


Civil-Military Coordination in Complex Emergencies (Mali)

Sophie Solomon (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Mali)

Distinguished participants, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. It is a great honor for me to deliver on behalf of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) a keynote speech at this very important forum. I would like to first thank Lieutenant General Takahashi, the Joint Staff College, and the Ministry of Defense for inviting OCHA Mali to this symposium and for their hospitality. I would like also to thank General Maqsood Ahmed for his very interesting and inspiring presentation and speech just before me.



As an introduction, I would like to present my organization, OCHA. OCHA is a part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies.

OCHA's mission is to mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian actions in partnership with national and international actors. We also advocate for the rights of people in need. We promote preparedness and we facilitate sustainable solutions.

Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination: this will be the topic of my speech today. Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (what we call in our humanitarian language UN-CMCoord) is a key component of OCHA's core coordination function. It has to be clearly differentiated from civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), which is a military function that focuses on the needs of the force and the mission. In humanitarian operations with the military presence, OCHA leads the establishment and management of interaction with military actors, which includes the coordination of military and civil defense assets (MCDA), which are sometimes deployed to support humanitarian operations.

OCHA is also the custodian of UN-CMCoord related guidelines. We have the Oslo Guidelines, which provide guidance on humanitarian civil-military coordination in a natural disaster environment. We have the MCDA guidelines, which provide guidance on humanitarian

civil-military coordination in a conflict environment, and we have the Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for a Humanitarian Convoy. In Japan, OCHA has an office in Kobe, which is headed by Mr. Masaki Watabe, who is also here today. The Kobe Office is focusing on partnership building with key Japanese partners, and Masaki is OCHA's Civil-Military Coordination Focal Point in Japan, engaging very closely with the Japanese Ministry of Defense including the Joint Staff College.

As requested by the organizers, I will start my speech with a summary of the discussions and products of the annual meeting of the Consultative Group on the Use of MCDA, which took place in Geneva in February 2014. Then I will briefly present on the ongoing civil-military coordination initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, I will elaborate on lessons learned and challenges of civil-military coordination in a conflict environment, as we are also calling 'complex emergency' in our humanitarian jargon. I will use Mali, where I am currently assigned, as a case study. I hope to elaborate on these issues further during the panel discussions also following this keynote speech.

So, let me first start with a brief explanation on my presence here today. On the 11th and 12th of February 2014, OCHA facilitated the annual meeting of the Consultative Group on the Use of MCDA where I delivered a presentation on Civil-Military Coordination in Complex Emergencies. The Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations in Geneva attended the meeting and kindly suggested my participation to this symposium.

In order for you to have a better understanding of the current issues and challenges in terms of the civil-military coordination at an international level, I will summarize the discussions we had in February in Geneva. However, before that, let me give you a bit of background on the Consultative Group platform itself. The Consultative Group on the Use of MCDA is a well-established forum, which includes civilian and military bodies of all member states, of UN agencies, the Red Cross Movement, the NGO consortia, international and regional organizations. The Consultative Group works as a platform for gathering and disseminating civil-military coordination lessons learned and best practices. The Civil Military Coordination Section of OCHA in Geneva where I used to work is the Secretariat of this group, which is currently chaired by Ambassador Toni Frisch from Switzerland. The Consultative Group used to meet once-a-year in Geneva, with extraordinary sessions as needed. In an attempt to extend its outreach, two extraordinary meetings of the Consultative Group took place in New York in 2012 and 2014. The regional consultative groups should be created in the near future, as we will see later on.

In the 2014 Consultative group meeting, a number of specific civil-military coordination themes were addressed in plenary and also in parallel sessions. Let me guide you through the findings and the salient points of this two-day event. We had a very rich agenda this year, I must

say, with discussions covering both natural disasters where we were speaking about the Typhoon Haiyan, and complex emergencies where we were speaking about Mali. Using Mali as a case study, the session on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination in Complex Emergencies allowed the audience to identify key lessons learned in the establishment of the UN-CMCoord function in a complex emergency setting. I will elaborate on this in the second part of my speech.




The audience showed particular interest and buy-in in the Community of Practice initiatives initiated by OCHA. New tools, such as a smartphone application and an online Humanitarian Dialogue platform aiming at enhancing information sharing and network building on Civil-Military Coordination, were presented. Therefore, I strongly encourage the participants here today to join this online platform if you are interested in all Civil-Military Coordination related issues.

Participants also discussed how to best coordinate foreign military assets on the ground in response to a natural disaster. The development of operational guidance and coordination platforms were proposed to better integrate foreign military assets into the overall humanitarian response operation.

Finally, the Consultative Group Forward Agenda as well as the Terms of Reference of the groups were finalized and endorsed to formalize the group as the major inter-governmental and inter-organizational platform for discussion and information sharing. The next meeting of the Consultative Group should take place early February 2015 in Geneva.

Extending the outreach of the Consultative Groups requires a regional approach. The development of regional and sub-regional strategies should be encouraged, as this approach has the advantage of including both a tailor-made and a global approach in its design. The 'neighbor helping neighbor' strategy, if well-designed and coordinated, prompts a timely and cost-effective response, while at the same time ensuring a proper application of Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines. The APC-MADRO is a good example of such a regional approach.



For those who are not aware, the Asia-Pacific Conference on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations (APC-MADRO) is a series of conferences in the Asia Pacific region, which, in the aftermath of the tsunami, has brought together military and civilian subject matter experts from over 30 regional countries and organizations through a multi-year process to contribute to the development of the Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations. The final version of these guidelines was released on October 2014 and is currently available online on the OCHA Regional Office for Asia and Pacific website. If you are interested in Civil-Military Coordination in Natural Disasters with a regional perspective, I would encourage you to refer to these guidelines.


The Asia-Pacific region shows a strong interest in Civil-Military Coordination as highlighted by the successful conclusions of the Civil-Military Coordination Workshop organized by the OCHA Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific in Bangkok on 16th and 17th of October this year. OCHA Japan participated in this event as a co-facilitator as the Japanese Ministry of Defense and the Embassy of Japan in Thailand also participated in this event. One of the outcomes of this event was the agreement to form a multi-stakeholder Regional Coordination Group on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia-Pacific. This group will be a consultative group linked to the global Consultative Group. The group will represent the major platforms for discussion and networking among regional actors and bring forward the Civil-Military Coordination Agenda in the region, including the implementation of the identified framework to achieve coordinated operational planning.

While the regional focus is obviously set on civil-military coordination in response to natural disasters, the objective of my speech today is to give you a better understanding of Civil-Military Coordination in Complex Emergencies based on my experience as a Civil-Military Coordination Officer in Mali. For the sake of clarity, I would like to introduce some concepts and principles on Civil-Military Coordination in a Complex Emergency environment.

UN-CMCoord Complex Emergencies

Complex emergency:

‘a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme.’






Let me start with the notion of ‘complex emergency’. For the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), a complex emergency is defined as, “...a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or a society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country program.” In other words, the term is generally used to differentiate humanitarian needs arising from conflict and instability from those that arise from natural disasters. In a ‘complex emergency’ setting, foreign military from individual nations, coalitions, regional organizations, or peacekeeping operations are most likely to be found, hence the need to ensure the establishment of appropriate ways of mutual engagement between military and humanitarian actors.

While coordination between military and humanitarian actors should take place whatever the context is, the Guidelines on the use of military and civil defense assets to support United Nations humanitarian activities in Complex Emergencies, also known as the MCDA Guidelines, explain that even a greater consideration should be given to the use of military and civil defense assets to support humanitarian operations in a conflict environment in order to preserve the impartiality, neutrality, and operational independence of humanitarian actors and humanitarian action. Our compliance with humanitarian principles affects our credibility and, therefore our ability to enter into negotiations with relevant actors and to establish safe access to affected populations.

In any context, whenever military and civil defense assets are requested and/or used to support humanitarian assistance, existing internationally agreed guidelines state that military and civil defense assets should be provided as a last resort, which means that there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. It should be also at no cost and at the request of or with the consent of the affected state, of course.

In these circumstances, the role of OCHA is to advise both humanitarian actors and military representatives on the appropriateness of the use of military assets to support

humanitarian activities. To summarize, in a ‘complex emergency,’ the priority and objectives of civil-military coordination is to ensure humanitarian access, the security of humanitarian aid workers and operations, and the protection of civilians.



We will see how these concepts and principles apply to a real-life context using Mali as a case study. First of all, I would like to highlight Japan’s contribution to the humanitarian response in Mali. In 2014, \$22.9 million were allocated to humanitarian response and humanitarian partners in Mali putting Japan in the third rank of all donors in Mali. In Mali, OCHA has a country office in Bamako, and three field offices in Mopti, Timbuktu, and Gao. We are there notably to strengthen emergency preparedness, to preserve and expand humanitarian space and access, and to support coordination structures at national and sub-national levels, including Civil-Military coordination structures. Lessons learned from Mali will allow us to feed our discussion with concrete examples while identifying best practices, challenges, and recommendations on civil-military coordination in complex emergencies.

Context

- **January 2013:** Serious deterioration of the security situation, when terrorist groups, with the support of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, advanced southward.
- **11 Jan. 2013:** Military operations against terrorist and associated elements are initiated under “Operation Serval”, led by France, in support of the Malian defence and security forces.
- **25 April 2013:** The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is established by Security Council resolution 2100
- **21 May 2014:** Armed confrontation between armed groups and the Malian Army resulted in a dramatic shift in the balance of power with armed groups taking hold of some key urban centers such as Kidal or Menaka
- **25 June 2014:** Security Council Extends Mandate of Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. (SC Resolution 2164)

To understand civil-military coordination in Mali, we need to understand the context in which it was initiated. On January 11, 2013, under the auspices of Security Council Resolution 2085, France began a military operation to oust the armed groups from Northern Mali. A total of, approximately, 4,000 French military troops were deployed in a challenging humanitarian context

where an acute food security and nutrition crisis was ongoing and 140,000 persons were displaced.


Forces from neighboring countries (6,300 troops) were deployed shortly as part of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). The main contributing countries for AFISMA were Nigeria, Niger, Togo, Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Chad. Under the framework of the European Union Training Mission (EUTM), 550 military personnel from 21 European countries also arrived in Bamako at the end of March 2013 to train four battalions of the Malian Army.

The multiplicity of military and humanitarian actors, at the time we had more than 90 organizations officially registered in Mali, as well as the dynamism of the situation, required the swift setting up of a UN-CMCoord mechanism to ensure appropriate coordination between the military and the civilian actors. Liaison arrangements, de-confliction of movement, information sharing, and development of country-specific policy papers were the first key elements to focus on in terms of civil-military coordination.

On the 25th of April 2013, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by Security Council resolution 2100 with an ambitious mandate including stabilization of key population centers and support for the reestablishment of state authority throughout the country, support for the national political dialogue and the electoral process, protection of civilians, promotion and protection of human rights, support for cultural preservation, support for national and international justice, and support for humanitarian assistance on which we will focus later on. The mission was established under Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations, a peace enforcement operation. Its mandate was renewed in June 2014 with the Security Council Resolution 2164.


In May 2014, the confrontation between armed groups and the Malian Army resulted in a shift in the balance of power with armed groups taking hold of some key urban centers such as Kidal or Menaka in Mali. In parallel, this year has seen a resurgence of violence in the north of the country with terrorist armed groups using asymmetric warfare against the Malian and Security Defense Forces, MINUSMA, and Barkhane, the French military actors.

Attacks against humanitarian actors are also on the rise. Almost 20 security incidents involving humanitarian actors were reported this year. The deadliest of which was on May 29, 2014 when two of our Norwegian Refugee Council colleagues were killed as their car hit a remote-controlled improvised explosive device (IED) in the Timbuktu region. This was the first time that humanitarian workers were killed on duty in Mali since the beginning of the crisis in 2012. Other incidents including hijacking of humanitarian vehicles, direct threats to staff, and physical denial of access are also reported.



In November 2014, according to OCHA, we have 157 humanitarian organizations registered in all including UN agencies, international and national NGOs, the Red Cross Movement, and International organizations. These humanitarian actors are sharing their operational environment with approximately 1,000 French troops, 8,500 peacekeepers, 500 European Union Training Mission troops, mainly trainers, and the Malian Security Defense Forces. Therefore, there is a great diversity of actors that we need to coordinate and to liaise together.

The multiplicity of stakeholders required the establishment of solid civil-military coordination mechanisms. Let me guide you through the different mechanisms and procedures in place in Mali to facilitate a liaison and coordination between humanitarian and military actors. Humanitarian civil-military coordination in Mali focuses on the following elements: liaison arrangement, policy development, operational coordination, and training.



A civil-military coordination cell chaired by OCHA was established in Bamako at the end of January 2013. This cell is a platform aiming at ensuring regular liaison between humanitarian actors and the military forces. It allows regular information sharing, ensures efficient and optimal functioning of the de-confliction mechanism, and identifies all specific humanitarian or security issues that could be the object of discussion between humanitarian actors and armed forces. It could be security, protection of civilians, and so on.

The cell meets on a weekly basis and is composed of the following participants: all military actors present in Mali, the Malian Security Defense Forces, and MINUSMA. Therefore, the main interlocutor is the CIMIC component. We have the French army, Serval first, but now Barkhane, and the European Union Training Mission. These are all the military forces. We have also key civilian participants that you can see there with OCHA doing the liaison for the humanitarian community. Civil-military coordination cells are now functional in Bamako, but also in Mopti, Gao, and Timbuktu.

Following the French intervention and the deployment of a multiplicity of military actors, there was a need to develop, also, a clear policy regarding the use of military and civil defense assets, the interaction between the humanitarian community and the militaries, and also to establish a clear interaction between both communities. The humanitarian community developed a country-specific operational guidance on the use of military and civil defense assets to support humanitarian operations and a position paper on the interaction between the humanitarian community and armed forces present in Mali. These documents, endorsed in 2013, guide up to now the interaction between civilian and military people.

The coexistence strategy that was developed in these guidelines was clearly essential for the humanitarian community. The coexistence strategy implies minimum interaction between the military and the humanitarian community. For instance, military actors are not invited to attend humanitarian meetings. At an operational level, civil-military coordination includes mediation on key civil-military coordination issues. For example, there was an uncoordinated vaccination campaign launched by military actors in Gao in early 2014, or the distribution of humanitarian mine risk education leaflets by humanitarian actors in the Timbuktu region in 2013. This was the kind of the activity that requires mediation from the humanitarian community.

The OCHA Civil-Military Coordination Unit is also participating in the development and maintenance of a de-confliction mechanism allowing humanitarian actors to notify their movements to military actors. This de-confliction mechanism was initiated by the French army and is currently managed by the Mission.


Finally, I would like to raise your attention on the importance of training to ensure appropriate and efficient civil-military relations in the field. For a smooth interaction between humanitarian and military actors, we do believe that training sessions are necessary to better understand the mandates, the principle, and modus operandi of the different actors. Since January 2014, OCHA trained more than 2,600 persons including 70% of militaries. OCHA is also participating in the training program of EUTM, MINUSMA, and the Peacekeeping School of Bamako. At the international level, OCHA is reinforcing its partnership with DPKO through the delivery of training of trainers.

Best practices

- Early engagement and early deployments of UN-CMCoord officers
- Adequate information sharing
- Transparency and coordination in the design and implementation of Quick Impact Projects



Based on my experience as UN-CMCoord Officer in Mali, I would like to share some lessons learned and best practices that could easily be replicated to other contexts and missions. Early engagement and early deployment of UN-CMCoord officers is essential. While early engagement favors confidence, and early deployment ensures that the most appropriate coordination mechanisms are set up. For example, OCHA liaised with the French military forces in the very first day of their intervention to share key information on both humanitarian and military intent, presence, and future deployments. This early liaison resulted in the establishment of the de-confliction mechanism even before CIMIC and CMCoord officers were deployed on the ground. Adequate information sharing contributed to the reinforcement of coordination mechanisms. In Mali, thanks to the notification of movements, military actors are aware of humanitarian flight schedules, for example, and can ensure the security of the secondary airfields accordingly.



Let me show you also some maps to illustrate how information sharing can contribute to better coordination. To inform military planning, humanitarian actors mapped the area to be secured in priority from a humanitarian perspective. These maps were shared with MINUSMA to influence, if I may say, the military planning in a way that would support humanitarian assistance as mentioned by the Security Council Resolution.


To avoid duplication of efforts and ensure consistency of relief efforts, we also do believe that transparency and coordination is essential, notably in the design and implementation of Quick Impact Projects. Quick Impact Projects are small-scale, rapidly-implemented projects, generally with a maximum of \$50,000 to be implemented within six months. These projects are generally used by UN Peacekeeping missions to establish and build confidence in the mission and its mandate.

In Mali, Quick Impact Projects include rehabilitation and equipment of police stations, reparation of water points, income generating activities, and so on. Sharing project proposals sufficiently in advance with the humanitarian community proved to be essential in Mali. OCHA, as a permanent member of the Project Review Committee of the mission, receives all the projects and consults with the humanitarian community. This coordination mechanism is specific to peacekeeping mission has been extended to other military actors in Mali.

Despite obvious success factors in terms of civil-military coordination, humanitarian and military actors are still facing a certain number of contextual, operational, organizational, and structural challenges.

Peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance are two clearly distinct forms of action with different objectives and priorities. Because of the robust mandate of the mission and the punctual collaboration with French militaries, most of the humanitarian's actors are reluctant to become included in what they may consider a political agenda. MINUSMA has been accused by some people of being partial and an extension of the Malian security apparatus. Peacekeepers are now clearly targeted by asymmetric attacks in Northern Mali.

By maintaining a distinct identity from the mission, humanitarian actors believe that they are more susceptible to obtain and sustain humanitarian access. Coordination between humanitarian and military actors is, therefore, limited and I must say, unfortunately, almost nonexistent in Kidal, for example in Northern Mali where OCHA is not permanently present.




Security Council Resolution 2164, that you can see here on the slide, mentions that

MINUSMA must, “...contribute to the creation of a secure environment for the safe, civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance, in accordance with humanitarian principles.” MINUSMA still has to reach its full human and equipment capacity, as it was mentioned before by General Maqsood Ahmed. We have currently 75% more or less of the troops deployed so far, and the mission is facing numerous challenges in fulfilling this part of the mandate due to the lack of troops and also lack of equipment.

Radical armed groups have reorganized since the 2013 French-supported military intervention, and MINUSMA has now become one of their main targets. In this context it is difficult for humanitarian actors to rely on MINUSMA to support the creation of a safe and secure environment.

In the absence of a conducive and secured environment, MINUSMA is proposing armed escorts to secure humanitarian operations. Though some UN agencies may have, in some cases, used such armed escorts, this contradicts the international humanitarian guidelines on the use of armed escorts and endangers the neutrality and independence of humanitarian actors.



Competition over resources has been identified as a challenge in terms of civil-military coordination. The setting up of a peacekeeping mission requires sufficient logistic capacities to absorb the arrival of troops. In northern Mali, because of the lack of infrastructure some contingents had to occupy some schools or other public facilities upon arrival, de facto disrupting access to basic social services and creating dissatisfaction among local population and humanitarian partners involved in education. The water footprint of military actors has also been criticized by numerous actors in areas where water availability is already low.

In May 2014, when clashes occurred between Malian forces and armed groups, some civilians sought refuge in MINUSMA camps. While the situation cannot be compared to South Sudan where some camps can host up to 20,000 IDPs, the presence of civilians in needs for protection, shelter, food and water in MINUSMA camps was a major challenge for the mission, which was not prepared to respond to this humanitarian and protection crisis. More needs to be

done in terms of contingency planning and coordination with humanitarian actors in this regard.

The turn-over and the frequent rotation of troops implies constant training to ensure that military actors are aware of humanitarian principles and concepts and are kept abreast of the latest humanitarian developments. Pre-deployment and induction training courses are essential to ensure that all troops deployed on the ground have the same understanding of civil-military coordination.

In Mali, the re-hatting of troops from AFISMA to MINUSMA resulted in a heterogeneous military community with a great variety of understanding of what is civil-military coordination and how to implement it. Because the CIMIC culture is not widespread among some of the troop contributing countries, some CIMIC officers have no background in civil-military coordination or cooperation, which hampered coordination with humanitarian actors.

Coordination with military actors is, of course, essential, but not sufficient in Mali. In addition to the military actors, the humanitarians have to coordinate with armed groups to ensure humanitarian access and advocate for humanitarian principles, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and protection of civilians. While coordination between humanitarian and military actors is quite structured, coordination with armed groups has to be strengthened and clarified.

In Mali, OCHA is engaged in humanitarian negotiations with armed groups at operational and strategic levels. Coordination structures have been set up in Menaka and Kidal and training/sensitization sessions on humanitarian principles, humanitarian space, and access are regularly delivered. A guidance note on humanitarian negotiations with armed groups was also developed and endorsed by the Humanitarian Country Team a few months ago.

In October 2014, senior OCHA staff participated in the peace talks in Algiers to seek for commitment from all parties to include relevant wording on humanitarian access, International Humanitarian Law, and protection of civilians in the final version of the peace agreement.

Finally, the military is regularly tempted to use 'winning hearts and minds' activities to ensure the local population's allegiance and support. The participation of the military in humanitarian-type activities while serving a tactical purpose is challenging and may blur the line between military and humanitarian activities. From a humanitarian perspective, these types of projects are problematic when used to gain the loyalty of the local population. It jeopardizes the perception of neutrality of humanitarian assistance and therefore puts at risk the humanitarian actors. Humanitarians are not the only ones targeted as a result of the aid being used to serve strategic goals. The affected people could also be endangered and their villages attacked in retaliation for 'collaborating' with the so-called enemy. Quick Impact Projects should, therefore, be carefully designed, coordinated, and implemented. These challenges are substantial, but not impossible to overcome.

Recommendations

- Be aware of existing in-country humanitarian guidelines on civil-military coordination/interaction;
- Ensure that adequate resources are available for the mission to carry out its duty;
- Develop joint military/humanitarian contingency plan on specific issues (protection, use of MCDA, security, etc.) – if relevant and feasible;
- QIPs: favor infrastructure support over direct assistance.



To conclude my speech, let me propose some recommendations. Whatever the context is, support to humanitarian actors should be done in respect with their principles and guidelines. Armed escorts, for example, cannot be imposed on them even if it seems to be the most appropriate solution from a military perspective.

To avoid competition over resources and to ensure the availability of sufficient capacities to guarantee a safe and secure environment to humanitarian actors, more has to be done to equip peacekeeping missions with the resources they need to carry out their mandate.

Joint humanitarian/military contingency plans need to be developed in missions where civilians may seek refuge in military compounds.

Pre-deployment and induction training should systematically include a CIMIC and a CMCoord component to ensure a better understanding of humanitarian action. Missions also need to ensure that appropriate skills and resources are available internally to ensure that civil-military coordination principles are mainstreamed within the mission.

In a complex emergency setting, military actors should favor infrastructure support activities over direct assistance. Coordination with humanitarian actors should clearly be a pre-requisite to the implementation of Quick Impact Projects to avoid incoherence and/or duplication of efforts.

If feasible, developing joint Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines and/or Standard Operational Procedures on the use of military assets on security and so on with humanitarian actors could also be recommended to facilitate coordination and ensure consistency and sustainability in the implementation of agreed Civil-Military Coordination Procedures.

To conclude, in a complex emergency setting like Mali, Civil-Military Coordination and the implementation of UN-CMCoord principles are crucial to ensure the security of humanitarian personnel and operations, and maintaining humanitarian access to the affected population. Effective, coherent, and consistent Civil-Military Coordination is a shared responsibility, essential to safeguarding humanitarian principles and humanitarian space. Whatever the context, a

minimum level of coordination is required and OCHA fully acknowledges that a continuous and robust dialogue between the military and humanitarian actors, both on the ground and at the headquarter level, is essential.



Thank you very much for your kind attention.