

# International Peace & Security Symposium 2021

## Contribution to International Peace through Partnership Peacekeeping

Significance of International Peace Cooperation  
in the FOIP Region



## MINUTES OF THE SYMPOSIUM

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Joint Staff College, MOD

Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center

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and do not necessarily represent the views of their Organizations.

## PROGRAM

### Contribution to International Peace through Partnership Peacekeeping Significance of International Peace Cooperation in the FOIP Region

**13:05-13:10 OPENING ADDRESS** LTG TAJIRI Yusuke (p.4-p.5)  
(Commandant, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense)

**13:10-13:50 KEYNOTE SPEECH** Australian Army MG(Ret.) Cheryl Pearce AM  
(Former Force Commander of the UN Force in Cyprus) (p.6-p.20)

**13:50-14:50 PANEL DISCUSSION:** (p.21-p.69)

Moderator:

Dr. SHINODA Hideaki  
(Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)

Panelist Presentation:

Dr. HAKATA Kei, (p.22-p.38)  
(Professor, Seikei University)

Vietnam People's Army MG Hoang Kim Phung (p.39-p.49)  
(Director of Vietnam Department of Peacekeeping Operations)

LTG(Ret.) MATSUMURA Goro (p.50-p.67)  
(Former Commanding General of North-eastern Army, JGSDF)

**15:00-15:55 DISCUSSION** (p.70-p.79)

**15:55-16:00 CLOSING ADDRESS** LTG TAJIRI Yusuke (p.80)  
(Commandant, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense)

## **OPENING ADDRESS**

### **LTG TAJIRI Yusuke (Commandant, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense)**

A very warm welcome to those of you participating physically and online. Good afternoon. My name is Tajiri, Commandant of the Joint Staff College of the Ministry of Defense. Before starting this symposium, I would like to say a few words on behalf of the organizer.

Last year, we unfortunately had to cancel this symposium due to the outbreak of COVID-19, but this year, we have adopted a hybrid format that allows online participation and we are pleased to be able to hold the 10<sup>th</sup> symposium after a one-year lapse. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all who are participating in this conference internationally, including those joining us online.

This year's conference will feature an online keynote speech by retired Major General Cheryl Pearce of the Australian Army who served as the Force Commander of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) until January of this year. For the panel discussion, as a moderator, we have again Prof. Hideaki Shinoda of the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies; and as panelists, we have Prof. Kei Hakata of Seikei University, Major General Hoang Kim Phung of the Vietnam People's Army and also Director of the Vietnam Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam, and Mr. Goro Matsumura, former Commanding General of the Northeastern Army of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. It is a great pleasure for me and all the members of the Joint Staff College to be able to hold this International Peace and Security Symposium 2021 with such distinguished experts. I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude for their participation.

The International Peace and Security Symposium, organized by the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center of the Joint Staff College, aims to share knowledge about the current status, challenges, and future direction of international peace and security activities, and deepen mutual understanding not only among the defense ministries and defense forces, but also among the public, private, and academic sectors, to promote high-quality international contributions.

For more than 30 years, Japan has been engaged in international peace cooperation activities in various regions. Currently, Japan continues to dispatch command staff to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and has dispatched command staff to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission from 2019. In addition, Japan has been dispatching staff to the UN Secretariat and has been providing training in heavy equipment operations to African military engineers since 2015 as part of the UN Triangular Partnership Project (TPP). Since 2018, we have expanded the program to Asia and the surrounding regions. From 2019, we have also expanded the support to the field of sanitation and are actively working to strengthen the capacity of PKO personnel.

The theme of this year's symposium is "Contribution to International Peace through Partnership Peacekeeping: Significance of International Peace Cooperation in the FOIP Region," focusing on partnership which has become one of the trends in the UN efforts in recent years. First, we will have a keynote speech from retired Major General Pearce of the Australian Army on the significance of and expectations for partnerships among countries in peace cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. In the panel discussion to follow, panelists from Japan and abroad will report on this theme from their respective perspectives as researchers and practitioners, and under Prof. Shinoda's facilitation, future international peace cooperation based on partnerships will be discussed and summarized, and recommendations will be made.

The outcome of this symposium will be used for future education and research at the Japan Peacekeeping

Training and Research Center of the Joint Staff College and will also be shared widely with relevant departments inside and outside our ministry. I hope that the lectures and discussions at this symposium will be helpful to you in your work and research on future international peace cooperation through partnerships.

In closing, I would like to thank all of you for attending and participating in this symposium despite your busy schedules. With that, I close my opening remarks.

This has been Lieutenant General Yusuke Tajiri, Commandant of the Joint Staff College. Thank you.

## KEYNOTE SPEECH

**Cheryl Pearce, AM (Major General (Ret.), Australian Army/ Former Force Commander of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus)**



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# Reflections on Command of UNFICYP

Brief for Japan Joint Staff College International Peace and  
Security Symposium

**MAJGEN Cheryl Pearce**



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Thank you and good afternoon, all. General, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for the warm invite to join you today. It is with a little bit of disappointment that I could not be with you in person on this occasion. I had the opportunity, as you saw in my bio earlier, to serve with Japanese colleagues in East Timor as a young major in 2002 as part of UNMISSET. While I have not had the opportunity to serve with military members from Japan, I have been well-served in the broader breadth of the United Nations with Japanese colleagues, and it is a great pleasure to be here today.

This afternoon, I will be talking about my reflections on command of UNFICYP and then also to really then link that to my experiences as the force commander to then follow on into some of the contemporary challenges that we have.

# AGENDA

- **Introduction**
  - **My experience in Cyprus**
- **Capability challenges in contemporary UN Missions**
  - **Equipment**
  - **Traditional military skills**
  - **Soft engagement skills**
- **Opportunities in our Region**



For today, I am just going to spend about the first 10 minutes talking about my experience as the force commander of a multinational and a multidimensional force, and then I will look at the capability challenges in contemporary UN missions across the globe, and covering off on equipment, traditional military skills, soft engagement skills, and really some opportunities for our region going forward.

## My Experience

### My three biggest take-away's :



- Relationships are vital – with all stakeholders
- Diversity in culture, language and experiences are complex – yet can be a real strength for the UN
- We can make a real difference across multiple agendas



As I was introduced, I had been the Force Commander of UNFICYP, the UN Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus, from January 2019 to January 2021. As many of you know, UNFICYP is a legacy mission and there many complexities across the Island of Cyprus with the Turkish Cypriot community and the Greek Cypriot community, but also the tensions in the region which add into that complexity across the political, military, and civil communities in which I served.

The UNFICYP mission, as a background, is just over 1,000 strong, and that is made up of mainly military of just over 800, a small policing contingent, and also civil affairs and then a political element with that. This has come a long way from 1964 when the mission first commenced where we had over 6,000 peacekeepers across the island trying to maintain the law and order to reduce the fighting, but also to return to normal conditions.

If I zoom down in now into the military, I led a military contingent from 14 different nations with different backgrounds – the diversity, the culture, the training, and gender – and we all came together and worked well as a single entity as part of a larger organization that had manpower and trust with civil affairs and also with our political leadership to ensure that we assisted the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in achieving a political way forward and peace on the island.

The role and the mandate for UNFICYP was to prevent a reoccurrence of fighting, to maintain the law and order, and a return to the normal conditions. This was in order to enable the political solution to find a way forward. This has yet to be achieved. The tensions remain high, it is complex in nature, and my assessment is it will be a long while until we are able to find that peaceful solution. But we continue to remain positive in defining those small steps.

When I think about my three biggest takeaways from this experience, I will talk about the first one. It is where



relationships are vital at all levels, and that is with all stakeholders. One of the three key pieces about providing a prevention of reoccurrence of fighting for the military is while our rules of engagement said that we are an armed force, since the mid-1990s, we were an unarmed force and we kept our weapons in the armory. So, while we would have infantry battalions being sent to Cyprus, it was actually our engagement in the buffer zone between two opposing forces, the Turkish forces and the Cypriot National Guard, of which there were thousands on either side of the buffer zone to deescalate the tensions. That is about establishing the relationships for myself with the two force commanders of both sides, the Turkish force commander and also the Cypriot force commander of the National Guard. That required a constant engagement relationship at that level, and also my relationships with the political entities and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and his staff, but also civil society. That covered off on education, the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda, and also with the religious tract, so there were many areas in civil society that were actively involved in trying to find a peaceful way forward.

If I think about then the diversity in culture, language, and experience, it is really complex. As many of you are aware that UN missions are either in French or English, for myself, UNFICYP was an English-based mission. However, of my 14 nations, approximately only four to five had English as a first language. That made our communications and conduct of operations having to really be clear and direct, but also quite simple in its execution to enable that freedom of action by my commanders on the ground to understand my intent and to conduct ops. What I did identify though was that diversity in thinking, the diversity in background and culture, as well as the assessment on both their experiences academic and learned, enabled us to be able to think more laterally and to bring and provide better options for solutions on hotspots within the buffer zone.

When I talk about the buffer zone, just for experience, Cyprus is approximately 180 kilometers wide of the buffer zone and it ranges from only about four meters wide in Nicosia which is an urban area out to about seven kilometers wide. With 800 peacekeepers, we were working hard in a mobile posture to be able to man hotspots that we identified through our operations centered to identify where the threats were and what the key issues were in each of the particular area of operations (AOs).

If I think about the forces I had, I had Argentinians in the west, I had UK forces in the center, and I had an AO with Slovakian forces in the east. For that, that gathered complexity in itself within the three AOs within the buffer zone. Then, on top of that, I had force troops who were Slovakian. I had an Argentinian aviation capability. I had a military police capability that was actually a mix of five different nations and they had to work together in a partnership as a single entity. Then, I had a mobile force reserve. Bringing all of their backgrounds together to even come as one military component was a significant amount of effort, and so we had to have the clarity of purpose. We had to have a clarity of our missions and then we had to have a unity of effort come together to achieve that mission to support the SRSG. So, that diversity in thought and that diversity in approach was a real strength for us to identify the issues on the ground and to provide options on the way forward, and I consider that to be a real strength. It also enabled us to have that independence when we were working both with the Greek Cypriot community, as well as with the Turkish Cypriot community and the opposing force commanders that we were impartial, transparent, and consistent in our approach.

The third one from my big takeaways is that we can make a real difference across multiple agendas. In addition to purely a military component, we can provide an influence in the broader UN. As a force commander, I had the opportunity to represent the WPS agenda in the international forums – and this is very much before COVID-19 hit – to be able to represent in Brussels and in Geneva. I went to New York a couple of times. I had an

opportunity to speak to the Security Council on UNFICYP, and to be able to actually communicate and engage at a number of different levels, both as an independent UN, but also as an Australian. For that, it is how do we come together, and using all the components of UNFICYP, to be able to bring a broader agenda at the strategic and political levels.

I add into that, of the 14 different nations all coming from contributing nations, they influence them through the permanent missions in the UN Secretariat on their contribution not only to UNFICYP, but to the UN more generally and are able to advance a number of agendas at that political UN level. So, the presence on the ground I saw will be able to achieve results in a number of different areas going forward.

I will leave that, too, and then my engagement in the region as my final point. It is, as the legacy missions of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and of UNFICYP and the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) were able to come together in a regional form where I was able to work with my force commanders in those regions and to be able to support the forces on the ground there, very much we had a shared experience for those from our region who served within those other missions and were able to engage and to understand some of the training and some of the complexities in the preparation and the conduct of operations.

# Capability challenges in Contemporary UN Missions



- Availability
- Cost
- Complexity
- Prioritisation
- Taking pressure off traditional UN systems

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Now, I would just like to cover off on capability challenges in contemporary UN missions. If I talk about availability, what I found from my experience was there was a lack of capabilities in many of the missions globally, especially the big five in Africa. That was UAV capability, strategic airlift, and aviation in general. While the units identified it in the monthly UN capability gaps, it was often difficult for member states to be able to fill those capability gaps. Sometimes it was not because of the want to be able to do it, but it was either by the constraint by the UN or the ability to work as partners to be able to build the capability together to actually send through to a mission. As many of you have been aware, it is a very often slow process to be able to offer up capability to engage and to deploy, and we have to think laterally about this, about how we can join together in a collaborative way to build on our capability and look at new opportunities going forward.

The second one is also the cost – the budget and cost pressures not only on both the UN who very much has budgetary constraints, but also on member states and on those capabilities. Especially, if I took my example as aviation, in the top left-hand of the slide, we had a small aviation capability within Cyprus, and that was contributed by the Argentinians. But the UN was looking at ways to save money and was looking at removing that capability, but for me, it was a significant operational effect. I was able to have the observation and also the ability for CASEVAC right across the buffer zone. When I think about the mountainous areas in the west, the ability to have that aviation capability was essential because I could not have achieved the effects I needed to achieve on the ground and through road transport. When I was looking at some of the violations for which we need to report – and that was both overmanning and unauthorized construction, and any significant changes by the opposing forces – it was the aviation capability that was able to identify those, so they were an essential element to me as the

commander to achieve my mission. However, for the UN who was looking to find resource savings, they often were the first ones, because they were high cost, to remove, and it was a constant tension between myself as the force commander and the UN to find the challenges of managing the budget.

The third one is complexity. We come across this more and more. As we become more technologically advanced, it is rather the complexity. As many of you will have known from an UN mission, it is a very austere environment and often the training required to maintain a high-technological approach is difficult. If I was honest, when I was running my headquarters and we were all trying to speak one language, having a simple information system where we could share and pass information in a clear, concise, and timely manner was more essential than having the latest bit of tech. That then added into the cyber. That then adds into the electromagnetic spectrum. A lot of those high-tech capabilities that member states now have often do not fit within the UN construct, nor can be maintained due to cost to the budgetary and cost to overheads.

Where I see the balance being achieved though is in some of those enablers where whole capabilities can be provided that have technological advancements within the entity. I mean that through medical, perhaps engineering, and aviation – those areas that are contained in higher tech that can achieve an effect on the battlefield or on the peacekeeping environment that would not be able to be achieved elsewhere. Also, it is about the safety of our personnel and the ability to provide the effect that we need. But in the main, the technology for the operations needs to remain simple to be able to incorporate and go back to the diversity of backgrounds and member states to cover all. So, there is always that tension in the balance.

If I look at the prioritization, that is often interesting in the UN construct and commitment to peacekeeping missions. It is quite a tension to commit forces in a global environment, but your national strategic footprint is in a more regional. It is, how do you find the balance to contribute in a region that works for your national security agenda, but then also meets part of the multinational environment as a member state? I was trying to find the balance to the contribution in the more broader UN, but having a focus on how we work with our neighbors in our region to provide an effect both in a collaborative way and perhaps co-deployments and partnerships, and then deliver to a mission. Australia and Vietnam have that with strategic lift at this point. We do that with Indonesia and with Fijian forces with Bushmasters, the protected mobility vehicles, in supplying and supporting the training and the maintenance of those capabilities. So, there are certainly a lot of opportunities that can be done in that space in trying to get that balance of national and UN priorities going forward.

If I take the last one, taking pressure off the traditional UN systems, that is where there are tensions both in a budgetary and a capability sense that we can look regionally to support. That is where, if you take the holistic air transport that the UN is tasked to provide, we are able then to be able to then step in and support in those manners. That is such as strategic airlift with Vietnam, but as I said, also some of the key equipment and platform support that we provide in the region to help each other both through education, training, and maintenance to support regionally to then achieve a global effect.

## Capability Challenges in UN Missions

- Virtual Development of UN Training
- Strategic partnerships :
  - Air Transport
  - Equipment – Protected Mobility
  - Engineering
  - Enabling conventional military skills development
- Identifying “soft skills and training”
  - How to develop relationships
  - How to influence and negotiate
  - How best underpin the Mission Mandate



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I just go on to when we talk about partnerships and we talk about how we can work together in where we are looking for in thinking about our future. When I think about our capability challenges in the UN and what we have experienced from COVID-19 last year and my experiences – I had one year without COVID-19 in commanding an operation, and then the second year was under COVID-19 conditions and very much at the infancy and when understanding what it was and what it was not and how we operate because we also had to operate 24/7, so it was really difficult to work with trying to understand the requirements and then our response plans – so how we look at it as both the preventative and also how we respond, and not only to reputational risk for the UN into the country for which it serves, but also for the forces and all member state forces. That was really difficult and very time-consuming, but very rewarding. I worked with my commanders to build those relationships and to build that capability going forward.

But what we did see was the ability we still had to deploy, we still had to train, and we still had to conduct our operations under those conditions. The first one that I saw was how we adapted very quickly to be able to provide a virtual training forum and how we were able then to do our new deployments and change over deployments in a virtual world. It really opened my eyes about what the opportunities are for the future. I think that we have taken the first step which is to look in a virtual training world and how we can deliver, but I would offer there is still more we can do. I think we need to be more finesse about how people learn and what the balance of an interactive, self-paced, reinforced training regime is with a small amount of online commitment per day. Because we are talking about languages and cultural differences, it is very difficult in a virtual world to sometimes pull it

together in an understanding in that relationship part, so we have to adapt and adjust, but I do think there are many opportunities going forward.

I would also offer though that in that space, we can really expand to think about how we can do our training in a region and how we can engage and work with each other in what can be achieved in partnerships going forward. While I cannot stay online, I really do look forward to hearing back on how we can really develop these partnerships that I assess we need to do as well going forward.

If I look at that in the next step, in addition to training, these strategic partnerships very much can be about air transport. It is about rapid and meaningful capacity building. That can be bilateral. That can be multilateral. But where my assessment is, they should remain focused on gaps within the UN system where possible. That is being agile to understand the pressure at least or the pledge, understand their opportunities, and really now seeing that the UN is very open and encouraging to have partnerships going forward, as the Lieutenant General made a comment on in his opening remarks about where the future is going for the United Nations and what they are looking for. I certainly identified during my time, it was about those partnerships and about the collaboration and potential co-deployments and how we work in the preparedness together in partnerships and supporting each other in that development of capability going forward. That would be in air transport which I mentioned, equipment and protected mobility, and engineering, but also enabling conventional military skills, actually using what each of us has best or what we do well to enable to support each other.

I note that there is certainly a new facility being built in Fiji, Blackrock, the peacekeeping center there, and the partnerships that have gone on to develop this center, and knowing that our region has been involved in that and the synergies that we will be able to get in our training and development going forward.

One I would like to just talk on – I talked about identifying soft skills and training. The United Nations talks about the capability bricks in deploying, and they generally, when you are looking at troops on the ground, are talking about infantry battalions. Infantry battalions are a lethal effect. The ability to train an infantry capability to deescalate down to communication unarmed and to be able to deescalate tensions and to find other means by which to engage and to communicate is really difficult. It is not simple and it requires a significant amount of preparation and training to do scenario-based and continue to build an understanding of those relationships. It is the little things – how to negotiate and how to influence, and it really underpins the mission mandate.

For me, in my experiences, it was that very much was about the engagement. It was nearly like a chess game. It took a lot of effort and thinking about how we could communicate, what to communicate, when to communicate, who to talk to first, and how we were going to articulate it to both sides. Being a legacy mission, and especially for my UK forces in Nicosia, the Turkish forces and the Greek forces have been there. This is over 40 years. They know when each of the contingents changes over. They know these things and they know where they can try and put pressure and change the narrative and to get back a bit of land or to move forward or to do an unauthorized construction or to change the narrative by which we know it. It was really about understanding, going from contingent to contingent, in the handover to ensure that there were no gaps.

Additionally to that, to ensure the engagement with the key liaison and the key staff on how to do that influence moving forward was significant. I cannot underestimate that. The amount of hours we have spent on trying to plan and execute our strategy in engaging – what we are going to say to which commander, and at what level, because we had to escalate it all the way up and all the way down – that was actually significant. I had underestimated that as the force commander on what that looked like.

So, for me, it is how we go forward in enabling the staff officers. The staff officer very much globally is a staff officer. We can train and prepare them, but how we train and work together in partnership to help build those other skills, which is quite unique to the United Nations in some ways and it is the primary means by which we communicate. How we do that in a partnership manner. They were probably some of the key challenges for me in that. It was about those soft skills, and developing language was really important, but is actually non-verbal skills if I was honest.

When you have a Turkish force, you cannot speak English. I have an Argentinian soldier who only speaks Spanish and cannot speak English. I have liaison officers who have a minimum of English. What actually is really important is your non-verbal, your posture and the way you hold yourself, your stance, and the way you try to communicate. So, what they are taking from non-verbal skills is really essential because it can escalate very, very quickly when we do not have a common language by which to work. So, how we then build that understanding with our forces.



## Opportunities in our Region



- Peacekeeping Centre collaboration on UN training
- Aligning UN deficiencies with capacity building
- Providing training and equipment
- Providing enabling facilities

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If I look at what I would call opportunities in our region going forward, I have been really excited looking over my career which has been 36 years, and I have recently retired and moved to the Australian Border Force. I had my first experience with the United Nations in 2002. That was off the back of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET), and then I deployed with the UN in UNMISSET. That experience from those early stages about what peacekeeping was or was not. For Australia, we had been actively involved in the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), in Cambodia, and very much we had Rwanda and Somalia, and now we are still contributing in UNTSO and South Sudan.

But it is actually about the partnerships that we are seeing now in more recent years within our region, supporting a lot of our South Pacific, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and all the nations regionally to help build these partnerships both in training and in deployments going forward. I think this is the strength of our region to continue, to develop those opportunities, to have the agility to be able to work into those gaps within UN capabilities and provide that enabling support where I think my assessment, the strength for the region is. I know Japan has strong engineering and strong medical for Vietnam. I am very cognizant of what each of the strengths of many of our near neighbors are. Fiji has got a strong commitment both to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), but also they are doing this work in the MFO, and then the partnering and the training and the support that is provided through the peacekeeping centers.

There is also a lot of behind-the-scenes training. That is our staff course, the Staff Officer Course (SOC), and I know that Japan just had for officers in Australia in the last month, but also the Female Military Officers' Course (FMOC) and trying to really increase our female footprint within peacekeeping. That is essential. I cannot speak



strongly enough about our commitment to provide a sense of gender parity. I know we are not going to get there in the military force, but we are trying to meet the 25% of female staff officers, but also in contingents to be able to get up to 12-13%. At the moment, it is sitting at 5%. There is a lot of work being done by the Elsie Initiative and UN Women to try and achieve better parity so we are able to serve within many of the peacekeeping missions in a way that we can do the “protection of civilians” mandate, so I do think there is a lot more we can do regionally, focusing on that component and how we get at that because that is something that is essential for the UN, and I have been focused on this in a really deliberate and at a significant level to increase the amount of female peacekeepers on operations. I do think the region can really lean in and support this in getting females out into missions when we have the opportunity to travel.

So, the training is key, and aligning UN deficiencies with capacity building, the equipment that I spoke about before, and also as enablers – how do we use the strength of the region? What is our point of difference? What can we bring that is unique to us? How can we work together in partnership to find those ways forward to support the UN Secretariat and the Secretary-General, and to develop our future leaders from the region to contribute globally in part of a multinational force.

# Questions



Thank you for the opportunity to speak today. I look forward to finding new opportunities and I will always, in my reserve capacity, remain connected to the United Nations and continue to support the United Nations' efforts in peacekeeping. I look forward to remain engaged and actively part of our regional discussions and forums in this area. Thank you again for the kind invitation to join you today, and I look forward to any questions you may have for the short time or any questions I am happy to take on notice. Thank you for that, and I am open for questions.

## Q&A

(Q1) Thank you very much for your very stimulating speech. I have one question for you that is on the role of the peacekeeping training center in fostering the partnership. Especially, you mentioned the engineering unit. Japan has a strength in the partnership for capacity building for the engineering piece. In the real capacity-building activities, we have bulldozers and graders – these type of real equipment on the ground, so it is easy to have the training of capacity building on site. But now, virtual training is the main core. In that sense, what is your take or what is your vision about the possibility of doing this kind of capacity building online, especially focusing on engineering units? Thank you very much.

(MG Pearce) Thank you. That is an excellent question and it is a difficult one because when you are talking about engineering capability, it is very much hands-on and practical with big plant equipment. So, when we think about the training, it has to be a mix of face-to-face or, where we can, virtually, but self-paced learning as well by individuals, but having really strong mentors involved in the training to ensure that the information is understood. As we are coming, what I would call, toward a new hybrid model, it would be to find a balance between what we can do virtually and online in a segmented way, as well as doing in-person in the near future.

In the virtual world, I do not know about you, but for me, I find it difficult to watch videos. I find it difficult to be online all day. It is how to relate it to how people best understand and people best learn so that we can separate delivering bulk information to actually what is received and really have that understanding between the mentors and the trainers in the centers to be able to transfer and evaluate what is being learned and to stop and to slow it down or speed it up depending on what is required. It is complex. It is going to be difficult. In such an enabling force such as engineers, it is way more difficult than something such as a staff officer, but hopefully we can find a hybrid model soon where we can be in-person for a lot of that hands-on training. Thank you.

(Q2) Major General Pearce, thank you very much for a very informative presentation. Through the UN activities, I learned that you understand about the culture diversity. Regarding the Australian Army, with your surrounding nations like the small island nations, for the interest of Australia, I believe that you have to understand the cultures of the surrounding countries. Such learnings from the PKO activities probably serve to understand when you operate as coast guards or you train the coast guards. How is your experience accumulated in the Australian Army reflected in those training programs?

(MG Pearce) Thank you. I like that question. It is quite deep. For me, as I have developed over my career from a young, 18-year-old army officer through now to a retired general, I have learned a lot of values that I did not think would be required. That is humility, active listening, compassion, and really having a respect. Respect is probably my number one value now as a leader. That is a respect for the diversity, a respect for the cultural backgrounds, and a respect for the prism by which they come at a particular issue, and to really understand the environment by which I served in the army or now in the border force in working through some of those environments and understand what outcomes each are trying to achieve both operationally and politically to how to best support. Also, that we are all equal and that respect is about the diversity of thought and that everybody has a voice, and to communicate in a way that we are all equal in the region and we are all equal globally, and then

how we work together to find the best way forward. So, for me, it is really adapting my style.

I have always been authentic to who I am as Cheryl Pearce and my development over time has come with my experiences, as you have indicated, in the UN. I had the opportunity to serve as the commander in Afghanistan of the Australian forces. But what I have taken away is it is all about the relationships. It is about the relationships with coalition partners. It is about the relationships with the civil community. It is about the relationships with the region. I could not be more proud to be an Australian Army officer and I could not be more proud to have worked with colleagues from the Pacific region. I feel like it is a camaraderie when we come from the region and I find I am serving with them whether it be Afghanistan or whether it be in the United Nations, whether I am visiting New York or whether I am visiting different missions. It is about having a sense of joy and camaraderie to work together to find ways forward. So, for me, it is really adjusting to be more respectful and bringing everybody to the table in a collaborative manner to find the best way forward to find a solution that way. Thank you.

(Q3) Thank you very much for your very valuable presentation. Major General, when you are engaged in operations, you value the communication with the local people and also you need to train your staff members on that point. When you actually make operations, in the training to each soldier, what is the thing that you make sure you want your staff members to really take care into? What is the thing that you emphasize the most when you dispatch your members?

(MG Pearce) Thank you. My key one is I have very much a mission command approach with my commanders on the ground in delivering my intent, the “why.” If you understand the “why” of what we are doing and then allow the commanders and our soldiers on the ground to do the “how,” we are empowering and inspiring each individual to be able to meet the overall mission. That is often having then the respect for the junior leaders. What I found, and especially through COVID-19, is by communicating openly often and effectively with my commanders and then them with their commanders, they were able to understand the intent in communication. But equally, I would always get out on the ground. I would either fly around or drive around to each of my AOs and walk the ground and join my soldiers to understand their concerns and their issues, and to be able to resolve issues at the lowest level.

But the bottom line for me in that communication is ensuring that I understand that they understand what I need from them, but also from their commanders. We do evaluations to understand that they have had the appropriate training and preparedness, enabling them to be successful on the ground. I do not wish to set them up for failure, so we are very strong and about ensuring the training, both pre, coming into the mission, and then during the mission, we conducted evaluations to ensure that they met the requirement. For me, it is about good leadership – leadership at every level through the chain of the command, that clear communication and that guidance and direction that they feel like they understood the “why,” and then they were able to deliver the “how” they were going to do that. That was essential because they were our diplomatic soldiers. What they did on the ground actually had a political effect. They were political ambassadors at the soldier level, so that was really important that they understood that, but then we empowered them to really give them the freedom of action within guidance to conduct their ops. Thank you.

## **PANEL DISCUSSION**

### **Moderator:**

Dr. SHIONDA Hideaki (Professor, Graduate School of Global Studies, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)

### **Panelists:**

Dr. Kei Hakata (Professor, Seikei University)

MG Hoang Kim Phung (Director of Vietnam Department of Peacekeeping Operations)

LTG (Ret.) MATSUMURA Goro (Former Commanding General of North-eastern Army, JGSDF)

(Prof. Shinoda) Thank you for the introduction. I am with the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. My name is Shinoda. This is the latter part of this symposium, the panel discussion. I have the honor of serving as the moderator of this panel session. We will have a break in-between, so we will have a first half and a second half of the panel discussion. In the first half, we will hear from the three panelists. They will give presentations. I ask that you present in about 15 minutes each. Then, we will take a 10-minute break from 2:50 p.m., and then from 3:00 p.m. to 3:55 p.m., we shall have a general discussion. Those in the hall, you can raise your hand and ask questions during the general discussion. If you are joining us online, we can take questions online as well. It would be desirable if you could submit your questions before the break, then we can reflect that and address them during the general discussion.

The three panelists have already been introduced by the organizer, so I will not repeat their biographies. First, we have Prof. Hakata. He is going to talk about Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), looking partnerships, international peace activities, and international peace cooperation from the FOIP perspective. That will be his presentation. So, it is the most high-level view and it is about the broad framework of Japanese diplomacy and security policy. That is where we would like to start our discussions. That will be followed by examples about human resource development of partnerships. We will be hearing from Major General Hoang Kim Phung of the Vietnam People's Army, the Director of the Vietnam Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Then, lastly we will hear from Lieutenant General Matsumura. He will give a comprehensive view to wrap up or summarize the discussions, and also give us a view toward the future.

First, I would like to call upon Prof. Hakata for his presentation.

Dr. Kei Hakata (Professor, Seikei University)

International Peace and Security Symposium 2021  
Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense

# The Free and Open Indo-Pacific —In search of a principled regionalism


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Professor Kei Hakata  
Seikei University  
December 3, 2021

I am Kei Hakata from Seikei University. I am pleased to be here with you today.

## The Indo-Pacific as a theater of great power competition

- With the two oceans, the Indo-Pacific is a vast region that is home to the major powers.
- It is the world's center of gravity.




Map 1 The Indo-Pacific region  
From *Indo-Pacific Strategies*  
(Cannon & Hakata, 2021)

© Kei Hakata & Brendon J. Cannon 2021

Since there are many practitioners here in the audience today, I would like to give a rather conceptual talk on the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific region is the stage for the ongoing great power competition between the United States and China. The Indo-Pacific is a vast region with two oceans and it is home to many of the world's major powers. Politically and economically, it is a region of gravity in the world.

- In the Pacific Ocean, there are not only major powers but also numerous island states with vast exclusive economic zones (EEZs). These small island states influence China's island chain strategy.




Map 2 The Pacific Ocean showing the small island states  
From *Indo-Pacific Strategies* (Cannon & Hakata, 2021)

In the Pacific Ocean, there are also numerous small island states with vast exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Though small, they have critical influence on China's island chain strategy. The Solomon Islands located in the South Pacific is one of them. A fierce battleground in the Pacific War, the strategic importance of the Solomon Islands remains unchanged. This island nation has become a stage for China's diplomatic warfare, but, as a recent report suggests, there is strong opposition from local residents to China's presence in recent days.



## The Indo-Pacific as a “geographized political reality”

- The Indo-Pacific, as a geography, is the product of strategies, and on the other hand, the geography informs the strategies.
- The Indo-Pacific is a geographical concept, but it is also a geopolitical and geostrategic concept; it is a “geography of strategies” (「戦略の地理」).



The Indo-Pacific attracting strong attention is nothing less than a “geographized political reality,” a geographic reflection of the political phenomena over the two oceans. It is a geography created by strategies, and conversely the geography of the Indo-Pacific informs the strategies. The Indo-Pacific is not only a geographical concept, but also a geopolitical and geostrategic concept. In other words, it is the embodiment of the “geography of strategies.”

## The Indo-Pacific vision's unstated objective

- It emerged with a rising and assertive China in view.
- It is a geostrategy to address China, a Eurasian power, from two oceans.
- The Quad and Quad states, i.e., Japan, the United States (US), Australia, and India, are its driving force.
- The addition of India and the Indian Ocean serves to dilute China's presence in the Asia-Pacific region.



Quad Summit of September 2021  
Image from the Prime Minister's Office  
of Japan

The Indo-Pacific concept emerged with a rising and assertive China in view. Although not stated publicly, it is also a geostrategy to approach China on the Eurasian continent from two oceans. Its driving force are the four countries that make up the Quad – Japan, the United States, Australia, and India. The addition of India and the Indian Ocean to the Indo-Pacific vision is not insignificant. This is because they are essential elements in diluting China's presence in the Indo-Pacific.

## Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision

- The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (「自由で開かれたインド太平洋」) vision, advocated by Japan, has taken root in the foreign policies of Japan, the US, and Australia.
- In September 2021, in the remarks by the leaders of Australia, United Kingdom, and the US on the creation of the AUKUS, US President Joe Biden referred to a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”
- India tends to differentiate itself by adding “inclusive” to the free and open Indo-Pacific.

At the core of this trend is, needless to say, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision or the FOIP vision proposed by Japan. The idea has already taken root in the foreign policies of Japan, the U.S., and Australia. It is used as a guiding principle when discussing Asian policy, especially the stance toward China. For example, in the remarks by the leaders of the U.S., the UK, and Australia on the occasion of the creation of AUKUS in September 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden referred to a free and open Indo-Pacific. India, a member of the Quad, has also adopted the concept, however it tends to differentiate itself by adding the word “inclusive.”

- The FOIP as a grand strategy for the Quad states.
- The FOIP serves as guiding principles in conducting projects and initiatives on a bilateral and/or multilateral basis.
- These include connectivity-oriented infrastructure projects, defense cooperation with strategically important states, and military exercises.
- “Minilateral” frameworks, involving a small number of states, are the FOIP’s actors.




The Malabar exercise in the Northern Arabian Sea, November 2020  
Image from the Ministry of Defense of Japan

Although there are some differences in the stances among the four countries, the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific has become the grand strategy for the Quad states to implement their foreign policies. Free and Open Indo-Pacific has become a guiding principle in conducting projects on a bilateral and multilateral basis. These include connectivity-oriented infrastructure projects, defense cooperation with strategically important states, and multilateral military exercises. In this connection, it can be pointed out that “minilateral” frameworks involving a small number of states are the FOIP’s actors.

## Japan's PKO-related cooperation

- The FOIP also inspires Japan's defense cooperation, including cooperation on peacekeeping operations (PKO).
- Concerning the PKO component, Japan conducts bilateral cooperation *for* multilateral cooperation.
- However, contrary to the idealistic discourse of the 1990s, a strategic perspective became evident.



Projects for Cambodia (upper)  
and Vietnam (lower)  
Image from the Ministry of  
Defense of Japan

FOIP also inspires Japan's defense cooperation, including cooperation on peacekeeping operations which is the topic of discussion today. What Japan actually conducts is bilateral cooperation for multilateral cooperation. However, unlike the discourse of the 1990s focusing on international contribution, a strategic perspective has become evident.

- United Nations (UN) PKOs do not contribute to a free and open Indo-Pacific. It is unthinkable that a PKO will be deployed to disputed areas in the South China Sea, and a robust PKO will restrain China's actions.
- It is also difficult to exclude the influence of China, which contributes 2,200 PLA personnel to the UN PKOs.

MINUSMA Holds Medal Parade for Chinese Contingent,  
February 2017  
Image from the UN




My own interpretation is as follows. As a matter of fact, at present, the United Nations' PKOs do not contribute to a free and open Indo-Pacific. For example, it is unthinkable that a PKO will be deployed to disputed areas in the South China Sea, and a robust PKO will restrain China's actions. It is also difficult to exclude the influence of China which contributes 2000-strong People's Liberation Army (PLA) personnel to the UN PKOs.



- With China being a permanent member of the Security Council, the UN plays a role in hampering the realization of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
- Japan's PKO-related cooperation may be analyzed as an attempt to restrain China's further penetration of the UN PKO.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres meets with Xi Jinping,  
April 2019  
Image from the UN



It can be said that the PKOs, and more generally the UN, play a role in hampering the realization of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Needless to say, China is a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power. That being the case, Japan's PKO-related cooperation may be analyzed as an attempt to restrain China's further penetration of the UN PKO.

## Meaning of “freedom and openness”

- Shinzo Abe’s idea:

*Bringing about the FOIP, given its spatial scope, means **protecting and nurturing the most important public good for the world and humanity**. On the contrary, any attempt to make the Indo-Pacific a confined and closed place is harmful and futile for everyone. It must not be allowed.*

*This is the reason why democratic countries that revere freedom, respect the rule of law, and have open governments must join forces. For it is obvious that the guardians of public goods must be such countries.*

*From his Foreword to *Indo-Pacific Strategies*  
(Cannon & Hakata, 2021)*

What does the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific seek in the first place? The original advocate, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, wrote a foreword to our co-edited book. Without naming any particular country, he explains the significance of FOIP as “protecting and nurturing the most important public good for the world and humanity.”



- Without the “free and open” qualifier, the Indo-Pacific becomes merely a geographical notion.
- “Peaceful” or “prosperous” does not express the underlying rationale of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
- The “free and open” norms mean the denial of coercion and predation in the face of an aggressive China.
- In essence, the “free and open” Indo-Pacific postulates a rules-based international order.

I believe that freedom and openness aim precisely at protecting this public good. It is because without the “free and open” qualifier, it would become merely a geographical notion. Last year, various policymakers used the terms “peaceful” and “prosperous.” These terms were heard from the policymakers, but those words do not express the underlying rationale of a free and open Indo-Pacific. What is the underlying rationale? My understanding is that “free and open” means the denial of coercion and predation. And the main source of “coercion and predation” is China. Behind the open sounding phrase of “free and open” is a strong will to check China’s unilateral actions and to seek a rules-based international order.

## A principled regionalism —*Pax Indo-Pacifica*

- Based on the norms of freedom and openness, the Indo-Pacific vision aims to realize a “principled regionalism” (規律的な地域主義).
- The “free and open” Indo-Pacific is an expression of *conditional* regionalism, which is not unconditionally inclusive.
- This region is constructed together by the states which revere the rules of international law and do not attempt to change the status quo by force.

Based on the norms of freedom and openness, the Indo-Pacific vision's ultimate aim is to realize a “principled regionalism.” The Indo-Pacific is not just a geographical concept, nor would it be desirable for that to be the case. When discussing the geographical notion of the Indo-Pacific, the concept of “free and open” is presented together. This is an expression of the will to differentiate from regionalism that is unconditionally inclusive. We must not overlook the nature of this regionalism as a conditional regionalism where there are certain conditions to be met for membership. It is a region constructed together by the states which accept the conditions of respecting the rules of international law and not attempting to change the status quo by force. This is the basis of the Indo-Pacific concept.

- The “principled regionalism” in the Indo-Pacific is what *Pax Indo-Pacific* means.
- *Pax Indo-Pacific* serves to refurbish the dwindling *Pax Americana* and defies the rising *Pax Sinica*.

Together we stand for a pluralistic vision that will ensure that our countries, and all the region’s diverse countries, can thrive as sovereign and prosperous nations in a free and open Indo-Pacific. One might call this **a vision of a *Pax Indo-Pacific***, a region at peace, protected and made prosperous in equal measure by those who comprise the Indo-Pacific.

Remarks by Deputy Secretary Stephen E. Biegun  
at India-U.S. Forum, October 2020

This is, in the words of a senior official in the Trump administration, *Pax Indo-Pacific*. It means a principled Indo-Pacific order. *Pax Indo-Pacific* serves to update the dwindling *Pax Americana* and defies the rising *Pax Sinica* or Chinese hegemony, and indicates the state of things to be in the next era.

## Japan's role for a principled regionalism

- In realizing a principled regionalism, Japan should play the role of “thought leader.”
- As such, it must advocate ideas and lead the world to create a desirable international environment for the camp of the free world.
- Japan has an advantage as a “trusted leader.” It excels in thought leadership and bridging power.

What is the role to be played by Japan to realize principled regionalism? In a word, it can be described as “thought leadership.” As such, it must advocate ideas and lead the world to create a desirable international environment for the camp of the free world. A friend in Southeast Asia described Japan as a “trusted leader.” Although Japan trails the U.S. and China in military power, it does not in thought leadership and bridging power. Just so there is no misunderstanding though, thought leadership does not deny the importance of the military – not at all. Without economic and military power, you will not be able to exert convincing leadership.

- As prime minister, Shinzo Abe played a historic role in ideating and advocating the FOIP and maintaining the rules-based international order.
- The challenge remains for the Fumio Kishida administration to launch new initiatives while building on the diplomatic assets of the former Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe and Yoshihide Suga.

PM Fumio Kishida attending the East Asia Summit, October 2021  
Image from the Prime Minister's Office of Japan



Prime Minister Abe, who led Japan's diplomacy in the 2010s, played a historic role in ideating and advocating FOIP and maintaining the rules-based international order. The Suga administration that followed inherited the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision and contributed to the success of the Quad summit. The challenge for the Kishida administration is to build on the diplomatic assets, but not rest on its laurels and launch new initiatives. The events of the past two years have provided us with a variety of materials for a turnaround offensive. The time seems ripe.

Reference:

Brendon J. Cannon & Kei Hakata (eds.),  
*Indo-Pacific Strategies: Navigating  
Geopolitics at the Dawn of a New Age*,  
Routledge, First published in 2021




Image from Routledge

That is all from myself. Thank you for your attention.

(Prof. Shinoda) Dr. Hakata, thank you very much. In international peace operations, partnership usually means the United Nations and the regional organizations. UN and the African Union (AU) or the EU, for example, have been established as a model. In Japan, we do not belong to operational regional organizations, so in order for FOIP to be developed in its security policy, there are still many challenges and issues to be addressed in my opinion. So, I appreciate Dr. Hakata's contribution on setting a good framework on which we will continue today.

I would like to now invite Major General Hoang Kim Phung of the Vietnam People's Army for his remarks.

**MG Hoang Kim Phung (Major General, Vietnam People's Army/ Director of Vietnam Department of Peacekeeping Operations)**

**International Peace and Security Symposium 2021**



**VIETNAM'S EFFORTS THROUGH PARTNERSHIP PEACEKEEPING  
EXPECTATIONS FOR FUTURE PEACE COOPERATION  
BETWEEN VIETNAM AND JAPAN IN THE FOIP REGION**

**Major General HOANG KIM PHUNG**  
**Director, Department of Peacekeeping Operations**  
**Vietnam Ministry of National Defense**

**December 03, 2021**

It is my great honor to be here with all of you today. I would like to express my great gratitude to the Ministry of Defense of Japan for inviting me to the International Peace and Security Symposium 2021.

As introduced by the MC, I am Major General Hoang Kim Phung. I am the Director of the Vietnam Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Today, I would like to speak about Vietnam's efforts through partnership peacekeeping, including training and capacity building of peacekeepers in the UN Triangular Partnership Project, and expectations for future peace cooperation between Vietnam and Japan in the free and open Indo-Pacific region.





## International Peace and Security Symposium 2021

### CONTENT



In my presentation, I am going to deal with three main points. The first one is about an overview of bilateral cooperation on defense in general and on peacekeeping operations in particular, as well as the UN Triangular Partnership Project. The second part is about our efforts through partnership peacekeeping and achievements on peacekeeping operations. The last one is our expectations for future peace cooperation.





As you can see on the screen, Japan and Vietnam signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on defense cooperation and exchange in 2011 and an MOU of cooperation on UN PKO in 2015 between the two ministries of defense.



## International Peace and Security Symposium 2021



### MOU of Cooperation on UN PKO

- Principle and purpose: equality and mutual benefit, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, international law, national law and international commitments.
- Major cooperation areas: Knowledge and experience exchange, training and capacity building, field support and coordination at the UN PKO missions, consultation on equipment and exchange of experts on procurement of equipment for units deployed to the UN PKO missions, including Military Hospital and Engineers.

The principle and purpose of cooperation on peacekeeping between the two sides are emphasized with equality and mutual benefit, and this cooperation will be implemented in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, international law, national law, and international commitments within the framework of UN peacekeeping activities to encourage and develop cooperation in the field of peacekeeping.

Major cooperation areas between the two sides consist of knowledge and experience exchange, training and capacity building, field support and coordination at the UN PKO missions, consultation on equipment, and exchange of experts on procurement of equipment for contingents deployed to the UN PKO missions, including military hospitals and engineers.

## UN Triangular Partnership Project (TPP)

### Background

- TPP: capacity building of TCC personnel supported through cooperation among the UN Secretariat, TCCs and third countries with specialized expertise.
- + UN: coordinating, planning and managing the implementation of the TPP Program.
- + TCC: receiving professional training and force deployment activities after receiving capacity building training to UN peacekeeping missions
- + Member States: training equipment, finance, trainers (with specialized expertise) and other resources

### Purpose

- UN: improve the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations.
- TCC: receive professional training and capacity building activities for their contingent..
- Member States: have the opportunity to flexibly support peacekeeping missions.



### Triangular Partnership Programme



United Nations



Troop Contributing Countries



Supporting Member States

The Triangular Partnership Project is one of the bright spots of the cooperation between the two countries. TPP focuses on capacity building of troop-contributing country (TCC) personnel supported through cooperation among the UN Secretariat, TCCs, and third countries with specialized expertise. This program helps the UN improve the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations by having more options for more well-trained and well-equipped engineering, medical, and information forces. Member states supporting the TPP program have the opportunity to flexibly support peacekeeping missions, establish new and more effective missions, promote security and stability, and contribute to the enforcement of responsibilities and obligations to the UN. TCCs receive professional training and capacity building activities for the engineering, military medical, and peacekeeping information units.

## EFFORTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

- Milestones in PKO:
- + IUPs: 61 (6 females), 3 UNHQ, 01 Central Africa.
- 2014: 2 first Vietnamese officers deployed to UN PKO missions.
- 2018: first Vietnamese female officer deployed to UN Mission as SO.
- 2019: first Vietnamese female officer deployed to UN Mission as UNMO.
- + Contingent: Level 2 Field Hospital (189 personnel, 33 females)

**Female: 16-21%**



Now, let me share with you our efforts and achievements on peacekeeping operations. Since 2014, Vietnam has deployed 250 military personnel to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. Regarding individual deployment, there were 61 officers, including six females, working as liaison officers, military observers, and staff officers at the field missions. Together with that, four Vietnamese officers are qualified to be selected to work at UN Headquarters in New York and the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). Regarding contingents, we have sent three rotations of a level-two field hospital, each of which consist of 63 doctors, nurses, and supporting personnel. Vietnam maintains the proportion of female soldiers at the field missions, and this rate is always higher in comparison with the average percentage of female personnel in UN missions.

## EFFORTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

### Peacekeeping Courses (TPP)

- First country in Southeast Asia to conduct 03 training courses to operate heavy engineering equipment under the TPP.

**\* 2018: Trial Training @ Hanoi, Vietnam**

- Duration: 5 November – 14 December, 2018

- Participants: 16 Engineering Personnel from 9 countries and 20 Japanese instructors.

**\* 2019: HEE Operator Course**

- Duration: 27 Oct – 17 Dec 2019

- Participants: 20 Japanese instructors, 04 international observers and 20 Vietnamese students.

**\* 2020: HEE Operator TOT Course**

- Duration: 10 Feb – 17 Mar 2020

- Participants: 29 instructors/interpreters and 20 students from 05 countries.



Regarding TPP, Vietnam is the first country in Southeast Asia in recent years to conduct three training courses to operate heavy engineering equipment under the TPP. These include Trial Training which was conducted from November 5 to December 14, 2018, and attended by 16 engineering personnel from nine countries and 20 Japanese instructors; the Heavy Engineering Equipment Operator Course which was organized from October 27 to December 17, 2019, with the participation of 20 Japanese instructors, four international observers, and 20 Vietnamese students; and the Heavy Engineering Equipment Operator, Training of Trainers Course from February 10 to March 17, 2020, with the attendance of 29 instructors and interpreters and 20 students from five countries.

With the coordination with the UN and the support from Japan, these courses are a great opportunity for Vietnam's UN peacekeeping forces, especially for the engineering contingent, to equip themselves with the professional knowledge and skills needed for their deployment to UN peacekeeping missions in upcoming times.



## EFFORTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS




### **ADMM PLUS PKO-EWG 2021-2023 (4<sup>th</sup> Cycle)**

15th EWG PKO under ADMM+ (3<sup>rd</sup> Dec 2021):

→ focus on pre-deployment training and preparing forces to participate in UN PKO

Vietnam and Japan will co-chair the 4<sup>th</sup> Cycle of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) Meeting of the Experts' Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations (EWG PKO) 2021-2023. I am very happy to inform you that at this moment, the 15<sup>th</sup> EWG PKO meeting under ADMM-Plus is being conducted at the same time as our symposium today. This meeting focuses on pre-deployment training and preparation for forces to participate in UN peacekeeping missions. This also gives a brief introduction of field training exercises (FTXs) that are supposed to be carried out in Vietnam next year.



The last part I would like to speak about today is expectations for future peace cooperation between Vietnam and Japan. Upholding the remarkable outcomes of the current cooperation between the two sides, Vietnam expects Japan to: support our commitments in participating in UN peacekeeping activities, continue to implement cooperation on PKO with a focus on training and capacity building under TPP, support Vietnam in capacity building for the training center to become a center of excellence in the region by 2026, support Vietnam in developing and implementing the capacity building project under the regional center of excellency for connection and capacity building, and support Vietnam in logistics, transportation, and other related fields for the implementation and participation in UN PKO.

**International Peace and Security Symposium 2021**



**ありがとうございました**

**Cảm ơn!**

**Thank you!**

In closing, Vietnam has joined peacekeeping operations for seven years and has achieved some impressive outcomes. Aside from our self-internal efforts, this achievement definitely comes from the support from our international partners like Japan, the U.S., Australia, the UK, France, India, South Korea, and others. I hope that we will work more closely to enhance our relationship and contribute to world peace. Ladies and gentlemen, it has been my privilege to speak here today. Thank you very much for your attention. I wish you all good health, happiness, and success. Thank you very much.



(Prof. Shinoda) Major General Hoang Kim Phung, thank you very much. From the Asia-Pacific's point of view, the bilateral relationship between Vietnam and Japan is extremely important. The capacity building and other cooperation in international peace operations and activities have been on one of the very important and promising areas. Thank you very much.

Now, I would like to invite retired Lieutenant General Goro Matsumura on the comprehensive presentation.

**MATSUMURA Goro (Lieutenant General (Ret.)/ Former Commanding General of the Northeastern Army, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force)**



I would like to make a presentation on the current status and future of Japan's international peace cooperation activities.




First, I will give an overview of the current status of Japan's international peace cooperation activities and then briefly talk about the trends of the international peace cooperation activities through partnerships around the world, and based on that, talk about the future. In doing so, I will present my personal opinion on how the future of international peace cooperation should be within the general concept of national security.



# 1 日本の国際平和協力活動の現状 (防衛省・自衛隊の活動)

**Current Status of Japan's International Peace Cooperation Activities  
(Activities of MOD/SDF)**

First, the current status of the activities of the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Force.



As you know, Japan has not dispatched units to a United Nations PKO mission after the withdrawal from UNMISS in South Sudan in May 2017. Currently, we dispatched two personnel to the United Nations Headquarters. For the staff officers, we dispatched four to UNMISS and two to MFO in the Sinai Peninsula for a total of six. This is not a direct participation to the mission on the ground, but to support capacity building in the unit-dispatching countries, we have been providing bilateral support to Cambodia, Mongolia, and Thailand since 2013, mainly in the field of engineering. Also, as was already referred to, we have been providing support under the framework of the UN TPP and dispatching instructors to PKO centers around Africa. UN TPP is a project conducted with the cooperation of three parties led by the United Nations Department of Operational Support (DOS) with support-providing countries such as Japan and dispatching countries. Japan started providing support to Africa in the field of engineering in 2015, and then expanded to Asian countries in 2018, adding the medical field in 2019. It is a developing effort. Utilizing the experience we have accumulated since the dispatch to Cambodia in 1992, we made intellectual contributions by exerting leadership as a chair country in developing and revising PKO engineering unit manuals.

Also, we have been involved in counter-piracy. Japan continues to dispatch one warship and two aircrafts, and around 400 personnel are working overseas, including the operation staff at the Djibouti base.



So, various missions are still under way, but it is true that there are some questions over them. One is that with all the peace cooperation activities conducted around the world, the presence is too small for a country with the third largest GDP. Another question is, so far we have been able to make contributions in the field of capacity building and others because of the experience accumulated by dispatching engineering troops until 2017, but now that missions were suspended in 2017, it is question of until when we can offer viable support.

To answer these questions, I think it is about time we reconsider the international peace cooperation as Japan. For that, we need to rethink how to position the international peace cooperation within the whole of national security policies.



## 2 パートナーシップ平和協力活動

### の世界的趨勢

#### Global Trend of Partnership Peace Cooperation Activities

Before we think about Japan, I would like to first talk about my understanding of the current peace cooperation missions in the world from the viewpoint of partnership peacekeeping referred to by other speakers.





After the end of the Cold War, PKO shifted from conventional PKO to PKO that includes the use of weapons to protect civilians. In the process, particularly since the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, regional organizations have been taking charge of operations that involve military activities supported by the United Nations troops. Such partnership peacekeeping has become mainstream. Regional organizations such as AU or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Africa, or EU or NATO in Europe for troops to operate in the front, and UN PKO troops, various UN organizations, and sometimes NPOs work together to stabilize the region.

In such cases, organizations under a completely different chain of command need to operate under close cooperation on the ground which is extremely difficult. Nevertheless, they are working well. Prof. Shinoda, who is the moderator today, made an important point in his book. Prof. Shinoda pointed out that the key to success is the fact that the participating organizations all share values based on a liberal democracy. Prof. Shinoda says that the shared goals of human rights, rule of law, good governance, fair elections, and a mature civil society enable to build a trusting relationship and cooperate with each other. I believe this is a very important observation.





Of course, not everything is perfect. Claiming that stability must be prioritized over establishing a democratic system, for that end, there must be a concentration of power. Something akin to the authoritarianism of China does have a certain point. Particularly in the Islamic world, the Western democratic way of thinking is not readily accepted in the local traditional values. This makes it difficult to realize the ownership principle which is to respect the local sense of values.

Also, in recent missions, the principle is shifting from neutrality as the formality to impartiality based on the criteria that inhumane actions should not be condoned. When the fight against terrorism is involved, taking an approach of achieving peace by standing between all the parties is becoming more and more difficult. However, if you go back to the essence of such issues, peace cooperation can be successful only after the values are shared.



### 3 国家安全保障における2つのアプローチ

#### Two Approaches in National Security

The next question is, what should Japan do in such a global trend? It is essential to think how to position the international peace cooperation in the entirety of national security policies. Before I talk about Japan, I would like to talk about the generalities on how we think about the national security.



There are mainly two approaches to achieve the national security. One is the power-focused approach. In this case, the best thing is that the country has an overwhelming military capability on its own over the threatening party, but if that is not the case, the country will form an alliance with stronger countries. Then, they train together, act together, and prepare deterrents and actions against the threatening party.

The other one is the value-focused approach. To prevent a threat from becoming actual, a number of countries coordinate with each other to work out rules based on common values. To a country that breaks the rules, they take actions together and make sure the rules are observed. This way, they secure the safety of their own country. This naturally requires an action of force.


As you can see, the former is close to the idea of “collective defense” and the latter is close to “collective security.” These are two extremes and the actual national security policies are about finding the right mix of the two.



## 4 日本の国家安全保障全般と 国際平和協力活動の関係

**Relationship between Japan's National Security and  
International Peace Cooperation Activities**

Based on the generalities, the next slide shows the position of international peace cooperation activities within the context of current Japanese national security policies.




In the FOIP concept, the premise is the sharing of certain values such as rule of law, and Japanese diplomatic policies do reflect that in many aspects. However, if you look at the actual operation of defense capability, it is mainly to counter direct military confrontations by the surrounding threats, so it cannot be denied that the main goal of international peace cooperation in such an environment is to maintain a good relationship with allies and partners that serve the defense purpose, and so we are trying to save the force.

On the other hand, there is a way of thinking that the defense capability should be used to enhance international norms such as human rights and rule of law, even if it has some risk. In reality, however, being surrounded by potential threats such as China, North Korea, and Russia, it is only natural that there is a growing notion that we should not be defeated in the direct confrontation of forces.



That used to be the way of thinking until recently, but the future security environment may change a bit. Let me raise an issue, even if I may sound a little extreme.





**新しい安全保障環境＝「ハイブリッド脅威」の出現**  
New security environment      Emergence of "hybrid threats"

- **社会・経済的手段（非軍事）**  
Social / economic means (non-military)
  - ・ 対象国内の世論誘導、影響工作、メディア工作  
Manipulation of public opinion in target country, influence maneuver, media maneuver
  - ・ 貿易、投資、エネルギー供給等を通じた経済的恫喝  
Economic intimidation through trade, investment, energy supply, etc.
  - ・ 国際世論工作等による対象国孤立化  
Isolation of target country through manipulation of international opinion, etc.
- **技術的手段（非軍事＋軍事）**  
Technological means (non-military + military)
  - ・ サイバー攻撃（政府・軍・社会インフラ、SNS等）  
Cyber attacks (government, armed forces, social infrastructure, social media, etc.)
  - ・ 電磁波攻撃（軍・国の基幹通信・社会インフラ）  
Electromagnetic attacks (armed forces, country's core communication, social infrastructure)
  - ・ 宇宙インフラへの攻撃（情報、通信、GPS等）  
Attacks against space infrastructure (information, communication, GPS, etc.)
- **武装手段（軍事）**  
Means with weaponry (military)
  - ・ 武装工作員、民兵、偽装漁民、民間軍事会社等  
Armed agents, militia, fake fishermen, private military companies, etc.
  - ・ 地上・海上・海中・空中の無人機攻撃  
UAV attacks on the ground, sea, underwater, and in the air
  - ・ 正規軍部隊、ミサイル等の展開による心理的恫喝  
Psychological threat through deployment of regular forces, missiles, etc.

In considering the new security environment, we cannot ignore the emerging hybrid threats. They start from the gray-zone level where we cannot readily call it an emergency situation using non-military methods such as manipulating public opinion, influence maneuvers, and imposing economic intimidations. In addition, cyberattacks which it is difficult to identify the actors, electromagnetic attacks, and attacks to space assets are conducted in both military and non-military fields. Militarily, they use disguised forces or unmanned planes to hide their involvement of a nation, and combine with intimidating military measures such as missiles to impose their intentions. Such various methods are hybrid threats.



Such hybrid wars using hybrid threats are characterized by “cognitive domain warfare”. In other words, it is not about physically destroying the enemy military or physically occupying the territory, but rather utilizing various hybrid means to influence the international opinions or domestic opinions of the target country in favor of its own country, and imposing intentions on the leader of the target country. Although unbeaten in physical strength, if a country succumbs to this cognitive domain warfare and loses international and domestic support, national security cannot be achieved.





In cognitive domain warfare, there are two different thoughts on the international order which could potentially become mainstream in forming the international opinion. I think these two will be competing in the years to come. One is the international order that emphasizes non-interference in internal affairs and respect for national sovereignty, and see the United Nations as a body that guarantees that order. This view, at a glance, seems to be calling for the equality of nations, but it does not have a solution principle in case there are clashes of interest among nations, so in the end, the international order is determined by the power relationship among the nations.

The other view puts an emphasis on respect for fundamental human rights, as well as rule of law, and that the United Nations is an organization that guarantees the principle of equal national sovereignty and human rights. It is the way of thinking that under the grand principle of protecting human rights, each country works hard to form international norms, and by doing so, maintains the international order. Of course, that would require a certain level of force.

As hybrid threats increase, it seems obvious that for Japan to protect the nation thoroughly in the international fight in the cognitive domain, we need to act more closely with the countries that have the latter idea.

ハイブリッド脅威に対して国の安全を確保していくためには、共通の価値観を持つ国々が連携して権威主義的な力に対抗し、**人権**や**法の支配**を重視した**国際規範**を打ち立てていくことが不可欠

To protect national security against hybrid threats, it is essential that countries with shared values work together to counter authoritarian power, and establish **international norms** that emphasize **human rights** and **rule of law**.



「今後の日本の安全保障政策を考える上で、欧州とアフリカのパートナーシップ平和協力活動で共有されているような「**共通の価値観**」（**人権**、**法の支配**、**良き統治**、**公正な選挙**、**市民社会の成熟**）実現のための**防衛力の国際的運用**を、今まで以上に大きく位置付け、日本としての実践を考えていくべきではないか？」

“In considering country's future security policy, Japan should put more emphasis on, and put into practice **international use of defense capability** aiming to materialize '**shared values**' (**human rights, rule of law, good governance, fair election, matured civil society**) as shared in Europe and Africa's partnership peace cooperation activities.”

In other words, to protect national security against hybrid threats, it is essential that countries with shared values work together to counter authoritarian power, establish international norms that emphasize human rights and rule of law, and act in line with the narrative. Therefore, in thinking about the overall future of Japanese national security, we should put more emphasis on and put into practice the international use of defense capability, aiming to realize the shared values, namely human rights, rule of law, good governance, fair elections, and a mature civil society as shared in the partnership peace cooperation activities by Europe or Africa.

＜課題と解決の方向性＞  
Challenges and Direction of Solution

- ・ アジアに有効な地域機構がない中で、ミャンマー問題等に取り組んでいくための地域内のパートナーシップをどう形成していくのか？ → 「体制」よりも「状況」に焦点  
How should we form a partnership in the region to deal with Myanmar issue and others while there's no effective regional organization in Asia?  
→ Focus on "situation" rather than "system"
- ・ アフリカ等遠隔地でのパートナーシップ国際平和活動への貢献の具体策は？ → 欧州諸国と連携して国連の能力強化  
What is the specific measure to contribute to partnership international peace activities in remote areas such as Africa?  
→ Enhance capacity of the UN in coordination with European countries
- ・ 実際の活動参加に伴うリスクを軽減するためにはどのような方策があるか？ → 「ドクトリン」と「装備」の開発  
What measures are there to reduce the risks that accompany actual participation in activities?  
→ Development of "doctrine" and "equipment"

Having said that, there are a number of challenges in utilizing defense power in actual diplomacy. First of all, Asia does not have a regional body with shared values as the EU or the AU, so even when a humanitarian issue occurs as in Myanmar, it is difficult to form an interregional partnership. Personally, as a way to solve this issue, I think the effective approach is not to question the political system of each country, but rather focus on solving the inhumane situation itself and take common actions toward that.

Secondly, there is the issue that it is difficult to come up with specific measures for Japan to effectively support the partnership international peace missions in remote places like Africa, but by coordinating with European countries such as the UK or France that share the same values, we may be able to identify specific ways to contribute to enhancing the capabilities of the United Nations.

Lastly, although taking part in actual missions always accompany risks of a certain level, without making efforts to reduce the risks as much as possible, we cannot have the understanding of the public for the participation. This is the same with Western countries, so we need to develop a doctrine that enables to work together with them, reduce the risks of the troops, and yet make effective activities, and also to develop equipment such as non-lethal weapons and unmanned planes that contribute to such a goal.

It is my personal conclusion that Japan should overcome such challenges and increase their engagement in international peace cooperation. Thank you very much.

(Prof. Shinoda) Thank you very much, Lieutenant General Matsumura. You focused on Japan and also presented the global trend, so it was very comprehensive content. Thank you very much for sharing with us.

Now, we will have a break starting from 2:50 p.m., so we still have some time. Right now, we are collecting all the questions. Please submit them before the plenary session at 3:00 p.m. Before we go on, if you have any impressions or comments to make, having heard other panelists – for example, probably each one of you can give us one minute each and give us your comments briefly. Let us start with Prof. Hakata. You focused on FOIP. Major General Phung and Lieutenant General Matsumura talked about capacity building in Vietnam, and partnerships and international activities. Based on that, Prof. Hakata, do you have any comments or impressions?

(Prof. Hakata) My talk was followed by Major General Phung, and I was very encouraged by his talk. Although Japan and Vietnam have different systems, I understand these two countries with shared strategic interests are deepening their cooperation. I think he explained the state of affairs clearly. Also, I listened to Lieutenant General Matsumura's talk with interest. Especially in the last slide that he showed, he suggested the ideas about countries with whom we share values and we should cooperate. Of course, in addition to supporting peacekeeping operations—this should be behind-the-scenes logistical support, there is a current situation in which these values could guide the Quad and military exercises in the non-Quad framework. These two talks were indeed very interesting.

(Prof. Shinoda) In order, next, Major General Phung, I want to ask you. From Japan, we had the comment that your presentation was very impressive. There was appreciation shown. For Japan and Vietnam, there was the expectation or the recognition or importance for the deepening of bilateral relation. After listening to the Japanese presentations, in terms of the partnership between Japan and Vietnam in the UN context in terms of capacity building at the UN, can you give us additional comments about the bilateral relations between Japan and Vietnam, please?

(MG Phung) Thank you, sir. I am very pleased to answer that question. I consider that for the countries like Vietnam, we started a little bit late on the PKO area. We need the support from other countries with vast experience. In the case of Vietnam and Japan, we have a very good relationship not only in the field of defense, but also in civilian. On the basis of the MOU signed by the two ministries of defense, we moved the cooperation onto the field of PKO. We have that very solid base to develop this cooperation. The MOU signed between the ministries of defense of Japan and Vietnam in 2015 is a very important document to have. The Japanese Ministry of Defense has sent a lot of instructors and specialists to Vietnam to help us to build capacity.

Especially, I have to emphasize the attention from the leadership of Japan. On the occasion of the inauguration of the third TPP course, we had the opportunity to receive the deputy secretary of state of Japan to come here to share experience with us on PKO on this course of TPP. The attention of the leadership from the government of Japan helped us with the guidelines to have more and practical cooperation between the entities like defense PKO department and the center of PKO of Japan.

Also, we have conducted a lot of visits to UN missions. When we have a unit of Japan, we have a unit to learn from you on the mission. I think that experience is very important for us to develop our capacity. In the future,

I think we need the Ministry of Defense of Japan to invite us to send more officials for your courses in Japan or send instructors to help us here. In the future, we also would like the Ministry of Defense of Japan to help us in the airlift of some officers from the UN missions for the vacation to Vietnam or some equipment of Vietnam to the UN missions. I think that is a very effective cooperation in both sides. Thank you very much.

(Prof. Shinoda) Thank you for that. Lastly, I would like to ask Mr. Matsumura. You had a very comprehensive talk, but listening to the other talks about FOIP and the relationship between Southeast Asia and Japan, especially between Japan and Vietnam, if you have any additional comments, please.

(LTG Matsumura) Thank you. First, listening to Major General Phung's presentation. In 2013, I visited Vietnam myself. Since then, I see that there is even more cooperation between the two countries advancing and I was very happy to hear that. Vietnam in the Asian region is trying to play a very active role, especially in terms of PKO capacity building. It is trying to help other countries, so that was very encouraging.

Dr. Hakata talked about sharing values with FOIP. It is not just a regional framework of the Indo-Pacific. It is "free and open." That value part is added to that concept. That was what Prof. Hakata said. Initially, I had a concern a while back that "free and open" maybe does not include the human rights component. That used to be my concern.

It depends on how you interpret it, but "rule of law" is mentioned. Rule of law is different from "rule by law". China talks about rule by law. The authority sets the laws, and whether the laws are set democratically is a different issue, but there are the laws that have been established domestically and internationally. Asking people to follow the law is what they are doing with rule by law, but rule of law is based on code of conduct, so human rights and humanitarian principles. There are certain rights that cannot be violated that each person has. Even if you are a person in power, you cannot violate that. They must not violate such basic rights. Rule of law binds those people in power.

Rule by law and rule of law are different. If we focus on rule of law and promote that, then the protection of the human rights of people living in the Indo-Pacific would also be included in that concept of FOIP. That is how I see it. In that regard, we have to think about the Indo-Pacific including those values.

(Prof. Shinoda) Thank you very much indeed. We would like to now take a 10-minute break, so please prepare your questions. Thank you.



## DISCUSSION

(Prof. Shinoda) Thank you very much. We have about 55 minutes for discussions among all of us. In principle, I will take questions from the audience and ask the panelists to answer them. I already asked the people in the audience to raise their hand, and also for online participants, we have already received their questions and comments, some of which I have already in printed-out form. We would like to first take questions from the floor in the hall, while at the same time I will try to keep time so that we will not lose time to answer the questions that we have received online.

Can I see hands in this hall for questions or comments? Are there any questions?

(Q1) I have questions to Mr. Matsumura. You described the contributions of Japan's peacekeeping operations. Perhaps, Japan's presence is too small as the heavy equipment operation training courses provided by Japan have all completed. Perhaps, we need to find another positioning for Japan for the future UN peacekeeping operations. For me, I would say that the staff officers being sent to the central nerve system, so to speak, have accepted by Japanese personnel. Do you think that Japan should, in addition to that, continue to try to dispatch again at the field level?

(Prof. Shinoda) Mr. Matsumura, please give us your answer.

(LTG Matsumura) Thank you for your question. I do not mean sending personnel as contingents to the field is the most important, but I think Japan's contributions should not be limited to the areas of the TPP or bilateral capacity building cooperation and staff officers. The protection of civilians in the field I think requires more contributions, while at the same time, we need to take a balance between human rights and civil rights and political considerations. That also should be an important area that Japan should think about contributing itself more. So, we need to think about what Japan should do and can do in the future.

That is the point that I mentioned in my last slide. There is no situation in Asia where peacekeeping operations are required. Of course, there is the Rohingya situation which attracted attention before the military coup, but right now, Myanmar does not require peacekeeping operations. That is why I said that human rights should also be taken into consideration, while addressing various issues.

Globally-speaking, Africa is having various difficulties. Japan should think about what role Japan should play and could play. The UK and France in particular have been involved in peace operations, including combat operations, so equipment cooperation or some development activities with Japan's technologies or logistics support are areas that Japan might be able to play a role together with European nations.

Overall, regarding what Japan can do for the United Nations' systems, while ensuring the safety of personnel, what doctrines and what equipment should be acquired – I think the United Nations itself does not have research and development arms on equipment and other areas. The member nations have such capabilities, so Japan, the United States, and other technologically-developed nations should provide some framework or mechanism through which the technological development could be contributed to the United Nations.

(Prof. Shinoda) Thank you. The next question, please. If there are any in the hall, please raise your hand.

(Q2) There are hybrid threats and also we need to address the threats in the cognitive domain, Mr. Matsumura. Of course, non-interference in internal affairs and also human rights should be respected, and yes, I agree the United Nations' narrative of respecting human rights should be established more.

Not only the Self-Defense Forces of Japan, but also the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese government as a whole should communicate more and send out these important messages abroad. Do you have any specific ideas?

Major General Phung, do you have any program as to communicating your efforts and your achievements or your presence to the world? I would appreciate it if you could shed light on this, if you have any efforts in such areas.

(Prof. Shinoda) Thank you very much. Once again, I invite Mr. Matsumura, but I also invite Major General Phung to answer. How you send out your messages or your communication to reach out to the international community or the other parties or stakeholders in the world, Mr. Matsumura?

(LTG Matsumura) Thank you very much. Regarding how to communicate or how to send out messages, I think Japan and the European nations have certain values – for example, human rights – with the United Nations. I mentioned two sets of values when it comes to the United Nations because China has started very heavy commitments to peacekeeping operations. Regarding to the National Security Law which China recently adopted for Hong Kong, 27 nations expressed concern, but 53 nations sided with China at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, so non-interference with the internal affairs of the Chinese version, so to speak. If that is too much to emphasize at the United Nations, then that would be a problem.

When the UN Charter was formed in 1945, respect for human rights and equality among sovereign nations were given equal value. So, if we are to neglect or shelve human rights and rather emphasize simply equality among sovereign nations, it would be a problem because even though the member nations are supposed to be equal, there are power relations with strong and powerful nations and weaker and smaller nations.

So, cases of human rights violations should be pointed out as a subject of concern. In Asia, I think Japan and other nations should seek cooperation or coordination more on a case-by-case basis on specific issues by expressing the concern of specific cases of human rights violations. But, of course, at the same time, some countries cannot take that position, given their own internal situations or considerations. If there is something that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and other units can play a role, then such a contribution should be considered. That requires a whole-government or a cross-ministerial approach headed by the National Security Agency.

(Prof. Shinoda) Thank you very much. I would like to ask Major General Phung on not just the bilateral partnership, but the importance of the United Nations PKO. How do you view the relevance of sending out information or communication, and what are you specifically doing in order to communicate?

(MG Phung) Thank you for your question. I consider that the partnerships with other friend countries in the world is very important for Vietnamese defense military to develop our forces to prepare our forces before deployment in UN missions. Since 2014, in Asia, there were only three countries that did not have forces to take part in UN PKO. They were Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar. We need to show the responsibility of a nation as a

member of the UN. We need to demonstrate our responsibility in front of humanity or the globe, so we need to have some partners like Japan, the U.S., the UK, and others to help us to prepare our forces to take part in PKO.

We need to convey and give enough information to our population. We send our troops abroad, but that does not mean we ally with other countries in order to make against an aggression against other countries. Because our whitepapers consider that Vietnam does not take part in any alliance, Vietnam needs to secure the authority and integrity of our nation. But when we send our troops for PKO of the UN, we need to modify our constitution. We need to make serious legal documents and make great efforts not only internally, but internationally in order to prepare and in order to have success in the UN missions.

In several years, we consider that with the support of our partners like Japan and other partners, we will have some positive results. I consider that role of partners or the role of partnerships in the international multilateral environment. It is very important for Vietnam and other developing countries like Vietnam to prepare troops or conduct troops to fulfill the UN missions abroad. Thank you.

(Prof. Shinoda) Thank you very much, Major General Phung. Then, let us move on to the next question. Anyone in the floor? Yes, please.

(Q3) It is a little question that comes with a little lengthy remarks, so please bear with me. The first part concerns Major General Hoang Kim Phung. Pakistan has close to around 6,000 peacekeeping troops right now, which is the seventh in the world, and we have lost around 160 people so far in the peacekeeping operations. I mentioned that before in my class as well. Until the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it was the highest in the world, but because of the ongoing war on terror, we had to pull back on our troops. That is why we have gone to the seventh number. But still, you specifically mentioned in your presentation about the participation of women in the peacekeeping operations and the UN mandate, but certainly also among those few countries which fulfill the UN minimum criteria of women participation in peacekeeping operations.

Now, think of a country, an orthodox country, which has often been labeled with gender disparity and women not taking part in the development process, not being given rights, and all that. Even from a country like that, women are coming and participating in peacekeeping missions. Why not from other developed liberal countries where the women have much more liberty to join the military service or other forms of service? Because I believe, specifically when you talk of the trouble in the Islamic world where the women are not allowed to freely mingle with the men, over there, if you have women peacekeepers, they would be even more beneficial in interacting with the people because the Australian Major General, in her speech, the most important thing which she mentioned was that for the rehabilitation and the development, the most important thing is the communication and relationships. This is how you build the trust of the people and this is how you do the peacekeeping job in an amical way.

With ladies on the job, I think it would be far easier and better to communicate with those locals going to their homes because they might not allow, after all the destruction and all that maybe in Afghanistan and Iraq, if the American troops had tried to enter their homes for the rehabilitation even. For that very purpose, they would not have accepted them that openly. But with that being done by a woman, it would have made the job easier. The women otherwise are better in communicating and interacting. That is why you have mostly receptionists who are women. They can communicate better. I think they would have done far better maybe in the fields of health



education, social rehabilitation, and welfare.

I would again refer to, if an orthodox or Islamic country where the women are not freely mingling with the men, if I can match the United Nations criteria of more than 20% – I think it is 25% or something, the minimum figure. If I can match that figure, why not the much more liberal countries to do this UN peacekeeping job in a far better way. I think I have spoken too much about the first part, so maybe later I will ask the second question. So, I will just confine to this portion. Thank you.

(Prof. Shinoda) Thank you very much. Then, let us go to Major General Phung about women's participation to PKO. Would you like to comment on this?

(MG Phung) Yes, thank you for the question. I have been the Director of the Vietnam peacekeeping center and right now the Vietnam Department of Peacekeeping Operations for more than seven years. I know the problem when we recruit female officers or female personnel to take part in the peacekeeping operations. In Vietnam, we do not have a problem with the gender. Gender in Vietnam is not a problem. We have a full equality between men and women. For some countries, when they have a vice president as a female, it is very rare, but for Vietnam, for a long time we have had a vice president as a female. The last time, we had the president of our national assembly, like your congress, as a female. Also, we have a lot of leaders even in the defense military as the female general. So, in Vietnam, we do not see the problem. We cannot see any problem of gender.

But as the commander of the PKO troops in our country – and I have been in a lot of countries in the world, testing or taking part in a conference or in a course – I can see the problem of females as a wife or as a girl in the family. The female officers always have more familial problems or issues, when we do not say “problem,” than men. They have a lot of things to do in the family. They play a very important role, so there are a lot of husbands who do not want the wife to go abroad. Then, he at home has to take care of the children of the house. This is a very normal problem that we can see in a lot of conferences of the UN.

The target of the UN to 2025 is 25% females in PKO forces. I think it is a very high target, but right now, normally in the level of units, it is about 5-7% females in the units. In the level of individual officers, we can see an average of 10%. So, this is a problem. The target of the UN should be 25%. I think it is high, but this is the target. We have to educate our personnel. We have to prepare our forces to reach this target of the UN. I think this is a very high target. In Vietnam, we have a plan to do that. Right now, we are preparing our personnel by recruiting a lot of females for preparations.

In Vietnam, we have another problem. It is the English language. There are very few female officers who can speak English in our defense military, so right now we are preparing a new generation with more female officers with not only English skill, but military experience and knowledge. I think this is hard work. This is a hard target for the leaders or the commanders like us in Vietnam. Thank you.

(Prof. Shinoda) Thank you very much for those comments. We have some other questions. The person over here, please.

(Q4) Prof. Hakata talked about disciplined regionalism, and he said the role that is asked of Japan is though leadership. FOIP is a manifestation of that and I think that has won trust and is continuing. Prof. Hakata, you

presented that the new administration should inherit the diplomatic assets and come up with new initiatives as well. I completely agree with what you said, but it could be because we have trust that other companies followed. So, this trust or confidence should be our strength as a country. Then, in terms of thought leadership, in order for us to continue to exert thought leadership, we need to win more trust, and so for that purpose, international cooperation activities, the theme of this symposium, may be effective. What do you think we need to do more in this international cooperation?

(Prof. Shinoda) Prof. Hakata, please.

(Prof. Hakata) As for thought leadership, one of the major contexts we must understand is that the battle of discourse is unfolding. China itself emphasizes the elements of “discourse.” In particular, the arena such as the UN is what they consider the *international* order, and *Pax Americana* is, according to them, the *world* order. Therefore, when China intends to control the international order, they think strongly about controlling the discourse. My presentation did not use the word “discourse,” but I it says the same idea. In terms of thought leadership, Japan has a proven track record. The question was whether Japan could make a track record in the field of international peace cooperation. Well, I believe that it should do so, but there is still a problem of political constraints. When the Self-Defense Forces withdrew from South Sudan, problems peculiar to Japan—that are difficult to understand—arose. As far as we look at the opposing views, it can be said that there is a lack of a national consensus on the dispatch or maintenance of the SDF in PKO. In such an environment, sending 300 new personnel, or 500 or 600 as in some other G7 countries, is probably not a reasonable choice given the current SDF posture. Then, by elimination, the bilateral cooperation is being contemplated as a possible approach, as we discussed today. In that regard, I also think India may be a strong partner for international peace cooperation. India is a country that ranks high in terms of numbers. It is inconceivable that, for example, Japan would be able to send several thousand people. Still, when you add up the total number of FOIPs—I understand that Australia is probably small, but by adding India to that, FOIPs as a whole are still contributing to UN PKO. Nevertheless, as there are political constraints, we take various measures regarding what we cannot do. I think we can give such an explanation.

(Prof. Shinoda) Thank you for that. Any other questions from the floor? I would like to move on to the online questions at this time. Concerning FOIP, in Japanese diplomacy, how to position international peace cooperation was a question that was raised. Following that, let us take another question that we received online for Prof. Hakata.

I will read it. Concerning whether PKO contributes to FOIP, a large number of PKO missions are in Africa from other countries. Japan’s FOIP supposedly includes the eastern coast of Africa because it faces the Indian Ocean. FOIP covers part of Africa, so FOIP should be covering the eastern coast of Africa. So, I think the PKO missions in Africa overlap with the FOIP efforts. How would being engaged in PKO in Africa be positioned in terms of pursuing FOIP? Working with the countries in Africa with whom we share values should contribute to FOIP like Japan and Vietnam, or Japan and other Indo-Pacific countries. If we conduct joint operations under the flag of the UN PKO in Africa, it may be significant for the purpose of FOIP. Also, China is supporting African PKO in terms of personnel and funding. Also, China is actively involved in the African Union and other

regional organizations that have a partnership relationship with the UN, so what kind of position should Japan take? Of course, there is this complex relationship, but from the FOIP perspective, how should Japan be engaged in international peace cooperation? Dr. Hakata, could you respond to that question?

(Prof. Hakata) In summary, I believe that the maintenance of maritime order makes the foundation of FOIP. Of course, Japan should also engage in international peace cooperation and contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of the international order centered on the UN. But I believe that what is primordial is the maritime order in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in the Western Pacific. If Japan is to directly contribute to that, for example, PKO, then defense cooperation with Vietnam will also contribute to FOIP. From a slightly different point of view, freedom of navigation operations to realize FOIP and Malabar, which is a different framework from the Quad, play a kind of preventive diplomatic role. I remember that a preventive PKO was conducted in Macedonia. Of course, military exercises are not referred to as “PKO,” but we can consider that they also play a certain kind of preventive peacekeeping role and as such, they contribute to PKO. The question led me to think in this way.

(Prof. Shinoda) Thank you. I think the last point about PKO or international peace operations is the importance of looking at peace operations or peacekeeping operations from a much broader perspective.

We have taken questions through online, but in relation to these questions, people in the hall could raise their hand for additional questions. Let me introduce another question that we received online. I believe this is one is addressed to Mr. Matsumura.

In the Asia-Pacific region, what regional framework should be and could be established in consideration of values and national interests? What do you think of emulating the cooperation, coordination, and role sharing among the PKO centers like Nordic nations in order to help promote peacekeeping operation capacity building? Do you have any insight on this, Mr. Matsumura?

(ITG Matsumura) Thank you very much. As I mentioned in passing previously, in the Indo-Pacific region, we are not ready to establish a regional organization such as the European Union or the African Union because of the diversity of this part of the world. ASEAN of course is a functioning organization, but the ASEAN members have differences of political systems or values or interests among them. So, they can act together in a loose manner, but they are not ready I believe in forming a mission, an ASEAN mission, so to speak, in order to address certain specific problems in any part of the world. ASEAN is at this stage, so we cannot do more, at least right now.

Instead of having a regional organization for addressing the standing and constant issues, perhaps issue-by-issue cooperation and collaboration among the Asian nations or ASEAN nations could be a better way – for example, addressing the Rohingya issue, although this is, at this moment, difficult because of the coup in Myanmar. I think, anyway, issue-specific cooperation would be a better way for this part of the world. The Quad is not a regional organization. The member countries of the Indo-Pacific region should broadly come more. That is why I stress the issue-specific cooperation or coordination,

It is too late if we try to form such a cooperative body when the problem arises. We should be ready. That is why I stress human rights.

Among the Western liberal nations, human rights are more strongly valued and stressed in the United States, North America, and Europe rather than Japan. I do not mean that Japan should always have identical values with Europeans and Americans, but we have a rather constant position with human rights, let us say, when we approach Asia, Africa or wherever. That way, we can gain trust from the international community and Japan would be more ready to act if a problem arises.

(Prof. Shinoda) Thank you very much. Now, ASEAN was mentioned. General Phung, we have broadened the perspective from the original title of this conference, but ASEAN is a very important regional organization. Japan's relations with ASEAN are very important. Of course, Vietnam has its own relations with ASEAN, so do you have any comments on this?

Given the situation in Myanmar and Afghanistan, what international cooperation can we form and can we do specifically? Of course, none of us has the answer to the question of what we can do for Myanmar as the situation there is very grave, but concerns I believe have been shared among all ASEAN nations and ASEAN people. Major General Phung, do you have any comments on ASEAN or ASEAN's role or ASEAN's presence on these issues that we have discussed so far?

(MG Phung) Thank you for your question. I consider that there are a lot of countries in Asia that have very vast experience on PKO. I have been Pakistan to learn from our colleagues on PKO preparation forces. Pakistan is an example of the field of UN PKO missions because Pakistan, India, and other countries have sent a lot of people that Vietnam considers that an example for us.

In the region, we have the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) that holds an annual conference. Vietnam took the presidency of IAPTC in 2019 from Thailand. We would have organized this conference in 2020, but because of the COVID-19 epidemic, we had to postpone this conference to 2022, if the conditions permit it. Also, in the framework of ASEAN, we have the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network (APCN). Vietnam assumed the presidency of this conference in 2019, too, but because of the problem of the COVID-19 epidemic, until now we have not organized this conference neither. This is a problem, but I consider that with the friendship and with the cooperation within ASEAN or Asia, member states or countries like Vietnam have learned a lot. They have sent experts and instructors to Vietnam. These countries also have been inviting Vietnam to send officers there to take courses. I think the cooperation in the area of Asia or the ASEAN region is very important for a country like Vietnam that is very new. So, I think in the future, we need to strengthen the cooperation in the framework of IAPTC or APCN in order to have more cooperation.

We have more relationships in other fields. For example, not only in training courses, but also in the field of the missions of the UN. We can share experience there or we can help each other when we have troops in the same mission or in the same area of a UN mission. Also, we can have the centers of training of some countries like Vietnam to build up as a center of excellence. I think this is a very positive way and a very good target. Vietnam promises to these friend countries to do that in the future. We are asking Japan and other counterparts and ASEAN members to help us to do that in the future. So, the cooperation in-between regional or international countries I think is very important for us to develop and to prepare our forces in order to get the target proposed by the UN. Thank you.

(Prof. Shinoda) Thank you very much, Major General Phung. Now, it is about time, so let us have the three panelists give one final word each. Based on the discussions we have heard, is there anything that you would like to add or emphasize? If possible, I hope that you will refer to the remaining questions. I would appreciate it if you could refer to the remaining questions.

For example, Prof. Hakata, in the question, it says that right now there is a growing notion about economic security, but in relationship with international peace activities, is there any approach to enhance this economic security? I believe that you can talk about this from a very wide viewpoint. Anything that you would like to add in the end?

(Prof. Hakata) I do not think the two have high relevance. Because while economic security is an approach that emphasizes the strengthening of supply chain resilience, international peace cooperation has not always been involved in those kinds of issues, and I do not think it will move in that direction. I believe it may be necessary to address them as a framework for other issues.

(Prof. Shinoda) Thank you very much. The next question is to Major General Phung. I would like to ask you to give us your final statement. This is something also I would like to ask Mr. Matsumura, but I would like to ask you to give us a comment. There is a question about the position of the United Nations.

PKO has been operated mainly by the leadership of the United Nations, and currently also the United Nations is making the best effort to operate the PKO. That has been the case, however there are so many actual operators and it is getting diversified. Rule-based international organizations – we are trying to strive for the ideal international order. In this very wide perspective, how should we view the importance of the United Nations? Probably, we should be more objective about this, but still we tend to focus on the relevance and importance of the United Nations in the PKO activities. How do you, once again, view the position of the United Nations in international peace operations? Based on that, if you can give us your final comment, we would appreciate it. Major General Phung, could you give us your final word on that prospect?

(MG Phung) Thank you for giving me the chance. I think under the flag of the UN, Vietnam has been committed to develop and carry out the PKO operations. We consider that this is the responsibility of the members of the UN like Vietnam. This is a responsibility in front of humanity. We take part in this cause in this area only for the benefit of the poor people in order to secure our environment and our peace. This is a very important target that Vietnam is committed to do with the UN and under the flag of the UN.

In the future, we consider that we can expand the number of our forces, the area that we can take part in, and the forces – for example, not only military forces, but also police and civilian. We consider that that is a very long-term commitment of Vietnam to the humanitarian activities like PKO. We are very happy and we are very proud that we are working in this area. We take this opportunity to express our thanks to the partnerships and the cooperation of some friend countries like Japan, the U.S., Korea, Australia, and the UK – a lot of countries that have been helping us. Thank you very much again for inviting me to take part in this session. Thank you very much, and good health and happiness to all. Thank you.

(Prof. Shinoda) Thank you very much. Then, Mr. Matsumura, your final comment, please.

(ITG Matsumura) Thank you very much. As for the final comment, I saw all the questions from online and I believe that everyone has a common question. One thing is, first of all, national security. Rather than partnering up with the values, probably the mainstream is that we partner up with the interests. Maybe that should be the mainstream. I believe that you all share the same question.

What I wanted to say today is that certainly that used to be the way of thinking until very recently, but these days we have the gray-zone or the hybrid warfare, and so it is the warfare of the cognitive domain that is becoming relevant. Prof. Hakata just mentioned this, China with a discourse power. They understand how the relevance of the narrative and they are sharing a lot of efforts in that. In that sense, Japan and the United States have one idea of the international order and China has another international order ideal, and they are different, so the views on the United Nations are also different. In that situation, how would you like to make an international order that is more beneficial to your side? We should really think about that, and based on that, we should think about national security.

One example is that we have the cyber domain. How do we create order in the cyber domain? There are a lot of talks about that, but there is a big difference between China and Russia on one hand, and the United States and Japan. China and Russia say that they want to have border walls and all the cyber should be controlled by each country, but Japan and the United States and others say that there should be a liberty of using the cyberspace. Then, we should also protect the privacy. This is not by the nations, but on the individual basis. In that, each person should have the liberty to use the cyberspace, and then also enable the exchange of data. It is not a wall of the nations, but to have a common mechanism, and so there is a difference of the values.

When you look at those differences, the ultimate difference is basic human rights. Do you look at it at the national level or do you look at it at the individual level? Based on that, your views about world order will change, and that is true not just for cyber, but outer space or the use of SNS and also media to exchange opinions. Regarding how to create order in those realms, Japan should make it clear that it stands on the side of those that respect individual human rights. That really leads to the interest of the state, so values and interests are not contradictory. I think one enforces the other. That is my final comment.

(Prof. Shinoda) Thank you very much. With that, we would like to conclude the general discussions. Let me just share my brief impression. There were multi-faceted and deep presentations, and also deep discussion, so I will not try to summarize the entire session, but the impression that I had throughout the session, talking about the “contribution to international peace through partnership peacekeeping: significance of international peace cooperation in the FOIP region”, when I look at this, I am an international political economist – the world situation is changing rapidly and the power relations among countries are changing and there are various incidents occurring. In this kind of a changing global environment, the significance of international peace cooperation is being impacted and is changing. It is not that it was important before, but it no longer is. It is not just the level, but there is a qualitative change in the global affairs and that is impacting everything, including international peace cooperation. I think that is the state of affairs.

When we talk about partnerships, we look at the UN, regional organizations, and nation states like Japan and Vietnam. The positioning of each will change dramatically with the change in the international situation. Of course, the UN cannot do everything, but of course you cannot say that it is better not to have the UN, so we have to understand the importance of the UN and develop a new order. For ASEAN, the EU, and FOIP, the same

thing can be said. They each have important elements, but each one of them is not going to provide stability to the global environment or to Japan. You have to use and develop these frameworks and have creative combinations of these institutions to have the maximum effect. So, partnerships between organizations, partnerships in terms of coordination between interests, and confirming shared values. That kind of work has always been important, but especially with the changing global environment, it has become even more important. That is how I see it. That is something that I was able to reconfirm strongly today.

In the general discussions, we heard from the three panelists, Prof. Hakata, Major General Phung, and Lieutenant General Matsumura. Very great contributions by all and very instructive and illuminating comments. Also, thank you for all of the stimulating questions from the audience as well. With that, I close the discussion and give the mic back to the MC.



## **CLOSING ADDRESS**

### **LTG TAJIRI Yusuke (Commandant, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense)**

At the closing of the International Peace and Security Symposium 2021, I would like to offer a few words of closing.

Thanks to your support, we were able to have a wonderful symposium today. In particular, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the keynote speaker, retired Major General Pearce of the Australian Army; the moderator, Prof. Shinoda; and the panelists, Prof. Hakata, Major General Phung of the Vietnam People's Army, and Mr. Matsumura, Former Commanding General of the Northeastern Army; as well as all the participants in this hall and online who actively participated in the discussions. Thank you so much.

Through today's keynote speech and discussions, I heard many thought-provoking and meaningful comments. Concerning international peace cooperation based on partnerships, and issues that the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces need to focus on in the future, the direction of resolution has become clearer. We will reflect your valuable opinions in our future education and training, as well as research and study, at the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center of the Joint Staff College. I hope that you also found the content of today's discussions useful in your own fields of expertise.

In closing, I would like to ask for your continued understanding and support for the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center of the Joint Staff College. With that, I would like to close my comments. Thank you very much for your time today.

The views expressed at the Symposium are those of the participants,  
and do not necessarily represent the views of their Organizations.

