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Opening Remarks

Tsuguo Ishino (Commandant of Joint Staff College, Lieutenant General)

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for coming to this Second International Peace and Security Symposium despite your busy schedules. We have, today, Professor Hoshino from Osaka University; Retired Major General Robert Gordon, who was the Force Commander of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea; and Dr. Osa of Association for Aide and Relief; and Mr. Kawabata from the UN Political Affairs Department; and Dr. Kamino from Gifu University. I want to thank all of these speakers for their contributions.

Now, I think that many of you know that this is the 20th anniversary since we first were engaged in the UN PKO activities. Let us look back in the history leading to today. Ministry of Defense and Self Defense Force has dispatched its first force in 1992 after the International Peace Cooperation Law or the PKO Cooperation Law was established. Our first mission was the UNTAC to Cambodia, and the most recent one was in South Sudan. We have dispatched 15 missions, troops and individuals, the cumulative total being 8,500 troops. During that time, the PKO Cooperation Law was amended twice in 1998 and 2001, and a ban on participation in the PKF was lifted, and the scope of our operations was expanded. The framework for use of weapons has gradually evolved. In 2007, it was decided that international peace cooperation activities is one of the main missions of the STF, along with National Defense and the maintenance of order.

Also, based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law or the Special Measures for Assistance in Iraq and Pirate Countermeasure Law, we have been dispatching ground, maritime, air forces to Bay of Aden and the Coast of Somalia.

In the 2011 National Defense Program Guideline, it is emphasized that we should contribute to secure the global peace and stability and human security. We have been actively participating in these activities and making high quality contributions, and we have earned a strong trust and high praise from the international community.

In the past 20 years, the situation surrounding UN missions have changed drastically, and the UN missions themselves have evolved through trial and error. The traditional PKO was focused on the ceasefire monitoring between countries, but now, in order to build sustainable peace, multiple functions are intertwined in a complex manner. It is the multidimensional mission that we have now seen the PKO evolve to. Because it is multidimensional, not just military but quite a wide range of actors including the police and civilians are involved. These multiple actors must be organically integrated or else we will not be able to achieve the target of the UN which is maintenance of international peace and stability, human rights development, and reconstruction. This is the environment we are in, and so for the SDF, it is important that we understand the latest trends about the UN mission as a whole and what are the situations in each of the contributing


countries.

The aim of this symposium is to learn about the issues and the future direction of the UN and the member states, and the information is to be shared not just amongst the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces, but also with the government, private sector, and academia, so that we can have high quality international contribution and human resource development. In order to achieve that goal, rather than focusing on different themes in each symposium, we make this a serial symposium and we will talk about the big direction of the UN missions and from the discussion of the previous symposium, we extract the theme for the next one and expand on our debate.

This is the second symposium, and we are going to focus on the increased multidimensionality of the PKO and the integration of the UN mission. We have various viewpoints; UN Secretariat, mission headquarters, commanders on the ground, organizational theory research. From various viewpoints, we are going to look at the UN Integrated Mission in a three-dimensional way and discuss the future issues and direction.

All the experts and everyone in the audience, thank you very much for coming today despite your busy schedules, and with that I close my opening remarks. Thank you so much.

Keynote Speech
The Challenges of UN Peacekeeping
Robert Gordon (Major General (retired))



I always like to start this issue of peacekeeping with this slide, which, in many ways, tells us a lot about peacekeeping because it actually speaks to the frustrations of peacekeeping, the uncertain mandates of peacekeeping, the lack of knowledge of rules of engagement about peacekeeping, and ultimately, the need for a united and strong Security Council, because they are the last resort for peacekeepers.

When we have Security Council Resolutions, and we will be talking about that later in the symposium, which are not clear where there is ambiguity, where people do not understand their mandate, people die in the field, and so it is important that this issue of really understanding what we are trying to do to avoid this sort of issue is essential.

This cartoon came from UNPROFOR days, and so it is a historical view of peacekeeping. However, what we have seen in Syria in last summer may well look a little like that. So, have we learned the lessons of peacekeeping or are we trying to return to this situation where we are sending peacekeepers who are ill-equipped, uncertain mandate into an area of conflict where there is no peace to keep? But something must be done and so the concept of something needing to be done is always something that drives peacekeeping.

In The Beginning

- UN Charter
- Traditional PK. Started in 1948 in Middle East.
Response to inter-state conflict

Characteristics

Support ceasefires and buffer zones by inter-positioning; observe, verify, report missions; principally static military (led) tasks. 3 traditional principles as doctrinal base.

- UN Nineties Nadir. End of cold war (SC able to act). Also shift from inter-state to intra-state conflict. Little PK capacity and no peace to keep. Rwanda, Som, FRY led to doctrinal rethink – Agenda for Peace - Brahimi Report.
- Multi-Dimensional or Contemporary PK.
Response to intra-state conflict

Characteristics

Very quickly, I want to just track how peacekeeping has developed so that we can look at this issue of integration. I will not go through the UN charter, because time does not allow me, but I just want to talk about how peacekeeping started which, of course, started in 1948 with the birth of the State of Israel. In our morning papers today, we see this problem is still around with the difficulties that the State of Israel has with its neighbors. This was interstate conflict and the response to that was traditional peacekeeping, which was about supporting ceasefires, it was about buffer zones, it was about observing, verifying, reporting, sending notes back to the Security Council that one side had done something, which was outside the ceasefire arrangements. If there was any doctrinal base to this form of peacekeeping, it was those old principles identified by men like Ralph Bunche, Dag Hammarskjöld, Lester Pearson, which were those principles of neutrality or impartialities – we now call it – non-use of force except in self-defense and the consent of the two parties to the war. Of course, therefore, that allowed for lightly-armed peacekeepers, with the consent of both parties, to observe ceasefire lines.

This was a very, very different requirement to what then ensued in the world. With the end of the Cold War, with the ability suddenly of the Security Council to pass resolutions in a way that they had not been able to pass before during the Cold War because of the veto, suddenly the Security Council found itself able to pass resolutions and passed many resolutions with many tasks. Tasks, which were trying to deal with this new paradigm of conflict, which was intrastate conflict or civil

war but with mechanisms of peacekeeping which was still rooted in traditional peacekeeping.

It is not surprising that when the UN was called to deal with these conflicts in places like Rwanda, Somalia, and the former Republic of Yugoslavia, that there was a degree – and I am being polite here – of uncertainty about what it is the UN were meant to be doing. There was no clear mandate. There were no clear rules of engagement. There were uncertain and complicated resolutions asking these peacekeepers to do many, many things without any degree of prioritization. It is not surprising that I call this period the Nadir of the UN in the 90s. Nadir is a word, which can be translated as the low point of UN Peacekeeping.

It did require a major shift. Boutros Boutros-Ghali started that process with his *Agenda for Peace*, looking at how better UN could undertake international interventions in this changed paradigm of conflict of intrastate conflict, taken up later by Lakhdar Brahimi in his famous, in 2000, the *Brahimi Report* and no doubt we will hear more about that in due course. This set the time what was not regarded as a doctrinal rethink, but now with the hindsight of history, we can see that it was a major rethink on UN Peacekeeping Doctrine, a major shift, and what emerged from that shift was what we now call multidimensional or integrated peacekeeping, contemporary peacekeeping. You could say that that became doctrinalized in 2000 with the *Brahimi Report* and, of course, this form of peacekeeping was a response to civil war, intrastate conflict, helping member states, nation states struggle with their authority over their own areas of responsibility trying to regain state authority in the areas of conflict.

Multi-Dimensional or Contemporary PK.

Characteristics: response to intra-state conflict;

- manoeuvrist not static - dealing with whole state (protecting space not line);
- supports parties and comprehensive peace agreements;
- complex lines of operation (political, security, humanitarian, developmental) and complex mandates;
- integration of civilian and security tasks under one political command;
- Focus on POC means increasing use of Chap VII by SC to mandate up to lethal force to protect civilians using “all necessary means”.

Is conflict paradigm changing again? Our response?

If we look at the characteristics of that form of peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping, we will see that they are very, very different from traditional peacekeeping. Now, our problem is that not all member states involved in UN Peacekeeping have understood this change in paradigm of conflict. So, we do still get uncertainty, but if we look at the characteristics of this multidimensional peacekeeping, we will see that they are manoeuvrist – I say this manoeuvrist, not static. They are not about intra-positioning. They are not about reporting lines between two warring states. They are about dealing with the whole state, maneuvering mentally with the state as well as maneuvering physically throughout the whole area of the state. It is about protecting space and people, not just about protecting lines between two warring states.

A very different approach from the start, it is about supporting comprehensive peace agreements and supporting parties in their adherence to those peace agreements. By definition, therefore, it has many lines of activity – I call them lines of operation – things to do, political things to do, humanitarian, developmental, as well as security issues.

They are characterized by very complex mandates. MONUSCO itself, which is the current mission in the DRC of Congo, has 45 different tasks given to it by the Security Council to undertake. Complex mandates – how do you prioritize issues that need to be dealt with? It is about, fundamentally, the integration of all those many, many civilian tasks, those tasks that actually get at the root causes of conflict being integrated with those security tasks that allow for those civilian tasks to take place in an environment of reasonable security.

Again, that is a very different approach from traditional peacekeeping, and significantly, all of this put together in an integrated way under one political command, under the leadership of a special representative of the Secretary General who is chosen for his or her political acumen; his or her ability to operate in this highly complex political environment.


Of course, increasingly this focus on protection of civilians means that the old comfort where we had Chapter VI missions, which were to do with consent and being nice and kind to people and Chapter VII missions, which were to do with using force, that became blurred, because increasingly the Security Council would call upon Chapter VII Article 42 of the UN Charter to give international legitimacy and law to peacekeepers to use up to lethal force or all necessary means in order to protect people who were suffering from conflict.

A major shift in focus from separating one state from another state to actually protecting people; men, women, and children who were dying or having their human rights violently abused through conflict. A major shift in emphasis on peacekeeping from traditional peacekeeping. A shift, as I said earlier, which not all member states, who are involved in peacekeeping, have understood, and mentally, they are still locked into the old traditional peacekeeping under Chapter VI.

I am putting this out to you that the paradigm of conflict is changing again, and what we are

seeing now is conflict and people dying from conflict – conflict driven by issues such as non-state actors working for criminal reasons. If we look at the spread of conflict from Afghanistan round through areas in the Middle East through the North African Sahel through areas like Haiti in the Caribbean, many of the characteristics of that instability and conflict is driven by organized crime and criminal activity and is driven by an absence of a rule of law.


What I am saying is I suspect that we are not fully aware that this paradigm of conflict has changed because we are still using mechanisms dealing with state building. When actually these are rule-of-law issues, and we need better responses, which are possibly not military responses but responses to these issues.




That is really just to show the nadir – the low point of UN Peacekeeping here in 1998-1999 after Cambodia, Somalia, and Yugoslavia – a major slump, and then a gradual increase in the black line of those uniformed police and military peacekeepers committed to UN Peacekeeping to a high point in 2011. Interestingly, peacekeepers now are going down. As we close missions, as we downsize the size of missions, as the international communities' consent to fund and supply big peacekeeping missions becomes tired. There is a trend of peacekeeping now dropping.

Now, we have about 97,000 peacekeepers in 14 peacekeeping missions, but that trend of reducing those numbers is now very much evident, and we need to think about that. In many ways, it is a recognition that just numbers do not reach the solution, that we have to be cleverer, we have to be

more nimble, more agile, more focused in our peacekeeping interventions. Just numbers alone are not clearly the solution.



Just to pull that very quickly together, we can see a development of peacekeeping from nonintegrated traditional peacekeeping where people observe the peace to a change to actually keeping the peace.



while keeping a peace, on occasions,
needing to enforce it.

(if so mandated and working within ROE)

=

“robust peacekeeping”
(Neither imposing force nor yielding to force)

While keeping the peace, on occasions needing to enforce that peace while still peacekeeping and if so mandate and working within the rules of engagement. In many ways, this is called – and those of you who know English will have heard the term “robust peacekeeping” which is used in the Secretariat and within member states. It means an ability – as I have interpreted in my personal way – not imposing force but not allowing force to destruct a peace process. It is having a robust plan. It is having a robust attitude to what needs to be done. It is having a robust training program. It is having a robust understanding of the mandates and its requirements and it is having, ultimately, robust security components, be they police or military, who are prepared to be robust when force is being used against the mission and its mandate. That is what we mean by robust peacekeeping. It is not peace enforcement. It is just doing what we are doing better, more robustly.



If we pictorially track that change, traditional peacekeeping intra-positioning characterized by watchtowers, white sandbags, very static, observing, verifying, nothing else, to maneuvering sometimes with armored vehicles in a member state's territory with the consent of that member state, because the member state does not have the ability to do this itself. Extraordinarily, even in peacekeeping using attack helicopters painted white in support of the people who are being preyed on by non-state actors, spoilers, warlords, and people are suffering and dying and the only response we have, as peacekeepers, is to use attack helicopters. That is a major shift in thinking about peacekeeping, a major shift, which, as I say again, is not completely understood or endorsed by all member states who contribute to peacekeeping.

Today's UN Peacekeeping Missions



That is of interest. That is where the peacekeeping missions are. Just note that the propensity of peacekeeping mission still in Africa and now peacekeeping missions in the Middle East. Of course, what we will be looking at in the future are new peacekeeping missions, a new thinking about what are we going to do about Somalia, what are we going to do about Syria, what are we going to do about the Sahel, that large region south of the Sahara or north of the Sahara, including areas like Mali, where we are looking at trying to support a peace process.

The numbers are less than they were 2 years ago, but the problems have not gone away in those three areas; Somalia, Syria, and the Sahel, which are focusing attention for peacekeeping in the future.

Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations

- Response in shift from inter to intra-state conflict
- Complex mandates in volatile, polarized, distressed, dysfunctional environment.
- New mandates to protect civilians blurs concept of Chap VI and Chap VII missions.
- Multi-disciplinary and multi-national (need joint planning). Many lines of operation to desired end state.
- Involve a wide range of internal and external actors. Coherence only thro' integration
- Primacy of political activity – in *supported* role. Mil/Police in *supporting* role.
- No purely military solutions. But still lack of civilian and specialist capacities. (Capability-based PK)

Trying to pull that a little bit together in terms of what I have said, integrated multidimensional peacekeeping is about response to a changing paradigm of conflict from inter to intrastate to civil wars.

It is characterized by very complicated mandates in areas which have suffered from internal conflict. It is volatile; the environment is highly polarized, because there is blood literally in the soil, very distressed and dysfunctional. The dysfunctionality of these mission environments is part of the problem because there is an absence of state authority; there is an absence of governance; there is an absence of the rule of law. All those things cannot be dealt with by sending in military peacekeepers alone. So, that begins to tell us that unless we integrate our effort, we are not going to tackle some of these issues.

Characterized mentioned by this new emphasis on protecting civilians, reminding us that is our business as peacekeepers, stopping people suffering from conflict. They are our constituency. They are why we are there, because people are dying from conflict.

Of course, to be able to deal with this we know that there is going to be multinational response but it is going to have to require a multidisciplinary response, which needs joint planning.

Now, joint planning is just another word for the things you need to do to integrate that effort. Just saying that we must be integrated does not lead to integration. The only thing that does lead to integration is a shared analysis of the problem and a shared planning response to that problem, be it securities, humanitarian, or developmental.


Many lines of activity to reach whatever it is that the goal – the strategic vision is and, of course, it therefore involves a wide range of both internal to the UN Peacekeeping and external actors and some of these external actors are part of the UN family; some are not part of the UN family. But they are operating within the environment of the peacekeeping mission.

If there is to be any coherence in this, you can only get it through an integrated effort, a determination to try and pull together to a common purpose.

Of course, also characterized by the primacy, I always like to come back to this because people forget that peacekeeping is essentially a political process. We might send uniformed peacekeepers, but they are there acting for a political end and a political intent. Therefore, all this political activity has primacy. They are the supported ones. They have the supported role and the people doing the supporting are the uniformed members of the peacekeeping mission, the police and the military.


We need to be absolutely clear on that. They are supporting a political process. They are not the solution; they are supporting a solution. Because, of course, what we have learned in peacekeeping time and time again, is there are no military solutions. Having said that, if we are to have civilian solutions, we need a rapidly deployable international capacity and if we are to be serious about capability-based peacekeeping, which looks at the root causes of conflict, we have to have these people here able to deploy.

Unfortunately, we do not have many of them. Because member states try and keep them for themselves and use these specialists, who are civilian specialists in issues like jurisprudence, in rule of law, in elections, in civil affairs. They tend to deal bilaterally with member states and do not contribute them to the United Nations. We have got a bit of a way to go, I would suggest.




I think another point worth making which these bubbles tell you about is that we have these words of peacemaking, peace enforcing, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and we tend to think of these as a sequential process, a linear process, but what this graph or picture tries to tell us is that this is not a linear process, that when you are in a peacekeeping mission, even though it is a peacekeeping mission, you may be having to make peace, especially with actors, who do not agree with the peace process. You may, on occasions, have to enforce a peace, and right from the beginning, you are having to build a peace, so undertake those activities which get at the root causes of that conflict. If we think we can make peace, enforce peace, keep peace, and build peace without an integrated effort, then clearly, we have lost control of our intellect. Because all these things need to be done quite often at the same time in the same space, so we need to understand that that peacekeeping now encompasses a lot of activities, which it did not do in the past.

The Compression of UN Levels of Command



I think the other thing that is worth looking at, mainly about the integration of peacekeeping, is this unusual compression of levels of command. The UN does talk about strategic level and the operation level – the operational level, which links strategic to the tactical. But actually, on the ground, you do not see that. On the ground, you have New York, which is actually at the grand strategic level, which is the center of diplomacy and international activity, deciding on what should be done, using the Security Council, using the Secretariat and the Secretary General, and then in the field, you have the Head of Mission and his or her Mission Leadership Team and there is nothing in between. There is no operational level of command actually within UN Peacekeeping.

This brings advantages. It brings speed of response, so as a Force Commander in this Mission Leadership Team, you can pick up the phone and talk directly to the strategic level. But it has disadvantages, in that when you talk at the strategic level, they are not actually talking the same language as you. Because they are not working really as your superior headquarters. They are working as the diplomatic resource to advise the Security Council, to advise the Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping, to advise the General Assembly on issues to do with peacekeeping. They are not giving command authority down to you in the field. It is something we may want to pick up as a point of interest, but it is also, and seen by many states, many developed member states, including my own country, as one of the weaknesses in UN Peacekeeping.



That is what an integrated peacekeeping mission looks like, and I put that up, because, in fact, that picture defines an integrated peacekeeping mission. It defines it through the role of this individual, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General with responsibility as Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator. A huge mouthful and I shudder to think how that gets translated into Japanese.

But you will see that by that person's presence who is responsible to the Head of Mission that his or her role brings in the UN Developmental and Humanitarian Family and allows an integrated process, therefore, to take place by the authority of that individual and by that individual being accountable to the politically-driven Head of Mission.

Now, we will hear from speakers, and I can talk to you in detail about the difficulties of this line here which, although it is an authority line, it has only a coordinating function. I am sure we will hear about the difficulties of coordinating the activities of the developmental and humanitarian community alongside this political process here, this military process here, and this police process here. There are difficulties, and I really do not want to skimp over them, but that is what an integrated mission actually means and what it looks like.

It is up to good people on the ground to implement that. Speaking as a practitioner, I can say that these structures tend to work better on the ground than they work in the gilded halls of New York and Geneva, where these issues become more important to them for parochial reasons than it actually does on the ground, where people know what needs to be done they tend to anyway.

UN PKO Realities

- Fragile triangular dynamics (SC- Sec - MS)
- Complex and variable support of TCCs/PCCs.
- Insufficient rapidly deployable civilian expertise
- UN required to operate bureaucratic budgeting. Little flexibility. Affects logistics and tempo
- Limitations in capability of DPKO as a superior HQ.
- Incoherent interests of member states / international community.
- Ad hoc C3I and difficult passage of info, (compared to media).
- Lack of doctrinal clarity/unity in the use of force.

Let us look at the realities of peacekeeping from a practitioner's and personal viewpoint, but how we can reflect on that. I think the first reality about peacekeeping as we have seen is this. I have called it a fragile triangular dynamic, and I know we are going to hear more about that from Mr. Kawabata later who is going to be talking about this triangular relationship between the Security Council, who decides; the Secretariat, who implements; and the Member States, who either pay or bleed.

That relationship is a very difficult relationship. It is a relationship that is in tension and unless there is a good conversation and a good dialogue in that relationship, we are not going to get integrated peacekeeping from the very start, even at the grand strategic level. There is a lot of criticism still that the Security Council is actually not delivering in a way – it is certainly not delivering in places like Syria – but nor is it delivering to the needs of the member states who want a stronger consultative process in what it is that is being done in the delivery of mandates. Not just because they are paying for it, as in the case of Japan and some of the western countries, but also because they are sending the peacekeepers in there.

The peacekeepers themselves, the troop-contributing countries, and the police-contributing countries come from a broad spectrum of countries, of course, but increasingly they come from the developed world. If we take western states, and I am using that term advisedly, so stand down, Japan, but western states, their percentage of peacekeeping effort now is about 6.5%. Including Japan, the developed world pays for nearly 85% of peacekeeping, so we have this slight mismatch between those who pay and those who go out and do. That is an issue.

Those who actually contribute come from all sorts of different doctrinal basis with different equipment, different language, different training, different understanding, different preparedness to take risk, different preparedness to take casualties in the course of peace in somebody else's country. Yet, we are asking these people, these TCCs, these member states, to do very difficult things, which require high degrees of training which they do not have the resources to undertake. We should not be surprised that actually the quality of our TCCs on the ground is not as good as the Secretariat would wish. It is something the Secretariat is having to deal with.

I have already mentioned that the reality is we do not have enough rapidly deployable civilian expertise, because it is the civilian expertise who actually make the difference. The military just hold the ring; create the environment for stability, to allow the difference to be made by the specializations of the civilians.

A fact is, we can talk about it, that the UN is required by the member states through the 5th Committee of the United Nations General Assembly to operate extremely bureaucratic systems of accounting, accounting for helicopter flying; accounting for logistics; accounting for everything that a military peacekeeper needs on the ground and yet slows down, therefore, everything that that military peacekeeper is trying to do.

As a Force Commander, you will be frustrated by the UN system of bureaucratic accounting, a system, as I say, demanded by the member states. It is a system that is not designed for high-tempo operations. It is a system designed for diplomatic reasons. Yet on the ground, we are asking peacekeepers to protect civilians with increasingly complicated equipment. There is a mismatch there between how we resource peacekeeping in terms of its logistics and actually what we are asking them to do in the field and that is something again that the Secretariat cannot resolve but needs to be worked out. If you do not understand this, you will find UN Peacekeeping extremely frustrating.

I have mentioned this to you already, but there are limits to what the Department of Peacekeeping Operations can do for you in the field. They can help you interpret your mandate. They can generate forces for you. They can give you the rules of engagement. They can negotiate with member states. What they do not give you is that superior headquarters' direction, information, intelligence, guidance that you would get from an operational level headquarters in your own national systems or in systems like NATO, where they do have these operational level headquarters. There are limits in the capability of DPKO which, to an extent, can constrain DPKO's ability to manage peacekeeping in this complex, volatile, distressed environment; where we are using increasingly sophisticated equipment.


Of course, because we are operating as a multinational group, everybody, and we should never forget this, member states send the people into peacekeeping for national interest reasons. It is all driven by national interest. Member states operate through national interest. So there will be

national interests in a peacekeeping mission, which are not necessarily coherent and trying to integrate within your mission becomes difficult if some of the member states contributing to that mission have a different view on what should be done than other member states. You are not working in a vacuum; you are working in a complex chaotic world, a world driven by member states and national interests. We need to, again, be really clear on that, because that makes it difficult because it is all multicultural, multinational, multidisciplinary.

The term ad hoc means unplanned; we have these unplanned command control communications and intelligence mechanisms, which are put in place without any preparation, without any prior training and development as headquarters. So the very passage of information is particularly difficult and, again, does not lead to good integration where passages of information can get confused and chaotic.

We are very dependent upon telephone communications in United Nations, unlike the media. You will find that the Undersecretary General, his pet issue at the moment is unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs, or drones. Needing drones to go out and see what is out there. But if unless you have communications and command systems that can put that information and make sure that information goes down to all needed recipients, a drone is only of certain and limited use. There is a lot of work that needs to be done there to improve integration.

Probably most emphatically, is this issue here that there is still a lack of clarity and agreement in actually the use of force. How much force can we use in peacekeeping? Do we have the will to use that force or not? When should we use it? There is a lack of clarity there, and not all member states agree. You, in Japan, have constitutional issues, but others who do not still have lack of clarity in when we should be using force and when not.



In the last 5 minutes that I have, I just want to show you this. Because even though it may be an odd picture to show about integrated peacekeeping, it does tell us something. When I was part of the team writing the UN's Capstone Doctrine on Peacekeeping, I developed this actually just to help us understand where we can use this instrument of peacekeeping and where we cannot.

If you look at that on this, the X axis is the level of capability needed from low, increasing. On this Y axis, you have the environment, from a consensual environment up to a hostile environment, and what we ought to know is that we should always make sure that X equals Y. What that says is that put into an environment the capability that matches that environment. I think everyone will agree with that.

If we track peacekeeping interventions broadly and we did this process – you can put them and they are roughly on the X equals Y line, and we can put rings around them and say that some here where there is a benign environment I consent to the operation, you can get away with low levels of capability. You can have unarmed peacekeepers. You can have civilian observers, civilian election officers, and civilian human rights officers. But where the environment starts to become more difficult, more hostile, then that capability needs to rise and so you move up the scale until you are right up here where the environment is so hostile, you need very high levels of capability.


So far so good, but what we understood and try to articulate in the doctrine is that there is a red line, and that red line is beyond which UN Peacekeeping cannot really go successfully because of the multinational, multidiscipline, multicultural, ad hoc nature of UN Peacekeeping. It cannot generate the tempo to operate at these high levels of needed capability, because the environment is

so hostile which is why UN Peacekeeping does not operate in Afghanistan. UN Peacekeeping does not operate in Somalia, at this stage. Because there is no peace to keep which takes us to this other red line, which is a line defined on this which is a line to do with the legitimacy and consent for peacekeeping. If we are using the UN's Peacekeeping mechanism to operate in an environment, where there is no consent for that peacekeeping, then immediately, any UN Peacekeeping intervention becomes part of the conflict. It becomes a party to the conflict, not an impartial keeper of a peace, which has the consent of the major parties.

That line tells us beyond which we should not go, and in many ways, that is often articulated as there must be a peace to keep. Do not send peacekeepers where there is no peace to keep, because that means you are operating up here without consent and, therefore, without legitimacy for UN Peacekeeping.

Now, the problem is that something needs to be done. Somalia – AMISOM in Somalia, the AMIS in Darfur were all up here in a highly hostile environment with low levels of capability. Even the mission we sent in, the observer mission we sent into Damascus this summer was operating here, very low levels of capability but in a highly volatile dangerous environment. We can do it, but do not call that peacekeeping, because it is not peacekeeping.

There is this box, this space for peacekeeping and what that tells us is that UN Peacekeeping is not a universal instrument. It cannot be used for everything.



If it is going to be used for things, and here it is, the UN Peacekeeping, and these are the things that

need to be done to turn – post-conflict state from conflict through time, considerable amounts of time, to a sustainable peace.

The peacekeeping operation is finite in the things it can do, because that is where the funding comes from and the mandate comes from, and they tend to be political things, security things, things like DDR, things like rule-of-law issues.

But there are a lot of other things that need to be done to move from conflict to peace and, therefore, there are a lot of other actors, be it the UN country team, be it international and regional organizations, be it donor states, non-government organizations, all the humanitarian people who are there at the beginning and will be there when the peacekeeping is gone, not even talking about international financial institutions, who are working on the development issues and governance issues, all this needs to be pulled together. That is what we mean by integration, because if we are just focusing as a peacekeeping on this little bit, there is great danger that all this other activity is not coherent but actually is in conflict with what we are trying to achieve. Integration, in many ways, means that process of discussion and planning and dialogue that gets all the arrows pointing in the same direction. That requires a Shared Strategic Vision for what we are doing and then the planning to support it.

Changing Context for Peacekeeping

Effects of Global Financial Crisis – “do more with less”.

Tension between FCCs and T/PCCs – impact on delivery of robust peacekeeping and PoC

Erosion of consent for large PKO – focus on transition and peacebuilding (but insufficient expertise)

Changing paradigm of conflict – outpacing structures and doctrinal thinking in UN Secretariat and MS.

All put increased pressure on senior mission leadership and increased need for partnerships.

But the context is changing, and the world is looking very different. You will know in your country, as I do in mine, that austerity cuts are now very much the focus of governmental activity. This is

affecting peacekeeping as well and so the old idea that peacekeeping would always get more and more funds and more and more peacekeepers is no longer true. To quote the Secretary General, “We have to do more with less.”

There remains this tension between the financial-contributing countries and the troop-contributing countries. The financial-contributing countries of which you are number 2 in the world, of course, rightly say, “We are spending this money; we want results. We want a qualitative improvement on UN Peacekeeping; otherwise, we are wasting our money.” This bunch say, “Fine, we can do more, but you need to recompense us more. If you want us to die for international peace, then we need to be better recompensed for it.” That tension between those two blocks, if I can call them the global north and the global south, has impeded the delivery of robust peacekeeping up till now and impeded the delivery of protection of civilians. It is getting better. The Special Advisory Group of the Secretary General has come up with some solutions to this. We can talk about those in question-time.

I would suggest that there is an erosion of consent internationally. There is a weariness internationally for large peacekeeping missions, and an increased focus now on transition, on political missions, which are agile, nimble, well-focused, civilian-led, civilian-targeted, with using the military mainly to keep those stable conditions. But there is insufficient expertise for this as yet.

There is that changing paradigm of conflict which I have mentioned, which I am suggesting is outpacing the structures and doctrinal thinking of the UN and the member states. How do we deal with transnational crime?

Because that is major problem in the world; all of this is putting increased pressure on senior mission leadership. A senior mission leadership, which still is not being selected, trained, prepared, and deployed in a satisfactory way; we are still throwing senior leaders into this really complex environment. We throw them into the pool, and we do not know whether they can swim or not. That is a terrifying concept when you think about it because the emphasis is on leadership, and we do not do much about it.

Take- Aways

- For PKO there must be a peace to keep - but SC decides. However, x should = y especially in mandates.
- Success depends on a united SC and positive regional engagement.
- End states are political, but they must be articulated and agreed at strategic level. Military solutions alone are illusionary.
- PSOs are complex and require integrated planning and multi-agency / dimensional solutions. A comprehensive approach.
- UN PKOs may be militarily “inefficient” but they have unique moral authority/legitimacy - but they are **not** a universal instrument. Increasing scope for partnerships.
- Short-termism is a blight. Peace is more than absence of war. Long-term supportive relationships/partnerships are needed. Foundations for PB established during PK.

Okay, this is lastly. I want my last take-aways just for you. Peacekeeping operations work when there is a peace to keep, but ultimately, the Security Council, responsible, has to decide, and they may decide that something has to be done through pressure, whether it is a peacekeeping mission or not is up to them to decide. Not necessarily all member states are involved in that thinking. What is important that the X should equal Y, so if we are going to authorize peacekeeping missions, integrated peacekeeping missions, let us ensure that we give that mission the resources needed to implement the mandate in that environment, so X should equal Y. It is a mantra we all need to have boned on our hearts.

We will hear more about this, but success does depend on a united Security Council. If we do not have the united Security Council as the representatives of the international community, or we are impeded from the start, and it does need regional mechanisms, because the UN cannot operate on its own; it has to have regional mechanisms, be it the Arab League, be it ECOWAS, be it the African Union, to support what we do.

Everything is political. End states' strategic goals are political but they have to be agreed. There are a number of actors, especially in this integrated process, who have views on what the end states should be. They need to be brought into this process. Military solutions, as I have said, are an illusion. The military can just hold the ring for a political process to take place.

Peace support operations – I use that term on peacekeeping, because it is wider than just peacekeeping. They are complex by definition and required, therefore, integrated planning and a multiagency approach, a comprehensive approach, and that is what we mean by integration.

On the military side, these peacekeeping operations are usually militarily inefficient, I use that word advisedly, meaning you can do this much better if you, the Japanese Defense Forces, went and did it on their own, it would be a much better result. But you would not have the legitimacy and the moral authority that this multinational, multicultural effort brings. But note they are not – peacekeeping is not a universal instrument. We need to be careful where we use this instrument which means if we cannot use it everywhere, we need to work on partnerships. Get other partner organizations working with the United Nations; more work needs to be done on that.

My last point, which speaks of integration directly, is that time and time again we have been criticized for a short-term approach. We send in military peacekeepers; when the fighting has stopped, we pull them out, and surprisingly, the fighting restarts. Peace is more than just the absence of fighting. Peace actually can only be sustainable when you tackle the root causes which mean that we need to lay the foundations of peacebuilding right at the start of peacekeeping. Laying those foundations of peacebuilding is what we mean by an integrated approach to peacekeeping. We are integrating the peacebuilding mechanisms with the security mechanisms. In one sentence, that is what we mean by integration.

Thank you very much.

Q&A

Q 1	<p>Thank you, sir, for sharing your wisdom with us. I am Wing Commander Mukul from Indian Air Force.</p> <p>India has been one of the largest contributors to UN for the peacekeeping operations forces, and I could not agree with you more on the issue of the mandate being one of the main hurdles for the peacekeeping operators, the feet on the ground which are fighting. As you mentioned, the higher organization definitely has the political acumen of charting out a clear mandate, but this has not been the case in the past. Thinking on the viewpoints from the higher organization, what would be their limitations in giving a clear mandate?</p> <p>The second part of the question is that with clear mandate clearly affecting the peacekeepers on ground, will it not lead to the troop-contributing countries to start reducing their forces because it is finally their soldiers which are getting killed in some other countries? Thank you.</p>
A1	<p>It was a very good question and thank you for it. I mean the first point, you are absolutely right. One of the major tasks of the Mission Leadership Team and by that I mean the Head of Mission, the Head of the Police Component, the Force Commander, the Director of Mission Support is to really understand what the mandate is asking them to do. This process of an analysis of the mandate is extremely important, because, as we have no doubt here, mandates are the art of the diplomatically possibly. We get mandates emerging from the Security Council which are shrouded in ambiguity, deliberately so, to get them through the Security Council.</p> <p>There needs to be a certain interpretation by the Mission Leadership Team normally talking to the Secretariat and saying, "This is what we understand you mean by that mandate? This is what we intend to do about it. Do you agree? Are you happy with that?" That process has to happen very frequently, because these missions are dynamic; things are constantly changing, and you always have to check, as the senior leader, your constituency in New York in the Security Council and in the member states, who have an interest, including your own country, say, in that mission. There is a constant checking back. Do we understand this is what we are meant to be doing? You have given us a priority to protect civilians. This is what we are doing about it. Are you happy with this? There is that sort of issue.</p> <p>Now, if this does not happen, and your point is dead right, and we are facing this, if there is a lack of confidence in the Mandate Delivery Process of the Security Council, member states will vote with their feet. They will say, "We are not happy about what you are trying to achieve in this country, so do not come to us for troops. Try next</p>

	<p>door.” That happens.</p> <p>When the Secretariat in Somalia went around in 2009, when we were looking like a peace process was emerging from the Somali dialogue, when the UN said, “We are thinking of a peacekeeping mission in this sort of mandate, what are you going to supply to it?” Not one member state contributed a thing, so there was no mission because member states have their own views on this peace process in Somalia. So, poor old African Union had to do it themselves.</p> <p>Does that answer your question? Which comes back to this point it is everything is really political.</p>
Q2	<p>Thank you, sir, for a very useful presentation. My name is Virendra Singh Malik and I am a former Military Colonel from the Indian Gorkha Rifles. I took early retirement, 2008, and currently, I am doing a Civilian Peace Builders course through this Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center.</p> <p>My question relates to the changing paradigm, as you said in the conflict – complex operations, restoring government authorities, installing new systems of governance, or new political leadership in countries. One of the dangers that I see and which I am sure the UN is grappling with is that unlike the traditional peacekeeping in which even if a troop-contributing nation sent a huge force, perhaps they had a limited role in influencing the government of the day or pursuing their national interest, because the force itself was static, had a very limited role.</p> <p>But in today’s complex operations, when the governments are actually involved in complete process of peacebuilding and installing governments, changing the form of governance. Now the dangers are that the national agendas tend to mess up much more with how these peacekeeping and peacebuilding takes place. We have examples, Afghanistan or other places, where the civilians then pay a heavier price than what they should have figured to be done. Just as we see in Afghanistan last year, you see the security is deteriorating and more civilians have died than the last previous 10 years, and it is all because of the geopolitical and higher-energy agendas of countries and various other things which gets much more now distorted because of the role that governments can play in the whole process of how a nation emerges from conflict.</p> <p>Is the UN seeing it as a potential danger because the R2P, the Right to Protect, gets into the way and there is then a resistance from some countries? Is this a potential future challenge for integrated mission and for peacekeeping?</p> <p>The second question is on the role of private security in peacebuilding, in peacekeeping. Particularly as you see that in America, for example, the corporate security agencies are putting a huge pressure on the government of the day in how it</p>

	<p>extends ODA to countries emerging from conflict. Do you think that private security is one of the realities for the future peacekeeping and peacebuilding and what are your views on it? What are the possible opportunities and challenges in the role of private security?</p>
A2	<p>Okay Colonel, thank you very much indeed. I am very fond of the Gorkha Rifles myself.</p> <p>Those were very big questions. We come back to this, and the first question is about national interests. We have a multilateral system. We have a multilateral world, at the moment. It is not brilliance. The UN – if we redesigned it now, we would not design it in the way that it was designed in 1945, but, ultimately, it is all we have got, and we will never get anything better unless there is some major global holocaust, where we all start picking ourselves up and redesign it. We have to work with the system.</p> <p>The UN has to work with individual member states' national interest and provided we are aware of that then we can operate better in these environments. The Secretariat does not like national interests' cards being played. It would rather these issues were coordinated through the international mechanisms of the United Nations. But, at the end of the day, member states pay, member states send in their people and national interest and sovereignty will always be influential in these relations.</p> <p>The challenge for UN Peacekeeping now and in the future and in the past was trying to harness these national interests for a better and wider good. Not an easy process and essentially political process again. But you are right to say that member states often do things in an incoherent manner in a member state, where there is a peacekeeping mission for national reasons, and sometimes that looks odd.</p> <p>Your second point of private security companies. I have – you ask my personal opinion, and you ask me to justify my opinion I noticed – my personal opinion is we do use private security companies now. All the helicopters that supply the UN support aviation come not from member states but come from private companies who have brought up surplus Warsaw Pact helicopter capability and use it under contractual arrangements with the UN. The UN uses private security companies for its aviation. Increasingly, the UN will use organizations that can build a camp and run a camp much more cheaply than the UN can do it.</p> <p>I think there is a place, and we should address this for a regulated system of using private security companies to provide logistical support for UN operations. That is quite an efficient way of doing business provided it is regulated. I personally draw the line in the use of force. I think if we are going to go down a road where force is being used by private security companies in support of international peace that looks like</p>

people making money out of conflict which sits uncomfortably. It still sits uncomfortably with the UN. In the short term, I think there is a line between administrative support and actually using force in the support of international peace and security and that line should not be crossed by private security companies.

The difficulty comes with some of your own fellow soldiers in the past who the UN uses a great deal, and I am speaking of Gorkha soldiers, who are used by the UN in great numbers to provide us the immediate security, especially for political missions where there is no contingent to provide that. That is very similar to my mission. We used a South African security company to train, recruit the Eritriain guards for our headquarters. We do, do that as well, but that has to be very carefully regulated. But they are there to protect and guard a premise; they are not there to go out and protect civilians. Again, so you can see there is a doctrinal difference between those two things. I think it is the way of the future, but it has got to be a regulated way, and we are still a little bit weak on the regulation, although there is attempt to do that now.

Special Lecture
Challenges in Integrated Mission from UN's Point of View
Kiyotaka Kawabata (Department of Political Affairs, United Nations)

I will discuss political aspects of the PKO policy decisions, with special emphasis on the Security Council perspectives. I will then discuss issues related to Integrated Missions. Especially, I will explain to you procedural and operational issues of Integrated Missions as well as their political background.

1. Introduction

I have been working for the United Nations for 24 years. My direct involvement with the peacekeeping operations started 18 years ago in the summer of 1994.

A civil war broke out in Rwanda, a tiny hilly country in central Africa, in April of that year. It was not merely a civil strife as it involved an ethnic cleansing of gigantic magnitude. At that time, UNAMID, a traditional peacekeeping operation based on the parties' consent, was deployed in Rwanda. However, this 2,700-strong PKO was in no way be able to cope with the full-scale conflict coupled with the intentional executions of the Tutsi minority ethnic group as well as moderate Hutus. The magnitude of the killing was totally beyond the thinking and the thoughts of the United Nations at that time.

The Security Council, at that time, was in disarray. They could not cope with that situation. I was involved in that process at the Security Council. From the very beginning, the consent of the parties had gone away, so the United States and the United Kingdom demanded that UNAMIR be withdrawn immediately. On the other hand, small and medium-sized members of the Council, particularly those from African, insisted that the UN should reinforce the Mission in order to save the innocent people from being slaughtered. After serious discussions, the Council decided in late April to scale down UNAMIR to 270 troops. The decision was tantamount to a de fact withdrawal of a PKO in the face of genocide. Indeed, the withdrawal of the peacekeepers helped accelerate the massacre which spread out of control from Kigali, the capital, to the entire country.

The spread of the killings prompted international outcry, which in turn created pressure on the United Nations to act. In a turnaround of its initial decision, the Security Council decided in the following month that the peacekeepers be increased significantly to 5,500. However, the Council's responses were reactive at best to the fast-evolving crisis. While a decision was made to reinforce UNAMIR, there were no Member States which had volunteered to send troops into an active war zone. After prolonged negotiations with potential troop-contributors, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali succeeded in securing commitments by several African nations to provide the United Nations with enough troops. However, it turned out that those African troops were

poorly equipped. Out of desperation, the United States and other Western powers proposed that they provide the peacekeepers with armored personnel carriers (APCs) and other necessary equipment. Nevertheless, the African troops did not know how to operate these APCs. So, time simply passed idly.

While members of the Security Council spent a lot of time discussing and wavering, the massacre spread and countless lives were lost before the eyes of the international community. After the futile attempts to enhance UNAMIR, the Security Council decided in June to dispatch a French-led multilateral force to stop the killing. However, when the advanced contingent of France entered into southern Rwanda in late June, the massacre was already over as the culprits, both Hutu-led Government forces and pro-government militias, had been defeated by the Tutsi-led forces. During those 3 months of UN inaction, as many as 800,000 or 10% of the total population were said to have been killed. Had this happened in Japan, the entire population of Tokyo would have been terminated within a short 3 months' period of time.

In early August 1994, I was sent to Kigali from UN Headquarters in New York as a political adviser. There, I witnessed the horrendous, heart-wrenching remnants of the genocide. It was really haunting. I remained convinced to the date that in an extreme situation like genocide, the international community has to stand firm and stop such atrocities by using all necessary means, including force. This is because if the international community is not able to prevent such a crime of massive scale, it may lose credibility and be regarded as useless.

The massacre eventually ended in that country. For several years since then, UN PKOs suffered a kind of identity crisis. Total number of PKO personnel plummeted from its peak of over 70,000 in the early 1990s to below 20,000 in the second half of the 1990s. At that time, some critics regarded the United Nations in general, and PKOs in particular, as totally useless. Some insisted that UN PKOs should strictly adhere to the so-called traditional peacekeeping principles - namely, the consent of parties, neutrality and non-use of force with the exception of self-defense. These principles were developed within the political constraints during the Cold War. Some maintained that the United Nations should never try again the grand idea of enforcing peace. Those were discussions that were very active in the late 1990s in New York.

However, in the meanwhile, regional conflicts continued to break out in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. The United Nations soon realized that it was simply beyond the capability of the traditional PKOs to deal with those new conflicts at their early stage, where parties were eager to fight on with little intention to welcome a UN intervention. What should be done? What can be done? After so many trials and errors, a new generation of PKOs with limited enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter started to emerge at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s.

The so-called Brahimi Report was issued in 2000. Mr. Brahimi and I worked together for

peacemaking effort in Afghanistan between 1997 and 1999. That effort was in a deadlock because of the rise of the Taliban. It was decided that Brahimi should be sidelined for some time as the negotiator, and he was called back to New York. During his "hiatus", he was given a new assignment to review the peacekeeping operations. It took one year for him to draft this report. Immediately after the publication of this report, the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred in the United States, so the situation in Afghanistan changed drastically as the United States started preparing to oust the Taliban. For the first time in decades, the international community started to cast a serious eye to the "orphan conflict". The United Nations peace effort started to make real progress and culminated in the Bonn Peace Conference in December of that year, in which both Brahimi and I attended.

Thanks to the Brahimi report, PKOs were able to make a renewed progress once again. The early attempt to enforce peace in Somalia was regarded as a failure because the United Nations had unwittingly become a party to the conflict. If an active military operation is necessary like Somalia, it has become the trend for the Security Council to use a multinational force. But for an intermediate-type situation that does not fit either traditional PKOs or multinational forces, the United Nations found it necessary to deploy robust peacekeeping operations with limited enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. .

The introduction of the concept of "robust peacekeeping" helped revive the UN peacekeeping operations. The number of PKOs started to rise since 1999, with total number of peacekeepers exceeding a record 100,000 in these days. When combined with civilian personnel, total number of those involved in PKOs worldwide exceeds 120,000 today. The scale of the operations was second to the United States in terms of the size of the military personnel deployed worldwide.



In addition to the limited enforcement mandate, all types of tasks had been added to these new generation PKOs. Can you imagine where the above photograph was taken? This was taken in Ivory Coast, where former president Gbagbo was defeated in the UN-supported election held in late 2011. Mr. Gbagbo refused to accept the election result certified by the United Nations. Moreover, his force and followers threatened to attack a hotel in April last year where UN troops were protecting the newly elected president. When pro-Gbagbo forces aimed mortars and other heavy weapons at this Golf Hotel, Secretary General Ban decided to order UNOCI to take a pre-emptive strike in order to neutralize those weapons. The UN pre-emptive attack, set the stronghold of the pro-Gbagbo forces on fire, as this picture shows. The pre-emptive attack might be an extreme example of the robust peacekeeping and thus remains controversial even among members of the Security Council. But, in any way, UN PKOs have come to this.

2. Characteristics of PKO

2.1. Not Found in the UN Charter

Now, UN Peacekeeping Operations. I have nothing more to add to what General Gordon already said. One of the most remarkable characteristics of UN PKOs is that there is no legally binding definition of UN PKOs. The UN founders did not anticipate PKOs. This was the reason why the UN Charter does not mention PKOs at all. Sixty-seven years ago, the drafters of the Charter envisioned the creation of UN forces, but it did not materialize due to the onset of the Cold War, which divided permanent members of the Security Council over every aspect of the Council's role in maintaining international peace and security. However, they needed to do something as conflict never stopped emerging. They could not just sit back. This was the background where the concept of peacekeeping operations was "invented" in order to break the deadlock. In other words, UN PKOs were a product of "political improvisation". This was the reason why, even today, we do not have the definition of PKOs.

2.2. Political Process

Therefore, PKOs are essentially a political, not legal, product. As such, PKOs do not work if there is little political will on the part of Member States. If Member States intend to use PKOs as a "fig leaf" to conceal their lack of political will, then the peacekeeping operations are doomed to fail, as in the case of Somalia and Bosnia.

The latest example of such a failure was the UN operation dispatched to Syria in April 2012 to monitor a non-existent ceasefire. 300 monitors were deployed. However, the Security Council that authorized that and especially its permanent members were divided deeply over how to deal with the Syrian conflict. While the United States and other Western powers calling for pressure on the Assad regime on one hand, Russia and China are refusing to take any coercive measure.

With Council members deeply divided and unable to provide the United Nations with sufficient political backing, the UN mission did not have a chance. On August 19th it had to withdraw completely without achieving the intended results.

2.3. Evolving Concept

UN peacekeeping operations are an evolving concept. This is the reason why the United Nations only have guidance and principles on PKOs, but not legal definition. Looking back at the past PKOs, these people have just assumed that this is what the peacekeeping operations would be like.

The concept of PKO keeps changing in accordance with the political realities and constraints of any given time. The concept of Integrated Missions, which is the theme of this symposium, is not exception. It is therefore wrong for any of you to assume that there is a solid definition of Integrated Missions, which will keep changing. You can just cut from one perspective, then you can come up with one definition, but this would keep changing. Political constraints and political will of Member States will play the key role in contouring what Peacekeeping Operations in general, and Integrated Missions in particular, would mean in the future.

3. New Generation PKO

Talking about the new generation of peacekeeping operations or contemporary peacekeeping operations, I think this was already explained in the earlier speech. Unlike the traditional PKOs which were to deal with an inter-state conflict, the new generation PKOs are aimed at a civil war or an internal conflict within the national borders. Another characteristic of the new generation PKOs is that they tend to be dispatched at the initial stage of conflict, where warring parties are eager to continue fighting with little interest in agreeing on a ceasefire.

During the cold war period, there were certain peacekeeping operations which could be characterized as the prototype of what we call the Integrated Mission now. The cases in point are Cambodia and Namibia. However, what is different from the peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and Namibia is that they were able to wait 20 years and 30 years and the parties to the conflicts got worn out. But there is no such patience anymore on the part of the international community. After the Cold War, Member States tended to ask the United Nations to dispatch peacekeeping operations immediately after the breakout of a conflict, even though there is no ceasefire agreement and the parties have little intention to cooperate with an intervening UN mission. When the warring parties are intent on keep fighting, it is almost impossible for the United Nations to secure an effective ceasefire and cooperation. If you were the parties to the conflict and were convinced that you would win in this conflict, if the UN comes to intervene, it is just a hindrance to your goal. There is no consent from the parties to the conflict and even if there is, it is quite superficial and there is no ceasefire established. Therefore, it is very difficult to

maintain neutrality. The UN was pushed out into a situation where three principles of traditional peacekeeping operations are quite difficult to maintain.

That is the background in which the new generation PKOs have emerged. In order to stabilize fragile peace, you need to have proactive operations and have to be able to sufficient room to make judgments on the spot.

The PKO, in its infancy, was quite limited in its mandate and back then they were just doing ceasefire monitoring and separation of forces. Just to have the presence with the blue helmet, they were able to play the role.

4. Characteristics of “Robust PKO”

4.1. Consent of the Parties

Let me explain more specifically. The robust PKO is characterized as follows: First of all, like the traditional PKOs, the UN needs to secure the consent from parties in principle. However, in the case of the new generation PKOs, the UN does not have to obtain consent from all parties. All what they need is the consent of the "major parties". Such major parties included the host government and main anti-government forces. The new generation PKOs do not need consent from "spoilers", such as small groups of criminals and guerilla forces.

4.2. Rules for the Use of Force

With regard to the rules for the use of force, if there is authorization by the Security Council and also if there is a consent from the hosting country or main parties, the new generation PKOs are allowed to use force to implemented authorized mandate. However, such use of force is limited to the tactical level. In other words, it is intended to deter, but not defeat, hostile forces. For instance, peacekeepers could use for to prevent the obstruction of the mission's mandate or protect civilians under imminent threat.

4.3 Scope of the Use of Force

The target of this use of force is spoilers, a small group of people who are intent on obstructing the task of UN peacekeeping operations. Also there should be clear text in the resolution of UN Security Council about the scope of this use of force.

4.4 Purpose of the Use of Force

There are several examples of the use of force beyond self-defense. For instance, ONUB and MONUC are authorized to use of force suppress or remove obstructions to the UN-sponsored political process.

The second example are UNAMIL, UNAMID, UNAMIL, UNAMID, UNISFA and UNMISS which are authorized to use force to protect humanitarian workers and to ensure their freedom of movement.

The third example is MONUC/MONUSCO, which are authorized to use force to support the

DRC Government force in disarming armed rebels. MINUSTAH is allowed to use force in support of the Haitian police force. This was because the Haitian national police was not able to eliminate the criminal organizations in the slum area in Port-au-Prince and this has been always a critical factor in instability of Haiti for the past 20 years. Haitian national police was not able to control the situation on its own, so MINUSTAH helped it in cracking down on organized crime, which is quite one of rare examples.

The forth example is the use of force to protect civilians under imminent threat. This protection mandate has become very common among the new generation PKOs. Today, most new generation PKOs have such mandate. Amongst the 15 currently ongoing peacekeeping operations, 8 have the protection of civilians mandate under Article VII of the UN Charter.

5. Political Interests Concerning Integration

5.1. Points of Agreement

Regarding political interests concerning integration, there is firm agreement among member states that there should be peacebuilding from the early phases of peacekeeping to prevent the recurrence of conflicts to solidify the foundation for the peace.

Especially the time immediately after the end of conflict is a golden time for peacebuilding, this is the words that US representatives often like to use. When you do emergency medical assistance, you are carried by an ambulance to the hospital. After the incidence, several hours are the key. The rate of recovery of the patient is quite high; if you treat on the patient immediately after the accident. That holds true for conflicts between countries. After the conflict, if you do not just the peacekeeping, but also you start the peacebuilding effort, that should be effective. That would help to consolidate peace. The probability that peace will be consolidated will be much higher, that is the thinking. On this point, I think that there is broad agreement amongst almost all of the member states.

By deploying PKO forces, you can apply a certain amount of political pressure to the host country to reconstruct the nation based on international standards. This is not often talked about. But the significance of doing this simultaneously is that you have this international force there and you have this silent political pressure applied to this newly established or establishing government.

Peacebuilding may be a comfortable term, but conflict countries have almost no experience in the human rights, democratization or election support. Especially the forces that won in the conflict really do not want to embark on those efforts. For the international society, the best way to sort of force the governments to take up those issues is to do it at the time immediately after the end of conflict. So, if you can apply this kind of silent political pressure that should be effective. There are areas where you cannot see improvement just by giving funds or money.

Now, look at this from the reverse view. After the end of conflict, the security is still unstable and you cannot just rely on the civilians or the UN country team. There is that concern that in the early phases of peace, security situation is still unstable and you cannot rely on just the civilians.

5.2. Points of Disagreement

5.2.1. True Intent of the Western Countries

These are the true intent of the western nations. That is to encourage human rights and democracy and spread the universal western values that should lead to elimination of dictatorships in Africa and Middle East. That should promote the establishment of west-leaning democratic governments. Also, by integrating PKO, they expand the scope of coverage of the Security Council. Human rights and democracy, previously, were not within the scope of security but through the Security Council, the western countries can enforce these ideas. So, this is an idea well understood by the western countries in the Security Council.

For example, in the Libya or Syria crisis, the Security Council is in a stalemate. What do US, UK and France do with these opponent members? There is political gridlock, so they try to take a different approach, take a different path. They talk about the human right situation in Syria. They are requested to report about that. They say the humanitarian situation in Syria is poor in the combat areas. Medical supplies and food is not reaching those areas. That should be reported to the informal meeting of the Security Council. That kind of thing has become regular activities.

For some time after the end of the Cold War, these were taboo issues. If you do those things, it was understood that non-western members of the Security Council will complain. They would say, "Where in the charter does it say the Security Council has jurisdiction over the human rights and the humanitarian issues?" However, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are deemed to be inseparable, so 20 years after the cold war, the international community and the Security Council have come to agree that those two are inseparable. With that as a background, the non-western Security Council members can no longer deny such activities.

In terms of stabilization and democratization of the conflict countries, protection of human rights, gender equality, and election support and development of the civil society, is understood to diminish the hotbed for Islam extremists. It is said that it should suppress international terrorism in the long run, so that is the intent of the western countries.

5.2.2. Interests of China and Russia

For this integrated mission, does everyone agree? The answer is not necessarily so. Although, not publicly said, there is concern that the integrated approach leads to interference in domestic affairs and infringement of sovereignty under the name of human rights and democracy. In the Syria crisis, the Security Council was divided in half. I think that reflects

such sentiment.

Also, if the authority of the Security Council is expanded, as I said in the previous page, then there could be a larger room to have intervention in those issues directly related to your interests. The interest of China has turned toward Myanmar and Tibet, and Russia has an interest in Caucasia. Currently, the situation is not the Security Council would directly intervene, but with the integrated mission now being done mainly in Africa. If that should spread globally, then it could come to affect the area of your concern. There is that political concern within the Security Council that the integrated missions will lead to intervention in the areas of concern.

Also there are the geopolitical concerns. Peacebuilding is fine, but you are doing this in Libya and Syria and before you know it, you have west-leaning governments established in these countries, that we cannot accept would be the position of the non-western countries.

5.2.3. Interests of Non-Aligned Nations

It is not just the China and Russia who have these concerns. There are concerns about the domination by major powers through the Security Council. Amongst the Security Council members, currently India and South Africa are members of the Security Council and they represent the unaligned movement. Until last year, Brazil was also a member. They do not squarely oppose a specific conflict resolution PKO. They do not oppose election support. They do not say that they oppose integration per se, but they do not wholeheartedly support the promotion of the integration of the peace support operations. I think you need to keep that in the back of your mind.

Secondly, democracy, human rights are talked about, but there is a concern that they are western values. We tend to think that we are talking about universal values. We tend to have that misconception or illusion, but in this world, those are not necessarily fully accepted by all countries. UN is a global institution, so when you are talking about the UN, you have to always keep that in mind that what some view as universal values are not necessarily so.

By spreading human rights and democracy, this could lead to the weakening of the governments who are dictatorship or kingdoms in Africa or Middle East. There are less democracies and more kingdoms and dictatorships. They overwhelm in terms of number. For them, integrated mission is fine if it is being done somewhere far away but they say, "Do not bring it to us. Do not do it here or around here." The devil is in the details. They agree with the concept but they do not like that to be introduced to their region. That is what I feel is the sentiment of these countries when I am in New York.

6. Challenges in Integrated Mission

6.1. Conflict Between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

To make it very clear, I gave a very provocative title; there is a conflict between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Do the two go well together? For the reasons that I mentioned, integrating peace activities is necessary and it is a good cause but if you look at the actual contents of what you are doing, there is a need to have a political resolution of civil war and also there is human right and humanitarian activities that try to eliminate the political factors, so there is conflict between the two.

For peacekeeping, you need to apply pressure to the government and through the Security Council sometimes you have to confront the government for military and political purposes. But on the other end of the spectrum are the human rights and humanitarian activists, they are looking at the general public and they cannot be active away from the people, so they want to eliminate the political character. That means they avoid unnecessary conflict, so they have to be in contact with the people and they have to be able to maintain their activity. That is the nature of humanitarian activities. In terms of objective and methods, there are differences between the political and military objectives and the humanitarian activities.

The priorities are different as well. For military and political efforts, you confront the government or the insurgency group. Against the Taliban, we conducted the sanctions and my human rights colleagues came to complain, "What have you done? Because we have these cooperative relations with Taliban, we are able to help the Afghan people. You, the political people simply take the sanction route very easily but you cannot help the people through that approach." This is the result of difference in priorities. We think that as long as Taliban takes those harsh measures, they could never be peace in Afghanistan.

The human rights, humanitarian personnel try to avoid conflict with the authority and they maintain a distance with the military and political forces. They do not want to become too close with the military forces. That is because they are trying to help the people and if they are too close with the military, it would inhibit their activities. I think that is one aspect that we see. It is not which is right, which is wrong. Their work or their mission is different, that is the reason why we have this kind of difference.

There is a difference in how much time it should take to achieve the goal. For the military and political objectives, it is relatively short term. You need to maintain ceasefire and you need to promote political processes. For the ceasefires, we need weeks or months. For the political process, even in Afghanistan, it was a 2 and a half-year process. That was a slow process establishing the transitional authority, a transitional government, and slowly they tried to enhance the legitimacy of the government. At the end of the 2 and a half-year period, the political process was concluded and full-fledged Karzai administration was established. We worked towards that goal and we said we would leave within 2 and a half years, so that is the scope of the duration of the work there.

But for humanitarian and human rights activities, it is much longer. If you talk about nation-building, it would require a minimum of 5 to 10 years. Although we are talking under the same roof of the integrated mission, the time that you need to remain under that roof is different by each family member who lives in that same house, so there is that conflict there.

There are also differences in organization, military and political departments. They are under the Secretary General's command; therefore, each mission, they are under the SRSG's command or Force Commander's command and the Line of Command is very clear.

But for the humanitarian and human rights organizations, the aid-giving organizations, I think, you know if you studied UN system, it is very disparate and each of the agencies have different budgets, separate personnel authority. The Security General does not have the authority to punish these organizations. They are impacted by specific donors. So we need to sort out these differences between the military and the civilian organizations.

6.2. Relationship with the Concerned Parties

In the relationship with the concerned parties, we need to talk about national ownership. Not in the case of peacekeeping but in terms of peacebuilding, we need to respect the intent of the host country because the UN must eventually exit from the country.

But the issue here is that you cannot necessarily do what you aim for. When you have this new government that has just been established, it is very rare that they are democratic from the very beginning. They do not necessarily represent the people broadly. They may just have won the civil wars so they have come to power, so they reflect just one of the opinions in the country. If human rights, democratization, and rule of law may lead to strengthening the anti-government forces, the government may not cooperate. Also, the government may selectively cooperate with the PKO Mission. In the case of DRC, there was the SSR reorganizing the national army. They said they did not want that to be touched and they did not want the UN to do that. They wanted some European country to be involved that were close to them so that they could do them freely. That seems to be a selfish stance. Burundi was not so eager to engage the anti-government forces. One UN representative negotiated hard but there was the contact from the military administration and they said they do not want that UN representative. So you have that kind of dilemma.

The same can be said of the anti-government forces. If the parties withdraw the consent then PKO must withdraw, that was true in Chad and DRC. Especially in Chad, the UN PKO had to withdraw without completing the mission. In the Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE), because of a lack of cooperation from Eritrea, they had to withdraw.

6.3. Challenges in the Use of Force

What are the challenges in the use of force? Of course, there are certain rules that have to be played by the use of force but the discussion is yet to be taken place concerning its relations between the use of force and also the role of peacekeepers in nation-building efforts. The rules and

the consent and understandings are yet to be formed in the case of POC, etc.

Also, when it comes to how and when and to what degree peacekeepers should play a role in protecting civilians, there are no criteria or standards to keep for them.

In fact, protection of the civilians from the kidnapping and the robbery and the rapes are the roles of the police primarily, though the PKO personnel are mandated to protect civilians. The crack down on demonstrations needs certain proper training but the military personnel have not trained for such roles with exception of some countries. In most peacekeeping operations, peacekeepers are not used to how to arrest people and how to use the certain degree of force in retaining, in keeping down riots.

Also, there are no clear-cut criteria and standard as to how to prioritize in the efforts to protect civilians. The case in point is Darfur, for example. Khartoum regime oppressed the Darfur and peacekeepers should try to keep good relations with the government in Khartoum or should they accept the possibility that they need to have to confront with the regime in the capital. Even PKO under the Article 7 of the UN Charter would face more challenges.

6.4. Change of the Guidelines

I would like to mention one important point as to the change of the guidelines for peacekeeping activities. In the traditional PKO, neutrality was one of the important three principles to keep but in a robust peacekeeping operation, impartiality takes precedence or it has the priority. Because of this impartiality, the peacekeepers and their commanders are expected to make a more discretion themselves at a critical moment.

For example, under the neutrality doctrine, the certain distance has to be kept between party A and party B. Let us say that the party A is very cooperative with the UN and they keep certain discipline but party B give the UN only the lip service and committing the murders, the killings, some disrupting or the subversive activities behind. However, the peacekeepers or the UN have to keep the same distance vis-à-vis party A and party B. But with this principle, impartiality, even though in principle, the UN has to keep the equal distance with these two groups, if group B continues to commit the human rights violations, then harsher measures are allowed to be taken by the UN toward party B. This is the line of thinking that is getting more weight.

That means that the peacekeepers and the commanders are expected to make to make their own judgment significantly more than before. They have to consider the consequences of their discretionary decisions, what kind of the peace process might take place and in what situation peacekeepers might be called for. Such a situation or such possibilities have to be considered constantly. The Force Commanders cannot be looked to always for their opinions in such a case. The robust peacekeeping operation is closely connected with Integrated Mission, and requires more complex expertise and skills.

Q&A

Q1	<p>My name is Tanaka from the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office. Thank you very much for your very interesting presentation.</p> <p>As you said toward the end of your lecture, the discretions or the more independent decisions are required and also I have a question with regard to the relationship between that and the use of force. Of course, even though there are certain safeguards through these of course, such a criteria as to the use of force is still ambiguous, so if you refer to the mandates and the roles of the peacekeepers, sometimes the independent decision in the field might not be very effective, particularly with regard to the use of force. What kind of the postmortem review system is established?</p> <p>If the troops of contributing countries have reached the certain standard as to the decisions to use force, are there any discussions within the Security Council in order to have the possible potential to unify the standards, so to speak amongst the troops of contributing countries?</p>
A1	<p>As I said at the outset, there are no established criteria in the UN. There are guidelines and principles that you can refer to but they themselves keep changing, as we speak. There is Lessons Learned team that is looking back at the both successes and failures of the past peacekeeping operations so that they can incorporate those lessons into future operations.</p> <p>But, on the other hand, if you go too much, there was some failure in Congo. Several years ago in assisting national troops, the peacekeeping operators were surrounding the village which was the stronghold of anti-government forces. The government forces went in and forced them to disarm. UN troops were surrounding this and Indian attack helicopters were providing close air support. But 50 anti-government forces were killed in this process. This was beyond the mandate of peacekeeping operations. That was what was raised as a question back then. I do not think that much excess is now the case. If there is obvious violation of disciplinary rules, responsibility will attribute to TCC. But if this was done as part of the mandate execution, the responsibility would reside with the Secretary General.</p>
Comment (Gordon)	<p>There are no criteria, except the criteria of the principles of use of force for the UN which we have discussed but that does not help you on the ground. What helps you on the ground is international humanitarian law and that is criteria, and then the rules of engagement which is criteria.</p>

	<p>Now, the problem is that very few member states spend time in training their people on international humanitarian law and on the rules of engagement they should and should not be using. This means that on the ground, it is subjected to too much interpretation but not because the principles, the guidelines, and the criteria are not clear. It is because the commanders and their soldiers are not clear. No one in the UN has been criticized for excess use of force. Many, many commanders are criticized for not using force when they should have used force when it was their responsibility to use force to protect civilians.</p> <p>This means that in order to interpret this environment, you have to have commanders who understand the political consequences of using force. Too often, we have people in the field who do not understand these political consequences and so what happens is they do nothing. It is much easier to do nothing if you are confused than to do something. Therefore, people continue to be killed under the watch of the United Nations and this is not good.</p> <p>So, the answer is we have to have better training and better understanding on these criteria of international humanitarian law and the rules of engagement. There are quite clear criteria but people do not understand them.</p>
Supplementary Explanation (Kawabata)	<p>If I may add one more thing to this issue of the use of force, yes we have to be efficient, yes we have to be, in certain cases, proactive. But at the same time you have to keep in your mind that you cannot continue using force in a host country which is in a transition. If you continued to help the country's police capacity and military capacity, inevitably you will create dependency.</p> <p>The case in point is Haiti. We have been there for 20 years and the MINUSTAH is the 5th peacekeeping operations that we have sent to that country. Every time we help the Haitian authorities in terms of ensuring security, four times in the past we failed. At the bottom, the problem is we have created a dependency. Eventually, Haitians have to be independent. They have to take care of their own country. The same applies to Africa and any other regions. We can help but it is temporary, not forever. That is another dilemma that we are facing when it comes to the use of force.</p>

Panel Discussion: Panelist Presentation 1
The UN Integrated Approach – Toward Effective Humanitarian Assistance -
Tomoya Kamino (Gifu University)

Background

■ Criticisms to the UN's Conflict Responses

- After the Cold War, the United Nations has been built multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations --- politics, military, civil police, development and humanitarian assistance.
- However, the UN has been criticized because the UN's responses for armed conflicts are not coherent and efficient.

■ Response to the Criticisms

- The UN has enhanced not only coordination between the UN military missions and other UN development and humanitarian agencies, but also structural and strategic integration.

2

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations have built many multidimensional peacekeeping operations. The UN pursued coordination among these sections and now enhanced structural and strategic integration.

Question

■ How does the UN integrated approach have effects on humanitarian assistance?

- The UN missions: multi-dimensional PKOs led by the DPKO, and political and peace building missions by the DPA
- Humanitarian organizations: the International Red Cross, local Red Cross and Crescent, international and local NGOs, and the UN humanitarian agencies --- the OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP.

The UN integrated approach (Within the UN organs)



3

How does the UN integrated approach have effects on humanitarian assistance? The question is a core problem in today's presentation. Before the presentation, I would like to confirm the meaning of the UN missions and humanitarian organizations.

UN missions mean two types of the UN Peace Operations. One is multidimensional PKOs, another is political and peacebuilding missions. Traditional PKOs and some types of political and peacebuilding missions are not a target of the integration approach. Humanitarian organization as

the international Red Cross, local Red Cross and Crescent, international and local NGOs, and the United Nations Humanitarian agencies. The UN Integrated Approach means promotion of a close relationship between the UN missions and UN humanitarian organizations. But non humanitarian agencies are also key actors for the efficiency of international humanitarian assistance.

<p>Historical Backgrounds</p> <p>Proposals for Structural Integration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform (1997) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● To keep coherence in multi-disciplinary field operations, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) has authority over the force commanders, civilian police commissioners, resident coordinator (RC) and humanitarian coordinator (HC). (para. 119) ■ Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report) (2000) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Proposal for the establishment of the Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) (paras. 198-217) 	<p>Historical Backgrounds</p> <p>The First Step for the Structural Integration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions (2000) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The DSRSG can combine with the RC/HC ● Promotion to integration among the DSRSG/RC/HC ("triple hatted" approach) ● The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL; 2001) ■ Integration of the OCHA local office into the UN missions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA; 2002) ● The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL; 2004)
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I will take account for historical backgrounds of the United Nations' integrated approach. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan published a report entitled *Renewing the United Nations* in 1997. The report also mentioned the UN Integrated Approach; "To keep coherence in multifunctional field operations, the SRSG has authority over the force commanders, civilian police commissioners, resident coordinator, and humanitarian coordinator." The purpose of the policy is to build an efficient structural integration among the UN agencies and sectors in the field. The *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operation* in 2000, the Brahimi Report made a proposal of the establishment of the Integrated Mission Task Forces, IMTFs, in order to coordinate PKOs at the headquarters.

Kofi Annan wrote the *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions* in 2000. The note made a proposal that the UN PKOs could set a Deputy Special Representative for the Secretary-General, DSRSG. The DSRSG could combine with the RC and HC. The DSRSG is a sub leader and coordinator to have authority over the UN Development and Humanitarian actors in the field. The approach is commonly called triple-hatted approach.

Other type of the structural integration is unification of the mission's office and the OCHA's local office. OCHA local office in Afghanistan has been set in the same building of the Mission's Office since 2002.

<h3>Historical Backgrounds</h3> <p>Modification of the Structural Integration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Concerns from Humanitarian Organizations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Neutrality may be damaged since political and military mission are integrated with humanitarian activities. ■ Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions (2006) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The RC reports to the UNDP Administrator as the Chair of UNDG; the HC reports to the USG/ERC ● The OCHA local office can be located separately from the mission to facilitate access by the broader humanitarian community ● The SRSG will uphold humanitarian principles and humanitarian space. 	<h3>Historical Backgrounds</h3> <p>Toward the Strategic Integration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP): Guidelines (2006) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The process requires the full engagement of the key UN actors at headquarters and the country level. ■ Planning Process <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Six processes: advance, foundation, operation, implementation, continuation, and transition & exit ■ Coordination Organizations for Planning Process <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● HQ : IMTF (Integrated Mission Task Force) ● Field : IMPT (Integrated Mission Planning Team)
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The structural integration of the UN Peace Operations makes humanitarian agencies feel unsafe because humanitarian authorities seem to be negatively affected. As political and military missions are getting integrated with humanitarian assistance, humanitarian agencies have fewer powers over their own activities.

The concerns from humanitarian organizations made the Secretary-General rewrite the *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions* in 2006. The note made consideration to the independence of the United Nations Development and Humanitarian agencies, especially the chain of command. The OCHA local office can be separated from the UN Mission's Office, so that non-UN humanitarian agencies easily make access to the OCHA office. According to the note, the SRSG will support humanitarian principles and humanitarian space.

Aside from promoting the structural integration, Kofi Annan went for the strategic Integration Policy. The purpose of the Strategic Integration Policy is to make key actors engaged in planning process of peacekeeping operations. The UN Development and Humanitarian agencies join in the IMTF and IMPT to coordinate operations plans.

<h3>The Decision of the SG in the Policy Committee (2008/24)</h3> <p>The Main Purpose of the Integration (i)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ To maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN's response, concentrating on those activities required to consolidate peace. 	<h3>The Decision of the SG in the Policy Committee (2008/24)</h3> <p>New Targets and Forms of the Integration (i)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Targets [including political missions/offices under the DPA] <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The UN Missions (multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations under the DPKO or political missions/offices under the DPA) ● The UN Country Teams (UNCTs) ■ Phases [including conflict situations] <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● All conflicts and post-conflict situations ■ Forms [from structural integration to strategic integration] <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Strategic partnership between the UN Mission and the UNCT <i>whether or not</i> they are structurally integrated.
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
The decision of the policy committee by the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon goes ahead with the

UN Integrated Approach.

The decision of 2008/24, “Decisions of the Secretary-General – 25 June meeting of the Policy Committee”¹ refers to the purpose of the UN Integrated Policy. The main purpose is to maximize the UN’s response to consolidate peace.

The decision mentions the new target and forms of the integration. UN Integrated Policy has a purpose to unite the UN Missions and the UN Country Teams, UNCTs, by their common strategy. The original target of the UN integration was only the multidimensional PKOs. The target has been enlarged to the political missions and offices under the DPA.

The original integration approach covered only post-conflict situation such as the phase of peacebuilding. But the decision of the Secretary-General in 2008 also covers conflict situations. The important point of decision is that integration does not necessarily mean structural integration, like the triple-hatted approach. The new integration approach focused on the strategic partnership between the UN Mission and the UNCT.



The chart shows the current PKOs and political and peacebuilding missions. The right column is the UN Missions under the structural integration based on triple-hatted approach. The middle

¹ United Nations. Interoffice Memorandum. 26 June 2008. “Decisions of the Secretary-General – 25 June meeting of the Policy Committee”. Decision No. 2008/24 – Integration. <http://www.undg.org/docs/9898/Integration-decision-SG-25-jun-08.pdf>

column is the UN Missions under the new integrated approach by the Secretary-General's decision in 2008. The left column is the mission's outside integrated approach, traditional PKOs and three regional offices under the DPA.

<p>The Decision of the SG in the Policy Committee (2008/24)</p> <p>Strategic Partnership (i-b/c)</p> <p>■ Construction of Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) (country level arrangement)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● A shared vision of the UN's strategic objectives ● Closely aligned or integrated planning ● A set of agreed results, timelines and responsibilities ● Agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation <p>● The planning process of the ISF</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Strategic Planning Group (SRG): the SRSG as a chair ● Integrated Strategy Planning Team (ISPT): Force commander and the RC/HC as a co-chair <p style="text-align: right;">13</p>	<p>The Decision of the SG in the Policy Committee (2008/24)</p> <p>The UN Integration and Humanitarian Assistance (i-d)</p> <p>■ The UN integrated approach and its humanitarian benefits</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Take full account of recognized humanitarian principles ● Allow for the protection of humanitarian space ● Facilitate effective humanitarian coordination with all humanitarian actors <p>■ Questions from the IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Does the UN integrated approach promote humanitarian benefits? <p style="text-align: right;">14</p>
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The strategic approach is the construction of the Integrated Strategic Framework, ISF². The ISF is a document between the UN Missions and the UNCTs. The document refers to a shared vision and among the sections aligned or integrated planning, results and timelines, monitoring and evaluation system. In the original integrated approach, the IMPT has responsibility to coordinate the planning system. The new integrated approach SPG (Strategic Policy Group) and ISPT (Integrated Strategy and Planning Group) coordinate to make the ISF document. The ISF document is a core document for integrated strategy for the UN Missions and UNCTs.

The Secretary-General's decision also refers to humanitarian assistance. The UN Integrated Approach respects for humanitarian principles and humanitarian space and promotes humanitarian coordination with all humanitarian actors. These humanitarian actors may include the UN and non-UN humanitarian agencies, such as the International Red Cross and other international and local NGOs.

However, the decision of the Secretary-General brought the concerns from the IASC. The IASC is the international humanitarian body composed of the UN Humanitarian agencies and International Red Cross and some international NGOs. The IASC raised the question: Does the UN Integrated Approach promote humanitarian benefits?

² See "IMPP Guidelines: Role of the Field: Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences;" Annex 12.

http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/jp_un/pdfs/itaku_pko_1103_4.pdf

The UN Integrated Approach and Humanitarian Assistance


■ Relationship between the UN Integration and Humanitarian Assistance

- The UN integrated approach does not mention to actors outside the UN because the approach focuses on the UN.
- However, whether the approach brings humanitarian benefits depends on the relationship between the UN and other actors.

16

In the next section, I will take for effects of UN Integrated Approach on humanitarian assistance.


The UN Integrated Approach does not mention to the non-UN actors because the approach focused on the efficiency within UN Peace Operations. However, whether the approach brings humanitarian benefits depends on the relationship between UN and the other actors.



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UN Integrated Approach covers the coordination and cooperation between the UN Missions and the UN Humanitarian organizations within the UN. According to the decision in 2008, the integration will promote humanitarian principles, humanitarian space, and humanitarian coordination.

However, the UN missions take actions in conflict and post-conflict areas. There were various interactions between the UN agencies and other actors in the field. The interaction had different effects on the UN Integrated Approach.



Actors outside the UN in the field are local armed groups and communities, international or regional army and non-UN humanitarian agencies. The political relationship between the UN and the local groups, communities and international or regional army have some effects on humanitarian community. In some cases the effects are negative on humanitarian principles, humanitarian space and humanitarian coordination.

<p>The OCHA's Policy Instruction for the UN Integrated Approach</p> <p>■ OCHA's Structural Relationships within an Integrated UN Presence (March 2011)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The OCHA maintains cautious stance to the UN Integrated approach ● Perception ● Coordination <p>20</p>	<p>The OCHA's Policy Instruction for UN Integrated Approach</p> <p>■ Perception from armed groups and communities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Hostile relationship between the UN mission and local armed groups and communities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● No peace agreement among armed groups ● Peace agreement but local communities does not support it. ● Local communities support a peace agreement but some of armed groups does not. <p>21</p>
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The UN OCHA has concerns for the UN Integrated Approach. The OCHA's policy interaction for the UN Integrated Approach says two types of the concerns; perception and coordination.

The OCHA points out three situations where the relationship between the UN Mission and local people is hostile. The first situation is there is no peace agreement among armed groups. Second is, armed groups agree with the peace pact, but some local communities does not agree with it. The third situation, some of the armed groups deny the peace agreement.

<p>The OCHA's Policy Instruction for UN Integrated Approach</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Perception from armed groups and communities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Hostile relationship between the UN mission and local armed groups and communities ● Effects of the tension on humanitarian activities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The UN humanitarian agencies closely cooperated with the UN military force, and humanitarian assistance will be limited by local armed groups and people. ● In this cases, humanitarian neutrality and humanitarian space cannot be kept in conflict areas <p style="text-align: right;">22</p>	<p>The OCHA's Policy Instruction for UN Integrated Approach</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Cooperation with the non-UN humanitarian agencies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Division in humanitarian community <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● The UN humanitarian agencies such as the OCHA have close relationship with the UN political and military sections under the UN integrated approach. ● In this case, the some non-UN humanitarian organizations will not take part in international humanitarian coordination system under the OCHA (eg. Afghanistan) because of keeping their neutrality. ● The integrated approach may make humanitarian coordination harder in humanitarian community. <p style="text-align: right;">23</p>
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In the hostile situations between the UN Missions and local groups and communities, there were some problems to the UN Humanitarian agencies. If the UN Humanitarian agencies closely cooperate with the UN missions, the local armed groups and communities become hostile even to the UN humanitarian assistance. Sometimes these local people aggressively prevent humanitarian assistance and attack humanitarian workers. In the serious situation, the UN Integrated Approach may be an obstacle for humanitarian neutrality and humanitarian space.

The UN Integrated Approach may divide the international humanitarian community. Many of the non-UN humanitarian agencies want to hold their independence and neutrality. If the UN Missions and the UN Humanitarian agencies have very close relationships, the non-UN Humanitarian agencies become distant to the UN Missions and also the UN Humanitarian agencies. In Afghanistan, the OCHA local office was built in the UN Mission's Office. The ICRC went out from the UN Humanitarian Coordination System managed by the UN OCHA.

Strategic Integration and Humanitarian Assistance

■ Construction of the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) (country level arrangement)

● Question

- The UN strategic integration aims to unite the goals and strategies in the UN peace operations and the UNCT, and political goals may take priority over humanitarian goals to save people.

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The Strategic Integration Approach may have negative effects on humanitarian neutrality and independence. The approach has the purpose to unite the goals and the strategies among political military and humanitarian sections. The unification of the strategy may restrict humanitarian purposes to save people in conflicts.

Conclusion

■ The UN Integrated Approach and Humanitarian Benefits

- The UN Integrated approach needs to **develop a mechanism to change the form of integration to respond the relationship between the UN and other actors.**
- If humanitarian crises occur and large emergency humanitarian assistance is required, **the top priority in the UN integration should be saving people.**

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I would like to conclude the presentation. The UN Integrated Approach needs to develop a mechanism to change the form of integration, to respond the relationship between the UN and the other actors. If humanitarian crisis occur and emergency humanitarian assistance is required, the top priority in the UN integration should be saving people. The UN Humanitarian agencies should have some distance to the UN Missions because of perception from local armed groups and communities and maintain international humanitarian community.

Panel Discussion: Panelist Presentation 2
Challenges in UN Integrated Missions
– the perspective of Non-UN humanitarian agencies -
Yukie Osa (Association for Aide and Relief, Japan)

From this October, I was appointed as an Advisory Board Member of UN CERF Advisory Board Members and with this occasion I was in Geneva about 2 weeks ago and then I was visiting OCHA Geneva Office and I was exactly discussing this integration policy with some OCHA's officials.

She put it in a very interesting way, when I asked that neutrality or independence of humanitarian assistance in integrated mission, she said, "You know, life is messy." That was her expression to describe these things and this correlates that in this morning General Gordon said, "We are not in vacuum, we are in living in complex, chaotic world." This is a kind of conclusion of my presentation. There will be no single silver bullet against these issues, but I will try to discuss about some points.

1. Current Status of UN Integrated Missions (as of Nov. 1, 2012)

First, I would like to give you some overview of integrated missions. Currently, as of November this year, the number of countries where resident coordinator, most of them are UNDP officials. They are stationed in 129 countries. Most of them are non-OECD countries. There are 129 countries where that resident coordinator exists. Among these 129 countries, where resident coordinator holds the post of humanitarian coordinator, it is only 32, and among these 32 countries, DSRSG, which Professor Kamino explained, holds the post of resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator, namely, integrated mission is only 11.

When we are talking about integrated mission, it seems that entire world is occupied by integrated mission, but not. Of course the place that integrated missions are deployed, they are very, very important places. But on the ground and to the NGOs, the integrated mission is kind of a special place. Not so many Japanese NGOs work in the place where the integrated missions are deployed.

2. Definitions in This Presentation: Who Are the Humanitarian Actors?

Then also, I would like to make some definitions in this presentation. Who are the humanitarian actors? Here, I mentioned that the agencies related to humanitarian assistance are, UN agencies are UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, all these agencies, plus IOM, although they are not UN agency. I mean, non-UN agencies are ICRC, IFRC, National Red Cross societies, and NGOs. Among these humanitarian actors, there are different interpretations of humanitarian principles. Especially, I would like to mention about independence.

3. Different Interpretations of Humanitarian Principles: Esp. “Independence”

For UN agencies, the famous UNGA Resolution 46/182 in 1991, it said, humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality. These three are the important principles for UN agencies, whereas for ICRC and NGOs, one more important principle is independence. In most of the cases, independence is not really mentioned, but for us, independence is something. Of course these principles are not primarily moral values, but rather a means to secure access to those who suffer the brunt of conflict and violence and to enhance the effectiveness of aid.

Then, I will show you a very interesting difference in terms of the notion of independence. For example, donor government, Japanese government has issued Humanitarian Aid Policy of Japan last year. This is issued by Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They said that the government of Japan respects the basic principles of humanitarian assistance which are humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. The principle of independence is to maintain autonomy and which is completely different, although we are using the same word of independence, but for us that independence is more or less institutional independence. This is also a very strong notion of ICRC.

4. Challenges in Integrated Mission: the Perspectives of Non-UN Humanitarian Agencies

Then, what are the challenges in integrated mission. Especially I would like to talk about from the perspectives of non-UN Humanitarian agencies. It is often said that this is a push for coherence with an integrated UN mission. This is a challenge for us. General Gordon explained that primacy of political affairs, of course that the hierarchy of priorities inherent in the coherence agenda and these are blurring boundaries between humanitarian action and military actions and this is sacrificing humanitarian space or shrinking humanitarian place or this results in erosion of humanitarian space in the name of greater good, that is the political purpose. Then also, we feel that it resulted in declining the respect for IHL, International Humanitarian Law. Of course, all of them resulted in insecurity of humanitarian aid workers.

5. Measures Taken by Non-UN Humanitarian Agencies

What we do for these situations? Some measures are taken by non-UN Humanitarian agencies. Notably ICRC, they are not taking part in the, for example, cluster system as well as integrated mission from the very beginning. These are from that there are severe needs to maintain the independence. For NGOs, it is not like the ICRC, but we are also not taking part in or secede from the integrated mission. What does this mean? Of course in a way if we are away from integrated mission, yes, at least we can try to preserve our humanitarian space. But in practice,

we are kind of marginalizing humanitarian agenda in the integrated mission because we are away.

Then also I would like to mention that this integrated mission has close connection with a cluster approach and for Japanese NGOs, there is some controversy. For example, I would like to mention about Japan Platform Mechanism. Japan Platform, JPF, is a mechanism composed of Japanese NGOs, *Gaimusho* or Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and *Keidanren* or Japan Business Association. Those NGOs, currently 36 Japanese humanitarian NGOs are member of Japan Platform. To be a member of Japan Platform, we are asking them to sign the Code of Conduct which makes a top priority of these humanitarian principles. Also, when the JPF member NGOs sends a proposal for funding, Japan Platform Secretariat is asking, is your paper in good coordination with cluster approach, are you a member of UN Cluster Approach. If we say, my organization is working in Afghanistan and Haiti, but we are not in the cluster approach, then the Secretariat said that you are not kind of entitled because it means you are not coordinating with other agencies at all. In a way, the Japan Platform is forcing Japanese NGO to be a member of cluster approach. It means to be integrated mission too. But, in most of the cases we are not really aware of this fact because we need money. This is a reality, but when we think that sometimes this cluster approach results in that sacrificing our neutrality or our independence.

- **Safety and Security Measures**

Then, also that measures are taken for safety and security issues, of course we are trying to avoid misbehavior such as obvious displays of rich equipment. You know that rich equipment, including automobiles, computer, or mobile phone and also clothing, for example, in Afghanistan if you wear jeans or if you are female and if you do not hide your hairs, it is making bad messages. Avoiding misbehavior is a principle.

Also, that we are taking sensitive nationalities approach of expatriates. In most of the cases, if you are the Japanese NGO members and if you are dispatched as a member of Japanese NGOs, it will not create many problems. But if you are Americans or American NGO who are in Iraq, of course this has some messages. This year one ICRC expatriate from UK was kidnapped in Pakistan and then he was killed, unfortunately, and I have heard that this is the first case of murder related to kidnapping of ICRC's 150 years' history. Of course they have lots of casualties, but all the victims of kidnapping were released after a long negotiation for them. This is the first case the victim of kidnapping was killed. There are many explanations, but one of those will be nationality, maybe, so this nationality issue will be very important and also religious and gender sensitivity.

Then this is a very classic thing, but low profiles approach was introduced nowadays. It used to be like this that if you are a member of ICRC with Red Cross, you are not attacked. If you are a NGO member and if you put logos of your organization on the cars' side, you are not attacked. But this is kind of a myth. Then, we are trying to keep our profiles as low as

possible, especially in the Afghanistan. For example, 20 years ago in Bosnia we are using that Toyota Land Cruiser, but now in Afghanistan we are trying to use local old car so that we are not seen as western humanitarian agencies. These kinds of low profiles also we are taking.

Of course, defense walls, armed military escort, although this is a last resort. But many people were saying that this kind of defense walls, huge walls, but it does not help in the longer senses. No matter how high our walls may be, they can attack it if they want to do. This kind of defense walls does not help in the end.

We are also applying the remote management system or remote control system with local staff. The prerequisite of this is that national staff is safer than international staff. International staff is kind of targeting. This international staff will be out of the country and then local national staff are staying in the country and doing the operations. But, this is causing a serious ethical and accountability problem right now. This is also the myth that national staff is safer than international staff.

Yes, it is true but now in Afghanistan, local staff is also attacked because he or she is working for NGOs, whether it is western or it is Asian or NGOs is kind of western idea for some local non-state actors. Even local staffs are not safe anymore. It means if we are applying Remote Management System, it means that we are just sacrificing local staff's life to keep us alive. This is kind of a very serious problem.

Also, accountability problem exists. Remote Management System is not just a management. We are leaving a huge amount of money, cash because when we operate we need cash on the ground. Then, we are paying local staff US \$500 or US \$1000 per month. Then, we are leaving like US \$10,000 in cash or US \$100,000 cash using in that month. This is also sacrificing the safety of local staff as well as we are kind of losing accountability to our donors. This Remote Management System is kind of a good practice, but it does not serve everything.

Then finally that ICRC's acceptance approach, they are trying to act only with agreement of all parties and they are trying to have open dialogue with all weapon bearers. Then, they are saying that dialogue and proximity are keywords and sometimes which resulted in that some dangerous situation, but still ICRC's acceptance is a key for the safety and security.

6. Positive Impacts of Being Inside of the Integrated Mission

Having said that, is there any positive impact of being inside of integrated mission? If you are inside of the integrated mission that your independence or impartiality or neutrality or safety will be sacrificed, is there any good point? This is what I was talking with OCHA officials last month and she said, "If we are in the integrated mission, there will be a possibility of humanizing political space and then that mainstreaming humanitarian agenda. If we are outside of integrated mission,

we are escalating that marginalizing humanitarian assistance. On the other hand, if we are in that we can make some influence and then humanizing political space.” It might sound just a playing of words, but still it might have some good message.

Secondly, as I mentioned, I am the member of the advisory board of CERF. CERF is a pooled funding, which are targeting UN agencies and their respective NGO implementing partners in the very severe crisis or forgotten crisis. In order to get this money, you have to be in cluster and you have to be in kind of integrated mission. I will tell you, this is not the real answer of my presentation, “Life is messy and then we are living in complex, chaotic world.”

Panel Discussion

Moderator: Toshiya Hoshino (Osaka University)

Panelists: Robert Gordon (Major General (retired))

Yukie Osa (Association for Aide and Relief, Japan)

Kiyotaka Kawabata (DPA/United Nations)

Tomoya Kamino (Gifu University)

(Hoshino) I think the audience by now is very clear. First of all, there is an irony because there is a group of people, both UN and the non-UN, like Professor Osa, who try to do a very good thing for the people there, but they can be targeted maybe because of working closely with the integrated mission. That is why we need to think about solving this dilemma, integration on one side and independence on the other side. At the same time, politics which is always the root cause of the conflict but the humanitarian activities to deal with the consequence of the political conflicts. Those are the very difficult and complex situations.

The two presentations made us understand better on the benefits of being in the part of the integrated approach and the benefit of being outside of the integrated approach. By discussing these questions probably we will not be able to find a 100% answer, but some sort of direction what kind of balance is necessary to have this integration question.

So, I would like to invite General Gordon and Professor Kawabata to the floor and comment on anything that those two presentations made to the floor to kick-off the discussion part of the program. Can I have General Gordon to respond or react to the two presentations which we have just heard?

(Gordon) Thanks to both the speakers that have articulated difficult issues very clearly. There are no easy solutions. But I think the wrong approach always is to think that this is a zero-sum issue: that more integration leads to more humanitarian space infringement, because I must admit, I do not see it in that way. There is a certainly a relationship, an inverse relationship which you can track between the level of local consent for an intervention by the international community and the ability to integrate. Where the level of consent for international intervention is high, such as in the case of a natural disaster, then integration is reasonably simple, but where there is opposition to international intervention, be it a peacekeeping mission or any other intervention, then it becomes more and more difficult for integration to take place because of this issue of independence and humanitarian space. If we understand that, I think we begin to understand the issue better.

Unfortunately, I believe that the spoiler groups, whose interests are not necessarily aligned with peace and stability, understand this as well. They have read the manual of counterinsurgency and realize that this whole issue is about winning the hearts and the minds of the people on the ground. You win their hearts and minds by providing their basic needs to them yourself. And if some other

international organization is doing that, whether it is an international organization or any other national organization that does not belong to you, then you will do something about that and you start either taking them hostage or you kill them and make it impossible for them to operate. This leads to a withdrawal of humanitarians.

And so the graph which tracks the relationship between the ability to integrate against the issue of consent starts turning the other way when the environment becomes so hostile, that it is very difficult for humanitarians to operate, and all those dilemmas that the good doctor has identified then take place. You tend to use local staff or you have to operate under some degree of protection from any security element that is there, whether it is a UN Peacekeeping operation or not. We do need to understand that dynamic as well.

We get hung up on vocabulary. We have heard the vocabulary of independence. We have heard the vocabulary of impartiality. This word impartiality means something completely different for UN Peacekeeping than it does for humanitarians and yet we use this word interchangeably. For peacekeepers, impartiality is impartiality to the mandate and if people are working against a peace process, then you take action against them. That is very different from the humanitarian meaning of impartiality, which meets need, wherever that need is and irrespective of politics, race, religion and gender. Vocabulary is important and we often get confused on these issues.

Although I think there is a basic tension in this system, I think that this is a healthy tension and I think there will always be tension between political imperatives and humanitarian needs. Just as there is tension between a political process and a process of justice, and reconciliation, so there are tensions in this very complex business of international intervention in support of peace. This issue of humanitarian tension with political/military activity is just one example. It has to be overcome by a good understanding of each other's needs. It does not have to be zero-sum.

If you do understand what the humanitarians need and the military stop doing things that look like humanitarian activity - because that really confuses local people - and leave humanitarian activity to humanitarians. When the military deal with security issues and political people deal with political issues, then these things can get resolved on the ground through good cooperation and coordination. But you cannot get good cooperation and coordination on the ground unless you have integrated mechanisms that enable that.

I do not see that integration automatically leads to an alienation of humanitarian space. I think you can only get a real understanding of the needs of humanitarians by better cooperation and coordination which is another way of saying better integration. It is difficult to do this when you have strategic-level arguments between Geneva and New York. But this tension is more easily reconcilable in the field where you are all sharing the same issues, which are ultimately about trying to protect people, protect their security and protect their humanitarian needs.

(Hoshino) Is that correct to say that in order to have better integration in each sector; those involved in the politics and the humanitarian and military activities have to be very professional? I think I am saying something very obvious, but sometimes that NGOs who are not professional and there are some people in the military, who are not professional, do some wrong things that spark the local conflicts and provoke the very delicate difficult situations. After hearing your comment, yes, there is no zero-sum, but at the same that those working on the ground have to be professional in various sense. That is one of the impressions I got.

(Gordon) And understand each other's principles, understand humanitarian principles.

(Hoshino) Understand each other's principles, yes. Thank you. Professor Kawabata, do you have any immediate reactions to those two presentations?

(Kawabata) My immediate reaction to Professor Osa is yes or the two speakers are that we should always remind ourselves what is the purpose of the integrated missions. In the past, we do not have to talk about the integration. Humanitarian operations are humanitarian operations, developmental operations are developmental operations. But it was only after the emergence or the realization that we really have to combine peacekeeping operations with peacemaking and that makes it necessary for us to talk about integration. That is the one purpose for the integration which is nation-building. Humanitarian operation alone is not enough to even save people as Professor Osa put it and the balancing of the principles and the operational guidelines among the divergent groups, the only purpose for us to talk about the integration is that there is a definite need for us to build the nation after the post-conflict situation.

Having said that, yes, integration is easy to be said, but difficult to be done. The agencies, as I had pointed out in the morning, are operating independently, in this case financially and administratively, and sometimes some donors try to influence those specific agencies and even the NGOs and that makes a dangerous room for the parties to manipulate and to make the ultimate purpose of integration less effective. That is one point for me to make.

Also, the dilemma we have to have is that on many occasions, yes, we intervene in a conflict situation on many occasions for humanitarian reasons. But then after we decide to intervene, we realize the ultimate way for us to leave that country in stable peace. We have no choice to build the nation which is very difficult in terms of priorities, in terms of the time to accomplish things which is different things than humanitarian activities.

For Professor Osa's presentation, my initial reaction is, yes, we need the NGOs to be a part of us. If we are talking about nation-building, the NGOs are the integral and the indispensable part of the whole overall international activity to help the nation to be independent. I understand the situation,

the stance of the ICRC which is a kind of a distinctive organization which tries to be independent from anyone all the time or at any time. That is the reason why the ICRC is respected even at the height of the fighting. But it seems to me rather exception than a general rule. If possible, any other organizations; humanitarian, human rights, rule of law organizations, be they the UN or the NGO, NPO, it is ideal for us to get together and work for the same purpose.

The issue about the NGOs in terms of the UN perspective is whether or not we should invite NGOs in a decision-making process. Then the NGOs, many NGOs want to be included in the UN decision-making process. But, of course, the difficult question is sometimes we have to ask what is the legitimacy so to say, or mainly the UN is intergovernmental organizations, we represent member states, and the NGOs are more private organizations and sometimes we have the problem inviting NGOs in decision making in the given UN operations.

Lastly, as far as the NGOs in Japan are concerned, my personal concern is that the scale and the number of the people who are engaged in the NGO activities in Japanese is still very small compared with the European or the American NGOs. The people working for the Japanese NGOs are usually very young. It is difficult for us to see people in their 40s or 50s in Japanese NGOs. We, in this case Japan, have to create more stable career-oriented NGO system so that they can better integrate themselves into the overall UN system. That is my view.

(Hoshino) Thank you very much, Professor Kawabata. I would like to have some comments from two previous presentators and then I would like to open the floor to some questions and comments from your side.

Now, Professor Kawabata said from the UN standpoint that NGO is an indispensable part, particularly for these very complex multifaceted nation-building activities and even invited you, Professor Osa, to be a part of this decision-making process. But from the NGO standpoint, there must be so many things. You might want the United Nations agencies to improve or to reform or something. If there is any request from the NGO side to the UN system, probably this is the opportunity to say a few comments in this regard and I would like to have some comment also from Professor Kamino. First, Professor Osa, please.

(Osa) For the NGO community, I think that especially for the Japanese NGOs, we are more or less practical, even if it is the civil-military cooperation too. This UN system is if the mission is perceived as more neutral or impartial, like a natural disaster thing, then that we are ready to work more with UN. But when it is very complex and a controversial system, we will be, I am not sure. It is really the case-by-case and then if the situation allows I think that Japanese NGOs are ready to do that.

Then, more stable and career-oriented system, that is what we, the Japanese NGOs are wishing

now. For example, my organization is in 33rd year since it was established. Then, we have now almost 100 Japanese staffs and 550 or more local staffs. There will be more 30s and 40s staff. The number of these kinds of NGOs is increasing, but not enough. So, we will do our best.

Then, for the general's comment that this is not a zero-sum issue is a very important lesson to learn and thank you so much.

(Kamino) Thank you. I agree with General Gordon. General Gordon says that the relationship between the level of consent from local people and ability of United Nations Integration Approach is more important. I agree with the point. I think that there is no standard model of United Nations Integrated Approach. The functions, purposes, and forms of UN Integrated Approach depend on the local people and local armed conflicts and local people, local situation. I think the level of integration depends on support from local people and groups and communities. The hostile situation between the UN missions and local people makes UN Integration Approach so hard, so difficult to attain.

The purpose of UN Integration Approach also depends on local armed groups and local community and local people. In the situation of emergency, we need to give humanitarian assistance. The UN Integrated Approach should have the priority to save people, but the situation is getting better. Professor Kawabata said that the purpose of the UN Integration Approach moved to the more peacebuilding assistance. The UN Integration Approach depends on the situation of local people, local armed groups.

(Kawabata) The level of the effective UN operation depends on the consent of the local people. Yes, I agree to an extent. But at the same time I have to point out what is the local population, local people. In many conflict situations, the local population is very much politicized. It is really unfortunate. I know that many people in a country like Japan or European countries, the critics in those countries tells us that why we are not utilizing the civil society, for example, for creating making peace and stabilizing the peace. Why you are talking to the bad guys all the time, those who are with the guns.

Our answer is that it is so unfortunate that we simply cannot find the civil society in a conflict situation. There are local people but they are so much politicized. Even in Afghanistan we went to the refugee camps, IDP camps in the hope that we will be finding the so-called independent moderate Afghans who could be the counterweight against those with the guns. But themselves are divided along the political lines. I am quite sure that you can always depend on the consent of the local people. What I am trying to say is in some occasion, in some cases in the process of a nation-building, you have to be confrontational. That is the reason why we are here. We mean, in this case, the political section.

(Hoshino) Thank you very much. Since the title of the whole symposium is The “Challenges” in UN Integrated Mission, so that somehow our attention goes to more or less negative or difficult side of the integration and the situations are certainly very tense and severe. If we look at the eastern sector of the Democratic Republic of Congo, as we speak, for instance, another new level group called M23 and others who are doing a lot of aggressive, atrocious works, and so forth. We cannot be so optimistic about it. But there are certain reasons to have this integrated approach. I would be tempted to ask if any of you to have episodes or examples of integrated approach, a positive side of the equation.

(Gordon) An integrated approach is an attempt to get coherence amongst the international community, as represented by the UN family, in their efforts to support a peace process, a wider peace process, a sustainable peace process which, as we both said, is a process that tries to get at the root causes of conflict. You do not do that with military components. You do that with developmental, political and humanitarian actors.

I think what Professor Kamino mentioned which I really would like to stress is the importance of this Integrated Strategic Framework, which is quite a new concept. This is all the actors getting together, including the host nation, and working out what it is that needs to be done by the international community in partnership with the host nation. This is what we mean by an integration process, which does not mean that the political and military start interfering in humanitarian issues. What it does mean is that those voices are heard when you come to decide what the activities are that you need to undertake, voices which can help deconflict potential conflicts and articulate priorities.

If I can just pick up one last point, there is this nice point that UN Peacekeeping is very state-ist. It deals with governments. It deals with the high level echelon of the host nation. It tends not to deal with civil society because it is not designed or resourced to do that; and yet the people who deal with civil society tend to be from the humanitarian and developmental part of the wider UN family. Therefore, if we do not have this integrated approach, we will just deal at the state level, which quite often is the major cause of the problem, and fail to have sufficient visibility of the issues on the ground within civil society, a visibility which good humanitarian and developmental actors do have.

That is why we have to work together to stop this purely statist approach and have a much better understanding and mechanism to deal with the societal issues of nation-building which go from the individual, through the community right up to a government we are trying to support, a government incidentally which may not be particularly respectful of the human rights of its people. There are dilemmas in this. But unless we do constantly work together and hear that humanitarian voice, hear that developmental voice and try and work together, we look incoherent. I think the answer to your

question professor, is to ask another question: what is the possible case for non-integration? Because that seems to be going backwards.

(Kawabata) The good thing about the integrated concept and the integrated mission is that we finally will be able to talk about it. Just 20 years ago, it was a taboo in the United Nations. As I have indicated repeatedly, the political activities, the peacekeeping activities, humanitarian activities, and developmental activities were supposed to be separate. Just 20 years ago, when the world is divided between the east and west and this is a quite new phenomenon as General Gordon indicated.

It might be imperfect or immature, but we have finally started talking about the integrated mission with the ultimate purpose of a nation-building, the real comprehensive approach and that is a start but there is so much confusion among ourselves, among the member states, among the institutes, including NGOs what to do, what independence, neutrality, or impartiality means. There are many things that we have to sort out. But this is the right direction and a good start, I believe.

Q&A

(Hoshino) Thank you. Now I would like to open the floor for some questions or comments. Before that, I would like to raise one question to General Gordon or others who will be willing to answer that is the best way to integrate our activities is to understand each other, you pointed out, and I think you partly answered this question, but what would be the best way to understand each other, probably working together I think itself is a learning process to understand each other. Are there any ideas or practices which can promote understandings, mutual understanding in this regard, to pursue common goals of nation-building or peace-building, so that will make this process of integration more effective. That is a kind of general question I would like to pose right now to General or others who are willing to respond to it.

But at the same time I would like to open the floor for some questions or comments on this kind of discussion of integration or integrated mission of the United Nations. Please do not hesitate to come forward with questions or comments.

(Q1) I am Takeda, a student at the Joint Staff College.

I learned a lot from this precious presentation. But there are a lot of different forms of joint mission and this really depends on the case. The representative from NGO talked about independence and even if you believe in what you do, but sometimes it may be imposing something on to others so I am not sure if that is actually in line with the purpose of the NGO.

And I have a question to Professor Kamino. You are talking about joint mission of the UN, but then why is it that each of the agencies of the UN is not working in a joint fashion. In my personal

view, it may be just a matter of leadership. If I can ask for your view on that, that will be appreciated.

(Hoshino) Any other questions or comments? I would like to take several questions at a time before asking them to answer those questions.

(Q2) I am Ikeda from Ground Research and Development Command.

I learned a lot about approaches and measures being taken in the field and I really appreciate that insight. Talking about joint mission, as Professor Kawabata said that the humanitarian and human rights aspect is a focal point. The necessity of joint mission is well understood by everybody, including NGOs and the international community will need to make efforts to achieve this joint mission. But the problem is how you go about doing this. What is being discussed now and also the papers from Secretary-General of the UN, looking at those, it is still in the process of building the framework of joint mission. What needs to be discussed is how you actually do this joint mission and how to combine those efforts.

My question is the following, our operational forces are in the field and what is the end state and is there any roadmap towards that end state as you combine your efforts in this joint mission because I am under the impression that this has yet to be worked out? From the joint mission of the UN, this has to be transferred to the mission of the host country or the mission or operation that would take advantage of the local civil societies. There has to be some roadmap that is very clear to the people in the field and that is very important for a joint mission and there needs to be a political initiative that is more reinforced. This would apply both for the central command and also the people in the field. If anybody can answer those questions or share with us their views.

(Hoshino) I would like to take one more question, then ask the four panel members to take up those questions before concluding this panel. There are two hands up. I would like to recognize those two people to ask the questions very briefly.

(Q3) My name is Yasuda. Thank you very much for very precious presentations.

In this joint mission or concept of joint mission what concerns me is the following: For what purpose the joint mission should be done? As Professor Kawabata said, nation-building may be one, but for what is this necessary because there is a matter of local ownership and local ownership should be there in nation-building. As you go through this discussion, in the local ownership the people in the field or local people, how to get these people involved depends on capacity of the local people. Capacity building is essential in this regard. I would like to ask for each one of the panel members to share their views with us.

(Q4) My name is Onaka. I am in PKO Department, Sudan, or I used to be in that department and the protection of civilians was even made clearer in this discussion today because talking about protection of civilians, the mission of PKO can get closer to the view points of the local residents.

I have a question to General Gordon. I think what we are experiencing, for example, in South Sudan these days is that the source of tensions are not so much now intergovernmental, but also what we are seeing is this vicious cycle of violence among the tribes, among ethnic groups. Once we lost a common enemy, now we see the cycle of violence at the local levels. My question now is that how can we break this cycle of violence and also how are we approaching the issue of mindset.

(Hoshino) Thank you very much. There are some questions directed to each one of the panelists. I would like to invite Professor Kawabata, General Gordon, Professor Osa, and Professor Kamino in that order. Please give your final words for this panel, including the comments and answer to the questions from the floor.

(Kawabata) Thank you. There are two questions addressed to me, integrated mission and national building, what is the end status, how do you bring this to an end. The other person asked about local ownership, how it gets involved. I think those are the questions of similar nature.

The ultimate end state of nation-building is to leave the stable government behind so that former conflict nation could be independent and this is about developmental assistance. Of course development assistance will need to be there, but without direct intervention by PKO, the country has to be self-reliant. What does this stable government mean in that context? It does not necessarily mean the dictatorship or some skewed small group of people monopolizes the power. A more democratic government needs to be established instead and that is where the UN has to come in to help. That is humanitarian assistance and human rights and election-assistance and rule of law. Those will be the keywords.

To that end within the framework of peacekeeping operations, the peacebuilding or rebuilding of the nation that would have been inconceivable in the past would be also in the scope and the local ownership, talking about local ownership, if the end state is to have a self-reliant, stable, and democratic government in place then the local ownership is undoubtedly important. However, on the other hand, local ownership is not just about capacity building.

As I pointed out in my presentation this morning, after the conflict the new government comes in and it does not necessarily mean that a new government represents the majority of the nation or the new government is originally democratic forces. If there is any work for us to be done politically, we can become a bridge between the government and the public and for that purpose elections have to be held and also there is an issue of human rights. It is not just protecting the rights of

individuals, but by protecting the human rights of individuals you can have the democracy sink in.

Of course, the local ownership, from the local ownership point of view, there is a resistance because it just happens that one force has won these conflicts and then they would like to hold on to their power. But, if they go into elections, they may lose and the human rights, no, never.

There were the ethnic group conflicts or inter-ethnic conflicts. Be it Sudan or other nations with conflicts, of course you would like to protect the human rights of your own ethnic group, but people tend to say that there is no human rights recognized for anti-government forces. We have to intervene in that mindset as part of humanitarian assistance. There is something that can only be done within the framework of peacekeeping operations. We will not impose obvious pressure, but the future government form is still in a chaotic state and in order to help them to get closer to a democratic form, the joint mission of the UN could come in and that could be the final purpose of the mission.

(Gordon) Thank you. I will be quite quick. But there are a number of issues that arose there. The first question: Why do not agencies work together? I think you can just look at the national context. Nationally, I am sure that the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs all have their own different issues, even in Japanese society, and it is exactly the same within the UN agencies. These are separate fiefdoms and they are concerned about their funding, their responsibilities, and their power base. This is incredibly sterile, but it is true and it happens, and even the Department of Political Affairs has major issues with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and there is tension between those departments, unhealthy tensions, unnecessary tensions, wasteful tensions. But that is a political fact of organizational life, and we must live with it.

I think when it comes down to the field, as I said before, then the coordination mechanisms are much easier to manage. To give Professor Hoshino an answer, the sort of example is the joint protection teams that are operating now in Eastern Congo, where you have security who may be military or may be armed police or may be community police officers going with humanitarian officers, with the political and civil affairs officers, around the communities, all with the single aim of the protection of civilians. But understanding that protection of civilians is a comprehensive activity, from providing security to providing the basic needs of life while having someone of their same gender to talk to them about womens' issues. That sort of joint approach which can be done right down at the ground level and then can be reflected upwards at mission level is an example of how you can work together respecting each other's responsibilities and their differences, but working together in the same environment. That is really what we mean by integration.

I think Yasuda-san's question about capacity building, has already been extremely well answered. I will just add the one other ingredient which is perseverance. This is a long-term activity and,

unfortunately, politically we all have masters who are often short-term in their approach and so national interest is short-term. It is driven by elections or political fashion but the countries we are trying to help need a long-term, sustained engagement. Trying to get that balance right is something that is a challenge for us all.

Turning to Onaka-san's question, which is a very pointed question about the issue of South Sudan. I have no real solutions to the issue of South Sudan, except to say we knew when we went into this, that the essential elements of a successful state there did not yet exist. But that was the political decision that took place. Unfortunately, both sides of the border between North and South Sudan are using proxies in each other's countries to continue this conflict despite a comprehensive peace agreement and these proxies are causing problems. Now there will be no solution to this until both sides, coming back to this issue of political will, have the political will and intent to actually deal with peace.

I was in Lebanon recently and looking at the UN mission down in Southern Lebanon. As you know Lebanese society is very sectarian, depending on which confessional faith you follow and there are differences between these confessional faiths. And yet if you go and ask the women in South Lebanon, what are the issues of security that concern them, they have nothing to do with faith or their confessional, they are all to do with basic simple issues of family security, like the ability to get water, the ability to send kids to school without being interfered with etc. These basic simple things we can lose sight of, which is why we need integrated missions to keep our focus on these issues. I am afraid that until South Sudan starts dealing with these issues and the women of South Sudan say enough, we want security at our basic level, we will not have sustainable solutions.

(Kawabata) Just one word concerning this nation-building. It takes a long time that was mentioned and it is true, it takes a long time. We are talking about the integrated missions, so international society has embarked on this integrated mission. But the time that we are involved in a country is 5 years, 10 years at longest. In Afghanistan, we have been there 10 years and the international society is very frustrated, they want to withdraw as early as possible. But, for a nation state to become independent to get onto its feet and start walking, it takes generations; 10, 20, 30, 40 years. In terms of the match with the aim of the integrated mission, the time that the international society allows these kinds of activities, there is a big gap between what is necessary and what is possible.

To talk about Japan, we started from the Meiji Restoration and today we have now a democratic and a stable society. It took about 150 years for us to achieve this stage. We experienced many wars, we killed people, and our people were killed. The same with Europe; in the middle of 17th century, they established a Westphalia system and after four centuries they were finally able to achieve this stable European system. This situation in international society, we are asking these

conflict countries to get the things right in 10, 20 years. Where we have taken centuries, we are asking them to do it in a few years because we do not have the time or the money to continue to support you. That is what we are saying and that is our dilemma.

(Osa) Two points I would like to say. First, the NGO activities. You may think we are pushy but we become more mature and if we just try to force something on to other people, then we will not be able to continue. We do coordination amongst the groups and the donors; they will not give money to selfishly-acting NGOs.

When is it that the NGOs are integrated and I said case-by-case earlier, but it depends on the situation, the circumstance at the time, and the other point is that we need to listen to the local voices, who are the residents. There should be a consistency with what we are doing and what is needed and if it is the UN that is doing the work, then they just listen to the top level government representatives and sometimes that does not benefit the people. At that time, it may be difficult for the NGOs to take part in the integrated effort. But, if the integrated mission is aiming for something that is consistent with what we are aiming for, then we are happy to participate. I think that will be the stance of the NGOs.

Who are the local people? That is a perpetual issue for us because we really cannot get the true sentiment of the people because we always have to ask through the interpreter or we talk with a local resident who speaks English, which is an abnormal person. He is not a mainstream local resident and he or she is a special unique person or foreigners who speak local language. He or she influences the interpretation of the residents' voices. As long as we work through interpreters, we may never hear the true voices of the local residents. How do we understand the local people's need? That is always a problem for us. We need to be cognizant that we have achieved so little and I think that recognition can lead to some better solution.

(Kamino) In terms of integrated mission, why is it that the various UN agencies cannot be integrated. Maybe there is a lack of leadership; that was one of the questions. When you go back to the principles, why are administrative bodies separate if they are one, is it always more efficient, not necessarily so. Sometimes, it is more efficient to be separate. It is not necessarily a good idea to combine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense. We have to think why are they separate. I think that is the perspective you need.

Also, 2 years ago from the cabinet office, there was a study about the US response to natural disasters, administrative and civilian NGO organizations, how do they respond to natural disaster. National Response Framework is what they studied and everything works under that framework in the US. That is very different from the integrated mission, however here desperate organizations are working towards the same goal. There was this framework in the US and so the Cabinet Office

asked us to study that matter and we did a report about that.

There are separate organizations, but putting together a strategy towards a common goal, I think that is one way to go. As Ikeda-san mentioned, in terms of integration it is not necessarily so that we just integrate the organizations, methodologies are important. There are many ways to do it, but we can learn from the US example or some other examples where such similar efforts are made.

(Hoshino) Well, we went a little bit over time. But, with that I would like to end the panel discussion. I think we had a very rich discussion and I think we had some frank exchange of views and we had very pointed questions from the audience which enriched the discussion further. My thanks to all of you and so let us show appreciation to all the panelists for their great contributions. Thank you very much.

Concluding Lecture

The Dilemma for UN Peacekeeping Missions and Integrated Approach

Toshiya Hoshino (Osaka University)

From my point of view, I dare to try to summarize what we have discussed today. What is the integration? The integration is a necessary process in conducting peacebuilding missions as perhaps all of you can agree. At the same time this is a very difficult process for us to follow, but this is essential. Then, what should be done and what can be done? This is exactly the thing that I would like to speak to you here.

1. Need for “3D Integration”

There is a need for 3D, three-dimensional integration. Or the integration that we pursue is not 2 dimensional, but should be three- (or multi-) dimensional. Then, the question is how. We have to address the situation during the period of transition from conflict to peace. There is a variety of needs and requirements, and we have to address them.

Then, why is integration needed? Probably because unintegrated and uncoordinated activities could not address problems of the post-conflict complex situations effectively nor properly. Unintegrated approaches can lead to the many overlaps and the waste of resources.

Another question is who leads the entire operation; i.e., DPKO or Security Council? In asking these questions, we can fall into air pockets, so to speak. As a result, the very important essential tasks are left unattended by anyone. We need a more comprehensive view. Here I would like to use the word “comprehensive” instead of the integration or integrated. I believe that such a comprehensive perspective is important.

Another problem is a risk that we should discuss. Humanitarian personnel could face physical risks. In order to avoid such risks we need to take a collective action. Unintegrated and uncoordinated situation must be improved. I think we need to agree on this first.

Then, how and what we should integrate? In a nutshell, there are many gaps in the peacebuilding processes, and we need to fill them. Let me now give you five integration points, (1) integration of different issue areas, (2) integration in terms of time, (3) integration of headquarter’s view into the field, (4) integration of doctrines, and (5) integration of various actors’ operational activities. The first point is to integrate the four broad issue areas of security, humanitarian, development and politics. Then, on the second point, Professor Kawabata talked about the “golden time” at the end of a conflict in sore need of assistance, and we need to make good use of the time. It also needs the integration in terms of time during the processes of stabilization in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, peace consolidation, and medium- and longer-term reconstruction/development.

The third point is to integrate headquarter's view into the field. This is necessary for the formulation and implementation of mandates. On the fourth point, even though we do not always need to integrate doctrines fully, we should promote mutual understanding among them because the military doctrine and the civilian one differ widely in culture. On the last point, when various actors pursue operational activities, it needs to share information about their roles, budgets and personnel, and to organize their area and time of deployment on a common plan in three (or multiple) dimensions. I believe that these processes of integration are necessary.

2. Challenges in the Integration

Then, what do we need for promoting effective integration? I think three tests are required in this regard. The first one may be called "strategic vision test." This is to test whether a common vision, a common priority and a common plan are developed or not among the participants.

The second one is the test of leadership. In an integrated mission, SRSG is the head, followed by DSRSG who is serving also as RC/HC. Under that, can the UN Country Team work properly? Can the non-UN organizations act together? Can they communicate with the local host government and stakeholders effectively? Good leadership is necessary for these tasks. The quality of the leadership is tested.

The third one is the test of political will. This is related to what General Gordon call fragile triangular. The test must be done whether there is a political will or not among the Security Council, the Secretariat, the member states (TCCs, PCCs and FCCs). For example, there might be a gap that some went to Libya but do not want to go to Syria; Some failed in Somalia, so they do not want to go to another place any further. To deal with these problems they need a political will.


Even though the mandates are formulated, enough equipment and personnel might not be secured. This means a gap between the mandates and resources. For integration, there must be a common vision, a common priority, and a good leadership and the political will. These have to be tested.

Then, as we discussed today, how can we deal with an increasing risk, the risk that increased due to integration. I just talked about how to promote the integration and its necessary conditions. But after integration, some problems might arise, as we discussed today as the "dilemma of integration," especially the problem of the mutual interference between political and humanitarian missions. As General Gordon said, importance of mutual understanding is also an issue. The lack of mutual understanding can give rise to risks.

3. "Integration" Model: What Are Integrated?

The circles, as you can see here, usually represent an integrated situation.

Model of “Integration”



On the upper right we see “Humanitarian.” Also, “Development” on the upper left is an essential factor even though we did not discuss today. There are “Security” on the lower right and “Politics” on the lower left. As among them, I specialize in “Politics.” There is a view that both the peacebuilding and peacekeeping are political as much as operational activities; that is just what I thought. The peacebuilding and peacemaking are impossible without politics, and so “Politics” is here highlighted.

What I would like to draw your attention to is that between “Humanitarian” and “Development” there is a dotted line. This is because both are interrelated and closely linked with each other. There are UN humanitarian actors as well as non-UN humanitarian actors, i.e., NGO. Similarly, there are UN and non-UN actors for development. They both work with each other in order to improve the local situations for development, reconstruction and humanitarian.

I might draw a dotted line between “Humanitarian” and “Security,” too. I marked the boundary with a thicker line because there is a difficult aspect of relationship between the humanitarian actors and the military actors. The military missions include not only the (traditional) peacekeeping but also POC (protection of civilians) and stabilization operation.

There are, of course, more subdivisions that could be made, but if you combine this in a jointed fashion, then it would constitute one circle and then this would lead to nation-building and peace-building, as was said by General Gordon.

These four categories differ in culture and principle, as Professor Osa pointed out. To ensure

security, it needs to promote the stabilization of the local situation effectively. Meanwhile, for humanitarian actors, it is important to build on principles such as impartiality and humanitarianism and independence from politics. It may be important that development actors should pursue such notions as poverty reduction and good governance. Politics should be based on free, just and fair business on one side, but it also has to have political power sharing and compromise to make it happen. We have to integrate these four different categories which have different values and principles; that is what was discussed today.

But, that is not all. Even though international actors may have a role to play, there are host government and stakeholders in the local field, and international aid should be designed to encourage self-help. We cannot ignore “Host Government & Stakeholders” in the circle.

Furthermore, I would like to insist on a human-centered model. In the center of the circle, I put “PEOPLE” who should feel that they are living a life of peace. It may be a matter of “Human Security Interests.” With having a vision and a set of priorities, we should assign a proper role to each of the various actors. Then, integration may be promoted in a positive manner. Well, this may be an ideal, but here I tried to visualize what we have discussed today.

4. “Integration” Reconsidered

Let me now share my views on integration once again. First of all, integration is not the ends but the means. The risks involved in integration are major dilemma that we face. While we act in accordance with humanitarian principles, as a result it sometimes causes a contradiction. For example, how we adjust a conflict between two types of “protection,” that are “humanitarian protection” and “military protection.” In order to handle such a conflict, we have to make sure to understand that integration is just a means and not the ends. We should share a common vision as an end purpose.

Then, integration is not a panacea, as we discussed today. Now I try to distinguish between synonyms, for example, “system cohesion” is one expression that was used. Professor Kamino said why UN agencies have to be integrated; each of them sometimes has to act in a very different way. “System cohesion” would have to be pursued, but it is not necessarily the same as “integration” all the time. “CIMIC” is also another common word. This may have some overlapping parts with integration, but this is not the same as integration.

Identifying multidimensional PKO with integration is one idea, but I am concerned about the assumption that PKO itself has multiple dimensions. Take MONUSCO for example, it has 45 different tasks, as we discussed today. Why PKO, which is funded by the mandatory PKO budget that Japan has to pay its large portion, has to conduct all these tasks within their mandates? PKO

may not need to cover everything and some other organs or organizations, with in the UN or outside the UN can better perform the necessary tasks. So that it may be necessary to scrutinize the existing operations. We do not always need to argue on the line that multidimensional equals integration.

To give you the conclusion, overintegration leads to more problems, and so we are permitted to pursue the partial integration or the harmonization of tasks based on the mutual understandings. I think we need the flexibility to meet the expected goals.

This is the last point. Ultimately, what is required is the comprehensive strategies, in which we have to share the common purpose, goal and vision. We also need to coordinate the necessary activities. Then, what is the vision? Please remember the circle that I shared with you. We should hear not only the local government's request but also the voice of the local people, and ask them what they need. The most important question on the integrated mission is, for whom the integration is promoted, preferably in a 3D fashion. This is what triggered me to think, and so this is my observation that I wanted to share with you today. Thank you very much.

Closing Remarks

Satoshi Kikuchi (Deputy Commandant of Joint Staff College, Rear Admiral)

Ladies and gentlemen, I am the Deputy Commandant of the Joint Staff College. My name is Kikuchi. Lecturers, thank you very much for giving us your very precious input and very illuminating discussion despite of your busy schedules and participating in the activities to maintain international peace and security on the ground and this was a very stimulating and a valuable learning experience for me and I thank all of the people in the audience for gathering here today from early in the morning. Your questions, based on experiences, were also a precious input to the symposium. I think we are able to deepen and promote the theme of or the aim of the symposium which is Fusion of Policy, Academia and Field Action.

The Japan Peacekeeping Training & Research Center has only a short history after reorganization, just 2-1/2 years. But, we have been looking at international peace and security, we have learned about history and the current status of this aim which has been the aim that the international society has pursued since the United Nations has been established and we have started various educations to foster effective SDF members based on our learning. We have about 130 graduates, but we can say that our education about international peace cooperation activities is moving forward and is going into gear.

Having said that though, the UN PKO activities still face various issues, as we heard today. From the time that the Cold War ended in the past 20 years, the form and function of the PKO has changed greatly. In the recent decade there has been more focus on the human rights of women and children and last year in this symposium, we talked about the protection of civilians and that is an urgent issue as well. If you look at the recent Libya and Syria situations, it seems that there is a question concerning the state and effectiveness of activities to maintain international peace and security as well as each country's effort towards that goal.

We are not in a stable period concerning UN PKO. As the formal threats against peace and the requirement of the international society and the actions of the member states continue to change and evolve, PKO will continue to evolve in the most appropriate manner in terms of its function, framework, and the actions on the ground. What is important for us on the ground is to acquire accurate information to understand the trends appropriately and prepare from peace time.

I hope that this symposium hosted by the Joint Staff College, Japan Peacekeeping Training & Research Center can be a forum where we can provide the latest and meaningful information to all the experts and activists in this field, not just the Self Defense Forces members. I want to thank all the lecturers and all the audience for your understanding and your cooperation to our center. Next year, at around this time of the year, I look forward to seeing you again to review the latest UN Missions to further deepen our debate about new issues and future direction. Thank you very

much.

Program

“Challenges in UN Integrated Mission -Function, Structure and Framework-”

09:30 – 09:45	Opening Remarks: Lt Gen Tsugio ISHINO (Commandant, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense)
09:45 – 10:50	Keynote Speech: Maj Gen (Retd) Robert Gordon
11:00 – 12:05	Presentation: Mr. Kiyotaka KAWABATA (Political Affairs Officer, Department of Political Affairs, UN)
12:05 – 13:15	Break
13:15 – 14:50	Panel Discussion Moderator: Prof. Toshiya HOSHINO (Osaka University) Panelists : Maj Gen (Retd) Robert Gordon Mr. Kiyotaka KAWABATA (DPA/United Nations) Prof. Tomoya KAMINO (Gifu University) Ms. Yukie OSA (Association for Aide and Relief, Japan)
15:00 – 15:40	Concluding Lecture and Round up: Prof. Toshiya HOSHINO (Osaka University)
15:40 – 15:50	Closing Remarks: RADM Satoshi KIKUCHI (Vice Commandant, Joint Staff College, Ministry of Defense)

Contributors

Major General Robert Gordon was educated at Wellington College and St Catharine's College. He got an M.A. in Modern History from Cambridge University. He was commissioned into the 17th/21st Lancers in 1970, and served in the Sudan, Cyprus, etc. From 1990-1992 he commanded the 17th/21st Lancers, an armoured regiment deployed in that time to the 1st Gulf War. In 1994 he took command of the 19th Mechanised Brigade in which post he went to Bosnia to assume command of UN Sector South West Bosnia (UNPROFOR). He commanded the 2nd (UK) Division in the rank of Major General in 1999 and also became the Governor of Edinburgh Castle. He was appointed Force Commander of the UNMEE in 2002 and served there until 2004. He retired from the British Army in 2005, formed his own consulting company and since then has worked on numerous contracts around the world for UN organizations, the EU, etc. as a specialist, lecturer, mentor and trainer on peace support operations.

Kiyotaka Kawabata is Political Affairs Officer at United Nations. He earned a Master of Arts degree from Columbia University. He joined United Nations in 1988, and served as Political Affairs Officer in the Special Working Group for Security Council Reform and Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations. He also served for Afghanistan Peace Negotiation and Iraq crisis response. Currently, he serves in charge of the Syrian civil war in the Division of Security Council. He is also invited as to Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University as Guest Professor. Publications include, *Why we could not prevent Iraq crisis? 600 days of UN diplomacy* (Iwanami Shoten, 2007) etc.

Tomoya Kamino is Associate Professor at Gifu University. He graduated in law from Tohoku University in 1999. He took a Master of Law degree from Tohoku University, and took a Master of Science degree in Economics from the University of Wales in 2006. He received a Doctor of Law degree from Tohoku University in 2007. He served in Japan Society for the Promotion of Science as a Fellow (PD) in 2007, and served in the Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation Center as a Researcher in 2010. He was appointed to current position in 2012. Publications include, *War and Humanitarian Assistance* (Tohoku University, 2012) etc.

Yukie Osa is the President of the Association for Aid and Relief (AAR), Japan. She is also Professor at Rikkyo University. She received her PhD in Human Security Studies at the graduate school of the University of Tokyo (2007). As a head of emergency assistance operations, she was involved in AAR's programs in Cambodia, Former-Yugoslavia, Mozambique, Kosovo, Chechenia, Afghanistan, etc. As a member of International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), she led the Japanese Mine Ban Campaign during and after the Ottawa Process. Publications include, *Srebrenica –Analysis of a genocide* (Toshindo Publishers, 2009) etc.

Toshiya Hoshino is Professor and the Dean at Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), Osaka University. He graduated from Sophia University, Tokyo, completed a Master's at the University of Tokyo, and Doctorate (Ph.D.) from Osaka University. His previous positions include: Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA); Guest Scholar at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University; Fellow at Stanford Japan Center, Stanford University; Visiting Fellow, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University; Visiting Fellow, the United States Institute for Peace (USIP); Visiting Fellow, The University of Woolongong, Australia; Consultant to the United Nations University; and a Special Assistant (Political Affairs) at the Embassy of Japan to the United States. Publications include, *Heiwakochiku Nyumon (Introduction to Peacebuilding)* (Yuhikaku, 2012) etc.