

Panel Discussion

Moderator: Toshiya Hoshino (Osaka University)

Panelists: Robert Gordon (Major General (retired))

Yukie Osa (Association for Aide and Relief, Japan)

Kiyotaka Kawabata (DPA/United Nations)

Tomoya Kamino (Gifu University)

(Hoshino) I think the audience by now is very clear. First of all, there is an irony because there is a group of people, both UN and the non-UN, like Professor Osa, who try to do a very good thing for the people there, but they can be targeted maybe because of working closely with the integrated mission. That is why we need to think about solving this dilemma, integration on one side and independence on the other side. At the same time, politics which is always the root cause of the conflict but the humanitarian activities to deal with the consequence of the political conflicts. Those are the very difficult and complex situations.

The two presentations made us understand better on the benefits of being in the part of the integrated approach and the benefit of being outside of the integrated approach. By discussing these questions probably we will not be able to find a 100% answer, but some sort of direction what kind of balance is necessary to have this integration question.

So, I would like to invite General Gordon and Professor Kawabata to the floor and comment on anything that those two presentations made to the floor to kick-off the discussion part of the program. Can I have General Gordon to respond or react to the two presentations which we have just heard?

(Gordon) Thanks to both the speakers that have articulated difficult issues very clearly. There are no easy solutions. But I think the wrong approach always is to think that this is a zero-sum issue: that more integration leads to more humanitarian space infringement, because I must admit, I do not see it in that way. There is a certainly a relationship, an inverse relationship which you can track between the level of local consent for an intervention by the international community and the ability to integrate. Where the level of consent for international intervention is high, such as in the case of a natural disaster, then integration is reasonably simple, but where there is opposition to international intervention, be it a peacekeeping mission or any other intervention, then it becomes more and more difficult for integration to take place because of this issue of independence and humanitarian space. If we understand that, I think we begin to understand the issue better.

Unfortunately, I believe that the spoiler groups, whose interests are not necessarily aligned with peace and stability, understand this as well. They have read the manual of counterinsurgency and realize that this whole issue is about winning the hearts and the minds of the people on the ground. You win their hearts and minds by providing their basic needs to them yourself. And if some other

international organization is doing that, whether it is an international organization or any other national organization that does not belong to you, then you will do something about that and you start either taking them hostage or you kill them and make it impossible for them to operate. This leads to a withdrawal of humanitarians.

And so the graph which tracks the relationship between the ability to integrate against the issue of consent starts turning the other way when the environment becomes so hostile, that it is very difficult for humanitarians to operate, and all those dilemmas that the good doctor has identified then take place. You tend to use local staff or you have to operate under some degree of protection from any security element that is there, whether it is a UN Peacekeeping operation or not. We do need to understand that dynamic as well.

We get hung up on vocabulary. We have heard the vocabulary of independence. We have heard the vocabulary of impartiality. This word impartiality means something completely different for UN Peacekeeping than it does for humanitarians and yet we use this word interchangeably. For peacekeepers, impartiality is impartiality to the mandate and if people are working against a peace process, then you take action against them. That is very different from the humanitarian meaning of impartiality, which meets need, wherever that need is and irrespective of politics, race, religion and gender. Vocabulary is important and we often get confused on these issues.

Although I think there is a basic tension in this system, I think that this is a healthy tension and I think there will always be tension between political imperatives and humanitarian needs. Just as there is tension between a political process and a process of justice, and reconciliation, so there are tensions in this very complex business of international intervention in support of peace. This issue of humanitarian tension with political/military activity is just one example. It has to be overcome by a good understanding of each other's needs. It does not have to be zero-sum.

If you do understand what the humanitarians need and the military stop doing things that look like humanitarian activity - because that really confuses local people - and leave humanitarian activity to humanitarians. When the military deal with security issues and political people deal with political issues, then these things can get resolved on the ground through good cooperation and coordination. But you cannot get good cooperation and coordination on the ground unless you have integrated mechanisms that enable that.

I do not see that integration automatically leads to an alienation of humanitarian space. I think you can only get a real understanding of the needs of humanitarians by better cooperation and coordination which is another way of saying better integration. It is difficult to do this when you have strategic-level arguments between Geneva and New York. But this tension is more easily reconcilable in the field where you are all sharing the same issues, which are ultimately about trying to protect people, protect their security and protect their humanitarian needs.

(Hoshino) Is that correct to say that in order to have better integration in each sector; those involved in the politics and the humanitarian and military activities have to be very professional? I think I am saying something very obvious, but sometimes that NGOs who are not professional and there are some people in the military, who are not professional, do some wrong things that spark the local conflicts and provoke the very delicate difficult situations. After hearing your comment, yes, there is no zero-sum, but at the same that those working on the ground have to be professional in various sense. That is one of the impressions I got.

(Gordon) And understand each other's principles, understand humanitarian principles.

(Hoshino) Understand each other's principles, yes. Thank you. Professor Kawabata, do you have any immediate reactions to those two presentations?

(Kawabata) My immediate reaction to Professor Osa is yes or the two speakers are that we should always remind ourselves what is the purpose of the integrated missions. In the past, we do not have to talk about the integration. Humanitarian operations are humanitarian operations, developmental operations are developmental operations. But it was only after the emergence or the realization that we really have to combine peacekeeping operations with peacemaking and that makes it necessary for us to talk about integration. That is the one purpose for the integration which is nation-building. Humanitarian operation alone is not enough to even save people as Professor Osa put it and the balancing of the principles and the operational guidelines among the divergent groups, the only purpose for us to talk about the integration is that there is a definite need for us to build the nation after the post-conflict situation.

Having said that, yes, integration is easy to be said, but difficult to be done. The agencies, as I had pointed out in the morning, are operating independently, in this case financially and administratively, and sometimes some donors try to influence those specific agencies and even the NGOs and that makes a dangerous room for the parties to manipulate and to make the ultimate purpose of integration less effective. That is one point for me to make.

Also, the dilemma we have to have is that on many occasions, yes, we intervene in a conflict situation on many occasions for humanitarian reasons. But then after we decide to intervene, we realize the ultimate way for us to leave that country in stable peace. We have no choice to build the nation which is very difficult in terms of priorities, in terms of the time to accomplish things which is different things than humanitarian activities.

For Professor Osa's presentation, my initial reaction is, yes, we need the NGOs to be a part of us. If we are talking about nation-building, the NGOs are the integral and the indispensable part of the whole overall international activity to help the nation to be independent. I understand the situation,

the stance of the ICRC which is a kind of a distinctive organization which tries to be independent from anyone all the time or at any time. That is the reason why the ICRC is respected even at the height of the fighting. But it seems to me rather exception than a general rule. If possible, any other organizations; humanitarian, human rights, rule of law organizations, be they the UN or the NGO, NPO, it is ideal for us to get together and work for the same purpose.

The issue about the NGOs in terms of the UN perspective is whether or not we should invite NGOs in a decision-making process. Then the NGOs, many NGOs want to be included in the UN decision-making process. But, of course, the difficult question is sometimes we have to ask what is the legitimacy so to say, or mainly the UN is intergovernmental organizations, we represent member states, and the NGOs are more private organizations and sometimes we have the problem inviting NGOs in decision making in the given UN operations.

Lastly, as far as the NGOs in Japan are concerned, my personal concern is that the scale and the number of the people who are engaged in the NGO activities in Japanese is still very small compared with the European or the American NGOs. The people working for the Japanese NGOs are usually very young. It is difficult for us to see people in their 40s or 50s in Japanese NGOs. We, in this case Japan, have to create more stable career-oriented NGO system so that they can better integrate themselves into the overall UN system. That is my view.

(Hoshino) Thank you very much, Professor Kawabata. I would like to have some comments from two previous presentators and then I would like to open the floor to some questions and comments from your side.

Now, Professor Kawabata said from the UN standpoint that NGO is an indispensable part, particularly for these very complex multifaceted nation-building activities and even invited you, Professor Osa, to be a part of this decision-making process. But from the NGO standpoint, there must be so many things. You might want the United Nations agencies to improve or to reform or something. If there is any request from the NGO side to the UN system, probably this is the opportunity to say a few comments in this regard and I would like to have some comment also from Professor Kamino. First, Professor Osa, please.

(Osa) For the NGO community, I think that especially for the Japanese NGOs, we are more or less practical, even if it is the civil-military cooperation too. This UN system is if the mission is perceived as more neutral or impartial, like a natural disaster thing, then that we are ready to work more with UN. But when it is very complex and a controversial system, we will be, I am not sure. It is really the case-by-case and then if the situation allows I think that Japanese NGOs are ready to do that.

Then, more stable and career-oriented system, that is what we, the Japanese NGOs are wishing

now. For example, my organization is in 33rd year since it was established. Then, we have now almost 100 Japanese staffs and 550 or more local staffs. There will be more 30s and 40s staff. The number of these kinds of NGOs is increasing, but not enough. So, we will do our best.

Then, for the general's comment that this is not a zero-sum issue is a very important lesson to learn and thank you so much.

(Kamino) Thank you. I agree with General Gordon. General Gordon says that the relationship between the level of consent from local people and ability of United Nations Integration Approach is more important. I agree with the point. I think that there is no standard model of United Nations Integrated Approach. The functions, purposes, and forms of UN Integrated Approach depend on the local people and local armed conflicts and local people, local situation. I think the level of integration depends on support from local people and groups and communities. The hostile situation between the UN missions and local people makes UN Integration Approach so hard, so difficult to attain.

The purpose of UN Integration Approach also depends on local armed groups and local community and local people. In the situation of emergency, we need to give humanitarian assistance. The UN Integrated Approach should have the priority to save people, but the situation is getting better. Professor Kawabata said that the purpose of the UN Integration Approach moved to the more peacebuilding assistance. The UN Integration Approach depends on the situation of local people, local armed groups.

(Kawabata) The level of the effective UN operation depends on the consent of the local people. Yes, I agree to an extent. But at the same time I have to point out what is the local population, local people. In many conflict situations, the local population is very much politicized. It is really unfortunate. I know that many people in a country like Japan or European countries, the critics in those countries tells us that why we are not utilizing the civil society, for example, for creating making peace and stabilizing the peace. Why you are talking to the bad guys all the time, those who are with the guns.

Our answer is that it is so unfortunate that we simply cannot find the civil society in a conflict situation. There are local people but they are so much politicized. Even in Afghanistan we went to the refugee camps, IDP camps in the hope that we will be finding the so-called independent moderate Afghans who could be the counterweight against those with the guns. But themselves are divided along the political lines. I am quite sure that you can always depend on the consent of the local people. What I am trying to say is in some occasion, in some cases in the process of a nation-building, you have to be confrontational. That is the reason why we are here. We mean, in this case, the political section.

(Hoshino) Thank you very much. Since the title of the whole symposium is The “Challenges” in UN Integrated Mission, so that somehow our attention goes to more or less negative or difficult side of the integration and the situations are certainly very tense and severe. If we look at the eastern sector of the Democratic Republic of Congo, as we speak, for instance, another new level group called M23 and others who are doing a lot of aggressive, atrocious works, and so forth. We cannot be so optimistic about it. But there are certain reasons to have this integrated approach. I would be tempted to ask if any of you to have episodes or examples of integrated approach, a positive side of the equation.

(Gordon) An integrated approach is an attempt to get coherence amongst the international community, as represented by the UN family, in their efforts to support a peace process, a wider peace process, a sustainable peace process which, as we both said, is a process that tries to get at the root causes of conflict. You do not do that with military components. You do that with developmental, political and humanitarian actors.

I think what Professor Kamino mentioned which I really would like to stress is the importance of this Integrated Strategic Framework, which is quite a new concept. This is all the actors getting together, including the host nation, and working out what it is that needs to be done by the international community in partnership with the host nation. This is what we mean by an integration process, which does not mean that the political and military start interfering in humanitarian issues. What it does mean is that those voices are heard when you come to decide what the activities are that you need to undertake, voices which can help deconflict potential conflicts and articulate priorities.

If I can just pick up one last point, there is this nice point that UN Peacekeeping is very state-ist. It deals with governments. It deals with the high level echelon of the host nation. It tends not to deal with civil society because it is not designed or resourced to do that; and yet the people who deal with civil society tend to be from the humanitarian and developmental part of the wider UN family. Therefore, if we do not have this integrated approach, we will just deal at the state level, which quite often is the major cause of the problem, and fail to have sufficient visibility of the issues on the ground within civil society, a visibility which good humanitarian and developmental actors do have.

That is why we have to work together to stop this purely statist approach and have a much better understanding and mechanism to deal with the societal issues of nation-building which go from the individual, through the community right up to a government we are trying to support, a government incidentally which may not be particularly respectful of the human rights of its people. There are dilemmas in this. But unless we do constantly work together and hear that humanitarian voice, hear that developmental voice and try and work together, we look incoherent. I think the answer to your

question professor, is to ask another question: what is the possible case for non-integration? Because that seems to be going backwards.

(Kawabata) The good thing about the integrated concept and the integrated mission is that we finally will be able to talk about it. Just 20 years ago, it was a taboo in the United Nations. As I have indicated repeatedly, the political activities, the peacekeeping activities, humanitarian activities, and developmental activities were supposed to be separate. Just 20 years ago, when the world is divided between the east and west and this is a quite new phenomenon as General Gordon indicated.

It might be imperfect or immature, but we have finally started talking about the integrated mission with the ultimate purpose of a nation-building, the real comprehensive approach and that is a start but there is so much confusion among ourselves, among the member states, among the institutes, including NGOs what to do, what independence, neutrality, or impartiality means. There are many things that we have to sort out. But this is the right direction and a good start, I believe.

Q&A

(Hoshino) Thank you. Now I would like to open the floor for some questions or comments. Before that, I would like to raise one question to General Gordon or others who will be willing to answer that is the best way to integrate our activities is to understand each other, you pointed out, and I think you partly answered this question, but what would be the best way to understand each other, probably working together I think itself is a learning process to understand each other. Are there any ideas or practices which can promote understandings, mutual understanding in this regard, to pursue common goals of nation-building or peace-building, so that will make this process of integration more effective. That is a kind of general question I would like to pose right now to General or others who are willing to respond to it.

But at the same time I would like to open the floor for some questions or comments on this kind of discussion of integration or integrated mission of the United Nations. Please do not hesitate to come forward with questions or comments.

(Q1) I am Takeda, a student at the Joint Staff College.

I learned a lot from this precious presentation. But there are a lot of different forms of joint mission and this really depends on the case. The representative from NGO talked about independence and even if you believe in what you do, but sometimes it may be imposing something on to others so I am not sure if that is actually in line with the purpose of the NGO.

And I have a question to Professor Kamino. You are talking about joint mission of the UN, but then why is it that each of the agencies of the UN is not working in a joint fashion. In my personal

view, it may be just a matter of leadership. If I can ask for your view on that, that will be appreciated.

(Hoshino) Any other questions or comments? I would like to take several questions at a time before asking them to answer those questions.

(Q2) I am Ikeda from Ground Research and Development Command.

I learned a lot about approaches and measures being taken in the field and I really appreciate that insight. Talking about joint mission, as Professor Kawabata said that the humanitarian and human rights aspect is a focal point. The necessity of joint mission is well understood by everybody, including NGOs and the international community will need to make efforts to achieve this joint mission. But the problem is how you go about doing this. What is being discussed now and also the papers from Secretary-General of the UN, looking at those, it is still in the process of building the framework of joint mission. What needs to be discussed is how you actually do this joint mission and how to combine those efforts.

My question is the following, our operational forces are in the field and what is the end state and is there any roadmap towards that end state as you combine your efforts in this joint mission because I am under the impression that this has yet to be worked out? From the joint mission of the UN, this has to be transferred to the mission of the host country or the mission or operation that would take advantage of the local civil societies. There has to be some roadmap that is very clear to the people in the field and that is very important for a joint mission and there needs to be a political initiative that is more reinforced. This would apply both for the central command and also the people in the field. If anybody can answer those questions or share with us their views.

(Hoshino) I would like to take one more question, then ask the four panel members to take up those questions before concluding this panel. There are two hands up. I would like to recognize those two people to ask the questions very briefly.

(Q3) My name is Yasuda. Thank you very much for very precious presentations.

In this joint mission or concept of joint mission what concerns me is the following: For what purpose the joint mission should be done? As Professor Kawabata said, nation-building may be one, but for what is this necessary because there is a matter of local ownership and local ownership should be there in nation-building. As you go through this discussion, in the local ownership the people in the field or local people, how to get these people involved depends on capacity of the local people. Capacity building is essential in this regard. I would like to ask for each one of the panel members to share their views with us.

(Q4) My name is Onaka. I am in PKO Department, Sudan, or I used to be in that department and the protection of civilians was even made clearer in this discussion today because talking about protection of civilians, the mission of PKO can get closer to the view points of the local residents.

I have a question to General Gordon. I think what we are experiencing, for example, in South Sudan these days is that the source of tensions are not so much now intergovernmental, but also what we are seeing is this vicious cycle of violence among the tribes, among ethnic groups. Once we lost a common enemy, now we see the cycle of violence at the local levels. My question now is that how can we break this cycle of violence and also how are we approaching the issue of mindset.

(Hoshino) Thank you very much. There are some questions directed to each one of the panelists. I would like to invite Professor Kawabata, General Gordon, Professor Osa, and Professor Kamino in that order. Please give your final words for this panel, including the comments and answer to the questions from the floor.

(Kawabata) Thank you. There are two questions addressed to me, integrated mission and national building, what is the end status, how do you bring this to an end. The other person asked about local ownership, how it gets involved. I think those are the questions of similar nature.

The ultimate end state of nation-building is to leave the stable government behind so that former conflict nation could be independent and this is about developmental assistance. Of course development assistance will need to be there, but without direct intervention by PKO, the country has to be self-reliant. What does this stable government mean in that context? It does not necessarily mean the dictatorship or some skewed small group of people monopolizes the power. A more democratic government needs to be established instead and that is where the UN has to come in to help. That is humanitarian assistance and human rights and election-assistance and rule of law. Those will be the keywords.

To that end within the framework of peacekeeping operations, the peacebuilding or rebuilding of the nation that would have been inconceivable in the past would be also in the scope and the local ownership, talking about local ownership, if the end state is to have a self-reliant, stable, and democratic government in place then the local ownership is undoubtedly important. However, on the other hand, local ownership is not just about capacity building.

As I pointed out in my presentation this morning, after the conflict the new government comes in and it does not necessarily mean that a new government represents the majority of the nation or the new government is originally democratic forces. If there is any work for us to be done politically, we can become a bridge between the government and the public and for that purpose elections have to be held and also there is an issue of human rights. It is not just protecting the rights of

individuals, but by protecting the human rights of individuals you can have the democracy sink in.

Of course, the local ownership, from the local ownership point of view, there is a resistance because it just happens that one force has won these conflicts and then they would like to hold on to their power. But, if they go into elections, they may lose and the human rights, no, never.

There were the ethnic group conflicts or inter-ethnic conflicts. Be it Sudan or other nations with conflicts, of course you would like to protect the human rights of your own ethnic group, but people tend to say that there is no human rights recognized for anti-government forces. We have to intervene in that mindset as part of humanitarian assistance. There is something that can only be done within the framework of peacekeeping operations. We will not impose obvious pressure, but the future government form is still in a chaotic state and in order to help them to get closer to a democratic form, the joint mission of the UN could come in and that could be the final purpose of the mission.

(Gordon) Thank you. I will be quite quick. But there are a number of issues that arose there. The first question: Why do not agencies work together? I think you can just look at the national context. Nationally, I am sure that the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs all have their own different issues, even in Japanese society, and it is exactly the same within the UN agencies. These are separate fiefdoms and they are concerned about their funding, their responsibilities, and their power base. This is incredibly sterile, but it is true and it happens, and even the Department of Political Affairs has major issues with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and there is tension between those departments, unhealthy tensions, unnecessary tensions, wasteful tensions. But that is a political fact of organizational life, and we must live with it.

I think when it comes down to the field, as I said before, then the coordination mechanisms are much easier to manage. To give Professor Hoshino an answer, the sort of example is the joint protection teams that are operating now in Eastern Congo, where you have security who may be military or may be armed police or may be community police officers going with humanitarian officers, with the political and civil affairs officers, around the communities, all with the single aim of the protection of civilians. But understanding that protection of civilians is a comprehensive activity, from providing security to providing the basic needs of life while having someone of their same gender to talk to them about womens' issues. That sort of joint approach which can be done right down at the ground level and then can be reflected upwards at mission level is an example of how you can work together respecting each other's responsibilities and their differences, but working together in the same environment. That is really what we mean by integration.

I think Yasuda-san's question about capacity building, has already been extremely well answered. I will just add the one other ingredient which is perseverance. This is a long-term activity and,

unfortunately, politically we all have masters who are often short-term in their approach and so national interest is short-term. It is driven by elections or political fashion but the countries we are trying to help need a long-term, sustained engagement. Trying to get that balance right is something that is a challenge for us all.

Turning to Onaka-san's question, which is a very pointed question about the issue of South Sudan. I have no real solutions to the issue of South Sudan, except to say we knew when we went into this, that the essential elements of a successful state there did not yet exist. But that was the political decision that took place. Unfortunately, both sides of the border between North and South Sudan are using proxies in each other's countries to continue this conflict despite a comprehensive peace agreement and these proxies are causing problems. Now there will be no solution to this until both sides, coming back to this issue of political will, have the political will and intent to actually deal with peace.

I was in Lebanon recently and looking at the UN mission down in Southern Lebanon. As you know Lebanese society is very sectarian, depending on which confessional faith you follow and there are differences between these confessional faiths. And yet if you go and ask the women in South Lebanon, what are the issues of security that concern them, they have nothing to do with faith or their confessional, they are all to do with basic simple issues of family security, like the ability to get water, the ability to send kids to school without being interfered with etc. These basic simple things we can lose sight of, which is why we need integrated missions to keep our focus on these issues. I am afraid that until South Sudan starts dealing with these issues and the women of South Sudan say enough, we want security at our basic level, we will not have sustainable solutions.

(Kawabata) Just one word concerning this nation-building. It takes a long time that was mentioned and it is true, it takes a long time. We are talking about the integrated missions, so international society has embarked on this integrated mission. But the time that we are involved in a country is 5 years, 10 years at longest. In Afghanistan, we have been there 10 years and the international society is very frustrated, they want to withdraw as early as possible. But, for a nation state to become independent to get onto its feet and start walking, it takes generations; 10, 20, 30, 40 years. In terms of the match with the aim of the integrated mission, the time that the international society allows these kinds of activities, there is a big gap between what is necessary and what is possible.

To talk about Japan, we started from the Meiji Restoration and today we have now a democratic and a stable society. It took about 150 years for us to achieve this stage. We experienced many wars, we killed people, and our people were killed. The same with Europe; in the middle of 17th century, they established a Westphalia system and after four centuries they were finally able to achieve this stable European system. This situation in international society, we are asking these

conflict countries to get the things right in 10, 20 years. Where we have taken centuries, we are asking them to do it in a few years because we do not have the time or the money to continue to support you. That is what we are saying and that is our dilemma.

(Osa) Two points I would like to say. First, the NGO activities. You may think we are pushy but we become more mature and if we just try to force something on to other people, then we will not be able to continue. We do coordination amongst the groups and the donors; they will not give money to selfishly-acting NGOs.

When is it that the NGOs are integrated and I said case-by-case earlier, but it depends on the situation, the circumstance at the time, and the other point is that we need to listen to the local voices, who are the residents. There should be a consistency with what we are doing and what is needed and if it is the UN that is doing the work, then they just listen to the top level government representatives and sometimes that does not benefit the people. At that time, it may be difficult for the NGOs to take part in the integrated effort. But, if the integrated mission is aiming for something that is consistent with what we are aiming for, then we are happy to participate. I think that will be the stance of the NGOs.

Who are the local people? That is a perpetual issue for us because we really cannot get the true sentiment of the people because we always have to ask through the interpreter or we talk with a local resident who speaks English, which is an abnormal person. He is not a mainstream local resident and he or she is a special unique person or foreigners who speak local language. He or she influences the interpretation of the residents' voices. As long as we work through interpreters, we may never hear the true voices of the local residents. How do we understand the local people's need? That is always a problem for us. We need to be cognizant that we have achieved so little and I think that recognition can lead to some better solution.

(Kamino) In terms of integrated mission, why is it that the various UN agencies cannot be integrated. Maybe there is a lack of leadership; that was one of the questions. When you go back to the principles, why are administrative bodies separate if they are one, is it always more efficient, not necessarily so. Sometimes, it is more efficient to be separate. It is not necessarily a good idea to combine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense. We have to think why are they separate. I think that is the perspective you need.

Also, 2 years ago from the cabinet office, there was a study about the US response to natural disasters, administrative and civilian NGO organizations, how do they respond to natural disaster. National Response Framework is what they studied and everything works under that framework in the US. That is very different from the integrated mission, however here desperate organizations are working towards the same goal. There was this framework in the US and so the Cabinet Office

asked us to study that matter and we did a report about that.

There are separate organizations, but putting together a strategy towards a common goal, I think that is one way to go. As Ikeda-san mentioned, in terms of integration it is not necessarily so that we just integrate the organizations, methodologies are important. There are many ways to do it, but we can learn from the US example or some other examples where such similar efforts are made.

(Hoshino) Well, we went a little bit over time. But, with that I would like to end the panel discussion. I think we had a very rich discussion and I think we had some frank exchange of views and we had very pointed questions from the audience which enriched the discussion further. My thanks to all of you and so let us show appreciation to all the panelists for their great contributions. Thank you very much.