Keynote Speech
The Challenges of UN Peacekeeping
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I always like to start this issue of peacekeeping with this slide, which, in many ways, tells us a lot about peacekeeping because it actually speaks to the frustrations of peacekeeping, the uncertain mandates of peacekeeping, the lack of knowledge of rules of engagement about peacekeeping, and ultimately, the need for a united and strong Security Council, because they are the last resort for peacekeepers.

When we have Security Council Resolutions, and we will be talking about that later in the symposium, which are not clear where there is ambiguity, where people do not understand their mandate, people die in the field, and so it is important that this issue of really understanding what we are trying to do to avoid this sort of issue is essential.

This cartoon came from UNPROFOR days, and so it is a historical view of peacekeeping. However, what we have seen in Syria in last summer may well look a little like that. So, have we learned the lessons of peacekeeping or are we trying to return to this situation where we are sending peacekeepers who are ill-equipped, uncertain mandate into an area of conflict where there is no peace to keep? But something must be done and so the concept of something needing to be done is always something that drives peacekeeping.
In The Beginning

- **UN Charter**
- **Traditional PK.** Started in 1948 in Middle East. Response to inter-state conflict

**Characteristics**
Support ceasefires and buffer zones by inter-positioning; observe, verify, report missions; principally static military (led) tasks. 3 traditional principles as doctrinal base.

- **UN Nineties Nadir.** End of cold war (SC able to act). Also shift from inter-state to intra-state conflict. Little PK capacity and no peace to keep. Rwanda, Som, FRY led to doctrinal rethink – Agenda for Peace - Brahimi Report.

- **Multi-Dimensional or Contemporary PK.** Response to intra-state conflict

**Characteristics**

Very quickly, I want to just track how peacekeeping has developed so that we can look at this issue of integration. I will not go through the UN charter, because time does not allow me, but I just want to talk about how peacekeeping started which, of course, started in 1948 with the birth of the State of Israel. In our morning papers today, we see this problem is still around with the difficulties that the State of Israel has with its neighbors. This was interstate conflict and the response to that was traditional peacekeeping, which was about supporting ceasefires, it was about buffer zones, it was about observing, verifying, reporting, sending notes back to the Security Council that one side had done something, which was outside the ceasefire arrangements. If there was any doctrinal base to this form of peacekeeping, it was those old principles identified by men like Ralph Bunche, Dag Hammarskjöld, Lester Pearson, which were those principles of neutrality or impartialities – we now call it – non-use of force except in self-defense and the consent of the two parties to the war. Of course, therefore, that allowed for lightly-armed peacekeepers, with the consent of both parties, to observe ceasefire lines.

This was a very, very different requirement to what then ensued in the world. With the end of the Cold War, with the ability suddenly of the Security Council to pass resolutions in a way that they had not been able to pass before during the Cold War because of the veto, suddenly the Security Council found itself able to pass resolutions and passed many resolutions with many tasks. Tasks, which were trying to deal with this new paradigm of conflict, which was intrastate conflict or civil...
war but with mechanisms of peacekeeping which was still rooted in traditional peacekeeping.

It is not surprising that when the UN was called to deal with these conflicts in places like Rwanda, Somalia, and the former Republic of Yugoslavia, that there was a degree – and I am being polite here – of uncertainty about what it is the UN were meant to be doing. There was no clear mandate. There were no clear rules of engagement. There were uncertain and complicated resolutions asking these peacekeepers to do many, many things without any degree of prioritization. It is not surprising that I call this period the Nadir of the UN in the 90s. Nadir is a word, which can be translated as the low point of UN Peacekeeping.

It did require a major shift. Boutros Boutros-Ghali started that process with his Agenda for Peace, looking at how better UN could undertake international interventions in this changed paradigm of conflict of intrastate conflict, taken up later by Lakhdar Brahimi in his famous, in 2000, the Brahimi Report and no doubt we will hear more about that in due course. This set the time what was not regarded as a doctrinal rethink, but now with the hindsight of history, we can see that it was a major rethink on UN Peacekeeping Doctrine, a major shift, and what emerged from that shift was what we now call multidimensional or integrated peacekeeping, contemporary peacekeeping. You could say that that became doctrinalized in 2000 with the Brahimi Report and, of course, this form of peacekeeping was a response to civil war, intrastate conflict, helping member states, nation states struggle with their authority over their own areas of responsibility trying to regain state authority in the areas of conflict.

**Multi-Dimensional or Contemporary PK.**

**Characteristics:** response to intra-state conflict;

- manoeuverist not static - dealing with whole state (protecting space not line);
- supports parties and comprehensive peace agreements;
- complex lines of operation (political, security, humanitarian, developmental) and complex mandates;
- integration of civilian and security tasks under one political command;
- Focus on POC means increasing use of Chap VII by SC to mandate up to lethal force to protect civilians using “all necessary means”.

**Is conflict paradigm changing again? Our response?**

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If we look at the characteristics of that form of peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping, we will see that they are very, very different from traditional peacekeeping. Now, our problem is that not all member states involved in UN Peacekeeping have understood this change in paradigm of conflict. So, we do still get uncertainty, but if we look at the characteristics of this multidimensional peacekeeping, we will see that they are manoeuvrist – I say this manoeuvrist, not static. They are not about intra-positioning. They are not about reporting lines between two warring states. They are about dealing with the whole state, maneuvering mentally with the state as well as maneuvering physically throughout the whole area of the state. It is about protecting space and people, not just about protecting lines between two warring states.

A very different approach from the start, it is about supporting comprehensive peace agreements and supporting parties in their adherence to those peace agreements. By definition, therefore, it has many lines of activity – I call them lines of operation – things to do, political things to do, humanitarian, developmental, as well as security issues.

They are characterized by very complex mandates. MONUSCO itself, which is the current mission in the DRC of Congo, has 45 different tasks given to it by the Security Council to undertake. Complex mandates – how do you prioritize issues that need to be dealt with? It is about, fundamentally, the integration of all those many, many civilian tasks, those tasks that actually get at the root causes of conflict being integrated with those security tasks that allow for those civilian tasks to take place in an environment of reasonable security.

Again, that is a very different approach from traditional peacekeeping, and significantly, all of this put together in an integrated way under one political command, under the leadership of a special representative of the Secretary General who is chosen for his or her political acumen; his or her ability to operate in this highly complex political environment.

Of course, increasingly this focus on protection of civilians means that the old comfort where we had Chapter VI missions, which were to do with consent and being nice and kind to people and Chapter VII missions, which were to do with using force, that became blurred, because increasingly the Security Council would call upon Chapter VII Article 42 of the UN Charter to give international legitimacy and law to peacekeepers to use up to lethal force or all necessary means in order to protect people who were suffering from conflict.

A major shift in focus from separating one state from another state to actually protecting people; men, women, and children who were dying or having their human rights violently abused through conflict. A major shift in emphasis on peacekeeping from traditional peacekeeping. A shift, as I said earlier, which not all member states, who are involved in peacekeeping, have understood, and mentally, they are still locked into the old traditional peacekeeping under Chapter VI.

I am putting this out to you that the paradigm of conflict is changing again, and what we are
seeing now is conflict and people dying from conflict – conflict driven by issues such as non-state actors working for criminal reasons. If we look at the spread of conflict from Afghanistan round through areas in the Middle East through the North African Sahel through areas like Haiti in the Caribbean, many of the characteristics of that instability and conflict is driven by organized crime and criminal activity and is driven by an absence of a rule of law.

What I am saying is I suspect that we are not fully aware that this paradigm of conflict has changed because we are still using mechanisms dealing with state building. When actually these are rule-of-law issues, and we need better responses, which are possibly not military responses but responses to these issues.

That is really just to show the nadir – the low point of UN Peacekeeping here in 1998-1999 after Cambodia, Somalia, and Yugoslavia – a major slump, and then a gradual increase in the black line of those uniformed police and military peacekeepers committed to UN Peacekeeping to a high point in 2011. Interestingly, peacekeepers now are going down. As we close missions, as we downsize the size of missions, as the international communities’ consent to fund and supply big peacekeeping missions becomes tired. There is a trend of peacekeeping now dropping.

Now, we have about 97,000 peacekeepers in 14 peacekeeping missions, but that trend of reducing those numbers is now very much evident, and we need to think about that. In many ways, it is a recognition that just numbers do not reach the solution, that we have to be cleverer, we have to be
more nimble, more agile, more focused in our peacekeeping interventions. Just numbers alone are not clearly the solution.

Just to pull that very quickly together, we can see a development of peacekeeping from nonintegrated traditional peacekeeping where people observe the peace to a change to actually keeping the peace.
While keeping the peace, on occasions needing to enforce that peace while still peacekeeping and if so mandate and working within the rules of engagement. In many ways, this is called – and those of you who know English will have heard the term “robust peacekeeping” which is used in the Secretariat and within member states. It means an ability – as I have interpreted in my personal way – not imposing force but not allowing force to destruct a peace process. It is having a robust plan. It is having a robust attitude to what needs to be done. It is having a robust training program. It is having a robust understanding of the mandates and its requirements and it is having, ultimately, robust security components, be they police or military, who are prepared to be robust when force is being used against the mission and its mandate. That is what we mean by robust peacekeeping. It is not peace enforcement. It is just doing what we are doing better, more robustly.
If we pictorially track that change, traditional peacekeeping intra-positioning characterized by watchtowers, white sandbags, very static, observing, verifying, nothing else, to maneuvering sometimes with armored vehicles in a member state’s territory with the consent of that member state, because the member state does not have the ability to do this itself. Extraordinarily, even in peacekeeping using attack helicopters painted white in support of the people who are being preyed on by non-state actors, spoilers, warlords, and people are suffering and dying and the only response we have, as peacekeepers, is to use attack helicopters. That is a major shift in thinking about peacekeeping, a major shift, which, as I say again, is not completely understood or endorsed by all member states who contribute to peacekeeping.
That is of interest. That is where the peacekeeping missions are. Just note that the propensity of peacekeeping mission still in Africa and now peacekeeping missions in the Middle East. Of course, what we will be looking at in the future are new peacekeeping missions, a new thinking about what are we going to do about Somalia, what are we going to do about Syria, what are we going to do about the Sahel, that large region south of the Sahara or north of the Sahara, including areas like Mali, where we are looking at trying to support a peace process.

The numbers are less than they were 2 years ago, but the problems have not gone away in those three areas; Somalia, Syria, and the Sahel, which are focusing attention for peacekeeping in the future.
Trying to pull that a little bit together in terms of what I have said, integrated multidimensional peacekeeping is about response to a changing paradigm of conflict from inter to intrastate to civil wars.

It is characterized by very complicated mandates in areas which have suffered from internal conflict. It is volatile; the environment is highly polarized, because there is blood literally in the soil, very distressed and dysfunctional. The dysfunctionality of these mission environments is part of the problem because there is an absence of state authority; there is an absence of governance; there is an absence of the rule of law. All those things cannot be dealt with by sending in military peacekeepers alone. So, that begins to tell us that unless we integrate our effort, we are not going to tackle some of these issues.

Characterized mentioned by this new emphasis on protecting civilians, reminding us that is our business as peacekeepers, stopping people suffering from conflict. They are our constituency. They are why we are there, because people are dying from conflict.

Of course, to be able to deal with this we know that there is going to be multinational response but it is going to have to require a multidisciplinary response, which needs joint planning.

Now, joint planning is just another word for the things you need to do to integrate that effort. Just saying that we must be integrated does not lead to integration. The only thing that does lead to integration is a shared analysis of the problem and a shared planning response to that problem, be it securities, humanitarian, or developmental.
Many lines of activity to reach whatever it is that the goal – the strategic vision is and, of course, it therefore involves a wide range of both internal to the UN Peacekeeping and external actors and some of these external actors are part of the UN family; some are not part of the UN family. But they are operating within the environment of the peacekeeping mission.

If there is to be any coherence in this, you can only get it through an integrated effort, a determination to try and pull together to a common purpose. Of course, also characterized by the primacy, I always like to come back to this because people forget that peacekeeping is essentially a political process. We might send uniformed peacekeepers, but they are there acting for a political end and a political intent. Therefore, all this political activity has primacy. They are the supported ones. They have the supported role and the people doing the supporting are the uniformed members of the peacekeeping mission, the police and the military.

We need to be absolutely clear on that. They are supporting a political process. They are not the solution; they are supporting a solution. Because, of course, what we have learned in peacekeeping time and time again, is there are no military solutions. Having said that, if we are to have civilian solutions, we need a rapidly deployable international capacity and if we are to be serious about capability-based peacekeeping, which looks at the root causes of conflict, we have to have these people here able to deploy.

Unfortunately, we do not have many of them. Because member states try and keep them for themselves and use these specialists, who are civilian specialists in issues like jurisprudence, in rule of law, in elections, in civil affairs. They tend to deal bilaterally with member states and do not contribute them to the United Nations. We have got a bit of a way to go, I would suggest.
I think another point worth making which these bubbles tell you about is that we have these words of peacemaking, peace enforcing, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and we tend to think of these as a sequential process, a linear process, but what this graph or picture tries to tell us is that this is not a linear process, that when you are in a peacekeeping mission, even though it is a peacekeeping mission, you may be having to make peace, especially with actors, who do not agree with the peace process. You may, on occasions, have to enforce a peace, and right from the beginning, you are having to build a peace, so undertake those activities which get at the root causes of that conflict. If we think we can make peace, enforce peace, keep peace, and build peace without an integrated effort, then clearly, we have lost control of our intellect. Because all these things need to be done quite often at the same time in the same space, so we need to understand that that peacekeeping now encompasses a lot of activities, which it did not do in the past.
I think the other thing that is worth looking at, mainly about the integration of peacekeeping, is this unusual compression of levels of command. The UN does talk about strategic level and the operational level – the operational level, which links strategic to the tactical. But actually, on the ground, you do not see that. On the ground, you have New York, which is actually at the grand strategic level, which is the center of diplomacy and international activity, deciding on what should be done, using the Security Council, using the Secretariat and the Secretary General, and then in the field, you have the Head of Mission and his or her Mission Leadership Team and there is nothing in between. There is no operational level of command actually within UN Peacekeeping.

This brings advantages. It brings speed of response, so as a Force Commander in this Mission Leadership Team, you can pick up the phone and talk directly to the strategic level. But it has disadvantages, in that when you talk at the strategic level, they are not actually talking the same language as you. Because they are not working really as your superior headquarters. They are working as the diplomatic resource to advise the Security Council, to advise the Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping, to advise the General Assembly on issues to do with peacekeeping. They are not giving command authority down to you in the field. It is something we may want to pick up as a point of interest, but it is also, and seen by many states, many developed member states, including my own country, as one of the weaknesses in UN Peacekeeping.
That is what an integrated peacekeeping mission looks like, and I put that up, because, in fact, that picture defines an integrated peacekeeping mission. It defines it through the role of this individual, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General with responsibility as Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator. A huge mouthful and I shudder to think how that gets translated into Japanese.

But you will see that by that person’s presence who is responsible to the Head of Mission that his or her role brings in the UN Developmental and Humanitarian Family and allows an integrated process, therefore, to take place by the authority of that individual and by that individual being accountable to the politically-driven Head of Mission.

Now, we will hear from speakers, and I can talk to you in detail about the difficulties of this line here which, although it is an authority line, it has only a coordinating function. I am sure we will hear about the difficulties of coordinating the activities of the developmental and humanitarian community alongside this political process here, this military process here, and this police process here. There are difficulties, and I really do not want to skimp over them, but that is what an integrated mission actually means and what it looks like.

It is up to good people on the ground to implement that. Speaking as a practitioner, I can say that these structures tend to work better on the ground than they work in the gilded halls of New York and Geneva, where these issues become more important to them for parochial reasons than it actually does on the ground, where people know what needs to be done they tend to anyway.
Let us look at the realities of peacekeeping from a practitioner’s and personal viewpoint, but how we can reflect on that. I think the first reality about peacekeeping as we have seen is this. I have called it a fragile triangular dynamic, and I know we are going to hear more about that from Mr. Kawabata later who is going to be talking about this triangular relationship between the Security Council, who decides; the Secretariat, who implements; and the Member States, who either pay or bleed.

That relationship is a very difficult relationship. It is a relationship that is in tension and unless there is a good conversation and a good dialogue in that relationship, we are not going to get integrated peacekeeping from the very start, even at the grand strategic level. There is a lot of criticism still that the Security Council is actually not delivering in a way – it is certainly not delivering in places like Syria – but nor is it delivering to the needs of the member states who want a stronger consultative process in what it is that is being done in the delivery of mandates. Not just because they are paying for it, as in the case of Japan and some of the western countries, but also because they are sending the peacekeepers in there.

The peacekeepers themselves, the troop-contributing countries, and the police-contributing countries come from a broad spectrum of countries, of course, but increasingly they come from the developed world. If we take western states, and I am using that term advisedly, so stand down, Japan, but western states, their percentage of peacekeeping effort now is about 6.5%. Including Japan, the developed world pays for nearly 85% of peacekeeping, so we have this slight mismatch between those who pay and those who go out and do. That is an issue.
Those who actually contribute come from all sorts of different doctrinal basis with different equipment, different language, different training, different understanding, different preparedness to take risk, different preparedness to take casualties in the course of peace in somebody else’s country. Yet, we are asking these people, these TCCs, these member states, to do very difficult things, which require high degrees of training which they do not have the resources to undertake. We should not be surprised that actually the quality of our TCCs on the ground is not as good as the Secretariat would wish. It is something the Secretariat is having to deal with.

I have already mentioned that the reality is we do not have enough rapidly deployable civilian expertise, because it is the civilian expertise who actually make the difference. The military just hold the ring; create the environment for stability, to allow the difference to be made by the specializations of the civilians.

A fact is, we can talk about it, that the UN is required by the member states through the 5th Committee of the United Nations General Assembly to operate extremely bureaucratic systems of accounting, accounting for helicopter flying; accounting for logistics; accounting for everything that a military peacekeeper needs on the ground and yet slows down, therefore, everything that that military peacekeeper is trying to do.

As a Force Commander, you will be frustrated by the UN system of bureaucratic accounting, a system, as I say, demanded by the member states. It is a system that is not designed for high-tempo operations. It is a system designed for diplomatic reasons. Yet on the ground, we are asking peacekeepers to protect civilians with increasingly complicated equipment. There is a mismatch there between how we resource peacekeeping in terms of its logistics and actually what we are asking them to do in the field and that is something again that the Secretariat cannot resolve but needs to be worked out. If you do not understand this, you will find UN Peacekeeping extremely frustrating.

I have mentioned this to you already, but there are limits to what the Department of Peacekeeping Operations can do for you in the field. They can help you interpret your mandate. They can generate forces for you. They can give you the rules of engagement. They can negotiate with member states. What they do not give you is that superior headquarters’ direction, information, intelligence, guidance that you would get from an operational level headquarters in your own national systems or in systems like NATO, where they do have these operational level headquarters. There are limits in the capability of DPKO which, to an extent, can constrain DPKO’s ability to manage peacekeeping in this complex, volatile, distressed environment; where we are using increasingly sophisticated equipment.

Of course, because we are operating as a multinational group, everybody, and we should never forget this, member states send the people into peacekeeping for national interest reasons. It is all driven by national interest. Member states operate through national interest. So there will be
national interests in a peacekeeping mission, which are not necessarily coherent and trying to integrate within your mission becomes difficult if some of the member states contributing to that mission have a different view on what should be done than other member states. You are not working in a vacuum; you are working in a complex chaotic world, a world driven by member states and national interests. We need to, again, be really clear on that, because that makes it difficult because it is all multicultural, multinational, multidisciplinary.

The term ad hoc means unplanned; we have these unplanned command control communications and intelligence mechanisms, which are put in place without any preparation, without any prior training and development as headquarters. So the very passage of information is particularly difficult and, again, does not lead to good integration where passages of information can get confused and chaotic.

We are very dependent upon telephone communications in United Nations, unlike the media. You will find that the Undersecretary General, his pet issue at the moment is unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs, or drones. Needing drones to go out and see what is out there. But if unless you have communications and command systems that can put that information and make sure that information goes down to all needed recipients, a drone is only of certain and limited use. There is a lot of work that needs to be done there to improve integration.

Probably most emphatically, is this issue here that there is still a lack of clarity and agreement in actually the use of force. How much force can we use in peacekeeping? Do we have the will to use that force or not? When should we use it? There is a lack of clarity there, and not all member states agree. You, in Japan, have constitutional issues, but others who do not still have lack of clarity in when we should be using force and when not.
In the last 5 minutes that I have, I just want to show you this. Because even though it may be an odd picture to show about integrated peacekeeping, it does tell us something. When I was part of the team writing the UN’s Capstone Doctrine on Peacekeeping, I developed this actually just to help us understand where we can use this instrument of peacekeeping and where we cannot.

If you look at that on this, the $X$ axis is the level of capability needed from low, increasing. On this $Y$ axis, you have the environment, from a consensual environment up to a hostile environment, and what we ought to know is that we should always make sure that $X$ equals $Y$. What that says is that put into an environment the capability that matches that environment. I think everyone will agree with that.

If we track peacekeeping interventions broadly and we did this process – you can put them and they are roughly on the $X$ equals $Y$ line, and we can put rings around them and say that some here where there is a benign environment I consent to the operation, you can get away with low levels of capability. You can have unarmed peacekeepers. You can have civilian observers, civilian election officers, and civilian human rights officers. But where the environment starts to become more difficult, more hostile, then that capability needs to rise and so you move up the scale until you are right up here where the environment is so hostile, you need very high levels of capability.

So far so good, but what we understood and try to articulate in the doctrine is that there is a red line, and that red line is beyond which UN Peacekeeping cannot really go successfully because of the multinational, multidiscipline, multicultural, ad hoc nature of UN Peacekeeping. It cannot generate the tempo to operate at these high levels of needed capability, because the environment is
so hostile which is why UN Peacekeeping does not operate in Afghanistan. UN Peacekeeping does not operate in Somalia, at this stage. Because there is no peace to keep which takes us to this other red line, which is a line defined on this which is a line to do with the legitimacy and consent for peacekeeping. If we are using the UN’s Peacekeeping mechanism to operate in an environment, where there is no consent for that peacekeeping, then immediately, any UN Peacekeeping intervention becomes part of the conflict. It becomes a party to the conflict, not an impartial keeper of a peace, which has the consent of the major parties.

That line tells us beyond which we should not go, and in many ways, that is often articulated as there must be a peace to keep. Do not send peacekeepers where there is no peace to keep, because that means you are operating up here without consent and, therefore, without legitimacy for UN Peacekeeping.

Now, the problem is that something needs to be done. Somalia – AMISOM in Somalia, the AMIS in Darfur were all up here in a highly hostile environment with low levels of capability. Even the mission we sent in, the observer mission we sent into Damascus this summer was operating here, very low levels of capability but in a highly volatile dangerous environment. We can do it, but do not call that peacekeeping, because it is not peacekeeping.

There is this box, this space for peacekeeping and what that tells us is that UN Peacekeeping is not a universal instrument. It cannot be used for everything.

If it is going to be used for things, and here it is, the UN Peacekeeping, and these are the things that
need to be done to turn – post-conflict state from conflict through time, considerable amounts of
time, to a sustainable peace.

The peacekeeping operation is finite in the things it can do, because that is where the funding
comes from and the mandate comes from, and they tend to be political things, security things, things
like DDR, things like rule-of-law issues.

But there are a lot of other things that need to be done to move from conflict to peace and,
therefore, there are a lot of other actors, be it the UN country team, be it international and regional
organizations, be it donor states, non-government organizations, all the humanitarian people who are
there at the beginning and will be there when the peacekeeping is gone, not even talking about
international financial institutions, who are working on the development issues and governance
issues, all this needs to be pulled together. That is what we mean by integration, because if we are
just focusing as a peacekeeping on this little bit, there is great danger that all this other activity is not
coherent but actually is in conflict with what we are trying to achieve. Integration, in many ways,
means that process of discussion and planning and dialogue that gets all the arrows pointing in the
same direction. That requires a Shared Strategic Vision for what we are doing and then the
planning to support it.

But the context is changing, and the world is looking very different. You will know in your country,
as I do in mine, that austerity cuts are now very much the focus of governmental activity. This is

Changing Context for Peacekeeping

Effects of Global Financial Crisis – “do more with less”.
Tension between FCCs and T/PCCs – impact on
delivery of robust peacekeeping and PoC
Erosion of consent for large PKO – focus on
transition and peacebuilding (but insufficient
expertise)
Changing paradigm of conflict – outpacing
structures and doctrinal thinking in UN
Secretariat and MS.
All put increased pressure on senior mission
leadership and increased need for partnerships.
affecting peacekeeping as well and so the old idea that peacekeeping would always get more and more funds and more and more peacekeepers is no longer true. To quote the Secretary General, “We have to do more with less.”

There remains this tension between the financial-contributing countries and the troop-contributing countries. The financial-contributing countries of which you are number 2 in the world, of course, rightly say, “We are spending this money; we want results. We want a qualitative improvement on UN Peacekeeping; otherwise, we are wasting our money.” This bunch say, “Fine, we can do more, but you need to recompense us more. If you want us to die for international peace, then we need to be better recompensed for it.” That tension between those two blocks, if I can call them the global north and the global south, has impeded the delivery of robust peacekeeping up till now and impeded the delivery of protection of civilians. It is getting better. The Special Advisory Group of the Secretary General has come up with some solutions to this. We can talk about those in question-time.

I would suggest that there is an erosion of consent internationally. There is a weariness internationally for large peacekeeping missions, and an increased focus now on transition, on political missions, which are agile, nimble, well-focused, civilian-led, civilian-targeted, with using the military mainly to keep those stable conditions. But there is insufficient expertise for this as yet.

There is that changing paradigm of conflict which I have mentioned, which I am suggesting is outpacing the structures and doctrinal thinking of the UN and the member states. How do we deal with transnational crime?

Because that is major problem in the world; all of this is putting increased pressure on senior mission leadership. A senior mission leadership, which still is not being selected, trained, prepared, and deployed in a satisfactory way; we are still throwing senior leaders into this really complex environment. We throw them into the pool, and we do not know whether they can swim or not. That is a terrifying concept when you think about it because the emphasis is on leadership, and we do not do much about it.
Okay, this is lastly. I want my last take-aways just for you. Peacekeeping operations work when there is a peace to keep, but ultimately, the Security Council, responsible, has to decide, and they may decide that something has to be done through pressure, whether it is a peacekeeping mission or not is up to them to decide. Not necessarily all member states are involved in that thinking. What is important that the X should equal Y, so if we are going to authorize peacekeeping missions, integrated peacekeeping missions, let us ensure that we give that mission the resources needed to implement the mandate in that environment, so X should equal Y. It is a mantra we all need to have boned on our hearts.

We will hear more about this, but success does depend on a united Security Council. If we do not have the united Security Council as the representatives of the international community, or we are impeded from the start, and it does need regional mechanisms, because the UN cannot operate on its own; it has to have regional mechanisms, be it the Arab League, be it ECOWAS, be it the African Union, to support what we do.

Everything is political. End states’ strategic goals are political but they have to be agreed. There are a number of actors, especially in this integrated process, who have views on what the end states should be. They need to be brought into this process. Military solutions, as I have said, are an illusion. The military can just hold the ring for a political process to take place.

Peace support operations – I use that term on peacekeeping, because it is wider than just peacekeeping. They are complex by definition and required, therefore, integrated planning and a multiagency approach, a comprehensive approach, and that is what we mean by integration.
On the military side, these peacekeeping operations are usually militarily inefficient, I use that word advisedly, meaning you can do this much better if you, the Japanese Defense Forces, went and did it on their own, it would be a much better result. But you would not have the legitimacy and the moral authority that this multinational, multicultural effort brings. But note they are not – peacekeeping is not a universal instrument. We need to be careful where we use this instrument which means if we cannot use it everywhere, we need to work on partnerships. Get other partner organizations working with the United Nations; more work needs to be done on that.

My last point, which speaks of integration directly, is that time and time again we have been criticized for a short-term approach. We send in military peacekeepers; when the fighting has stopped, we pull them out, and surprisingly, the fighting restarts. Peace is more than just the absence of fighting. Peace actually can only be sustainable when you tackle the root causes which mean that we need to lay the foundations of peacebuilding right at the start of peacekeeping. Laying those foundations of peacebuilding is what we mean by an integrated approach to peacekeeping. We are integrating the peacebuilding mechanisms with the security mechanisms. In one sentence, that is what we mean by integration.

Thank you very much.
Q&A

**Q 1** Thank you, sir, for sharing your wisdom with us. I am Wing Commander Mukul from Indian Air Force.

India has been one of the largest contributors to UN for the peacekeeping operations forces, and I could not agree with you more on the issue of the mandate being one of the main hurdles for the peacekeeping operators, the feet on the ground which are fighting. As you mentioned, the higher organization definitely has the political acumen of charting out a clear mandate, but this has not been the case in the past. Thinking on the viewpoints from the higher organization, what would be their limitations in giving a clear mandate?

The second part of the question is that with clear mandate clearly affecting the peacekeepers on ground, will it not lead to the troop-contributing countries to start reducing their forces because it is finally their soldiers which are getting killed in some other countries? Thank you.

**A1** It was a very good question and thank you for it. I mean the first point, you are absolutely right. One of the major tasks of the Mission Leadership Team and by that I mean the Head of Mission, the Head of the Police Component, the Force Commander, the Director of Mission Support is to really understand what the mandate is asking them to do. This process of an analysis of the mandate is extremely important, because, as we have no doubt here, mandates are the art of the diplomatically possibly. We get mandates emerging from the Security Council which are shrouded in ambiguity, deliberately so, to get them through the Security Council.

There needs to be a certain interpretation by the Mission Leadership Team normally talking to the Secretariat and saying, “This is what we understand you mean by that mandate? This is what we intend to do about it. Do you agree? Are you happy with that?” That process has to happen very frequently, because these missions are dynamic; things are constantly changing, and you always have to check, as the senior leader, your constituency in New York in the Security Council and in the member states, who have an interest, including your own country, say, in that mission. There is a constant checking back. Do we understand this is what we are meant to be doing? You have given us a priority to protect civilians. This is what we are doing about it. Are you happy with this? There is that sort of issue.

Now, if this does not happen, and your point is dead right, and we are facing this, if there is a lack of confidence in the Mandate Delivery Process of the Security Council, member states will vote with their feet. They will say, “We are not happy about what you are trying to achieve in this country, so do not come to us for troops. Try next
When the Secretariat in Somalia went around in 2009, when we were looking like a peace process was emerging from the Somali dialogue, when the UN said, “We are thinking of a peacekeeping mission in this sort of mandate, what are you going to supply to it?” Not one member state contributed a thing, so there was no mission because member states have their own views on this peace process in Somalia. So, poor old African Union had to do it themselves.

Does that answer your question? Which comes back to this point it is everything is really political.

| Q2 | Thank you, sir, for a very useful presentation. My name is Virendra Singh Malik and I am a former Military Colonel from the Indian Gorkha Rifles. I took early retirement, 2008, and currently, I am doing a Civilian Peace Builders course through this Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center. My question relates to the changing paradigm, as you said in the conflict – complex operations, restoring government authorities, installing new systems of governance, or new political leadership in countries. One of the dangers that I see and which I am sure the UN is grappling with is that unlike the traditional peacekeeping in which even if a troop-contributing nation sent a huge force, perhaps they had a limited role in influencing the government of the day or pursuing their national interest, because the force itself was static, had a very limited role.

But in today’s complex operations, when the governments are actually involved in complete process of peacebuilding and installing governments, changing the form of governance. Now the dangers are that the national agendas tend to mess up much more with how these peacekeeping and peacebuilding takes place. We have examples, Afghanistan or other places, where the civilians then pay a heavier price than what they should have figured to be done. Just as we see in Afghanistan last year, you see the security is deteriorating and more civilians have died than the last previous 10 years, and it is all because of the geopolitical and higher-energy agendas of countries and various other things which gets much more now distorted because of the role that governments can play in the whole process of how a nation emerges from conflict.

Is the UN seeing it as a potential danger because the R2P, the Right to Protect, gets into the way and there is then a resistance from some countries? Is this a potential future challenge for integrated mission and for peacekeeping?

The second question is on the role of private security in peacebuilding, in peacekeeping. Particularly as you see that in America, for example, the corporate security agencies are putting a huge pressure on the government of the day in how it
extends ODA to countries emerging from conflict. Do you think that private security is one of the realities for the future peacekeeping and peacebuilding and what are your views on it? What are the possible opportunities and challenges in the role of private security?

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Okay Colonel, thank you very much indeed. I am very fond of the Gorkha Rifles myself.

Those were very big questions. We come back to this, and the first question is about national interests. We have a multilateral system. We have a multilateral world, at the moment. It is not brilliance. The UN – if we redesigned it now, we would not design it in the way that it was designed in 1945, but, ultimately, it is all we have got, and we will never get anything better unless there is some major global holocaust, where we all start picking ourselves up and redesign it. We have to work with the system.

The UN has to work with individual member states’ national interest and provided we are aware of that then we can operate better in these environments. The Secretariat does not like national interests’ cards being played. It would rather these issues were coordinated through the international mechanisms of the United Nations. But, at the end of the day, member states pay, member states send in their people and national interest and sovereignty will always be influential in these relations.

The challenge for UN Peacekeeping now and in the future and in the past was trying to harness these national interests for a better and wider good. Not an easy process and essentially political process again. But you are right to say that member states often do things in an incoherent manner in a member state, where there is a peacekeeping mission for national reasons, and sometimes that looks odd.

Your second point of private security companies. I have – you ask my personal opinion, and you ask me to justify my opinion I noticed – my personal opinion is we do use private security companies now. All the helicopters that supply the UN support aviation come not from member states but come from private companies who have brought up surplus Warsaw Pact helicopter capability and use it under contractual arrangements with the UN. The UN uses private security companies for its aviation. Increasingly, the UN will use organizations that can build a camp and run a camp much more cheaply than the UN can do it.

I think there is a place, and we should address this for a regulated system of using private security companies to provide logistical support for UN operations. That is quite an efficient way of doing business provided it is regulated. I personally draw the line in the use of force. I think if we are going to go down a road where force is being used by private security companies in support of international peace that looks like
people making money out of conflict which sits uncomfortably. It still sits uncomfortably with the UN. In the short term, I think there is a line between administrative support and actually using force in the support of international peace and security and that line should not be crossed by private security companies.

The difficulty comes with some of your own fellow soldiers in the past who the UN uses a great deal, and I am speaking of Gorkha soldiers, who are used by the UN in great numbers to provide us the immediate security, especially for political missions where there is no contingent to provide that. That is very similar to my mission. We used a South African security company to train, recruit the Eritriain guards for our headquarters. We do, do that as well, but that has to be very carefully regulated. But they are there to protect and guard a premise; they are not there to go out and protect civilians. Again, so you can see there is a doctrinal difference between those two things. I think it is the way of the future, but it has got to be a regulated way, and we are still a little bit weak on the regulation, although there is attempt to do that now.