

Special Lecture

Challenges in Integrated Mission from UN's Point of View

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I will discuss political aspects of the PKO policy decisions, with special emphasis on the Security Council perspectives. I will then discuss issues related to Integrated Missions. Especially, I will explain to you procedural and operational issues of Integrated Missions as well as their political background.

1. Introduction

I have been working for the United Nations for 24 years. My direct involvement with the peacekeeping operations started 18 years ago in the summer of 1994.

A civil war broke out in Rwanda, a tiny hilly country in central Africa, in April of that year. It was not merely a civil strife as it involved an ethnic cleansing of gigantic magnitude. At that time, UNAMID, a traditional peacekeeping operation based on the parties' consent, was deployed in Rwanda. However, this 2,700-strong PKO was in no way be able to cope with the full-scale conflict coupled with the intentional executions of the Tutsi minority ethnic group as well as moderate Hutus. The magnitude of the killing was totally beyond the thinking and the thoughts of the United Nations at that time.

The Security Council, at that time, was in disarray. They could not cope with that situation. I was involved in that process at the Security Council. From the very beginning, the consent of the parties had gone away, so the United States and the United Kingdom demanded that UNAMIR be withdrawn immediately. On the other hand, small and medium-sized members of the Council, particularly those from African, insisted that the UN should reinforce the Mission in order to save the innocent people from being slaughtered. After serious discussions, the Council decided in late April to scale down UNAMIR to 270 troops. The decision was tantamount to a de fact withdrawal of a PKO in the face of genocide. Indeed, the withdrawal of the peacekeepers helped accelerate the massacre which spread out of control from Kigali, the capital, to the entire country.

The spread of the killings prompted international outcry, which in turn created pressure on the United Nations to act. In a turnaround of its initial decision, the Security Council decided in the following month that the peacekeepers be increased significantly to 5,500. However, the Council's responses were reactive at best to the fast-evolving crisis. While a decision was made to reinforce UNAMIR, there were no Member States which had volunteered to send troops into an active war zone. After prolonged negotiations with potential troop-contributors, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali succeeded in securing commitments by several African nations to provide the United Nations with enough troops. However, it turned out that those African troops were

poorly equipped. Out of desperation, the United States and other Western powers proposed that they provide the peacekeepers with armored personnel carriers (APCs) and other necessary equipment. Nevertheless, the African troops did not know how to operate these APCs. So, time simply passed idly.

While members of the Security Council spent a lot of time discussing and wavering, the massacre spread and countless lives were lost before the eyes of the international community. After the futile attempts to enhance UNAMIR, the Security Council decided in June to dispatch a French-led multilateral force to stop the killing. However, when the advanced contingent of France entered into southern Rwanda in late June, the massacre was already over as the culprits, both Hutu-led Government forces and pro-government militias, had been defeated by the Tutsi-led forces. During those 3 months of UN inaction, as many as 800,000 or 10% of the total population were said to have been killed. Had this happened in Japan, the entire population of Tokyo would have been terminated within a short 3 months' period of time.

In early August 1994, I was sent to Kigali from UN Headquarters in New York as a political adviser. There, I witnessed the horrendous, heart-wrenching remnants of the genocide. It was really haunting. I remained convinced to the date that in an extreme situation like genocide, the international community has to stand firm and stop such atrocities by using all necessary means, including force. This is because if the international community is not able to prevent such a crime of massive scale, it may lose credibility and be regarded as useless.

The massacre eventually ended in that country. For several years since then, UN PKOs suffered a kind of identity crisis. Total number of PKO personnel plummeted from its peak of over 70,000 in the early 1990s to below 20,000 in the second half of the 1990s. At that time, some critics regarded the United Nations in general, and PKOs in particular, as totally useless. Some insisted that UN PKOs should strictly adhere to the so-called traditional peacekeeping principles - namely, the consent of parties, neutrality and non-use of force with the exception of self-defense. These principles were developed within the political constraints during the Cold War. Some maintained that the United Nations should never try again the grand idea of enforcing peace. Those were discussions that were very active in the late 1990s in New York.

However, in the meanwhile, regional conflicts continued to break out in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. The United Nations soon realized that it was simply beyond the capability of the traditional PKOs to deal with those new conflicts at their early stage, where parties were eager to fight on with little intention to welcome a UN intervention. What should be done? What can be done? After so many trials and errors, a new generation of PKOs with limited enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter started to emerge at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s.

The so-called Brahimi Report was issued in 2000. Mr. Brahimi and I worked together for

peacemaking effort in Afghanistan between 1997 and 1999. That effort was in a deadlock because of the rise of the Taliban. It was decided that Brahimi should be sidelined for some time as the negotiator, and he was called back to New York. During his "hiatus", he was given a new assignment to review the peacekeeping operations. It took one year for him to draft this report. Immediately after the publication of this report, the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred in the United States, so the situation in Afghanistan changed drastically as the United States started preparing to oust the Taliban. For the first time in decades, the international community started to cast a serious eye to the "orphan conflict". The United Nations peace effort started to make real progress and culminated in the Bonn Peace Conference in December of that year, in which both Brahimi and I attended.

Thanks to the Brahimi report, PKOs were able to make a renewed progress once again. The early attempt to enforce peace in Somalia was regarded as a failure because the United Nations had unwittingly become a party to the conflict. If an active military operation is necessary like Somalia, it has become the trend for the Security Council to use a multinational force. But for an intermediate-type situation that does not fit either traditional PKOs or multinational forces, the United Nations found it necessary to deploy robust peacekeeping operations with limited enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The introduction of the concept of "robust peacekeeping" helped revive the UN peacekeeping operations. The number of PKOs started to rise since 1999, with total number of peacekeepers exceeding a record 100,000 in these days. When combined with civilian personnel, total number of those involved in PKOs worldwide exceeds 120,000 today. The scale of the operations was second to the United States in terms of the size of the military personnel deployed worldwide.



In addition to the limited enforcement mandate, all types of tasks had been added to these new generation PKOs. Can you imagine where the above photograph was taken? This was taken in Ivory Coast, where former president Gbagbo was defeated in the UN-supported election held in late 2011. Mr. Gbagbo refused to accept the election result certified by the United Nations. Moreover, his force and followers threatened to attack a hotel in April last year where UN troops were protecting the newly elected president. When pro-Gbagbo forces aimed mortars and other heavy weapons at this Golf Hotel, Secretary General Ban decided to order UNOCI to take a pre-emptive strike in order to neutralize those weapons. The UN pre-emptive attack, set the stronghold of the pro-Gbagbo forces on fire, as this picture shows. The pre-emptive attack might be an extreme example of the robust peacekeeping and thus remains controversial even among members of the Security Council. But, in any way, UN PKOs have come to this.

2. Characteristics of PKO

2.1. Not Found in the UN Charter

Now, UN Peacekeeping Operations. I have nothing more to add to what General Gordon already said. One of the most remarkable characteristics of UN PKOs is that there is no legally binding definition of UN PKOs. The UN founders did not anticipate PKOs. This was the reason why the UN Charter does not mention PKOs at all. Sixty-seven years ago, the drafters of the Charter envisioned the creation of UN forces, but it did not materialize due to the onset of the Cold War, which divided permanent members of the Security Council over every aspect of the Council's role in maintaining international peace and security. However, they needed to do something as conflict never stopped emerging. They could not just sit back. This was the background where the concept of peacekeeping operations was "invented" in order to break the deadlock. In other words, UN PKOs were a product of "political improvisation". This was the reason why, even today, we do not have the definition of PKOs.

2.2. Political Process

Therefore, PKOs are essentially a political, not legal, product. As such, PKOs do not work if there is little political will on the part of Member States. If Member States intend to use PKOs as a "fig leaf" to conceal their lack of political will, then the peacekeeping operations are doomed to fail, as in the case of Somalia and Bosnia.

The latest example of such a failure was the UN operation dispatched to Syria in April 2012 to monitor a non-existent ceasefire. 300 monitors were deployed. However, the Security Council that authorized that and especially its permanent members were divided deeply over how to deal with the Syrian conflict. While the United States and other Western powers calling for pressure on the Assad regime on one hand, Russia and China are refusing to take any coercive measure.

With Council members deeply divided and unable to provide the United Nations with sufficient political backing, the UN mission did not have a chance. On August 19th it had to withdraw completely without achieving the intended results.

2.3. Evolving Concept

UN peacekeeping operations are an evolving concept. This is the reason why the United Nations only have guidance and principles on PKOs, but not legal definition. Looking back at the past PKOs, these people have just assumed that this is what the peacekeeping operations would be like.

The concept of PKO keeps changing in accordance with the political realities and constraints of any given time. The concept of Integrated Missions, which is the theme of this symposium, is not exception. It is therefore wrong for any of you to assume that there is a solid definition of Integrated Missions, which will keep changing. You can just cut from one perspective, then you can come up with one definition, but this would keep changing. Political constraints and political will of Member States will play the key role in contouring what Peacekeeping Operations in general, and Integrated Missions in particular, would mean in the future.

3. New Generation PKO

Talking about the new generation of peacekeeping operations or contemporary peacekeeping operations, I think this was already explained in the earlier speech. Unlike the traditional PKOs which were to deal with an inter-state conflict, the new generation PKOs are aimed at a civil war or an internal conflict within the national borders. Another characteristic of the new generation PKOs is that they tend to be dispatched at the initial stage of conflict, where warring parties are eager to continue fighting with little interest in agreeing on a ceasefire.

During the cold war period, there were certain peacekeeping operations which could be characterized as the prototype of what we call the Integrated Mission now. The cases in point are Cambodia and Namibia. However, what is different from the peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and Namibia is that they were able to wait 20 years and 30 years and the parties to the conflicts got worn out. But there is no such patience anymore on the part of the international community. After the Cold War, Member States tended to ask the United Nations to dispatch peacekeeping operations immediately after the breakout of a conflict, even though there is no ceasefire agreement and the parties have little intention to cooperate with an intervening UN mission. When the warring parties are intent on keep fighting, it is almost impossible for the United Nations to secure an effective ceasefire and cooperation. If you were the parties to the conflict and were convinced that you would win in this conflict, if the UN comes to intervene, it is just a hindrance to your goal. There is no consent from the parties to the conflict and even if there is, it is quite superficial and there is no ceasefire established. Therefore, it is very difficult to

maintain neutrality. The UN was pushed out into a situation where three principles of traditional peacekeeping operations are quite difficult to maintain.

That is the background in which the new generation PKOs have emerged. In order to stabilize fragile peace, you need to have proactive operations and have to be able to sufficient room to make judgments on the spot.

The PKO, in its infancy, was quite limited in its mandate and back then they were just doing ceasefire monitoring and separation of forces. Just to have the presence with the blue helmet, they were able to play the role.

4. Characteristics of “Robust PKO”

4.1. Consent of the Parties

Let me explain more specifically. The robust PKO is characterized as follows: First of all, like the traditional PKOs, the UN needs to secure the consent from parties in principle. However, in the case of the new generation PKOs, the UN does not have to obtain consent from all parties. All what they need is the consent of the "major parties". Such major parties included the host government and main anti-government forces. The new generation PKOs do not need consent from "spoilers", such as small groups of criminals and guerilla forces.

4.2. Rules for the Use of Force

With regard to the rules for the use of force, if there is authorization by the Security Council and also if there is a consent from the hosting country or main parties, the new generation PKOs are allowed to use force to implemented authorized mandate. However, such use of force is limited to the tactical level. In other words, it is intended to deter, but not defeat, hostile forces. For instance, peacekeepers could use for to prevent the obstruction of the mission's mandate or protect civilians under imminent threat.

4.3 Scope of the Use of Force

The target of this use of force is spoilers, a small group of people who are intent on obstructing the task of UN peacekeeping operations. Also there should be clear text in the resolution of UN Security Council about the scope of this use of force.

4.4 Purpose of the Use of Force

There are several examples of the use of force beyond self-defense. For instance, ONUB and MONUC are authorized to use of force suppress or remove obstructions to the UN-sponsored political process.

The second example are UNAMIL, UNAMID, UNAMIL, UNAMID, UNISFA and UNMISS which are authorized to use force to protect humanitarian workers and to ensure their freedom of movement.

The third example is MONUC/MONUSCO, which are authorized to use force to support the

DRC Government force in disarming armed rebels. MINUSTAH is allowed to use force in support of the Haitian police force. This was because the Haitian national police was not able to eliminate the criminal organizations in the slum area in Port-au-Prince and this has been always a critical factor in instability of Haiti for the past 20 years. Haitian national police was not able to control the situation on its own, so MINUSTAH helped it in cracking down on organized crime, which is quite one of rare examples.

The forth example is the use of force to protect civilians under imminent threat. This protection mandate has become very common among the new generation PKOs. Today, most new generation PKOs have such mandate. Amongst the 15 currently ongoing peacekeeping operations, 8 have the protection of civilians mandate under Article VII of the UN Charter.

5. Political Interests Concerning Integration

5.1. Points of Agreement

Regarding political interests concerning integration, there is firm agreement among member states that there should be peacebuilding from the early phases of peacekeeping to prevent the recurrence of conflicts to solidify the foundation for the peace.

Especially the time immediately after the end of conflict is a golden time for peacebuilding, this is the words that US representatives often like to use. When you do emergency medical assistance, you are carried by an ambulance to the hospital. After the incidence, several hours are the key. The rate of recovery of the patient is quite high; if you treat on the patient immediately after the accident. That holds true for conflicts between countries. After the conflict, if you do not just the peacekeeping, but also you start the peacebuilding effort, that should be effective. That would help to consolidate peace. The probability that peace will be consolidated will be much higher, that is the thinking. On this point, I think that there is broad agreement amongst almost all of the member states.

By deploying PKO forces, you can apply a certain amount of political pressure to the host country to reconstruct the nation based on international standards. This is not often talked about. But the significance of doing this simultaneously is that you have this international force there and you have this silent political pressure applied to this newly established or establishing government.

Peacebuilding may be a comfortable term, but conflict countries have almost no experience in the human rights, democratization or election support. Especially the forces that won in the conflict really do not want to embark on those efforts. For the international society, the best way to sort of force the governments to take up those issues is to do it at the time immediately after the end of conflict. So, if you can apply this kind of silent political pressure that should be effective. There are areas where you cannot see improvement just by giving funds or money.

Now, look at this from the reverse view. After the end of conflict, the security is still unstable and you cannot just rely on the civilians or the UN country team. There is that concern that in the early phases of peace, security situation is still unstable and you cannot rely on just the civilians.

5.2. Points of Disagreement

5.2.1. True Intent of the Western Countries

These are the true intent of the western nations. That is to encourage human rights and democracy and spread the universal western values that should lead to elimination of dictatorships in Africa and Middle East. That should promote the establishment of west-leaning democratic governments. Also, by integrating PKO, they expand the scope of coverage of the Security Council. Human rights and democracy, previously, were not within the scope of security but through the Security Council, the western countries can enforce these ideas. So, this is an idea well understood by the western countries in the Security Council.

For example, in the Libya or Syria crisis, the Security Council is in a stalemate. What do US, UK and France do with these opponent members? There is political gridlock, so they try to take a different approach, take a different path. They talk about the human right situation in Syria. They are requested to report about that. They say the humanitarian situation in Syria is poor in the combat areas. Medical supplies and food is not reaching those areas. That should be reported to the informal meeting of the Security Council. That kind of thing has become regular activities.

For some time after the end of the Cold War, these were taboo issues. If you do those things, it was understood that non-western members of the Security Council will complain. They would say, "Where in the charter does it say the Security Council has jurisdiction over the human rights and the humanitarian issues?" However, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are deemed to be inseparable, so 20 years after the cold war, the international community and the Security Council have come to agree that those two are inseparable. With that as a background, the non-western Security Council members can no longer deny such activities.

In terms of stabilization and democratization of the conflict countries, protection of human rights, gender equality, and election support and development of the civil society, is understood to diminish the hotbed for Islam extremists. It is said that it should suppress international terrorism in the long run, so that is the intent of the western countries.

5.2.2. Interests of China and Russia

For this integrated mission, does everyone agree? The answer is not necessarily so. Although, not publicly said, there is concern that the integrated approach leads to interference in domestic affairs and infringement of sovereignty under the name of human rights and democracy. In the Syria crisis, the Security Council was divided in half. I think that reflects

such sentiment.

Also, if the authority of the Security Council is expanded, as I said in the previous page, then there could be a larger room to have intervention in those issues directly related to your interests. The interest of China has turned toward Myanmar and Tibet, and Russia has an interest in Caucasia. Currently, the situation is not the Security Council would directly intervene, but with the integrated mission now being done mainly in Africa. If that should spread globally, then it could come to affect the area of your concern. There is that political concern within the Security Council that the integrated missions will lead to intervention in the areas of concern.

Also there are the geopolitical concerns. Peacebuilding is fine, but you are doing this in Libya and Syria and before you know it, you have west-leaning governments established in these countries, that we cannot accept would be the position of the non-western countries.

5.2.3. Interests of Non-Aligned Nations

It is not just the China and Russia who have these concerns. There are concerns about the domination by major powers through the Security Council. Amongst the Security Council members, currently India and South Africa are members of the Security Council and they represent the unaligned movement. Until last year, Brazil was also a member. They do not squarely oppose a specific conflict resolution PKO. They do not oppose election support. They do not say that they oppose integration per se, but they do not wholeheartedly support the promotion of the integration of the peace support operations. I think you need to keep that in the back of your mind.

Secondly, democracy, human rights are talked about, but there is a concern that they are western values. We tend to think that we are talking about universal values. We tend to have that misconception or illusion, but in this world, those are not necessarily fully accepted by all countries. UN is a global institution, so when you are talking about the UN, you have to always keep that in mind that what some view as universal values are not necessarily so.

By spreading human rights and democracy, this could lead to the weakening of the governments who are dictatorship or kingdoms in Africa or Middle East. There are less democracies and more kingdoms and dictatorships. They overwhelm in terms of number. For them, integrated mission is fine if it is being done somewhere far away but they say, "Do not bring it to us. Do not do it here or around here." The devil is in the details. They agree with the concept but they do not like that to be introduced to their region. That is what I feel is the sentiment of these countries when I am in New York.

6. Challenges in Integrated Mission

6.1. Conflict Between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

To make it very clear, I gave a very provocative title; there is a conflict between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Do the two go well together? For the reasons that I mentioned, integrating peace activities is necessary and it is a good cause but if you look at the actual contents of what you are doing, there is a need to have a political resolution of civil war and also there is human right and humanitarian activities that try to eliminate the political factors, so there is conflict between the two.

For peacekeeping, you need to apply pressure to the government and through the Security Council sometimes you have to confront the government for military and political purposes. But on the other end of the spectrum are the human rights and humanitarian activists, they are looking at the general public and they cannot be active away from the people, so they want to eliminate the political character. That means they avoid unnecessary conflict, so they have to be in contact with the people and they have to be able to maintain their activity. That is the nature of humanitarian activities. In terms of objective and methods, there are differences between the political and military objectives and the humanitarian activities.

The priorities are different as well. For military and political efforts, you confront the government or the insurgency group. Against the Taliban, we conducted the sanctions and my human rights colleagues came to complain, "What have you done? Because we have these cooperative relations with Taliban, we are able to help the Afghan people. You, the political people simply take the sanction route very easily but you cannot help the people through that approach." This is the result of difference in priorities. We think that as long as Taliban takes those harsh measures, they could never be peace in Afghanistan.

The human rights, humanitarian personnel try to avoid conflict with the authority and they maintain a distance with the military and political forces. They do not want to become too close with the military forces. That is because they are trying to help the people and if they are too close with the military, it would inhibit their activities. I think that is one aspect that we see. It is not which is right, which is wrong. Their work or their mission is different, that is the reason why we have this kind of difference.

There is a difference in how much time it should take to achieve the goal. For the military and political objectives, it is relatively short term. You need to maintain ceasefire and you need to promote political processes. For the ceasefires, we need weeks or months. For the political process, even in Afghanistan, it was a 2 and a half-year process. That was a slow process establishing the transitional authority, a transitional government, and slowly they tried to enhance the legitimacy of the government. At the end of the 2 and a half-year period, the political process was concluded and full-fledged Karzai administration was established. We worked towards that goal and we said we would leave within 2 and a half years, so that is the scope of the duration of the work there.

But for humanitarian and human rights activities, it is much longer. If you talk about nation-building, it would require a minimum of 5 to 10 years. Although we are talking under the same roof of the integrated mission, the time that you need to remain under that roof is different by each family member who lives in that same house, so there is that conflict there.

There are also differences in organization, military and political departments. They are under the Secretary General's command; therefore, each mission, they are under the SRSG's command or Force Commander's command and the Line of Command is very clear.

But for the humanitarian and human rights organizations, the aid-giving organizations, I think, you know if you studied UN system, it is very disparate and each of the agencies have different budgets, separate personnel authority. The Security General does not have the authority to punish these organizations. They are impacted by specific donors. So we need to sort out these differences between the military and the civilian organizations.

6.2. Relationship with the Concerned Parties

In the relationship with the concerned parties, we need to talk about national ownership. Not in the case of peacekeeping but in terms of peacebuilding, we need to respect the intent of the host country because the UN must eventually exit from the country.

But the issue here is that you cannot necessarily do what you aim for. When you have this new government that has just been established, it is very rare that they are democratic from the very beginning. They do not necessarily represent the people broadly. They may just have won the civil wars so they have come to power, so they reflect just one of the opinions in the country. If human rights, democratization, and rule of law may lead to strengthening the anti-government forces, the government may not cooperate. Also, the government may selectively cooperate with the PKO Mission. In the case of DRC, there was the SSR reorganizing the national army. They said they did not want that to be touched and they did not want the UN to do that. They wanted some European country to be involved that were close to them so that they could do them freely. That seems to be a selfish stance. Burundi was not so eager to engage the anti-government forces. One UN representative negotiated hard but there was the contact from the military administration and they said they do not want that UN representative. So you have that kind of dilemma.

The same can be said of the anti-government forces. If the parties withdraw the consent then PKO must withdraw, that was true in Chad and DRC. Especially in Chad, the UN PKO had to withdraw without completing the mission. In the Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE), because of a lack of cooperation from Eritrea, they had to withdraw.

6.3. Challenges in the Use of Force

What are the challenges in the use of force? Of course, there are certain rules that have to be played by the use of force but the discussion is yet to be taken place concerning its relations between the use of force and also the role of peacekeepers in nation-building efforts. The rules and

the consent and understandings are yet to be formed in the case of POC, etc.

Also, when it comes to how and when and to what degree peacekeepers should play a role in protecting civilians, there are no criteria or standards to keep for them.

In fact, protection of the civilians from the kidnapping and the robbery and the rapes are the roles of the police primarily, though the PKO personnel are mandated to protect civilians. The crack down on demonstrations needs certain proper training but the military personnel have not trained for such roles with exception of some countries. In most peacekeeping operations, peacekeepers are not used to how to arrest people and how to use the certain degree of force in retaining, in keeping down riots.

Also, there are no clear-cut criteria and standard as to how to prioritize in the efforts to protect civilians. The case in point is Darfur, for example. Khartoum regime oppressed the Darfur and peacekeepers should try to keep good relations with the government in Khartoum or should they accept the possibility that they need to have to confront with the regime in the capital. Even PKO under the Article 7 of the UN Charter would face more challenges.

6.4. Change of the Guidelines

I would like to mention one important point as to the change of the guidelines for peacekeeping activities. In the traditional PKO, neutrality was one of the important three principles to keep but in a robust peacekeeping operation, impartiality takes precedence or it has the priority. Because of this impartiality, the peacekeepers and their commanders are expected to make a more discretion themselves at a critical moment.

For example, under the neutrality doctrine, the certain distance has to be kept between party A and party B. Let us say that the party A is very cooperative with the UN and they keep certain discipline but party B give the UN only the lip service and committing the murders, the killings, some disrupting or the subversive activities behind. However, the peacekeepers or the UN have to keep the same distance vis-à-vis party A and party B. But with this principle, impartiality, even though in principle, the UN has to keep the equal distance with these two groups, if group B continues to commit the human rights violations, then harsher measures are allowed to be taken by the UN toward party B. This is the line of thinking that is getting more weight.

That means that the peacekeepers and the commanders are expected to make to make their own judgment significantly more than before. They have to consider the consequences of their discretionary decisions, what kind of the peace process might take place and in what situation peacekeepers might be called for. Such a situation or such possibilities have to be considered constantly. The Force Commanders cannot be looked to always for their opinions in such a case. The robust peacekeeping operation is closely connected with Integrated Mission, and requires more complex expertise and skills.

Q&A

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| <p>Q1</p> | <p>My name is Tanaka from the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office. Thank you very much for your very interesting presentation.</p> <p>As you said toward the end of your lecture, the discretions or the more independent decisions are required and also I have a question with regard to the relationship between that and the use of force. Of course, even though there are certain safeguards through these of course, such a criteria as to the use of force is still ambiguous, so if you refer to the mandates and the roles of the peacekeepers, sometimes the independent decision in the field might not be very effective, particularly with regard to the use of force. What kind of the postmortem review system is established?</p> <p>If the troops of contributing countries have reached the certain standard as to the decisions to use force, are there any discussions within the Security Council in order to have the possible potential to unify the standards, so to speak amongst the troops of contributing countries?</p> |
| <p>A1</p> | <p>As I said at the outset, there are no established criteria in the UN. There are guidelines and principles that you can refer to but they themselves keep changing, as we speak. There is Lessons Learned team that is looking back at the both successes and failures of the past peacekeeping operations so that they can incorporate those lessons into future operations.</p> <p>But, on the other hand, if you go too much, there was some failure in Congo. Several years ago in assisting national troops, the peacekeeping operators were surrounding the village which was the stronghold of anti-government forces. The government forces went in and forced them to disarm. UN troops were surrounding this and Indian attack helicopters were providing close air support. But 50 anti-government forces were killed in this process. This was beyond the mandate of peacekeeping operations. That was what was raised as a question back then. I do not think that much excess is now the case. If there is obvious violation of disciplinary rules, responsibility will attribute to TCC. But if this was done as part of the mandate execution, the responsibility would reside with the Secretary General.</p> |
| <p>Comment (Gordon)</p> | <p>There are no criteria, except the criteria of the principles of use of force for the UN which we have discussed but that does not help you on the ground. What helps you on the ground is international humanitarian law and that is criteria, and then the rules of engagement which is criteria.</p> |

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| | <p>Now, the problem is that very few member states spend time in training their people on international humanitarian law and on the rules of engagement they should and should not be using. This means that on the ground, it is subjected to too much interpretation but not because the principles, the guidelines, and the criteria are not clear. It is because the commanders and their soldiers are not clear. No one in the UN has been criticized for excess use of force. Many, many commanders are criticized for not using force when they should have used force when it was their responsibility to use force to protect civilians.</p> <p>This means that in order to interpret this environment, you have to have commanders who understand the political consequences of using force. Too often, we have people in the field who do not understand these political consequences and so what happens is they do nothing. It is much easier to do nothing if you are confused than to do something. Therefore, people continue to be killed under the watch of the United Nations and this is not good.</p> <p>So, the answer is we have to have better training and better understanding on these criteria of international humanitarian law and the rules of engagement. There are quite clear criteria but people do not understand them.</p> |
| <p>Supplementary Explanation (Kawabata)</p> | <p>If I may add one more thing to this issue of the use of force, yes we have to be efficient, yes we have to be, in certain cases, proactive. But at the same time you have to keep in your mind that you cannot continue using force in a host country which is in a transition. If you continued to help the country's police capacity and military capacity, inevitably you will create dependency.</p> <p>The case in point is Haiti. We have been there for 20 years and the MINUSTAH is the 5th peacekeeping operations that we have sent to that country. Every time we help the Haitian authorities in terms of ensuring security, four times in the past we failed. At the bottom, the problem is we have created a dependency. Eventually, Haitians have to be independent. They have to take care of their own country. The same applies to Africa and any other regions. We can help but it is temporary, not forever. That is another dilemma that we are facing when it comes to the use of force.</p> |