

# **International Peace & Security Symposium 2022**



## **MINUTES OF THE SYMPOSIUM (English Version)**

**December 1, 2022**

**At the Hotel Grand Hill Ichigaya**

*Joint Staff College(JSC), MOD  
Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center(JPC)*

The views expressed at the Symposium are those of the participants, and do not necessarily represent the views of their Organizations.

# **PROGRAM**

## **13:00 – 13:05 Opening Remarks:**

Vice Admiral FUTAKAWA Tatsuya, Commandant of JSC

## **13:05 – 13:10 VIP Message:**

Mr. PRAK Sokhonn, Minister of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and  
Deputy Prime Minister of Cambodia

## **13:10 – 13:25 Opening Presentation:**

Colonel TAKEKUMA Koichi, Director of JPC

## **Part 1**

### **Japan's 30 Years of Contributions and Achievements in UN PKOs and related activities - Looking Back on the 30 Years of JSDF Int'l Peace Cooperation including UN PKOs**

## **13:25 – 13:50 Special Speech:**

Lieutenant General (Ret.) WATANABE Takashi,  
Former Commanding General of the North-Eastern Army

## **13:50 – 14:35 Panel Discussion**

### **Panelists:**

Lieutenant General (Ret.) ISOBE Koichi,  
Former Commanding General of the Eastern Army  
Major General (Ret.) IMAURA Yuki,  
Former Commandant of the Chemical School, JGSDF

### **Moderator & Panelist:**

Prof. SHINODA Hideaki, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

## **Part 2**

### **Current and Future Challenges of International Peace Operations - Recent Efforts and Future international peace cooperation**

#### **14:45 – 14:50 VIP Message:**

Ms. NAKAMITSU Izumi, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations

#### **14:50 – 15:50 Panel Discussion**

##### **Panelists:**

Mr. YOSHIZAKI Tomonori, Vice President for Academic Affairs,  
National Institute for Defense Studies

Lieutenant Colonel Leigh Scott Crawford, Commanding Officer  
for the ADF Peace Operations Training Centre

Ms. MATSUZAWA Tomoko, Director for Defense Cooperation  
in the Indo-Pacific Region, MOD

##### **Moderator:**

Prof. SHINODA Hideaki, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

#### **16:00 – 17:00 Discussion**

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The presentation of the Opening Remarks and Part 1 were conducted in Japanese. So, those parts of this minutes were originated from the simultaneous interpretation conducted at the venue for the presentation. Please refer to the original speech in Japanese from the Japanese web-site <https://www.mod.go.jp/js/jsc/jpc/event/proceedings/index.html> )

## **Opening Remarks**

### **Vice Admiral FUTAKAWA Tatsuya, Commandant of JSC**

Ladies and gentlemen who are joining us in person and joining us virtually good afternoon, everyone. I am Futakawa, Ministry of Defense, Joint Staff College. I am Commandant of the Joint Staff College.

Prior to the opening of the symposium, I'd like to give you an opening address as an organizer. So, given the pandemic situation since last year, we resumed a symposium in a hybrid format. And this year marks the 11th time.

Nepali ambassador, Iraqi ambassador, we have attendance of these excellencies, and also we have so many of you who are attending this meeting internationally, including those who join online. And also, we have a special lecture from Mr. Takashi Watanabe, Lieutenant General, a Former Commanding General of the North Eastern Army, the first Engineering Battalion Commander to Cambodia. And also, just like a previous time, we have Professor Shinoda from the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies as a panelist. And also we have Mr. Isobe, the Lieutenant General, Former Commanding General of the Eastern Army, as a panelist. And Mr. IMAURA, the Major General, Former Commandant of the Chemical School and Mr. Yoshizaki, Vice President for the Academic Affairs, National Institute for Defense Studies. And Lieutenant Colonel Leigh Scott Crawford, Commanding Officer for the ADF. And also Ms. Matsuzawa, Director for Defense Cooperation in the Indo Pacific Region, Ministry of Defense as a panelist and also, we have messages from Ms. Nakamitsu, UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, as well as Mr. Prak Sokhonn, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cambodia.

With such a distinguished lineup, we are very happy to hold this International Peace and Security Symposium in 2022, and I'd like to express my great appreciation on behalf of JSC. This International Peace and Security symposium is aiming at discussing the current status and challenges, as well as the future direction on activities for peace and the security of the international community, and to share the wisdom and knowledge not only among Ministry of Defense and Self Defense Forces, but also among the government, academia and industry.

To deepen the mutual understanding and contribute to a higher quality international contribution. Well, Japan over the past 30 years have been engaged in the international peace cooperation in various regions, and we continue to dispatch personnel to its headquarters in the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan.

And also, from 2019, we dispatch the headquarter personnel to the Multinational Forces and Observers located in the Sinai Peninsula from 2019 in order to contribute to the international. Peace Activities of the United Nations.

We continue to dispatch the personnel to the Secretariat as the UN Triangular Partnership Program from 2015. We provide training on heavy machinery operations for military engineers in African countries and expanding these activities to Asia and neighboring countries from 2018.

And also, we expanded the support to the Hygiene area from 2018 to strengthen capacity building for PKO personnel and also as an international contribution leveraging our strength in the Indo Pacific region and others, we are providing capacity building support and also providing other training on HA/DR and the military band development.

And also, we provide the international peace cooperation activity for relief activities of those people affected by the Ukraine War this year. So, we are proactively working on the efforts toward the international peace.

So, the action cooperation with the UN peacekeeping operations and other operation was enacted in August 1992. The so called PKO law was enacted 30 years ago, which means that this is the 30th commemorative anniversary symposium and we would like to reflect on the 30 year history of Self Defense Forces dispatched to PKO from the viewpoint of the world and Japan. We hope to see a very expanded fruitful discussion on the international peace cooperation activities.

And today, we reserve some time for discussion involving the audience, and also from the viewpoint of dispatching to the entire world, the part two will be held in English and also for the outcome of this symposium.

We will share those widely within and outside of the Department and the Ministry and also, we hope that this will be conducive to the research and education. With this I'd like to conclude my speech. Thank you very much for your participation during busy schedule.

## **VIP Message**

### **Mr. PRAK Sokhonn, Minister of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister of Cambodia**

Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentleman, at the outset, I express my appreciation to the Joint Staff College of the Minister of Defense of Japan for its initiative to organize this international peace and security symposium under the theme of Japan's 30 years of contributions and achievements in UNPKOs.

I am certainly pleased and honored to be invited to deliver this video address to this forum as this year marks the 30-year anniversary of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, or UNTAC, as it was commonly known.

What is so special about UNTAC at that time was that Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the Japanese national, was appointed as Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations to oversee this mission from 1992 to 1993.

Equally special and highly meaningful in the history of Japan peacekeeping policies was the participation of the first military contribution based on the Peacekeeping Operation Act established in June 1992, to UNTAC.

The mission led to the development of integration in Japan's peacekeeping efforts, especially in terms of direct Japan engineering groups, support to local community through civil construction works, which skills and friendly attitude was very much appreciated by our people.

As we all know, this successful experience laid the foundation for Japan pursuit of greater integration. 700 Japanese peacekeepers, including 600 engineering forces, 8 unarmed military observers, 75 civilian police officers and 41 civilian election observers participated in UNTAC mission.

It was indeed a historic and pivotal moment in Cambodia modern history as UNTAC made a significant contribution to the peace process, peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the country. It helped pave the way for Cambodia to rebuild itself from war, conflicts and genocide, which lasted for nearly three decades.

From a historical accuracy, it is essential to recognize that although UNTAC has fulfilled the biggest part of its mandate, it was not successful in fully disarming and disbanding the Khmer Rouge forces.

It was only at the end of 1998, after the implementation of win-win policy of our Prime Minister, Smdech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo Hun Sen, that Cambodia was able to achieve full peace,

which is precisely maintain and preserve till the present time.

Here, I want to show my sincerest appreciation to the Japanese Self Defense Forces for its contribution to the peacebuilding and peacekeeping process, and certainly to the government and people of Japan for their support to help Cambodia in its rehabilitation and reconstruction effort in the post UNTAC period and in the full-fledged comprehensive development of the country which has lasted till now.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Japan's support to Cambodia is well known in the area of engineering works, especially in the construction of infrastructure, bridges, roads, irrigation systems and humanitarian demining.

Japan has and is making great contribution to our social, economic development with aid, concessional loan, trade and investment, human resource building, people to people relations and many more areas of cooperation.

In the area of the UNPKO, Japan has provided many technical assistance programs to build capacity of the Cambodian peacekeepers with the aim of upgrading their skills to become a more professional, knowledgeable and competent peacekeeping forces at their service to the United Nations.

In 2006, Cambodia has become a country capable of dispatching its first demanding force to Sudan since, and with support from Japan, it has gained the confidence of the United Nations to expand its forces and expertise to other missions in Africa, Europe and the Middle East, where its courage and professionalism has earned them dignity and respect on the international stage.

From 2006 to present, Cambodia has dispatched a total of 8302 peacekeepers, including 580 women, to UN missions in 9 countries, namely Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, Lebanon, Syria, Mali, Central African Republic, Cyprus and Yemen.

Currently, 801 Cambodian troops, out of which 118 of them are women, are serving in South Sudan, Lebanon, Central African Republic and Mali. The deployment of Cambodian contingents ranked number 28 among 120 troop contributing countries.

In terms of women peacekeepers, Cambodia ranked number 2 in ASEAN and number 12 among all troop contributing countries. These are proud moments for my country Cambodia, which used to be a recipient of the UN peacekeeping.

But peacekeeping operations are not without risk and danger. During UNTAC, 2 Japanese military and policemen, Mr. Atsuhito Nakata and Mr. Haruyuki Takata, lost their lives. In 16



years of services under the UNPKO, 10 of our Cambodian Blue Beret died and 15 were wounded. We pay tribute and honor them all for the sacrifice they have made for the normal cause of peace. Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, you have just heard the Cambodia story.

But I am certain that this important symposium will enable other participants to share experiences and countries specific stories as well. And on that note, I wish this symposium a great exchange of ideas and initiatives as well as an overall success.

**Opening Presentation**  
**Colonel TAKEKUMA Koichi, Director of JPC**

**[International Peace and Security Symposium 2022]**

**International Peace Cooperation  
and other related activities of Japan**

**– The history of peace operations  
from world and Japan perspectives**

**December 1, 2022**

**Peacekeeping Training and Research Center,  
Joint Staff College**

Good afternoon, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. I, Col. TAKEKUMA, Director of Japan Peace Keeping Training and Research Center will conduct general briefing. The purpose of this report is to share common recognition with you here about the history of peace operations from world and Japan perspectives prior to discussion.

## Conflicts in the world



- United Nations was established after WW II based on the reflection of WW I . (The main premise is "For the sake of international peace, we will not hesitate to take military compulsory measures.")

↓

In every dispute, one of the Security Council P5 holds a fixed stake.

↓

UN peacekeeping as an alternative

- From the era when inter-state conflicts were the main focus, the problem of fragility in the host country itself, requiring the intervention of the international community, became apparent.

Firstly, about the world conflicts. Until the end of World War II, most of the world's conflicts had occurred between states.

After World War II, the presence of intra-state conflicts grew gradually and this trend became particularly obvious after the collapse of the Soviet Union.


In recent years, there have been an increasing number of cases of "internationalized intra-state war" in which foreign powers intervene, such as Ukraine conflict in 2014.

On the other hand, in response to such conflicts, the United Nations, which was established after World War II adopts a collective security system, and when the peace and security of the world might be threatened, the United Nations forces would take military action. It was supposed to settle the disputes with the coercive measures.

However, if one of the P5 nations had a certain and specific interest in the East-West Cold War structure, it would be difficult for the Security Council to build a consensus toward resolving disputes. As a result, the adoption of military coercive measures by the UN Forces, which was originally envisioned, has become almost impossible.

Therefore, UN PKO was born as a conflict management measure that does not necessarily require the participation of major powers. Going back to conflicts in the world, we have entered an era in which intra-state conflicts account for a large proportion of the world's conflicts.

## Int'l Peace Operations Responding to World Conflicts



This slide provides an overview of the international peace activities conducted by the international communities in response to the conflicts in the world.

As you see, most of the activities carried out by the international communities are based on authorizations from the UN Security Council. They are categorized into activities led by the United Nations and activities led by organizations other than the United Nations.

Activities led by the United Nations, in other words, United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs), were mainly carried out in so-called "traditional peacekeeping operations," whose missions were to monitor ceasefires and separate forces after inter-state conflicts during the Cold War. Then, after Cold War, with increasing the number of reconstruction of nations that have collapsed due to the internal armed conflicts, the mainstream has been a "Multi-Dimensional PKO" whose missions include election support, humanitarian and development assistance, and the reconstruction of administrative organizations and systems.

The 1992 "Ghali Report" was a major change in the form of UN peacekeeping operations, and the 2000 "Brahimi Report" was followed by the failure to prevent the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica. As a result, the granting of the "protection of civilians" mandate to UN peacekeeping operations became mainstream in UN PKOs. In recent years, PKO personnel have been targeted by hostile forces and the number of casualties has been increasing.


Against this background, the "Cruz Report" was announced and the issue of "safety and security of Peacekeeping personnel" was raised. Under these circumstances, in 2018, the United Nations announced the A4P (Action for Peacekeeping Operations) Initiative and A4P+ later, calling on member states to work together to

address the various challenges they face. In addition to the issues mentioned above, issues such as support for capacity building to improve the performance of PKO personnel, women, peace and security, digital transformation, and protection of the environment are attracting attention.

On the other hand, in response to the diversification of the roles required to UN peacekeeping operations, there is a growing presence of peace operations led by non-UN organizations such as specific countries and regional organizations such as the AU and the EU under the authorization by the UN Security Council. In a meaning, it is gaining momentum, and various organizations are cooperating to play roles in the peace and security of the international community.

There are also activities that contribute to international peace and security by organizations led by specific countries or regions, although they are not directly authorized by the UN Security Council.

# Changes in Japanese Policies



In the global response to conflicts, (1) especially in UN PKOs, the mission of "Protecting Civilians" has become mainstream, and missions have mandates under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and, if necessary, use all necessary means; Two notable trends can be seen: the so-called "robustness" that makes it possible to use all necessary means has become normal, and (2) the impact of activities by non-UN entities has increased.

This slide provides an overview of Japan's response, which has undergone changes under such circumstances.

Japan achieved its long-sought membership in the United Nations in 1956 and became the first non-permanent member of the Security Council in 1959. However, Japan had not been able to make a visible contribution to military activities of the United Nations due to the legal restrictions.


A change appeared in that situation after the Iran-Iraq War in 1987 when Japan received a request from the United States to dispatch minesweepers. At that time, financial assistance was provided. Then, in the midst of major disasters overseas, the importance of responding to international requests and expectations was recognized, and the Law for the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams was enacted. However, dispatching the Self-Defense Forces as an activity body was shelved until 1992.

The next big change came with the response to the Gulf War. During the War, Japan provided a large amount of financial assistance, but it was not highly evaluated by the international community. As a result, the International Peace Cooperation Law was enacted, and the Self-Defense Forces began personnel contribution to UN peacekeeping operations.

The next change was the 9/11 terrorist attacks, followed by the Iraq War. As a non-UN-led activity actor, Japan has entered a new stage in its activities to meet international demands and expectations. At this point, it can be

said that Japan has begun to diversify its forms of responding to international demands.

In 2015, the Legislation for Peace and Security enacted expanded the scope of SDF activities in UN peacekeeping operations whose context was to permit civilian protection partially, and made the SDF dispatch to non-UN-led activities under a permanent and independent law.



I would like to give an overview of Japan's international peace cooperation activities that were carried out in the context of the major trends that we have seen earlier.

As we saw in the previous slide, Japan's international peace cooperation activities showed major movements in the aftermath of the Gulf War and the aftermath of the Iraq War. One is to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations starting in Cambodia, and the other is to contribute to non-UN activities.

In addition, activities such as international humanitarian relief operations and international disaster relief activities are activities that have a certain amount of "quantity" by working units of a certain size. From a "quantity" perspective, we have contributed by dispatching large-scale personnel to various PKOs since the Cambodian PKO, and the other international peace cooperation activities based on the Special Measures Laws on terrorism, replenishment support, and reconstruction assistance in Iraq.

As mentioned earlier, as the task of "protecting civilians" has become mainstream in UN PKOs, the range of tasks has been expanded through the revision of the Peace and Security Legislation in 2015. However, The Counter-Piracy Operation became the only active force dispatched after withdrawal of the SDF engineering unit from South Sudan in 2017, and it can be said that the contribution from the dispatch of units have decreased. On the other hand, from the perspective of "quality" rather than "quantity", in addition to the dispatch of ceasefire observers, who had already been dispatched during the PKO in Cambodia, the dispatch of headquarters personnel, which began dispatching after the PKO in Mozambique, and the dispatch of Self-Defense Force personnel to the United Nations Headquarters since 2002, we have been engaged in activities that greatly




contribute to the qualitative improvement of the UN PKO as a whole, such as the development of the UN PKO Engineering Manual and the leadership in the UN Triangular Partnership Programme.

In addition, we are expanding our contributions from the perspective of quality, such as by dispatching instructors to PKO centers in Troop Contributing Countries to support the efforts of those countries, and by supporting capacity building of countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Such efforts will promote regional stability and cooperation with related countries, and will also lead to the creation of a desirable security environment for Japan.



Please see the screen for the state of the international peace cooperation activities that the Self-Defense Forces have implemented so far.



Finally, looking back on these activities from the view point of those working in the Self-Defense Forces, after the Gulf War, the world that we working in has changed dramatically. In order to meet the expectations of the international community, the Self-Defense Forces got to participate in overseas missions.

Then 9/11. The world that we practitioners see has changed again. In addition to activities as a part of the United Nations, we have decided to respond to new activities by independently participating in peace operations that the international community is working together.

It can be said that the Self-Defense Forces have adapted themselves flexibly and appropriately in response to major changes that could be described as "crustal movements," and have fully met the expectations of the international community in their respective activities.

The experiences and lessons learned through these activities were also utilized in the 2004 Indonesian international disaster relief activities, when the Self-Defense Forces established the Joint Liaison and Coordination Center for the first time, and GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF conducted "integrated" activities. It can be said that it laid the groundwork for the establishment of the joint operation system of the Self-Defense Forces, which was later reorganized into the Joint Staff Office.

In 2007, the international peace cooperation activities training unit was established under the newly organized GSDF Central Readiness Forces, and in 2010, the JPC was established under the Joint Staff College, which have been playing a role to develop human resources would-be engaged in international peace cooperation activities.

And now, we are witnessing a big change in Ukraine, and based on the request from UNHCR (United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees), the Self-Defense Forces have been conducting international peace cooperation activities such as air transport of relief goods regarding victims of Ukraine.

I have provided an overview of global trends and Japan's initiatives related to international peace and security, but looking back on the past, it is important to continue to prepare for responding to dramatic changes in the world affairs and to meet the expectations of the international community. With that in mind, We would like to look back on the international peace cooperation and its related activities including the Self-Defense Forces from various perspectives and discuss the international peace cooperation toward the future.

This concludes my briefing with my full respect. To all soldiers committed in peace operation in the world. Thank you very much.

## Special Speech

### LTG(Ret.) WATANABE Takashi, Former Commanding General of the North Eastern Army

(This is simultaneous interpretation. Please refer to the original speech in Japanese from the Japanese web-site)



Thank you for introduction. I am Watanabe. Well, we have been listening to English, so I almost wanted to introduce myself in English, but they said it's okay to speak in Japanese. So, allow me to speak in Japanese.

First of all, today I am here, and then, given this opportunity to speak to you. So, I'd like to thank the organizers for this opportunity. Thank you and also Mr. Shinoda and others who took very good care of us back in Cambodia.

I think there are some of you here in the audience. So, I'd like to take this opportunity to thank you all for taking good care of me in Cambodia. So, Cambodia, this is a 30-year-old year story in me.

This is a good memory of a long time ago. However, I am not going to talk about a memoir today. I only have a limited amount of time as well. So, if possible, I'd like to provide some food for thought for your discussion to come later after my talk. So, let me begin. Next slide please.

1992. 9.15



Okay, well, the formation of the first Engineer Battalion dispatched to the UNTAC, Cambodia, first such unit to be dispatched, based on the International Peace Cooperation Act, was completed on 1992 at Camp Itami. It has been 30 years since, as you know, Japan Ground Self Defense Forces, back then, was not meant to operate overseas. And to be precise, the capability was designed not to be able to operate overseas.

Indeed, and therefore, and I'm being honest here with you, domestic is one thing, but when it comes to the conventions of the international military forces and then what our international military forces are like was hardly known to us as we operated.

The only exception, the Japan-US Joint Drill that started 1977 based on the Japan-US guidance was the sole opportunity for us to get in touch with the military forces of the world. I do not wish to sound, you know, self-deprecating, but the JGSDF, back then, was trying to have a, so to speak, an occasional peep out of the world, hiding behind the back of the world's mightiest forces, the US Forces. And yeah, there were Americans in Cambodia, but there was no USA unit. And in the course of operating with forces of many different countries and non-US. countries, JSDF learned for the first time the global standards and had an opportunity to evaluate ourselves objectively.

And then we came to notice that the forces of our ally, the US. are not just the mightiest in the world. They are also a sort of off the scale forces that defy the international conventional ideas of what their forces are like.

So, we came to know the world and at the same time we came to know ourselves, able to objectively evaluate ourselves through this opportunity.



Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces, from the beginning, were not as domestic as Ground Self Defense Forces. And then, this one shows C-130, Maritime Self Defense Force Carriers, and on the right-hand side, we have Miura and Ojika, very small ones. They are now decommissioned already and no longer with us. And then, they were succeeded by Osumi and Kunisaki, and then, they were themselves succeeded by Huga and Ise.

## PKO ≡ 国際平和協力活動




Now, I think you gathered here know, but Japan's International Peace Cooperation Missions, especially UNPKO, is not part of SDF mission. Whether it's an SDF officer or police officer and others, anyone participating in International Peace Cooperation mission organized by International Peace Cooperation headquarters is registered as member over the International Peace Cooperation Corps from Japan.

In the case of the JSDF officers among the International Peace Cooperation Corps members, command and control will be by the Director General of the Defense Agency. As you can see different emblems of the different organizations.





And then now let's take a quick look at the United Nations PKO, the history quickly.



According to UN data, as of the end of June 2022 there have been a total of 71 UNPKO missions since 1948. Of which 12 are ongoing right now.

And at this drawing shows already concluded 59 PKO missions shown. And then, as this drawing shows, region Africa 25, Asia/Pacific 10, Europe 8, Americas 9 and the Middle East 7.

## 地域別・時期別にみるPKO


派遣地域	活動終了	活動中	計	1990～
アフリカ	25	7	32	29
米州	9	0	9	7
アジア	10	0	10	6
欧州	8	2	10	9
中東	7	3	10	4
計	59	12	71	55 (77%)

国連HPからの集計

And the same thing shown in numbers in this chart. So, region by region Africa has a good number, followed by Asia however, but the density wise, the Middle East has the greatest PKO concentration as you can see.

So that is to say, Post World War II, what kind of areas had more conflicts? We can see that from this chart. Especially notable is a sharp increase of PKO after 1990. That is Post Cold War. There has been a sharp increase of PKO.

According to the United Nations, over the 71 PKO missions rolled out after World War II, 55 or more than four thirds were set up after the Cold War. And this one shows currently ongoing 12 PKOs shown on a map.



Ongoing for two meanings, for reasons, factors if you like. So, PKO mainly in Africa, these are newly rolled out PKO missions. The other factor is that they are decades old, yet there is no end in sight. There are such PKO missions as well.



Now, Japan's International Peace Corporation began with the Gulf War. After the Cold War, it started around this time. As you know, the Gulf War was one major event for the international community.

## 国際連合平和維持活動(部隊派遣)

- UNTAC:カンボディア内戦
- UNIMoz:モザンビーク内戦
- UNDOF: #4中東戦争(ゴラン高原)
- UNMISET:東チモール(独立)
- MINUSTAH:ハイチ(武力衝突)
- UNMISS:南スーダン(独立)



In search of the Post Cold War New International Order, Japan made a hefty contract of \$13 billion to support the war efforts. But appreciation from the international community was not what we expected. This will later be dapped the trauma of the Gulf War and based on the reflection on that, Japan would create a legal framework for sustainable and concrete international cooperation.

The establishment of the current International Peace Cooperation Act in 1992, based on this legislation, not just the JSDF units but the Japanese police officers and civilians participated in 13 UNPKO missions since.


And this slide shows the names, destinations and causes of the 6 UN missions for which Japanese units were dispatched. In addition to these 6, Japan and JSDF have participated and engaged in various other overseas activities not counted as UNPKO.

## 国際平和協力活動等：PKO+

- ペルシャ湾機雷掃海活動：現行法※
- ルワンダ難民救援：PKO法
- ホンデュラスハリケーン災害救援：国際緊急援助隊法（改正後）
- ソマリア沖海賊対処：海賊対処法※
- インド洋給油活動：対テロ特措法
- イラク人道支援活動：イラク特措法
- ウクライナ緊急空輸：PKO法



These are not UNPKO nor international peace cooperation activity but are activities for international peace and support in a broader sense and they need to be part of our consideration. So, in this broader sense, Japan's first international peace activity was the minesweeping in the Persian Gulf by JMSDF. Incidentally, Japan's first PKO was Angola election monitoring activity.



Earlier there was a briefing from the center. If you look at the dispatch activities and then there are legislative backings and then that is shown in this chart paid blue as so called the UNPKO Emissions.

And we participated in these PKO missions. Apart from that, after the Gulf War and the 911, United Nations Security Council had resolutions to form coalition multinational forces. And then, we cannot participate in overseas through a dispatch involving use of military armed forces.

But we have our own unique activities to provide support to these countries participating in equalization forces. For example, mine sweeping in the Persian Gulf or Afghanistan in the post 911 Afghanistan operational support as well.

Maritime Self Defense Forces had replenishment support missions in the Indian Ocean and also during the Iraqi War, by the US., we went to Samawah in Iraq for humanitarian assistance. We sent units for that. So, these two activities are based on temporary legislation or Special Measures Acts.

Apart from that, there was Rwanda and also ongoing Ukrainian humanitarian aid. So, based on International Humanitarian Law, we participate in some international corporate activities. And also, there are Honduras, Sumatra, Pakistan, Haiti and New Zealand where they had the international disasters and we dispatched our units for the relief efforts.

And also, in the Somalian Coast, based on the Counter-Piracy Law, we have Counter-Piracy Activities and currently in the Sinai Peninsula, we dispatch personnel to the headquarters for the Sinai based Multinational Forces and Observers, or MFO, as part of a new activity called Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace



and Security.

As such, Japan's peace cooperation activities overseas have legislative basis, and as a result, it feels like we have a little varied and complex legal system. I'd like to point that out now.



I'd like to move to analysis and the consideration.

## 時代認識とPKOの変遷

- 冷戦崩壊後の国連中心主義
  - 復興型PKOの成功
  - 国連主導の紛争解決: Agenda for Peace
    - ※ボスニア・ソマリアPKOでの挫折
- 9.11後のテロとの戦い
- 中立・停戦監視から住民保護へ
  - ルワンダ内戦後 → 交戦者となる
- PKO参加五原則との乖離



Okay. In the main, there are two things I would like to raise. In the past 30 years, something has become clear. The PKO itself has ended up changing a lot. Well, PKO is not really prescribed in the UN charter. So, because of that, it has changed a lot over the course of time. For our PKO efforts, the big trigger was after the Gulf War. After the end of Cold War, the UNPKO changed from one focusing on truce monitoring and peacekeeping to a new one to support the construction of a war-ravaged country.

That is a new focus. Currently in Rwanda and in Africa, many PKO missions are ongoing. And these were based on the ideas of the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan. He had an emphasis on protection of civilians.

Well, what the Kofi Annan, back then, said that basically soldiers in the uniforms participating in PKO should prioritize protecting civilians. That means PKO soldiers should be combatants to protect civilians even at the cost of venturing out of the position of traditional neutrality.

So as a result, the present PKO is far from Japan's five principles on PKO participation which are based on the previous PKO of neutral third party for keeping peace. So, it has changed to a kind of PKO that involves a combating, that is a reality and then, therefore, it has become something different from what we based our PKO policy on.

## PKO参加の意義と成果

### 我が国及び自衛隊にとって…

- 安全保障分野での国際社会への参画
  - 外交上のもう一つのカード
- ノウハウの蓄積
  - 国際活動教育隊、PKOセンターなど
  - 実戦に近い環境下 → 高い訓練効果
- Military-to-Military Contacts
- 国民・隊員の意識の変化



On the other hand, in these 30 years, Japan and JSDF have also changed in my opinion in terms of the significance and fruits of participating in UNPKO.

Firstly, we have had opportunity to join in the international community in security domain.

And second, we have gained knowhow. Through things like International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit and the PKO Center, the knowhow on the PKO participation permeates the entire JSDF. Moreover, operating in the near-combat environment inherent in PKO missions is a highly effective training and drilling for JSDF personnel and units.


And the third, PKO is a military to military contacts providing fantastic opportunities to establish forces and relations with other forces. And then fourth, in hindsight, because of the three decades of international peace cooperation activity by JSDF and others, the mindset of the Japanese and the JSDF personnel have also changed.

On the other hand, we have begun to realize that there are several challenges in relation to dispatching units to UNPKO missions. The greatest of all these challenges is the right authority to use weapons, authorization to use weapons. After much discussion, now, so called “coming to aid” duty and the joint defense of an encampment are executable. Yet, if we stay within the framework of the current International Peace Cooperation Act, we cannot imagine engaging in a battle with unarmed groups.


We have so far dispatched units mainly for logistical support in terms of engineering, transport, liaison, medical support. But as of now, we have never dispatched infantry units, that is to say, foot soldiers tasked with keeping public order in a target region.



In the future, what kind of a course will Japan's international peace cooperation activity we take? Well, let me talk about my personal opinion.



This is the chronology of major international peace cooperation projects. And then, blue one, so called the UNPKO. In the middle section in green, they are so called international emergency relief missions. At the top, yellow, red or purple, these activities represent non-UN, non-International Emergency Relief missions based on the temporary registration or Special Measures Acts and other reasons.



So, category wise, if you categorize them, you can begin to see two directions. Are these UN-related or are these Allies-related? We need to consider these two ideas, UN-related or Allies-related, and then, they should be both worked on. These are not alternatives. It's not either or.

## 国際平和協力の二つの方向性

二つの方向性：同盟か？国連か？

※ 二者択一ではない

① Linkage案

我が国防衛と国際平和協力の連携

② Separate案

我が国防衛と国際平和協力の両立



In light of what our picture should be like in the future, I think there are two possible ways to go.

One is a linkage idea. There's international peace cooperation activities and other international activities linked to the Defense of Japan. That's the first idea.

Second idea is to think these two things separately. Defense of Japan is one thing and then international peace cooperation activity as a member state of UNs is another. Active participation in international peace cooperation activities is another, so, separate thinking of Defense on the one hand and then international peace cooperation activities on the other. That's a separation idea.



## PKOの方向性(試案)

- Linkage: 日本の安全保障と連携
  - 国家防衛を第一義:国際平和協力はそのための直接・間接的な手段
  - 総合一体的な運用体制(選択的)
  - 周辺事態、インド太平洋など地域を考慮
  - 米戦略を補完する役割
- Separate: 日米同盟と国連(PKO)の並立
  - PKOは日米同盟と別次元
  - よりグローバルに国際社会への寄与
  - 専門の部隊、装備、教育訓練
  - 官民合同の組織、NGOとの連携



As you can see here in the linkage idea, we implement various activities in an integrated and unified manner as all as part of Japan's security efforts. This represents direct and indirect means of national defense putting the peace, independence and national interest of Japan first. And also, if we consider the situations of area surrounding Japan or Taiwan situation, then, I think that our focus is more likely to be on providing support laws.

On the other hand, in the separate idea, we separate Japanese alliance and UNPKO separately. We would take an UNPKO and Japanese alliance are things of different dimensions, oil and water, and engage with them separately. So, we would be focusing more on how much we can contribute to international committee from a global perspective and seek to make suitable levels of contribution in terms of special units, equipment, training and education.

## 平和安全法体系下でのPKO

- シームレスな事態対応
  - 災害派遣からPKOへ
  - PKOから重要影響事態対応へ
  - 重要影響事態から存立事態へ
- グレーゾーンへの対応
- 領域横断作戦への対応
- 事態推移に応じる判断・決心
- ※ 憲法の議論とともに



At any rate, the international environment is clearly different from what it was 30 years ago when Japan dispatched the first unit to Cambodia. More than anything, the security situation around Japan has changed significantly.

And the latest invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the Taiwan situation might be suggesting that it is now time to greatly improve Japan's security policy. And PKO is one thing we need to consider in our reconsideration of Japan security policy. We might possibly need to envisage a major reorganization of our security organization to incorporate response to grey zones and cross-domain operations.

I always say, well, I have served as a Self-Defense officer for 40 years. I have faced a diversity of difficulties and challenges in my service. But this mission, PKO, has brought the greatest opportunity for me to grow. I am convinced of that. I have already folded my uniforms, but I think there will be a more active, advanced discussion about PKO and our Defense in general. I have high expectations on that. That concludes my briefing.

**質 疑:**

**(Question)**

I would like to start by thanking Japan for their mission in Iraq and their special approach. They show a very different way for security forces to work in a foreign country of conflicts and aggression. So, thank you very much. Your work there is very appreciated and never forgotten by my people and my governments.

Me as victim of the former dictatorship in our country and also as a refugee many, many years in Europe. And then as ambassador and as writer and translator of Deep Geopolitics books and as a human being, we're noticing what is going on in the world, especially in the very hard time we are going through.

I think we need to think a little bit differently. We are failed. We are a failure. I mean, all forces, all countries. And the very simple evidence and proof is the wars we are going through and the tensions are heightening and raising up and up.

Maybe we'll see another war breaks up sooner. So, I think we need to rethink how to face the challenges, the dangerous issues, the conflicts, the disputed issues, whether intrastate or interstate conflicts.

So, my question, is there any alternative? As we have failed, all our traditional peacekeeping, peace cooperation organizations, United Nations, allies and regional organizations. So, the result is complete failure.

**(Answer: Mr. WATANABE)**

Thank you. I was not listening to the simultaneous translation, but I understand that whether you ask me, Japan will go into more committed missions. Personally, after 30 years, I believe that Japan has will be forced into the next stage of commitment, but to do so, the national discussion will be required, or the discussion on Constitution should be conducted and deepened. That is my personal view. Did I answer your questions? I'm not sure, thank you.

## Panel Discussion (Part 1)

### LTG(Ret.) ISOBE Koichi, Former Commanding General of the Eastern Army

(This Speech was delivered, centering around the resume below)

【国際平和と安全シンポジウム 2022】

## PKO 草創期と中央即応集団創設期

### ～送り出す側の視点～

2022年12月1日

元陸将 磯部 晃一

#### 1 派遣の意義（大義名分）～派遣隊員が納得して任務に赴く～

PKO 等派遣の意義：自衛隊にどのような意義があるのか？

「戦争遂行と抑止という役割に加えて、発生した紛争を低レベルの紛争状態に抑制するという役割」と「平時における自衛隊の存在意義を付与し、自衛隊の役割拡大をもたらすとともに国際性を付与する」という意義がある。他方、「平和維持活動のみでは紛争の根本的解決はできず、あくまで地域紛争の政治的解決のための一過程であることを認識すべき」

このため、

- ① 平和維持活動の地位付けを明確にすること
- ② 平和維持任務と国家の戦略目標のつながりを明確にすること
- ③ 従来の軍隊にはない特殊な任務につくことから、平和維持活動に関する教育が必要

《磯部晃一「平和維持活動の軍事的意義に関する考察」

1990年1月『陸戦研究』より抜粋》

《スライド》

1990年5月外務省 PKO 調査団

1990年8月イラクのクウェート侵攻

1991年2月国会審議

1992年8月カンボジア部隊派遣事前調査団

#### 【事例】派遣の意義

UNTAC：人道支援、東南アジアの平和、自衛隊初の PKO を象徴

イラク復興支援：人道支援、資源を依存する中東の安定、日米同盟の強化

## 2 活動内容の検討

UNTAC 派遣に際して3つの任務を検討選定：施設（工兵）・給水・輸送

### 【考慮要因】

- ① 戦闘任務ではなく後方支援に限定
- ② 国内での災害派遣の実績を反映
- ③ 全国に配置する方面隊・師団等が保有する機能

UNTAC 以降の PKO 等派遣のモデルとなる。

《スライド》

2003 年～2006 年 中央即応集団の組織検討、イラク復興支援群派遣

2007 年 3 月 中央即応集団創設

## 3 人材育成と組織編成

PKO 等任務を遂行するために人材育成と組織編成を如何に整えるか？

《2003 年～2006 年当時の防衛課長の問題認識》

中央即応集団（CRF）の組織検討時（2004 年頃）

当初検討：国内の唯一の部隊を集約一元化


本格検討：当初検討に加えて、国際任務をも CRF が担任

当時の人材育成の考え方：PKO 派遣部隊の司令官（将補クラス）、参謀長（将補から1佐）を将来的に派遣できる人材育成を目標

⇒ CRF に国際活動教育隊新設（2007 年）

統幕に国際平和協力センター新設（2010 年）

PKO 等職域の人事ピラミッド



【国際平和と安全シンポジウム2022】

## PKO草創期と中央即応集団創設期 ～送り出す側の視点～

2022年12月1日

磯部 晃一

(This is the simultaneous interpretation done for the speech of Mr. ISOBE; Please refer to the original speech in Japanese from the Japanese web-site)

### **(Gen. ISOBE)**

Congratulations on holding a symposium to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the U.N. PKO enactment. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude for inviting me to this glorious symposium.

The theme given to me was "Looking back on this PKO from the perspective of the sender." I worked at the Ground Staff Office (GSO) in the early 1990s. At that time, I was in charge of dispatching PKOs. It was around the time that Commander Watanabe was going to Cambodia. More than 10 years later, I assumed Director, Policy and Program Division, GSO. At that time, I tackled issues such as Humanitarian Assistance for Iraq and the establishment of the Central Readiness Force (CRF).

My story is broadly threefold. I talked about the cause of the dispatch, and the second was how we considered the contents of the activities. Finally, I would like to talk about how I thought about human resource development.

First, the cause of the PKO dispatch. Right now, Russia invaded Ukraine abruptly, and still fighting in Ukraine, the cause of the battle is very important for warfighters. It also has a significant impact on the morale of the troops.

Therefore, I have compiled a paper on the cause of the PKO dispatch described here and what significance it has for the Self-Defense Forces. Prior to working at the GSO, while attending the Command and General Staff Course at Staff College, I wrote the paper in 1989. The theme is "Military Implications of the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations".

At that time, PKO missions were not yet stipulated in the Self-Defense Forces Law. That's why a Faculty Advisor told me that this theme is useless. I was told not to do anything that was not on duty. However, I had the feeling that the Self-Defense Forces would go to PKO in the future, so I asked another advisor to continue research on PKO, he approved my idea then I could write this PKO thesis.

As written, in addition to the role of waging war and deterrence, PKO has the role of mitigating conflicts that have occurred into low-level conflict conditions, and in addition, it gives the SDF a *raison d'être* in peacetime, expands the role of the Self-Defense Forces, and imparts an international character. At the time, I thought that these would be the significance roles of the PKO.

However, I thought that it would be necessary for the dispatched party to undertake the mission with a clear understanding that peacekeeping operations alone could not fundamentally resolve conflicts, but were only a process for political resolution of regional conflicts.

For this purpose, if the Self-Defense Forces are to be dispatched, the three points described below are important. One is to clarify the position of PKO. The second is to clarify the link between peacekeeping missions and national strategic objectives. The third is that education on peacekeeping operations is extremely important because it is a special mission that is not available in conventional militaries. This was three years before the PKO was dispatched.

# 平和維持活動の軍事的意義に関する考察

磯部 晃 一

## 目 次

はじめに	第3章 平和維持活動の軍事的意義
第1章 平和維持活動とは	1 平和維持活動に見る新しい 軍隊の役割
1 いわゆる国連軍とは	2 平和維持活動の特色
2 朝鮮戦争の国連派遣軍	第4章 平和維持活動の実際
3 平和維持活動とは	—シナイ国際監視団の事例を 通じて—
第2章 平和維持活動に対するイメージ	第5章 結 論
1 一般国民の抱くイメージ	
2 幹部自衛官の抱くイメージ	

陸戦学会『陸戦研究』1990年1月号

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## 1990年5月 外務省PKO調査団



フィンランドPKOセンター



After writing the thesis, I graduated from Staff College and was seconded to the North American Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for two years. At that time, an official in charge of the United Nations Policy Bureau, who had read my paper, asked me “Maj. Isobe, would you like to observe PKO centers in Nordic countries?” I replied, “Definitely.” Here is a photo of when I went to see it. It is a PKO center in Finland.

The person in the center is former Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Kagami. This delegation was composed of the Ambassador, and the official and myself. You can see a military personnel in the lower right, he is the Soviet Army officer. It was just before the collapse of the Soviet Union.

## 1990年5月 外務省PKO調査団



ノルウェーPKOセンター

## 1990年8月2日 イラク軍、クウェート侵攻



Three months after visiting PKO centers in Scandinavia, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait broke out. It had just been one year since I started working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although he passed away due to the COVID-19, Mr. Yukio Okamoto (then Director of North American 1st Division) formed a task force for the U. S. Forces assistance. I joined that task force and provided support for the American military, logistical support for the Operation Desert Storm.




## 1992年8月 カンボジア部隊派遣事前調査団



After two years of service in the North American Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I was assigned to the Policy and Programs Division, GSO in August 1991. PKO bill was proposed, and the bill was enacted. When it was finally decided that the Self-Defense Forces would dispatch a PKO unit (just a month before Commander Watanabe's contingent was dispatched.) It was decided that we had to go to the final decision on where the JGSDF PKO campsite in Cambodia would be. The persons in this photo who are looking at the map are Mr. Hatakeyama, Director General, Defense Bureau, Japan Defense Agency, and next to it, MajGen. Miyamoto, Director G35, GSO

## 1992年8月 UNTAC司令部における調整



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I accompanied them to Cambodia. This mission was the first envoy to Cambodia since the end of World War II as members of the Self-Defense Forces. This is a photo from that time.

In the end, we decided to set up camp in Takeo. After that, I extended my scheduled business trip and worked on information gathering at HQs, UNTAC. This is a photo taken with a Pakistani Army major in front of the Cambodia's big map.

I will return to my resume here. Regarding the cause of the dispatch written at the end of the first page of the resume, I thought that the UNTAC dispatch would have the significance of humanitarian assistance by helping the Cambodian people, and at the same time, contributing to peace and stability in Southeast Asia. I also believed that the SDF assumed a new type of PKO mission.

As the head of the Director, G5, and GSO at that time, I had been thinking about the cause of the dispatch of the reconstruction assistance to Iraq. I was seriously thinking about how to convince the contingent. One is humanitarian assistance. The second significance is to achieve peace and reconstruction in the Middle East, where Japan is heavily dependent on energy resources. The third is that the fact that the Self-Defense Forces are entrusted to support the reconstruction of Iraq to the United States will lead to the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance. In this way, I made sense for the dispatch of reconstruction assistance to Iraq.

The second page of the resume is about the examination or development of the contents of the activities. In case of UNTAC mission in Cambodia, I considered three missions: One is engineer such as road repair and construction, two is water supply, and three is transportation.

Why did we choose these missions? First, it was a mission limited to logistical support rather than combat missions. The second reflects the expertise of disaster relief operations in Japan. The Ground Self-Defense Force has accumulated know-hows of disaster dispatch, so we chose one that is close to such a mission. Third, if you are going to dispatch contingents for a longer period, it is appropriate to set up rotations. From that point of view, let's start with the common functions possessed by the divisions or brigades stationed throughout the country. The theory is that even if you change units for a long period of time, you can dispatch troops from all over the country in order. I believe that this has become a model for PKOs and other overseas dispatches after Cambodia.

## 中央即応集団創設期

2003年～2006年 中央即応集団の組織検討  
イラク復興支援群派遣

2007年 中央即応集団(CRF)創設

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I was dispatched to Cambodia in 1992. After 10 years of Cambodia, I was in charge of organizing CRF, and dispatching the Iraqi Reconstruction Assistance contingent at the same time, as shown on this slide.





イラク復興支援隊員との集合写真記念 2006.1.9

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This photo is taken in 2006. As Director, G5, I actually visited the Samawah JGSDF campsite in Iraq.

This is a photo of Samawah. The JGSDF established CRF in 2007, which is now transformed to Ground Component Command. At the time of the establishment of Central Readiness Force, I assumed Vice Commander, CRF. For about two and a half years, I was devoted myself to educating HQs staff and setting the foundation for the International Activities Education Unit.

Let's return to the resume. The third is about human resource development. When CRF was founded, as the Director, G5, I was thinking a lot about how to develop human resources and organize the institution to carry out oversea missions such as PKO.

At first, during those days, international missions were not regarded as the main mission of JSDF, but secondary missions, so predecessors tried to establish CRF with the idea that HQs of CRF would be command and control of various unique functional units of the Ground Self-Defense Force, by bundling up Special Operations Group, 1st Helicopter Brigade, 1st Airborne Brigade, etc.

However, anticipating that international overseas missions could increasingly become important in the future, I believe CRF should also assume responsibilities for overseas missions in addition to the initial plan. Then I decided CRF become HQs for both domestic and overseas missions. There were two deputy commanders under the CRF commander, one for international affairs and one for domestic affairs, and I became the first deputy commander in charge of international affairs.

The concept of human resource development at that time is written here. It is the commander or chief of staff class of the PKO multinational contingent, that is Major General level. Our goal was to create an organization that would allow us to dispatch larger PKO contingent which was headed by Major General officer in the future. Accordingly, in 2007, the International Activities Education Unit was newly organized into the CRF. Later, in 2010, this International Peace Cooperation Center was established.

I wrote a triangular pyramid for personnel workforce, and this is the idea I had in mind at the time.

We examined the personnel pyramid of the workforce from the perspective that in order to carry out so-called special activities, it is necessary to accumulate knowledge, know-how, and expertise. Looking back on it now, I wrote that it was like this.

On the left is posts of the Self-Defense Forces. It is written in order of rank from Major General to colonel, and majors. The one at the top is Major General, which is equivalent to post of deputy commander of the CRF. Then there is the list of Deputy Chief of Staff, CRF, or the head of the International Activities Education Unit and the commander of the Central Readiness Regiment.

In addition, there is a commander class in the staff of the headquarters, and it is the junior officer who is working in the unit. In the meantime, education at the International Activities Education Unit and the International Peace Cooperation Center will be furnished as appropriate. It was created with this pyramid of human resource development in mind at that time. I believe that these achievements have led to the present. Looking back on the past 30 years, this is what my experience looks like.

In the future, the Self-Defense Forces may be granted new overseas deployment missions under a different legal framework. In that case, it is important for the sending party or the person considering the dispatch to clarify the

cause of the dispatch and link it to the national strategic objective of the Japan. Then clarify the content of the activity and the legal relationship. Finally, of course, human resource development. Mission Rehearsal Training (MRT) shall be thorough, and MRT is the KEY for mission accomplishment. I believe that this will allow us to dispatch contingent to overseas site without hesitation and regret.

This concludes my presentation, for your reference. Thank you very much for your kind attention.

**(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)**

Thank you, Mr. ISOBE. Well, earlier we have the question from the Ambassador of Iraq UNPKO International Peace Cooperation missions. How should they be better? But in Mr. ISOBE's reporting, he talked about the significance of a dispatchment for Japan.

We had a look at it. The significance of a dispatch for PKO disciplined countries and so for international communities, we want to contribute to them. If without contribution, there's no point. That was very much emphasized by Mr. IOBE.

So, it's difficult to pick up all the disembodied points before the break. But after the overall discussion time at the end, we'd like to talk more about this and then prepare your questions to ask at that time as well.

So now over to Mr. IMAURA. Go ahead.

## **Panel Discussion (Part 1)**

### **MG(Ret.) IMAURA Yuki, Commander of second Iraq Reconstruction Group and Commander of second Movement Control Company in ONUMOZ**

(This is the simultaneous interpretation done for the speech of Mr. IMAURA; Please refer to the original speech in Japanese from the Japanese web-site)

#### **(Gen. IMAURA)**

I am Yuki Imaura, retired Major General. I served the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) for 35 years, during which time I was appointed Vice Commander of Central Readiness Force (CRF) and the Commandant of the Chemical School of JGSDF.

In today's simple theme, I'd like to talk as someone who has participated in International Peace Corporation development as a Commander. I have been a Commander of Second Movement Control Company in United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUOMOZ) between November 1993 and June 1994 and of Second Iraq Deconstruction Group between May and August 2004.

As a Captain and as a Group Commander respectively, I was in charge of giving various types of training and commanded units during the deployments. Today, based on such experience, I would like to make two points.

One, on the authorization of use of weapons in the International Peace Cooperation Act and so on and two, on whether or not Japan Self-Defense Force officers can adapt to International Peace Cooperation deployment or not.

Regarding the first theme, I need to touch on Article 95 of the SDF Act, use of weapons for the protection of weapons and so on and other legislations related to two IPC deployments. For the Mozambique PKO, I will touch on the use of weapons under PKO Act. And, for Iraqi reconstruction group, I will touch on the authorization of the use of weapons under the Iraqi Special Measures Act. Back to the earlier strike.

## ONUMoz キャンプ・マトラ

スライド1



The deployment period of the second unit for the Mozambique PKO overlapped with that of a second unit for the Cambodian PKO. It was a very nasty period of Japan PKO and SDF was a PKO beginner under the PKO Act back then.

PKO Act, back then, was extremely restrained about the use of weapons districting their use to only when each individual member perceived danger and the commander was prohibited from giving orders about using weapons. The most concerning matter as a Commander was that the Commander could not give direct orders about using weapons in situations where the safety of unit members cannot be insured without the use of weapons.

Moreover, I worried that leaving the conditions to use weapons or the judgment on danger to unit members would lead to illegal use of weapons in the worst-case scenario. I was worried about that possibility as well.

This concern was resolved thanks to a piece of advice by a legal expert who told me that the PKO Act did not prohibit Commanders from giving orders on restraining the use of weapons. That is to say, a Commander can order ceasefire.

Moreover, the expert advised me that when a Commander is commanding a unit and face a situation that leaves no option but to use weapons, the Commander can shoot first and the unit members can take a cue from that and shoot as well. With this advice, I was finally able to feel assured that the Commanders can give minimum necessary orders on shooting.



On the other hand, the Iraq Special Measures Act states that when one finds that there is a compelling reason to protect the life or physical safety of oneself, another SDF personnel present in the front with oneself or anyone under one's control, he/she may use weapons to the extent that one determines to be reasonable to respond to the situation.

A legal expert was clear in their advice here as well. They said weapons can be used to achieve the purpose of this provision of the law.



Based on this interpretation of the act, in the preparatory training, I gave a thorough training on shooting and responding as a unit when under attack.

In the shooting training to ensure that unit members master weapons use procedures and then a reliable shooting skill. I gave all of them an amount of shooting training normally given in five years so that they can run shooting procedures, proactively in any situation and shoot in the way they intend or, in other words, shooting without fatally wounding the enemy.

But to neutralize this enemy. Regarding the response as a unit, I gave a photo training on dealing with attacks during traveling, attacks during aid activities, and attacks to encampment. The purpose is to make the unit recognize the situation that may require the use of weapons and take the best course of response action. I believe that if there is a mistake in relation to the use of weapons, I think that's because of poor shooting skills or hesitation in response actions, I believe we can even avoid a situation which necessitates the use of weapons if we have unit members thoroughly understand comparing weapons use procedures and acquire shooting skills which allow them to shoot accurately as they intend.

During my mission in Iraq, there was one time when I considered the use of weapons was unavoidable. After the night of the 14 July 2004, I was informed that there would be a vehicle suicide attack at Gate One of the Samawah encampment.

And the source of this intelligence was a human with an accuracy rate of 75%. Immediately, I rushed to Gate One of the encampment with the security company commander and gave orders. I ordered the change of the commander at Gate One from the sergeant to a senior officer.

I also ordered to place road blocks and road spikes at Gate One to prevent suicide vehicles from crashing through the gate. I also ordered that the LAM and the heavy machine guns be ready for firing against suicide vehicles.

On top of all that, to leave no doubt that there was a situation that compelled the use of weapons, I ordered the construction of an ad hoc barricade at the entrance to the passage way next to the gate for the circumstantial evidence. After I saw that all these were completed, I told the Gate One commander that any vehicle that would try to force through the barricade is a suicide terrorist attack. So, shoot.

Without hesitation, I left the gate and spent the night in the group commander room. While in standby, I thought about the situation, about Suarez and response to it. I braced myself for the fact that I would become the first commander to use weapons in an abroad mission.

I decided that if questioned, I would respond to that my response was a right form based on the weapons used provision of the Iraqi Special Measures Act and I ordered to shoot. Fortunately, no suicide terrorist attack materialized, and at 06:00 a.m., the following morning, I lifted the response posture. SDF officers are extremely less trained regarding the use of weapons, but they should not hesitate to use weapons and should master skills that allow them to use weapons legally and accurately when necessary.

SDF officers should have a thorough training for that to conduct. To conclude this area faster theme, I'd like to make a request regarding the use of weapons in international contribution activities to protect the lives of personnel including SDF officers in mission.

Please establish more legislation as necessary so that their commanders and unit members will not be in any doubt in the front lines. And also, please impart other advice to units to be dispatched on the operation of the laws.





Next, can SDF officers adapt to International Peace Corporation missions? Yes. My answer is yes. And the use of weapons for executing mission, I think, can carry the risk of distorting the way International Peace Corporation work should be.

And Japan has not allowed the use of weapons for the execution of a mission in the past. So far, I think that has been an advantage for Japan in executing international peace cooperation mission in my opinion.

And then also regarding use of weapons to protect lives of members of the units. That should be our last resort and should be cautious. And I believe that we SDF officers have thought of all possible situations that can arise and establish solutions to them in advance and thoroughly tolerant units on such solutions, thereby avoiding situations that require the use of weapons and execute missions steadily.



And another important thing. Whether in Mozambique or in Iraq, SDF officers were able to blend in with the locals and were accepted by locals. And the reason for that, I believe, is that we Japanese do not have any bias about religions or food or living habits and no taboos.

And they can deal with their locals on equal footing and they can toil with their local people based on our work ethics. I think these are the major reasons if you have your local residents on your side that will help protect dispatched SDF officers.

And as a result, we can create a synergy effect for limiting the possibility of the use of weapons. Ever since its birth, Japan's Defense Force has operated under a variety of constraints to hone its capabilities.

In closing, I would like to say that the SDF has steadily earned the trust of the citizens through disaster relief and international peace cooperation missions. I believe this kind of culture built up in the course of SDF's progress is a treasure for SDF when executing missions in and outside of Japan. Thank you for your attention.

## **Panel Discussion (Part 1)**

### **Professor SHINODA Hideaki, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies**

(This is the simultaneous interpretation done for the speech of Prof. SHINODA; Please refer to the original speech in Japanese from the Japanese web-site)

Now, I am moderating the session, but I'd like to speak a little bit. So, we are looking back on our 30 years, and I'd like to take a perspective of a civilian to discuss this matter. In the keynote address, we have an overview of the defense policies, and Mr. Isobe also talked about how difficult it was in the initial stage of policy making. And Mr. Imaura also shared with us his own experience on the field, how difficult it was, his responsibility as commanders, and these are the challenges we need to address.

So, 30 years ago, the International Peace Corporation law was enacted. And I was a graduate student then, and the Association for Aid and Relief Japan was the NGO I was helping. And through this organization I was sent to overseas.

I visited Iran, Africa, Cambodia. And LSE is the university in London where I studied. And for about two months I was working as an international polling station in Cambodia. So, when I was a graduate student, I was following the process of the law being enacted, and I was sent to the field as well.

And I still remember Cambodia at the time I was interviewed by the media. Before I left Japan, most of the questions was about my view on the dispatch of JSDF overseas. And about 50 civilian participants were chosen, and including Nakata, who was killed in the line of duty.

And he was the first Japanese killed in action. And the other one was also killed in the line of duty, and eight individuals decided not to go. So, 42 individuals, including public officials, were sent to overseas under this framework.

And so, one of the main interviewees by the media, and I was puzzled why the questions were so skewed. And I was sent to the province of Takeo, where I stayed at JSDF camp for three nights, enjoying miso soup together.

And I still remember chatting with the members of JSDF. When we had to leave with our bulletproof vest in hand, they were worried. We went to elementary school used as a polling station and we were sort of cheerful about going there, but members of the JSDF were not cheerful at all. They were worried and they came around to watch over us at our polling station. And, I later learned that that was disputed at the National Diet meetings.

And I have many thoughts on this. Many things have improved, but still some challenges remain over 30 years in terms of legislation.

I have written in my books as well concerning constitutions and how we handle them. But today I want to focus my talk on the future challenges so that we can link our panel discussion to the part two of the discussion.

## 現状を踏まえた国際平和協力

### For the future of Japan's engagement in international peace cooperation

#### <原点> Fundamental Goal

- 日本が国際社会に貢献し、日本の国際社会での地位を固める (Japan contributing to international peace and consolidating its position in international society)  
⇒ より戦略的に安全保障政策の中に国際平和協力を位置づける (Strategic understanding Japan's international peace cooperation in its overall security policies)

#### <課題> Current Tasks

- 日本人が国際社会に貢献し、日本の国際社会での地位を固める (Japanese experts contributing to international peace and consolidating Japan's position in international society)  
⇒ より戦略的な個人貢献と能力構築支援の位置づけ <専門家コミュニティ創出> (More strategic development of Japanese experts through deployment and capacity-building engagements) <Enhancement of the Community of Experts>

Currently we know that Gulf War prompted us to participate in the peacekeeping efforts internationally to make contributions. So, we wanted to improve Japan's presence internationally by joining these initiatives.

I think this policy still holds, but some remains skewed. So, the UN framework and security landscape have changed. Some issues were resolved, others are not. The security environment is severe and UNPKOs have been sophisticated, but today we are only sending individuals, not troops.

So, Japan needs to have strategic goals and to be realistic about our national security. We are not sending our troops overseas, and I'm not arguing that we should send them, but I believe human resources and its capabilities are critical here because they can make contributions for Japan overseas.

The individual contributions can raise Japan's presence internationally, consolidating Japan's position in international society. So, the capacity building and also the development of the human resources through networking and training would need to be seriously considered.

The enhancement of the community of experts would be critical. Otherwise our activities cannot sustain. We would need to utilize the international opportunities such as deployments and capacity building engagements for the development of experts.

1. 「自由で開かれたインド太平洋(FOIP)」と国際平和協力の連結  
Connection of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) and international peace cooperation

⇒戦略的なパートナーシップ対象国のネットワーク拡張  
More strategic extension of “partners” in the FOIP network

2. 同盟国・友好国との連携強化  
Consolidation of collaboration with the ally and associates in operations

⇒戦略的な非国連PKO以外の活動への参画  
More strategic participation in non-UN peace support operations

3. 近隣諸国との交流対話の機会の創出  
Creation of opportunities of dialogues with neighboring countries

⇒戦略的な地域会合等への積極的な参加と専門家リーダーシップ  
More strategic facilitation of regional forums and leadership by experts

And this is overall direction. So, we have the free and open Indo Pacific Vision. And following this policy, I think Japan should pursue a security policy. And I was in Africa until last night and I interviewed many people there.

And I visited PKO Center in Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda, run by the United Nations. I had a chance to visit those three facilities. The Kenya shares the same values with Japan. This is a very important country for Japan and we need to understand this country correctly. And we should develop a friendly relationship with that country that is strategic for Japan.

And then, second, we must strengthen cooperation with our allies and allies of allies which are critical in implementing our security policies. We can carry out international peacebuilding activities together. So, the collaboration with these countries needs to be strengthened. And also, the operations in the field together will enhance the relationship. And UNPKO activities can accommodate that. Not only troop contribution, but also association in the field of intelligence and individual staff contribution are important, and we can utilize the strategic perspective when participating non-UN framework.

And then third, it was very important that Japan experienced the same mission with China and Korea in UNMISS. The individual human resource exchange and organizational exchange can be critical for the better relationship of those countries and the capacity building and staff contribution should be more detailed in the context of the significance of the deployments. Thank you very much.

Okay, so this is the end of the first panel discussion.

Anything to add from panelists or from Mr. Watanabe? Really?

No. We have people in active duty, many of them so literally safety mass officers in ground, maritime and air must raise their voices and send information, send a message.

I think that is what is needed as a closing remark. Thank you for very strong message on that. After the second part of the discussion onwards, please participate. I would like to invite active duty officers present today, but still we have to stick to the schedule.

So up to this point we will take a break for about ten minutes.

## **VIP Message (Part 2)**

### **Ms. NAKAMITSU Izumi, United Nations Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs**

#### **(USG NAKAMITSU)**

Distinguished participants, ladies and gentlemen, it is my pleasure to address the International Peace and Security Symposium. Let me express my gratitude to the Joint Staff College of the Ministry of Defense of Japan, for organizing this important event. I am particularly honored to speak to you at the 30-year anniversary of Japan's first deployment to United Nations peacekeeping operations.

At a critical time when geostrategic shifts and a rapidly evolving global landscape required us to prepare for New Era of maintaining and sustaining peace. Since the act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations was passed in 1992.

Japan has contributed to international peace and security through the deployment of more than 12,500 brave women and men to 28 missions across the world. I would like to remember their sacrifices and thank them for their service.

Japan's commitment to deliver high quality training and capacity building support to UN and Troop Contributing Countries have added to excellent reputation in the Peacekeeping field. Through its renowned UN Triangular Partnership Program, Japan contributes funding and trainers to enhance the engineering, medical and other capabilities of thousands of trainees.

Many of them are currently serving in our most challenging mission in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan. Ladies and gentlemen, in the past decades, UN peacekeeping have recognized the complex multidimensional issues that were associated with the challenging context peacekeeping missions operate in.

In response, UN Peacekeeping has recognized the fundamental principle of national ownership, helped build national capacities to respond to these challenges, and moved towards more integrated mission setups to be able to properly address the multiplicity of challenges in a cohesive manner while fulfilling its core mandate to protect civilians.

Since I started my UN career, I have seen the landscape in which our peacekeepers operate, evolve and shift as conflicts became more complex. Today, UN Peacekeeping finds itself in a deteriorating political and security environment characterized by increased attacks against peacekeepers and growing restrictions against their movement.

Coupled with trends of disinformation and misinformation, as well as significant capacity and resource challenges, the COVID-19 pandemic has also taken a heavy toll. As a result, we are again at the turning point for UN Peace Operations.

In such an environment, it is important that the UN plans to improve the effectiveness of Peace Operations while adapting the ways and means through which it supports international peace and security.

With an increased focus on building and sustaining peace to reinforce the sustainability of peacekeeping and support a sustainable development agenda. The support of the key member states, like Japan will be critical in this process.

Ladies and gentlemen, turning to the ongoing war in Ukraine, I would first like to recognize Japan's valuable support to the UN through its provision of humanitarian supplies and dispatch of Self Defense Force aircraft to bring materials to Ukraine and its neighboring countries.

As the war has further exacerbated geopolitical tensions and as a High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, I need to voice my concern about the worst rhetoric and heightened risk of use of nuclear weapons.

While the 10th review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was taking place in New York this year. UN Secretary General visited Hiroshima. He stressed that the world must never forget what happened there. As citizens of the only country to have suffered atomic bombings in war, young people of Japan hold a special role and responsibility in continuing the work of the “Hibakusha” and ensuring that such a devastation never happens again anywhere.

The escalating conflicts in Ukraine and beyond are not taking place in a vacuum. Political polarization, pandemics, increasing poverty and inequalities are all inter-linked and mutually reinforcing.

Adding to these crises is the climate emergency. Our planet is fast approaching a tipping point that will make climate kills irreversible. The world's wealthier countries, in solidarity with the rest of the world, need to invest financially to meet our climate targets, reduce emissions, and implement the sustainable development goals.

The world doesn't lack financial resources. For example, last year global military expenditures continued to rise to more than \$2 trillion. We must remember that our common security is broader than what the military can protect.

Japan has always promoted the concept of human security, which reinforces and complements traditional national or territorial security. And the human centered approach is a major commitment of the UN.

Secretary General has emphasized in his common agenda. And his forthcoming new Agenda for Peace, where he calls for a new vision for disarmament to guarantee human, national and collective security. This new Agenda for Peace is an opportunity to consider how to build on the great gains in disarmament and nonproliferation and adopt measures to reduce existential risks while crafting a new approach to International Security Corporation.

It could act as a vehicle for the revitalization of existing and development of new transparency and confidence



building measures which remain underutilized. And it could seek to ensure that disarmament and arms control take their rightful place as a pillar of the international peace of security architecture and as a key accelerator for achieving sustainable development.

And it will be a critical opportunity to craft a new approach to Peace Operations and Peacebuilding efforts that are fit for purpose in our new Post Post Cold War Era. Altogether, can we take the next steps for revitalized Peace Operations in solidarity with and all for people?

I thank you very much for your attention.

**(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)**

In this panel, we are going to have three presentations. We would like to proceed in the order of the program.  
First, Mr. Yoshizaki, please.

## Panel Discussion ( Part 2 )

**Mr. YOSHIZAKI Tomonori, Vice President for Academic Affairs, National Institute for Defense Studies**



### **(Mr. YOSHIZAKI)**

Thank you very much for invitation, and I'm so honored to speak for this very important panel on the future of peace operations. I'd like to start with the PowerPoint slide to think out of the box. This is not your map in your mind, but please look at that.


In this map ASEAN Centrality is visible. Japan is on a bottom, and Australia on the top. This is not exactly what we have in mind, .it will be a starting point to think about the future of peace operations.

We have to redesign it, because Ukraine War is a burning issue and the real challenge while we have to face the COVID challenges at the same time.

Next, how to think out of the box? It will be the starting point and I'd like to start with this picture describing a kind of challenge of our common sense. Next please.

# Japan's Traditional Concept *Engineering Peace*

- Traditional Narrative: Roles of the Military in **Post-conflict Reconstruction**
  - Human Security focused
  - Defense Diplomacy, or mini-literalism
    - Support to ASEAN's centrality
    - Cooperation with "like-minded" partners
- Challenges
  - **Post-conflict?**
    - If there is "no peace to keep", what to do?
  - **Reconstruction?**
    - Or starting from scratch?
  - Re-emergence of traditional security challenges: grey-zone deterrence
- **3-Step to Dynamic Capability Approach**



Let me start with the book titled *Engineering Peace*. The author was US Army Colonel Galan Williams who served in Camp Zama in Kanagawa prefecture, Japan.

Previously He had served in Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo; and during a civil military cooperation, so called CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation) he had wide-ranging experiences on the battlefield, and also engineering units. I had the chance to meet him and I had a briefing and I was so impressed.

That book was published by U.S. Institute of Peace, well-known institute in DC looking to the future of peace operations. And that book was published in 2005, right after the Iraqi War. Then I was so inspired that that is the thing we have to think about it, *Engineering Peace* for Japan.

The first panel described our lessons learned in Cambodia, and Isobe-san and Watanabe-san clearly stated that this was the foundations of the peace operation first done by SDF. And it set the Japan's standard, starting with the engineering unit on the ground.

That was the Ice Breaker, and that set the stage. So, in my mind, *Engineering Peace* is a key concept to describe Japan's approaches to international peace cooperation activities.

But there are many differences since then. As Nakamitsu-san clearly stated that the UN faces a series of challenges, including Ukraine, and also the subtitle of this book underlined the post conflict reconstruction.

But we may wonder what is post conflict? Syria, Liberia, Afghanistan, Iraq, many of these conflicts have no such thing like a post conflict, nor an idea of reconstruction. Our experiences in South Sudan started with starting from


scratch, not reconstruct.

That means we had to think about the state-building just from the beginning. That was a huge challenge: not only the peace operations, but also state-building. It was not state “reconstruction.”

Also, we have to think about defense and military things at the same time, because the military will be called up not only for peace operation, but also for deterrence and defense purpose as well. That is the number one priority.

So, what will be our approaches? My idea is to start with the dynamic capability approach. This is a critical approach and I was so inspired by the concept of national defense, back in 2010.

## Why peace fails? 1: Optimistic assumption



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Next slide please. Three big surprises about this chart. Number one is that a curve, so called the “Lund Curve”, named after the researcher of the U.S. Institute of Peace, back in 1990s. This curve highlighted a kind of linear process, having a kind of the peace-resolution-conflict management, which should proceed in a linear way. But unfortunately it is not the case with many of the war situation.

## Why peace fails?


### 2: Black Swan



Next slide please. Number two difficulty is, so called, “Black Swan” situation and I took this picture in London, 2020, March 11. As the picture clearly shows that was the day when the World Health Organization declared that the COVID is a pandemic.

Then we closed the national boundaries, and, so called, “social distancing” and “wearing the mask” became a new normal. That was a Black Swan, something, a random, big event onto our mindset.

## Why peace fails? 3: Red Team Challenges



Next please. And last, not least, is a red team, or spoiler issues. Peace Process may be challenged by red team. Not everybody is a blue team, and a red team prevails in some cases. Just like Taliban took over in Kabul on August 15 last year.

Why? Because the local community may be targeted. Who is winning that game? Who is attracting the resources and also support? This is a very competitive play on the battlefield or in the local community.



### 3 Steps to *Dynamic Capabilities* Approach

#### 1<sup>st</sup> Step: Sensing the change, or brainstorming



Next slide please. Then how we should envision our peace operation for the future. My approach is a three-step approach, starting from brainstorming, sensing the changes, think about unthinkable. Forget about the common sense for a while.

First, *brainstorming*. So, think about what's happening. And the 3D words I'd like to underline. Number one is disintegration. That's the reality. Well, China-US competition and Russia invasion to Ukraine, these are not integral one, but disintegration.

So, we have to think about how far we can get UN Security Council Resolution, Protecting Civilians supports. We have very big question mark on this issue, to be honest. Second is *disconnectivity*. I'm sorry to say that we are disconnected and international "social distancing" is a reality. So, for it is under challenge, we are not that free, we are not that open. But we are constrained and disconnected. Third, *deterrence failure*. So, we have to think about deterrence failure which is a bad thing to start with. Now is not a good timing to think about the peace but that's a reality.

## 2<sup>nd</sup> Step: Seizing the change: social construction

### 1. **Re-Engineering Peace to mitigate Disintegration**

New look to mini-literalism: Hybrid support  
Triangular Partnership Programme

### 1. **Re-connect:**

New approach to Capacity-building in a New  
Normal (post-COVID-19)

### 2. **Revitalizing Deterrence & Defense:**

Emerging Strategic Culture?  
Affordance and Sustainability revisited



7

Next slide please. Second, we have to redesign our peace operation. My idea is to start with three Rs. Start with the Reengineering our peace operations to have a new look onto the hybrid formula connecting a triangular partnership program.

Second, we had to Re-connect. Thanks to the web technology, we have a hybrid formula not only face to face, but also connected to the internet. So, we can have more opportunity to be stay connected thanks to the technology. And please have a look at the picture. It is a triangular, that is, we have partners, not only Japan acting alone, but we have partners to work with. And also, Matsuzawa-san will talk more detail about capacity building endeavor. That will be very powerful tool for Japan for the future.

The third is Revitalizing deterrence and defense issues. Again, this is a very important, critical challenge for the military in the world. So, we have to think both about the peace operations and deterrence and defense issue at the same time.

### 3<sup>rd</sup> Step: Transformation: Re-design our options

Diplomatic	Informational	Military	Economic
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>Back to Basics:</b> <b>Global unity:</b> Territorial integrity & Sovereignty <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Conflict prevention and management  <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>Limits of Liberal International Order (LIO)?</b> Order of Exclusion?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>Social resilience</b>  <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Defending information network  <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Dealing with Propaganda/Disformation/Infodemic	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>Security Sector Reform</b> Revisited: Ukraine Case <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>Civil-Military Cooperation</b> Revisited: Ukraine Case  <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Networking Capacity-building approach	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <b>Economic resilience</b>  <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Defending critical infrastructure  <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Transportation of supply goods
United Nations <----- Like-minded Partners -----> Japan <sub>8</sub>			

Next slide please. This is the last slide. To wrap up my argument, what we should do next? Think about our own capability and opportunity and chances. So, I will start with “DIME” options. Diplomatic, Informational, Military Economic options that will ensure the comprehensive approaches to think about the holistic picture of the peace operation. Not only about the UN peace operations, but also UN-led or coalition type or capacity building things.

I will skip the details, but as to the red one, we have to go back to basics. What is what this conference is for? Peace & global unity. These are the starting point of our endeavor. So, we have to go back to basics. And in the Informational area we have to think about the social resilience, including support for the Ukraine and others. And also Military term, Security Sector Reform idea should be revisited. Now, we see the Ukraine forces very much encouraged by international support with the defense equipment transfer. That's a reality. It is not the UN thing, but it is a partnership support to enhance resilience in Ukraine. I'm sure that would be typical item to talk more about the future with today's audience.



Thank you

3 Steps to  
Re-Designing  
Peace Operations

And the next slide, please. This is the last slide. My idea is that professional military education is quite critical. I have been doing that for three decades. And I'm so happy to speak for you and talk more about the future of Peace Operations. Thank you very much.

**(Prof. SHINODA)**

Thank you very much. Mr. Yoshizaki. It seems very impressive that he emphasized the necessity to go in a new direction while analyzing complex new circumstances in international affairs.

Combining all of these, we would like to discuss thematic issues later in the Plenary discussions. If you have any questions, please take a record of your questions and then submit it later so that we can discuss all your questions in the final preliminary discussion.

## Panel Discussion ( Part 2 )

### Lieutenant Colonel Leigh Scott Crawford, Commanding Officer for the Australian Defense Force Peace Operations Training Centre

**AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE**

## The future of peacekeeping and making an impact with meaningful partnerships

Brief for Japanese Joint Staff College  
LTCOL Leigh Crawford – CO ADF Peace Operations Training Centre

*Joint, International partner of choice in Delivering the Intellectual Edge on Peace Operations to the ADF and into the wider Indo-Pacific Region*

Joint Capabilities Group | AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE TRAINING CENTRE

An integral element of the Australian Defence College  
PROPTER POSTEROS DISCIMUS

#### (LTC CRAWFORD)

Thank you, Commandant, Director of the Peacekeeping Center, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.

Firstly, thank you for the invite. It is an honour for me to be here today at the symposium and to reflect on my position as a commanding officer of a peacekeeping training centre and my experience as a strategic planner in the UN Department of Peace Operations.

It is indeed a good time as an Australian to visit Japan. I note my Chief of Joint Operations, Lieutenant General Bilton, is here for exercise, Yamasakura and my minister will also follow up for the two plus two dialogue in a short period of time.

Earlier this year, Australia celebrated our 75th anniversary of deploying peacekeepers under the UN mission. They were four UN military observers deployed to what we now know as Indonesia. So, Australia has a long history of supporting the UN.

If I also reflect from a contingent perspective, our more recent contingents were in the early 90s in Rwanda, Somalia and Cambodia, and then probably more a reflection of our position today and likelihood of deploying a

contingent in our near region in East Timor in 1999 and 2000 onwards.

The images on this first slide, I just wanted to point out, are also more a reflection of the Australian commitment to peacekeeping in today's environment. From left to right, our strategic air support to the Vietnamese level II hospital in South Sudan.

Moving to the right, our construction and gifting of a new age and advanced peacekeeping training centre in Nadi, Fiji for the Republic of Fiji military forces to conduct their training.

Our niche provision of female leadership - that is an image of Major General Cheryl Pearce, who was recently the Force Commander in the UN mission in Cyprus. And the last image is to go full circle. Our current commitment to the military of Timor Leste in their vision to become a recognized UN training entity and to have their own troop contribution on a permanent basis, who will deploy in February next year to South Sudan.

# ADF Peace Operations Training Centre

## AGENDA

- The POTC Mission
- Issues to unpack in the UN:
  - Enabling the optimal Force
  - Partnership initiatives and opportunities
- What does this mean for likeminded countries like Japan and Australia?
- Questions



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Next slide, please. The agenda of my short talk today will be briefly to talk about my mission for the Peace Operations Training Centre and its Nuanced components. And then I'd like to unpack some issues within the United Nations.

I'm a visual learner, so I'll try and use more pictures than text and then describe that in due course. Last of all, I'd like to sum up by talking about what does this mean for, likeminded countries like Japan and Australia and others in the audience today?



# ADF Peace Operations Training Centre



**Mission: POTC is to prepare selected Australian and international military personnel for employment on peace operations and in gender appointments in order to support ADF force-generation and deliver Defence International Engagement outcomes.**




Next slide, please. So, historically, the Peace Operations Training Centre was created as a wing within our Australian Defence Force warfare centre in January of 1993. So, like your 30th anniversary next month, we will have our 30th anniversary too.

It was then aligned as a government response to a 1995 General Assembly resolution intended to develop a professional learning organization to specifically deal with United Nations Pre-deployment Training.

POTC also has an important role in conducting International Engagement. And you'll see that second underlying blue component is actually a very important developing part of what I do, which is using UN training to conduct engagement into our region, especially the South Pacific countries that are not able to have the capacity to deal with conventional military engagement.

Yet they highly value the United Nations and they often all have their own contributions and they value training capacity building that we can provide quite easily.

# How do we Train and Deploy the optimum Force?



Next slide, please. So, I said I was a visual learner coming towards the end of my three years as a strategic planner in New York.

I tried to conceptualize what this UN problem was in creating an optimized and deployed force. I used the symbolization of an impossible triangle and it has capability, force integration. And if I can get the next build, what

I consider to be the anchor point or the bedrock, which is training, all of the elements around this are shaping and forcing factors that optimize or in some cases degrade the elements of this impossible triangle.

And I certainly, in my experience, see all of them need to be pushed forward and synchronized if you're going to achieve the optimal effect. So, when you get that chance and I note that one of your own here in Japan, Colonel Tominaga, is about to go to New York and be the chief of the MPET, which is the military performance and evaluation team inside of the Department of Peace Operations.

It's a real opportunity to make difference and to enhance that capability that's being produced.

# ADF Peace Operations Training Centre

## Recent initiatives for peacekeeping cooperation



Next slide, please. Again, during the pandemic to enable Australia, and we have about 30 staff officers and military observers that we are training on an annual basis.

To continue that, we developed a learning management system called the Peace Operations Training Environment Partnership, or POTEP. It is a moodel-based learning management system and I'm sure many people in the audience have used something similar in a university type environment, or indeed the staff college.

In this case. We've built it with the functionality to be shared on a global basis. Each flag you see is a system in its own right, protected by security keys, but course materials and activities can be easily dragged and shared in a common way amongst all nations who choose to use this system.

# ADF Peace Operations Training Centre

## Recent initiatives for peacekeeping cooperation



Next slide, please. This is an example of an activity we ran in 2021 using the POTE system. It was an ADMM plus Ministers initiative, and we ran a UN Staff Officers Course for women in the ASEAN region. As opposed to the traditional way of face to face training, we ran this as a flexible, online, individually catered to course.

And so, over a period of just over three months, we were able to, when these women were releasable, get them to finish the training they were doing and individually scheduled debriefs, collecting all of the learning outcomes in a digital sense to prove the learning outcomes and have them awarded a qualification that could see them deploy to a UN mission.

Our advice from New York was that this was probably one of the more successful women peace and security activities in terms of providing that qualification, which a lot of initiatives genuinely don't get to. And it's also worth noting that this came at zero cost. It is flexible and was able to be catered to the individual and not have them all be available for two-week concentrated training period.

# ADF Peace Operations Training Centre

## Recent initiatives for peacekeeping cooperation



Next slide, please.

I'll just get you to play the video. So, this is an image of the simulation project wait for it to come up. That my unit has been working on for about the last two years. The video you are seeing simulates twelve scenarios for a team of military observers based on real incidents that occurred in UN missions.

As a video file you're seeing right now should show it uses complex incidents, including protection of civilians, minefields, and allows changes in weather, light, terrain, and additionally, and not shown on this particular slide.

It can be coupled with the use of avatar technology so that military observers can actually negotiate with a child soldier to pass a checkpoint in missions, just like they would in South Sudan. This is all relatively low cost. Again, it is off the shelf gaming technology, but coupled with really well-developed lessons learned from members who have deployed on UN operations.

# ADF Peace Operations Training Centre

**So what does this mean for like-minded countries like Australia and Japan?**


- More than just a good global country
- Peace Operations a tool for niche engagement (South Pacific) and partnerships
- Evolutions in Peace Operations
  - Planning
  - Training
  - “Enduring Acceptable Conditions”



Next slide, please. So now I'd like to talk about what this all means for like-minded countries such as Australia and Japan and others in the audience. Because I certainly believe in my experience, we need to be more than just good global citizens. We need to be smart at using experience and our innovative training concepts as ways to engage our friends and many countries throughout the Indo-Pacific, especially, as I mentioned earlier, those smaller countries that highly value contributions to the UN.

Lastly, we need to contribute in the evolution of the UN system and that's been alluded to by many speakers prior to me. I'd like to also introduce the concept of how do we know when a mission is ready to be closed down and setting conditions that I would refer to as Enduring Acceptable Conditions. For a mission to be closed down and moved into post recovery.

# STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS



- Challenge: Sufficient time for proper analysis and planning (process)
- Political guidance and involvement



Next slide, please. So, falling from the previous slide, this is a wide diagram of my time in New York as a strategic planner. What you really need to take away is the area circled in red, and this is my opinion.

It's an area we very much underdo when we're designing and implementing a mandate and a mission structure for a new UN mission. It's in these areas that I think like minded countries need to get together and use the experience that we've had in the last 20 years to ensure we design a roadmap that sees clear goals and objectives and conditions that need to be met and tracked for the closure of a mission in due course.

Additionally, we need to also be flexible enough in reporting on a mission that we are able to change direction and alter our plans if need be. Certainly, my experience in New York is that it's very difficult to get honesty if there are problems or failures within a UN mission and Secretary General's reports will generally always read in a positive manner when really, we need to be making changes in a lot of these missions and need to be more honest.

Next slide, please. The next four slides demonstrate examples of innovation in UN training that my unit has been working on in the last year or two. Instead of doing what we've done for the past 20 years, where we would generally run a staff exercise using a complicated UN scenario. Some of you may have heard of the Carana scenario.

More concentrated activities over a 90 to 120 minutes period, where we would put our members on the spot and get them to make decisions. So, you see here for our exercise, we ran in Thailand this year, we ran, instead of a staff exercise, a round table of quick decision exercises.



QDE 1 UNMISS PATROL

Review mode

QDE 1. UNMISS Patrol

100% COMPLETE

INTRODUCTION

- Overview ✓
- Revision on Rules of Engagement and Directives on the Use of Force ✓
- Example ROE and DUF ✓

ACTIVITY


- QDE 1 ✓

SUMMARY

- Consequences of "Failure to Act" ✓

Step 1

QDE 1




Approximately two kms from the village you are stopped by state security forces at a temporary checkpoint who inform you that you cannot pass, and offer no reason why. To date state forces have been belligerent and have increasingly impeded UN movements. Bypassing is not an option due to difficult terrain and farmland. **What is your response?**

1 2 3 4 5 ✓

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Next slide, please. In doing that, and I know culturally, sometimes it's not acceptable, we would put someone on the spot as a patrol commander, in this case in South Sudan, who had come across a particular incident or activity, which are all very common in the mission area, and we would ask them to give us their response.

And I'd caveat that always by saying that in my opinion, the training environment is an environment where you are intended to make your mistakes and learn from them. The only wrong decision in the training environment is no decision.

And I find that all too common as being a problem to a lot of the issues we've had in UN missions in the past decade or so is our young commanders are not making decisions which lead to fatalities.

The screenshot displays a web-based course interface for POTEP. The main content area is titled 'Case Studies' and features six interactive cards, each with a representative image and a title. The cards are arranged in two rows of three. The first row includes 'CASE STUDY 1: Mandates in Action' (image of soldiers), 'CASE STUDY 2: Training for Peace Operations' (image of a classroom), and 'CASE STUDY 3: Key challenges in Mali' (image of a military vehicle). The second row includes 'CASE STUDY 4: Proxies and mercenaries in UN Mission Areas' (image of a conflict zone), 'CASE STUDY 5: Women Peace and Security' (image of soldiers), and 'CARANA UNITED INJECT 3: Training' (image of a classroom). A dark sidebar on the left provides navigation for various course elements. The footer contains the Joint Capabilities Group logo, the text 'AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE TRAINING CENTRE', and the hashtag '#ForTheFutureWeLearn'.

Next slide, please.

So, this is and this is an example of syndicate activities that we also designed for a more robust discussion of some of the issues that need to be unpacked, that have developed dynamically in the UN since in the past five to eight years.

And they can include and in my own country's case, our doctrine hasn't caught up to it yet. We are not now simply dealing with Chapter Six and Seven missions. We have missions in the Congo with Force Intervention Brigades, which are largely offensive capabilities.

And for a lot of people who have worked in the UN for the last 20 years, that that's hard to understand and contemplate. But we have certainly had a dramatic shift in how we operate in our UN missions. But I'm not convinced that our doctrine and our training has caught up in terms of understanding those concepts.

## Case Study 4. Proxies and Mercenaries

Review mode



### Case Study 4. Proxies and mercenaries

100% COMPLETE

INTRODUCTION

Overview

ACTIVITY

SUMMARY

### Mercenary forces in UN mission areas

Click on the markers on the map of Africa and note the UN mission information then watch the videos. Be prepared to discuss the questions below.

- under international law, what is the legal status of 'mercenaries'?
- what are the implications for UN peacekeepers operating in the same area?



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TRAINING CENTRE

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Next slide, please. This is an example of one of the case studies that we did or had discussions. It was simply to look at mercenary forces or proxy forces within UN missions in Africa, such as the Wagner Group and more. Also, look at what does this mean legally and what does it mean to you in the mission?

Once again, these are things that we don't teach in UN training systems because the system hasn't caught up to some of these dynamic changes.

# ADF Peace Operations Training Centre

## 3 Take-aways

- Training is the bedrock of UN Capability and needs to be refined, focussed and optimised.
- Flexible digital training options and simulation can deliver exponentially if optimised.
- Countries like Australia and Japan can have exponential influence through partnerships that deliver effects through practical, new age thinking – ***“The Intellectual Edge”***



Next slide, please. Thank you for listening to me for the past ten minutes or so.

I would very much like you to take away three points from my talk today. First of all, as I mentioned earlier, I firmly believe that training really is that bedrock or centre of gravity of UN capability.

But I also believe that it needs to be refined, focused and optimized. And I don't see us doing that largely as a global audience. In the last certainly five to eight years, flexible digital training options and simulation can deliver exponentially.

If optimized and I'll underline there, it has to be optimized. It has to be based on lessons learnt that have come out of our current missions so the soldiers and officers of tomorrow can learn from the soldiers and officers of today in missions.

Last of all, likeminded countries like Japan, Australia and others can have exponential influence through partnerships that deliver effects through practical new age thinking. Or as we would like to call it in Australia. The intellectual edge. Arigato thank you.

# Questions



Arigato, thank you.

## **(Moderators, Prof. SHINODA)**

Thank you very much. LTC Crawford. We are especially very much glad to hear that you emphasize that Japan and Australia are likeminded countries.

We understand Australia is a typical likeminded state for Japan. So, from that perspective, sharing United Nations operations in Africa, India, Pacific, Asia, Oceania, QUAD and so on. We are very much glad to share today's discussion with you.

Now we would like to proceed to the next presenter. Mr. Matsuzawa, you have the floor,

## Panel Discussion ( Part 2 )

**Ms. MATSUZAWA Tomoko, Director for Defense Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region, Ministry of Defense**

1

# JAPAN MOD / SDF DEFENSE COOPERATION INITIATIVES IN THE FIELD OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS



### (Ms. MATUZAWA)

Thank you. Firstly, I would like to express my appreciation to Commandant Futakawa, of the Joint Staff College and the JPC for convening such an important event today.

It is my great pleasure to be given this opportunity. Today I am going to speak about two aspects of Japan's Ministry of Defense and Self Defense Forces Defense Cooperation activities, which are enabling our regional partners to make further contributions to peacekeeping operations.

One is about our capacity building activities with partner countries in the region, and the other is our contribution within Southeast Asian's key security regional platform.



Next slide, please. Firstly, let me quickly introduce our capacity building programs.

In order to foster regional stability and prosperity, improving connectivity between Asia and Africa is crucial.

And on this basis, we believe that the Indo-Pacific should remain free and open to all. We call it FOIP, and in order to pursue FOIP, we plan and conduct a number of defense cooperation and exchange activities, and out of a variety of tools to promote and pursue it, one of the most effective and meaningful tools, is the provision of capacity building to partner countries.

Since 2012, the MOD and Self Defense Force have delivered many capacity building activities in a variety of fields, including PKO, and we have ensured that such efforts are targeted to address the needs and gaps of our partner countries – while making use of our niche capabilities and experience.

As you can see on the map, our main focus is on the Indo-Pacific region, particularly Southeast Asian countries. As of now, we are conducting 24 capacity building activities. With regard to support in the field of PKO, we have been conducting projects with Cambodia, Mongolia and Vietnam.

Let me introduce an overview of the respective activities.

## Cambodia–Japan cooperation project in the field of PKO (civil engineering)



**Objective:** To further develop the skills of engineering units of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) deployed to UN peacekeeping operations

### Training focus

#### Phase 1 (2013-2017)

- For peacekeepers, such as: civil engineering theory, road construction, road drainage systems, road maintenance, concrete road construction (based on Cambodia's annual needs)

#### Phase 2 (2017-2022)

- 'Train-the-trainer' program for road surveying instructors

Recent activity (in-country)	
Period	30 May – 24 June 2022
Trainees	13 RCAF personnel
Unit, Location	Training School for Multi-National Peacekeeping Forces, Kampong Speu
JMOD/JSDF contingent	1 official from Indo-Pacific Regional Policy Division, JMOD, and 5 personnel from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force



Next slide, please. Firstly, Cambodia. This year marks the 30th anniversary of Japan's first ever deployment to a PKO mission, which was to Cambodia.

As was introduced by previous speakers in an earlier session, today, Cambodia is no longer a host country for a PKO mission, instead it has made remarkable progress. As of now, Cambodia is the third largest troop contributing country among ASEAN.

Cambodia is currently deploying almost 800 personnel to five PKO missions. In terms of capacity building activities, as mentioned by the Deputy Prime Minister of Cambodia at the beginning of this event, the MOD and Self Defense Force have enjoyed a long and valuable relationship with the country by supporting their development of engineering units.

As with all the capacity building projects we implement, the training focus has always been determined through regular and close consultation with the partner country in order to address identified need.

Since we started this project in 2013, approximately 160 Cambodian engineers have received training by about 50 Ground Self-Defense Force instructors, and many of those who completed our training have in fact been deployed to PKO missions such as MINUSCA and MONUSCO.

Our training has focused on road construction techniques, and in the current phase, we have developed road surveying instructors through a train-the-trainer program. Even during the COVID pandemic when we had to postpone many activities, we continued this project by setting up online training in order to maintain momentum as well as the skills that they have previously learned.

The most recent activity was conducted in May and June this year by deploying Ground Self-Defense Force instructors to Cambodia for about a month to train road surveying instructor candidates.



## Mongolia–Japan cooperation project in the field of PKO (civil engineering)



**Objective:** To enhance the capacity of Mongolian Army engineering units in order to support deployments to UN peacekeeping operations

### Training focus

#### Phase 1 (2014-2016)

- Basic road construction training

#### Phase 2 (2017-2019)

- Intermediate road construction training, including drainage

#### Phase 3 (2021-2024)

- Road construction ('train-the-trainer') and surveying

### Recent activity (in-country)

<b>Period</b>	1-26 August 2022
<b>Trainees</b>	45 Mongolian Army personnel
<b>Unit, Location</b>	Mongolian Army Unit 014, Ulunbaatr
<b>JMOD/JSDF contingent</b>	2 officials from Indo-Pacific Regional Policy Division, JMOD, and 9 personnel from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force



Next slide, please.

The second case is Mongolia, which is another active PKO Troop Contributing Country that deploys about 900 personnel. Mongolia aims to deploy its engineering unit to a PKO mission in the future. In order to support this objective, we have been conducting capacity building training to develop the skills of Mongolian army engineers since 2014.

Training has been provided across three phases, and it has focused on road construction techniques. Most recently, in August this year, we dispatched Ground Self-Defense Force instructors who were deployed to Mongolia for about a month to provide training to 45 Mongolian engineering personnel.

The development pathway shown on the left side of this slide is a clear example of one of the ways we seek to structure the implementation of capacity building. In phase one, basic skills are taught to create a solid foundation, and in phase two, intermediate techniques were covered.

This project has now progressed into phase three, where more advanced train-the-trainer program has been conducted. Since we have started this project, over 330 Mongolian army personnel have received training by more than 100 Ground Self-Defense Force instructors.

By structuring our capacity building project in this manner, the partner country will be able to independently sustain and operationalize the key capabilities and functions in which they have received training from us, and naturally, by continuing these activities for multiple years, we can further strengthen our relationship with them.

## Vietnam–Japan cooperative activities in the field of PKO



**Objective:** To facilitate the deployment of units belonging to the People’s Army of Vietnam (VPA), including engineers, to UN peacekeeping operations

### Training focus

**2013, 2016, 2018**

- Shared knowledge about PKO missions, including observation of deployed contingents of JGSDF engineers

**2021, 2022**

- Provided advice and directly supported the packing of materials for the first deployment of a VPA engineer contingent to Abyei (UNISFA)

Recent activity (in-country)	
<b>Period</b>	25 December 2021 – 12 January 2022
<b>Trainees</b>	Approx. 100 VPA personnel
<b>Unit, Location</b>	Vietnam Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Hanoi
<b>JMOD/JSDF contingent</b>	1 official from Indo-Pacific Regional Policy Division, JMOD, and 26 personnel from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force



Next slide, please. Our close cooperation with Vietnam. Today, Vietnam has become an active troop contributing country among ASEAN by deploying about 270 personnel to PKO missions.

Since 2013, the MOD and Self-Defense Force has intermittently worked with Vietnam to support their preparations for deployment to PKO missions. This year, Vietnam has started to deploy its first ever engineering unit to PKO mission in Abyei, UNISFA.

In order to support them, we deployed 26 GSDF personnel, drawn from a range of specialist units, to Hanoi from the end of last year to the beginning of this year. They worked with about 100 personnel from the Vietnamese Department of Peacekeeping Operations and provided advice and directly supported them by packing materials which were to be used in Abyei.

With this cooperative activity, the Vietnamese engineering contingent was fully prepared to start their deployment, and they departed for Abyei in May and June this year, and have since been operating in the field and making great efforts to fulfill their PKO mission mandates.

## ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) Experts' Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations (PKO-EWG)

- PKO-EWG is one of seven ADMM-Plus subordinate groups, and brings together military and civilian experts in the field of PKO from **10 ASEAN Member States and 8 Plus countries**
- EWGs promote practical cooperation by providing a platform to share information, promote joint exercises, and submit reports and recommendations



### Co-chairs of current cycle (2021-2023): Japan and Vietnam

Activities	
	Established the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Platform
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aims to build awareness of WPS, share challenges and lessons learned, and encourage active participation of female experts in EWGs, exercises, actual PKO deployments</li> <li>• Seminars and resources portal</li> </ul>
	Involvement of Subject Matter Experts
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aims to share of knowledge and experience about PKO deployment, pre-deployment training and capacity building, A4P and A4P+, and effective partnering with the UN</li> </ul>

**Through such initiatives, Japan is contributing to the improvement of ASEAN Member States' capacity to support PKO, and to the peace and stability of the region and beyond**



3<sup>rd</sup> PKO-EWG (Oct 2022 in Vietnam)



2<sup>nd</sup> WPS Seminar (Oct 2022 in Vietnam)

Next slide, please. Now, I would like to turn your attention to a part of Japan's contribution to Southeast Asia's key regional security framework. In pursuing FOIP, ASEAN plays an important role in regional security architecture, and it also provides a forum for the inclusion of extra-regional states.

In this respect, the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus, or ADMM Plus, is the key forum. ADMM Plus is composed of the ten ASEAN member states and eight regional states, namely Japan, U.S., Australia, New Zealand, India, Russia, R.O.K. and China.

Under the umbrella of the ADMM Plus, there are seven Experts' Working Groups, one of which is focusing on peacekeeping operations. Japan has taken a co-chair role of the PKO Experts' Working Group with Vietnam from 2020 for a three-year term.

Together with Vietnam, we as co-chairs have set three objectives to address. First, increase awareness about Women, Peace and Security, WPS, and conduct activities supporting WPS objectives. Second, further develop member states' capacity to contribute to peacekeeping operations. And third, to improve pre-deployment training and capacity building for peacekeepers.

As a co-chair, Japan with Vietnam has planned, organized and convened every session where all member states can exchange their lessons learned, good practices and challenges about selected, important PKO topics, such as: capacity building, Action for Peace, A4P Plus. Most recently, we discussed effective coordination between UN headquarters and Troop Contributing Countries.

Furthermore, since we have set WPS – Women, Peace and Security – as one of our main objectives, we established a WPS Platform under the co-chairs in order to consolidate member states' WPS-related experience and

to serve as a portal for associated reference materials.

Under this WPS platform, we have hosted WPS seminars by inviting eminent experts to share their insights and challenges, which have greatly contributed to deepening understanding about WPS among member states and reflecting it into respective member states' WPS activities in the PKO context.

As a co-chair, Japan is fully committed to make this cycle beneficial and practical for all member states since we strongly believe what we learn and discuss through this platform will greatly contribute to respective member states' endeavors and activities for successful peacekeeping operations.

## Questions



What I introduced today is a part of the initiatives and activities that Ministry of Defense and Self Defense Force have conducted.

Still, I believe that these bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation activities with partner countries as well as a regional organization are crucial to uphold and reinforce Free and Open Indo-Pacific, which ultimately seeks to bolster regional and international peace and security.

Thank you.

**(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)**

Thank you very much, Ms. Matsuzawa. There are some insights, quite important insights as well as our own experiences in the course of capacity development with regional partners neighboring countries.

In the first panel before the break we discussed, we looked at the history of PKO law as well as related special measures in the last three decades. And though and we said that there is an extended version of our International Peace Corporation.

Now we learned that many bilateral initiatives not within the area of PKO law or even the Special Measures Law are quite important for us to envisage, have a vision of a future framework of international peace cooperation for Japan.

And then I personally sometimes participate in some forums of experts, practitioners like IAPTC Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers together with representatives of JPC of Defense Ministry, and then we participate in the regional forum of our partners coming from other Asian countries.

That is very natural. And these similar forums are taking place throughout within the PKO community as well as related but non PKO communities like ODA fields and so on. So now talking about International Peace Corporation is such a comprehensive intellectual program.

## **Discussion (Part 2)**

**Moderator: Professor SHINODA Hideaki, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)**

### **(Moderator, Prof. SHINODA)**

Thank you very much. So now let us start the final plenary discussion. We are a little bit behind the schedule though. We try to finish everything by at 05:00 1st. We would like to take a question, questions or any kind of comments from the audience.

While perhaps those who are watching our symposium online may continue to send their questions or comments, we will continue to receive those questions and comments. But while we do so, perhaps we would like to take questions from the audience.

Any questions or comments from the audience in this hall? There was encouragement in the first panel that the senior metal figures would like to hear the views opinions by active professionals in our community or in the military SDF.

Any views? If I may, could I ask the question to the panelists? Yeah, perhaps I would like to ask the audience to be prepared because of the encouragement. I do not want to finish this preliminary discussion without having comments from the active officers of SDF nor the audience.

But please be prepared. You can ask questions in Japanese if you like and then simultaneous interpretations will follow you. But if there's one question from Defense Attaché community, please, first of all, good afternoon for everybody.

### **(Question 1)**

I think with the second session, the speaker, he talked about, I think Mr. Yoshizaki, talked about the redesigning peace operation. And really this is something good.

I think we have to take in our consideration to take care how big we have to enforce even just to keep those guys who is performing the, I mean, observer missions and also the other people who are going to sometimes to enforce the peace.

Because I was military observer in UNOMIG, United Nations Mission in Georgia, and at that time, lots of our colleagues, they passed away because some of the terrorists, they shot the helicopter during the Heli patrol by rocket.

And all of them, they passed away and even some of them kidnapped and some of them, you know, stayed with them more than ten days. And we start to, you know, to, you know, to make dialogue and make, you know, immediately between both sides to pick them back. Really, we have to concentrate on this issue, how to help them, just to let them have the sense that they are somebody taking care about them and they can take the rule of engagement.

Also, it depends on the situation of the mission we have to give them just to keep themselves to do their job in the right way. Thank you very much.

**(Moderator: Prof. SHINODA)**

Thank you very much indeed. Now, I think that Professor Yoshizaki, you are talking about redesigning peace operations. So, at the level of more operational advancements, what can we respond to this comment?

**(Mr. YOSHIZAKI)**

Okay, thank you very much for your interest and comments. First one is that I put the term the redesign based upon our achievement. So, the redesign is based upon designing our achievements and what we can do. My focus is on pragmatism and the practices, and the capabilities and asset which is available in the field or in the capital.

That is a political support, how far we can do that. So in that sense, what I care is that capabilities and assets which is available on the field and also political availability. We talked about the protection of civilians or dealing with the atrocity and humanitarian system, since this is very important in normative terms.

But what we can do on the field may be somewhat challenged by the political difficulties or the limitations about the mandate or the debate in the capital.

**(Moderator: Prof. SHINODA)**

Thank you very much, Mr. Yoshizaki. Do we have any other comments on this point, please?

**(LTC CRAWFORD)**

Just to follow on from that. I don't think you're talking about conventionally redesigning the task of a military observer. It's more about understanding the dynamics that they're being exposed to. And the point that I got out of that last comment was the engagement side.

Military observers of today are massive force multipliers, but they need to be diplomats and negotiators. They don't just count weapon systems and watch things with binoculars. They have to do so much more.

But we haven't evolved our training system to prepare our observers to do this. I certainly take your point. They are the most vulnerable of the UN force elements, and their force protection is of utmost importance.

But I think the point in terms of redesign is about tooling them with training to meet the new conditions of today. Thank you very much.

**(Moderator: Prof. SHINODA)**

Any other comments on this point? Otherwise, do we have any new questions or comments from the audience, please?



**(Question 2)**

LTC Crawford and Ms. Matsuzawa, I'm directing my question. So, this year, 22 October, the Australian and Japan have signed an agreement and they are going to promote the female peace promotion initiatives under 1325 of UN Security Council.

So, WPS agenda should be promoted between Australia and Japan. But how? So, the gender advisor has been set and also LTC Crawford is a leader of this initiative. And also Ms. Matsuzawa has led that initiative. I hope to hear your initiatives.

**(Moderator: Prof. SHINODA)**

Over 30 years of engagement in UN peacekeeping operations. Perhaps at the beginning, there was no great consensus among what we call now, women, peace and security.

But now, there's a growing international attention and we, Japanese are very much willing to promote our engagement in WPS together with our partners. So, this question is very crucial. So now, LTC Crawford, can you kindly answer this question, please?

**(LTC CRAWFORD)**

Thank you for the question. You're very right. We did sign an agreement recently, and we do reflect on 1325 now being over 20 years old. And we reflect on what we have achieved in furthering the women, peace and security agenda in that 20 plus years.

As you know, there are cultural barriers. As you know, the UN seeks to deal with some of these issues using quotas. And quotas mean that the countries have to have a certain percentage of women in their force element to meet the requirements of the UN for them to be an ongoing serving, troop contributing nation.

I'm not sure if that's constructive. What it's doing, and certainly from my observation, is forcing a lot of countries to deploy unprepared women. And in some cases, and I won't mention country names, but I know public servants are issued uniforms and deployed to represent their nation to ensure their quotas are met.

That's not what we want to achieve. So inside of that key dialogue of 1325, there's a phrase that says meaningful participation of women. That's what we need to be all about. And that is the start point for certainly what I see the partnership with Japan to identify how we increase that meaningful participation.

There are some issues, certainly, that I reflect on. I talked about cultural issues. Some women are only now getting the opportunity to attend staff college in their countries, or some still don't have that opportunity.

So, in some respects, it's going to take nearly a generation for women to get the experience that their compatriot males have to tool them to be able to go into operations. Now, we want to accelerate that, and there are number of

initiatives that we can put in place to provide just in time training and experience.

But we also have to be careful we don't force the issue. Another observation that I've certainly had in the last five years or so is in the ASEAN region, the same women are deploying multiple times, the same women are attending courses and WPS initiatives.

And once again, that's not what we want to see. We want to see a larger number being exposed to our capacity building and then filtering into UN missions. One of the reasons we ran an initiative to formally provide a qualification was because in many respects, women, peace and security initiatives can be executed.

And then whilst it was a great activity for them to be exposed to, they then go back to their countries and join a long line waiting to do the formal qualification course and being denied the opportunity to deploy.

So, I think we need to be smarter about how we run our capacity building, and that also needs to be sent to the UN headquarters, where they can put pressure on member states to deploy qualified personnel. I think that's all I really had.

**(Ms. MATSUZAWA)**

Thank you for your question. WPS is, as mentioned by Leigh, a very important topic and as Professor Shinoda also mentioned, today it is perceived as a hot topic in the international community, including as an aspect of PKO.

With Australia, we have conducted WPS-related activities in the context of PKO on an ad hoc basis. So, I would like to introduce some examples.

In 2019, Fiji organized gender specific training for peacekeepers, and Japan with Australia and also U.S. and New Zealand teamed up and jointly provided training to Fijian peacekeepers. At that time, I had an opportunity to be there as an instructor and closely worked with an Australian gender trainer. It was the first time that we worked together in this specific topic for Fijian peacekeepers.

And most recently, in July this year in Indonesia, there was the so-called Garuda Shanti Dharma, which is a large, multilateral peacekeeping operation exercise. It was hosted by Indonesia and the U.S. The exercise ran for almost one month with participation from dozens of countries. During the exercise, a one-week gender training course was conducted with Indonesia's strong initiative and interest in WPS. For this gender training, Japan dispatched an instructor to work with Australia, which led the activity.

Most of the time for WPS training, the instructors tend to be women; however, men could also be instructors. As I think Australia share the same perception with regard to the importance of involvement of men to WPS, we can encourage each other to bring more men on board and work together for WPS issues in a PKO context.

**(Moderator: Prof. SHINODA)**

Thank you very much. And now do we have any more comments or questions from the audience right now? The gentleman here.

**(Question 3)**

Thank you very much for very interesting briefings. Allow me to have a quick question just in my personal capacity, and my question will go to Lieutenant Colonel Crawford regarding co-deployment.

I understand that your countries have particularly defense forces that have co-deployment with Fijian Armies to peacekeeping missions. As far as I understand and I think that co-deployment arrangement is one of kind of strong arrangement to effective arrangement to have a more enhanced capability to the ground.

If you have any thought on what is the benefit of co-deployment and what is kind of strengthened but a weakness and any issues to have such coordination and such arrangement to visit you like-minded our partners. So, leave you any thought on that arrangement. I really appreciate your comments. Thanks.

**(Moderator: Prof. SHINODA)**

Okay, thank you very much. So now, LTC Crawford, please.

**(LTC CRAWFORD)**

Thank you for the question. I suppose I'll answer in two parts.

Enabling a partner to deploy to the same location that you're deploying is actually relatively simple and by sharing capabilities such as strategic lift and some of our logistics you're right, it's an easy sell and it provides unity and strengthens relations from an international perspective.

And we've done that pretty well in the South Pacific with our friends and our other friends in ASEAN countries as well. We did look at a true joint deployment or co-deployment into Mali last year. Unfortunately, it didn't eventuate for a bunch of reasons, but that's a lot more difficult.

And we did go through extensive planning with one of our partners to conduct or deploy a Quick Reaction Force, a company level Quick Reaction Force, where we would provide armored vehicles and a second country would provide the combat personnel.

We would provide perhaps the logistics and support elements. Where it gets messy is when you have, we call it ITARs but prohibited sales agreements where you can't share some of your equipment with other nations. That becomes a barrier, and you have to resort to commercial, off the shelf solutions. So, if you can envisage you'll have one company with 12 or 15 vehicles, but some of the vehicles will be different.

They might have different electronic counter-measures, different communications fits, but they are at least able to talk to each other. So, a true co-deployment, I think, would be very difficult to execute.

I know that under the banner of the triangular partnership that the UN runs, that is Under-Secretary General Khare's vision, that he has one country provide equipment, another country take that equipment and deploy with it with the UN's assistance, I think that's going to be really difficult to execute.

I'm not saying it's impossible, but I think it'll be very difficult. The other issue is, and this is now my job in New York as a planner from a safety and security perspective. We have to be aware of the protection that this equipment is going to give to the second country.

If they are to run over an IED and sustain multiple casualties, is there a liability with the donor nation? All of these things, I think, will come into play if we do actually use that Triangular Partnership to deploy able capability like this.

I think it's a great idea, but I think there are a lot of potential problems down the road. I hope that answers your question.

**(Moderator: Prof. SHINODA)**

Thank you very much. Okay, now the next question is the gentlemano.

**(Question 4)**

Thank you very much for this symposium. As you know that Japan is going to be a member of the Security Council next year, and we are discussing how we can utilize the United Nations further for our interest.

And my question goes to the Yoshizaki-san in the field of peacekeeping operations. That Triangular Partnership Project is our flagship project. And you have mentioned that hybrid support for the Triangular Partnership Programs.

Can you elaborate a little bit more on your ideas? The things that we are going to actually ask personally? I'm going to have a board meeting with the TPP, that's next year, next week. So, if it's a great, useful ideas, I'd like to use that idea to have an input. Thank you very much.

**(Moderator: Prof. SHINODA)**

Thank you very much. It's a significant fact that the Japanese is going be the member of the Security Council from January next year. And in January, Japan is going to chair the Security Council by setting up some agendas.

So, we should be very much prepared. I would like to highlight the fact, because I mentioned it, Kenya is now a member of the Security Council and it is a partner of our Triangular Partnership Program for the United Nations Capacity Development. So, in many ways there are issues that we would like to develop in the context of a partnership, future development of UN peacekeeping and so on. But now I would like to give the floor to Mr. Yoshizaki for your comment.

**(Mr. YOSHIZAKI)**

Thank you very much for your interest and question. That's a very important question and I'm still working on that. But the first example is that kind of remote Triangular Partnership Program. And this is quite amazing because this is a kind of the new frontier of having a capacity building on the website and using our equipment and using English and having the Asian partners and not only a single partner, but the multiple partners.

And then we have so-called manuals and explanations and also sharing the equipment. And this is a kind of online, virtual education and training education. And actually, I'm a big fan of the remote training and virtual training because that is a very powerful tool to have our own expertise in strategic communications.

And the strategic communications should be well-structured. So, number one issue is that we will have engineering manuals and Japan has a capacity. Expertise in revising and also making contribution to update the engineering manual. And I think that there are couple experts in this room to working us having a good manual and update based upon our experiences. Number two is that the outreach to the African Union Peacekeeping Training Center and our friends were happy to be given a speak for that conference and have a training opportunity along with the African Union peacekeepers there in the Ethiopian and others.

So, the idea is that first we will have expertise in the manual and also based upon our experiences and also a strategic communication skill. That is the expertise in training, and training of trainers mentioned by Matsuzawa-san is critical because the language is always a challenge for Japanese peacekeepers.

But what matters would be the personal skill and management skill. Back in Cambodia, here, it is the unit level. So, as the unit, the capability or unity was a core but now we have to think about the individual capability and the management skill that's critical.

So that's the strength and that should be the focus of the group of experts who can run this kind of training. So TPP will be very important in order to highlight the importance of networks and individual skills.

And also, we should have much more structured training manuals and also training menus. So, peacekeeping training center, the JPC and IPCAT would be a very powerful venue for these opportunities. So, I'm so happy to speak on this very important issue. Thank you very much for your question.

**(Moderator: Prof. SHINODA)**

Thank you very much, Mr. Yoshizaki. And this agenda is quite important in the sense that we have been discussing the importance of capacity development and in which how Japan should contribute to this area.

And then we have a consensus that we would like to develop our engagement in engineering training courses as part of capacity development. This is our expertise, no question about it. But there are some trends and key

points highlighted by some other stakeholders, like United Nations Security General Guterres, who has been emphasizing the importance of digital transformation and so on.

And then, our Australian partners are trying to respond to this request. LTC Crawford provided explanation of digital training options. This is a trend, and if you have any comments in this context, I would like to welcome it.

And from the perspective of capacity development, as we discussed, there are many things going on with our Asian partners, even on bilateral frameworks. But perhaps, they themselves may have the desire, wish to develop our capacity development programs in a wider context, including their engagements in United Nations peacekeeping operations or some other peace support operations. Perhaps, we would like to respond to this kind of wish together with our Asian partners, if possible.

Any comments?

**(LTC CRAWFORD)**

Thank you. I suppose our vision is we initially set out using digital technologies to find short term solutions to training during the pandemic. The lessons learned over the two years that we've done that now has confirmed to us that there are a number of benefits that we didn't foresee in the first place.

I think it's very difficult to explain the success of using digital training systems and simulation when I try to explain it. And I visited many international and regional forums this year representing Australia. Generally, people don't understand what I'm talking about because nobody out there is doing it.

For example, the UN has a module of training called the Core Pre-deployment Training Materials. We have had them in a self-paced mode on a learning management system available to give to anyone for the last two years.

And yet, some nations are only just recently putting pledges forward to develop the same thing. So, from my perspective, it's frustrating. I don't think there is an understanding of the benefits or an understanding of what digital transformation is.

When I was recently in Bangladesh, a number of the nation's almost had a handout approach in terms of wanting digital capability or platforms that would enable or transform their forces. That's not going to happen.

Digital transformation is using tools to enhance the systems that you already had in place and using alternate methods to conduct training objectives, maybe inside a classroom that you would normally have to go out into a field training area.

So, understanding what digital transformation is very, very difficult. My view, or my wish is that Japan come on this journey and other like-minded that are interested with Australia and push the envelope and start to use this capability as is intended to be used, and understand what it means. I hope that makes sense. Thanks.

**(Moderator: Prof. SHINODA)**

Thank you very much. I wanted to highlight this point because I just visited you at the facility in the Entebbe, Uganda, just a week ago. In my travel to some African countries, there's a function called IC40, the UN function UNCAT, which focuses on digital transformation in response to UN Secretary General Guterres request to reinforce digital transformation for the sake of the development of UN peace operations in order to save more lives of UN peacekeepers.

So, there's a belief on the sides of the United Nations that once we develop our digital transformation, we will be able to develop the contents of UN peacekeeping operations. Especially, we will be able to save more lives. And there are security awareness systems as well as the training courses focusing on digital affairs and so on. Japan has been assisting this function, but IC40, though it's not widely known, quite frankly.

And so, there's a great room for further development, for us to emphasize our engagement and to support the UN initiatives and so on, especially given that the Europeans are quite busy to handle the crisis over Ukraine. We would like to go together with the Europeans, but if they are so much busy, perhaps we would like to take into consideration this factor and then perhaps supporting European partners, too, while we would like to support the UN initiatives on our way, together with the Australian partners and so on.

Matsuzawa-san, do you have any comments on that now? Okay, fine. Now, perhaps there are some questions concerning operational issues like why UN has been failing in many places. That's a very big question. I would like to say that by talking about these issues like capacity development, digital transformation, perhaps, I hope that we are responding to the question like this. Perhaps, there is an analysis that because of the weakness on these areas, capacity development, digital transformation, there's quite significant limit of the performance of the United Nations. Therefore, we would like to promote the development of United Nations peacekeeping operations in these courses because they believe that they would like to do so and we are very much keen to support them.

There's another question coming from audience online. Let me read the question. Thank you very much indeed. And I want to ask what Japan hope to achieve whether Japan's national security strategy has changed in light of the changes from traditional PKO to modern PKO, considering that most security issues of today are beyond what PKO can solve.

So, this is a question about what kind of achievement Japan would like to achieve in the future, given the past record of our activities in three decades. But the concerns are our limit of Japanese engagements. That's one issue. There is a limit of the anti UN peacekeeping operations being faced with quite significant, very hard challenges on the ground in many theaters. So, given these challenges, what can we set up our next goal from the side of Japan?

That's a very much crucial question, but we cannot finish this symposium without mentioning these issues a little bit more. Any panelists can make comments? I don't necessarily ask for ultimate answer to these big

questions, but if you have any observations on this kind of point, perhaps I would like to welcome your comments. Are you ready to make comments?

**(Mr. YOSHIZAKI)**

Thank you very much. And this is a kind of supplement to the previous questions about the TPP things. And in my slide number eight, I describe some of the options diplomatic, informational, military and economic. And I underlined the importance of two things. The first one is informational, social resilience. Another one is economic resilience. The keyword, common keyword is resilience. And now we have a greater attention to the resilience of the Ukraine.

And this is a kind of the support of the state governments and the strengths of Japan endeavor with a combination of ODA and also civilian supports and also military backup and also transportation goods and also sharing the expertise of our peace operations.

So, my short answer is that we can have more support, wider support for resilience. And this is based upon previous activities, but the focus may be digital transformation. We have equipment, expertise and very high-tech people as well.

Plus, the over the horizon activities for the supporting economic disease of the very fragile society and countries. I think that would be a very powerful and promising item to be discussed for the TPP for years to come.

Thank you.

**(Moderator: Prof. SHINODA)**

Thank you very much. Any more comments, please?

**(Ms. MATSUZAWA)**

With regard to PKO activities, as mentioned by previous panelists and Professor Shinoda, we are not deploying any contingents to PKO today; however, with our capacity building activities to support troop contributing countries, it contributes to regional peace and security. In this, it is also important to work with partner countries that share the same value with us, such as Australia, in order to achieve more effective outcomes.

**(Moderator: Prof. SHINODA)**

Thank you very much indeed. Now it seems that we are running out of time. Perhaps, if we can get one more question finally we should be able to do that. Any questions remaining at this moment from the audience or any other comments from audience online? I haven't received any new ones. Just final question or comments before we close it. No. Okay.

And if there is no more question, perhaps now is the time to finish it. But if I add some comments on the issues we've been discussing, the overall context is that we have achieved many things in the last three decades,



though obviously there are many points we haven't achieved. And then looking at the entire UN peacekeeping operations, there are many challenges, of course, to which everyone is trying to solve, and we would like to contribute to their efforts to solve these problems.

And there is a wider context, like FOIP overall international security, in which we would like to reinforce our security efforts too. But of course, we would like to identify our international peace cooperation efforts under the wider umbrella of international security agendas.

All these are quite obvious. But how we can set up concrete agendas in these courses, there are many points for discussions. If I add some points that we haven't covered, not necessarily very big, but if I am allowed to make some of small points now we are talking about FOIP and Southeast Asian countries as well as Oceanian partners.

They are very much obvious partners. And then we talk about Africa in terms of the operations of UN peacekeeping operations. And there are some other countries, like South Asian countries, which they are making great efforts in UN peacekeeping operations. Now, top TCC, Troop Contributing Countries are South Asian countries ranging from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indian troops. Especially, we are talking about Indo-Pacific, and if we mentioned QUAD, Indian partners are quite obvious important partners for instance, if we haven't been able to mention them.

But we would like to collaborate with them because they are so much experienced and so much willing to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations in the future. When it comes to Africa, we haven't mentioned some other related but wider issues like maritime security.

We have SDF overseas base in Djibouti in the context of Anti-Piracy operations originally. But now we know that this area is so important in our interest in Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Perhaps, we would like to keep our presence and engagement in order for us to be informed of the situation in Africa.

And then naturally, we would like to identify Djibouti as a partner and the surrounding countries ranging from countries like Kenya who shares great interest in our engagement in maritime security to perhaps as a package of FOIP or international peace of force and so on.

So, there are many points that we would like to discuss and develop if we are allowed to do so. More time. Now we would like to finish today's symposium, but I hope that you have all enjoyed today's discussion.

Although there are many challenges that we cannot solve in the immediate future. Though perhaps, we all share that we are still willing to contribute to international peace operations in the future as much as we can. Thank you very much indeed.

**(End)**

**The views expressed at the Symposium are those of the participants, and do not necessarily represent the views of their Organizations.**



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