence overwhelmed the **UNAMET**
- Australia-led **INTERFET** stabilized the situation, paving the way for peacekeeping mission.
Focus: Return, reconciliation, reintegration, and elections



Some of the examples I would quote here are like East Timor where I first served as a military observer. We saw that after the 1999 referendum, East Timor went into an intense phase of violence. The situation became highly challenging for the UN political mission. In response, the Security Council authorized a multinational force led by Australia to intervene forcefully. Swift action controlled the violence, creating the necessary space and conditions for a comprehensive UN peacekeeping mission to follow.

I was there when UNTAET (UN Transitional Administration in East Timor) was there, and thereafter the return of the refugees, the return of the rebels, reconciliation, and reintegration back into society took place, followed by elections and ensuring normalcy to return in East Timor.

Somalia



- African Union Mission in Somalia (**AMISOM**) transitioned into the AU Transitional Mission in Somalia (**ATMIS**) in partnership with the UN. Will be transiting into AUSSOM in 2025.
- Currently UNTMIS.


Similarly, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was launched in 2007, one of the most prominent AU-led operations established to stabilize Somalia, combat the extremist group Al-Shabaab, and support the establishment of a functioning government there. When the AU went in, it was soon confronted with serious resource inadequacies. The UN's complete support first to the AU and then to the Somali government made a significant and lasting contribution to the mission.

Central African Republic




- **MINUSCA** and **French Sangaris** forces operated under a Security Council mandate. Collaboration resulted in a significant reduction in violence.

In 2014, the UN deployed MINUSCA amidst escalating violence in CAR. Simultaneously, French Sangris forces operated under a UN Security Council mandate. It provided critical military support to reduce the violent cases. Sangris and the UN forces were deployed and operated in parallel for two years. During this time, the level of violence decreased significantly and this dynamic engagement has also been well recognized as “partnership peacekeeping.”



Next is about the UN hybrid peacekeeping operation in Sudan. It did a good job, mostly protecting the people who were in the refugee camps, otherwise, it could have been very difficult for them. But the UN could not produce all the desired results because of a number of issues of legitimacy. There were ongoing challenges by the Sudanese government itself, rebel factions, and civilian society groups. The mission started with a lot of hope and exuberance. However, it ended up with some people giving remarks that this model may not be ameliorated in the future.



The deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in Congo also generated a lot of discussion, but it helped counter the activities of M23. There were a lot of problems for the common people, a lot of killing, and a lot of security situations. So the Force Intervention Brigade was deployed, it achieved its mission, brought a lot of semblance of peace and security among the people, and provided the UN mission with much-needed space to continue achieving its goal. So these examples just highlight the significant importance and necessity of partnership peacekeeping to effectively respond to the complexities of the conflict in today's environment. FIB in Congo and AMISOM are examples that showed some complications in such partnerships requiring greater planning and clarity at all levels.

PARTNERSHIP IN PEACEKEEPING

On one hand it shares the load of the UN and provides a way out for gridlocked UNSC; and on the other hand it has all the possibility to adversely impact its reputation and credibility.

A lot of studies have been carried out on traditional peacekeeping missions. Studies on partnership peacekeeping are relatively less, but whatever has been written and done is of exceptionally high quality. A close study of such missions indicates that partnership peacekeeping has some glaring strengths and challenges as well. On one hand, it shares the load of the UN and provides a way out for the gridlocked UN Security Council, and on the other hand, it has all the possibility to impact negatively the reputation and credibility of the UN also.

ANALYSIS OF PARTNERSHIP PEACEKEEPING

STRENGTHS

Proximity and Readiness	Efficient Deployment
Contextual Understanding	Political Influence
Standardization	Operational Synergy



Now some of the strengths are highlighted here. The regional and subregional forces are readily available near the conflict zone with fewer bureaucratic hurdles. Their deployment is swift. They have knowledge of the historical, social, and cultural dimensions of the people and the issue. Therefore, they can tailor the best-suited response according to the situation. It can, however, exert sufficient regional political influence, and we have relatively standardized training, equipment, language, and motivation. If both UN and non-UN partners are employed together either sequentially or in parallel, they tend to produce good synergetic results. Non-UN partners being military-heavy immediately respond to the violence, whereas the UN concentrates on other issues like social and political development and settlement of long-lasting issues for stability.



Some challenges are that the regional and state organizations may have competing political and economic interests in the region and they might affect the principle of impartiality and human rights. Non-UN partners are predominantly military-heavy and violent in nature and apply the same for situation stabilization. Therefore, it has the possibility of tarnishing the image of the UN which claims to be impartial and neutral in all situations. High-handedness at times displayed and excesses committed will have serious implications for the physical security of the UN military and civilian personnel and the possibility of operational confusion. Due to a variety of reasons like ambiguity of role and expected tasks, miscommunication, and lack of coordination can hinder the peacekeeping operation.

Now lastly, not a demerit but a caveat that UN peacekeepers can decrease violence even if deployed alone and they can effectively mitigate violence when deployed along with a non-UN partner. However, we must understand that non-UN partners cannot decrease violence in the long run. They can decrease violence in the short term, but since it is only military-specific and lacks the other tools that the UN has, the study says that it cannot decrease the violence in the long run.



Now, not actually a way forward, but some observations about partnership peacekeeping and peacekeeping in general. In spite of the prevalent geopolitical fragmentation and the shortcomings which surface during various peacekeeping operations, studies and analysis show that the UN remains the most credible and globally accepted organization, which has all the wherewithal to conduct multidimensional peacekeeping operations.



Similarly, despite some irritants in partnership peacekeeping, its merits largely outweigh its demerits. With astute planning and coordination with all stakeholders, it certainly has the capability to mitigate violence and bring stability to the conflict zone.

Now, what should be done? Leaders of global and regional states and organizations, members of states of the United Nations, United Nations Security Council, African Union Peace and Security Council all understand the gravity of the situation confronted by the world at the moment. Pursuing national interests is fine, but there is a need for the powers to sit down and decide the aspects which should take precedence over all other interests, which is the shared goal and the shared vision of a better world. The sooner it is done, the better it will be. Partnership peacekeeping, as we have seen, is going to be the new norm in the foreseeable future. Old paradigms are changing and it is important that this new reality is accepted and proper mechanisms are put in place to ensure the smooth launching of collaborative, supportive, and mutually complementary partnership peacekeeping operations.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719 is a commendable step in this direction. It is a watershed resolution, which when formalized systems and procedures are put in place will empower the AU to effectively undertake robust actions to address the threats being faced by the continent having global implications. Though the resolution has been passed, there are a number of discussion cases there and it needs to be formalized and systemized. The further environment and mission areas are likely to remain overly volatile and vitiated in foreseeable future. Enormity of threat to peacekeepers and civilians will have to be seriously factored in while ‘planning and deciding the mandates’ and ‘configuring and resourcing the troops’ for any future operation. Ambiguity in mandates, overlapping responsibilities, and resource constraints cause inefficiency and conflict between the partners, which must be avoided.

Only time and the global environment will tell whether large-scale traditional UN missions will be authorized or not in the future; however, smart, agile, and well-equipped partnership peacekeeping

deployments may be the new norm. It'll be appropriate that regional and non-UN forces operate in complete coordination, harmonizing their operational strategies with the UN.

There is a dire need that the political prong of the UN, the UN DPPA, should be strengthened and empowered to address the root causes of the problems. Though they're already empowered to do that, they need to step forward and be more visible. They should be empowered in coordination with the regional and global partners. SPMs should be taking the center stage in identifying and resolving the issues seen by the mission areas. Early identification of simmering problems and preventive, diplomatic, and political actions is likely to yield better results. This will be many times more cost-effective than going after the volcano has erupted and the fallout becomes unmanageable.

There is one more aspect that needs study and attention: the correct interpretation of the notion of "Success." Various studies show that generally, within 10 years of a so-called successful UN mission, the country falls back into the cycle of disturbance and violence. Immediate stabilization should not be taken as a measure of success and the end result; rather building systems and structures to withstand the aftershocks should be aimed at; and then success should be measured and declared through the test of time.

In order to harmonize training standards, it is imperative to conduct joint pre-deployment training of troops; or at least commanders and master trainers from different states and troop-contributing countries. The role of all international and regional training organizations and associations assumes added importance under the guidance of UNITS. Now, most of our contingents are trained and equipped for traditional peacekeeping, but the threat today is asymmetrical. It is imperative that the troop-contributing countries must train their troops accordingly to effectively neutralize the threats when encountered. The troops must be trained in subjects like anti-ambush drills, support convoy movement safety, counter-IED procedures, early warning information to protect their troops, protection from raids on compounds, and medical and first aid qualities. In Pakistan, we have a massive counter-terrorism training center at Pabbi where all regiments earmarked for UN missions are extensively trained for four to six months before their deployment.

International organizations may lack local knowledge leading to ineffective strategies. It is therefore imperative to cooperate and incorporate regional organizations and local stakeholders at the planning and decision-making stage. It is of utmost importance that we look at the problem through the prisms of local perspectives. History, traditions, and cultures of locals must always be factored in.

Every troop-contributing country, training institution, and the UN must establish repositories for best practices and lessons learned from all previous missions. Though every new mission might have different dynamics requiring a different approach, yet best practices will help reduce wastage of time in reinventing the wheel, ensure better and considered decision-making, protection of personnel, and ultimately increase the prospects of successful mission and mandate accomplishment.

It is imperative to leverage the technology of advanced nations to enhance the intelligence-gathering and sharing capacity of the peacekeepers using secure and interoperable communication systems in order to avoid confusion and take timely and correct decisions. Similarly, advanced nations must share counter-IED technology to provide physical and psychological security for the mission personnel. The impact of MDMH and social media vandalism is devastating. Even the most advanced countries are struggling with the issue. Serious efforts in this regard are required by technologically advanced nations. Some stringent legislation will also be considered by the UN to rein in the platforms being utilized by the perpetrators.

UN and non-UN forces must be trained and prepared to engage regularly with the local community, not just fortnightly routine visits. Winning the trust of the common man is half the job done. It is important for the peacekeepers to understand when a common man meets him, he is taking and accepting the risk of being persecuted by the miscreant/rebel. In return, the peacekeeper is ethically and morally duty-bound to be with the oppressed ones through thick and thin.

Though peacekeeping operations are not warfighting per se, the troops deployed are all trained for this job. They are trained throughout their careers to face threats, and uncertain situations, get in and do the needful. There is no place for second thoughts and a laid-back approach. Almost all missions are mandated to protect civilians and allow the use of force for self-defense and defense of the mandate. Swift, robust, and effect-based actions must be taken to ensure both. Only by being with the people in testing times does the mission actually get the trust and “Consent” of the people. It should be realized that people enhance and expand the parameter of security of the peacekeeper. A paradigm shift in mindset is essential in this regard. Today's peacekeeping is not the ordinary peacekeeping of the good old days. It is asymmetric warfare, one who displays initiative, aggressiveness, alertness, and unorthodox and innovative character and remains unpredictable will carry the day. A simple litmus test in today's environment is to see who enjoys the freedom of movement. The one who enjoys the freedom of movement is the victor and the one who does not have the freedom of movement will be vanquished sooner or later. Peacekeeping is the order of the day. A lot of work is being done in this regard.

It took more than 15 years for resolution 2719 to materialize. Irritants and impediments in it should be ironed out by the Security Council and African Union to make it effective. Lastly, I would say that in spite of functional problems that were highlighted in various partnership peacekeeping missions, it remains the most effective and viable tool to address the multitude of security issues being confronted by the world and bring some solace to the lives of poor, helpless, and innocent masses.

Thank you very much. I thank you all.

Panel Discussion

Moderator: Dr. SHINODA Hideaki, Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

Thank you very much for the kind introduction. My name is SHINODA. I'm going to chair the panel discussion.


In the first part of the panel discussion up to 4:35, we are going to have presentations by distinguished panelists in this panel. As much as possible, we might promote mutual conversations as well as dialogues with the audience by taking questions. After a 10-minute minutes break, we will resume the session at 4:45 and then we will continue our discussion up to 5:45, almost an hour for mainly questions and answers or any kind of mutual discussions. So please raise your hands in the audience if you come up with questions or any kinds of comments. We have a very much distinguished diplomatic core. We are very much interested in benefiting from your insights and then SDF colleagues should have their own perspectives. So, we look forward to having your views, and that applies to any other academic or other guest seated here.

We are sure that we will have an audience on the internet too. If you ask questions especially before the next session during the 10-minute minutes break, JPC colleagues will give me your questions and then we will try to answer as many questions as possible even if you ask questions from the internet panel.



Before I ask the panelists to make a presentation, I would like to make a brief comment myself on today's topic.

Thank you very much for showing the record of my publications. I have 15 or 16 or so single authored books under my individual name.



I would like to highlight one of the latest ones. This is under the title of “Partnership Peace Operations.” I have actually the publication which topic is partnership peace operations, and this does not mean that I influenced the topic of the symposium. I was influenced by the growing trend of paying attention to this issue.

So, I'm just one of those normal watchers of the development of the community of international peace operations in which everyone is aware or paying attention to this trend of importance of partnership peace operations.



Two, three weeks ago I went to Kenya to work as a facilitator for the leadership academy, which the government of Japan supported. Thanks to this benevolent opportunity, I met the executive director of IGAD, a sub-regional organization in East Africa. I was able to meet him to discuss several issues at IGAD headquarters.



I actually enjoyed the opportunity to spend three days with female leaders, potential leaders selected from seven countries of IGAD members including countries like Sudan and so on. And that was a wonderful opportunity to spend three days as a facilitator on that occasion. This is kind of a part of the big story of partnership.

Japan wants to contribute to operations directly or through donations in kind, but more capacity building and development-oriented partnership. Maybe one of the ideas that Japan should be interested in and then I was very much privileged to be part of it in Africa or sometimes in Japan. I get engaged with similar kinds of issues occasionally, quite often, quite frankly.



At this moment in East Africa, this case of Somalia is a very much crucial case of partnership, international peace operations. We have ATMIS, which is going to evolve at some point very soon in January 2025.



The United Nations is helping the AU through political missions. Logistical missions to collaborating with the federal government of Somalia too. And though there are many political issues, operational issues and so on.

As well as regional issues too. As General Khan has said, there are merits as well as perhaps unfortunately demerits, disadvantages of partnership peace operations. But with all these elements we shall have to go perhaps this is the final one.

So, in summary, I would like to say three points as regards partnership peace operations as an author of the book entailing that thematic issue in the book. One is that as General Khan has already stated very clearly there are so many advantages in the aspects of international peace operations. So, we are very much interested in developing the advantages of international peace operations, partnership operations so that we can always constantly study the way to enrich each operation by pursuing great possibilities of international partnership, international peace operations positively.

Secondly, however, somewhat negative aspects of partnership are inevitable. Why? Because we have so many armed conflicts unfortunately or even potential tensions among some of the stakeholders in key regions while peacekeeping operations are actually shrinking, losing a good amount of budget. As a result, a good number of personnel has been reduced and so any kind of combination of various partners

would be highly welcome or almost like inevitable to respond to as many crises as possible. So, this is an inevitable path that we cannot avoid.

Thirdly, I would like to emphasize that partnership areas are so distinctive in each case. All of the partnership cases are organized in ad hoc manners. So, we have to be very creative. That's a very key issue, creative as well as perhaps that for us to be creative we have to be very flexible and anyway we have to show our ad hoc manners of leadership communication and so on.

At this moment, as we all know, that's not a secret. We don't have any battalion deployed to international peace operations from Japan. However, we remain engaged in this community through individual assignments to international peace operations, UN or non-UN missions or we remain engaged with this community by being engaged with capacity building training courses as one. In many ways, we remain engaged but each case is very distinctive. So, we have been somewhat creative. So, we should be proud of this record of being creative in being engaged with partnership peace operations in our own ways. But perhaps there is no limit to being creative. There is no rigid framework of peace operations which we just comply with. If there are many big rigid operations there, we just deploy ourselves to them and comply with the roles. But now the time is very different. We ourselves have to be very creative in utilizing our human networks, communicating with our friendly experts. By doing so, we will show our creativity in exploring different new kinds of ad hoc manners of partnership engagements. So, from this perspective, today's panel is a great opportunity to strengthen our ideas, extend our knowledge, as well as extend our human network with indispensable experts working very hard in this community.

So, I have the privilege to introduce the distinguished panelists from this perspective of the importance of partnership international peace operations. Next to me, we have the continuous privilege of having General in this panel. He doesn't make a presentation though he is ready to answer any questions up to the end point of this session. But for the time, I would like to ask other panelists to make their own presentations. First, I would like to invite Mr. Sameh representing what we call the usually triple CPA, which is quite an important capacity-building institution in the community of entire international peace operations throughout the world. So now Mr. Sameh, you have the floor please.

Panel Discussion

Mr. Ahmed Sameh, Senior Policy Coordinator, Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, Egypt



Thank you. Professor SHINODA, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues, participants, and panelists. Konnichiwa! At the outset, I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to the Joint Staff College of the Ministry of Defense of Japan, as well as the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center for organizing this very timely edition of the International Peace and Security Symposium and for extending the invitation to the Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCPA). It's an honor to be here, especially since the theme of this symposium focuses on partnerships, a priority whose importance continues to grow as we navigate the future of peace operations.

Mandate & International Role

ESTABLISHED IN 1994 BY EGYPT'S MOFA AS THE CAIRO REGIONAL CENTER FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION & PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA (CCCPA)

- 2017**
Re-chartered in 2017 as the Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping & Peacebuilding
- IAPTC**
President (2017-2018) and Secretariat (2017-2027) of the IAPTC
- African Union Center of Excellence**
- Arab Civilian Training**
Only Arab civilian training center in the field of peacekeeping
- ASWAN FORUM**
The Secretariat of the Aswan Forum for Sustainable Peace and Development
- CRSP**
The Secretariat of the COP27 Presidency Initiative Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace
- AU NETT4Peace**
Co-Chair of the African Union Network of Think Tanks for Peace (NETT4Peace)

Members/Partners

NATO OTAN, Challenges Forum, EPON X

For those unfamiliar with our institution, CCCPA was established in 1994 by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a regional center for conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Africa. In 2017, we were rebranded as the Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding, reflecting our expanded international focus. We also proudly serve as an African Union Center of Excellence for Capacity Building, mandated to provide training to the North African Regional Capability (NARC), one of the main capabilities of the African Standby Force.

Additionally, we act as the executive secretariat of the Aswan Forum for Sustainable Peace and Development, as well as the COP 27 Presidency Initiative called Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace. CCCPA also assumes key leadership roles, including within the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC). Currently, Pakistan holds the presidency of this association, which gathers all peacekeeping centers around the world. It is a very important association. We also co-chair what we call the Network for Peace, an African Union network of think tanks working on peace, initiated by the Department of Political Affairs, Peace, and Security.




Since 2008, our work has centered on capacity building, convening, and research in peace operations and the broader field of peace and security. We have eight programs, including peacekeeping, peacebuilding, Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS), Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), and preventing radicalization. These programs are all interconnected. For example, in peacekeeping, we always discuss WPS and how to increase women's participation.



CCCPA carries out a variety of trainings in the field of Peace

Operations

- Pre-deployment Training (PDT) for Egyptian peacekeepers.
- North African Regional Capability (NARC) of the African Standby Force (ASF) trainings
- Senior Mission Leaders Training (SML)
- United Nations National Planners Training Program
- Protection of civilians (PoC) & Preventing Sexual Exploitation & Abuse (PSEA)
- FPU's Commanders workshop in 2020 and 2021 to implement the new "UN Standard Operating Procedures on the Assessment and Evaluation of the Formed Police Units Performance in UN Peacekeeping Operations"
- Joint Trainings in collaboration with national counterparts (Egyptian Ministries of Defense and Interior) on several different topics, such as the 'Protection of civilians' safety and security and PSEA



CCCPA Training Statistics 2008 - January 2024

333 Training and Capacity Building Courses



Over this period, we have trained more than 28,000 personnel from Egypt and Africa, including 95 pre-deployment training sessions. A total of 96 countries have benefited from our trainings, including 50 African countries.



Ladies and gentlemen, first and foremost, I would like to reaffirm CCCPA's unwavering commitment to strengthening international cooperation and peace operation trainings. This commitment is evident through our diverse roles and responsibilities, as I mentioned before. As the secretariat of the IAPTC, as co-chair of a member of the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA), we are deeply involved in advancing global peace and security.

I would also like to take this opportunity to express our deep appreciation for our enduring partnership with Japan, which has been instrumental in advancing global peace and security. Japan's steadfast support has significantly blustered CCCPA's effort in conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding across Africa.



In this context, training centers and relevant stakeholders bear the responsibility of fostering partnerships to circumvent this critical juncture


Ladies and gentlemen, in today's complex security landscape where challenges such as climate change, transnational crimes, terrorists, MDMH transcend borders, partnerships are not merely optional, they are indispensable. No single actor actually can address these multifaceted challenges alone. So effective peace operations require collaboration that leverages the strengths and resources of all stakeholders including each comparative advantage. The evolving nature of peace operations including the drawdowns of major missions like MINUSMA adds urgency to this need. Such changes complicate planning and highlight the importance of adaptable forward-looking training program that prepare our peacekeepers for rapidly changing environment.

In this context, I would like to emphasize that now more than ever, stronger partnerships among the diverse stakeholders engaged in training are urgently needed. By capitalizing on their comparative advantages and leveraging their respective expertise, we can collectively enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of peace operations. The importance of partnerships, as General Raja said and training in peace operations has been highlighted in several key frameworks.



We have included the “Pact for the Future,” the “Action for Peacekeeping” initiative, and the newly published study commissioned titled “The Future of Peacekeeping, New Models, and Related Capabilities.”

As we address the theme of partnership during this panel in maintaining peace and security, and as an African Union Center of Excellence, I would like to underscore the critical role of regional organizations in this endeavor, particularly the partnership between the UN and the African Union.



UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping at a critical juncture
A new chapter for Peace Operations
UNSCR 2719

—> **Historic Milestone that solidifies partnership between UN and AU.**

Key challenges:

- Case by case implementation
- Financial issues.
- Adapting Regulations.
- what type of missions.
- Joint working Methods
- Capacity building.

—> **Key determinant for a successful implementation is:**
POLITICAL WILL

While we all know that the UN has a primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security under the UN Charter, regional organizations are increasingly recognized as first responders in addressing peace and security challenges across the continent. African-led peace operations are often deployed in highly dangerous and volatile environments responding to complex and multifaceted crises on the ground. We have the landmark United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719 reflects this reality, cementing the partnership between the UN and the African Union and highlighting the AU's competitive advantage when it comes to addressing the Africa's unique peace and security challenges. As the two presenters before me mentioned, the resolution allows African Union-led peace operations support to access the assessed contributions, but it's capped at 75%. So, we can say that the implementation of this resolution, this milestone resolutions has significant hurdles. How are we going to secure the rest of the 25%? We have to be innovative. This is where partnerships come and if I may say as Japan is a leading country when it comes to peace operations, maybe they could contribute in this bridging the cap, the 25%. We have this financial challenge. There is a dire need to adapt the UN financial regulations to adapt with the African Union PSOs as well, particularly when it comes to compensation rates, budgeting processes and other matters type of missions in the resolution.

It was not clear what type of missions can benefit from this resolution. This ambiguity must be clarified so we can move forward. We have another thing which is very important and which is joint planning and oversight because there is a need to do so if we want to correctly implement this resolution, but we need to define the initial planning processes and we need to determine the appropriate level of oversight by the over the AU-led operations.

And last but not least, we have joint working methods. There is a dire need to strengthen cooperation between the AU Commission and the regional economic communities as well as between the two councils, the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council. The successful implementation of this resolutions beyond what we said the financial and operational issues hinges on

the political will of the key stakeholders, particularly the permanent members of the UN Security Council. So, we have to move beyond debates and take timely action because there is a lot of meetings between the two councils and right now we didn't even agree on the first case to implement this resolution. There is a need to move from debate to action. Moreover, since we are a capacity building training, there is a dire need in this regard as well. We need to enhance collaboration in providing training and capacity building for TCCs, PCCs, and for the civilian components and for the AU institution as well as EU institution responsible of peace operations to enable them to fulfill their assigned roles in alignment with the resolution.



Since 2008, Japan has been a key strategic partner of CCCPA and a strong supporter of its activities



Japan has been supporting CCCPA's Pre-deployment Trainings for Egyptian Female Military Contingents to be deployed to UN Peacekeeping missions



September 2022



December 2022



December 2022

Partnerships as I was saying, are an essential means of implementing our mandate as CCCPA of capacitating peacekeepers either Egyptians or Africans. For instance, Japan has been a steadfast supporter to CCCPA's pre-deployment training program for Egyptian military contingent participating in UN peace operation including specialized training for female military personnel.

Our partnership is further exemplified by active participation of Japanese officials and experts in CCCPA's training programs. And this collaboration underscores the rich history we share with Japan as a strategic partner with Aswan Forum for Sustainable Peace and Development. In this regard, it's worth noting the strong synergies between Aswan Forum and the TICAD as well because they both tackle peace development. Both forums prioritize building robust and resilient institution to achieve sustainable peace and development promoting African owned and led responses in line with national ownership. And I have to highlight that national ownership is extremely important when it comes to partnership. Partnership must feed into local priorities and local owned initiatives as well. Both forums prioritize as

well advancing holistic and integrated approaches that reinforce the HDP (Humanitarian, Development, Peace) nexus.

Additionally, the Japanese government has supported CCCPA in hosting several high-level events over the years related to peace operations like the 21st session of the senior mission leaders training course, the 23rd IAPTC annual conference. It was held in Egypt and a high-level regional conference on enhancing the performance of peacekeeping operations from mandate to exit in 2018. What is interesting in the last event that it culminated in the adoption of what we call "The Cairo Roadmap - Enhancing the Performance of Peacekeeping Operations," which was later adopted as an African common position in 2020 20. Furthermore, the list is really long.



What the relation between Japan and Egypt in CCCPA when it comes to peace operations? I will try to be concise as much as I can, but we did together a TOT course on protection of civilians (POC). We did as well a training on strengthening the capacities of Somali Civil Society and ATMIS on peace and conflict sensitive reporting.



Two Workshops for Formed Police Units (FPU) Commanders



November 2021



January 2020

As you can see, there are two workshops for formed police units (FPU) commanders on revised policies, guidelines and standard operating procedures.



In 2021, CCCPA conducted a series of ASF trainings with the support of the Government of Japan



- Pre-deployment training; protection of vulnerable groups in conflict zones; conflict resolution and mediation; foundational training course for the military component, including civil-military coordination; and the role and tasks of the police component in the field of peace and security.

And a series of African Standby Force trainings.



Training on teaching French to Egyptian Peacekeepers to be deployed to missions located in French-speaking areas



January 2024

When it comes to partnership, I would like to shed light on some of innovative, I would not say innovative, but extremely important training. As you know, most of peacekeeping operations are deployed in French speaking countries and we as Egypt for example, our military and police do not speak French language and it was highlighted in several key frameworks, the importance of language to build trust with locals and so on.

So, we did with the international organization of LA Francophone a training course for our peacekeepers to reinforce their linguistic to the French language. So, the linguistic capacities. The training was done to peacekeepers to be deployed in MINUSCA. Back then, we did another interesting training as well on climate peace and security within peace operations and I don't think that there are many training centers which have such a course.



Ladies and gentlemen, as a thinktank CCCPA has been focusing on peace operations. I would like to share some recommendations with you to strengthen partnership and to reflect on the future of peace operations. First, I will shed light on some key takeaways from the 28th IAPTC annual conference held in Pakistan.

In our capacity as secretariat, I had the privilege to moderate a session titled “Partnerships and Meaningful connections in training” last November. If I may, allow me to emphasize a few takeaways. It's really important to remember that. The first thing is that we need to leverage networks like this symposium. Do not underestimate the strengths of networking because, while networking, ideas come and we can close gaps. I talked with Professor SHINODA, he was telling me about what he did in IGAD for example, he brought to my attention something that might be missing at my site. It is important to leverage networking like IAPTC, like such symposiums, and to enhance coordination and leverage competitive advantages move beyond one training session, toward continuity. We have this problem, as sometimes peace training centers we do one training and then we stop. So, we need to go beyond one-time training, to embrace modern technology for training and partnerships, and to foster commitment, adaptability and innovation in all peace operations efforts. And last, the essential role of adaptation and innovation as foundational pillars in fostering meaningful connection.



Secondly, allow me to shed the light on some key takeaways of workshops that we did in our capacity as a co-chair of NeTT4Peace and the conclusion of the 4th Edition of the Aswan Forum. As part of the ongoing process on reflecting on the future of peace operations and exploring new models through the independent study commissioned by the UNDP, CCCPA hosted a workshop titled “African Perspectives on the Future of Peace Operations” on the sideline of the Strategic Group Meeting of NeTT4Peace. So this workshop brought together the former SRSG who is the author of the independent study with more than 12 African thinktanks.

Aswan Forum panel on peace operations brought high level officials from the UN, the AU and the EU. And Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations was there. Director of AU PAPS was there. Head of ATMIS was there. We tried to bring together all relevant stakeholders to think about the future of peace operations. The main idea from these discussions is to contribute to the preparatory process of the Berlin Ministerial Peacekeeping Summit to be held in Berlin in 2025. Bearing in mind that for example, we have this preparatory process has three phases. One will be held next week in Uruguay under the theme of partnerships as well. So, we as intercommunity started by partnerships. Second one will be held in Islamabad, in Berlin and then in Jakarta.

What were the key outcomes of these events? Peacekeeping challenges are inherently political with security issues, often reflecting deeper political dynamics. So, sustaining peace requires prioritizing political solutions. It's a political solution after all. Without political will, peacekeeping mission will never do the job until the end. Secondly, success of peacekeeping hinges on securing the consent of local population and I think what we saw in Mali and other areas prove that in a very clear way. Local population support is essential to achieve sustainable lasting peace and stability. Future peacekeeping models, as it was reflected in the new commissioned study, must be deeply attuned to the unique realities and context of.

So, we need, as Professor SHINODA said, ad hoc creativity. We need to add tailor made as well. We need to tailor made our interventions to align with specificities of each case. Both internal and external partnerships with the United Nations are vital for peacekeeping effectiveness. Breaking down silos within the UN is very essential for fostering collaboration and enhancing efforts. I'm talking here about the UN country team, about the specialized agencies and the peacekeeping missions. We have to work all together. What's happening now proves that it does not work. So, we need a whole of approach to succeed. Models proposed by the independent study must be critically assessed and tailor made as I said to the African context. So, this must be built on the ongoing review of the ASF. Right now, there is a review in the African Union about the African Standby Forces. So, these two reviews must align. We cannot work in silos. Our problem is that we are talking a lot about partnerships, but in fact on the ground we work in silos. We do not consult each other. As for the donors, you can easily find donors who go and do a certain project and there are two or three other donors who do the same project actually. This was very evident in the Sahara region for example.

So, the review must align with the ASF current review. Colonel Watanabe started his presentation by mentioning the Brahimi Report and HIPPO Report. If we go back then and read very carefully the reports we didn't implement until now, the recommendations actually. So, it's not about the lack of ideas, it's lack of implementation, which sometimes can be lack of political will in some. So, it's all about political will. The political will is really the decisive factor in translating strategy into action.

And the last thing, and this is very important to my eyes, is increasing the contribution of peace operations to peace building and post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD). It's really essential. This includes building strong state institutions which are fundamental to the success of future peace operations and laying the foundation for a long-term and sustainable peace.

Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to conclude here by iterating that partnerships are the foundation of sustainable peace networking platforms like this symposium, like IAPTC, like NeTT4Peace, that play vital roles in fostering collaborations, sharing expertise as well as addressing capacity gaps.



Let's seize this opportunity to build meaningful connections and work collectively towards a more peaceful and secure future.

Thank you so much.


(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much Mr. Sameha. I'm sorry for the limited time, but as we all know, the CCCPA has a lot of activities, and his presentation was very rich. Thank you for illustrating the partnership between Japan and Egypt with the CCCPA as a focal point. He also kindly showed some of the key documents related to our topic, including Resolution 2719. This has been discussed in academia, but we still don't know how important it is in the first place. It is really important as well, but the point is that if it is implemented in one specific case, even though the resolution itself says that the resolution is going to be implemented on a case-by-case basis, once the resolution is implemented in one African Union Mission, 75% of the budget could come from assessed contributions of UN members. That means that Japan may cover, let's say, 5 or 6% of the budget of the AU mission, not the UN peacekeeping operation. So that could be a change, although we don't know how or when it's going to take place.

Now I would like to invite one more distinguished panelist from Africa. Colonel Wanjiku, she is the Defence Attaché at the Embassy of the Republic of Kenya. As you all know, Kenya has been engaged with many types of international peace operations representing various kinds of partnership operations. So, she is very kind to present these cases from her viewpoint. Colonel Wanjiku, please have the floor.

Panel Discussion

Colonel Esther Barbara Wanjiku, Defence Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Kenya



Thank you very much, Professor. Lieutenant General YAJIMA Masahito, and Joint Staff College general officers, senior officers, fellow panelists, excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. As mentioned, my name is Wanjiku, the current Defence Attaché at the Kenya Embassy. I would like to thank the government of Japan through JPC for organizing such a distinguished event. I was part of the audience last year, and I'm very honored to be part of this distinguished panel this year. Kindly allow me to acknowledge the presence of my ambassador. Thank you, sir, for being here. The ambassador is not only a career diplomat but also very passionate about matters of peace and security. So, feel free to channel all the hard questions to him.

Before I commence with my presentation, I'd like to acknowledge the relationship that we've had with Japan. Last year, we commemorated 60 years of diplomatic relations, and these relations have expanded to a myriad of different kinds of relations. Earlier this year in February, the president, His Excellency William Ruto, was here in Japan where a statement of intent was signed between the two different ministries, the Ministry of Defence of Kenya and the Ministry of Defense of Japan, proving the future of defense relations between our two countries. Japan has also been a key partner in our International Peace Support Training Centre, which is a center of excellence in peace support operations training since its inception in 2008. I'll now proceed with my presentation.

SCOPE

- Introduction
- Kenya's achievements and contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations
- Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP)
- Challenges in implementing various types of partnerships
- Expectations to the International Community and Japan for strengthening partnerships
- Conclusion




Ladies and gentlemen, that will be my scope. I'll do a brief introduction, highlight Kenya's achievements and contribution, speak on the Triangular Partnership Programme, the challenges that we face in implementing various types of partnerships, the expectations we have towards stakeholders, and then I will conclude thereafter.

INTRODUCTION

- Kenya is a supporter of UN Peacekeeping Operation efforts globally since joining the UN in 1963
- The first comprehensive participation in PKO was in 1979 in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe
- Kenya continues to serve in many UN, OAU, AU and Commonwealth Peacekeeping Missions
- Responsive to UNSC requests to contribute to PKO upon consent of the parties in the host state



Since joining the UN in 1963, Kenya has made significant contributions towards peacekeeping efforts globally, with the first comprehensive troop contribution PKO in 1979 in former Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. Since then, Kenya has continued to serve in many UN, OAU, as well as AU and the Commonwealth peacekeeping missions. This has been, of course, with the consent from the host country.



INTRODUCTION

- Regional and subregional efforts:
 - East Africa Community Response Force (EACRF)
 - Operation Linda Nchi, AMISOM, ATMIS and now AUSSOM
- UNSC non-permanent seat paved way for:
 - Participation to influence change in UNSC reforms & climate change
 - Finding solutions to ongoing conflicts like in DRC and Haiti

Additionally, Kenya has been involved in the promotion of sub-regional peace and security efforts, notably leading and contributing more than 2000 peacekeepers for the East Africa Community Response Force (EACRF) in DRC. Outside the UN peace operation, one of the most significant operations that Kenya has undertaken has been of course in Somalia where we deployed in 2011 under Operation Linda Nchi. That is when I was deployed at the onset of this operation and then we transitioned to AMISOM in 2012, then transitioned to ATMIS in 2022, and now we are looking into transitioning to the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Also, these deployments continue to showcase Kenya's commitment towards stabilizing neighboring and regional countries.



Kenya's third assumption to the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member also paved the way for participation in contributing to conversations not only in the UNSC reforms and climate change, but also in finding solutions in ongoing conflict in the DRC and in Haiti where we have our police under the MSS (Multinational Security Support) mission in Haiti.

KENYA'S CONTRIBUTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

- Troop Contributions & Field Presence
- Mediation Role: Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005
- Post Conflict Contribution
- Training and Capacity Building



KDF Soldier in UN Mission



(left) J.E. Ali Osman Mohamed (Right) Dr. John Garang de Mabior

Ladies and gentlemen, I'd like to speak on a few. There is a lot to talk about but just to highlight a few of Kenya's contributions and achievements in the UN and AU missions. Of course, there's the issue of the troop contributions and field presence. As I've mentioned before, we've been in several peacekeeping operations contributing over 50,000 troops in over 40 countries. Another significant role and achievement that we have had as a country is mediation and diplomacy achievement. Working under the framework of the UN, AU and other regional organizations, Kenya has been instrumental in mediating several peace agreements. Just to highlight, one would be the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, which eventually led to the independence of South Sudan.

Another contribution is the post-conflict contribution. Kenya has continued to engage with post conflict activities beyond having the troops on the boots on ground, not only within the military sphere but also within the civil service with the provision of humanitarian assistance, development programs, rebuilding infrastructure, and provision of medical care.

Another key contribution is training and capacity building. Kenya has invested in training peacekeepers both from within Kenya and from other African nations. As I highlighted before, our premier peace support centre, the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi is one of the continent's leading institutions in this regard, providing specialized training not only to the military but to the police and civilian personnel. The center has strengthened Kenya's ability to prepare peacekeepers for complex missions and improve both preparedness and effectiveness.

KENYA'S CONTRIBUTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

- Support for Regional Stability
- Advocacy for African interests in Peacekeeping Missions
- Senior Leadership Roles
- Commitment to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda



Maj Steplyne Nyaboga



FET in Dhobley, Somalia

Support for regional stability is also another contribution that we have made. This has been clearly seen through AMISOM and ATMIS where Kenya's participation in Somalia and in other East African countries.

Another key contribution is advocacy for African interests in peacekeeping missions. Kenya has been an advocate for Africa's needs within the UN framework, emphasizing the importance of African-led solutions and increased support for peacekeeping operations on the continent. I am honored to be part of some of these initiatives in my two previous deployments.

Another contribution is through senior leadership roles. Kenya has had several appointments across the command structure serving in top roles including force commanders in various missions. This has helped Kenya to leverage its experience to improve mission strategies and operational coherence.

Another key contribution is that of the commitment to the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Kenya has made several strides towards incorporating this being one of the leading countries in Africa to have a gender policy within the Ministry of Defense, which has helped not only in ensuring that we have the recruitment of women personnel but also the deployment of these women personnel. Kenyan peacekeepers have been trained to address a myriad of gender issues within the peacekeeping areas. An example of a key participation in this is the Female Engagement Team (FET) in Somalia. Let me attention draw your attention to the second picture. We can see the Kenya Defense Forces female personnel together with the women of Somalia. This is an activity that has been undertaken where we involve the women of Somalia in social economic activities, helping them find initiatives that can help them not only find something to do, but also a source of income for their families. Through this we've been able to cooperate with the society and even get information from the women on how to enhance our presence in Somalia. In the top picture, which is Major Steplyne Nyaboga, who was awarded the 2020 United Nations Military Gender Advocate of the Year Award for her role in UNAMID. Through

her efforts, Major Nyaboga introduced new perspectives and increased awareness of crucial gender dimensions across the mission and helped strengthen our engagement with women.



I would like to speak also on another kind of partnership, that is the Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP).

TRIANGULAR PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME (TPP)

- A cooperative framework launched in 2015 to support UN peacekeeping operations

- Expanded with four distinct projects: engineering, field medicine, C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and camp security technologies

- Achievements:
 - Capacity building
 - Support for the purchase and maintenance of equipment
 - Training of trainers
 - Outreach courses targeting pre-deployment female communication officers
 - Introduction and training of telemedicine




The Triangular Partnership Programme is a cooperative framework that was launched in 2015 following the outcome of the 2014 Leaders' Summit on the UN peacekeeping. The Triangular Partnership Programme was initially focused on engineering, but with time it has expanded to the four thematic areas including engineering, field medicine, C4ISR, and camp security technologies. Some of the key TPP achievements just to highlight a few, include capacity building in the four projects, support for the purchase and maintenance of equipment, training of trainers, outreach courses targeting pre-deployment female communication officers, the introduction and training of telemedicine, among others.

TRIANGULAR PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM (TPP)

- In partnership with the UN and Japan, Kenya hosts the TPP at HPSS
- Japan has greatly continued to support the TPP at HPSS not only with provision of competent trainers but also funds that have been able to sustain the training
- Additionally, in June 2024, Japan hosted the TPP Stakeholders' Workshop
- The future focus and expectation:
 - Increased training activities that have high impact on the population; vertical engineering (water provision)
 - Continued support in expert provision
 - Financial support



In partnership with the UN and Japan, Kenya hosts the TPP at the Humanitarian Peace Support School (HPSS) in Nairobi. The school is engineering-based with over 400 participants with the aim to improve efficiency and effectiveness while enhancing peacekeepers' capacity in engineering and the three other projects. Over the years, Japan has greatly continued to support this program, not only with the provision of competent trainers, which is intellectual partnership, but also with funds that have been able to sustain the training. Additionally, in June 2024, Japan hosted the TPP stakeholders workshop here in Tokyo. The workshop allowed for a review, interrogation and reflection sessions on TPP with discussions on the future of the program. The workshop further showcased the commitment by Japan to ensure the sustainability of this program. The future focus on TPP and areas of expectation on sponsor countries such as Japan is increased training activities to diversify on areas of scope. An example within engineering we can try vertical engineering. This is water provision, increases our training in activities that have a high impact on the population versus force protection. Another area of focus would be continued support in the provision of financial support.



As with all partnership agreements, there are challenges, some of which have been mentioned by the previous speakers. So, I will quickly brush through some of these challenges that we continue to face in implementing this partnership.



One would be the political and strategic misalignments. While the AU is African centric, the UN is highly global. Trying to bring these two together, sometimes sidelines specific African issues or dilutes the AU's role in its own continent.

Another challenge that we face is that of economic disparity and trade conflicts. Funding for AU-led peacekeeping operations and development projects faces at times insufficient funding and relies heavily on contributions primarily from UN members and, of course, donors. In these particular cases, you find their priorities are not that of AU priorities and it becomes a challenge.

Another challenge in implementing these partnerships is that of bureaucratic and operational constraints. Within our own organization we face bureaucratic procedures. Now, you have to bring in two huge, highly independent organizations. Coordinating between these two organizations and other organizations becomes cumbersome. There are bureaucratic procedures and some of these bureaucratic processes delay simple humanitarian provisions because of the need to have joint approvals.

Another key challenge is that of sovereignty and national interests. Again, African versus global. Some of these interventions may be seen as infringing on the sovereignty of some states where the AU feels sidelined in decision making process.

Another constraint is that of legal and structural frameworks; the different legal frameworks in all organizations that form a partnership. Overriding the different legal procedures may cause their initiatives to be challenging through legally overcoming their framework that has been put in place.

A final challenge that I may speak to is that of public perception and domestic opposition. It is obvious that some of the initiatives have not faced positive reception by some countries. Public opinion in some African countries may view interventions with skepticism given historical experiences, which has become a challenge in having to work with these partnerships. But not all is listed.



EXPECTATIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND JAPAN FOR STRENGTHENING PARTNERSHIPS

Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to, as the previous speakers have said, not give a conclusive solution but just a mere proposal of expectations towards all stakeholders as international partners in peace and security. As we are able to ensure fit-for-purpose initiatives that restore peace, one expectation is to enhance multilateral collaboration and coordination.



The expectation here is greater alignment and cooperation among organizations, whether it be the AU, UN or EU. The rationale here is that of course complex conflicts require multilateral approaches. So, partnership is inevitable. Coordinated missions allow for better resource sharing, reduce costs, and improve mission coherence.

Localization of peace efforts and community engagement is another expectation. Peace operations should incorporate local perspectives and prioritize local solutions. A key example is what I gave with the female engagement team in Somalia. The rationale here is that peace operations are more effective when they are relevant and responsive to local needs.

Another expectation is that of support to regional organizations, which has been mentioned here before. Peace operations are becoming expensive. Our proposal here to mitigate some of these costs is to support existing organizations. An example is the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF). The rationale here is that these regional mechanisms provide the capability for rapid deployment to carry out preventive deployment as well as offer tailor-made solutions to the problems.

Another expectation here is the focus on addressing root problems. Focus on addressing root causes of conflict. In areas of the conflict, we have seen some of the causes are poverty, political exclusion, resource competition and economic disparity. The rationale here is that lasting peace can only be achieved by tackling these inequalities. Without those, you will still come back with another kind of solution named under a different outfit.



➤ Adaptation to new threats and technological advancements

EXPECTATIONS

➤ Environmental sustainability and climate-sensitive approaches

➤ Long-term peacebuilding and development support

Another expectation is adaptation to new threats and technological advancements. Peace operations should adapt to emerging challenges including cyber threats, misinformation, hybrid warfare and climate-induced displacement, as had been mentioned before by Major General in his presentation. We are facing a situation where before the UN or the AU come out with a statement on an incident that has occurred, the pictures are all over TikTok, the pictures are all over Twitter and thus the need for us to be alive to this evolving environment that we are operating in within conflicts. The rationale here is with conflicts becoming increasingly complex, peace operations need to be technologically equipped and skilled in addressing both traditional and non-traditional threats.

We also have another expectation on the environmental sustainability and climate-sensitivity approaches. Climate change exacerbates competition for resources and thus the need for peace operations to include environmental risk assessment and strategies for managing resource conflict and addressing these root causes of instability.

Finally, the expectation of long-term peacebuilding and development support. The expectation here, ladies and gentlemen, is to have peace operations that are not limited to short-term interventions but should contribute to long-term peacebuilding and supporting post-conflict recovery. The rationale, of course, is that successful peace operations transition from stabilization to development and capacity building, creating resilient states that maintain peace and independence. Maybe with this, we might avoid the football analogy that was given to us here before.

CONCLUSION

- A holistic, integrated approach to peace operations, combining both Military and Non-military efforts, preventive and reactive strategies, and local and global perspectives is imperative
- The implementation of a forward-looking Defence Policy by Kenya has ensured the positioning of Kenya as an anchor state ready to partner, cooperate and lead on efforts towards global peace and security



In conclusion, ladies and gentlemen, I'd like to say that the international community is expected to adopt a more holistic integrated approach to peace operations through partnership combining both military and non-military efforts, preventive and reactive strategies, and local and global perspectives. The focus is on peace operations that not only halt violence but also pave the way for stable, resilient societies. Kenya's proactive role in UN and AU peacekeeping among others, not only demonstrate its commitment to international peace and security, but also reflects its broader foreign policy goals of promoting stability, peace and development in Africa. The implementation of a forward-looking defense policy has ensured the positioning of Kenya as an anchor state ready to partner, corporate and lead on efforts towards global peace and security. Thank you.



(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much, Colonel Wanjiku, for another rich comprehensive presentation. We received a lot of information, and at least we got to know that Kenya has been so active in international peace operations. Thank you very much for illustrating the partnership between Kenya and Japan, which is also a source of our pride as well.

Anyway, now we would like to proceed to the final presenter in this panel, Lt. General MATSUMURA. He is an expert on the issues of international peace operations, and now he is very much ready to make a proposal in the context of our theme.

Panel Discussion

Lieutenant General (Retired) MATSUMURA Goro, Former Commanding General of the Northeastern Army, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

(The presentation has been edited from the simultaneous interpretation. Please refer to the original speech in Japanese on the Japanese website.)



Thank you Dr. SHINODA. I speak Japanese. So English speakers, please prepare your earphone.

My name is MATSUMURA, eight years ago I retired from the commanding general of the Northeastern Army of Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces. So, what I'm going to talk about today is not what I am thinking about as a researcher or practitioner on PKO, but this is something I have thought about during my research on international securities in general after my retirement. Therefore, I would like to offer you a perspective on current UN PKO from an outsider.

議題

Agenda

- 1 国際法における「戦争大義のルール」と「戦争方法のルール」
The Law of Just Cause for War and the Law of Waging of War under international law
- 2 戦争との二つの向き合い方
Two Approaches to War
- 3 平和維持活動への適用
Review UN PKO methodology
- 4 提言：「平和構築」と「人権擁護」の分離
Recommendation: Separate “Peacebuilding” and “Protection of Human Rights”

This is the table of accounts. In the first part, I would like to talk about the way you were thinking in terms of international law in general. Then, if they are applied to PKO, what kind of implication it would have? That is my latter part.


1 国際法における

「戦争大義のルール」と

「戦争方法のルール」

The Law of Just Cause for War and the Law of Waging of War under international law

Under the international law, there are two rules that are “the law of just cause for war” and “the law of waging of war.” So, it is called "jus ad bellum," and "jus in bello," respectively.



「戦争大義のルール」 (jus ad bellum)
The Law of Just Cause for War

- 戦争に訴えること自体を規律する規範
- The law concerning the resort to war
- かつては開戦法規等
- Once primarily regulated the process of the opening of war
- 現在は国連憲章に基づく武力の使用（自衛権等）
- Currently UN Charter governs the use of force including exercising the right of self-defense
- 判断は総合的（戦争に至った経緯を総合的に判断）
- The legality is judged comprehensively (in consideration of the context of the war)

“The law of just cause for war” stipulates the rule of resorting to war itself. And before illegalizing the war it refers to the process of the initiating of the war. And after illegalizing “the threat or use of force” by the UN Charter, the major discussion point is whether the act constitutes the exercise of self-defense right in line with the UN Charter. And the legality is judged comprehensively in consideration of the context of the war.



「戦争方法のルール」 (jus in bello)
The Law of Waging of War

- 戦時における戦闘の手段・方法を規律する規範
- The law regulating means and methods of warfare
- ハーグ条約、ジュネーブ条約等の国際人道法
（非戦闘員保護、捕虜取り扱い等）
- IHL: Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions, etc.
(Protection of non-combatant, Treatment of POWs, etc.)
- 判断は個別的（実際に起きた個別の事象を判断）
- The legality is judged respectively.
(consider respective actual events).

On the other hand, “the law of waging of war” is the norm. The law regulating means and methods of warfare and therefore it contains the protection of non-combatants, and the treatment of POWs as stipulated by the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions. And the legality is judged on a case-by-case basis.

「戦争方法のルール」は
Jus in bello is applicable to armed conflicts

「戦争大義のルール」の影響を受けない
and Independent from the consequences of *jus ad bellum* violation.

(大義がある側であっても、
The right of self-defense

「戦争方法のルール」を守らなければ国際法違反)
would not absolve the Victim State from its own responsibility
under *jus in bello*.

The important point is that *Jus in bello* is applicable to armed conflicts and independent from the consequences of a *jus ad bellum* violation and the right of self-defense would not absolve the Victim State from its own responsibility under *Jus in bello*.

2 戦争との二つの向き合い方
Two Approaches to war

法律論とは別に、
「戦争の大義に関する問題」と、
「戦争で棄損されている人権の問題」は
分けて考えるべきとの発想から戦争への
向き合い方を考えてみると…

Inspired by the relationship of these two legal frameworks, review existing
approach to war. You could clear your mindset to war.
Issues concerning just cause for war and **issues concerning violation of
human rights in war** are different. How about the problem-solving process?

As long as the theory is thought, but if we think about how to deal with the work from this perspective, how should we view the current status?

<ウクライナ戦争の例>
Russo-Ukrainian War Case

- ウクライナ侵攻は国連憲章に反しており、ロシアは部隊を引き揚げて占領地を返還すべき
- Invasion on Ukraine is the violation of UN Charter. Russian armed forces are required to retreat and return occupied Ukrainian territory.

→ **戦争大義の問題**
Issues concerning just cause for war

- ロシア、ウクライナの双方は、非戦闘員の被害を避けるよう努力し、住民の権利を守るとともに、捕虜を適切に処遇すべき
- Both Russia and Ukraine are required to make efforts to minimize damages of non-combatants, ensure human rights of local population, and treat POWs humanly.

→ **戦争で棄損されている人権の問題**
Issues concerning violation of human rights in war.

For example, in the Ukraine war, Russia is in violation of the UN Charter through the invasion of Ukraine. Therefore, Russia should withdraw from Ukraine and should return occupied territory as it is associated with the law of just cause.

On the other hand, when we look at the just cause of the war, both Russia and Ukraine are required to make efforts to minimize damages to non-combatants, ensure human rights of the local population, and treat POWs humanly.

<イスラエル・ハマスの紛争の例>
Israel-Hamas War Case


- イスラエルは自衛権を行使する権利を有するが、
- Israel may exercise the inherent right of self-defense,
その自衛権は無制限ではない
the right is not unlimited.
 - **戦争大義の問題**
Issues concerning just cause for war
- イスラエル、ハマスの双方は、非戦闘員の被害を最小限にとどめるよう努力し、住民の権利を守るべき
- Both Israel and Hamas are required to make efforts to minimize damages of non-combatants and ensure human rights of local population.
 - **戦争で棄損されている人権の問題**
Issues concerning violation of human rights in war.

So, these are associated with the violation of human rights in war in the case of Israel and Hamas. From the viewpoint of the cause of the war, Israel has the right of self-defense against Hamas, but the right is not unlimited.

Both Israel and Hamas are required to make efforts to minimize damages to non-combatants and ensure the human rights of the local population. This is the issue concerning the violation of human rights in war.



So, the issue concerning the just cause for the war is extremely important in preserving international law and making efforts to lead to a just resolution of a conflict is indispensable. However, in reality, sometimes peacemaking takes time and requires compromise. Meanwhile, violations of human rights against the local population never end. It is important to make continuous parallel efforts for the protection of the human rights of the local population as well as conflict resolution. So, the temporary ceasefire for the polio vaccination in Gaza in September this year must be based on this way of thinking.




Efforts to pursuit justifiable conflict resolution and efforts to protect the human rights of local people:

- Both require concurrency, continuity, and independence from each other.

Desirable relationship between conflict resolution actors and human rights protection actors is:

- Separation.

The above is the valid way of thinking.




If we apply this to peacekeeping operations, what should we think about it?

- 近年の国連平和維持活動のマンデートには、
「紛争解決・平和構築」に関するものと
「住民の人権擁護」に関するものの
両方が含まれていることが多い。

Most of today's UN PKO mandates are hybrid of tasks contributing to **conflict resolution and/or peacebuilding**, and to **protection of human rights of local population**.

Most of today's UNPKO mandates are multi-tasks contributing to “conflict resolution and/or peacebuilding,” and to “the protection of the human rights of the local population.”



For instance, the Mandate of MINUSCA, which was deployed in Central Africa, initially had seven tasks of these mandates.

“Conflict resolution and/or peacebuilding” related tasks are as follows:

Number two, “Support for the implementation of the transition process”;

Number six, “Support for national and international justice and the rule of law”; and

Number seven, “Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation.”

And “The protection of the human rights of the population” related tasks are as follows:

Number one, “Protection of civilians”; and

Number three, “Facilitate the immediate, full, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance.”

And the other two tasks, “Protection of the UN” and “Promotion and protection of human rights,” pertain to both “Conflict resolution” and “The protection of human rights.”

Since “Promotion of human rights” includes a political process, I consider that this pertains to both groups.

○ 「Impartiality (公平性・不偏性)」の二義性
Ambiguity at “impartiality”

a. 紛争解決のための政治的取り決めに適った行動を取っているか？
Peacekeepers’ judge if local parties comply with the **political agreements**.

b. 人類に普遍的な**人権擁護の規範**に適った行動を取っているか？
Peacekeepers’ judge if local parties comply with universal **human rights standards**.

→ 現地勢力にとって、**a.**に関しては見解が分かれることがあり、
Local parties may have different opinions on **a.**

PKO部隊が**b.**を目的に行動している際も、**敵対的になる可能性**
Even peacekeepers protecting human rights may met with backlash from local parties.

In a position where today’s UNPKO has to go on with the two different groups of mandates, it is related to “impartiality” concept which is one of the basic principles that set UNPKO instead of original “neutrality” concept. What this principle signifies are as follows:

- a) Peacekeepers’ judge if local parties comply with the political agreements; and
- b) Peacekeepers’ judge if local parties comply with universal human rights standards.


On the point a), local parties may have different opinions. Therefore, even if peacekeepers apply the principle of impartiality, local parties may disagree, leading to conflict with the peacekeeping operations. If peacekeepers try to implement tasks based on both the criteria a) and b), they may meet with backlash from local parties when protecting human rights.



So, I have a proposal.




My recommendation is that PKO mission for “conflict resolution” and for “human rights protection” should be separated completely. Both missions could have their own military components, but their head offices and chains of command are completely separated and each mission works independently. For example, the PKO mission personnel wear blue helmets and the human rights protection mission personnel wear orange helmets, and so we could have separate units for each mission,



New Human Rights Protection Mission should not engage in medium- to long-term peacebuilding but dedicate itself to meet immediate human rights needs. For instance, food distribution, improvement of sanitation, medical services, education, and ensuring the safety and security of the local population.

Even in the area of human rights, issues that require political processes, such as legislation or the establishment of institutions to protect human rights, should be allocated to the PKO. In particular, the PKO mission should be in charge of the task of “Promote freedom of speech and association” until local parties’ consent can be obtained because it is clearly political matter.



While the New Human Rights Protection Mission would try to ensure its security under the consent of local parties, it should bear arms in self-defense. The new mission should integrate similar activities by the UN family and NGOs. On the other hand, if necessary, the UN family and NGOs could use armed escort of the new mission.

Regarding today's theme of "partnership," one possible role-sharing model would be that the UN would take on new human rights protection mission and a regional partner such as AU takes PKO mission.

課題： 居住地域などによって住民にも政治性あり
Challenge: Some local civilians may support one side of confronting parties.

→ 各勢力に、**人権擁護活動の必要性を説得**
New Human Rights Protection Mission would be required to convince local parties that **human rights protection activities are necessary.**

その上で、**中立性原則を重視した運用**
In addition, the mission would be required to work with a high regard for **neutrality.**

There would be a challenge; some local civilians may be active in politics and support one side of confronting parties. Depending on the residential area, there could be some political differences. How shall we deal with such a problem?

To solve this problem, New Human Rights Protection Mission would be required to convince local parties that human rights protection activities are necessary. In addition, the mission might use the minimum of weapons necessary for self-defense, but it would be required to work with a high regard for neutrality.

That is all my presentation and thank you so much for listening.

(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much, General MATSUMURA, for your very stimulating ideas and also thank you very much for your cooperation in making your presentation as brief as possible to highlight the key points. We really respect your thinking on how we can organize partnership peace operations and future peace operations in a more stimulating and meaningful manner.

We'd like to hear from one more of our panelists, Dr. NAKAYA, as the commentator, but now is the time to have a break. We take a 10-minute break and Dr. NAKAYA will give comments after the break. The next program will resume at 4:50 PM. Please come back to your seat by then. Thank you.

Discussion

Moderator: Dr. SHINODA Hideaki, Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

Commentator: Dr. NAKAYA Sumie, Assistant Professor, Hitotsubashi University on special leave from the United Nations Department of Peace Operations

(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much. Let us resume the session now by asking for the comments by Dr. NAKAYA please.

(Dr. NAKAYA)

I heard such rich and comprehensive views on partnerships and peacekeeping. So, what I'm going to do is to pick up a few themes and make some comments also based on my own experiences in the UN Secretariat in the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), where I spent 15 years overseeing mainly missions in Sudan and South Sudan. When I joined the UN at the time, the DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations), currently the Department of Peace Operations, my first job was the deployment of the UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur. In the subsequent 15 years, the mood in the Secretariat changed so much. At the moment, there is real anxiety among those of us who are still involved in peacekeeping, studying, and practicing it.

The first theme that I picked up from the panelist presentation is the change in landscape. We all know this, but the real and active rejection of peacekeeping really hit us hard. The fact that we got kicked out from Mali, I don't know how long we'll stay in South Sudan or the DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo). It's not just us; the French and Americans, especially in West Africa, had to terminate or were asked to terminate their security cooperation framework. There is a strong sentiment against international intervention, particularly in Africa. So how do we engage with these countries, their leadership, and the people? It is not only the UN. After the coup in Mali, these countries also rejected mediation efforts by the regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). So, it's not just anti-colonialism but the shrinking space for external engagement throughout. And again, that's Africa either. If you look at the election results, not just in the US but across Europe and other continents, the sentiment against migration, nationalism, decreased funding not only for the UN but diplomacy overall. Also, let us not forget, we've been talking about peacekeeping missions in conflict countries, but that's not the primary cause of casualties. If you look at the statistics, organized crime, gang violence, homicides, these things kill more people than conflict. Climate change and natural disasters displace more people than violence. So, we probably need to also redefine what international peace and security means for us now and in the future. But that's the landscape that we are in. Panelists commented on it quite extensively. So, I just wanted to complement that with the larger political context.

Second, in relation to that, the panelists also talked about the new threats: organized violence, criminality, climate change, and these kinds of threats. Because of the sentiment against large-scale international intervention, there has been no new deployment of large-scale peacekeeping. That means again, we also need to rethink the peacekeeping engagement framework. I would like to comment on the idea of delinking protection and peacemaking; I'll come back to that in a second. We need a new model, and this study, "The Future of Peacekeeping, New Models, and Related Capabilities," that Mr. Sameh mentioned in the presentations is, in a way, a recognition of the new challenges. It talks about cybersecurity, maritime security, natural disaster response, infrastructure security, city security, and so forth. So that's probably the starting point of conversations about the kinds of interventions and the expertise needed to meet today's challenges. If you actually look at the list, the UN doesn't have expertise in all or most of these areas. The expertise will have to come from member states. That means the troop and police-contributing countries, donors like Japan, and so forth. I can imagine the UN playing a sort of coordinating role, getting this expertise from member states that have it and transferring it to countries in need of this expertise. By providing training, it's a mutual transfer of knowledge and a circulation of the expertise that is going to be required in meeting new challenges. So that may be one model of the new peacekeeping.

But that also requires a different way of planning missions. This is not today's conversation topic, so I will not go into detail, but if you have spent time in the bureaucratic planning process, whether in Japan or any other country, you'll know this: it's planning by committee, and it's a very internal conversation. When we plan a mission, whether it's Darfur or South Sudan, it's us, the lead department, coordinating the conversations. The UN country team, meaning the agencies, sponsor programs, and other departments sit in the same room, and it's basically internal reallocation—who gets the pie? I mean, who gets the piece of the pie? That is very different from the kind of creative and flexible planning needs mentioned in the beginning and also the silo in planning that needs to be resolved, as Mr. Sameh also mentioned.

The final remarks that I'm going to make are about the new concept of peacekeeping or rather the peace process. What Mr. MATSUMURA proposed, I think, is very interesting in that it questions the whole concept of international peace support. We still base intervention in terms of mediation comes first, then we have a peace agreement, and only after that can we have peacekeeping. I think what the panelists described is that if that's very limiting considering today's vast challenges, and while we wait for a peace agreement, people die. So, what do we do? That's precisely what's driving MATSUMURA's proposal. I think we need to rethink that framework. It's very conventional. It's still assuming two parties, whether it's government versus government or government versus opposition, but it doesn't quite jive with the very interesting football picture that Major General Khan described. We have many more players, and it's very chaotic. So how do we deal with that? The current framework may not actually be quite right, and we may need different kinds of partnerships.

One last comment is that in this current climate of shrinking space financially and politically, our peacekeeping investments have to make sense domestically and as a foreign policy tool. I think we may have neglected the domestic part of it. Investing in medical support will make sense if you think of it as an exchange of knowledge and a transfer internationally for emerging and medical support. Japan might benefit from that. Countries also probably benefit from having cybersecurity expertise, whether that comes through the UN or otherwise. So, I think we need to start having conversations about what this means for us. Why is it important for us rather than taking for granted that investing in peacekeeping is a good thing? That narrative is unfortunately at the moment dying down. Thank you.

(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much, Dr. NAKAYA. Now, we really want to open up the floor for questions or comments.

(Audience 1)

Thank you very much, moderator. I would like to join my colleagues in thanking the commandant of the Joint Staff College of the Ministry of Defense of Japan for this very important invitation. I've already filled out my form, and one of the comments I included is that we should have made more time and separated the sessions.

I have a few quick comments to make. The first is regarding the role of global peace within what we call Kenya in the UN and the UN in Kenya. We consider peace operations to be a very strong component of the value proposition for global peace and security, and we thank all the countries that have contributed soldiers, including countries like Japan that are very active in supporting these operations.

My second comment concerns the issue of partnership. I want to thank the general for talking about knowledge-based decisions and deployment. As a diplomat and an alumnus of the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi, it is important that we train diplomats in the process of peace operations. They lead the political processes that we see as enablers for peace. Knowledge-based deployment involves capacity building for partners, including diplomats, so that we can achieve what we call an integrated model of peace operations.

The second issue is the complexity of political language that surrounds conflict. We all know that one of the reasons why the UN never approves all proposals is the political language. As partners, we must find a way to build local ownership of such processes, the peace processes, which better address the complexity of the political languages around peace processes.

The third issue, and I want to agree with Dr. NAKAYA, is the transition in language. I see in some of the documents here, as much as in our diplomacy as Kenya, we talk about Youth, Peace and Security. I think the correct conversation that we need to look at is Youth, Democracy, and Leadership. How can peace operations accommodate the reality that the youth are no longer learning for leadership, but are

grabbing leadership? You've just heard what has happened in some African countries, where young leaders, generally considered young, see the solution to the challenges of peace and security surrounding youth as taking up leadership roles.

The fourth issue is about the lessons that we learned as Kenya. In the cases of the DRC and Somalia, we realized that peacekeeping, peace operations, and peace processes are better when countries have a sense of regional belonging. The integration or transition of Somalia and the DRC into the Eastern African Community is very significant for the success of these interventions in both countries. Once countries have political collaboration within the region, there is some element of standardization and aspiration for peace and security as a regional common goods. So again, partnership in building those aspects enables countries to have that sense of regional progress.

My final comment, which I believe is the most important, is that we need, as partners, to talk about investment in rapid response mechanisms. Rapid response capacity gives countries willing to intervene, like Kenya, the technical and resource elements that are actually missing. Here, I would like to give great credit to Japan for some of the overseas security assistance initiatives that you are undertaking around the world. I think this is something that Africa can benefit from a lot, particularly in investing in what we call regional security infrastructure, which will again complement the capacity of the countries to deploy rapidly and address the situation. It is important that we work on peace operations, building their capacity to support political processes. For example, in the DRC, we had a dual track: we had our defense forces on the ground, but we also had a political process, and these two policies complemented each other very well. Being able to run a dual track with an integrated mechanism and response in a conflict situation is very important.

I thank you again, moderator, and wish the discussions very well. Thank you very much.

(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much for giving us critical insights. We are all benefiting from your engagement. Thank you very much indeed. So now, are there any other comments or questions from the audience?

(Audience 2)

Thank you very much. First of all, I want to thank the panelists for the good presentations and also thank you for the invitation we received for this important symposium.

I just want to make a few comments. First of all, I would like to highlight the good relationship between the government of Japan and the government of Rwanda in enhancing the capacity of regional security sector actors in peace support operations, which focus on several significant interventions. We all know that during the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) ministerial meeting this year, Japan reaffirmed its commitment to the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda. The discussions in that meeting highlighted Japan's support for women's participation in peace processes

and the importance of mainstreaming gender perspectives to achieve sustainable peace. This support has been consistent since January 2022, when the Rwanda Peace Academy, in collaboration with the government of Japan and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), conducted a course aimed at enhancing participants' understanding of gender dynamics in peace support operations. The training emphasized the importance of women's participation in peacekeeping and the integration of gender perspectives in such missions, as mentioned by our sister from Kenya. We believe that this is a very important aspect to consider, and Rwanda is committed to it. We think that these initiatives reflect Japan's ongoing commitment to strengthening regional security capacities with a focus on gender inclusivity and addressing the unique challenges faced by women in conflict situations.

As all presenters mentioned, partnership is very important, and we need to strengthen our capacity, as my colleagues said, because we need capacity building in peacekeeping missions not only for the people who are immediately involved but for all of us, including diplomats and other involved parties. It is also important to strengthen initiatives on our continent, whether under the African Union, the East African Community, or other initiatives. It is crucial to support and consider the realities on the ground and involve the people who benefit from this support.

I think you have made good recommendations, and I totally support them, emphasizing that it is very important to consider these aspects. Thank you so much.

(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much. We know that Rwanda is always a great contributor to the community of international peace operations. So now, are there any other comments or questions from the audience?

(Audience 3)

Thank you very much, Professor SHINODA, for the excellent moderation. I would like to thank the Ministry of Defense for this well-organized symposium and also for the invitation. I also extend my appreciation to the panelists for having this excellent brainstorming and exchange of ideas. I just have a very small comment regarding the presentation made earlier by Major General Raja Khan on the UN in particular.

First of all, I thank the Pakistani forces that work in Sudan within the UN mission, and I think they were excellent and showed a high level of professionalism that was recognized by the MOFA and other departments in our country. Thank you so much for that. Regarding the presentation, I believe financial matters were a key challenge for the mission, which led to an overall kind of failure, if you like, of that mission. In particular, the financial issues prevented the AU forces, the AU component within the mission, from feeling ownership of solving the problem. Therefore, this lack of ownership for forces coming from Africa with a very clear objective—African solutions to African problems—was very frustrating to the AU. This led to competition over the mandate of the mission itself and caused other

corresponding problems like management coordination. I think these were the main concerns of the mission regarding cooperation with the government of Sudan. I think the government extended a huge amount of support to that mission, which was proved by the support and protection of the UN personnel during their movements. They used to be guarded by the Sudanese army forces when they moved. Therefore, this is one indication.

The other one is that during the exit process, the government showed flexibility and entered into a very sincere, gradual, negotiated process. These were well documented in the UN. I think Dr. NAKAYA will also agree with me, having been in the UN at that time. We believe major issues of concern about the sovereignty of the country contradicted the mandate of the mission. For example, the UN used to write some reports about the human rights situation in Sudan as a whole, while its mandate was restricted to Darfur. This is one of the issues that I think will be considered in future missions.

All of you distinguished panelists talked about partnership, but I think the key figure in that partnership must be the host country itself. It's not only when we talk about partnership that we talk about the UN and donor countries, but the role of the government showed that its acceptance and cooperation are of utmost importance. This is not only restricted to the case of the UN; in all cases, you'll see that cooperation with the host was an issue. So, in the future, if we need successful missions, I think we need to have close cooperation and coordination with the host country. Thank you so much.

(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much for the additional insights. General Khan, do you want to respond?

(Gen. Khan)

I would just like to thank the gentleman for acknowledging the presence and contribution made by the Pakistani contingent there. It was a difficult mission, as we have been told, but everyone collectively did a good job bringing stability there. There were definitely issues about the mandate, and as an army, we say that one bad general is better than two good ones. So, if you have two different bosses, even if they're very good, they will always have disputes. It is always good to have one boss to whom you report and from whom you get the directions. So overall, thank you very much for the very enlightening comments and thanks again. Thank you.

(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much. We would like to see more questions and comments now.

(Audience 4)

Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for the invitation to participate in this symposium on challenges in international peace operations. Thank you to all the panelists for the insightful presentations and thank you as well to the moderator.

I will be very brief in my presentation just to say that Kenya's mission in Haiti is a useful one. The security in Haiti is still challenging, but hopefully, with the necessary resources, especially financial resources, this mission can achieve its mandate, which is to contribute to security and peace in Haiti. Thank you so much.

(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much. The ongoing operation in Haiti, which we usually call the MSS (Multinational Security Support) mission, is primarily a police mission with a security-oriented focus in Haiti. This is a very innovative attempt to dispatch a Kenyan police mission to countries like Haiti in the western hemisphere. Moreover, it demonstrates Kenya's willingness to contribute to security in their region as well. We are in a position to support and praise their efforts, along with the efforts of the Haitian government itself.

Now, I would like to open the floor to any kind of questions. Please indicate your intention to ask questions or make comments, and not just diplomats, anybody, please. In the meantime, Mr. Sameh may proceed.

(Mr. Sameh)

Thank you, Professor SHINODA. We are all here because we recognize that peacekeeping is at a critical juncture. The real problem is that there is no peace to keep. Secondly, it has been proven that the so-called "Christmas tree" mandates are ineffective. We need to look at things from a different angle. As Egypt, we believe in what we call the peace continuum. As you all know, the peace continuum starts with conflict prevention, then moves to peacekeeping, and finally to peacebuilding. I would like to highlight a very interesting report published by the World Bank a few years ago on the economics of conflict prevention. It stated that spending \$1 on conflict prevention saves \$16 in peacekeeping or peacebuilding. We need to adopt a more holistic approach. Peacekeeping has many shortcomings, so we must adopt this peace continuum, which is more effective and addresses the root causes of the problem. Peacekeeping operations do not necessarily address root causes, which are key themes that must be addressed.

Secondly, someone mentioned that peacekeeping missions are costly, but I think they are a very cost-effective tool, representing less than 0.5% of global military expenses. We need to adapt peacekeeping to the evolving landscape.

Thirdly, regarding the interlinkage between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, officials from the Sahel region and other African countries often express concern that peacekeeping missions, despite their significant expenses, do not benefit their economies. Local perception is crucial for the credibility of peacekeeping missions. Peacebuilding is a vital component; we deploy peacekeeping to secure peace and build upon it, not just to keep the peace. We need to be more proactive.

Currently, there are two parallel global processes: the review of peacekeeping operations and the peacebuilding architecture review. At some points, these two processes must be linked together as they are interconnected. We cannot ignore the dimensions of peacekeeping and conflict prevention when discussing peacekeeping. These are my sporadic thoughts and ideas. Thank you, Professor SHINODA.

(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much, Mr. Sameh. Are there any more questions?

(Audience 5)

Thank you very much for your insightful presentation. My question is about the partnership among regional organizations, not only in Africa and Asia, but also inter-regional partnerships. We are pleased to have distinguished guests from Pakistan, Egypt, and Kenya, as well as from Japan. Are there any challenges to overcome to accelerate interaction and cooperation among regional organizations for the partnership of international peace operations, such as knowledge sharing and so on? If you have any examples or ideas, could you share them with us?

I also have a comment for Dr. NAKAYA. I totally agree with your third or fourth point about the domestic discussion on partnerships in international peace operations. In Japan, contributing to the partnership of international peace operations is not only about multilateral cooperation but also about risk management for our country. Therefore, accelerating the discussion about the partnership of international peace operations domestically in Japan and within each member state is very important. This is my comment. Thank you very much.

(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much indeed. Now Mr. Sameh and then Dr. NAKAYA, please.

(Mr. Sameh)

Just a small comment on your question. I will talk about us as peacekeeping training centers. As I was saying, we at the CCCPA proudly assume the role of the IAPTC secretariat. The IAPTC association gathers all peacekeeping training centers from around the globe. Currently, Pakistan holds the presidency, previously it was Kenya, and next time there will be another election, possibly from Europe. This

platform provides a space for fostering collaboration and exchanging ideas. For example, the IAPTC is a global entity. In Africa, we have APSTA, in Latin America, we have ALCOPAZ, and in Asia Pacific, we have AAPTTC. We have this regional structure as global peacekeeping training centers.

I will speak about the African Union as I am from Africa. We have the AU-UN partnership, and within the AU, we have five RECs (Regional Economic Communities). The AU and RECs operate on two main principles: complementarity and subsidiarity. This is how we interact between RECs and the African Union. As you know, the UN and the AU have this partnership, and Secretary-General António Guterres always meets with AUC Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat on an annual basis. This is how we operate when it comes to interaction between organizations and peacekeeping training centers. Thank you.

(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much indeed. Now Dr. NAKAYA please

(Dr. NAKAYA)

Thank you for the comment. I don't think it's only about Japan; I think it's about US, France, and all advanced economies. We actually need to have this conversation to keep investing in international cooperation.

I'm in academia now, so I can say this out loud without having to worry about it. But really, think about this: if, say, a neighboring country implodes weeks from now and there's a refugee crisis, how are we in Japan going to respond, and who is going to coordinate the conversation? We have regional tension about who takes the lead in that kind of conversation, and the UN might indeed be the third party that could handle the humanitarian conversation, the power-sharing conversation, and the peacemaking conversation. So, I think we have to start simulating and thinking about what we need, and I believe extra support would be required in some of these events.

(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much. Are there any more questions?

(Audience 6)

Thank you. First of all, I would like to express my appreciation for the opportunity to deepen my understanding of the future vision of peace operations as well as the importance of the relationship between Japan and African countries. My question is about diversity in Africa. We often say "Africa," but I believe there is a lot of diversity within Africa as well. There are many ethnic groups and regions. I would like to know what kinds of differences exist within Africa and between Japan and Africa.

Additionally, my second question is about what we need to pay attention to when we are committed to peace operations in Africa, considering these differences. Thank you.

(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much. Could anyone on the panel perhaps discuss cultural diversity in Africa from a very practical perspective? What kind of things should we take into consideration when deploying there or in similar situations?

(Col. Wanjiku)

Yes, I had this conversation, I think, yesterday with my colleagues from the defense community. Thank you for your question. Indeed, understanding Africa is challenging. I don't think we'll ever fully understand a continent with 54 countries. For example, my country has 42 tribes, and that's just one out of 54 countries. My neighboring country has a hundred tribes. These are different people that you have to interact with. So, I think that helps you understand how diversified Africa is. Implementing initiatives in a vacuum, thinking they will shape a narrative or form a solution, won't work. Hence, the need for fit-for-purpose initiatives. We do share common values across the continent. During my two years here in Japan, I can tell you we are not so different as people. We have shared values, especially in respect to age and women. These are the things that help create solutions with a lasting impact on the community.

You mentioned how different regional partnerships exist. These partnerships face challenges, just as we face challenges with our international partners. Some of these challenges include bureaucracy and financing. However, the overriding aspect of regional partnerships is our common interest and need for African-led initiatives. This is what helps us overcome these challenges and develop initiatives that provide long-lasting and impactful solutions.

(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much indeed. Now Mr. Sameh, please.

(Mr. Sameh)

I will just complement what Colonel just said. Before being deployed to African soil, we, as a center, realized at a certain moment that there is a real problem when it comes to language. We know that, for example, in Kenya there is Swahili, and many other languages, but at least they speak English. So, I think this will not be problematic when speaking English. But in African French-speaking countries, it is problematic. So, to facilitate this, we, as a training center, started collaborating with an international organization, OIF, to teach our peacekeepers who are to be deployed in French-speaking African countries the French language. This way, they can easily communicate with the local population because,

after all, understanding the local population is a game changer. If you cannot communicate, you will not be able to continue, explain, or help effectively.

Secondly, when it comes to culture, we, as a peacekeeping training center, in our pre-deployment training, try to expedite experts. Sometimes we bring in nationals from countries like the Central African Republic to talk about the culture. If there is someone from the military or police who was previously deployed on this mission, they will come and explain the culture as well. But anyways, as my dear colleague Colonel said, you will never be able to know everything, but you will have to have a minimum understanding. And this, I think, can be easily reached if I'm not mistaken. Thank you.

(Gen. Khan)

Yes, thank you. It was a wonderful question, a very practical question. Within a continent, there can be much diversity in culture and traditions. Those who are going on peacekeeping missions from other parts of the world to that particular continent and country can face many problems. But please remember, wherever you go, respect for humanity is universal. That does not need any language or anything—respect for humanity, respect for their culture, respect for their traditions, respect for their values. That is very universal. And whenever we send our troops on any peacekeeping mission, that is one of the basic things that we teach them: they must respect humanity, they must respect human life. It is universal and it will pay back. As I said, the mandate or consent of the state is important, but the consent of the people is even more important. If the people have given you consent, you will be able to achieve the mandate. If you fail them, they will not give you consent and you will never be able to achieve the mandate. This is one of the basic things, as very rightly brought out by both speakers. So, respect for humanity is something which is universal and which everyone should keep in mind. Thank you.

(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much, General Khan.

(Audience 3)

Thank you once again, Professor SHINODA. Since the issue of complementarity was raised, I would like to complement my earlier intervention. First of all, I would also like to commend the Minister of Defense of Japan, with whom we enjoy a very close relationship. After the war erupted in Sudan, we closely cooperated to evacuate the Japanese nationals from Sudan. I would like to appreciate that cooperation. In 2026, we will be celebrating our seventieth anniversary of the relationship with Japan. We also enjoy a very strong and old relationship with Japan and its people.

My question is directed to Commanding General Mr. MATSUMURA, especially regarding the proposal I like. It's very interesting to hear about the human rights protection mission. What is special

about that mission? Since peacekeeping missions include a component for human rights protection, especially considering the limitations we spoke about regarding finance, coordination, and acceptance, how do you foresee the coordination and cooperation with the Human Rights Council, the OHCHR, and other special entities in your proposal? Thank you so much.

(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much. So, let us turn to general. I'm sorry, this is the final comment, especially from you.

(Gen. MATSUMURA)

Thank you very much for indicating such an important point. First of all, what I would like to point out is that New Human Rights Protection Mission I mentioned is about improving immediate human rights situations that local people are in. This could be medical care, education, food, or the protection of human life, and I'm talking about improving those areas. I think that the host country's efforts to improve the domestic human rights situation should be assisted by the PKO mission.

There are about four reasons why I propose to separate the two missions. One is that it will be difficult for the UN to promote traditional peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations under the current Security Council characterized by division and confrontation. Given the circumstances, the reality is that local people are in emergency humanitarian situations. Therefore, I think that we need a mission model separated from political efforts in order to improve the human rights situations immediately while the PKO process is not progressing.

The second reason is that some member states, especially in Europe, the US, and Japan, may be skeptical that the deployment of troops in PKO missions will really lead to a solution to the root causes of the problem, and so hesitate to contribute troops. If mandates are focused on human rights protection, it will be easier for such member states to contribute troops in the mission.

Third point is to establish clear ROE (Rules of Engagement) or to clarify the level of force that can be used. Originally, peacekeepers should be neutral in the execution of their mandate, and had principle of non-use of force except in self-defense. The scope of a concept of self-defense has subsequently extended to include defense of mandate, which may be one of causes of the current outbreak of the local sentiment against PKO mission. Therefore, I propose to divide the mission into two: a PKO mission that may proactively use force in defense of their mandate to facilitate the political process, and a human rights protection mission that is strictly neutral in the execution of their mandate.

The fourth reason is that there are NGOs and the UN family that work for human rights protection and humanitarian assistance in the same field. Such humanitarian actors may have concerns regarding the danger of conflating political-military activities with their humanitarian operations. A mission separated from the peacekeeping operations may help alleviate humanitarian actors' concerns and

maintain cooperation with humanitarian communities. If humanitarian actors have an expectation of protection in an emergency, one option is that they would work together with accompanying a mission unit that can use weapons just for self-defense.

(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much. Any comments?

(Mr. Sameh)

Yes, maybe just a few sporadic elements. We can say that there is no one-size-fits-all solution. We need to have tailor-made interventions. We need to respect national ownership. We need to bear in mind as well, during our intervention, the context specificity. This can be applied to everything actually when it comes to re-envisioning peacekeeping and peacebuilding. We really need to take into consideration the realities on the ground, and we cannot just duplicate interventions in all corners of the world. Thank you.

(Moderator, Dr. SHINODA)

Thank you very much indeed. As I said, we mentioned at the beginning that we are discussing more specifically Security Council Resolution 2719 in terms of the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union or subregional organizations. But in the end, the message of the resolution is that on specific terms, they are going to make decisions on a case-by-case basis. So, we have to proceed in a very distinctive ad hoc manner. Always. It takes a lot of efforts and involves complexities, but we just have to face this reality. We cannot avoid this situation because we are faced with it due to many reasons. And so, we just want to develop the manner in which we are coping with this complex situation. We would like to overcome those tasks in a skillful manner.

One of the points, once again, I indicated at the beginning is the importance of networking, creativity, and flexibility. All these come from human connections and human interaction; it's all about networking. And so, this kind of intellectual dialogue and communication through experts or these channels are always important. But even more important in the age of partnership peace operations. By saying so, I would like to conclude the panel discussion session and give the floor to the main moderator. Thank you very much.

Closing Remarks

(Announce)

Dr. SHINODA and all participants, thank you very much for your intensive briefing and discussion with various viewpoints. Dear colleagues, please give a big hand to all participants and the moderator. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

Please go back to your original seats.

That will be all for today's International Peace & Security Symposium 2024. All the programs are finished and thank you very much once again for your participation.



End



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