

International Peace & Security Symposium 2023



MINUTES OF THE SYMPOSIUM (English Version)

December 7, 2023

At the Hotel Grand Hill Ichigaya

*Joint Staff College (JSC), MOD
Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC)*

The views expressed at the Symposium are those of the participants, and do not necessarily represent the views of their Organizations.

PROGRAM

Challenges in the Current UN Peacekeeping Operations Way Forward of the International Community

14:05 – 14:10 Opening Remarks:

Lieutenant General SAKAMOTO Koichi, Commandant of JSC

14:10 – 14:20 Opening Presentation:

Colonel KOBAYASHI Takashi, Executive Research Officer of JPC

14:20 – 15:05 Keynote Speech:

Major General (Ret.) Patrick Cammaert,
Royal Netherlands Marine Corps

15:15 – 16:35 Panel Discussion

Moderator:

Dr. SHINODA Hideaki, Professor,
Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

Panelists:

Mr. YOSHIZAKI Tomonori, Professor
Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

Colonel Werner Klaffus, German Bundeswehr

Commander, Bundeswehr UN Training Centre, HAMMELBURG

Colonel KAWASAKI Machiko

Commander, Military Medicine Research Unit, JGSDF

16:45 – 17:45 Discussion

The presentation of the Opening Remarks and Part 1 were conducted in Japanese. So, those parts of this minutes were originated from the simultaneous interpretation conducted at the venue for the presentation. Please refer to the original speech in Japanese from the Japanese web-site <https://www.mod.go.jp/js/jsc/jpc/event/proceedings/index.html>)

Opening Remarks

Lieutenant General SAKAMOTO Koichi, Commandant of JSC

(This is simultaneous interpretation. Please refer to the original speech in Japanese from the Japanese web-site)

Ladies and gentlemen and the participants who are with us online, good afternoon. My name is Koichi Sakamoto, Commandant of Joint Staff College, of the Ministry of Defense. On behalf of the organizer, I would like to extend you a brief opening remark.

This symposium is the 12th International Peace and Security Symposium. It is held in the hybrid form with online participants as it was last year. Japan has announced its candidacy to host the 2026 annual conference of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC), co-hosted by the Joint Staff College and the Secretariat of the Headquarters for International Peace Cooperation, Cabinet Office. In preparation for this, we have decided to proceed today mainly in English.

I sincerely welcome Mr. Akashi Yasushi, former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, and many online/on-site participants beyond national borders. We are very pleased to have Mr. Patrick Cammaert, a retired Major General of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, and former General Commander of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) Eastern Region, as a keynote speaker. As moderator, we have Prof. Shinoda Hideaki, of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, and as panelists, Colonel Werner Klaffus, Commander of Bundeswehr United Nations Training Centre, Prof. Tomonori Yoshizaki of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, and Colonel Machiko Kawasaki, Commander of the Military Medicine Research Unit of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. All of us at the Joint Staff College are delighted to open this symposium with these distinguished speakers. I express my sincere appreciation to all the speakers for they are having kindly accepted our invitation.

The International Peace and Security Symposium is intended to share knowledge on issues and future directions regarding activities and operations on international peace and security, not only among the Ministry of Defense and Japan Self-Defense Forces, but also among the public, private, and academic sectors, and promote a mutual understanding among them, in order to deliver high-quality distributions to the international community.

For more than 30 years, Japan has been engaged in the international peace corporation activities around the world. Currently, Japan has dispatched staff officers the UN Missions in South Sudan and the multinational force and observers in Sinai. Since this year, engineer staff officers have been additionally sent to the MFO. Japan continues sending officials to the United Nations Secretariat for United Nations peace activities and has been conducting the UN Triangular Partnership Project to train African engineers on heavy engineering equipment since 2025, and will expand the project to Asia and neighboring countries since 2018. In 2019,


training of medical personnel began. Under the Capacity Building Support Project, Japan provides the education and training concerning military band, HADR, in Indo-Pacific countries and help raise capabilities of their militaries.

Today, our discussions should focus on the present status and challenges for peace, given the withdrawal of MINUSMA, the prolonged situation in the Ukraine, the heightened Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Middle East and other developments. I hope the discussions today will suggest to us the way that Japan and the international community could and should go forward. Prof. Shinoda will moderate the panel discussion, during which there is time for the audience in this room to join the discussions as well. The result of this symposium will be shared widely within the Ministry of Defense and with relevant ministries to inform their educational and research activities.

Once again, I will conclude by expressing my sincere gratitude to you all for taking time from your busy schedule to be with us today. Thank you.

Opening Presentation

Colonel KOBAYASHI Takashi, Executive Research Officer of JPC



Good afternoon, Excellencies, distinguished guest. I am Colonel Kobayashi from Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center. I will conduct introductory brief prior to main discussion. The year 2023 marked a significant moment in the UN peacekeeping operation, with the decision to withdraw the MINUSMA mission in Mali. The landscape of UN peacekeeping effort has increasingly become complicated in recent years, arriving at a crossroad. This symposium titled “Challenges in the Current UN Peacekeeping Operations: Way Forward of the International Community” is intended to promote broad discussions on these current issues. Anticipating the extensive and in-depth discussions, I will present an introductory briefing focusing on the transition of UNPKO and the challenges they face as viewed through recent development.

The Transition of UN Peace Operation				
		1950~1980's	1990's	2000's
International Situation		The Cold War	U.S. Unipolarity	Terrorism Great Power Rivalry
Operational Environments in Peace Operations		Interstate conflicts involving Eastern & Western blocs → Monitoring ceasefires	Regional, interstate conflicts increased and more complex → Nation- building, Humanitarian aid	Rise of Transnational terrorist groups, Violent extremism armed groups → Protection of civilian, Handling Asymmetric threats
		Traditional PKO (Cease-fire monitoring, Force withdrawal)		Multi-Dimensional PKO (Election, HA, Development, Governance support)
Peace Operations by UN	UN-Led		★ Ghali Report (1992)	★ Brahimi Report (2000) ★ HIPPO Report (2015) ★ Cruz Report (2018) ★ A4P (2018)
	Non UN-Led	• U.S. and Other Countries : MFO(1982~)	• NATO : Kosovo Air Strikes	• AU : PKOs in Africa • EU : Africa, East-Europe • NATO : ISAF(Afghanistan) • OSCE : East-Europe, Ukraine • U.S.-Led : Iraq War • Malaysia, etc. : IMT • EU-Led : AMM

The international security environment has made significant changes since the end of World War II, and the operational environment surrounding peacekeeping activities has also changed substantially. During the Cold War era, there were interstate conflicts involving the Eastern and Western blocs. Peacekeeping efforts focused on monitoring ceasefires at that time. Entering the 1990s, despite the United States unipolarity, regional conflicts increased and became more complex. To address the intricate situation of civil wars and inter-ethnic conflicts, UN has incorporated nation building support and humanitarian aid into its peacekeeping effort. Since the 2000s, with the beginning of the fight against terrorism and competition among major powers such as the United States, China, and Russia, has become more apparent. Consequently, peace operations now also deal with asymmetric threat, such as transnational terrorist groups and violent extremists, specifically in the situations where it is difficult to leverage the utility of conventional military forces.


In light of these challenges, PKO efforts have transitioned from traditional peacekeeping to multidimensional peacekeeping that focus on the reconstruction of states from internal conflicts. Significant shifts in the form of the UNPKO can be seen with Ghali Report and Brahimi Report, which mainstreamed the protection of civilians in the UNPKO. With peacekeepers becoming targets of hostile forces, the Cruz Report highlighted the critical concern for their safety. Recently the UN launched action for peacekeeping and subsequently “A4P+ initiative,” calling for Member States to cooperate in addressing the various challenges faced now.

Furthermore, with the diversification of roles required in PKO, peacekeeping activities are now also being carried out by organizations other than the UN, such as regional structures like

African Union and European Union, with various entities taking on roles for peace and security.



This slide shows the status of PKO in 2023. Currently, there are 12 PKO missions underway, primarily operated in Africa and the Middle East, with participation from approximately 86,000 personnel, comprising military, police, and civilian staff from 122 countries. However, not all peacekeeping operations are making smooth progress towards their goals due to challenges such as fragile host country consent and credibility, challenges for safety of personnel along with unstable political and security conditions, and shrinking financial resources. These challenges spoil the progress towards peace agreement and security improvement for some missions.



Particularly in Africa, PKO face significant challenges. For instance, MINUSMA faced worsening relations with Mali's government following two coups and Wagner's advance. In 2022, the UN accused Mali's army and Wagner involved in the massacre, it made a turning point in deteriorating relations. Hostile acts against PKO soldiers emerged such as detention by Mali government. In 2023, citing MINUSMA's failure to improve security, the Mali government requests the Security Council to withdraw MINUSMA, which was decided upon. This withdrawal will leave a security vacuum, heightening concerns of deteriorating security and peace process in Mali. Moreover, this issue extends beyond Mali, affecting the wider Sahel region's safety and stability.

In Sudan, clashes in the April 2023 between the military and paramilitary group in the Khartoum resulted in the thousands of casualties, including UN staff. Previously, the UNAMID mission, now transitioned to UNITAMS, identified the presence of paramilitary groups as a major risk. The UN Security Council decided to terminate the mandate of UNITAMS as of 1st December this year. This crash can be described as a case where risks have realized and resulting to a resurgence of conflicts. Additionally, the instability in Sudan is causing the surge of refugees into neighboring countries, including Chad, and there are concerns that this could spill over into South Sudan, where UNMISS is deployed. Similar challenges affect MONUSCO in the DRC, with the Congolese government requesting the mission's withdrawal as of September 1st.

In the background of these issues, local people feel that UNPKO have not been successful in governance, security, and reconstruction. Meanwhile, the presence of other major groups

effectively responsible for security are growing. This suggests your perceived decline in the value and reliance on the UNPKO efforts. Moreover, new challenges have emerged. One is climate change. In Africa, where the population is growing, concerns are rising about conflicts over agricultural and pastoral lands due to drought and flooding. Another issue is the impact of the Ukrainian war. Rising price of grain and resource may accelerate poverty due to supply shortages.

Conclusion

[The Key Points of "A New Agenda for Peace"]

- UN push for African nations to address both regional conflicts and terrorism.
- ⇒ UNSC authorization and partnerships with regional organizations.
- ⇒ UN PKO budget provides to regional missions.
- Highlighting the gap between mandate-actual mission capability, advocating achievable mandates based on sufficient resources.
- ⇒ Agile, adaptable peacekeeping model and forward-looking exit strategies
- ⇒ Utilizing data and digital technology for understanding of conflict trends and local sentiments, enabling evidence-based decision-making*

*These themes have been actively led and discussed by JPC at IAPTC in Nov. Similarly, JPC will continue to lead it at the upcoming AAPTTC.

- As global threats are evolving, PKO stand at a critical juncture.
- PKO and other peace operations offer means to "Create a secure and stable environment" and "Facilitate the political process" in regions with fragile governance
- ⇒ The international community needs to gather military and civilian expertise on Peacekeeping.

With these backgrounds, in July 2023, UN Secretary-General announced the "New Agenda for Peace" offering proposals in the context of UN peace operation.

Firstly, UN suggests that African nations engage not just regional conflicts, but also terrorism. This involves encouraging partnerships with regional organizations like AU and suggesting that the UN Security Council authorizes the mission and allocates UNPKO budget for these efforts. Moreover, the necessity of peace enforcement is highlighted. These proposals emphasize the need for UN member states to respond firmly and fairly to issues such as terrorism and violent extremism.

Secondly, it points out the gap between PKO mandates and actual mission capability, advocating for achievable mandates based on adequate resources. It calls for more agile and adaptable peacekeeping models and forward-looking exit strategies, and the utilization of data and digital technology for operational situational awareness and peacekeeping intelligence to understand conflict trend and local sentiments. In this regard, JPC actively led the discussion as a moderator on these themes at the international conference IAPTC in November. Similarly, JPC will continue to lead it at upcoming AAPTTC.

In conclusion, peacekeeping operation, especially in Africa, are experiencing a deadlock. The evolving threats such as proliferation of terrorism and violent extremism, disturbance through disinformation campaigns, and climate change present grave concerns for the international community. Meanwhile, the UN regards peacekeeping operation as creating safe and stable environment and facilitating political process. To make peace operations more effective and

feasible, international community must intensify its focus on these endeavors, gathering knowledge from both military and civilian sides.

This concludes the introductory briefing from Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center. Thank you.


Keynote Speech

Major General (Ret.) Patrick Cammaert,

Royal Netherlands Marine Corps



During my career, I have seen firsthand the success and failure of UN military operations in peacekeeping missions trying to protect the local population from physical violence, including sexual violence.



As a contingent commander in UNTAC in beginning of the '90s in Cambodia, the mission was successful even countering the hostile actions of the Khmer Rouge. Thirteen years later in Democratic Republic of Congo as General Officer Commanding Eastern Division in MONUC, the environment had already changed for the worse and was the challenge to protect civilians much more difficult. However, the UN managed in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire, to name two missions, to help the host governments to bring peace and bring the missions to a successful end.

The last 15 years the nature of conflict has been changing further and has created an environment where many times, there is no peace to keep and where the Security Council is not always unanimously endorsing a mandate for the peacekeeping missions. Missions in Mali and Central African Republic are facing a very difficult political and security challenge which makes it difficult to implement their mandates. I have seen firsthand the troop contributing countries (TCC) that are willing to be pro-active and are willing to take the risk and others who are staying in their compound and abandon the local population.



I have seen firsthand the impact on peacekeepers when they are targeted by armed groups. I have seen the memorial wall in mission headquarters of MINUSMA in Bamako, Mali, with 309 names of peacekeepers who gave their lives in order to implement the mandate of the Security Council. Still, thousands of civilians are still alive and protected despite all the challenges. In my view there still is a future for peacekeeping adjusted for the changing political and security landscape.

Ladies and gentlemen, peacekeeping is changing and changing fast. Thank you for inviting me to speak on this seminar, on the subject “Challenges in the Current UN peacekeeping Operations: Way forward of the International Community.” It is very much a pleasure to be here, and the most pleasure is to see my first SRSG, Mr. Akashi in good form. It is such a pleasure to see you Sir, thank you very much.

Contemporary Peacekeeping

➤ MilAd DPKO



➤ GOC E-Div MONUC DR Congo 2005-2007



Let us talk about environment. The environment in which I served my first mission in Cambodia in 1992 to 1993 as battalion commander, as Force Commander in UNMEE, Ethiopia and Eritrea, in 2000 to 2002, and as General Officer Commanding Eastern Division in MONUC in 2005 to 2007 is so different than the growing complexity of the conflict environment in the various missions in particular in Africa. The main problem in current UN peacekeeping operations is that missions are struggling to implement their mandate to support a political process, to implement cease fires and peace agreements and to protect civilians under physical threat. Let us go in more detail why that is.

Scope

- The challenges at two different levels:
 - the **strategic** level
 - and **the operational/tactical** level
- and end with some considerations on **the way forward.**

I would like to describe the challenges at two different levels: the strategic level and the operational/tactical level and end with some considerations on the way forward.

Strategic level

- Host governments and Security Council members are increasingly questioning whether peacekeeping is the right tool.
- The dwindling supply of well-trained and well-equipped peacekeepers.
- Peacekeeping and parallel forces.
- the Security Council and TCC's to consider the fates of other large-scale missions.

Let start with strategic level. Conflict prevention and mediation remain key to the Secretary-General's vision for the multilateral system. The New Agenda highlights the enormous challenges facing peace operations today and calls for the Security Council and the General Assembly to reflect on the "limits and future of peacekeeping in light of the evolving nature of conflict," which is marked by "complex domestic, geopolitical and transnational factors." Let me mention a few of those challenges of current peacekeeping:

First one is that host governments and Security Council members are increasingly questioning whether peacekeeping is the right tool in hostile environments in places such as Mali whose government in June of this year called for the expeditious withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping operation and the Democratic Republic of the Congo where President Tshisekedi called for the start of withdrawal of MONUSCO at the 1st of January 2024. The Security Council is also less unanimous in their decisions on peacekeeping and full backing of the Security Council is one of the criteria for a successful deployment.

Second is the dwindling supply of well-trained and well-equipped peacekeepers, as nations around the world becoming problematic in providing troops and equipment. In addition, a rift is growing between the developing countries that donate troops to peacekeeping missions and the developed world, which dominates the Security Council and determines where the peacekeepers are deployed. Increasingly, there are calls for burden-sharing to lead to power sharing in the peacekeeping arena. This rift was manifest in MINUSMA in Mali.

Third is peacekeeping and parallel forces. As a result of changes in the nature of armed

conflict and shifting global and regional geopolitics, the field of peacekeeping and peacemaking is likely to remain crowded, and new actors may emerge, with consequences for how the UN conducts future operations. Examples are Operation Artemis in DRC in 2003 by EUFOR and Operation Barkhane by the French armed forces in Mali from 2013 to 2023. An environment which is hostile and where UN missions are deployed might need a parallel force for more aggressive, offensive operations for which the UN forces are not mandated. However, there is a considerable risk that the UN missions are lured in actions of those parallel forces with the risk of losing the UN's impartiality. Later I will elude a bit more on impartiality.

Fourth, MINUSMA's abrupt dismissal has led members of the Security Council and TCCs to consider the fates of other large-scale missions on the continent. The outcomes of these debates look set to shape the future of multilateral crisis management. As the International Crisis Group reported in July, the UN missions in Mali, the DRC (MONUSCO), the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and South Sudan (UNMISS) face similar challenges to those experienced by MINUSMA: UN missions are eschewed by host governments in favor of security partners that do not scrutinize human rights records. While these governments are unlikely to expel UN blue helmets as unceremoniously as Mali and Congo did, Council members quietly acknowledge that the era of large-scale stabilization missions is coming to an end.

Operational/tactical level: on the ground

- Lack of political will.
- Mindset peacekeepers.
 - *"Sometimes the presence of peacekeepers is not enough. Sometimes UN Peacekeepers have to show their skill and will to physically fight to protect civilians under threat including from sexual violence."*
- Losing consent and impartiality

Let me turn now to a few challenges on the ground at the operational and tactical level. First is the lack of political will by host governments and the parties involved. In several cases host governments and armed groups are happy to keep a status quo in their country or in the disputed areas for economic and political reasons. That puts a UN mission in a difficult position since it pushes the end state of a UN mission further away and diminishes a successful implementation of the mandate. Lack of political will manifests itself also when relations with the host government are strained or even hostile. While blaming the UN, political figures have also increasingly cut the UN mission leadership out of national peace processes and transitional arrangements. Examples MINUSMA and MONUSCO where the SRSG and or Force Commander have no or hardly access to the leadership of the host government being it elected or by committing a coup, which means the loss of political leverage of the UN.

Second is mindset of peacekeepers. The issues plaguing MINUSMA, surface time and again in the rest of the “big four” missions. The most obvious of these is peacekeepers’ failure to project sufficient force to deter or halt violence against civilians. Although protecting civilians is a standard element of peacekeeping mandates and in my view an implied task, UN contingents often lack the situational awareness, military resources and in particular the lack of willingness to take risks required to prevent attacks on the people they are supposed to protect. Sometimes the presence of peacekeepers is not enough. Sometimes UN Peacekeepers must show their skill and will to physically fight to protect civilians under threat, including from sexual violence. That is what the international community and the local population expects from the UN peacekeepers.

Third is losing consent and impartiality. At the strategic level, the legitimacy of peace support operations is based on a Security Council Resolution. At mission level, the legitimacy of a mission stems from being seen to be fair and decent. The loss of legitimacy leads to erosion of consent. Sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel or others making use of the vulnerability of the local population is a very serious issue that should be non-stop on the forefront of the leadership in the mission.



UN peacekeeping missions are operating under the principles of peacekeeping: Consent of the host government, impartiality and the use of force in self-defense and in defense of the mandate. We see now deep-seated crises of consent and legitimacy unfolding in several missions in particular MONUSCO and MINUSMA. These Missions has failed to build legitimacy and consent among the ordinary people who are most affected by the conflict. If a host government withdraws their consent, the UN can only do one thing: pack up and leave. Mali's Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop addressed the Council on 16 June 2023. He called for MINUSMA to withdraw from the country "without delay," saying that the Mission has not been able to adequately respond to the security situation.

Withdrawing Consent



Bamako, 18th June 2023

Mali's Foreign minister addressed the Security Council. He called for MINUSMA: to withdraw "without Delay". (sans délai)

On this picture, you see an UN vehicle, who stops for a traffic light in Bamako, and the local population wrote on the back-wheel *sans délai*, or without delay, which indicates the mood of the local population in Bamako. Result was withdrawal per 1st of September 2023 terminated at the end of this year.

DR Congo President Tshisekedi seeks withdrawal of UN peacekeepers this year.



Felix Tshisekedi's pronouncement comes just weeks after the East African Community extended the mandate of a regional force in DRC.

In 2022, disillusioned citizens in the eastern DRC launched a series of protests accusing the UN stabilization mission MONUSCO, of failure to fight rebel groups which are violating the local population. Some of these demonstrations turned violent, with both civilian and UN fatalities. This risk averse attitude which leads to an under performance of their given tasks and an erosion of credibility and consent of people, which is central to UN peace operations' effective work. Ultimately it was leading to the withdrawal and the termination of the mission in DRC by the host government's President Tshisekedi. Protests in the DRC highlight how the consent of people, not just the state, is central to UN peace operations' effective work.

Operational/tactical level: on the ground

- Many actors on the ground.
- Private Military Contractors(PMC).

Fourth, many actors on the ground. You have the United Nations, host government, NGO's, neighboring countries, non-state armed groups, including terrorist groups, private military company (PMC), parallel forces all with their own interest and task. That makes it a very crowded field. Coordination and cooperation are key words to address the challenges the UN is facing.

New security actors emerge on the ground: PMC



Fifth is the private military contractors are invited by the host government and are used for training purposes, close protection of local political dignitaries and operate together with host governments forces against armed groups. Clear examples are in Central African Republic, Mali, and also in DRC. It puts the UN in a very difficult position resulting in an attitude addressing the activities of those PMCs, which is vague and confusing.

Operational/tactical level: on the ground Mis and Dis-information



The population DRC is dissatisfied with performance of MONUSCO, which is unable to provide security and to protect the population from violence in the East in particularly from M23.



Goma, 26 July 2022



Sixth point is mis-and-disinformation by armed groups and host government. Mis-and-disinformation forms a growing threat to peacekeeping. This includes false allegations that UN peacekeepers are trafficking weapons to armed groups, supporting terrorists, and exploiting natural resources. This disinformation makes it harder for peacekeeping operations to implement their mandates and has put the safety of peacekeepers at risk.

It negatively affects the safety and security of peace operations, as well as their ability to implement mandates effectively. The UN Security Council has introduced language on mis-and-disinformation into the mandates of the four largest peace operations between 2019 and 2023. A key challenge however remains how peace operations and their mission leadership could better contain mis-and-disinformation risks and better leverage opportunities for strategic communications as part of a whole-of-mission approach. Governments are struggling with mis-and-disinformation as well.

Operational/tactical level: on the ground

- Mis-and disinformation.

- UN is a target itself and attacked.
 - Improvised Explosive Device (IED)

Seventh, the UN is a target itself and attacked. This can affect mission performance. Deliberate attacks creating high threat environments could hamper the willingness of peacekeepers to engage forcefully when needed. Risk averse attitude negatively affects the performance of a mission. This can lead to risk mitigating efforts adding distance between the local communities and the mission.

New Threats against UN personnel: Improvised Explosive Device (IED)



MINUSMA

IED



MINUSCA



Selfie bomb

One of the methods opponents targeting the UN use is the weapon on the improvised explosive device (IED). It creates serious restrictions in the freedom of movement for all in the mission and paralyzes the implementation of the mandate.

Operational/tactical level: on the ground

- Protection of Civilians.
- Lack of resources.

Eighth is protection of civilians. Each mission faces political and security problems specific to the country where it is based, but all of them share the challenges and pitfalls typical of large-scale stabilization operations. Each has struggled to protect civilians in areas where its contingents are deployed. Since 1999 in the resolution for the UN Mission in Sierra Leone UNAMSIL, the Security Council gave the mission a mandate, “to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence”. Since that time this task is given to all Chapter VII missions. The execution of the task is challenging. It becomes even more challenging if the threat to civilians is not physical but of an ideological nature, radicalization of the local population. Jihadists and other extreme armed groups provide basic needs for the locals, which their government is not doing, but have also an iron grip on them. What to do as peacekeepers with an POC mandate? This was very much the case in Mali. There is a need to reflect on this.



Ninth is lack of resources. Most of the mission are struggling with not sufficient resources, such as niche capabilities, air assets including drone capabilities for early warning, intelligence gathering, force protection, etc. Ukraine was one of the major troop contributors of helicopters in various missions. The war in Ukraine needed those assets back home so a huge gap was created. While these capabilities were part of UN missions, in the future, small high-tech or niche-capability operations may provide operational support to UN missions while operating outside of their command. Peacekeeping is increasingly likely to require highly specialized capabilities, including cyber capabilities, that only a few member states can provide. Where there are sensitivities about the non-transfer of these technologies, certain TCCs may elect to deploy outside of the UN to control when and how these capabilities are shared with UN missions. Such deployments would require the consent of the host state but could nonetheless raise concerns from the host government or TCCs about the nature of the units' activities.

Leadership

Decisive and courageous leadership at all levels is required.



Finally, a challenge for all levels is leadership. Decisive leadership is vital for the success of peace support operations. It is not easy to lead such complex missions. However, it does not start in the field. It starts at UN Headquarters in New York at the highest levels.

Way Forward

➤ Agenda for Peace.

➤ Support to African Union (AU) and regional organisations.

A few words on the way forward. In the near future it is likely that we will see a security environment the same as in Mali at this moment: High threat of extremist armed groups for the local population, host government and the UN, a difficult political landscape, hardly a peace to keep and an international community who are less and less willing to risk the lives of their troops and police to protect civilians under threat of physical violence.

The policy brief of the UN Secretary General, Agenda for Peace, underlines the increased need for peace enforcement and recommends that the Council authorize multinational forces where required. The Council has a long history of authorizing such forces, and may consider doing so again in the near future to restore order to Haiti, whose capital is largely controlled by violent gangs. The New Agenda recommends support to the African Union and subregional peace support operations authorized under Chapter VII and Chapter VIII the UN Charter, with the UN footing at least part of the bill where required.

African members of the UN Security Council have long called for enhanced UN resources for African Union peace support operations, which has now gained greater traction. Sustainable and predictable financing of peace support operations is of fundamental importance to African Union, and to the world. There is growing consensus that time has come for UN assessed contributions to complement and address funding shortfalls for regional operations.



As has been seen in the recent past, when the UN Security Council falls short, affected countries, neighboring countries and/or regions increasingly opt to take parallel action through different ad-hoc arrangements to deal with conflict, for example recently a Kenya-led regional security force: to stabilize and secure peace in Eastern DRC. These security arrangements might complement, or at times serve as an alternative to established UN instruments. It is mentioned in various fora, think tanks etc., that it is time to review and expand the UN's toolbox with these AU peace support operations. These tailor-made operations could be short-term and composed of special forces with offensive capabilities. However, I would like to caution on expectations on this. As I mentioned earlier offensive, aggressive operations have a great risk that the UN get involved in the conflict and will lose their impartiality and becoming part of the problem.

Way Forward

- Agenda for Peace.
 - Support to African Union (AU) and regional organisations.
 - Security Council and the General Assembly reflect *“on the limits and future of peacekeeping...with a view to enabling “more nimble, adaptable and effective mission models”.*

The policy brief recommends that the Security Council and the General Assembly reflect “on the limits and future of peacekeeping...with a view to enabling “more nimble, adaptable and effective mission models”, leveraging the full range of civilian capacities and expertise across the UN system and beyond, with appropriate transition and exit strategies.

The UN Secretary-General’s report on Our Common Agenda notes that investments in prevention and preparedness pay for themselves many times over in the human and financial costs that are spared. Hence, the option of launching UN operations to prevent rather than react to conflict remains important while discussing the future. Many peace operations, including UN Special Political/Observer Missions, could contribute to conflict prevention in different ways.



Observer missions which are traditionally primarily military in nature, could become more prominent in the years ahead as they are less expensive and less intrusive compared to multi-dimensional field missions. Perhaps more importantly, they tend to be easier to negotiate in today's world with a divided UN Security Council. Example UNMHA in Hodeida Yemen where I was serving as Head of Mission.

When advocating more aggressive action by UN and/or other actors operating under a UN SC mandate, a serious discussion should be held if the key principles of peacekeeping are still valid or not? In my view they should be upheld. Consent of the host government is key in this. These principles mean that peace support operations under the UN flag have limitations. Being impartial is one of them. The UN is not geared for war. Parallel forces maybe are with a more aggressive mandate but should not be under the UN flag.

Member States should authorize peace operations that build consent and support for peace and for their presence and goals at multiple levels, including both the state and its people and draft mandates that are anchored in meaningful, context-sensitive political processes that center diplomatic and humanitarian goals.

Leadership



Farewell to casualties in Mali
20 Jan 2021 by SRSG and DFC
MINUSMA



FC



SRSG


But everything comes back to leadership. Senior leadership positions should be filled with the most competent people that can be found, maybe even outsourcing the recruitment process to persons outside the UN secretariat with sufficient UN experience. This has been done in the past when I was military adviser in DPKO.

Way Forward on Challenges at the operational and tactical level

"We need to adapt our mindsets to these very flexible, volatile and unpredictable environments in which we operate in peacekeeping. We need to do this collectively, together with our troop and police contributing countries." Jean Pierre Lacroix

The way forward on challenges at the operational and tactical level should be approached by the leadership in the Secretariat and the TCCs/PCCs to make sure that forces which are generated, are prepared, well equipped, and trained to operate in the environment as I mentioned.

As Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Jean Pierre Lacroix said recently, "We need to adapt our mindsets to these very flexible, volatile and unpredictable environments in which we operate in peacekeeping. We need to do this collectively, together with our troop and police contributing countries."



I would like to add that the mandate is as strong as the will of the leadership and the TCC to implement it. That mindset is very important to success in the execution of a UN mission but in my view good decisive leadership is key making sure that this mindset is corrected and adjusted at all levels when necessary. Leaders are all the time faced in the field with dilemmas in the implementation of the protecting mandate.

My former boss, Under-Secretary-General Jean Marie Guehenno said once, “In Peacekeeping you have a dilemma: to look the other way and have to live the rest of your life with maybe the notion, that if you had moved in, you may have made a difference. Or, to move in maybe with the risk of failure.”



CASE STUDY MALI

- Case Study of MINUSMA Mali could cover:
- political processes,
- the use of force,
- parallel forces, regional forces, PMC's,
- impartiality,
- jihadist group behavior,
- community engagement,
- restrictions on the freedom of movement on land and in the air,
- extremely difficult logistics,
- intelligence gathering,
- overcoming challenges on conduct of operations by Western TCCs and the others.

Finally, two days ago, the 2023 UN Peacekeeping Ministerial Meeting took place in Accra, Ghana. It was announced that with missions navigating unprecedented challenges and threats, this year's event will focus on critical issues such as the protection of civilians, strategic communications and addressing misinformation and disinformation, safety and security, mental health of uniformed peacekeepers, and the pivotal role of women in peacekeeping.

I would like to recommend to interested members of the Security Council and Japan is one of

them, to consider to organize a seminar, or workshop on future peace support missions based on a case study of MINUSMA in Mali on political processes, the use of force, parallel forces, regional forces, PMC's, impartiality, jihadist group behavior, community engagement, restrictions on the freedom of movement on land and in the air, extremely difficult logistics, intelligence gathering, overcoming challenges on conduct of operations by Western TCCs and the others. A case study workshop is in my view what is needed to make real progress for future peace support operations.



In closing, I would like to thank again, Commandant of the Japan Joint Staff College, General Sakamoto to invite me to speak to you. Thank you very much.

Q&A:

(Question 1)

General Cammaert, thank you very much for your great presentation. I am a researcher from an independent think tank in Tokyo. I do also work on areas of peace and security and I just did a short tour in East Africa learning from the local insights.

I would like to ask two things. Actually, one thing is what I would like to just mention and relating to that I want to ask you a question on the capability of the regional forces or parallel forces. In my tour, I understood the level of the troop trainings at AU and RECs are quite different from the way that the UN does, they do have the standard, manuals, and guidance, but they are not really following through the whole trainings and evaluation compared to the United Nations. This is sometimes because of the capability or lack of the finance or the will to follow up through. And which will subsequently effectivity of the troop's performance in the field. That is one thing that I found.

Another thing is – in a few days ago I saw newswire from AFP that the Kenyan troops left the DRC because of the fact that they were considered to be underperforming by the Congolese authority. Having said that, my question is, if we are to partly rely on the parallel forces to intervene on the situations where UN forces cannot get into, I think it is really imperative for us to encourage the regional forces and the regional peacekeeping training centers to raise the standards of the regional forces to intervene at least to the similar level as the UN operation standards. That is the other question that I would like to ask.

You also mentioned about important point at the end. You suggested that Japan should consider the case of Mali. Do you also see any other sort of concrete ways that Japan can contribute in terms of the not just the finances, by human resources, sending liaison officers, equipment, or in any other kind? If you have any idea, that would be great. Thank you.

(Answer: Gen. Cammaert)

Thank you very much for your question. I could talk about it for a long time, but I will not do that, but a few observations and reactions on that. As you heard me saying, I was rather reluctant or hesitant, is a better word, on the regional forces and parallel forces etc., because if you talk about the regional forces, many times the neighbors, the neighbors all have an interest in operating just across the border. A political interest, economic interest, which is sometimes a bit questionable if that is the right mindset, the right issue. Another issue of the regional forces, standby forces etc., are the logistics. We know that for years that logistics are really a major point of concern when you talk about the East African standby forces, Ecuador, etc.

Last point is the human rights records and the behavior record in a number of countries have

not a very good record on that and that is a risk. So, I have also a little bit of a hesitation on the issues that were mentioned in the New Agenda for Peace of the Secretary General. In your observation that Kenya has withdrawn their party from the DRC because of underperformance is only an illustration of that. What can be done, the standards should be raised? But we say that already for years that the standard to be raised, so maybe that we should be a little bit more serious about that.

Second, what can Japan do? I think that you mentioned already liaison officers' etc. Japan has very high qualified staff officers and they are very welcome in the various missions, male and female, particular female officers, to deploy. But you do not need to send battalions etc. Japan has a limitation from the Constitution, but there is, for instance, a lot of room on sending training teams on drone capacity. You can do that from a training site way out of the conflict zone and you contribute enormously to the capabilities of the mission. The same thing for medical facilities and training. There are a lot of things that Japan can do. I would strongly recommend, as you heard me saying that it is fantastic on the ministerial level in Accra to come up with the usual arguments, but if you want to really look at the future, in my view, you have to take a case study and start digging and unravelling and brainstorming on that mission because in the future, we will see the same challenges as Mali faced. I have been living the last 2.5 years in Bamako and I have seen it with my own eyes and I am strongly convinced that that will be in the future and therefore a seminar where we can deal with that is very much needed. Sorry for the long reply.

(Question 2)

Thank you very much for your presentation, General Cammaert. I was your student in this July. My question is very simple because I am a military lawyer, not a liar. Should we stick to UN peace keeping operations if there are many challenges as you mentioned? Because world peace is our goal, but UN peacekeeping operation itself is not our goal, it is merely a tool. If this tool cannot meet the requirement, we should change our tool. What do you think of this idea?

(Answer: Gen. Cammaert)

You are absolutely right that peacekeeping is a tool, but with the various challenges that we see in the world, the way we do business might change. As I said in my intervention, it is highly unlikely that we will see in the very near future massive operations like MONUSCO with 15-20 thousand troops and that is unlikely to happen, certainly with the mood in the Security Council as we speak, certainly with political developments in the near future in the United States and other countries, it is very unlikely that you will see massive operations. However, there are a lot of other ways of operating smaller missions, observer missions, political missions, combination of my mission that I performed in the Hodeida to implement a ceasefire. These kinds of missions are certainly possible. If you see operations like in Libya or in Ukraine or in

Gaza or in the future, that comes at a certain moment and end to a conflict. I am sure that the United Nations will be called upon to see what can be contributed, what can be put together, so if you want to call it peacekeeping or peace support operations or peace operations, it does not matter, but I think that certainly a role to play for the near future.

Panel Discussion

**Moderator: Dr. SHINODA Hideaki, Professor,
Tokyo University of Foreign Studies**

**Panelists: Mr. YOSHIZAKI Tomonori, Professor
Tokyo University of Foreign Studies
Colonel Werner Klaffus, German Bundeswehr
Commander, Bundeswehr UN Training Centre
Colonel KAWASAKI Machiko
Commander, Military Medicine Research Unit, JGSDF**

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much for the audience for gathering today. This is a great opportunity for us to discuss the current circumstances of international peace operations. Ladies and gentlemen, we are very much at a critical juncture of the world of international peace operations. We are faced with many challenges, changes, difficulties and so on, and despite the great amount of our knowledge and experiences accumulated in the last decades, especially in the last three decades since the end of the Cold War, we still feel that we are trying to cope with the new circumstances in the new future. This is a great opportunity for us to share our understanding as well as our insights into the challenges we are faced with. We benefited from such a comprehensive and exciting keynote speech by General Cammaert in the first session where I was so much impressed by the manner the General described the current situation we are faced with.

Let me briefly introduce my experience in June this year. As the director of Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center (HPC), I have a second title to be engaged with the community of international peace operations. I have been running HPC on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan for 17 years to provide training courses for young professionals, active UN officials at the entry levels and mid-levels, in order for us to enhance human resource capacities to contribute to international peace operations. In addition to annual training courses, in June this year, we held a special occasion of UN Senior Mission Leaders' Course. Former SRSG Mr. Akashi kindly visited our sites a few times to greet our participants. This SML course was the UN training course in which D2 level – already very senior officials are gathering, to be prepared for even higher leadership like SRSG, Force Commander, Police Commissioner, and so on. Japan hosted the SML in June, spending two weeks in Tokyo. While United Nations directly implemented SML, we were a host and HPC took the logistical support position. Therefore, I was called the National Course Director and looked after logistical affairs and observed the entire process of SML.

We discussed a lot of issues and participants organized exercise under the title of very famous Carana, a fictitious country, and that is the very major topic of SML. While we were in Tokyo together, the Security Council discussed Mali and sensationally the Malian Foreign Minister called for the withdrawal of MINUSMA. Those participants coming from New York describe

the circumstance from the perspective of New York, and the field officers responded to these observations from the perspective of field experiences. At the point in late June, Security Council passed the resolution to terminate the mandate of MINUSMA by the end of December this year.

Given this context, many people at the endpoint of SML said that it is really feasible to continue to organize exercises in such a manner like a fictitious country like Carana, in which they all contribute to the formation, planning, and implementation of multidimensional peacekeeping forces, but it is very doubtful that in the near future we would see the new multidimensional peacekeeping force. If so, if this observation is correct, what would be the next? The significant downsizing of the budget, as well as the number of personnel in the UN peacekeeping operations and more complex configurations of partnership, international peace operations between UN and non-UN entities. We are experiencing the significant changes right now. That is for sure very clear. But what kind of changes we are facing at this moment and what kind of consequences we are going to see in the new future; all these things are at this moment very uncertain.


This symposium is a great opportunity for all of us to share our insights and propose any kind of new ideas so that we can discuss the feasibility of our ideas. Especially in this panel discussion, three additional but major contributors to this symposium will offer their insights into the current circumstances of international peace operations from their own distinctive perspectives. We are looking forward to having this panel and then after the break we will have more plenary exciting discussions with all of you.

I would like to explain the procedure of this panel. We are going to spend around 80 minutes from now on up to 4:35 p.m. Sixty-five more minutes we spend on this panel. Each panelist will be given 15 to 20 minutes, and then if there are some opportunities, we may take some questions among ourselves from you, but otherwise we will have your questions and comments in the next session.


Now, I would like to invite Colonel Klaffus as a first presenter of this panel discussion. Colonel, if you are ready, you have the floor, please. Thank you very much.

Panel Discussion

Colonel Werner Klaffus, Commander, Bundeswehr UN Training Centre



Distinguished guests, Excellencies, Comrades, ladies, and gentlemen, *konnichiwa*. It is a pleasure to be here, and it is an honor to be here and to make a short 15-minute speech. I am not a friend of 15 minutes, but anyway, I will try.



Thank you to the panel for giving me this interesting question: talking about Europe. What is Europe? If we have a glance on the map, this tiny piece is Europe. Europe is going from the Atlantic Ocean, from the Portuguese coast to the Ural Mountains more or less in the middle of Russia. It is going from the North Pole down to the level here on the North Shore of the Mediterranean. That is all. That is Europe.

Now if you ask me what is the perspective of Europe and the perspective of UN business, that is not easy because there is no one Europe. Europe has been on the map for some three thousand years since the old Greek and the old Romans started writing history. This history was almost war history, and this was going through whole Europe for 2000 years, at least for Central Europe, where Germany is located. For 2000 years, German history is a history of war, more-or-less in every generation. That is Europe.

Now, after Second World War, Europe – the world – the northern hemisphere was divided into the free world and the Warsaw Pact. Thanks God, in 1989, when this Warsaw Pact collapsed, all the nations under the umbrella of the Soviet Union got their freedom again and most of them joined NATO; most of them joined EU. Why? They were seeking for security. And this year Finland joined NATO to get security from Russia. Within the last two years, the world has changed completely.

To the North and to the West, Europe is safe. To the north, beyond the North Pole and to the west, Canada and the United States, our allies are located. This alliance is our safety and our freedom. To the east, Russia has been and is again fighting several wars during last years on

the southern flank of Russia. Now this terrible war in Ukraine starting, in 2014 with an asymmetric warfare and now, for two years, more-or-less since February last year, it is a real, large scale war. Number three, the southern flank. This is a really challenging area for the Europeans, because there are a lot of civil wars, uprising and struggles, what we have been talking about last hours. A lot of people are striving to achieve to Europe to get safety. Europe is not able to get them all, to take them all. This is a real challenge for the European nations and so the big question is what will politics do? It is a political decision at the end, but the times are getting more and more worse, and politics need to take decisions and those decisions will take unhappy pictures.

This is why I want to talk for Europe in this point. Europe is striving for safety and security all over the world because Europe needs a safe southern flank and a safe eastern flank. Europe needs safe trade routes to do trade all over the world because this is the only thing we are living from. Europe is not having major resources. So, Europe needs the international trade.



What does it mean at the moment? What are the consequences? What can I see on the horizon? To start on the strategic level, at the moment, the United Nations are not workable anymore. They are a battlefield. For two or three years now, the big players the US, China and Russia, are fighting their disputes in the Security Council; in New York and in the United Nations. That is the real challenge for the world. As long as those nations are fighting those struggles, I think the option for stabilization operations is a real challenge.

The last 30 years were happy years. All the nations usually were fine with any mission, wherever in the world. Everybody agreed. Russia agreed. China agreed. All the nations agreed. There was common understanding or even cooperation in and for UN missions. Today, the big players are competing in New York and they are competing in the world. We mentioned the Wagner team. What does it mean for stabilization for Russia, for UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations? This is one of the big questions for today.



Now, I want to switch to the picture of Afghanistan. I have a deep experience from Afghanistan and the situation was a look alike of the situation in Mali. In Afghanistan, in 2001, NATO succeeded militarily within a few days. NATO won the war against the Taliban. NATO overcame the Taliban within a few days. From my perspective, it was a political mistake to take this easy win and to say, "Okay, this is an easy win. People are happy with us now." They were waving hands, and everybody was happy with NATO. And then the nations started to consider to create a state. This was the first step to the disaster, because Afghanistan has never been a state. This piece of land in the frame of those borders that we call Afghanistan has never been a nation. It is just tribes. Alexander the Great, 2300 years ago, on his way to India, made his way as quickly as possible through Afghanistan. Why? Because he was not able to overcome those tribes from the mountains. The British made the same experience in the 1850's. The Russians made the same experience and now NATO.

What do I take from this? What is my lesson? If you are employed in any country and Mali is the same situation, then all those nations face the same challenges. A lot of parties are struggling for own goals in a complex scenario. If you have two conflicting parties in two pieces of a country with a demarcation line to separate those two parties, the situation is easy. That is like in Cyprus. This is like on the Golan Heights. Such situations are quite easy. But if the conflicting parties are mingled into each other, how to distinguish between them? Protection of Civilians is one of the key issues for UN- or NATO-forces in mission. For the opposing fighters it is an easy thing to attack civilians to show the lack of force of the protection forces. And I am taking the example of Afghanistan and NATO, because the NATO forces were very well equipped; they were well trained. They had everything they needed. At the end,

they did not succeed. It is not possible for regular and UN forces to protect civilians all over the country and it is not possible to fight an irregular enemy without interfering civilian life.

Number two, if nations try to create a state in a foreign country, and we were doing so, nations are going high risk to create a disaster. I am military. We were training 300,000 Afghans as soldiers and our training was a good one. In 2021, when the Taliban started their approach to Kabul, nobody appeared on the battlefield. Why? The soldiers of the Afghan army were never serving the Afghan state. They were never serving the Afghan flag. They were always loyal to their families, clients, and tribes. As long as the international community is not able to create a stable state structure and state organization, the military is not able to achieve any goal. So, it is consequent that NATO went out two years ago, in 2021. This was a classical military decision. If you identify that you are running against a pole and you are not able to overcome it, to win whatever, you have to reduce your forces, you have to withdraw your forces to get back the freedom of action.

The interesting thing is, when NATO entered Afghanistan in 2001, there were seventeen point something million people living there. When we left some 20 years later in 2021, it was thirty-five point something million. So, Afghanistan more than doubled the population. At the end, the mission was helpful to a certain extent, but as long as those missions are not able to support creating national structures, politics, police, military, etc., then those missions have no option to succeed. If you are now looking to Africa, Mali, the number of participating parties is increasing. Wagner and all those other groups who are coming up. This is too much for a classic stabilization mission. The classical military forces are able to fight a foe. They are not able to fight in such a complex scenario, because: who is the enemy and who is not? This is why the nations are not going to Libya those days. This is why the nations are not going to Syria. Syria is collecting more than one hundred different conflicting parties. This is no option for any military force, for any political or civilian force and this is what I require as military from politics: to decide on a mission which is achievable. Otherwise, it will not work.

Number two: what do we need to do? It was mentioned that we need to train our forces. Such a mission is not a 'Joy Riding' tour. The decision will be achieved by the soldiers with the boots on the ground. Strategic decision is okay, but the decision will be achieved by the troopers with the boots on the ground. If they are not able to successfully accomplish their mission; whether they are lacking equipment, ammunition, or whatsoever, then it is time to get the soldiers out. Otherwise, they will suffer and we will not achieve anything. The strange thing, for me, it is not easy, is that in 2018, we received the report of General Santa Cruz. He was describing exactly those points with some additional points, and nothing has changed. We are always sending forces who are poorly equipped, who are not really combat ready. When I went to Kosovo, and when I went to Afghanistan, I took every single day before the mission to prepare and to train my soldiers for combat. Again - it is not a 'Joy Riding' tour. In Kosovo there was

no challenge at all, but we learned it after a few weeks. A few month later the next mission to Afghanistan, at the end, was a combat mission. And thanks God, we were training for real combat. And I urge, and I recommend providing this high-level professional training to all forces and to any mission under the flag of United Nations, under the flag of EU or under the flag of NATO.

This is more or less what I have as keywords. And of course, I am always talking up for military, police, and civilian organizations. You know the word ‘comprehensive approach’? This was what we learned in Afghanistan. There is no only military mission. There will be no success ever, if nations are not following the comprehensive approach to get the civilian organization, the military, and the police together on a mission. At the end, peace will never be possible without the people in the region. If the region is not a nation – I just repeat, there are no nations – if it is tribes, if the people in the region are not willing to take care about themselves, foreign forces will never succeed. That is not very optimistic. Of course, sorry for that, but at the end, we need to take care of our personnel and to get them home safely.

Thank you very much. If you have any questions, please ask them.



(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much indeed, Colonel. As we have already discussed the distinction between UN peacekeeping operations and the non-UN peace support operations has become much blurred, and in the end, they are influencing each other. Despite the fact that our focus may still be on the UN peacekeeping operation today, but there are a lot of issues we should learn from the experiences of non-UN entities. As in the case of Afghanistan, we have bitter memories; experiences and we still have to discuss Afghanistan together with our experiences in Mali as well.

Now, let us turn to the next speaker. I would like to invite Colonel Kawasaki. She is experienced in the field of international peace operations in SDF, New York, and so on. She is almost a rising star in our community of Japanese experts on the international peace operations. We are so much glad to have her presence today. Colonel Kawasaki, you have the floor.

Panel Discussion

Colonel KAWASAKI Machiko,

Commander, Military Medicine Research Unit, JGSDF



Thank you, Prof. Shinoda, and good afternoon everyone. Thank you for giving me this opportunity. My name is Machiko Kawasaki, as Prof. Shinoda introduced me, I worked at the Department of Operational Support, in UN headquarters in New York for three years until August. As a medical training officer in the Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP) Team, I implemented medical capacity-building and telemedicine projects for UN peacekeeping operations. Today, I would like to share my ideas for improving and enhancing UNPKO in capacity building.



Here is the agenda. I will introduce the outline of Triangular Partnership Programme and share its challenges and best practices. Then, I will talk about the possible contributable areas for Japan.



UN peacekeeping missions face several challenges. Complex threats are causing a rise in fatalities and injuries of peacekeepers, and missions have sometimes lacked the personnel and equipment to meet these threats. The Secretary-General launched Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) in 2018 to focus on peacekeeping with better-equipped and trained forces. The Secretariat has set these eight key priorities. Priority number two, women peace and security; number four, safety and security of peacekeepers; and number five, support for effective performance; those three priorities are deeply related to the capacity building, including TPP.

Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP)

- **Launched in 2015**
- **Framework for corporation- UN/TCCs/Supporting Member States**
- **Aim to enhance peacekeepers' capacity through the provision of training and operational support**
- **4 project areas; Engineering, Medical, C4ISR, and Telemedicine**
- **Geographical aspects; East Africa - Asia-Pacific**



<https://operationalsupport.un.org/en/triangular-partnership-programme-tpp>

TPP was launched in 2015. Its projects have been implemented by collaborating with the UN, supporting member states and troops contributing countries (TCCs) to improve peacekeeping performance. Through TPP, the UN can conduct more effective peace operations with an expanded pool of well-trained and equipped TCCs. TCCs can receive professional training with enough equipment for mission deployment. Supporting member states can have the opportunity to contribute to peacekeeping and foster partnerships with TCCs. TPP consists of three training projects: engineering, tactical casualty care, C4ISR, and one operational support project for introducing telemedicine project to UN peacekeeping missions. It originally started in African countries but is currently expanding to the Asia-Pacific region.


Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP)

- Completed over 16,000 personal
- Deployed PKOs in Africa after courses
- Trainers' provider; Japan (SDF), Switzerland, Brazil, Togo, and so on
- Language; English, French, and local languages



https://operationalsupport.un.org/sites/default/files/230101_tpp_factsheet_en.pdf (English)
https://www.unic.or.jp/files/230701_TPP_Factsheet_JPN.pdf (Japanese)

As of the 1st of July, more than 16,000 personnel have participated in training courses, some of them subsequently deployed in PKOs in Africa. Initially, it was funded by only Japan, but now Republic of Korea, India, Israel, and so on provided funds. TPP is contributing A4P by improving the safety and security of peacekeepers and supporting effective performance of troops contributing countries. Now, TPP became the flagship programme of the Department of Operational Support.



Through my work in the TPP team, I have identified several challenges to improve the performance of peacekeepers. Many TCCs struggle to secure sufficient equipment for pre-deployment training and mission activities. Many medical training participants told me they lack the first aid kits and mannequins needed for unit training. Securing equipment is a key for the performance. Training quality control is also essential. In the case of medical training, trainers with much experiences as medical instructors in their own countries participated, however, there were differences in the skill set of the trainers. It is necessary to develop a pool of well-trained trainers and standardized training materials for sustainable training delivery. As you know, women peace and security (WPS) is included A4P priorities, so there is a need to increase women's participation. Project evaluation is also needed to solicit further funding from new and current partners.

Best practice to improve TCCs' performance

- **Training equipment transfer**
- **Standardizing of teaching methodology**
- **Encourage women participation**
- **Hearing TCC performance from Stakeholders**



I will share the recent best practices to address identified challenges.

Training equipment transfer



UN Department of Operational Support
@UN/OpSupport

On 8 Nov #UNTPP launched the Heavy Engineering Equipment (HEE) Operators' Intermediate Course at the Multinational Peacekeeping Training School in Cambodia. 10 ROK trainers will equip 32 Cambodian trainees with the skills to operate their assigned HEE over the 4-week course.







8:26 AM · Nov 9, 2023 · 7018 Views

<https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/south-korea-donates-engineering-machinery-peacekeeper-training>

https://x.com/UN_OpSupport/status/1722994972593205700?s=20

- Bilateral equipment transfer from ROK to Cambodia in Mar 2023
- Organizing the TPP Engineering course at Cambodia with ROK trainer team and donated equipment.

The first is the equipment transfer. South Korea donated heavy engineering machines to Cambodia bilaterally in March 2023. TPP has provided engineering training for operators with donated machines working with a Korean trainer team since last month.

Standardizing of teaching methodology

UN Department of Operational Support
@UnOpsupport

Yesterday #UNTPP successfully concluded a 4-day Field Medical Assistants Course (RIMAC) Training of Trainers (TOT) Virtual Workshop. Improving #UNPeacekeeping emergency medical response will increase the survivability of injured peacekeepers.



02:00 PM - Apr 14, 2022 - 2288 Views

https://x.com/UN_OpSupport/status/1646860970189377539?s=20

— INSTRUCTIONAL VIDEOS



<https://deployedmedicine.com/market/193/category/295>

- Shifting Training-of-Trainers (TOT) courses to strengthen training capacities
- Using video materials to standardizing lectures/demonstrations

The second case is standardizing the teaching methodology. To broaden the TPP's training impact, training of trainers (TOT) is important. If TCCs can have well-trained trainers in their countries, they can improve the quality of pre-deployment training. Usually, after TOT, participants would probably teach contents to other trainers in their countries. To provide the same quality training, video materials are very helpful. They can give the same demonstration and same explanation to the participants at any time. In addition, for trainees, video materials help review the class. In the medical training, participants often used video clips created by the US military.

Encourage women participation

UN C4ISR Academy for Peace Operations
@UNC4ISR_Academy

UNCAP welcomes 15 military & police officers from 🇪🇪 🇨🇩 🇨🇰 🇨🇮 🇨🇲 🇨🇳 participating in the 8th Women's Outreach Course, in French language @univice. Thank you to @Canada/MI 🇨🇦 for the generosity and continued support to building capacity for #WomenInPeacekeeping!





The 8th Women Outreach Course promoted by the UN C4ISR Academy for Peace Operations (UNCAP) starts next week, from 18 to 20 Septemb...
<https://fb.watch/cEi6DMVcm8/>

19:02 PM · Sep 12, 2023 · 671 Views
https://x.com/UNC4ISR_Academy/status/1701609685990948869?s=20

Launched the Women's Outreach Course (WOC) for T/PCCs female Officers

The third point is encouraging women's participation. C4ISR academy held the women's outreach course. It was for female officers who learned technology on UN-owned C4ISR and camp security systems in English and French.

Hearing TCC performance from Stakeholders

UN Department of Operational Support
@UN_OpSupport

The Triangle Partnership Programme (TPP) held its 6th Stakeholders' Workshop, 15-17 May, with the support of SRSBNT, in Stans-Oberdorf, Switzerland. 28 participants from 18 countries discussed ways to improve UN Peacekeeping performance through training & capacity building.



16:33 PM · May 15, 2023 · 4,000 views

https://x.com/UN_OpSupport/status/1658828069170192385?s=20

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- Organized stakeholders' workshop for the training needs assessment and impact for TCCs'
- Having conferences/symposiums to discuss challenges in particular areas

The last best practice case is meeting to hear stakeholders' feedback. TPP held the stakeholder meeting in April, discussing the gap and training needs with the Department of Peace Operations, donor countries, training providers, and training recipients. Also, the Office of ICT in the UN organized an international symposium in June and discussed digital transformation, including capacity building and telemedicine.



Finally, I would like to share my thoughts on areas where Japan may be able to contribute. First, Japan should consider providing equipment to the TCC bilaterally. This year, the Charter on Development Cooperation was updated to include cooperation in PKO. The Japanese government has already announced that it will support Ukraine's demining capability through ODA, utilizing Japanese technology and experience, and the ODA framework could be used to provide equipment for PKO activities from Japan to the TCC bilaterally.

Second, I suggest that the SDF create video clips as training materials and upload them for free access; since many Japanese trainers in TPP training courses use interpreters to deliver their lectures, I think the videos can also help reduce the language barrier for trainees and Japanese trainers.

Third, the need for female trainers is growing. Currently, TPP is working with the trainer team from Ground Self Defense Force Engineering School to offer the construction process management course in Tokyo, through tomorrow. One female instructor is giving the lectures. This is the WPS best practice. There are many excellent instructors in Japan and more and more female trainers should participate. In addition, in engineering and medical area, Japan could consider training courses exclusively for women. This would also be a great opportunity for trainees to develop their capacities.

Fourth, how about organizing international conferences and workshop with the UN? Japan can utilize them to know the training needs from the TCCs and the UN directly and showcase the SDF training capacities and scales related to PKO missions.

At last, I strongly recommend that SDF build the training alumni network. I have group chats with ex-trainees and trainers. Sometimes, they posted their best practice on the group chat, or someone asked questions and solved them in the group. If SDF builds an alumni network and has alumni events, the network will be incredibly worth it.

That is all from my side. Thank you for your attention, and I would be happy if you could give me your comment for my ideas. Thank you.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much, Colonel Kawasaki. It was a great exhibition of very much kind of down to Earth activities, as well as very creative proposals. I highly appreciate and there are some keywords like partnership and capacity building, training courses, and so on. There is a clear limit of what Japan can do, but together with our partners, we would like to extend our sphere of activities. Thank you very much, Colonel Kawasaki.

Now I would like to invite Prof. Yoshizaki, as the next presenter. He was widely known as the great researcher on the side of the National Defense Academy until March this year. Now he took a position of a professorship at my university and we highly welcome his renewed engagement in the policy circle. Now, Prof. Yoshizaki, please take the floor.

Panel Discussion

Professor YOSHIZAKI Tomonori, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies



Thank you very much, Prof. Shinoda. Last year I spoke as a Vice President for Academic Affairs of National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense. This year I had the position of an academic one. So, I feel that I am so relaxed to make a comment and make my personal view about Japan's engineering peace starting from Cambodia. It was my great pleasure to speak before Mr. Akashi about the key findings and challenges beyond Cambodia, UNTAC, and what is the implication for the age of Ukraine or Middle East disasters. The keyword today is resilience, resilience support. I would like to add this term and the mindset of peacekeeping or capacity building or triangular partnership project, because a resilience is the key to support Ukraine and possibly Taiwan. These are the challenges not only in the UN framework but also global challenges.

Japan's Engineering Peace in Thirty-Year of Crises

■ Ver. 1.0 Post-Cold War Model:

UN-centered approach

Cambodia; East Timor; South Sudan

■ Ver. 2.0 "Global War on Terror" Model

Support to U.S.-led Coalition of Willing

Stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq?

■ Ver. 3.0 New Strategic Competition Model

China's Rise & Russian Invasion to Ukraine

Resilience Support with Like-minded Partners



I put three phases, every roughly 10 years. Number one is engineering peace, basic one, started as the UNTAC Cambodia providing a facility engineering unit under the UN flag and highly legitimate and global support, plus the capability as shown on the screen and the picture that Japanese heavy, not the weaponry, but the equipment, heavy equipment like bulldozers or graders that can be transported world-wide in a very rapid manner. That is one of the Japanese expertise. And financially we can sustain that activity. So, number one is UN centered approach.

Number two is starting from 9/11, 2001. We clearly remember the moment that the world changed with the Twin Towers falling down and Pentagon attacked. What matters is the collective defense or right of self-defense worldwide; how the world can support US-led coalition of willing, including Japan, first in Afghanistan, second in Iraq and beyond, but the picture being indicated that Taliban is back. We clearly remember the 2021 August 15th. We had the Taliban in the back in the capital of Afghanistan. Total failure and what was wrong.

Then we have to think about the current stage strategic competition again, just like a Cold War, this is a kind of model we have to think. China's rise or Russian invasion to Ukraine is a reality. UN flag or coalition with willing in Ukraine? No. UN can have a UN peacekeeping mission? No. What matter? It would be a resilience support from likeminded partners. This is the key term I would like to add in the literature of the peace support operation, peace operation plus Japanese literature.

Engineering Peace 1.0: UN-focused

- **First Step in “International Peace Cooperation Activities”**
 - “Trinity” of UNPKO: minimum use of force
 - Civil-Military “Separation”

- **Assessment :**
 - Japan’s “contribution to international society”
 - Narrative
 - UNTAC Mission as a “success story”
 - “Human Security” concept (1994)
 - Focus on conflict avoidance, not on conflict resolution

Number one is the original idea of engineering peace started in UNTAC Cambodia and the trinity of UN peacekeeping operation, minimum use of force, and also impartiality neutrality, and also the civil-military separation, that means we will have a kind of the UN Centers but try to be rather neutral. Assessment was that rather indirect, but very positive Japanese contribution to international society, it is a kind of the Japanese support to the general global challenges. The prevailing narrative was, that UNTAC mission was a success story, based upon a facility building and the support to the UN missions not by combat forces, but by the engineering unit. Plus, Japanese focus on human security, which is unique and based upon Japan’s lesson learned after the World War II, focusing on the educations or the welfare and the economy, not military. In that sense, human security is a kind of the Japanese unique model, plus Japanese engineering, and this is very capable. So, we focus on not the resolution itself, but a bit stay away from the burning issues. That was the original idea.

“Engineering Peace” in Number (Data Source: MOD)						
UN Mission	Duration	Personnel	Activities/ Achievements			
(Country)		(in total)	Road Repaired	Bridge Repaired	Land Reclamation	Facilities Construction
UNTAC (Cambodia)	12 months (1992.9-93.9)	1,200	110km	47	n.a.	n.a.
UNTAET UNMISET (East Timor)	27 months (2002.3-04.6)	2,287	151 spots	4	n.a.	15 places
MINUSTAH (Haiti)	35 months (2010.2-13.1)	2,184	3km	1	120,000 Km2	24 places
UNMISS (South Sudan)	63 months (2012.2-17.5)	3,912	260km	n.a.	500,000 km2	97 places

Then, this is the kind of the data which includes the kind of evolution of the engineering peace from the left, the UNTAC and down to the East Timor and Haiti or South Sudan. We have very rich experiences and lessons learnt. In that sense, we should be proud of the achievement of the engineering peace under UN practice. But the real question may be that where is the Japan’s position in the new mission with the politically acceptable positions and with limited use of force? That is the question we should ask.

Engineering Peace 2.0: GWOT

➤ Japan and “Global War on Terror”

- Support to the “coalition of willing and capable”
 - Indirect support to Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Afghanistan
 - Japan Ground SDF activities in Samawah, Iraq


➤ Assessment :

- Indirect & de-facto *alliance management* with the U.S.
- Narrative:
 - “Boots on the Ground”
 - Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) with NGOs and IOs
 - All-Japan Approach and Seamless Cooperation

Then we will move on to the second generation like an engineering peace 2.0 during the Global War on Terror period. Japan supported so-called coalition of willing and capable, led by US first in Iraq and possibly with Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, Japan’s support was somewhat indirect. Indirect support to the provincial reconstruction team in Chaghcharan plus security sector reform in Afghanistan, with the focus of gender issues, such as the women police officer training. In Turkey we have had a growing interest of how women peace and security (WPS) will be in line with NATO’s stabilization operation there in Afghanistan.

In case of Iraq, we have the Ground Self Defense Force’s activities and that was not UN mission, but we had huge interest how the Japanese unit can work with Australia, Holland (Dutch), and Britain. That means assessment may be indirect, de facto alliance management issue with the United States, but not directly. This is the key.

A prevailing narrative was, boots on the ground. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) with the NGO and the international organizations was the first real challenge. Holistic approach or comprehensive approaches or in case of Japan, we said all-Japan approach or seamless cooperation with like-minded partners, that was the lesson learned.



Then a kind of mindset shared by the coalition of the willing is that “Okay, in the center, local population who can win hearts and minds.” This is de facto counter insurgency operation mindset, not PKO. It is very different, and it is combat ready things, and you see the picture on the right top, David Petraeus, and on the left top, the “Counterinsurgency Field Manual.” In that sense, this was not UN-led one, but the collective defense mindset.

Engineering Peace 3.0: Resilience Support with Partners

- The rise of "strategic competition"
 - "Back to basic": Article 5 for NATO & Japan-US
 - Capacity-building for ASEAN members and beyond:
 - **"Like-minded" partners** out of UN framework:
 - Cf. Japan as "AP-4" or Asia-Pacific Four; NATO Summit and G-7
 - **Connectivity** between Indo-Pacific & Euro-Atlantic areas
- Assessment
 - New narrative: **"resilience support"** to regional partners
 - Strategic Communication revisited
 - Implications for Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP)

I will conclude with the third period, engineering peace 3.0, which is the current stage. My term is the "resilience support," including Japan, NATO, or the UN members with partners and the rise of strategic competition is a reality. In that sense, we cannot get United Nations Security Council Resolution on use of force or all necessary means to deal with the burning issues. That is the reality. Then we have to think about "back to basic," the Article 5 of NATO and US-Japan, including the Senkaku issue. That is the core mission of the combined effort of the alliances. It is the collective defense things plus like-minded partners out of UN framework but in NATO or G7 Summit, like Hiroshima. AP-4 was named by the NATO, including South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, and that is a kind of minilateralism. In that sense, connectivity is a password.

My assessment now is that the new narrative may be international global resilience support to Ukraine, Taiwan, or some other burning issues not committing to the unit themselves, but they are raising support from everywhere. And the strategic communication will be the key. Then TPP may be related to the UN framework, ASEAN framework, the regional cooperation framework, or the collective defense framework that can be the reality.



I will explain a bit more about what I did and what I do in the time of the engineering piece 3.0. This is the era of strategic competition. The red team, Russia and China strategic partnership is a reality. The blue team with Japan, NATO, and the U.S. has a global lead. You will see a green area, Ukraine and Taiwan, so this is simply a model in order to have the gaming. This is not the reflection of the reality, but this is the whole game playing purposes I simplified. But the thing is that the US has limited resources. How alliance will work or partnership will work in this situation; this is the real challenge.

Resilience Support: Ukrainian Case

Seven Baseline Requirements

- 1 Continuity of government**
- 2 Energy supplies**
- 3 Movement of people**
- 4 Food and water**
- 5 Management of mass casualties and disruptive health crises**
- 6 Civil communications systems**
- 7 Transport systems**

Source: NATO "Resilience, civil preparedness and Article 3"

Then the key term may be 'resilient support.' In the case of Ukraine, NATO, and EU, highlighted the key visions, but the on the top you will see – this is the most important one and I would like to underline it – continuity of government. Let me compare two cases. Number one is Afghanistan. Unfortunately, Mr. Gani left the capital immediately. In the case of the Ukraine, President Zelensky maintained his position wearing the military uniform and has the connectivity everywhere, including Hiroshima and Tokyo, using website. So, the continuity of the government's political will, is the key. And the rest, (2) energy, (3) movement, (4) food and water, (5) mass casualties management, (6) civil communications systems, and (7) transportation, are logistic supports and supply chain maintenance. That means political will and capability is the key for success in the case of resilience.

(sample) DIME Options for Ukraine Resilience

Diplomatic	Informational	Military	Economic
			
			
			<p>ALH Design your DIME for group discussion</p> <p>10</p>

This is the dime options which I use for playing the resilience games and the diplomatic informational, military economic options on the table, on how we can utilize.

Challenges for Japan: Changing Nature of Conflict Management

Emerging & Disruptive Technologies (EDT)

- Quantum-based technologies;
- Artificial intelligence (AI);
- Robotics and autonomous weapons systems;
- Big data analytics;
- Hypersonic weapons systems and space technologies;
- New advanced materials

(Source: NATO & European Union)

“Nowhere to hide” (Christopher Coker, *Future War*, p. 209)

Let me conclude with this slide. Challenge for Japan is clear. Conflict management is changing. UN model or GWOT collision model or partnership resilience model that can coexist. Not taking over, not dominant, but prevailing narrative may be emerging and destructive technology like quantum-based technology; AI, robotics, big data, hypersonic, and new advanced materials. These are the reality. Then, these are where Japanese efforts can fit in. Japan is capable and willing. The key is low mission capability but the most critical is capability, and Japan can do. In that sense, battlefield is everywhere. We have nowhere to hide. That is a term by Christopher Coker, the LSE professor, and this may be the reality.

Let me conclude. Engineering peace is a multilayered effort. Number one is UN and very transparent, legitimate, and highly-welcomed worldwide. Number two is the counter terrorism point or collective difference issues. But the reality on the ground in Ukraine may need another one and Mali or other cases needs a resilience support. I would like to propose to have a new round of discussion on this issue. Let me conclude. Thank you very much.



(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much, Prof. Yoshizaki. It was another comprehensive, exciting presentation to look at the history of international peace operations from the coherent perspective of engineering peace, which was very much beautiful, we describe the history of international peace operations.

Frankly, allow me to show my experience. When I was 25 years old, exactly 30 years ago, I was volunteering to join in the UNTAC operation to take responsibility over one tiny polling station in Takeo Province in Cambodia. I was called the International Polling Station Officer under the bottom level subordinate of SRSG, Mr. Akashi. Since then, so many things have happened in this community of international peace operations. Of course, I just did not anticipate any of these elements 30 years ago, like our experiences in Afghanistan, Mali, and now the Ukraine, as well as the Gaza and so on. Prof. Yoshizaki kindly introduced very important keywords like resilience and the new technologies. Of course, he illustrated what is very much obvious, which we all know about the reality of international politics only in which international peace operations got deployed. Thank you very much indeed for your great presentation.

In the remaining 15 minutes of this panel, if any distinguished members have any insights, I would like to invite you up, but I would like to also first of all, highlight the presence of General Cammaert, the keynote speaker. He might have some insight into the presentations by three of our panelists. I would really would like to hear your views now.

(Gen. Cammaert)

Thank you very much for the interesting presentations. A few observations if I may. I also spoke about the risk averse attitude of a number of troops contributing countries, and UN operations and my comments are very much based on the operations under the UN flag, not so much on the NATO or European Union flag. It is interesting to observe that the risk averse attitude of a number of countries, particularly, Western countries in the UN operations are not so risk averse when they are deploying in Afghanistan or Iraq. So, it is very interesting to note that why that is the attitude of the same countries when they deploy under the UN leadership? I mentioned already the word leadership. Perhaps it has to do with the fact that Western countries have maybe less trust in countries that are leading forces or missions, outside the NATO or European Union structure. It is interesting to note. If you look at the wall, I showed you of the 309 names on the wall in MINUSMA, there are only four Western casualties on that wall. The rest is all non-Western countries. It is very interesting to note. And so, the priority in the Western countries are very much in Afghanistan and Iraq and now Ukraine, and not so much of the United Nations, which is a pity.

The second observation I would like to make is on the winning hearts and minds and the community engagement, which is extremely important in UN operations for building trust with the local population, getting information, etc. It is always encouraged that not only are the civilian colleagues doing that, but also in particular, the police and the military colleagues are doing this. It is very important. But there is also a flip side of the coin and that is in several missions – one is Mali. A number of people in the local communities are very reluctant to talk to UN colleagues, militaries, civilian, or police because of the repercussions of the jihadists and extreme armed groups. If you talk to UN people, then that has repercussions for your safety and security, particularly for women. So, it is very important to make sure that the UN is building up trust and not only visit for an hour or two hours or half a day in a place, and then you go and a month later, you might come back. You have to overcome the fear of the of the local population for the extremist groups.

I mentioned women, and the last comment that I would like to make is the importance of the women peace and security agenda and my experience in the field, particularly in the Congo, was that we simply do not have enough women in uniform and outside of uniform in the field, and also in headquarters. It is not critical point but it is interesting if you look at the gender balance in this room. It is a very male dominated environment. So, to work on the gender equality and the gender advisor's etc., that are so important in the field. It is very important to start in our capitals and in my own country and in the very layers of the armed forces. This is sometimes very difficult to penetrate and advocate that the gender advisory is so important in that it has always started at the top. If the Chief of Defense staff is the gender champion, then it simple more quickly to down to various levels. So, I would like to underline the need for women in the field, in particular to bring this different perspective in and to be able to deal and address the

violence against women and children, but also men and boys. Thank you.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much, General Cammaert. Do you have any additional thoughts on each other, like any comments on your colleagues' presentation or any kind of consequences of the stimulation as a result, Prof. Yoshizaki?

(Prof. YOSHIZAKI)

Thank you very much and let me respond to the comment and question by General Cammaert and the why Japan can be there in Iraq operations and under the very harsh condition while we have limitations about the way we operate. My thought is that legal interpretation and constitutional issues still remain. We have more flexibility than before, especially after 2014 and 2015 debate. Then we have a new security and the peace legislation which paved the way for much more flexible interpretations. But what is needed is our kind of experiences and actual activity there. As to South Sudan, we have and they have a lot of training, preparations, and a lot of experiences. So, we were ready to go and another one is the political will to maintain that the attitudes. So, what is important is that capability we can do that. Then what matters next with the political will and political situation, is which paved the way for actual operations? In that sense, national defense or the security issues are very delicate issues. It is not taboo, but military related things, has some unique interpretations, so that would be the reflections of the Japanese unique history. But now we should look to the reality that we should look to the Ukraine or Gaza reality. Then it is a good time to reconsider our staff.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much. If General Cammaert or Colonel Klaffus, have any responses to this question or comment, please take the floor.

(Col. Klaffus)

It would be a pleasure to just answer because Germany was doing a more or less similar experience. When the Iron Curtain fell in 1989, 45 years before, there was a frontline and Iron Curtain going through the whole of Europe. Of course, we had one part of Germany in the West and one part of Germany in the east, and this meant there would be no option to go to any mission because there could be a risk that we meet somewhere in the world. But when the Iron Curtain fell, Germany had no option not to follow all the invitations and the good recommendations of friends, partners and so on. And we learned. We did it step by step. One of my brothers is logistician and he was first submission to Somalia in the early 90s. Not me, as a combat guy. Germany did it step-by-step, putting more effort, more resources. In the mid-90, Germany as part of NATO, was asked to contribute and to participate in the war in former Yugoslavia because of all the slaughtering's in this war, the killing of civilians. And then NATO decided to go in and Germany participated. There was no option at the end. So, we learned step-by-step. My

training facility, next year it will be 25 years, was just installed to prepare our forces for this different kind of missions. We call it stabilization operations, whatever you call it, under the flag of United Nations. It is usually not combat, but at the end, what I am saying, we learned that today, if UN is sending soldiers, it is often combat. Thank you.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much, Colonel. Any other comments from the side of the panelist? Otherwise, in theory we still have five minutes, so we can take any questions or comments. Then, we will take questions from the audience.

(Question 3)

Thank you very much, Prof. Shinoda. I am a doctoral student and researching about DDR in northeastern DRC. My first question goes to General Cammaert for your previous presentation, regarding the question of DRC. In the event that the UNDP, and the UN peacekeeping operations seemingly appearing to be on the fence. Based on the facts that you have presented, previously we have had the scenario in DRC in 2013 where the Force Intervention Brigade came in with force and the world questioned the part of impartiality for the UN. There they are trying to portray security, trying to address the question of security, and that is what the local population probably wants to listen to. At the same time, the UN dares to leave that because it was a short run solution and later on it seemed not to have yielded so much fruit, because it was questioned for impartiality. At this point, where the local population is asking, “Why are you not protecting us?” And to date they are even asking the regional forces, “Why are you not protecting us?” Why does protection translate into, in this case for the local people? It is because they have these expectations. How can the mandate of the UN then be adjusted to make sure that it addresses the question that the local population understands for protection?

The next question goes to Colonel Klaffus. I understand with the assertions you have made about of Afghanistan and the question of tribal structure for who they are that has been disrupted by the interests of the West or the world, the international community to build a state. With that understanding of their tribes, the Taliban’s were not using sticks to fight before. They probably had weapons that they still have today, even after the exit of the United States or NATO. As a recruitment strategy, what, perhaps, are we thinking they are using based on their tribes? Why is this recruitment strategy hindering the peace building process that has come in place to pave way for a state for state building? Thank you.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much. Now I should ask General and Colonel to response to this question, however, it is already 16:35. Why do not we start with your answers to this question in the next session. The audience may come up with more questions, of course, and our colleagues are collecting questions from online participants too. Altogether, we will organize a one more hour

session after a 10-minute break.

Discussion

Moderator: Professor SHINODA Hideaki,

Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much. We are going to have one hour for this plenary session up to 17:45. We believe that we should be able to take so many questions within one hour. This is a wonderful opportunity for all of us to communicate with the distinguished panelists, to share our insights, ideas, concerns, and so on. Please prepare your questions now.

I would like to start with General Cammaert and Colonel Klaffus. As I said, I would like you to respond to the question that was raised at the endpoint of the last session. General, please.

(Gen. Cammaert)

Thank you. Very interesting question on what they call the “Force Intervention Brigade.” For the people who do not know, at the end of 2012, beginning 2013, in the northeastern part of the Congo, near Goma there was fighting. Goma was threatened by a group called the “M23.” The government forces, the FARDC was battling with this group, supported by the United Nations. At a certain moment, the government forces ran away and then the United Nations made a fatal mistake. The leadership of the United Nations said, “Now, we have no mandate anymore to protect civilians,” and they let the M23 take in Goma. In short words, the Security Council was very disappointed and said, “Now we need troops who want to do the job.” And then they said, we give an extra mandate on top of the protection of civilians to a brigade, and that was Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania. That mandate was stronger than protection of civilians. It was more aggressive, and very quickly the M23 were defeated by this Force Intervention Brigade. It was a brigade under the Watch Commander of the MONUSCO, but the various sectors had no command or control over part of the brigade that was.

So, everybody was in heaven, “Hallelujah. Very well done,” but if you start unravelling why this was so successful, then you will find out that there were a lot of factors that were contributing, and not so much this Force Intervention Brigade.

I wrote an article for the International Peace Institute in 2003. You can Google it. I was against this Force Intervention Brigade, more vigorous against. The main reason was that you created two groups in the mission, the willing and the unwilling, to use force if necessary. The protection of civilians was a sufficient mandate that you can do everything you need, and you had the rules of engagement to accompany that to protect civilians. The civilians could be protected by the United Nations when the host government runs away, or if they are unwilling or not capable, then the United Nations could step in. They did not do that. Later, the Force Intervention Brigade was also then asked to destroy this group, or to go after that group and the Force Intervention Brigade did not want to do that.

The flip side of the consequence of this Force Intervention Brigade was that then MONUSCO was becoming very much part of the problem. They were leaning too much towards their own government and then you lose your impartiality. Politically, they could not dismantle this Force Intervention Brigade, but I think at this moment also in the HIPPO report, if you read that, people are very reluctant to continue with this kind of option because it is very frustrating for Sector Commanders. If there is a problem, people say, “Oh, you go to the Force Intervention Brigade” instead of doing the job themselves.

Impartiality, you mentioned that, and I would like to give you another example. The parallel forces that I was talking about, Operation Barkhane in Mali, they were very closely located many times with the United Nations while they had a totally different mandate, that to the local population and others they do not see the difference between Barkhane—the parallel forces—and the United Nations. So, you lose your impartiality very quickly, instead of being far away from them.

You mentioned, maybe you should, to adjust the mandate, there is no reason in my view, and I have said that time and again, there is no reason to adjust a mandate. If you have a mandate to protect civilians under threat, the door is wide open. You can do everything you need to do with the rules of engagement in hand, if there is a will to do it. And the problem is the will to do it. If there is no will, you cannot. I can give you all the “goodies” in the world, the attack helicopters, you name it, special forces, but if the will of the leadership in the mission and the true contributors is not there, nothing will happen. If the capitals are whispering in the ear of a Contingent Commander, “Do not be so proactive,” and the Force Commander says, “You should protect people and prevent rapes and gang rapes from happening, sexual violence to happen,” then you will make it very difficult for a commander on the ground of a contingent. The Force Commander must help that Contingent Commander via the contact of the Permanent Mission in New York, to do the business. There is no reason to adjust a mandate in my view. Thank you.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much, General. Now, I would like to ask Colonel Klaffus for your comments. Thank you.

(Col. Klaffus)

Thank you, General. I would like to jump first on the POC keyword again, and I completely agree. At the end, it is the question of “will” and to support this will we need clear a mandate. If I refer from my missions, there was not always a very clear mandate what we were allowed or what we should do because for politics, it is always a real challenge to be clear on this point because then it is measurable.

Number two. Thank you very much for your question concerning Afghanistan and your references to nation-building and the challenges with the tribes and the Taliban. Nation-building should be one of the objectives of any UN mission because only a nation's structures, whether it is police, political structures, administration and military is providing security. This needs to be the end state. However, if you have a scenario, as we were having in Afghanistan, it was easy. The US took the Taliban out in 2001, it took only a few days, and they were either defeated or they were pushed out of Afghanistan. And 3-4 years later, they started sneaking back. They were not coming back officially, they were sneaking, taking the cover of the civilian population and trying to destabilize the approaches and the efforts of the people in the region. Of course, the people in the region know the Taliban for many, many years. When the Russians left Afghanistan, the North was free of Taliban, but then later, the Taliban sneaked in and they were attacking the civilian society. As they are doing this in civilian dress without any insignia, the classical forces like NATO forces have no opportunity to identify those guys unless they start the attack, so we were always in the second-hand.

This meant that all the leaders of the tribes and the society got more and more careful not to get engaged in this conflict and to wait what would happen if NATO was fighting the Taliban and vice versa. In my opinion, this is a consequent and smart solution. If you do not know who will win, you step back and wait undercover until there will be a decision.

As I mentioned earlier, the history of Afghanistan shows that it is a real challenge, even Alexander the Great was then not able to handle those guys. Those days it was surely not the Taliban, but the procedures were the same. And so, the civilian population is not eager to step forward, to organize themselves, to be a mayor or to be any other exposed person because they would be the target for any attacks. This is the disaster. Of course, international forces, whether it is the UN or NATO, we will never be able to protect every civilian. In the strongest time, NATO had 170,000 troops in Afghanistan. If you remember the numbers in 2001, it was 17 million Afghans, and 20 years later it was 35 million. What could we do? You cannot put one soldier in front of one or two people and protect them. This is not possible. This is a high risk. If the UN is giving protection of civilian a very high level of importance, then it is easy to show that the United Nations are failing, if irregular forces attack the civilians all the time. This is a tit for tat situation. It is politics at the end. Are you fine with this answer?

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Yes, thank you. It is great response. I think he should be very much satisfied. Thank you very much for the great emphasis on politics. We still are in a period in which we are talking about Hippo Report, which was issued in 2015 at the time of 70th anniversary of the United Nations. In 10 years, they issued some kind of concept framing document. HIPPO, as our colleagues might have mentioned at some point, was the report on UN Peacekeeping Operations

that was issued in 2015. One of the key messages within the HIPPO report of 2015 was, “Politics must drive the design and implementation of international peace operations.”

Well, we all know that it is not so easy, it is too much obvious that way. It is so difficult to bring in and utilize this observation to the full extent, but still, all the more because of that again and again we have to remind ourselves of the importance of this observation of the message of the HIPPO like, “politics must drive the design and implementation of international peace operations.”

Now, I would like to really open up the floor for questions. This session will continue until 17:45, so 45 more minutes. Now you have the floor. Questions from the audience.

(Question 4)

Thank you very much for this excellent seminar. I am from the Sudan Embassy. Actually, avoiding the conflicts is much cheaper than keeping the peace, even if you exclude the valuable lives of the victims. Having said so, I think resolving the issues, the root causes of the conflicts is more important than seeking solutions after the conflict emerged or erupted, especially with the comprehensive approach that Colonel Klaffus talked about. For example, the issue of the huge divide between the West and the developing nations in terms of development, for example, having unfulfilled commitments from the developed countries with regard to the development agenda. We have a sustainable development agenda. Before, we had the agenda for development, before it was renewed.

Also, the commitments to fight the climate change, especially within Africa, we have very huge impacts of climate change which, in many cases like Sudan, made a very central role in erupting the conflict in Darfur, in particular. This is according to the United Nations Environment Program report, which linked between the climate change and the conflict in Darfur.

Maybe, this is directed to Kawasaki-san in particular, the UN peacekeeping missions and other missions of the UN, having besides the advantages, there are also so many disadvantages and we will focus on the last one, since this is a kind of learning forum rather than political one. It is the kind of challenges including the misconduct of some of the personnel of the peacekeeping missions. We have some examples in Sudan. For example, the UN mission in Darfur caused the deforestation of a huge area. They cut a lot of trees just to build the campus there, which is also contributing to climate change. Some incidents of harassment were also reported. There is also need for respecting other cultures, especially for personnel coming from another continent.

This leads me to the other point regarding, “engineering peace,” as highlighted by Professor Yoshizaki that there is a very great role to be played by the new term, the “Global South” if this term is true. I am referring to developing countries in general, especially if you want to send a mission to a specific country in Africa for example, I think it is more pertinent to have a very

huge contribution from the neighboring countries rather than bringing people from different culture, which in many cases add some problems.

My apologies, I had very long questions and comment, but the seminar is very interesting, and I thank you all. Thank you so much.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much for the great questions from our colleague from Sudan. Sudan has been such an important country for many of us, including the United Nations as a whole. While there are no more UN peacekeeping operations over there, quite frankly, I have a graduate of our training course working as a civilian peacekeeper in Abyei. And then, we had graduates who used to work within Sudan as WFP officers and so on. Unfortunately, they had to evacuate in April this year, but still many Japanese are also very much committed to the future of Sudan.

Given that, now I need to give the floor to Professor Yoshizaki and Colonel Kawasaki. Our colleagues, Colonel Klaffus and General, if you have any comments, of course are highly welcome. Now can I turn to Professor Yoshizaki?

(Prof. YOSHIZAKI)

Thank you very much for your questions. In my presentation, I highlighted the division between the red and blue and might suggest that the West is united and the West may be kind of the Global South, or kind of part of the West and it is split. My sense is that, okay, Japan or the European countries or the US do not forget about the Global South implications and the challenges of the Global South, and the climate change you mentioned.

Also, many of the questions referred to the kind of tribal history and competitions and also, basic human needs on the ground, so many, many challenges on the ground. My point is expectation management, how far we can maintain that level of expectation management end goal? That means the end goal will be our target in our operations and support to the UN or non-UN mandated operation, because many of the origins of the conflicts in the case of Afghanistan, which attracted global attention for two decades, what mattered was that Afghanistan never experienced good governance in the past and there are so many challenges. That means, outsiders like the NATO or the UN can do very little things. What matters would be capacity-building, state-building, nation-building, regional frameworks, these kinds of cooperative, sustainable frameworks in the local communities and within the national boundaries, plus good partnerships with neighboring countries. That is the key. In order to do that, we should have a much more global or regional scope which can be maintained not only militarily but also economically, and also culturally. That will be the big, big challenge.

Let me repeat. Expectation management is pretty tough because once we refer to protecting

civilian, it may sound like protection of all the civilians, but is this possible? I do not think so. The protection of civilians' idea came from the kind of separation between the civilians and the military. And the protection of military or the UN units only? No. Protection of the civilians will be definitely needed when a POC became a kind of focal point. However, we must be honest that we have limitations about the resources, transportation capability. In that sense, expectation management, and also, we must admit that there are limitations to the capabilities we can employ and mobilize. I will stop here.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much for your very much critical observations. Colonel Kawasaki, do you have any comments?

(Col. KAWASAKI)

Thank you for your comments and the questions. Actually, my presentation is focused on the peacekeepers' capabilities and their training, etc. I know that many of the UN peacekeeping mission areas including Darfur and Abyei, they have a lot of natural disasters, maybe due to global warming and other hazardous activities. My ex-position was the Department of Operational Support and USG Khare always said that environmental management is very important for peacekeepers, so my team created a course for how to preserve the environmental situation for peacekeepers. At first, we need to advocate peacekeepers' behavior related to the environment. Of course, in many cases, very small actions, for example how to keep the clean camp, or how to manage the solar panel, or something like that, it is a small step. Also, as you know, in South Sudan's UNMISS, many engineering troops contributed relief operations, it was a very important role for the UN Peacekeepers, recently.

Actually, some outsiders like peacekeepers sometimes have damaged the environment in the mission areas, but at the same time, we provide other environmental activities for the host nation. I think the host nation's ownership is very important. Also, the UN peacekeeping operation needs to support the host nation's activities also to collaborate with the regional organizations such as with the AU, or something like that. Thank you so much.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much, Colonel Kawasaki. Apparently, that is a very much clear and present threat in South Sudan and any other places. Peacekeepers are mobilized and encouraged and requested to respond to the climate change issues like flooding and so on, but that is the actual reality on the ground. And now, Colonel, please.

(Col. Klaffus)

Thank you very much for the opportunity and thank you very much for the keywords. There are a lot of important keywords and of course I completely agree. The first one was, "avoiding

conflict is easier than peacekeeping.” You are completely right. This is your topic, General. When forces are stepping back than to do their business, this is a disaster. I would recommend and I always try to replace “easier” by “better,” so avoiding conflict is better than peacekeeping. How to do it? Now, when I was the Commander in Kosovo, I was out every day traveling around my area of responsibility, talking to all the Mayors, Police Commanders, Military Commands and so on, to learn about the situation, to get good cooperation from the people, to learn about the situation. My personal experience, it helped a lot. Of course, the same in Afghanistan. I was out, let us say, one-third of my time, to talk to the Governor, to talk to all the important guys in the region. Kunduz was a huge area of responsibility, sometimes it was a 2-day tour to get forth and back. This is what I recommend. And General, to pick up your word, this is what I expect from Commanders on all levels, not to sit in their offices but to get out. Be brave. Now of course, this is a question of braveness and talk to the people. My experience, when you do so, it is always effective. It is always successful.

Number two, “climate change.” I completely agree, but with this word, I will not touch this at the moment. You also could add “population growth.” This is another challenge for many nations over the world. Your frustration in Sudan because of harassment—sorry for saying this, but we are having this challenge every time again, and we are not getting a hand on this. If only one single soldier is doing something wrong, this kills the whole mission. Correct conduct was one of my key issues during training with my soldiers. And: Correct conduct is not a topic to be trained before forces go to mission, it is to educate soldiers. Correct conduct is not a question of one course, of one lesson or something, you need to educate your leaders and enlisted before you go to mission, as long as you are training them. This is my approach to getting a hand on this.

The important point, and a really good question, is to discuss, to conduct a worldwide supported UN-mission or a regional mission. Now we are tackling this topic from time to time. My personal perspective, I am not a politician, but the UN is the UN. A regional mission is always a tricky thing. Maybe the one or the other nation is touched in the region, whatever. If you ask me, and again I am not a politician, I would recommend to have worldwide UN missions to represent the world and not only region. I know the African Union are doing a great job but to have a real independent perspective on the scenario, I recommend to have worldwide UN missions. Thank you.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much for your very deep, strong observations. Thank you very much indeed. General, do you have any brief words?

(Gen. Cammaert)

No, I think I leave it with that. Otherwise, it will be a repetition of arguments.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

All right. Thank you very much.

Now any other questions from the audience? If you happen to feel that you might want to ask a question in Japanese language, or any other languages as long as we are able to translate, how about you should be able to do so and then we will absorb your questions in English language environment. Inoue-san, please.

(Question 5)

Thank you very much. I was working in the UN Peacekeeping Operations at four different countries, a total of more 10 years as a civilian staff. From this viewpoint, I would like to make a comment. Frankly speaking, although you did not so clearly say it, I got the impression overview said, “UN Peacekeeping Operation is dead or dying, at least for Japan and European countries.” That is why you said, ‘It is better to ask the regional forces’ or at least like a triangle operation, train indirectly other troop-contributing countries rather than directly involving, or a military alliance rather than the UN peacekeeping force, but why you say that kind of things?

And you mentioned now, politics matters, the time to move from military to politics, but then your argument stops. You do not want to go into further. Maybe because you are all military people and usually in Europe and Japan military people do not want to be involved in the politics. That is why you stop thinking further, but for me as a civilian staff, I think now it is a time of civilian PKO. That is very important. For example, today’s symposium title is “Challenges in the Current UN Peacekeeping Operations: Way Forward of the International Community.” Nothing mentioned about the role of the military. I do not want to complain to the host organizations, but I am a bit surprised that today's presenters are all military background people. There is no civilian here. That is why you are talking only about the role of the military. If you want to say the importance of politics, you should talk about the role of the civilians. That is the most important point. For me, that means now it is governance matters. That is the most important point rather than using the force. Yes, that is necessary, but fundamentally you have to build a good governance in the conflict areas. For example, the first one is of course institutional-building based on the history and tradition of the country, not just copying Japan, or Western countries. That is the most important.

Also, I believe what is important is the so-called “norm sharing” or “norm spreading.” One of the strongest powers of the UN is build the norms of the international communities. That is through the history of the United Nations and that norm should be spread more widely. That is not the role of the military people, the civilians.

In this connection, thirdly, I also would like to emphasize the importance civic education for

the people at all levels. That is, again, not the role of the military people but is the civilian's role. Now, I think the UN PKO should shift more civilian-centered operations. That is my point. Please reexamine the role of the civilians in peacekeeping operations. Next year, I hope your host agency can invite senior civilian people in addition to military people. Thank you.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much indeed for your very much stimulating as well as even provocative question. We are not concluding yet, so plenty of time yet to discuss the role of civilians and so on. Yoshizaki-san, are you a military person? I do not know if you have any comments, I would like to ask you for your comments too, but now, Colonel Klaffus, do you have any comments?

(Col. Klaffus)

Yes, of course. Thank you very much sir, for your question.

The point is, and I hope I highlighted it in my presentation, I am very convinced. Since my mission in Afghanistan I am more than convinced that the comprehensive approach is the only approach to achieve or to have the opportunity to achieve a safe and secure environment. Only military missions are not working. This is no option. Maybe on the first phase of a mission to provide a secure environment, but then we need the police and then we need the civilian world to support. This is when I was saying, not to create a copy of Western democracy but an organization that people are fine with. Otherwise, they will not support. This is what we learned in Afghanistan. The people were not supporting the international approach.

Number two, you were mentioning Europe is not providing forces anymore, or not that many. You are right. You are completely right. Two years ago, the situation has changed completely. To say the good old days, some 10 years ago, Germany had 4,500 troops in Afghanistan every day. In Mali, we had 1,500 troops, and today Germany is participating in 12 different missions all over the world. However, now we have a real problem in Europe. Russia has attacked Ukraine. After the first irregular attack in 2014, now it is a real large-scale terrible war. It is a disaster. This means that the governments in Europe had to take a decision. The challenge is a huge one, and Russia is a huge challenge, this is no question at all. In the consequence, a good military decision is to put all national forces, all your assets to the main effort, the defense of the free Europe, and to skip all the international participation. But the German government, and I am only talking for Germany, in March 2022, only a couple of weeks after the Russian attack, the German government decided to stick to all the missions Germany is running or supporting all over the world. Therefore, yes, Germany is still supporting the UN but of course, also yes, we are not having those large numbers of forces available anymore because we need to reinforce our forces to protect our friends in Mideast Europe and the Baltic States in the neighborhood of Russia. Are you fine with this answer?

(Questioner)

Yes, thank you very much. Instead, please increase German civilians. They are also excellent civilian staff you have. Thank you.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Yes, of course. Now, Yoshizaki-san, do you have any response?

(Prof. YOSHIZAKI)

Thank you very much. The title of my presentation is “Resilience Supports” and not military. Period number 3, “Engineering Peace 3.0” focusing on resilience and partners. Let me repeat the content of seven baseline requirements. Number one is government, another are energy, people, food, mass casualty healthcare, civil communication, and transport. Nothing related to military. However, this paper was prepared by NATO, military organization, which highlighted that the resilience civilian preparedness. That means military organization even NATO must think about this kind of civilian resilience, not the military resilience, and that will be the foundation of the institutionalization and better management of conflict or prevention of conflicts. That is the key. Let me repeat. The resilience support highlights civilian support, which is good for the cooperative and comprehensive approaches including military, but the military will not be the first to deal with resilience support.

(Gen. Cammaert)

Can I say a word on that? I think that I made in my intervention also, not so much focused on the military part of it. The last part of my intervention when I looked at the future and mentioned very well the change in missions, going away from big missions to more peace operations, including special political observed missions and a combination. I gave the example of myself as a civilian head of mission in Hudaydah and Yemen, where it is easy to have a military mission there, but it was very specifically chosen to have a kind of mix under the leadership of DPPA and not DPO (Department of Peace Operations) but it was on the political side, so, you see the shift certainly. I totally agree with you that the civilian part is very important in peacekeeping or peace support operations, as you mentioned it. And many militaries have a problem serving under civilian leadership, but the leadership in all our missions is still civilian leadership and logistics are civilian logistics. In that respect I think that we are not so much focusing on the military part. To your suggestion to have a civilian in the panel, I leave that up to the Japanese organizers, but I think, I made my point during my intervention.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much. We all know that since the time or after Brahimi Report of year 2000, how United Nations talked about the integration so much including the issues of civilian and military cooperation, how to mobilize military and civilian assets altogether in a coherent strategy. But now, given the context that while the United Nations is not dead, of course, as

you should know very well. However, it seems as if we are observing a different trend of downsizing of especially, the multidimensional peacekeeping operations. That means that the integration must be nuanced a bit more in a different manner, together with civilians and militaries coming from non-UN entities like regional organizations. Configuration is even more complex now, though perhaps in a different manner we will have to put an emphasis on the importance of civilian military relations.

Now, another question, the gentleman in the middle.

(Question 6)

Thank you very much. I am from Embassy of Iraq. I would like to thank you for your insightful presentations.

My question will go to Colonel Klaffus, especially you mentioned that the control, the emergence of Taliban and the control over the tribal community in Afghanistan. Could you elaborate on the root causes of this control of Taliban over the community in Afghanistan? Also, I do agree with Professor Yoshizaki especially, and Major General Cammaert, especially when they touched upon the role of the UN should not be restricted and should not be limited to security and also will go to other areas as we discussed with the professor, especially Japan assist Iraq after 2003 in different areas, especially in water resources and many areas, because after 2003, the Iraqi people, they suffered a great deal and we were in need of different needs, so the UN should not be restricted to security, it should also cover a lot of areas which might the society need. Thank you very much.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much. Indeed, in our community of SDF colleagues, there are still many people who have experiences of working in Iraq, and they are very senior now, so, your question is highly welcome. Thank you very much indeed. Any response, General?

(Gen. Cammaert)

Just to make sure that you understand, peacekeeping goes hand-in-hand with peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is the long-term, the development which many times is in the hands of UNDP, in mine action, DDR, security sector reforms are all long-term measures that is under the heading of the UN peacebuilding and rebuild the judicial systems, prisons, police, etc., so it is not only often security. There are a lot of organizations in the United Nations who work in Iraq and in other places to deal with these long-term facts.

(Col. Klaffus)

Thank you for your question. This is the key issue in Afghanistan. The Taliban were part of the society and the Afghan society has never been united. They were always having tribes

fighting each other for centuries and more than 2,000 years—when I mention Alexander the Great. The northerners, the tribes and cultures in the North, they were not eager to have the Taliban. After the Afghans expelled the Russians, in the North, they had some strong leaders who were willing to keep their area free of Taliban. When the Taliban came back after 2004, they often assassinated those leaders. The leaders in the north had the same problem. The Taliban sneaked into the society, not visible, and they were assassinating those strong leaders. This led that those societies also stepped back, they were not eager to fight, stepped back and gave themselves to the hands of the Taliban. The Taliban were having one saying to NATO, “You are having the resource, we are having time.” And it took 20 years to always work on the stone, to get the stone rolling down the valley. In the end, the Taliban were the victors.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Okay. Thank you very much indeed. Now, the next question.

(Question 7)

Thank you very much. I am from Embassy of Kenya. I have a comment and a question. I wanted to reiterate what my Sudanese colleague said but he has left, nonetheless I will still. He talked about appreciating and understanding culture. I wanted to add in the appreciation and understanding of culture, it is also important not just in the operation area but also in training, you need to understand why there are fewer female participants in this particular training versus the male counterparts. So, understanding of culture not only during the mission but before the mission. Also, while at the mission the DDR processes also need to be culture-centric. We are coming up with incentives or plans that are not culture-centric, and then they end up failing because you are putting people in places that are not ideally meant for that particular set of groups. That is just a comment on culture.

My question is open to anybody who might be able to answer this. With globalization and the change of technology in terms of media, that is how as a security personnel, in particular the UN, there is increased accessibility to various media sources, information sources in the theater. How has this affected peacekeeping operations and how is the UN adapting to these changes? In the beginning, probably earlier on in the ‘80s and the ‘90s the only source of any incident or an operation would be the UN. But now, before even the UN would report anything, there is a Tweet out there, there is a TikTok video, so how is the UN adopting to media technology advancement? Thank you.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much indeed for the question from our Kenyan colleague. I would like to highlight a very significant fact. Colonel Kawasaki has explained Japan has been engaged with many capacity development support triangular cooperation and so on. The IPSTC training center in Kenya is always the great hub of our activities. Especially the current incumbent

director of IPSTC, Female Director Joyce Sitienei, she is a great partner of all of us in Japan. I really highly welcome your question from Kenya.

Any questions? Kawasaki-san, please.

(Col. KAWASAKI)

Yes. Thank you for your comments. At first, why female participants are very low rate in the training. Of course, in the UN peacekeeping missions currently around 8% or 10% are female staff officers and members, other peacekeepers in the field. Actually, from my viewpoint there are several reasons why the female numbers are low in training. One is that usually when we offer the training in the Member States, a lot of member state senior leaders are male, so the male senior leaders tend to select the male soldiers to send to the training areas. I think the leadership is very important. Senior leaders or the commanders need to select female members in order to send for the training courses.

When I conducted medical courses in Entebbe, Uganda last June, I invited the trainees from Kenya and Uganda and half of them were females because I strongly requested to send the female members to the training. Also, many female participants told me they are just assistants, war clerk or something like that, not main roles in patrol or something like that, but after the training, they would be first responders during the training or sports events and so on. The female members got roles not as assistants but first responders or as medics. It is very important to advocate the senior leaders, especially male leaders.

The other point, when we conduct training, not medical, for example engineering, in that case, many countries have a low rate female sergeant or enlisted people in the engineering unit. In that case it is difficult to invite female members. For example, in Japan, the SDF have 8% female members, but in medical, actually when I was the Commander of the Medical Battalion, around 20% or 25% female members were in my unit. However, in the engineering unit, they do not have much female members. I think if the UN conducts the training in a particular area, we have to consider which area is easy to participant for the females. Thank you.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much, Colonel Kawasaki. As regarding your question part, new technology-oriented media communication tools, that reminds me of one of the points General Cammaert has raised with regards disinformation or misinformation, which is one of the most serious issues in the ongoing international peace operations. If General has any comments or response to this question, please take the floor.

(Gen. Cammaert)

Thank you. The two points that you made, the cultural awareness and

misinformation/disinformation. On the cultural awareness, I cannot agree more that during the pre-deployment training, cultural awareness should get a lot of attention, where people understand in which kind of culture, the different religions, which area you will be deployed and that you are not making all the basic mistakes that people make and then the damage has been done. Many times, I say, “Well, if you deploy, look through the problem with the local glasses, not your Western glasses, your Dutch glasses, or your German glasses, whatever, but look through the glasses of the country that you deploy to.” Very, very important.

The second point on misinformation/disinformation. You mentioned that everything nowadays is in TikTok or TokTik or whatever. The problem, you do this, and you put the button and it is all over the world. You see the most dramatic scenes coming out of the Middle East, West Bank, Gaza, etc., and it is all the little things. It is also prone to misinformation/disinformation. As I said in my intervention, yesterday, the day before yesterday you had this ministerial meeting in Ghana, in Accra and misinformation/disinformation was high on the agenda because not only the UN but governments are struggling what to do with misinformation/disinformation.

Maybe you know, but I live in New York and it is a place in the United States where you have misinformation/disinformation, it is in the United States where you get the most horrendous stories and false accusations that people are still denying that the elections were the elections, and people are saying, no, no, I won, not him, the misinformation/disinformation. There is a lot of talk at this moment in the UN itself with the Member States, how are we going to address this? False allegations were one of the triggers in MONUSCO in last July where the youth were very much triggered with misinformation against the Indian presence in the North Kivu area. One of the instruments that the UN wants to use is the Radio Okapi. Radio Okapi is the radio station that the UN uses in MONUSCO. You also have radio stations in other nations where you can nonstop bring your message and send your message and can correct where things go wrong. I can assure you it is high on the agenda because everybody is struggling with it.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much, General. Looking at the time, there is a limitation of the number of questions I can take. I am so sorry for saying this, but it is the reality. My obligation is to pick up at least one question from the online audience. Let me read the one question coming from the online audience, and then I ask perhaps Professor Yoshizaki to respond to this question. Let me read, “How do you visualize strategies to balance greater power interest in international peacekeeping, considering that it affects decision-making at the strategic level?” Well, it is a relationship between a strategic level decision and the policy circles and so on, but in the end, it is once again the background context of the very hard reality of international politics. Professor Yoshizaki, if you can add more words on these crucial point in the 21st century, please take the floor.

(Prof. YOSHIZAKI)

Okay. That may be the last question in this session and the toughest questions I have ever heard. It is how we can visualize the future of the peace operations during the great power competition age. My answer, my take is that first title of my presentation highlight “Resilience Supports.” That means not taking sides, and have a more realistic vision. That is, to know the capability and capacity on the ground, and listen to the local needs, then think about their work. Let them think and let them write their own blueprint for future, so, initiatives should come from the locals and on the ground. We will listen to it. Then great power may find interest supporting plan A, plan B, plan C, but if we have an open discussion, then we can judge, which great power listens to the local voices better and who is very serious and who is thinking about a long-term sustainable development, which is in line with the global visions and norms. We should listen and we should watch the voices first from the locals, but which country will respond to which demand, and which future they will describe. We should be careful about it, but we must study and know the reality. Thank you.

(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)

Thank you very much, Professor Yoshizaki. It is very sad though looking at the time I need to say that we have to finish this panel discussion. I am so sorry if you wanted to ask questions but unfortunately, we are not able to take questions because of the time, I am really sorry, but I am confident that these distinguished panelists have offered so many critical and exciting insights to you. I feel that I have learned quite a lot and then I have been so much stimulated by the way they got engaged with your questions, they observed the current circumstances surrounding international peace operations. I hope you have already enjoyed the process of this panel discussion. Having said that, thank you very much, our distinguished panelists.

Closing Remarks

(Announce)

Dr. Shinoda and all participants, thank you so much for your intensive briefing and discussion with very various viewpoints. Dear colleagues, please give a big hand to all participants and the moderator today. Thank you very much. Please go back to your respective, original seats.

That will be all for today's International Peace and Security Symposium 2023. Thank you very much once again for your participation today. All the programs are finished and thank you very much.

— 統合幕僚学校からのお知らせ —

○ 令和5年11月6日(月)～10日(金)、第27回IAPTC年次会合(ケニア)において令和8年度(第30回)年次会合の日本開催について関心表明を行い、執行委員会等からの合意を得ました。

IAPTC(国際平和維持訓練センター協会)とは
平成7年に設立された、世界中のPKOに関わりのある機関や個人等で構成される国際的に権威ある協会です。
年に1度、変化する情勢や脅威のトレンドに最適な訓練プログラム及び教訓等の共有を目的として、会合が開催されています。

○ 令和8年度年次会合開催国は、令和6年度(第28回)IAPTC年次会合において、決定されます。
日本開催が決定した場合、以下の予定での開催が検討されています。

- ・実施時期
令和8年11月予定
- ・実施場所
都 内
- ・参加規模(過去実績)
約60か国、約300名
- ・主催(共催)
**防衛省統合幕僚学校
内閣府国際平和協力本部事務局**

第27回年次会合(ケニア)の様子



モデレーターを務める武蔵1勝次



分科会司会を務める新井1勝次

Here is one announcement. At the Joint Staff College, together with the Cabinet Office International Peace Corporation Secretariat, we are making preparations to hold in Tokyo the Annual Conference of the IAPTC for 2026. The 27th IAPTC Annual Meeting was held in Kenya from November 6th to November 10th, and Japan wants to host the 2026 Annual Meeting in Japan, and that was agreed. Once this will be final, then the meeting will be held in Tokyo in November 2026. The current situation makes the troop contribution to the PKO activities very much limited, but still, Japan intends to make active intellectual contributions to the international issues, so please stay tuned.

Also, in the back of the room, there are the interpreters who worked for today, so please give them a big applause. Thank you very much.



(End)

The views expressed at the Symposium are those of the participants, and do not necessarily represent the views of their Organizations.



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Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense

URL: <https://www.mod.go.jp/js/jsc/jpc/english/index.html>

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