Reference 1 Changes in the Roles of Defense Capabilities

	[Background]	[The Roles of Defense Capabilities]
1976 NDPG (approved by the National Defense Council and Cabinet on October 29, 1976)	○ International situation of easing tensions despite the continuing Cold War ○ Balance of power among the United States, China, and the Soviet Union formed in the vicinity of Japan ○ Necessary to show the Japanese people the objectives of Japan's defense capabilities	· Basic Defense Force Concept · Maintain a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation to prevent a power vacuum that destabilizes the region, rather than directly coping with military threats to Japan
19 years ↓		
1995 NDPG (approved by the Security Council and Cabinet on November 28, 1995)	○ End of the Cold War ○ International situation with opaque and uncertain factors ○ Growing Japanese public expectations for international contributions, etc.	· Basically follow the Basic Defense Force Concept · In addition to "defense of the nation," add "dealing with various contingencies such as large-scale disasters" and "contributing to building a more stable security environment" to the roles of defense capability
9 years ↓		
2004 NDPG (approved by the Security Council and Cabinet on December 10, 2004)	○ New threats, including international terrorism and ballistic missiles ○ Situation in which world peace is directly linked to Japan's peace ○ Necessary to shift the emphasis from deterrence to response	· Defense capabilities that are multifunctional, flexible, and effective, enabling working independently and proactively on implementing international peace cooperation activities, as well as dealing effectively with new threats and diverse contingencies · Inherit the effective parts of the Basic Defense Force Concept
6 years ↓		
2010 NDPG (approved by the Security Council and Cabinet on December 17, 2010)	○ Changes in the global balance of power ○ Increasingly complex military situation in the vicinity of Japan ○ Diversification of the roles of military power in the international community	· Development of a Dynamic Defense Force (not bound by the Basic Defense Force Concept) · Defense capabilities to facilitate effective deterrence of and responses to various contingencies, and to make it possible to proactively conduct activities to further stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security environment
3 years ↓		
2013 NDPG (approved by the National Security Council and Cabinet on December 17, 2013)	○ Increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan ○ U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region ○ Lessons learned from the JSDF's activities in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake	· Development of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force · Defense capabilities to be more thorough with the concept of joint operation, which enables the JSDF to respond swiftly to the increasingly severe security environment and carry out various activities, such as achieving maritime and air superiority, seamlessly and flexibly
5 years ↓		
2018 NDPG (approved by the National Security Council and Cabinet on December 18, 2018)	○ Security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe and uncertain at a remarkably fast pace ○ Rapid expansion of the use of new domains, including space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum ○ Pronounced trend toward further strengthening military capabilities and intensifying military activities	· Development of a Multi-Domain Defense Force · Truly effective defense capabilities that enable cross-domain operations organically fusing capabilities in all domains by strengthening not only those in the traditional land, sea, and air domains but also those in new domains, which are space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum
5 years ↓		
National Defense Strategy (NDS) (approved by the National Security Council and Cabinet on December 16, 2022)	○ Japan faces the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II ○ As neighboring countries, etc. continue to strengthen their military capabilities and intensify their military activities, Japan finds itself on the front line of these developments ○ As new ways of warfare emerge, whether Japan can respond to them becomes a challenge in building its future defense capabilities	· Development of defense capabilities with attention to the opponents' capabilities and new ways of warfare · Defense capabilities, through the radical enhancement of the multi-domain defense force, capable of preventing unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts, deterring invasion of Japan, and, should deterrence fail, disrupting and defeating an invasion of Japan on Japan's own initiative

Reference 2 National Security Strategy of Japan

(December, 2022)

I Purpose

The international community is facing changes defining an era. We are reminded once again that globalization and interdependence alone cannot serve as a guarantor for peace and development across the globe. The free, open, and stable international order, which expanded worldwide in the post-Cold War era, is now at stake with serious challenges amidst historical changes in power balances and intensifying geopolitical competitions. Meanwhile, a host of issues such as climate change and infectious disease crises are emerging, requiring cross-border cooperation among nations. Today, we are in an era where confrontation and cooperation are intricately intertwined in international relations.

To date, advanced democratic countries, including Japan, have devoted themselves to upholding universal values such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law, and to spearheading the effort to shape the international society of coexistence and coprosperity. Numerous countries around the world, including developing countries, have also enjoyed the fruits of international peace, stability, and economic development in this globalized world rooted in such order.

At the same time, however, dissatisfaction stemming from widening economic disparities and other factors are generating renewed feelings of tensions at the domestic level and even in inter-state relations. Guided by their own historical views and values, some nations, not sharing universal values, are making attempts to revise the existing international order. In the course of almost a century, humanity has invested itself in defining a fundamental international principle of the general prohibition of the use of force. Yet, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (hereinafter referred to as the "UN Security Council"), which has the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, has overtly trampled on this very principle. This is coupled with ongoing unilateral changes to the status quo and such attempts at sea. In addition, some states, not sharing universal values, are exploiting unique approaches to rapidly develop their economies and science technologies, and then, in some areas, are gaining superiorities over those states that have defended academic freedom and market-economy principles. These moves challenge the existing international order, thereby intensifying geopolitical competitions in international relations. In the face of that, many developing and other nations are striving to avoid embroiling themselves in geopolitical competitions. We are even observing that some states are now following the lead of those not sharing universal values.

At a time when geopolitical competition is intensifying, issues are arising elsewhere in the world which call for global cooperation at large. We live in an era where there is a greater imperative than ever before for the international community to rally together in cooperation beyond differences in values, conflicts of interest, and others for the sake of taking on those global challenges that transcend national borders and put the very existence of humankind at risk such as climate change and infectious disease crises.

Turning our eyes to the neighboring region, Japan's security environment is as severe and complex as it has ever been since the end of World War II. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has easily breached the very foundation of the rules that shape the international order. The possibility cannot be precluded that a similar serious situation may arise in the future in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in East Asia. Across the globe, historical changes in power balances, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, are occurring. In addition, in the vicinity of Japan, military buildups, including of nuclear weapons and missiles, are rapidly advancing, coupled with mounting pressures by unilaterally changing the status quo by force. Moreover, grey zone situations over territories, cross-border cyberattacks on critical civilian infrastructures, and information warfare through spread of disinformation, are constantly taking place, thereby further blurring the boundary between contingency and peacetime. Furthermore, the scope of national security has expanded to include those fields previously considered non-military such as economic, technological and others, and thus the boundary between military and non-military fields is no longer clear-cut either.

Japan also faces difficult domestic challenges such as a declining and aging population with a low fertility rate and a severe fiscal condition. With a view to resolving these challenging economic and social agendas at home and to bringing about economic growth, Japan must ensure an international environment that is conducive to facilitating cross-border economic and social activities such as trade of goods, energy, and food which are essential for industries, and the movement of people.

We live in the world of a historical inflection point and in the face of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII. Against this backdrop, Japan must protect its own national interests, including the peace, security and prosperity of Japan, the safety of its people, and the coexistence and coprosperity of the international community by steadfastly preparing for the worst-case scenario, including fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities. To this end, we will strive to proactively foster a desirable security environment for Japan by carrying out vigorous diplomacy. In addition, possessing defense capabilities, which enable Japan to firmly defend itself on its own, will indeed bolster the solid footing of Japan's diplomacy. To achieve these objectives, Japan needs a strategy that integrates its national responses at a higher level by taking a panoramic view of the diverse dimensions of international relations as a whole, where confrontation and cooperation are intricately intertwined, including geopolitical competition and responses to global-scale challenges, and then by taking full advantage of comprehensive national power, including diplomatic, defense, economic, technological, and intelligence capabilities. From this standpoint, the Government of Japan hereby sets forth the National Security Strategy as its supreme national security policy document. The Strategy provides strategic guidance for Japan's national security policy areas, including diplomacy, defense, economic security, technology, cyber, maritime, space, intelligence, official development assistance (ODA), and energy. Japan's first-ever National Security Strategy (decided by the National Security Council and approved by the Cabinet Decision on December 17, 2013) was formulated in 2013. Guided by the policy of Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the principle of the international cooperation, the Legislation for Peace and Security was enacted. By so doing, the Government has put arrangements in place where Japan can seamlessly respond to situations concerning security. While maintaining the fundamental principles of the Japanese national security, grounded in these arrangements, the strategic guidance and policies under this Strategy will dramatically transform Japan's national security policy after the end of WWII from the aspect of its execution.

Meanwhile, the exercise of power as a nation begins with the determination of its people. In order to steadily execute the Strategy, which encompasses a broad range of fields beyond the traditional boundaries of diplomacy and defense, it is essential for the Government to gain the understanding and cooperation of its people regarding the content and execution of the Strategy and to foster an environment in which they can voluntarily and proactively

participate in Japan's security policy.

The Strategy consists of the following:

The Strategy first outlines Japan's national interests, which should serve as the starting point in defining a national security strategy. Then, based on these national interests, the Strategy lays out basic principles concerning Japan's national security that have been nurtured over the course of the postwar security history and experiences as well as by the choices of the Japanese people. Additionally, it presents the current security environment surrounding Japan and its security challenges. On this basis, it sets out national security objectives that Japan should achieve, and identifies ways and means, namely through strategic approaches, by which it can deliver on the objectives through capitalizing on the Japanese comprehensive national power. Then, the Strategy puts forward various foundations of Japan, which sustain the execution of the strategic approaches.

II Japan's National Interests

Japan's national interests to be preserved and developed are listed below:

1. Japan will maintain its sovereignty and independence, defend its territorial integrity, and secure the safety of life, person, and properties of its nationals. Japan will ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security grounded in freedom and democracy and preserving its rich culture and traditions. Furthermore, Japan and its nationals will continue to strive so that Japan and its nationals are respected and favorably regarded around the world.
2. Japan will achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic growth, thereby consolidating its own peace and security. And, while working to realize Japan's economic prosperity, Japan will maintain and strengthen an open and stable international economic order and achieve an international environment in which Japan and other countries can coexist and prosper together.
3. Japan will maintain and protect universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law, and international order based on international law. In particular, Japan will maintain and develop a free and open international order, especially in the Indo-Pacific region where Japan is situated.

III Fundamental Principles Concerning Japan's National Security

As a prerequisite for the execution of Japan's national security policy in pursuit of protecting its national interests, the following are the fundamental principles concerning Japan's national security.

1. Japan will maintain the policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on international cooperation. In order to further embody this principle in the international community and to protect our own national interests in the time ahead, and based on the recognition that the primary responsibility for defending Japan lies with itself, Japan will squarely face the ever-changing security environment by decisively taking on necessary reforms and reinforcing our national security capabilities and roles.
2. Japan will execute its security policy in a manner that maintains and upholds universal values such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law. As one of the most mature and stable advanced democratic countries in the world, even amidst a complex and severe security environment, Japan will strive to maintain and uphold universal values and principles in cooperation with other countries, and lead the international community by example.
3. As a peace-loving nation, Japan will adhere to the basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense- oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non- Nuclear Principles.
4. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the provision of extended deterrence, will remain the cornerstone of Japan's national security policy.
5. Japan will attach importance to coexistence and coprosperity alongside other countries, cooperation with like-minded countries, and multilateral cooperation.

IV Security Environment Surrounding Japan and Japan's National Security Challenges

In defining its national security objectives, the security environment surrounding Japan and its national security challenges are listed below.

1. Global Security Environment and Challenges

(1) Since the formation of the previous National Security Strategy in 2013, the international community has consistently gone through rapid changes, in conjunction with the center of gravity of global power shifting to the Indo-Pacific region, where Japan is situated. These changes are likely to carry on over the medium-to-long term and to have historical consequences that will transform the nature of the international community.

(2) Many opportunities and benefits are presented worldwide such as economic development, technological innovation, people-to-people exchanges, and the creation of new cultures. At the same time, however, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the United States, Japan's ally with the world's greatest comprehensive power, and international frameworks such as the G7 to manage risks in the international community and to maintain and develop a free and open international order. The United Nations, which should embody the will of the international community at large, has experienced a round of confrontation and thus has not fully lived up to fulfilling its functions. This is largely due to the fact that nations, not sharing universal values, or political and economic systems based on such values in common, are expanding their influences, thereby manifesting risks around the globe. Specifically, some states, which do not exclude the policy of increasing their own national interests at the expense of others, are expanding their influence through both military and non-military means, attempting to unilaterally change the status quo, and accelerating actions to challenge the international order. Such moves have sharpened competition and confrontation among states in wide-ranging areas, including military, diplomatic, economic, and technological fields, and have shaken the foundation of the international order. As a result, the current international security environment has become complex and severe, one where inter-state relations and interests of each and every nation are intertwined with each other in a mosaic-like manner.

(3) The following are prominent examples of the complexity and severity of the current international security environment.

(i) Unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts against the territorial sovereignty and others of other nations are taking place, combined with military and non-military means. In particular, Russia's aggression against Ukraine constitutes a serious violation of international law prohibiting the use of force, and shakes the very foundation of the

international order.

(ii) In cyber, maritime, space, and electromagnetic domains, and other areas, the risks that impede free access to and utilization of these areas are becoming increasingly serious. In particular, the threat of cyberattacks, in which the risk of exposure is relatively low and attackers have an advantage, is growing rapidly. Cyberattacks have been used constantly to disable or destroy critical infrastructures, interfere in foreign elections, demand ransoms, and steal sensitive information, even in the form of state-sponsored cyberattacks. It is highly likely that hybrid warfare, combining military and non-military means to achieve military objectives such as information warfare which utilizes the spread of disinformation prior to an armed attack, will be conducted in an even more sophisticated form in the time ahead.

(iii) Addressing those issues not necessarily deemed as security targets in the past, such as supply chain vulnerabilities, increasing threats to critical infrastructures, and leadership struggles over advanced technologies, has also become a major security challenge. As a result, the scope of security has expanded to include the economic sector, making economic measures even more necessary to ensure security.

(iv) In the field of international trade and economic cooperation, which in principle should be mutually beneficial, some nations are trying to expand their own influence by economically coercing other nations through such means as restricting the exports of mineral resources, food, and industrial and medical supplies, as well as providing loans to other nations in a manner that ignores their debt sustainability.

(v) As major nations increase competition in advanced technology research and the use of its outcomes for security and other purposes, some nations are illegally stealing information related to advanced technologies developed by private companies, universities, and other organizations in other countries and using it for their own military purposes.

(vi) Due to the changing power balances and diversifying values around the world, strong leadership is being lost in the global governance structure at large. As a result, the international community is presented with greater difficulties to rally together in taking on common challenges such as climate change, free trade, arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, terrorism, global health including measures against infectious diseases, and food and energy issues. In addition, vulnerable countries in the Middle East, Africa, and the Pacific Islands are disproportionally suffering large damages from extreme weather and reduction of land area due to climate change, the global spread of infectious diseases, and shortages of food and energy.

2. Security Environment and Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region

The global security environment and challenges articulated above are particularly prominent in the Indo-Pacific region, where Japan is situated, and its severity may be on the rise in the future. In this regard, the security environment and challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, including notable trends of countries and regions in particular, are as follows.

(1) Overview of Security in the Indo-Pacific Region

The Indo-Pacific region is the core of global vitality, home to more than half of the world's population. The dynamism of the intersection of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans is a growth engine for the global economy. Japan, situated in this region, is well positioned to benefit from this.

At the same time, the Indo-Pacific region faces a host of security challenges. For example, several nations and regions that possess large military forces, including nuclear weapons, do not share universal values, nor political and economic systems based on such universal values. There exists a complex intertwining of diplomatic and other relations based on historical backgrounds. In addition, Japan faces threats and challenges of various types and intensities, such as unilateral changes to the status quo and such attempts in the East and South China Seas and other areas, piracy, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and natural disasters.

Guided by the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (hereinafter referred to as "FOIP"), in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan has the vital importance of striving to realize a free and open international order based on the rule of law and securing regional peace and stability in cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries and others.

(2) China's Activities in the Area of Security

China has set clear goals to achieve "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation," the full completion of "building China into a great modern socialist country" by the middle of this century, and the prompt buildup of the People's Liberation Army to be elevated to "world-class standards." Under these national goals, China has been increasing its defense expenditures at a continuously high level and extensively and rapidly enhancing its military power, including its nuclear and missile capabilities, without sufficient transparency.

In addition, China has intensified its attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the maritime and air domains including in the East and South China Seas, such as its intrusions into the territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands, and has expanded and intensified its military activities that affect Japan's national security in the Sea of Japan, the Pacific Ocean, and other areas as well. Furthermore, China is strengthening its strategic ties with Russia and attempting to challenge the international order.

The international community strongly urges China, the second largest economy in the world and one of the major countries leading today's global economy, to make further efforts to address global issues, including climate change, in a manner befitting its international influence. Yet, China does not participate in international frameworks in which other major official creditor nations take part in together, and its development finance and other related activities lack adequate transparency. In addition, China is redoubling its strategic efforts to establish its security in the economic field, and there have been instances of China taking advantage of other countries' dependence on China to exert economic pressure on other countries.

While maintaining its policy of peaceful reunification of Taiwan, China has not denied the possibility of using military force. In addition, China has been intensifying its military activities in the sea and airspace surrounding Taiwan, including the launch of ballistic missiles into the waters around Japan. Regarding peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, concerns are mounting rapidly, not only in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, but also in the entire international community.

It is expected that China contributes, together with Japan, to the peace and stability of the international community including the Indo-Pacific region, through building constructive relations with the international community via communications at various levels including at the summit level as well as repeating dialogue and cooperation with the international community, including Japan.

However, China's current external stance, military activities, and other activities have become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community, as well as in strengthening the international order based on the rule of law, to which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power and in cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries and others.

(3) North Korea's Activities in the Area of Security

In the Korean Peninsula, the large-scale military forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea are in confrontation with one another. North Korea has not carried out the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, in accordance with a series of relevant UN Security Council resolutions. While facing serious economic difficulties without any improvement in its human rights situation to date, North Korea continues to heavily allocate its resources to military affairs.

In recent years, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles with an unprecedented frequency and in new ways, rapidly enhancing its capabilities. In particular, North Korea is making rapid progress in its missile-related technologies and operational capabilities, exemplified by its launching of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)-class ballistic missiles with a range covering the U.S. mainland, launching missiles in new ways including missiles flying with irregular trajectories, and launching missiles from various platforms such as Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL), submarines, and trains.

Furthermore, North Korea intends to bolster its nuclear capabilities both in quality and in quantity at the maximum speed. When considered together with its rapid development of missile-related technologies, North Korea's military activities pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan's national security than ever before.

The issue of abductions by North Korea is a critical issue concerning the sovereignty of Japan and the lives and safety of Japanese citizens. It is an urgent issue for the Government to resolve under its responsibility. It is also a universal issue for the international community to take on as a violation of basic human rights.

(4) Russia's Activities in the Area of Security

Russia's aggression against Ukraine and its other actions clearly demonstrate that it does not hesitate to resort to military forces to achieve its own security objectives. In addition, Russia continues to repeat words and actions that could be interpreted as threats to use of nuclear weapons.

Russia is accelerating its military activities in the vicinity of Japan. Russia is also strengthening its armaments in the Northern Territories, which is an inherent territory of Japan. This is presumably due to the background that the Sea of Okhotsk plays as an area of activity for strategic nuclear submarines, an important part in Russia's strategic nuclear forces.

Furthermore, Russia has been doubling down on strategic coordination with China. In particular, in recent years, these two countries have ramped up their military coordination by continuing to conduct joint exercises and drills, such as joint navigation by their naval vessels and joint flights of their bombers in the vicinity of Japan.

By its recent aggression against Ukraine and others, Russia's external and military activities and others have shaken the very foundation of the international order, and are perceived as the most significant and direct threat to security in the European region. In addition, Russia's external and military activities and others in the Indo- Pacific region, including Japan, together with its strategic coordination with China, are of strong security concern.

V National Security Objectives of Japan

The following are the national security objectives of Japan to ensure its national interests in the face of the above-mentioned national security challenges. These objectives are grounded in the fundamental principles of Japan's national security as outlined in III.

1. Japan will continue to be a nation capable of protecting its sovereignty and independence, autonomously determining its domestic and foreign policies, and defending its territory and the safety of life, person, and the properties of its nationals. To this end, Japan will reinforce its own capabilities and roles, and together with its ally, the United States, and like-minded countries and others, deter contingencies and attempts to unilaterally change the status quo in Japan and its vicinity. If by any chance a threat should reach Japan, Japan will disrupt and defeat the threat and minimize the damage caused, and bring it to an end in a manner favorable to protecting its national interests.
2. Japan will proactively ensure, through executing its security policy, an international environment in which its own economy can grow. By doing so, Japan will work to achieve a virtuous cycle of security and economic growth, in which economic growth promotes the improvement of the security environment surrounding Japan. Concurrently, Japan will ensure the self-reliance of its economic structure, as well as advantages over other countries and ultimately the indispensability of its technologies.
3. As a major global actor, Japan will join together with its ally, like-minded countries and others to achieve a new balance in international relations, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. In so doing, Japan will prevent the emergence of situations in which any one state can unilaterally change the status quo easily, and redouble efforts to secure a stable, predictable, free and open international order based on the rule of law.
4. Japan will work on multilateral cooperation in the fields of international economy, response to global issues such as climate change and infectious diseases, and the formation of international rules and regulations, and then generate an environment in which the international community can coexist and coprosper.

VI Strategic Approaches Prioritized by Japan

Japan will implement strategic approaches to achieve its national security objectives, harnessing its comprehensive national power as an integrated and efficient means.

1. Main Elements of Comprehensive National Power for Japan's National Security

(1) First is diplomatic capabilities. The basis of national security

is to proactively create a peaceful, stable, and highly predictable international environment based on the rule of law and to prevent the emergence of threats. Over the years, Japan has devoted itself to diplomatic undertakings and international cooperation to promote peace, stability, and prosperity worldwide. Rooted in these traditions and experiences, and guided by significantly enhanced diplomatic implementation architecture, Japan will continue to nurture relations of trust with many countries, engage in diplomatic efforts to gain understanding and support for its country's position, and carry forward international cooperation with the aim of pursuing coexistence and coprosperity with other countries.

(2) Second is defense capabilities. These capabilities are the last guarantee of Japan's national security and embody the will and ability to resolutely defend our nation. In light of the current reality of the world, this function cannot be replaced by any other means. By means of defense capabilities, Japan will deter threats from reaching it, and if threats are indeed posed to Japan, it will disrupt and defeat them. In addition, fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities will bolster the solid footing of our diplomacy for proactively fostering a desirable security environment for Japan.

(3) Third is economic capabilities. Economic capabilities are the foundation of policies to achieve a peaceful and stable security environment. As the world's third largest economy and a major player in shouldering an open and stable international economic order, Japan will undertake free and fair trade and investment activities. In addition, Japan will provide high value-added goods and services that are indispensable to the global supply chain to accomplish its economic growth.

(4) Fourth is technological capabilities. The creation of science, technology, and innovation is the source of Japan's own economic and social development. In addition, the appropriate use of technological capabilities plays a crucial role in improving Japan's national security environment and is also indispensable in addressing global issues such as climate change. Japan will actively capitalize on its advanced technological capabilities, developed over the years in the public and private sectors in the field of national security, without being bound by its conventional way of thinking.

(5) Fifth is intelligence capabilities. In a rapidly and complexly changing security environment, the collection and analysis of high-quality and timely information is essential for the Government to make accurate decisions. To this end, under close cooperation between the policy and intelligence departments, and through comprehensive analyses utilizing all means of collection and sources of information possessed by the Government, information on national security should be obtained as early and accurately as possible, and shared and utilized within and outside the Government. In addition, the Government and the private sector will work on information security to prevent leakage of critical information on its national security.

2. Strategic Approaches and Major Ways and Means

(1) Develop Efforts Centered on Diplomacy to Prevent Crises, Proactively Create a Peaceful and Stable International Environment, and Strengthen a Free and Open International Order

(i) Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. security arrangements at its core, plays an indispensable role not only for the security of Japan but also for the realization of peace and stability in the international community, including in the Indo-Pacific region. In particular, for the U.S. commitment to the region to be maintained and strengthened, deepened cooperation between Japan and the U.S. at a concrete level in the Indo-Pacific region is of vital importance. Bearing these considerations in mind, Japan, while ensuring the bilateral coordination at its strategic levels, will work in coordination with the United States to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance in all areas, including diplomacy, defense, and economy.

(ii) Maintain and Develop a Free and Open International Order and Strengthen Ties with its Ally, Like-minded Countries and Others

As a nation in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will further promote efforts to realize a FOIP by deepening cooperation with like-minded countries through the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a cornerstone and through efforts such as the Japan-U.S.-Australia-India (Quad) partnership. To this end, Japan will strive to make the vision of a FOIP more universal around the world, create rules to expand the free and fair economic zone, improve connectivity, empower governance of countries and international organizations, and expand efforts to ensure maritime security.

Japan will also further enhance diplomatic engagement with developing countries, which are economically growing and becoming more influential in the international arena. By doing so, Japan, together with as many countries as possible, will strengthen a free and open international order based on the rule of law.

Furthermore, Japan will build a multilayered network among its ally and like-minded countries, expand it, and strengthen deterrence. Thus, while utilizing frameworks such as the Japan-U.S.-ROK, and Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan will enhance security cooperation with Australia, India, the ROK, European countries, ASEAN countries, Canada, NATO, EU, and others. Specifically, Japan will promote enhanced engagement with like-minded countries and others in the Indo-Pacific region through bilateral and multilateral dialogues, bilateral training and exercises, conclusions of information protection agreements, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), joint development of defense equipment, transfer of defense equipment and technology, capacity building support, strategic communication, and Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO).

(iii) Strengthen Diplomacy with Japan's Neighboring Countries and Regions as well as Efforts toward Resolution of Various Issues of Concern, including Territorial Issues

Both Japan and China have important responsibilities for the peace and prosperity of the region and the international community. Japan will build a "constructive and stable relationship" with China through communication at various levels, in which Japan asserts its position and calls for responsible actions, while continuing dialogue including on issues of concern and cooperation on matters of common interests. This is essential for peace and stability in the international community, including in the Indo-Pacific region.

Japan will strongly oppose China's growing attempts

to unilaterally change the status quo by force, demand it to not conduct such activities, and respond in a calm and resolute manner. Additionally, with regard to China's rapid strengthening of its military capabilities and expansion of military activities, Japan will strongly encourage China to improve transparency and to cooperate constructively with international efforts for arms control, disarmament and other such efforts, in cooperation with its ally, like- minded countries and others. Furthermore, in order to nurture a relationship of trust, Japan will enhance communication with China in the security field. Japan will also promote efforts, including the establishment of a framework for avoiding and preventing the occurrence of unforeseen situations with China.

At the same time, based on the recognition that it is possible to cooperate with China in the fields of economy and people-to-people exchange in a mutually beneficial way, Japan will develop appropriate economic relations in a manner that contributes to Japan's economic development and economic security, and revitalize people to people exchanges with China. In addition, in cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries as well as with international organizations and others, Japan will cooperate with China in areas that need to be tackled together such as global issues, while encouraging China to comply with international rules and standards, increase its own transparency and predictability, and play a responsible and constructive role commensurate with its international influence.

Japan's relationship with Taiwan has been maintained as a non-governmental working relationship based on the Japan-China Joint Communique in 1972. Japan's basic position regarding Taiwan remains unchanged. Taiwan is an extremely important partner and a precious friend of Japan, with whom Japan shares fundamental values, including democracy, and has close economic and personal ties. Peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is an indispensable element for the security and prosperity of the international community, and Japan will continue to make various efforts based on its position that the cross-Strait issues are expected to be resolved peacefully.

The ROK is a highly important neighboring country to Japan both in a geopolitical context and in regard to Japan's security. With the response to North Korea and other issues in mind, Japan will enhance Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK strategic coordination, including in the area of security. To this end, Japan will communicate closely with the ROK in order to develop Japan-ROK relations based on the foundation of the friendly and cooperative relations that have developed since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965. Japan will also appropriately address issues of concern between the two nations, based on its consistent positions. With regard to the issue over the sovereignty of Takeshima, which is an inherent territory of Japan, Japan will make persevering diplomatic efforts, based on the principle of peaceful resolution of conflicts in accordance with international law, and responding firmly based on the consistent position of Japan.

With regard to North Korea's nuclear and missile development, Japan will urge North Korea to take concrete actions toward its complete denuclearization, based on the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and relevant UN Security Council resolutions through strengthening regional deterrence, fully implementing sanctions against North Korea, including those based on UN Security Council resolutions, and pursuing diplomatic efforts in close coordination with the U.S. and the ROK. Concerning Japan-North Korea relations, Japan will endeavor to achieve a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, such as the abductions, nuclear and missile issues, in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. In particular, it is the basic recognition of Japan that normalization of relations with North Korea will not be possible without resolving the abductions issue, a serious humanitarian issue with a time constraint. Japan will make every effort to ensure the safety of all abductees and realize their immediate return at the earliest possible date, investigate the truth regarding the abductions, and transfer those who executed the abductions.

With regard to the relations with Russia, Japan will respond in a manner that protects its own national interests in light of the severe security environment in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, Japan will prevent Russia from taking actions that undermine the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while cooperating with its ally and like-minded countries and others. As for the Northern Territories issue, which is the greatest concern regarding our diplomacy with Russia, Japan's basic policy of concluding a peace treaty through the resolution of the territorial issue remains unchanged.

(iv) Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-proliferation

Japan will further strengthen its efforts in arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, in order to improve its security environment and realize peace and stability around the world by halting and reversing the trend of arms buildup, including nuclear weapons, in the vicinity of Japan, and to prevent the occurrence of situations such as threats of nuclear weapons. Specifically, Japan, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, will spearhead international efforts in realizing a "world without nuclear weapons." Taking into account regional non- proliferation issues such as North Korea and Iran, Japan will maintain and strengthen the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) at its cornerstone, and steadily promote practical and realistic efforts while appropriately addressing present international security challenges.

In addition, Japan will undertake non-proliferation policy with a focus on preserving and bolstering the international export control regime to prevent the proliferation of weapons and related sensitive technologies, implementing appropriate non-proliferation measures domestically, and supporting capacity building of each country.

With regard to biological, chemical, and conventional weapons, Japan will actively engage in multilateral efforts and rule-making, including on the Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS).

(v) International Counter-Terrorism

Acts of terrorism are unjustifiable regardless of

their motivation and must be firmly condemned. Japan will take a firm position against them and take counter-terrorism measures in coordination with the international community. In this regard, Japan will promote measures against international terrorism and take thorough steps to ensure the security of critical facilities for the livelihoods of its people such as nuclear power plants in Japan. Furthermore, Japan will build arrangements to cooperate with others such as foreign countries and corporate enterprises, including information sharing, to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals and others overseas.

In addition, Japan will reinforce its mechanisms and capabilities for collecting and analyzing information on the international terrorism situation.

(vi) Climate Change Measures

Climate change is a security issue that affects the very existence of humankind. Extreme weather events due to climate change significantly impact Japan's national security in various ways including through more frequent and severer natural disasters, increased responses to disasters, more serious energy and food problems, a decrease in national land area, and increased use of the Arctic sea routes.

Japan will lead the way in advancing efforts both at home and abroad with all stakeholders, including its ally and like-minded countries. Specifically, Japan will embark on initiatives toward the realization of a decarbonized society through structural transformation of the energy and industrial sectors, including maximizing the use of renewable and nuclear energies, and the creation of innovation through bold investments in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 46% from FY 2013 in FY 2030, and realize net-zero by 2050.

Japan will also stand at the forefront in galvanizing global efforts for minimizing negative impacts of climate change upon the international security environment. As part of these efforts, Japan will provide assistance to island nations and other developing countries where climate change poses imminent threats so that sustainable and resilient economies and societies can be built.

(vii) Strategic Use of ODA and Other International Cooperation

Guided by the vision of a FOIP, Japan will strategically utilize ODA to maintain and develop a free and open international order and to realize coexistence and coprosperity in the international community.

Specifically, Japan will provide assistance to strengthen connectivity through quality infrastructure and human resource development, maritime security, the rule of law, and economic security, thereby strengthening relationships of trust and cooperation with developing countries and others. Japan will also engage with partners in the international community at large that support the vision of a FOIP.

Also, under the concept of "human security," Japan will lead international efforts to solve global issues such as poverty reduction, health, climate change, environment, and humanitarian assistance. In so doing, Japan will strengthen its support for overseas operation of Japanese companies, and enhance collaboration between ODA, and other non-ODA public funds. Japan will also continue to strengthen coordination with various stakeholders including international organizations and NGOs.

For the purpose of deepening security cooperation with like-minded countries, apart from ODA for the economic and social development of developing countries and other purposes, a new cooperation framework for the benefit of armed forces and other related organizations will be established. Japan will provide equipment and supplies as well as assistance for the development of infrastructures to like-minded countries in view of strengthening their security capacities and improving their deterrence capabilities. This is part of the efforts to reinforce the comprehensive defense architecture.

(viii) Promotion of People-to-People Exchanges

The promotion of mutual understanding among people and countries is the foundation for mitigating inter-state tensions and creating peaceful and stable international relations. With a view to promoting understanding of Japan abroad and fostering an international environment in which Japan and its people are favorably regarded, Japan will engage in people-to-people and cultural exchanges. Specifically, Japan will promote exchanges at various levels and in various fields, including exchanges with government officials, intellectuals, and cultural figures from countries and regions around the world, student exchanges, youth exchanges, sports exchanges, and others. In addition, Japan will support those programs intended to introduce the rich culture of Japan and to spread the Japanese language overseas.

(2) Strengthening Japan's Defense Architecture

(i) Fundamentally Reinforcing Defense Capabilities as the Last Guarantee of National Security

Across the globe, unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force are constantly taking place, and military buildups in the vicinity of Japan are rapidly expanding. The possibilities are not precluded that serious situations shaking the foundation of the international order, such as Russia's aggression against Ukraine, may occur especially in East Asia in the future. In order to respond to this security environment, Japan will fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities.

It is difficult to accurately predict when an entity with powerful military capabilities will come to have an intention to directly threaten other countries. Therefore, Japan must pay attention to the capabilities of such actors and develop defense capabilities to take all possible measures to ensure the security of Japan in peacetime. Moreover, Japan's defense capabilities must be able to respond to new ways of warfare as a result of advances in science and technology.

From this perspective, Japan will respond to situations in a multi-layered way by cross domain operational capabilities that enhance the Japan Self- Defense Forces (SDF) capabilities overall, through the synergy of organically integrated capabilities in space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic domains as well as in ground, maritime and air, and by stand- off defense capabilities and other capabilities that will enable us to respond to invading forces from outside the sphere of threats. In addition to manned assets, by reinforcing unmanned defense and other capabilities, Japan will establish defense capabilities where various capabilities are integrated. Furthermore, in order to maximize effective

use of the current defense equipment, Japan will further enhance the effectiveness of defense capabilities by improving mobility, securing ammunition and fuel, and hardening major defense facilities as a top priority.

A key to deterring invasion against Japan is counterstrike capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities. In recent years, in Japan's surroundings, there have been dramatic advances in missile-related technologies, including hypersonic weapons, and practical skills for missile operations, such as saturation attack. Missile forces in the region have significantly improved in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and missiles themselves have been repeatedly launched. Missile attacks against Japan have become a palpable threat. Under these circumstances, Japan will continue its steadfast efforts to both qualitatively and quantitatively enhance its missile defense capabilities by continuing to develop technologies that bring the ability to deal with missiles with irregular trajectories.

Looking ahead, however, if Japan continues to rely solely upon ballistic missile defenses, it will become increasingly difficult to fully address missile threats with the existing missile defense network alone.

For this reason, we need counterstrike capabilities: capabilities which, in the case of missile attacks by an opponent, enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent to prevent further attacks while defending against incoming missiles by means of the missile defense network.

Counterstrike capabilities are SDF's capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities. In cases where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent's territory. Counterstrikes are done as a minimum necessary measure for self-defense and in accordance with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force.

By possessing such capabilities to mount effective counterstrikes, Japan will deter armed attack itself. If an opponent ever launches missiles, it will be able to prevent the opponent's further armed attacks by counterstrike capabilities, while protecting itself against incoming missiles by the missile defense network, thereby defending the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals.

Counterstrike capabilities are the capabilities on which the Government expressed its view on February 29, 1956, which stated that, under the Constitution, "as long as it is deemed that there are no other means to defend against attack by guided missiles and others, to hit the bases of those guided missiles and others is legally within the purview of self-defense and thus permissible." These are also capabilities that the Government has chosen not to acquire up to now as a matter of policy decision.

This Government view squarely applies to measures for self-defense taken under the Three New Conditions for Use of Force, presented in the 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security, and the capabilities that Japan has now decided to acquire can be used when the above-mentioned Three Conditions are met in compliance with this view.

Counterstrike capabilities fall within the purview of Japan's Constitution and international law; they do not change Japan's exclusively defense-oriented policy; and, they will be used only when the above-mentioned Three New Conditions are fulfilled. Needless to say, preemptive strikes, namely striking first at a stage when no armed attack has occurred, remain impermissible.

While the basic division of roles between Japan and the United States will remain unchanged, as Japan will now possess counterstrike capabilities, the two nations will cooperate in counterstrikes just as they do in defending against ballistic missiles and others.

Furthermore, Japan will consistently strengthen coordination and cooperation between the SDF and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), including control over the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) by the Minister of Defense in the event of a contingency.

Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) utilizing SDF assets in the form of cross-governmental coordination will also be implemented.

In light of Japan's current security environment, Japan will need to promptly realize the fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities. Specifically, by FY 2027, five years after the formulation of the Strategy, Japan will strengthen its defense capabilities to the point at which Japan is able to take the primary responsibility for dealing with invasions against its nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats while gaining the support of its ally and others. Furthermore, by approximately ten years from now, Japan will reinforce its defense capabilities to the point at which it will be possible to disrupt and defeat invasions against its nation much earlier and at a further distance. In addition, as a top priority in five years from now, Japan will maximize effective use of its current equipment, while strengthening its core capabilities for the future of the SDF.

The above measures related to the development of the SDF architecture and defense policies will entail unprecedented undertakings in terms of size and content. The fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities will not be achieved by a temporary increase in spending, but rather, the Government will be required to maintain a certain level of expenditure.

Hence, these policies will be delivered in accordance with the National Defense Strategy and the Defense Program based on this National Security Strategy. Japan will also need to take appropriate measures for securing stable fiscal resources.

In FY 2027, as per its own judgement, Japan will take the necessary measures to make the level of its budget, for both the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and complementary initiatives, reach 2% of the current GDP, through building on the contents of necessary defense capabilities, and by taking into account indexes of international comparison, with a view to coordination with its ally, like-minded countries and others.

(ii) Coordinating with Reinforced Comprehensive Defense Architecture.

The core effort in addressing Japan's defense challenges will be to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities. However, because of wide-

ranging security targets and fields, Japan will utilize not only its defense capabilities but also its comprehensive national power, including diplomatic and economic capabilities, to defend itself. With this in mind, Japan will reinforce its comprehensive defense architecture by promoting efforts in four areas that complement and are inseparable from the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities under the frameworks of relevant ministries and agencies, namely research and development, public infrastructure development, cyber security, and international cooperation, to enhance deterrence capabilities of Japan and like- minded countries.

In addition to this, Japan will promote cooperation with organizations inside and outside the Government, including local public authorities, to develop its defense architecture as a whole.

(iii) Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Base as Defense Capabilities Themselves

Japan's defense production and technology base is an indispensable foundation for ensuring stable research and development, production, and procurement of defense equipment in Japan. Therefore, Japan will advance defense production and technology bases because they are characterized as defense capabilities themselves. Specifically, in order to build a strong and sustainable defense industry, Japan will promote various initiatives, including making business projects more attractive and actively leveraging the outcomes of advanced technological research in the public and private sectors for research and development of defense equipment. Japan will also reinforce the system for research and development of new defense equipment and take other measures.

(iv) Promoting Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

Transfer of defense equipment and technology overseas is a key policy instrument to ensure peace and stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force, to create a desirable security environment for Japan, and to provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat of force. From this perspective, the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, its Implementation Guidelines, and other systems are to be considered for revisions in order to promote smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology of high security significance and international joint development in a broad array of fields. In doing so, the necessity, requirements, and transparency of the related procedures for transfer of defense equipment and technology will be under adequate consideration, while maintaining the three principles themselves.

In addition, Japan will carry forward with the transfer of defense equipment and technology in the joint public and private efforts by implementing measures including providing various forms of assistance to smoothly promote such transfers.

(v) Strengthening the Foundation for SDF Personnel to Fulfill Abilities as Core of Defense Capabilities

Japan will solidify the human resource base for the SDF personnel, the core of its defense capabilities, in order for the personnel to further fulfill their abilities. To this end, Japan will work to secure diverse and talented SDF personnel from diverse backgrounds. On top of this, Japan will set in place an organizational environment of zero tolerance for harassment, and foster an environment so that female members can play more active roles. Japan will also improve treatment of SDF personnel, and drive efforts to foster an environment in which all SDF personnel can maintain high morale and fully fulfill their abilities.

(3) Deepening Security Cooperation with the United States

Japan will fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities and deepen security cooperation with the United States. By undertaking such efforts, Japan will further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including extended deterrence by the U.S. that is backed by its full range of capabilities, including nuclear. Particularly, based on constant examinations of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the U.S., for the purpose of strengthening the Alliance's deterrence and response capabilities, Japan will undertake efforts to coordinate bilateral operations including cross-domain operations and the use of Japan's counterstrike capabilities, improve interoperability, deepen cooperation in the cyber, space and other fields, advance equipment and technological cooperation that capitalizes on advanced technologies, carry out more advanced and practical bilateral exercises, conduct joint Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO), conduct joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, and increase joint/shared use of Japanese and U.S. facilities, while further developing coordination functions of such framework as the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM). In doing so, Japan will strengthen the foundations of information security and cybersecurity so that Japan and the U.S. can fully employ their capabilities.

At the same time, while undertaking these efforts, Japan will steadily implement the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, from the viewpoint of mitigating impacts on local communities including Okinawa.

(4) Strengthening Efforts to Seamlessly Protect Japan in All Directions

In the current security environment, the boundaries between military and non-military, peacetime and contingency, have become blurred. Hybrid warfare is taking place, and gray zone situations are constantly arising. Japan will seamlessly protect its national interests by promoting cross- governmental policies in diverse fields, including cyber, maritime and space domains, technology, intelligence, and ensuring the safety of its people at home and abroad.

(i) Improving Response Capabilities in the Field of Cybersecurity

In order to ensure secure and stable use of cyberspace, especially the security of the nation and critical infrastructures, the response capabilities in the field of cybersecurity should be strengthened equal to or surpassing the level of leading Western countries.

Specifically, in order to be able to respond to emerging cyber threats at any time, Japan will first establish a mechanism to continuously assess the information systems of government agencies, to improve measures against cyber threats as necessary, and to constantly manage vulnerabilities of government agencies' information systems. As part of these efforts, the Government will continue to enhance defense

throughout the lifecycle of information systems of government agencies, including those used in the fields of diplomacy, defense, and intelligence, from installation to disposal, while also promoting the development and effective use of human resources inside and outside the Government, by actively adopting cutting-edge concepts and technologies related to cybersecurity at all times.

In addition, Japan will introduce active cyber defense for eliminating in advance the possibility of serious cyberattacks that may cause national security concerns to the Government and critical infrastructures and for preventing the spread of damage in case of such attacks, even if they do not amount to an armed attack. For this purpose, the Government will take further steps to develop information gathering and analysis capabilities in the field of cybersecurity and establish systems to implement active cyber defense. Therefore, the Government will advance efforts to consider to realize necessary measures including the following (a) to (c):

(a) Japan will advance efforts on information sharing to the Government in case of cyberattacks among the private sector including critical infrastructures, as well as coordinating and supporting incident response activities for the private sector.

(b) Japan will take necessary actions to detect servers and others suspected of being abused by attackers by utilizing information on communications services provided by domestic telecommunications providers.

(c) For serious cyberattacks that pose security concerns against the Government, critical infrastructures, and others, the Government will be given the necessary authorities that allow it to penetrate and neutralize attacker's servers and others in advance to the extent possible.

In order to realize and promote these efforts, including active cyber defense, the National center for Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) will be constructively restructured to establish a new organization which will comprehensively coordinate policies in the field of cybersecurity, in a centralized manner. Then, the Government will work on legislation and strengthen operations for the purpose of materializing these new efforts in the field of cybersecurity. These measures will contribute to the reinforcement of a comprehensive defense architecture.

In addition, the Government will improve coordination with other policies that contribute to the enhancement of cybersecurity, such as economic security and the enhancement of technical capabilities related to national security.

Furthermore, the Government will continue to work for the enhancement of information gathering and analysis, attribution and its public announcement, as well as formulation of international frameworks and rules in a coordinated manner with its ally, like- minded countries and others.

(ii) Promoting Maritime Security and Strengthen Maritime Law Enforcement Capabilities

As a maritime nation surrounded by the sea on all sides and blessed with one of the world's most extensive jurisdictional waters, Japan will work with its ally, like-minded countries, and others to promote efforts to ensure the freedoms of navigation and overflight and to ensure safety, as well as maintain and develop the international maritime order based on universal values, including the rule of law. Specifically, Japan will advance multilateral maritime security cooperation by enhancing maritime surveillance to respond to threats in sea lanes, active bilateral drills and exercises with other countries, and overseas port calls. In addition, anti-piracy and intelligence gathering activities will be conducted to ensure the safety of maritime traffic.

While undertaking international cooperation in these areas, Japan will ensure freedoms of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea and other waters, promote peaceful settlement of disputes based on international law, strengthen relations with those coastal states along the sea lanes, and actively utilize the Arctic sea routes. Furthermore, Japan will continue to actively utilize the SDF facility in Djibouti in order to secure stable use of the sea lane.

The role played by the JCG, Japan's maritime law enforcement agency, is essential to its national security. In order to ensure the security of Japan's territory, including the areas surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and to respond effectively in the event of multiple major incidents, Japan's maritime law enforcement capabilities will be significantly reinforced, in conjunction with efforts to strengthen its organization. Specifically, in accordance with the new policy on strengthening maritime law enforcement capabilities, the JCG will promptly increase assets and introduce new technologies, secure sufficient operational expenses, renew degraded vessels, and secure and train personnel.

In addition, the coordination and cooperation between the JCG and the SDF will be consistently strengthened, including the Minister of Defense's control over the JCG in the event of an emergency.

Furthermore, international coordination and cooperation with maritime law enforcement agencies in the United States, Southeast Asian countries, and other countries will be carried forward.

(iii) Reinforcing Comprehensive Efforts for Space Security

To ensure safe and stable utilization of space, which is indispensable for economic and social activities, Japan will strengthen its response capabilities in the field of space security. Specifically, while promoting the use of the space domain by the SDF, JCG and others, Japan will drive forward measures to capitalize on Japan's overall space-related capabilities in the field of security, such as strengthening cooperation between the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and the SDF.

In addition, Japan will set up a framework for the Government's decision-making in unforeseeable circumstances, strengthen mechanisms for understanding the space domain, promote measures to address the issue of space debris, expand the development of capabilities to hinder command and control as well as information and communications at the other end, and Japan will enhance cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries, and others, including on the formulation of international codes of conduct.

Furthermore, Japan will utilize its civilian space technology in its national defense by supporting

and fostering Japan's space industry, including the construction of satellite constellations, thereby realizing a virtuous cycle to further encourage the development of its space industry

In order to put the agenda and policies in the field of space security into practice, Japan will put together the Government's concept and reflect it in the Basic Plan on Space Policy and other relevant documents.

(iv) Enhancing Public-private Partnerships for Improving Technical Capabilities and Proactively Capitalizing on Outcomes of Research and Development in the Security Field

Cutting-edge science and technology are advancing at an accelerated pace, and it has become extremely difficult in practice to distinguish between technologies for civilian use and for security purposes. Against this backdrop, in order to widely and actively utilize Japan's advanced technological capabilities in the public and private sectors for security purposes, Japan will strengthen the system to improve technological capabilities of the public and private sectors that can be used for security purposes, to utilize, in a whole-of-government manner, funds and information related to research and development. Specifically, for the purpose of promoting research and development of science and technology that contributes to the enhancement of the comprehensive defense architecture, a whole-of-government mechanism will be established to match research and development needs based on the views of the Ministry of Defense with the appropriate technological seeds possessed by relevant ministries and agencies, in addition to implementing these projects. On top of that, Japan will promote active utilization of funds and outcomes related to government-wide R&D, including the Key and Advanced Technology R&D through Cross Community Collaboration Program, for the security sector.

Japan will also work to further strengthen assistance for gathering information, development, and training in the area of cutting-edge and critical technologies and to put in place arrangements.

In order to promote private-sector innovation and to actively utilize the results of such innovation in the security field, Japan will promote the participation of a wide range of leading-edge researchers including those in the academia, while obtaining understanding and cooperation of all parties concerned. Japan will also work across the Government to foster an environment in which the defense industry can fully harness the opportunities offered by other private sector innovations.

(v) Strengthening Intelligence Capacities for Japan's National Security

Japan will reinforce its arrangements and capabilities in the field of intelligence, which is closely related to the maintenance of a sound democracy, smooth decision-making by the Government, and effective external communications. Specifically, in order to strengthen Japan's ability to analyze global trends from a broad, accurate, and multifaceted perspective across diplomatic, military, and economic spheres, Japan will significantly enhance its information-gathering capabilities from various information sources, including human intelligence, open source intelligence, signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence. In particular, with regard to human intelligence, the structure for collecting information will be enhanced and strengthened.

As for imagery intelligence, the functions of information gathering satellites will be expanded and enhanced, and collected information will be utilized more effectively by strengthening the cooperation and coordination between the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center and the Ministry of Defense as well as the SDF. In addition, a mechanism will be established to aggregate information in an integrated manner, and the coordination between the policy and intelligence departments will be enhanced. At intelligence departments, intelligence analysis capabilities will be strengthened to provide high-value-added analysis results to policy making departments through comprehensive analysis (all-source analysis) utilizing all of the intelligence means possessed by the Government, including the use of new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI).

Also, while taking into account the discussions on the establishment of a new security clearance system in the economic security field, the arrangement for information security will be further solidified.

In addition, from the perspective of bolstering the ability to respond to information warfare in the cognitive domain, including spread of disinformation, a new structure will be established within the Government to aggregate and analyze information on disinformation and others originated abroad, to strengthen external communications, and to enhance cooperation with non-governmental agencies. Furthermore, strategic communication will be actively implemented in a coordinated manner within the Government.

Japan will also promptly consider effective measures by both public and private sectors to prevent the misuse of geospatial information in the security area.

(vi) Reinforcing Response Capabilities within Japan with Contingencies in Mind

In preparation for a direct threat to Japan, Japan will enhance response capabilities in wide ranging areas at home. Specifically, as part of the reinforcementof the comprehensive defense architecture, Japan will establish a cross-governmental mechanism to develop and enhance the functions of public infrastructures such as airports and seaports based on the needs of the SDF and the JCG for their smooth utilization and deployment in response to protection of its nationals, peacetime training, and deployment during contingencies. At the same time, rules will be established for ordinary utilization of airports and seaports with a view to responding to contingencies. These efforts will be promoted in cooperation with local municipalities and residents.

To ensure the smooth activities of the SDF and U.S. forces, and others, measures will be taken to develop arrangements for transportation and storage of SDF ammunition and fuel, coordinate with related parties and organizations regarding use of civilian facilities by the SDF and U.S. forces, ensure secure and flexible use of radio waves, and ensure that SDF facilities and activities be not negatively impacted by civilian facilities.

Regarding measures to secure critical infrastructures, which are closely linked to sustaining the daily livelihoods, such as nuclear power plants, and measures against illegal landing on remote border islands, Japan will make efforts to seamlessly respond to crises in various forms and stages that do not amount to armed attacks, in addition to armed attack situations. For that purpose, the SDF, Police, the JCG, and others will establish a coordination framework and strengthen their response capabilities by enhancing the equipment, systems, and training, in order to seamlessly respond to crises in various forms and stages that do not amount to armed attacks, in addition to armed attack situations.

(vii) Reinforcing Mechanisms for the Protection of Japanese Nationals

Japan will reinforce a mechanism for the protection of Japanese nationals through, for instance, efforts to protect residents, in cooperation of the Government, local municipalities, and designated public institutions. Specifically, for the purpose of achieving prompt evacuation of residents, including those in the Southwest region well in advance of an armed attack, Japan will take measures such as formulating a plan for smooth evacuation as soon as possible, securing the means of transportation of the public and private sectors, developing and coordinating the use of airports, seaports, and other public infrastructures, securing various types of evacuation facilities, and working with international organizations.

In order to enhance the efficacy of these efforts, Japan will also consider the necessary policies, including structural arrangements through promoting coordination among the Government, local municipalities, and designated public institutions, after conducting and assessing drills for the evacuation of residents.

Furthermore, while consistently tackling the enhancement of the information transmission function of J-ALERT, the Government will work to share information and raise public awareness on evacuation activities in preparation for emergencies concerning ballistic missiles.

(viii) Reinforcing Architecture and Measures for the Protection of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas

Japan will reinforce arrangements and measures to protect Japanese nationals and others overseas from threats such as conflicts, natural disasters, infectious diseases and terrorism. Specifically, efforts will be made to take measures, including for raising awareness of Japanese nationals overseas on safety measures from peace time, providing safety information in a timely manner, ensuring means of evacuation, and strengthening cooperation with related countries.

In this context, consular services at Japanese embassies and consulates, which serve as the most critical hub for protection of Japanese nationals overseas, will be strengthened in terms of structure and capabilities. At the same time, the SDF and other assets will be promptly mobilized for evacuating Japanese nationals and others overseas, when necessary and feasible. To this end, cooperation among relevant ministries and agencies will be enhanced.

Furthermore, while gaining understanding from the Government of Djibouti, the SDF facility there, which has been in operation for counter-piracy activities, will be also utilized for the protection of Japanese nationals and others overseas.

(ix) Securing Resources Essential for Japan's National Security including Energy and Food

From the perspective of ensuring smooth economic and social activities in Japan and abroad, as well as the ability to sustainably respond in the event of an emergency, the Government will promote policies to secure resources essential for Japan's national security, such as energy security and food security, which form the basis of its people's lives and social and economic activities.

To ensure energy security, in addition to advancing ties with resource-rich countries, diversifying supply sources, and enhancing procurement risk assessment and other methods, Japan will maximize the use of energy sources that contribute to its energy self- sufficiency, such as renewable energy and nuclear power, and will strategically develop and solidify energy sources for this purpose. In cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries, and international organizations, Japan will drive forward measures to improve Japan's energy self-sufficiency ratio and build a robust energy supply system that can withstand contingencies.

With regard to food security, the situation surrounding the supply and demand of food and trade worldwide is unstable and uncertain. As Japan depends largely on imports of food and production materials from overseas, the risks associated with Japan's food security are manifesting themselves. Therefore, transforming the structure of its food supply is key. Specifically, Japan will produce at home what can be produced here in Japan to the extent possible and work to secure domestic production of items and materials that highly dependent on foreign countries, in conjunction with ensuring stable imports and appropriate supplying of national stockpiles. In pursuit of this, Japan will expand the production of grains, ramp up the production of feed, amplify the use of domestic resources such as compost, and then appropriately carry out measures to ensure stable imports and the national stockpiles of items that are difficult to procure at home, so that Japan can ensure stable food supply to our people and bolster Japan's food security.

With a view to responding to global food security crises, Japan will improve the international environment for food supply, improve food production, and provide support to vulnerable countries, in cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries, and international organizations.

(5) Promoting Economic Security Policies to Achieve Autonomous Economic Prosperity

Economic security is to ensure Japan's national interests, such as peace, security, and economic prosperity, by carrying out economic measures. In the face of various threats at hand through economic means, Japan will coordinate ideas on necessary economic measures and execute these measures comprehensively, effectively and intensively to enhance Japan's self-reliance and to secure the advantage and indispensability concerning our technologies and others.

Specifically, Japan will reinforce its mechanisms for promoting economic security policies, and work with its ally and like-minded countries, as well as in cooperation with the private sector, to take measures including those indicated

below. Japan will consistently consider and revisit these measures, and in particular, continuously assess the risks that exist in each industry, and implement other necessary security measures in a whole-of-government manner.

(i) Japan will steadily implement and constantly review the Economic Security Promotion Act (Law No. 43, 2022.hereinafter referred to as the "Promotion Act"), and further reinforce efforts in this regard.

(ii) With regard to supply chain resilience, Japan will curb excessive dependence on specific countries, carry forward next-generation semiconductor development and manufacturing bases, secure stable supply for critical goods including rare earth, and promote capital reinforcement of private enterprises with critical goods and technologies, and strengthen the function of policy-based finance, in pursuit of protecting and nurturing critical goods.

(iii) Japan will consider reviewing government procurement procedures, including those by local municipalities, as well as expanding the scope of the prior screening system under the Promotion Act, with regard to the critical infrastructure field.

(iv) With regard to data and information protection, Japan will carry out additional measures to ensure more appropriate management of sensitive data and safety and reliability of information and communication technology services. In addition, keeping in mind information security practices of leading countries and needs of the industries, examinations will be made to bolster Japan's information security, including security clearance.

(v) For the purpose of fostering and preserving technology and other purposes, Japan will proceed with specific considerations in further stepping up support and developing systems for information gathering, development, and fostering of advanced critical technologies, taking on additional measures to enhance investment screening and export control as well as response to forced technology transfer, and further advancing research integrity and measures against talent drain.

(vi) Japan will promote effective efforts against economic coercion by foreign countries.

(6) Maintaining and Strengthening International Economic Order based on Free, Fair, and Equitable Rules

Japan will maintain and strengthen an open and stable international economic order by preventing non-military pressure by certain states aimed at impeding independent national foreign policy decision-making and sound economic development. Specifically, while maintaining and strengthening the multilateral trading system with the World Trade Organization (WTO) at its core, Japan will enhance its own measures to counter against unfair trade practices and economic coercion, including through working to solidify international norms in cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries.

In addition, in order to achieve the development of economic order and sustainable and inclusive economic growth in the Indo-Pacific region and extend the free and fair economic order, we will maintain the high standards of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), ensure the full implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement, and materialize other economic partnership agreement negotiations and the Indo- Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF).

Furthermore, Japan will pursue implementing mutually beneficial economic cooperation as well as maintaining and strengthening international frameworks and rules. To be specific, in order to avoid situations where recipient countries fall into "debt traps" due to opaque forms of assistance to developing countries by some states and others, Japan will spearhead global efforts to ensure that states and institutions comply with international rules and standards and carry out development finance in a transparent and fair manner.

In addition, Japan will provide capacity-building support for developing countries to enhance their self-reliance and present attractive options for the economic development of developing countries, including support in coordination with its ally and like-minded countries and development finance institutions.

(7) Global Efforts for Coexistence and Coprosperity in the International Community

Japan's national security can only be fulfilled through the peace and stability of the international community. In order to achieve coexistence and coprosperity with the international community, Japan will cooperate with the international community in ways commensurate with its international standing, economic capabilities, and technological capabilities.

(i) Promote Multilateral Cooperation and Strengthen Ties with International Organizations and Frameworks Japan has built relationships of trust with many countries, regardless of differences in political and economic systems, through various forms of cooperation. On this basis, through multilateral diplomacy, Japan will strive to realize the goals it attaches importance to and cooperate with the international community for coexistence and coprosperity by engaging in tailored communications with these countries and strengthening cooperation with the United Nations and other international organizations.

In particular, the UN plays a role in a wide range of fields, including conflict management, humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, protection and promotion of human rights, climate change, food crisis, natural disasters, and refugee issues, and Japan will strengthen cooperation with the UN and countries surrounding the UN to further promote multilateral cooperation. At the same time, given that the UN Security Council does not function adequately when a permanent member is a party to a dispute, and that other inherent limitations of the UN are becoming apparent, we will lead efforts to strengthen the functions of the UN, including reform of the UN Security Council.

In addition, Japan will advance efforts to enable Japanese nationals to play an even more active role as staff in the UN and other international organizations.

(ii) Efforts to Address Global Challenges

The Sustainable Development Goals ("SDGs"), adopted by the UN in September 2015 are goals for the international community as a whole to address global challenges in an integrated manner, including peace, the rule of law, and human rights, with no one being left behind. Rather than addressing each goal individually, Japan will contribute to the achievement of the SDGs by taking on and preventing complex interrelated risks based on the concept of human security.

In addition, with regard to global issues such as climate change, infectious diseases, energy, food problems, and the environment, which have a direct or indirect impact on Japan's national security, Japan will expand the circle of cooperation not only to include its ally and like-minded countries, but also many other countries and organizations, and then enhance international efforts.

Fully recognizing that global health, including measures against infectious diseases, is an important issue for the international community, encompassing not only economic and social risks but also major national security risks, Japan will cooperate with its ally and like-minded countries as well as international organizations and other relevant partners to take all possible measures to prevent, prepare for, and respond to future infectious disease crises on a regular basis, based on its experience in responding to COVID-19. In doing so, Japan, in cooperation with its ally and like-minded countries as well as with international organizations and other relevant partners, will steadfastly deliver medical care at home, and secure infectious disease control supplies including medicines from the early stages of infection crises, and undertake efforts to advance the ability to respond to infectious diseases based on scientific knowledge. The Government will also work to reinforce its own function of serving as the control tower in response to infectious disease crises. Furthermore, Japan will strive to advance health systems and relevant international frameworks that contribute to the enhancement of response capabilities of infectious diseases in developing countries.

In addition, the Government will actively promote global efforts in realizing more resilient, equitable and sustainable universal health coverage (UHC).

Additionally, in order to appropriately respond to the rapidly growing needs for humanitarian assistance around the world in recent years, Japan will step up efforts necessary to provide humanitarian assistance promptly and on a sufficient scale. Furthermore, Japan will actively accept displaced people due to war or natural disasters in foreign countries.

The protection of human rights is the fundamental responsibility of each and every country. Japan will raise its voice against serious human rights violations and continue to build on dialogue and cooperation with various countries for the sake of the protection and promotion of human rights.

Given the vulnerable position of women in conflict, Japan will spearhead international efforts to promote the protection and redress of women's human rights. Japan will also undertake efforts around the globe to achieve gender equality and promote women's empowerment in all areas.

The international peace cooperation, including peacekeeping operations (PKO) that Japan has long contributed in order to promote peace and stability in the international community, fosters cooperation with other Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), and helps to develop Japan's human resources. Therefore, Japan will continue to actively engage in various forms of cooperation including dispatch of personnel and strategic use of capacity building assistance.

VII Domestic Base that should be Strengthened to Support Japan's National Security

1. Strengthening the Economic and Fiscal Bases

Japan will achieve a virtuous cycle of security and economic growth, in which economic growth promotes further improvements in Japan's national security while ensuring a security environment in which its economy can grow.

Japan will also ensure sustainable response capabilities in the event of contingencies across a broad array of sectors. To this end, Japan will promote cooperation between the public and private sectors to secure energy, food, and other resources, develop infrastructure, and build stable supply chains for parts and other items essential for security.

Furthermore, as Japan's economy is highly dependent on foreign countries, Japan has critical importance in maintaining the confidence of international markets and having adequate fiscal capacity to secure the necessary funds to meet a substantial increase in fiscal demand associated with securing resources and defense equipment in the event of contingency. Thus, Japan will work consistently to reinforce the economic, monetary, and fiscal bases which serve as the foundation of Japan's national security. This is a premise for Japan's continuous and stable national security policy including fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities.

2. Reinforcing the Social Base

Japan will consistently engage in efforts to deepen the understanding of and cooperation on national security among the people of Japan and organizations, inside and outside the Government, including local municipalities and corporate enterprises. Japan will also pay respect to other countries and their citizens, and foster love for its own country and homeland. In addition, Japan will further promote efforts to ensure that activities of the members of SDF and JCG, police officers, and others who dedicate themselves to hazardous duties for the peace and security of Japan be appropriately appreciated across its society. Furthermore, measures will be taken to ensure understanding and cooperation of residents living near security-related facilities, which form the basis for the activities of these personnel.

In addition, Japan will redouble efforts to put forward information at home and abroad on matters that concern both the public and private sectors, such as issues related to its territory and sovereignty, protection of its nationals, and cyberattacks, and to broaden understanding of the current activities of the SDF and U.S. Forces in Japan.

Furthermore, Japan will improve public and private sector mechanisms and response capabilities in preparation for the next infectious disease crisis, and promote measures for disaster prevention and mitigation in advance.

3. Enhancing the Intellectual Base

The importance of information and technology in the field of national security is on the rise, and ensuring an intellectual base that generates such information and technology is essential to improving security. From this perspective, Japan will promote measures to foster practical cooperation among the Government, business community and academia in the security field, to drive forward information sharing between the public and private sectors for encouraging measured and accurate responses to national security issues, such as the spread of disinformation and cyberattacks, and to step up cooperation between the public and private sectors to facilitate effective communication of Japan's security policy at home and abroad.

VIII Duration, Evaluation, and Revision of the Strategy

The National Security Strategy will fulfill its complete purpose only when its contents are to be executed. Measures based on the Strategy will be strategically and sustainably implemented in a timely and appropriate manner under the National Security Council which serves as the control tower for national security. Furthermore, the National Security Council will regularly and systematically evaluate the security environment and execution of measures based on this document. The Strategy will be executed approximately over the coming decade. Should Japan expect any significant changes including in the security environments, it will make necessary revisions.

IX Conclusion

At this time of an inflection point in history, Japan is finding itself in the midst of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII. In no way can we be optimistic about what the future of the international community will bring.

However, the world which we have built will continue to be able to nurture economic prosperity thanks to vibrant trade and investment, innovation from global interactions of diverse talents, and new and attractive cultures. We should hold on to these hopes.

We are now standing at the crossroads of ushering in either a world of hope or a world of adversity and distrust. This very choice will depend on the actions of the international community in the time ahead, including Japan. Japan will ensure its security on the basis of comprehensive national power in areas where the international community is in confrontation. In areas where the international community should engage in cooperation, by contrast, we will continue to fulfill a leading and constructive role in resolving a broad array of issues. Japan's action in this way worldwide will further enhance its presence and credibility in the international arena and expand the circle of like-minded countries and others, thereby leading to improve the security environment surrounding Japan.

Even standing at this crossroads between a world of hope and a world of adversity and distrust amidst the most severe and complex post-war security environment, Japan, blessed with a stable democracy, the established rule of law, a mature economy, and rich culture, will advocate policies grounded in universal values and then lead the way in undertaking efforts to reinforce the international order with steadfast resolve.

Reference 3 National Defense Strategy

(December 16, 2022)

I Objectives of National Defense Strategy

The most consequential responsibility of the Government of Japan is to resolutely defend to the end the lives of Japanese nationals and their peaceful livelihood as well as Japan's territorial land, waters and airspace and it is the very heart of Japan's national security.

Since the end of World War II (WWII), in the face of the Cold War as well as the dramatic changes in the security environment that ensued its ending, Japan has preserved peace and security for 77 years by: enhancing its diplomatic strength and defense capability and expanding and deepening cooperation with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being the key pillar. In so doing, adhering under the Constitution to the basic precepts of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses threats to other countries, Japan has ensured civilian control of the military and observed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Japan under these basic precepts will not ever change the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation.

As Russia's aggression against Ukraine attests, the international community, of which Japan is a member, is facing serious challenges, and has entered into a new crisis. China continues to advance its unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. North Korea escalates its activities as it launches ballistic missiles at an unprecedented high frequency, and pursues further miniaturization of its nuclear weapons. Russia has launched an aggression against Ukraine while its military activities in the Far East have been trending upward. Given the foregoing, in the future one cannot rule out the possibility of serious events taking place in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in East Asia, that might shake the foundation of the stable post-war international order. As Japan is situated on the very frontline of these trends, it is no exaggeration to say the future shape of Japan's security and defense policy has a direct link to the peace and stability of the region and the international community.

The fact that Russia, a permanent member of the United Nation Security Council (hereinafter referred to as the "UNSC"), has launched an aggression against Ukraine, tells us that maintaining Japan's own sovereignty and independence can be achieved through its own independent and voluntary efforts, and that it is important to expand the role Japan can play to avoid inviting foreign aggression. In today's circumstance, no country can now protect its own security alone. As challenges to the post- war international order continue, it is critical for Japan to deepen cooperation and collaboration with its ally and like-minded countries with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests. For this cooperation and collaboration to produce meaningful results, Japan must strengthen its own efforts more than ever before, and our ally, like-minded countries and others also expect Japan to play a role commensurate with its national strength. Japan, its ally, like-minded countries and others are called upon to not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts through further synergistic effects from common efforts.

Amid the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII, Japan needs to squarely face the grim reality and fundamentally reinforce Japan's defense capabilities, with a focus on opponent capabilities and new ways of warfare, to protect the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals.

Japan also needs to strengthen Japan's architecture for national defense that integrates various elements of national power. Thinking strategically, Japan should promote these two lines of effort as a coherent whole. It is this undertaking that provides the way forward to bolster Japan's deterrence capabilities and further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and which forms the foundation of security cooperation with like-minded countries and others.

The United States this year devised a new National Defense Strategy. It is therefore timely for Japan and the United States to align their respective strategies and promote defense cooperation in an integrated manner.

Based on this recognition, the Government hereby finalizes the National Defense Strategy (hereinafter referred to as "NDS") to comprehensively present Japan's defense objectives, approaches and means by which Japan accomplishes those objectives. The NDS replaces the National Defense Program Guidelines (hereinafter referred to as "NDPG"), which have served as Japan's basic guidelines for development, sustainment and operation of defense capability with the Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as "SDF") as its core and formulated six times since 1976.

The policies concerning the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and the levels of defense buildup that underpin it, which have been decided by the Government through the NDS and "Defense Buildup Program" ("DBP," approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 16, 2022), represent a major turning point for post-war defense policy. By formulating this Strategy, which provides mid-to long- term directions and a breakdown of the reinforcement of defense capabilities, the Government will make efforts to deepen the Japanese public's understanding about the significance of this major turning point.

II Changes in the Strategic Environment and Defense Challenges

1 Changes in the strategic environment

Following the development of information society and the expansion of international trade, economic and culture interactions among states further expand and deepen. On the other hand, states that do not share universal values or political and economic systems based on these values are expanding their influence. Unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts represent significant challenges to the free and open international order underpinned by the rule of law. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has revealed this in a most blatant way. The international community is facing the greatest post-war trial yet, and has entered a new era of crisis.

In addition, the global power balance has significantly changed and interstate competition across the political, economy and military spheres is emerging. Such trends are especially notable in the Indo-Pacific region, where China has been continuing and amplifying its unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts. Not only China but also North Korea and Russia have further intensified their activities.

As the interstate competition between China and the United States in particular is expected to further intensify in various fields, the United States has presented a view that the next ten years will be the decisive decade for its competition with China.

Rapid advances in science and technology are fundamentally changing the paradigm of security. Countries are striving to develop cutting-edge technologies that could dramatically alter the character of warfare and thus prove to become "game changers." China in particular has been rapidly promoting accelerated technological innovation and its application for military purposes under the name of the "military-civilian integration strategy": China is notably accelerating military capability development premised on unmanned assets that leverage artificial intelligence (AI). These trends are resulting in fundamental changes to the way the military is organized as well as the way warfare is prosecuted. In addition, there exist a range of global security challenges such as increasingly serious risks in cyber and other domains, the expansion

of information warfare including the spread of disinformation, and climate change.

2 Military trends of Japan's neighboring countries and regions

In the report to the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2017 (hereinafter referred to as "NCCPC"), China sets the goals of "basically completing modernization of national defense and the military" by 2035 and building "a world-class forces" by the middle of this century. And in the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Communist Party of China Central Committee in 2020, the achievement of "the centenary goal of the People's Liberation Army" by 2027 was added as a target. In a report to the NCCPC in 2022, it was newly stated that elevating the People's Liberation Army to a "world-class standards" at an early stage is a strategic task for fully building "a modern socialist country." With these goals in mind, China calls for a "new system for mobilizing resources nationwide," promotes integrated development of "mechanization, informatization and the application of smart technologies" and thereby extensively and rapidly enhancing its military capability in a qualitative and quantitative manner. China defines the next five years as the crucial period to start the full- scale construction of a "modern socialist country."

China's published national defense expenditures exceeded Japan's defense-related expenditures for the first time in Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 and has since increased at a rapid pace, reaching in FY2022 approximately 4.8 times of Japan's defense-related expenditure. China's published national defense expenditures are assessed to represent only a portion of actual amount spent for military purposes. Supported by the rapid growth of defense expenditures, China now possesses modern naval and air assets in larger numbers than does Japan. China is strengthening its capabilities in new domains including the space and cyber. Regarding nuclear forces, it appears highly likely that China intends to possess at least 1,000 deliverable nuclear warheads by the end of the 2020s. With respect to missile forces, China, a non-signatory to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, has deployed numerous surface-launched intermediate- range missiles, which the INF Treaty covered. China is also operationalizing anti-ship ballistic missiles and long-range land- attack cruise missiles, and developing and deploying hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV). These efforts are aimed at improving military capabilities to deny foreign military's access to, and deployment in, China's surrounding areas as well as to impede foreign military activities in those areas (the so-called anti- access/area-denial, or "A2/AD" capability). China also continues to develop and deploy unmanned assets. Increased activities of unmanned assets have been confirmed in Japan's surrounding areas.

Backed by these military capabilities, China has been intensifying its activities across the entire region surrounding Japan, including in the East China Sea, particularly in the areas around the Senkaku Islands, the Sea of Japan, and the western Pacific Ocean including areas around the Izu and Ogasawara Islands, extending beyond the so-called first island chain to the second island chain. China is increasing military pressure on Taiwan. In the South China Sea, it continues to entrench its military foothold.

Chinese naval ships are intensifying their activities in waters around the Senkaku Islands. Under such circumstances, China Coast Guard ships repeatedly make intrusion into Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. Chinese navy vessels have been seen navigating in Japan's territorial waters and contiguous zones around Japan's southwestern islands.

Regarding Taiwan, the report to NCCPC in 2022 reiterated that China "will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force." At the same time, the report also stated that "we have thus maintained the initiative and the ability to steer in cross-Strait relations," and "complete reunification of our country must be realized, and it can, without doubt, be realized." In recent years, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is rapidly tilting in China's favor, and China has been intensifying military activities around Taiwan. It is believed that through the series of activities around Taiwan, China seeks to create a fait accompli where Chinese military is continuously operating, and improve its actual combat capabilities. Moreover, China has launched nine ballistic missiles in August 4, 2022, five of which landed within Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This was perceived as a threat to local residents. China thus has intensified its coercive military activities around Taiwan, and concerns about the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait are rapidly growing not only in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan but also in the entire international community.

China's current external stance, military activities, and other activities have become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community, as well as in strengthening the international order based on the rule of law, to which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power including defense capabilities and in cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others.

In order to maintain its regime, North Korea has concentrated its efforts on enhancing its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles. It is assessed that North Korea already possesses the technological capabilities to mount a nuclear warhead on its ballistic missiles, whose range includes Japan and is able to attack Japan with such a missile. Regarding ballistic missiles, a delivery means of WMDs, North Korea is rapidly improving its related technologies and operational capabilities by, for example, diversifying launch modes. In particular, North Korea in recent years has been seemingly aiming to complicate indication and warning, detection, and interception of its missiles, by pursuing the operationalization of ballistic missiles that can fly at low altitudes with irregular trajectories as well as by launching these missiles from various platforms such as Transporter- Erector-Launchers (TEL), submarines and trains. North Korea appears to be advancing its research and development setting its priorities to attain "hypersonic gliding flight warheads" and "solid fuel-propelled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)" with a range covering the U.S. mainland among other things, which renews concerns over its future technological advancements. These nuclear and missile developments and others by North Korea violate a series of UNSC resolutions and others, and significantly undermine the peace, stability and security of the region and the international community. North Korea's military activities pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan's national security than ever before.

Russia's aggression against Ukraine has shaken the very foundation of the international order and is perceived as the most significant and direct threat to defense in the European region. As for the areas surrounding Japan, the Russian forces are also accelerating their military activities including through the deployment of newer-model equipment and implementation of large-scale military exercises in the Far East region including the Northern Territories. In recent years, Russia has ramped up its military coordination with China by conducting activities such as joint navigation of their naval vessels and joint flights of their bombers. Russia's military activities in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, together with its strategic coordination with China, are of strong concern from a

defense perspective.

In case that these activities are conducted simultaneously in the Indo-Pacific region, it would be necessary to take a close look at what implication they would have for the region.

3 Defense challenges

An unprecedented situation is unfolding: Russia, a permanent member of the UNSC and a nuclear weapon state that bears primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and stability, has launched an outright aggression against Ukraine, repeatedly taken actions and sent messages that can be interpreted as threat of nuclear weapons use. This is an event that shakes the very foundation of the international order that the international community has built since the end of WWII. Such unilateral change to the status quo by force that is occurring in Europe could also occur in the Indo-Pacific region.

The military background for Russia's aggression against Ukraine was that Ukraine's defense capability against Russia was insufficient, thus failing to discourage and deter Russian aggression. Ukraine did not possess sufficient capabilities.

Also, while no country can defend its own security by itself alone, there is a renewed recognition of the importance of cooperation with allies who have the intention and capability to respond to invasions jointly to deter invasions from outside.

Also worth paying attention to in this event is that a country with strong military capability has one day come to possess the intention to launch an aggression. A threat materializes when the capability to inflict harm is combined with the intention to do so. Accurately gauging other's intent from outside is inherently difficult. When a state's decision-making process is opaque, there always exists conditions under which threat may materialize.

To protect one's own country from such states, it is necessary to have deterrence capability, thereby making said states realize that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are difficult. itisalsonecessaryto build one's own capability, that is defense capability focusing on opponent capabilities, to discourage opponents from harboring the intention to launch an aggression.

The way of warfare has also drastically changed. In addition to the traditional forms of invasion through air, sea, and land, new ways of warfare have emerged with the combination of massive missile strike by ballistic and cruise missiles with enhanced precision strike capabilities, hybrid warfare including information warfare such as false-flag operations, asymmetric attacks leveraging the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains and with unmanned assets, and public remarks by nuclear powers that could be interpreted as threat using nuclear weapons. Whether or not to be able to respond to these new ways of warfare is a major challenge in building future defense capabilities.

Surrounded by seas and with long coastlines, Japan possesses numerous islands remote from the mainland and is endowed with a vast EEZ and continental shelves: spread widely therein are the life, person, and property of the Japanese nationals, as well as its territory, territorial waters, airspace, and various natural resources, all of which Japan must defend to the end. For Japan, a maritime nation that depends on overseas trade for the majority of its resources and food, it is essential to reinforce the free and open maritime order as well as to ensure the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight.

Japan is prone to natural disasters that exact heavy damage. Industry, population, and information centers concentrate in urban areas and many critical facilities such as nuclear power plants are located in coastal areas. Protecting Japanese nationals and critical infrastructures from various threats is among Japan's security challenges.

Japan is undergoing rapid population decline and ageing with declining birth rates. Tight fiscal conditions linger. It is essential that Japan make more efficient use of budget and labor force.

III Japan's Basic Defense Policy

Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor for ensuring Japan's security. It will deter threats from extending to Japan, and in the case that a threat does reach Japan, it will be disrupted and defeated, thereby demonstrating Japan's resolve and capability to defend itself to the end.

Since the end of WWII, Japan has consistently committed to modest and efficient development of its defense capabilities. In particular, since the formulation of the NDPG in 1976 (approved by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet on October 29, 1976), the purpose of Japan's possessing its own defense capability had been presented as, rather than to counter specific threats, to avoid Japan's becoming a power vacuum and thus a destabilizing factor in the region surrounding Japan.

After the end of the Cold War, SDF's roles and missions have expanded to cover various situations including domestic and international large-scale disaster responses and International Peace Cooperation Activities. The 2010 NDPG (approved by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010) stated that defense capability development will no longer depend on the "Basic Defense Force Concept," which placed importance on the deterrence effect form the existence of defense capability itself. The subsequent 2013 NDPG (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) called to squarely face the reality of increasingly severe security environment and to build a truly effective defense capability. Meanwhile, Japan's neighboring countries have drastically strengthened their military capabilities, and rapidly expanded and intensified missile launches and coercive military activities, threatening the security of Japan and the region.

As these activities escalate, it is extremely difficult to predict when and how intentions will change and unilateral changes to the status quo by force will occur. It is clear from Russia's aggression against Ukraine that a unilateral change to the status quo by force causes massive human and material damage, with disruption in economy, finance, energy as well as maritime and air traffic felt not only regionally but also globally, seriously affecting people's daily lives.

To account for the foregoing, Japan must clearly demonstrate the intention that Japan will never tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts. To this end, Japan must: fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities with a focus on opponents' capabilities and the ways they prosecute warfare. and, actively adapt to new ways of warfare. Japan cannot engage in these efforts alone: Japan needs close cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others. This strategy thus intends to clearly define Japan's defense objectives and present approaches and specific means to achieve those objectives, thereby ensuring all efforts will be made in an integrated manner.

-Japan's defense objectives are as follows:

The first objective is to shape a security environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force. The second objective is to deter, through cooperation with our ally, like-minded countries and others, unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts that concern Japan's peace and security. Should such an eventuality occur, our objective is to swiftly respond in whatever ways and bring the situation under control at an early stage so that the situation would not lead to invasion of Japan.

The third objective is, should deterrence fail and invasion of

Japan occur, to rapidly respond to the invasion in a tailored and seamless manner; to take primary responsibility to deal with the aggression. and, while receiving support from the ally and others, to disrupt and defeat the invasion.

In dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons, U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential. Japan will defend itself to the end in all situations through the combination of its own efforts to achieve the first, second and third defense objectives and extended deterrence and others provided by the United States.

-Approaches to realize Japan's defense objectives are as follows. Specific means will be presented later in the description of respective approaches:

The first approach is, in an effort of strengthening of Japan's own architecture for national defense, to fundamentally reinforce Japan's defense capabilities, which constitute the core of national defense, and to reinforce the defense architecture of the whole country.

The second approach is to further reinforce joint deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by further strengthening cooperation with the United States, our ally. The third approach is to reinforce collaboration with like- minded countries and others with whom Japan cooperate to uphold and reinforce a free and open international order.

1 Strengthening Japan's own architecture for national defense

It goes without saying that the success of Japan's national defense depends on its own efforts. Only when a country musters strong will and efforts to defend itself can it protect and support itself and its allies, etc., in times of emergency. The first approach therefore is to make renewed efforts to strengthen Japan's own architecture for national defense that integrates all aspects of national power. At the core of such efforts is the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities.

(1) Fundamental reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities

Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of Japan's security. Japan has aimed to build a defense capability that can respond to and deter a range of possible situations in a truly effective manner. More specifically, in accordance with the "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond" (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 18, 2018), Japan, in order to operate seamlessly across all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies, has striven to build the Multi-Domain Defense Force, which organically fuses capabilities in space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum with those in ground, maritime and air domains and is capable of sustained and flexible activities through joint operations.

As the international community finds itself in the most challenging time since the end of WWII, Japan has explored the shape of future defense capability, considering the opponent's capabilities as well as new ways of warfare, performing various analyses, including capability assessment, regarding responses to various possible situations. Building upon these efforts, to continue to protect the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals from unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts, Japan will fundamentally reinforce the current Multi-Domain Defense Force through further accelerated efforts.

The basic thoughts that underpin our efforts to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities are as follows:

a. First, with a fundamentally reinforced defense capability, Japan should be able to take primary responsibility to disrupt and defeat invasion against Japan. This means that Japan will possess a capability that makes the opponent realize that the goal of invasion of Japan is not achievable by military means, and that the damage the opponent will incur makes the invasion not worth the cost. In addition, if Japan possesses a defense capability to enable disrupting and defeating invasion, this capability, coupled with that of the United States, Japan's ally, will be able to deter not only an invasion against Japan, but also deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the Indo- Pacific region. This will help foster a security environment where such forcible actions are not tolerated.

b. Second, a fundamentally reinforced defense capability should be able to deter invasion against Japan through activities such as: persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). training and exercises conducted as Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO). and measures against aircraft intruding into Japan's territorial airspace. Such a defense capability should also be able to swiftly respond to and address a range of situations in a seamless manner.

   Such a defense capability must come with high readiness and response capability. We need to prepare training infrastructures both inside and outside Japan. we also need a flexible work environment so that SDF can, even in the face of ever-increasing volume of peacetime operations, conduct sufficient volume of training and exercises necessary for improving the ability of SDF personnel and the proficiency of SDF units.

c. Third, a fundamentally reinforced defense capability should be able to adapt to new ways of warfare. It must operate with U.S. forces and integrate a variety of missions such as cross-domain operations, hybrid operations including information warfare, and missile interception and counterstrike. To that end, Japan first needs to identify functions and capabilities necessary for national defense, in accordance with the guidance in the National Security Strategy (NSS), NDS and DBP as well as joint operational concepts aligned with the guidance, and then determine how those capabilities should be distributed among the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces.

d. As part of the functions and capabilities required for the defense of Japan described above, Japan needs capabilities with which to disrupt and defeat invading forces over long distances, thereby deterring invasion itself. Japan therefore will strengthen "stand-off defense capabilities" and "integrated air and missile defense capabilities."

   Should deterrence fail and an invasion of Japan occur, Japan would need to ensure asymmetric advantage by leveraging, in addition to these capabilities, manned as well as unmanned assets and gain superiority across domains such as underwater, surface, and air. To this end, Japan will strengthen "unmanned defense capabilities," "cross-domain operation capabilities," and "command and control/ intelligence-related functions."

   Japan would also need to operate in a swift as well as persistent manner to crush to the opponent's will to invade. Japan will thus strengthen "mobile deployment capabilities, civil protection," and "sustainability and resiliency."

e. Japan will need to promptly realize the fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities as when and how unilateral changes to the status quo occurs is hard to predict: More specifically, by FY2027, five years after the formulation of the Strategy, Japan will strengthen its defense capability to the point where Japan is able to take primary responsibility for dealing with invasions against this nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats with the support of its ally and others. By

approximately ten years from now, Japan will make further efforts to attain this defense objective and will reinforce its defense capabilities to the point where Japan is able to disrupt and defeat invasion much earlier and at places further afield.

The top priorities for the next five years are twofold: first, to maximize effective use of its current equipment, Japan will improve operational rates, secure sufficient munitions and fuel, and accelerate investments in defense facilities for improved resiliency; and second, Japan will strengthen its core capabilities for future operations.

This defense capability development will be constantly reviewed and adapted according to the ever-evolving security environment surrounding Japan.

f. This fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities entails significant costs and a commensurate increase in personnel strength. In a way that serves to realize fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities, Japan will, while adhering to a scrap-and-build approach, optimize SDF's organization and authorized strength as well as equipment. We will also further the ongoing efforts toward more efficient procurement, which have achieved significant cost reductions, while giving due consideration to the defense production base. In addition, to account for population decrease and declining birthrates/aging population, Japan will robustly promote automation, labor- saving and optimization.

g. The purposes of the above-mentioned fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities are none other than to not allow unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and to deter invasion against Japan.

Fundamentally reinforcing Japan's own defense capabilities will further enhance deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; collaboration with like-minded countries will be enhanced as well. By doing so, Japan will ensure that opponent fully recognize Japan's intention and capability, do not underestimate Japan, and do not overestimate their own capabilities, thereby deterring invasion against Japan. This is the purpose of Japan's fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities.

h. A key to deterring invasion against Japan is counterstrike capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities.

In recent years, in Japan's surroundings, there have been dramatic advances in missile-related technologies, including hypersonic weapons, and practical skills for missile operations, such as saturation attack. Missile forces in the region have significantly improved in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and missiles themselves have been repeatedly launched. Missile attacks against Japan have become a palpable threat. Under these circumstances, Japan will continue its steadfast efforts to both qualitatively and quantitatively enhance its missile defense capabilities by continuing to develop technologies that bring the ability to deal with missiles with irregular trajectories.

Looking ahead, however, if Japan continues to rely solely upon ballistic missile defenses, it will become increasingly difficult to fully address missile threats with the existing missile defense network alone.

For this reason, Japan needs counterstrike capabilities: capabilities which, in the case of missile attacks by an opponent, enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent to prevent further attacks while defending against incoming missiles by means of the missile defense network.

Counterstrike capabilities are SDF's capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities. In cases where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent's territory. Counterstrikes are done as a minimum necessary measure for self-defense and in accordance with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force.

By possessing such capabilities to mount effective counterstrikes, Japan will deter armed attack itself. If an opponent ever launches missiles, it will be able to prevent the opponent's further armed attacks by counterstrike capabilities, while protecting itself against incoming missiles by the missile defense network, thereby defending the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals.

Counterstrike capabilities are the capabilities on which the Government expressed its view on February 29, 1956, which stated that, under the Constitution, "as long as it is deemed that there are no other means to defend against attack by guided missiles and others, to hit the bases of those guided missiles and others is legally within the purview of self-defense and thus permissible." These are also capabilities that the Government has chosen not to acquire up to now as a matter of policy decision.

This Government view squarely applies to measures for self-defense taken under the Three New Conditions for Use of Force, presented in the 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security, and the capabilities that Japan has now decided to acquire can be used when the above-mentioned Three Conditions are met in compliance with this view.

Counterstrike capabilities fall within the purview of Japan's Constitution and international law; they do not change Japan's exclusively defense-oriented policy; and, they will be used only when the above-mentioned Three New Conditions are fulfilled. Needless to say, preemptive strikes, namely striking first at a stage when no armed attack has occurred, remain impermissible.

While the basic division of roles between Japan and the United States will remain unchanged, as Japan will now possess counterstrike capabilities, the two nations will cooperate in counterstrikes just as they do in defending against ballistic missiles and others.

(2) Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country

To defend Japan, SDF needs to be strong. Also self-evident is that national defense cannot be achieved without a whole-of- country approach. In addition to fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities, Japan will build an overall national defense architecture by integrating Japan's national power--diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and technological--as well as by systematically combining all policy means. To enhance the whole-of-government undertaking, it is essential to break down sectionalism within the Government. From this perspective, Japan will enhance the comprehensive defense architecture that draws upon Japan's national power. This undertaking is an indivisible part of the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities. The national government will also promote cooperation with local governments and private entities.

a. Diplomatic efforts underpinned by Japan's enhanced defense architecture are important for our efforts to prevent unilateral changes to the status quo by force. By promoting robust diplomatic efforts through the promotion such as the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Japan will: proactively create a peaceful, stable, and predictable international

environment. prevent unilateral changes to the status quo by force. and ensure Japan's peace and security and the peace, stability, and prosperity of the region and the international community.

Working together with these diplomatic efforts, the Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as "MOD/SDF") will promote cooperation with our ally and multilayered collaboration with like- minded countries and others to create a desirable security environment. Also, in order to continue to demonstrate the intention and capability to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and influence opponent's actions, it is necessary to improve and enhance training and exercises as FDO and Strategic Communication (SC) with a whole-of-government approach, as well as with our ally and like-minded countries and others.

b. To detect indications of contingencies at early stages, relevant government agencies need to conduct persistent ISR and analysis in collaboration from peacetime. Also important are swift government-level decision-making and inter-agency coordination tailored to the given situation. With respect to integrated information warfare with special regard to the cognitive dimension, Japan will enhance fact- checking and counter-messaging to deal with disinformation, thereby enhancing the whole-of-government response from the current point in time as well as during contingency.

c. It is important not to allow unilateral changes to the status quo by force through acting collaboratively between relevant agencies based on the whole-of-government decision-making. For this purpose, Japan will improve the effectiveness of its response by conducting simulations and joint training and exercises while establishing coordination procedures from peacetime across the whole government. In particular, to protect critical facilities such as nuclear power plants and respond to infringements that do not amount to armed attacks from outside Japan and armed attack situations in the vicinity of remote islands, SDF will conduct training and exercises assuming contingencies with the police and Japan Coast Guard from peacetime, and establish necessary collaboration procedures, including the procedure to have the Minister of Defense control the Japan Coast Guard in an armed attack situation.

d. Since the domains of space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum are basic infrastructure in people's daily lives and are vitally important for carrying out cross-domain operations in defense of Japan, Japan will reinforce relevant capabilities across the whole government.

Regarding the space domain, securing its stable use for information gathering, communication, positioning, etc., is vitally for ensuring the lives of our nationals and our defense, and MOD/SDF will reinforce cooperation and collaboration including research and development with relevant agencies including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and private companies. In doing so, MOD/SDF will further apply civilian technologies into the defense field, facilitate investment in technology development in the private sector and improve space capabilities for Japan as a whole.

In the cyber domain, it is important to work together with international partners, relevant ministries and agencies, and private companies to gather and share information at all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies as well as to strengthen response capability in the cybersecurity field as a whole country. In line with the government's overall cybersecurity policy which will be comprehensively coordinated in a centralized manner, MOD/SDF will enhance its cybersecurity capability, while also promoting initiatives that contribute to strengthening cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, critical infrastructure providers, and defense industry.

With regard to the domain of electromagnetic spectrum, its range of application and use have expanded to cover the ground, maritime, air, space, and cyber domains, making it the frontlines of offense and defense in contemporary warfare. For this reason, ensuring superiority in the domain of electromagnetic spectrum is extremely important for reinforcing deterrence and conducting cross-domain operations. MOD/SDF will work closely with the relevant ministries and agencies to ensure SDF's stable and flexible use of radio waves both for civilian purposes and for SDF's command and control as well as intelligence gathering activities.

e. In an era where victory or defeat is determined by the mastery of new ways of warfare underpinned by advanced technologies, it has become critical to leverage cutting-edge technologies for defense purposes.

Under the whole-of-government mechanism for strengthening comprehensive defense architecture, Japan will leverage the cutting-edge technology research and development conducted by relevant government organizations for defense purposes based on the needs of MOD/SDF. In addition, MOD/SDF will implement initiatives to link the results of research and development conducted by start-ups and other companies and various research institutions into early production and deployment of defense equipment, utilizing the defense industry.

f. National administrative agencies, local governments, public entities, and private enterprises must make joint efforts in a cooperative and collaborative manner, in order to respond to an invasion against Japan while protecting the lives of Japanese nationals and in order to respond to various contingencies including large-scale disasters.

First, based on defense needs, under the inter-agency mechanism for strengthening comprehensive defense architecture, the Government will develop and upgrade airports, seaports and other facilities, particularly in the southwestern region. To enable SDF to use, for purposes including peacetime training, facilities such as existing airports and seaports as operation infrastructure, the Government will take necessary measures such as the establishment of a framework for interagency coordination. Japan will also deepen collaboration with relevant organizations regarding the expansion of the use of civilian vessels and aircraft for SDF's maneuver and deployment, and coordinate and cooperate to systematically implement civil protection measures employing such vessels and aircraft. In addition, MOD/SDF will promote various measures such as reinforcing whole-of-government civil protection training assuming an armed attack situation and other situations, as well as enhancing information transmission function of the national early warning system (J-ALERT) in preparation for an attack by ballistic missiles or other means.

Furthermore, Japan will establish an effective mechanism to balance defense requirements with socioeconomic activities such as the installation of wind power generation facilities so that the defense-related facilities can fully function through the smooth use of sea, airspace and radio waves.

In addition, concerning the transportation and storages of SDF's ammunition and fuel, Japan will reinforce

collaboration with the relevant ministries and agencies while taking measures for further facilitation.

Japan will promote similar initiatives for smooth implementation of Japan-U.S. bilateral responses to various contingencies.

g. For Japan, a maritime nation, reinforcing the maritime order and ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight are extremely important for peace and security. To this end, Japan will work to secure the national interest in Japan's territorial waters and the stable use of its important sea lanes.

First, MOD/SDF will promote maritime security cooperation guided by the vision of FOIP, with our ally and like-minded countries as well as coastal states in the Indo-Pacific, while closely cooperating and collaborating with Japan Coast Guard, responsible for maritime security in Japan.

In order to secure the stable use of sea lanes, Japan will make necessary efforts to conduct counter-piracy operations and ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in cooperation and collaboration with relevant organizations. In this regard, Japan will make stable, long-term use of its operation activity in Djibouti.

h. To enable SDF and U.S. Forces in Japan to seamlessly and effectively conduct activities on a daily basis, Japan will strive to gain understanding and cooperation from local governments and residents around their facilities. Japan will actively engage in public relations activities regarding the policies and activities of the MOD/SDF and also the role of U.S. Forces in Japan on a regular basis, and coordinate to accommodate the requests and situations of local communities, while fulfilling accountability. At the same time, Japan will continue to promote measures to improve the living environment of areas around defense facilities including those against noise from the perspective of promoting cooperation to the defense of Japan.

In some communities, SDF's emergency patient transport and the very existence of SDFunits themselves are making a major contribution to the communities'maintenance and vitalization. In conducting unit reorganization, establishing as well as administering camps and bases, Japan will give due consideration to regional characteristics and SDF's contribution to local economy so as to gain understanding of local governments and residents.

2 Joint deterrence and response by the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The second approach is to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The Alliance with the United States is a key pillar of Japan's security policy, and fundamental reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities will lead to more effective employment of U.S. capabilities and will further strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. By demonstrating such joint resolve and capabilities, Japan and the United States will prevent escalation of emergencies from gray-zone situations to conventional armed invasions and eventually the use of nuclear weapons, and deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts. In addition, if an invasion against Japan occurs, Japan-U.S. joint response will disrupt the invasion. To this end, both Japan and the United States constantly modernize the Alliance and strengthen joint capabilities by aligning strategies and prioritizing goals together. In doing so, building upon the fundamental reinforcement of Japan's own defense capabilities, Japan will play a larger role for the defense of Japan and the peace and stability of the region under the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Specifically, Japan will work on the following measures:

(1) Strengthening Japan and U.S. joint deterrence and response capabilities

Japan's NDS and the United States' National Defense Strategy are well aligned in prioritizing the prevention of unilateral changes to the status quo by force through integrating all approaches and means. Accordingly, from the viewpoint of reinforcing readiness and resiliency, imposing cost on opponents and deterring invasion against Japan, Japan will further deepen discussion with the United States on their roles, missions and capabilities and further reinforce joint deterrence capabilities of both countries in an integrated manner.

Specifically, Japan will further deepen cooperation with the United States to smoothly implement allied cross-domain operations including space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum and to improve interoperability. Regarding Japan's counterstrike capabilities, Japan will work with the United States to establish a cooperative posture including information gathering in order to effectively employ the capabilities. Furthermore, Japan will reinforce collaboration in such areas as air-defense, anti-surface warfare; anti-submarine warfare; mine-warfare; amphibious operations; airborne operations; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISRT); protection of assets and facilities, and logistic support. In order to effectively realize the division of roles and missions between Japan and the United States in light of the fundamental reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities, Japan will ensure close operational coordination with the United States through Japan-U.S. bilateral planning. In addition, Japan will work to improve allied response capabilities, including readiness and interoperability of the Alliance, through more advanced and practical exercises and training.

In addition, in order to ensure that U.S. extended deterrence with nuclear deterrence at its core remains credible and resilient, Japan will further actively engage in and deepen bilateral discussions on extended deterrence including those at the ministerial level.

As joint measures from peacetime to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts as well as to deter various contingencies from emerging, Japan will further expand and evolve operations including joint FDO and ISR. In order to effectively conduct these operations, Japan will actively make such efforts as promoting participation of like-minded countries and others and protecting assets, namely U.S. vessels and aircraft, by SDF.

Furthermore, as part of efforts to strengthen allied deterrence and response capabilities, Japan will on a regular basis increase joint/shared use of Japanese and U.S. facilities, and promote mutual deployment of both units to their respective facilities for training or other purposes.

(2) Reinforcing alliance coordination functions

To conduct aligned joint response of Japan and the United States in any situation, Japan will further upgrade the overall coordination functions centered on the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM).

In addition, in order to enhance collaboration with like-minded countries and others centered around the Japan-U.S. Alliance, Japan will promote closer operational coordination by leveraging the ACM and others.

(3) Reinforcing the foundation for allied response

Japan will reinforce the foundational elements that support effective allied response in all phases.

First, in order to further reinforce information sharing at all levels, Japan will fundamentally reinforce efforts related to information security and cybersecurity so that Japan and the

United States can fully employ their capabilities. Also, in order to ensure the Alliance's technological edge, interoperability, readiness, and persistent warfare capabilities, Japan will further reinforce defense equipment and technology cooperation through joint analysis and joint research in cutting-edge technology, joint development and production of defense equipment, improvement in mutual interchangeability, shared use and reinforcement of various networks, expansion of production and maintenance capability of U.S. military equipment in Japan and reinforcement of supply-chain.

(4) Measures to support stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

Japan will promote various measures to provide stable support for the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan, such as steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and the initiatives to reinforce the readiness and resiliency of U.S. Forces in Japan, while optimizing the bilateral joint posture to respond to the severe security environment.

Particularly in Okinawa, which occupy a critically important location for Japan's security, Japan will continue to work to mitigate impact by steadily implementing such measures as realignment, consolidation and reduction of facilities and areas of

U.S. Forces in Okinawa including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma as well as the relocation of units and training, while dealing with the increasingly severe security environment. In order to smoothly and effectively implement aforementioned Japan-U.S. undertakings, it is essential to gain understanding of Japanese nationals: Japan will enhance efforts such as active public messaging about their significance and importance.

3 Collaboration with like-minded countries and others

The third approach is to enhance collaboration with like-minded countries and others. In order to counter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and to ensure Japan's security, it is extremely important to reinforce collaboration with not only our ally but also as many countries as possible. From such perspective, Japan will promote efforts to contribute to realizing the vision of a FOIP.

First of all, Japan will, while placing the Japan-U.S. Alliance the key pillar of its security policy, proactively promote multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges, taking into account characteristics of the region as well as situation of each country. In doing so, Japan will further promote institutional frameworks such as Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAA), Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA), and Agreements concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.

With Australia, under the "Special Strategic Partnership" in the Indo-Pacific region and the guidance of the renewed "Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation", Japan will build the closest cooperative relationship second only to the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation and deepen consultations at all levels including the Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations ("2+2"), bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation. In addition, in light of such developments as the RAA, Japan will pursue actions such as exercises and rotational deployment in Australia. Given the prospect of cooperation among Japan, the United States and Australia, in the event of contingencies, Japan will mutually consult and collaborate with Australia, focusing on logistics support and information sharing. From the viewpoint of ensuring effective responses to contingencies, Japan will promote discussions on the scope, objectives and forms of operational cooperation on a regular basis.

With India, Japan has established the Special Strategic and Global Partnership. In order to reinforce strategic collaboration, while utilizing frameworks such as "2+2," Japan will further deepen bilateral and multilateral defense exchanges including service-to-service exchanges in a broad range of fields including maritime security and cybersecurity, while promoting training and exercises as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation.

With partners like the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, Japan will mutually reinforce involvement in global security issues as well as challenges in Europe and Indo-Pacific. Accordingly, Japan will build close cooperation with them by placing their Alliance with the United States built through such arrangements as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a cornerstone, and implement consultations such as "2+2," bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation including the joint development of the next-generation fighter aircraft, and mutual dispatch of vessels and aircraft. In doing so, Japan will reinforce cooperation through jointly monitoring illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea and the counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

With NATO and the European Union (EU), based on the bilateral relations with above-mentioned European countries, Japan will reinforce collaboration with regard to international rule-makings and involvement to the security of the Indo-Pacific region.

With the Republic of Korea (ROK), considering the importance to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the U.S.-ROK Alliance in response to the nuclear and missile threats posed by North Korea, Japan will reinforce the collaboration among Japan, the United States and the ROK through measures including trilateral training and exercises.

With Canada and New Zealand, Japan will promote measures including consultation at each level, bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, and bilateral cooperation with third parties, in a bilaterally coordinated manner in order to further collaborate to tackle the challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.

Japan will reinforce collaboration with Nordic-Baltic states, which are facing unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts, including Russia's aggression against Ukraine, and are working on cutting-edge initiatives such as information warfare, cybersecurity, strategic communication and hybrid warfare. Japan will also reinforce collaboration with Central and Eastern European countries, including the Czech Republic and Poland, countries that show interest in strengthening their relationships with Japan.

With regards to Southeast Asian countries, Japan will support their efforts to reinforce centrality and unity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through such means as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus, and the ASEAN-Japan Defense Ministers' Informal Meeting. Furthermore, from the perspective of stabilizing the security of the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will implement consultations at all levels, including "2+2," strategic port calls and air visits, and bilateral/multilateral training and exercises depending on the situation of each country. In addition, with the aim of stabilizing the region, Japan will implement transfer of defense equipment and capacity building, which contribute to reinforcing defense capabilities of the region.

With Mongolia, in light of its strategic importance as a democratic country geographically located between China and Russia, Japan will promote defense equipment and technology collaboration to elevate cooperation in the political and security fields to a new dimension, in addition to implementing defense exchange at all levels, capacity building and multilateral exercises. With Central Asian countries, with which Japan has only had a few achievements in defense exchanges despite the fact that these countries are located

in a geopolitically important region between Asia and Europe, Japan will accumulate defense exchange including capacity building in areas of mutual interest.

With Pacific Island countries, Japan, as an important partner, will engage in cooperation including capacity building through collaboration with countries including its ally and like-minded countries. In doing so, Japan will also consider cooperation with organizations other than military forces such as coast guard.

With Coastal States of the Indian Ocean and Middle Eastern countries, Japan will promote defense cooperation, based on the importance of stable use of sea lane and an energy and economic perspective. At the same time, Japan will also develop defense cooperation with countries including African countries in terms of responding to global challenges. In particular, Japan will strengthen cooperation with Djibouti and secure the long-term and stable use of the SDF operation facility there in order to reinforce our operational base in the region, for activities including counter- piracy and rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas.

While promoting collaboration with like-minded countries and others, Japan will pay attention to communication with China and Russia.

With China, in order to build a "constructive and stable relationship," Japan will promote multilayered dialogues and exchanges including Japan-China security dialogue. In doing so, Japan will continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, comply with international code of conduct, and improve transparency regarding its strengthening of military capabilities buildup and its defense policies, while also conveying the concerns Japan has in a candid manner. Japan will also make use of the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan-China including the hotline, in order to avoid unexpected contingencies between the two countries.

With regard to Russia, based on the stance that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are unacceptable, Japan condemns the aggression against Ukraine to the maximum extent possible, and will closely cooperate with the international community including G7 in taking appropriate measures. At the same time, Japan will maintain necessary communication with Russia, which is our neighboring country, in order not to incur unexpected contingencies and unnecessary friction.

IV Key Capabilities for Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities

The following are the basic concepts and contents of the seven functions and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan, which are derived from the comprehensive operation concept in line with the basic policies set forth in the Strategies.

1 Stand-off defense capabilities

In order to protect Japan's territory, which stretches approximately 3,000 km along the both north-south and east-west axes: Japan will fundamentally reinforce its stand-off defense capabilities to deal with vessels and landing forces invading Japan, including its remote islands, from locations outside of threat zones.

First of all, Japan will possess necessary and sufficient capabilities in a multilayered manner across the country to be able to disrupt and defeat these vessels and landing forces invading Japan in multilayered manner and from various locations in Japan. Also, Japan will reinforce capabilities that can be launched from various platforms with such diverse capabilities as hyper velocity glides and hypersonic glides which are difficult to intercept.

To this end, by FY2027, Japan will reinforce capability to enable operation of stand-off missiles including surface-launched and ship-launched models. In doing so, to secure sufficient capability in prior to the establishment of increased production of domestic stand-off missile, Japan will promptly procure stand-off missiles manufactured overseas.

In the future, by approximately ten years from now, Japan will reinforce its capability to enable operation of aircraft-launched stand-off missiles and will acquire capability to operate hyper velocity gliding missiles with irregular trajectories, hypersonic guided missiles, and other stand-off missiles.

In addition, Japan will have the capability to persistently gather accurate target information regarding vessels and landing forces, which is essential for stand-off defense capabilities, and possess command and control-related capabilities to transmit the information in real time. Japan will also possess information analysis capabilities including the evaluation of results after a response, as well as the resiliency and redundancy of information networks.

2 Integrated air and missile defense capabilities

As a country surrounded by sea, it is extremely important for Japan to respond to airborne threats. In recent years, along with the improvement of the capabilities of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft, the emergence of anti-ship ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) has diversified, complicated, and advanced airborne threats.

To this end, Japan will fundamentally reinforce detecting, tracking and intercepting capabilities, and establish a system to enable unified and optimized operation of various sensors and shooters through networks to reinforce integrated air and missile defense capabilities.

As a response to the missile attacks from an opponent's country to Japan, Japan will first intercept missiles flying to Japan over the high seas and Japan's territorial airspace with its missile defense system. Subsequently, as a measure for self-defense to the minimum required level to prevent missile attacks including ballistic missiles, Japan will utilize capabilities including stand- off defense capabilities to enable itself to conduct effective counterstrike in the opponent's territory. By having capability to conduct effective counterstrike and facilitate interception by missile defense, Japan will restrict opponent's missile launches and thereby deter missile attacks from happening.

To this end, by FY2027, Japan will reinforce the capabilities of warning and control radar and surface-to-air missile and procure Aegis System Equipped Vessels. Japan will also reinforce the capability to respond to small UAVs with weapons including directed-energy weapons.

By approximately ten years from now, Japan will reinforce its integrated air and missile defense capabilities by further introducing research on capability to respond to hypersonic weapons in the gliding phase and interception by non-kinetic means to deal with assets such as small UAVs.

3 Unmanned defense capabilities

Unmanned assets are often relatively affordable compared to manned equipment and have the great advantage of being able to minimize human loss and operate continuously for a long period of time. Furthermore, by combining these unmanned assets with AI and manned equipment, it can be a game-changer that fundamentally transform force structure and way of warfare, enabling Japan to gain asymmetrical advantages in the air, sea, and underwater domains. For this reason, these unmanned assets will be effectively utilized not only for information gathering and surveillance, but also for a wide range of missions including combat support. Japan will also promote initiatives to optimize the equipment system and

organization of SDF by automation and labor-saving through the mission replacement of manned assets.

To this end, SDF will acquire practical capabilities in a wide range of missions by introducing unmanned assets through early production and deployment or leasing by FY2027. In particular, Japan will promote the early production and deployment of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) to acquire and maintain underwater superiority.

By approximately ten years from now, Japan will further materialize the style of warfare using unmanned assets, accelerate the development and introduction of equipment based on the geographical characteristics of Japan, and expand full- scale operation. Furthermore, SDF will reinforce the ability to simultaneously control multiple unmanned assets using system such as AI.

4 Cross-domain operation capabilities

It has become increasingly important for Japan to overcome inferiority in individual domains by conducting cross-domain operations which organically fuse capabilities in all domains including space, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, land, sea, and airspace to generate synergy and amplify the overall strength, and thereby ensuring Japan's national defense.

(1) In the space domain, MOD/SDF will reinforce it operational capabilities in the land, sea, and air domains by proactively integrating novel form of space use including satellite constellation, and by receiving information gathering, communication, and positioning etc. from space. Also, in order to respond to threats to the stable use of space, MOD/SDF will develop ground and space-based surveillance capabilities, build-up a Space Domain Awareness (SDA) structure, and bolster the resiliency of our space assets to enable the continuation of missions in response to various situations.

By FY2027, MOD/SDF will utilize space to develop essential infrastructure for unit operations and enhance our SDA capability.

By approximately ten years from now, MOD/SDF will further enhance our space operation capabilities by increasing multi-layering and redundancy in space use and also by acquiring new space capabilities.

(2) In the cyber domain, MOD/SDF will cooperate with whole-of-government initiatives in the field of cybersecurity, including active cyber defense. MOD/SDF will realize advanced cybersecurity posture by shifting to a posture that is able to conduct continuous risk management primarily on critical information systems, by significantly increasing the number of cyber personnel particularly by utilizing external human resources who have advanced cyber skills. MOD/SDF will protect itself from every cyber threat with these advanced cybersecurity capabilities and will utilize these capabilities to the initiatives to reinforce cybersecurity as a whole country.

To this end, by FY2027, MOD/SDF will establish a cybersecurity posture to secure command and control capabilities and high-priority equipment systems even under cyberattacks and to support cyber defense of the defense industry.

By approximately ten years from now, MOD/SDF will establish a cybersecurity posture to secure command and control capabilities, force projection capabilities and operational bases to perform its missions even under cyberattacks, while reinforcing its posture to support cybersecurity of entities other than the SDF.

(3) In the domain of electromagnetic spectrum, MOD/SDF will effectively function its electronic warfare capabilities and its support capabilities while impairing opponent's capabilities of accomplishing missions even under a severe electromagnetic spectrum environment including communication jamming by the opponent. Also, MOD/ SDF will reinforce electromagnetic spectrum management function for the entire SDF to utilize electromagnetic spectrum more effectively.

(4) MOD/SDF will expand capabilities necessary to disrupt or neutralize the opponent's use of space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains.

(5) Regarding ground, maritime, and air defense capabilities, which form the basis of cross-domain operations, Japan will fundamentally reinforce these capabilities by steadily introducing naval ships and fighter aircraft to maintain and enhance maritime and air superiority; and, introducing new surface combatants and developing next generation fighter aircraft, while leveraging advanced technologies and bearing in mind collaboration with unmanned assets.

5 Command and control / Intelligence-related functions

The character of warfare will continue to increase in speed and complexity. In order to win in future battles, Japan needs to ensure superiority in decision-making, whereby commanders at various levels can make decisions more promptly and more accurately than their opposites. For this purpose, Japan will enhance command and control and intelligence-related functions from a cross-domain perspective including prompt and assured materialization of ISRT by building networks that are enhanced by AI and come with real-time responsiveness, resiliency, and flexibility.

By FY2027, Japan will develop intelligence capabilities capable of responding to hybrid warfare and integrated information warfare with special regard to the cognitive dimension. Japan will also develop near-real-time information gathering capabilities by utilizing assets such as satellite constellations, etc.

By approximately ten years from now, Japan will further enhance information gathering and analysis capabilities by utilizing various means including AI to the greatest extent. Japan will also establish a system to share information in real time through further reinforcement of information gathering assets.

In addition, the necessity to continuously and accurately grasp the intentions and capabilities of Japan's neighboring countries is more crucial than ever. To this end, Japan will reinforce the capabilities of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) based on functions such as signal, imagery, human, and open-source intelligence (SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, and OSINT), and fundamentally reinforce comprehensive analysis capabilities including the utilization of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) to effectively collect, arrange, analyze, share and protect information, from operational intelligence to strategic intelligence. At the same time, Japan will promote cooperation and collaboration with relevant domestic intelligence-related organizations and take necessary measures to more effectively utilize the intelligence collected through information gathering satellites for SDF's activities.

Moreover, in order to effectively respond to integrated information warfare, including the spread of disinformation, Japan will fundamentally reinforce the organization and functions of MOD/SDF, and conduct information sharing and bilateral/multilateral exercises with its ally and like-minded countries.

6 Mobile deployment capabilities / Civil protection

In response to an invasion of Japan including its remote islands, Japan needs to ensure that deployed units are always operational,

and that necessary units are swiftly maneuvered and deployed according to situations to secure maritime and air superiority and disrupt the access/landing of units invading Japan. For this purpose, Japan will make maximum use of civilian transportations including Private Finance Initiatives (PFI), while reinforcing maritime and air transport capabilities of SDF.

In addition, in order to enable smooth and effective transportation and replenishment of units through these initiatives, Japan will reinforce the logistic posture through integrations, expansion of airport and seaport facilities usage capacity in the southwestern region, where remote islands are particularly concentrated, and conduct improvement of logistics capabilities, while proactively promoting the modernization of logistics bases located throughout the country.

SDF will not only defeat the infringements upon remote islands but also carry out civil protection missions by utilizing its reinforced mobile deployment capabilities for evacuating residents.

To this end, by FY2027, Japan will reinforce its transportation capabilities by measures such as expanding the use of PFI vessels, thereby acquiring the ability to quickly build up defense posture in the southwestern region and working to expedite the evacuation of residents.

By approximately ten years from now, Japan will have further reinforced its transport capabilities and accelerated transport and replenishment through the improvement of supply bases.

7 Sustainability and Resiliency

(1) In order to defend Japan in the future, the current warfighting sustainability of SDF is not necessarily sufficient in the form of ammunitions and fuel, and the number of operationally available equipment. It is necessary to squarely address these realities and strive to ensure and maintain sufficient war sustainability so that SDF can continue persistent activities in contingencies, which serves as an effective deterrent. Therefore, Japan will improve ammunition production capacity, secure ammunition storage commensurate with the amount of ammunition produced, promptly acquire necessary and sufficient ammunition, promptly ensure necessary and sufficient amount of fuel required, and establish a system to enable operation of all equipment except those under planned maintenance.

To this end, by FY2027, Japan will resolve the situation of ammunition shortage. Also, Japan will reinforce its production posture for high-priority ammunition and install more ammunition storage facilities. Furthermore, Japan will resolve parts shortages and ensure that all equipment except those under planned maintenance are operationally available.

By approximately ten years from now, Japan will maintain appropriate inventory of ammunition and parts and complete the installation of further ammunition storage facilities. Regarding defense equipment, Japan will maintain appropriate stock of parts including those for new equipment.

(2) Furthermore, in order to ensure the safety of SDF personnel on a daily basis and preventing an easy loss of operational capabilities even in a contingency, Japan will promote measures such as making major command headquarters underground and reinforcing their structures, relocate and consolidate facilities ensuring stand-off distance, and steady construct barracks and housing and maintain aging buildings. Moreover, Japan will conceal and deceive equipment to improve resiliency.

In addition, the issue of climate change, including responses to future energy shifts, will inevitably further impact future MOD/SDF operations, including various plans, facilities, defense equipment and security environment surrounding Japan, which demand Japan to deal with a variety of issues related to these matters.

To this end, by FY2027, Japan will promote measures to construct underground command headquarters, and relocating and consolidating facilities in major bases and camps to improve resiliency of respective facilities. In addition, Japan will promote reinforcement of facilities and infrastructure against disasters such as tsunamis, starting from bases and camps that are anticipated to be damaged significantly and are important for operations.

By approximately ten years from now, Japan will have further improved resiliency of defense facilities.

(3) In order to save the lives of SDF personnel and mitigate risks to their person, and thereby enabling them to respond to an invasion of Japan for a longer period of time and with greater strength, Japan will reinforce emergency relief capabilities and transform medical functions by developing a seamless medical care and transportation system from the frontlines to the final rear destination, increasing the chances of survival for each personnel.

V The Future of Self-Defense Forces

1 Role of SDF in the seven key fields

In the seven fields of key capabilities for fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities, Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Force (GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF) will fulfill the following roles.

Regarding stand-off defense capabilities, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will build required and sufficient number of launching stand-off missiles from vehicle, ship and aircraft capable of diverse responses from outside of the threat envelope and against vessels and landing forces invading Japan.

Regarding integrated air and missile defense capabilities, as a basic role, MSDF destroyers will assume interception in the upper layer and GSDF and ASDF will assume interception by surface-to-air missiles in the lower layer, and Japan will reinforce capabilities to respond to future airborne threats such as hypersonic weapons. Also, each SDF service will utilize capabilities such as stand-off defense capabilities etc. as counterstrike capabilities.

Regarding unmanned defense capabilities, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will significantly reinforce their defense capabilities in unmanned aerial, maritime, underwater and ground assets in accordance with their respective division of roles, concurrent to their review of existing units.

Regarding cross-domain operations, in the space domain, ASDF will reinforce various functions including space situational awareness. In the cyber domain, MOD/SDF as a whole will reinforce its capabilities to contribute to the reinforcement of cybersecurity of the entire country; and in particular, GSDF will play a core role to expand foundations such as for human resource development. In the domain of electromagnetic spectrum, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will acquire and reinforce defense equipment for the electronic warfare and also promote introduction of equipment for deception utilizing electromagnetic spectrum. Also, in light of the rapid buildup of conventional forces of neighboring countries, Japan will continue to enhance the quality and quantity of ground, maritime and air defense equipment for conducting cross-domain operations in cooperation with the capabilities in the above-mentioned domains.

Regarding command and control and intelligence-related functions, Japan will reinforce the information gathering capabilities of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, accelerate decision- making based on gathered information, and develop a network that enables definite command and control. Also, Japan will fundamentally reinforce the intelligence functions of the DIH, including the ISRT required for

the operation of stand-off missiles, and reinforce collaboration with the command and control function.

Regarding mobile deployment capabilities and civil protection, Japan will reinforce SDF's mobile deployment capabilities by securing medium-sized and small vessels by GSDF, transport vessels by MSDF, and transport aircraft by ASDF to rapidly deploy units to remote islands, when an invasion against Japan is predicted. Additionally, GSDF will reinforce its architecture including unit reinforcement for the protection of civilians in Okinawa.

Regarding sustainability and resiliency, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will secure the necessary amount of ammunitions, fuel and mobile equipment on a daily basis, to allow for SDF's continuous operation, and improve the resiliency of defense facilities, which serve as the foundation for exercising capabilities.

2 Concept of developing SDF architecture

Based on the roles in seven fields as mentioned above, development of joint operational architecture as well as development of architectures of GSDF, MSDF, ASDF and DIH will be conducted in following basic concepts.

In order to reinforce effectiveness of joint operational posture, Japan will establish a permanent Joint Headquarters which can unify command of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF by reviewing the existing organization. Furthermore, Japan will promote defense equipment system benefitting joint operation.

GSDF will develop a system that places importance on reinforcing cross-domain operation capabilities and disrupting invading forces from a distance by reinforcing surface-launched stand-off defense capability, which has many advantages, maintaining sustainability and resiliency, reinforcing rapid maneuver and disperse deployment capabilities to islands located in Southwestern areas, introducing unmanned assets, improving integrated air and missile defense capabilities including response to drones, and command and control and intelligence-related functions, including systems necessary for disperse deployed units.

In light of increasing missile threats in recent years, MSDF will develop a system to reinforce air-defense capability, promote labor-saving and automation measures, reinforce integrated information warfare capability, ensure superiority underwater, reinforce stand-off defense capabilities and surface rear support capability, and enable persistent unit operation that require high level of speed and activity. In particular, MSDF will develop a system which will allow acquiring and sustaining superiority in underwater which is an important factor in cross-domain operations.

In order to persistently execute tasks through resilient and flexible operations under a high-threat environment, ASDF will develop a system which can reinforce quality and quantity of air defense capability, maintain effective stand-off defense capabilities, ensure effective missile and air-defense posture, and introduce various unmanned assets. Also, ASDF will be renewed as the Air and Space Self-Defense Force, reinforcing its space operation capability and developing a system to ensure superiority in use of space.

In addition to collecting and analyzing SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, OSINT, etc., DIH will assume the central role of responding to integrated information warfare concerning the defense of Japan and fundamentally reinforce the capability to grasp military activities of other countries in a persistent, continuous and accurate manner and analyzing and disseminating them. Furthermore, in line with the reinforcement of cross-domain operation capabilities and stand-off defense capabilities, DIH will reinforce existing capabilities and ensure seamless cooperation and collaboration with other relevant organizations.

MOD/SDF will fundamentally reinforce its architecture to contribute to the cybersecurity of Japan as a whole country, in line with the Government's initiatives in the field of cybersecurity including active cyber defense.

3 Reinforcing policy-making function

For SDF to fully exert its capabilities and respond to the increasingly severe, complex, and rapid-paced strategic environment, strategic and agile defense policy planning and making are required, including in domains such as space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum, and MOD/SDF will fundamentally reinforce its functions. In this regard, MOD/SDF will establish a consultation framework to obtain policy advice from experts. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture to comprehensively advance future ways of warfare for SDF and utilize and nurture cutting-edge technologies and apply those technologies to defense equipment necessary for future SDF operations from a strategic perspective, while closely cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, private research institutions, and private companies particularly defense industry as their core. Furthermore, in order to promote such efforts and support the formulation of policies, Japan will review and reinforce the research system of MOD/SDF led by the National Institute for Defense Studies and reinforce its functions as an intellectual base.

VI Protection of Life, Person and Property of Japanese Nationals and Measures for International Security Cooperation

1 Measures for protection of life, person and property of Japanese nationals

Situations that Japan must be prepared for are not limited to unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and an invasion of Japan. Large-scale terrorist attacks and related attacks on critical infrastructures including nuclear power plants, large-scale disasters such as earthquakes and typhoons, and infectious disease crisis caused by COVID-19 are serious threats to the life, person and property of Japanese nationals, and Japan must respond to them with its utmost efforts.

As such, MOD/SDF, in close cooperation with relevant organization such as the police, Japan Coast Guard, firefighting services, and local governments, will respond to large-scale terrorist attacks and attacks against critical infrastructures by utilizing fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities, and in the event of a large-scale disaster, will protect lives, conduct emergency recovery, and provide livelihood support. Furthermore, in the event of natural disasters or civil disturbances overseas, MOD/SDF will work closely with the diplomatic authorities to promptly and accurately rescue and transport Japanese nationals. In order to utilize defense capabilities and smoothly implement such response, it is essential to establish a collaborative framework with relevant organizations from peacetime. Japan will conduct comprehensive training with relevant local governments and infrastructure business enterprises in order to ensure the effectiveness of response plans. Japan will also leverage such coordination to facilitate initiatives for civil protection, including evacuation guidance for residents, when an invasion of Japan is predicted.

2 Measures for international security cooperation

Peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community must be ensured for the peace and security of Japan. For this reason, it is necessary for MOD/SDF to utilize fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities, and, from the perspective of proactive contribution to peace bound to international cooperation, Japan must make proactive efforts towards resolving conflicts and confrontations around the world and responding to global challenges such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the event of large-scale international disasters caused by climate change, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and others.

Regarding International Peace Cooperation Activities including International Peacekeeping Cooperation Assignments such as UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and International Disaster Relief Activities, in line with the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan will conduct activities with a focus on the areas where Japan has advantages such as engineering and medicine, while collecting detailed information using intelligence-related functions even in remote areas, and swiftly transferring the necessary units using mobile deployment capabilities as necessary. Furthermore, Japan will continue to dispatch SDF personnel to local mission headquarters, taking advantage of the characteristics of Japan's SDF personnel with high levels of expertise. In addition, Japan will make the best use of accumulated experience and will provide capacity building.

From the perspective of improving the security environment surrounding Japan, Japan will also promote initiatives for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations. In doing so, Japan will utilize the knowledge of MOD/SDF to improve the effectiveness of international organizations and multilateral export control regimes.

VII Defense Production and Technology Bases as Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability

Defense production and technology bases are indispensable foundation for a country to secure the research, development, production and procurement of defense equipment in a stable manner on its own and to incorporate the cutting-edge technology necessary for new ways of warfare into defense equipment; it is virtually defense capability itself, and its reinforcement is essential. Therefore, Japan will promote initiatives such as building a strong and sustainable defense industry necessary for a new way of warfighting, dealing with various risks, and expanding sales channels. Regarding whole-of-government initiatives such as protecting the supply-chain for general-purpose products, and managing the security of sensitive technologies and information security for civilian cutting-edge fields, MOD will implement measures necessary for defense purposes and will also collaborate with the initiatives of relevant ministries and agencies.

1 Reinforcing defense production base

Japan's defense industry is important, considered as a partner responsible for national defense along with MOD/SDF in terms of securing equipment for SDF to carry out its missions, and it is necessary to maintain and reinforce the capability to produce high performance equipment and secure high operational rates. To this end, in the defense industry, Japan will secure not only advanced technological capabilities and quality control capabilities through reinforcing the defense technology base, but also the production, sustainment, maintenance, repair, and capacity improvement of defense equipment.

In order to ensure that the defense industry can play this significant role, Japan will reinforce the bases including the entire supply chain. In doing so, Japan aims to make business attractive by introducing a new profit margin calculation method to appropriately evaluate the cost management and quality control of the defense industry to secure appropriate profits, while promoting measures to maintain and reinforce existing supply chains and promote the entry of new suppliers.

Additionally, Japan will place more emphasis on the viewpoint of maintaining and strengthening the domestic base in acquiring defense equipment, and strive for technological, qualitative, and production-time improvements while ensuring predictability for companies, and if there are no other means available even after taking these measures, Japan will consider the owning manufacturing facilities and others itself.

Furthermore, Japan will deal with supply chain risks in the defense industry, while reinforcing industrial security including cybersecurity based on international standards, as well as strengthening the security of sensitive technologies. From these perspectives, Japan will work with the defense authorities of the ally, like-minded countries and others to engage in initiatives such as supply chain protection and sensitive technology security relating to the defense industry.

2 Reinforcing technology bases

In order to acquire defense equipment required for the new way of warfare, the use of our domestic technologies is extremely important. Therefore, MOD/SDF scrutinizes proposals made by the defense-related companies to see technological potential for the new way of warfare. MOD/SDF will proactively promote initiatives to accelerate efforts to achieve operational capability of future defense equipment technologies solely used for defense equipment, their in-house research results, as well as dual-use technologies from non-defense industries. For projects which are particularly urgent and significant from a policy perspective, MOD/SDF will further accelerate R&D, and operationalize R&D results, by being willing to take risks under the assumption of expected outcomes.

In addition, MOD/SDF will reinforce initiatives to deploy necessary equipment by improving specifications while operating prototype units.

Furthermore, from the defense technology base perspective, Japan will promote cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others by leading international joint development as means to acquire equipment which will benefit the defense of Japan.

Moreover, MOD/SDF will establish a framework for actively exploiting cutting-edge civilian technologies developed by start-up companies, domestic research institutions, and academia, and will utilize a whole-of-government mechanism for comprehensively strengthening defense architecture.

Through the scrap-and-build of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA's) research and development-related organization, Japan will establish a new research institution in MOD to find multi-use cutting-edge technologies that contribute to defense equipment development, and to produce equipment that leads to defense innovation. Japan will also expand and enhance systems to comprehensively consider and promote the utilization of cutting-edge technology in terms of policy, operation and technology. In order to increase predictability under this system, Japan will, based on new ways of warfare, strategically publicize information on the technology fields that Japan will focus on and its outlook for research and development.

3 Promoting transfer of defense equipment and technology

Transfer of defense equipment and technology overseas is a key policy instrument to ensure peace and stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force, to create a desirable security environment for Japan, and to provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat of force. From this perspective, the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, its Implementation Guidelines, and other systems are to be considered for revisions in order to promote smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology of high security significance and international joint development in a broad array of fields. In doing so, the necessity, requirements,

and transparency of the related procedures for transfer of defense equipment and technology will be under adequate consideration, while maintaining the three principles themselves. In addition, Japan will carry forward with the transfer of defense equipment and technology in the joint public and private efforts by establishing a fund, and implementing measures including providing corporate assistance as necessary to smoothly promote such transfers.

VIII Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities

1 Reinforcing human resource base

The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. In order to realize fundamental reinforcement of defense capability, MOD/SDF will secure necessary SDF personnel without increasing capacity. MOD/SDF must create an environment that enables all SDF personnel to demonstrate their own abilities while maintaining high morale and pride, in light of the fact that SDF personnel are required to have more knowledge, skills and experience than before and are required to be well-grounded so as to not to be deceived by disinformation, etc. MOD/SDF will continue to work on improving living and work environments, improving treatment, promoting measures concerning honors and privileges, expanding support for families including collaboration with the families of SDF personnel and related organizations, fostering an environment in which female SDF personnel can play a more active role through flexible personnel management, promoting work-life balance, and enhancing re- employment support for uniformed SDF personnel who retire at a younger age, etc. In particular, it is necessary to give a certain level of consideration to SDF personnel who work in demanding environments in which high readiness and long-term missions are required and are socially isolated. In addition, each SDF personnel must recognize anew that harassment shakes the foundation of SDF, a human organization, and develops an organizational environment of zero tolerance for any harassment. These initiatives are important not only for preventing the decline of warfighting capabilities due to mid-career retirement but also for securing qualified human resources.

Regarding recruitment, MOD/SDF will further reinforce SDF recruitment capabilities to secure the necessary number of high-quality human resources. At the same time, MOD/ SDF will further raise the retirement age and expand the re- enrollment of retired uniformed SDF personnel to effectively utilize experienced skills, while considering the maintenance of military strength. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will promote flexible human resource utilization and secure human resources from a wide range of areas, including personnel in the private sector with specialized knowledge and skills such as in the cyber domain. In particular, MOD/SDF will implement comprehensive measures that contribute to securing human resources, such as crew members with low sufficiency rates in naval vessels and radar site surveillance personnel. Regarding SDF Reserve Personnel and others, which supplement active SDF personnel, MOD/SDF will review its system and reinforce its architecture to drastically increase recruitment including in the cyber domain. In addition, MOD/SDF will reinforce cooperation with retired SDF personnel and others.

With regard to the development of the human resources that SDF has recruited, MOD/SDF will reskill SDF personnel and reinforce the educational infrastructure such as the National Defense Academy and respective SDF educational institutions. In this regard, MOD/SDF will focus on the cyber domain and other fields requiring high expertise as well as reinforcing education and research on joint operations in particular, and implement measures to effectively utilize personnel with scarce and valuable expertise. Furthermore, MOD civilian officials and others play an important role not only in supporting the activities of SDF as an element of defense capability but also in fundamentally reinforcing defense capability, designing policies associated with the fundamental reinforcement, and providing operational support to units. Therefore, MOD/SDF will work to reinforce the human resource base by securing the civilian officials, technical and engineering officials, and others necessary for this purpose and by further considering necessary systems.

In this way, MOD/SDF will implement bold measures focusing on the entire life cycle of SDF personnel, while considering the creation of an organizational environment that enables SDF personnel to demonstrate their abilities even when they are in the middle of various life events including childbirth, childcare, and nursing care.

2 Transformation of medical function

Regarding SDF medical force, MOD/SDF has been placing importance on sustaining health of SDF personnel, but from the perspective of sustainability and resiliency, MOD/SDF will transform SDF medical force into an organization that saves the lives of SDF personnel who carry out their missions in a contingency in spite of danger.

For the purpose, MOD/SDF will develop a joint operations capability by unifying medical roles and functions common to all SDF services so that SDF can respond to various situations and undertake diverse missions both in Japan and abroad and build a posture to mobilize the full strength of SDF's medical force including the National Defense Medical College, and promote fundamental reforms to improve the combat trauma care capabilities.

In this regard, MOD/SDF will establish a seamless posture for medical care and evacuation from the frontlines to the destination hospital, while clarifying the role of each medical establishment from the frontlines of southwestern region to the hospitals in Honshu and other islands, and standardize medical equipment and materials for transportation, and develop a system to share medical information necessary for medical care and transportation across the country including in the frontlines. In addition, MOD/SDF will reinforce SDF units' first aid capabilities, secure medical equipment and materials including blood and oxygen that are essential for combat trauma care, and develop a medical base in the southwestern region.

Furthermore, MOD/SDF will reinforce education and research on combat trauma care in the National Defense Medical College and improve management necessary to further enhance the clinical experience of medical and nursing officers. In addition, MOD/SDF will complement the clinical experience of medical and nursing officers through active external training. Based on this, MOD/SDF will enhance the common knowledge and skills of respective components of SDF through integrated education and training on combat trauma care.

IX Points of Attention

1. This Strategy, under the National Security Strategy, will be implemented in alignment with strategies in other fields. The National Security Council regularly and systematically will evaluate whether the approach and means to achieve defense objectives are taken appropriately, especially whether the strengthening of the defense architecture of the whole country is surely implemented. In addition, Japan will constantly evaluate the capabilities necessary for building defense capabilities that can effectively deal with changes in the security environment, particularly focusing on opponent's capabilities, based on joint operational concepts.
2. The fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities based on the strategy must be maintained and reinforced in the

future. To this end, Japan will continuously consider how to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities from a mid-to long-term perspective.

3. The strategy will be executed approximately over the coming decade; should Japan expect any significant changes including in international situation and trends in technological level, it will make necessary revisions.

Reference 4 Defense Buildup Program

(December 16, 2022)

I. Program Guidelines

In accordance with the "National Defense Strategy" (approved by the National Security Council and Cabinet on December, 16, 2022), Japan will fundamentally reinforce its "Multi-Domain Defense Force," through the synergy of organically integrated capabilities including space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains, and is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies, focusing on the capabilities of our opponents and new ways of warfare. By FY 2027 or by five years from now, Japan will strengthen its defense capabilities to the point at which Japan is able to take the primary responsibility for dealing with invasions against its nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats while gaining support of its ally and others. Furthermore, in approximately 10 years from now, Japan will make further efforts to better attain this defense objective and will reinforce its defense capabilities to the point at which it will be possible to disrupt and defeat invasions against its nation much earlier and at a further distance. Given the guiding thoughts above, Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as "MOD/ SDF") will effectively and efficiently build, maintain and operate defense capabilities based on the following program guidelines.

1 The functions and capabilities required for the defense of Japan are, firstly, Japan needs capabilities with which to disrupt and defeat invading forces over long distances, thereby defending invasion itself. Japan therefore will reinforce "stand-off defense capabilities" and "integrated air and missile defense capabilities".

Secondly, should deterrence fail and invasion of Japan occur, Japan would need to ensure asymmetric advantage by leveraging, in addition to these capabilities, manned as well as unmanned assets and gain superiority across domains such as underwater, surface, and air. To this end, Japan will reinforce "unmanned defense capabilities," "cross. domain operation capabilities," and "command and control/ intelligence related functions".

Lastly, Japan would also need to operate in a swift as well as persistent manner so as to force the opponent to give up invasion. For this, Japan will reinforce "mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection" and "sustainability and resiliency."

Additionally, Japan will also place emphasis on the defense production and technology base, characterized as virtually integral part of a defense capability, as well as areas such as the human resource base that supports our defense capability.

2 In procuring equipment, by properly combining the introduction of new, high performance equipment, along with life extension and improvement of existing equipment, MOD/ SDF will efficiently secure necessary and sufficient quality and quantity of defense capability. In this regard, MOD/SDF will strengthen its project management throughout its equipment life-cycle, including during its research and development activities, and reduce the life- cycle costs to improve cost-effectiveness. In addition, MOD/ SDF will steadily realize acceleration of defense equipment deployment which is particularly urgent and significant from a policy perspective of the areas that could directly affect the SDF's current and future ways of warfare by incorporating advanced civilian

technologies.

3 In the face of Japan's aging population with a declining birth rate, and with no prospect of an increase in the number of recruits, MOD/SDF will comprehensively promote various measures to reinforce human resource base such as strengthening recruitment efforts, utilizing SDF Reserve Personnel and others, promoting women's participation, raising the retirement age for uniformed SDF personnel, utilizing diverse and distinguished personnel including retired uniformed SDF personnel, improving living and working environment, developing the human resources, improving treatments, and supporting reemployment, etc.

4 To further reinforce the joint deterrence capabilities of Japan and the United States in an integrated manner, Japan will promote cooperation, etc. related to cross-domain operations, including space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains. In addition, in order to reinforce the infrastructure to support effective joint response capabilities in all phases, Japan will reinforce efforts related to information security and cybersecurity, as well as equipment and technology cooperation to promote information sharing between Japan and the United States. In addition, measures to support the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan will be steadily implemented.

In line with the vision of the Free and Open Indo- Pacific (FOIP), to strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security operations, Japan will further promote establishing policy frameworks such as Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA), General Security of (Military) Information Agreement (GSOMIA/GSOIA), and transfer of defense equipment and technology agreement, while also promoting defense cooperation and exchanges including bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building, and interchanges among military branches.

5 In fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities, Japan will, while adhering to scrap-and-build approach, optimize SDF's organization and authorized strength as well as equipment. We will also further our ongoing efforts toward more efficient procurement, which have achieved significant cost reductions. In addition, to account for Japan's aging population with a declining birth rate, Japan will robustly promote automation, labor-saving and optimization.

II Major Programs regarding SDF's Capabilities

In order for Japan to buildup defense capabilities to the point at which Japan is able to take the primary responsibility for dealing with invasions against its nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats while gaining support of its ally and others by FY 2027. Japan will place emphasis on implementing the following major programs listed from 1 to 7 in fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities.

1 Stand-Off Defense Capabilities

In order to reinforce capabilities to conduct diverse responses from outside of the threat envelope and against vessels and landing forces invading Japan, MOD/SDF will continue development and production of the prototype of upgraded Type- 12 surface-to-ship missile (develop surface-, ship-, and air-to- ship models), upgraded Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile and hypersonic missiles. MOD/SDF will extend the ranges of its various missiles, such as by upgrading Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile and hypersonic missiles. In order to fundamentally reinforce defense capability as soon as possible, MOD/SDF will procure mass-produced rounds for the above-mentioned standoff missiles, and will also continue to steadily procure foreign-made stand-off missiles, such as U.S.-made Tomahawks.

In addition, MOD/SDF will proceed research and development for further diversifying launch platforms, and will develop and procure vertical missile launch system (VLS) that can be equipped on submarines and a system that can be equipped on transport aircraft, aiming to improve the operational capability of standoff missiles.

In order to ensure the effectiveness of stand-off defense capabilities, MOD/SDF will enhance functions of information collection and analysis as well as command and control by acquiring imagery intelligence, etc. using satellite constellations and introducing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and target observation rounds, from the perspective of effective collection of target information. Since the operation of these stand-off missiles requires a series of command and control including the collection of target information and the assignment of targets to each unit to be conducted in a unified manner, a posture based on joint operation will be established. In addition, a series of functions necessary for the development and operation of stand-off missiles will be established by building additional ammunition storage facilities for storing stand-off missiles and other equipment, as well as facilities necessary for testing and maintenance, including securing facilities that can be used for live-firing.

2 Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities

In order to enhance capabilities to detect and track threats such as Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGV), MOD/SDF will procure and upgrade ground-based warning and control radars (FPS) etc., as well as procure a future warning and control radar. In addition, MOD/SDF will improve its capability to respond to HGVs and other such weapons with interceptor missiles with upgraded capabilities (PAC-3 MSE) by upgrading the surface-to- air guided missile PATRIOT system and introducing a new radar (LTAMDS).

In order to respond more effectively to various situations, MOD/SDF will begin reviewing the organization and deployment of fire units and establish a multi-layered air defense system in key areas together with mid-range ground-to-air guided missile units, and conduct unit operations for deployment from peacetime. MOD/SDF will also promote the upgrade of base air defense surface-to-air missile (SAM). In addition, research and studies will be conducted on a guided missile system which is capable of responding to HGVs and other such weapons at the glide phase.

In order to enhance the capability to respond to HGVs and other such weapons, MOD/SDF will upgrade the Type 03 medium- range surface-to-air guided missile (modified), and also procure missiles such as interceptor missiles for ballistic missile defense (SM-3 Block IIA), interceptors with upgraded capabilities (PAC- 3MSE), and long-range ship-to-air missiles (SM-6).

To achieve effective and efficient response through networking, MOD/SDF will acquire a network system that enables fire control network between destroyers and other vessels (FC network) and will possess Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). In addition, by modifying the information coordination central (ICC) of the surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT system, various guided missile systems will be networked together.

To strengthen Japan's air defense capabilities, MOD/SDF will procure Aegis System Equipped Vessels that will primarily conduct BMD operations.

MOD/SDF will expeditiously develop capabilities to deal with small unmanned aircraft, etc., by non-kinetic means through a combination of directed energy weapons such as high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves (HPM).

Counterstrike capabilities are SDF's capabilities that leverage

standoff defense capability and other capabilities. In cases where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent's territory.

Counterstrikes are done as a minimum necessary measure for self-defense and in accordance with the Three Conditions for Use of Force. Operation of this counterstrike capability will be conducted under unified command and control based on joint operations.

3 Unmanned Defense Capabilities

In order to accomplish missions while minimizing human loss, SDF will expeditiously procure various types of unmanned assets, promoting initiatives to optimize the existing equipment system and personnel deployment. In procuring these assets, MOD/SDF will aim to secure both safety and capability to effectively carry out our mission.

To conduct seamless intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISRT), SDF will procure long-endurance UAVs and ship-borne unmanned assets that contribute to maritime surveillance, reconnaissance UAVs that can continuously collect target information in the threat envelope of an opponent, as well as a variety of unmanned assets for ISRT. In addition, to implement rapid transport of supplies to widely dispersed deployed units, remote bases, and naval vessels, MOD/SDF will consider introducing transportation UAVs and take necessary measures.

To disrupt and defeat an invasion against Japan, MOD/SDF will procure utility/attack UAVs and miniature attack UAVs that effectively retains various attack functions to enable itself to search and identify personnel, vehicles, naval vessels from the air and quickly respond to targets.

MOD/SDF will develop and procure unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) that can be linked to naval vessels and effectively conduct various operational maneuvers. Various types of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) will also be developed to gain underwater superiority.

In addition, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and UAVs will be effectively combined to improve the efficiency of security and protection systems at garrisons, bases, and critical facilities. MOD/SDF will also enhance collaboration between manned and unmanned aircraft, as well as strengthen its ability to operate multiple unmanned assets simultaneously.

4 Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities

(1) Capabilities in the Space Domain

In order to improve cross-domain capabilities, including the operation of stand-off missiles, various capabilities such as information gathering and communications utilizing the space domain will be further improved. Specifically, MOD/SDF will establish satellite constellation to improve the detection and tracking of target, with enhancing Japan-U.S. cooperation and using images from commercial satellites as supplementary endeavors. In addition, MOD/SDF will conduct required technological demonstrations to improve capabilities such as detection and tracking of HGVs using satellites, considering the possibility of cooperation with the U.S. Furthermore, in order to cope with the increasing demand for satellite communications, MOD/SDF will make efforts to establish multiple layers of communication band with higher resiliency in addition to the conventional X-band communications.

In response to the space domain, SDF will further enhance capability to disrupt C4I and other capabilities of opponent. In addition, in order to enhance the capability for Space Domain Awareness (SDA), MOD/SDF will promote various efforts, including the development of SDA satellites scheduled for launch in FY2026, as well as further studies on the operation of multiple SDA satellites. Furthermore, in order to enhance the resilience of Japan's space system including satellites, MOD/SDF will promote the use of multiple positioning signals including Quasi- Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) and commercial satellites, and start development and demonstration of technology related to resilience of satellite communication.

Regarding cooperation with other countries, in addition to promoting information sharing with the U.S. and other countries on SDA, MOD/SDF will strengthen cooperation such as multilateral shared use of communication waves with high resiliency.

In order to strengthen the organizational structure and human resource base for the space domain, MOD/SDF will engage with relevant organizations such as JAXA, as well as allied and like- minded countries such as the U.S. to secure necessary human resources for space, such as by establishing a framework to effectively utilize knowledge and experience on space gained among relevant ministries.

(2) Capabilities in the Cyber Domain

In line with the government-wide cybersecurity policy which will be comprehensively coordinated in a centralized manner, MOD/SDF will enhance its cybersecurity capability, while also promoting initiatives that contribute to strengthening cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, critical infrastructure providers, and defense industry. MOD/SDF will establish a posture to secure command and control capabilities and high- priority equipment systems, to assure SDF's ability to perform its mission, and to support the cyber defense of the defense industry even under cyberattacks.

Therefore, considering the latest cyber threat situation, capability of MOD/SDF in the cyber domain will be strengthened, based on an assumption that there is no longer safe network, transitioning from the traditional idea that perimeter security is sufficient to maintain the network safety. Introducing security functions based on the "Zero Trust" concept will be considered. "Risk Management Framework (RMF)" based on a mindset that manages risks continuously, by analyzing, assessing and appropriately managing risks continuously after introduction of information systems, will be introduced. Protection posture of equipment systems and facility infrastructure systems will be strengthened. Based on an assumption that threats may have already intruded into our network, cyber threat hunting capability will be improved to detect the threats early. In addition, efforts will be made to support strengthening cybersecurity measures for defense industry, etc.

In order to strengthen the cybersecurity posture of MOD/SDF, MOD/SDF will reorganize the GSDF Signal School into the GSDF System and Signal/Cyber School to expand the educational infrastructure to train cyber personnel. Furthermore, efforts to develop capability to disrupt opponent's use of cyberspace for an attack against Japan, will be strengthened.

In order to strengthen the capability to implement these initiatives as an organization as a whole, the number of cyber personnel belonging to cyber-related units such as the SDF Cyber Defense Command will be expanded to approximately 4,000 by the end of FY 2027, and MOD/SDF will provide training to its personnel engaged in cyber-related tasks such as system procurement, maintenance, and operations. In addition to the increase of cyber personnel belonging to cyber-related units, these efforts will bring the total number of MOD/SDF cyber personnel to approximately 20,000 by around FY2027. Further reinforcement of cyber defense architecture is intended in the future.

(3) Capabilities in the Electromagnetic Domain

Along with reinforcing SDF's communication and radar

jamming capabilities, MOD/SDF will strengthen electronic warfare capabilities by enhancing ability to detect and identify electromagnetic waves and acquiring means of deception using electromagnetic waves. In addition, MOD/SDF will expand its use of electromagnetic waves to take countermeasures against small UAVs using lasers and other means. Furthermore, MOD/ SDF will reinforce electromagnetic domain management functions which reasonably manage and coordinate SDF's use of electromagnetic waves.

To this end, MOD/SDF will make the following efforts: Procurement of network electronic warfare system (NEWS) with communication and radar jamming capabilities, development of stand-off electronic warfare aircraft to jam communications and other functions from outside of their threat envelope and stand-in jammers to use various types of electronic jamming within the threat envelope; Improvement of signal detection and identification capabilities of naval vessels and fixed-wing patrol aircraft by installing radio wave detection equipment; development of anti-aircraft electronic warfare equipment to jam radar from ground. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will verify the provision of jamming capabilities to fixed-wing patrol aircraft and take measures as necessary. In addition, MOD/SDF will start operation of vehicle-mounted laser devices for responding to small UAVs and take measures for early deployment of directed energy technologies such as high-energy laser systems and high-power microwaves (HPM). Along with adding the functions to monitor and manage the use of electromagnetic domain in each SDF system, MOD/ SDF will work closely with the relevant ministries and agencies to ensure SDF's use of spectrum necessary for its activities.

(4) Capabilities in the Ground, Maritime, and Air Domains

MOD/SDF will accelerate the acquisition of equipment, etc. and capability improvement, etc. in each of the SDF services, and strengthen capabilities in the ground, maritime, and air domains that form the basis of cross-domain operations. MOD/ SDF will actively utilize advanced technology to steadily upgrade equipment, etc. in each of the SDF services, and enhance advanced operational capabilities to collaborate with unmanned assets.

5 Command-and-Control and Intelligence-related Functions

(1) Enhancing Command-and-Control Functions

In order to ensure a swift and reliable command and control, MOD/SDF will establish resilient communications, system network, and data infrastructure, establish a real-time command and control posture, conduct studies on command and control capabilities that enables unified command of each SDF service, and take measures as necessary.

To this end, MOD/SDF will develop a cloud as a common infrastructure to reinforce information sharing function for cross-domain operations; upgrade the SDF central command system to strengthen the command and control function and its connection with related ministries and agencies; procure a future command and control system to strengthen GSDF's autonomous operational capability; upgrade the command and control system to further speed up the decision-making cycle in the MSDF; upgrade Japan Aerospace Defense Ground environment (JADGE) to strengthen the resilience of the command and control function in the ASDF; and enhance the mobility and flexibility of command and control function ; procure a space operation command and control system which centrally commands and controls the operation of space-related equipment and reinforce resilience of the satellite use. Additionally, MOD/SDF will enhance the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) necessary for sharing those information.

(2) Enhancing Information Gathering and Analysis Functions

MOD/SDF will establish a seamless intelligence gathering and analysis scheme by persistently collecting information on military trends in the vicinity of Japan and fundamentally reinforcing our capability and posture to process, analyze, and disseminate such information, as well as establish a posture that can promptly provide information that contributes to policy decisions and SDF unit operations. In addition, MOD/SDF will examine the ideal state of information sharing with U.S. forces and joint operations for unmanned assets, and take necessary measures.

To this end, the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), which plays a central role in intelligence functions for the defense of Japan, will strengthen the capabilities of each function, such as signal, imagery, human, and open-source intelligence (SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, and OSINT), while expanding the training base for analysts, etc., enhancing the system for intelligence collection and analysis, including the utilization of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and augmenting its defense attach. system. The SDF will build a satellite constellation for acquiring target detection and tracking capabilities, which will be complemented by various initiatives such as the strengthening of cooperation with the United States and the use of commercial satellites, as well as the strengthening of information gathering capabilities from space domain using information-gathering satellites and commercial satellites. In addition, various types of UAVs, etc. that are indispensable for effective ISR implementation will be procured.

(3) Responses to Integrated Information Warfare with Special Regard to the Cognitive Dimension

In the international community, emphasis is being placed on information warfare, which is an attempt to create a favorable security environment by influencing the public opinion and decision-making of other countries through disinformation and strategic communications, etc., and minimizing the impact to one's own decision-making, even when conflict has yet to arise. MOD/ SDF will establish a system and posture that ensures the capability to cope with information warfare.

To this end, the DIH, which plays a central role in responding to integrated information warfare, will strengthen the system for information collection, analysis, and communication. In addition, the following functions will be developed: automatic collection and analysis of open-source information using artificial intelligence (AI), which will enable continuous collection and analysis of information on trends in each country; automatic collection of information on social networking sites, etc., to determine the authenticity of information communicated by each country; and future forecasting functions for estimating the security situation.

6 Mobile Deployment Capabilities / Civil Protection

In order to secure capabilities for swift and reliable transportation of necessary units to defeat the invasion of islands to the southwest region, MOD/SDF will procure various transportation assets such as transport ships (LSVs, LCUs and maneuverable boats), transport aircraft (C-2), aerial refueling/ transport aircraft (KC-46A, etc.), and transport/ utility helicopters (CH-47J/JA, UH-2). In addition, MOD/SDF will secure additional private finance initiative (PFI) vessels specialized for mass transportation of vehicles and containers to supplement the maritime transportation capability.

To enhance self-sufficiency in transportation to southwestern regions, MOD/SDF will procure transportation vehicles (container trailers) and cargo handling equipment (large cranes and large forklifts). In addition, MOD/SDF will conduct research and development of a landing support system to improve the efficiency of transportation toward islands where the size of seaports is

limited. At the same time, MOD/SDF will make efforts to reduce transportation needs by stockpiling supplies in the southwestern region.

In addition, in order to enhance the effectiveness of the SDF's mobile deployment and civil protection, the government as a whole will work on measures to develop and strengthen airports and seaports, and others, particularly in the southwestern region, and take necessary measures to enable SDF to use facilities such as existing airports and seaports, as operational infrastructure. Furthermore, the government as a whole will deepen collaboration with relevant organizations regarding the expansion of the use of civilian vessels and aircraft for SDF's maneuver and deployment, and coordinate and cooperate to systematically implement civil protection measures employing various transport assets of the SDF, in addition to civilian vessels and aircraft. In doing so, the government as a whole will strengthen civil protection training for armed attack situations as well as secure various evacuation facilities. In addition, MOD/SDF will promote various measures such as reinforcing SDF units capable of also responding to civil protection, and utilizing SDF Reserve Personnel.

7 Sustainability and Resiliency

(1) Procurement of Various Ammunitions

Procure required quantities of various ammunitions, including standoff missiles such as the Type 12 surface-to-ship guided missile, interceptor missiles for ballistic missile defense (SM-3 Block IIA), interceptor missiles with upgraded capabilities (PAC-3MSE), long-range ship-to-air missiles (SM-6), and Type 03 medium-range surface-to-air guided missile (modified) promptly. In order to mass-produce ammunitions quickly and stably, MOD/SDF will encourage the defense industry to expand its domestic manufacturing capacity. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will strengthen maintenance posture for the various ammunitions.

In addition, in order to meet the increasing storage requirements for ammunitions, MOD/SDF will promote the expansion of ammunition storage facilities and the disposal of unused ammunitions.

(2) Securing fuel, etc.

MOD/SDF will secure necessary amount of fuel for SDF operations. In addition, in order to secure fuel requirements quickly and stably, MOD/SDF will build new fuel tanks while also renting private fuel tanks. In addition, MOD/SDF will secure necessary quantities of food and clothing.

(3) Improving the Operational Availability of Defense Equipment

By securing necessary budget for maintenance and material, with lead time in consideration, while dealing with the increasingly sophistication and complexity of defense equipment, MOD/SDF will eliminate the number of non-mission capable equipment caused by material shortage and maximize the number of operationally available equipment by FY 2027. To this end, the supply warehouse will be renovated to improve the precision of supply and demand forecasts and to shorten the time it takes for units to receive parts. In increasing the number of operationally available units, MOD/SDF will promote the outsourcing of maintenance and other operations to outside parties in order to make effective use of limited resources. In addition, MOD/SDF will promote the introduction of digital transformation (DX) in the logistics support field to optimize maintenance and upkeep. In addition, MOD/SDF will expand comprehensive contracts, including Performance Based Logistics (PBL) where outcomes are acquired through performance-based arrangements that will deliver SDF's requirements in maintenance.

(4) Facility Improvement

In conjunction with the acquisition of various types of ammunition, including standoff missiles, SDF will secure necessary ammunition storage facilities. In securing the ammunition storage facilities, SDF will pursue and promote efficient joint operations among the SDF services, joint use of U.S. ammunition storage facilities, and dispersed deployment to islands from the viewpoint of ensuring the resiliency of the ammunition.

In order to protect major equipment and command posts, etc., and ensure a tenacious fighting posture, MOD/SDF will establish underground basing, reinforce facilities, take electromagnetic pulse (EMP) measures for command posts, construct dispersal pads for fighter aircraft, build hardened alert shelters, and establish redundant utility infrastructures.

In addition, the base security function will be strengthened while reducing the number of personnel. In addition, MOD/ SDF will develop facilities to enable efficient operation of new equipment such as unmanned assets.

When renovating existing facilities, protective measures against explosives, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, electromagnetic waves, and guerrilla attacks shall be provided.

Structural reinforcement of facilities in accordance with their functions and importance, and relocation and consolidation of facilities to ensure stand-off distance shall also be implemented.

In order to prevent the functional decline of SDF facilities in the event of large-scale disaster, MOD/SDF will promote countermeasures against disasters such as tsunamis, starting from bases and camps that are expected to be damaged significantly and are important for operations. In the future, SDF will improve the resiliency of defense facilities and infrastructure in bases and camps in order to adapt and respond to various challenges associated with climate change, and to fulfill SDF's missions and roles.

MOD/SDF will smoothly execute facility improvements in a focused manner over a five-year period, while utilizing the knowledge of relevant ministries and agencies as well as private sector.

III Organization of Japan Self-Defense Forces

Based on the program guidelines, the structures of each SDF services shall be developed as described in 1 through 5.

1 Joint Operation Structure

(1) A Permanent Joint Headquarters will be established in order to build a system capable of seamlessly conducting cross-domain operations at all stages from peacetime to contingency, with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of joint operations among each SDF services. In this regard, in light of the rapidly increasing severity of the security environment surrounding Japan, MOD/SDF will make every effort to pursue the establishment of a Permanent Joint Headquarters as soon as possible and, upon the new establishment of the Permanent Joint Headquarters, SDF will examine how each unit, including joint units, should be structured.

(2) For further improvement of capabilities in the cyber domain, including constant and continuous monitoring of MOD/ SDF's network and systems as well as the capability to disrupt opponent's use of cyberspace for an attack against Japan, SDF will possess a cyber defense unit as a joint unit, in order to fundamentally reinforce cyber defense capability.

(3) In addition, a new maritime transport unit will be established as a joint unit to improve the mobile deployment capabilities to the southwestern region.

2 Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

(1) Level of Defense Capability to Possess

(a) Regarding the basic operational units, the 15th Brigade will be reorganized into a division in order to strengthen the defense architecture in the southwestern region. The other eight divisions, five brigades, and one armored division will be operated on the basis of rapid deployment in order to deter and respond immediately to various situations effectively and rapidly. In addition, units with specialized functions such as airborne units, amphibious rapid deployment units and air rapid deployment units will be also operated on the basis of rapid deployment.

In this regard, based on a favorable training environment, one division, two brigades, and one armored division that maintain a high level of proficiency will be placed in Hokkaido on the premise that they will be deployed and transported rapidly by the integrated transport capability.

As a premise for the above measures, GSDF will thoroughly ensure optimizing organizational capacity, and will consider how to structure the posture in the mid-and long-term span.

(b) In order to strengthen stand-off defense capabilities, surface-to.ship missile units equipped with upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship missiles will be retained. Furthermore, units equipped with Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile, and a long-range guided missile unit equipped with upgraded Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile and hypersonic missiles will be newly established.

(c) In order to protect important bases, etc. from various airborne threats, surface-to-air missile units equipped with upgraded Type 03 medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles (modified) will be retained.

(2) Reorganization of the Major Units.

(a) In order to strengthen cross-domain capabilities, GSDF will newly establish a new anti-aircraft, and the electronic warfare unit and reinforce the electronic warfare unit on islands. Furthermore, a new multi-purpose unmanned aerial vehicle unit that retains information gathering and attack capabilities, etc., will be established. In addition, a new unit will be established to ensure advantages in information warfare, including in the cognitive dimension, in coordination with cyber and electronic warfare.

(b) In order to strengthen sustainability and resiliency, the logistics support system will be strengthened by establishing a new branch depot in the southwestern region, and reorganizing the Ground Material Control Command to centrally operate each logistic depot.

(c) In order to secure the increased personnel necessary to strengthen stand-off defense capabilities, cyber capabilities, etc., MOD/SDF will abolish units mainly composed of the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, and allocate the regular uniformed SDF personnel belonging to the units to fulfill the personnel requirements. In addition, MOD/SDF will manage SDF Ready Reserve Personnel as replacements.

3 Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

(1) Level of Defense Capability to Possess

(a) To conduct persistent and multilayered information gathering and surveillance in the waters around Japan in peace time, MSDF will possess surface units strengthened by the introduction of patrol vessels and other vessels so that it can persistently respond to an increasing volume of activities, such as ensuring security of maritime traffic, which is the foundation of stable economic activities, and conducting overseas deployment for security cooperation with other countries. And in a contingency, in order to secure Japan's territory and the waters around Japan and to ensure security of maritime traffic, MSDF will possess strengthened and increased destroyer units and minesweeper units, as well as strengthened patrol helicopter units to enable effective and sustained execution of various operations such as anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, and anti-mine warfare. In addition, MSDF will procure Aegis System Equipped Vessels that will primarily conduct BMD operations

(b) To conduct information gathering and surveillance in the waters around Japan continuously in peace time, and to gain and maintain underwater supremacy, a critical area for cross-domain operations, during contingency, MSDF will possess strengthened submarine units.

(c) To conduct persistent and multi-layered information gathering and surveillance in the waters around Japan in peace time, and to conduct various operations including reconnaissance, targeting, and anti-submarine warfare in a contingency, MSDF will possess strengthened fixed-wing patrol aircraft units.

(2) Reorganization of the Major Units

(a) To enhance the capability of responding to integrated information warfare, including the cognitive dimension, and to develop a posture to enable swift decision-making, MSDF will conduct necessary research and development. In addition, MSDF will newly establish an Information Warfare major unit to carry out comprehensive information warfare through consolidating units with intelligence, cyber, communications, meteorology and oceanography functions.

(b) To establish a multilayered surveillance posture, to secure underwater and maritime superiority, and to reduce loss of human resources, MSDF will introduce various unmanned assets, such as UAVs, USVs including the use of existing manned vessels, and UUV, as well as newly establishing unmanned asset units.

(c) MSDF will establish a system that can sustainably carry out unit operations that require a high level of speed and volume of activities, under the joint operation system, through reorganizing the structure of the major units and establishing new units as necessary.

(d) MSDF will improve the capability of Self-Defense Fleet Headquarters, etc. responsible for the operation of the Joint Task Force, to improve warfare sustainability. In addition, MSDF will initiate a review of logistics posture and take necessary measures to ensure the sustainability and robustness of MSDF.

(e) Destroyers and Frigates (DDG, DD, FFM), and other vessels will be equipped with stand-off missiles, such as upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missile.

(f) In addition to (e) above, to gain underwater supremacy, MSDF will develop a submarine (SS) equipped with Vertical Launching System (VLS) with the aim of acquiring stand-off missiles carrying submarines.

(g) MSDF will decommission vessels that have been in service for a considerable amount of years and have limitations in expandability, etc., and increase the number of labor- saving frigate (FFM), etc., at an early date. In addition, in order to enable diverse operations such as distributed maneuver operations, MSDF will increase the number of air defense destroyers and improve the air defense and electronic warfare capabilities of destroyers and frigates (DDG, DD, and FFM).

Furthermore, to enhance mine warfare capabilities, the number of minesweepers that control unmanned minesweeping assets will be increased, and the number of replenishment ships will be increased to strengthen logistical support capabilities on the sea. In addition, in order to respond to air attacks in a contingency, etc., the modification of destroyers ("Izumo" type) will be promoted to enable the operation of fighter aircraft (F-35B).

(h) MSDF will procure fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) with enhanced capability and patrol helicopter (SH-60K (upgraded version)), and improve the electronic warfare, anti-ship attack, and other capabilities of fixed-wing patrol aircraft.

4 Japan Air Self-Defense Force

(1) Level of Defense Capability to Possess

(a) ASDF will possess a warning and control unit equipped with a grounded-based warning and control radar to conduct persistent warning and surveillance of the airspace around Japan including the vast airspace over the Pacific Ocean, as well as to detect and track new airborne threats such as HGVs in addition to ballistic missiles flying toward Japan. In addition, ASDF will possess airborne warning and control units consisting of reinforced airborne warning units to effectively monitor and control the airspace around Japan for a longer period of time in times of heightened tensions such as the so-called gray-zone situations.

(b) The ASDF will possess a greatly enhanced fighter aircraft unit in terms of both quality and quantity, where fighter aircraft and their supporting functions can work in unison to provide a comprehensive posture for Japan's air defense and other operations. In addition, to ensure fighter units can continue to fight tenaciously in various air operations of increasing intensity in the airspace around Japan, etc., ASDF will possess an enhanced aerial refueling/transportation unit and air rescue unit.

(c) ASDF will possess an enhanced air transport unit to effectively conduct mobile deployment of troops, etc. and international peace cooperation activities, etc.

(d) In addition to coordinating with the GSDF's surface-to- air missile units in conducting air defense in critical areas, ASDF will possess an enhanced fire unit to respond to increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats, with the capability to respond in the terminal phase, providing multi- layered protection to Japan from ballistic missile attacks.

(e) ASDF will possess a specialized space domain unit with enhanced SDA capabilities to ensure the stable use of space.

(f) ASDF will possess an unmanned aircraft unit to collect information in areas relatively remote from Japan and to conduct persistent surveillance in the air when the situation becomes tense.

(2) Reorganization of the Major Units.

(a) In order to further refine and strengthen the quality and quantity of Japan's air capability, ASDF will accelerate the pace of replacement of fighter aircraft that are not suitable for modernization (F-15) with fighter aircraft (F-35A and F-35B). In addition, ASDF will continue to upgrade capabilities for modernized fighter aircraft (F-15), such as improving its electronic warfare capability, equipping stand-off missiles, and increasing the number of equipped missiles. Furthermore, with regard to fighter aircraft (F- 2), from the viewpoint of strengthening stand-off defense capability, upgrade program will be promoted for a total of two squadrons for them to carry upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship missile, etc. In addition, ASDF will conduct necessary studies by FY2027, and take necessary measures in order to further advance the quantitative enhancement of air capability. In this regard, studies on the possibility of utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles will be conducted.

(b) Joint development of the next-generation fighter aircraft with the UK and Italy will be promoted, while ensuring freedom of modification and interoperability with the allied country, so that by the end of FY 2035, when fighter aircraft (F-2) are expected to start retiring, fighter aircraft capable of securing and maintaining air superiority in the future can be delivered. In addition to the fighter aircraft itself, development of systems including unmanned aerial vehicles, etc., will be undertaken with the possibility of international collaboration in sight.

(c) Furthermore, for the sake of efficient training of pilots of cutting-edge fighter aircraft such as the F-35 and next-generation fighter aircraft, ASDF will take necessary measures after studying the ideal education system, including the integration of ground training and flight training by training aircraft as one education system.

(d) In order to continue the battle tenaciously, a system for rapid development of deployment infrastructure, etc. will be established so that mobile and dispersed operations can be carried out at various locations. In addition, necessary studies will be conducted on operational concepts of air capability so that air capability can be flexibly concentrated and directed to the front of the aggression of Japan.

(e) In order to respond to high-intensity air operations and from the viewpoint of persistent combat, the aerial refueling and transport aircraft (KC-46A, etc.) will be increased in order to strengthen the aerial refueling function and rescue aircraft (UH.60J) will be replaced. In addition, in order to strengthen the air defense posture in the airspace around Japan, including the vast airspace over the Pacific, ASDF will promote the deployment of mobile warning and control radars, etc., on the islands on the Pacific side, as well as increase airborne early warning aircraft (E-2D). In order to implement rapid maneuvering deployment of ground units, etc., ASDF will procure transport aircraft (C-2).

(f) In order to improve the operational capability of stand-off missiles, ASDF will introduce unmanned aerial vehicles that can persistently collect target information inside the opponent's threat envelope, and new operational intelligence units will be established to strengthen the intelligence function necessary for the execution of the unit's mission.

(g) ASDF will continue to upgrade the capabilities of surface-to-air missile PATRIOT system and others in order to respond to increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats.

(h) In order to strengthen the space operation capability, development of SDA posture will be promoted steadily, and a new specialized space domain missions unit commanded by a general will be established, and the "Air Self-Defense Force" will be renamed to "Air and Space Self-Defense Force".

5 Optimizing Organizational Capacity

The number of SDF personnel in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF will be reviewed as necessary to optimize organizational capacity, targeting the level at the end of FY2022. In addition, the capacity necessary to strengthen the joint operation system will be transferred from each SDF, and GSDF personnel will be transferred to MSDF and ASDF, to meet the increased personnel requirements of MSDF and ASDF. To this end, approximately 2,000 GSDF personnel will be transferred to joint unit, MSDF and ASDF, respectively.

During the period of this plan, necessary measures will be taken to secure the necessary number of personnel without increasing the total number of SDF personnel.

IV Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

1 Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

In order to further reinforce deterrence capabilities of Japan and the United States in an integrated manner, Japan will establish a posture to work together with the United States on a regular basis and promote cooperation with the United States in cross- domain operations including space, cyber and electromagnetic domain and measures to improve interoperability, cooperation in the use of Japan's counterstrike capabilities, air-defense, anti-surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, amphibious operations, airborne operations, ISRT, protection of assets and facilities, and logistic support. In addition, Japan will improve its responsive capabilities, including the readiness and interoperability of the Alliance, through more advanced and practical exercises and training.

In order to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and occurrence of various situations, Japan will further expand and deepen joint Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and will on a regular basis increase joint/shared use of Japanese and U.S. facilities, and promote mutual deployment of both units to their respective facilities for training or other purposes. In addition, Japan will further develop coordination functions between Japan and the United States, and will realize closer operational coordination with like-minded countries and others with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its core.

In order to reinforce the infrastructure to support effective joint responses in all phases, Japan will reinforce measures related to information security and cybersecurity for facilitating information sharing between Japan and the United States, and will further enhance defense equipment and technology cooperation through joint analysis and joint research in cutting-edge technology, joint development and production of defense equipment, improvement in mutual interchangeability, sharing and reinforcing of various networks, expansion of production and maintenance capability of U.S. military equipment in Japan, and reinforcement of supply-chain.

2 Steady Implementation of Measures to Support the Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

From the perspective of not only supporting the stable presence of U.S. Forces in Japan but also strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, Japan will steadily secure funding for expenses related to the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan, including Host Nation Support.

V. Collaboration with Like-minded Countries and Others

While guided by the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Japan will further promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges based on the recognition that creating a security environment that is desirable for Japan is an extremely important and essential initiative that contributes to Japan's defense itself and also relates to its basic foundations. In particular, considering the policy on collaboration with like- minded countries and others indicated in the National Defense Strategy, in addition to high-level exchanges, policy dialogues, service-to-service exchanges and personnel exchanges such as liaison officers, Japan will appropriately combine, depending on characteristics of each SDF services, and strategically implement specific initiatives taking into account characteristics of the region as well as situation of each country, such as strategic port calls and air visits, bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building, and International Peace Cooperation Activities, in order to improve interoperability among SDF and armed forces of like-minded countries and to strengthen Japan's presence.

Based on such significance of defense cooperation and exchanges, in order to further collaborate mutually and conduct specific and thoroughgoing initiatives, Japan will proceed with the improvement of operation procedures, development of organizational systems, review of institutions including treatment, and establishment of infrastructure such as hotlines between countries including secure communications, and will further reflect needs concerning defense cooperation and exchanges in SDF operations. Japan will also strive to collaborate with relevant ministries and agencies as well as with other countries, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector, and strategically disseminate information on Japan's initiatives. In doing so, Japan will particularly emphasize the following.

1 Bilateral/Multilateral Training and Exercises

Taking their significance as defense cooperation and exchanges into account, Japan will promote bilateral/multilateral training and exercises including logistics cooperation. Through this, Japan will demonstrate the intention and capability to create a desirable security environment and will also seek to improve interoperability with like-minded countries and strengthen cooperative relationships with them.

2 Equipment and Technology Cooperation

Considering that cooperation in defense equipment is an initiative that spans more than half a century from conception to retirement, Japan will strengthen initiatives for equipment and technology cooperation including overseas transfers of defense equipment and international joint development and strive to enhance our partners' military capabilities and strengthen mid-and long-term relationships with those countries. In particular, these initiatives should be combined with other efforts such as defense cooperation and exchange, training and exercises, and capacity-building to be promoted effectively. In this regard, Japan will consider the transfer of equipment that has reached a considerable number of years in service and has limited expandability to like-minded countries through early decommissioning or early removal from service.

3 Capacity Building

Japan will further strengthen its efforts of capacity-building to armed forces and others of countries in the Indo-Pacific region, aiming to create a desirable security environment for Japan, while promoting the strengthening of relations with the countries to be assisted. In this regard, Japan will coordinate thoroughly with diplomatic policy, and work together with its ally and like- minded countries such as the United States and Australia, so as to maximize results. In addition to those for Southeast Asian countries, capacity-building for Pacific Island countries will be expanded

VI Elements Supporting Defense Capabilities

1 Training and Exercises

To effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance the deterrence effectiveness, MOD/SDF will conduct bilateral and multilateral training and exercises with Australia, India, and European and Southeast Asian countries in addition to SDF's joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises, in a planned and visible way to demonstrate Japan's intention and capability that unilateral changes to the status quo by

force and such attempts will not be tolerated. In doing so, MOD/SDF will seek to enhance and strengthen training and exercises as FDO which are flexibly implemented according to the situation, as well as enhance the content of training and conduct new training utilizing favorable training environments overseas, based on the development of Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) and other measures.

In addition, to maximize the capabilities of SDF units in a contingency, MOD/SDF will expand the establishment and utilization of training areas and other facilities in Hokkaido and other areas in Japan, and steadily establish and enhance the necessary training infrastructure in Japan. In addition to expanding the joint/shared use of

U.S. military facilities and areas by SDF and the use of civilian airport and seaport facilities, MOD/SDF will enhance training for rapid deployment of its units to islands such as those in the southwestern region, joint training, and civil protection training, etc., with relevant organizations such as the police, Japan Coast Guard, firefighting services and local governments to appropriately respond to infringements that do not amount to armed attacks from outside as well as armed attacks in the vicinity of remote islands.

In order to expand such training, it is necessary to obtain the understanding and cooperation of related local governments and local residents. Therefore, while taking all possible measures to ensure the safety of training, MOD/SDF will give due consideration to the surrounding environments of training infrastructures, including training ranges in Hokkaido and other areas in Japan.

2 Reinforcing Coordination and Cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard

In order to appropriately respond to any types of contingencies, coordination and cooperation with Japan Coast Guard will be further strengthened. To this end, MOD/SDF will deepen the information sharing and coordination mechanism with Japan Coast Guard, as well as enhance various response procedures and training, including developing procedures to have the Minister of Defense control the Japan Coast Guard in an armed attack situation and conducting joint training.

3 Collaboration with Local Communities

To enable SDF and U.S. Forces in Japan to seamlessly and effectively conduct activities on a daily basis, Japan will strive to gain understanding and cooperation from local governments and residents around their facilities.

Japan will actively engage in public relations activities regarding the policies and activities of MOD/SDF and also the role of U.S. Forces in Japan on a regular basis, and coordinate to accommodate the requests and situations of the local communities, while fulfilling accountability. At the same time, Japan will continue to promote measures to improve the living environment of areas around defense facilities including those against noise the perspective of promoting cooperation to the defense of Japan. In addition, in light of the fact that in some regions, the very existence of SDF units contribute greatly to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities, and the transportation of emergency patients by SDF support the local medical service, MOD/SDF will give due consideration to the characteristics of the regions and the contribution to the local economy in order to gain understanding of the local governments and residents upon reorganization of units as well as placement and operation of SDF camps and bases. In addition, based on the national government's policy on contracts concerning small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), MOD/SDF will promote various measures that contribute to local economies, such as securing opportunities for local SMEs to receive orders, while also taking efficiency into consideration.

4 Reinforcing Policy-Making Functions

In order for SDF to fully exert its capabilities and response to the increasingly severe, complex, and rapid-paced strategic environment, strategic and agile defense policy planning and making are required including such domains as space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum and MOD/SDF will fundamentally reinforce its functions. In this regard, MOD/SDF will establish a consultation framework to obtain policy advice from experts. Also, MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture to comprehensively advance future way of "warfare" for SDF and how to utilize and nurture cutting-edge technologies as well as apply those technology to defense necessary for this from a strategic perspective, while closely cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, private research institutions, and private companies particularly defense industry as their core. Furthermore, in order to promote such efforts and support the formulation of policies, MOD/SDF will review and reinforce its research system led by National Institute for Defense Studies and reinforce its functions as an intellectual base.

In addition, MOD/SDF will contribute promoting security education by dispatching lecturers to educational institutions and enhancing public symposiums, etc., so that citizens can accurately recognize knowledge and information on security policy. MOD/SDF will also promote various measures to further utilize social networks, which are becoming increasingly diverse, and to enhance our ability to disseminate information, including in foreign languages. In addition, in order to further strengthen the research and education functions of MOD/SDF, centering on National Institute for Defense Studies, MOD/SDF will expand networks and organizational collaboration with domestic and foreign research and education institutions, universities, think tanks, and other organizations.

VII Protection of Life, Person and Property of Japanese Nationals and Measures for International Security Cooperation

1 Response to Large-Scale Disasters

In the event of various types of disasters including natural disasters such as the Nankai Trough Earthquake, nuclear disasters, and other special disasters, MOD/SDF will take all possible measures to ensure initial response promptly by transferring and deploying units of sufficient scale, while maintaining joint operations as the basis of its operations.

At the same time, measures will be taken to strengthen the response posture, such as the procurement of UAVs(near-field), helicopter satellite communication systems (helicopter SATs), lifesaving systems, and emergency power supplies.

In addition, in close coordination and cooperation with related ministries and agencies, local governments, and the private sectors, MOD/SDF will promote various measures such as conducting various training and exercises, formulating plans, and securing alternative functions and deployment infrastructure in the event of a disaster.

Furthermore, including in areas where many nuclear power plants are located, MOD/SDF will conduct training in cooperation with related organizations, verify coordination procedures, and take necessary measures after examining such issues as securing deployment infrastructure in the vicinity of nuclear power plants.

2 Measures for Maritime Security and Use of the Airspace based on Existing International Rules

Recognizing that open and stable seas and the use of the airspace based on existing international rules are the foundation of peace and prosperity of Japan as a maritime nation, and based on the vision

of a FOIP, MOD/SDF will promote efforts such as port calls by naval vessels and aircraft on various occasions with other countries that share awareness of maritime security and the use of airspace based on existing rules such as through joint training and exercises, equipment and technologies cooperation, capacity building and information sharing. In this way, MOD/SDF will actively and visibly demonstrate our willingness and capability for the stability of the maritime order and the use of the airspace based on existing international rules.

3 International Peace Cooperation Activities

In line with the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan will continue to promote international peace cooperation activities, while giving comprehensive consideration to such factors as purposes of mission, situation in host country, and political and economic relations between Japan and host countries. In particular, by making good use of accumulated experiences, Japan will actively promote activities such as dispatch of embedded personnel to mission headquarters, capacity building related to UN PKO such as the UN Triangular Partnership Program (TPP), and the dispatch of staff members to UN headquarters, etc., in order to contribute to the improvement of the security environment. In addition, in order to strengthen the systems concerning international activities including rescue or transportation of Japanese nationals overseas in the unstable international situation, the Central Readiness Regiment and the International Operations Training Unit will be integrated to form a new international operations force with high readiness and high technical capabilities in the field of facilities and unmanned aircraft operation, etc.

MOD/SDF will expand curriculum of the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center, and given the importance of cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, foreign countries, and non.governmental organizations, MOD/SDF will strengthen the cooperation with them through efforts such as providing educational opportunities to not only SDF personnel but also other personnel from various backgrounds.

Regarding the SDF's operation facility in Djibouti for counter-piracy operations, MOD/SDF will promote renewal/upgrade to ensure its long.term and stable utilization for regional security cooperation, including the protection and transportation of Japanese nationals abroad in the Middle East and Africa.

VIII New Measures for Early Deployment of Defense Equipment

MOD/SDF will steadily realize acceleration of defense equipment deployment which is particularly urgent and significant from a policy perspective of the areas that could directly affect the SDF's current and future operations. Those areas include stand- off defense capabilities, maritime assets, soft kills, unmanned defense capabilities, AI, next-generation information and communications, space domain, DX, high-power energy and integrated information warfare. For acceleration of defense equipment deployment, MOD/SDF will receive proposals from the defense-related companies or incorporate advanced civilian technologies through start-up companies, domestic research institutes and other organizations. To this end, MOD/SDF will establish a new framework to deploy defense equipment within the next five years and to operate it with intensive iterations of operational verification, evaluation, and improvement, in addition to flexibly reviewing administrative procedures, contracting methods and other rules of MOD/SDF that might be obstacles to this acceleration of deployment efforts, and to realize its full- scale operation within approximately the next 10 years.

IX Defense Production and Technological Base as Virtually Integral Part of a Defense Capability

1 Reinforcing Defense Production Base

While Japan's defense industry is responsible for each stage of the equipment life cycle, the equipment and defense industry are inseparable. In this context, the defense production and technological bases are virtually integral part of a defense capability.

While the defense business requires a large investment of management resources to meet advanced performance requirements and maintenance measures, companies are facing diverse issues; profitability is lower than the level defined by the procurement system, the industry is currently considered as unattractive because sales channels are limited to SDF, and growth is not expected, and various risks, such as supply chain risks and cyberattacks, are apparent.

In order to address these issues, MOD/SDF will make defense industry more attractive, by adopting method to evaluate each company's quality management, cost management and delivery management for defense business to calculate company's costs and profits accurately. In addition, MOD/SDF will adopt a method of acquiring equipment that further emphasizes the viewpoint of maintaining and strengthening the domestic infrastructure while developing company's predictability for projects, such as the plan-and.proposal method. As for equipment to be procured under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procurement, efforts will be made to promote the participation of domestic companies, as well as to streamline and improve efficiency.

In order to cope with various risks and maintain and strengthen the defense production bases, appropriate fiscal measures and financial support will be provided for companies' initiatives such as upgrading manufacturing and other facilities, strengthening cybersecurity, making supply chains more resilient, and business succession.

MOD/SDF will conduct supply chain surveys to identify supply chain risks and promote new entrants to the supply chain to strengthen the supply chain and incorporate advanced commercial/basic technologies. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will cooperate with defense authorities of allies and like-minded countries, etc., to mutually complement supply chains. In this way, the supply chain will be strengthened to contribute to stable procurement.

Since the protection of information from intelligence activities and cyberattacks by foreign countries, or other cause, is a prerequisite for defense production and international equipment and technology cooperation, MOD/SDF will reinforce industrial security system while taking measures for steady implementation of Standards on Cybersecurity Measures for Defense Industry as well as for formulation and application of Defense Industrial Security Manual. In addition, MOD/SDF will implement sensitive technology security in conjunction with economic security measures such as the patent application non.disclosure system.

2 Reinforcing Defense Technology Base

MOD/SDF will realize acceleration of defense equipment development through various efforts concerning R&D by identifying specific projects necessary for future warfare and organizing the entire picture up to the acquisition. Based on the integrated equipment system, which is systematically organized for future battles from the viewpoint of joint operations, MOD/ SDF will intensively invest in equipment/technology fields (1)-(6) that are directly linked to future battles. Furthermore, by improving the efficiency of the R&D process, including improving the capabilities of conventional equipment, and by introducing new methods, MOD/SDF will realize shortening the time required for R&D and lead to the acceleration of defense equipment deployment.

At the same time, MOD/SDF will establish a mechanism to

promptly abolish projects for research and development with low prospects for results.

In order to secure technological superiority in the future, and realize advanced capabilities ahead of other countries, MOD/SDF will pursue and implement technological cooperation, including international joint research and development and research and development that incorporates a wide range of advanced commercial/basic technologies, and at the same time will invest heavily in technologies that can be directly linked to defense applications, aiming to acquire technologies at an early stage. In doing so, MOD/SDF will promote collaboration with projects in related ministries and agencies and actively utilize the results of those projects.

Based on the above, the policy division, the operational division, and the technological division will work in unison to promote measures related to the study of future battle strategies and the utilization of advanced technologies.

From the perspective of gathering Japan's scientific and technological capabilities, MOD/SDF will strategically release the information on technological fields and research and development prospects that it enhances predictability for companies and others. In addition, in order to fundamentally reinforce the functions to produce defense innovation and groundbreaking equipment, etc., a new research institute will be established in Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) after FY2024 through scrap-and-build, the R&D -related organizations of the agency, and the strengthening of the R&D system will be implemented. In addition, from the viewpoint of effective implementation of initiatives related to advanced technologies, MOD/SDF will strongly promote technological cooperation not only with domestic research institutes but also with allies and like-minded countries such as the United States, Australia, and the U.K.

Promote the development of equipment that anticipates equipment transfer from the development stage and review of SDF's original specifications. In developing equipment, MOD/ SDF will consider cost reductions in the mass production and maintenance phases. In addition, regarding conventional technologies such as ammunition and vehicles, measures would be taken to maintain the production and technological infrastructure.

(1) Stand-Off Defense Capabilities

Japan will acquire capabilities to deal with vessels and landing forces invading Japan, including its remote islands, from locations outside of threat zones.

a. Continue development of upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missile (surface-, ship-, and air-to-ship missiles), aiming to complete development of the surface-type by the end of FY2025, the ship-type by the end of FY2026, and the air- type by the end of FY2028 for the air-type.
b. Buildup submarine-type stand-off defense capabilities that can be launched from submarines that can operate in a highly covert manner.
c. Continue research on Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) for island defense that fly at high altitude and high speed to hit ground targets, aiming to complete the project for the early deployment by the end of FY2025. In addition, upgraded HVGP for island defense will be developed to defeat the opposing forces invading the islands, from more distant areas in the mainland, etc.
d. Promote research on hypersonic missiles, which are difficult to be intercepted by traveling at hypersonic speeds, aiming to complete the project by FY2031, and consider the development of derivative types.
e. Research on new anti-ship guided missile for island defense that has a longer-range, low radar cross section (RCS), and higher mobility, while having multiple functions through modularization.

(2) Capabilities to Respond to HGVs, etc.

MOD/SDF will acquire technologies to deal with Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) threats and others that are difficult to detect or intercept with existing equipment.

a. Develop upgraded Type-03 Medium-Range SAM (modified) with capability of responding to HGV and ballistic missiles in addition to cruise missiles, etc.
b. Conduct research and studies on guided missile systems for responding to HGV threats that travel at hypersonic speeds at high altitudes with high maneuverability.

(3) Capabilities to Respond to Drones and Swarm Attacks

MOD/SDF will aim to acquire and promptly equip technologies to economically and effectively respond to the rapidly growing airborne threat of drone swarms.

a. Continue research on various types of high-energy lasers to intercept drones and other airborne threats.
b. Continue research on technologies to intercept drones and other objects by radiating them with high-power microwaves (HPM).

(4) Unmanned Assets

In order to promote unmanned and labor-saving defense equipment, MOD/SDF will acquire technologies related to UUVs while reviewing existing equipment systems and personnel assignments.

a. Conduct research on technologies such as UUV-UUV control to enhance operational capabilities in the underwater domain.
b. Conduct research on operational support technology to control multiple unmanned combat vehicles (UGVs) from a manned vehicle, autonomous driving technology, etc.
c. Conduct research on technologies related to USVs in order to further reduce personnel and achieve unmanned waterborne vessels.

(5) Measures for Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft

a. Steadily promote joint development of the next-generation fighter aircraft with the UK and Italy, aiming to complete development by the end of FY2035. Research and development will also be promoted for a combat support unmanned aircraft to be collaborating with manned aircraft such as the next-generation fighter aircraft.
b. In conducting research and development of these technologies, Japan-led development will be realized by ensuring freedom of modification for timely and appropriate upgrade in the future and domestic production and technological bases for high readiness, etc. on the premise that the aircraft maintains the capability to effectively counter numerically superior opponents.

(6) Reinforcing Other Deterrence and Response Capabilities

a. Continue research on future railguns to improve the capability of intercepting various airborne threats.
b. Conduct research on technology of jamming device that misleads radar and other radio wave equipment into believing that multiple threats exist by giving false information.
c. Conduct research to reflect the technology to support commanders' decision-making into equipment by analyzing the course of action using AI to cope with the complex and fast changing combat situations.
d. Research and develop the next generation signal intelligence

aircraft, which will be the successor to the multipurpose aircraft (EP-3), with improved target information collection capability, etc.

e. Develop new small mines that are compact and can be controlled remotely in order to lay mines quickly from naval vessels on alert watch, etc.

f. Begin research and development of hypersonic surface-to- air guided missiles utilizing the results of elemental research on hypersonic missiles.

3 Promoting Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

Transfer of defense equipment and technology overseas is not only a strategic tool of foreign and defense policy to build effective partnerships with allied and like-minded countries and to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force or invasion of Japan, but also effective in ensuring the growth of the defense industry through the expansion of defense equipment market. From this perspective, the government will take the lead in promoting appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology by further cooperation between the public and private sectors. The government will also establish a fund and provide corporate assistance as necessary.

4 Promotion of Various Measures and Institutional Development

In order to implement the above policies, necessary budgetary measures, etc., as well as necessary legislation and financing of projects with a high policy nature through the use of government financial institutions, etc., will be provided, and the status of their execution will be constantly verified and the system will be revised as necessary.

X Strengthening the Foundation for SDF Personnel to Fulfill Abilities as Core of Defense Capabilities

1 Reinforcing Human Resource Base

In order to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities, MOD/SDF will reinforce the human resource base by securing necessary uniformed SDF personnel and civilian officials and others, and by conducting study of necessary systems, while paying attention to the facts that individual SDF personnel are required to have more knowledge, skills, and experience than ever before and that MOD/SDF needs to develop SDF personnel who have a background to reliably deal with cross.domain operations, information warfare, and others. In this regard SDF personnel who work on research and development will be secured and their knowledge and skills will be developed. In addition, MOD/SDF will reinforce its education, especially focusing on domains such as cyber, and utilize civilian workforce in these domains. To this end, an environment will be created in which all SDF personnel can demonstrate their abilities even as they face life events such as childcare, childbirth, and nursing care, and MOD/SDF will take comprehensive measures focusing on the entire life cycle starting from recruitment, including reskilling of SDF personnel.

(1) Enhancing Recruitment Efforts

In order to stably secure excellent human resources in the severe recruiting environment with a declining number of people eligible for recruitment due to a declining birthrate, MOD/SDF will promote various recruiting measures such as digitalization of recruitment PR, and strengthen the functions of the Provincial Cooperation Offices and the cooperation with local governments and related organizations.

In addition, from the viewpoint of improving the attractiveness of fixed-term SDF personnel, MOD/SDF will review the system of Candidates for SDF personnel and improve support for the re.employment and learning at universities, etc., after the completion of their term of service. Furthermore, in light of the declining birthrate and higher education level, measures to expand the recruitment of untenured officers and to broaden the recruitment base to include college graduates, etc., should be promoted. At the same time, MOD/SDF will secure high-quality human resources at an early stage through the expansion of the SDF scholarship student system.

Furthermore, in order to incorporate human resources with specialized knowledge and skills who are expected to be active in fields such as cyber and space domains, a new SDF personnel system will be established to enable flexible recruitment and appointment, and necessary measures will be taken to utilize human resources from the private sector, including retired SDF personnel.

(2) Utilization of SDF Reserve Personnel and Others.

In order for SDF Reserve Personnel and others to effectively supplement regular SDF personnel in the changing operational environment and diversifying missions of SDF, MOD/SDF will not only improve their sufficiency rates but also fundamentally review and reinforce the system of SDF Reserve Personnel and others. To this end, after reviewing the roles of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and SDF Reserve Personnel, MOD/SDF will expand the recruitment of them from civilians with no experience in the SDF and review the current system in light of their age limits and training periods, and other issues.

(3) Effective Use of Human Resources

MOD/SDF continues to actively recruit female SDF personnel and appoint them according to their motivation, ability, and aptitude, as well as develop an educational infrastructure that supports their activities, and systematically develop women's quarters in the military barracks and naval vessels with an eye to increasing the number of female SDF personnel.

In addition, in order to further utilize human resources with abundant knowledge, skills, and experience, the retirement age for SDF personnel will be raised while paying attention to their military strength, and the duties in which re-enrolled SDF personnel can be engaged in will be greatly expanded.

Curbing mid-career retirements is an urgent issue, therefore a survey on SDF personnel's attitude towards mid-career retirement will be conducted in order to contribute to the consideration of effective measures to curb mid-career retirement. Taking into consideration the special nature of the missions and service environment, MOD/SDF will constantly review and implement necessary measures.

(4) Improvement of Living and Working Environment, etc.

Recognizing that there is no place for harassment which ruins the mutual trust among SDF personnel and shakes the very foundation of the entire organization, MOD/SDF will establish new measures based on the findings of the expert panel and other reviews on harassment prevention, and ensure that all SDF personnel are fully aware of them. In addition, MOD/SDF will develop an organizational environment of zero tolerance for harassment with continuous review of the measures taken to ensure that they are in line with the times.

In addition, MOD/SDF will steadily develop housing necessary for introducing and reorganizing units as well as ensuring readiness. MOD/SDF will also systematically take measures against aging and earthquake of barracks and housing, including modernization and preventive maintenance. Furthermore, the living and working environment for personnel will be improved by ensuring the required number of living and working equipment, replacing aging equipment, and ensuring the required number of daily consumables.

In doing so, Japan will place consideration on creating a comfortable working environment even in special environments such as naval vessels. Through these measures, MOD/SDF will aim to improve the morale of SDF personnel.

In addition to promoting efforts to ensure work-life balance, including the development and dissemination of systems that support a good balance between family and work, MOD/SDF will promote measures such as the development of childcare facilities and temporary childcare for children during emergency visits for the office based on the needs of SDF personnel. In addition, MOD/SDF will expand measures to support families in cooperation with local governments and related organizations.

(5) Human Resource Development

In order to secure human resources who can contribute to more advanced cross-domain joint operations, MOD/SDF will strengthen the education on joint operations in the educational institutions such as the Joint Staff College and staff colleges of each service. Each SDF service, National Defense Academy, and National Institute for Defense Studies will strengthen their education and research contents and architecture for cyber domain and others for securing and providing skilled human resources who can become the core of SDF units. In addition, MOD/SDF will transform the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force High Technical School into a combined school of each service, as well as a coeducational school by accepting female students.

In addition, in order to further promote mutual complementation between each service of the SDF, MOD/SDF will integrate their educational programs and promote effective and efficient education and research by utilizing state-of-the-art technologies. Furthermore, the 1st and 2nd Service Schools of the Maritime Self-Defense Force will be integrated in order to implement unified education and improve educational effects, and the T-7/T-4 successor aircraft and related systems will be upgraded to optimize the flight education and training environment for the so-called 5th generation fighter pilot training.

(6) Improving Treatment and Reemployment

Through conducting a survey of SDF personnel's overtime work, etc., MOD/SDF will make salaries and allowances based on the special nature of their missions and work environment, and continue to give due treatment to personnel engaged in harsh missions, especially on naval vessels and radar sites. In addition, treatment will be improved given the fact that missions are increasing such as the counterstrike capability. MOD/SDF will conduct research on the salary systems of military personnel in other countries, and consider how SDF personnel should be paid in the future. MOD/SDF will promote measures concerning honors and privileges for those well-deserved for achievements through many years of diligent services for their duties as SDF personnel.

In addition, given that it is the responsibility of the government to secure the livelihood of uniformed SDF personnel after retirement under the early retirement system or fixed-term service system, MOD/SDF will further improve and strengthen reemployment support by enhancing the career guidance and job training opportunities for SDF personnel scheduled for retirement, and by strengthening cooperation with local governments, relevant organizations, and private companies, etc.

2 Transformation of Medical Functions

In order to cope with various situations and respond to diverse missions in Japan and abroad, MOD/SDF will promote integrated medical operations by unifying medical functions common to all SDF units, build a posture that can mobilize the full strength of SDF's medical force, including the National Defense Medical College, and promote fundamental reforms to improve the combat trauma care capabilities.

In order to save the lives of personnel who are performing their duties in a contingency without regard for danger, it is necessary to establish a seamless medical care and evacuation posture from the front line to the destination hospital. For this purpose, it is necessary to strengthen the respective medical functions first aid at the front line, medical evacuation by utilizing various assets of each service to transport wounded personnel to the destination hospital, and the SDF hospitals.

First, for the first aid at the front line, MOD/SDF will increase the number of frontline combat medics certified as assistant nurse and paramedic, and further strengthen the foundation for education and training. In addition, a new joint training course for damage control surgery following first aid at the frontline will be established to systematically train personnel. Furthermore, MOD/ SDF plans to provide necessary education and training regarding surgical operations on board naval vessels for those who have completed the above course in order to strengthen onboard medical care capability.

For aero medical evacuation, new training equipment will be introduced, and an education and training environment will be established to improve first-aid capabilities during transport of wounded and sick. In implementing these education and training programs, MOD/SDF will standardize, integrate and improve common knowledge and skills among each force.

MOD/SDF considers enhancing the functions and survivability of the SDF Naha Hospital is an effective measure in strengthening medical capacity in the southwestern region. MOD/SDF will take measures for SDF Naha Hospital such as increasing the number of beds, adding medical departments, and building underground facilities. Other SDF hospitals that can be a destination will be strengthened similarly when they are reconstructed.

Since most of medical functions are common to all SDF units, MOD/SDF will promote standardizing medical equipment and materials in consideration of interoperability between each SDF service. In addition, in order to enable Self-Defense Forces hospitals and other facilities to obtain the medical information of each SDF member in a timely manner without distinction between the SDF services, the medical record of each member would be digitized, and a system would be established to enable prompt retrieval and viewing of medical record for each member. Most deaths in war are due to exsanguination from bomb wounds, gunshot wounds, and other similar causes. To prevent such deaths, it is extremely important to secure blood products for transfusion, and MOD/SDF would consider establishing a system to autonomously secure and stockpile blood products. In addition, in order to secure medical oxygen, which is as important as blood products in war wound care, MOD/SDF will also acquire oxygen concentrators and other relative equipment.

In addition, MOD/SDF will strengthen education and research, including combat trauma care capabilities improvement, at the National Defense Medical College in light of modern medical technology evolution. The National Defense Medical College Hospital, which is the clinical site, is to be strengthened to accommodate the acceptance of those wounded in war, in addition to advanced medical education for medical and nursing officers and skill improvement for the medical personnel of SDF. In order to accommodate the acceptance of those wounded in war, the hospital will undergo a drastic reform of its operation, and its functions will be strengthened by utilizing opportunities such as the reconstruction of the hospital. As a complement to these efforts, efforts will also be made to ensure that medical and nursing officers receive training outside the department.

XI. Optimization Efforts

1 Equipment

For GSDF, in order to optimize the air structure, the air units of divisions and brigades will be abolished with some exceptions, and helicopter functions will be concentrated in each district unit, while the functions of anti-tank and combat helicopters (AH) and observation helicopters (OH) will be transferred to UAVs and UAVs for utility/attack and surveillance, etc. The functions of AHs and OHs will be transferred to UAVs and UAVs for reconnaissance and other purposes. In doing so, the minimum functions necessary will be maintained by arming existing helicopters, etc.

For MSDF, the number of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) acquisitions will be partially reviewed in conjunction with the acquisition of a dwell UAV to enhance offshore surveillance capabilities over a wide area. The number of patrol helicopters (SH-60K (upgraded version)) acquired will be partially revised due to a review of the shipboard requirements, including the installation of fighter aircraft (F-35B) on destroyers (Izumo class). Proceed with the discontinuation of the use of multi. purpose aircraft (U-36A).

For ASDF, in order to optimize the aircraft types, it will move forward with the elimination of the use of rescue search aircraft (U.125A) and other aircraft.

Further efforts for effective and efficient acquisition of equipment include: cost reduction through planned and stable acquisition of equipment by expanding the application of long- term contracts, improving the predictability of companies and promoting efficient production, procurement in consideration of the supply-demand situation of equipment including that of other countries, and narrowing down SDF-unique specifications that cause costs to rise. In addition, the SDF's own unique procurement system, which takes into account the supply-demand situation of equipment, including that of other countries, and the narrowing of specifications, etc., will enhance the effectiveness of project management throughout the equipment life cycle.

2 Personnel

In addition to transferring the capacity necessary to strengthen the joint operation system from each of the SDF, GSDF personnel will be transferred to MSDF and ASDF to optimize the organizational capacity of the SDF, based on the increase of required personnel by MSDF and ASDF. To this end, approximately 2,000 GSDF personnel will be transferred to joint unit, MSDF and ASDF.

In addition, the number of all SDF officers will not be increased, but rather a review of existing units and the use of outside labor force, such as private-sector contractors, will be promoted.

XII Quantities of Major Procurement

Targets to be achieved in five years and approximately in ten years for the defense capabilities to be fundamentally reinforced under this program are shown in Appendix 1.

The specific scale of the major procurement of defense equipment listed in II and III above is shown in Appendix 2.

In addition, the major formation quota and the specific scale of the major procurement of defense equipment, etc. in approximately 10 years are shown in Appendix 3.

XIII Expenditures

1 The expenditure aiming for the implementation of defense capability buildup described in this program for the next five years from FY2023 to FY2027 amount to approximately 43 trillion yen.

2 The annual defense budgets for FY2023 to FY2027 under this program amount to approximately 40,500 billion yen in total (approximately 8,900 billion yen in FY 2027), on the assumption that the following measures will be taken.

(1) Considering the progress of each project, further accelerate the improvement of SDF facilities in an agile and flexible manner (approximately 1,600 billion yen);

(2) Utilize settlement surplus in the general account further when the surplus is larger than the expected settlement surplus in 6 (approximately 900 billion yen).

In light of the increasingly severe fiscal conditions and the significance of other budgets related to the lives of the people, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, further optimization and rationalization of defense buildup will be thoroughly implemented, by means of suspending the use of equipment whose importance has decreased, reviewing projects of low cost-effectiveness, optimizing equipment procurement through cost management/reduction and long-term contracts, and securing other revenues. If the surplus does not increase to the above-mentioned level, MOD/SDF will secure financial resources virtually through these initiatives.

In the budget formulation process of each fiscal year, MOD/SDF will take care to respond to unforeseen circumstances such as changes in the security environment. On top of that, MOD/SDF will examine the progress, effectiveness, and feasibility of each project, including the equipment procurement shown in Appendix 2, and revise projects flexibly, if necessary.

3 The expenses based on contracts (material expenses) to be newly concluded to implement this program amount to approximately 43,500 billion yen (excluding the amount corresponding to payments for the period outside of the program that contribute to improving project efficiency, such as maintenance), and the future obligation for each fiscal year is to be managed appropriately.

4 Since measures such as for equipment procurement and maintenance, facility maintenance, R&D, and system development/upgrade will be intensively implemented during the next five years from FY2023 to FY2027 under this program, MOD/SDF will make efforts to appropriately take these into account and proceed defense buildup in a stable and sustainable manner in the subsequent program based on the FY2027 level.

5 This program will be reviewed, if necessary, based on the medium to long-term defense and fiscal outlook, considering various factors at home and abroad such as the international environment at the time, trends in technological standards including Information and Communication Technology (ICT), and the situation of the economic power and fiscal foundation supporting the reinforcement of defense capabilities.

6 To secure financial resources for the stable sustainment of defense capabilities after FY2027 as well as for covering this program from FY2023 to FY2027, necessary measures will be implemented in both expenditure and revenue areas, such as the reform in government expenditure, using settlement surplus, creation of defense buildup funds utilizing non-tax revenues, and tax measures.

XIV Notes

In order to reduce the burden on Okinawa Prefecture and other local communities, specific measures regarding the review of the U.S. military force posture in Japan and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related projects will be steadily implemented.

Annex Table 1

Fields	By 5 years until FY2027*	Approx.10 Years Later
	If an invasion of Japan occurs, Japan will respond with primary responsibility and buildup defense capabilities to disrupt and defeat the invasion while gaining support from its ally and others.	Further efforts to ensure the defense concept described on the left (buildup defense capabilities to disrupt or to defeat invasion at an earlier and more distant location)
Stand-Off Defense Capabilities	• Acquire practical capability to operate stand-off missiles	• Acquire capabilities to operate more advanced stand-off missiles • Secure required sufficient quantities
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities	• Reinforce capability to respond to Hypersonic Weapons • Reinforce capability to respond to miniature Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)	• Reinforce wide-area air defense capabilities • More efficient and effective UAV countermeasures
Unmanned Defense Capabilities	• Expand the use of UAV to strengthen capabilities to practically operate	• Reinforce capability to control multiple unmanned assets simultaneously, etc.
Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities/ Civil Protection	• Reinforce Space Domain Awareness (SDA), cybersecurity capabilities, and electromagnetic domain capabilities, etc. • Reinforce ground, sea, and air domain capabilities that become basis of cross- domain operations	• Further reinforce space operation capability • Further reinforce cybersecurity capability to enable support for entities other than SDF • Strengthen ground, maritime, and air capabilities to work with UAV
Command and Control/Intelligence-related Functions	• Accelerate decision-making through the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI), etc., while strengthening the resiliency of the network • Strengthen information acquisition and analysis in both strategic and tactic information, including responses in the cognitive dimension	• Reinforce information gathering and analysis capabilities through the use of AI, etc., while enhancing the system for persistent information gathering and sharing
Mobile Deployment Capabilities	• Reinforce the SDF's transportation and supply capabilities (deployment/ civil protection), including enhancement of the SDF's transportation assets and use of PFI vessels, etc.	• Further enhancements of transportation capability • Accelerate transportation and supply capabilities by improving supply centers, etc.
Sustainability and Resiliency	• Increase quantity of ammunitions and missiles • Ensure maximum operational availability of equipment except during maintenance • Improve the resiliency of defense facilities for contingencies • Secure required ammunition depots, etc.	• Maintain and ensure adequate inventory of ammunitions and missiles • Maintain the operational availability ratio • Further improve the resiliency of defense facilities • Further secure ammunition depots and other facilities commensurate with ammunition requirements
Defense Production and Technological Bases	• Establish strong defense production bases through measures to strengthen the supply chain, etc. • Focused investment in equipment areas directly linked to future warfare, and a significant reduction in research and development periods	• Maintain robust defense production base capable for realizing innovative equipment • Acquire technologies for securing technological superiority in the future
Human Resource Base	• Secure the necessary number of high- quality human resources from a wide range of sources, including the private sector, by strengthening recruitment capabilities and establishing a new SDF personnel system. • Reinforce education and research (cyber and other domains, joint operations, medical) • Improvement of living and working environments and treatment by taking necessary measures against aging barracks and housing and eliminating equipment shortages	• Even amid a declining population eligible for recruitment, continuously and stably secure the necessary human resources, including those with specialized knowledge and skills. • Further strengthen education and research • Foster an organizational environment in which all members can demonstrate their individual abilities while maintaining high morale

* Accelerate investment in improving mobility, securing ammunition, and fortifying key defense facilities to maximize the use of existing equipment, while focusing on fundamentally strengthening core areas of future defense capabilities, such as stand - off defense and unmanned asset defense capabilities.

Annex Table 2

Classification	Equipment Type	Procurement Quantity
(1) Stand-off Defense capabilities	Upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missile (Surface-, Ship-, Air-ship)	Surface-type 11 Units
	Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) Hypersonic Missile	—
	Ship-to-surface cruise guided missile (Tomahawk)	—
(2) Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities	Type 03 Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (modified)	14 Units
	Aegis System-Equipped Vessels	2 ships
	Airborne Early Warning Aircraft(E-2D)	5 aircraft
	Interceptor Missiles for Ballistic Missile Defense (SM-3 Block IIA)	—
	Interceptor Missiles with Upgraded Capabilities (PAC-3MSE)	—
	Long-Range Ship-to-Air Missiles SM-6	—
(3) Unmanned Defense Capabilities	Various UAVs	—
	USV	—
	UGV	—
	UUV	—
(4) Cross-Domain Capabilities	Destroyer	12 ships
	Submarine	5 ships
	Patrol Vessel	10 aircraft
	Fixed-wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1)	19 aircraft
	Fighter (F-35A)	40 aircraft
	Fighter (F-35B)	25 aircraft
	Fighter Upgrade (F-15)	54 aircraft
	Stand-off Electronic Warfare Aircraft	1 aircraft
	Network Electronic Warfare System (NEWS)	2 types
(5) Command and Control/ Intelligence-related Functions	Signals Intelligence Aircraft (RC-2)	3 aircraft
(6) Mobile Deployment Capabilities and Civil Protection	Transport Vessels	8 ships
	Transport Aircraft (C-2)	6 aircraft
	Aerial Refueling and Transport Aircraft (KC-46A, etc.)	13 aircraft

Annex Table 3

Classification	Future Posture		
Joint Units	Cyber Defense Units Maritime Transport Units		1 squadron 1 group
Ground Self-Defense Force	Active-Duty Personnel		149,000 people
	Major Units	Basic Operational Units	9 divisions 5 brigades 1 armored division
		Airborne Units Amphibious Units Air Transport Units	1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade
		Stand-off Missile Units Joint Units	7 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments
			2 battalions (hyper velocity gliding projectile Intended for the defense of remote islands)
			2long-range guided missile units
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8anti-aircraft artillery groups
		Electronic Warfare Units (incl. anti-aircraft electronic warfare units)	1 electronic warfare operations unit (incl.1anti-aircraft electronic warfare unit)
		Unmanned Vehicle Units	1 multi-purpose unmanned aerial vehicle unit
		Information Warfare Units	1 unit
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Surface Vessels Units (Destroyers and Minesweeper vessels) Submarine Units Patrol aircraft Units (Fixed-wing Patrol aircraft Units) Unmanned Vehicle Units Information Warfare Units	6 groups (21 divisions) 6 divisions 9 divisions (4 divisions) 2 divisions 1 unit
	Major Equipment	Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Aegis System Equipped Vessels Patrol Vessels Submarines Combat Aircraft	54 (10) 2 12 22 Approx. 170
Air Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Air Warning & Control Units Fighter Aircraft Units Aerial Refueling/Transport Units Air Transport Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units Space Domain Mission Units Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units Operational Intelligence Units	4 Aircraft Control & Warning Wings 1 AEW wing (3 squadrons) 13 squadrons 2 squadrons 3 squadrons 4 groups (24 fire squadrons) 1 squadron 1 squadron 1 squadron
	Major Equipment	Combat Aircraft Fighters	Approx. 430 Approx. 320

Note 1: 14 out of the 15 divisions/brigades are operated on the basis of rapid deployment.
Note 2: Regarding the number of fighter aircraft units and fighters, necessary studies will be conducted by FY 2027 and necessary measures will be taken in order to further advance the quantitative enhancement of air capability. In this regard, the possibility of utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles will be studied.

Reference 5 Changes in the Annex Table of the National Defense Program Guidelines and Appendix Table 3 of the Defense Buildup Program

	Classification		1976 NDPG	1995 NDPG	2004 NDPG	2010 NDPG	2013 NDPG	2018 NDPG	DBP
Joint Units	Cyber Defense Units							1 squadron	1 squadron
	Maritime Transport Units							1 group	1 group
Ground Self-Defense Force	Authorized Number of Personnel (Note 1)		180,000	160,000	155,000	154,000	159,000	159,000	
	Active-Duty Personnel			145,000	148,000	147,000	151,000	151,000	149,000
	Ready Reserve Personnel (Note 1)			15,000	7,000	7,000	8,000	8,000	
	Major Units	Basic Operational Units (Note 2)	12 divisions 2 combined brigades 1 armored division	8 divisions 6 brigades 1 armored division	8 divisions 6 brigades 1 armored division	8 divisions 6 brigades 1 armored division	5 divisions 2 brigades 1 armored division	5 divisions 2 brigades 1 armored division	9 divisions 5 brigades 1 armored division
		Airborne Units (Note 3)	1 airborne brigade	1 airborne brigade			1 airborne brigade	1 airborne brigade	1 airborne brigade
		Amphibious Rapid Deployment Units (Note 3)					1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade	1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade	1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade
		Airborne Rapid Deployment Units (Note 3)	1 helicopter brigade	1 helicopter brigade			1 helicopter brigade	1 helicopter brigade	1 helicopter brigade
		Rapid Deployment Units (Note 4)	1 training group		Central Readiness Force	Central Readiness Force	3 rapid deployment divisions	3 rapid deployment divisions	
			1 artillery brigade				4 rapid deployment brigades	4 rapid deployment brigades	
		Stand-off Missile Units (Note 5)					5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments	5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments	7 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments
								2 battalions with hypervelocity gliding projectiles	2 battalions with hypervelocity gliding projectiles intended for the defense of remote islands
									2 long-range guided missile units
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups
		Electronic Warfare Units (Incl. Counter-Air Electronic Warfare Units)							1 electronic warfare operations unit (1 counter-air electronic warfare unit)
		Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units							1 multi-purpose unmanned aerial vehicle unit
		Information Warfare Units							1 unit
		Ballistic Missile Defense Units						2 ballistic missile defense units (Note 11)	
	Major Equipment	Tanks (Note 6)	(Approx. 1,200 vehicles)	Approx. 900 vehicles	Approx. 600 vehicles	Approx. 400 vehicles	(Approx. 300 vehicles)	(Approx. 300 vehicles)	
		Artillery (main artillery) (Note 6)	(Approx. 1,000 guns/ vehicles)	(Approx. 900 guns/ vehicles)	(Approx. 600 guns/ vehicles)	Approx. 400 guns/ vehicles	(Approx. 300 guns/ vehicles)	(Approx. 300 guns/ vehicles)	
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Surface Vessels Units (Destroyer Units and Minesweeper Vessel Units)				4 escort flotillas (8 divisions)	4 escort flotillas (8 divisions)	4 flotillas (8 divisions)	6 flotillas (21 divisions)
						4 escort flotillas	6 escort flotillas		
		Destroyer and Minesweeper Vessel Units (Note 7)						2 groups (13 divisions)	
		Rapid Deployment (Note 7)	4 escort flotillas	4 escort flotillas	4 escort flotillas (8 divisions)				
		Regional Deployment (Note 7)	(Regional units) 10 units	(Regional units) 7 units	5 divisions				
		Submarines Units	6 divisions	6 divisions	4 divisions	6 divisions	6 divisions	6 divisions	6 divisions
		Patrol Aircraft Units (Fixed-wing Patrol Aircraft Units)	(Land-based) 16 units	(Land-based) 13 units	9 divisions	9 squadrons	9 squadrons	9 squadrons	9 squadrons (4 divisions)
		Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units							2 divisions
		Information Warfare Units							1 unit
		Minesweeper Units (Note 7)	2 flotillas	1 flotilla	1 flotilla	1 flotilla	1 flotilla		
	Major Equipment	Destroyers (Aegis System-Equipped Destroyers)	Approx. 60	Approx. 50	47	48	54	54	54 (10)
		Aegis System-Equipped Vessels							2
		Patrol Vessels						12	12
		Submarines	16	16	16	22	22	22	22
		Combat Aircraft	Approx. 220	Approx. 170	Approx. 150	Approx. 150	Approx. 170	Approx. 190	Approx. 170
Air Self-Defense Force	Air Self-Defense Force Major Units	Air Warning & Control Units	28 warning groups	8 warning groups	8 warning groups	4 warning groups	28 warning squadrons	28 warning squadrons	4 aircraft control & warning wings
				20 warning squadrons	20 warning squadrons	24 warning squadrons			
			1 squadron	1 squadron	1 AEW group (2 squadrons)	1 AEW group (2 squadrons)	1 AEW group (3 squadrons)	1 AEW wing (3 squadrons)	1 AEW wing (3 squadrons)
		Fighter Aircraft Units			12 squadrons	12 squadrons	13 squadrons	13 squadrons	(Note 12) 13 squadrons
		Fighter-Interceptor Units Support Fighter Units	10 squadrons 3 squadrons	9 squadrons 3 squadrons					
		Air Reconnaissance Units	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron			
		Aerial Refueling/Transport Units			1 squadron	1 squadron	2 squadrons	2 squadrons	2 squadrons
		Air Transport Units	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	6 air defense missile groups	6 air defense missile groups	6 air defense missile groups	6 air defense missile groups	6 air defense missile groups	4 air defense missile groups (24 fire squadrons)	4 air defense missile groups (24 fire squadrons)
		Space Domain Mission Units						1 squadron	1 squadron
		Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units						1 squadron	1 squadron
		Operational Intelligence Units							1 squadron
	Major Equipment	Combat Aircraft	Approx. 430	Approx. 400	Approx. 350	Approx. 340	Approx. 360	Approx. 370	Approx. 430
		Fighter Aircraft	(Note 9) (Approx. 350)	Approx. 300	Approx. 260	Approx. 260	Approx. 280	Approx. 290	(Note 12) Approx. 320
Major Equipment/ Units That May Also Serve for Ballistic Missile Defense Missions (Note 8)		Aegis System-Equipped Destroyers			4	(Note 10) 6	8	8	
		Air Warning & Control Units			7 warning groups	11 warning groups/units			
					4 warning squadrons				
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units			3 air defense missile groups	6 air defense missile groups			

(Notes)
1. Not included in DBP Appendix Tables but shown here for comparisons with Appendix Tables of NDPGs from 1976 to 2018.
2. The Basic Operational Units were units designated as "units deployed in peacetime" through the 2010 NDPG, as "Regional Deployment Units" through the 2018 NDPG (except for 1 armored division which was defined as a "Rapid Deployment Unit"), and as "Rapid Deployment Units" in the DBP.
3. Units designated as "Rapid Deployment Units" through the 2018 NDPG.
4. Not included in DBP Appendix Tables but shown here for comparisons with Appendix Tables of NDPGs from 1976 to 2018.
5. In Stand-off Missile Units, Surface-to-ship Guided Missile Regiments were called "Surface-to-ship Guided Missile Units" and Hypervelocity Gliding Projectile Units Intended for the Defense of Remote Islands were called "Hypervelocity Gliding Projectile Units," respectively in NDPGs up to 2018.
6. Not included in the 1976 NDPG, 2013 NDPG, 2018 NDPG, and DBP Appendix Tables, but shown here for comparisons with Appendix Tables of NDPGs from 1995 to 2010.
7. Not included in the DBP but shown here for comparisons with DBP Appendix Tables. Destroyer Units were called "Anti-submarine Surface Units (for rapid deployment)" and "Anti-submarine Surface Units (regional units)" in the 1976 NDPG, "Destroyer Units (for rapid deployment)" and "Destroyer Units (regional units)" in the 1995 NDPG, and "Destroyer Units (for rapid deployment)" and "Destroyer Units (regional deployment)" in the 2004 NDPG.
8. Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions were included in the MSDF's major equipment and ASDF's major units in the 2004 and 2010 NDPGs, but those newly procured are included in the categories of Aegis system-equipped destroyers, Air Warning & Control Units, and Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units in the 2013 and 2018 NDPGs. In addition, this is not included in the DBP Appendix Tables but shown here for comparisons with the Appendix Tables of the NDPGs from 1976 to 2018.
9. Not included in the Appendix Tables of the 1976 NDPG but shown here for comparisons with the 1995 NDPG to DBP Appendix Tables.
10. In the 2010 NDPG, Aegis system-equipped destroyers with BMD functions were allowed to be additionally procured within the limited number of destroyers above, when separately determined in light of the progress in BMD technologies and financial circumstances.
11. With the deployment of two land-based Aegis systems (Aegis Ashore), two ballistic missile defense units were to be added, but the Cabinet decided in December 2020 to replace the land-based Aegis systems (Aegis Ashore) with two Aegis system-equipped vessels, maintained by the MSDF. The two are mentioned as a part of major equipment of the MSDF in the DBP Appendix Tables.
12. Regarding the number of fighter aircraft units and fighters, necessary studies will be conducted and necessary measures will be taken by FY2027 in order to further advance the quantitative enhancement of air capabilities. In this regard, the possibility of utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will be studied.

Reference 6 Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People

(July 1, 2014, National Security Council Decision)
Cabinet Decision

Since the end of WWII, Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation under the Constitution of Japan. While adhering to the basic policy of maintaining an exclusively defensive-oriented stance, not becoming a large military power that poses a threat to other countries, and upholding the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, Japan has flourished as a key economic power through the hard work of its people. Japan has also built a stable and affluent way of life for its citizens. In addition, as a peace-loving nation, Japan has been proactively engaging in international activities in cooperation with the international community and international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), while strictly upholding the tenets of the United Nations Charter. Japan's path as a peace-loving nation has won a high level of praise and respect from the international community, a position that must be further reinforced from now on.

Meanwhile, the security environment surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed in the 67 years between the enforcement of the Japanese Constitution and today, and it continues to evolve even further. Japan is also confronting complicated and significant national defense issues. There are no prospects for the realization of the so-called formal United Nations Command, which has been held up as an ideal in the Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, it is necessary to develop national legislation that will enable a seamless response.

In accordance with the basic orientation presented by then Prime Minister Abe at a press conference on May 15, which took place after the report of the "Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security" was submitted that same day, discussions have been repeatedly held between governing parties, and examination has also been conducted by the Government. Based on the results of discussions by governing parties, the Government will promptly develop national legislation necessary for protecting the lives and peaceful livelihoods of its people in accordance with the following basic policies.

1. Responses to Infringements that Do Not Amount to Armed Attacks

(1) Considering the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies are liable to occur, posing risks that could potentially develop into more serious situations. For infringements that do not amount to armed attacks, it has become even more important to prepare and ensure seamless and sufficient responses to any unlawful acts through closer cooperation between relevant agencies, including police organizations and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), assuming the basic division of roles.

(2) Specifically, under a basic policy in which relevant agencies, including the police and the Japan Coast Guard, UN Charter. Moreover, in the quarter-century following the end of the Cold War alone, shifts in global power balance, the rapid advancement of technological innovation, the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and threats from international terror organizations and similar have led to issues and tensions in the Asia-Pacific Region. Any threats, no matter where they arise in the world, could have a direct impact on the security of Japan. Furthermore, in recent years, risks that hinder free access to the oceans, space, and cyberspace, as well as their utilization, have been spreading and growing more serious. It is already no longer possible for any one country to uphold peace by itself. The international community expects Japan to take on a more proactive role in a way that is commensurate with its national capabilities.

The most important responsibility for the Government is to maintain the peace and security of Japan and ensure its survival, along with protecting the lives of its people. In order to adapt to the changing security environment surrounding Japan and fulfill its responsibility, the Government must first and foremost create a stable and predictable international environment and prevent the emergence of threats by promoting impactful diplomacy with sufficient institutional architecture. The Government must also resolve conflicts peacefully by acting in conformity with international law and placing importance on the rule of law.

Furthermore, it is important to appropriately build up, maintain, and operate Japan's own defense capabilities, strengthen mutual cooperation with the United States, which is Japan's ally, and deepen trust and cooperative relations with partners both within and outside the region. In particular, for the security of Japan and the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific Region, it is necessary to avoid armed conflicts and prevent threats from reaching Japan by further improving the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. On that basis, to resolutely protect the lives and peaceful livelihoods of its people in any situation, as well as contribute even more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community under the policy of a "Proactive are to respond in close cooperation with one another in accordance with their respective duties and authorities, the Government will further strengthen necessary efforts in all areas, such as enhancing each agency's response capabilities, strengthening collaboration including information sharing, examining and developing specific response guidelines, accelerating procedures to issue orders, and improving various types of exercises and training in order to respond to various unlawful acts.

(3) As for accelerating procedures, in cases of responding to an external infringement not amounting to an armed attack that occurs in regions surrounding remote islands and similar where there are either no police forces available nearby or police agencies cannot respond immediately (including situations in which police agencies cannot respond due to the nature of the weapons held by the armed groups, etc.), the Government will thoroughly examine the application of related provisions for ordering public security operations or maritime security operations in advance and establish a common understanding among the relevant agencies. At the same time, to avoid the spread of damages caused by unlawful acts while procedures are being followed, the Government will also consider specific measures for issuing orders swiftly and accelerating procedures in accordance with the circumstances.

(4) Moreover, to ensure Japan's security, it is crucial for the SDF and United States armed forces to respond seamlessly and in close cooperation to situations in which an attack is launched on U.S. armed forces units currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan, and due to the circumstances, escalates into an armed attack. Assuming a case of an infringement not amounting to an armed attack against U.S. armed forces units in the course of various peacetime activities carried out in coordination between the SDF and the U.S. armed forces, and referring to the concept of "use of weapons" for the purpose of protecting its own

weapons and other equipment under the provision of Article 95 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, the Government will develop legislation that enables the SDF to carry out very passive and limited "use of weapons" at the minimum extent necessary for protecting the weapons and other equipment of the U.S. armed forces units should they be currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises) in cooperation with the SDF under the provision of Article 95 of the SDF Law, assuming a request or consent has been received from the U.S.

2. Further Contributions to the Peace and Stability of the International Community

(1) So-called Logistics Support and "Integration with the Use of Force"

1. So-called logistics support is a support activity that does not in itself constitute a "use of force." For instance, when international peace and security are threatened and the international community is united in responding to the situation in accordance with a UN Security Council resolution, there are situations in which it is necessary for Japan to carry out such support activities for armed forces of other countries carrying out a legitimate "use of force" in line with the resolution. Meanwhile, in relation to Article 9 of the Constitution, legal frameworks limiting Japan's support activities to "rear areas," or so- called "non-combat areas," etc. have been established in past legislation to ensure that the issue of "integration with the use of force" does not arise. This is to prevent Japan from being legally assessed as having carried out a "use of force" by itself, which is not permitted under the Constitution, as Japan's support activities would form an "integral part" of the use of force by other countries and thereby constitute "integration with the use of force."
2. Even under such legal frameworks, the SDF has been steadily carrying out various support activities, leading to growing expectations for and trust in Japan. Amid further major changes in the security environment, it is necessary to enable the SDF to play a sufficient role through a wide range of support activities for the peace and stability of the international community from the perspective of a "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation. This is also vital from the viewpoint of ensuring Japan's peace and security, thereby enabling such activities to be carried out more than ever before without any hindrances.

C. Under the premise of the so-called theory of "integration with the use of force" itself, and in light of the accumulation of discussions related thereto, considering factors such as the actual experiences of the SDF to date and the reality of the UN's collective security measures, the Government does not support a conventional framework that uniformly limits the area of SDF activities to "rear areas" and "non-combat areas," i.e., areas where the issue of "integration" does not arise. Instead, the Government recognizes that Japan's support activities such as supply and transportation, which are carried out at places other than "sites where combative actions are currently being carried out" by other countries, do not constitute "integration with the use of force" of that country. Taking into account the following considerations based on that recognition, the Government will proceed to develop legislation that will enable the SDF to carry out activities necessary to support the armed forces of other countries engaging in activities for ensuring Japan's security and the peace and stability of the international community.

(i) Not carrying out support activities at "sites where combative actions are currently being carried out" by the armed forces of other countries that are subject to support by Japan.
(ii) Immediate pausing or ceasing support activities in places where Japan is carrying out support activities, should these places become "sites where combative actions are currently being carried out" due to changing conditions.

(2) Use of Weapons Associated with International Peace Cooperation Activities

1. Japan has been developing necessary legislation up to present, alongside conducting international peace cooperation activities for over 20 years. In conducting such activities, the right of SDF personnel to use weapons when engaging in international peace cooperation activities has been limited to so-called self-preservation and protection of its own weapons and other equipment. This is because the use of weapons in association with so-called "kaketsuke-keigo" operations (coming to the aid of geographically distant units or personnel under attack) or the "use of weapons for the purpose of executing a mission" could constitute a "use of force," which is prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution in cases where such use of weapons is directed against "a state or quasi-state organization."
2. From the perspective of a "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan must further enhance its efforts towards promoting the peace and stability of the international community. To that end, it is important to enable full and proactive participation in international peace cooperation activities such as UN peace keeping operations (PKO). Moreover, given that many Japanese nationals are actively working overseas, thus face the possibility of being involved in emergency situations such as acts of terrorism, it is necessary to enable the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas involving the use of weapons subject to receiving consent from the territorial state, which has an obligation to extend protection to foreigners within its territory under international law.
3. In light of the above, the Government will proceed to develop legislation that enables the SDF's use of weapons associated with so-called "kaketsuke-keigo" operations and the "use of weapons for the purpose of executing a mission" in international peace cooperation activities that do not involve the "use of force," including UN peacekeeping operations, as well as policing activities that do not involve the "use of force," including the rescue of Japanese nationals based on consent from the territorial state, upon ensuring that "a state or a quasi-state organization" does not appear as an adversary. This legislation is based on the following considerations.

(i) With respect to UN peacekeeping operations and similar, since "consent of acceptance from the country that controls the regions in which the activities are conducted" and "consent of acceptance from the Parties to Armed Conflict conducting the activities" are necessary under the framework of the Five Principles for Participation in PKO, "a quasi-state organization" other than the Parties to Armed Conflict who have given their consent of acceptance

is not expected to appear as the adversary in principle. This has been backed up by Japan's experiences taking part in UN peacekeeping operations and similar for over 20 years. When the use of weapons in the execution of missions is expected to exceed the scope of self- preservation or the protection of its own weapons and other equipment, it is necessary that consent of acceptance from the Parties to Armed Conflict is stably maintained, especially due to the nature of the activities. This also includes cases in which the SDF is tasked with maintaining order, such as protecting citizens, which is considered to be an important mission in recent UN peacekeeping operations.

(ii) When SDF units carry out policing activities not involving a "use of force," including the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas, based on consent from the government of the territorial state, the activities are conducted in the area for which consent from the government of the territorial state is valid, or in other words, in the area for which authority is maintained in the territory, as a matter of course. This means that no "quasi-state organizations" will be present in that area.

(iii) The Cabinet will determine whether the consent of acceptance is stably maintained, as well as the area for which consent of the government of the territorial state is valid, etc., based on deliberations etc. by the National Security Council.

(iv) The use of weapons in these activities is subject to the inherent constraints of the strict principle of proportionality, which is similar to the principle of police proportionality.

3. Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution

(1) In order to adapt to the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan and protect the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people in any situation, the Government has examined what constitutional interpretations would be appropriate, as sufficient responses would not necessarily be possible if the constitutional interpretation to date were maintained as the status quo. In this regard, logical consistency and legal stability are required for the Government's constitutional interpretation. Accordingly, the Government must form a logical conclusion for protecting the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people within the limits of the basic logic of the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution as expressed by the Government to date.

(2) The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit any "use of force" in international relations in all forms. However, when considered in light of "the right (of the people) to live in peace," as recognized in the Preamble of the Constitution, and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution, which stipulates that "their (all the people's) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" shall be the supreme consideration in governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of self-defense necessary to maintain its peace and security and ensure its survival. Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful situations where the people's right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence, "use of force" to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted. This is the basis, or the so-called basic logic, of the view consistently expressed by the Government to date with regard to any "use of force" permitted in exceptional circumstances under Article 9 of the Constitution. It is clearly shown in the document Relationship between the Right of Collective Self-Defense and the Constitution submitted by the Government to the Committee on Audit of the House of Councillors on October 14, 1972.

This basic logic must continue to be maintained under Article 9 of the Constitution.

(3) Up to now, the Government had considered that, under this basic logic, "use of force" was permitted only in the case of an armed attack against Japan. However, as stated in the introduction, in light of the current situation, that is, one in which the security environment surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed and continues to evolve due to shifts in global power balance, the rapid advancement of technological innovation, and threats from weapons of mass destruction and similar, even an armed attack on another country could actually constitute a threat to Japan's survival, depending on its purpose, scale, and mode, etc.

Should a dispute arise, Japan will make the utmost diplomatic efforts to settle the dispute peacefully and take any action necessary in accordance with existing national laws and regulations developed based on the constitutional interpretation to date, and the development of laws and regulations capable of implementation within the limits of the constitutional interpretation, as a matter of course. However, Japan still needs to take all necessary measures to ensure its survival and protect its people.

Under the recognition of such issues and as a result of careful examination in light of the current security environment, it has been concluded in accordance with the basic logic of the Government's view to date that the Constitution should be interpreted as permitting the use of force to the minimum extent necessary as a measure for self-defense not only in the case of an armed attack on Japan, but also in cases where an armed attack on another country having a close relationship with Japan threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger in terms of fundamentally overturning people's right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, and further, there are no other appropriate means available to repel the attack, ensure Japan's survival, and protect its people.

(4) Japan's "use of force" will be carried out while observing international law as a matter of course. At the same time, the legal basis under international law needs to be understood separately from the constitutional interpretation. In certain situations, the aforementioned "use of force" permitted under the Constitution is, under international law, based on the right of collective self-defense. The Government has concluded that although this "use of force" includes cases that are triggered by an armed attack on another country, these cases are permitted under the Constitution only when they are taken as measures for self-defense necessary for ensuring Japan's survival and protecting its people, or in other words, in defense of Japan.

(5) Moreover, even when the "use of force" is permitted under the Constitution, since it is carried out to protect the lives and peaceful livelihood of the people, an assurance of democratic control is required as a matter of course. In the draft

legislation, the Government will stipulate that in principle, the approval of the Diet is required prior to ordering the SDF to be dispatched for carrying out a "use of force" permitted under the Constitution in the case of an armed attack not on Japan but on another country, in the same manner as procedures related to defensive dispatches as prescribed in the current laws and regulations.

4. The Way Forward for Developing National Legislation

When these activities are to be conducted by the SDF, the Cabinet shall make its decision in line with deliberations, etc. by the National Security Council. Including such procedures, national legislation serving as the legal basis will be necessary in enabling the SDF to actually conduct such activities. Under the basic policies described above, the Government will commence drafting legislation that enables a seamless response to any situation to protect the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people. Alongside this, the Government will carry out a full examination, and as soon as preparations are complete, will submit the draft legislation to the Diet for its deliberations.

Reference 7 Major Ground Systems (Fire Arms and Armored Vehicles)

(As of March 31, 2026)

Type	Pistols and rifles	Mortars	Mobile Combat Vehicles	Armored Vehicles	Light armored vehicle	Amphibious vehicle	Surface-to-ship Missile
Approximate number owned	Approx. 218,000 guns	Approx. 1,300 guns	Approx. 220 vehicles	Approx. 1,000 vehicles	Approx. 1,800 vehicles	Approx. 50 vehicles	7 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments

Note: 1. As for tanks and guns, the MOD completed a system of about 300 tanks and 300 guns, respectively, by the end of FY2023 through thorough efficiency and rationalization.

Reference 8 Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service

(As of March 31, 2026)

Category	Destroyer	Submarine	Mine Warfare Ship	Patrol Combatant Craft	Amphibious Ship	Auxiliary Ship
Number (vessels)	52	22	18	6	14	31
Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)	288	64	21	1	38	136

Note: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.

Reference 9 Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications

(As of March 31, 2026)

Service	Type	Model	Use	Number Owned	Maximum Speed (knots)	Crew (number)	Full Length (m)	Full Width (m)	Engine
GSDF	Fixed-wing	LR-2	Liaison and Reconnaissance	8	300	2 (8)	14.2	17.7	Turboprop, twin-engines
	Rotary-wing	AH-1S	Anti-tank	34	120	2	13.6	3.6	Turboshaft, single-engine
		OH-1	Observation	25	140	2	12.0	3.3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-1J	Utility	93	110	2 (11)	12.7	2.8	Turboshaft, single-engine
		UH-2	Utility	21	130	2 (11)	13.1	2.9	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		CH-47J/JA	Transport	51	150/140	3 (55)	15.5/15.9	3.8/4.8	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-60JA	Utility	39	150	2 (12)	15.6	5.5	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		AH-64D	Combat	12	150	2	15.0	5.7	Turboshaft, twin-engines
	Tilt Rotor	V-22	Transport	17	280	3 (24)	17.5	15.5	Turboshaft, twin-engines
MSDF	Fixed-wing	P-1	Patrol	40	450	11	38.0	35.4	Turbofan, quadruple-engine
		P-3C	Patrol	24	400	11	35.6	30.4	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
		US-2	Rescue	7	320	11	33.3	33.2	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
	Rotary-wing	SH-60J	Patrol	3	150	4	15.3	4.4	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		SH-60K	Patrol	68	140	4	15.9	4.4	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		SH-60L	Patrol	2	140	4	15.9	4.4	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		MCH-101	Minesweeping and transport	10	150	4	19.5	5.1	Turboshaft, triple engine
ASDF	Fixed-wing	F-15J/DJ	Fighter	200	Mach 2.5	1/2	19.4	13.1	Turbofan, twin-engine
		F-2A/B	Fighter	90	Mach 2	1/2	15.5	11.1	Turbofan, single-engine
		F-35A	Fighter	46	Mach 1.6	1	15.7	10.7	Turbofan, single-engine
		F-35B	Fighter	8	Mach 1.6	1	15.6	10.7	Turbofan, single-engine
		C-2	Transport	18	Mach 0.82	2–5 (110)	43.9	44.4	Turbofan, twin-engine
		C-130H	Transport	13	320	6 (92)	29.8	40.4	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
		KC-767	Aerial refueling transport	4	Mach 0.84	4–8 (200)	48.5	47.6	Turbofan, twin-engine
		KC-46A	Aerial refueling transport	6	Mach 0.86	3–14 (104)	50.4	47.6	Turbofan, twin-engine
		KC-130H	Aerial refueling transport	3	320	6 (92)	29.8	40.4	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
		E-2C	Early warning	7	320	5	17.6	24.6	Turboprop, twin-engines
		E-2D	Early warning	11	350	5	17.6	24.6	Turboprop, twin-engines
		E-767	Early warning and control	4	450	20	48.5	47.6	Turbofan, twin-engine
		RQ-4B	Surveillance	3	310	0	14.5	39.9	Turbofan, single-engine
	Rotary-wing	CH-47J	Transport	15	160	5 (48)	15.9	4.8	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-60J	Rescue	39	140	5	15.7	5.4	Turboshaft, twin-engines

Notes: 1. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2026.
2. Parenthetical figures in the item "Crew" represents the number of people transported.
3. The full lengths and widths of rotary-wing aircraft and tilt-rotor aircraft do not include the rotor diameter.
4. Maximum speed is approximate.

Reference 10 Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Item / Fiscal Year	GNP/GDP (Original Estimates) (A)	Annual Expenditures on General Account (B)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	General Annual Expenditures (C)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Defense-Related Expenditures (D)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to GNP/GDP (D/A)	Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to Annual Expenditures on General Account (D/B)	Ratio of Defense-related Expenditures to General Annual Expenditures (D/C)
1955	75,590	9,915	△0 .8	8,107	△ 2.8	1,349	△ 3.3	1.78	13.61	16.6
1965	281,600	36,581	12.4	29,198	12.8	3,014	9.6	1.07	8.24	10.3
1975	1,585,000	212,888	24.5	158,408	23.2	13,273	21.4	0.84	6.23	8.4
1985	3,146,000	524,996	3.7	325,854	△ 0.0	31,371	6.9	0.997	5.98	9.6
1995	4,928,000	709,871	△ 2.9	421,417	3.1	47,236	0.9	0.959	6.65	11.2
2005	5,115,000	821,829	0.1	472,829	△ 0.7	48,301	△ 1.0	0.944	5.88	10.2
						48,564	△ 1.0	0.949	5.91	10.3
2013	4,877,000	926,115	2.5	539,774	5.3	46,804	0.8	0.960	5.05	8.67
						47,538	0.8	0.975	5.13	8.81
2014	5,004,000	958,823	3.5	564,697	4.6	47,838	2.2	0.956	4.99	8.47
						48,848	2.8	0.976	5.09	8.65
2015	5,049,000	963,420	0.5	573,555	1.6	48,221	0.8	0.955	5.01	8.41
						49,801	2.0	0.986	5.17	8.68
2016	5,188,000	967,218	0.4	578,286	0.8	48,607	0.8	0.937	5.03	8.41
						50,541	1.5	0.974	5.23	8.74
2017	5,535,000	974,547	0.8	583,591	0.9	48,996	0.8	0.885	5.03	8.40
						51,251	1.4	0.926	5.26	8.78
2018	5,643,000	977,128	0.3	588,958	0.9	49,388	0.8	0.875	5.05	8.39
						51,911	1.3	0.920	5.31	8.81
2019	5,661,000	994,291 (1,014,571)	3.8	599,359 (619,639)	5.2	50,070 52,574	1.4 1.3	0.884 0.929	5.04 5.18	8.35 8.48
2020	5,702,000	1,008,791 (1,026,580)	1.2	617,184 (634,972)	2.5	50,688 53,133	1.2 1.1	0.889 0.932	5.02 5.18	8.21 8.37
2021	5,595,000	1,066,097	3.8	669,020	5.4	51,235	1.1	0.916	4.81	7.66
						53,422	0.5	0.955	5.01	7.99
2022	5,646,000	1,075,964	0.9	673,746	0.7	51,788	1.1	0.917	4.81	7.69
						54,005	1.1	0.957	5.02	8.02
2023	5,719,000	1,143,812	6.3	727,317	8.0	66,001	27.4	1.154	5.77	9.07
						68,219	26.3	1.193	5.96	9.38
2024	6,153,000	1,125,717	△ 1.6	677,764	△ 6.8	77,249	17.0	1.255	6.86	11.40
						79,496	16.5	1.292	7.06	11.73
2025	6,293,000	1,151,978	2.3	681,071	0.5	84,748	9.7	1.347	7.36	12.44
						87,005	9.4	1.383	7.55	12.77
2026	6,919,000	1,223,092	6.2	701,557	3.0	88,093	3.9	1.273	7.20	12.56
						90,353	3.8	1.306	7.39	12.88

Notes: 1. The upper figures for defense-related expenditures for FY2005 and thereafter exclude SACO-related expenses (26.3 billion yen in FY2005, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, 2.8 billion yen in FY2016, 2.8 billion yen in FY2017, 5.1 billion yen in FY2018, 25.6 billion yen in FY2019, 13.8 billion yen in FY2020, 14.4 billion yen in FY2021, 13.7 billion yen in FY2022, 11.5 billion yen for FY2023, 11.6 billion yen in FY2024, 11.1 billion yen in FY2025, and 11.5 billion yen in FY2026), the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) (64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, 142.6 billion yen in FY2015, 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, 201.1 billion yen in FY2017, 216.1 billion yen in FY2018, 167.9 billion yen in FY2019, 179.9 billion yen in FY2020, 204.4 billion yen in FY2021, 208.0 billion yen in FY2022, 210.3 billion yen in FY2023, 213.0 billion yen in FY2024, 214.6 billion yen in FY2025, and 214.5 billion yen in FY2026), expenses related to the introduction of new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015, 14.0 billion yen in FY2016, 21.6 billion yen in FY2017, 31.2 billion yen in FY2018, 6.2 billion yen in FY2019, 0.03 billion yen in FY2020, 0.03 billion yen in FY2021, and 0.008 billion yen in FY2022) as well as expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention, mitigation and building national resilience (50.8 billion yen in FY2019 and 50.8 billion yen in FY2020), while the lower figures include them.

2. Annual expenditure on general account and the lower figures in parentheses in the general annual expenditures column for FY2019 and FY2020 include temporary/special measures.

3. Includes 18.7 billion yen in the FY2021 annual budget amount, 31.8 billion yen in the FY2022 annual budget amount, 33.9 billion yen in the FY2023 annual budget amount, 32.4 billion yen in the FY2024 annual budget amount, 31.4 billion yen in the FY2025 annual budget amount, and 51.0 billion yen in the FY2026 annual budget amount as expenses related to the Digital Agency.

Reference 11 Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries

	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
Japan (100 million yen)	51,235 53,422	51,788 54,005	66,001 68,219	77,249 79,496	84,748 87,005	88,093 90,353
Japan FY-on-FY growth rate (%)	1.1 0.5	1.1 1.1	27.4 26.3	17.0 16.5	9.7 9.4	3.9 3.8
U.S. (U.S. 1 million dollar)	717,577	726,458	775,874	826,275	868,426	913,708
U.S. FY-on-FY growth rate (%)	3.9	1.2	6.8	6.5	5.1	5.2
China (100 million yuan)	13,553	14,505	15,537	16,655	17,847	19,096
China FY-on-FY growth rate (%)	6.8	7.1	7.2	7.2	7.2	7.0
Russia (100 million RR)	35,761	46,787	64,067	88,665	135,037	129,305
Russia FY-on-FY growth rate (%)	12.9	30.8	36.9	38.4	52.3	△4.2
Republic of Korea (100 million won)	528,401	546,112	570,143	594,244	612,469	658,642
ROK FY-on-FY growth rate (%)	5.4	3.4	4.4	4.2	3.1	7.5
Australia (1 million Australian dollar)	44,568	47,979	51,028	53,400	57,421	60,642
Australia FY-on-FY growth rate (%)	4.6	7.7	6.4	4.6	7.5	5.6
U.K. (1 million GBP)	46,000	48,200	50,900	51,700	59,800	65,500
UK FY-on-FY growth rate (%)	11.1	4.8	5.6	1.6	15.7	9.5
France (1 million euro)	47,700	49,600	53,100	56,700	60,000	66,700
France FY-on-FY growth rate (%)	3.7	4.0	7.1	6.8	5.8	11.2
Germany (1 million euro)	46,930	50,495	58,526	71,752	86,367	————
Germany FY-on-FY growth rate (%)	4.2	7.6	15.9	22.6	20.4	————

Notes:
1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others.
2. % shown are the rate of growth over the previous year
3. In Japan, the figures in the upper row exclude SACO-related expenditures (13.8 billion yen for FY2020, 14.4 billion yen for FY2021, 13.7 billion yen for FY2022, 11.5 billion yen for FY2023, 11.6 billion yen for FY2024, 11.1 billion yen for FY2025, and 11.5 billion yen for FY2026), the expenditures associated with the U.S. Forces realignment (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) (179.9 billion yen for FY2020, 204.4 billion yen for FY2021, 208.0 billion yen for FY2022, 210.3 billion yen for FY2023, 213.0 for FY2024, 214.6 for FY2025, and 214.5 for FY2026), expenses related to the introduction of new government aircraft (0.03 billion yen for FY2020, 0.03 billion yen for FY2021, and 0.01 billion yen for FY2022), as well as expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention, mitigation and building national resilience (50.8 billion yen in FY2020), while the figures in the lower row are based on the initial budget and include them.
4. The figures for the U.S. are Department of Defense budget expenditures from the Historical Table. Figures for FY2026 are estimated values.
5. The figures for China are based on the initial budget in the Finance Budget Report to the National People's Congress (only the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure [a portion of the central government expenditure] was released. The rate of growth over the previous year is calculated by comparing the defense expenditures in the central ministry expenditures or based on the figures officially announced by China.
6. For Russia, the figures are based on the expenditures for FY 2019–2023 and the budget amount for FY 2024–2026 in documents published by the Ministry of Finance and Federal Treasury of Russia.
7. The figures for the Republic of Korea are based on the budget released on its Ministry of National Defense website.
8. The figures for Australia are based on the budget in the Defence Portfolio Budget Statements published by the Australian Department of Defence.
9. The figures for the United Kingdom are based on the budget proposal as published by the Ministry of Finance.
10. The figures for France are based on the budget in the Projet de loi de finances published by the French Department of Defence.(Includes pension-related expenses.)
11. The figures for Germany are the budget based on the Budget Act. The figures for FY2022, FY2023, FY2024 and FY2025 include the federal armed forces special fund. The figures for 2026 have not yet been published as of May 2026.

Reference 12 Conditions Required for Main Operations of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the Japan Self-Defense Forces

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Provisions For Authority
Defense operation (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 76)	(1) When there is a situation in which armed attack against Japan from outside occur or when it is considered that there is an imminent and clear danger of armed attack, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against these attacks. (2) When there is a situation in which an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, which in turn poses an imminent and clear danger of Japan's survival to be threatened and fundamentally overturns people's right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against such a situation.	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: required (prior approval required in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required	❍ Use of force necessary to defend Japan ❍ Control of the Japan Coast Guard (limited to the Armed Attack Situations)

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Provisions For Authority
Establishment of defense facilities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-2)	When there are areas in which the deployment of JSDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of JSDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensified and the order for defense operations (only for the Armed Attack Situations) is likely to be issued.	(1) Authorized by: Defense Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister)	❍ Establishment of positions and defense facilities in the intended deployment area [Use of weapons] ❍ JSDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming existing danger other than the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of their own and other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Measures to be taken before Defense Operation order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-3 and U.S. and Others' Military Actions Related Measures Act)	When a Defense Operation order is expected under a tense situation	(1) Authorized by : Defense Minister or person delegated by the Minister for supplies; Defense Minister for services (2) Approval of the Diet: not required for supplies; required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) for services (3) Cabinet decision: not required for supplies; required (approval of the Prime Minister) for services	❍ Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on U.S. and others' Military Actions Related Measures Act ❍ Provision of services as a related measure [Use of weapons] ❍ JSDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives or bodies of their own, other JSDF personnel who are with them, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of JSDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Civil protection dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-4)	When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation / Anticipated Armed Attack Situations, Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law	(1) Authorized by: Defense Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: request of prefectural governors or Armed Attack Situation/Anticipated Armed Attack Situations, Task Force Chief (Prime Minister)	❍ Measures including guidance of fleeing residents, emergent measures, traffic control, pursuant to the provision of the Civil Protection Law ❍ The Police Duties Law weapons (including Measures for Refuge Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry) (all only when police officers are not present) is partially applied mutatis mutandis. ❍ The Japan Coast Guard Law (including requests for cooperation) is partially applied mutatis mutandis. [Use of weapons] ❍ Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to JSDF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including assistant cast guard officers, are not present.
Public security operation by order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 78)	When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the law enforcement force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergencies	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: required (to be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order's issuance) (3) Cabinet decision: required	❍ The Police Duties Law (including Questioning, Measures for Refuge, Prevention and Suppression of Crime) is applied mutatis mutandis. ❍ The Japan Coast Guard Law (including requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections) is partially applied mutatis mutandis. ❍ Control over the Japan Coast Guard [Use of weapons] ❍ Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of JSDF personnel under public security operations. ❍ JSDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other than the use of weapons.
Information gathering before public security operation order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 79-2)	When situations have intensified and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifles, machine guns, or other weapons are expected; and there is a special need to gather information	(1) Authorized by: Defense Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: consultation between the Defense Minister and the National Public Safety Commission	[Use of weapons] ❍ JSDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons within the limit judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger other than the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of their own and other JSDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Provisions For Authority
Public security operation by request (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 81)	When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (4) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission	❍ The Police Duties Law (including Questioning, Measures for Refuge, Prevention and Suppression of Crime) is applied mutatis mutandis. ❍ The Japan Coast Guard Law (including requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections) is partially applied mutatis mutandis. [Use of weapons] ❍ Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of JSDF personnel under public security operations. ❍ JSDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other than the use of weapons.
Guarding operation (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 81-2)	When special measures are deemed necessary to prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (4) Additional requirements: Defense Minister consults with the National Public Safety Commission after hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural governor	❍ The Police Duties Law (Questioning; Measures for Refuge; Entry (all only when police officers are not present); Prevention and Suppression of Crime) is partially applied mutatis mutandis. [Use of weapons] ❍ Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of JSDF personnel under guarding operations. ❍ JSDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons in execution of their duties to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.
Critical computing systems protection measures [Self-Defense Forces Law Article 81-3] *Enforced on October 1, 2026	When the GOJ confirmed a cyberattack to certain critical computers, and is deemed to be an advanced cyberattack by state-sponsored actors and in case of special need to take response by the JSDF	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (4) Additional requirements: it is deemed that there is a large risk that specific serious harm will be caused to important computers by said specific wrongful acts, the special technologies and intelligence possessed by the Japan Self-Defense Forces are essential for preventing the specific serious harm, and there has been a request or consent from the National Public Safety Commission.	❍ The Police Duties Execution Act (Measures taken by cyber harm prevention measures enforcement officers) is partially applied mutatis mutandis
Maritime security operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82)	When special measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea	(1) Authorized by: Defense Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister)	❍ The Japan Coast Guard Law (including requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections) is partially applied mutatis mutandis. [Use of weapons] ❍ Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of JSDF personnel under maritime security operations. ❍ Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows stopping the progression of the vessel that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of JSDF personnel under maritime security operations.
Counter-piracy operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82-2 and Counter-Piracy Measures Act)	When special measures are deemed necessary to combat acts of piracy	(1) Authorized by: Defense Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (to be reported to the Diet when the Prime Minister approves the counterpiracy operation and when the operation is completed) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: Defense Minister shall submit the response guidelines to the Prime Minister	❍ The Japan Coast Guard Law (including requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections) is partially applied mutatis mutandis. [Use of weapons] ❍ Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of JSDF personnel engaged in counter- piracy operations. ❍ If any party perpetrating acts of piracy, including approaching excessively close to a ship or trailing around a ship, continues their acts despite the counterpiracy measures of the other party, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of the ship in question, the use of weapons is permitted to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.
Destruction measures against ballistic missiles (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82-3)	When it is anticipated that ballistic missiles are flying toward Japan and the measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and properties in Japan's territory from the damage caused by the missiles	(1) Authorized by: Defense Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (after-the fact report required when measures taken) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: for an urgent case, the order can be made in advance according to the emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister	[Use of weapons] ❍ JSDF units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles flying headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Provisions For Authority
Disaster relief dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 83)	When judged necessary in order to protect lives and property in the event of natural calamities or other disasters	(1) Authorized by: Defense Minister or those designated by the Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (4) Additional requirements: request of prefectural governors or other parties designated by Government ordinance (excluding particularly urgent situations when it is deemed there is no time to wait for a request to be made)	❍ The Police Duties Law (including Refuge, entry) (all only when police officers are not present) is partially applied mutatis mutandis. ❍ The Japan Coast Guard Law (request for cooperation) is partially applied mutatis mutandis. ❍ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (including Designation of alert zones, guarantee of passage for emergency vehicles; only when no municipal mayor or police officer is present)
Action against intrusion of territorial airspace (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84)	When a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan's territorial airspace in violation of international law and/or the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations	(1) Authorized by: Defense Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required	❍ The action necessary to make intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (including issuing warnings, guiding intruders away, use of weapons)
Elimination of mines and other dangerous objects (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-2)	—	Authorized by: Defense Minister Approval of the Diet: not required Cabinet decision: not required	❍ Elimination and disposition of mines and other dangerous explosive objects found on the sea
Rescue of Japanese nationals overseas (RJNO) (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-3)	Emergency situations overseas	(1) Authorized by: Defense Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to rescue Japanese nationals under threat of harm to life or body; competent authorities of the country concerned are currently working on maintaining public safety and order and no acts of combat are confirmed to take place; the country concerned provides consent for the JSDF to take rescue measures	[Use of weapons] ❍ JSDF personnel engaged in duties of rescue measures for Japanese nationals overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations when: (1) there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of their own and Japanese nationals, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties; (2) there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives or bodies of their own, other JSDF personnel engaged in duties together, or those who have come under the protection of JSDF personnel during the duties. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Japanese Penal Code.
Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas (TJNO) (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4)	Natural disasters, turmoil, and other emergency situations overseas	(1) Authorized by: Defense Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (4) Additional requirements: request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to transport Japanese nationals in need of life or physical protection	[Use of weapons] ❍ JSDF personnel engaged in evacuation of Japanese nationals overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of their own, other JSDF personnel engaged in the evacuation, or Japanese nationals to be evacuated under the management of JSDF personnel or of those granted permission to ride the same means of transport. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Japanese Penal Code.
Logistics support and other activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5, Important Influence Situations Law, and Ship Inspection Operations Act)	Situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security	(1) Authorized by: Defense Minister or person who is a delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; Minister of Defense for services, search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations (2) Approval of the Diet: required (prior to taking measures in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister to implement response measures, for the draft basic plan and for the prescribed implementation guidelines pursuant to the basic plan)	[Use of weapons] ❍ JSDF personnel ordered to provide services as logistics support activities or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect lives or bodies of their own, other JSDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of JSDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which are established within foreign territories and where JSDF units and JSDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as the U.S. Forces personnel, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the JSDF units and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect lives or bodies of their own as well as other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code. ❍ JSDF personnel ordered to conduct ship inspection operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of their own and others engaged in duties together or of those who, have come under the protection of SDF personnel during the duties. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Provisions For Authority
Cooperation and support operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5, International Peace Support Act, and Ship Inspection Operations Act)	Situations where the peace and security of the international community is threatened and the international community is collectively addressing the situation to remove the threat in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations Charter, and where Japan needs to make independent and proactive contributions to these activities as a member of the international community, and when a resolution of the General Assembly or the Security Council of the UN is adopted	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or person who is a delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; Defense Minister for services, search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations (2) Approval of the Diet: required (prior consent required with no exception) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister for implementing response measures, for the draft basic plan and for the prescribed implementation guidelines pursuant to the basic plan)	[Use of weapons] ❍ JSDF personnel ordered to provide services as cooperation and support operations or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives or bodies of their own, other JSDF personnel engaged in duties together, or those who have come under the protection of JSDF personnel during the duties; (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which are established within foreign territories and where JSDF units and JSDF personnel jointly station with personnel from other countries such as those of foreign armed forces, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the JSDF units and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect lives or bodies of their own as well as other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Japanese Penal Code. ❍ JSDF personnel ordered to conduct ship inspection may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of their own and others engaged in duties together or those who have come under the protection of JSDF personnel during the duties. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self- defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Japanese Penal Code.
International disaster relief activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5 and Japan Disaster Relief Team Law (JDR Law))	In the case that a large-scale disaster has happened or is about to happen overseas, especially in developing countries/areas	(1) Authorized by: Defense Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (4) Additional requirements: request of the government of the disaster- stricken country to dispatch international disaster relief teams, and consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs	—
International peace cooperation activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5 and International Peace Cooperation Act)	United Nations peacekeeping operations, internationally coordinated operations for peace and security, and international humanitarian assistance	(1) Authorized by: Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister) (JSDF personnel dispatched individually) Defense Minister (JSDF personnel dispatched as a unit) (2) Approval of the Diet: (when SDF units and organization, conduct so-called primary operations and "safety-ensuring" operations) required (prior consent required in principle); (other than so- called primary operations and "safety- ensuring" operations) not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (for implementation of international peace cooperation operations and the draft implementation plan) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister)	[Use of weapons] ❍ JSDF personnel engaged in duties in international peace cooperation operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect lives or bodies of their own, other JSDF personnel engaged in duties together, International Peace Cooperation Corps, or those who have come under the protection of JSDF personnel during the duties; (2) in the case where there are attacks against JSDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as personnel of foreign armed forces' units, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as other personnel stationed together at the camps; (3) with regard to JSDF personnel engaged in so- called "safety-ensuring" operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives, bodies or assets, or other individuals, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties, in addition to (1) and (2) above; (4) with regard to JSDF personnel engaged in so-called "rush-to-guard" operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect lives or bodies of their own, or other individuals involved in the operations whom they intend to protect, in addition to (1) and (2) above. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self- defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Japanese Penal Code.

Reference 13 Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the SDF Law

(Approved by the National Security Council on December 22 2016)

1 Purpose

These Implementation Guidelines set forth the basic concepts of Article 95-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law (hereinafter referred to as "this Article") and the involvement, etc. of the Cabinet in the implementation of this Article.

The Minister of Defense should apply these Implementation Guidelines when implementing this Article, as well as what is provided for in laws and regulations.

2 Basic Concepts of this Article

(1) Purpose

This Article authorizes the extremely passive and limited use of the minimum necessary weapons to protect against infringements that will not trigger an armed attack involving the armed forces of the United States of America as well as other foreign armed forces and similar organizations (hereinafter referred to as the "United States Armed Forces, etc.") engaged in activities aiding the defense of Japan in cooperation with the Self-Defense Forces (including joint training sessions but excluding those conducted at actual combat operation sites), which armed forces, etc. can be evaluated as equivalent to important material means constituting Japan's defense capability.

The stipulation of "excluding those conducted at the actual combat operation sites" in Paragraph 1 of this Article ensures that the protection under this Paragraph will not "integrate with the use of force" by United States Armed Forces, etc., nor will it deal with combat operations by using weapons as stipulated in said article, and therefore that the SDF will not engage in the use of force, nor will the use of weapons under said article trigger the development of acts of combat.

Such use of weapons does not constitute the "use of force" prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution.

Regarding "other foreign countries" in this Article, the units of these countries are limited to those of foreign countries that have close cooperative relationships with Japan in the field of defense, since they are the units currently engaging in activities that aid the defense of Japan in cooperation with the SDF.

(2) Activities that Aid the defense of Japan

Activities that may constitute "activities aiding the defense of Japan" under this Article will be determined on a case-by-case basis and the main possible activities are as follows:

(a) Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, including ballistic missile alerts

(b) Activities, including transportation and supply, in situations that have a key impact on Japan's peace and security

(c) Bilateral/multilateral exercises to enhance capabilities required for defending Japan.

(3) Decision on Protection Missions

When the Minister of Defense receives a request from the United States Armed Forces, etc., the Minister makes an independent decision on whether the activities in which the units of United States Armed Forces, etc. are engaged, alongside the SDF, constitute "activities that aid the defense of Japan" and whether protection provided by the SDF personnel is necessary, by considering the objective and details of the activities, capability of the unit, the type of weapons, etc. of the relevant unit involved in the request, the surrounding circumstances - including the potential for combat - as well as the impacts on the SDF's regular duties.

3 Involvement of the Cabinet

(1) Deliberations at the National Security Council

Requests for protection from United States Armed Forces, etc. pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 2 of this Article should be deliberated by the NSC prior to a decision made by the Minister of Defense in the following cases. However, in urgent cases where there is no time to deliberate, the Minister should promptly report to the NSC regarding the decision on whether to implement the protection.

(a) First request from the United States Armed Forces, etc.

(b) The request for protection in the territory of a third country (Protection pertaining to this Article in the territory of a third country should only be carried out with the consent of said third country for such activities.)

(c) Other requests for protection deemed particularly important

In addition, where protection is deemed necessary under circumstances with a key impact (referring to those that have an important influence stipulated in Article 1 of Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security (hereinafter referred to as "Act on Important Influence Situations Safety Securement")), the Prime Minister should seek the clear statement of such necessity in the Basic Plan (referring to the basic plan stipulated in Article 4 (1) of Act on Important Influence Situations Safety Securement), its deliberations in the NSC and then its approval by the Cabinet.

(2) Deliberations at the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

Requests for protection from the U.S. Forces and other forces pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 2 of this Article should be deliberated at the Executive Committee of the NSC prior to the decision by the Minister of Defense in the following cases. However, in urgent cases where there is no time to deliberate, the Minister should promptly report to the NSC regarding the decision on whether to implement the protection.

The National Security Council should be informed of any such deliberations or reports made.

(a) If there is no past record of protecting weapons, etc. of the units of United States Armed Forces, etc. engaged in similar activities in the past with respect to "activities aiding the defense of Japan" conducted by the units of United States Armed Forces, etc. subject to the protection

(b) Other requests for protection deemed particularly important

(3) Cooperation with related ministries and agencies

The Ministry of Defense should closely cooperate with relevant ministries and agencies in implementing this Article, including the sharing of information with the National Security Secretariat, Cabinet Secretariat, in the event of a request for protection by the United States Armed Forces, etc.

4 Reporting to the National Security Council and Disclosure of Information

(1) Reporting to the National Security Council

The Minister of Defense should report annually to the National Security Council concerning the results of protection conducted the previous year.

(2) Information Disclosure

With regard to the implementation status of this Article, in addition to what is stipulated in (a) and (b) below, the government should appropriately disclose information in accordance with Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (No. 42 of 1999).

(a) In implementing this Article, the Minister of Defense should promptly announce any peculiar event that occurs during

the operation of protection under this Article, including the occurrence of any specific infringement on a unit of the SDF or United States Armed Forces, etc.

(b) The Prime Minister should publicly announce the basic plan of 3 (1).

Reference 14 **Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities**

Item	International Peace Support Act	International Peace Cooperation Act	Japan Disaster Relief Team Law	Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Expired on July 31, 2009)	Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (Expired on January 15, 2010)
Purpose	○ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the ○ international community	○ Proactive contribution to U.N.-centered efforts ○ towards international peace	○ Contribution to promotion of international ○ cooperation	○ Proactive contribution to the efforts by the ○ international community to support and encourage the self-reliant efforts by the Iraqi people towards the prompt reconstruction of the State of Iraq ○ Contribution to ensuring ○ peace and security of the ○ international community including Japan through the reconstruction of Iraq	○ Proactive contribution to the international ○ community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism ○ Contribution to ensuring ○ peace and security of the ○ international community including Japan
Provisions in the SDF Law	○ Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the ○ SDF Law	○ Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the ○ SDF Law	○ Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law	○ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law	○ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law
Major Activities	○ Cooperation and support activities1 ○ Search and rescue ○ activities1 ○ Ship inspection operations3	○ International peacekeeping activities ○ Internationally coordinated ○ operations for peace and ○ security ○ International humanitarian assistance ○ International election ○ monitoring activities ○ Supplies cooperation for the abovementioned ○ activities	○ Rescue activities ○ Medical treatment ○ (including prevention of ○ epidemics) ○ Activities for disaster emergency response and ○ disaster recovery ○ Transportation of personnel or equipment/ ○ goods for the abovementioned activities	○ Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance ○ activities ○ Support activities for ensuring security	○ Replenishment support activities
Areas of Operation	○ Territories of Japan ○ Territories of foreign ○ countries (consent of ○ the agency in charge of administration (in such countries) is required. ○ High seas and the airspace ○ above	○ Areas excluding Japan (including the high seas) ○ (A ceasefire agreement between the parties of the dispute and an agreement by the receiving country are required)	○ Regions overseas, especially in less-developed regions	○ Territories of Japan ○ Territories of foreign ○ countries (consent of ○ the agency in charge of administration is required in such countries and in Iraq (Note 2) ○ High seas and the airspace above (Note 2)	○ Territories of Japan ○ Territories of foreign ○ countries (limited to the ○ Indian Ocean States) (consent of such countries is required) (Note 2) ○ High seas (limited to the ○ Indian Ocean, etc.) and the ○ airspace above (Note 2)
Diet Approval	○ Prior approval required without exception	○ To be discussed in advance in the Diet ○ in principle, only for cases where SDF units, etc. conduct so-called ceasefire monitoring and safety-ensuring operations (Note 4)	N/A	○ To be discussed in the Diet within 20 days from the ○ day since the SDF initiates such measures (Note 4)	(Note 5)
Diet Report	○ Report on the details of operation plan is required ○ without delay	○ Report about the details of operation plan is required ○ without delay	N/A	○ Report on the details of operation plan is required ○ without delay	○ Report about the details of operation plan is required ○ without delay

Notes: 1. Limited to sites where combat is not taking place.
2. Limited to areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan's activities are being implemented.
3. Operations shall be conducted in waters where the activities can be clearly distinguished from ship inspection operations carried out by foreign countries.
4. In cases where the Diet is in recess, etc., an approval shall be promptly requested in the Diet at the earliest session.
5. As prescribed by Law, (1) the category and nature of operations shall be limited to supply. (2) As the area of operations is prescribed, including foreign territories, it is not considered necessary to re-obtain the approval of the Diet. Therefore there are no provisions relating to Diet approval.

Reference 15 Number of Days and Total Incursions into the Territorial Waters Around the Senkaku Islands by Ships Belonging to the China Coast Guard Bureau, etc.

Number of days and total number of vessels entering territorial waters

Year	Period	Number of times	Number of ships
2018	Jan.-Apr.	8	27
	May-Aug.	8	31
	Sep.-Dec.	3	12
2019	Jan.-Apr.	12	48
	May-Aug.	12	46
	Sep.-Dec.	8	32
2020	Jan.-Apr.	7	28
	May-Aug.	13	38
	Sep.-Dec.	9	22
2021	Jan.-Apr.	15	36
	May-Aug.	19	52
	Sep.-Dec.	6	22
2022	Jan.-Apr.	5	18
	May-Aug.	20	50
	Sep.-Dec.	12	35
2023	Jan.- Apr.	12	43
	May-Aug.	14	42
	Sep.-Dec.	16	44
2024	Jan.-Apr.	13	33
	May-Aug.	22	58
	Sep.-Dec.	7	24
2025	Jan.-Apr.	10	31
	May-Aug.	14	38
	Sep.-Dec.	6	20
2026	Jan.- Mar.	5	16

Status of confirmation in connecting waters

Year	Confirmation days (Day)	Total number of confirmed vessels (vessels)
2012	79	407
2013	232	819
2014	243	729
2015	240	709
2016	211	752
2017	171	696
2018	159	615
2019	282	1,097
2020	333	1,161
2021	332	1,222
2022	336	1,201
2023	352	1,282
2024	355	352
2026	90	339

(Note) As of September 30 for 2012 and as of March 31 for 2026.

Reference 16 Government's Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 27, 2019
December 11, 2020
December 24, 2021
November 1, 2022
November 7, 2023
November 5, 2024
November 7, 2025
Partially revised)

Peace and stability in the Middle East are crucial to the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan. In addition, it is very important to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels (meaning Japanese-flag ships and foreign-flag ships that Japanese nationals are on board, as well as foreign-flag ships operated by Japanese shipping business operators or foreign-flag ships transporting Japanese cargoes that are important for stable economic activities of Japanese people; hereinafter the same) in the Middle East, which is the world's major energy source.

In the Middle East, amidst ongoing high tensions, there were incidents of attacks on ships. In June 2019, Japan-related vessels suffered damage. Under these circumstances, each country is engaging in efforts to ensure the safety of navigation in the region by utilizing ships and aircraft. Under the International Maritime Security Construct, the United States is carrying out activities utilizing ships, etc., together with the United Kingdom and other countries. France is participating in the initiative by European countries and has established a command in the UAE. India and the ROK are also carrying out activities using ships independently. In this manner, the international community is making all-out efforts to ensure safety, while gathering information for the safety of navigation by diverse means.

In this context, Japan has decided to make government-wide efforts and implement comprehensive measures in collaboration among relevant ministries and agencies with regard to the following points as Japan's independent initiative to ensure peace and stability in the Middle East and the safety of Japan-related vessels: (1) further diplomatic efforts to ease tensions in the Middle East and stabilize the situation; (2) thorough implementation of navigation safety measures, including close information sharing with relevant industries; and (3) better utilization of the SDF's ships and aircraft to strengthen information gathering posture. In light of the significance of these measures, Japan will take actions as follows based on the Cabinet decision.

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1. Further diplomatic efforts

Japan has built good relations with countries involved in the stability of the Middle East, such as maintaining good relations with Iran for many years while being an ally of the United States. Taking advantage of these relations, Japan will make further diplomatic efforts, including reaching out to the countries concerned at various levels, to ease tensions and stabilize the situation in the Middle East. In addition, Japan will continue to seek cooperation from the coastal countries that play an important role in the safe navigation of vessels. As for SDF's activities in the Middle East region, Japan has made efforts to gain the understanding of related countries in the region. Continued efforts will be made to gain the understanding of the countries concerned in the region regarding the SDF's information gathering activities described in 3 below.

2. Thorough implementation of navigation safety measures

Japan will thoroughly implement its navigation safety measures, including meticulous information sharing with related industries. Specifically, a system of cooperation within the government and between the government and related industries will be established, which will also cover the sharing of information obtained through the SDF's information gathering activities described in 3 below by related ministries and agencies. In addition, whenever information that suggests the existence of a risk to the safe navigation of vessels is obtained, the government will promptly share such information with related industries to call for vigilance in a timely manner, encouraging them to thoroughly implement navigation safety measures at their own initiative.

3. Information gathering activities by the SDF

Although there is no immediate need to implement protective measures for Japan-related vessels in the Middle East, given the ongoing high tensions in the region, it is necessary to strengthen the information gathering system to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels. Therefore, Japan has decided to have the SDF conduct information gathering activities, considering the distance from Japan to the Middle East region, the SDF's experience in operating in the region, and the importance of cooperation with units and organizations from other countries. The SDF's information gathering activities are part of the government's navigation safety measures and are aimed at collecting information necessary to ensure the safety of Japan- related vessels. The activities are to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, paragraph (1), item (xviii) of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense (Act No. 164 of 1954), as they would need smooth decision making and order issuance in relation to Maritime Security Operations as measures for unforeseen circumstances or other changes in the situation, which are provided in Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Law (Act No. 165 of 1954) described in (4) below.

Basic implementation policies are as follows. Details are to be provided in the Defense Minister's order.

(1) Information to Be Gathered
The SDF will gather information that directly affects or is necessary for ensuring safe navigation in the waters described in (3) below.

(2) Equipment
A single destroyer will be dispatched. In addition, the SDF will also use fixed-wing patrol aircraft P-3C or P-1 (however, both P-3C and P-1 when substituting aircraft in order to start the dispatch of fixed-wing patrol aircraft P-1 at the same time as the ending of the dispatch of the fixed-wing patrol aircraft P-3C) of the units currently engaged in the Counter-Piracy Operations under Article 7, paragraph (1) of the Act on Punishment of Acts of Piracy and Measures against Acts of Piracy (Act No. 55 of 2009, hereinafter referred to as the "Piracy Countermeasures Act").

(3) Geographical Scope of Activities
The geographical scope of the information gathering activities by destroyer and fixed-wing patrol aircraft described in (2) consists of three waters of high seas: the Gulf of Oman, the northern Arabian Sea, and the Gulf of Aden to the east of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (including the exclusive economic zones of the coastal states). For resupply, destroyer will call at a port facing the three seas.

(4) Responding to Unforeseen Circumstances or Other Changes in the Situation
In the event of unforeseen circumstances or other changes in the situation, the relevant ministries and agencies will

work together to understand the situation, share information closely and promptly with each other, and strengthen the government's response. Then, if further measures by the SDF are deemed necessary in response to the situation in question, Maritime Security Operations will be ordered in accordance with Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. When issuing such an order, the MOD will make best efforts for prompt decision making.

The measures that can be taken in the course of Maritime Security Operations will be based on international laws, including the flag state principle, and will vary depending on the circumstances, such as whether the protected vessel is a Japanese or foreign-flagged vessel and the type of infringement.

(5) Ensuring the Safety of the SDF Units

In conducting information gathering activities, the SDF units take all possible measures to ensure their own safety, including the collection of sufficient information on the situation in the areas of operation, the installation of equipment necessary to ensure safety, and appropriate prior education and training

(6) Cooperation among Relevant Ministries and Agencies

In order to ensure the effectiveness of information gathering activities and responses to changes in the situation including the rise of unforeseen circumstances, relevant ministries and agencies will work closely together to share understanding regarding such responses, improve response capabilities through training, and develop a system that allows for a prompt response to the situation.

(7) Cooperation with Other Countries

Although Japan does not participate in any specific framework related to the safety of navigation in the Middle East and the SDF's information gathering activities are to be conducted at its own initiative, Japan will communicate and cooperate with other countries as necessary.

(8) Duration of the SDF's Activities

The period during which the SDF should engage in the information gathering activities (including preparation and training periods) under the Cabinet decision is from December 27, 2019, to November 19, 2026. If it is deemed necessary to extend the SDF's activities based on the Cabinet decision, another Cabinet decision or any changes to it will be made in that regard. If, prior to the expiration of the above period, the SDF's activities are no longer deemed necessary in light of the necessity described in this paragraph, the SDF will terminate such activities at that point. If there is a noticeable change in the situation, the National Security Council will consider a response.

4. Report to the Diet

In view of the fact that matters pertaining to the SDF operations under the Anti-Piracy Measures Act are reported to the Diet in accordance with Article 7, paragraph (3) of the Anti-Piracy Measures Act, the Diet is to receive a report whenever a Cabinet decision or any changes to it is made and a report on the results of such activities upon termination.

Reference 17 History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan

1993	May 29: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that fell into the Sea of Japan
1995	Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense
1998	August 31: North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory The Security Council approved the commencement of the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) for parts of the sea-based upper-tier system
1999	Started the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles
2002	Decision by the United States on the initial deployment of BMD
2003	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started
2005	Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law (ballistic missile destruction measures) The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptors for BMD
2006	July 5: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, six of which fell into the Sea of Japan while the other exploded immediate after the launch
2007	Deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units started SM-3 launch tests by Aegis-equipped destroyers started
2009	March 27: First shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued April 5: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew over the Tohoku region and passed through to the Pacific Ocean July 4: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, which fell into the Sea of Japan
2012	March 30: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued April 13: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew a minute or longer, then separated into several parts and fell into the Yellow Sea December 7: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued December 12: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew over Okinawa Prefecture and passed through to the Pacific Ocean
2014	North Korea launched a total of 11 ballistic missiles in March, June, and July
2015	March 2: Two missiles were launched and flew approx. 500 km before landing in the Sea of Japan
2016	North Korea launched 23 ballistic missiles including what it claimed to be a “satellite” in a single year February 3: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued December 22: At the Nine Ministers’ Meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), it was decided that the BMD enhanced-capability interceptor missile (SM-3 block IIA) would proceed to the joint production and deployment stage
2017	North Korea launched 17 ballistic missiles beginning in February June 22: Conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA at the sea December 19: NSC and the Cabinet meeting approved introducing two units of Aegis Ashore systems.
2018	January 31: The United States conducted a test shot of the SM-3 block IIA June 1: The MOD announced candidate sites for the deployment of two units of Aegis Ashore (GSDF Araya Maneuver Area in Akita Prefecture and Mutsumi Maneuver Area in Yamaguchi Prefecture) July 30: The MOD selected the components of Aegis Ashore (LMSSR) October 26: The United States conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA at the sea October 29: The MOD started surveys concerning the deployment of Aegis Ashore December 11: The United States conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA
2019	North Korea launched a total of 25 ballistic missiles and other objects since May May 27 and 28: The MOD explained results of surveys concerning the deployment of Aegis Ashore and results of study by the MOD to the governors of Akita and Yamaguchi Prefectures December 17: The MOD provided the heads of the relevant local governments in Yamaguchi Prefecture with explanations anew on the results of the resurvey on deployment of Aegis Ashore
2020	North Korea launched eight ballistic missiles in March Deployment of PAC-3MSE units started June 15: The MOD announced suspension of Aegis Ashore deployment process December 18: Security Council and Cabinet approved the installation of two Aegis System Equipped Vessels in place of Aegis Ashore
2021	North Korea has launched six ballistic missiles since March
2022	North Korea has launched 59 ballistic missiles since January November 16: Aegis-equipped destroyer conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA at the sea
2023	North Korea has launched 25 ballistic missiles since January August: Start of Japan-U.S. co-development of glide phase interceptors (GPIs) decided
2024	North Korea has launched 5 ballistic missiles since January May: Japan-U.S. co-development of GPIs started; September: development concept decided August 23, September 18: A contract was concluded to build two Aegis System Equipped Vessels
2025	—
2026	Target detection tests using U.S. equipment conducted on the first Aegis System Equipped Vessel

(Note) As of March 31 for 2026

Reference 18 Efforts in Recent Years by the MOD on Cybersecurity

2012	September: "Towards the Stable and Effective Utilization of Cyberspace by the Ministry of Defense and the Japan Self-Defense Forces" formulated
2013	July: The MOD and defense industry members deeply interested in cybersecurity established the Cyber Defense Council (CDC) August: Agreed at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers' Meeting to consider a new framework for cooperation between the defense authorities from the perspective of further promoting Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in the cybersecurity area October: Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) established between the Japanese and U.S. defense authorities
2014	March: Cyber Defense Group newly formed under the Command Control Communication and Computers Systems Command
2015	May: Joint statement of CDPWG issued
2016	April: The MOD established Deputy Director-General for Cybersecurity and Information Technology Management
2018	January: Japan was approved to join the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) located in Estonia
2019	March: Dispatched MOD personnel to the CCDCOE in Estonia April: Shared the view at the Japan-U.S. "2+2" Meeting on enhancing cooperation on cyber issues, and affirmed that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty December: Officially participated in "Cyber Coalition 2019," a cyber defense exercise organized by the NATO, for the first time
2021	March: Held MOD cyber contest, for the first time April: Officially participated in "Locked Shields 2021," a cyber defense exercise organized by the CCDCOE, for the first time
2022	March: Newly established the JSDF Cyber Defense Command as a joint unit of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF March: The Ground Self-Defense Force held its first ever Multilateral Cyber Security Competition, Cyber KONGO 2022 September: At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting, both sides agreed that information security and cybersecurity are of vital importance for deepening Japan-U.S. defense cooperation October: The MOD officially participated in the activities of the NATO CCDCOE in Estonia
2023	July: The Information and Communications Division of the Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning was reorganized and the Cyber Buildup and Planning Division was newly established, and increased the number of Minister's Secretariat Councilor, who promote measures against cyber attacks across the organization.
2024	July: The MOD Cyber Workforce Comprehensive Strategy formulated
2025	May: The Cyber Response Capability Strengthening Act and Necessary Arrangement of Relevant Acts enacted
2026	October: Assignment of new missions pertaining to critical computing systems protection measures, etc. (Partial enforcement of the Cyber Response Capability Strengthening Act and Necessary Arrangement of Relevant Acts)

(Note) As of March 31 for 2026

Reference 19 Participation of the MOD/SDF in Civil Protection Joint Training Exercises with Central and Local Government Bodies (FY2025)

Types of Exercise	Training content (estimated)	Date	Location
Simulation/ Field exercise	Training assuming an armed attack situation, etc.	October 30, 2025	Niigata Prefecture
	Training assuming an armed attack situation, etc.	February 3, 2026	Kagoshima Prefecture
	Emergency Response Situation Assuming Training	February 5, 2026	Tokushima Prefecture
	Emergency Response Situation Assuming Training	February 10, 2026	Hyogo Prefecture
Simulation exercise	Training assuming a missile incidents	May 28, 2025	Iwate Prefecture
	Civil protection regional block review meeting	July 24, 2025	Tokyo
	Emergency Response Situation Assuming Training	July 28, 2025	Aomori Prefecture
	Training assuming a missile incidents	August 19, 2025	Mie Prefecture
	Training assuming a missile incidents	October 28, 2025	Tokyo
	Civil protection regional block review meeting	November 5, 2025	Kumamoto Prefecture
	Training assuming an armed attack situation, etc.	November 7, 2025	Akita Prefecture
	Training assuming an armed attack situation, etc.	November 11, 2025	Nagano Prefecture
	Emergency Response Situation Assuming Training	November 12, 2025	Toyama Prefecture
	Emergency Response Situation Assuming Training	November 19, 2025	Yamagata Prefecture
	Training assuming a missile incidents	November 20, 2025	Fukuoka Prefecture
	Emergency Response Situation Assuming Training	November 21, 2025	Fukui Prefecture
	Emergency Response Situation Assuming Training	November 26, 2025	Hiroshima Prefecture
	Training assuming a missile incidents	December 23, 2025	Miyagi Prefecture
	Emergency Response Situation Assuming Training	December 25, 2025	Shimane Prefecture
	Training assuming an armed attack situation, etc.	January 14, 2026	Oita Prefecture
	Civil protection regional block review meeting	January 14, 2026	Niigata Prefecture
	Emergency Response Situation Assuming Training	January 20, 2026	Aichi Prefecture
	Emergency Response Situation Assuming Training	January 21, 2026	Fukushima Prefecture
	Training assuming a missile incidents	January 22, 2026	Tochigi Prefecture
	Emergency Response Situation Assuming Training	January 23, 2026	Saga Prefecture
	Emergency Response Situation Assuming Training	January 26, 2026	Miyazaki Prefecture
	Emergency Response Situation Assuming Training	January 28, 2026	Ehime Prefecture
	Training assuming an armed attack situation, etc.	January 29, 2026	Okinawa Prefecture
	Emergency Response Situation Assuming Training	February 2, 2026	Tottori Prefecture
	Training assuming a missile incidents	February 6, 2026	Kagawa Prefecture
	Training assuming an armed attack situation, etc.	February 13, 2026	Nagasaki Prefecture
	Emergency Response Situation Assuming Training	February 26, 2026	Ishikawa Prefecture

Reference 20 Record of Disaster Relief (Past Five Years)

FY	Number of Dispatches	No. of overall personnel	No. of vehicles	No. of aircraft	No. of vessels
2021	383	Approx. 45,000	Approx. 6,700	Approx. 480	0
2022	381	Approx. 50,000	Approx. 5,600	Approx. 660	Approx. 20
2023	387	Approx. 1,153,000	Approx. 17,600	Approx. 5,100	Approx. 370
2024	377	Approx. 46,000	Approx. 3,100	Approx. 890	0
2025	339	Approx. 13,000	Approx. 1,200	Approx. 670	1

Notes: 1. The number of overall personnel includes maintenance, communication, command, standby/backup and other rear-service personnel in addition to personnel working in the field.
2. The record for 2023 includes disaster relief for the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake that was completed on August 31, 2024.

Reference 21 Transportation of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas by the Self-Defense Forces

(April 22, 2022
Cabinet Decision)

With the enforcement of the Act for Partial Revision of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense and Other Laws (Act No. 26 of 2022), the transportation of Japanese nationals overseas (TJNO) under Article 84-4 of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Law (Law No. 165 of 1954) shall be conducted in accordance with the following policy, and the "TJNO by the Self-Defense Forces" (Cabinet Decision on November 29, 2013) shall be abolished.

1. Based on the experiences of transporting Japanese nationals and others including the one in Afghanistan in August 2021, the Government of Japan shall further enhance comprehensive measures for transportation of Japanese nationals overseas (TJNO) including: strengthening coordination within the Government in preparation for rapid changes in the situation; strengthening coordination with other countries that are engaged in similar transportation activities; consistently being aware of the Japanese and foreign nationals prescribed in Article 84-4, paragraph (1) of the SDF Law and foreign nationals by Japan's diplomatic missions; and reinforcing the readiness of the SDF.
2. In preparation for future TJNO, the Government will make constant efforts to collect information on the availability of transportation bases and routes, and other information.
3. In consideration of the usefulness of transport aircraft in emergency situations and the abolishment of the provision requiring the use of the government aircraft in principle for TJNO, the Government shall routinely consider effective transport procedures based on the characteristics of aircraft, vessels, or vehicles that are expected to be used for transportation (hereinafter referred to as "Aircraft and other means"), and shall have more flexibility in choosing the best means of transportation to dispatch the SDF quickly in emergency situation.
4. The SDF has transported Japanese nationals and others overseas when the Defense Minister deems that such transportation can be carried out safely. Specifically, considering the anticipated risks, transportation was carried out with measures in place including: maintaining airfield functions through control and security by the Party or a third country; controlling crowds on and off the airfield through security by the Party or a third country; and selecting the method of transportation based on collected information and coordination with relevant countries (including the use of self-protection devices such as chaffs, flares, and bulletproof armor).

   In light of Article 84-4, paragraph (1) of the SDF Law, which prescribes that measures shall be taken to avoid the risks anticipated in transporting Japanese nationals and others overseas, safety shall continue to be ensured in conducting such transportation.
5. When there is a possibility of transporting Japanese nationals and others overseas, and it is deemed that such a mission cannot be carried out in a timely manner if the SDF departs Japan after a decision is made, the Defense Minister shall, based on a request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, relocate the Aircraft and other means to places outside Japan in preparation for transportation and put them on standby, and shall strive to make even quicker decisions regarding the relocation and standby.
6. The arms carried by SDF personnel TJNO shall be necessary and appropriate in light of local transportation bases, transportation routes, the nature of the work required to carry out the transportation, and within the scope of the relevant provisions of the SDF Law.
7. Diplomatic missions shall be consistently aware of the Japanese and foreign nationals prescribed in Article 84-4, paragraph (1) of the SDF Law. Furthermore, in conducting the transportation, the relevant ministries and agencies shall cooperate to examine local identification, immigration procedures, and treatment after their entry into Japan. In principle, the transportation of foreign nationals prescribed in the same paragraph shall be conducted only when they need to be evacuated under the same circumstances as Japanese nationals from a humanitarian standpoint and when the government of the country to which the foreign national belongs makes a request to Japan for the transportation of the said foreign national.

Reference 22 Record of Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas (TJNO)

Date	Outline	Details
April 2004	TJNO in Iraq	(Background) Frequent incidents of foreigners being taken hostage, including Japanese nationals. Members of the media expressed their desire to be immediately evacuated from Samawa to the Government of Japan, which consequently determined it to be of particular importance. (Operation) A total of 10 Japanese nationals (journalists and other media-related personnel) were transported from Iraq (Tallil Air Base) to Kuwait (Mubarak Air Base) via a C-130 aircraft.
January 2013	TJNO in Algeria	(Background) A hostage crisis involving Japanese nationals in the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria required their transportation back to Japan as soon as possible. (Operation) A total of 16 Japanese nationals (seven survivors and the bodies of nine deceased persons) were transported from Algeria (Houari Boumediene Airport) to Japan (Haneda Airport) via a B-747 government aircraft.
July 2016	TJNO in Bangladesh	(Background) An attack involving Japanese nationals in the People's Republic of Bangladesh required their transportation back to Japan as soon as possible. (Operation) A total of 24 persons (the bodies of seven deceased Japanese nationals and 17 family members) were transported from Bangladesh (Hazrat Shahjalal Airport) to Japan (Haneda Airport) via a B-747 government aircraft.
July 2016	TJNO in South Sudan	(Background) Gunfire attacks in the Republic of South Sudan required the transportation of Japanese nationals out of South Sudan as soon as possible. (Operation) Four Japanese nationals (embassy staff) were transported from South Sudan (Juba Airport) to the Republic of Djibouti (Djibouti Airport) via a C-130 aircraft.
August 2021	TJNO in Afghanistan	(Background) The Taliban takeover of Kabul, the capital of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, required the TJNO out of Afghanistan as soon as possible. (Operation) Transported one Japanese national and, on the request of the U.S., 14 Afghan people from Afghanistan (Kabul Airport) to a neighboring country via a C-130 aircraft
April 2023	TJNO in Sudan	(Background) Armed clashes broke out in Khartoum, the capital of the Republic of the Sudan, between the Sudanese military and the Rapid Support Forces, which required the TJNO out of Sudan as soon as possible. (Operation) Transported 45 Japanese nationals and their families from Sudan (Port Sudan New International Airport) to the Republic of Djibouti (Djibouti Airport) via a C-2 aircraft.
October, November 2023	TJNO in Israel	(Background) The Israeli-Palestinian situation has deteriorated since Palestinian armed groups including Hamas launched a cross-border attack against Israel from the Gaza Strip, which created the need to quickly TJNO out of Israel. (Operation) Transported 129 Japanese nationals and others from Israel (Ben Gurion Airport) to Japan (Haneda Airport) via a KC-767 aircraft. Transportation was conducted one each in October and November 2023 (twice in total).
October 2024	TJNO in Lebanon	(Background) The situation in the Lebanese Republic deteriorated rapidly, including large-scale airstrikes near the capital Beirut and ground operations in the south by Israel, which required the TJNO in the Lebanese Republic out of the country as quickly as possible. (Operation) Transported 16 people, comprised of 11 Japanese nationals, one family member of foreign nationality, and four French nationals, from Lebanon (Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport) to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Marka International Airport) via a C-2 aircraft.

Reference 23 Government Initiative to Ensure the Safety of Japanese Nationals Overseas in the Middle East and Africa

(Cabinet Decision on December 22,2023)

Amidst the political and security instability in the Middle East and Africa, the Government of Japan has been making further diplomatic efforts to stabilize the situation in the region. In the event of a drastic situation change, the Government has collected information through its diplomatic missions overseas and has made utmost efforts to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals overseas and to evacuate them depending on the situation.

On top of that, in order to implement the Rescue and Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas (R/TJNO) stipulated in the Article 84-3 and 84-4 of the Self-Defense Forces Law (No.165, 1954) respectively (hereinafter collectively referred to as "R/TJNO") more swiftly and effectively, it is essential for the SDF to establish a posture, in addition to information gathering by diplomatic missions overseas.

In this regard, the Republic of Djibouti is in a suitable location to serve as a standby location for the SDF to respond more quickly than before when a need for the R/TJNO arises in the Middle East and Africa. Based on this view, the "National Security Strategy of Japan" (Cabinet Decision on December 16, 2022) states, "… while gaining understanding from the Government of Djibouti, the SDF facility there, which has been in operation for counter-piracy activities, will be also utilized to protect Japanese nationals overseas. " In light of the fact that the SDF's facility in Djibouti was utilized for transportation of Japanese nationals Overseas (TJNO) in Sudan in April 2023, the possibility of the need for the R/TJNO in the Middle East and Africa may continue to remain. Based on these backgrounds, the following activities will be carried out by utilizing SDF units, such as ones operating under the Act of Punishment and Countermeasures Against Piracy(No. 55 ,2009)(hereinafter referred to as the "Counter-Piracy Act")

1 In the Middle East and Africa, conflicts, political upheavals, natural disaster and other events may necessitate the R/TJNO. In this regard, in order for the Government of Japan to be fully prepared for the R/TJNO, the Government of Japan will, with the understanding of the Government of the Republic of Djibouti, have the SDF units which conduct operations under the Counter-Piracy Act accumulate and manage equipment, strengthen defense cooperation and exchange, enhance information gathering and analysis, and conduct educational training as a temporary posture for the possible R/TJNO at the facility which the units have been using in the Republic of Djibouti (hereinafter referred to as "SDF Facility in Djibouti").

2 Considering the situation in the Middle East and Africa, these activities conducted by the SDF are necessary to facilitate the operation of its units when an order for the R/TJNO is issued, which also include the accumulation and management of equipment.

Therefore, these activities are to be carried out by the units, such as ones that conduct necessary operations to counter piracy acts based on Article 7 (1) of the Counter-Piracy Act, pursuant to Article 4 (1)(ix), (xiii),(xviii), and (xxxiii) of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense (No. 164, 1954).Details of such activities will be determined by the Defense Minister.

3 Additionally, considering the situation in the Middle East and Africa, in the event that a need arises such as conducting international peace cooperation assignments including international humanitarian relief operations based on the Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (No. 79 of 1992), the SDF Facility in Djibouti will be utilized as needed with the understanding of the Government of the Republic of Djibouti.

Reference 24 List of Maneuver Areas

Category	Name	Location	Size				Notes
			Administrative properties	Properties of other ministries	Private properties	Total	
Large maneuver areas	Yausubetsu	Hokkaido	168,134	—	15	168,149	
	Hokkaido	Hokkaido	95,802	35	106	95,943	Consists of 7 areas.
	Ojojihara	Miyagi	42,487	11	4,059	46,557	
	Kitafuji	Yamanashi	19,659	6	26,930	46,595	
	Higashifuji	Shizuoka	29,338	5,139	53,831	88,308	
	Hijudai	Oita	49,870	—	—	49,870	
	Total	6	405,289	5,190	84,942	495,421	
Medium maneuver areas	Onishibetsu	Hokkaido	14,925	—	—	14,925	
	Kamifurano	Hokkaido	42,851	—	17	42,867	
	Shikaribetsu	Hokkaido	33,288	—	4	33,292	
	Iwatesan	Iwate	22,891	—	0	22,891	
	Shirakawanunobikiyama	Fukushima	18,108	1	1,716	19,825	
	Soumagahara	Gunma	6,312	—	2,725	9,036	
	Sekiyama	Niigata	15,856	—	2,994	18,850	
	Aibano	Shiga	22,555	—	2,234	24,789	
	Aonogahara	Hyogo	6,085	—	—	6,085	
	Nihonbara	Okayama	14,654	—	4,982	19,635	
	Onohara	Nagasaki, Saga	5,992	—	83	6,075	
	Oyanohara	Kumamoto	16,328	12	—	16,340	
	Jumonjibaru	Oita	6,328	—	79	6,407	
	Kirishima	Miyazaki, Kagoshima	11,093	5	—	11,098	
	Total	14	237,266	19	14,833	252,117	
Small maneuver areas	50		62,692	106	3,393	66,191	
Total	70		705,247	5,315	103,168	813,729	

Notes: 1. Unit: 1,000 square meters
2. Rounded to the nearest unit
3. “0” indicates less than the unit, and “ --” indicates there is no applicable quantity.

Reference 25 Track Record of Asset Protection for the U.S Forces and Other Forces (SDF Law Article 95-2)

Period	Country	Type of protected Asset (Type of JSDF Asset which conducted asset protection)	Category of "Activities which contribute to the Defense of Japan" conducted by the U.S. Forces and the Armed Forces of Other Foreign Countries				Total
			ISR activities including ballistic missile alert	Transportation and Logistics under the "Important Influence Situation"	Joint exercises which improve capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan	Others	
2017	U.S.	Vessels (vessels)	0	0	1	0	2
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	1	0	
2018	U.S.	Vessels (vessels)	3	0	3	0	16
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	10	0	
2019	U.S.	Vessels (vessels)	4	0	1	0	14
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	9	0	
2020	U.S.	Vessels (vessels)	4	0	0	0	25
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	21	0	
2021	U.S.	Vessels (vessels)	4	0	10	0	22
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	7	0	
	Australia	Vessels (vessels)	0	0	1	0	
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	0	0	
2022	U.S.	Vessels (vessels)	4	0	18*	0	31
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	5	0	
	Australia	Vessels (vessels)	0	0	4*	0	
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	0	0	
2023	U.S.	Vessels (vessels)	4	0	13*	0	27
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	5	0	
	Australia	Vessels (vessels)	0	0	4*	0	
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	1	0	
2024	U.S.	Vessels (vessels)	4	0	6	0	13
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	3	0	
2025	U.S.	Vessels (vessels)	4	0	2	0	11
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	3	0	
	U.K.	Vessels (vessels)	0	0	2	0	
		Aircraft (aircraft)	0	0	0	0	

Note: With regard to the coordinated asset protection among Japan, the U.S., and Australia, the cases for 2023 are counted as two cases each for both the U.S. and Australia. For 2022 the case is counted as one for both the U.S. and Australia.

Reference 26 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

(April 27, 2015)

I. Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines

In order to ensure Japan's peace and security under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize:

- seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses;
- synergy across the two governments' national security policies;
- a whole-of-government Alliance approach;
- cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and
- the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The two governments will continuously enhance the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Each government will maintain its individual defense posture based on its national security policy. Japan will possess defense capability on the basis of the "National Security Strategy" and the "National Defense Program Guidelines." The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combat-ready forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly.

The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation ("the Guidelines") provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination, with a view to improving the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation. In this way, the Guidelines advance peace and security, deter conflict, secure the basis for economic prosperity, and promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

II. Basic Premises and Principles

The Guidelines, as well as actions and activities under the Guidelines, are and will be consistent with the following basic premises and principles.

A. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, will remain unchanged.

B. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and its provisions regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality of States, as well as other relevant international agreements.

C. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws, and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense- oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.

D. The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specific policies and measures.

III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies.

The two governments must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral security and defense cooperation. To that end, the two governments will take advantage of all available channels to enhance information sharing and to ensure seamless and effective whole-of- government Alliance coordination that includes all relevant agencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning.

A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism

Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on the peace and security of Japan and the United States. In order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan's peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism. This mechanism will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also will contribute to timely information sharing as well as the development and maintenance of common situational awareness. To ensure effective coordination, the two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises.

The two governments will tailor to the situation the procedures for coordination as well as the exact composition of participating agencies within the Alliance Coordination Mechanism structure. As part of these procedures, contact information will be shared and maintained from peacetime.

B. Enhanced Operational Coordination

Enhanced bilateral operational coordination for flexible and responsive command and control is a core capability of critical importance to Japan and the United States. In this context, the two governments recognize the continued importance of collocating operational coordination functions to strengthen cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination from peacetime to contingencies, and to support international activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in close cooperation and coordination, will take action through their respective chains-of-command.

C. Bilateral Planning

The two governments will continue to develop and update bilateral plans to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated operations by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. To ensure the effectiveness of the plans and the ability to make flexible, timely, and appropriate responses, the two governments will exchange relevant

information, including identifying operational and logistic support requirements and sources in advance, as appropriate.

The two governments will conduct bilateral planning in peacetime for contingencies relevant to Japan's peace and security through an upgraded Bilateral Planning Mechanism, which includes relevant agencies of the respective governments. Bilateral plans will be developed with input from relevant agencies, as appropriate. The Security Consultative Committee (SCC) will continue to be responsible for presenting directions, validating the progress of the planning under the mechanism, and issuing directives as necessary. The SCC will be assisted by an appropriate subordinate body.

Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments.

IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan's Peace and Security

Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on Japan's peace and security. In this increasingly complex security environment, the two governments will take measures to ensure Japan's peace and security in all phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners.

The two governments recognize that these measures need to be taken based on flexible, timely, and effective bilateral coordination tailored to each situation and that interagency coordination is essential for appropriate Alliance responses. Therefore, the two governments will utilize the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to:

- assess the situation;
- share information; and
- develop ways to implement the appropriate Alliance response, including flexible deterrent options, as well as actions aimed at de-escalation.

To support these bilateral efforts, the two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels on issues that could potentially affect Japan's peace and security.

A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime

In order to ensure the maintenance of Japan's peace and security, the two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, including through diplomatic efforts, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance to prepare for all possible situations. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to, the following:

1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

In order to identify at the earliest possible stage any indications of threats to Japan's peace and security and to ensure a decisive advantage in intelligence gathering and analysis, the two governments will share and protect information and intelligence, while developing and maintaining common situational awareness. This will include enhancing coordination and cooperation among relevant agencies.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities based on the capabilities and availability of their respective assets. This will include conducting bilateral ISR activities in a mutually supportive manner to ensure persistent coverage of developments that could affect Japan's peace and security.

2. Air and Missile Defense

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain and strengthen deterrence and their defense postures against ballistic missile launches and aerial incursions. The two governments will cooperate to expand early warning capabilities, interoperability, network coverage, and real-time information exchange and to pursue the comprehensive improvement of capabilities to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles. Moreover, the two governments will continue to coordinate closely in responding to provocative missile launches and other aerial activities.

3. Maritime Security

The two governments will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order based upon international law, including freedom of navigation. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, on various efforts such as maintaining and enhancing bilateral presence in the maritime domain through ISR and training and exercises, while further developing and enhancing shared maritime domain awareness including by coordinating with relevant agencies, as necessary.

4. Asset Protection

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual protection of each other's assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in a cooperative manner, including during training and exercises.

5. Training and Exercises

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct effective bilateral and multilateral training and exercises both inside and outside of Japan in order to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. Timely and realistic training and exercises will enhance deterrence. To support these activities, the two governments will cooperate to ensure that training areas, facilities, and associated equipment are available, accessible, and modern.

6. Logistic Support

Japan and the United States are primarily responsible for providing logistic support for their respective forces in all phases. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual logistic support where appropriate, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services, for such activities as set forth in the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) and its related arrangements.

7. Use of Facilities

In order to expand interoperability and improve flexibility and resiliency of the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, the two governments will enhance joint/shared use and cooperate in ensuring the security of facilities and areas. Recognizing the importance of being prepared for contingencies, the two governments also will cooperate in conducting site surveys on facilities including civilian airports and seaports, as appropriate.

B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan's Peace and Security

The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an

important influence on Japan's peace and security. Such situations cannot be defined geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries' respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation. Early recognition and adaptable, resolute decision-making on bilateral actions will contribute to deterrence and de-escalation of such situations.

In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to ensure the peace and security of Japan. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to, those listed below.

1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
   When Japanese and U.S. noncombatants need to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals, as well as dealing with the authorities of the affected area. As appropriate, the two governments will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out evacuations of Japanese or U.S. noncombatants. These evacuations will be carried out using each country's capabilities such as transportation means and facilities in a mutually supplementary manner. The two governments may each consider extending evacuation assistance to third-country noncombatants.

   The two governments will conduct early-stage coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to carry out cooperation in fields such as the safety of evacuees, transportation means and facilities, customs, immigration and quarantine processing, safe havens, and medical services. The two governments will enhance coordination in noncombatant evacuation operations from peacetime, as appropriate, including by conducting training and exercises.
2. Maritime Security
   Taking into account their respective capabilities, the two governments will cooperate closely to enhance maritime security. Cooperative measures may include, but are not limited to, information sharing and inspection of ships based on a United Nations Security Council resolution or other basis under international law.
3. Measures to Deal with Refugees
   If a situation develops such that a flow of refugees into Japan becomes likely or actually begins, the two governments will cooperate to maintain Japan's peace and security while handling refugees in a humane manner consistent with applicable obligations under international law. Primary responsibility for such refugee response lies with Japan. The United States will provide appropriate support upon a request from Japan.
4. Search and Rescue
   The two governments will cooperate and provide mutual support, as appropriate, in search and rescue operations. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will provide support to combat search and rescue operations by the United States, where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.
5. Protection of Facilities and Areas
   The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces are responsible for protecting their own facilities and areas in cooperation with relevant authorities. Upon request from the United States, Japan will provide additional protection for facilities and areas in Japan in close cooperation and coordination with the United States Armed Forces.
6. Logistic Support
   The two governments will enhance mutual logistic support (which includes, but is not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services), as appropriate, to enable effective and efficient operations. This includes rapid validation and resourcing of operational and logistic support requirements. The Government of Japan will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies as well as private sector assets. The Government of Japan will provide logistic or other associated support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.
7. Use of Facilities
   The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, temporary use of facilities, including civilian airports and seaports, in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas.

C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan
Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation.

When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will take steps to deter the armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan.

When an armed attack against Japan occurs, the two governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage and to deter any further attacks. The two governments also will take necessary measures including those listed earlier in Chapter IV.

1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated
   When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will intensify, through a comprehensive and robust whole-of-government approach, information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to deter the attack and to de-escalate the situation.

   The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will assume appropriate postures for bilateral operations, including the execution of necessary deployments. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for its support of U.S. deployments. The preparations by the two governments may include, but would not be limited to: joint/shared use of facilities and areas; mutual logistic support, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services; and reinforced protection of U.S. facilities and areas in Japan.
2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs
   a. Principles for Coordinated Actions
      If an armed attack against Japan occurs despite diplomatic efforts and deterrence, Japan and the United States will cooperate to repel promptly the attack and deter any further attacks to return peace and security to Japan. Such coordinated actions will contribute to the reestablishment of peace and security in the region.

      Japan will maintain primary responsibility for defending the citizens and territory of Japan and will take actions immediately to repel an armed attack against

Japan as expeditiously as possible. The Self-Defense Forces will have the primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations in Japan and its surrounding waters and airspace, as well as its air and maritime approaches. The United States will coordinate closely with Japan and provide appropriate support. The United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces to defend Japan. The United States will take actions to shape the regional environment in a way that supports the defense of Japan and reestablishes peace and security.

Recognizing that all instruments of national power will be required to defend Japan, the two governments respectively will employ a whole- of-government approach, utilizing their respective chains-of-command, to coordinate actions through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism.

The United States will employ forward-deployed forces, including those stationed in Japan, and introduce reinforcements from elsewhere, as required. Japan will establish and maintain the basis required to facilitate these deployments.

The two governments will take actions as appropriate to provide defense of each other's forces and facilities in response to an armed attack against Japan.

b. Concept of Operations

i. Operations to Defend Airspace

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan. The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, defense against attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

ii. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange real-time information for early detection of ballistic missile launches. When there is an indication of a ballistic missile attack, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain an effective posture to defend against ballistic missile attacks heading for Japan and to protect forces participating in ballistic missile defense operations.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

iii. Operations to Defend Maritime Areas

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, coastal defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, anti-air warfare, and air interdiction.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack.

The effectiveness of these activities will be enhanced through information sharing and other forms of cooperation among relevant agencies.

iv. Operations to Counter Ground Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands. If the need arises, the Self- Defense Forces will conduct operations to retake an island. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, operations to prevent and repel airborne and seaborne invasions, amphibious operations, and rapid deployment.

The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, also will have primary responsibility for defeating attacks by special operations forces or any other unconventional attacks in Japan, including those that involve infiltration.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

v. Cross-Domain Operations

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks. These operations will be designed to achieve effects across multiple domains simultaneously.

Examples of cooperation across domains include the actions described below.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, as appropriate, will strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other's ISR assets.

The United States Armed Forces may conduct operations involving the use of strike power, to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces. When the United States Armed Forces conduct such operations, the Self-Defense Forces may provide support, as necessary. These operations will be based on close bilateral coordination, as appropriate.

The two governments will cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains in accordance with bilateral cooperation set out in

Chapter VI.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces' special operations forces will cooperate during operations, as appropriate.

c. Operational Support Activities

The two governments will cooperate in the following activities in support of bilateral operations.

i. Communications and Electronics

The two governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will ensure effective communication between the two forces and maintain a common operational picture for bilateral operations under common situational awareness.

ii. Search and Rescue

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide mutual support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate.

iii. Logistic Support

When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability.

The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support.

iv. Use of Facilities

The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, additional facilities in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas.

v. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection

The Government of Japan will maintain primary responsibility for emergency responses to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents or attacks in Japan. The United States retains primary responsibility for maintaining and restoring the mission capability of the United States Armed Forces in Japan. At Japan's request, the United States will support Japan in CBRN incident or attack prevention and response-related activities in an effort to ensure the protection of Japan, as appropriate.

D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan

When Japan and the United States each decides to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks. Bilateral responses will be coordinated through the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism.

Japan and the United States will cooperate as appropriate with other countries taking action in response to the armed attack.

The Self-Defense Forces will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people's right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan's survival, and to protect its people.

Examples of cooperative operations are outlined below:

1. Asset Protection

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in asset protection, as appropriate. Such cooperation will include, but not be limited to, protection of assets that are engaged in operations such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations or Ballistic Missile Defense.

2. Search and Rescue

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate.

3. Maritime Operations

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in minesweeping, as appropriate, including to secure the safety of sea lines of communication.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in escort operations to protect ships and vessels, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack, as appropriate.

4. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in intercepting ballistic missiles, as appropriate, in accordance with their respective capabilities. The two governments will exchange information to ensure early detection of ballistic missile launches.

5. Logistics Support

When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability.

The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support.

E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan

When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. Recognizing that immediate recovery from a large-scale disaster in Japan is essential for Japan's peace and security and that such a disaster could affect the activities of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, the United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan's activities. Such support may include search and rescue, transportation, supply, medical services, incident awareness and assessment, and other specialized capabilities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate.

To improve the effectiveness of the United States Armed

Forces' cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities in Japan, the two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. In addition, the United States Armed Forces also may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters.

V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security

In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. For well over half a century, both countries have worked together to deliver effective solutions to challenges in diverse regions of the world.

When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities for the peace and security of the region and beyond, the two governments, including the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below. This cooperation also will contribute to the peace and security of both countries.

A. Cooperation in International Activities

The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable.

The two governments may coordinate the activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, and also will pursue trilateral and multilateral cooperation in these activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will share procedures and best practices, as appropriate, for smooth and effective cooperation. While the two governments will continue to cooperate on a broad array of issues that may not be explicitly included in the Guidelines, common areas for cooperation by the two governments in regional and international activities will include:

1. Peacekeeping Operations
   When the two governments participate in peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations (UN) in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate, to maximize interoperability between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The two governments also may cooperate in providing logistic support for and protecting UN and other personnel who participate in the same mission, as appropriate.
2. International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
   When the two governments conduct international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale humanitarian and natural disasters, the two governments will cooperate closely to provide mutual support, as appropriate, maximizing interoperability between participating Self-Defense Forces and United States Armed Forces. Examples of cooperative activities may include mutual logistic support and operational coordination, planning, and execution.
3. Maritime Security
   When the two governments conduct activities for maritime security, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate. Examples of cooperative activities may include efforts for: safe and secure sea lines of communication such as counter-piracy and minesweeping; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and counterterrorism activities.
4. Partner Capacity Building
   Proactive cooperation with partners will contribute to maintaining and enhancing regional and international peace and security. The two governments will cooperate in capacity building activities, as appropriate, by making the best use of their capabilities and experience, with the objective of strengthening the capability of partners to respond to dynamic security challenges. Examples of cooperative activities may include maritime security, military medicine, defense institution building, and improved force readiness for HA/DR or peacekeeping operations.
5. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
   In circumstances when international action is required for the evacuation of noncombatants, the two governments will utilize, as appropriate, all possible avenues including diplomatic efforts to ensure the safety of noncombatants, including those who are Japanese or U.S. nationals.
6. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
   When the two governments participate in international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in ISR activities, as appropriate, based on the respective capabilities and availability of their assets.
7. Training and Exercises
   In order to enhance the effectiveness of international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct and participate in joint training and exercises, as appropriate, to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. The two governments also will continue to pursue opportunities to work with partners in training and exercises to contribute to enhancing interoperability with the Alliance and the development of common tactics, techniques, and procedures.
8. Logistic support
   When participating in international activities, the two governments will cooperate to provide mutual logistic support. The Government of Japan will provide logistic support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation

The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. In particular, the two governments will reinforce efforts and seek additional opportunities to cooperate with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations.

The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promoting cooperation based upon international law and standards.

VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation

A. Cooperation on Space

Recognizing the security aspects of the space domain, the two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space.

As part of such efforts, the two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation. The two governments will provide mutual support, as appropriate, to establish and improve capabilities and will share information about actions and events that might affect the safety and stability of the space domain and impede its use. The two governments also will share information to address emerging threats against

space systems and will pursue opportunities for cooperation in maritime domain awareness and in space- related equipment and technology that will strengthen capabilities and resiliency of the space systems, including hosted payloads.

To accomplish their missions effectively and efficiently, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate and to contribute to whole- of-government efforts in utilizing space in such areas as: early-warning; ISR; positioning, navigation, and timing; space situational awareness; meteorological observation; command, control, and communications; and ensuring the resiliency of relevant space systems that are critical for mission assurance. In cases where their space systems are threatened, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, in mitigating risk and preventing damage. If damage occurs, they will cooperate, as appropriate, in reconstituting relevant capabilities.

B. Cooperation on Cyberspace

To help ensure the safe and stable use of cyberspace, the two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and routine manner, as appropriate. The two governments also will share, as appropriate, information on the development of various capabilities in cyberspace, including the exchange of best practices on training and education. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions, including through information sharing with the private sector, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will:

- maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems;
- share expertise and conduct educational exchanges in cybersecurity;
- ensure resiliency of their respective networks and systems to achieve mission assurance;
- contribute to whole-of-government efforts to improve cybersecurity; and
- conduct bilateral exercises to ensure effective cooperation for cybersecurity in all situations from peacetime to contingencies.

In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, including those against critical infrastructure and services utilized by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and based on close bilateral coordination, the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. The two governments also will share relevant information expeditiously and appropriately. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, including those that take place when Japan is under an armed attack, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.

VII. Bilateral Enterprise

The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation:

A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

In order to enhance interoperability and to promote efficient acquisition and maintenance, the two governments will:

- cooperate in joint research, development, production, and test and evaluation of equipment and in mutual provision of components of common equipment and services;
- strengthen the basis to repair and maintain common equipment for mutual efficiency and readiness;
- facilitate reciprocal defense procurement to enhance efficient acquisition, interoperability, and defense equipment and technology cooperation; and
- explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on defense equipment and technology.

B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security

- Recognizing that common situational awareness is essential, the two governments will enhance intelligence cooperation and information sharing at all levels, including the national strategic level.
- In order to enable robust intelligence cooperation and information sharing, the two governments will continue to promote cooperation in strengthening policies, practices, and procedures related to the protection of classified information.
- The two governments also will explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on information sharing.

C. Educational and Research Exchanges

Recognizing the importance of intellectual cooperation concerning security and defense, the two governments will deepen exchanges of members of relevant organizations and strengthen communication between each side's research and educational institutions. Such efforts will serve as the enduring foundation for security and defense officials to share their knowledge and reinforce cooperation.

VIII. Processes for Review

The SCC, assisted by an appropriate subordinate body, will regularly evaluate whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances. The two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan-U.S. Alliance relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time.

Reference 27 Chronology of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

1951	Years of the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty	The former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed
1952		The treaty enters into force
1958	Revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty	Fujiyama-Dulles Talks (agreement on the revision of the treaty)
1960		The new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed and enters into force
1968		(Ogasawara Islands are returned to Japan)
1969		Sato-Nixon Talks (agreement on the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the return of Okinawa to Japan)
1972		(Okinawa is returned to Japan)
1976	Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines and expanding Japan-U.S. defense cooperation	(Agreement on the establishment of the Sub-Committee for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation)
1978		Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1978 Guidelines)
1991	End of the Cold War and the establishment of the 1997 Guidelines	(Collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War)
1996		Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton talks)
		SACO Final Report
1997		Formulation of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997 Guidelines)
2001	Japan-U.S. relations since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States	9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S.
2003		The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global context (Koizumi-Bush Talks)
2006		Formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
		The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century (Koizumi-Bush Talks)
		The Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia (Abe-Bush Talks)
2007		Irreplaceable Japan-U.S. Alliance (Abe-Bush Talks)
2010		50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
2012		Japan-U.S. Joint Leaders' Statement: A Shared Vision For the Future (Noda-Obama Talks)
2013		Agreement on the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
2014		The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond (Abe-Obama Talks)
2015	2015 security environment and the establishment of the new Guidelines	Formulation of the New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Japan-U.S. Joint Vision Statement (Abe-Obama Talks)
2017		Joint Leaders' Statement (Abe-Trump Talks)
2018		Joint Leaders' Statement (Abe-Trump Talks)
2020		60th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
2021		Joint Leaders' Statement (Suga-Biden Talks)
2022	Formulation of the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program	Joint Leaders' Statement (Kishida-Biden Talks)
2023		Joint Leaders' Statement (Kishida-Biden Talks)
2024		Joint Leaders' Statement (Kishida-Biden Talks)
2025		Joint Leaders' Statement (Ishiba-Trump Talks)

Reference 28 Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2022)

	Outline and Results
May 4, 2022 The Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting Washington D. C. Participants: Defense Minister Kishi U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin	• The Ministers severely condemned Russia's aggression against Ukraine, stating that it is a unilateral change to the status quo by force that poses serious challenge to the international order and such actions are absolutely unacceptable. Both sides confirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to work together to support Ukraine as much as possible. • The U.S. side expressed his appreciation to Japan's leadership in supporting Ukraine. Japanese side stated his vision to strengthen the commitment to security in Europe from the viewpoint that security of the Indo-Pacific region and Europe cannot be regarded separately. • Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. • Both sides discussed the recent behaviors of China in the Indo-Pacific region such as coercive actions in the East and South China Seas. Both sides determined that any change to the status quo by force in the Indo-Pacific region cannot be condoned, and confirmed that both countries would continue to strengthen cooperation to deter and, if necessary, respond to such actions. • The U.S. side affirmed that the Senkaku Islands are under the administration of Japan and that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. The U.S. side also expressed opposition to any unilateral attempts to undermine the administration of Japan. • Both sides also reiterated the importance of peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. • Both sides agreed on the view that North Korea's repeated missile launches and nuclear development, etc. are a serious threat against peace and stability of the region and the international community and that such actions cannot be tolerated. Both sides also confirmed to advance close bilateral and trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea in response to North Korea's provocations. • Both sides concurred to strengthen defense cooperation with partner countries in the region and beyond such as Australia, India, Southeast Asian and Pacific Island nations, and European nations. • Both sides agreed that Japan and the United States would promptly materialize various measures to enhance the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond. • Japanese side expressed his determination to fundamentally reinforce Japan's defense capabilities through formulating the National Security Strategy (NSS), etc. The U.S. side welcomed the statement and both sides confirmed that Japan and the United States would align their respective strategies through close consultations. • The US side stated that the U.S. commitment to providing the extended deterrence including nuclear capabilities to Japan remains unwavering. Japanese side stated that bilateral efforts at various levels to ensure nuclear deterrence remains credible and resilient is more important than ever under the current international security situation, and shared the recognition with the U.S. side. • Both sides concurred on the importance of information security and cybersecurity which is the basis for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, and agreed to work together to strengthen them. • Both sides concurred to further deepen cooperation in the area of equipment and technology including cooperation in counter-hypersonic technology. • The Ministers affirmed that they would continue to work together to mitigate impact on local communities including Okinawa and concurred on the importance of understanding and cooperation from the local communities for the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japanned their daily activities. • Both sides shared the importance of continuing to closely work together and further expedite the cooperation to mitigate impact on Okinawa this year, which marks the 50th anniversary of Okinawa's reversion to Japan.
May 23, 2022 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting Tokyo Participants: Prime Minister Kishida President Biden	• Prime Minister Kishida extended his sincere welcome to President Biden's visit to Japan as it demonstrates the continued commitment of the U.S. to the Indo-Pacific region under any circumstances, and President Biden stated that he hopes to demonstrate the unwavering U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific region through this visit to Japan. • As Russia's aggression against Ukraine shakes the very foundations of international order, the two leaders reaffirmed the need to resolutely defend free and open international order based on the rule of law. The two leaders also recognized that the Indo-Pacific is a region of vital importance to global peace, security and prosperity, and concurred that Japan and the United States will lead the international community towards the realization of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific." • Regarding Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to promoting support for Ukraine and imposing sanction measures against Russia, in continued close coordination with the G7 and the international community. The two leaders concurred that Japan and the United States will continue to cooperate towards strong international solidarity. • The two leaders concurred on the importance of clearly demonstrating that any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force, such as the recent aggression, should not be tolerated in any region, and that such attempts should have significant cost. • The two leaders discussed the possible impact of the situation in Ukraine on the Indo-Pacific region and concurred to be attentive to developments such as the recent China-Russia joint military exercises. The two leaders strongly opposed any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas and economic coercion, expressed serious concern about the development in Hong Kong and the human rights situation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and concurred to continue to work closely together in addressing issues related to China. • The two leaders confirmed that their basic positions on Taiwan remain unchanged, reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element in security and prosperity in the international community, and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. • The two leaders condemned North Korea's nuclear and missile development activities, including its ICBM-class ballistic missile launches. The two leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions and urged North Korea to abide by its obligations under these resolutions. The two leaders concurred to further strengthen cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK, including security cooperation. • Prime Minister Kishida expressed his appreciation for President Biden's meeting with the family members of the abductees by North Korea. He asked for full understanding and cooperation again for the immediate resolution of the abductions issue, and gained further support from President Biden. • The two leaders concurred to swiftly strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. President Biden reiterated the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan, and the two leaders concurred to communicate more closely between Japan and the U.S. to ensure that extended deterrence remains unwavering. • They reiterated their opposition to any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan's longstanding administration of the Senkaku Islands. • Prime Minister Kishida stated his determination to fundamentally reinforce Japan's defense capabilities and secure substantial increase of its defense budget needed to effect it, which received strong support from President Biden.

	Outline and Results
June 27, 2022 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / Elmau Participants: Prime Minister Kishida President Biden	• The Japanese side emphasized the significance of the President Biden's visit to Japan in May. The two leaders confirmed their commitment to continue close coordination toward further strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance and realizing a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific". • The two leaders concurred in working together for the success of the Japan-U.S. Economic Policy Consultative Committee (the Economic "2+2") at the Ministerial level to be held in July. • The two leaders confirmed their commitment to continue close coordination regarding their response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine. In this regard, the two leaders also discussed responses to rising oil prices, such as putting a price cap on Russian oil.
September 14, 2022 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington D.C. Participants: Defense Minister Hamada U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin	• The Ministers had a wide range of discussions on the challenging security environment surrounding the Japan-U.S. Alliance. • The Ministers once again strongly condemned China's ballistic missile launches in early August including the landing of missiles inside Japan's EEZ as a grave issue related to the security of Japan and the safety of its people. The Ministers reiterated the importance of peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait and concurred that they would call for the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. The Ministers confirmed that they would not condone unilateral change to the status quo by force in the Indo-Pacific region, and that both sides would cooperate closely and seamlessly to that end. • The Ministers confirmed that Russia's aggression against Ukraine is an outrage that undermines the foundation of international order. They confirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to work together to carry on support for Ukraine. • Regarding North Korea's nuclear and missile issues, the Ministers welcomed the Japan-U.S.-ROK exercise during the missile warning exercise Pacific Dragon in August. The Ministers confirmed that they would further advance even closer Japan-U.S. bilateral and Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation in order to promptly respond to North Korea's provocative actions in a concerted manner. • The Ministers concurred that they would strengthen cooperation with partner countries in the region and beyond to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific. • The Japanese side expressed its determination to fundamentally reinforce Japan's defense capabilities through formulation of new National Security Strategy, etc., examining all options including the so-called "counterstrike capabilities." The Japanese side also stated that the MOD was working to secure substantial increase of the defense budget needed to effect it. The U.S. side expressed his strong support for these efforts. The Ministers confirmed that the strategies of Japan and the United States share the same direction and that they would align their respective strategies even more closely to strengthen the Alliance. • The U.S. side reaffirmed that the U.S. commitment to providing extended deterrence including nuclear capabilities to Japan remains unwavering. The Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States would deepen discussions including at the ministerial level on efforts to ensure that extended deterrence of the • U.S. including nuclear capabilities remains credible and resilient. • The Ministers agreed upon the importance of strengthening intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities as part of strengthening the Alliance's capabilities to deter and respond. From such perspective, the Ministers welcomed the progress towards the temporary deployment of USAF MQ-9s to MSDF Kanoya Air Base. The Japanese side stated that the temporary deployment of MQ-9s contributes to the deepening of ISR activities by unmanned aerial vehicles of JSDF. The Ministers concurred that Japan and the United States would jointly analyze information acquired by Japanese and the U.S. assets including MQ-9s. • The Ministers concurred that Japan and the United States would further accelerate cooperation in the area of equipment and technology to ensure technological edge of the Alliance. From such perspective, the Ministers agreed to continue joint analysis on counter-hypersonic technology and based on its progress, to begin consideration of joint research on technologies and components. The Ministers also concurred to further accelerate cooperation in unmanned aerial vehicles that have the potential to collaborate with manned aircraft such as F-X, as well as efforts to strengthen supply chains, etc. • The Ministers concurred that information security and cybersecurity is crucially important to deepening Japan-U.S. defense cooperation. The Japanese side explained that Japan would work to fundamentally strengthen cybersecurity. • The Ministers confirmed that the understanding and cooperation from local communities as well as safe and environment-friendly operations of the U.S. forces are important for the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan and their daily activities. The Ministers concurred that Japan and the United States would continue to work closely together for the steady progress of the realignment initiatives of the U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Henoko-saki as well as facility development of Mageshima. The Ministers affirmed that they would continue to work together to mitigate impact on local communities including Okinawa.
November 13, 2022 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / Phnom Penh Participants: Prime Minister Kishida President Biden	• At the outset, the two leaders shared the recognition that the security environment surrounding us is becoming increasingly severe due to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, North Korea's repeated provocative actions, and continuing unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas. They then shared the recognition that the strong Japan-U.S. relationship has a significant role to play in regional peace and stability and beyond, and concurred to work together to ensure peace and prosperity in the region and the international community, by further strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and promoting efforts to realize a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific." • The two leaders exchanged their views on regional issues. • The two leaders concurred to continue close coordination between Japan and the U.S. in addressing various issues related to China. They also confirmed the importance of peace and stability in the region. • The two leaders concurred that North Korea's ballistic missile launches in an unprecedented frequency and manner are absolutely unacceptable, and confirmed their commitment to continue close coordination between Japan and the U.S. as well as among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK toward the complete denuclearization of North Korea in accordance with the UNSCRs. Prime Minister Kishida also asked for continued understanding and cooperation of the U.S. for the resolution of the abductions issue, and gained full support from President Biden. • The two leaders, regarding Russia's aggression against Ukraine, confirmed their commitment to impose strong sanctions against Russia and to support Ukraine, in solidarity with the G7 and other like-minded countries, while further reaching out to the Global South. They also confirmed that they have a serious concern about Russia's nuclear threat, which is absolutely unacceptable, let alone the use of such weapons. • The Japanese side explained that Japan is in the process of formulating a new national security strategy by the end of this year amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan. The Japanese side reiterated his determination to fundamentally reinforce Japan's defense capabilities and to secure a substantial increase of defense budget needed to effect it, which received strong support from the U.S. side. • While welcoming the progress made on the IPEF and the economic "2+2," the two leaders shared the recognition that engagement of the U.S. in the economic order and economic security in the region is becoming increasingly important. The Japanese side urged the U.S. to return to the TPP at an early time. The Japanese side also conveyed Japan's thoughts on the U.S. credits for clean vehicles. • The two leaders concurred to continue close coordination between Japan and the U.S. toward the success of the G7 Hiroshima Summit Meeting in 2023.

	Outline and Results
January 11, 2023 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2") Meeting / Washington D.C. Participants: Defense Minister Hamada Foreign Minister Hayashi U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin U.S. Secretary of State Blinken	• At the beginning of the meeting, the U.S. side expressed its sincere welcome to the visit of the two Japanese ministers to the U.S. and its great pleasure that this Japan-U.S. "2+2" could be held face-to-face for the first time in two years in a timely manner, immediately after the release of the strategic documents of the two countries. They also stated that the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance has never been higher than ever amidst an increasingly severe security environment, and they also stated that they would like to demonstrate the unwavering U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific region to achieve a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific." The Japanese side stated that this is an excellent opportunity to have discussion on further deepening of the Alliance, while aligning the two countries' perceptions of the security environment, based on both countries' strategic documents. They added that they are fully committed to continuously strengthening the Alliance and sincerely look forward to working closely with the two Secretaries. They also stated that the strategies do not end when they are formulated, and it is important to work together to promptly implement their respective strategies. • Japan and the U.S. welcomed the release of their respective National Security Strategies and National Defense Strategies, and confirmed unprecedented alignment of their vision, priorities, and goals. • The Japanese side stated that, it would reinforce its defense capabilities by acquiring new capabilities and enhancing its warfighting sustainability early under the substantially increased defense budget. In response, the U.S. side stated that this is an important initiative to strengthen Alliance deterrence and response capabilities, and stated that the U.S. strongly supports this initiative. • The U.S. side restated its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan under Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear, and reaffirmed Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. • The Japanese side stated that Japan will strengthen its diplomatic and security roles to proactively create a peaceful and stable international environment, and to enhance a free and open international order based on the rule of law. Then both sides aligned their perspectives on the security environment as follows: • Japan and the U.S. concurred that China's foreign policy-based actions aimed at reshaping the international order for its own benefit are of serious concern to the Alliance and the entire international community, and pose the greatest strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, and beyond. • The U.S. side also reiterated its strong opposition to China's intensified attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the East China Sea, including through actions that seek to undermine Japan's longstanding administration of the Senkaku Islands. • Japan and the U.S. recognized that their basic positions on Taiwan remain unchanged, and reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international community and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. • Japan and the U.S strongly condemned North Korea's unprecedented number of unlawful and reckless ballistic missile launches over the past year. The Japanese side stated that if North Korea ,which has announced its policy of mass production of tactical nuclear weapons and other initiatives, decides to conduct another nuclear test, this test needs to be recognized as an event that is completely different from the previous six nuclear tests. In addition, the U.S. side expressed its full support for the abductions issue. • Japan and the U.S. strongly condemned Russia's brutal, unprovoked, and unjustifiable war against Ukraine. The Japanese side stated that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific region are indivisible, and that as the G7 chair this year, Japan will lead the discussion on how to respond to Russia and support Ukraine. • The Japanese side stated that the strategies of both countries are aligned in that both sides seek to fundamentally reinforce their own defense capabilities to enhance deterrence, to increase investment for this purpose, and to strengthen cooperation with allies and like-minded countries. The both sides discussed measures to maximize Alliance deterrence and response capabilities under their strategies. • The Japanese side stated that it is necessary to achieve a more effective division of roles and missions between Japan and the U.S. based on fundamentally reinforced Japan's defense capabilities. Japan and the U.S. reemphasized the necessity to further enhance bilateral coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism in order to cope with the full spectrum of possible situations in a timely and integrated manner. The U.S. side welcomed Japan's decision to establish a permanent joint headquarters. • Japan and the U.S. decided to deepen bilateral cooperation toward the effective employment of Japan's counterstrike capabilities in close coordination with the U.S. • Japan and the U.S. decided to deepen bilateral coordination, including on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and flexible deterrent options. • The Japanese side stated that cooperation in equipment and technology is important both for maintaining the technological edge and for swiftly achieving the reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities, and that it is necessary to further accelerate such cooperation. The U.S. side expressed its willingness to make efforts with Japan toward maintaining their technological edge. • The Japanese side stated that deepening cooperation in the space and cyber domains is a core element in modernizing the Alliance. Both sides committed to deepening cooperation on space-related capabilities. In addition, Japan and the U.S. consider that attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance, and affirmed such attacks, in certain circumstances, could lead to the invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The Japanese side stated that this is an important achievement in terms of strengthening the deterrence capabilities of the Alliance. • The Japanese side stated that, with regard to multilateral cooperation, it will build and expand a multilayered network of allies and like-minded countries to strengthen deterrence. • Japan and the U.S. took time to have in-depth discussions on extended deterrence as one of the agenda, based on the release of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. • Japan and the U.S. reaffirmed the critical importance of ensuring U.S. extended deterrence remains credible and resilient. • Furthermore, Japan and the U.S. concurred to deepen the substantive discussions at the Extended Deterrence Dialogue as well as through various senior-level meetings. • Japan and the U.S. affirmed the need to optimize Alliance force posture based on improved operational concepts and enhanced capabilities to address increasing security challenges in the region, including for the defense of the Southwestern Islands of Japan. They also concurred on the importance of steadily implementing the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Henoko which is the only solution that avoids its continued use. • Japan and the U.S. concurred to readjust the force posture of U.S. forces in Japan in light of the current severe security environment. Facing a severely contested environment, Japan and the U.S. confirmed that the forward posture of U.S. forces in Japan should be upgraded to strengthen Alliance deterrence and response capabilities by positioning more versatile, resilient, and mobile forces with increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, anti-ship, and transportation capabilities. In line with such policy, Japan and the U.S. affirmed that the Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, as adjusted by the SCC on April 27, 2012, will be readjusted so that the 3rd Marine Division Headquarters and the 12th Marine Regiment will remain in Okinawa and the 12th Marine Regiment will be reorganized into the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment by 2025. This effort will be carried out while maintaining the basic tenets of the 2012 Realignment Plan, with utmost consideration to the impacts on local communities. • The Japanese side expressed appreciation for the dedicated activities of U.S. forces in Japan to address the severe security environment. The Japanese side also introduced the steady progress of the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility and the facility development on Mageshima. Japan and the U.S. also reconfirmed the steady implementation of ongoing projects supporting realignment of facilities and areas of U.S. Forces in Japan and the importance of relationships with local communities, and underlined their commitment to continue construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab/ Henokosaki area and in adjacent waters as the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. They also welcomed the progress and future prospects for the development of the JSDF facility on Mageshima. • Japan and the U.S. confirmed the importance of accelerating bilateral work on U.S. force realignment efforts, including construction of relocation facilities and land returns in Okinawa, and the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam beginning in 2024. The Japanese side requested the U.S. side for safe operations of the U.S. forces with utmost consideration to the impacts on local communities, appropriate responses to incidents and accidents including sharing information in a timely manner, and cooperation on environmental issues. Both sides confirmed that Japan and the U.S. will work in close cooperation.

	Outline and Results
January 12, 2023 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington D.C. Participants: Defense Minister Hamada U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin	• The Ministers concurred that they would promptly implement the respective new National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy and discussed concrete measures based on the Japan-U.S. "2+2" meeting. • The Japanese side expressed its strong resolve, under its new strategies, to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, including counterstrike, at an early stage through a substantial increase of its defense budget. The U.S. side expressed its strong support for such efforts of Japan. • The Ministers confirmed that they would direct to promptly have intensive discussions on roles and missions of the Alliance based on the fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities of Japan. The Ministers confirmed the necessity of deepening discussions on effective operation of counterstrike capabilities under the bilateral cooperation, joint efforts to deter the occurrence of contingencies from peace time, prompt and effective bilateral coordination at every phase, among others. • The U.S. side reiterated that the U.S. extended deterrence including nuclear capabilities to Japan remains unwavering. The Ministers confirmed that they would deepen efforts to ensure that extended deterrence of the United States including nuclear capabilities remains more credible and resilient, including discussions at Japan-U.S. "2+2." • The Ministers welcomed the temporary deployment of U.S. Air Force MQ-9s to MSDF Kanoya Air Base as well as the commencement of Bilateral Information Analysis Cell from the perspective of strengthening intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. • Recognizing the vital importance of ensuring the technological edge of the Alliance for the deterrence and response capabilities of the Alliance, the Ministers concurred that they would further deepen cooperation in equipment and technology area. As a framework that forms such foundation, the Ministers signed the Memorandum of Understanding for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Projects as well as Security of Supply Arrangement toward strengthening supply chain cooperation. In addition, the Ministers welcomed the progress for discussions toward joint research and development in counter-hypersonic technology, high-power microwaves and autonomous systems. • The Ministers confirmed that information security and cybersecurity is fundamental to the Alliance. The Japanese side expressed its resolve to thoroughly implement measures to fundamentally strengthen security in such area. • The Ministers agreed to implement the U.S. Forces posture initiatives confirmed in the Japan-U.S. "2+2" meeting which will substantially strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Alliance, and confirmed that they would continue consultations for realizing such initiatives. The Japanese side highlighted the importance of mitigating impact on Okinawa and the Ministers concurred that the understanding and cooperation from local communities is important for the stable stationing of the U.S. forces and their daily activities.
January 13, 2023 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / Washington D.C. Participants: Prime Minister Kishida President Biden	• At the outset, Prime Minister Kishida expressed his pleasure to meet with his close friend, President Biden, on his first visit to Washington, D.C. as Prime Minister of Japan in the new year 2023. In response, President Biden welcomed Prime Minister Kishida's visit to the U.S. and stated that the partnership between the two leaders and the Japan-U.S. Alliance are stronger than ever. • The Japanese side stated that as Japan and the U.S. face the most severe and complex security environment in recent years, Japan will fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, including the possession of counterstrike capabilities, and substantially increase its defense budget, based on the new National Security Strategy and other documents released last December, and the U.S. side reiterated his full support. a • The Japanese side expressed his high appreciation for the U.S. National Security Strategy released last October, and the U.S. side reiterated its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan. The two leaders then welcomed the national security strategies of the two countries are aligned with each other and renewed their determination to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including seeking to create synergies in the implementation of the strategies. • The two leaders instructed to further deepen concrete consultations regarding Japan-U.S. cooperation on the security front, taking into account the discussions at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2") on January 11. • The two leaders exchanged views on the regional issues, based on the viewpoint that any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in East Asia, must not be tolerated. • (1) The two leaders concurred on continuing to work closely together in addressing issues related to China. The two leaders also confirmed the importance of cooperating with China on shared challenges. Furthermore, the two leaders reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. • (2) The two leaders concurred on continuing to work closely together between Japan and the U.S. as well as among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK toward the complete denuclearization of North Korea in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions on strengthening regional deterrence, including security cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK, and on responses at the UN Security Council. The Japanese side also asked for continued understanding and cooperation of the U.S. for the immediate resolution of the abductions issue, and once again gained full support from the U.S. side. • (3) Regarding Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the two leaders concurred on continuing to strongly promote sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine in close coordination with the G7 and other like-minded countries. They also reaffirmed their views that Russia's nuclear threat is absolutely unacceptable, and Russia should never use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. • The Japanese side explained that, at the G7 Hiroshima Summit, it would like to demonstrate the G7's vision and determination to uphold the international order based on the rule of law and also discuss the Indo-Pacific substantially. In addition, Prime Minister Kishida stated that as the Prime Minister of Japan, the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, he hopes to join with the G7 leaders, including President Biden, in sending a pledge from Hiroshima to the world that humanity will never repeat the scourge of nuclear weapons. The two leaders then concurred on working together toward a world without nuclear weapons, while taking into account the severe security environment. Furthermore, the leaders shared the view that it is important for the G7 to work in solidarity in such areas as the global economy, including energy and food security, economic security, and global issues such as climate change, health and development. The leaders reaffirmed their commitment that Japan and the U.S. will work closely together toward the success of the G7 Hiroshima Summit. • The two leaders shared the view that the Japan-U.S. economic relations were elevated to a strategic stage in 2022, with the launch and progress of the Japan-U.S. Economic Policy Consultative Committee (the Economic "2+2") and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The two leaders then concurred that, with Japan holding the G7 Presidency and the U.S. holding the APEC Chair this year, the two countries will lead the international community toward sustainable and inclusive economic growth and maintaining and strengthening a rules-based, free and fair international economic order, while also utilizing this year's Economic "2+2." • In addition, the Japanese side once again conveyed Japan's thoughts on the U.S. credits for clean vehicles. • Furthermore, the two leaders shared the recognition that U.S. engagement in the regional economic order is becoming increasingly important, and concurred on cooperating for the progress of IPEF negotiations. The Japanese side, meanwhile, conveyed Japan's position on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), from a strategic perspective. The two leaders also concurred on promoting DFFT (Data Free Flow with Trust). • The two leaders concurred on strengthening supply chain resilience among like-minded countries to handle economic security challenges, including economic coercion. • Furthermore, the two leaders shared the importance of working toward strengthening energy security. • The two leaders concurred on further promoting Japan-U.S. cooperation in the area of outer space. • The two leaders shared the recognition that commitment to a free and open international order based on the rule of law has never been more important. • The Japanese side then stated that he will strengthen efforts to realize a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)". In response, the U.S. side expressed its support for the Japanese side's initiatives and reiterated the unwavering U.S. commitment to the region. • The two leaders concurred that Japan and the U.S. will continue to promote endeavors to realize a FOIP to ensure the peace and prosperity of the region and the international community. • The two leaders reconfirmed unprecedented Japan-U.S. cooperation, rooted in the shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific and a peaceful and prosperous world, and guided by the shared values, including the rule of law, and issued the Joint Statement of the United States and Japan.

	Outline and Results
May 18, 2023 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / Hiroshima Prime Minister Kishida President Biden	• At the outset, the Japanese side expressed his pleasure to meet again with President Biden since his visit to Washington D.C. in January. The Japanese side also stated that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is the cornerstone of the peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, and that our multilayered cooperation is not limited to security and economy, but to all fields. In response, the U.S. side stated that Japan and the U.S share fundamental values, and that this Alliance is stronger than ever. • The Japanese side stated that Japan is working closely with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), one of the leading universities in the U.S., to conduct a feasibility study to establish a "Global Startup Campus" in central Tokyo (Meguro / Shibuya) in order to create an ecosystem of innovation and startup in the field of deep tech. The two leaders concurred that it is important for Japan and the U.S. to coordinate closely in the field of startup and innovation. The two leaders also welcomed the finalization of a Memorandum of Cooperation on education and technology. • The two leaders exchanged their views on Japan-U.S. security cooperation, and concurred to continue to cooperate for further strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, based on the outcomes of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2") and the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in January. The two leaders reaffirmed the critical role that U.S. extended deterrence plays in ensuring the security of Japan as well as the peace and stability of the region, coupled with Japan's enhanced defense capabilities. • The U.S. side reiterated the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, backed by the full range of capabilities, including nuclear, and, in this context, the two leaders reaffirmed their intent to ensure full bilateral coordination throughout every phase of a developing situation. The two leaders commended the robust and in-depth consultations on U.S. extended deterrence at the latest Japan-U.S. "2+2" and Extended Deterrence Dialogue meetings, and reaffirmed the importance of further strengthening such consultations. • The two leaders exchanged views on regional issues, on the basis of the recognition that any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force in the Indo- Pacific region, especially in East Asia, must not be tolerated. • (1) The two leaders concurred on continuing to work closely together in addressing issues related to China. The two leaders also confirmed the importance of cooperating with China on shared challenges. Furthermore, the two leaders reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. • (2) The Japanese side, touching upon its visit to the ROK earlier this month, expressed its intention to work on further advancement of Japan-ROK relations. In response, the U.S. side welcomed improvement in Japan-ROK relations. The two leaders concurred on continuing to work closely together between Japan and the U.S. as well as among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK toward the complete denuclearization of North Korea in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions in strengthening regional deterrence, including security cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK, and on responses at the UN Security Council. The Japanese side also asked for continued understanding and cooperation of the U.S. for the immediate resolution of the abductions issue, and once again gained full support from the U.S. side. • (3) Regarding Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the two leaders concurred on continuing severe sanctions against Russia and strong support for Ukraine in close coordination with the G7 and other like-minded countries. • (4) The two leaders confirmed the importance of engagement with and support for the so-called "Global South". • Looking toward the G7 Hiroshima Summit from the 19th, the two leaders concurred to coordinate closely to demonstrate to the world the G7's unwavering solidarity in addressing the issues of the international society and the region. • The two leaders shared the recognition that U.S. engagement in the economic order of the region is becoming increasingly important and had a discussion on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The Japanese side conveyed Japan's views and efforts on the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). • The two leaders shared the importance of promoting and protecting critical technologies. The two leaders welcomed a planned signing of partnerships between Japanese and U.S. universities and companies in the area of quantum and semiconductor and concurred on expanding cooperation into the areas of biotechnology and the AI. Furthermore, the two leaders shared the importance of working together toward strengthening energy security. The two leaders also concurred on further materializing economic security cooperation through the Japan-U.S. Economic Policy Consultative Committee (the Economic "2+2").
June 1, 2023 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo Participants: Defense Minister Hamada U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin	• The Ministers reconfirmed that they would maintain international order based on rules and Free and Open Indo-Pacific in this this age of intense competition. • The Ministers confirmed that they would not accept any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force and such attempts in the Indo-Pacific region and continue to work closely together than ever before to that end. • The Ministers confirmed that Russia's illegal, unjustifiable and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine is an outrage that shakes the foundation of the international order and confirmed that Japan and the U.S. will work together to continue to provide maximum support for Ukraine. • The Ministers concurred that they will continue to work closely together in response to issues concerning China. Moreover, the Ministers affirmed the importance of having an open dialogue with China. • Furthermore, the Ministers reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. • The Ministers welcomed the outcome of the Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT) held this April regarding North Korea's nuclear and missile issues and confirmed to further deepen Japan-U.S. and Japan-U.S.-ROK ties. • The Ministers welcomed that the Japan-U.S.-Australia cooperation has deepened at an unprecedented level. • The Ministers confirmed to expand training opportunities and enhance interoperability of the three countries through Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement. • In the G7 Hiroshima Summit, the Ministers welcomed the progress of discussions on roles, missions and capabilities of the Alliance including effective operation of counterstrike capabilities under Japan-U.S. cooperation. • Secretary Austin reiterated that the U.S. commitment to providing extended deterrence including nuclear capabilities to Japan remains unwavering. • The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of further strengthening consultations to ensure that extended deterrence of the United States including nuclear capabilities remains more credible and resilient. • The Ministers recognized that the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities of Japan including counterstrike strengthens the Alliance deterrence capabilities, and confirmed to continue to cooperate between both countries towards strengthening deterrence. • The Ministers affirmed that the U.S. Air Force MQ-9s temporary deployed to MSDF Kanoya Air Base and the Bilateral Information Analysis Cell play a significant role in strengthening intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. • They confirmed the necessity of maintaining and strengthening the ISR capabilities in the region. • The Ministers confirmed to deepen cooperation and to advance the discussions related to the possibility of the joint development in a future interceptor against counter-hypersonic technology, in addition to cooperation in unmanned aerial vehicles. • The Ministers confirmed that ensuring cybersecurity and information security serves as foundation for the Alliance. Minister Hamada expressed his strong resolve to fundamentally reinforce cybersecurity. • The Ministers confirmed to continue discussion on implementing initiatives of the posture of the U.S. Force as confirmed at the Japan-U.S. "2+2" meeting. The Ministers welcomed the initiatives on U.S. Forces realignment so far including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Henoko-saki as well as facility development of Mageshima, and concurred to work closely together to steadily advance such effort in the future. • The Ministers affirmed that they would continue to work together to mitigate impact on local communities including Okinawa and concurred on the importance of understanding and cooperation from the local communities for the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan and their daily activities.

	Outline and Results
August 18, 2023 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / Camp David Prime Minister Kishida President Biden	• At the outset, Prime Minister Kishida reiterated his sympathies on the wild fires in Maui, Hawaii and stated Japan's decision to provide relief measures for the victims of the disaster. He also stated that the Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting is meaningful, and in response, President Biden stated that he wishes to deepen cooperation between Japan and the U.S. as well as among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK under the increasingly severe security environment. • The two leaders exchanged their views on regional issues. (1) Regarding Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the two leaders concurred on continuing severe sanctions against Russia and robust support for Ukraine in close coordination with the G7 and other like-minded countries. (2) The two leaders concurred on continuing to work closely together in addressing issues related to China. The two leaders also confirmed the importance of cooperating with China on shared challenges. Furthermore, the two leaders reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. (3) Prime Minister Kishida expressed his appreciation for the U.S. support and understanding concerning Japan's efforts on the ALPS treated water. The two leaders exchanged views on coordination to prevent the spread of disinformation regarding the ALPS treated water. • Recognizing the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan backed by the full range of U.S. capabilities, the two leaders welcomed that the two countries will initiate the joint development of GPI (Glide Phase Interceptor) for further strengthening Alliance deterrence and response capabilities.
September 28, 2023 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Call conference Participants: Defense Minister Kihara U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin	• At the outset, Minister Kihara offered his greetings as a new Defense Minister and stated his determination to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities and strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Secretary Austin congratulated Minister Kihara for his appointment. • The Ministers discussed initiatives to strengthen the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond and confirmed to further advance discussion concerning roles, missions and capabilities of the Alliance including effective operation of counterstrike capabilities. • The Ministers affirmed that they would work closely together than ever before to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, the Ministers concurred that they would further advance defense cooperation among Japan-U.S.-ROK in the light of the current situation in North Korea. • The Ministers concurred that they would continue to cooperate closely to implement initiatives towards optimizing the U.S. Forces posture and steadily advance the U.S. Forces realignment plan. • The Ministers affirmed that they would continue to closely collaborate and work on further strengthening the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond and realizing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
October 5, 2023 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington D.C. Participants: Defense Minister Kihara U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin	• The Ministers confirmed that they would not accept any unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in any parts of the world including the Indo-Pacific region and confirmed that they need to strengthen the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond to that end. In addition, the Ministers noted the importance of the U.S. stating its commitment that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. • The Ministers confirmed that Russia's aggression against Ukraine is an outrage that shakes the foundation of the international order including Asia and confirmed that Japan and the U.S. would work together to continue to provide support for Ukraine. • Given China's intensifying military activities including cooperation with Russia, the Ministers concurred that they would continue to cooperate more than ever before. Furthermore, the Ministers reiterated the importance of peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. • Based on the belief that trilateral partnership among Japan, U.S. and ROK advances the security and prosperity of all our people, the region, and the world, as confirmed at the Trilateral Summit in August this year, the Ministers confirmed the importance of trilateral cooperation in addressing the regional security challenges. Regarding North Korea's nuclear and missile threat, the Ministers confirmed to advance trilateral defense cooperation among Japan, U.S. and ROK, including the efforts towards operationalizing the real-time sharing of missile warning data on North Korea by the end of this year. • The Ministers welcomed the expansion of training opportunities that applies Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement. In addition, they confirmed to further deepen defense cooperation among Japan, U.S. and Australia in various areas including bilateral training. • The Ministers confirmed to steadily progress efforts to strengthen Alliance capabilities to deter and respond under the new strategies. They confirmed to accelerated discussions on roles, missions and capabilities of the Alliance including effective operation of counterstrike capabilities under Japan-U.S. cooperation. • Secretary Austin welcomed the initiatives towards establishment of a Permanent Joint Headquarters in Japan. The Ministers confirmed to discuss coordination procedures between the two countries. • Secretary Austin reiterated that the U.S. commitment to providing extended deterrence including nuclear capabilities to Japan remains unwavering. The Ministers welcomed the deepening of substantial discussions between the two countries and concurred to continue to hold in-depth discussions on extended deterrence. • The Ministers concurred the importance of expanding bilateral presence of Japan and U.S. in Southwestern region. • The Ministers reaffirmed that the U.S. Air Force MQ-9s temporary deployed to MSDF Kanoya Air Base and the Bilateral Information Analysis Cell play a significant role in strengthening intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities of the Alliance. • The Ministers affirmed that they would expand UAVs-related cooperation and deepen cooperation towards the success of the joint development of GPI (Glide Phase Interceptor) from the perspective of ensuring technological superiority. • The Ministers shared the recognition that ensuring information security and cybersecurity serves as the foundation for the Alliance. Minister Kihara expressed his firm resolve to fundamentally reinforce information security and cybersecurity together with the U.S., and Secretary Austin welcomed such initiatives. • The Ministers confirmed to steadily implement initiatives of the posture of the U.S. Forces as confirmed at the Japan-U.S. "2+2" meeting and continue to cooperate between Japan and the U.S. The Ministers welcomed the initiatives on U.S. Forces realignment so far and concurred to work closely together to steadily advance such efforts in the future. • The Ministers affirmed the importance of understanding and cooperation from the local communities for the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan and their daily activities and confirmed that they would continue to work together to mitigate impact on the local communities including Okinawa.
November 16, 2023 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / San Francisco Prime Minister Kishida President Biden	• At the outset, Prime Minister Kishida stated that he is delighted to meet with President Biden after the historic Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit in Camp David. Prime Minister Kishida also stated that the coordination between Japan and the U.S. is becoming more important than ever with the situation in the Middle East, Ukraine, and the challenges of the Indo-Pacific region including China and North Korea. In response, President Biden stated that the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance is higher than ever, and that he would like to further strengthen the coordination between Japan and the U.S. Prime Minister Kishida also welcomed the significant progress on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) and stated that the Japan-U.S. Economic Policy Consultative Committee (the Economic"2+2") was timely. • The two leaders exchanged their views on regional issues. (1) Prime Minister Kishida stated that he highly appreciates President Biden's leadership and the U.S. diplomatic efforts including the realization of humanitarian pauses regarding the situation in Israel and Palestine. The two leaders condemned the terror attacks by Hamas and others and concurred on continuing to work closely together to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza and toward realizing a two-state solution. (2) Regarding Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the two leaders concurred on continuing severe sanctions against Russia and robust support for Ukraine. (3) The two leaders, based on the results of the U.S.-China Summit Meeting on the 15th, concurred on continuing to work closely together in addressing issues related to China.

	Outline and Results
December 12, 2023 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Call conference Participants: Defense Minister Kihara U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin	• At the outset, Minister Kihara offered his condolences for the eight service members who lost their lives in the U.S. Air Force CV-22 Osprey incident, as well as their family members. He stated that the Japan Ministry of Defense and Self Defense Forces would do what it can to cooperate to ensure the swift recovery of the service members. In addition, he once again requested the U.S. side resume flight operations of the Japan-deployed V-22s after flight safety is confirmed, and also requested sharing of information about the incident and safety measures. Secretary Austin thanked Minister Kihara for Japan's support in the search and recovery mission, and he reaffirmed that the safety of U.S. service members and Japanese communities is a top priority for the Department of Defense. • The Ministers shared their recognition that flight safety is the top priority regarding future flight operations of the V-22s, and reaffirmed that they will continue to work closely together in addressing this matter. • The Ministers exchanged views on the situation of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and concurred that they will work together to ensure maritime security and peace and stability in the international community. • The Ministers concurred to accelerate the Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral security cooperation initiatives which were affirmed at the historic Camp David Summit in August 2023 and their Trilateral Ministers Meeting in November 2023. • The Ministers welcomed the deepening of substantial discussions on extended deterrence between the two countries, including bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) this month, and concurred to continue to hold in-depth discussions on extended deterrence. • The Ministers affirmed that they will continue to closely collaborate and work on further strengthening Alliance deterrence and capabilities to ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
March 13, 2024 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Call conference Participants: Defense Minister Kihara U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin	• At the outset, Minister Kihara expressed his appreciation for the sympathy and support offered by the United States as well as the cooperation extended by U.S. Forces Japan for disaster relief operation in the wake of the Noto Peninsula Earthquake that occurred on January 1. • Following the U.S. Air Force CV-22 Osprey incident last November, Minister Kihara once again offered his condolences for the eight service members who lost their lives in the incident, as well as their family members. In response Secretary Austin thanked Minister Kihara for Japan's support in the search and recovery mission by Self Defense Forces, Japan Coast Guard, and local communities. • The Ministers confirmed the outcome of efforts to verify safety measures, etc., which had been conducted in close cooperation between both countries following the U.S. Air Force CV-22 Osprey incident off the shore of Yakushima Island. Minister Kihara expressed his gratitude for sharing technical information at an unprecedented level, and requested the U.S. side's cooperation in MOD's efforts to better inform the Japanese public of the content of U.S. accident investigation report upon its release. The Ministers confirmed that they will further cooperate on this issue. • The Ministers confirmed that they will carefully proceed with the resumption of flight operations of V-22 Osprey aircraft in Japan in a phased manner in close cooperation between both countries after implementing safety measures that the U.S. side presented this time, while ensuring that flight safety remains a top priority. • The Ministers concurred that they will continue to work on further strengthening the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond as well as realizing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

	Outline and Results
April 10, 2024 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / Washington D.C. Prime Minister Kishida President Biden	• At the outset, Prime Minister Kishida stated that it is an honor to be invited to the official visit. Prime Minister Kishida stated that Japan and the U.S. are bonded by deep trust and multi-layered friendship, and that based on the bonds, Japan and the U.S. have become global partners beyond bilateral or regional spheres, to uphold and bolster the free and open international order based on the rule of law. Prime Minister Kishida also expressed his intention to showcase how Japan-U.S. relations, which have become stronger than ever, would create our future through his official visit. The two leaders concurred that Japan and the U.S. are global partners working on the issues of the international society. • The two leaders shared the recognition that division of the international society is deepening and is facing an unprecedented level of challenges and shared the view to jointly uphold and bolster the free and open international order based on the rule of law. • As the role of the Japan-U.S. Alliance has become more significant than ever before, Prime Minister Kishida stated that with a strong determination he has been making efforts to reinforce Japan's defense capabilities in accordance with its National Security Strategy, including the future possession of counter-strike capabilities and the increase of its budget for defense capabilities and complementary initiatives to 2% of its GDP as of FY 2022 in FY 2027. In response, President Biden reiterated his strong support for Prime Minister's initiatives. The two leaders reaffirmed the urgent need to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and shared the view to expand and deepen security and defense cooperation, including their upgrade of respective command and control frameworks in order to enhance interoperability between the U.S. forces and the JSDF. President Biden also reiterated unwavering U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan. • The two leaders exchanged their views on regional issues. (1) The two leaders reaffirmed that unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion are totally unacceptable anywhere in the world and to resolutely respond to them, in coordination with allies and like-minded countries. (2) The two leaders shared the view to continue working closely together in addressing issues related to China. The two leaders also confirmed the importance of cooperating with China on shared challenges. Furthermore, the two leaders reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. (3) The two leaders held a candid discussion on the latest situation relating to North Korea including its nuclear and missile development as well as Russia-North Korea relations. The two leaders welcomed the progress of Japan-U.S.-ROK relations across many fields, following the outcomes of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit held last August at Camp David upon the invitation of President Biden, and shared the view to closely cooperate between Japan and the U.S. as well as among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK facing the current situation of serious concern. Prime Minister Kishida also asked for continued understanding and cooperation of the U.S. for the immediate resolution of the abductions issue, and once again gained full support from President Biden. (4) The two leaders shared the necessity to enhance engagement with a variety of countries such as Southeast Asian countries and Pacific Island countries. The two leaders shared the view to maintain close coordination including through the Japan-U.S.-Philippines Summit meeting to be held on the following day. (5) Regarding Russia's aggression against Ukraine, with the recognition that "Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow," Prime Minister Kishida expressed his determination to continue severe sanctions against Russia and robust support for Ukraine as Japan's own issue and shared the view with President Biden to continue to closely cooperate with like-minded countries including the G7 members. (6) Prime Minister Kishida stated that he highly appreciates President Biden's diplomatic efforts with regard to the situation in the Middle East and explained that Japan has been making diplomatic efforts to improve the humanitarian situation and to realize a sustainable ceasefire. The two leaders condemned the terror attacks by Hamas and others and shared the view to continue working closely together to improve the humanitarian situation in and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, to realize a two-state solution as well as to stabilize the Middle East region. • The two leaders shared the recognition that facilitating private sector-led two-way investment between Japan and the U.S. is crucial for the two countries to together lead global economic growth. Touching upon the investments by Japanese companies in North Carolina, where he is scheduled to visit during his stay in the U.S. ,Prime Minister Kishida explained that Japanese companies have made tremendous contributions to the U.S. economy through investments and job creation, to which President Biden expressed his applause. With a view to maintaining and strengthening competitiveness in advanced technologies, including semiconductors, AI, and quantum technology, the two leaders welcomed the materialization of ongoing research and development cooperation and confirmed their intention to accelerate bilateral collaboration on establishing start-up environments that promote innovation and human resource development exchange. • The two leaders concurred on strengthening cooperation to respond to economic coercion, non-market policies and practices and overproduction, enhance supply chains resilience, and towards the realization of sustainable and inclusive economic growth through efforts such as decarbonization. In this context, the two leaders shared the view to further deepen coordination toward ensuring economic security either bilaterally, through the G7, or based on other various frameworks. Furthermore, Prime Minister Kishida stated that the U.S. economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific region is essential, and the two leaders exchanged views on the economic order of the region. • The two leaders concurred on further promoting cooperation between Japan and the U.S. in the area of outer space. The two leaders welcomed the signing of a Lunar Surface Exploration Implementing Arrangement, which includes the provision of a pressurized lunar rover from Japan as well as the allocation of two astronaut flight opportunities to the lunar surface to Japan. Furthermore, the two leaders announced a shared goal for a Japanese national to be the first non-American astronaut to land on the Moon on a future Artemis mission, assuming important benchmarks are achieved. • The two leaders confirmed that realistic and practical efforts on nuclear disarmament are making progress, including the announcement of the "G7 Leaders' Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament" last year. Prime Minister Kishida welcomed the U.S. participation in the "FMCT Friends." • The two leaders reaffirmed that people-to-people ties are the foundation of unwavering bilateral relations between Japan and the U.S. and that it is important to further promote people-to-people exchanges to further strengthen the bilateral ties. • Manifesting the unwavering determination to uphold and bolster the free and open international order based on the rule of law, which is the basis of global peace and prosperity, whatever it takes, the two leaders issued a Joint Leaders' Statement "Global Partners for the Future" as a guideline of their determination.
May 2, 2024 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Hawaii Participants: Defense Minister Kihara U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin	• The Ministers reaffirmed that they should not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in any region including the Indo-Pacific, and they need to strengthen the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond to that end. • The Ministers affirmed strategic initiatives to strengthen the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond, which were confirmed at Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in April this year, and affirmed that they will closely cooperate to realize the initiatives. The Ministers also affirmed that they will continue to strengthen cooperation with like-minded regional partners in order to realize a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. • The Ministers concurred that, in order to strengthen interoperability between the U.S. Forces and Self Defense Forces, they will continue discussions to upgrade their respective command and control frameworks, etc. while confirming progress on this issue. • The Ministers confirmed that they will move forward with preparation to hold a Forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS) as early as possible, and concurred that they will accelerate discussions on co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment through DICAS and further deepen defense equipment cooperation between the two countries. • The Ministers concurred that they will deepen discussions on extended deterrence on the occasion of the next security "2+2" meeting. • The Ministers once again concurred the importance of steadily expanding bilateral presence of Japan and the U.S. in Southwestern region. • The Ministers concurred that they will continue to closely cooperate between the two countries to steadily advance the realignment of facilities and areas of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and its relocation to Henoko, from the perspective of maintaining deterrence and mitigating impact on the local communities. They also concurred on the importance of cooperation from the local communities for the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan and their daily activities, and confirmed continued coordination including supporting strong relationship with the local communities.

	Outline and Results
June 2, 2024 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Singapore Participants: Defense Minister Kihara U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin	• The Ministers discussed strategic initiatives to strengthen the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond, namely upgrading the respective command and control frameworks of Japan and the U.S., extended deterrence, and Japan-U.S. defense industrial cooperation, which were confirmed at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in April this year, and they reaffirmed that they will closely cooperate to realize the initiatives. • The Ministers once again concurred the importance of steadily expanding bilateral presence of Japan and the U.S. in Southwestern region. • The Ministers confirmed that they will continue to advance strengthening cooperation with regional partners such as the Republic of Korea with which a trilateral ministerial meeting is to be held on the sidelines of the Shangri-la Dialogue, to realize a shared vision: Free and Open Indo-Pacific. • The Ministers concurred that their two countries will continue to closely cooperate to steadily advance the realignment of facilities and areas of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and its relocation to Henoko.
July 29, 2024 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo Participants: Defense Minister Kihara U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin	1 Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation • Based on the Japan-U.S. "2+2" meeting, the Ministers confirmed to accelerate efforts on evolving roles and missions of the Alliance including effective operation of counterstrike capabilities under bilateral cooperation. With regards to upgrading respective command and control frameworks, they confirmed that they will continue to discuss bilateral coordination procedures and efforts to enhance collaboration. The Ministers once again concurred the importance of steadily expanding bilateral presence of Japan and the U.S. in Southwestern region. 2 Realignment of U.S. Forces / U.S. Forces in Japan • The Ministers confirmed that they will continue to closely collaborate on the upgrade of U.S. tactical aircraft deployed to Japan. • The Ministers concurred that they will steadily advance the realignment of facilities and areas of the U.S. Forces in Japan in order to maintain and strengthen deterrence and mitigate impact on the local communities. In addition, the Ministers confirmed to accelerate bilateral work toward the total return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS) as early as practicable, including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko. • Furthermore, they also concurred on the importance of cooperation from the local communities for the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan and their daily activities, and confirmed continued coordination including supporting strong relationship with the local communities.
October 8, 2024 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Call conference Participants: Defense Minister Nakatani U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin	• At the outset, Minister Nakatani offered his greetings as a new Defense Minister and stated his determination to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities and strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Secretary Austin congratulated Minister Nakatani for his appointment. • The Ministers affirmed that they will work together with each other and regional partners more closely than ever in light of intensifying attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion in the Indo-Pacific region. • The Ministers confirmed that they will continue to work closely together on important initiatives to reinforce Alliance deterrence and response capabilities such as upgrading command and control frameworks and expanding bilateral presence in the southwestern region of Japan. • The Ministers concurred that they will further accelerate the work to realize the realignment of facilities and areas of the U.S. Forces in Japan, including the total return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma as early as practicable, in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan in order to mitigate impact on Okinawa while maintaining and strengthening deterrence. • The Ministers affirmed that they will continue to work on further strengthening the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond and on realizing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific while closely collaborating with regional partners.
October 19, 2024 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Naples Participants: Defense Minister Nakatani U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin	• The Ministers affirmed that they will work together to further reinforce the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond, such as the effective operation of counterstrike capabilities, the upgrading of respective command and control frameworks and expansion of bilateral presence in the southwestern region of Japan. • The Ministers affirmed that they should not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force or coercion and such attempts, and confirmed that they will strengthen bilateral collaboration to that end. In addition, they shared a strong sense of urgency, keeping in mind the recent developments in the area surrounding Japan. Furthermore, the Ministers reiterated the importance of peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. • With regards to upgrading respective command and control frameworks, the Ministers confirmed that they will continue to accelerate the discussion concerning bilateral coordination procedures and efforts to enhance collaboration through the working groups, in order to facilitate close cooperation in response to any situations in peacetime and during contingencies. • The Ministers concurred that they will work together to realize defense industrial cooperation that contributes to reinforcing the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond through the Forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS). • The Ministers confirmed that they will continue to further advance multilateral cooperation, including with regional partners, to realize the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. • The Ministers concurred that they will continue to cooperate closely on the work to realize the realignment of facilities and areas of the U.S. Forces in Japan, including the total return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma as early as practicable, in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan.
November 17, 2024 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Darwin Participants: Defense Minister Nakatani U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin	• The Ministers affirmed that they will work together to further reinforce the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond in every field, including the upgrading of respective command and control frameworks, expansion of bilateral presence in the southwestern region of Japan, space cooperation, and defense equipment and technology cooperation. • The Ministers welcomed the establishment of U.S. Space Forces - Japan in December 2024 and affirmed to further advance bilateral cooperation in the space domain, including a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellation in response to hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV), etc. • The Ministers welcomed the progress of the Forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS) and reiterated its importance. The Ministers also reconfirmed that they will promote mutually beneficial defense industrial cooperation that contributes to reinforcing the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond. • The Ministers confirmed that they will continue to further advance multilateral cooperation, including with regional partners namely Australia with whom a Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting was convened, to realize the shared vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. • The Ministers reconfirmed that they will steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan, including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko toward the total return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma as early as practicable. The Ministers also affirmed that they will continue to work closely for relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam beginning in 2024.
December 10, 2024 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo Participants: Defense Minister Nakatani U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin	• At the outset, Minister Nakatani expressed his heartfelt respect and gratitude for Secretary Austin's tremendous contribution for the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The Ministers discussed the regional security situation, and confirmed the necessity to continue close communication between two countries as well as to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Alliance in order to meet the challenges posed by the evolving security environment. • The Ministers welcomed the progress to date on initiatives to reinforce the Alliance, including the upgrading of respective command and control frameworks, expansion of bilateral presence in the southwestern region of Japan, and defense equipment and technology cooperation, and reaffirmed that they will continue to work together to strengthen bilateral defense cooperation in every field. • Amid the increasingly severe security environment in the region, the Ministers confirmed that they will continue to further advance multilateral cooperation, including with regional partners namely Australia and the Republic of Korea, to realize the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. • The Ministers reconfirmed and highlighted the necessity to continue the current initiatives to further strengthen the Alliance deterrence and response capabilities.

	Outline and Results
January 31, 2025 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Call conference Participants: Defense Minister Nakatani United States Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth	• At the outset, Minister Nakatani extended his condolences to those deceased and their bereaved families in the wake of the aircraft accident which occurred in Virginia, the United States, on January 29th. • Secretary Hegseth then offered his greetings as a new Defense Secretary. Minister Nakatani congratulated Secretary Hegseth for his appointment and said that he looks forward to working with Secretary Hegseth to further strengthen the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond amid the increasingly severe security environment in the Indo-Pacific. • The Ministers agreed to bilaterally cooperate to realize the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific. • The Ministers affirmed their firm intent to continue the initiatives to reinforce the Alliance, including the upgrading of respective command and control framework and expansion of bilateral presence in the southwestern region of Japan. The Ministers reaffirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security applies to the Senkaku Islands. • The Ministers expressed their willingness to meet in person at the earliest possible time.
February 7, 2025 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / Washington D.C. Participants: Prime Minister Ishiba President Trump	• At the outset, Prime Minister Ishiba stated that the U.S. is the most important country for Japan's diplomacy and security. He also stated that he would like to work together with President Trump to continue elevating the Japan-U.S. Alliance to new heights to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific. • The two leaders shared the views on the severe and complex security environment and concurred to work closely to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific and to elevate the Japan-U.S. Alliance to new heights. • The two leaders concurred to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and to work closely to address strategic challenges in the region that both countries are facing. Prime Minister Ishiba reiterated Japan's unwavering commitment to fundamentally reinforcing its defense capabilities and President Trump welcomed such commitment. • President Trump underscored the unwavering commitment by the U.S. to the defense of Japan, using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear. The two leaders once again reaffirmed that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security applies to the Senkaku Islands. The two leaders confirmed their commitment to the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan, including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko and the return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. • The two leaders affirmed that Japan and the U.S. are close partners in the economic field as well, with Japan being the world's largest investor in the U.S. for five consecutive years. Prime Minister Ishiba conveyed his willingness to cooperate together to elevate Japan's investment in the U.S. to an unprecedented amount of one trillion dollars, and President Trump strongly welcomed such investments by Japanese companies. • The two leaders then concurred to elevate the Japan-U.S partnership to an even higher level through improving the business environment and increasing bilateral investment and employment, strengthening each other's industries and leading the world in development in the field of technologies such as AI and leading-edge semiconductors, and strongly promoting efforts to harness the energy of the growing market in the Indo-Pacific region. The two leaders also confirmed that they will cooperate to strengthen energy security between the two countries, including increasing exports of U.S. liquefied natural gas to Japan, in a mutually beneficial manner. • The two leaders exchanged their views on regional issues. (1) The two leaders shared the view on issues related to China and confirmed their opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion including in the East and South China Seas. The two leaders reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. (2) The two leaders shared the views on the situation regarding North Korea, and affirmed the need to address its nuclear and missile issues together, as well as their resolute commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea. Prime Minister Ishiba asked for continued understanding and cooperation of the U.S. for the immediate resolution of the abductions issue, and gained full support from President Trump. • The two leaders concurred on the importance of further developing coordination of like-minded countries, including Japan-U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan-Australia-India-U.S. and Japan-U.S.-Philippines. • The two leaders concurred to maintain a close partnership to further uphold and bolster the Japan-U.S. relations, which have become stronger than ever, and they issued a joint statement. • At the end of the meeting, Prime Minister Ishiba invited President Trump to the official visit to Japan at an early timing.
March 30, 2025 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo Participants: Defense Minister Nakatani United States Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth	• The two ministers shared recognition of the increasingly severe and complex security environment and confirmed that Japan and the United States would closely cooperate to realize a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" and further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Specifically, they focused their discussions on the following: (1) With regard to upgrading the respective command and control frameworks of Japan and the United States, the ministers welcomed tangible progress including the establishment of the JSDF Joint Operations Command (JJOC) and commencement of the upgrading of the U.S. Forces in Japan to a joint force headquarters, and discussed making continued efforts to realize even more effective cooperation on bilateral activities from peacetime to contingency; (2) With regard to expansion of bilateral joint presence in the southwestern region of Japan, the ministers discussed such efforts as one of the highest priorities of the Alliance, including enhancement of more advanced and practical bilateral training; (3) With regard to defense equipment and technology cooperation, the ministers discussed mutually complementing and strengthening the defense industrial bases of Japan and the United States by accelerating initiatives on missile co-production such as AMRAAM and co-sustainment of vessels and aircraft of the U.S. forces toward the next iteration of the Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustainment (DICAS) Forum, while effectively utilizing its framework; and (4) Enhance collaboration in space, cybersecurity, extended deterrence, and other areas. • The ministers concurred that they will continue to advance cooperation, including information sharing and operational cooperation, with Japan and the United States at the core along with regional partners such as Australia, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines. • In order to maintain deterrence and mitigate the impact on local communities, the ministers confirmed the vital importance of the steady implementation of the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan and other existing bilateral arrangements, such as the return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko as the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma. The Ministers also concurred on advancing cooperation to prevent recurrence of incidents and accidents involving the U.S. Forces in Japan. • The Ministers discussed efforts to strengthen the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond as confirmed at the Japan-U.S. "2+2" meeting in January in order to steadily implement the resolve to protect a free and open international order based on the rule of law as confirmed in the G7 Hiroshima Summit. The two leaders also confirmed the importance of cooperating with China on shared challenges.
May 31, 2025 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Singapore Participants: Defense Minister Nakatani United States Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth	• Based on their exchange at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting on March 30, 2026, the Ministers discussed Japan-U.S. defense cooperation initiatives, including the following recent developments. • The Ministers confirmed that they will coordinate closely together to align the strategic priorities of both countries as the U.S. Department of Defense formulates a new National Defense Strategy. • Defense Minister Nakatani addressed Japan's initiatives to improve our cyber security capabilities, including the enactment of Cyber Response Capability Strengthening Act. The Ministers concurred to further strengthen the bilateral cooperation in cyber domain. • The Ministers reaffirmed that they will work closely together in order to further strengthen the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond.

	Outline and Results
October 28, 2025 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / Tokyo Participants: Prime Minister Takaichi U.S. President Trump	• Prime Minister Takaichi welcomed President Trump's visit to Japan and expressed respect for his contributions to the development of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and his leadership in the international community, including in the Middle East. • Prime Minister Takaichi also stated that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is the foundation for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, and emphasized that strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance further is a top priority in Japan's foreign and security policy, and that Japan is an indispensable partner for the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region. • Furthermore, Prime Minister Takaichi conveyed her determination to restore strong Japanese diplomacy with the Japan-U.S. Alliance, now the greatest alliance in the world, as the cornerstone. She expressed her desire to create a new chapter in the history of the Japan-U.S. Alliance together, that makes both countries stronger and more prosperous. • In response, President Trump expressed his very warm congratulation for Prime Minister Takaichi on her appointment and stated that the Japan-U.S. relationship would be stronger than ever before and Japan and the U.S. are an ally at the strongest level. President Trump emphasized that he would help Japan at any time when Japan needs and stated that he would have a fantastic relationship with Prime Minister Takaichi. • The two leaders also affirmed their intention to jointly celebrate 250 years of American independence next year and further develop the friendship and people-to-people exchanges between Japan and the U.S. • The two leaders concurred to advance broad-ranging security cooperation order to further enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. • Prime Minister Takaichi stated that she has consistently emphasized the necessity of fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities amidst the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II and that she has taken actions immediately after assuming office. She expressed her commitment to continue working on fundamentally reinforcing its defense capabilities and increasing its defense spending as its own initiative. President Trump stated that he knows that Japan is increasing defense capabilities very substantially. • The two leaders signed a document reaffirming the swift and continued efforts by both countries regarding the agreement on tariffs between Japan and the U.S. ("Implementation of the Agreement – Towards a New Golden Age of the Japan-U.S. Alliance") and confirmed their intention to further strengthen economic growth of both countries. • They also signed a document on critical minerals and rare earths ("Japan-U.S. Framework for Securing Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths through Mining and Processing"). Furthermore, they concurred to further strengthen economic security initiatives in a wide range of fields, including critical technologies such as AI and shipbuilding, in addition to critical minerals and rare earths. • Prime Minister Takaichi expressed her determination to continue strongly promoting the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)" as a pillar of Japan's diplomacy and to develop the concept in line with the eras. Additionally, the two leaders affirmed their commitment to work closely together to strongly advance the FOIP. Under this vision, they also affirmed the importance of strengthening regional networks among like-minded partners, such as Japan-U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan-U.S.-Philippines, and Japan-Australia-India-U.S. • The two leaders exchanged views on efforts towards peace in various regions of the world, including in the Middle East, Cambodia and Thailand, where ceasefire agreements have been recently realized. Prime Minister Takaichi stated that Japan is a partner in the pursuit of peace alongside the United States. • The two leaders also exchanged views on the situation and various challenges facing the Indo-Pacific region, considering the upcoming diplomatic calendar. • They discussed the unprecedentedly severe and complex regional security environment, including the cooperation among China, North Korea, and Russia, as well as intensification of their military activities. • They exchanged views on issues concerning China. They opposed unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion, and concurred to work closely between Japan and the U.S. The two leaders reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. • The two leaders shared their views on the situation regarding North Korea, and affirmed the need to address its nuclear and missile issues together, as well as their resolute commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea. • Prime Minister Takaichi asked for continued understanding and cooperation of the U.S. for the immediate resolution of the abductions issue and gained full support from President Trump. Additionally, the two leaders met with the family members of the abductees.
October 29, 2025 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo Participants: Defense Minister Koizumi United States Secretary of War Pete Hegseth	• The Ministers candidly exchanged and shared the views on increasingly severe security situation in the Indo-Pacific. Based on the concurrence between the two leaders at Japan-U.S. summit meeting on October 28, the Ministers confirmed their shared responsibility for concrete implementation of the concurred items and that they will demonstrate strong leadership to further strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Alliance, which is "the greatest alliance in the world". Especially, Minister Koizumi expressed his intention to work with a sense of speed, his commitment to continue working on fundamentally reinforcing Japan's defense capabilities and increasing Japan's defense spending as Japan's own initiative, and explained that Japan has begun discussions toward revising the National Security Strategy and other related documents. Secretary Hegseth expressed his support to these efforts. • The Ministers concurred to promote various initiatives to further strengthen the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond, with a sense of urgency and speed, in order to respond to challenges posed by the changing security environment. The key points of the discussion are as follows: (1) With regard to upgrading respective command and control frameworks, the Ministers welcomed tangible progress in the upgrade of U.S. Forces Japan and implementation of the Japan Self-Defense Forces Joint Operations Command (JJOC). They confirmed to make efforts to further effective bilateral cooperation from peacetime to contingency. (2) The Ministers welcomed the progress and confirmed on expansion of bilateral joint presence in the southwestern region of Japan as one of the highest priorities of the Alliance, including enhancement of more advanced and realistic bilateral training across Japan, and in the southwestern region in particular. (3) With regard to defense equipment and technology cooperation, the Ministers recognized that strengthening the defense production and technological base is a shared challenge and reaffirmed the importance of mutually complementing the defense production and technological base of Japan and the United States. The Ministers welcomed the progress under Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustainment (DICAS), including exploring missile co-production such as AMRAAM and co-sustainment of vessels and aircraft of U.S. forces, and confirmed to further advance these initiatives. Minister Koizumi expressed appreciation for the United States' efforts to accelerate delivery of missiles as a demonstration of the Alliance's commitment to enhancing deterrence. (4) In addition, the Ministers concurred that they will continue to advance multilateral cooperation including information sharing and operational collaboration with regional partners namely Australia, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines, with Japan and the U.S. at the center of such cooperation. • In order to maintain deterrence and mitigate the impact on local communities, the Ministers reiterated the vital importance of the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan and other existing bilateral arrangements, such as the return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko as the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma. The Ministers also concurred to advance cooperation to prevent recurrence of incidents and accidents involving U.S. Forces in Japan.
November 1, 2025 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Malaysia Participants: Defense Ministe Koizumi United States Secretary of War Pete Hegseth	• Building on the exchanges during the recent Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting, the Ministers actively exchanged views on the progress of the U.S. National Defense Strategy, as well as the U.S. approval for the Republic of Korea to build a nuclear powered submarine. • The Ministers also discussed the importance of trilateral defense cooperation among Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea for the regional peace and stability, and the need to further advance collaboration among like-minded countries, centered around the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and pursue tangible initiatives to strengthen deterrence. • The Ministers concurred to continue strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance with a sense of speed.

	Outline and Results
December 12, 2025 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Call conference Participants: Defense Minister Koizumi United States Secretary of War Pete Hegseth	• The Ministers exchanged candid views on the increasingly severe security situation in the Indo-Pacific region, including the radar illumination incident against Self Defense-Force aircraft by Chinese military aircraft on December 6th. Minister Koizumi stated that Japan would firmly and steadily continue surveillance and monitoring activities in the airspace and waters surrounding Japan, and cope with any unexpected situation in a calm and resolute manner. The Ministers expressed serious concern over any actions to increase regional tensions, as China's actions are not conducive to regional peace and stability, and concurred to closely communicate and collaborate with each other. • Minister Koizumi recounted his visit to Sakishima Islands in November and explained progress so far in Japan's efforts for further reinforcement of defense capabilities. Based on the concurrence at the Defense Ministerial Meeting on October 29th in Tokyo, the Ministers reaffirmed to continue promoting various initiatives to further strengthen the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond, with a sense of urgency and speed. • Furthermore, the Ministers concurred to proceed with necessary coordination to meet in person in the new year.
January 15, 2026 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington D.C. Participants: Defense Minister Koizumi United States Secretary of War Pete Hegseth	• The Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States have been working closely together under the unwavering Alliance, as demonstrated in four Defense Ministerial engagements over the past three months. In light of the increasingly severe security situation in the Indo-Pacific region, the Ministers also exchanged candid views on concrete measures to further enhance Japan-U.S. defense cooperation. • The Ministers joined each other to exercise together in physical training, highlighting that the United States and Japan stand shoulder to shoulder and make the utmost effort to fulfil their respective responsibilities, which further deepens the bilateral tie and strengthens the Alliance. • Minister Koizumi explained the progress Japan has made so far towards the further reinforcement of Japan's own defense capabilities, including Government of Japan's draft budget request for the next fiscal year, highlighting that - Japan does not rule out any option particularly in consideration of the revision of the three strategic documents - Japan would like to reference the U.S. military pay system for improving the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) personnel treatment. • Secretary Hegseth welcomed Japan's efforts to reinforce its defense capabilities across all domains and capabilities, and reinforced U.S. support for such efforts. • Following the discussions in the meeting, Minister Koizumi received a briefing on U.S. Forces' AI utilization at the Department of War. • The Ministers concurred to promote various initiatives to further strengthen the Alliance capabilities to deter and respond, with a sense of urgency and speed, in order to respond to challenges posed by the changing security environment. The key points of the discussion are as follows: (1) With regard to expansion of bilateral joint presence in the southwestern region of Japan, based on the progress in measures to reinforce defense capabilities of the JSDF, the Ministers confirmed to make further efforts including enhancement of more advanced and realistic bilateral training across Japan, and in the southwestern region in particular, as one of the highest priorities of the Alliance. (2) With regard to defense equipment and technology cooperation, the Ministers concurred to work more closely together. In particular, Minister Koizumi emphasized the importance of moving forward with holding the next iteration of the Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS) Plenary as early as possible. The Ministers agreed to a. Accelerate mutually beneficial efforts to enhance the defense industrial base of Japan and the U.S. under the DICAS framework, which are: • Progress in co-production of air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM) and surface-to-air interceptor missiles (PAC-3MSE) • Co-sustainment of vessels and aircraft of the U.S. Forces • Initiatives on supply chain resiliency, including cooperation related to but not limited to critical minerals b. Advance discussion to substantially increase the production of interceptor missiles for Ballistic Missile Defense (SM-3 Block IIA). (3) The Ministers discussed the necessity of enhancing cooperation in Integrated Air Missile Defense capabilities and space domain. • In order to maintain deterrence and mitigate the impact on local communities, the Ministers reiterated the vital importance of the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan and other existing bilateral arrangements, such as the return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko as the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma. The Ministers also concurred to advance cooperation to prevent recurrence of incidents and accidents involving U.S. Forces in Japan.
March 10, 2026 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Call conference Participants: Defense Minister Koizumi United States Secretary of War Pete Hegseth	• Regarding the situation in Iran, Secretary Hegseth provided an overview of the latest developments and the outlook, and Minister Koizumi stated that the Government of Japan is closely monitoring developments with grave concern in order to ensure thorough information gathering and the protection of Japanese nationals, and that Japan is ensuring the utmost warning and surveillance around Japan. • The Ministers concurred to maintain close communication.
March 15, 2026 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Call conference Participants: Defense Minister Koizumi United States Secretary of War Pete Hegseth	• Regarding the situation in the Middle East including the Strait of Hormuz, Secretary Hegseth provided an overview of the latest developments and the outlook. Minister Koizumi stated that maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East, including the Strait of Hormuz, is of critical importance to the international community, including Japan. He conveyed Japan's intention to closely communicate with relevant countries, including the United States. • Secretary Hegseth reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan–U.S. Alliance and to peace and stability in the region, stated that the recent situation in the Middle East does not entail any changes to the posture of U.S. forces in Japan, and that U.S. forces in Japan continue to maintain a full state of readiness. Minister Koizumi, for his part, conveyed that the Ministry of Defense and the Japan Self-Defense Forces are likewise ensuring thorough vigilance and surveillance in the areas surrounding Japan. • The Ministers concurred to maintain close communication.

Reference 29 Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (U.S.-Japan "2+2")

Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary of Defense Austin, Minister for Foreign Affairs Kamikawa, and Defense Minister Kihara (referred to collectively as "the Ministers") convened the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in Tokyo, Japan, on July 28, 2024.

Recognizing the profound level of global threats to our Alliance's shared vision and common values, the Ministers affirmed the enduring U.S. and Japanese commitment to stand shoulder-to-shoulder in upholding and protecting the free and open international order based on the rule of law, and to redouble our work with allies and partners in furtherance of this goal. The Ministers reiterated the importance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. The Ministers confirmed steady progress in implementing both countries' national strategic documents and in holding intensive consultations on Alliance roles and missions to further strengthen deterrence and response capabilities. The Ministers reaffirmed their intent to implement new strategic initiatives following Prime Minister KISHIDA's historic Official Visit with State Dinner on April 10, with the vision to build a global partnership for the future, including upgrading Alliance command and control (C2), deepening defense industry and advanced technology cooperation, and enhancing cross-domain operations.

Given the increasingly severe security environment caused by recent moves of regional actors, the United States restated its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan under Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear. Japan reaffirmed its steadfast dedication to reinforce its own defense capabilities and to enhance its close coordination with the United States. In line with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, Japan reaffirmed its role in maintaining peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region by seamlessly responding to any situation from peacetime to contingencies. This has been further enabled by Japan's 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security, which enhances U.S.-Japan Alliance deterrence and response capabilities. The United States welcomed Japan's reinforcement of its defense capabilities, including the sustained increase in its defense budget, the creation of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) Joint Operations Command (JJOC), the focus on cybersecurity, and the possession of counterstrike capabilities.

Acknowledging the evolving security environment and the challenges posed to the Alliance today and in the future, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region. • The Ministers concurred that the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s foreign policy seeks to reshape the international order for its own benefit at the expense of others. They highlighted that the PRC employs political, economic, and military coercion of countries, companies, and civil society, as well as facilitates its military modernization through the diversion of technology to achieve these objectives. Such behavior is a serious concern to the Alliance and the entire international community and represents the greatest strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

The Ministers reiterated their strong opposition to the PRC's intensifying attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion in the East China Sea, including through actions that seek to undermine Japan's longstanding and peaceful administration of the Senkaku Islands, as well as escalatory behavior around the Southwest Islands. The United States reaffirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security applies to the Senkaku Islands. They shared their continuing concerns regarding the PRC's ongoing and rapid expansion of its nuclear weapons arsenal, which continues without any transparency regarding its intent and which the PRC refuses to acknowledge, despite publicly available evidence.

The Ministers reiterated their strong objections to the PRC's unlawful maritime claims, militarization of reclaimed features, and threatening and provocative activities in the South China Sea. The PRC's destabilizing actions in this region include unsafe encounters at sea and in the air, efforts to disrupt other countries' offshore resources exploitation, as well as the dangerous use of Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels. The Ministers reaffirmed full respect for international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea as reflected in the relevant provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS). They emphasized that the July 12, 2016, Award in the South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The PRC), constituted under UNCLOS, is final and legally binding on the parties to that proceeding. The Ministers reaffirmed their serious concern over the PRC's repeated obstruction of Philippine vessels' exercise of high seas freedom of navigation and the disruption of supply lines to Second Thomas Shoal, which constitute dangerous and destabilizing conduct. The Ministers resolved to work with partners in Southeast Asia, based on their unwavering support for ASEAN centrality and unity, to support regional maritime security and uphold international law.

The Ministers stated that their basic positions on Taiwan remain unchanged and reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international community. They encouraged cross-Strait issues be resolved peacefully. The Ministers emphasized Taiwan's political transition period should not be used as a pretext for provocative actions across the Taiwan Strait.

They expressed serious concerns about the dismantling of Hong Kong's autonomy and freedoms as well as the PRC's human rights issues, including in Xinjiang and Tibet.

The Ministers strongly condemned North Korea's continued conduct of reckless ballistic missile launches, alarming in number, in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) and at the cost of the welfare of people in North Korea. The Ministers also condemned North Korea's continued nuclear weapons program and nuclear rhetoric and reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea, urging North Korea to abide by all its obligations under relevant UNSCRs and engage in substantive dialogue. The Ministers urged all UN Member States to ensure full and effective implementation of all UNSCRs related to North Korea, and reaffirmed close cooperation in exploring ways to ensure implementation. The Ministers confirmed the need for an immediate resolution of the abductions issue.

The Ministers strongly condemned Russia's brutal, unprovoked, and unjustifiable war against Ukraine. They recognized that Russia's violation of the UN Charter and its attempts to unilaterally change borders by force through its ongoing aggression against Ukraine present a clear challenge to the international order, with global impacts including on the Indo-Pacific. The Ministers condemned Russia's reckless nuclear rhetoric and its attacks against critical infrastructure, and they reiterated the need for Russia to be held accountable for its atrocities in Ukraine. They also highlighted with concern Russia's growing and provocative strategic military cooperation with the PRC, including through joint operations and drills in the vicinity of Japan, and the PRC's support for Russia's defense industrial base. The Ministers strongly condemned deepening Russia-North Korea cooperation, exemplified by

Russia's procurement of ballistic missiles and other materiel from North Korea in direct violation of UNSCRs for use against Ukraine, and expressed deep concern about the potential for transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or ballistic missile-related technology and expertise to North Korea, which would deteriorate regional stability and further undermine the global non-proliferation regime. They underscored that Russia's and North Korea's actions have a destabilizing impact on global and Indo-Pacific security. The Ministers underscored that the outcome of the recent Russia-North Korea Summit, including the signing of the "Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership," should be of grave concern in the interest of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, upholding the global non-proliferation regime, and supporting the people of Ukraine as they defend their freedom and independence against Russia's brutal aggression.

The Ministers shared the recognition that instability in the Middle East reverberates across the international community, impacting Indo-Pacific security and economies. They condemned Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and surrounding waterways that threaten the regional and global economy and cause delivery delays and price increases for badly needed food and medicine. The Ministers remained committed to seeing a ceasefire and hostage deal in Gaza, and a negotiated two-State solution that resolves the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict with an independent Palestinian state with Israel's security guaranteed, enabling both Israelis and Palestinians to live in a just, lasting, and secure peace.

U.S.-Japan Deterrence and Response Capabilities

Building upon the past year's achievements and the unprecedented alignment of both countries' national strategic documents, the Ministers emphasized the United States and Japan will further enhance Alliance deterrence and response capabilities to meet the challenges posed by the evolving security environment, focusing on the following areas:

1. Upgrading Alliance Coordination, Command and Control

The Ministers affirmed the need to strengthen Alliance policy and operational coordination at all levels through exercise and discussion, and to foster a shared understanding of Alliance processes from peacetime through contingencies. To facilitate deeper interoperability and cooperation on joint bilateral operations in peacetime and during contingencies, the United States intends to reconstitute U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) as a joint force headquarters (JFHQ) reporting to the Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). This reconstituted USFJ is intended to serve as an important JJOC counterpart. Through a phased approach, USFJ would enhance its capabilities and operational cooperation with the JJOC, as well as assume primary responsibility for coordinating security activities in and around Japan in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In coordination and consultation with the U.S. Congress, the Department of Defense intends to reconstitute USFJ, in parallel with the development of the JJOC. The United States and Japan will closely consult and establish working groups to further develop bilateral aspects of this proposal, building upon the following shared C2 principles.

- In line with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, the United States and Japan will upgrade respective C2 frameworks in support of the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region.
- The United States and Japan will enhance interoperability at the policy-level by coordinating respective decision-making processes, and at the operational-level by coordinating plans, capability development and employment, posture, resource allocation, and exercises. This includes facilitating greater interoperability on joint bilateral operations, such as: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, training and exercises; operational planning; contingency planning; and logistics.
- The United States and Japan will clearly define relationships between U.S. and Japanese C2 structures, taking into account Japan's establishment of the JJOC, with a focus on aligning missions, capabilities, and responsibilities between counterparts.
- In line with the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, the United States and Japan will ensure that the existing Alliance Coordination Mechanism remains the mechanism that facilities bilateral policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the United States Armed Forces and the Self-Defense Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies.
- The United States and Japan recognize the importance of strong cyber and information security, as well as information sharing, for realizing deeper interoperability, and will consider enhancing information sharing opportunities; further improving cyber, data, and information security; and enhancing communications and physical security.

2. Improving Alliance stand-off defense capabilities

The Ministers welcomed Japan's advances in developing stand-off defense capabilities and highlighted progress on U.S.-Japan cooperation towards the effective operation of Japanese counterstrike capabilities in close coordination with the United States. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to accelerate cooperation on Japan's acquisition of Tomahawk, including on ship refurbishment and personnel training, to support Japan's operational capability. The Ministers also highlighted cooperation on stand-off missile procurements, including Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles with Extended Range (JASSM-ER). They welcomed further cooperation on Japan's development of its indigenous stand-off missiles, including the provision of U.S. materiel and technological support.

3. Bolstering Alliance activities in Japan's Southwest Islands

The Ministers welcomed Japan's efforts to improve JSDF capabilities in the Southwest Islands by deploying additional units. To demonstrate Japan's resolve to strengthen its own defense capabilities and their mutual commitment to the security of Japan, the Ministers reaffirmed the Alliance's goal to increase bilateral presence in Japan's Southwest Islands. Japan's own efforts in the Southwest Islands, combined with Alliance exercises, training, posture, and other defense-related activities, enhance Alliance deterrence and response capabilities in this critical region. The Ministers underscored the importance of continued coordination with local communities of the region for these efforts, including support for strong relationships with them through enhanced communication about the importance of Alliance activities.

4. Strengthening bilateral exercises, readiness, and operations

To maintain and enhance Alliance readiness, which underpins the credibility of Alliance deterrence, the Ministers affirmed bilateral efforts to advance planning for contingencies, as well as improve and expand the scope of realistic cross-domain training, tabletop exercises, and exercises, such as Resolute Dragon, Orient Shield, Yama Sakura, Keen Edge, Keen Sword, and Resilient Shield. The Ministers underscored the importance of continued discussion to improve the resiliency and smooth deployment of U.S. and Japanese defense assets, as well as their operational effectiveness during disaster responses and during a contingency, including through flexible access to air and seaports, and other operational foundations. They supported exploring further opportunities for

Alliance exercises and joint/shared use of facilities throughout Japan, including in the Southwest Islands. The Ministers also welcomed the establishment and first meeting of Working Group for Future Fighter Training and Readiness (WG-FFTR), which will explore opportunities for future fighter pilot training and readiness, including AI and advanced simulators, and co-development and co-production of cutting-edge technologies such as common jet trainers to maintain combat-ready next-generation fighter airpower.

5. Enhancing extended deterrence

As the Alliance faces a severe strategic and nuclear environment, the Ministers stressed the critical importance of continuing to enhance U.S. extended deterrence, bolstered by Japan's defense capabilities, as well as strengthening cooperation on extended deterrence and escalation management primarily through the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. Signifying the commitment to deepen substantive strategic-level discussions, the Ministers held the first ministerial-level meeting on extended deterrence.

6. Deepening ISR Cooperation

The Ministers confirmed steady progress in ISR cooperation, which improves bilateral maritime domain awareness, facilitates timely information sharing and intelligence collection, bolsters Alliance deterrence, and provides the foundation for effective Alliance coordination, command, and control. In this context, they welcomed achievements of the Bilateral Information Analysis Cell (BIAC) and concurred to enhance and expand the BIAC through continued discussion on future cooperative efforts. They reiterated the importance of the U.S. MQ-9 deployment to Kadena Air Base to support Alliance ISR cooperation.

7. Expanding cooperation on cross-domain operations, information warfare, and artificial intelligence (AI)

The Ministers committed to strengthening bilateral coordination on cross-domain operations, including cyber, space, and electromagnetic warfare (EW), recognizing the importance of all these domains to future concepts of deterrence and response capabilities. The Ministers welcomed cooperation on space capabilities, including a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) detection and tracking constellation for strategic threats such as long-range missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles, as well as bilateral and multilateral space cooperation including within the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative since December 2023. They also highlighted deepening discussions on EW between the U.S. Department of Defense and Japanese Ministry of Defense, and welcomed the establishment of the EW Working Group between the U.S. Department of Defense and Japanese Ministry of Defense. Recognizing the threats to global stability via malign influence operations and grey zone activities, the Ministers supported the addition of information warfare as a topic for further cooperation to counter these looming threats and welcomed the establishment of the Information Warfare Synchronization Working Group between the U.S. Department of Defense and Japanese Ministry of Defense. On AI, the Ministers underlined the critical bilateral work to promote the responsible use of AI in the military domain, particularly through the AI Partnership for Defense (AIPfD) and the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy.

8. Strengthening cyber and information security

The Ministers emphasized the foundational importance of cyber and information security for the Alliance and its ability to develop future-oriented capabilities, as well as stay ahead of growing cyber threats. They committed to deep cooperation on cyber and information security through incorporating Zero Trust Architecture to build resilience in the information and communication technology domain. The Ministers concurred on the importance of enhancing the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, and discussed promoting closer cooperation in U.S.-Japan defensive cyberspace operations to respond to threats for further strengthening alliance deterrence. The United States welcomed Japan's efforts to bolster its national cybersecurity posture, including Japan's steady implementation of its Risk Management Framework, which will help realize better network defense for information sharing with Japan. The Ministers discussed increasing opportunities for incorporating cyber defense concepts in future exercises. They applauded significant progress made through bilateral cyber and information security consultation.

9. Realizing shared goals with likeminded allies and partner

The United States and Japan are leveraging our global partnership to network with likeminded countries that share the Alliance's goal to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific and uphold the free and open international order based on the rule of law. The Ministers reaffirmed the U.S.-Japan Alliance is at the core of both countries' efforts to deepen and expand multilateral cooperation on posture, capabilities, exercises, maritime domain awareness, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and other areas to enhance regional deterrence.

The Ministers renewed their commitment to further advance the Alliance's partnership with Australia, leveraging the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) and in line with recent commitments at the May 2024 Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting (TDMM). The Ministers discussed key areas of cooperation, including on reciprocal deployments of U.S., Japanese, and Australian F-35s; ISR capabilities and exercises; increasing Japan's participation in U.S.-Australia force posture cooperation activities; pursuing networked air and missile defense architecture and exercises; and technology development through the recently signed trilateral Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) Memorandum of Arrangement. The Ministers welcomed the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) partners' consideration of cooperation with Japan on AUKUS Pillar II advanced capability projects and looked forward to further discussions.

The Ministers emphasized the critical importance of deepening cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK) to maintaining regional peace and stability, underpinned by the leadership commitments at the 2023 Camp David Summit and respective trilateral foreign and defense ministerial-level meetings this year. In support of these commitments, the Ministers hailed successful execution of the first iteration of the new, multi-domain trilateral exercise, FREEDOM EDGE, and the continued operation of a trilateral real-time Democratic People's Republic of Korea missile warning data sharing mechanism.

The United States welcomed the signing of the Japan-Philippines RAA, and the Ministers looked forward to greater trilateral and multilateral cooperation on shared areas of interest, including maritime domain awareness and security, training and exercises with our respective forces, cooperation between our respective coast guards, capacity building, and HA/DR. They noted additional multilateral efforts including between the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia to support capacity building for the Philippines. They lauded the April 2024 U.S.-Japan-Australia-Philippines and the June 2024 U.S.-Japan-Canada-Philippines maritime cooperative activities in the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone to strengthen the interoperability of our defense/armed forces' doctrines, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and uphold high seas freedoms in a manner consistent with the international law of the sea as reflected in UNCLOS.

The Ministers underscored their strong support for ASEAN's unity and centrality. They also emphasized their support for the Pacific region's unity and its priorities as articulated through the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. They supported further cooperation with partners in Southeast Asia and Pacific Island

Countries through joint training, capacity building, and assistance initiatives. Relatedly, the United States welcomed Japan's decision to establish the Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework to strengthen the security capacities and improve the deterrence capabilities of third countries, including the provision of coastal radar systems to the Philippines. The Ministers noted bilateral efforts to align U.S. initiatives with Japan's OSA. The Ministers reconfirmed the importance of the Quad, and their commitment to furthering the public goods Quad partners deliver to the region through the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) and other initiatives.

Highlighting the interconnected nature of security challenges in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions, the Ministers supported Japan's increased multilateral cooperation with NATO and cooperation throughout Europe. They confirmed efforts to align U.S. and Japanese strategic and diplomatic approaches toward each region through the recently launched U.S.-Japan Strategic Diplomacy and Development Dialogue.

Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

The Ministers reiterated the President and Prime Minister's aim to maximally align our economic, technology, and related strategies to advance innovation, strengthen our industrial bases, promote resilient and reliable supply chains, and build the strategic emerging industries of the future. They reaffirmed the importance of defense equipment and technology cooperation in enhancing Alliance capabilities, which underpins the Alliance's ability to support regional peace and stability. Through this cooperation, the United States and Japan are connecting acquisition, science, and technology ecosystems to maintain the technological edge, and cooperating on economic security measures to counter the weaponization of economic dependencies.

The Ministers welcomed high-priority efforts to pursue mutually beneficial co-production opportunities to expand production capacity of Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) and meet critical demand for such advanced systems, address timely procurement and readiness requirements, and deter aggression. This includes the U.S. Interagency Missile Co-Production Working Group, led by the Deputy Secretary of State and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, which will inform the U.S.-Japan Forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustainment (DICAS). DICAS will focus on advancing missile co-production efforts as well as building supply chain resilience and facilitating ship and aircraft repair. Further, the Ministers supported senior U.S. and Japanese leadership attendance at the upcoming September 2024 Industry Day organized by Japanese Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency, which will provide opportunities to advance discussions on these key efforts. DICAS, in updating the SCC, and the U.S. Interagency Missile Co-Production Working Group will communicate with industry stakeholders to create the conditions required to co-produce advanced defensive systems. DICAS Missile Co-production Working Group participants will submit action plans for accelerating responsible technology release, promoting a viable business case, establishing programmatic timelines and required procurement quantities, and identifying funding mechanisms to the second DICAS meeting to be organized by the end of 2024.

The Ministers further highlighted major arrangements signed recently, including the Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) Project Arrangement, the Overwhelming Response through Collaborative Autonomy (ORCA) Project Arrangement, the High-Powered Microwave (HPM) Project Arrangement, and the Testing and Evaluation Program (TEP) Memorandum of Understanding. They echoed the role of the Defense Science and Technology Cooperation Group (DSTCG) in the bilateral technology cooperation and welcomed its second meeting this summer. The United States also commended Japan's future establishment of its new institute for defense innovation technology. Furthermore, they emphasized the importance of expanding bilateral cooperation on uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), especially joint research on RTA (runtime assurance) technology scheduled to start in the first half of 2025. The United States reiterated support for Japan's cooperation with like-minded countries on defense equipment and technology, including the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) with the United Kingdom and Italy, and the Ministers supported cooperation to ensure interoperability between GCAP and U.S. aircraft and uncrewed systems.

The United States welcomed Japan's revision of its Three Principles on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and its Implementation Guidelines, which supports efforts to leverage our respective industrial bases to meet the demand for critical capabilities. Under this revision, the United States further welcomed progress in transferring Japan's Patriot interceptor missiles to supplement U.S. stocks.

To support further cooperation in the above areas, the United States welcomed Japan's efforts to bolster its defense industrial security base with the publication of the first Defense Industrial Security Manual, as well as Japan's participation in the Multinational Industrial Security Working Group (MISWG) as the first Asian country to become an official member, and Japan's passage of the Act on the Protection and Utilization of Important Economic Security Information.

Alliance Force Posture

The Ministers emphasized the importance of optimizing Alliance force posture to address increasing security challenges in the region and be better postured to meet these challenges in the future. To this end, they welcomed the U.S. plan to modernize its tactical aircraft laydown across Japan. The modernization plan reflects capability investments to enhance the U.S.-Japan Alliance and bolster regional deterrence. The Ministers celebrated the U.S. redesignation of the 12th Marine Regiment to the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), and the steady implementation of the MLR reorganization toward initial operational capability by 2025. They welcomed the forward deployment and return of the USS George Washington to Japan, and its critical role in supporting Alliance deterrence.

To maintain deterrence and mitigate impact on local communities, the Ministers reiterated their firm commitment to the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan and other existing bilateral arrangements, including construction of relocation facilities and land returns in Okinawa. Following the progress of construction in the Oura-wan area, the Ministers underlined the importance of accelerating bilateral work toward the total return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma as early as practicable including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko as the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma. The Ministers confirmed the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam beginning in 2024. The Ministers highlighted progress on development of the SDF facility on Mageshima. They underscored the importance of continued bilateral coordination for sharing timely information on incidents and accidents. In the spirit of alliance cooperation, the Ministers welcomed the efforts to be implemented by USFJ to prevent unacceptable incidents and behavior.

The Ministers affirmed their commitment to the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) in accordance with Japan's national

laws and regulations. This includes both countries' commitment to implement FIP lines of effort during the duration of the 2022 Special Measures Agreement and to take all appropriate initiatives with the aim of further ensuring timely and effective implementation of the 164.1 billion yen budget, which was reaffirmed in the Joint Statement of the SCC in 2022.

Coordination on Environmental Issues and Humanitarian Assistance

In line with President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida's Joint Leaders Statement in April to respond more rapidly to climate change-related and other natural disasters by establishing a HA/DR hub in Japan, the Ministers decided to convene a task force for the operational requirements to move in an expedited manner. The Ministers discussed enhancing bilateral environmental cooperation, including on per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) issues, in compliance with the Status of Forces Agreement and related arrangements.

Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)

The Ministers underscored that cooperation on WPS will uphold our global partnership goals of advancing the empowerment of women and girls, achieving gender equality, and including diverse perspectives in national security activities. The Ministers affirmed that realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific requires the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women in leadership positions as well as their contributions toward conflict prevention, reconstruction, and peacebuilding. The Ministers welcomed efforts, including ongoing U.S. Forces commitment to recurring WPS symposiums, Japanese participation at the USINDOPACOM Regional Military Gender Advisor Course, bilateral cooperation under ASEAN working groups, Japan's continued engagement and leadership with the WPS Focal Points Network, integration of WPS into disaster risk reduction policies and efforts, and bilateral support for the regional WPS Center of Excellence. The Ministers confirmed they will further explore cooperation by continuing to promote participation in U.S. and Japanese-led WPS activities, as well as through incorporating WPS considerations in regular bilateral training, exercises, and other activities.

Investment in People for the Alliance

The strong bonds of friendship between our peoples anchor and sustain our growing global partnership. Further strengthening these bonds, including through cultural and educational exchanges, are the most effective way to develop future stewards of the U.S.-Japan relationship. The Ministers emphasized the importance of building new and expanding existing exchange opportunities, such as Think of Okinawa's Future in the U.S. (TOFU) and Student Educational Exchange and Dialogue (SEED), to create a diverse pipeline of future U.S.-Japan experts who support the Alliance. Our peoples form the core of our Alliance, and we reaffirm our commitment to forge ever-closer bonds for generations to come.

Reference 30 Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (the Japan-U.S. "2+2") (Outline) (July 2024)

Overview

- At the outset, the Japanese side stated that there are ongoing trends that threaten a free and open international order based on the rule of law, that the decisions we make today are crucial for deciding the course of the future, and that, to protect the existing international order, it is necessary to keep strengthening the Alliance and enhancing deterrence capabilities. The U.S. side celebrated the remarkable progress on enhancing the role and mission of the Alliance, which is to support our ability to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region, as well as the Alliance's capabilities.
- Japan and the United states reaffirmed their intent to implement new strategic initiatives following Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's historic official visit to the United States in April, which is bound to elevate the Japan-U.S. Alliance to higher levels than ever before, with the vision to build a global partnership for the future, including upgrading Alliance command and control (C2), deepening defense industry and advanced technology cooperation, and enhancing cross-domain operations.
- The U.S. side restated its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan under Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear, and reaffirmed that this article applies to the Senkaku Islands. The Japan side reaffirmed its role in maintaining peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region by seamlessly responding to any situation, including everything from peacetime to contingencies.

Regional Security Environment

- The four ministers had a candid discussion on the challenging security environment in the region, thereby aligning their perspectives.
- Japan and the United States concurred that China's foreign policy seeks to reshape the international order to its benefit. Japan and the United States highlighted that the PRC employs political, economic, and military coercion of countries, companies, and civil society while also facilitating its military modernization through the diversion of technology to achieve these objectives. Japan and the United States concurred that this behavior is of serious concern to the Alliance and the entire international community and represents the greatest strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.
- Japan and the United States also reiterated their strong opposition to China's intensified attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion in the East China Sea, including through actions that seek to undermine Japan's longstanding peaceful administration of the Senkaku Islands, as well as China's attempts to escalate the situation around the Nansei Islands.
- Japan and the United States recognized that their basic positions on Taiwan remain unchanged, and reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international community and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.
- Japan and the United States strongly condemned North Korea's ongoing ballistic missile launches. Japan and the United States also condemned North Korea's continued nuclear weapon and missile program as well as the country's nuclear rhetoric and reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea. In addition, the U.S. side expressed its full support for the abductions issue.
- Japan and the United States strongly condemned Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Japan and the United States also highlighted with concern Russia's growing and provocative strategic military cooperation with China as well as China's support for Russia's defense industrial base. Japan and the United States also strongly condemned deepening Russia-North Korea military cooperation and expressed deep concern over the possible transfer of technologies, etc. related to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles to North Korea.

Modernizing the Alliance

- The four ministers discussed the policy of further strengthening the ability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats.
- Japan and the United States affirmed the need to enhance coordination related to Alliance policies and operations at all levels through exercises and consultation and to cultivate a common understanding of Alliance processes that include everything from peacetime to contingencies, and the countries reaffirmed their intention to bilaterally improve their command and control frameworks. In addition, Japan and the United States agreed to establish working groups and to advance discussions on matters such as the counterpart relationship between the JSDF Joint Operations Command (JJOC) and the U.S. Armed Forces, while recognizing as one of the principles that securing the existing Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) remains the mechanism that facilities bilateral policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the U.S. Forces and the SDF in all phases from peacetime to contingencies.
- Japan and the United States welcomed progress on the establishment of Japan's stand-off defense capabilities. Japan and the United States highlighted progress on Japan-U.S. cooperation aimed at the effective employment of Japan's counterstrike capabilities in close coordination with the United States.
- Japan and the United States reaffirmed the fact that one objective of the Alliance is to improve their bilateral presence in the Nansei Islands of Japan. Japan and the United States emphasized the importance of ongoing cooperation with local communities to achieve the above initiatives, including enhancing communication concerning the importance of Alliance activities to support strong relationships with local communities.
- Japan and the United States affirmed bilateral efforts to improve and expand the scope of realistic cross-domain training and exercises aimed at maintaining and enhancing Alliance readiness, which underpins the credibility of Alliance deterrence. Japan and the United States also welcomed the first meeting of the Working Group for Future Fighter Training and Readiness (WG-FFTR), which will explore opportunities for future fighter pilot training and readiness.
- Japan and the United States confirmed that steady progress has been made on cooperation related to information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). In addition, they welcomed achievements of the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Information Analysis Cell (BIAC) and agreed to enhance and expand the BIAC through continued discussion on future cooperative efforts.
- Japan and the United States committed to strengthening bilateral coordination on cross-domain operations, including cyber, space, electromagnetic, and information warfare, recognizing the importance of all these domains to future concepts of deterrence and response capabilities.
- Japan and the United States emphasized that cybersecurity and information security form the foundation of the Alliance and discussed the promotion of cooperation to strengthen response capabilities in the cyber domain in order to improve the Alliance's deterrence capabilities.

- Japan and the United States reiterated the aim of the leaders of the two countries to maximally align our economic, technological, and related strategies to advance innovation, strengthen our industrial bases, promote resilient and reliable supply chains, and build the strategic emerging industries of the future. Based on this perspective, Japan and the United States welcomed the first meeting of the Forum on Japan-U.S. Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS). Japan and the United States welcomed high-priority initiatives aimed at pursuing mutually beneficial co-production opportunities to expand the production capacity of AMRAAM and PAC-3 MSE. In addition, the Japanese side stated that, to promote co-production, it is necessary for the U.S. side to engage in mutually beneficial cooperation, including further technical disclosure.
- Japan and the United States reaffirmed that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is at the core of both countries' efforts to deepen and expand multilateral cooperation with countries and international organizations that include Australia, the ROK, the Philippines, ASEAN, the Pacific Island countries, and NATO.

Posture of the U.S. Forces

- The four ministers discussed the posture of the U.S. Armed Forces from the perspective of mitigating the impact on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
- Japan and the United States emphasized the importance of optimizing the Alliance force posture to address increasing security challenges in the region and to adopt a more suitable posture for responding to such challenges in the future. To achieve this objective, Japan and the United States welcomed the United States plan to modernize tactical fighter jets throughout Japan.
- In order to maintain deterrence capabilities and mitigate the impact on local communities, Japan and the United States expressed a strong commitment to the steady implementation of the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan and other existing bilateral arrangements, including the construction of replacement facilities and land returns in Okinawa. Japan and the United States emphasized the importance of accelerating bilateral work aimed at the total return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS) as early as practicable, including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko. Japan and the United States confirmed that the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam would begin in 2024.
- The Japanese side once again requested that the U.S. side strive to ensure safe operations of the U.S. Forces based on the utmost consideration of impacts on local communities, appropriate responses to incidents and accidents, including sharing information in a timely manner, and environment-related cooperation. Both sides confirmed that Japan and the United States will work in close cooperation. Japan and the United States positively evaluated initiatives implemented by the U.S. Forces in Japan to prevent incidents and actions that seem unacceptable given the spirit of cooperation by the Alliance.

Reference 31 Record of Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2025

Joint Staff

Training Name	Period (YY.M.DD)	Place	Participating Units [Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF)]	Participating Units [U.S. Forces and Foreign Armed Forces]
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	25.4.24	Airspace from the East China Sea to the area above the western Pacific Ocean southeast of Okinawa	9th Air Wing F-15 fighters × 4	B-1 × 1 F-15E × 6 F-35A × 4 F-35B × 2 EA-18G × 2 RC-135 × 1 KC-135 × 1
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	25.5.9	Airspace above the Sea of Japan	3rd Air Wing F-35A fighters × 2	B-1B × 2
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	25.10.1	Airspace over the East China Sea west of Kyushu	5th Air Wing F-15 fighters × 6	F-16 × 3, KC-135 × 2
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	25.11.15	Airspace above the Sea of Japan	2nd Air Wing F-15 fighters × 2 7th Air Wing F-2 fighters × 2	B-1B × 1
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	25.11.17	Airspace over the East China Sea west of Kyushu and airspace over the Pacific Ocean east of the main island of Okinawa	8th Air Wing F-2 fighters × 2 9th Air Wing F-15 fighters × 4	B-1B × 2, F-35A × 12, EA-18G × 2 E-3G × 1, KC-135 × 2, RC-135 × 1 P-8A × 1
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	25.12.10	Airspace above the Sea of Japan	3rd Air Wing F-35 fighters × 3 6th Air Wing F-15 fighters × 3	B-52 × 2
FY 2025 Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise (Command Post Exercise)	26.1.29 to 2.5	Locations of the Ichigaya area of the Ministry of Defense and other units participating in the exercise, USFJ facilities and Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, U.S.	Ground Self-Defense Force: Ground Component Command, each army, etc. Maritime Self-Defense Force: Self-Defense Fleet, Headquarters of all Districts, etc. Air Self-Defense Force: Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc. Joint Units: JSDF Joint Operations Command, JSDF Intelligence Security Command, JSDF Cyber Defense Command, Japan Self-Defense Forces Maritime Transport Group e. Staff Office, etc., Internal Bureau, each Staff Office and the Defense Intelligence Headquarters	U.S. Forces and Australian Defence Force
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise	26.2.16, 2.18	Airspace over the Sea of Japan and East China Sea	7th Air Wing F-2 fighters × 3 8th Air Wing F-2 fighters × 3 9th Air Wing F-15 fighters × 5	B-52 × 4
FY2025 Japan-U.S. Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense (Defensive) Exercise	26.2.23 to 2.26	(1) MSDF Yokosuka Area (2) ASDF Chitose Air Base, Misawa Air Base, Yokota Air Base, Iruma Air Base, Gifu Air Base, Kasuga Air Base, Naha Air Base, Kasumgaura Sub Base and Aibano Sub Base (3) USFJ facilities (Yokota Air Base, Yokosuka Air Base and Kadena Air Base) and Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, U.S.	JSDF Joint Operations Command, Self-Defense Fleet and Air Defense Command	94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, 1st Battalion in the 1st Air Defense Artillery Regiment, U.S. 7th Fleet, 613th Air Operations Center and Fifth Air Force

Ground Self-Defense Force

Training Name	Period (YY.M.DD)	Place	Participating Units [Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF)]	Participating Units [U.S. Forces and Foreign Armed Forces]
FY2025 Field Training with U.S. Marines (Resolute Dragon 2025)	25.9.11 to 9.25	(1) Hokkaido Ground Self-Defense Force Hokkaido Maneuver Area, Ground Self-Defense Force Camp Kitaeniwa, Ground Self-Defense Force Yausubetsu Maneuver Area, Ground Self-Defense Force Kashiwadai Maneuver Area, Ground Self-Defense Force Camp Okadama and Air Self-Defense Force Kenebetsu Air Base (2) Yamaguchi U.S. Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni (3) Oita Ground Self-Defense Force Hijudai Maneuver Area and Ground Self-Defense Force Jumonjibaru Maneuver Area (4) Saga Ground Self-Defense Force Camp Metabaru (5) Nagasaki Maritime Self-Defense Force Sasebo Base (6) Kumamoto Ground Self-Defense Force Camp Kengun, Ground Self-Defense Force Vice-Camp Takayubaru and Ground Self-Defense Force Oyanohara Maneuver Area (7) Kagoshima Ground Self-Defense Force Sata Anti-Aircraft Firing Range, Maritime Self-Defense Force Kanoya Air Base, Ground Self-Defense Force Camp Amami, Ground Self-Defense Force Vice-Camp Setouchi and Tokunoshima Island (8) Okinawa Some of the JSDF facilities, USFJ facilities, etc. within the prefecture	Ground Self-Defense Force: Western Army (Army Headquarters, 8th Division, 15th Brigade, etc.), Ground Component Command, Northern Army, Middle Army, etc. Maritime Self-Defense Force: Self-Defense Fleet, etc. Air Self-Defense Force: Air Support Command, etc.	U.S. Marine Corps: III MEF Command, 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 3rd Marine Division (12th Marine Littoral Regiment, etc.), III MEF Intelligence Command, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, III MEF Logistics Group, U.S. Marine Corps Pacific Base units, etc. U.S. Army: 3rd Multi-Domain Task Force, etc. U.S. Navy: U.S. Seventh Fleet, etc. U.S. Air Force: 18th Air Wing
FY2025 Field Training with the U.S. Army in the U.S. (Rising Thunder 25)	25.10.27 to 11.12	Yakima Training Center, Washington, U.S.	22nd Rapid Deployment Regiment Core Units/6th Division	U.S. Army: 2nd and 3rd Infantry Battalions Core Units/7th Infantry Division
FY2025 Field Training with U.S. Army (North Wind 26)	26.1.22 to 2.2	Camp Makomanai, Camp Minamieniwa, Camp Okadama, Camp Takikawa, Takikawa Maneuver Area, and Hokkaido Maneuver Area, etc.	11th Brigade, 10th Rapid Deployment Regiment, etc.	11th Airborne Division, 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 509th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Battalion, U.S. Army Aviation Battalion Japan
FY2025 Bilateral Training with U.S. III Marine Expeditionary Force (Iron Fist 26)	26.2.11 to 3.9	Air Station Iwakuni, Camp Ainoura, Camp Metabaru, Vice-Camp Takayubaru, Kirishima Maneuver Area, Maritime Self-Defense Force Omura Air Base, Fukue Airport, Air Self-Defense Force Fukuejima Sub Base Air Base, Tanegashima Island, Amami-Oshima Island, Naha Air Base, Idesuna Jima Range, Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield, Camp Hansen, Kin Blue Beach, etc.	Ground Self-Defense Force: Ground Component Command (Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, 1st Helicopter Brigade, 1st Airborne Brigade, etc.) and Western Army (Western Air Defense Force, etc.) Maritime Self-Defense Force: Mine Warfare Force	U.S. Marine Corps: 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, etc. U.S. Navy: U.S. Seventh Fleet

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Name	Period (YY.M.DD)	Place	Participating Units [Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF)]	Participating Units [U.S. Forces and Foreign Armed Forces]
Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise	25.4.3	South of Okinawa	JS “Inazuma”, EP-3, OP-3C, UP-3D	EA-18G
Minesweeping Special Training (Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise)	25.4.7 to 4.11	Guam and the surrounding waters	Explosive ordnance disposal divers (Mine Warfare Force Headquarters)	Explosive ordnance disposal divers etc. (5th Mobile EOD Unit)
Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise	25.4.7 to 4.25	From Yokosuka to the east of Okinawa	JS “Ashigara”	Destroyers USS Dewey, USS Shoup, USS Milius, and USS Benfold, replenishment ship USNS Carl Brashear
Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise	25.4.23 to 4.28	From south of the Southwest Islands to the western Pacific Ocean	JS “Ariake”	Aircraft carrier USS Nimitz, destroyer USS Lenah Sutcliffe Higbee, destroyer USS Gridley, destroyer USS Curtis Wilbur, destroyer USS Wayne E. Meyer, and replenishment oiler USNS John Lewis
Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise	25.5.15	Sagami-bay	SH-60K	MH-60R
Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise (ILEX25)	25.6.8	South of Honshu	Replenishment ship JS “Tokiwa”	United States Coast Guard: Patrol vessel USCGC Stratton
FY2025 Mine Disposal and Minesweeping Exercises (Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises) (Iwo-To)	25.6.10 to 6.22	Area around Iwo Jima	Participating Units: 7 vessels（minesweeper carriers × 2, minesweepers × 1, smaller minesweepers × 4）	Explosive ordnance disposal divers etc. (5th Mobile EOD Unit)
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise	25.7.11, 7.12	Off the coast of Boso	Submarines, SH-60K	Submarines
FY2025 Mine Warfare (Mutsu Bay) and Minesweeping Exercises (Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises)	25.7.14 to 7.29	Mutsu Bay	10 vessels (minesweeper carriers × 2, minesweepers × 2, smaller minesweepers × 6) 7 aircraft ((P-1/P-3C aircraft × 5, MCH-101 helicopters × 2) explosive ordnance disposal divers, unmanned underwater vehicles	Officer in Charge of the Exercise (OCE): one flagship of the 7th Mine Countermeasures Squadron (MCMS) (minesweeper × 1) 2 aircraft (MH-53E helicopters × 2) explosive ordnance disposal divers, unmanned underwater vehicles
JMSDF Table-Top Exercise 2025	25.7.30 to 8.1, 9.3, 9.9	Locations of the Maritime Operation Center and other units participating in the exercise, etc.	Self Defense Fleet, Headquarters of all Districts, Communications Command, MSDF Maritime Materiel Command, etc.	—
Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise	25.8.15	West of Kyushu	Replenishment ship JS “Oumi”	U.S. Navy: Tanker MT Stena Imperative
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (RESCUE FLAG IWAKUNI) (*Note 1)	25.9.2 to 9.12	Surrounding Iwakuni Air Base, surrounding the Bungo Channel, and south of Shikoku	Maritime Self-Defense Force: US-2 Air Self-Defense Force: U-125A, UH-60J	U.S. Air Force: MC-130J, HH-60W U.S. Marine Corps: F-35B, MV-22, AH-1, CH-53
Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise	25.9.4, 9.5	Sea area around Guam	JS Ise, JS Suzunami (IPD25 3rd Surface Unit)	U.S. Navy: USS Higgins
Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise	25.9.22 to 10.2	Peleliu state and Aimeliik state (Palau)	IPD25 Engineer Unit	U.S. Navy Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Group 4, Amphibious Construction Battalion 1
Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise	25.10.2	Sagami-bay	SH-60K	U.S. Navy: MH-60R
Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise	25.10.17	Off the coast of San Diego	Training ships JS “Kashima” and JS “Shimakaze”	USS Jack H. Lucas
Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise	25.11.2 to 11.4	From south of Shikoku to East China Sea	JS “Haguro”	Aircraft carrier USS “George Washington” USS Robert Smalls USS “Milius”
Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise	25.11.13	South of Okinawa	P-3C	P-8A
Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise	25.11.14	South of Shikoku	JS Sawagiri P-1, EP-3, OP-3C, UP-3D	EA-18G
FY2025 Mine Warfare Exercise (Hyuga nada) and Japan-U.S. Bilateral MCM Exercise	25.11.16 to 11.26	Hyuga-Nada	17 vessels (minesweeper carriers × 2, minesweepers × 4, smaller minesweepers × 11) 2 aircraft（MCH-101 helicopters × 2） Explosive ordnance disposal divers (Sasebo, Okinawa Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams)	2 aircraft (MH-53E helicopters × 2) Explosive ordnance disposal divers, UUV operators, etc. (5th Mobile EOD Unit)
Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise	25.11.17 to 11.21	Tinian Island (United States of America)	IPD25 Engineer Unit	Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Group 133
Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise	25.11.17 to 11.21	Yap Island (Federated States of Micronesia)	IPD25 Engineer Unit	Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Group 4
Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise	25.12.8 to 12.11	South of Kanto	JS Akizuki	Aircraft carrier USS “George Washington” USS “Dewey”

Training Name	Period (YY.M.DD)	Place	Participating Units [Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF)]	Participating Units [U.S. Forces and Foreign Armed Forces]
FY2025 Mine Warfare (Ise Bay) and Minesweeping Exercises (Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises)	26.2.1 to 2.10	Ise Bay	Naval vessels: 15 (minesweeper carriers × 1, minesweepers × 2, smaller minesweepers × 12) 1 aircraft (MCH-101) Explosive ordnance disposal divers (Yokosuka, Maizuru, Ominato, Okinawa Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams)	Explosive ordnance disposal divers, UUV operators, etc. (5th Mobile EOD Unit)
Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise	26.2.18	South of Shikoku	JS “Harusame” EP-3、OP-3C、UP-3D	EA-18G, F/A-18E, E-2D
Medical Special Training	26.3.11	Japan Self Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka and United States Naval Hospital Yokosuka	Headquarters Yokosuka District JSDF Hospital Yokosuka Medical Service Unit Yokosuka Number of personnel: approx. 60	United States Naval Hospital Yokosuka Number of personnel: approx. 30
Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise	26.3.19	Sagami-bay	SH-60K	U.S. Navy: MH-60R

Air Self-Defense Force

Training Name	Period (YY.M.DD)	Place	Participating Units [Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF)]	Participating Units [U.S. Forces and Foreign Armed Forces]
U.S. Air Force Exercise (RED FLAG ALASKA 25-2)	25.6.12 to 6.28 (Period from deployment to redeployment: May 30 - July 5, 2025)	Eielson Air Force Base and Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, United States of America, and the airspace surrounding these bases	(1) Participating Units 9th Air Wing (Naha), Warning Wing (Hamamatsu) and 1st Tactical Airlift Wing (Komaki) (2) Types of Aircraft and Numbers of Each Type, etc. F-15J/DJ × 6, E-767 × 1, C-130 × 2 Number of personnel: approx. 270	—
Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise (RESCUE FLAG IWAKUNI) (*Note 2)	25.9.2 to 9.12	Waters and airspace surrounding Iwakuni Air Base, surrounding the Bungo Channel, and south of Shikoku	Air Self-Defense Force: Air Rescue Wing U-125A, UH-60J Maritime Self-Defense Force: 31st Fleet Air Wing US-2	353rd Special Operations Wing: MC-130J aircraft 33rd Rescue Squadron HH-60W helicopter 12th Marine Aircraft Group F-35B 36th Marine Aircraft Group MV-22, AH-1, CH-53
FY2025 Bilateral Training between the U.S. Pacific Air Force and Air Support Command regarding Air Mobility	26.2.8 to 2.13	Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, U.S. and its surrounding airspace	Transport Aircraft (C-2) × 1 aircraft Number of personnel: approx. 20	—

(*Note 1) The ASDF also participated (written in duplicate in the ASDF section).
(*Note 2) The MSDF also participated (written in duplicate in the MSDF section).

Reference 32 United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (tentative translation)

(Washington, DC, May 1, 2006)

Overview

On October 29, 2005, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, "U.S.– Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future." In that document, the SCC members directed their respective staffs "to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006." This work has been completed and is reflected in this document.

Finalization of Realignment Initiatives

The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan.

The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will finance their realignment associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities.

Key Implementation Details

1. Realignment on Okinawa

(a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)

- The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a "V"-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.
- In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.
- Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.
- Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.
- Facility improvements for contingency use at ASDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary, after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.
- Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.
- In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill.
- The USG does not intend to operate fighter aircraft from this facility.

(b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam

- Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters.
- The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area.
- The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.
- Of the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide $6.09 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam estimated in U.S. FY2008 dollars at $3.18 billion in fiscal spending plus approximately $1 billion for a road.

(c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities

- Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.
- Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March 2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six candidate facilities will be examined:
  - ○ Camp Kuwae: Total return.
  - ○ Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.
  - ○ MCAS Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above).
  - ○ Makiminato Service Area: Total return.
  - ○ Naha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging constructed at Urasoe).
  - ○ Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1: Total return.
- All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will occur before the return of designated facilities.
- While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be reevaluated.
- Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. Shared use that requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006.
- ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities.

(d) Relationships among Initiatives
- Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected.
- Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.
- The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan's financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.

2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability
- U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed by U.S. FY2008. The headquarters of the GSDF Central Readiness Force subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan FY2012; SDF helicopters will have access to Kastner Heliport on Camp Zama.
- Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.
- In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented.
  - ○ Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and underground rail (approximately 2ha). Affected housing units will be relocated to Sagamihara Housing Area.
  - ○ A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD (approximately 35ha) will be provided for local use when not required for contingency or training purposes.
  - ○ Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1ha) will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate.

3. Yokota Air Base and Airspace
- ASDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base in Japan FY2010. A bilateral master plan for base use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements.
- A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of shared use equipment and systems.
- The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements.
  - ○ Establish a program in Japan FY2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.
  - ○ Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008; specific portions will be identified by October 2006.
  - ○ Develop procedures in Japan FY2006 for temporary transfers of air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.
  - ○ Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military (U.S. and Japanese) demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be completed in Japan FY2009.
- The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from commencement.
  - ○ The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.
  - ○ Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian-military dual-use.

4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni
- The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.
- Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to accommodate MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni, taking into account the continued requirement for U.S. operations from Atsugi.
- The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities. The aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-l30 aircraft, necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya.
- U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam.
- Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulfill safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces, Japan SDF, and commercial aircraft (including those in neighboring airspace) through coordination by the Joint Committee.
- A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent field carrier landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter.
- Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.

5. Missile Defense
- As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will continue.
- The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as ASDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006.
- The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ.
- U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time.

6. Training Relocation

- Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan FY2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan FY2006 can be developed.
- Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities — Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni — will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future.
- The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.
- Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training requirements.
- In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1–5 aircraft for the duration of 1–7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6–12 aircraft for 8–14 days at a time.
- At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained.
- The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness.

(Attached conceptual diagram omitted)

Reference 33 Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility

Month & Year	Background
April 1996	• Then Prime Minister Hashimoto and then U.S. Ambassador Mondale held a meeting, and the total return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) was announced. SACO Interim Report. → The airfield will be returned within five to seven years, following the completion of an adequate replacement facility.
December 1996	• SACO Final Report → A maritime facility will be constructed off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa (one that can be removed).
November 1999	• Then Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Inamine stated that he had chosen the Henoko coast region of Nago City as a candidate for the facility relocation on condition that it would be for joint military-civilian use
December 1999	• Then Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF • "Government Policy on Relocation of MCAS Futenma" (Cabinet decision) → Construction in the water area of Camp Schwab, Henoko coastal region in the Nago City
July 2002	• "Basic Agreement Regarding the Use Agreement of Replacement Facilities" concluded between the Director General of Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture. • "Basic Plan for Replacement Facilities for MCAS Futenma" was prepared. → Scale, construction methods, and specific construction site decided
November 2003	• Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visited Okinawa.
August 2004	• A U.S. Forces helicopter crashed into a university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa.
October 2005	• "2+2" Joint Statement → Agreement on a new plan (an L shape plan connecting the coastal area of Camp Schwab with the adjacent water area of Oura bay)
April 2006	• "Basic Agreement Regarding the Construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility" concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency, the Mayor of Nago City, and the Mayor of Ginoza Village. → Agreement was reached by creating flight paths avoiding overflight of the surrounding region (the V shape plan).
May 2006	• "2+2" Joint Statement → The "U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation," was finalized, and V shape plan was approved "Basic Confirmation Regarding the Realignment of U.S. Military Forces in Okinawa" was concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture. • "GOJ Efforts for USFJ Force Structure Realignment and Others" (Cabinet decision) → The cabinet decision of December 1999 was abolished.
August 2006	• Establishment of "The Council on Measures for Relocation of MCAS Futenma"
August 2007	• The EIA scoping document was sent to the Governor, municipal mayors etc., of Okinawa Prefecture.
April 2009	• Draft Environment Impact Statement was sent to the Governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa Prefecture.
September 2009	• Conclusion of a three-party coalition government agreement between the Democratic Party of Japan, the Social Democratic Party, and the People's New Party. → Agreement on reviewing the status of the U.S. Forces realignment and U.S. Forces bases in Japan.
November 2009	• Establishment of the Ministerial-Level Working Group on the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station. Japan-U.S. summit meeting → Agreement on resolving the relocation of Futenma Air Station expeditiously through the working group.
December 2009	• Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies convened, Exploratory Committee for the Okinawa Bases Issue was established.
May 2010	• "2+2" Joint Statement → Confirmed the intention to locate the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas • Cabinet approval of "immediate actions by the Government of Japan on items decided by the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee on May 28th, 2010"
August 2010	• Futenma Replacement Facility Bilateral Experts Study Group Report
June 2011	• "2+2" Joint Statement → Confirming the commitment that a replacement plan should be completed as early as possible after 2014, while deciding that the shape of the runway in the replaced facility should be V-shaped.
December 2011-January 2012	• The Environmental Impact Statement report was sent to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture.
February 2012	• The Japan-U.S. Joint Statement was announced on the realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. → Official discussion was initiated to delink two issues—the relocation of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.
April 2012	• "2+2" Joint Statement → The four Ministers reconfirmed that the current plan to relocate MCAS Futenma to Henoko continues to be the only viable solution. Agreement reached to delink two issues—the relocation of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.
December 2012	• Revised Environment Impact Statement was sent to the Governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa Prefecture.
March 2013	• The Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau submitted the Landfill Permit Request on public waters to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture.
April 2013	• Release of "the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa" → MCAS Futenma can be returned in FY2022 or later through relocation, etc.
October 2013	• "2+2" Joint Statement → The four Ministers confirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
December 2013	• The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture approved reclamation of the public water related to the FRF project
July 2014	• Started the construction of replacement facilities
April 2015	• "2+2" Joint Statement → The four Ministers reconfirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma

Month & Year	Background
October 2015	• The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture revoked the landfill permit for the FRF project • The Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau requested the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to review the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture's revocation of the landfill permit for public waters, and requested the suspension of its execution • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism decided to suspend execution of the revocation of the landfill permit
November 2015	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed a subrogation lawsuit to retract the revocation of the landfill permit. • Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Stated that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution.
March 2016	• The government announced it would accept the court's settlement recommendation • Landfill work was suspended • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued an instruction for correction to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture to repeal the revocation of the landfill permit on public waters • Dissatisfied with the instruction for correction by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed • a request for review with the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council
April 2016	• Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Japan explained that its position remains unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution and that the Government decided to accept a court suggested settlement under the philosophy of "haste makes waste," and stated that it would like to realize the return of MCAS Futenma through the completion of the relocation to Henoko at the earliest possible time and will continue to make joint efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. The U.S. stated that it understands the court-suggested settlement on the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko as Prime Minister Abe's strategic decision, and said that the U.S. will continue its efforts through close cooperation.
June 2016	• The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council notified the results of the review • Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution
July 2016	• The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed an action for the declaration illegality of inaction
September 2016	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution
December 2016	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Governor of Okinawa Prefecture in a lawsuit to confirm the illegality of inaction (finalized victory of the • national government) • The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture revoked the revocation of the landfill permit on public waters • Resumed the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project • Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Japan stated that its position remains unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, that construction has resumed following the Supreme Court ruling, and that the Government will steadily move forward with the construction
February 2017	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution • Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
April 2017	• Began construction of the seawall, the main part of the public waters reclamation
June 2017	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution
July 2017	• Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit (injunction lawsuit) against the central government, arguing it is illegal to damage rock reefs on the seabed and conduct other such acts without receiving the permission of the governor
August 2017	• Joint statement of "2+2" → The four Ministers reconfirmed that construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
November 2017	• Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
March 2018	• Naha District Court dismissed Okinawa Prefecture's lawsuit that demands for an injunctive order for actions that damage the reefs, etc.
April 2018	• Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
August 2018	• The Vice Governor of Okinawa Prefecture revoked (withdrew) the landfill permit on public waters.
October 2018	• The Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau requested the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to review the Vice Governor of Okinawa Prefecture's withdrawal of the landfill permit on public waters, and requested the suspension of its execution. • Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism decided to suspend execution of the withdrawal of the landfill permit.
November 2018	• Dissatisfied with the determination by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to suspend execution, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a request for a review with the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council.
December 2018	• The Fukuoka High Court, Naha Branch dismissed an appeal by Okinawa Prefecture regarding a lawsuit that demands for an injunctive order for actions that damage the rock reefs, etc. • Started landfill work in the waters on the Henoko side.
January 2019	• Meeting between then Defense Minister Iwaya and then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
February 2019	• The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council dismissed the request for a review by the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture of the suspension of execution by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. • Okinawa Prefecture held a prefectural referendum on whether or not people support the land-fill work related to the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko, Nago City. → 114,933 voted for the work, 434,273 voted against it, and 52,682 voted neither (605,385 total votes cast, 52.48% voter turnout).

Month & Year	Background
March 2019	• The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit to revoke the determination to suspend execution of the withdrawal of the landfill permit. • Okinawa Prefecture withdrew a petition for acceptance of final appeal with the Supreme Court regarding a lawsuit that demands for an injunctive order for actions that damage the rock reefs, etc. (finalized victory of the central government).
April 2019	• Regarding the request for a review from the Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism decided to revoke the withdrawal of the landfill permit by the Vice Governor of Okinawa Prefecture. • Joint statement of "2+2" → The four Ministers reconfirmed that construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture withdrew its claim regarding the lawsuit to revoke the determination to suspend execution of the withdrawal of the landfill permit. • Dissatisfied with the determination by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture requested for a • review with the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council.
June 2019	• Meeting between then Defense Minister Iwaya and then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan → The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will cooperate closely to make steady progress in implementing the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces. • The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council dismissed the request for review with the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture over the decision made by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism.
July 2019	• The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture was dissatisfied with the dismissal by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council and filed a lawsuit with the Fukuoka High Court, Naha Branch to revoke the central government's determination.
August 2019	• Dissatisfied with the determination by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit (appeal lawsuit) to revoke the determination. • Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
October 2019	• The Fukuoka High Court, Naha Branch dismissed the lawsuit to revoke the central government's determination. • The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a petition for acceptance of final appeal with the Supreme Court regarding the lawsuit to revoke the central government's determination.
November 2019	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
January 2020	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
March 2020	• The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture in the lawsuit to revoke the central government's determination (finalized victory of the central government).
April 2020	• The Landfill Permit Revision Request due to the additional implementation of soil improvement work was submitted to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture.
August 2020	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
November 2020	• The Naha District Court dismissed Okinawa Prefecture's lawsuit to revoke the determination (appeal lawsuit)
December 2020	• Okinawa Prefecture appealed to the Fukuoka High Court, Naha Branch in the lawsuit to revoke the determination (appeal lawsuit)
March 2021	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma • Joint statement of "2+2" → The four Ministers reconfirmed that construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
April 2021	• Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma • Completed landfill from the sea level to 3.1m (4.0m along some seawalls) in the waters on the Henoko side
August 2021	• The height of the reclaimed land on the Henoko side achieved up to 4.0 m from the sea level
November 2021	• The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture disapproved the Permit Revision Request
December 2021	• The Director General of Okinawa Defense Bureau filed a request for review with the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism seeking revocation of disapproval • The Fukuoka High Court, Naha acceptance Branch dismissed the appeal filed by Okinawa Prefecture in the lawsuit to revoke the determination (appeal lawsuit) • Okinawa Prefecture filed a petition for of final appeal with the Supreme Court in the lawsuit to revoke the determination (appeal lawsuit)
January 2022	• Joint statement of "2+2" → The four Ministers confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko, the only solution to avoid continued use of the Air Station, will be continued.
April 2022	• The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism determined to revoke the disapproval by the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture in response to the request for a review by the Director General of Okinawa Defense Bureau • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued an instruction for correction to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture to approve the • Permit Revision Request.
May 2022	• Dissatisfied with the determination by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture requested for a review with the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council. • Dissatisfied with the instruction for correction by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture requested for a review with the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council. • Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → The two leaders confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution to avoid continued use of the Air Station.
July 2022	• The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council dismissed the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture's request for a review of the determination by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism.

Month & Year	Background
August 2022	• Dissatisfied with the dismissal by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit with the Fukuoka High Court, Naha Branch to revoke the central government's determination. • The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council determined that the instruction for correction by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism was not illegal. • Dissatisfied with the determination by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a • lawsuit with the Fukuoka High Court, Naha Branch to revoke the central government's instruction for correction.
September 2022	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Concurred to make steady progress of the realignment initiatives of the U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko and facility development of Mageshima. • Dissatisfied with the determination by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit (appeal lawsuit) to demand a revocation of the decision.
December 2022	• The Supreme Court rejects Okinawa Prefecture's appeal against ruling (Appeal Suit)
January 2023	• Joint statement of "2+2" → The four Ministers confirmed to continue construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko as the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma.
March 2023	• The Fukuoka High Court, Naha Branch rendered a judgment in a lawsuit to revoke the central government's determination and instruction for correction (dismissed the lawsuit relating to the determination and the request relating to the instruction for correction). • The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a petition for acceptance of final appeal with the Supreme Court in the lawsuit to revoke the central • government's determination and instruction for correction.
June 2023	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → The Ministers welcomed the realignment initiatives of U.S. Forces in Japan so far including the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko and facility development of Mageshima and agreed that Japan and the United States will continue to closely work together to steadily advance them.
August 2023	• The Supreme Court decided not to accept petition for acceptance of the final appeal by the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture regarding the lawsuit to revoke the central government's determination.
September 2023	• The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture in the lawsuit to revoke the central government's determination (finalized victory of the central government). • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued a recommendation for correction to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture to approve the Permit Revision Request • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued an instruction for correction to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture to approve the Permit Revision Request
October 2023	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → The Ministers welcomed the realignment initiatives of U.S. Forces in Japan so far, and agreed that Japan and the United States will continue to closely work together to steadily advance them. • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed a suit (a subrogation lawsuit) in the Fukuoka High Court, Naha Branch seeking a judicial decision to order the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture to grant approval based on the Local Autonomy Law, because the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture had not given approval within the indicated time limit.
December 2023	• The Fukuoka High Court, Naha Branch rendered a judgment in a subrogation lawsuit (Order for correction to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture to approve the Permit Revision Request). • Governor of Okinawa Prefecture filed a petition (an administrative lawsuit) for acceptance of final appeal with the Supreme Court • Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism approves the permit revision request on behalf of the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture.
January 2024	• Started construction on the Oura-wan area.
February 2024	• The Supreme Court decided not to accept petition (an administrative lawsuit) for acceptance of the final appeal by the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture
April 2024	• Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting Joint Statement → The two leaders firmly committed to the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan, including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko as the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma.
May 2024	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue to closely work together to steadily advance the realignment plan of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the return of MCAS Futenma and its relocation to Henoko.
June 2024	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue to closely work together to steadily advance the realignment plan of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the return of MCAS Futenma and its relocation to Henoko.
July 2024	• Japan-U.S. "2+2" Joint Statement → Following the progress of construction in the Oura-wan area, the Ministers underlined the importance of accelerating bilateral work toward the total return of MCAS Futenma as early as practicable including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko as the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma. • Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → The Ministers confirmed to accelerate bilateral work toward the total return of MCAS Futenma as early as practicable, including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko.
September 2024	• The Fukuoka High Court Naha Branch dismissed the appeal filed by Okinawa Prefecture against the revocation of determination (appeal lawsuit). • Okinawa Prefecture filed a petition for acceptance of final appeal with the Supreme Court against the revocation of determination (appeal lawsuit).
October 2024	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → The Ministers confirmed that they will continue to closely work together on the work to realize the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including the total return of MCAS Futenma as early as practicable, in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan.
November 2024	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → The Ministers reaffirmed that they will steadily advance the realignment plan of U.S. Forces in Japan in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan, including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko toward the total return of MCAS Futenma as early as practicable.
December 2024	• Ground reinforcement work in the Oura-wan area was commenced.
January 2025	• The Supreme Court decided not to accept petition for acceptance of the final appeal filed by Okinawa Prefecture against the revocation of determination (appeal lawsuit).

Month & Year	Background
February 2025	• Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting Joint Statement → The two leaders confirmed the vital importance of the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan, including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko and the return of MCAS Futenma.
March 2025	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → The Ministers confirmed the vital importance of the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan and other existing bilateral arrangements, such as the return of MCAS Futenma, including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko as the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma.
October 2025	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → The Ministers reiterated the vital importance of the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan and other existing bilateral arrangements, such as the return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko as the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma.
January 2026	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → The Ministers reiterated the vital importance of the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan in accordance with the Okinawa Consolidation Plan and other existing bilateral arrangements, such as the return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko as the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma.

Reference 34 Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena

	Areas Eligible for Immediate Return Upon Completion of Necessary Procedures	
	West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	Returned (March 31, 2015)
	The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	Returned (August 31, 2013)
	Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	Returned (March 31, 2019)
	A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	Returned (March 31, 2020)[1]
	Areas Eligible for Return Once the Replacement Facilities in Okinawa are Provided	
	Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester)	JFY2025 or later
	Lower Plaza Housing area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2024 or later
	A part of Kishaba Housing area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2024 or later
	The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2024 or later[2, 3]
	Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area	JFY2025 or later
	Naha Port	JFY2028 or later
	Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1	JFY2022 or later
	Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma	JFY2022 or later
	Areas Eligible for Return as USMC Forces Relocate from Okinawa to Locations Outside of Japan	
	Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	—
	The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	JFY2024 or later

Notes: 1. Shirahi River area was returned at the same timing.
2. Part of the logistics support units in this area are scheduled to be relocated to locations outside of Japan. Efforts will be made to minimize the impact of the relocation on the approximate timing for return. However, the relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation.
3. Area south of the Industrial Corridor (Camp Foster) can be returned at the same timing.

Reference 35 Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces

June 6, 2011	The U.S. Department of Defense announced that the CH-46 deployed at MCAS Futenma would be replaced with the MV-22 Osprey in the latter half of 2012.
June 13, 2012-	Provided an explanation on the results of the Environment Review, MV-22 pamphlet, etc., to Okinawa Prefecture, relevant local governments and other organizations.
June 29-	Host Nation Notification and U.S. Department of Defense press release regarding the deployment of the MV-22 Osprey to Okinawa • Deployed a squadron in October 2012 (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in late July). • Deployed an additional squadron in summer 2013. • The results of the investigation of the crash accident were provided to the Government of Japan; the MV-22 Osprey did not conduct any flights in Japan until the safety of flight operations was reconfirmed.
July 23	Off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.
September 19	Released the report "MV-22 Osprey deployment in Okinawa" (that safety was confirmed by the government). The Joint Committee agreed on matters related to the Osprey's operations.
October 6	Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.
January 28, 2013	The Okinawa Citizens' Council, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, and other organizations sent a statement to the Prime Minister.
April 30	The MOD provided explanation to the relevant local governments and other organizations regarding the U.S. explanation on the deployment of the MV-22 squadron (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in summer 2013).
July 30	The second squadron off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.
September 25	Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.
May 11, 2015	The U.S. Department of Defense announced that it would deploy the CV-22 Osprey at Yokota Air Base starting in the latter half of 2017.
December 13, 2016	Emergency landing of an MV-22 Osprey off the coast of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture.
February 1, 2017	Planned maintenance interval of the MV-22 Osprey was commenced at Camp Kisarazu.
March 14	Informed relevant local governments and other organizations that the U.S. Department of Defense announced the postponement of the arrival of the CV-22 Osprey that were to be deployed at Yokota Air Base.
August 5	Accident of a MV-22 attached to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Force (Futenma) off the east coast of Australia.
April 3, 2018	U.S. Forces in Japan announced that five CV-22 Osprey would be deployed to Japan around summer of 2018, and that a total of ten Osprey would be deployed gradually over the next few years.
August 22, 2018	Informed relevant local governments and other organizations that the U.S. Forces in Japan announced that five CV-22 Osprey would be deployed at Yokota Air Base on October 1, 2018, and that a total of ten CV-22 would be deployed at Yokota Air Base gradually by around 2024.
October 1, 2018	Five CV-22 Ospreys were deployed at Yokota Air Base.
July 6, 2021	Sixth CV-22 Osprey was deployed at Yokota Air Base.
November 29, 2023	One CV-22 Osprey crashed off the coast of Yakushima Island, eight crew members died.
November 14, 2024-	CMV-22 Ospreys were deployed at MCAS Iwakuni.
June 7, 2025	One CV-22 Osprey arrived at Yokota Air Base as a replacement for the aircraft lost off the coast of Yakushima Island in November 2023

Reference 36 Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces, etc. in Japan

1. Purpose

It is critically important to realize the realignment of the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ), in order to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in Japan and to mitigate the impact of defense facilities on surrounding residents by all of Japan. In this light, the purpose of this Act is to contribute to the smooth implementation of USFJ realignment by taking the following special measures, etc.

2. Special Measures, etc. (Note 1)

(1) Realignment grants for municipalities incurring greater impacts

- In connection with the realignment of USFJ, the national government designates defense facilities for which it is deemed that consideration must be paid to their increasing impacts on the stability of the lives of the residents in the surrounding areas. Realignment grants are awarded to municipalities in the area of such defense facilities, in order to cover the expenses of the projects that contribute to making the residents' lives more convenient and to developing industries, if the grants are considered necessary to help carry out the USFJ realignment smoothly and infallibly.
- The national government takes into consideration the extent that the stability of the lives of the residents is impacted, and awards the realignment grants based on both the progress of the measures for achieving realignment and the length of time that has passed since the measures were first implemented.

(2) Public project special provisions for areas incurring particularly large impacts

- Designate areas that include municipalities incurring particularly large impacts as Special Area for Development concerning Realignment, and promote the development of these areas by establishing special provisions for cost sharing by local governments when developing roads, ports, and other infrastructure.
- Set up at the MOD the Council for Local Development concerning Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces comprised of relevant ministers, and at the Council's meetings discuss matters such as the designation of the Special Area for Development concerning Realignment and the establishment of the development plan for the area (Development Plan for Special Area for Development concerning Realignment).

(3) Measures for USFJ local employees

- Implement skills education and training that contribute to the continuous employment of USFJ local employees.

3. Expiration of the Law (Note 2)

This Act expires on March 31, 2027; provided, however, that the realignment grants will be awarded until March 31, 2032 at the latest based on the situation of the realignment.

Notes: 1. At the time of its enactment, this Act provided for the special measures, etc., under this Act in 2. (1) to (3) above, as well as for special provisions for the operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation for the implementation of investments and loans for family housing and infrastructure development related to USFJ relocation to the United States of America (Guam) for the promotion of said relocation.
However, the said provision was abolished pursuant to the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017, after the 2+2 Joint Statement of April 2012 limited Japan's financial commitment for the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam to direct cash contribution and it was confirmed that other forms of financial assistance (investments and loans) would not be utilized.
2. At the time of its enactment this Act was set to expire on March 31, 2017. However, the term of validity has been extended by 10 years to March 31, 2027 pursuant to the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017.

Reference 37 Outline of 23 Issues

(As of April 1, 2022)

Facility	Scope	Area (ha)	Classification				Remarks
			SCC	Gun-Ten-Kyo	Governor	U.S. Forces	
<Already returned>							
Army POL Depots	1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City	4			◎		Returned on December 31, 1990
Camp Zukeran	2. Manhole, etc., for underground communication system (Noborikawa)	0.1		◎			Returned on September 30, 1991
	20. Awase Meadows Golf Course	47			◎		Returned on July 31, 2010
Northern Training Area	3. Kunigami-son (Mt. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) district	480		◎			Returned on March 31, 1993
	4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago-Kunigami line	(256)	◎				
Camp Schwab	5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Henoko)	1	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Makiminato Service Area Annex	6. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on March 31, 1993
Naha Cold Storage	7. In whole	Building	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Sunabe Warehouse	8. In whole	0.3				◎	Returned on June 30, 1993
Yaedake Communication Site	9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Motobu-cho)	19	◎				Returned on September 30, 1994
Onna Communication Site	10. In whole	62			◎		Returned on November 30, 1995
	11. Eastern part	(26)	◎				
Kadena Air Base	12. A part of southern area (Tobaru)	2		◎			Returned on January 31, 1996
Chibana Site	13. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on December 31, 1996
Camp Hansen	14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin)	3		◎			Returned on December 31, 1996
	23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City)	162	◎				Returned on June 30, 2014 (55ha) Returned on June 30, 2017 (107ha)
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	(22. Eastern Side of National Highway 58 (Kino–Hija), Southwestern corner (Yamanaka Area))	74	○				Returned on March 25, 1999
	15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58)	3	○	◎			Returned on March 25, 1999
	22. Former Higashi-Onna Ammunition Storage Area	98	◎				Returned on March 31, 2005 (9ha) Returned on October 31, 2006 (58ha) Returned on March 31, 2022 (31ha)
Torii Communication Station	16. Kadena bypass	4		◎			Returned on March 31, 1999
Deputy Division Engineer Office	17. In whole	4	◎				Returned on September 30, 2002
Camp Kuwae	(19. Southern side of the eastern part)	2	○	○			Returned on December 31, 1994
	18. Northern part (Ihei)	38		◎			Returned on March 31, 2003
	(18. Along Route 58)	(5)	○				
MCAS Futenma	21. Lands along eastern side (Nakabaru - Ginowan)	4		◎			Returned on July 31, 2017
	17 facilities, 22 issues	1008	8	8	3	3	
<Not yet returned after release agreement was concluded>							
Camp Kuwae	19. Northern side of eastern part (Kuwae)	0.5	◎				Change agreed on December 21, 2001
	1 facility, 1 issue	0.5	1	0	0	0	
Total	17 facilities, 23 issues	1009	9	8	3	3	

Notes: 1. For the "Area" column, the value within parentheses is a portion of the value indicated immediately above.
2. A single circle in the "Classification" column expediently indicates that the scope of the case overlaps that of another issue.
3. The numbers in the "Scope" column were assigned only for the purpose of classifying 23 issues.
4. "SCC" in the "Classification" column indicates issues for which release was not achieved by June 1990 with respect to realignment, consolidation, and reduction plans of facilities and areas in Okinawa which were approved by the 15th and 16th Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee meetings. "Gun-Ten-Kyo" indicates issues for which release was requested by the Council for promotion of dezoning and utilization of military land and consultation of problems accompanying bases in Okinawa Prefecture chaired by Okinawa's governor. "Governor" indicates issues for which then-Governor Nishime of Okinawa requested the U.S. government to release facilities and areas. "U.S. Forces" indicates issues in which the U.S. side declared to be returnable with respect to facilities and areas in Okinawa.

Reference 38 **The SACO Final Report (tentative translation)**

(December 2, 1996)

The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan–U.S. alliance.

The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce

U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year.

The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996.

The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report.

Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of

U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the

U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.

Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the yearlong SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary. The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee.

The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject.

In accordance with the April 1996 Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa related issues at the same time.

Return Land:

— Futenma Air Station—See attached.

— Northern Training Area

Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/9,852 acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions:

- Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.
- Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area.

— Aha Training Area

Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided.

— Gimbaru Training Area

Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.

— Sobe Communication Site

Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.

— Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield

Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated.

— Camp Kuwae

Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa.

— Senaha Communication Station

Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.

— Makiminato Service Area

Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area.

— Naha Port

Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha/87 acres).

— Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran)
Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.).

Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:

— Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104
Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese FY1997.
— Parachute drop training
Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.
— Conditioning hikes on public roads
Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.

Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:

— Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station
Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented.
— Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft
Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed.
— Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base
Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996.
— Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base
Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998.
— Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station
Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces.

Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:

— Accident reports
Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996. In addition, as part of the U.S. forces' good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces' assets or facilities.
— Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements
Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.
— Visits to U.S. facilities and areas
Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
— Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles
Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on U.S. forces official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all non-tactical U.S. forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997.
— Supplemental automobile insurance
Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997.
— Payment for claims
Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:
- Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under
- U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.
- A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by U.S. authorities.
- In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S. Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount.

— Quarantine procedures
Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
— Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen
Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. forces in the United States.
— Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee

The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station
(an integral part of the SACO Final Report) (tentative translation)

(Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996)

1. Introduction
   a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield's critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF).
   b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary.
   c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.–Japan working group under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of its work.
2. Decisions of the SCC
   a. Pursue construction of an SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station's flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)—capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations.
   b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions.
   c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base.
   d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities, which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available.
   e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.
3. Guiding Principles
   a. Futenma Air Station's critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.
   b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station's operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing U.S. facilities and areas.
   c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other U.S. military facilities and housing.
   d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations.
   e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision.
   f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation.
4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods

   Studies have been conducted by a "Technical Support Group" comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a "Technical Advisory Group" comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible.
   a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules)— supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed.
   b. Pontoon Type—platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater.
   c. Semi-Submersible Type—platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.

5. The Next Steps
   a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection.
   b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility.
   c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility.

Reference 39 Progress of the SACO Final Report

[Return of Lands]

1. Already returned facilities

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Northern Training Area (Return of major portion)	• April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after seven HLZs are relocated, etc. • February 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on changes to the agreement of April 1999 (HLZs: from 7 HLZs to 6 HLZs, reduction of the scale of the site preparation from 75 m to 45 m in diameter) • December 2016: Major portion (approximately 4,000 ha) returned
Aha Training Area (Return of total area)	• December 1998: Total return completed (release of joint use)
Gimbaru Training Area (Return of total area)	• January 2008: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the helicopter landing zone (HLZ) is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen • July 2011: Total return completed (approximately 60 ha)
Sobe Communication Site (Return of total area)	• April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after communication systems including communication facilities such as antennas and others are relocated to Camp Hansen • December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned
Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (Return of total area)	• October 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the Sobe Communication Site is relocated • December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 191 ha) returned
Senaha Communication Station (Return of most areas)	• March 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on return of most land after communication systems including the antenna facilities and others are relocated to Torii Communication Station • September 2006: Partially returned (approximately 61 ha excluding the microwave tower portion) • October 2006: The microwave tower portion consolidated into Torii Communication Station

2. Facilities to be returned as the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
MCAS Futenma (Return of total area → Return of total area)*	* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation • December 2015: Japan and the U.S. came to an agreement on partial early land return to be used for municipal roads.
	[Already returned area] • May 1997: Partially returned (approximately 473 m2) • September 1997: Partially returned (approximately 62 m2) • July 2017: Partially returned (approximately 4 ha) • March 2018: Partially returned (approximately 0.4 ha) • December 2020: Partially returned (approximately 0.1 ha)
Camp Kuwae (Return of most areas → Return of total area)*	* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation • July 2002: Youth Center was furnished • January 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of the Naval Hospital and other related facilities. • December 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the Naval Hospital. • February 2008: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of accessory facility (helipad) • December 2008: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of accessory facility (utility). • May 2009: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facility (barracks for non-accompanied enlisted sailors) • October 2009: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facility (water tank 1) • October 2010: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facility (water tank 2) • September 2011: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities (barracks for non-accompanied officers, blood storage facility, etc.) • February 2013: 13 buildings including the Naval Hospital were furnished • March 2013: The Naval Hospital opened • December 2013: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (preventive medical center, alcohol rehabilitation center, etc.) • December 2015: Related facilities of the Naval Hospital (BOQ and blood storage facility, etc.) were furnished
	[Already returned Area] • March 2003: Northern side returned (approximately 38 ha)
Makiminato Service Area (Return of partial area → Return of total area)*	* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation • December 2015: the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on partial land return for the expansion of national highway • March 2018: Partially returned (approximately 3ha)
	[Already returned area] • May 1997: Partially returned (approximately 38 m2) • September 2001: Partially returned (approximately 1 ha) • August 2013: Return of north access road (approximately 1 ha) • March 2018: Partially returned (approximately 3 ha) • March 2019: Return of area near Gate 5 (approximately 2 ha) • May 2021: Partially returned (approximately 0.2 ha)
Naha Port (Return of total area → Return of total area)*	* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
	[Already returned area] June 2000: Partially returned (approximately 1 ha)

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Housing Consolidation Camp Zukeran (Return of partial area → Return of partial area)*	(Phase I: Golf Range Area) • April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • July 2002: Two high rises were furnished • July 2006: An underpass was furnished (Phase II: Sada Area) • February 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • September 2005: Two high rises, 38 townhouses, and others were furnished (Phase III: Eastern Chatan Area) • March 2004: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • June 2008: 35 townhouses and others were furnished (Phase IV: Futenma and Upper Plaza Area) • March 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • March 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on conducting the construction work (Phase IV Futenma and Upper Plaza Area) • February 2010: 24 townhouses constructed in Upper Plaza Area were furnished • April 2020: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on conducting the construction work (Phase IV Futenma) * May 2006: Camp Zukeran was described as partial return in the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa • April 2013: It was written in the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa that the Okinawa Housing Consolidation (OHC) plan under the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was reevaluated, and that based on the family housing requirement after the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa, approximately 910 family housing units (including the replacement of units to be demolished at the construction areas) will be constructed in addition to the 56 units which have already been agreed to
	[Already returned area] • March 1997: Partially returned (approximately 371 m2) • May 1997: Partially returned (approximately 598 m2) • June 1997: Partially returned (approximately 353 m2) • December 1997: Partially returned (approximately 0.3 ha) • March 1998: Partially returned (approximately 2 ha) • February 2000: Partially returned (approximately 3 ha) • December 2006: Partially returned (approximately 145 m2) • March 2015: Return of West Futenma Housing Area (approximately 51 ha) • March 2020: Partial return of the Facilities and Engineering Compound (approximately 11 ha)

[Adjustment in training or operation]

Point	State of Progress
Relocation of Artillery Live-fire Training over Highway 104	• Relocated to five maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan in FY1997
Parachute Drop Training	• Relocation training conducted at Iejima Auxiliary Airfield since July 2000

[Implementation of initiatives to reduce noise]

1. Initiatives already taken

Point	State of Progress
Relocation of the U.S. Navy Ramp at Kadena Air Base	• June 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of rinse facility • September 2008: Rinse Facility was furnished • February 2009: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation of Navy Ramp • October 2010: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of area forming and the construction of ramp and taxiway. • April 2011: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of the construction of parking and utility. • February 2013: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of the construction of type II maintenance hangar. • July 2013: Ramp, etc., were furnished. • July 2014: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of construction of hangars, etc. • December 2016: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the furnishing of maintenance hangar, etc. • January 2017: Relocation completed • February 2020: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the implementation of demolition of part of the existing facilities • March 2021: Completed demolition of part of the existing facilities
Installation of Noise Reduction Baffles at Kadena Air Base	• July 2000: Furnished

2. Ongoing initiatives as the U.S. Forces realignment

Point	State of Progress
Transfer of KC-130 aircraft*	* May 2006: United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation stated that the KC-130 squadron would be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and that the aircraft would regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam.

Reference 40 Consultative Bodies on the Mitigation of Impact of Bases on Okinawa

Name (year)	Member	Purpose
Okinawa Policy Council (1996)	Entire cabinet excluding Prime Minister and Governor of Okinawa	Consultation concerning issues pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa and basic policies relating to Okinawa
Subcommittee of the Okinawa Policy Council (2013)	Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of State for Okinawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Defense Minister, and Governor of Okinawa	Responses to various issues relating to the mitigation of the impact of bases on Okinawa and measures to revitalize the economy of Okinawa Prefecture
Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa (2014)	Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of State for Okinawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Defense Minister, Governor of Okinawa, and Mayor of Ginowan	Consultation concerning the mitigation of the impact of Futenma Air Station
Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa (2014)	State Defense Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, Administrative Vice-Defense Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, Director General of Minister's Secretariat, Director General of Bureau of Defense Policy, Director General of Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning, Director General of Bureau of Policies for Regional Society, Chief of Staff of Joint Staff, Chief of Staff of GSDF, Chief of Staff of MSDF, and Chief of Staff of ASDF	Deliberation on basic policies regarding the early return of USFJ facilities and areas, and regarding the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa with the aim of smooth and effective implementation of measures based on those policies
Consultation between the Central Government and Okinawa Prefecture (2016)	Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of State for Okinawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Defense Minister, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, Governor of Okinawa, and Deputy Governor of Okinawa	Consultation concerning the mitigation of the impact of bases on Okinawa and measures to revitalize the economy of Okinawa Prefecture

Reference 41 Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements

(As of March 31, 2026)

	Security and Defense Cooperation Documents	Status of Forces Agreement/ Reciprocal Access Agreement	Agreements concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology	Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA)	General Security of (Military) Information Agreement
United States	Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Signed in September 1951 and entered into force in April 1952 Signed in January 1960 and entered into force in June 1960 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Set forth in November 1978 Set forth in September 1997 Set forth in April 2015 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996	Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement Signed in January 1960 and entered into force in June 1960 Supplementary Agreement on the Environment Signed and entered into force in September 2015 Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component Signed and entered into force in January 2017	Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Signed in March 1954 and entered into force in May 1954 Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America (exchange of notes) Concluded in November 1983 Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America (exchange of notes) Concluded in June 2006	Signed in April 1996 and entered into force in October 1996 Signed in April 1998 and revised in September 1999 Signed in February 2004 and revised in July 2004 Signed in September 2016 and entered into force in April 2017	Signed and entered into force in August 2007
Australia	Signed memorandum in September 2003 Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security in March 2007 Revised memorandum in December 2008 New Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security in October 2022	Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement Signed in January 2022 and entered into force in August 2023	Signed in July 2014 and entered into force in December 2014	Signed in May 2010 and entered into force in January 2013 Signed in January 2017 and entered into force in September 2017	Signed in May 2012 and entered into force in March 2013
India	Japan-India Joint Declaration on Security in October 2008 Signed memorandum in September 2014	—	Signed in December 2015 and entered into force in March 2016	Signed in September 2020 and entered into force in July 2021	Signed and entered into force in December 2015
United Kingdom	Signed memorandum in January 2004 Revised memorandum in June 2012 Japan-U.K Joint Declaration on Security in August 2017	Japan-U.K. Reciprocal Access Agreement Signed in January 2023 and entered into force in October 2023	Signed and entered into force in July 2013	Signed in January 2017 and entered into force in August 2017	Signed in July 2013 and entered into force in January 2014 Signed amending protocol in October 2014 Entered into force amending protocol in April 2015
France	Signed statement of intent in July 2014	Japan-France Reciprocal Access Agreement Agreed to launch negotiations at the Japan-France Summit Working Lunch in May 2024	Signed in March 2015 and entered into force in December 2016	Signed in July 2018 and entered into force in June 2019	Signed and entered into force in October 2011
Germany	—	—	Signed and entered into force in July 2017	Signed in January 2024 and entered into force in July 2024	Signed and entered into force in March 2021
Italy	Signed statement of intent in June 2012 Signed memorandum in May 2017	—	Signed in May 2017 and entered into force in April 2019	Signed in November 2024 and entered into force in September 2025	Signed in March 2016 and entered into force in June 2016
Netherlands	Signed memorandum in December 2016	—	—	Signed in December 2025	—
NATO	Announced Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) between Japan and NATO in May 2014 Announced Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP) between Japan and NATO in July 2023	—	—	—	Signed and entered into force in June 2010
EU	November 2024 Japan-EU Security and Defence Partnership	—	—	—	At the Japan-EU Summit in July 2025, the commencement of formal negotiations was welcomed
Republic of Korea	Signed statement of intent in April 2009	—	—	Agreed to move forward with opinion exchanges at the Japan-ROK Ministerial Meeting in January 2011	Signed and entered into force in November 2016
Canada	Japan-Canada Joint Declaration on Political, Peace and Security Cooperation in November 2010	—	Concurred to begin formal negotiations at the Japan-Canada Foreign Ministers' Meeting in October 2024 Signed in January 2026	Signed in April 2018 and entered into force in July 2019	Signed in July 2025 and entered into force in January 2026
New Zealand	Signed memorandum in August 2013 Signed statement of intent in June 2023	—	—	Signed in December 2025	Signed in December 2025 and entered into force in March 2026
Sweden	Signed memorandum in December 2013	—	Signed and entered into force in December 2022	—	—

	Security and Defense Cooperation Documents	Status of Forces Agreement/ Reciprocal Access Agreement	Agreements concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology	Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA)	General Security of (Military) Information Agreement
Finland	Signed memorandum in February 2019	—	Concurred to begin formal negotiations at the Japan-Finland Summit Meeting in December 2024	—	—
Ukraine	Signed memorandum in October 2018	—	—	—	Signed in November 2024 and entered into force in June 2025
Indonesia	Signed memorandum in March 2015	—	Signed and entered into force in March 2021	—	—
Singapore	Signed memorandum in December 2009 Revised memorandum in June 2022	—	Signed and entered into force in June 2023	—	—
Thailand	Signed memorandum in November 2019	—	Signed and entered into force in May 2022	—	—
The Philippines	Signed statement of intent in July 2012 Signed memorandum in January 2015	Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement Signed in July 2024 and entered into force in September 2025	Signed in February 2016 and entered into force in April 2016	Signed in January 2026	—
Viet Nam	Signed memorandum in October 2011 (defense cooperation and exchanges) Signed memorandum in September 2015 (PKO field) Signed Japan-Viet Nam Joint Vision Statement in April 2018 Signed memorandum in May 2019 (cooperation between defense and industry) Signed memorandum in November 2021 (cyber field) Signed memorandum in November 2021 (military medicine) Signed memorandum (rescue and relief sector) in December 2025 Signed memorandum (education and training sector) in December 2025	—	Signed and entered into force in September 2021	—	—
Malaysia	Signed memorandum in September 2018	—	Signed and entered into force in April 2018	—	—
Mongolia	Signed memorandum in January 2012 Revised memorandum in February 2024	—	Signed in December 2024 and entered into force in January 2025	—	—
Bangladesh	Signed memorandum in April 2023	—	Signed and entered into force in February 2026	—	—
UAE	Signed memorandum in May 2018	—	Signed in May 2023 and entered into force in January 2024	—	—
Djibouti	Concluded E/N in April 2009	—	—	—	—

(Note) Japan has also signed memorandums with Bahrain, Cambodia, Spain, Qatar, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Colombia, Kazakhstan, Czech, Oman, Israel, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Poland, Brunei, Lithuania, Peru, Laos, Brazil, Chile, and Russia, and has signed statements of intent with Türkiye and Kenya

Reference 42 International Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2025)

(Number of students)

	United States	Australia	India	Indonesia	Viet Nam	Singapore	The Philippines	Thailand	Cambodia	Malaysia	Republic of Korea	Mongolia	France	Germany	Timor-Leste	Fiji	Tonga	Qatar	Kosovo	Colombia	Saudi Arabia	Zambia	Togo	Türkiye	Papua New Guinea	Bangladesh	Jordan	Sub total
National Institute for Defense Studies	1	2	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8
National Defense Academy	10	—	—	4	11	1	2	4	4	1	3	2	11	—	1	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	58
Ground Self-Defense Force (Training Evaluation Research and Development Command, etc.)	4	1	1	2	—	1	—	2	1	—	4	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	17
Maritime Self- Defense Force (Command and Staff College, etc.)	1	3	2	—	1	—	—	2	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10
Air Self-Defense Force (Command and Staff College, etc.)	—	1	1	2	1	—	1	—	—	—	1	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10
Joint Staff College	—	3	1	1	1	3	—	2	—	1	—	—	—	2	—	1	—	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	27
Total	16	10	6	10	14	5	3	10	5	2	10	7	11	3	1	3	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	130

Reference 43 **Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (FY2022 and Beyond)**

(Apr. 1, 2022 - Mar. 31, 2026)

High-level talks, etc.	Apr. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and the Australian Chief of the Defence Force (New Delhi, India (Raisina Dialogue))
	Apr. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force (U.S.)
	Apr. 2022	Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Navy
	May 2022	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Navy (Sydney (Indo Pacific Sea Power Conference))
	May 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (Brussels, Belgium, NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting)
	Jun. 2022	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jun. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jun. 2022	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Jun. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force (VTC)
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS; Australian Chief of the Defence Force; and Australian Chief of Joint Operations (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Jul. 2022	Video Teleconference between the GSDF Chief of Staff and the Australian Chief of Army
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force (U.K)
	Aug. 2022	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Aug. 2022	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Navy
	Sep. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force (Australia)
	Oct. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force (Tokyo)
	Oct. 2022	☆Signing of New Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Navy (Tokyo (WPNS))
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Navy (Tokyo (Malabar KLE))
	Dec. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of Joint Operations (Tokyo)
	Dec. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (Tokyo)
	Dec. 2022	Tenth Japan-Australia Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting ("2+2") Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Feb. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force (Australia)
	Feb. 2023	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Army
	Mar. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (New Delhi, India (Raisina Dialogue))
	Mar. 2023	Japan-Australia Vice Ministers' Meeting (Canberra)
	Mar. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (Tokyo)
	Mar. 2023	Official visit by MSDF Chief of Staff
	April 2023	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force
	May 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (California, U.S. (Indo-Pacific Security Conference))
	May 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Army (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
	Jun. 2023	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (20th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (Australia (Talisman Sabre 2023 observation))
	Jul. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (Australia (Talisman Sabre 2023 observation))
	Aug. 2023	☆Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement entered into force
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (Fiji (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, GSDF and Australian Chief of Army (Perth, Australia (CAS))
	Sep. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Navy (Hawaii, U.S. (Malabar KLE))
	Sep. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, GSDF and Australian Chief of Army (New Delhi, India (IPACC))
	Oct. 2023	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Oct. 2023	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force
	Nov. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Navy (Sydney (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	Nov. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force (Hawaii, U.S. (The Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium))
	Dec. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, GSDF and Australian Chief of Army (Tokyo (LFS))
	Mar. 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, GSDF and Australian Chief of Army (California, U.S.)
	Mar. 2024	Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Navy
	May 2024	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hawaii, U.S.)
	May 2024	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Army (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
	May 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (Belgium (Multilateral Strategic Chiefs of Defense Consultation))
	Jun. 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (Canberra, Australia)
	Jun. 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of Joint Operations (Canberra, Australia)
	Jul. 2024	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Navy (Tokyo)
	Jul. 2024	Visit to Australia by MSDF Chief of Staff (Indo-Pacific Sea Power Conference)
	Jul. 2024	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force (Australia (Pitch Black 24))

High-level talks, etc.	Aug. 2024	Japan-Australia Vice Ministers' Meeting (Sydney, Australia)
	Aug. 2024	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force
	Sep. 2024	11th Japan-Australia Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting ("2+2"), Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Melbourne, Australia)
	Sep. 2024	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of Joint Operations
	Sep. 2024	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force
	Sep. 2024	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Army (Melbourne, Australia (Chief of Army Symposium))
	Oct. 2024	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Nov. 2024	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Darwin, Australia)
	Oct. 2024	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force (Tokyo (AFFJ))
	Dec. 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, GSDF and Australian Chief of Army (Tokyo (LFS))
	Jan. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (Belgium (NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session))
	Feb. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (Tokyo, official invitation)
	Feb. 2025	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force
	Mar. 2025	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force (Melbourne, Australia (Avalon Airshow))
	May 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (Singapore (22nd Shangri-La Dialogue))
	May 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of Army (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
	Jun. 2025	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (22nd Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2025	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force
	Sep. 2025	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Navy (Tokyo)
	Sep. 2025	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Japan)
	Sep. 2025	Video teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force
	Sep. 2025	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Army (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (IPACC))
	Oct. 2025	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force (Seoul ADEX)
	Nov. 2025	Visit to Japan by the Deputy Premier of Tasmania, Australia
	Nov. 2025	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (7th ADMM-Plus))
	Nov. 2025	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Navy (Sydney)
	Nov. 2025	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Air Force (Australian official invitation)
	Dec. 2025	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Japan)
	Dec. 2025	Visit to Japan by the Secretary of the Department of Defence of Australia
	Dec. 2025	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Army (Tokyo (LFS/LFD))
	Jan. 2026	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (Belgium (NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session))
	Feb. 2026	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Germany (Munich Security Conference))
	Mar. 2026	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Video Conference
	Mar. 2026	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Australian Chief of Navy (Sydney (International Fleet Review hosted by the Royal Australian Navy))
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jul. 2022	Japan-Australia Military to Military Dialogue (MM) (Canberra)
	Oct. 2024	Japan-Australia Military to Military Dialogue (MM) (Tokyo)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Apr. 2022	Japan-Australia aerial refueling compatibility test (ASDF F-2A/B, Royal Australian Air Force KC-30A)
	Aug. 2022	Unit-to-unit exchanges coinciding with a visit by the Ground Component Command Headquarters
	Jan. 2023	Participation by the head of the Australian Defence Force Parachuting School in New Year's Jump 2023 by 1st Airborne Brigade
	Apr. 2023	Japan-Australia aerial refueling compatibility test (ASDF F-15J/DJ, Royal Australian Air Force KC-30A)
	Aug. 2023	Unit-to-unit exchange between the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade and the 1st Brigade of the Australian Army (Darwin)
	Aug.-Sep. 2023	F-35A mobile deployment training to the U.S. and Australia ASDF F-35A × 4, KC-767 × 2, C-130H × 1, C-2 × 2
	Sep. 2023	Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral ISR Exchange
	Jan. 2025	Participation in New Year Jump in Indo-Pacific
	Oct. 2025	Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral ISR Exchange
	Jan. 2026	Participation in New Year's Jump
	Feb. 2026	Exchanges between the Space Forces of Japan and Australia (Canberra)
Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral cooperation (See reference 61 for multilateral exercises)	Feb. 2022	Trilateral Navy-to-Navy Conversation between Japan, Australia, and the United States (Hawaii, U.S.) (Chief of Staff, MSDF)
	Jun. 2022	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Aug. 2022	10th Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior Leaders Seminar (Hawaii, U.S.) (Chief of Staff, GSDF)
	Oct. 2022	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hawaii, U.S.)
	Mar. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS; Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; and Australian Chief of the Defence Force (New Delhi, Raisina Dialogue)

Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral cooperation (See reference 61 for multilateral exercises)	Jun. 2023	Japan-U.S.-Australia Chiefs of Defense Meeting (Singapore (20th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jun. 2023	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (20th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Aug. 2023	Japan-U.S.-Australia Chiefs of Defense Meeting (Fiji (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Aug. 2023	11th Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior Leaders Seminar (Perth, Australia) (Chief of Staff, GSDF)
	May 2024	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hawaii, U.S.)
	Jul. 2024	Japan-U.S.-Australia Meeting (Darwin, Australia (Pitch Black 24)) (Chief of Staff, ASDF)
	Sep. 2024	Japan-U.S.-Australia Chiefs of Defense Meeting (Hawaii, U.S. (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Nov. 2024	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Darwin, Australia)
	May 2025	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (22nd Shangri-La Dialogue))

Ground Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Australia)
Japan-Australia field exercise	Aug. 2022	Australia	Special Operations Group	Special Operations Command
Japan-Australia field exercise	Sep. 2023	Australia	Special Operations Group	Special Operations Command
Japan-Australia field exercise	Oct. 2024	Australia	Special Operations Group	Special Operations Command

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Australia)
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise	Mar. 5, 2022	Bay of Bengal	JS “Yudachi”	Frigate HMAS “Arunta”
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise (Nichi-Gou Trident)	Jun. 24-25, 2023	South China Sea	JS “Izumo,” JS “Samidare”	Frigate HMAS “Anzac,” P-8A
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise (Nichi-Gou Trident)	Nov. 20-21, 2023	From South of Kanto to South of Shikoku	JS “Sazanami,” Submarine P-1	HMAS “Brisbane”, Replenishment Vessel HMAS “Stalwart”, P-8A
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise (Nichi-Gou Trident)	Nov. 22, 2023	East China Sea	P-3C	Frigate HMAS “Toowoomba”
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise (Nichi-Gou Trident 24)	May 10, 2024	East China Sea	Replenishment ship JS “Hamana”	HMAS “Hobart”
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise (Nichi-Gou Trident 24-2)	Oct. 2-3, 2024	Andaman Sea	JS “Ariake” (IPD24 2nd Surface Unit)	Frigate HMAS “Stuart”
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise (Nichi-Gou Trident 25)	Jun. 1, 2025	East China Sea	JS “Haguro”	HMAS “Sydney”
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise (Nichi-Gou Trident 25-2)	Sep. 14-16, 2025	Western Pacific	JS “Kaga”	HMAS “Brisbane”
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise (Nichi-Gou Trident 25-3)	Sep. 19, 2025	South of Kanto	JS “Kumano”	HMAS “Brisbane”
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise (Nichi-Gou Trident 25-4)	Nov. 1, 2, 2025	South of Kyushu	Destroyer JS Ariake and submarine P-1	HMAS “Brisbane”
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise	Feb. 22, 2026	East China Sea	Replenishment ship JS “Towada”	Frigate HMAS “Toowoomba”
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise (Nichi-Gou Trident 26)	Mar. 17-21, 2026	East China Sea	Destroyer JS Akizuki, replenishment ship JS Hamana	Frigate HMAS “Toowoomba”

Air Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Australia)
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise	Mar. 28-30, 2022	Airspace above the Pacific Ocean, east of Kanto	Air Tactics Development Wing (Iruma) RC-2 × 1	P-8A × 1
Japan-Australia bilateral exercise (Bushido Guardian 23)	Sep. 4-14, 2023	Komatsu Air Base and its surrounding airspace	3rd Air Wing F-35A fighters × 6 6th Air Wing F-15 fighters × 10 7th Air Wing F-2 fighters × 4 Air Tactics Development Wing F-15 fighters × 6 1st Tactical Airlift Wing KC-767 fighters × 1 Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-35A × 6, KC-30 × 1, C-130J × 1, C-17 × 1

Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Defense Minister, State Defense Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
2. The high-level exchange includes the status of the conclusion of important agreements, etc. relating to defense cooperation between both countries.
3. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.
4. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.
5. For multilateral exercises, refer to Reference 61.

Reference 44 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (FY2022 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2022- Mar. 31, 2026)

[India]

High-level talks, etc.	Apr. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and the Indian Chief of Integrated Defense Staff and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (New Delhi, (Raisina Dialogue))
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and the Indian Chief of Eastern Naval Command (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Sea Power Conference)
	May 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Indian Air Chief (Tokyo)
	Jun. 2022	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Army Chief
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and the Indian Chief of Integrated Defense Staff and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Jul. 2022	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Navy Chief
	Sep. 2022	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting, 2nd Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting ("2+2") (Tokyo)
	Sep. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and India Air Chief (Washington D.C. (International Air Chiefs Conference hosted by the U.S.))
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Navy Chief (Tokyo (WPNS))
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Navy Chief (Tokyo (Malabar KLE))
	Mar. 2023	Video teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Army Chief
	Mar. 2023	Visit to India by Chief of Staff, JS, Meeting with Indian Chief of Defence Staff (New Delhi, Raisina Dialogue)
	Mar. 2023	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Indian Chief of Defence Staff
	Apr. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Indian Chief of Defence Staff (California, U.S. (Indo-Pacific Security Conference))
	May 2023	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Navy Chief (Hawaii, U.S. (Malabar KLE))
	Sep. 2023	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Navy Chief (Hawaii, U.S. (Malabar KLE))
	Sep. 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Army Chief (New Delhi, India (IPACC))
	Nov. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and India Air Chief (Hawaii, U.S. (Pacific Air Chiefs. Symposium)
	Nov. 2023	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and the Indian Chief of Southern Naval Command (Australia (Indo-Pacific Sea Power Conference))
	Dec. 2023	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and the Indian Chief of Southern Naval Command (Australia (Indo-Pacific Sea Power Conference))
	Jul. 2024	Video teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Army Chief
	Aug. 2024	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting, 3rd Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting ("2+2") (New Delhi, India)
	Sep. 2024	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Indian Air Chief (Jodhpur, India (Tarang Shakti 24))
	Oct. 2024	Visit to Japan by Indian Army Chief
	Oct. 2024	Official visit to India by Chief of Staff, JS, Meeting with Indian Chief of Defence Staff
	Nov. 2024	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Vientiane, Laos (11th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus))
	Dec. 2024	VTC participation in LFS by Indian Army Chief
	Mar. 2025	Visit to India by Chief of Staff, JS, Meeting with Indian Chief of Defence Staff (New Delhi, Raisina Dialogue)
	May 2025	Visit to India by Minister Nakatani
	Jul. 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Staff, Indian Navy (Tokyo)
	Jul. 2025	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Army Chief (VTC)
	Aug. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Integrated Defense Staff to the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (CISC), India (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference)
	Oct. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Indian Chief of Defence Staff (VTC)
	Dec. 2025	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Army Chief (Tokyo (LFS/LFD))
	Mar. 2026	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Indian Army Chief (VTC)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Apr. 2023	Japan-India Policy Defence Dialogue (New Delhi)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Mar. 2023	Exchange between helicopter pilots (ASDF)
	Mar. 2023	Exchange between intelligence officials (ASDF)
	Feb. 2024	Conversation between Commander in Chief of the Self-Defense Fleet and Flag Officer Commanding in Chief of the Indian Eastern Naval Command (India (MILAN2024))
	Sep. 2024	Conversation between Commander in Chief of the Self-Defense Fleet and Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet of the Indian Navy (Australia (KAKADU2024))
	Oct. 2024	Conversation between Commander in Chief of the Self-Defense Fleet and Flag Officer Commanding in Chief of the Indian Eastern Naval Command (India (MALABAR2024))

Ground Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (India)
Bilateral Exercise with the Indian Army in Japan (Dharma Guardian 22)	Feb. 17-Mar. 2, 2023	Aibano Maneuver Area, etc.	36th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Division	5th Infantry Battalion
Bilateral Exercise with the Indian Army in India (Dharma Guardian 23)	Feb.25-Mar.9, 2024	Mahajan Field firing Range, Rajasthan, India	34th Infantry Regiment, 1st Division	19th Infantry Battalion, Approx. 40 personnel
Bilateral Exercise with the Indian Army in Japan (Dharma Guardian 24)	Feb. 24-Mar. 7, 2025	East Fuji Maneuver Training and Asaka Maneuver Area	Eastern Army (1st Division), Ground Component Command (Central Readiness Regiment)	5th Battalion, 48th Infantry Brigade
Bilateral Exercise with the Indian Army (Dharma Guardian 25)	Feb. 24-Mar. 8, 2026	Chaubatia Training Area in India	Eastern Army (1st Division)	14th Battalion under the Ladakh Scouts Regiment

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (India)
Japan-India bilateral exercise	May 23, 2022	Arabian Sea	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Shimakaze”	Replenishment vessel INS “Aditya”
Japan-India bilateral exercise	Jul. 23, 2022	Indian Ocean	JS “Samidare”	Patrol vessel INS “Sukanya”
Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX 2022)	Sep. 11-17, 2022	From Andaman Sea to Bay of Bengal	JS “Izumo,” JS “Takanami”	INS “Ranvijay,” Frigate INS “Sahyadri,” Corvettes INS “Kadmatt,” INS “Kavaratti,” Patrol vessel INS “Sukanya,” Fleet tanker INS “Jyoti,” Submarines, P-8I, MiG29K, DORNIER-228, etc.
Japan-India bilateral exercise	Oct. 29-30, 2022	East of Okinawa	Replenishment ship JS “Hamana”	Frigate INS “Shivalik,” Anti- submarine corvette INS “Kamorta”
Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX 2023)	Jul. 5-10, 2023	Port of Visakhapatnam and Bay of Bengal	JS “Samidare”	INS “Delhi,” Anti- submarine corvette INS “Kamorta,” Replenishment vessel INS Shakti, Submarines, P-8I、DORNIER-228
Japan-India bilateral exercise	Nov. 28, 2023	Area surrounding Okinawa	Replenishment ship JS “Towada”	Corvette INS “Kadmatt,”
Japan-India bilateral exercise	Dec. 7, 2023	South of Kyushu	Replenishment ship JS “Towada”	Corvette INS “Kadmatt,”
Japan-India bilateral exercise	Apr. 3, 5, 2024	South of Kanto	P-1	P-8I
Japan-India bilateral exercise	Jun. 8, 2024	Indian Ocean	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Shimakaze”	Replenishment vessel INS “Shakti”
Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX 24)	Jun. 14, 15, 2024	South of Kanto	JS “Yugiri,” submarine	Frigate INS “Shivalik”
Japan-India bilateral exercise	Oct. 7, 2024	Bay of Bengal	JS “Ariake” (IPD24 2nd Surface Unit)	Replenishment vessel INS “Shakti”
Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JAIMEX 25)	Oct. 16-18, 2025	West of Kyushu	Destroyer JS Asahi, Replenishment ship JS Oumi, Submarine	Frigate INS Sahyadri

Air Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (India)
Bilateral fighter exercise with the Indian Air Force (Veer Guardian 23)	Jan. 16-26, 2023	Hyakuri Air Base and its surrounding airspace and Iruma Air Base	7th Air Wing F-2 fighters × 4 Air Tactics Development Wing F-15 fighters × 4 Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	Su-30MKI × 4 C-17 × 2 (only for transportation during deployment and withdrawal) IL-78 × 1 (only for support during deployment and withdrawal) Approx. 150 personnel
Bilateral transport aircraft exercise with the Indian Air Force (Shinyuu Maitri 23)	March 1-2, 2023	Komatsu Air Base and its surrounding airspace	3rd Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command C-2 × 1 Approx. 10 personnel	C-17 × 1 Approx. 10 personnel

Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Defense Minister, State Defense Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
2. The high-level exchange includes the status of the conclusion of important agreements, etc. relating to defense cooperation between both countries.
3. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.
4. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.
5. For multilateral exercises, refer to Reference 61

Reference 45 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries (FY2022 and Beyond)

[United Kingdom] (Apr. 1, 2022- Mar. 31, 2026)

High-level talks, etc.	Apr. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff (New Delhi, India (Raisina Dialogue))
	Apr. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Director of the Space Directorate of the U.K. Ministry of Defence (Tokyo)
	May 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff (Brussels, Belgium (NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting))
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff of the U.K. (Sydney, Australia (IP22))
	Jul. 2022	Visit to the U.K. by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Jul. 2022	Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Oct. 2022	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (VTC)
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff (WPNS)
	Jan. 2023	☆Signing of Japan-U.K. Reciprocal Access Agreement
	Feb. 2023	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and U.K. Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence (London)
	Mar. 2023	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Mar. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Air Staff of the U.K. Royal Air Force
	Mar. 2023	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff
	Mar. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and U.K. Space Command Commander (Tokyo (DSEI Japan))
	Apr. 2023	Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff
	May 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the General Staff of the British Army (Hawaii, U.S.(LANPAC))
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between the Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Strategic Command Commander (Tokyo)
	Aug. 2023	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff
	Aug. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff (London） Meeting between the Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Strategic Command Commander (Tokyo)
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the General Staff of the British Army (New Delhi, India (IPACC))
	Sep. 2023	Conference between Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff (Norway (Multilateral Strategic Dialogue))
	Sep. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Air Staff of the U.K. Royal Air Force (Tokyo)
	Oct. 2023	☆Japan-U.K. Reciprocal Access Agreement entered into force
	Oct. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	Nov. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Air Staff of the U.K. Royal Air Force (Hawaii, U.S. (The Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium))
	Nov. 2023	The 5th Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) (Tokyo)
	Nov. 2023	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Feb. 2024	Visit to Japan by Chief of the General Staff of the British Army
	May 2024	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff (London (First Sea Lord’s Sea Power Conference))
	Jun. 2024	First Japan-U.K. Vice Ministerial Defense Dialogue (London)
	Jul. 2024	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff (Perth, (Indian Ocean Defence & Security Conference (IODS))
	Jul. 2024	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Air Staff of the U.K. Royal Air Force (RIAT24)
	Jul. 2024	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (London)
	Sep. 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff (Hawaii, U.S. (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Oct. 2024	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff (Venice (Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS))
	Oct. 2024	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Air Staff of the U.K. Royal Air Force (Tokyo (AFFJ))
	Jan. 2025	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (London)
	Jan. 2025	Visit to the U.K. by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Jul. 2025	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and U.K. First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff
	Jul. 2025	Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff (RIAT25)
	Aug. 2025	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Japan)
	Aug. 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and U.K. First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy (Tokyo)
	Sep. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Cyber & Specialist Operations Command (CSOC) (Tokyo)
	Sep. 2025	Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff (Friendly visit to North America and Europe (Atlantic Eagles))
	Sep. 2025	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the General Staff of the British Army (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (IPACC))
	Dec. 2025	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Air Staff of the U.K. Royal Air Force (Toulouse, France (Combined Space Operations (CSpO) Initiative Principals’ Board))
	Dec. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff (VTC)
	Dec. 2025	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (VTC)
	Jan. 2026	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff (Brussels, Belgium (NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting))

Regular discussions between defense authorities	Sep. 2020	18th Japan-U.K. Politico-Military Dialogue (VTC)
	Oct. 2020	14th Japan-U.K. Military to Military Dialogue (VTC)
	Oct. 2020	19th Japan-U.K. Politico-Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jan. 2023	Participation in New Year's Jump
	Feb. 2023	Japan-U.K. Unit-to-Unit Exchange (UK) (ASDF)
	Dec. 2023	Japan-U.K. Unit-to-Unit Exchange (Japan) (ASDF)
	Jan. 2024	Participation in New Year's Jump
	Sep. 2024	Japan-U.K. goodwill exercise
	Jan. 2025	Participation in New Year Jump in Indo-Pacific
	Feb. 2025	Japan-U.K. Transport Aircraft Unit-to-Unit Exchange (Japan) (ASDF)
	Sep. 2025	Japan-U.K. Fighter Aircraft Unit-to-Unit Exchange and Transport Aircraft Unit-to-Unit Exchange (Atlantic Eagles) (ASDF)
	Feb. 2026	Japan-U.K. Director-Level Space Staff Consultations (London) (ASDF)

Ground Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.K.)
Field exercise with the U.K. Army (Vigilant Isles 22)	Nov. 22-30, 2022	Soumagahara Maneuver Area, Shirakawanunobikiyama Maneuver Area, Misawa ATG Range, GSDF Fuji School	1st Airborne Brigade	1st Regiment Royal Horse Artillery
Field exercise with the U.K. Army (Vigilant Isles 23)	Nov. 15-26, 2023	Soumagahara Maneuver Area, Sekiyama Maneuver Area, Ojojihara Maneuver Area, Misawa ATG Range,	1st Airborne Brigade, etc.	1st Gurke Rifle Brigade, 16th Air Assault Brigade, etc.
Field exercise with the U.K. Army (Vigilant Isles 24)	Jan. 15-26, 2025	Hijudai Maneuver Area, etc.	12th Brigade, 1st Airborne Brigade, etc.	16th Air Assault Brigade Combat Team
Field exercise with the U.K. Army (Vigilant Isles 25)	Nov. 5-20, 2025	Hokkaido Maneuver Area, etc.	5th Brigade, 1st Airborne Brigade, Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, etc.	16th Air Assault Brigade Combat Team

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.K.)
Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise	Jun. 20, 2022	Atlantic Ocean (English Channel)	Training ships JS "Kashima," "Shimakaze"	Offshore patrol vessel HMS "Mersey," Survey vessel HMS "Enterprise"
Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise	Jun. 26, 2022	Atlantic Ocean (English Channel)	Training ships JS "Kashima," "Shimakaze"	Offshore patrol vessel HMS "Severn"
Japan-U.K. goodwill exercise	Sep. 5, 2024	From the mouth of the Thames River to London	Training ship JS "Kashima"	Offshore patrol vessel HMS "Ranger"
Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise	Sep. 10, 2024	English Channel	Training ships JS "Kashima," JS "Shimakaze"	Offshore patrol vessel HMS "Tyne"
Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise	Oct. 24, 2025	Arabian Sea	Destroyer JS Akebono (IPD25, 4th surface unit)	Replenishment ship Tidespring

Air Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.K.)
Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise	Aug. 7, 2025	Airspace surrounding Kyushu	8th Air Wing (Tsuiki): F-2 fighters × 3 Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Kasuga)	F-35B
Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise	Sep. 6, 2025	Airspace above Sea of Japan	6th Air Wing (Komatsu) F-35A fighters × 4 and F-15 fighters × 8 Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Iruma)	F-35B × 4 Some personnel

[France]

High-level talks, etc.	Apr. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff of French Air and Space Force, and Commander of the French Space Command (Colorado Springs, U.S. (Space Symposium))
	May 2022	Visit to France by Chief of Staff, JS
	Sep. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Air and Space Force (International Air Chiefs Conference held by the U.S.)
	Sep. 2022	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Navy
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Navy (Tokyo(WPNS))
	Jan. 2023	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Army
	Jan. 2023	Visit to France by Administrative Vice-Defense Minister
	Mar. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Navy (Tokyo (DSEI Japan))
	May 2023	Seventh Japan-France Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting ("2+2") (VTC)
	Jun. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Air and Space Force (France (Paris Air Show))
	Jun. 2023	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and French Chief of the Defence Staff
	Jul. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Air and Space Force (Japan)
	Sep. 2023	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Navy (Newport, U.S (International Seapower Symposium))
	Sep. 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Army (New Delhi, India (IPACC))
	Nov. 2023	Visit to France by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Dec. 2023	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Navy
	May 2024	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Navy (London (First Sea Lord's Sea Power Conference))
	Jun. 2024	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (21st Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Sep. 2024	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Army (Melbourne, Australia (CAS)) (GSDF Chief of Staff)
	Oct. 2024	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Navy (Venice (Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS))
	Mar. 2025	Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the French Army
	May 2025	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (22nd Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and French Chief of the Defence Staff (VTC)
	Nov. 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Navy (Philadelphia (events celebrating the 250th anniversary of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps))
	Feb. 2026	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the French Army (VTC)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Nov. 2022	20th Japan-France Military to Military Dialogue (Paris)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jan. 2024	Participation in New Year Jump)
	Jan. 2025	Participation in New Year Jump in Indo-Pacific
	Oct. 2025	Participation of ASDF personnel as observers in the Mhanuu exercise (New Caledonia)
	Dec. 2025	Japan-France Junior Officer Exchange (Japan)
	Jan. 2026	Participation in New Year's Jump

Joint Staff

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (France)
Bilateral exercise with a French carrier strike group	Jan. 28-F eb. 1, 2023	Western Gulf of Aden and northern Arabian Sea	JS "Suzutsuki"	Aircraft carrier FS "Charles de Gaulle," FS "Forbin," FS "Provence," Replenishment vessel FS "Marne"
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise	Jan. 17, 2024	Eastern Gulf of Aden	JS "Akebono"	Replenishment vessel FS "JACQUES CHEVALLIER"

Ground Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.K.)
Field exercise with the French Army at New Caledonia (Brunet-Takamori 2023)	Sep. 10-29, 2023	French New Caledonia	9th Division, 5th Infantry Regiment, etc.	French troops stationed in New Caledonia, New Caledonian Marine Infantry Regiment, etc.
9th Division, 5th Infantry Regiment, etc. Field exercise with the French Army (Brunet-Takamori 24)	Sep. 8-20, 2024	Ojojihara Maneuver Area and Iwatesan Maneuver Area	9th Division, 39th Infantry Regiment, etc.	6th Light Armoured Brigade
FY2025 Field Exercise with the French Army (Brunet-Takamori 25)	Sep. 1-11, 2025	New Caledonian Marine Infantry Regiment Training Area (French New Caledonia)	21st Infantry Regiment/9th Division	New Caledonian Marine Infantry Regiment French troops stationed in New Caledonia

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (France)
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny)	Mar. 17, 2022	East China Sea	JS “Kirisame”	Frigate FS “Vendémiaire”
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny 22-2)	May 25, 2022	Arabian Sea	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Shimakaze”	Multipurpose support vessel FS “Loire”
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny 22-3)	Jun. 14, 2022	Mediterranean Sea (off the coast of Toulon)	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Shimakaze”	Frigate FS “Auvergne”
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny 22-4)	Jun. 27, 2022	Area surrounding Hawaii	JS “Izumo,” JS “Takanami”	Frigate FS “Prairial”
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny 22-5)	Aug. 25-26, 2022	Area surrounding New Caledonia	JS “Kirisame”	Patrol vessel FS “D’Entrecasteaux,” Patrol aircraft “Falcon 200,” etc.
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny 23)	Apr. 20-21, 2023	South of Kanto	JS “Kumano”	Frigate FS “Prairial”
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny 23-2)	May 29, 2023	South of Kanto	JS “Yamagiri”	Frigate FS “Lorraine”
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny 23-3)	June 7, 2023	South of Shikoku	Destroyer JS Kumano, Submarine, 8th Air Wing (F-2 fighters x 4), Western Control and Warning Wing	Frigate FS “Lorraine”
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny 23-4)	Aug. 10, 2023	Area surrounding New Caledonia	Landing Ship Tank “Shimokita”	Patrol vessel FS “Auguste Bénébig”
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny 24)	Jun. 11, 2024	Area surrounding Tahiti	Tank landing ship JS “Kunisaki” (IPD24, 1st surface unit)	Patrol vessel FS “Bougainville”
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny 24-2)	Jun. 21-Jul. 2, 2024	Waters from offshore Guam to offshore Hawaii	JS “Haguro” (IPD24, 2nd surface unit)	Frigate FS “Bretagne”
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny 24-3)	24.7.10-7.11	Offshore Noumea	JS “Noshiro” (IPD24, 3rd surface unit)	Frigate “Vendémiaire”
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny 24-4)	Jul. 17, 2024	Area surrounding Dakar	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Shimakaze”	F-50
Japan-France bilateral exercise	Aug. 14, 2024	South of Kanto	JS “Murasame”	Frigate FS “Bretagne”
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny 24-5)	Nov. 12, 2024	Wakasa Bay	JS “Sendai”	Frigate FS “Prairial”
Japan-France Bilateral Exercise (Oguri-Verny 25)	Mar. 3, 2025	Offshore Darwin	Destroyer JS “Noshiro”	Frigate Vendémiaire

Air Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (German)
Japan-France Bilateral Training	Jul. 26-29, 2023	Nyutabaru Air Base, the surrounding airspace, and the airspace surrounding Kanto ASDF Hyakuri Air Base and the surrounding airspace	5th Air Wing F-15 fighters × 3 8th Air Wing F-2 fighters × 4 1st Tactical Airlift Wing KC-767 fighters × 1 2nd Tactical Airlift Wing C-2 transport aircraft × 1 Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	RAFALE × 2, A330MRTT × 1, A-400M × 1 Approx. 120 personnel
Japan-France bilateral exercise	Jul. 19-20, 2024	ASDF Hyakuri Air Base and the surrounding airspace	7th Air Wing F-2 fighters × 2	Rafale fighter aircraft × 4, A400M transport aircraft × 3, A330MRTT air refueling aircraft × 3, approx. 260 personnel

[Germany]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and German Inspector General of the Bundeswehr (Brussels, Belgium (NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting))
	May 2022	2nd Japan-Germany Defense Vice-Ministerial Strategic Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Jun. 2022	Video Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Air Force
	Jun. 2022	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Navy
	Jul. 2022	Visit to Germany by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Sep. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Air Force
	Nov. 2022	2nd Japan-Germany Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) (Hybrid)
	Feb. 2023	3rd Japan-Germany Defense Vice-Ministerial Strategic Dialogue (Munich (59th Munich Security Conference))
	Mar. 2023	Visit to Germany by Chief of Staff, JS
	Mar. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Air Force
	Mar. 2023	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo (Japan-Germany Inter-Governmental Consultations))
	Jun. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and German Inspector General of the Bundeswehr (Singapore (20th Shangri- La Dialogue))
	Jun. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Air Force (Germany)
	Jul. 2023	Visit to Japan by Inspector of the German Army (Tokyo)
	Dec. 2023	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Army
	Dec. 2023	4th Japan-Germany Defense Vice-Ministerial Strategic Dialogue (Berlin)
	Jan. 2024	☆Signing of Japan-Germany Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (Japan-Germany ACSA)
	Feb. 2024	Visit to Germany by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Jul. 2024	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Air Force (Japan, Japan-Germany Bilateral Exercise)
	Aug. 2024	Visit to Japan by Inspector of the German Navy (Tokyo)
	Sep. 2024	5th Japan-Germany Defense Vice-Ministerial Strategic Dialogue (Japan)
	Sep. 2024	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Army
	Oct. 2024	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Italy (G7 Ministerial Meeting on Defense))
	Oct. 2024	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Navy (Venice (Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS))
	Nov. 2024	Visit to Germany by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Feb. 2025	Meeting between Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense and German Parliamentary State Secretary of Defence (Germany (Munich Security Conference))
	Mar. 2025	Visit to Japan by Inspector of the German Army
	Jul. 2025	Visit to Japan by German Inspector General of the Bundeswehr (Tokyo)
	Jul. 2025	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Air Force (U.K. (RIAT25))
	Jul. 2025	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Army (Sydney, Australia (Talisman Sabre 25))
	Sep. 2025	Visit to Germany by ASDF Chief of Staff (Friendly visit to North America and Europe (Atlantic Eagles))
	Jan. 2026	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and German Inspector General of the Bundeswehr (VTC)
	Feb. 2026	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Inspector of the German Army (VTC)
	Feb. 2026	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich)
	Mar. 2026	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Yokosuka)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Oct. 2023	17th Japan-Germany Military to Military Dialogue (Berlin)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jan. 2024	Participation in New Year Jump
	Jan. 2025	Participation in New Year Jump in Indo-Pacific
	Sep. 2025	Japan-Germany Fighter Aircraft Unit-to-Unit Exchange and Transport Aircraft Unit-to-Unit Exchange (Atlantic Eagles) (ASDF)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (German)
Japan-Germany Goodwill Exercise	Sep. 2, 2024	Waters and airspace from the mouth of the Elbe to the German Bight	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Shimakaze”	NH90 NTH Sea Lion, P-3C, Eurofighter

Air Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (German)
Bilateral exercise with the German Air Force	Sep. 28, 2022	Airspace on the deployment route	7th Air Wing F-2 fighters × 3	Eurofighter 2000 × 3
Japan-Germany Bilateral Exercises “Nippon Skies 24”	Jul. 22-25, 2024	ASDF Chitose Air Base and the surrounding airspace	2nd Air Wing F-15 fighters × 4	Eurofighter fighter aircraft × 3, A400M transport aircraft × 2, A321 transport aircraft × 1, approx. 80 personnel

[Italy]

High-level talks, etc.	Apr. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Italian Air Force Air Education & Training Command (Colorado Springs, U.S. (Space Symposium))
	Apr. 2022	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force (U.K.)
	Oct. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force (Tokyo)
	Oct. 2022	Visit to Italy by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Nov. 2022	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Feb. 2023	Visit to Italy by Administrative Vice-Defense Minister
	Mar. 2023	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Mar. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force (Tokyo (DSEI Japan))
	Mar. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Italian Navy (Tokyo (DSEI Japan))
	Apr. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force (Colorado Springs, U.S. (Space Symposium))
	May 2023	Visit to Italy by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Jun. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Italian Navy (Tokyo)
	Jun. 2023	Visit to Italy by Administrative Vice-Defense Minister
	Nov. 2022	Visit to Italy by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Dec. 2023	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Apr. 2024	VTC between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Italian Army
	Jul. 2024	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (U.K.)
	Aug. 2024	Japan-Italy Defense Ministers Working Lunch (Tokyo)
	Aug. 2024	Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy (Tokyo)
	Oct. 2024	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy (Venice (Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS))
	Oct. 2024	Visit to Italy by ASDF Chief of Staff (Naples)
	Oct. 2024	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force (Tokyo (AFFJ))
	Oct. 2024	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Naples)
	Jan. 2025	Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the Italian Army
	May 2025	Visit to Italy by ASDF Chief of Staff (ASPC25)
	Jul. 2025	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Italian Army (VTC)
	Nov. 2025	Visit to Italy by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Dec. 2025	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff, Italian Air Force (Toulouse, France (Combined Space Operations (CSpO) Initiative))
	Dec. 2025	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (VTC)
	Feb. 2026	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Nov. 2022	7th Japan-Italy Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Jan. 2024	8th Japan-Italy Military to Military Dialogue (Rome)
	Mar. 2024	1st Japan-Italy Politico-Military Dialogue (Rome)
	Feb. 2025	9th Japan-Italy Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jan. 2025	Participation in New Year Jump in Indo-Pacific

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Italy)
Japan-Italy PASSEX	Apr. 8, 2023	Gulf of Aden	JS “Makinami”	Frigate ITS “CARLO BERGAMINI”
Japan-Italy Bilateral Exercise	Jul. 3, 2023	East China Sea	Replenishment ship JS “Hamana”	Frigate ITS “Francesco Morosini”
Japan-Italy Goodwill Exercise	Aug. 13, 2024	Aegean Sea	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Shimakaze”	Frigate ITS “Margottini”
Japan-Italy Bilateral Exercise	Apr. 28, 2025	East China Sea	Replenishment ship JS “Oumi”	Frigate Antonio Marceglia

Air Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Unit	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Italy)
Japan-Italy Bilateral Exercise	Aug. 2-10, 2023	Komatsu Air Base and its surrounding airspace	6th Air Wing F-15 fighters × 4, 1st Tactical Airlift Wing KC-767 fighters × 1, Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	F-35A x 4, KC-767 x 3, CAEW (G550) x 1, G550 x 1, C130J x 1, approx. 160 personnel
Japan-Italy Bilateral Exercise (Rising Sun 24)	Aug. 6-8, 2024	ASDF Misawa Air Base and the surrounding airspace	3rd Air Wing F-35A fighters × 4 1st Tactical Airlift Wing KC-767 fighters × 1	F-35A x 4, Eurofighter x 3, KC-767 x 1, CAEW (G550) x 1, C130J x 1

[The Netherlands]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence of the Netherlands Armed Forces (Brussels, Belgium (NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting))
	Jun. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence of the Netherlands Armed Forces (Singapore (19th Shangri- La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Netherlands Air Force (U.K. (Royal International Air Tattoo))
	Oct. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Netherlands Air Force
	Oct. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Netherlands Navy (Venice, Italy (T-RSS))
	Mar. 2023	Meeting between State Defense Minister and Netherlands Minister of Defence
	Apr. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence of the Netherlands Armed Forces (Tokyo)
	May 2023	Meeting between Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense and Chief of Defence of the Netherlands Armed Forces
	Jun. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence of the Netherlands Armed Forces (Singapore (20th Shangri i- La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Netherlands Navy (Tokyo)
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and the Commander of the Netherlands Army (Australia (CAS))
	Sep. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Netherlands Navy (Newport, U.S. (International Seapower Symposium))
	Nov. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Netherlands Air Force (Hawaii, U.S. (The Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium))
	Jun. 2024	Japan-Netherlands Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (21st Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Aug. 2024	Video teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Royal Netherlands Army
	Oct. 2024	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Netherlands Air Force (Tokyo (AFFJ))
	Oct. 2024	Japan-Netherlands Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brussels (NATO Defense Ministers' Meeting))
	Nov. 2024	Visit to the Netherlands by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Jan. 2025	Visit to the Netherlands by Chief of Staff, JS
	May 2025	Visit to the Netherlands by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	Jun. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence of the Netherlands Armed Forces (Singapore (22nd Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence of the Netherlands Armed Forces (VTC)
	Oct. 2025	Visit to Japan by Commander of the Royal Netherlands Army
	Jan. 2026	Japan-Netherlands Defense Ministerial Meeting (Davos (Davos Conference))
	Mar. 2026	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Netherlands Air and Space Force (Japan, Japan-Netherlands-U.S. Trilateral Exercise)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jan. 2024	Participation in New Year Jump in Indo-Pacific
	Jan. 2025	Participation in New Year Jump in Indo-Pacific

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Netherlands)
Japan-Netherlands Bilateral Exercise	Jun. 9, 2024	West of Kyushu	JS "Akebono"	Frigate HNLMS "Tromp"

[Spain]

High-level talks, etc.	Jan. 2023	Visit to Spain by State Defense Minister
	Sep. 2023	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Spanish Navy （Newport, U.S. (International Seapower Symposium))
	Oct. 2024	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Spanish Navy (Venice (Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS))
	Sep. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Spanish Chief of the Defence Staff (Spain)
	Nov. 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Admiral Chief of Staff of the Navy, Spain (Sydney (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Apr. 2023	4th Japan-Spain Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Oct. 2024	5th Japan-Spain Military to Military Dialogue (Madrid)
	Nov. 2025	6th Japan-Spain Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)

Joint Staff

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Spain)
Counter-piracy exercise with the Spanish Navy	Oct. 25, 2022	Gulf of Aden	JS "Harusame"	Frigate SPS "Numancia"

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Spain)
Japan-Spain Bilateral exercise	Jun. 16, 2022	Atlantic Ocean (west of the Strait of Gibraltar)	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Shimakaze”	Frigates SPS “Victoria,” SPS “Almirante Juan de Borbón”
Japan-Spain Goodwill exercise	Aug. 23-24, 2024	Mediterranean Sea, Atlantic Ocean	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Shimakaze”	Patrol vessel SPS “Atalaya,” Aegis frigate SPS “Cristobal Colon”
July 2025 Japan-Spain Bilateral Exercise	Jul. 31-Aug.4, 2025	From south of Shikoku to east of the Philippines	Destroyer JS Kaga, Destroyer JS Teruzuki	Frigate Méndez Núñez

[NATO]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	NATO visit by Chief of Staff, JS
	Jun. 2022	Visit to Japan by Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
	Oct. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Allied Joint Force Command Naples (Naples, Italy)
	Mar. 2023	Meeting between State Defense Minister and NATO Deputy Secretary General (Brussels, Belgium (1st EU Schuman Security and Defence Forum))
	Mar. 2023	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
	Apr. 2023	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
	Jun. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (Singapore (20th Shangri- La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2023	☆Agreement on the NATO-Japan Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP)
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (Fiji (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Nov. 2023	Participation in NATO Partner Air Chiefs’ Conference by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Jan. 2024	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
	Feb. 2024	Meeting between Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense and NATO Deputy Secretary General (Munich, Germany)
	Feb. 2024	Visit to Japan by NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Tokyo)
	Sep. 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (Hawaii (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Oct. 2024	Attendance at NATO Defense Ministers’ Meeting
	Oct. 2024	Meeting between Minister Nakatani and Secretary General Rutte
	Jan. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (Belgium (NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session))
	Jan. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) (Belgium (NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session))
	Feb. 2025	Meeting between Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense and NATO Deputy Secretary General (Munich)
	Apr. 2025	Meeting between Minister Nakatani and Secretary General Rutte
	Sep. 2025	Visit to Japan by Chair of Military Committee of NATO
	Jan. 2026	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) (Belgium (NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session))
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Dec. 2022	17th Japan-NATO High-Level Consultations (Tokyo)
	Jan. 2025	18th Japan-NATO High-Level Consultations (Tokyo)

Joint Staff

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units (Japan)	Participating Units (NATO)
NATO Cyber Defense Exercise (Cyber Coalition 2022)	Nov.28-Dec. 2, 2022	Estonia, Japan	Joint Staff, etc.	NATO member countries/partner countries, EU, etc.
NATO CCDCOE Cyber Defense Exercise (Locked Shields 2022)	Apr. 19-22, 2022	Estonia, Japan	Internal Bureau, Joint Staff, GSDF C5 Command, MSDF Communications Command, ASDF Operations Support Wing, ASDF Air Communications and Systems Wing, SDF Cyber Defense Command	Approx. 30 countries including NATO member countries
NATO CCDCOE Cyber Defense Exercise “Locked Shields 2023”	Apr. 18-21, 2023	Estonia, Japan	Internal Bureau, Joint Staff, GSDF C5 Command, MSDF Communications Command, ASDF Operations Support Wing, ASDF Air Communications and Systems Wing, SDF Cyber Defense Command	Approx.40 countries including NATO member countries
NATO cyber defense exercise “Cyber Coalition 2023”	Nov.27-Dec. 1, 2023	Estonia, Japan	Joint Staff, etc.	NATO member countries/partner countries, etc.

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (NATO)
Japan-NATO bilateral exercise	Jun. 6, 2022	Mediterranean Sea	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Shimakaze”	Frigates ITNS “Carlo Margottini,” TNS “Salihreis”
Japan-NATO bilateral exercise	Aug. 14, 2024	Mediterranean Sea	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Shimakaze”	Frigate HMCS “Charlottetown,” Frigate TCG “Gaziantep,” Minesweeper ROS “Constantin Balescu”

[EU]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of EU Military Committee (Brussels Belgium (NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting))
	Oct. 2022	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs of the European External Action Service
	Mar. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander of Operation Atalanta of the EU Naval Force Somalia (including signing ceremony for the Administrative Arrangement concerning the Japan-EU joint anti-piracy exercises)
	Mar. 2023	Attendance by State Defense Minister at the 1st EU Schuman Security and Defence Forum
	Mar. 2023	Meeting between State Defense Minister and Secretary General of the European External Action Service (Brussels (1st EU Schuman Security and Defence Forum))
	May 2024	Attendance by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs at the 2nd EU Schuman Security and Defence Forum
	May 2024	Meeting between Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Secretary General of the European External Action Service (Brussels (2nd EU Schuman Security and Defence Forum))
	Nov. 2024	Meeting between Minister Nakatani and High Representative of the EU Borrell
	Jul. 2025	Meeting between Minister Nakatani and High Representative of the EU (Japan)
	Feb. 2026	Meeting between Minister Koizumi and High Representative of the EU (Germany (Munich Security Conference))

Joint Staff

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (EU)
Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (France)	Sep. 11, 2022	Northern Arabian Sea	JS “Harusame”	Frigate FS “GUEPRATTE”
Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)	Nov. 4, 2022	Gulf of Aden	P-3C×1	P-3M×1
Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)	Jul. 22, 2023	Western Gulf of Aden	JS “Ikazuchi”	Frigate SPS “Navarra”
Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Italy)	Sep. 8, 2023	Western Gulf of Aden	JS “Ikazuchi”	Multi-mission Patrol vessel ITS “Francesco Morosini”
Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)	Oct. 6, 2023	Western Gulf of Aden	JS “Ikazuchi”	Frigate SPS “Navarra”
Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Italy)	Apr. 21, 2024	Eastern Gulf of Aden	JS "Sazanami"	Frigate ITS “MARTINENGO”
Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)	Sep. 15, 2024	Eastern Gulf of Aden	JS “Samidare”	Frigate SPS “NUMANCIA”
Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)	Dec. 15, 2024	Eastern Gulf of Aden	JS “Murasame”	Frigate SPS “SANTA MARIA”
Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)	Jul. 7, 2025	Arabian Sea	JS “Harusame”	Frigate SPS “Navarra”
Joint training with EU Naval Force (Greece)	Jul. 22, 2025	Eastern Gulf of Aden	JS “Harusame”	Frigate Psara

[Sweden]

High-level talks, etc.	Jun. 2022	Japan-Sweden State Ministers of Defense Meeting (Tokyo)
	Dec. 2022	☆ Signing and entry into force of the Agreement between Japan and Sweden concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
	May 2023	Visit to Sweden by Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense
	Jun. 2023	Japan-Sweden Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Nov. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Swedish Navy (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	Jul. 2024	Japan-Sweden Defense Ministerial Meeting (Sweden)
	Dec. 2024	Japan-Sweden Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)

[Denmark]

High-level talks, etc.	Oct. 2023	Conversation between Chief of Staff, JS and the Director of Joint Operations of the Danish Armed Forces (Tokyo)
	Sep. 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence of the Danish Armed Forces (Denmark (Multilateral Strategic Dialogue))

[Norway]

High-level talks, etc.	Sep. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and the Commander of the Forsvaret (Norway (Multilateral Strategic Dialogue))
	Sep. 2024	Japan-Norway Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Apr. 2025	Visit to Norway by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	Aug. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defense of Norway (Tokyo)
	Aug. 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Royal Norwegian Navy (Tokyo)
	Aug. 2025	Meeting between State Defense Minister of Japan and State Secretary to Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of Norway
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Mar. 2026	Japan-Norway Unit-to-Unit Exchange (Norway) (ASDF)

[Finland]

High-level talks, etc.	Sep. 2022	Visit to Japan by Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces
	Oct. 2022	Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	May 2023	Visit to Finland by Parliamentary Secretary of Defense Visits Finland
	Oct. 2024	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Finnish Air Force (Tokyo (AFFJ))
	Sep. 2024	Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Aug. 2025	Visit to Finland by the State Defense Minister
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Oct. 2022	4th Japan-Finland Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)

[Estonia]

High-level talks, etc.	Sep. 2023	Visit to Estonia by Chief of Staff, JS
	Mar. 2024	Visit to Japan by Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces
	Jan. 2025	Japan-Estonia Defense Ministerial Meeting
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jul. 2023	1st Japan-Estonia Military to Military Dialogue (Tallinn)

[Latvia]

Regular discussions between defense authorities	Oct. 2023	1st Japan-Latvia Military to Military Dialogue (Riga)

[Lithuania]

High-level talks, etc.	Jun. 2022	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Deputy Minister of National Defence of Lithuania (Singapore (19th Shangri- La Dialogue))
	Jun. 2023	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Deputy Minister of National Defence of Lithuania (Singapore (20th Shangri- La Dialogue))
	Oct. 2023	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Deputy Minister of National Defence of Lithuania (Tokyo)
	Oct. 2023	☆Signing of the Japan-Lithuania Memorandum on Defense cooperation and Exchanges
	Feb. 2024	Meeting between Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense and Deputy Minister of National Defence of Lithuania (Munich, Germany (60th Munich Security Conference))
	Apr. 2024	Visit to Lithuania by Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense
	Jun. 2024	Japan-Lithuania Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (21st Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jan. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence of the Lithuanian Armed Forces (Belgium (Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session))
	May 2025	Japan-Lithuania Defense Ministers Meeting (Japan)
	Oct. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence of the Lithuanian Armed Forces (Vilnius)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jul. 2022	1st Japan-Lithuania Military to Military Dialogue (Vilnius)
	Sep. 2023	2nd Japan-Lithuania Military to Military Dialogue (Vilnius)
	Nov. 2025	3rd Japan-Lithuania Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)

[Ukraine]

High-level talks, etc.	Mar. 2021	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Mar. 2022	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Apr. 2022	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Mar. 2023	Japan-Ukraine State Defense Minister Meeting (Tokyo)
	Jun. 2023	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (20th Shangri- La Dialogue))
	Oct. 2023	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Video teleconference
	Apr. 2024	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Video teleconference
	Jun. 2024	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (21st Shangri- La Dialogue))
	Oct. 2024	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Meeting (Belgium (G7 Ministerial Meeting on Defense))
	Mar. 2025	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Video teleconference

[Austria]

High-level talks, etc.	Feb. 2023	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Secretary General of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence (Tokyo)

[Slovenia]

High-level talks, etc.	Mar. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces (Tokyo (DSEI Japan))

[Czech]

High-level talks, etc.	Jan. 2023	Visit to Czech by State Defense Minister
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jul. 2023	1st Japan-Czech Military to Military Dialogue (Prague)

[Bulgaria]

High-level talks, etc.	Oct. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Bulgarian Commander of the Navy (Venice, Italy (T-RSS))
	Oct. 2024	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Bulgarian Navy (Venice (Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS))
	Sep. 2025	Visit to Bulgaria by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kaneko

[Belgium]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Belgian Chief of Defence (Brussels (NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting))
	Jan. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Belgian Chief of Defence (Belgium (NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session))
	Jan. 2026	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Belgian Chief of Defence (Belgium (NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session))

[Greece]

High-level talks, etc.	Jan. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff (Belgium (NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session))
	Dec. 2025	Japan-Greece Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)

[Poland]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (Brussels (NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting))
	Oct. 2022	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Deputy Minister-Secretary of State of Poland (Warsaw (Warsaw Security Forum))
	Feb. 2023	Visit to Poland by Chief of Staff, JS
	Apr. 2023	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces
	Jul. 2023	Visit to Poland by Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense
	Sep. 2023	Visit to Poland by Chief of Staff, JS
	Jun. 2024	Visit to Japan by Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces
	Feb. 2025	Japan-Poland State Ministers of Defense Meeting
	Jan. 2026	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (Brussels (NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session))
	Feb. 2026	Japan-Poland State Ministers of Defense Meeting (Poland)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jul. 2023	3rd Japan-Poland Military to Military Dialogue (Warsaw)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jan. 2025	Participation in New Year Jump in Indo-Pacific
	Jan. 2026	Participation in New Year Jump in Indo-Pacific

[Romania]

High-level talks, etc.	Oct. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Romanian Chief of the Naval Forces (Venice, Italy (RSS))
	Aug. 2023	Visit to Romania by Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense
	May 2024	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Romanian Naval Forces (London (First Sea Lord's Sea Power Conference))
	Oct. 2024	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Romanian Navy (Venice (Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS))
	Jan. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence of Romania (Belgium (NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session))
	Feb. 2025	Courtesy call on State Defense Minister by State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania
	Oct. 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Romanian Chief of the Naval Forces (Philadelphia (events celebrating the 250th anniversary of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps))
	Jan. 2026	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defense Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces (Brussels (NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session))
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jul. 2022	2nd Japan-Romania Defense Authorities Meeting (Bucharest)
	Oct. 2024	3rd Japan-Romania Defense Authorities Meeting (Bucharest)

[Switzerland]

High-level talks, etc.	Aug. 2024	Japan-Switzerland Working Dinner (Tokyo)
	Feb. 2026	Japan-Switzerland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Davos (Davos Conference))

[Japan-U.K.-Italy Trilateral Cooperation]

High-level talks, etc.	Mar. 2023	Japan-U.K.-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting
	Dec. 2023	Japan-U.K.-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Dec. 2023	☆Signing of Convention on the Establishment of the "Global Combat Air Programme – GCAP International Government Organisation"
	Jul. 2024	Japan-U.K.-Italy Air Chiefs' Meeting (RIAT24)
	Jul. 2024	Japan-UK-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (London)
	Oct. 2024	Japan-U.K.-Italy Air Chiefs' Meeting (Tokyo (AFFJ))
	Oct. 2024	Japan-U.K.-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Naples)
	Dec. 2024	☆Entry into force of Convention on the Establishment of the "Global Combat Air Programme – GCAP International Government Organisation"
	May 2025	Japan-U.K.-Italy Air Chiefs' Meeting (ASPC25 in Italy)
	Jul. 2025	Japan-U.K.-Italy Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting (VTC)
	Nov. 2025	Japan-U.K.-Italy Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting (VTC)

Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Defense Minister, State Defense Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
2. The high-level exchange includes the status of the conclusion of important agreements, etc. relating to defense cooperation between both countries.
3. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.
4. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.
5. For multilateral exercises, refer to Reference 61. (Trainings with NATO members countries, etc. are listed in duplicate.)

Reference 46 Recent Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and Exchanges (FY2022 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2022 - Mar. 31, 2026)

High-level talks, etc.	Sep. 2022	Japan-ROK Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Seoul (Seoul Defense Dialogue))
	Jun. 2023	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (20th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Oct. 2023	Japan-ROK Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Seoul (Seoul Defense Dialogue))
	Jun. 2024	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (21st Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2024	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo, Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting)
	Jul. 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, Joint Staff and Chairman of ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (Tokyo, Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Chiefs of Defense Meeting)
	Sep. 2024	Courtesy call on ROK Minister of National Defense by Japan State Defense Minister (Seoul (Seoul Defense Dialogue))
	Oct. 2024	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (VTC)
	Nov. 2024	Japan-ROK Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Seoul)
	Nov. 2024	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Laos (11th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus))
	Jan. 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations of ROK Navy (VTC)
	Apr. 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations of ROK Navy (VTC)
	Jul. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (Seoul, Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Chiefs of Defense Meeting)
	Aug. 2025	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (VTC)
	Sep. 2025	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Seoul (Seoul Defense Dialogue))
	Oct. 2025	Japan-ROK Air Force Chiefs of Staff Meeting (Seoul)
	Nov. 2025	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (12th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus))
	Dec. 2025	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (VTC)
	Jan. 2026	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations of ROK Navy (VTC)
	Jan. 2026	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Yokosuka)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Nov. 2024	Conversation between SDF Commander-in-Chief and Commander, ROK Navy Joint Cruise Training Task Group (Yokosuka)
	Dec. 2024	Conversation between President of JMSDF Command and Staff College and Director of Maritime Operations Studies, ROK NWC (Tokyo)
Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation(See reference 61 for multilateral exercises)	Jun. 2022	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Aug. 2022	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff, Indo-Pacific Command, Chief of Staff, ROK Army (Adelaide, Australia (CAS))
	Oct. 2022	Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Chiefs of Defense Meeting (Washington D.C., U.S.)
	Nov. 2022	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff, Commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations of ROK Navy (Tokyo (WPNS))
	Apr. 2023	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense working level meeting
	Jun. 2023	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (20th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2023	Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Chiefs of Defense Meeting (Hawaii, U.S.)
	Nov. 2023	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Dec. 2023	Japan-U.S.-ROK Director General Level Teleconference
	Apr. 2024	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense working level meeting (VTC)
	Jun. 2024	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (21st Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2024	Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Chiefs of Defense Meeting (Tokyo)
	Jul. 2024	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Sep. 2024	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense working level meeting (Seoul)
	Nov. 2024	Japan-U.S.-ROK meeting between the Air Force Chiefs of Staff (VTC)
	Jul. 2025	Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Chiefs of Defense Meeting (Seoul)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (US, ROK)
Japan-ROK goodwill exercise	Nov. 6, 2024	South of Kii Peninsula	Training ship JS "Hatakaze"	Landing ships ROKS "Marado" and "Cheonjabong," replenishment ship ROKS "Daecheong"

Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Defense Minister, State Defense Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
2. The high-level exchange includes the status of the conclusion of important agreements, etc. relating to defense cooperation between both countries.
3. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.
4. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.
5. For multilateral exercises, refer to Reference 61.

Reference 47 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Canada and New Zealand (FY2022 and Beyond)

[Canada] (Apr. 1, 2022 - Mar. 31, 2026)

High-level talks, etc.	Apr. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force (Colorado Springs, U.S. (Space Symposium))
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	May 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces (Brussels, Belgium (NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session))
	Jun. 2022	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Sep. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force ((Washington D.C., U.S. (International Air Chiefs Conference))
	Oct. 2022	Visit to Canada by Chief of Staff, JS
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy (Tokyo (WPNS))
	Mar. 2023	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces
	Apr. 2023	Visit to Canada by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Apr. 2023	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy
	Jun. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces (Tokyo)
	Jun. 2023	Visit to Japan by Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces
	Sep. 2023	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy (Newport, U.S. (International Seapower Symposium))
	Nov. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force (Hawaii, U.S. (Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium))
	May 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces (Netherlands (Multilateral Strategic Dialogue))
	Jun. 2024	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (21st Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jun. 2024	Visit to Canada by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Jul. 2024	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force (U.K. (RIAT))
	Sep. 2024	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Sep. 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces (Hawaii (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Oct. 2024	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force (Tokyo (AFFJ))
	Nov. 2024	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy (Tokyo)
	Mar. 2025	Visit to Japan by Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces (Tokyo)
	Mar. 2025	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force (Melbourne, Australia (Avalon Airshow))
	May 2025	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Canadian Army (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
	Jul. 2025	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force (London, U.K. (Global Air and Space Chiefs' Conference and RIAT))
	Aug. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces (Indonesia)
	Oct. 2025	Video Teleconference between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force
	Oct. 2025	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force (Seoul, ROK (Seoul ADEX))
	Mar. 2026	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Dec. 2022	12th Japan-Canada Politico-Military Dialogue, 13th Japan-Canada Military to Military Dialogue (Ottawa)
	Dec. 2024	13th Japan-Canada Politico-Military Dialogue, 14th Japan-Canada Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Aug. 2023	Port of call by Frigates HMCS "Ottawa," "Vancouver" and Replenishment vessel HMCS "Asterix" (Yokosuka)
	Nov. 2023	Port of call by Frigates HMCS "Ottawa," "Vancouver" (Kure) and Replenishment vessel HMCS "Asterix" (Yokosuka)
	Jan. 2024	Participation in New Year's Jump
	Dec. 2024	Japan-Canada space forces exchange (Ottawa)
	Jan. 2025	Participation in New Year Jump in Indo-Pacific
	Sep. 2025	Friendly visit to North America and Europe
	Nov. 2025	Japan-Canada space forces exchange (Tokyo)

Joint Staff

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Canada)
MASAKARI 25	Jul. 7-25, 2025	Canada	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber unit, etc. of Canada

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Canada)
Japan-Canada bilateral exercise (KAEDEX22)	Sep. 21-23, 2022	Off the coast from Malaysia to Singapore	JS “Izumo,” JS “Takanami”	Frigate HMCS “Winnipeg”
Japan-Canada bilateral exercise (KAEDEX23)	Jun. 13-14, 2023	Area surrounding Victoria	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Hatakaze”	Frigate HMCS “Winnipeg”
Japan-Canada bilateral exercise	Jul. 28, 2024	East China Sea	Replenishment ship JS "Tokiwa"	Frigate HMCS "Montreal"
Japan-Canada bilateral exercise (KAEDEX24)	Aug. 31-Sep. 3, 2024	Western Pacific	JS “Ariake” (IPD24, 2nd surface unit)	Frigate HMCS "Vancouver"
Japan-Canada bilateral exercise (KAEDEX24-2)	Sep. 6-8, 2024	Timor Sea	JS “Ariake” (IPD24, 2nd surface unit)	Frigate HMCS "Vancouver"
Japan-Canada bilateral exercise (KAEDEX25)	Nov. 15-17, 2025	From the East China Sea to south of Kanto	JS “Maya”	Patrol vessel HMCS Max Bernays

Air Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Canada)
Japan-Canada Space Tabletop Exercise	Mar. 6-7, 2023	Fuchu Air Base	Space Operations Group 12 personnel	7SOPS (7th Space Operations Squadron): approximately 20 personnel CC-150 transport aircraft × 1 (Only used for deployment and withdrawal)

[New Zealand]

High-level talks, etc.	Apr. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and New Zealand Air Component Commander (Washington D.C., U.S. (International Air Chiefs Conference))
	May 2022	Visit to New Zealand by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Jun. 2022	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, and Commander Joint Forces of the New Zealand Defence Force (On the occasion of his visit to Japan for participation in PALS)
	Jun. 2022	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and New Zealand Chief of Defence Force (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander Joint Forces of the New Zealand Defence Force (Tokyo (WPNS))
	May 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Royal New Zealand Navy (Singapore (IMDEX))
	Jun. 2023	☆Signing of the Statement of Intent between the Minister of Defence of New Zealand and the Defense Minister of Japan on Defence Cooperation in Maritime Security, Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief and Climate Change in the Pacific Islands
	Jul. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander Joint Forces of the New Zealand Defence Force (Australia (Talisman Sabre 2023 observation))
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and New Zealand Chief of Defence Force (Fiji (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Mar. 2024	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and the Chief of the New Zealand Army (California, U.S.)
	Jun. 2024	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (21st Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2024	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the New Zealand Air Force (U.K. (RIAT))
	Sep. 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and New Zealand Chief of Defence Force (Hawaii (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Sep. 2024	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the New Zealand Army (Melbourne, Australia (CAS))
	Nov. 2024	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Vientiane, Laos (11th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus))
	Nov. 2024	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the New Zealand Navy (VTC)
	May 2025	Japan-New Zealand Vice Ministers' Meeting (Tokyo)
	May 2025	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and New Zealand Chief of Army (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
	Jun. 2025	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (22nd Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2025	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and New Zealand Chief of Defence Force
	Aug. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and New Zealand Chief of Defence Force (Thailand (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Oct. 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and the New Zealand Chief of Navy (Tokyo)
	Nov. 2025	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (12th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus))
	Dec. 2025	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and New Zealand Chief of Defence Force
	Dec. 2025	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Feb. 2026	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Germany (Munich Security Conference))
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Mar. 2023	15th Japan-New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Tokyo)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	May 2024	Japan-New Zealand ISR Unit-to-Unit Exchanges (Naha)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (New Zealand)
Japan-New Zealand bilateral exercise	Sep. 13, 2024	West of Kyushu	JS "Sendai"	Replenishment ship HMNZS "Aotearoa"
Japan-New Zealand Goodwill Exercise	Aug. 7-8, 2025	West of New Zealand	Destroyer JS Ise, Destroyer JS Suzunami (IPD25, 3rd surface unit)	Multi-role vessel HMNZS Canterbury

Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Defense Minister, State Defense Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
2. The high-level exchange includes the status of the conclusion of important agreements, etc. relating to defense cooperation between both countries.
3. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.
4. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.
5. For multilateral exercises, refer to Reference 61.

Reference 48 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Member States (FY2022 and Beyond)

[Indonesia] (Apr. 1, 2022 - Mar. 31, 2026)

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference)
	Jun. 2022	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Phnom Penh Cambodia (7th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting)
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Aug. 2022	Visit to Indonesia by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy (Tokyo (WPNS))
	Dec. 2022	Visit to Indonesia by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Feb. 2023	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army (Tokyo)
	Apr. 2023	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces
	Jun. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Air Force (Tokyo)
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Vice-Defense Minister of Indonesia (Jakarta (ADSOM Plus))
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army (Perth, Australia (CAS))
	Nov. 2023	Meeting between State Defense Minister and Indonesian Deputy Minister of Defense (Jakarta (10th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus))
	Jan. 2024	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Secretary General, Ministry of Defence (Tokyo (13th
	Apr. 2024	Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Sep. 2024	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Dec. 2024	Visit to Indonesia by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Jan. 2025	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Air Force (Tokyo)
		Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Jakarta)
	Feb. 2025	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Secretary General, Ministry of Defence (Fukuoka (14th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Apr. 2025	Visit to Indonesia by Chief of Staff, JS
	May 2025	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
	Aug. 2025	Visit to Indonesia by Chief of Staff, JS
	Sep. 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy (Tokyo)
	Nov. 2025	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (9th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting)
	Nov. 2025	3rd Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting ("2+2")
	Nov. 2025	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (3rd Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting ("2+2"))
	Dec. 2025	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (VTC)
	Feb. 2026	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy (Jakarta)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jan. 2024	Participation in New Year Jump
	Feb. 2024	Visit to Indonesia by president of JMSDF Command and Staff College (Bali, Jakarta)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Indonesia)
Japan-Indonesia Goodwill Exercise	Feb. 26, 2023	Area surrounding Bitung	JS "Asagiri," Training ship JS "Shimakaze"	Frigate KRI "Fatahillah"
Japan-Indonesia Goodwill Exercise	May 11, 2023	Java Sea	JS "Kumano"	Corvette KRI "Pachimura"
Japan-Indonesia Goodwill Exercise	Oct. 5, 2024	South of Kanto	JS "Murasame"	Training ship KRI "Bima Suci"
Japan-Indonesia Goodwill Exercise	Feb. 25, 2025	Strait of Malacca	Destroyer JS "Noshiro"	Patrol boat KRI "Madidihang"
Goodwill exercise with the Indonesian Navy	Apr. 12, 2025	Off the coast of Surabaya	JS "Suzunami"	Frigate KRI Gusti Ngurah Rai
Goodwill exercise with the Indonesian Navy	May 15, 2025	Off the coast of Jakarta	Destroyer JS Yahagi (IPD25, 1st surface unit)	Corvette KRI Cut Nyak Dien
Goodwill exercise with the Indonesian Navy	Nov. 20, 2025	Off the coast of Jakarta	JS "Harusame"	Corvette KRI Cut Nyak Dien
Japan-Indonesia Goodwill Exercise	Mar. 3, 2026	Off the coast of Bitung	Destroyer JS Shiranui, Training ship Yamagiri	Patrol vessel KRI Selar

[Cambodia]

High-level talks, etc.	Apr. 2022	Visit to Cambodia by Chief of Staff, JS
	Jun. 2022	Japan-Cambodia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Phnom Penh (7th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting))
	Feb. 2023	Visit to Cambodia by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Mar. 2023	Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) (Tokyo (12th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Apr. 2023	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
	May 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of the Royal Cambodian Navy (Changi, Singapore (IMDEX))
	Sep. 2023	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Cambodian Army (New Delhi, India (IPACC))
	Jan. 2024	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Cambodian Secretary, Ministry of National Defense (Tokyo (13th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Mar. 2024	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Cambodian Secretary, Ministry of National Defense
	Jul. 2024	Commander of the Royal Cambodian Army's visit to Japan
	Aug. 2024	Japan-Cambodia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Phnom Penh)
	Aug. 2024	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Cambodian Army (Nadi, Fiji (IPAMS))
	Feb. 2025	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Director of the International Policy Bureau of Cambodia's Ministry of National Defence (Fukuoka (14th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	May 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander of the Royal Cambodian Army (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
	Jun. 2025	Visit to Cambodia by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Nov. 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and the Commander of the Royal Cambodian Navy (Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Feb. 2023	7th Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Feb. 2023	8th Japan-Cambodia Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Jan. 2025	8th Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Jan. 2025	9th Japan-Cambodia Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jan. 2024	Participation in New Year Jump
	Jun. 2024	Deployment of ASDF C-130Hs to Cambodia (overseas flight training)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Cambodia)
Goodwill exercise with the Royal Cambodian Navy	Mar. 15, 2022	Waters surrounding Sihanoukville Autonomous Port	Minesweeper Tender JS "Uraga," Minesweeper Ocean JS "Hirado"	Personnel from Ream Naval Base
Goodwill exercise with the Royal Cambodian Navy	Mar. 28-30, 2023	Port of Sihanoukville and Ream Naval Base, Cambodia	JS "Kirisame"	Military personnel belonging to Ream Naval Base
Japan-Cambodia Goodwill Exercise	Apr. 24-26, 2023	Port of Sihanoukville and Liam Naval Base, Cambodia ,etc.	Minesweeper Tender JS "Uraga," Minesweeper Ocean JS "Awaji"	Military personnel belonging to Ream Naval Base
Japan-Cambodia Goodwill Exercise	Feb. 24, 2024	Waters surrounding Sihanoukville Autonomous Port	JS "Suzunami," Training ship JS "Shimakaze"	Patrol boats HMAS "Koh Svay," "Koh Krosar"
Goodwill exercise with the Royal Cambodian Navy	Apr. 22, 2025	Off the coast of Ream	Minesweeper tender JS "Bungo," minesweeper JS "Etajima"	Patrol boat RCNS Koh Krabey

[Singapore]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Navy (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	May 2022	Meeting between the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Singaporean Defence Permanent Secretary (Phnom Penh,Cambodia (ADSOM-Plus))
	Jun. 2022	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jun. 2022	☆ Revision of the Memorandum on Defence Exchanges
	Jun. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence Force of Singapore (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Air Force
	Sep. 2022	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Singaporean Defence Permanent Secretary (Seoul (Seoul Defense Dialogue))
	Oct. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Navy (Venice, Italy (T-RSS))
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Navy (Tokyo (WPNS))
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and the Singaporean Defence Permanent Secretary (Siem Reap (9th ADMM-Plus))
	Feb. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Air Force
	May 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Navy (Singapore (IMDEX))
	May 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Army (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
	Jun. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence Force of Singapore (Singapore (20th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jun. 2023	☆ Signing and entry into force of the Agreement between Japan and Singapore concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense and Singapore's Senior Minister of State for Defence
	Nov. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Navy (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	Jan. 2024	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Army
	Jan. 2024	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Singaporean Defence Permanent Secretary (Tokyo (13th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Jun. 2024	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (21st Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2024	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Navy (Perth, Australia (Indian Ocean Defence & Security Conference (IODS))
	Sep. 2024	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Singaporean Defence Permanent Secretary
	Sep. 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence Force of Singapore (Hawaii (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Sep. 2024	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Army (Melbourne, Australia (CAS))
	Oct. 2024	Visit to Japan by Commander of the Singapore Army
	Oct. 2024	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Navy (Venice (Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS))
	Feb. 2025	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Singaporean Defence Permanent Secretary (Fukuoka (14th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	May 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Navy (Singapore (IMDEX))
	May 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence Force of Singapore (Singapore (22nd Shangri-La Dialogue))
	May 2025	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (22nd Shangri-La Dialogue))
	May 2025	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Army (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
	Jul. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence Force of Singapore (VTC)
	Aug. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Defence Force of Singapore (Thailand (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Sep. 2025	Visit to Singapore by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Oct. 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Navy (Philadelphia (events celebrating the 250th anniversary of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps))
	Nov. 2025	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (12th ADMM-Plus))
	Nov. 2025	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Singaporean Chief of Air Force (Tokyo)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Apr. 2022	17th Japan-Singapore Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Mar. 2023	18th Japan-Singapore Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Jan. 2025	19th Japan-Singapore Military to Military Dialogue (Singapore)
	Mar. 2026	20th Japan-Singapore Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Oct. 2023	Visit to GSDF Chemical School by Singapore Army Combat Engineer Battalion
	Aug. - Sep. 2024	Deployment of ASDF F-2s, etc. to Singapore (participation in Tarang Shakti 24)
	Jan. 2025	Participation in New Year's Jump
	Jan. 2026	Participation in New Year's Jump

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Singapore)
Japan-Singapore goodwill exercise	Mar. 6, 2022	Bay of Bengal	JS “Yudachi”	Frigate RSS “Tenacious”
Japan-Singapore goodwill exercise	Aug. 27, 2022	South of Kanto	JS “Yamagiri”	Frigate RSS “Intrepid”
Japan-Singapore goodwill exercise	Aug. 23, 2024	South of Kanto	JS “Yugiri”	Frigate RSS “Stalwart”
Japan-Singapore goodwill exercise	Mar. 24, 2026	South China Sea	JS “Asahi”	Frigate RSS Supreme

[Thailand]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	☆ Signing and entry into force of the Agreement between Japan and Thailand concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Navy (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	Jun. 2022	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commandant Ronnarong of the Royal Thai Marine Corps (Tokyo (PALS))
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Navy (Tokyo (WPNS))
	Feb. 2023	Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Navy
	Mar. 2023	Visit to Japan by Thai Deputy Minister of Defence (Tokyo (12th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	May 2023	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Thai Permanent Secretary for Defence
	Nov. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Navy (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	Jan. 2024	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army
	Jan. 2024	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Thai Permanent Secretary for Defence (Tokyo (13thJapan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	May 2024	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
	Feb. 2025	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Thai Permanent Secretary for Defence (Fukuoka (14th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Jun. 2025	Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (22nd Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jun. 2025	Visit to Thailand by GSDF Chief of Staff
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jan. 2025	15th Japan-Thailand Politico-Military Dialogue (Bangkok)
	Jan. 2025	15th Japan-Thailand Military to Military Dialogue (Bangkok)
	Jan. 2026	Participation in New Year’s Jump

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Thailand)
Goodwill exercise with the Royal Thai Navy	Mar. 30, 2022	Gulf of Thailand	JS “Suzutsuki”	Patrol vessel HTMS “Tapi”
Japan-Thailand Goodwill Exercise	Apr. 4, 2024	Waters off the coast of Sattahip	JS “Murasame”	Frigate HTMS “Bhumibol Adulyadej”
Japan-Thailand Goodwill Exercise	Mar. 16, 2025	Waters off the coast of Laem Chabang	JS “Ariake” and JS “Hamagiri”	Frigate HTMS “Naresuan”
Japan-Thailand Goodwill Exercise	Jul. 24, 2025	In the vicinity of Sattahip	JS “Asahi”	Patrol boat HTMS Songkhla

[The Philippines]

High-level talks, etc.	Apr. 2022	1st Japan-Philippines Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Apr. 2022	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Army
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Navy (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	May 2022	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Philippine Defense Undersecretary (Phnom Penh, Cambodia (ADSOM-Plus))
	Jun. 2022	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps (Tokyo (PALS)
	Jun. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Air Force
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Jul. 2022	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Army
	Jul. 2022	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff and Representative of the Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps
	Sep. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Air Force
	Nov. 2022	Conversation between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Air Force
	Dec. 2022	8th Japan-Philippines Deputy Secretary-level talks (Manila)
	Dec. 2022	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff, Chief of the Philippine Army, and Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps (Japan-Philippines-United States Land Forces Chiefs Meeting)
	Feb. 2023	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Feb. 2023	Conversation between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Air Force
	Feb. 2023	☆ Signing of the Terms of Reference (TOR) between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines concerning the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Activities of the Japan Self-Defense Forces in the Republic of the Philippines
	Mar. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Tokyo (DSEI Japan))
	Mar. 2023	Visit to Japan by Philippine Acting Undersecretary (Tokyo (12th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice- Ministerial Forum))
	Apr. 2023	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
	Apr. 2023	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Army
	Apr. 2023	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps
	May 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Navy (Singapore (IMDEX))
	May 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Army (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Philippine Defense Undersecretary (Jakarta, Indonesia (ADSOM-Plus))
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippine (Fiji (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Sep. 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Army (New Delhi, India (IPACC))
	Nov. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Navy (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	Nov. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Air Force (Hawaii, U.S. (Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium))
	Nov. 2023	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps
	Dec. 2023	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
	Jan. 2024	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Philippine Defense Undersecretary (Tokyo (13th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice- Ministerial Forum))
	May 2024	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hawaii)
	Jun. 2024	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
	Jul. 2024	2nd Japan-Philippines Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Manila)
	Sep. 2024	Visit to the Philippines by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Oct. 2024	Visit to Japan by Chief of the Philippine Air Force (Tokyo (AFFJ))
	Nov. 2024	Video Teleconference between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Navy
	Nov. 2024	Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Nov. 2024	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Vientiane (11th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus))
	Dec. 2024	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
	Dec. 2024	Commander of the Philippine Army's visit to Japan
	Dec. 2024	Commander of the Philippine Marine Corps's visit to Japan
	Jan. 2025	Video teleconference between the ASDF Chief of Staff and the Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force
	Feb. 2025	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
	Feb. 2025	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Philippine Defense Undersecretary (Fukuoka (14th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice- Ministerial Forum))
	Feb. 2025	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Manila)
	Mar. 2025	Visit to the Philippines by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Mar. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (New Delhi (Raisina Dialogue))
	May 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Navy (Singapore (IMDEX))
	May 2025	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Army (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
	Jun. 2025	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (22nd Shangri-La Dialogue))

High-level talks, etc.	Jul. 2025	Participation of GSDF Chief of Staff in the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines Quadrilateral Meeting (Sydney, Australia (Talisman Sabre 25))
	Sep. 2025	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Seoul, ROK (Seoul Defense Dialogue))
	Oct. 2025	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (VTC)
	Oct. 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Philippine Navy (Philadelphia (events celebrating the 250th anniversary of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps))
	Dec. 2025	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (VTC)
	Dec. 2025	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff, Chief of the Philippine Army, and Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps (Tokyo (LFS/LFD))
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Oct. 2022	9th Japan-Philippines Military to Military Dialogue (Manila)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jan. 2022	Visit to the Philippines by ASDF C130-H (Overseas Flight Training)
	Dec. 2022	Unit-to-unit exchange with the dispatch of ASDF F-15
	Aug. 2023	Unit-to-unit exchanges between GSDF Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, GSDF Fuji School and Philippine Marine Corps, the Philippine Army (Manila)
	Sep. 2024	Meeting between Commander in Chief of the Self-Defense Fleet and Fleet Commander of the Philippine Navy (Australia (KAKADU2024))
	Jul. 2024	Dispatch of ASDF Central Band to the Philippines
	Jan. 2025	Participation in New Year Jump in Indo-Pacific
Japan-U.S.- the Philippines trilateral cooperation (See reference 59 for multilateral exercises)	Dec. 2022	High-Level Talks of Japan-U.S.-Philippines Land Forces
	Apr. 2023	Japan-U.S.-Philippines High-Level Marine Corps Video Teleconference
	Apr. 2023	Japan-U.S.-Philippines Trilateral Chiefs of Defense Video teleconference
	Jun. 2023	Japan-U.S.-Philippines Trilateral Chiefs of Defense Meeting (Singapore (20th Shangri-La Dialogue)
	Aug. 2023	Japan-U.S.-Philippines Trilateral Chiefs of Defense Meeting (Fiji (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Dec. 2023	High-Level Meeting of Japan-U.S.-Philippines Land Forces and Marine Corps (Tokyo (LFS))
	Oct. 2024	Japan-U.S.-Philippine meeting between the Air Force Chiefs of Staff (Tokyo (AFFJ))

Joint Staff

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (the Philippines)
Japan-Philippines Bilateral Exercise	Jun. 14, 2025	South China Sea	JS “Takanami”	Frigate BRP Miguel Malvar
Japan-Philippines Bilateral Exercise	Nov. 29, 2025	South China Sea	JS “Harusame”	Frigate BRP Antonio Luna C-208

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (the Philippines)
Japan-Philippines Goodwill Exercise	Apr. 9, 2022	Off the coast of Subic	JS “Suzutsuki”	Frigate BRP “Apolinario Mabini”
Japan-Philippines Goodwill Exercise	Nov. 26, 2022	Area surrounding Subic	JS “Harusame”	Patrol vessel BRP “Conrado Yap”
Japan-Philippines Bilateral Exercise	Aug. 2, 2024	South China Sea	JS "Sazanami"	Frigate BRP “Jose Rizal”
Japan-Philippines Goodwill Exercise	Feb. 27, 2025	Waters off the coast of Manila	Destroyers JS “Ariake” and JS “Hamagiri”	Frigate BRP “Jose Rizal”
Japan-Philippines Goodwill Exercise	May 2, 2025	In the vicinity of Manila	Minesweeper tender JS “Bungo,” minesweeper JS “Etajima”	Corvette BRP “Apolinario Mabini”
Japan-Philippines Bilateral Exercise	Feb. 26, 2026	In the vicinity of Davao	Destroyer JS Shiranui, Training ship Yamagiri	Patrol vessel BRP Artemio Ricarte, Multi-purpose assault craft BRP BA-488 and BRP BA-491, Patrol aircraft (C-90)

Air Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (the Philippines)
Bilateral Training on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/ DR) with the Philippine Air Force	Jun. 21-24, 2022	Clark Air Base, Colonel Ernesto Ravina Air Base and its surrounding airspace	1st Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command C-130H transport aircraft × 1 Approx. 20 personnel	C-130H × 1 Approx. 50 personnel
Bilateral Training on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/ DR) with the Philippine Air Force	Aug. 6-19, 2023	Clark Air Base and its surrounding airspace	1st Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command C-130H transport aircraft × 1 Approx. 20 personnel	—
Bilateral Training on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) with the Philippine Air Force	Oct. 2-7, 2024	Mactan Air Base and its surrounding airspace	1st Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Support Command C-130H transport aircraft × 1 Approx. 30 personnel	C-130H × 1
Japan-Philippines Bilateral Exercise on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) “Doshin-Bayanihan 5-25”	Oct. 7-11, 2025	(1) BGEN BENITO N EBUEN Air Base, Cebu, Philippines and airspace in vicinity of the Air Base (2) Daniel Z. Romualdez Airport, Leyte, Philippines and airspace in vicinity of the Airport, Tacloban drop zone	Transport aircraft (K/C-130H) × 1 Approx. 30 personnel (Air Support Command)	C-130H transport aircraft × 1, utility helicopter × 1

[Brunei]

High-level talks, etc.	Jun. 2022	Japan-Brunei Ministerial-level Meeting (Phnom Penh (7th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting))
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of Royal Brunei Navy (Tokyo (WPNS))
	Feb. 2023	Japan-Brunei State Defense Minister/Deputy Minister of Defence Meeting (Tokyo)
	Jun. 2023	1st Defense Policy Dialogue (Bandar Seri Begawan)
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between the Chief of Staff, JS and the Commander of the Royal Brunei Armed Forces (Fiji (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and the Commander of Royal Brunei Army (New Delhi, India (IPACC))
	Nov. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and the Acting Commander of Royal Brunei Navy (Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	Jan. 2024	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Brunei (Tokyo (13th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Nov. 2024	Japan-Brunei Defense Ministerial Meeting (Vientiane (11th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus))
	Feb. 2025	2nd Defense Policy Dialogue (Fukuoka) (14th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Brunei)
Japan-Brunei Goodwill Exercise	Apr. 11, 2023	Waters off the coast of Muara	JS “Kirisame”	Patrol vessel KDB “Daruttaqwa”
Japan-Brunei Goodwill Exercise	Feb. 19, 2024	Waters off the coast of Muara	JS “Suzunami” “Shimakaze”	Patrol vessel KDB “Darussalam”
Japan-Brunei Goodwill Exercise	Jun. 2, 2024	Waters off the coast of Muara	Training ships JS “Kashima” and JS “Shimakaze”	Patrol vessel KDB “Darulehsan”
Japan-Brunei Goodwill Exercise	Jul. 31, 2024	Waters off the coast of Muara	JS “Sazanami”	Patrol vessel KDB “Darulehsan”
Japan-Brunei Goodwill Exercise	Feb. 6, 2026	Muara Port	JS “Yudachi”	Boarding Inspection Team

[Viet Nam]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People's Army of Viet Nam
	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of the Viet Nam People's Navy (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	Jun. 2022	Japan-Viet Nam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Phnom Penh, Cambodia (7th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting))
	Jun. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of Air Defence-Air Force, Viet Nam People's Army
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Viet Nam People's Navy (Tokyo (WPNS))
	Feb. 2023	Visit to Viet Nam by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Mar. 2023	Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Deputy Minister of National Defence (Tokyo (12th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum, 9th Japan-Viet Nam Deputy-Secretary level talks))
	Apr. 2023	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the General Staff of the People's Army of Vietnam
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People's Army of Viet Nam (Perth, Australia (CAS))
	Oct. 2023	Visit to Japan by Chief of the General Staff of the People's Army of Viet Nam
	Nov. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Viet Nam People's Navy (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	Nov. 2023	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence
	Nov. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of Air Defence-Air Force, Viet Nam People's Army (Tokyo)
	Jan. 2024	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence (Tokyo (13th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice- Ministerial Forum)
	Feb. 2024	10th Japan-Viet Nam Deputy-Secretary level talks
	May 2024	Meeting between State Defense Minister and Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence (Tokyo)
	Aug. 2024	Japan-Viet Nam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi)
	Feb. 2025	11th Japan-Viet Nam Deputy-Secretary level talks (Fukuoka (14th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Dec. 2025	1st Japan-Viet Nam Foreign and Defence Vice-Ministerial Consultation (Tokyo)
	Dec. 2025	Visit to Viet Nam by MSDF Chief of Staff
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Dec. 2024	8th Japan-Viet Nam Strategic Partnership Dialogue (Tokyo)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jun. 2023	Dispatch of ASDF Central Band to Viet Nam
	Jun. 2024	Visit to Japan by Viet Nam's Air Defence-Air Force band

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Vietnam)
Japan-Viet Nam Goodwill Exercise	Jun. 23, 2023	South China Sea	JS "Izumo," JS "Samidare"	Frigate 'Ly Thai To'
Goodwill exercise with the Viet Nam People's Navy	Apr. 3, 2025	Off the coast of Da Nang	JS "Suzunami"	Patrol aircraft TP-274
Goodwill exercise with the Viet Nam People's Navy	Dec. 10, 2025	Hiroshima Bay	Training ship Yamagiri	Frigate Trần Hưng Đạo

[Malaysia]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and the Chief of Navy of the Royal Malaysian Navy (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	Feb. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Malaysian Air Force
	Mar. 2023	Visit to Japan by Malaysian Secretary General (Tokyo (12th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	May 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and the Commander of the Malaysian Army (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
	Sep. 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and the Commander of the Malaysian Army (New Delhi, India (IPACC))
	Nov. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and the Chief of Navy of the Royal Malaysian Navy (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	May 2024	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and the Commander of the Malaysian Army (Hawaii, U.S. （LANPAC))
	Sep. 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander-in-Chief of the Malaysian Armed Forces (Hawaii (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Sep. 2024	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Malaysian Army (Melbourne, Australia (CAS))
	Feb. 2025	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Malaysian Secretary General (Fukuoka (14th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	May 2025	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Malaysian Chief of Army (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
	Jun. 2025	Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (22nd Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Aug. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander-in-Chief of the Malaysian Armed Forces (Thailand (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Sep. 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Royal Malaysian Navy (Tokyo)
	Sep. 2025	Conversation between GSDF Chief of Staff and Malaysian Chief of Army (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (IPACC))
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Oct. 2022	7th Japan-Malaysia Military to Military (MM) Dialogue (Kuala Lumpur)
	Dec. 2024	1st Japan-Malaysia Strategic Dialogue, 8th Japan-Malaysia Military to Military (MM) Dialogue (Tokyo)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Malaysia)
Japan-Malaysia Goodwill Exercise	Apr. 5, 2023	Around the straits of Malacca	JS “Kirisame”	Frigate KD “Lekir”
Japan-Malaysia Goodwill Exercise	Feb. 13, 2024	Andaman Sea	JS “Sazanami”	Frigate KD “Jebat”
Japan-Malaysia Bilateral Exercise	Apr. 2-5, 2024	Kota Kinabalu Port and the South China Sea	Destroyer JS Akebono	Patrol vessels KD “Keris” and KD “Selangor”
Japan-Malaysia Bilateral Exercise	Nov. 23 and 25, 2024	Strait of Malacca and Port Klang	Destroyer JS Samidare	Patrol vessels KD “Terengganu” and KD “Kasturi,” Eurocopter Fennec AS555SN
Japan-Malaysia Bilateral Exercise (MALPAN)	Mar. 8, 2025	Strait of Malacca	Destroyers JS “Ariake” and JS “Hamagiri”	Frigate KD "Lekiu" and KD “Lekir”
Japan-Malaysia Bilateral Exercise (MALPAN)	Apr. 14-15, 2025	Strait of Malacca and Port Klang	Minesweeper tender JS “Bungo,” minesweeper JS “Etajima”	Minesweeper Coastal KD Mahamiru, Minesweeper Coastal KD Kinabalu Divers (Naval Diving and Mine Warfare)
Japan-Malaysia Bilateral Exercise (MALPAN)	Jun. 10, 2025	South China Sea	JS “Harusame”	Patrol vessel KD Terengganu
Japan-Malaysia Bilateral Exercise (MALPAN)	Nov. 11-12, 2025	Harbor Phase: Kota Kinabalu Port Sea Phase: South China Sea	Destroyer JS Akebono (IPD25, 4th surface unit)	Patrol vessel KD Selangor

[Laos]

High-level talks, etc.	Mar. 2023	Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Laos (Tokyo (12th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice- Ministerial Forum))
	Mar. 2023	Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	Jan. 2024	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Laos (Tokyo (13th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Feb. 2024	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Deputy Minister of National Defence Laos
	Sep. 2024	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Lao Deputy Minister of National Defence (Vientiane)
	Nov. 2024	Meeting between Defense Minister and Lao Deputy Minister of National Defence (Vientiane (11th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus))
	Feb. 2025	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Laos (Fukuoka (14th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Nov. 2025	Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (12th ADMM-Plus))
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jun. 2024	Deployment of ASDF C-130Hs to Laos (overseas flight training)

Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Defense Minister, State Defense Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
2. The high-level exchange includes the status of the conclusion of important agreements, etc. relating to defense cooperation between both countries.
3. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.
4. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.
5. For multilateral exercises, refer to Reference 61.

Reference 49 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Asian Countries (FY2022 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2022-Mar. 31, 2026)

[Kazakhstan]

High-level talks, etc.	Oct. 2022	Video Teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan

[Nepal]

High-level talks, etc.	Oct. 2022	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and the Chief of Staff of the Nepal Army (New Delhi, India (IPACC))

[Mongolia]

High-level talks, etc.	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the General Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Nov. 2022	Visit to Japan by Commander of Air Force of the Mongolian Armed Forces
	May 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and the Commander of the Mongolian Army (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
	Jul. 2023	Visit to Mongolia by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the General Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces (Fiji (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Feb. 2024	Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	May 2024	VTC between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Mongolian Air Force
	May 2024	Visit to Mongolia by State Defense Minister
	Aug. 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the General Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces (official visit to Ulaanbaatar)
	Sep. 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the General Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces (Hawaii (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Sep. 2024	VTC between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Mongolian Air Force
	Oct. 2024	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Mongolian Air Force (Tokyo (AFFJ))
	Mar. 2025	VTC between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Mongolian Air Force
	Dec. 2024	☆Signing of the Agreement between Japan and Mongolia concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
	Jan. 2025	☆Entry into force of the Agreement between Japan and Mongolia concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
	May 2025	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and the Commander of the Mongolian Army (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
	Jun. 2025	Visit to Japan by the Commander of the Mongolian Army
	Aug. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the General Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces (Thailand (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Feb. 2026	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of the General Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces (official visit to Tokyo)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Mar. 2024	6th Japan-Mongolia Politico-Military-Security Dialogue, 6th Japan-Mongolia Military to Military Dialogue (Ulaanbaatar)

Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Defense Minister, State Defense Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
2. The high-level exchange includes the status of the conclusion of important agreements, etc. relating to defense cooperation between both countries.
3. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.
4. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.
5. For multilateral exercises, refer to Reference 61.

Reference 50 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Pacific Island Countries (FY2022 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2022-Mar. 31, 2026)

[Solomon Islands]

High-level talks, etc.	Aug. 2022	Visit to the Solomon Islands by State Defense Minister
	Mar. 2024	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Solomon Islands Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Police, National Security and Correctional Services (Tokyo (JPIDD))
	Feb. 2026	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Solomon Islands Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Police, National Security and Correctional Services (Tokyo (JPIDD))

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Solomon Islands)
Japan- Solomon Goodwill exercise	Aug. 4, 2023	Honiara Port	JS “Shiranui”	Maritime boarding team
Japan-Solomon Islands Bilateral Exercise	Jun. 9-13, 2025	Honiara (Solomon Islands)	IPD25 Boarding Inspection Team	Sea Patrol officers

[Tonga]

High-level talks	Jul. 2022	Japan-Tonga Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Component Commander of the Tongan Maritime Force (Sydney (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Nov. 2022	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Tongan Maritime Force (Tokyo (WPNS))
	Aug. 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and the Commander of the Tongan Army Ground Forces (Perth, Australia (CAS))
	Nov. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Tongan Maritime Force (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	Mar. 2024	Japan-Tonga Ministers of Defense Meeting (Tokyo (JPIDD))
	Aug. 2024	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Tongan Army Ground Forces (Nadi, Fiji (IPAMS))
	Apr. 2025	Japan-Tonga Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Nov. 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Tongan Maritime Force (Sydney (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	Feb. 2026	Japan-Tonga Ministers of Defense Meeting (Tokyo (JPIDD))
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jul. 2024	Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD24), 3rd surface unit, participation of the destroyer JS “Noshiro” in the International Fleet Review hosted by the Tongan Maritime Force

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Tonga)
Japan-Tonga Goodwill exercise	Aug. 20, 22, 2022	Area surrounding Nuku‘alofa	JS “Kirisame”	Patrol vessel VOEA “Ngahau Siliva”
Japan-Tonga Goodwill exercise	Aug. 30, 2023	Area surrounding Tonga	JS “Shiranui”	Patrol vessel VOEA “Ngahau Koula”
Japan-Tonga Bilateral Exercise	Sep. 1-5, 2025	Nukualofa (Kingdom of Tonga) and in the vicinity of Nukualofa	IPD25 Boarding Inspection Team	Tonga Royal Navy personnel

[Republic of Nauru]

High-level talks, etc.	Mar. 2024	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Commissioner of Police (Tokyo (JPIDD))

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Participating Units (Nauru)
Japan-Nauru Bilateral Exercise	Jun. 30-Jul. 4, 2025	Yaren (Republic of Nauru)	IPD25 Boarding Inspection Team	Maritime Unit Officers

[Republic of Vanuatu]
Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Republic of Vanuatu)
Japan-Vanuatu Goodwill exercise	Aug. 10, 2022	Area surrounding Vanuatu	JS “Kirisame”	Operation Center, Vanuatu Police Maritime Wing

[Papua New Guinea]

High-level talks, etc.	Mar. 2024	Japan-Papua New Guinea Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo (JPIDD))
	Jun. 2024	Visit to Papua New Guinea by ASDF Chief of Staff
	May 2025	Visit to Papua New Guinea by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	Aug. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander of Papua New Guinea Defence Force (Thailand (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Feb. 2026	Japan-Papua New Guinea Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo (JPIDD))
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jul. 2023	Memorial offering performance by PNG Defence Force Military Band and GSDF Central Band
	Sep. 2025	Joint Performance by the PNGDF Military Band and the JGSDF Central Band at the Independent State of Papua New Guinea 50th Independence Anniversary Military Music Festival

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Papua New Guinea)
Japan- Papua New Guinea Goodwill exercise	Jul. 11, 2023	Coral Sea	JS “Izumo”	Patrol vessel HMPNGS “Francis Agwi”
Japan- Papua New Guinea Goodwill exercise	Mar. 14, 2026	Port Moresby	Destroyer JS Shiranui, Training ship Yamagiri	Landing craft HMPNGS Cape Gloucester
Japan-Papua New Guinea Bilateral Exercise	Sep. 29-Oct. 3, 2025	Port Moresby (Papua New Guinea) and its vicinity waters	IPD25 Boarding Inspection Team	Maritime Element personnel

[Palau]

High-level talks, etc.	Aug. 2022	Visit to Palau by the State Defense Minister
	Jun. 2024	Visit to Palau by ASDF Chief of Staff
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jan. 2023	Dispatch of ASDF U-4 to Palau (overseas flight training)
	Aug. 2024	Commander of the Fleet Escort Force and Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD24), 2nd surface unit, participation of the destroyer JS “Ariake” in the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and Palau

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Palau)
Japan-Palau Goodwill exercise	Mar. 6, 2022	Area surrounding Palau	JS “Inazuma,” Training ship JS “Hatakaze”	Patrol vessel PSS “Kedam”
Japan-Palau Goodwill exercise	Jul. 20-22, 2022	Area surrounding Palau	JS “Kirisame”	Patrol vessel PSS “Kedam”
Japan-Palau Goodwill exercise	Jul. 27, 2022	Area surrounding Palau	JS “Shiranui”	Patrol vessel PSS “Kedam”
Japan-Palau Goodwill exercise	Aug. 20, 2024	Area surrounding Koror	Destroyer JS “Ariake” (IPD24, 2nd surface unit)	Patrol vessel PSS “Kedam”
Japan-Palau Bilateral Exercise	Oct. 13-17, 2025	Koror (Palau) and its vicinity waters	IPD25 Boarding Inspection Team	Maritime Security officers

[Fiji]

High-level talks	Jun. 2022	Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (Sydney (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Fijian Navy (Tokyo (WPNS))
	Oct. 2023	Courtesy call on the Fiji Minister of Home Affairs and Immigration by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	Mar. 2024	Japan-Fiji Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo (JPIDD))
	Jun. 2024	Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (21st Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Aug. 2024	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Fiji Infantry Regiment (Nadi, Fiji (IPAMS))
	Sep. 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (Hawaii, Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference)
	Nov. 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of the Fijian Navy (Sydney (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	Feb. 2026	Japan-Fiji Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo (JPIDD))

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Fiji)
Japan-Fiji Goodwill exercise	Aug. 15, 2022	Area surrounding Fiji	JS “Kirisame”	Patrol vessel RFNS “Kikau”
Japan-Fiji Bilateral Exercise	Nov. 3-7, 2025	Suva (Fiji) and its vicinity waters	IPD25 Boarding Inspection Team	Tonga Royal Navy personnel

[Federated States of Micronesia]

High-level talks	Mar. 2024	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Undersecretary, FSM Attorney General, Department of Justice (Tokyo (JPIDD))
	Feb. 2026	Meeting between State Defense Minister and Secretary of Justice of Micronesia (Tokyo (JPIDD))

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Federated States of Micronesia)
Japan-Federated States of Micronesia Goodwill exercise	Jul. 29-31, 2022	Area surrounding the Federated States of Micronesia	JS “Kirisame”	Operation Center, Federated States of Micronesia Border Control and Maritime Surveillance
Japan-Federated States of Micronesia Goodwill exercise	May 20-26, 2024	Kolonia	Deployed Special Boarding Platoon	Maritime Wing officers
Japan-Micronesia Bilateral Exercise	May 20-23, 2025	Kolonia (Federated States of Micronesia)	IPD25 Boarding Inspection Team	Sea Patrol officers

[Republic of the Marshall Islands]

High-level talks	Feb. 2026	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Marshall Islands Director of National Security (Tokyo (JPIDD))

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Republic of the Marshall Islands)
Japan-Marshall Islands Goodwill Exercise	May 14-16, 2024	Majuro and the surrounding area	Tank landing ship JS “Kunisaki” (IPD24, 1st surface unit), Yokosuka Fleet Training Command	Patrol vessel RMIS “Lomor II,” Sea Patrol officers
Japan-Marshall Islands Bilateral Exercise	Jul. 7-11, 2025	Majuro and in the vicinity of Majuro (RMI)	IPD25 Boarding Inspection Team	Sea Patrol officers

[Tuvalu]

High-level talks	Feb. 2026	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Tuvalu Police Commissioner (Tokyo (JPIDD))

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Participating Units (Tuvalu)
Japan-Tuvalu Bilateral Exercise	Sep. 15-19, 2025	Funafuti and the vicinity of Tuvalu	IPD25 Boarding Inspection Team	Maritime Surveillance Unit Officers

[Kiribati]

High-level talks	Feb. 2026	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Kiribati Acting Police Commissioner (Tokyo (JPIDD))

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Participating Units (Kiribati)
Japan-Kiribati Bilateral Exercise	Aug. 4-8, 2025	Tarawa (Republic of Kiribati) and in the vicinity of Tarawa	IPD25 Boarding Inspection Team	Maritime Unit Officers

[Samoa]

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Participating Units (Samoa)
Japan-Samoa Bilateral Exercise	Oct. 6-10, 2025	Apia (Samoa) and its vicinity waters	IPD25 Boarding Inspection Team	Maritime Wing officers

Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Defense Minister, State Defense Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
2. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.
3. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.
4. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.
5. For multilateral exercises, refer to Reference 61.

Reference 51 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Middle Eastern Countries (FY2022 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2022 - Mar. 31, 2026)

[Sri Lanka]

High-level talks, etc.	Nov. 2022	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Sri Lankan Navy (Tokyo (WPNS)
	Nov. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Sri Lankan Navy (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	May 2025	Conversation between Defense Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence of Sri Lanka (Colombo)
	Mar. 2026	Meeting between Defense Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence of Sri Lanka (Tokyo)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jun. 2023	Port of call (45th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement, DSPE, JS "Ikazuchi")

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Sri Lanka)
Japan-Sri Lanka Goodwill exercise	May 21, 2022	Off the coast of Colombo	Training ships JS "Kashima," JS "Shimakaze"	Patrol vessel SLNS "Sayurala"
Japan-Sri Lanka Goodwill exercise	Jul. 29, 2023	Off the coast of Colombo	JS "Samidare"	Patrol Vessel SLNS "Gajabahu"
Japan-Sri Lanka Goodwill exercise	Oct. 31, 2023	Off the coast of Trincomalee	JS "Akebono"	Landing Ship SLNS "Shakthi"
Japan-Sri Lanka Goodwill exercise	Jun. 22, 2024	Off the coast of Colombo	JS "Samidare"	Patrol Vessel SLNS "Gajabahu"
Japan-Sri Lanka Goodwill exercise	Nov. 19, 2024	Off the coast of Colombo	JS "Samidare"	Patrol Vessel SLNS "Gajabahu"
Japan-Sri Lanka Goodwill exercise	Apr. 4, 2025	Off the coast of Colombo	Minesweeper tender JS "Bungo," minesweeper JS "Etajima"	Patrol vessel SLNS Vijayabahu
Japan-Sri Lanka Goodwill exercise	Oct. 31, 2025	Off the coast of Colombo	Destroyer JS Akebono (IPD25, 4th surface unit)	Patrol vessel SLNS Sayura
Japan-Sri Lanka Goodwill exercise	Mar. 11, 2026	Off the coast of Colombo	JS "Onami"	Missile boat SLNS Nandimithra

[Pakistan]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Staff of Pakistan (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Staff of Pakistan (Tokyo (WPNS))
	Oct. 2024	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Staff of Pakistan (Venice (Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS))
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jun. 2021	8th Japan-Pakistan Security Dialogue, 11th Japan-Pakistan Military to Military Dialogue (VTC)
	Sep. 2023	9th Japan-Pakistan Security Dialogue, 12th Japan-Pakistan Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Nov. 2021	Unit-to-unit exchanges between Japan and Pakistan Air Forces (during participation in the Dubai Airshow)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Pakistan)
Japan-Pakistan Goodwill exercise	Aug. 2, 2024	Waters east of the Gulf of Oman	JS "Samidare"	Frigate PNS "Yarmook"

[Bangladesh]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Staff of the Bangladesh Navy (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Principal Staff Officer of the Armed Forces of Bangladesh (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Staff of the Bangladesh Navy (Tokyo (WPNS))
	Apr. 2023	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Principal Staff Officer of the Armed Forces Division of Bangladesh (Tokyo)
	Feb. 2023	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Air Staff of the Bangladesh Air Force
	May 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff and the Chief of Staff of the Bangladesh Army (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
	Nov. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Bangladesh Navy (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	Oct. 2024	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Air Staff of the Bangladesh Air Force (Tokyo (AFFJ))
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jan. 2022	Port of call (Minesweeper Tender JS "Uraga," Minesweeper Ocean JS "Hirado")
	Apr. 2023	Port of call (Minesweeper Tender JS "Uraga," Minesweeper Ocean JS "Awaji")

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Bangladesh)
Japan-Bangladesh Goodwill exercise	Jan. 10-11, 2022	Area surrounding Chittagong	Minesweeper Tender JS "Uraga," Minesweeper Ocean JS "Hirado"	Frigate BNS "Prottasha," Missile boat BNS "Nirmul"

[Republic of Maldives]

High-level talks, etc.	Sep. 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander of the Maldives National Defence Force (Hawaii (Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference))
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Mar. 2023	Port of call (IMED23 Minesweeper Tender JS "Uraga," Minesweeper Ocean JS "Awaji")
	Mar. 2023	Port of call (IPD23 JS "Samidare")

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Republic of Maldives)
Japan- Maldives Goodwill exercise	Mar. 30- Apr. 1, 2023	Malé	Minesweeper Tender JS "Uraga," Minesweeper Ocean JS "Awaji"	Maldivian Coast Guard, MNDF

[UAE]

High-level talks, etc.	Jun. 2023	Meeting ASDF Chief of Staff and UAE Chief of Air Force (Paris, France (Paris Air Show))
	Jan. 2024	Signing and entry into force of the Agreement between Japan and the UAE concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
	Oct. 2024	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and UAE Chief of Air Force (Tokyo (AFFJ))
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Sep. 2022	3rd Japan-UAE Military to Military Dialogue (Abu Dhabi)
	Dec. 2025	4th Japan-UAE Military to Military Dialogue (Japan)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Oct. 2023	Subject Matter Expert Exchange on Aviation Meteorology (ASDF)

[Israel]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (Tokyo)
	Jul. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Israeli Air Force (U.K.)
	Aug. 2022	Japan-Israel Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Aug. 2022	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (Tokyo)
	Nov. 2022	Meeting between ASDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Israeli Air Force (Tokyo)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Dec. 2022	6th Japan-Israel Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo), 3rd Japan-Israel Politico-Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Mar. 2025	4th Japan-Israel Politico-Military Dialogue (Israel)
	Jan. 2026	5th Japan-Israel Politico-Military Dialogue (Japan)

[Iran]

High-level talks, etc.	Apr. 2022	Japan-Iran Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference

[Oman]

High-level talks, etc.	Feb. 2024	Visit to Oman by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Oct. 2024	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Navy of Oman (Venice (Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS))
	Feb. 2025	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Navy of Oman
	May 2025	Conversation between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Staff of the Sultan's Armed Force of Oman (Japan (DSEI Japan))
	May 2025	Conversation between MSDF and Chief of Staff of the Sultan's Armed Force of Oman (Japan (DSEI Japan))
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jun. 2023	1st Japan-Oman Military to Military Dialogue (Muscat)
	May 2025	2nd Japan-Oman Military to Military Dialogue (Japan)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Oman)
PASSEX with the Royal Navy of Oman	Jun. 26, 2022	Muscat Port (Oman) and its surrounding waters	JS “Samidare”	Patrol ship “HKASAB”
PASSEX with the Royal Navy of Oman	Jan. 5, 2023	Waters east of Salalah, Oman	JS “Suzutsuki”	Corvette SNV “SADH”
Japan-Oman PASSEX	Aug. 3, 2023	Arabian Sea	JS “Ikazuchi”	Patrol ship SNV “ALRAHMANI”
Japan-Oman bilateral exercise	Jan.5, 2024	Gulf of Oman	JS “Akebono”	Corvette SNV “Al Mua’zzar”
Japan-Oman Goodwill Exercise	Mar. 3, 2025	Area surrounding Duqm	Minesweeper tender JS “Bungo,” Minesweeper Ocean JS “Etajima”	Patrol vessel RNOV “Sadh”

[Qatar]

High-level talks, etc.	Jun. 2024	Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Meeting(Singapore)
	Nov. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of Staff of the Qatar Armed Forces (Qatar)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Nov. 2023	1st Japan-Qatar Military to Military Dialogue
	Sep. 2025	2nd Japan-Qatar Military to Military Dialogue (Japan)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Qatar)
Japan-Qatar Goodwill Exercise	Nov. 4, 2024	Off the coast of Doha	JS “Murasame”	Patrol vessel QENS “Al Khor”

[Saudi Arabia]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces (Sydney, Australia (Indo-Pacific Seapower Conference))
	Jul. 2023	Japan-Saudi Arabia Defense Minister Meeting (Tokyo)
	Dec. 2023	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Saudi Assistant Minister of Defense (Riyadh)

[Türkiye]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chief of General Staff, Turkish Armed Forces (Brussels, Belgium (NATO Military Chiefs of Defence Meeting))
	Sep. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff Turkish Naval Forces Command (Newport, U.S. (International Seapower Symposium))
	Oct. 2024	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces (Venice (Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS))
	Nov. 2024	Video teleconference between GSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Turkish Land Forces
	Jan. 2025	Visit to Türkiye by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Aug. 2025	Japan-Türkiye Defense Ministerial Meeting (Türkiye)
	Oct. 2025	Conversation between the GSDF Chief of Staff, and the Commander of the Turkish Land Forces (VTC)
	Jan. 2026	Visit to Japan by Commander of the Turkish Land Forces

Joint Staff

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Türkiye)
Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the Turkish Navy	Oct. 28, 2022	Gulf of Aden	JS “Harusame”	Frigate TCG “Burgazada”

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Türkiye)
Japan-Türkiye Bilateral Exercise	Jun. 16, 2024	South of Kanto	Destroyer JS Takanami	Corvette TCG “Kınalıada”
Japan-Türkiye Goodwill Exercise	Aug. 8, 2024	Sea of Marmara	Training ships JS “Kashima” and JS “Shimakaze”	Frigate TCG “Barbaros,” missile boat TCG “Gurbet,” SH-70B

[Bahrain]

Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Nov. 2024	Held a reception to commemorate the 15th anniversary of participating in counter-piracy activities (Bahrain)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Bahrain)
Japan-Bahrain Goodwill exercise	Mar. 11, 2024	Off the coast of Bahrain	JS “Sazanami”	Patrol ship “Al-Muḥarraq”
Japan-Bahrain Goodwill exercise	Jul. 2, 2024	Off the coast of Bahrain	Destroyer JS “Samidare”	Patrol ship “Al-Muḥarraq”
Japan-Bahrain Goodwill exercise	Mar. 12, 2025	Off the coast of Bahrain	JS “Asahi”	Patrol vessel RBNS “Al-Sakhir”

[Jordan]

High-level talks, etc.	Feb. 2023	Visit to Jordan by the Chief of Staff, JS
	Apr. 2023	Video Teleconference between Chief of Staff, JS and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Jordan
	Feb. 2024	Japan-Jordan Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	Nov. 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Jordan (Tokyo)
	Aug. 2025	Japan-Jordan Defense Ministerial Meeting (Jordan)
	Dec. 2025	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Jordan (Jordan)
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Dec. 2022	4th Japan-Jordan Politico-Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Feb. 2026	5th Japan-Jordan Politico-Military Dialogue (Jordan)

Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Defense Minister, State Defense Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
2. The high-level exchange includes the status of the conclusion of important agreements, etc. relating to defense cooperation between both countries.
3. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.
4. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.
5. For multilateral exercises, refer to Reference 61.

Reference 52 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries (FY2022 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2022 - Mar. 31, 2026)

Africa

[Djibouti]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	Visit to Djibouti by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	Feb. 2023	Visit to Djibouti by Chief of Staff, JS
	Aug. 2023	Visit to Djibouti by MSDF Chief of Staff
	May 2024	Visit to Djibouti by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	Jul. 2025	Visit to Djibouti by Chief of Staff, JS
	Aug. 2025	Meeting between the Defense Minister and the Acting Minister of Defense of Djibouti (Djibouti)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Djibouti)
Japan-Djibouti Goodwill exercise	May 31, 2022	Gulf of Aden	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Shimakaze”	Patrol vessels DBNS “Captain Elmi Robleh,” DBNS “ADJUDANT ALI M.HOUMED”
Japan-Djibouti Joint PASSEX	Jul. 28, 2022	Waters surrounding Djibouti	JS “Harusame”	Patrol vessels DBNS “ADJUDANT ALI M.HOUMED”
Japan-Djibouti Cruising Exercise	Nov. 12, 2023	Waters surrounding Djibouti	JS “Ikazuchi”	Patrol vessels DBNS “ADJUDANT ALI M.HOUMED”

[Kenya]

High level talks	Feb. 2024	☆Signing of the Japan- Kenya Statement of Intent on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Jan. 2024	1st Japan- Kenya Military to Military Dialogue (Nairobi)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Kenya)
Japan-Kenya Goodwill Exercise	Mar. 16, 2025	Area surrounding Mombasa	Minesweeper tender JS “Bungo,” Minesweeper Ocean JS “Etajima”	Patrol vessel KNS “Shujaa”

[Uganda]

High-level talks, etc.	Nov. 2024	Meeting between Chief of Staff, JS and Commander of the Uganda People's Defence Forces (Tokyo)

[Seychelles]

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Seychelles)
Japan-Seychelles Goodwill Exercise	Jun. 20, 2024	Waters off the coast of Victoria	Training ships JS “Kashima” and JS “Shimakaze”	Two vessels	Patrol vessel PS “Topaz”
Japan-Seychelles Goodwill Exercise	Jul. 13, 2024	Area surrounding Victoria	JS "Sazanami"	One vessel	“Dornier”
Japan-Seychelles Goodwill Exercise	Mar. 24, 2025	Off the coast of Victoria	Minesweeper tender JS “Bungo,” Minesweeper Ocean JS “Etajima”	Two vessels	Patrol vessel PS “Andromache”

[South Africa]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2025	Meeting between the Chief of Staff, JS and the Chief of the South African National Defence Force (Japan (DSEI JAPAN))
	May 2025	Japan-South Africa Defense Vice-Minister Meeting (Japan)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (South Africa)
Japan-South Africa Goodwill Exercise	Jul. 2 and Jul. 4, 2024	Cape Town Port and waters off the coast of Cape Town	Training ships JS “Kashima” and JS “Shimakaze”	Frigate SAS “Amatola,” inshore patrol vessel SAS “King Shaka Zulu”

[Tunisia]

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Tunisia)
Japan-Tunisia Goodwill Exercise	Aug. 16, 2024	Area surrounding Tunisia	Training ships JS “Kashima” and JS “Shimakaze”	Two vessels	Coast guard patrol vessel TNS “Syphax,” H-60M

[Senegal]
Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Senegal)
Japan-Senegal Goodwill Exercise	Jul. 23, 2024	Area surrounding Dakar	Training ships JS “Kashima” and JS “Shimakaze”	Inshore patrol vessel SNS “Niani”

[Algeria]
Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Algeria)
Japan-Algeria Goodwill Exercise	Jul. 30, 2024	Area surrounding Algeria	Training ships JS “Kashima” and JS “Hatakaze”	Frigate ANS “El Faith”

Central and South America

[Argentina]
Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Argentina)
Japan- Argentina Goodwill exercise	Aug. 3, 2023	Off the coast of Buenos Aires	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Hatakaze”	Patrol vessel INS “Contraalmirante Cordero”, H-3, B-200
Japan- Argentina Goodwill exercise	Aug. 14, 2025	Off the coast of Puerto Belgrano	Training ships JS “Kashima” and JS “Shimakaze”	Destroyer “Sarandí,” corvette “Rosales”

[Colombia]

High-level talks, etc.	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander of the Colombian Navy (Tokyo (WPNS))
	Sep. 2025	Meeting between the Chief of Staff, JS and the Chief of the Joint Staff of the Military Forces of Colombia (Tokyo)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Colombia)
Japan-Colombia Goodwill exercise	Jul. 17, 2022	Caribbean Sea	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Hatakaze”	Frigates ARC “Antioquia,” ARC “Caldas”

[Chile]

High-level talks, etc.	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Navy (Tokyo (WPNS))
	Sep. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Navy (Newport, U.S. (International Seapower Symposium))
	Mar. 2024	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Navy (Official Invitation)
	Aug. 2025	Visit to Chile by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Exchange of the Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Chile)
Japan-Chile Goodwill exercise	Aug. 5, 2022	Area surrounding Hawaii	JS “Takanami”	Frigate CNS “Almirante Lynch”
Japan-Chile Goodwill exercise	Jul. 23, 2023	Off the coast of Valparaiso	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Hatakaze”	Frigates “Cochrane”, “Condell”
Japan-Chile Goodwill exercise	Jun. 18, 2025	From Osaka Bay to the Kii Channel	Minesweeper “Aoshima”	Training ship “Esmeralda”
Japan-Chile Goodwill exercise	Aug. 5, 2025	Off the coast of Valparaiso	Training ships JS “Kashima” and JS “Shimakaze”	Frigate “Capitán Prat”

[Brazil]

High-level talks, etc.	May 2022	Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the Brazilian Navy (Tokyo)
	May 2024	Meeting between the MSDF Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Joint General Staff of the Brazilian Armed Forces (Japan (DSEI Japan))
	Aug. 2025	Visit to Brazil by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Aug. 2025	First Japan-Brazil Foreign Affairs and Defense Dialogue (Brasília)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Brazil)
Japan-Brazil Goodwill exercise	Aug. 10, 2023	Off the coast of Rio de Janeiro	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Hatakaze”	Frigates “Independencia,” “Uniao,” AH-11B, UH-12
Japan-Brazil Goodwill exercise	Aug. 24, 2023	Off the coast of Recife	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Hatakaze”	Patrol vessel “Macau”
Japan-Brazil Goodwill exercise	Aug. 23, 29, 2025	Off the coast of Santos and in the vicinity of Rio de Janeiro	Training ships JS “Kashima” and JS “Shimakaze”	Frigates Defensora and União, AF-1, AH-11B, divers

[Peru]

High-level talks, etc.	Nov. 2022	Meeting between MSDF Chief of Staff and General Commander of the Peruvian Navy (Tokyo (WPNS))
	Sep. 2023	Conversation between MSDF Chief of Staff and General Commander of the Peruvian Navy (Newport, U.S. (International Seapower Symposium))
	Nov. 2024	☆Signing of the Japan-Peru Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
	Nov. 2024	Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and Peruvian Vice-Minister of Defence (Lima)
	Nov. 2025	Meeting between the MSDF Chief of Staff and the Commander of the Peruvian Navy (Sydney (Indo-Pacific Sea Power Conference))
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Oct. 2025	1st Japan-Peru Joint Commission meeting (Lima)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Peru)
Japan-Peru Goodwill exercise	Jul. 14-15, 2023	Off the coast of Callao	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Hatakaze”	Frigates “Palacios”, Patrol Combat Corvette “BAP Ferré”, Submarine
Japan-Peru Goodwill exercise	Jul. 22, 27, 2025	Off the coast of Kallao	Training ships JS “Kashima” and JS “Shimakaze”	Frigate Bolognesi, divers (Peruvian Navy Rescue Group)

[Mexico]
Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Mexico)
Japan-Mexico Goodwill exercise	Aug. 5, 2022	Area surrounding Hawaii	JS “Izumo”	Frigate ARM “Benito Juarez,” tank landing ship ARM “Usumacinta”
Japan-Mexico Goodwill exercise	Oct. 14, 2024	Pacific Ocean	Training ships JS “Kashima” and JS “Shimakaze”	Patrol vessel ARM “Jalisco”
Japan-Mexico Goodwill exercise	Jul. 15, 2025	Off the coast of Acapulco	Training ships JS “Kashima” and JS “Shimakaze”	Patrol vessel Hidalgo

[Guatemala]
Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Participating Units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (Guatemala)
Japan-Guatemala Goodwill Exercise	Sep. 29, 2025	Western Caribbean Sea	Training ships JS “Kashima” and JS “Shimakaze”	Guatemalan Navy: Inshore patrol vessels Tzacol and Gucumatz

Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Defense Minister, State Defense Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
2. The high-level exchange includes the status of the conclusion of important agreements, etc. relating to defense cooperation between both countries.
3. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.
4. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.
5. For multilateral exercises, refer to Reference 61.

Reference 53 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (FY2022 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2022 - Mar. 31, 2026)

High-level talks, etc.	Jun. 2022	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (19th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	May 2023	First telephone call of the Hotline Between Japan-China Defense Authorities by Japanese and Chinese Defense Ministers
	Jun. 2023	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (20th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jun. 2024	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (21st Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Nov. 2024	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Vientiane (11th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus))
	Nov. 2025	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus))
Regular discussions between defense authorities	Nov. 2022	14th Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs (VTC)
	Feb. 2023	Japan-China Military to Military Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Feb. 2023	17th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Apr. 2023	15th Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs (Tokyo)
	Oct. 2023	16th Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs (Yangzhou)
	Oct. 2024	17th Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs (Tokyo)

Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Defense Minister, State Defense Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
2. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.
3. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release.

Reference 54 Recent multilateral high-level exchanges (FY2022 and Beyond)

(Apr. 1, 2022 - Mar. 31, 2026)

Japan-U.S.-Australia- India Corporation For multilateral exercises, refer to Reference 61	Nov. 2022	Japan-U.S.-India-Australia Navy Chiefs Meeting (Tokyo (Malabar KLE))
	Sep. 2023	Japan-U.S.-India-Australia Navy Chiefs of Staff-level talks (Hawaii, U.S. (Malabar KLE))
	Oct. 2024	Japan-U.S.-Australia-India meeting between the Air Force Chiefs of Staff (Tokyo (AFFJ))
Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK Corporation For multilateral exercises, refer to Reference 61	Sep. 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff, Commanding General of U.S. Army Pacific, Australian Chief of Army and the Chief of Staff of the ROK Army (New Delhi, India (IPACC))
	Dec. 2023	Meeting between GSDF Chief of Staff, Commanding General of U.S. Army Pacific, Australian Chief of Army and the Chief of Staff of the ROK Army (Tokyo (LFS))
	May 2024	Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK panel discussion (Hawaii, U.S. (LANPAC))
Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippine Corporation For multilateral exercises, refer to Reference 61	Jun. 2023	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippine defense ministerial talks (Singapore (20th Shangri- La Dialogue))
	Nov. 2023	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippine meeting between the Air Force Chiefs of Staff (Hawaii (Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium))
	Dec. 2023	High-Level Meeting of the Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippine Land Forces and Marine Corps (Tokyo (LFS))
	Jul. 2024	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippine meeting between the Air Force Chiefs of Staff (Australia (Pitch Black 24))
	Aug. 2024	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippine quadripartite meeting (Indo Pacific Armies Management Seminar (Nadi, Fiji)) (GSDF Chief of Staff)
	Aug. 2024	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippine meeting between the Air Force Chiefs of Staff (Australia (Pitch Black 24))
	Sep. 2024	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippine quadripartite meeting (Melbourne, Australia) Chief of Army Symposium (GSDF Chief of Staff)
	Nov. 2024	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippine defense talks (Vientiane, Laos)
	Dec. 2024	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippine Land Forces Summit (LFS) (Tokyo) (GSDF Chief of Staff)
	Dec. 2024	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippine meeting between the Air Force Chiefs of Staff (Australia (Avalon Airshow))
	May 2024	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippine defense ministerial talks (Hawaii, U.S.)
	May 2025	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippine defense ministerial talks (Singapore (22nd Shangri- La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2025	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippine quadripartite meeting (Sydney, Australia (Talisman Sabre 25)) (GSDF Chief of Staff)
	Nov. 2025	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippine defense ministerial talks (Malaysia (ADMM-Plus))
	Dec. 2025	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippine quadripartite meeting (Tokyo (LFS/LFD)) (GSDF Chief of Staff)
Multilateral Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippine-ROK Cooperation	Nov. 2024	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippine-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Vientiane, Laos (ADMM-Plus))

Notes: 1. High-level talks in this document refers to meetings between the Defense Minister, State Defense Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and each Chief of Staff with their respective counterparts.
2. Video teleconference (VTC) refers to video conference or web-based conference.

Reference 55 **Record of Major Multilateral Security Dialogues (Indo-Pacific Region, FY2022 and Beyond)**

(Apr. 1, 2022 - Mar. 31, 2026)

	Dialogue		Date
Participation in Security Dialogues in the Indo-Pacific Region	Intergovernmental	○ ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)	
		· Ministerial Meeting	(Jun. 2021, Nov. 2022, Nov. 2023, Nov. 2024, Nov. 2025)
		· ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting Plus (ADSOM-Plus)	(Apr. 2021, May 2022, Aug. 2023, Sep. 2024, Sep. 2025)
		· ASEAN Defence Senior Officials' Meeting Plus Working Group (ADSOM-Plus WG)	(Apr. 2021, Jun. 2021, Feb. 2022, Mar. 2022, Apr. 2022, Oct. 2022, Feb. 2023, May 2023, Jul. 2023, Aug. 2023, Feb. 2024, Sep. 2024, Oct. 2024, Jan. 2025)
		· Experts' Working Group (EWG)	
		Counter-Terrorism EWG	(Jun. 2021, Dec. 2021, Mar. 2025, Jul. 2025, Jan. 2026)
		HA/DR-EWG	(Apr. 2021, Nov. 2021, May 2022, Nov. 2022, Aug. 2023, Oct. 2023, Mar. 2024, Nov. 2024, Jul. 2025, Oct. 2025, Jan. 2026)
		Maritime Security EWG	(Jul. 2021, Feb. 2022, May 2022, Jul. 2022, Aug. 2022, Feb. 2023, Aug. 2023, Sep. 2023, Mar. 2024, Nov. 2024, Mar. 2025, Oct. 2025, Mar. 2026)
		Military Medicine EWG	(Jun. 2021, Jun. 2022, Nov. 2022, Mar. 2023, Sep. 2023, Oct. 2023, Feb. 2024, Oct. 2024, Apr. 2025, Oct. 2026, Jun. 2026, Feb. 2026)
		Peacekeeping Operations EWG	(Apr. 2021, Sep. 2021, Dec. 2021, Oct. 2022, Dec. 2022, Mar. 2023, Sep. 2023, Dec. 2023, Dec. 2024, Jun. 2025, Dec. 2025)
		Humanitarian Mine Action EWG	(Sep. 2021, Jul. 2022, Feb. 2023, Sep. 2023, Dec. 2024, Dec. 2025)
		Cyber Security EWG	(Nov. 2021, Jul. 2022, Nov. 2022, Jul. 2023, Nov. 2023, Aug. 2024, Oct. 2024, Nov. 2025, Jan. 2026)
		○ ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting	(Jun. 2022, Nov. 2023, Nov. 2025)
		○ ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)	
		· Defence Officials' Dialogue	(May 2021, Apr. 2022, May 2023, May 2024, May 2025)
		· Security Policy Conference	(May 2021, Jun. 2022, Jun. 2023, Jul. 2024, Jun. 2025)
	Hosted by the Government	○ Doha Forum	
	Hosted by the Government and private sector	○ Raisina Dialogue	(Apr. 2022, Feb. 2023, Feb. 2024, Mar. 2025)
	Hosted by the private sector	○ IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)	(Jun. 2022, Jun. 2023, May 2024, May 2025)
		○ IISS Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)	(Nov.2023, Dec. 2024, Oct. 2025)
Security Dialogue hosted by the Ministry of Defense	○ Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum		(Mar. 2023, Jan. 2024, Feb. 2025)
	○ International Conference of Cadets		(Mar. 2022, Mar. 2023, Feb. 2024, Feb. 2025, Dec. 2025)
	○ Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue		(Sep. 2021, Mar. 2024, Feb. 2026)

Reference 56 Multilateral Security Dialogues Organized by the Ministry of Defense

Security Dialogue			Outline	Recent Situations
Organized by Ministry of Defense	Internal Bureau and others	Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense since 2009. Vice-ministerial level officials and others from the defense authorities of ASEAN countries, the ASEAN Secretariat are invited to Japan to hold candid dialogues on regional security issues. The objective is to strengthen multilateral and bilateral relations by building close interpersonal relationships.	During the 14th meeting held in Fukuoka in February 2025, the Vice Minister-level defense authorities of each country revisited specific defense cooperation achievements undertaken under "JASMINE," which was presented by Japan at the 8th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting, and held candid discussions aimed at implementing new initiatives in the future.
		Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD)	JPIDD was held in 2021 for the first time. It was organized by the MOD, with participation by Pacific Island countries and region partner countries. (The first session was conducted online due to COVID-19.) The event was an opportunity to exchange views on a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, maritime security, space/cyber, new security challenges such as influence operations through disinformation, climate change, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and similar issues, as well as promote mutual understanding and confidence-building between participating countries.	In March 2024, the 2nd Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue was held for the first time in a face-to-face format, with the participation of 14 Pacific Island countries and 7 partner countries (the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, New Zealand, and Chile). The future of cooperation and collaboration in Pacific Island countries was also discussed, and Japan presented the "Cooperation Concept for United Security Efforts in the Pacific Islands Region".
		Professional Airmanship Program (PAP)	Hosted by the MOD and part of efforts under the Vientiane Vision 2.0, the principle for Japan's defense cooperation with ASEAN, PAP is a place to share knowledge and exchange views, targeting air force officers and others of the ASEAN countries and the ASEAN Secretariat.	The 5th PAP was held in August 2025. It included a seminar on "Awareness Beyond the Space Domain (Utilization of Outer Space)," unit training (Space Operations Group), and external training (visits to Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Tsukuba Space Center and Astroscale). Participants deepened their understanding of the practical application of the rule of law and cooperation in rule-making. Through this program, mutual understanding and confidence building were further promoted among the MOD/JSDF and air forces of ASEAN member states.
	GSDF	G5 Dialogue (G5D)	Hosted by the GSDF for the first time in 2017, this dialogue provides a platform for the army and other services of like-minded countries that has close ties with the GSDF to exchanges views on multilateral engagement in the Asia-Pacific region for the armies to actively contribute to regional peace and stability.	In February 2018, with the participation of five service branches from four countries to include the U.S. (including the Marines), Australia, the U.K. and France, group discussions under the theme of "Direction of defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region the army should aim for" and field trip to the GSDF Chemical School were carried out.
		Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST)	Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, inviting officers in charge of logistics support from major countries in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on logistic system.	The 23rd Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST) meeting was held in November 2019. The participants were working-level officers in charge of logistics sent from armies in 25 countries in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe. Views were exchanged under the theme "Logistic in Urban Disaster Response (including Measures for the Olympic Games)."
	MSDF	Indo-Pacific Naval College Seminar (IPNCS)	Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1998 with the participation of naval college staff from the Indo-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on the roles of naval forces with a view to encouraging school education or research and contributing to the promotion of defense exchange and mutual understanding between participating countries. (*From 1988 to 2021, the seminar conducted as the Asia-Pacific Naval College Seminar (APNCS)	In February 2026, the 29th seminar was held with participants at the rank of naval captain from 24 countries, and a lively exchange of views was held on various issues, naval efforts, and other details pertaining to the Indo-Pacific region based on the following topic: "Efforts toward Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Naval Cooperation in an Era of Uncertainty."
		Western Pacific Naval Symposium Short Term Exchange Program (WPNS STEP)	Hosted by the MSDF, this program has been held annually since 2011, with the participation of junior naval officers from the WPNS countries. The program is designed to provide them with opportunities to deepen their understanding of Japan's security environment, defense policy or buildup, and culture and history.	In September 2025, the 13th WPNS STEP was held with the participation of 30 countries, with presentations by participants on their countries' security environments and naval activities, discussions on the theme of "Trusted Seas: Naval Cooperation in Addressing Diverse Challenges," cultural training, and unit training. Through these discussions and cultural exchanges, the program promoted mutual understanding and confidence building, and established a personal network among naval officers of each country.
	ASDF	Air and Space Power Symposium	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2022, with the participation of officials related to air staff colleges mainly from the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on officer's education. (From 1996 to 2014 and from 2015 to 2021, this seminar was held as International Air Force Education Seminar and Japan Air Self-Defense Force Air Command and Staff College Seminar, respectively.)	In February 2026, air staff college personnel and researchers from both Japan and abroad were invited to take part in a keynote speech by former Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, YOSHIDA Yoshihide, research presentations, and the exchange of views on the following topic: "Air and Space Power in the Era of Joint and Multi-Domain Operations: Building More Effective Aerospace Defense Capabilities."
		International Air Command and Staff Seminar	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with the participation of students of air staff college students from the Asia-Pacific region. This program is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on security and roles of nations.	The 24th seminar was held in February 2026, with participation by 31 participants, including air staff college students, from 23 countries and one organization. Participants held a group discussion.
	National Defense Academy	International Seminar on Defense Science	Hosted by the National Defense Academy since 1996, this seminar provides opportunities to discuss international affairs and security by inviting military academy representatives from the Asia-Pacific regions.	The 21st International Seminar on Defense Science was held in July 2016, inviting 10 countries. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of "Commitment to national cybersecurity by military academy and services in education and research." This seminar ended in 2016.
		International Cadets' Conference	Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this conference has been held annually since 1998 with the participation of cadets from each country. The conference is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on militaries in the 21st century.	In December 2025, the 29th conference was held, and opinions were exchanged on the theme of "Qualities Required of Modern Military Officers."

Security Dialogue			Outline	Recent Situations
Organized by Ministry of Defense	National Institute for Defense Studies	International Symposium on Security Affairs	Hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, this symposium has been held annually since 1999 with officials at home and abroad knowledgeable about defense being invited. The symposium is designed to provide them with opportunities for advanced and professional reports and discussions on security issues in addition to enhancing public awareness of security issues.	The 25th International Symposium on Security Affairs was held in December 2024. The theme was “National Security Space Policies in the Changing Environment.” Experts from Japan, the U.S., the U.K., and France exchanged views in a hybrid face-to-face/online format. In addition, the event was streamed live online so that it could be viewed by anyone interested from within or outside the ministry.
		International Forum on War History	Hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with participation by military historians. The forum is designed to deepen the mutual understanding of its participants by making comparative studies of military history.	The 22nd International Forum on War History was held in September 2024. The theme was “The Role of Military Cooperation in Times of Crisis.” Experts from Japan, the U.S., the U.K., and Canada exchanged views in a hybrid face-to-face/online format. In addition, the event was streamed live online so that it could be viewed by anyone interested from within or outside the ministry.
		ASEAN Workshop	Hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, this workshop-style group study session has been held annually since 2010 to discuss emerging security issues that the Asia-Pacific region faces in common. Since 2018, participating regions are limited to ASEAN countries.	In January 2025, face-to-face discussions were held with experts from the U.S., Australia, Malaysia, and the Philippines under the theme of “New Strategies in Southeast Asia?” In addition, the event was streamed live online so that it could be viewed by anyone interested from within or outside the ministry.

Reference 57 Other Multilateral Security Dialogues

Other Multilateral Security Dialogue			Overview
Hosted by the Government	Internal Bureau	South Pacific Defense Minister's Meeting (SPDMM)	A meeting in which defense ministers from South Pacific nations participate to discuss various security topics essential for the maintenance of peace and stability of the region. Japan first joined the 7th meeting in 2022 as an observer.
	Internal Bureau and others	ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)	Started in October 2010. It is a government-sponsored official meeting of the defense ministers in the Indo-Pacific region, which provides opportunities to exchange views on issues related to regional security. It was decided in the 4th ADMM-Plus held in October 2017 that this meeting will take place annually instead of biennially.
		ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting	First held in 2014. It is a platform for defense ministers of all of the ASEAN nations and Japan to discuss a wide spectrum of security related issues, and to exchange views on concrete action plans to develop future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation.
		ARF: ASEAN Regional Forum	A forum that started in 1994, designed to improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region through political and security dialogue and cooperation. Currently 25 countries and 1 region (11 ASEAN nations, 14 non-ASEAN nations including Japan, and 1 region) as well as 1 organization (EU) are members of the forum. In the ARF, authorities in charge of diplomacy and defense meet through various government-to-government meetings to discuss the current regional situation and security area.
		Asia-Pacific Military Operations Research Symposium (AMORS)	AMORS is a forum held by Asia-Pacific countries on a rotational basis to exchange views on defense operations and research technology. Japan has participated in the forum since the second meeting in 1993.
		Seoul Defense Dialogue (SDD)	This event, hosted by the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK and participated in by the defense vice ministers of Asia-Pacific and Western countries, is a forum for exchanging opinions regarding regional security issues, including the issues of the Korean Peninsula. Japan has participated since the first meeting in 2012. This event, hosted by the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK and participated in by the defense vice ministers of Asia-Pacific and Western countries, is a forum for exchanging opinions regarding regional security issues, including the issues of the Korean Peninsula. Japan has participated since the first meeting in 2012. In 2024, the meeting was held with participation by minister-level representatives of various countries.
		Doha Forum	Doha Forum is an international conference hosted by the Government of Qatar and participated in by ministers and government officials, intellectuals and personnel from international organizations specialized in diplomacy, security, global issues (climate change and emergence of global powers, etc.), and energy-related problems. Participants have unrestricted discussions. The Forum has been held every year since 2001, and Japan participated in this forum for the first time in 2019.
		Schuman Security and Defence Forum	Hosted by the EU, the EU-Defense Summit brings together defense ministers from EU member states and partner countries, experts, and officials from international organizations to discuss various issues related to EU security and defense in light of the increasingly complex security environment. Participated in the 1st meeting in March 2023.
	Joint Staff	Indo-Pacific Chief of Defense Conference (CHODs)	ICHOD is an annual conference hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries on a rotational basis. Senior defense officials and others of Indo-Pacific countries meet to exchange views on security issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1998.
		South Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference	Navy Chiefs of Staff-level Meeting held in preparation for the South Pacific Defense Ministers' Meeting, attended by the chiefs of staff and other officials from seven countries: the Kingdom of Tonga, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Chile, France, and Fiji. Japan has participated as an observer since 2022.
		The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific	It is a meeting of the heads of maritime law enforcement, military, immigration, and customs agencies around the South Pacific to discuss security issues. Japan has participated as an observer since 2022.
		Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)	PASOLS is a seminar hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis mainly to exchange information on logistic-support activities. Japan's participation in the seminar as an official member started in 1995 when the 24th session was held. The 47th Seminar was held in Japan with participation of nearly 30 countries and organizations in 2018.
		Raisina Dialogue	Raisina Dialogue is an international conference co-hosted by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, and the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) and participated in by Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers, Chiefs of Staff, etc., from over 100 countries worldwide. Participants discuss matters in diverse fields including the field of security. The MOD has participated in the Dialogue since its third session in 2018 (1st: Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; 2nd: Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs; 3rd: Chief of Joint Staff and Special Advisor to the Prime Minister; 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th: Chief of Staff, Joint Staff; 9th: Director General, Operations Department, Joint Staff (Acting); 10th: Chief of Staff, Joint Staff).
	GSDF	Indo Pacific Army Chiefs Conference (IPACC)	IPACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every other year when IPAMS is held. Army chiefs of Asia-Pacific countries and others meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1999.
		Indo Pacific Armies Management Seminar (IPAMS)	IPAMS is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about efficient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Indo-Pacific region can develop their ground troops. The GSDF has participated in PAMS since the 17th meeting in 1993.
		Land Forces Pacific Symposium and Exposition (LANPAC)	This is a symposium held each year in Hawaii, the U.S., by the Association of the United States Army (AUSA). It is a place for high-level government officials from each service of the armies of several countries from the Indo-Pacific region to exchange opinions in respect of strategic issues within the region through panel discussions or conversations, and similar.
		Chief of Army Symposium (CAS)	While the seminar was initially called either the Chief of Army's Exercise (CAEX) or the Chief of Army Land Forces Seminar (CALFS), it has been referred to as the Chief of Army Symposium since 2021. It is an exercise hosted by the Australian Army every other year. Senior officers of the Australian Army as well as the heads of land forces in the Asia-Pacific region and experts attend and exchange a wide range of views on the issues facing the land forces in the region. Since its first participation in 2012, the GSDF has joined the seminar seven times thus far.
		Pacific Amphibious Leaders Symposium (PALS)	This event, which is hosted by the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and was held for the first time in May 2015, is intended to contribute to improving the amphibious operation capabilities of friendly nations in the Asia-Pacific region while also contributing to increased regional stability by strengthening relationships with the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and improving interoperability. The meeting has since been held once per year, and Japan has participated in all of them.
		Annual Meeting of the Association of U.S. Army (AUSA)	Hosted annually by AUSA in Washington, D.C., the Chief and Vice-Chief of Staff of the GSDF participate in the meeting, exchange opinions among the General-class officers from the U.S. Army, and deliver speeches.

Other Multilateral Security Dialogue			Overview
Hosted by the Government	MSDF	International Sea Power Symposium (ISS)	ISS is a symposium hosted by the United States every other year. Navy Chief of Staff of member countries and others meet to exchange views on common issues for their navies. Japan has participated in the symposium since the first meeting in 1969.
		Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)	WPNS is a symposium hosted by a member country on a rotational basis every other year when ISS in not held. Senior navy officials and others of Western Pacific countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.
		International MCM Seminar	This seminar is hosted by a WPNS member country on a rotation basis to exchange views on minesweeping in a year when minesweeping exercises are not conducted in the Western Pacific. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 2000. Japan's MSDF hosted this seminar in Yokosuka in October 2007.
		Asia Pacific Submarine Conference	Hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries in the Asia-Pacific region on a rotational basis to exchange views on issues centering around submarine rescue. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2001. The MSDF hosted the conference in October 2006.
		Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)	This symposium is held every two years hosted by a different participating country on a rotational basis. It is a platform for the Navy Chief of Staff from the Indian Ocean coastal countries to exchange their opinions concerning the maritime security of the Indian Ocean. Japan has participated since the third event in 2012.
		RAN Sea Power Conference (SPC) (From 2022, the name has been changed to the Indo-Pacific Sea Power Conference (IP).)	Held biennially as part of the Pacific International Maritime Exposition. As many navies send their Chief of Staff or Admirals to this conference, the conference serves as a platform for bilateral and multilateral exchange.
		Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS) (From 2022, the name has been changed to T-RSS: Trans-Regional Seapower Symposium)	Biennially hosted by the Italian Navy. Mostly attended by Chief of Staff of Navy from NATO nations who gather to exchange views on common naval challenges. Japan has participated since the 7th symposium in 2008.
		International Maritime Security Symposium (IMSS)	Hosted by the Indonesian Navy every other year. Navy Chief of Staff from mostly western Pacific nations exchange opinions on maritime security issues. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2013.
		Galle Dialogue	Hosted by the Sri Lankan Navy annually. Navy Chief of Staff from nations around the Indian Ocean exchange views on maritime security challenges. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2010.
		MILAN (Ocean Seminar)	Multilateral Exercise (MILAN) berthing event biennially led by the Indian Navy, and is a forum for the Navy Chiefs of Indian Ocean littoral states and others to exchange views on maritime security issues. The conference has been held since 1995, and the Maritime Self-Defense Force has been participating since 2022.
		IMSC: International Maritime Security Conference	Hosted biennially by the Singapore Navy, it is a forum for Navy chiefs and other naval officers from littoral states in the Indo-Pacific region to exchange views on maritime security issues. The MSDF has participated in this event since the 1st seminar in 2009.
		LIMA: Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition	The conference is held every other year under the auspices of the Royal Malaysian Navy and is a forum for exchanging views on initiatives in the field of military science and technology in each country at the Naval Technology Conference and the Chiefs of Staff Roundtable of each country. The conference has been held since 1991, and the NMFS has participated since 2017.
		First Sea Lord's Sea Power Conference 2024 (SPC: Sea Power Conference)	This naval symposium is hosted by the Royal Navy and offers an opportunity for participating countries to engage in a panel discussion on predetermined topics. The MSDF participated in this event for the first time in 2024.
		Participated in a RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) Sea Power Conference	This conference is hosted by the U.K. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and is supported by both NATO and the Royal Navy. Naval chiefs of staff of various NATO countries participate in the conference by holding a panel discussion, and the MSDF participated in this event for the first time in 2024.
	ASDF	Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS)	PACS is a conference hosted by the United States every other year with senior air force officials such as Air Chiefs and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1989.
		Space Symposium	Space Symposium is hosted by the United States every year with senior air force officials such as Air Chiefs and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the symposium since the 35th meeting in 2019.
		Global Air and Space Chief's Conference	Air and Space Power Conference hosted by the Royal Air Force of the United Kingdom is held every year and Chiefs of Staff of Air Forces exchange views on issues in the aerospace field in line with themes set up for each year. The ASDF has participated in this conference since 2009.
		Air and Space Power Conference (APC)	APC is an international conference hosted by Australia every other year to exchange views on air power. The ASDF has participated in this conference since 2000.
		Air Force Symposium	Air Force Symposium is hosted by the Philippine Air Force annually to exchange opinions under the themes concerning security. The ASDF has participated in this symposium since 2015.
		Aerospace Medicine Conference	Aerospace Medicine Conference is hosted by the Indian Air Force annually to exchange opinions concerning aerospace medicine. The ASDF has participated in this conference since 2019.
		Dubai International Air Chiefs Conference	Dubai International Air Chiefs Conference is hosted by the UAE Air Force biennially. Chiefs of Staff of Air Forces gather and exchange opinions on issues in line with themes set up for each year. The ASDF has participated in this conference since 2013.
		Colombo Air Symposium	Colombo Air Symposium is hosted by the Sri Lankan Air Force annually to exchange opinions concerning air power and air strategy. The ASDF has participated in this symposium since 2016.
		Military Flight Training International Conference	Military Flight Training International Conference is hosted by the PLA Air Force biennially to exchange opinions concerning flight training, etc. The ASDF has participated in this conference since 2016.
		NATO Partner Air Chiefs Conference	Held annually by the NATO Allied Air Command, it is a forum for the exchange of views among the Chiefs of Air Staff and others from NATO partner countries. Since 2014, The ASDF has participated so far.
		Air Force Forum in Japan	This conference is hosted by the Air Self-Defense Force. The Air Force Chiefs of Staff of various countries are invited to the conference, where they can exchange views, etc. This event has been held four times since 2004. In 2024, the event was held with 20 participants representing 19 countries as part of festivities to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the Air Self-Defense Force.
		Combined Space Operations (CSpO) Initiative Principals' Board	CSpO Initiative Principals' Board is comprised of the U.S. and other like-minded countries. Air force chiefs of staff, space chiefs, and others from participating countries meet to discuss space security.

	ASDF	Space Chiefs Forum	Space Chiefs Forum hosted by the U.S. is a multinational meeting on space. Air force chiefs of staff, space chiefs, and others from across the world meet to discuss country situations, among other matters.
		NATO Space Operations Commander's Conference	This conference is a forum for exchanges of views among NATO's space commanders. Japan has participated since 2024 to foster mutual understanding and relationships of trust with NATO.
Hosted by the Government	Defense Intelligence Headquarters	Indo- Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference (IPICC)	Hosted in turn by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and participating countries, the Conference serves as a place for the exchange of opinions among intelligence chiefs from the defense information ministries of countries in the Indo-Pacific region and other areas. Alongside exchanges of opinions on cross-border issues pertaining to regional security, the Conference is also aimed at contributing to the nurturing of relationships of trust between the respective countries, as well as at the sharing of information. To date, the Defense Intelligence Headquarters has co-hosted the Conference twice, in 2011 and 2025.
	National Institute for Defense Studies	ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Heads of Defence Universities, Colleges and Institutions Meeting	Defense universities and other educational institutions from the ARF member countries take turns and hold a meeting once a year. The host country plays the central role in making a decision on the themes with respect to global security issues in the Asia-Pacific region and the role of defense educational and research institutions, and the meeting takes place in the form of presentations and question-and-answer sessions based on certain themes. From Japan, National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending all of the meetings since the first meeting in 1997, and hosted the fifth meeting in 2001 and 22nd meeting in 2018 in Tokyo. For the 5th Meeting in 2001 and the 22nd Meeting in 2018, the Presidency hosted the conference in Japan. After 2020, due to the impact of COVID-19 and other factors, the meeting was canceled or conducted online, but in August 2023, the 25th meeting was held face-to-face in Malaysia for the first time in 4 years, and, in January 2025, the 26th meeting was held in Sri Lanka, which Japan participated in.
		NATO Defense College Conference of Commandants (CoC)	CoC is an annual international conference hosted by the NATO Defense College, defense educational institutions from NATO member countries and NATO partner countries in turns. During the meeting, the heads of participating educational institutions exchange opinions from the perspective of improving advanced defense education, while at the same time the meeting focuses on the promotion of educational exchange among the heads of the educational institutions, NATO member countries, and the dialogue partners in the Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Mediterranean region. From Japan, National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending most of the conferences since FY2009 (no invitation in FY2013). Although the 2020 CoC was canceled due to the impact of COVID-19, Japan participated in the CoC meeting in Denmark in 2021, the meeting in Germany in 2022, the meeting in Estonia in 2023, and the 53rd meeting in the U.S. in May 2024.
Hosted by the Private Sector	IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)		Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2002 with defense ministers and others of the Indo-Pacific region participating to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. From Japan, the Defense Minister has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2002 (except for the 3rd and 11th conferences in 2004 and 2012; and the State Minister of Defence participated in the 11th conference).
	IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Sherpa Meeting		A Sherpa meeting (preparation meeting) for the Shangri-La Dialogue hosted by the IISS. Defense authorities (Director General/ Vice Chief of Staff level) of the countries that attend the Shangri-La Dialogue exchange opinions on regional security issues. Japan has participated in this meeting since the 1st meeting was held in 2013.
	IISS Regional Security Summit (IISS Manama Dialogue)		Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held every year since 2004. Foreign and defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior official's level for the first time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the State Defense Minister. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th, 12th and 13th Conferences in 2010, 2016, and 2017. The Defense Minister participated in the 15th Conference for the first time.
	Munich Security Conference		This Conference was established in 1962. It is one of the most prestigious international conferences on security in Western countries. Foreign dignitaries such as Cabinet members, Diet/Parliament members, officers of defense authorities from Germany, which is the host country, NATO member countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, etc.), Russia, and central and eastern Europe countries attended. Japan participated for the first time in the 45th Conference in 2009, sending the Defense Minister. The State Defense Minister participated in the 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 55th Conferences in 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019. The Defense Minister participated in the 56th Conference in February 2020. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 61th Conference in February 2025.
	Warsaw Security Forum		This international conference, which is a forum for discussing transatlantic cooperation and security, was established in 2014 by the Polish think tank the "Casimir Pulaski Foundation" and the U.S. think tank the "German Marshall Fund." NATO and the National Security Bureau to the President of the Republic of Poland serve as co-hosting partners for the forum, and, during typical years, forum participants include Western country leaders, ministers, parliamentary representatives, and military personnel as well as military-industry and academic stakeholders. The Ministry of Defense participated for the first time in October 2022.
	Halifax International Security Forum		Hosted by Halifax International Security Forum with the support of the Canadian Department of National Defense, the Forum is attended by many government officials from the United States and Europe (including NATO Ministers and Defense Ministers from each EU country), who exchange opinions on security at the Forum. Japan has participated since the 1st Conference in 2009.
	The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)		Organized mainly by the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California, San Diego, this dialogue is designed for participants — private-sector researchers and government officials from member countries (China, North Korea, Japan, the ROK, Russia, the United States) — to freely exchange their views on security situations and confidence-building measures in the region. Japan has participated in the dialogue since the first meeting in 1993 (except in 2018).

Reference 58 Vientiane Vision 2.0

Key Elements

○ Reviewing our efforts over the past three years on defense cooperation with ASEAN under the Vientiane Vision announced in November 2016
○ Redefining the vision in line with the concept of the "Indo-Pacific"
○ Presenting three principles for our defense cooperation with ASEAN and including enhancement of resilience as one of the ends

Contents

1. Review of our efforts under the Vientiane Vision

(1) Multilateral efforts: Ship Rider Cooperation Program, HA/DR Invitation Program and Professional Airmanship Program

○ Heart-to-heart cooperation: Japan has contributed not only to enhancing participants' abilities by offering various practical programs, but also to creating a sense of unity among all ASEAN member state participants by offering opportunities to work together on common issues.

(2) Bilateral efforts: Defense cooperation programs (e.g. maritime security, HA/DR and engineering), defense equipment and technology cooperation, human resource development and academic exchanges, etc.

○ Tailored and lasting cooperation: Aiming to establish a self-standing system in partner countries, Japan has implemented various projects based on elaborate multi-year plans with special emphasis on the transparency of process.

(3) Having contributed to the enhancement of ASEAN's capabilities as a whole, especially in

(i) Ensuring the rule of law, (ii) Strengthening maritime security, and (iii) Assisting ASEAN's autonomous responses to regional challenges, such as natural disasters and non-traditional threats.

In so doing, we have also reaffirmed the importance of continuing and developing our efforts to uphold ASEAN's resilience, which is a basis for ASEAN centrality and unity.

⇒ Pursuing further practical cooperation to support ASEAN's resilience, and in turn, its centrality and unity

2. Redefining the Vientiane Vision in line with the concept of the "Indo-Pacific"

(1) As the hinge connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans, ASEAN is the key to regional cooperation.

(2) ASEAN's principles outlined in the "ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific," such as openness, transparency, inclusivity and a rules-based framework, share the same bases with those of Japan's vision for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific."

(3) Under its vision for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific," and with full respect for the "ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific," Japan will promote equal and open cooperation through partnership with ASEAN member states and all other countries that share the principles outlined above.

3. Three Principles for Japan's Defense Cooperation with ASEAN

(1) Heart-to-heart Cooperation: Upholding ASEAN's principles, valuing people-to-people connections and listening sincerely to partners' needs

(2) Tailored and Lasting Cooperation: Pursuing sustainable outcomes through well-planned, transparent and ongoing engagement

(3) Equal and Open Cooperation: Pursuing wide-ranging international collaboration that supports ASEAN centrality, unity and resilience

I. Ends:With a view to ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific that holds Southeast Asia as its hinge, the Japan Ministry of Defense aims to

(i) enhance the Japan-ASEAN Strategic Partnership and (ii) contribute to ASEAN centrality and unity by supporting its resilience.

II. Ways: On the basis of the above three principles, Japan aims to support ASEAN centrality, unity and resilience by taking the following approaches with special emphasis on the three key areas of cooperation.

(i) Approaches based on the principles of ASEAN centrality and unity

○ Japan promotes international collaboration between ASEAN member states and countries outside ASEAN, with a central emphasis on ASEAN-led frameworks

○ Japan promotes confidence-building and interoperability among ASEAN member states by enhancing connectivity and promoting shared norms and practices among defense authorities

(ii) Key areas of cooperation with a view to upholding ASEAN's resilience

○ Ensuring the rule of law: Promoting the development and sharing of universal norms regarding the sea, air space

○ Strengthening maritime security: Promoting ASEAN's efforts to enhance maritime domain awareness capabilities, and supporting individual states' efforts to enhance their national security, and in turn, regional peace and stability

○ Assisting ASEAN's organizational responses to regional challenges: Promoting ASEAN's efforts to enhance its capacity to deal with natural disasters and non-traditional threats

III. Means: As part of a concerted whole of government effort, JMOD conducts practical cooperation by combining the following diverse measures.

(i) Promoting Shared Understanding of International Norms: Holding programs such as seminars with a view to share knowledge on international norms and practices

(ii) Defense Cooperation Program: Assisting ASEAN's proactive efforts for enhancing its collective capabilities by sending JSDF personnel to Southeast Asia, inviting ASEAN practitioners to Japan

(iii) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation: Transferring equipment and technology, developing human resources, holding seminars on defense industries, etc.

(iv) Joint Training and Exercises: Conducting bilateral and multilateral joint exercises or expanding forms of participation and inviting ASEAN observers to JSDF training

(v) Human Resource Development and Academic Exchanges: Reinforcing human networks among students and trainees, inviting opinion leaders to Japan, etc.

Reference 59 Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation (JASMINE)

Overview
○ On November 15, 2023, during the 8th ASEAN-Japan- Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting, Defense Minister Kihara presented this initiative, JASMINE, to advance Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation to a new level in the face of an increasingly severe and complex security environment
○ In line with the spirit of "Vientiane Vision 2.0," which presents the overall picture of Japan's direction of defense cooperation with ASEAN, JASMINE proposed specific defense cooperation under four pillars in order to realize the shared vision of the future for the Indo-Pacific region

Four Pillars	Projects
I. Japan-ASEAN to carry out efforts to create a security environment that does not allow any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion ・Working with ASEAN to create a security environment that does not allow any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. ・Promoting practical defense cooperation between Japan and ASEAN to secure prosperity through the open and stable seas and air. ・Specific interrelated efforts to contribute to the first pillar include ensuring the rule of law and strengthening security of the seas and the air. ✓ Ensuring the rule of law: Reaffirming the importance of the rule of law, and becoming the practitioners of the rule of law, further strengthen the rule of law in various domains, including space and cyber, while promoting cooperation in rule-making. ✓ Strengthening security of the seas and the air: Continuing working on developing confidence-building measures and strengthening Japan and ASEAN security capabilities towards ensuring the safety and stability of the sea and air in the Indo-Pacific region.	・Seminar on the rule of law and security in space domain ・Seminar on Air Domain Awareness (ADA) ・Seeking synergies between OSA, transfer of defense equipment and technology, capacity building, etc. ・"Japan-ASEAN Cyber International Law Seminar" ・"Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program (SRCP)" ・"Professional Airmanship Program (PAP),"etc.
II. To continue and expand the Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation ・The continuation and expansion of Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation to cover cross-border challenges, which we have traditionally been dealing with, as well as emerging issues. ✓ Continuation: Continuing defense cooperation with ASEAN in addressing cross-border challenges such as the impact of climate change, leading to rising sea levels and severe natural disasters, and terrorism which remains serious threat to the region. ✓ Expansion: Expanding Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation on emerging issues related to domains such as space or cyber, and cutting-edge technologies including AI.	・"Japan-ASEAN Seminar on Climate Change and Security" ・"Japan-ASEAN Cyber Security Training Program for Defense Authorities," etc.
III. To pursue further friendship and opportunities between Japan and ASEAN defense officials ・The pursuit of further friendship and opportunities among Japan-ASEAN defense officials. ✓ Friendship: Promoting mutual exchanges, strengthening the people-to-people foundation, and deepening the cooperative relationship between Japan-ASEAN. ✓ Opportunities: Creating opportunities for all humankind to not merely survive but prosper and live in dignity. Further promoting the "Women, Peace and Security (WPS)" agenda through Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation.	・New capacity building program on WPS for ASEAN ・Delivering seminars on WPS in capacity building programs on PKO and HA/DR, etc. ・Actively engaging in WPS-related trainings and events conducted in ASEAN countries ・Having exchange students at the National Defense Academy of Japan, the National Institute for Defense Studies, JSDF Staff Colleges, etc.
IV. To support defense cooperation between ASEAN, Japan, and the Pacific Island countries ・Supporting cooperation between ASEAN and countries from other regions, particularly Pacific Island countries by serving as a bridge, where appropriate. Contributing to the security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region by promoting regional interconnectivity. ・ASEAN, Japan, and Pacific Island countries share many common interests and challenges such as maritime security, climate change, and disaster response. Effectively addressing the common challenges by enhancing cooperation in these areas among ASEAN, Japan, and Pacific Island countries. Continuing to be a close partner with countries of the Indo-Pacific region by supporting regional interconnectivity while respecting ASEAN centrality and unity.	・Hosting the "Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program" and "Japan-Pacific Islands Countries and Timor-Leste Ship Rider Cooperation Program" concurrently, etc.

(Note) Some projects are relevant to multiple pillars.

Reference 60 **23rd Shangri-La Dialogue**
Speech by Defense Minister Koizumi

May 31, 2026

It is a great honor to speak in front of you today at the Shangri-La Dialogue, an extremely important forum for considering the future of the Indo-Pacific. I extend my heartfelt respect and gratitude to the IISS who organized this event, and to Singapore, our gracious host.

I am also delighted to share this stage with Minister of Defense Khaled of Malaysia and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of the Netherlands, Ms. Dilan.

Distinguished guests,

The Indo-Pacific is the world's center of growth. We are blessed with the power of youth, with technology and with vitality. And above all, we are bound together by free and open seas.

Peace and stability in this region are not matters for this region alone. They are directly linked to the peace and prosperity of the whole world.

Today, ministers from nations that bridge the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic are all gathered here. This demonstrates the connectivity of the three oceans. I want to extend warmest welcome to the Netherlands' recent presence in this region.

But at the same time, the Indo-Pacific is facing a severe reality. Attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion. Economic coercion. Challenges to the established rules. Complex competition, including in cyber, space, and information domains. The weaponization of everything. The boundary between peacetime and contingency is becoming increasingly unclear.

We are living in a time where social media and AI can be misused, and people's decisions can be shaken by disinformation and information manipulation. So what is really at stake today? It is the freedom of each nation to make their own choices by their own will.

Today, we are seeing a situation in which the Strait of Hormuz is unfree and closed. A strait that is neither free nor open. Sea lanes that are neither free nor open. An order that is neither free nor open. Who benefits from such a situation? The importance of a free and open order can never be overemphasized.

Distinguished guests,

Each nation has the power to choose for itself. And on that foundation, we build, protect, and strengthen a free and open region.

Japan will work together with all of you to realize this goal. This determination is embodied in the upgraded FOIP newly set forth by the Takaichi administration.

No country should be forced or coerced to take a certain path. Every country must be able to choose its future by its own will. And this region must remain open to all countries that respect our shared rules and principles.

This is the Indo-Pacific that Japan envisions.

That said, the vision will not be realized just by wishing for it. It requires action. It requires sustained action

In particular, the defense authorities play a crucial role in order to realize this vision. We need to make sure the efforts of each country will not end up being isolated. Operational cooperation. Joint training. Information-sharing. Defense equipment and technology cooperation. Defense industrial cooperation. Structural framework. We must consolidate all these efforts and turn them into effective deterrence and response capabilities.

We need three things to make this happen: trust, transparency, and talks.

Trust. International law is upheld. Sovereignty is respected. Unilateral change to the status quo by force or coercion cannot be tolerated. Without sharing this conviction, regional order does not make sense.

Transparency. Opaque military buildups and action without clear intensions will be the cause of distrust and miscalculation. Transparency is the baseline for reducing tensions and preventing crises.

And talks. All nations have different positions. All nations have different views. But that is precisely because we need to have talks. We engage in talks because we have differences. We continue to talk because there exists tensions between us.

Japan is always open to have talks with any country. At the ADMM-Plus held in Kuala Lumpur last year, hosted by Minister Khaled here, I had the opportunity to have a frank and fruitful discussion with my Chinese counterpart. I am feeling sad that we were unable to have the opportunity to have a meeting this time. But again, we keep the door open to talks. I remain committed to communicating with the countries concerned, including China, for the peace and stability in the region and of the world.

Distinguished guests,

Japan will take concrete actions.

First, Japan will steadily build up its defense capabilities and make continuous updates with a high degree of transparency.

AI. Unmanned systems. Cyber. Space. New ways of warfare using these technologies are spreading across the world. It is only natural that every country is working to update its own defense capabilities in order to respond to these new challenges. Japan, too, will respond to these new developments swiftly yet steadily.

We will do so in order to defend our nation and contribute to peace and stability of a free and open region. And Japan will carry out this update with a high degree of transparency. What are we developing these capabilities for? And based on what thinking? Japan will move forward while making a clear explanation to the international community.

The fundamental reinforcement of our defense capabilities, strengthening our defense production and technology base, and the revision of the three strategic documents expected to be done late this year are all part of this effort. Japan will not look away from reality. We will make the necessary preparations with a sense of responsibility.

Distinguished guests, some of you may have heard the term "new militarism," but nothing further from the truth.

Think about it. There is a country that has a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons and strategic bombers. Japan has neither of such weapons. And yet Japan is labeled "new militarism." Isn't it strange?

Since the end of the Second World war, Japan has consistently respected international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and has made sincere efforts to maintain and strengthen a free and open international order. Japan's path as a peace-loving nation has been valued by the region and by the international community. This fact will not be shaken by false claims. Because It is a fact.

And let me say this as well. Differences in perception and friction do arise between nations. What is needed at such times is not the repetition of unfounded claims in the other side's absence. What is needed is direct and candid dialogue. And in fact, Japan's door to dialogue is always open.

Second, Japan will further strengthen cooperation with all of you.

Strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Sophisticating training through the use of the Reciprocal Access Agreement with Australia, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom. Maritime domain awareness and cutting-edge technology cooperation in the Quad framework. Defense cooperation with ASEAN countries. Greater resilience of industrial base, including through PIPIR. And AUKUS. We will link all these efforts to turn points into lines, and from lines into planes.

Third, Japan is determined to play a new role in defense equipment cooperation across the region.

This April, Japan fundamentally revised its domestic framework concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology. The OSA, launched in 2023, is also steadily producing results. The aim of these initiatives is to tangibly strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the region. And both initiatives have been highly valued by countries across the region.

What matters now is to ensure the seamless provision of necessary equipment and capabilities to the region as a whole. What if necessary items run short and logistics is cut off in crisis? We cannot afford such a scenario as the whole region.

That is why Japan will be even more proactive in defense equipment cooperation, defense industrial cooperation, and maintenance and sustainment cooperation. Our aim is to ensure that each country has the capabilities it needs and to make them available when needed.

A great deal of cooperation is already underway. Cooperation with Australia on frigates. The provision of radar systems and patrol vessels to the Philippines. Development in cooperation on destroyers and frigates. New Zealand expressed their interest in Japan's naval vessels. And a new cooperation framework with Indonesia.

These efforts are not exclusive or not directed at any particular country. These are the efforts to support each country to choose for itself, to defend itself, and to contribute to regional stability. Japan is hoping to be a reliable partner for that purpose. And Japan is hoping to serve as a connecting point that bring together the efforts of the region.

Distinguished guests,

Division weakens deterrence. Unity strengthens deterrence.

If gaps emerge among the United States, Europe, and allies and like-minded countries, forces which take it as an opportunity will surely come in. We must prevent such a situation. We must keep our cooperation going on. Now is the time to make our cooperation even stronger.

What we seek is not a region that can only endure crisis. We seek a region that can stand against coercion. We seek a region that is not misled by falsehoods. We seek a region that is not influenced by pressure.

A Free and Open Indo-Pacific is not something to be given by someone. It is something we must build and protect ourselves. And something we must pass on to the next generation.

Japan will walk towards this goal with all of you. Japan will act together with all of you.

Thank you very much for your attention.

Reference 61 Participation in Multilateral Exercises (FY2022 and Beyond)

Joint Staff (Apr. 1, 2022 - Mar. 31, 2026)

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Locked Shields 2022	Apr.19-22, 2022	Estonia, Japan	NATO member states, etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of NATO member states
Multilateral Exercise hosted by French Forces in Polynesia (MARARA22)	May 8-19, 2022	French Polynesia	France, etc.	Joint Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Ground Component Command 5 personnel	—
Pacific Partnership 2022	Jun. 6, -Jul. 23, Aug. 27-Sep.10, 2022	Vietnam, Palau, Solomon Islands	U.S., U.K., Vietnam, Palau, Solmon Islands	Joint Staff Office; Ground Component Command; Japan Self-Defense Forces Central Hospital; Japan Self Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka; Headquarters Yokosuka District; Air Defense Command and Air Training Command; Cyber Defense Command; JMSDF Band, Tokyo; Japan Self Defense Forces Hospital Kure Approx. 20 personnel	—
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Exercise hosted by the United States (Fortune Guard 22) (*Note 2)	Aug. 8-12, 2022	Hawaii	The U.S., etc.	Joint Staff Office, GSDF Chemical School 4 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise	Oct. 6, 2022	Sea of Japan	The U.S., the ROK	JS “Chokai”	(U.S. Navy) Cruiser USS “Chancellorsville” (ROK) ROKS “Sejong Daewang”
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise	Oct. 6, 2022	Waters surrounding Japan	The U.S., the ROK	JS “Ashigara”	(U.S.) Several warships (ROK) Several warships
Multilateral Exercise hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Equateur 2022)	Nov. 14-25, 2022	French New Caledonia	France, etc.	Joint Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Ground Component Command 4 personnel	—
Cyber Coalition 2022	Nov. 28-Dec. 2, 2022	Estonia, Japan	NATO member states, etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of NATO member states
Bilateral Exercises with French Carrier Strike Group	Jan. 9-14, 2023	Western Gulf of Aden and northern Arabian Sea	France, the U.S.	JS “Suzutsuki”	(France) Aircraft Carrier FS “Charles de Gaulle,” Guided-missile FS “Forbin,” Frigates FS “Provence,” Replenishment tanker FS “Marne” (U.S.) USS “Truxtun”
Multilateral Exercise Cobra Gold 2023	Feb. 9-Mar. 10, 2023	Thailand and Japan (Ichigaya Area, Ministry of Defense)	Thailand, the U.S., Indonesia, Malaysia, the ROK, Singapore, Australia, China, India	Internal Bureau, Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command, Self Defense Fleet, Communications Command, Air Staff Office, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command, Air Communications and System Wing, Air Materiel Command Headquarters, JSDF Cyber Defense Command, Defense Intelligence Headquarters Approx. 130 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise	Feb. 22, 2023	Sea of Japan	The U.S., the ROK	JS “Atago”	(U.S.) USS “Barry” (ROK) ROKS “Sejong Daewang”
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise	Apr 17, 2023	Sea of Japan	The U.S., the ROK	JS “Atago”	(U.S.) USS “Benfold” (ROK) ROKS “Yulgok Yi I”
Locked Shields 2023	Apr.18-21, 2023	Estonia, Japan	NATO member states, etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of NATO member states
Croix du Sud 23	May 1-6, 2023	French New Caledonia	France, the U.S., Australia, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, New Zealand, Netherland, Philippines, Panama, Tonga, the U.K, Vanuatu	Joint Staff Office, MSDF Staff College 2 personnel	—
Multinational Exercise “Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),” (Eastern Endeavor 23) (*Note 2)	May 31, 2023	Korea (waters surrounding Jeju Island)	The U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Singapore	JS “Hamagiri”	—

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise	July 16, 2023	Sea of Japan	The U.S., the ROK	JS “Maya”	(U.S.) USS “John Finn” (ROK) ROKS “Yulgok Yi I”
Multilateral exercise GPOI Capstone exercise (Keris Aman 2)	Aug. 13-26, 2023	Malaysia	Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Thailand, Canada, Fiji, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, the ROK, Sri Lanka, the U.S., Uruguay, Vietnam, El Salvador, New Zealand, Malaysia (20 countries in total)	Joint Staff College, Ground Component Command 6 personnel	—
Pacific Partnership 2023	Aug. 18-29, Oct. 11-20, 2023	Republic of Fiji, Kingdom of Tonga, Independent State of Papua New Guinea	The U.S., Australia, New Zealand, the U.K., Tonga, Papua New Guinea	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command, MSDF Band, Tokyo, 1st Air Wing, Self-Defence Forces Central Hospital, Japan Self Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka, Japan Self Defense Forces Hospital Iruma Approx. 230 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise	Aug. 29, 2023	East China Sea	The U.S., the ROK	JS “Haguro”	(U.S.) USS “Benfold” (ROK) ROKS “Yulgok Yi I”
International Peace Cooperation Exercise (ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Exercise)	Oct. 14-21, 2023	Indonesia (Special Region of Yogyakarta)	ADMM Plus participating countries (18 countries) and ASEAN Secretariat (working level)	Joint Staff, GSDF, ASDF C-130×1 Approx. 40 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise	Nov.26, 2023	East China Sea	The U.S., the ROK	JS “Kirisame”	(U.S. Navy) Aircraft carriers USS “Carl Vinson,” USS “Sterett,” USS “Kidd,” (ROK Navy) ROKS “Sejong Daewang,”
Pacific Partnership 2024	Nov. 18-Dec.12, Dec. 21-Dec.30, 2023	Solomon Islands, Palau	The U.S., Australia, Solomon Islands, Palau	Joint Staff Office, Kure District Army, Sasebo District Army, 7th Air Wing, 8th Air Wing, Self-Defence Forces Central Hospital, Japan Self Defense Forces Hospital Hanshin, Japan Self Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka, Japan Self Defense Forces Hospital Iruma Approx. 20 personnel	—
Cyber Coalition 2023	Nov. 27-Dec. 1, 2023	Estonia, Japan	NATO member states, etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of NATO member states
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise	Dec.20, 2023	Airspace surrounding Northwestern of Kyushu	The U.S., the ROK	8th Air Wing F-2×4	(U.S. Air Force) B-1×2, F-16×3(ROK Air Force) F-15 ×2
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise	Jan. 14- 17, 2024	East China Sea	The U.S., the ROK	JS “Hyuga,” JS “Kongou”	(U.S. Navy) Aircraft carriers USS “Carl Vinson,” USS “Princeton,” USS “Sterett,” USS “Kidd,” (ROK Navy) ROKS “Sejong Daewang,” “Wang Geon”
Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 2024	Feb. 4-Mar. 17, 2024	Thailand	Thailand, the U.S., Indonesia, Malaysia, the ROK, Singapore, Australia, China, India, etc.	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command, GSDF Northern Army, GSDF Military Police, Self Defense Fleet, Communications Command, Air Staff Office, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command, Space Operations Group, Air Communications and System Wing, Air Materiel Command Headquarters, JSDF Cyber Defense Command, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Air Military Police Approx. 230 personnel	—
Locked Shields 2024	Apr. 23-26, 2024	Estonia, Japan	NATO member states, etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of NATO member states
Multilateral Exercise hosted by French Forces in Polynesia (MARARA24)	May 27-Jun. 4, 2024	French Polynesia and its surrounding waters	France, etc.	Joint Staff Office, Tank Landing Ship JS “Kunisaki” etc. Approx. 230 personnel	—

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
U.S.-hosted Multilateral Exercise "Valiant Shield 2024"	Jun. 7-18, 2024	JSDF facilities, waters and airspace around Japan, USFJ facilities and areas, waters from Japan to the waters surrounding the Philippines, U.S. Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii and Andersen Air Force Base on Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the waters and airspace around Palau	The U.S., etc.	Joint Staff Office, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, etc.	—
Japan-U.S.-ROK Joint Exercise "Freedom Edge 24-1"	Jun. 27-29, 2024	Ichigaya Area, Ministry of Defense, the waters and airspace around the East China Sea, etc.	The U.S., ROK	Self-Defense Fleet (Destroyers JS "Ise" and JS "Atago," Air Group), Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc. Approx. 490 personnel	(U.S. Armed Forces) Aircraft carrier USS "Theodore Roosevelt," destroyers USS "Halsey" and USS "Daniel Inouye," patrol aircraft P-8, fighter aircraft F/A-18, early warning aircraft E-2D, special operations helicopter MH-60 (ROK Armed Forces) destroyers ROKS "Seoae Ryu Seong-ryong" and ROKS "Gang Gam-chan," patrol aircraft P-3, Westland Lynx anti-submarine helicopter, fighter aircraft KF-16
Pacific Partnership 2024-2	Jul. 15-19, Sep. 4-10, Oct. 7-15, 2024	Republic of Vanuatu, Federated States of Micronesia	The U.S., Australia, Canada, Vanuatu, Micronesia	Joint Staff, Ground Component Command, Middle Army, Japan Self-Defense Forces Central Hospital, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Band, Tokyo, Japan Self Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka, Air Defense Command, Self Defense Force Sendai Hospital, Maritime Staff Office, Self-Defense Fleet, 3rd Service School of the Maritime Self-Defense Force Approx. 20 personnel	—
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Exercise "Pacific Protector 24"	Sep. 25-27, 2024	Sydney, Australia and the waters and airspace around it	The U.S., Australia, New Zealand, the ROK, Singapore	Joint Staff Office, Ground Component Command, Self-Defense Fleet (1 aircraft (P-1) and Special Boarding Unit personnel)	—
New Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines multilateral exercise	Sep. 28, 2024	South China Sea	The U.S., Australia, the Philippines, New Zealand	JS "Sazanami"	(U.S. Navy) Destroyer USS "Howard" (Royal Australian Navy and Air Force) Destroyer HMAS "Sydney," P-8A (Philippines Navy) Frigate BRP "Antonio Luna" and patrol vessel BRP "Emilio Jacinto" (New Zealand Navy) Replenishment ship HMNZS "Aotearoa"
Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise	Nov. 3, 2024	Airspace northwest of Kyushu	The U.S., ROK	8th Air Wing (Tsuiki) F-2 fighter aircraft × 4	(U.S. Air Force) B-1 bomber × 1, F-16 fighter aircraft × 3 (ROK Air Force) F-15 fighter aircraft × 4
Second Japan-U.S.-ROK Joint Exercise "Freedom Edge 24-2"	Nov. 13-15, 2024	Ichigaya Area, Ministry of Defense, the waters and airspace around the East China Sea, etc.	The U.S., ROK	Self-Defense Fleet (Destroyer JS "HAGURO," Air Group), Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc. Approx. 500 personnel	(U.S. Armed Forces) Aircraft carrier USS "George Washington," destroyers USS "Higgins" and USS "Dewey," patrol aircraft P-8, fighter aircraft F-35 and F-18, aerial refueling/transport aircraft KC-135 (ROK Armed Forces) Destroyers ROKS "Seoae Ryu Seong-ryong" and ROKS "Chungmugong Yi Sun-sin," P-3, F-35, F-15
Cyber Coalition 2024	Nov. 27-Dec. 6, 2024	Estonia, Japan	NATO member states, etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of NATO member states
Japan-U.S.-Philippines trilateral exercises	Dec. 6, 2024	South China Sea	The U.S., Philippines	Destroyer JS Samidare	(U.S. Navy) P-8A (Philippines Navy) Patrol vessel BRP "Andrés Bonifacio," C-90
Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines multilateral exercise	Feb. 5, 2025	South China Sea	The U.S., Australia, Philippines	Destroyer JS "Akizuki," SH-60K	(U.S. Navy) Missile destroyer USS "Benfold," P- 8A (Royal Australian Navy and Air Force) Destroyer HMAS "Hobart," P-8A (Philippines Navy) Frigate BRP "Jose Rizal"

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 2025	Feb. 5-Mar. 7, 2025	Thailand	Thailand, the U.S., Indonesia, Malaysia, the ROK, Singapore, Australia, China, India, etc.	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command, GSDF Northern Army, GSDF North Eastern Army, Middle Army, GSDF Military Police, Self Defense Fleet, Communications Command, Air Staff Office, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command, Space Operations Group, Air Communications and System Wing, Air Military Police, Air Materiel Command Headquarters, JSDF Cyber Defense Command, Defense Intelligence Headquarters Approx. 230 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Philippines trilateral exercises	Mar. 28, 2025	South China Sea	The U.S., Philippines	Destroyer JS "Noshiro"	(U.S. Navy) Missile destroyer USS "Shoup," P-8A (Philippines Navy) Frigate BRP "Jose Rizal," C-90
Multilateral Joint Exercise Hosted by the United States and the Philippines Balikatan 25	Apr. 4-May 9, 2025	Republic of the Philippines	Philippines, the U.S., Australia	Joint Staff Office, JSDF Joint Operations Command, Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command, GSDF Central Transportation Command, GSDF Ordnance School, GSDF Quartermaster School, GSDF Transport and Logistics School, Japan Self-Defense Forces Central Hospital, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Staff Office, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Communications and Systems Wing, frigate JS "Yahagi" Approx. 150 personnel	—
Locked Shields 2025	May 6-9, 2025	Estonia, Japan	NATO member states, etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of NATO member states
Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise	Jul. 11, 2025	Airspace over the East China Sea west of Kyushu	The U.S., ROK	8th Air Wing: F-2 fighter aircraft × 2 1st Tactical Airlift Wing: KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft × 1	U.S. Armed Forces: B-52 × 2 ROK Forces: F-15K × 1, F-16 × 2, KC-330 × 1
Multilateral Joint Exercise Hosted by the United States and Australia "Talisman Sabre 25"	Jul. 13-Aug.4, 2025	Australia (Queensland and New South Wales) and the surrounding maritime and airspace	U.S., Australia, Canada, Fiji, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, ROK, Thailand, Tonga, U.K.	Joint Staff Office, JSDF Joint Operations Command, Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command, Eastern Army, Middle Army, Western Army, Fuji School, Air Defense School, Maritime Staff Office, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Staff Office, Air Defense Command, Space Operations Group, Japan Self Defense Forces Hospital Iruma and Air Materiel Command Headquarters Destroyers JS "Ise," JS "Suzunami," JS "Osumi" Approx. 1,500 personnel	—
Pacific Partnership 2025	Jul. 28-Aug. 7, Sep. 22-Oct. 2, 2025	Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Republic of Palau	U.S., Australia, ROK, Canada, U.K., Singapore, Germany, Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Republic of Palau	Joint Staff, Ground Component Command, North Eastern Army, Japan Self-Defense Forces Central Hospital, Maritime Staff Office, Self-Defense Fleet, Yokosuka Regional Unit, Kure District, Sasebo District, Japan Self Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka, MSDF Staff College, 3rd Service School of the MSDF and ASDF Central Band Approx. 40 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-U.K. Trilateral Exercise	Sep. 11, 2025	Airspace above the Pacific Ocean, east of the main island of Okinawa	U.S., U.K.	9th Air Wing: F-15 fighter aircraft × 2	U.S. Armed Forces: F-35A × 2, F-35B × 1 F-15E × 4, EA-18G × 3, E-3 × 1 KC-135 × 3, RC-135 × 1, HC-130 × 1, KC-130 × 1 U.S. Armed Forces: F-35B × 7 (U.K. carrier HMS "Princess of Wales")
Japan-U.S.-Philippines trilateral exercises	Sep. 13, 2025	South China Sea	The U.S., Philippines	J.S. Osumi	U.S. Armed Forces: Destroyer USS "John Finn", P-8A Philippine Navy: Frigate BRP "Jose Rizal," FA50, C-208B

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-U.S.-ROK Joint Exercise Freedom Edge 25	Sep. 15-19, 2025	Ichigaya Area, Ministry of Defense; the East China Sea and the airspace above it; and locations of other participating units, etc.	The U.S., ROK	Joint Staff Office, JSDF Joint Operations Command, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, JSDF Cyber Defense Command JS "Hyuga," JS "Haguro," P-1, SH-60K, F-15, E-767, KC-767, and KC-46A Approx. 700 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise	Sep. 26, 2025	Airspace over the East China Sea west of Kyushu	U.S., Australia	5th Air Wing: F-15 fighters × 3 3rd Tactical Airlift Wing: KC-46A aerial refueling/transport aircraft × 1	U.S. Air Force: F-35A ×2, KC-135 × 1 Royal Australian Air Force: F-35A ×3, KC-30A × 1
Multilateral Joint Counter-piracy Exercise with EU naval forces, the Djiboutian Navy, and others (DORALEH II) oct, 26-30, 2025	Oct. 26-30, 2025	Republic of Djibouti and surrounding waters	Spain, Djibouti, etc.	JS "Harusame" P-3C × 1, etc.	EU maritime forces: Frigate ESPS "Victoria" (Spanish Navy), etc. Djiboutian Navy: High-speed vessels, etc.
Japan-U.S.-Philippines trilateral exercises	Nov. 14, 2025	South China Sea	The U.S., Philippines	JS "Akebono"	U.S. Navy: Aircraft carrier USS "Nimitz," destroyers USS "Gridley," USS "Wayne E. Meyer," and USS "Lenah Sutcliffe Higbee" Philippine Navy: Frigates BRP "Jose Rizal" and BRP "Antonio Luna" Philippine Coast Guard: Patrol vessels BRP "Cape San Agustin" and BRP "Melchora Aquino"
Cyber Coalition 2025	Nov. 28-Dec. 4, 2025	Estonia, Japan	NATO member states, etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of NATO member states
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise "Pacific Shield 25" Hosted by Japan	Dec. 2-4, 2025	Ministry of Foreign Affairs headquarters and the maritime and airspace areas off the Boso Peninsula	—	Joint Staff Office, Ground Component Command, Self-Defense Fleet, 1 frigate (FFM), and 1 patrol aircraft (P-1) Approx. 120 personnel	—
Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 2026	Jan. 31-Mar.6, 2026	Kingdom of Thailand	Thailand, U.S., Indonesia, Malaysia, ROK, Singapore, Australia, China, India, etc.	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command, GSDF Northern Army, GSDF Eastern Army, GSDF Military Police, GSDF System and Signal/ Cyber School, Self Defense Fleet, Communications Command, Air Staff Office, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command, Space Operations Group, Air Communications and System Wing, Air Military Police, Air Materiel Command Headquarters, JSDF Joint Operations Command, JSDF Cyber Defense Command, and Defense Intelligence Headquarters	—
Japan-U.S.-Philippines trilateral exercises	Feb. 24, 2026	Northern Luzon Island	The U.S., Philippines	P-3C	U.S. Navy: Destroyer USS "Dewey," P-81 Philippine Navy: Frigate BRP "Antonio Luna," FA-50PH, C-208B Philippine Coast Guard: Patrol vessel BRP "Gabriela Silang"

Ground Self-Defense Force

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
TechNet Indo-Pacific Multinational Capture the Flag	Apr. 12, 2022	Japan	U.S., etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the U.S.
Field Training with U.S. and Australian Forces in Australia (Southern Jackaroo 22)	May 9-27, 2022	Shoalwater Bay Training Area and Gallipoli Barracks (Queensland, Australia)	The U.S., Australia	13th Infantry Regiment, Central Readiness Regiment	(Australian Army) 6th Infantry Regiment of 7th Division (U.S. Marine Corps) Marine Rotational Force - Darwin from 1st Marine Expeditionary Force
Multilateral Exercise (Khaan Quest 22)	Jun. 6-20, 2022	Mongolia	Mongolia, the U.S., etc.	Ground Component Command Headquarters, Central Readiness Regiment, International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit, 18 Infantry Regiment	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK Multilateral Exercise (Pacific Vanguard 22) (*Note 2)	Jun. 29-Aug. 4, 2022	Guam, and the waters and its surrounding airspace	The U.S., Australia, the ROK, Canada	Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, JS “Izumo,” JS “Takanami,” etc.	(U.S. Navy) Submarine, Dry cargo replenishment ship USNS “Amelia Earhart” (U.S. Marine Corps) 5th Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, III Marine Expeditionary Force (Royal Australian Navy) HMAS “Sydney” (ROK Navy) ROKS “Sejong Daewang,” etc. (Canadian Navy) Frigate HMCS “Vancouver”
Multilateral Exercise hosted by the U.S. Navy (RIMPAC 2022) (*Note 2)	Jul. 3-25, 2022	Hawaii Islands, and the waters and airspace around the islands	The U.S., etc.	5th Surface-to-ship Missile Regiment (Type 12 Surface-to-ship Missile) of Western Field Artillery Unit, etc., JMSDF Air Patrol Squadron 3	(U.S.) 17th Artillery Brigade, Patrol Aircraft Units, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Unit
U.S.-Indonesia Field Training in the U.S. and Indonesia (Garuda Shield 22)	Jul. 26-Aug. 5, 2022	Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.) and its surroundings, Sumatra Island, Baturaja Training Area and its surroundings (Indonesia)	The U.S., Indonesia	1st Airborne Brigade	(U.S.) 11th Airborne Brigade, 374th Airlift Wing, etc. (Indonesian Army) 18th Airborne Brigade
TechNet Augusta 2022	Aug. 16-17, 2022	Japan	U.S., etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the U.S.
U.S.-Philippine Marine Corps. Field Training in the Philippines (Kamandag 22)	Oct. 3-14, 2022	In and around Naval Education, Trainig, And Doctrine Command (NETDC) in Luzon (the Philippines)	The U.S., the Philippines	Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit, NBC Countermeasure Medical Unit	(U.S. Marine Corps) 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (U.S. Navy) U.S. 7th Fleet (Philippine Marine Corps) 6th Marine Battalion, etc.
Cyber Skills Challenge 2022	Nov. 30-Dec.2, 2022	Japan	Australia, etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of Australia
Defense Cyber Marvel 2	Feb. 13-17, 2023	Japan	U.K., etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the U.K.
Cyber KONGO 2023	Feb. 15-17, 2023	Japan	U.S., etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the U.S.
Multilateral Exercise (Khaan Quest 2023)	Jun.19 - Jul.2, 2023	Five Hills Training Center, Mongolia	Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, Qatar, the ROK, Singapore, Thailand, Türkiye, the U.K., the U.S., Vietnam	Ground Component Command Headquarters, Central Readiness Regiment, International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit, 11 Infantry Regiment	—
2023 Field Training with U.S. and Australian Forces in Australia (Southern Jackaroo 23)	Jun. 22 - Jul.13, 2023	Townsville Training Area, Queensland, Australia, etc.	The U.S., Australia	44th Infantry Regiment, 1 Infantry company, Northeast Area Special Regiment, 1 Special company	(U.S. Marine Corps) Marine Rotational Force - Darwin from 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (Australian Army) 7th Brigade

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Multilateral Exercise hosted by the United States and Australia (Talisman Sabre 23) (*Note 2)	Jul.20 - Aug.4, 2023	(1) Amphibious Operation a. Integrated Firepower Guidance Training Shoalwater Bay Training Area, Queensland, Australia b. Preparation for landing Midge Point, Queensland, Australia c. Comprehensive training Stanage, Queensland, Australia (2) Air-to-air combat Shoalwater Bay Training Area, Queensland, Australia (3) Surface-to-ship combat Jervis Bay Territory, Australia	Australia, Canada, Fiji, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the ROK, Tonga, the U.K., the U.S.	(1) Amphibious Operation Ground Self-Defense Force: Ground Component Command (Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade and 1st Helicopter Brigade) Maritime Self-Defense Force: JS "Izumo," Landing Ship "Shimokita" (2) Air-to-air combat Ground Self-Defense Force: Eastern Area (2nd anti-aircraft artillery groups) (3) Surface-to-ship combat Ground Self-Defense Force: Western Area (5th surface-to-ship guided missile regiments), Fuji School (Specialized Training Squadron) and Northern Area (2nd Intelligence Corps)	(1) Amphibious Operation (U.S. Marine Corps) 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, etc. (U.S. Navy) 7th Fleet (Amphibious assault ship USS "America," Dock transport landing ship USS "Green Bay" and "New Orleans") (German Navy) 1st Fleet (1 Platoon/ Maritime Battalion) (2) Air defense (U.S. Marine Corps) 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (3) Anti-ship combat (Royal Australian Navy) 816th and 822nd X Squadrons
TechNet Augusta 2023	Aug. 15-16, 2023	Japan	U.S., etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the U.S.
Multilateral Exercise hosted by the United States and Indonesia (Super Garuda Shield 23)	Aug.27 - Sep.13, 2023	(1) Asembagus Training Area, Graudy drop zone, etc., Java, Indonesia (2) Japan Narashino Training Area, etc.	The U.S., Indonesia, Australia, the U.K., Singapore	1st Airborne Brigade, Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, etc.	(U.S. Armed Forces) 25th Infantry Division, 11th Airborne Division, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, etc. (Indonesian Armed Forces) 2nd Division, etc. (Australian Army) 9th Brigade (British Armed Forces) 16th Air Assault Brigade Combat Team (Singapore Armed Forces) GUARDS* The Singapore Army's Emergency Readiness Regiment responds to domestic and international incidents
FY2023 U.S.-Philippine Marine Corps. Field Training in the Philippines (Kamandag 23)	Nov.9 -Nov.20, 2023	Philippines Marine Corps Base Bojador, Illinois; Cavite Naval Base, Cavite, Cavite; Marine Corps Base West Rodolho, Puerto Princesa; Marine Corps Base Bonifacio, Taguig, etc.	The U.S., Philippines	Ground Component Command Headquarters, Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit, NBC Countermeasure Medical Unit, Fuji School	(U.S. Marine Corps) 3rd Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine expeditionary unit, 11th Marine expeditionary unit, etc. (Philippines Marine Corps) 4th Marine Corps Battalion, Marine Regiment
Cyber Skills Challenge 2023	Nov. 20-24, 2023	Japan	Australia, etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of Australia
FY2023 Japan-U.S.-Australia multilateral command post exercise (YS-85)	Nov.30-Dec.13, 2023	Asaka Camp, Higashi Chitose Camp, Sendai Camp, etc.	The U.S., Australia	(1) Participating Units Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command, Northern Army, GSDF, Training Evaluation Research, Ground Material Control Command, etc. (2) Cooperating Units, etc. Joint Staff, MSDF, ASDF, Hokkaido Defense Bureau, Tohoku Defense Bureau, etc.	(U.S. Armed Force) (1) Participating Units U.S. Army Pacific Headquarters; U.S. Army Japan Headquarters; First Corps; 7th Infantry Division; 11th Airborne Division; 3rd MDTF; 8th Theater Sustainment Command, etc. (2) Cooperating Units, etc. Pacific Fleet, Pacific Air Force, etc. (Australian Army) (1) Participating Units 1st Division
Cyber KONGO 2024	Feb. 8-9, 2024	Japan	U.S., etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the U.S.
Defense Cyber Marvel 3 (*Note 3)	Feb. 8-17, 2024	Japan	U.K., etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the U.K.
2024 Field Training with U.S. and Australian Forces (Southern Jackaroo 24)	May 16-Jun. 29, 2024	Lavarack Barracks, Townsville Training Area and Tully Military Training Area in Queensland, Australia	The U.S., Australia	35th Infantry Regiment	(U.S. Marine Corps) Marine Rotational Force - Darwin from 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (U.S.) U.S. Army Pacific 11th Airborne Brigade (Australian Army) Australian Army 3rd Brigade

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Multilateral Exercise (Khaan Quest 2024)	Jul. 27-Aug. 8, 2024	Mongolia (Five Hills Training Center)	Australia, Canada, China, the U.K., Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mongolia, Philippines, Qatar, the ROK, Turkey, the U.S. and Vietnam	Ground Component Command Headquarters, Central Readiness Regiment, International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit, 10th Rapid Deployment Regiment, etc.	—
TechNet Augusta 2024	Aug. 20-21, 2024	Japan	U.S., etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the U.S.
Multilateral Exercise hosted by the United States and Indonesia (Super Garuda Shield 24)	Aug. 26-Sep. 6, 2024	Asembagus Training Area, Java, and Baturaja Training Area, Sumatra, etc. in the Republic of Indonesia	The U.S., Indonesia, Australia, the U.K., Singapore	1st Airborne Brigade, Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, etc.	(U.S. Armed Forces) 25th Infantry Division, 11th Airborne Division, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, etc. (Indonesian Armed Forces) 2nd Division, 2nd Marine Infantry Brigade, etc. (Australian Army) 1st Brigade, etc. (British Armed Forces) Brigade of Gurkhas (Singapore Armed Forces) Army Deployment Force, etc.
FY2024 Field Training with U.S. Army (Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center 25)	Sep. 30-Oct. 21, 2024	East Range Training Area of Schofield Barracks, etc. in Oahu, Hawaii, U.S.	The U.S., Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand, Maldives, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the U.K.	6th Rapid Deployment Regiment, 302nd Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Battalion, etc.	(U.S. Armed Forces) 25th Infantry Division, 11th Airborne Division, 75th Ranger Regiment, U.S. Navy and Air Force and Marine Corps, etc.
FY2024 U.S.-Philippine Marine Corps. Field Training in the Philippines (Kamandag 24)	Oct. 15-25, 2024	Marine Corps Base Bojador, Marine Corps Base Bonifacio, etc. in the Republic of the Philippines	The U.S., Philippines	Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit, NBC Countermeasure Medical Unit, Fuji School, etc.	(U.S. Marine Corps) 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, etc. (Philippine Marine Corps) 4th Marine Corps Battalion/4th Marine Infantry Brigade, Marine Regiment, etc.
Cyber Skills Challenge 2024	Nov. 13-15, 2024	Japan	Australia, etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of Australia
FY2024 Japan-U.S.-Australia multilateral command post exercise (YS-87)	Dec. 2-14, 2024	Camp Asaka, Camp Kengun, etc.	The U.S., Australia	Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command, Eastern Army, Western Army, Training Evaluation Research, Ground Material Control Command, etc.	(U.S. Armed Forces) U.S. Army Pacific Headquarters, U.S. Army Japan Headquarters, First Corps, 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, 3rd Multi-Domain Task Force, 593rd Corps Sustainment Command, etc. (Australian Army) 1st Division
Cyber KONGO 2025	Feb. 4-6, 2025	Japan	U.S., etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the U.S.
Defense Cyber Marvel 4 (*Note 3)	Feb. 20-28, 2025	Japan	U.K., etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the U.K.
2025 Field Training with U.S. and Australian Forces (Southern Jackaroo 25)	May 19-Jun. 13, 2025	Townsville Training Area, Queensland, Australia, etc.	The U.S., Australia	46th Infantry Regiment, Middle Artillery Regiment, etc.	U.S. Marine Corps: Marine Rotational Force - Darwin from 1st Marine Expeditionary Force Australian Defence Force: 3rd Brigade
FY2025 U.S.-Philippine Marine Corps, etc. Field Training in the Philippines (Kamandag 25)	May 26-Jun. 6, 2025	Quezon, Palawan Island; Bonifacio Marine Base on Luzon Island; etc. in the Republic of the Philippines	U.S., Philippines, ROK	Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit, NBC Countermeasure Medical Unit, Fuji School, etc.	U.S. Marine Corps: Marine Rotational Force - Darwin, etc. Philippine Marine Corps: 7th Marine Battalion Landing Team, 3rd Marine Brigade, Coastal Defense Regiment, etc. ROK Marine Corps: 8th Marine Brigade and 2nd Marine Division
FY2025 Multilateral Exercise (Khaan Quest 2025)	Jun. 14-28, 2025	Mongolia (Five Hills Training Center and within Ulaanbaatar City)	Mongolia, U.K., Japan, Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Qatar, ROK, Thailand, Turkey, U.K.	Ground Component Command, Northern Army, etc.	—
FY2025 Japan-U.S.-Australia multilateral command post exercise (YS-89)	Aug. 21-Sep. 1, 2025	Camp Asaka, Camp Itami, etc.	Japan, U.S., Australia	Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command, Training Evaluation Research and Development Command, etc.	U.S. Armed Forces: U.S. Army Japan Headquarters, First Corps, 3rd Multi-Domain Task Force, etc. Australian Army: 1st Division

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Multilateral Exercise hosted by the United States and Indonesia (Super Garuda Shield 25)	Aug. 24-Sep. 4, 2025	Baturaja Training Area on Sumatra Island, Dabo on Singkep Island, PKO Training Center on Java Island, etc. in the Republic of Indonesia	U.S., Indonesia, Australia, U.K., Singapore, Netherlands, France	a. GSDF 1st Airborne Brigade, Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, etc. b. MSDF J.S. Osumi c. ASDF (training support) 1st Tactical Airlift Wing	U.S. Navy: I Marine Expeditionary Force, etc. Indonesian National Armed Forces: 17th Airborne Brigade, 2nd Marine Brigade, etc. Australian Defence Force: 1st Division, etc. British Armed Forces: The Royal Welsh regiment, etc. Singapore Armed Forces: Army Deployment Force, etc. Netherlands Armed Forces: 2 Marine Combat Group French Armed Forces: Transport Squadron 82
FY2025 Field Training Exercise with U.S. and Australian Forces "Orient Shield 25"	Sep. 16-24, 2025	Sekiyama Maneuver Area, ASDF Kyougamisaki Sub-Base, Kyogamisaki Communication Site, Camp Senzo, Narashino Training Area, Soumagahara Maneuver Area, etc.	Japan, U.S., Australia	Middle Army Headquarters, 3rd Division, Middle Air Group, Middle Army Medical Unit, etc.	U.S. Army: Part of U.S. Army Japan Headquarters; U.S. Army Pacific, 1st Battalion, 138th Infantry Regiment; 35th Infantry Division, 200th Military Police Command, U.S. Army Aviation Battalion Japan, 528th Field Hospital, etc. Australian Army: 1 infantry company, 1st Division
FY2025 Multilateral Airborne Exercise Hosted by the Italian Army "Mangusta 25"	Nov. 7-28, 2025	Siena, Pisa, and Livorno Provinces in Tuscany, Republic of Italy, etc.	Italy, etc.	1st Airborne Brigade	Italian Armed Forces: Folgore Airborne Brigade, etc. U.S. Armed Forces: 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, etc. French Armed Forces: 1st Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment German Armed Forces: Paratrooper Regiment 31, etc. Polish Armed Forces: 6th Airborne Brigade Spanish Armed Forces: VI Paratrooper Brigade British Armed Forces: 16th Air Assault Brigade Combat Team
Cyber Skills Challenge 2025	Dec. 3-5, 2025	Japan	Australia, etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of Australia
FY2025 Multilateral Airborne Exercise (Japan)	Jan. 13-20, 2026	Ojojihara Maneuver Area, Camp Narashino, etc.	U.S., U.K.	1st Airborne Brigade, 1st Helicopter Brigade, etc.	U.S. Armed Forces: 11th Airborne Division (Army), III Marine Expeditionary Force (Marine Corps), etc. British Armed Forces: 16th Air Assault Brigade Combat Team (Army)
Defense Cyber Marvel 2026	Feb. 6-13. 2026	Japan	U.K., etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the U.K.
Cyber KONGO 2026	Feb. 18-20, 2026	Japan	U.S., etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the U.S.

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise (Noble Partner 22)	Jun. 19-24, 2022	The Pacific	The U.S., Australia	JS "Izumo," JS "Takanami"	(U.S. Navy) Aircraft carrier USS "Abraham Lincoln," Cruiser USS "Mobile Bay" USS "Gridley," USS "Sampson," USS "Spruance" (Australia Navy) Amphibious assault ship HMAS "Canberra," Frigate HMAS "Warramunga," Replenishment ship HMAS "Supply"
Multilateral Exercise hosted by the U.S. Navy "RIMPAC 2022" (*Note 3)	Jun. 29-Aug. 4, 2022	Hawaii Islands, and the waters and airspace around the islands	The U.S.	JS "Izumo," JS "Takanami," 3 embarked aircraft, 1 P-1, 4th Maintenance and Supply Squadron, JGSDF Western Army 40 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise	Jul. 4-6, 2022	Waters and airspace from the East China Sea to the east of Okinawa	The U.S., Australia	JS "Asahi"	(U.S. Navy) USS "Dewey" (Australia Navy) Frigate HMAS "Parramatta"
Japan-U.S.-Solomon Islands Goodwill Exercise	Aug. 8, 2022	Area surrounding the Solomon Islands	The U.S., Solomon Islands	JS "Kirisame"	(U.S. Navy) Littoral combat ship USS "Oakland" (Solomon Islands maritime police) Patrol vessel RSIPV "Taro"
Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK-Canada Missile Defense Exercise (Pacific Dragon 2022)	Aug. 8-14, 2022	Area surrounding Hawaii	The U.S., Australia, ROK, Canada	JS "Haguro"	(U.S. Navy) USS "Fitzgerald," USS "William P. Lawrence," F/A-18F (Australia Navy) HMAS "Sydney" (ROK Navy) ROKS "Sejong Daewang" (Canada Navy) Frigate HMCS "Vancouver"
Japan-Canada-New Zealand Trilateral Exercise	Aug. 9, 2022	The Pacific	Canada, New Zealand	JS "Izumo," JS "Takanami"	(Canada Navy) Frigate HMCS "Winnipeg" (New Zealand Navy) Replenishment ship HMNZS "Aotearoa"
Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK-Canada Multilateral Exercise (Pacific Vanguard 22) (*Note 3)	Aug. 21-29, 2022	Guam and its surroundings	The U.S., Australia, ROK, Canada	JS "Izumo," JS "Takanami," Submarine, P-1, UP-3D, JGSDF Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, etc.	(U.S. Navy) Submarine, Dry cargo replenishment ship USNS "Amelia Earhart," P-8A, EA-18G, 5th Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, III Marine Expeditionary Force (Australia Navy) HMAS "Sydney," Frigate HMAS "Perth" (ROK Navy) ROKS "Sejong Daewang," ROKS "Mun Mu Daewang" (Canada Navy) Frigate HMCS "Vancouver"
Japan-France-Australia Trilateral Exercise (La Perouse 22)	Aug. 30-Sep. 1, 2022	Area surrounding New Caledonia	France, Australia	JS "Kirisame"	(France Navy) Frigate FS "Vendémiaire" (Australia Navy) Frigate HMAS "Warramunga"
Japan-U.S.-Canada Trilateral Exercise (Noble Raven 22)	Aug. 30-Sep. 7, 2022	Area surrounding Guam through the South China Sea	The U.S., Canada	JS "Izumo," JS "Takanami"	(U.S. Navy) USS "Higgins," Replenishment ships USNS "Rappahannock," USNS "John Ericsson" (Canada Navy) Frigate HMCS "Vancouver"
Multilateral Exercise Hosted by Royal Australian Navy (KAKADU 2022)	Sep. 12-26, 2022	Area surrounding Darwin	Australia, etc.	JS "Kirisame"	—
Japan-U.S.-Canada Trilateral Exercise (Noble Raven 22-2)	Sep. 23-Oct. 1, 2022	South China Sea	The U.S., Canada	JS "Izumo," JS "Takanami," Submarine	(U.S. Navy) USS "Higgins," Replenishment ship USNS "Big Horn" (Canada Navy) Frigate HMCS "Winnipeg"
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise	Sep. 30, 2022	Sea of Japan	The U.S., ROK	JS "Asahi"	(U.S. Navy) Aircraft carrier USS "Ronald Reagan," Cruiser USS "Chancellorsville," USS "Barry," USS "Benfold," Submarine (ROK Navy) Destroyer ROKS "Mun Mu Daewang"

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada Multilateral Exercise (Noble Mist 22)	Oct. 4-8, 2022	South China Sea	The U.S., Australia, Canada	JS "Kirisame"	(U.S. Navy) USS "Milius," USS "Higgins," Patrol vessel USCGC "Midgett" (Australia Navy) HMAS "Hobart," Frigate HMAS "Arunta," Replenishment ship HMAS "Stalwart" (Canada Navy) Frigate HMCS "Winnipeg"
Multilateral Exercise Hosted by the U.S., Australia, and the Philippines (Exercise SAMASAMA/ LUMBAS 2022)	Oct. 11-18, 2022	Sulu Sea	The U.S., Australia, the Philippines, France, the U.K.	JS "Kirisame," US-2	(U.S. Navy) USS "Milius," P-8A (Australia Navy) HMAS "Hobart," Replenishment ship HMAS "Stalwart" (The Philippines Navy) Frigate BRP "Jose Rizal," C-90, etc. (Forces armées en Polynésie française (FAPF)) Falcon 200 (U.K. Navy) Patrol vessel HMS "Spey"
Multilateral Exercise	Nov. 6-7, 2022	South of Kanto	Australia, Canada, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, ROK, Singapore, Thailand, the U.S.	—	—
Japan-U.S.-India-Australia Multilateral Exercise (Malabar 2022)	Nov. 8-15, 2022	South of Kanto	The U.S., India, Australia	JS "Takanami," JS "Shiranui," JS "Hyuga," Landing Ship Tank JS "Kunisaki," Replenishment ship JS "Oumi," Submarine, P-1, UP-3D, Special Boarding Unit	(U.S. Navy) Aircraft carrier USS "Ronald Reagan," Cruiser USS "Chancellorsville," USS "Milius," P-8A, Special Operations Unit (India Navy) Frigate INS "Shivalik," Anti-submarine corvette INS "Kamorta," P-8I, Special Operations Unit (Australia Navy) Frigate HMAS "Arunta," Replenishment ship HMAS "Stalwart," Submarine, P-8A
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise	Nov. 19-20, 2022	South of Kanto through South of Shikoku	The U.S., Australia	JS "Setogiri"	(U.S. Navy) Aircraft carrier USS "Ronald Reagan," Cruiser USS "Chancellorsville," USS "Milius" (Australia Navy) Replenishment ship HMAS "Stalwart"
Multilateral Exercise Hosted by the U.S. and Sri Lanka (CARAT 2023)	Jan. 19-27, 2023	Off the coast of Colombo	The U.S., Sri Lanka, Maldives	MSDF Maritime Staff Office	(U.S. Navy) Landing ship USS "Anchorage," P-8A (Sri Lanka Navy) Frigates SLNS "Gajabahu," SLNS "Vijayabahu" (Maldives) Maldives National Defense Force Headquarters, etc.
Multilateral Exercise hosted by Pakistan Navy (AMAN 23)	Feb. 9-14, 2023	North of the Arabian Sea	Pakistan, etc.	JS "Suzutsuki," MSDF Staff Office	—
International Maritime Exercise hosted by the U.S. (IMX/CE23)	Feb. 26-Mar. 19, 2023	Area surrounding Bahrain	The U.S., etc.	Minesweeper Tender JS "Uraga," Minesweeper Ocean JS "Awaji" Approx. 200 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise (*Note 2)	Mar. 6-8, 2023	Area surrounding Kyushu	The U.S., Australia	EP-3, OP-3C, RC-2	(U.S. Navy) RC-135 (Australia Navy) P-8A
Multilateral Exercise (La Pérouse 23)	Mar. 13-14, 2023	East of Sri Lanka	France, the U.S., Australia, India, the U.K., Canada, New Zealand	JS "Suzutsuki"	(French Navy) Amphibious assault ship FS "Dixmude," Frigate FS "La Fayette" (U.S. Navy) Littoral combat ship USS "Charleston" (Royal Australian Navy) Frigate HMAS "Perth" (Indian Navy) Frigate INS "Sahyadri," Replenishment ship INS "Jyoti" (U.K. Navy) Patrol ship HMS "Tamar" (Canadian Navy) RCN HQ (New Zealand Navy) RNZN HQ, etc.
Multilateral Exercise hosted by U.S. Navy (Sea Dragon 2023)	Mar. 13-30, 2023	Guam, and the waters and airspace surrounding the island	The U.S., etc.	Air Patrol Squadron 1 Approx. 40 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise	April. 3-4, 2023	East China Sea	The U.S., ROK	JS "Umigiri"	(U.S. Navy) Aircraft carrier USS "Nimitz", USS "Decatur", "Wayne E. Meyer," (ROK Navy) ROKS "Choi Yong", "Dae Jo-yeong", "Yulgok Yi I," Replenishment ship ROK "Soyang"

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada Multilateral Exercise (Noble Wolf)	Jun. 3-5, 2023	East China Sea	The U.S., Australia, Canada	JS "Shiranui" P-1	USS "Chung-Hoon" (Australia Navy) Frigate HMAS "Anzac" (Royal Canadian Navy) Frigate HMCS "Montreal", Motor Vessel HMCS "Asterix"
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise	Jun. 3-15, 2023	Area surrounding Japan (Pacific Ocean)	The U.S., Australia	P-3C Submarine	(U.S. Navy) P-8A (Royal Australian Air Force) P-8A
Multilateral Joint Exercise organized by the Indonesian Navy (Komodo 2023)	Jun. 4-9, 2023	Makassar, Republic of Indonesia	Indonesia, etc.	Medical officer of the MSDF and a worker of the MSO	—
Japan-U.S.-France Trilateral Exercise (Multi Big-Deck Event) (*Note 2)	Jun. 7-10, 2023	East of Okinawa to East China Sea	The U.S., France	(1) Maritime Self-Defense Force JS "Izumo", "Samidare" (2) Air Self-Defense Force 9th Air Wing (F-15 × 1), Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	(U.S. Navy) Aircraft carrier USS "Ronald Reagan," "Nimitz," Cruiser USS "Antietam," "Robert Smalls," "Bunker Hill," USS "Rafael Peralta," "Decatur," "Wayne E. Meyer," "Chung-Hoon" (U.S. Air Force) B-52 (French Navy) Frigate "Lorraine".
Japan-U.S.-Canada-France Multilateral Exercise (Novel Typhoon)	Jun. 10-14, 2023	South of Okinawa to East China Sea	The U.S., Canada, France	JS "Izumo", JS "Samidare"	(U.S. Navy) Aircraft carrier USS "Ronald Reagan," Cruiser USS "Antietam," "Robert Smalls," USS "Rafael Peralta," "Chung-Hoon," Replenishment oiler USNS "Rappahannock" (Royal Canadian Navy) Frigate HMCS "Montreal" (French Navy) Frigate "Lorraine".
Japan-U.S.-Canada Trilateral Exercise (Noble Raven 23)	Jun. 14-19, 2023	South China Sea	The U.S., Canada	JS "Izumo"	(U.S. Navy) USS "Rafael Peralta (Royal Canadian Navy) Frigate HMCS "Montreal"
Japan-U.S.-France Trilateral Exercise (Noble Buffalo)	Jun. 14-19, 2023	South China Sea	The U.S., France	JS "Samidare"	(U.S. Navy) Aircraft carrier USS "Ronald Reagan," Cruiser USS "Robert Smalls" (French Navy) Frigate "Lorraine".
Japan-Australia-Kiribati Goodwill Exercise	Jun. 24, 2023	Area surrounding Kiribati	Australia, Republic of Kiribati,	JS "Shiranui" Japan Coast Guard MCT (Mobile Cooperation Team)	(Republic of Kiribati) Police patrol vessel RKS" Teanoai II" (Australia) Maritime Service Advisor
Multilateral exercise "Sea Breeze 23" jointly organized by the U.S. and Ukraine	Jun. 26-Jul. 7, 2023	The U.K.	The U.S., Ukraine, etc.	1 mentor	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK Multilateral Exercise (Pacific Vanguard 23)	Jul. 1-10, 2023	Surrounding Guam	The U.S., Australia, the ROK	JS "Shiranui" Submarine	(U.S. Navy) USS"Howard," Submarine, Dry cargo ship USNS "Cesar Chavez," Replenishment Oiler USNS ""Yukon," P-8A (U.S. Marine Corps) 5th Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, III Marine Expeditionary Force (Australia Navy) Headquarters Command Staff (ROK Navy) ROKS "Mun Mu Daewang"
Mine Warfare Training (Mutsu Bay) and Minesweeping Special Training 2023 (Japan-U.S.-India-Italy multilateral exercise)	Jul. 16-28, 2023	Mutsu Bay	The U.S., India, Italy	Minesweeper Tender × 1, × 2, Minesweeper Ocean × 2, Minesweeper Coastal × 8, MCH-101, P-3C, P-1	(U.S. Navy) Minesweeper Ocean, Minesweeper (MH-53E), Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel (Indian Navy) Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel (Italian Navy) Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel
Multilateral Exercise hosted by the United States and Australia (Talisman Sabre 23) (*Note 3)	Jul. 20-Aug. 4, 2023	Midge Point and Stanage, Queensland, Australia and the surrounding maritime airspace	The U.S. and Australia etc.	(1) Maritime Self-Defense Force JS "Izumo", Landing Ship "Shimokita"/LCAC (2) Ground Self-Defense Force Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, 1st Helicopter Brigade, Amphibious Vehicles (AAV-7), Transport Helicopters (CH-47)	(1) Amphibious Operation (U.S. Marine Corps) 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, etc. (U.S. Navy) 7th Fleet (Amphibious assault ship USS "America," Dock transport landing ship USS "Green Bay" and "New Orleans") (German Navy) 1st Fleet (1 Platoon/ Maritime Battalion) (2) Air defense (U.S. Marine Corps) 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (3) Anti-ship combat (Royal Australian Navy) 816th and 822nd X Squadrons

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-U.S.-India-Australia Multilateral Exercise (Malabar 2023)	Aug. 11-21, 2023	Sydney and the eastern maritime airspace of Australia	The U.S., India, Australia	JS “Shiranui”, Special Boarding Unit	(U.S. Navy) USS “Rafael Peralta,” Replenishment oilers USNS “Rappahannock,” Submarine, P-8A, Special Operations Unit (Indian Navy) HMS “Calcutta,” Frigate INS “Sahyadri” (Australia Navy) HMAS “Brisbane, Landing ship dock HMAS “Choules,” Submarines, Special Operations Unit forces (Royal Australian Air Force) P-8A, F-35A
Multilateral Exercise hosted by U.S. Navy (SEACAT2023)	Aug. 14-16, 2023	Republic of Singapore	The U.S., etc.	JS “Samidare”	—
Japan-U.S.-Canada Trilateral Exercise (Noble Chinook)	Aug. 21-28, 2023	East of Kuril Islands to south of Kanto	The U.S., Canada	JS “Hyuga”	(U.S. Navy) USS “Benfold” (Royal Canadian Navy) Frigate HMCS “Ottawa,” “Vancouver,” Motor Vessel HMCS “Asterix”
Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines Multilateral Exercise	Aug. 24, 2023	Surrounding Manila	The U.S., Australia, Philippines	JS “Izumo”, JS “Samidare”	(U.S. Navy) Littoral combat ship USS “Mobil” (Australia Navy) Amphibious assault ship HMAS “Canberra,” Frigate HMAS “Anzac” (Royal Australian Air Force) F-35A (Philippine Navy) Landing dock ship BRP “Davao del Sur”
Japan-U.S.-Canada Trilateral Exercise (Noble Stingray)	Sep. 5-6, 2023	South of Okinawa	The U.S., Canada	JS “Izumo”, JS “Samidare”, Submarine	(U.S. Navy) USS “Ralph Johnson” (Royal Canadian Navy) HMCS “Ottawa”
Japan-U.S.-Colombia Goodwill Exercise	Sep. 8, 2023	Cartagena and surrounding waters	The U.S., Colombia	Training ships JS “Kashima,” JS “Hatakaze”	(U.S. Navy) Littoral combat ship USS “Detroit” (Colombian Navy) Patrol Vessel “Victoria”, AS365 (helicopter)
Multilateral Exercise hosted by the U.S.-Philippines (Exercise SAMASAMA 2023)	(1) Anchor phase Oct. 2-7, 2023 (2) On-the-sea phase Oct. 8-13, 2023	Manila and Legazpi and surrounding maritime airspace	The U.S., Philippines, Canada, U.K.	JS “Akebono”	(U.S. Navy) USS “Dewey” (Philippine Navy) Patrol Vessel “San Antonio”, C-90 (Royal Canadian Navy) Frigate HMCS “Vancouver” (Royal Navy) Patrol vessel HMS “Spey”
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise	Oct. 9-10, 2023	East China Sea	The U.S., ROK	JS “Hyuga”	(U.S. Navy) Aircraft carrier USS “Ronald Reagan,” Cruiser USS “Antietam,” “Robert Smalls,” USS “Shoup” (ROK Navy) ROKS “Yulgok Yi I”, Replenishment Vessel ROKS “Cheonji”.
Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada- New Zealand Multilateral Exercise (Noble Caribou)	Oct. 23, 2023	South China Sea	The U.S., Australia, Canada, New Zealand	JS “Akebono”	(U.S. Navy) USS “Rafael Peralta” (Australia Navy) HMAS “Brisbane” (Royal Canadian Navy) HMCS “Ottawa” (New Zealand Navy) Frigate HMNZS “Temana”
FY2023 MSDF Anual Exercise	Nov. 10-20, 2023	Maritime airspace surrounding Japan	The U.S. Australia, Canada, Philippines	JS “Hyuga,” etc. approx. 15 vessels, Patrol aircraft “P-1,” etc. approx. 20 aircrafts	JS “Hyuga,” etc. approx. 10 vessels, Patrol aircraft “P-8,” etc. approx. 10 aircrafts (Royal Australian Navy and Air Force) HMAS “Brisbane,” P-8A x 1 (Royal Canadian Maritime Air Force) Frigate HMCS “Vancouver” and 2 other vessels, CP-140 × 1 (Philippine Navy) Dispatch Staff
FY2023 multilateral exercise for fixed-wing patrol aircraft hosted by the U.S. Navy (Sea Dragon 2024)	Jan. 8-24, 2024	Surrounding Guam	The U.S., etc.	P-1 Approx. 40 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia Multilateral Exercise (Cope North 24) (*Note 2)	Feb. 5–23, 2024	Surrounding Guam	The U.S., Australia	US-2 Approx. 30 personnel	—

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Multilateral Exercise hosted by the Indian Navy (MILAN 2024)	(1) Anchor phase Feb. 19-23, 2023 (2) On-the-sea phase Feb. 24-27, 2023	Visakhapatnam and surrounding maritime airspace	India, etc.	JS “Sazanami”	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise	Feb. 7-8, 2024	South China Sea	The U.S., Australia	JS “Sazanami”	(U.S. Navy) USS “John Finn,” Littoral combat ship USS “Gabrielle Giffords” (Royal Australian Navy) Frigate HMAS “Warramunga”
Defense Cyber Marvel 3 (*Note 5)	Feb. 8-17, 2024	Japan	U.K., etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the U.K., etc.
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise	Feb. 17-18, 2024	Bay of Bengal	The U.S., Australia	JS “Sazanami”	(U.S. Navy) USS “Halsey” (Royal Australian Navy) Frigate HMAS “Warramunga”
Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines multilateral exercise	Apr. 6, 7, 2024	South China Sea	The U.S., Australia, Philippines	Destroyer JS Akebono	(U.S. Navy) Littoral combat ship USS “Mobil,” P-8A (Royal Australian Navy) Frigate HMAS “Warramunga” (Royal Australian Air Force) P-8A (Philippines Navy) Frigate BRP “Antonio Luna,” patrol vessel BRP “Valentin Diaz”
Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise	Apr. 11, 12, 2024	East China Sea	The U.S., ROK	JS “Ariake”	(U.S. Navy) Aircraft carrier USS “Theodore Roosevelt,” destroyers USS “Daniel Inouye,” USS “Howard,” and USS “Russell,” P-8A (ROK Navy) Destroyer ROKS “Seoae Ryu Seong-ryong”
New Japan-U.S.Bilateral Exercise (Noble Raven 24)	May 11-13, 2024	East China Sea	The U.S., New Zealand	Destroyer JS Akizuki	(U.S. Navy) Expeditionary mobile base USS “Miguel Keith” (Royal New Zealand Air Force) P-8
Blue Spectrum 24-1	May 22-Jun. 1, 2024	Australia	U.S., Australia	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the U.S. and Australia
Japan-U.S.-Canada-Philippines multilateral exercise	Jun. 16, 2024	South China Sea	The U.S., Canada, Philippines	Destroyer JS Kirisame	(U.S. Navy) Destroyer USS “Ralph Johnson,” P-8A (Royal Canadian Navy) Frigate HMCS “Montreal” (Philippines Navy) Patrol vessel BRP “Andrés Bonifacio”
Multilateral Exercise hosted by the U.S. Navy (RIMPAC 2024)	Jun. 27-Aug. 2, 2024	Hawaii Islands, and the waters and airspace around the islands	The U.S., etc.	Tank Landing Ship JS “Kunisaki” (1st Surface Unit), destroyer JS “HAGURO” (2nd Surface Unit), Fleet Air Wing 1 (P-1) (1st Airborne Unit) approx. 95 Dispatch Staff, etc.	—
Japan-U.K.-Australia trilateral exercise	Jul. 1, 2, 2024	South Pacific (offshore Fiji to offshore Tonga)	The U.K., Australia	Destroyer JS “Noshiro” (IPD24 3rd Surface Unit)	(U.K. Navy) Patrol ship HMS “Tamar” (Australian Navy) Landing ship HMAS “Choules”
U.S.-Organized Multilateral Missile Defense Exercise (Pacific Dragon 24)	Jul. 29-Aug. 15, 2024	Area surrounding Hawaii	The U.S., Australia, Canada, Italy, ROK, Netherlands	JS “Haguro”	(U.S. Navy) Cruiser USS “Shiloh,” destroyers USS “Carl M. Levin” and USS “Kidd,” F/A-18, EA -18G, MQ -9 (Royal Australian Navy) Destroyer HMAS “Sydney” (Royal Canadian Navy) Frigate HMCS “Vancouver” (Italian Navy) Frigate ITS “Raimondo Montecuccoli” (ROK Navy) Destroyer ROKS “Yulgok Yi I” (Netherlands Navy) Frigate HNLMS “Tromp”
U.S.-Organized Multilateral Exercise (Pacific Vanguard 24)	Aug. 23-Sep. 2, 2024	Surrounding Guam	The U.S., ROK, Canada	Destroyer JS “Ariake” (IPD24 2nd Surface Unit), replenishment ship “Tokiwa,” submarine (IPD Submarine Unit)	(U.S. Navy) Destroyer USS “Dewey,” replenishment ship USNS “Richard E. Byrd,” P -8A, EA-18G (ROK Navy) Destroyer ROKS “Yi Sun-sin” (Royal Canadian Navy) Frigate HMCS “Vancouver”

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-Australia-Italy-Germany-France Multilateral Exercise (Noble Raven 24-3)	Aug. 27-29, 2024	From south of Kanto to east of Okinawa	Australia, Italy, Germany, France	Destroyer JS "Izumo," destroyer JS "Onami," submarine, P-1	(Royal Australian Navy) Destroyer HMAS "Sydney" (Italian Navy) Aircraft carrier ITS "Cavour," frigate ITS "Alpino," patrol vessel ITS "Raimondo Montecuccoli" (German Navy) Frigate GS "Baden-Württemberg," replenishment ship GS "Frankfurt am Main" (France Navy) Frigate FNS "Bretagne"
Blue Spectrum 24-2	Sep. 2-6, 2024	Japan	U.S., Australia	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the U.S. and Australia
Multilateral Exercise Hosted by the Royal Australian Navy (KAKADU 2024)	Sep. 9-19, 2024	Darwin and the waters and airspace around it	Australia, etc.	Destroyer JS "Ariake" (IPD24 2nd Surface Unit) Air Development Squadron 51 (P-1)	—
Multilateral exercise "Sea Breeze 24" jointly organized by the U.S. and Ukraine	Jun. 25-Jul. 5, Sep. 9-20, 2024	Bulgaria	The U.S., Ukraine, etc.	10 Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel, etc.	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise (Noble Raven 24-4)	Sep. 23-27, 2024	Waters from offshore Darwin to offshore Java	The U.S., Australia	Destroyer JS "Ariake" (IPD24 2nd Surface Unit)	(U.S. Navy) Destroyer USS "Dewey" (Royal Australian Navy) Frigate HMAS "Stuart"
Multilateral Exercise hosted by the U.S.-Philippines (Exercise SAMASAMA 2024)	Oct. 7-15, 2024	Waters and airspace surrounding Manila	The U.S., Philippines	Air Patrol Squadron 3 (P-1) Approx. 30 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-India-Australia multilateral exercise (MALABAR 2024)	Oct. 8-18, 2024	Visakhapatnam and surrounding maritime airspace	The U.S., India, Australia	Destroyer JS "Ariake" (IPD24 2nd Surface Unit) Special Boarding Unit (IPD24 Special Boarding Unit)	(U.S. Navy) Destroyer USS "Dewey," P-8A, Special Operations Unit (Indian Navy) Destroyer INS "Delhi," frigates INS "Tabar," INS "Kadmatt" and INS "Kamorta," replenishment ship INS "Shakti," submarine, P-8I, Special Operations Unit (Royal Australian Navy) Frigate HMAS "Stuart," Special Operations Unit (Royal Australian Air Force) P-8A
Multilateral Exercise hosted by Pakistan Navy (AMAN 2025)	Feb. 7-11, 2025	Karachi and the northern Arabian Sea	Pakistan, etc.	JS "Murasame" 2 personnel (Maritime Staff Office)	—
International naval training IMX/CE25 organized by U.S. Navy	Feb. 9-21, 2025	The Kingdom of Bahrain and its surrounding waters	The U.S., etc.	Minesweeper Tender JS "Bungo," Minesweeper Ocean JS "Etajima"	—
Japan-U.S.-France trilateral exercise (Pacific Steller)	Feb. 10-18, 2025	Waters and airspace east of the Philippines	The U.S., France	Destroyer JS "Kaga," destroyer JS "Akizuki," patrol aircraft "P-3C"	(U.S. Navy) Aircraft carrier USS "Carl Vinson," cruiser USS "Princeton," destroyer USS "Sterett," destroyer USS "William P. Lawrence," patrol aircraft USS "P-8A" (France Navy) Aircraft carrier FS "Charles de Gaulle," frigate FS "Alsace," frigate FS "Forbin," destroyer FS "Provence," replenishment ship FS "Jacques Chevallier," patrol aircraft "Atlantique"
Multilateral Joint Exercise organized by the Indonesian Navy (Komodo 2025)	Feb. 15-22, 2025	The waters and airspace around Bali, Republic of Indonesia	Indonesia, etc.	JS "Asahi"	—
Defense Cyber Marvel 4 (*Note 5)	Feb. 20-28, 2025	Japan	U.K., etc.	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the JSDF	Personnel from cyber units, etc. of the U.K.
New Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises	Mar. 4, 2025	Area surrounding Japan (Pacific Ocean)	The U.S., New Zealand	P-1, P-3C	(U.S. Navy) P-8A (Royal New Zealand Air Force) P-8A
FY2024 Multilateral Exercise for Fixed-wing Aircraft hosted by U.S. Navy (Sea Dragon 2025)	Mar. 4-18, 2025	Waters and airspace around Guam	The U.S., etc.	Squadron 1 (P-1) Approx. 40 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise	Mar. 17-20, 2025	East China Sea	The U.S., ROK	JS "Ikazuchi"	(U.S. Navy) Aircraft carrier USS "Carl Vinson," cruiser USS "Princeton," destroyer USS "Sterett," destroyer USS "William P. Lawrence" (ROK Navy) Destroyer ROKS "Sejong Daewang," destroyer ROKS "Dae Jo-yeong"

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-U.K.-Italy Trilateral Exercise	May 3, 2025	South China Sea	U.K., Italy	Frigate JS "Yahagi" (IPD25, 1st surface unit)	U.K. Royal Navy: Patrol vessel HMS "Spey" Italian Navy: Frigate FREMM "Antonio Marceglia"
Multilateral Exercise "Sea Breeze 2025" Jointly Organized by the U.S. and Ukraine	Jun. 30-Jul. 11, 2025	Waters surrounding Portland (U.K.)	U.S., Ukraine, etc.	Mine Warfare Force Headquarters: 9 personnel including explosive ordnance disposal divers MSDF Maritime Staff Office: 1 undersea medical officer	—
Japan-Australia-New Zealand Trilateral Exercise	Aug. 3-4, 2025	Eastern sea area of Australia	Australia, New Zealand	Destroyers JS "Ise" and JS "Suzunami" (IPD25, 3rd surface unit)	Australian Air Force: P-8A patrol aircraft Royal New Zealand Air Force: P-8A patrol aircraft
Japan-U.K.-U.S.-Australia-Spain-Norway Multilateral Exercise	Aug. 4-12, 2025	Western Pacific	U.K., U.S., Australia, Spain, Norway	Destroyers JS "Kaga"and JS "Teruzuki," submarine	U.K. Royal Navy and Royal Air Force: Carrier HMS "Prince of Wales," destroyer HMS "Dauntless," frigate HMS "Richmond," replenishment ship RFA "Tidespring" U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps: Aircraft carrier USS "George Washington," cruiser USS "Robert Smalls," destroyer USS "Shoup," amphibious assault ship USS "America" Royal Australian Navy: Destroyer HMAS "Brisbane" Spanish Navy: Frigate SPS "Méndez Núñez" Royal Norwegian Navy: Frigate HNoMS "Roald Amundsen"
Multilateral Joint Exercise "Pacific Vanguard 25" Hosted by U.S. Forces	Aug. 24-Sep. 3, 2025	Surrounding Guam	U.S., Australia, ROK, New Zealand	Destroyers JS "Ise" and JS "Suzunami" (IPD25, 3rd surface unit), replenishment ship JS "Oumi," submarine (IPD25 Submarine Unit)	U.S. Navy: Destroyer USS "Higgins," replenishment ship USNS "Alan Shepard," submarine, P-8A, EA-18G Australian Air Force: P-8A ROK Navy: Destroyer ROKS "Wang Geon" Royal New Zealand Navy: Headquarters Command Staff
Field Training Exercise with the Forces of the United States, Indonesia, and Others "Exercise Super Garuda Shield 25"	Aug. 24-Sep. 4, 2025	Republic of Indonesia, Java, Sumatra, Dabo Singkep, and the surrounding maritime and airspace	U.S., Indonesia, etc.	JS "Osumi" landing ship, 2 air-cushion landing craft (IPD25, 2nd surface unit)	—
Japan-UK-Norway Trilateral Exercise	Sep. 2-Oct. 21, 2025	From the waters surrounding Japan through the East China Sea, western Pacific, and South China Sea to the Indian Ocean	U.K., Norway	Destroyer JS "Akebono" (IPD25, 4th surface unit)	U.K. Royal Navy and Royal Air Force: Carrier HMS "Prince of Wales," destroyer HMS "Dauntless," frigate HMS "Richmond," replenishment ship RFA "Tidespring" Royal Norwegian Navy: HNoMS "Roald Amundsen" frigate
Japan-U.K.-U.S.-Australia-Canada-Norway Multilateral Exercise	Sep. 9-14, 2025	From the East China Sea to the western Pacific Ocean	U.K., U.S., Canada, Norway	JS "Kaga" JS "Akebono" (IPD25, 4th surface unit)	U.K. Royal Navy and Royal Air Force: Carrier HMS "Prince of Wales," destroyer HMS "Dauntless," frigate HMS "Richmond" U.S. Navy: Destroyer USS "Higgins," replenishment ship USNS "Rappahannock" Royal Australian Navy: HMAS "Brisbane" Royal Canadian Navy: Frigate HMCS "Ville de Québec" Royal Norwegian Navy: Frigate HNoMS "Roald Amundsen"
Ninth Pacific Reach Exercise (Pacific Reach 2025)	Sep. 15-29, 2025	(1) At-sea training: Vicinity of Singapore (2) Shore-based training, various events, etc.: Changi Naval Base	Singapore, etc.	Submarine rescue ship JS "Chiyoda," submarine JS "Kuroshio"	—
Multilateral Exercise Hosted by U.S. Navy (UNITAS 2025)	Sep. 19-20, 2025	Waters off Mayport	—	Training ships JS "Kashima," JS "Shimakaze"	—

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-UK-India-Norway Multilateral Exercise	Oct. 5-8, 2025	Arabian Sea	U.K., India, Norway	JS “Akebono” (IPD25, 4th surface unit)	U.K. Royal Navy and Royal Air Force: Carrier HMS “Prince of Wales,” destroyer HMS “Dauntless,” frigate HMS “Richmond,” replenishment ship RFA “Tidespring” Indian Navy: Aircraft carrier INS “Vikrant,” frigates INS “Tushil” and INS “Teg,” destroyers INS “Kolkata” and INS “Imphal,” replenishment ship INS “Deepak,” submarine Royal Norwegian Navy: Frigate HNoMS “Roald Amundsen”
Multilateral joint exercise hosted by the U.S. and the Philippines (SAMASAMA 2025)	Oct. 13-14, 2025	Vicinity of Palawan Island (Philippines)	U.S., Philippines, etc.	JS “Onami”	—
FY2025 MSDF Anual Exercise	Oct. 20-31, 2025	Maritime airspace surrounding Japan, etc.	U.S., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, France	Approx. 20 vessels, 20 aircraft	—
Japan-U.S.-India-Australia Multilateral Exercise (Malabar 2025)	Nov. 11-18, 2025	Guam and its surrounding waters	U.S., India, Australia	JS “Hyuga” P-1 (IPD25, 1st air unit)	U.S. Navy: Destroyer, submarine, P-8A Indian Navy: Frigate INS “Sahyadri” Royal Australian Navy: Frigate HMAS “Ballarat” Australian Air Force: P-8A
Japan-Australia-Canada-New Zealand Multilateral Exercise	Nov. 14, 2025	East China Sea	Australia, Canada, New Zealand	Destroyer JS “Maya,” replenishment ship JS “Hamana”	Royal Australian Navy: Destroyer HMAS “Brisbane” Royal Canadian Navy: Patrol vessel HMCS “Max Bernays” Royal New Zealand Navy: Replenishment ship HMNZS “Aotearoa”
Japan-India-Indonesia Trilateral Exercise	Feb. 13, 2026	Waters surrounding the Andaman and Nicobar Islands	India, Indonesia	JS “Yudachi”	Indian Navy: Corvette INS “Kora” Indonesian Navy: Frigate KRI “Bung Tomo”
Multilateral exercise organized by Indian Navy (MILAN 2026)	Feb. 19-22, 2026 (Anchor phase: Feb. 19–20, 2026) (On-the-sea phase: Feb 21–22, 2026)	Visakhapatnam and surrounding maritime airspace	India, etc.	JS “Yudachi”	—
Multilateral Exercise hosted by U.S. Navy (Sea Dragon 2026)	Mar. 9-24, 2026	Vicinity of Guam, etc.	U.S., etc.	Air Patrol Squadron 3 (P-1) Approx. 40 personnel	—

Air Self-Defense Force

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Multinational Space Situational Awareness Exercise (Global Sentinel 2022)	Jul. 25-Aug. 3, 2022	Vandenberg Space Force Base, the U.S.	The U.S., Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, the U.K., Italy, Israel, the ROK, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Ukraine	Air Staff Office Space Operations Group 4 personnel	—
Australian Air Force Exercise (Pitch Black 22)	Aug. 20-Sep. 8, 2022	RAAF Base Darwin (the northern territory of Australia) and the airspace surrounding the base	Australia, etc.	7th Air Wing F-2A × 6 Approx. 150 personnel	—
Joint Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Exercise in the Federated States of Micronesia, etc. (Christmas Drop)	Nov. 30-Dec. 12, 2022	Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), the Northern Mariana Islands (the U.S.), Palau, and Micronesia, and the airspace surrounding these areas	The U.S., Australia, etc.	Air Support Command C-130 × 1 Approx. 20 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia Multilateral Exercise (Cope North 23)	Feb. 8-24, 2023	Guam (the U.S.) Northern Mariana Islands (the U.S.) Area surrounding the locations set forth in the preceding two items Roman Tmetuchl International Airport (Republic of Palau) JMSDF Iwo Jima Air Base	The U.S., Australia, etc.	8th Air Wing, 9th Air Wing, Air Tactics Development Wing, Air Rescue Wing, Airborne Warning and Control Wing, 1st Tactical Airlift Wing, 2nd Tactical Airlift Group, 3rd Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Traffic Control Service Group, Air Weather Group, Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron F-15J/DJ × 6 F-2A/B × 6 UH-60J × 1 E-767 × 1 C-130H × 2 KC-767 × 1 Approx. 500 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise (*Note 2)	Mar. 6-8, 2023	Airspace surrounding Kyushu	The U.S., Australia	Air Tactics Development Wing: RC-2 × 1, Fleet Air Wing 31: EP-3 × 1, OP-3 × 1	(U.S.) RC-135 × 1 (Australia) P-8A × 1
Multilateral Table-top Exercise hosted by U.S. Space Force (Schriever Wargame 2023)	Mar. 20-31, 2023	Maxwell Air Force Base	The U.S., Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the U.K.	Internal Bureau, Joint Staff Office, Air Staff Office 18 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-France Trilateral Exercise (Multi Big-Deck Event) (*Note 2)	Jun. 7-10, 2023	East of Okinawa to East China Sea	The U.S., France	(1) Maritime Self-Defense Force JS “Izumo”, “Samidare” (2) Air Self-Defense Force 9th Air Wing (F-15 × 4), Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	(U.S. Navy) Aircraft carrier USS “Ronald Reagan,” “Nimitz,” Cruiser USS “Antietam,” “Robert Smalls,” “Bunker Hill,” USS “Rafael Peralta,” “Decatur,” “Wayne E. Meyer,” “Chung-Hoon” (U.S. Air Force) B-52 (French Navy) Frigate “Lorraine”.
Multilateral Exercise in (Mobility Guardian 23)	Jul. 3-21, 2023	(1) Illinois, U.S. (2) Guam, U.S. (3) Hawaii, U.S. (4) Republic of Palau (5) Komaki base (6) Yakumo Sub-base (7) U.S. Forces in Japan Yokota Air Base	The U.S.	Air Support Command C-130H × 2 Approx. 240 personnel	—
Participation in the Multilateral Exercise (Silver Flag) hosted by the U.S. Air Force	Aug. 5-12, 2023	Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, U.S.	The U.S., etc.	Approx. 20 personnel	—
Participation in the multilateral exercise (Pacific Airlift Rally 23) hosted by the U.S.-Philippines and the Japan-Philippines Joint Exercise on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief	Aug. 6-19, 2023	Clark Air Force Base, Pampanga Province, Republic of the Philippines and its surrounding airspace	The U.S., Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, etc.	Air Support Command 1st Tactical Airlift Wing C-130H × 1 Approx. 20 personnel	—

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise	Oct. 22, 2023	Airspace northwest of Kyushu	The U.S., ROK	8th Air Wing F-2A × 4, Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	(U.S. Air Force) B-52 × 1, F-16 × 3 (ROK Air Force) F-15K × 2
Joint Training for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Micronesia, etc. (Christmas Drop)	Nov. 29-Dec. 12, 2023	Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, the U.S., the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Micronesia, and the surrounding airspace	The U.S., etc.	1st Tactical Airlift Wing: C-130H × 1 Approx. 20 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Base Defense Exercise	Dec. 4-8, 2023	ASDF Iruma Air Base	The U.S., Australia	Air Defense Command Approx. 10 personnel	(U.S. Air Force) 10 U.S. Air Force in Japan (Royal Australian Air Force) 5 Royal Australian Air Force
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise	Dec. 20, 2023	Airspace northwest of Kyushu	The U.S., ROK	8th Air Wing F-2 × 4	(U.S. Air Force) B-1 × 2, F-16 × 3 (ROK Air Force) F-15K × 2
Multinational Space Situational Awareness Exercise (Global Sentinel 2024)	Feb. 5-16, 2024	Vandenberg Space Force Base, the U.S.	The U.S., Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Germany, Finland, France, England, Italy, Israel, the ROK, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Ukraine	Air Staff Office Space Operations Group 7 personnel	
Japan-U.S.-Australia Multilateral Exercise (Cope North 24) (*Note 2)	Feb. 5-23, 2024	Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, the U.S. and surrounding airspace	The U.S., Australia, etc.	8th Air Wing, 9th Air Wing, Air Tactics Development Wing, Air Rescue Wing, Airborne Warning and Control Wing, 1st Tactical Airlift Wing, Air Traffic Control Group, Air Weather Group, Aeromedical Evacuation, JSDF Iruma Hospital, Air Materiel Command F-15J/DJ × 6 F-2A/B × 6 U-125A × 1 UH-60J × 1 E-767 × 1 K/C-130H × 1 Approx. 500 personnel	—
Organized by French Space Command Multinational Space Military Exercise (AsterX2024)	Mar. 4-15, 2024	France Centre spatial de Toulouse; CST	France, the U.S., Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, the ROK, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, United Arab Emirates	Space Operations Group 2 personnel	
Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise	Apr. 2, 2024	Airspace northwest of Kyushu	The U.S., ROK	8th Air Wing (Tsuiki) F-2 × 4, Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Kasuga)	(U.S. Air Force) B-52 × 2 and F-16 × 3 (ROK Air Force) F-15K × 2
Exercise with the Royal Australian Air Force (Pitch Black 24)	Jul. 12-Aug. 2, 2024	RAAF Base Darwin (the northern territory of Australia) and the airspace surrounding the base	Australia, etc.	Air Defense Command (8th Air Wing, Warning Wing), F-2A × 6, E-767 × 1 Approx. 230 personnel	—
Japan-Germany-Spain Trilateral Exercises	Jul. 19, 20, 2024	ASDF Chitose Air Base and the airspace surrounding the base	Germany, Spain	2nd Air Wing (Chitose) F-15 × 4	(German Air Force) Eurofighter fighter aircraft × 8, A400M transport aircraft × 3, A330MRTT aerial refueling aircraft × 4, A321 transport aircraft × 1, approx. 180 personnel (Spanish Air Force) Eurofighter fighter aircraft × 4, A400M transport aircraft × 2, approx. 150 personnel"
Participation in the Multilateral Exercise (Silver Flag) hosted by the U.S. Air Force	Jul. 20-28, 2024	Andersen Air Force Base, the United States territory of Guam	U.S. Forces, etc.	Approx. 20 personnel	—
Multilateral Exercise (Khaan Quest 2024)	Aug. 1-9, 2024	Tov prefecture, Mongolia (Five Hills Training Center)	Mongolia, etc.	The Air Support Command, the Air Training Command Approx. 10 personnel	—
Search and rescue exercise hosted by the U.S. Pacific Air Force and the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (Pacific Angel 24-1)	Aug. 26-30, 2024	Port Moresby, Independent State of Papua New Guinea	The U.S., Independent State of Papua New Guinea, etc.	2 personnel	—

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Indian Air Force exercise (Tarang Shakti 24)	Aug. 29-Sep. 14, 2024	Jodhpur Air Force Station, Rajasthan State, India, and the airspace surrounding the station	India, etc.	Air Defense Command (7th Air Wing (Hyakuri)) F-2 × 3, approx. 110 personnel *The fighter aircraft flew to a transit point	—
Joint Training for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Micronesia, etc. (Christmas Drop)	Dec. 4-17, 2024	Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, the U.S., the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Micronesia, and the surrounding airspace	The U.S., etc.	1st Tactical Airlift Wing C-130H × 1 Approx. 20 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise	Jan. 15, 2025	Airspace northwest of Kyushu	The U.S., ROK	8th Air Wing (Tsuiki) F-2 × 4 Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing Approx. 250 personnel	(U.S. Air Force) B-1B × 2 and F-16 × 1 (ROK Air Force) F-15K × 2
Japan-U.S.-Australia Multilateral Exercise (Cope North 25)	Feb. 3-21, 2025	Guam, the U.S., and the airspace surrounding it	The U.S., Australia	3rd Air Wing, Warning Wing and 3rd Tactical Airlift Wing, F-35A × 6, E-2D × 2 and KC-46A × 1, approx. 250 personnel	—
Organized by French Space Command Multinational Space Military Exercise (AsterX2025)	Mar. 24-28. 2026	Toulouse Space Centre, France	France, Australia, Canada, Germany, India, Italy, Norway, Poland, ROK, Spain, U.K., U.S.	Space Operations Group 2 personnel	—
Multinational Space Situational Awareness Exercise (Global Sentinel 2025)	Apr. 28-May 9, 2025	Vandenberg Space Force Base, the U.S.	U.S., Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, NATO, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, ROK, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Ukraine, U.K.	Air Staff Office Space Operations Group 7 personnel	—
Multilateral Joint Exercise Hosted by the United States and Mongolia (Pacific Airlift Rally 25)	May 3-10, 2025	Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar)	U.S., Mongolia, etc.	2 personnel	—
Multilateral Exercise (Khaan Quest 2025)	Jun. 17-22, 2025	Tov prefecture, Mongolia (Five Hills Training Center), etc.	Mongolia, U.S., etc.	10 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise	Jun. 18, 2025	Airspace over the west of Kyushu	U.S., ROK	8th Air Wing: F-2 × 2 Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	U.S. Air Force: F-16 × 4 ROK Air Force: F-15K × 2
"Resolute Force Pacific" Exercise Hosted by the U.S. Forces	Jul. 9-Aug. 4, 2025	(1) JSDF facilities (2) U.S. Forces Japan facilities and areas (3) Airspace surrounding Japan	U.S., etc.	Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command, etc.: 50 aircraft, etc. Approx. 3,100 personnel	Pacific Air Force, U.S. Forces Japan, etc.
Multilateral Joint Exercise "Mobility Guardian 25" Hosted by U.S. Forces	Jul. 13-27, 2025	A. Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, U.S.) and the surrounding airspace B. Tinian Island, U.S. and the surrounding airspace C. Palau International Airport, Republic of Palau	U.S., etc.	U.S., etc.C-130H × 1 50 personnel	—
Multilateral Table-top Exercise Hosted by U.S. Space Force (Schriever Wargame 2025)	Aug. 10-21, 2025	Maxwell Air Force Base	U.S., Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, U.K.	Internal Bureau, Joint Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Space Operations Group, etc. 23 personnel	—
Multilateral Search and Rescue Exercise Hosted by the U.S. Pacific Air Forces and the Sri Lanka Air Force (Pacific Angel 25-1)	Sep. 8-12, 2025	Air Force Base Katunayake, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka	U.S., Sri Lanka, etc.	4 personnel	—
Participation in the Multilateral Exercise (Silver Flag) hosted by the U.S. Air Force	Sep. 20-28, 2025	Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, U.S.	U.S., etc.	20 personnel	—

Exercise	Period	Location	Participating countries	Participating JSDF units	Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise (Bushido Guardian 25)	Sep. 29-Oct. 10, 2025	ASDF Misawa Air Base and the surrounding airspace	U.S., Australia	3rd Air Wing: F-35A × 8 Airborne Warning and Control Wing: E-2D × 1 Northern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	U.S. Air Force: F-35A× 8, F-16 × 8, E-3G × 1, KC-135 × 2, approx. 230 personnel Royal Australian Air Force: F-35A× 8, KC-30A × 1, C-17A × 1, approx. 160 personnel
Joint Training for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Micronesia, etc. (Christmas Drop)	Dec. 3-16, 2025 (Including deployment and withdrawal)	(1) Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, U.S. (2) The Northern Mariana Islands, U.S.; the Republic of the Marshall Islands; the Federated States of Micronesia; the Republic of Palau; and the surrounding airspaces	U.S., etc.	1st Tactical Airlift Wing: C-130H × 1 Approx. 25 personnel	—
Multinational Space Military Exercise Organized by the French Space Command (SparteX 2026)	Feb. 8-20, 2026	French Air and Space Force Base "Général Robert Aubinière"	France, Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland, ROK, Spain, Switzerland, U.K., U.S.	Space Operations Group 1 personnel	—
Japan-U.S.-Netherlands Joint Exercise (Kazaguruma Guardian)	Mar. 20-Apr. 3, 2026	ASDF Misawa Air Base and the surrounding airspace	The U.S., Netherlands	3rd Air Wing: F-35A × 8 Airborne Warning and Control Wing: E-2D × 1 Northern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing	U.S. Air Force: F-35A × 2, F-16 × 4 Royal Netherlands Air Force: F-35A × 5, MRTT × 1

Notes: 1. The numbers of personnel, etc., are based on those at the time of release. The total number of personnel may not match the actual number if it is the sum of approximate numbers.
2. The results of the "Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)" exercise* are duplicated in Reference 64.
3. The MSDF also participated (written in duplicate in the MSDF section)
4. The ASDF also participated (written in duplicate in the ASDF section)
5. The GSDF also participated (written in duplicate in the GSDF section)

Reference 62 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations

(As of March 31, 2026)

(1) Dispatch of Personnel to United Nations Agencies

Period of Dispatch	Position in the Dispatched Organization	Dispatched Personnel
Jun. 9, 1997–Jun. 30, 2002, Aug. 1, 2004–Jul. 31, 2007	Inspectorate Division Director, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major General)[1]
Jun. 23, 1997–Jun. 23, 2000	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF officer (Captain)
Oct. 1, 2002–Jun. 30, 2007	Head, Operations and Planning Branch, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Jul. 11, 2005–Jul. 10, 2009	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major)
Jan. 9, 2009–Jan. 8, 2013	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major)
Aug. 27, 2013–Aug. 31, 2016	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF officer (Captain)
Sep. 12, 2022–	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Dec. 2, 2002–Jun. 1, 2005	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Nov. 28, 2005–Nov. 27, 2008	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jan. 16, 2011–Jan. 15, 2014	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Sep. 18, 2013–Sep. 17, 2016	Force Generation Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jun. 1, 2015–Nov. 30, 2017	Senior Military Liaison Officer, Africa I Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Mar. 1–Aug. 31, 2016	Strategic Support Service, Logistics Support Division, Department of Field Support, United Nations (New York)	1 administrative official [2]
Aug. 29, 2016–Aug. 26, 2019	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) (New York)[3]	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Feb. 11, 2017–Feb. 18, 2020	Strategic Support Service, Logistics Division, Department of Operational Support, United Nations (New York)[4]	1 administrative official
Apr. 1, 2018–Dec. 31, 2020	Group of Experts, Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (New York)	1 instructor
Oct. 19, 2019–May. 8, 2022	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Aug. 8, 2020–Aug.25, 2023	Support Partnerships Service, Division for Special Activities, United Nations Department of Operational Support (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Mar. 15, 2021–Mar. 15, 2025	Support Partnerships Service, Division for Special Activities, United Nations Department of Operational Support (New York)	1 administrative official
Jul. 3, 2022–Jul. 4, 2025	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Dec. 5, 2022–	Military Doctrine and Performance Evaluation Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO)(New York)[5]	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Feb. 10, 2024–	Triangular Partnership Programme Service, Division for Special Activities, United Nations Department of Operational Support (New York)[6]	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Mar. 29, 2024–	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)

Notes: 1. The OPCW Inspectorate Division Director served in office until July 2009 after his retirement from the SDF on August 1, 2007.
2. Dispatched as an official of Ministry of Foreign Affairs
3. Due to the organizational change on January 1, 2019, the name changed from "Department of Peacekeeping Operations" to "Department of Peace Operations."
4. Due to the organizational change on January 1, 2019, the name changed from "Department of Field Support" to "Department of Operational Support."
5. As a result of organizational restructuring effective July 1, 2025, the Military Performance Evaluation Team was reorganized as the Military Doctrine and Performance Evaluation Service.
6. As a result of organizational restructuring effective April 1, 2026, the duty station was changed from the Support Partnerships Service to the Triangular Partnership Programme Service.

(2) Dispatch of Instructors and Others to PKO Centers, etc.

Period of Dispatch	Position in the Dispatched Organization	Dispatched Personnel
Nov. 21–30, 2008	Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
May 22–Jun. 6, 2009	Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)	1 GSDF personnel (Major General)
Aug. 28–Sep. 5, 2009	Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Apr. 10–17, 2010	Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel) *1
Aug. 14–30, 2010	Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Nov. 15–20, 2011	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Jul. 31–Aug. 5, 2012	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Dec. 15–19, 2012	Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)	1 ASDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Mar. 9–14, 2013	South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
Aug. 28–Sep. 1, 2013	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Oct. 5–9, 2013	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
Mar. 8–13, 2014	South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
Mar. 23–May 25, 2014	Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Aug. 12, 2014	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya) (dispatched to give lecture in South Sudan)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Oct. 5–9, 2014	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
Oct. 6–23, 2014	Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Mar. 19–Apr. 1, 2015	UN Peacekeeping Centre (India)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
Jun. 4–Jul. 1, 2015	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia) *2	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Sep. 5–20, 2015	South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
Oct. 22–Nov. 7, 2015	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Mar. 21–Apr. 1, 2016	UN Peacekeeping Centre (India)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
May 31–Jun. 17, 2016	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Nov. 4–19, 2016	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Mar. 6–19, 2017	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jun. 2-18, 2017	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Dec. 1-15, 2017	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jun. 30-Jul. 15, 2018	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Aug. 22-28, 2018	Indonesian National Defense Forces Peacekeeping Centre (Indonesia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Nov. 2–18, 2018	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Mar. 3–15, 2019	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jun. 28–Jul. 12, 2019	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Nov. 8-22, 2019	International Peace Support Training Institute (Ethiopia) *3	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Mar. 6-15, 2020	International Peace Support Training Institute (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Mar. 5-16, 2022	International Peace Support Training Institute (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
August 6–20, 2022	International Peace Support Training Institute (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Nov.9-18, 2023	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Feb.2-11, 2024	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)

*1 First dispatch of female SDF personnel.
*2 In June 2015, the name changed from "International Peace Keeping Training Centre" to "Peace Support Training Centre."
*3 In October 2019, the name changed from "Peace Support Training Center" to "International Peace Support Training Institute."

Reference 63 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Assignments

(1) Dispatch to the Persian Gulf for minesweeping

(As of March 31, 2026)

Place of Dispatch		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Persian Gulf, etc.	Persian Gulf Minesweeping Dispatch Unit	Apr.-Oct. 1991	Approx. 510	Approx. 510	Minesweeping and disposal in the Persian Gulf

(2) International Peace Cooperation Assignments

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (PKO)	Ceasefire Monitors	Sep. 1992 - Sep. 1993	8	16	– Monitor custody of weapons collected – Monitor observance of ceasefire
	Engineer unit	Sep. 1992 - Sep. 1993	600	1,200	– Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure – Supply fuel and water – Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities for work and medical care
United Nations operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (PKO)	Headquarters staff	May 1993 - Jan. 1995	5	10	– Draft mid-and long-term plans, plan or coordinate transport operations
	Transport coordination unit	May 1993 - Jan. 1995	48	144	– Support customs clearance work and provide other transport related technical coordination in the allocation of transport
Humanitarian Relief Operation for Rwandan Refugees (Humanitarian aid)	Rwandan refugee relief unit	Sep. - Dec. 1994	260	260	– Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies
	Air transport unit	Sep. - Dec. 1994	118	118	– Air transport of Rwandan refugee relief unit personnel and supplies – Air transport of personnel of international organizations, etc., and materials
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (PKO)	Headquarters staff	Feb. 1996 - Feb. 2009	1st-13th personnel: 2	38	– Create PR and budgets, plan and coordinate transport, maintenance and other operations
		Feb. 2009 - Jan. 2013	14th-17th personnel: 3		
	Transport unit	Feb. 1996 - Aug. 2012	1st-33rd personnel: 43	1,463	– Transport food and other supplies – Store goods at supply warehouses, repair roads and other infrastructure, maintain heavy machinery, conduct firefighting and snow clearance
		Aug. 2012 - Jan. 2013	34th personnel: 44		
Humanitarian Relief Operations in Timor-Leste	Air transport unit	Nov. 1999 - Feb. 2000	113	113	– Air transport of relief supplies or UNHCR related personnel
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees	Air transport unit	Oct. 2001	138	138	– Air transport of relief supplies
United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) (United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMISET) from May 20, 2002) (PKO)	Headquarters staff	Feb. 2002 - Jun. 2004	1st rotation: 10 2nd rotation: 7	17	– Plan and coordinate engineering or logistics operations
	Engineer unit	Mar. 2002 - Jun. 2004	1st and 2nd rotation: 680 3rd rotation: 522 4th rotation: 405	2,287	– Maintain and repair roads and bridges – Maintain reservoirs used by units of other nations and local inhabitants that are in Dili and other locations – Public welfare support operations
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Refugees (Humanitarian aid)	Air transport unit	Mar. - Apr. 2003	50	50	– Air transport of relief supplies
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Victims (Humanitarian aid)	Air transport unit	Jul. - Aug. 2003	98	98	– Air transport of materials
United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) (PKO)	Arms monitors	Mar. 2007 - Jan. 2011	6	24	– Monitor management of weapons of Maoist soldiers and those of the Nepalese government force
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) (PKO)	Headquarters staff	Oct. 2008 - Sep. 2011	2	12	– Coordination in UNMISS concerning overall logistics of the military sector – Database management
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (PKO)	Headquarters staff	Feb. 2010 - Jan. 2013	2	12	– Coordination of facility-related duties, overall military logistics
	Engineer unit	Feb. 2010 - Feb. 2013	1st rotation: 203 2nd rotation: 346 3rd and 4th rotation: 330 5th and 6th rotation: 317 7th rotation: 297 Withdrawal support unit: 44	2,184	– Remove rubble, repair roads, construct simple facilities, etc.
United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (PKO)	Military liaison officer	Sep. 2010 - Sep. 2012	2	8	– Intelligence gathering on the security situation across Timor-Leste

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) (PKO)	Headquarters staff	Nov. 2011 -	1st - 5th rotation: 3 6th - 15th rotation: 4 16th rotation: 6 17th rotation and after: 4	63	– Coordination regarding the demand of overall military logistics – Management of database and information analysis – Planning and coordination of engineering duties – Planning and coordination of aircraft operation supports
	Engineer Unit	Jan. 2012 - May 2017	1st rotation: 239 2nd - 4th rotation: 349 5th and 6th rotation: 401 7th - 10th rotation: 353 11th rotation: 354 Withdrawal support unit: 58 (Number of personnel for 1st to 4th rotations includes personnel at the local support coordination center)	3,912	– Development of infrastructure – (The following duties were added after 5th personnel) – Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities – Coordination regarding logistics
	Local support coordination center	Jan. 2012 - Dec. 2013			– Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities – Coordination regarding logistics
International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Sinai Peninsula (Internationally coordinated operation)	Headquarters staff	Apr. 2019 -	1st - 4th rotation: 2 5th rotation and after: 4	20	– Liaison and coordination between Egypt and Israel and the MFO – Planning and progress management related to the renewal of various facilities at the MFO
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Ukrainian Refugees (Humanitarian aid) refugees	Air transport unit	May-Jun., 2022	142	142	– Air transportation of UNHCR humanitarian relief supplies

Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and Timor-Leste), the ASDF (in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Haiti, and Republic of South Sudan).
2. An advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part of the Rwandan refugee relief effort.

(3) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International Disaster Relief Activities in Honduras (hurricane)	Medical unit	Nov.–Dec. 1998	80	185	– Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics
	Air transport unit		105		– Transportation of equipment for medical units, etc.
International Disaster Relief Activities in Turkey (earthquake)	Maritime transport unit	Sep.–Nov. 1999	426	426	– Marine transportation of materials required for international disaster relief activities (e.g., temporary dwellings)
International Disaster Relief Activities in India (earthquake)	Material support unit	Feb. 2001	16	94	– Delivery of aid materials, technical instruction on aid materials
	Air transport unit		78		– Air transport of aid materials, support units, etc.
International Disaster Relief Activities in Iran (earthquake)	Air transport unit	Dec. 2003–Jan. 2004	31	31	– Air transport of materials required for international disaster relief activities (tents, etc.)
International Disaster Relief Activities in Thailand (earthquake, tsunami)	Dispatched maritime unit	Dec. 2004–Jan. 2005	590	590	– Search and rescue activities for the disaster struck victims
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake, tsunami)	Joint liaison office	Jan.–Mar. 2005	22	925	– Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities
	Medical/Air support unit		228		– Air transport of aid materials – Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics
	Maritime transport unit		593		– Marine transportation of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams – Marine transportation of aid materials
	Air transport unit		82		– Air transport of aid materials
International Disaster Relief Activities off Kamchatka Peninsula, Russia (submarine accident)	Maritime transport unit	Aug. 2005	346	346	– Rescue of a Russian submarine
International Disaster Relief Activities in Pakistan (earthquake)	Air support unit	Oct.-Dec. 2005	147	261	– Air transport in connection with relief activities
	Air transport unit		114		– Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Team
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake)	Medical support unit	May-Jun. 2006	149	234	– Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics
	Air transport unit		85		– Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake)	Joint liaison office	Oct. 2009	21	33	– Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities
	Medical support unit		12		– Medical treatment
International Disaster Relief Activities in Haiti (earthquake)	Joint liaison office	Jan.–Feb. 2010	33	234	– Coordination with relevant Haitian organizations and others
	Air transport unit		97		– Air transportation of International Disaster Relief Teams – Air transportation of victims from Haiti to the United States as part of international disaster relief activities on the return trips of said unit
	Medical support unit		104		– Medical treatment
International Disaster Relief Activities in Pakistan (flood)	Joint operations coordination center	Aug.–Nov. 2010	27	514	– Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities
	Air support unit		184		– Air transport of materials, etc.
	Marine convoy		154		– Marine transportation of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams
	Air transport unit		149		– Air Transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams
International Disaster Relief Activities in New Zealand (earthquake)	Air transport unit	Feb.–Mar. 2011	40	40	– Air transport of personnel engaging in international disaster relief activities, materials
International Disaster Relief Activities in the Philippines (typhoon)	Joint Operations Coordination Center	Nov.–Dec. 2013	Approx. 10	Approx. 1,100	– Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities
	Joint Task Force		Approx. 1,080		– Medical treatment (examination/vaccination) – Prevention of epidemics – Transport of relief supplies, etc.
International Disaster Relief Activities for the missing Malaysian airplane (searching)	Local operation support center	Mar.–May. 2014	Approx. 10	Approx. 140	– Coordination with relevant Malaysian organizations and others
	International disaster relief squadron		Approx. 130		– Rescue operations including searching
International Disaster Relief Activities in West Africa (Ebola virus disease outbreak)	Field coordination headquarters	Nov.-Dec. 2014	4	14	– Coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JICA, UNMEER, and other relevant organizations engaged in international disaster relief activities
	Air transport unit		10		– Air transport
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (airplane accident)	Field coordination headquarters	Dec. 2014 - Jan. 2015	3	Approx. 350	– Information gathering related to rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501, coordination with relevant organizations and countries
	International disaster relief surface force		Approx. 350		– Rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501
International Disaster Relief Activities in West Africa (Ebola virus disease outbreak)	Epidemiological study support	Apr.– May 2015	1	1	– Support for WHO's epidemiological study and other activities in Sierra Leone
International Disaster Relief Activities in Nepal (earthquake)	Joint operations coordination center	Apr.– May 2015	4	Approx. 140	– Coordination with relevant organizations of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal and relevant countries
	Medical support unit		Approx. 110		– Medical treatment
	Air transport unit		Approx. 30		– Air transport of equipment and materials required for medical treatment
International Disaster Relief Activities in New Zealand (earthquake)	Air patrol unit	Nov. 2016	Approx. 30	Approx. 30	– Evaluation of damages
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake, tsunami)	Field coordination headquarters	Oct. 2018	Approx. 10	Approx. 60	– Information gathering concerning damages or operations in the affected areas – Coordination with relevant organizations of Indonesia and relevant countries
	Air transport unit		Approx. 50		– Transportation of personnel/materials
International Disaster Relief Activities in Djibouti (heavy rain, flood)	Part of the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement *	Nov.-Dec. 2019	Approx. 230	Approx. 230	– Drainage work and function recovery of public facilities (elementary and junior high schools), transport / distribution of emergency relief supplies
International Disaster Relief Activities in Australia (bush fire)	Field coordination headquarters	Jan.-Feb. 2020	Approx. 10	Approx. 80	– Coordination with relevant organizations of the Commonwealth of Australia and relevant countries
	Air transport unit		Approx. 70		– Air transport of materials and personnel required for firefighting and relief activities
International Disaster Relief Activities in Tonga (volcanic eruption)	Field coordination headquarters	Jan.-Feb. 2022	7	Approx. 370	– Coordinating with related organizations of Kingdom of Tonga, Australia, and other related countries
	International Disaster Relief Airlift Detachment etc.		Approx. 120		– Air transport for emergency relief supplies
	Joint Task Force		Approx. 240		– Sea transport for emergency relief supplies and emergency water- supply

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International Disaster Relief Activities in Türkiye (earthquake)	Field coordination headquarters	Feb.-Mar. 2023	10	Approx. 60	– Coordination with relevant organizations of the Republic of Türkiye, relevant countries, etc.
	International Disaster Relief Airlift Detachment etc.		Approx. 50		– Air transport of emergency relief supplies and equipment necessary for international disaster relief activities
International Disaster Relief Activities in Myanmar (earthquake)	Local Coordination Center	Apr. 2025	Approx. 10	Approx. 30	– Information gathering concerning damages or operations in the affected areas – Air transport of medical equipment, materials, etc. necessary for international disaster relief activities
	Air transport unit		Approx. 20		

* Units dispatched for a counter-piracy mission (see (7) Counter-Piracy Operations) carried out the activities

(4) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

Place of Dispatch		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Indian Ocean	Units carrying out replenishment support activities	Nov. 2001 - Nov. 2007	Approx. 320	Approx. 10,900	– Materials supplies for foreign vessels
U.S. Forces in Japan, etc.	Units carrying out replenishment support activities		—	Approx. 2,900	– Transportation of materials

(5) Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law

Place of Dispatch		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Indian Ocean	Replenishment support unit	Jan. 2008 - Feb. 2010	Approx. 330	Approx. 2,400	– Materials supplies for foreign vessels

(6) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

Place of Dispatch		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Southeast Iraq, etc.	Reconstruction assistance group (1st to 10th) Operation assistance unit (1st to 5th)	Jan. 2004 - Jul. 2006	Approx. 600	Approx. 5,500	– Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities, etc.
Kuwait, etc.	Evacuation operation unit	Jun.– Sep. 2006	Approx. 100	Approx. 100	– Operations required for evacuation of vehicles, equipment and others
Persian Gulf, etc.	Maritime transport unit	Feb.- Apr. 2004	Approx. 330	Approx. 330	– Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipment required for the GSDF's activities
Kuwait, etc.	Air transportation unit (1st to 16th term)	Dec. 2003 - Dec. 2008	Approx. 210	Approx. 3,500	– Air transportation of materials for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance
Kuwait, etc.	Withdrawal operation unit	Dec. 2008 – Feb. 2009	Approx. 130	Approx. 130	– Operation related to withdrawal

(7) Counter-Piracy Operations (including dispatches as Maritime Security Operations)

Place of Dispatch		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden	Maritime Force	Mar. 2009 - Dec. 2016	Approx. 400	Approx. 10,000	Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.
		Dec. 2016 -	Approx. 200*	Approx. 5,600*	Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.
Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti	Air Unit (MSDF)	May 2009 - Feb. 2011	Approx.100	Approx. 1,640	Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, tasks related to general affairs, accounting, public relations, health, etc.
		Feb. 2011 - Jun. 2012	Approx.120		
		Jun. 2012 - Jul. 2014	Approx.110		
Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti		Jul. 2014 - Jul. 2015	Approx. 70	Approx. 210	Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.
Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti		Jul. 2015 -	Approx. 60*	Approx. 2,460*	Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc. (Conduct information gathering activities in the Gulf of Aden, especially in the airspace of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor where counter-piracy operations are carried out, within the area of the high seas to the west of the northern Arabian sea since January 2020)
Djibouti	Support Unit (MSDF)	Jul. 2014 - Feb. 2023	Approx. 30	Approx. 820	Communication or coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct counter-piracy operation, etc.
		Feb. 2023 -	Approx. 40		
Bahrain, etc.	Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) Deployed Unit at the Headquarters	Aug. 2014 -Jun. 2021	Under 20	Approx. 70	Communication and coordination with foreign troops taking part in CTF-151
	CTF-151 Deployed Unit at the Headquarters	Jun. 2021 -	Under 15	11	Communication and coordination with foreign troops taking part in CTF-151
	CMF Deployed Unit at the Headquarters	Jun. 2021 -	1–2	12	Communication and coordination with Headquarters of CTF-151, foreign troops taking part in CTF-151
Djibouti	Local Coordination Center	Jul. 2012 - Jul. 2014	3	12	Communication or coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities necessary for Maritime Force and Air Unit to conduct counter-piracy operation
Djibouti	Air Unit (GSDF)	May 2009 - Feb. 2011	Approx. 50	Approx. 970	Security of activity base and P-3C
		Feb. 2011 - Jun. 2012	Approx. 60		
		Jun. 2012 - Jul. 2014	Approx. 80		
	Support Unit (GSDF)	Jul. 2014 - Feb. 2023	Approx. 80	Approx. 2,070	Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities or supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct counter-piracy operation, etc.
		Feb. 2023 -	Approx. 90		
	Support Unit (ASDF)	Jan.2024-	Several personnel	Approx. 10	

(8) Information Gathering Activities in the Middle East

Place of Dispatch		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Gulf of Oman, the northern Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the east of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait	Maritime Force	Feb. 2020 - Feb. 2022	Approx. 200	Approx. 1,200	Information gathering activities for ensuring the safety of Japan related Vessels
	Surface Detachment (Concurrently served by Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement)	Feb. 2022 -	Approx. 200	Approx. 2,600	Information Gathering Activities for Ensuring the Safety of Japan-related Vessels
Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti	Air Detachment (MSDF) (Concurrently served by Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement)	Jan. 2020 -	Approx. 60	Approx. 1,380	Conduct information gathering activities in the Gulf of Aden, especially in the airspace of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, where counter-piracy operations are carried out, and within the area of the high seas to the west of the northern Arabian sea.

* The number and the cumulative number of personnel and of Surface, Air Detachments are included in (7) Counter-piracy Operations* respectively, because the information gathering activities in Middle East are conducted with personal of the counter-piracy forces.

Reference 64 Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction Exercise (Since 2014)

(March 31, 2026)

Date	Exercise	Location	Participation of the MOD/SDF
August 2014	PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the United States	United States	Joint Staff (including one ship)
November 2015	PSI interdiction exercise hosted by New Zealand	New Zealand	Joint Staff
September 2016	PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Singapore	Singapore	Joint Staff
September 2017	PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Australia	Australia	Joint Staff, Ground Staff, Maritime Staff, Internal Bureau (including one aircraft)
July 2018	PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Japan	Japan	Joint Staff, Ground Defense Command, Self Defense Fleet, Eastern Army, Yokosuka Regional Unit, Chemical School, Internal Bureau (including two vessels, two aircraft and three vehicles)
July 2019	PSI interdiction exercise hosted by ROK	ROK	Joint Staff and Chemical School
October 2021	PSI exercise hosted by Singapore	Singapore	VTC participation by the Joint Staff Office and GSDF Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit
August 2022	PSI exercise hosted by the U.S.	United States	Joint Staff and Chemical School, etc.
May 2023	PSI exercise hosted by ROK	ROK	Joint Staff, Ground Component Command, Self Defense Fleet （1 vessel）
September 2024	PSI exercise hosted by Australia	Australia	Joint Staff, Ground Defense Command, Self Defense Fleet (including one aircraft)
December 2025	PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Japan	Japan	Joint Staff, Ground Defense Command, Self Defense Fleet (1 vessel, 1 aircraft)

Reference 65 Activities in Civic Life

Items	Details of Activities and Their Past Records
Disposal of Unexploded Bombs (Supplementary provisions of the Self-Defense Forces Law)	○ The GSDF disposes of such bombs at the request of municipal governments and others. ○ Disposal operations in FY2025: a total of 1,655 disposal operations (average of approximately 32 operations per week), weighing approximately 37.4 tons in total; in particular, in Okinawa Prefecture, 466 disposal operations (accounting for about 28% of the nationwide total), weighing approximately 11.5 tons (accounting for about 31% of the nationwide total). (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the JSDF. However, the JSDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible in regard to disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)
Removal of Underwater Mines (Article 84-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law)	○ The MSDF undertakes minesweeping operations in waters designated as dangerous areas because underwater mines had been laid there during World War II, as well as removes and disposes of explosives after receiving reports from municipal governments and others. ○ Minesweeping has been almost completed in the dangerous areas. ○ Disposal operations in FY2025: a total of 122 units were disposed of, weighing approximately 0.5 tons in total. (If explosive hazardous materials are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the JSDF. However, the JSDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)
Medical Activities (Article 27 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 4-1-10 of Defense Ministry Establishment Law, and others)	○ Medical services are provided to the general public at the National Defense Medical College Hospital in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and some hospitals affiliated with the JSDF (eight out of 11 such hospitals, including the JSDF Central Hospital in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo). ○ The National Defense Medical College Hospital serves as an advanced treatment hospital (provision of advanced medical treatment, etc.) and a medical facility providing tertiary emergency services (acceptance of emergency patients in critical condition). ○ In the wake of a disaster, medical units belonging to major JSDF units, acting on a request from municipal governments, provide travelling clinics, quarantines and so forth when a disaster occurs. ○ The GSDF Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo), MSDF Underwater Medical Center (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), and ASDF Aviation ○ Medicine Laboratory (Tachikawa City, Tokyo and Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture) undertake study on outdoor sanitation, underwater medicine, and aviation medicine, respectively. ○ The National Defense Medical College Research Institute (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture) undertakes study on disaster and emergency medicine.
Cooperation in Supporting Athletic Meetings (Article 100-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, etc.)	○ At the request of concerned organizations, the JSDF helps operations of the Olympics and Asian games in Japan as well as national sports meetings in the fields of ceremonies, communications, transportation, music performance, medical services, and emergency medical services. ○ The JSDF provides transportation and communication support to marathon events and ekiden road relays.
Exchanges with Local Communities	○ Sports facilities such as grounds, gyms and swimming pools at many of the JSDF garrisons and bases are open to general citizens in response to requests from local communities. Participation in various events sponsored by general citizens and municipal governments or taking part as sports referees and instructors on an individual basis.

Reference 66 List of U.S. Forces Japan Facilities/Areas (including joint use facilities)

As of January 1, 2026

Facility/Area	Purpose	Location							Area (km²)	2-1(a) Area	2-4(a) Area	2-4(b) Area
Camp Chitose	Communications	Chitose City, Hokkaido							4,274	4,274	4,263	0
Camp Higashi Chitose	Maneuver area	Chitose City, Hokkaido							81	0	0	81
Hokkaido Chitose Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Eniwa City, Hokkaido	Chitose City, Hokkaido	Sapporo City, Hokkaido	Kita Hiroshima City, Hokkaido				92,288	0	0	92,288
Chitose Air Base	Air base	Chitose City, Hokkaido	Tomakomai City, Hokkaido	Erimo Town, Horoizumi County, Hokkaido					2,584	0	0	2,584
Betsukai Yausubetsu Large Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Betsukai Town, Notsuke County, Hokkaido	Akkeshi Town, Akkeshi County, Hokkaido	Hamanaka Town, Akkeshi County, Hokkaido					168,178	0	0	168,178
Camp Kushiro	Barracks	Kushiro Town, Kushiro County, Hokkaido							26	0	0	26
Camp Shikaoi	Maneuver area	Shikaoi Town, Kato County, Hokkaido							59	0	0	59
Kamifurano Medium Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Kamifurano Town, Sorachi County, Hokkaido	Nakafurano Town, Sorachi County, Hokkaido	Furano City, Hokkaido					34,688	0	0	34,688
Camp Sapporo	Maneuver area	Sapporo City, Hokkaido							8	0	0	8
Shikaoi Shikaribetsu Medium Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Shikaoi Town, Kato County, Hokkaido							32,832	0	0	32,832
Camp Obihiro	Maneuver area	Obihiro City, Hokkaido							757	0	0	757
Asahikawa Chikabumidai Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Asahikawa City, Hokkaido							1,416	0	0	1,416
Camp Okadama	Other	Sapporo City, Hokkaido							2	0	0	2
Nayoro Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Nayoro City, Hokkaido							1,734	0	0	1,734
Takikawa Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Takikawa City, Hokkaido	Shintotsukawa Town, Kabato County, Hokkaido						1,367	0	0	1,367
Bihoro Training Area	Maneuver area	Bihoro Town, Abashiri County, Hokkaido							2,269	0	0	2,269
Kutchan Takamine Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Kutchan Town, Abuta County, Hokkaido							928	0	0	928
Engaru Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Engaru Town, Mombetsu County, Hokkaido							1,082	0	0	1,082
Misawa Air Base	Air base	Misawa City, Aomori	Hachinohe City, Aomori	Tohoku Town, Kamikita County, Aomori	Mutsu City, Aomori				15,968	15,780	5,183	188
Hachinohe POL Depot	Storage	Hachinohe City, Aomori	Misawa City, Aomori	Oirase Town, Kamikita County, Aomori					173	173	1	0
Misawa ATG Range	Maneuver area	Miasawa City, Aomori	Rokkasho Village, Kamikita County, Aomori						7,656	7,656	7,655	0
Camp Sendai	Maneuver area	Sendai City, Miyagi							51	0	0	51
Camp Hachinohe	Barracks	Hachinohe City, Aomori							53	0	0	53

Facility/Area	Purpose	Location							Area (km²)	2-1(a) Area	2-4(a) Area	2-4(b) Area
Iwate Iwatesan Medium Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Takizawa City, Iwate	Hachimantai, City, Iwate						23,264	0	0	23,264
Taiwa Ojojihara Large Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Shikama Town, Kami County, Miyagi	Taiwa Town, Kurokawa County, Miyagi	Ohira Village, Kurokawa County, Miyagi					45,377	0	0	45,377
Kasuminome Air Field	Air base	Sendai City, Miyagi	Iwanuma City, Miyagi						260	0	0	260
Aomori Kotani Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Aomori City, Aomori							3,183	0	0	3,183
Hirosaki Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Nishimeya Village, Tsugaru County, Aomori	Hirosaki City, Aomori						4,904	0	0	4,904
Jinmachi Otakane Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Murayama City, Yamagata	Higashine City, Yamagata						1,308	0	0	1,308
Shariki Communication Site	Communications	Tsugaru City, Aomori							135	135	0	0
Akasaka Press Center	Office	Minato Ward, Tokyo							27	27	0	0
Yokota Air Base	Air base	Fussa City, Tokyo	Mizuho Town, Nishitama County, Tokyo	Musashimurayama City, Tokyo	Hamura City, Tokyo	Tachikawa City, Tokyo	Akishima City, Tokyo	Sayama City, Saitama	7,139	7,136	139	3
Tama Service Annex	Other	Inagi City, Tokyo	Tama City, Tokyo						1,948	1,948	0	0
Kisarazu Air Field	Air base	Kisarazu City, Chiba							2,095	2,095	2,082	Buildings only
Camp Asaka	Communications	Wakou City, Saitama							118	118	0	0
Tokorozawa Communications Station	Communications	Tokorozawa City, Saitama							966	966	0	0
Iruma Air Base	Maneuver area	Iruma City, Saitama	Sayama City, Saitama						4	0	0	4
Owada Communication Site	Communications	Niiza City, Saitama	Kiyose City, Tokyo						1,199	1,199	0	0
Iwo Jima Communication Site	Communications	Ogasawara Village, Tokyo							6,630	3,810	132	2,820
New Sanno U.S. Forces Center	Other	Minato Ward, Tokyo							7	7	0	0
Takada Sekiyama Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Myoko City, Niigata	Joetsu City, Niigata						14,080	0	0	14,080
Hyakuri Air Base	Air base	Omitama City, Ibaraki							1,089	0	0	1,089
Soumagahara Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Takasaki City, Gunma	Shinto Village, Kitagunma County, Gunma						5,796	0	0	5,796
Camp Asaka	Maneuver area	Asaka City, Saitama	Wako City, Saitama	Niiza City, Saitama					17	0	0	17
Haneda Air Mail Control Activity Office	Office	Ota Ward, Tokyo							Buildings only	0	0	Buildings only
Negishi Dependent Housing Area	Housing	Yokohama City, Kanagawa							429	429	0	0
Yokohama North Dock	Port facility	Yokohama City, Kanagawa							523	523	Buildings only	0
Camp Zama	Office	Sagamihara City, Kanagawa	Zama City, Kanagawa						2,292	2,292	170	0
Naval Air Facility Atsugi	Air base	Ayase City, Kanagawa	Yamato City, Kanagawa						5,056	2,497	1,076	2,559
Sagami General Depot	Manufacturing	Sagamihara City, Kanagawa							1,967	1,967	0	0

Facility/Area	Purpose	Location							Area (km²)	2-1(a) Area	2-4(a) Area	2-4(b) Area
Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex	Housing	Zushi City, Kanagawa	Yokohama City, Kanagawa						2,882	2,882	0	0.1
Azuma Storage Area	Storage	Yokosuka City, Kanagawa							802	802	254	0
U.S. Fleet Activities Yokosuka	Port facility	Yokosuka City, Kanagawa							2,363	2,363	49	Buildings only
Sagamihara Housing Area	Housing	Sagamihara City, Kanagawa							593	593	0	0
Nagasaka Rifle Range	Maneuver area	Yokosuka City, Kanagawa							97	0	0	97
Urago Ammunition Depot	Storage	Yokosuka City, Kanagawa							194	194	0	0
Fuji Barracks Area	Barracks	Gotemba City, Shizuoka							1,177	1,177	47	0
Tsurumi POL Depot	Storage	Yokohama City, Kanagawa							184	184	0	0
Numazu Training Area	Maneuver area	Numazu City, Shizuoka							28	28	28	0
Fuji Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Fujiyoshida City, Yamanashi	Yamanakako Village, Minamitsuru County, Yamanashi	Gotemba City, Shizuoka	Oyama Town, Sunto County, Shizuoka	Susono City, Shizuoka			133,925	0	0	133,925
Camp Takigahara	Maneuver area	Gotemba City, Shizuoka							8	0	0	8
Gifu Air Base	Other	Kakamigahara City, Gifu							1,626	0	0	1,626
Komatsu Air Base	Air base	Komatsu City, Ishikawa	Wajima City, Ishikawa						1,606	0	0	1,606
Imazu Aibano Medium Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Takashima City, Shiga							24,083	0	0	24,083
Camp Itami	Maneuver area	Kawanishi City, Hyogo	Itami City, Hyogo						20	0	0	20
Kyogamisaki Communications Site	Communications	Kyotango City, Kyoto							36	36	0	0
Fukuchiyama Rifle Range	Maneuver area	Fukuchiyama City, Kyoto							55	0	0	55
Akizuki Ammunition Depot	Storage	Etajima City, Hiroshima							559	559	0	0
Kawakami Ammunition Depot	Storage	Higashihiroshima City, Hiroshima							2,604	2,604	0	0
Hiro Ammunition Depot	Storage	Kure City, Hiroshima							359	359	0	0
Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni	Air base	Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi	Otake City, Hiroshima						8,648	8,648	5,615	0
Sofu Communications Site	Communications	Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi							24	24	0	0
Kure Pier No.6	Port facility	Kure City, Hiroshima							12	12	0	0
1st Service School training facility	Maneuver area	Etajima City, Hiroshima							Buildings only	0	0	Buildings only
Haramura Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Higashihiroshima City, Hiroshima							1,687	0	0	1,687
Nihonbara Medium Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Nagi Town, Katsuta County, Okayama	Tsuyama City, Okayama						18,844	0	0	18,844
Miho Air Base	Air base	Sakaiminato City, Tottori	Yonago City, Tottori						1,020	0	0	1,020
Haigamine Communication Site	Communications	Kure City, Hiroshima							1	1	0	0
Itazuke Air Base	Air base	Fukuoka City, Fukuoka							515	23	0	491
U.S. Fleet Activities Sasebo	Port facility	Sasebo City, Nagasaki							496	488	12	9

Facility/Area	Purpose	Location							Area (km²)	2-1(a) Area	2-4(a) Area	2-4(b) Area
Sasebo Dry Dock Area	Port facility	Sasebo City, Nagasaki							83	41	28	41
Akasaki POL Depot	Storage	Sasebo City, Nagasaki							754	754	0	0
Sasebo Ammunition Supply Point	Storage	Sasebo City, Nagasaki							582	582	0	0
Iorizaki POL Depot	Storage	Sasebo City, Nagasaki							227	227	45	0
Yokose POL Depot	Storage	Saikai City, Nagasaki							679	679	0	0
Harioshima Ammunition Storage Area	Storage	Sasebo City, Nagasaki							1,297	1,297	48	0
Tategami Basin Port Area	Port facility	Sasebo City, Nagasaki							135	135	28	0
Nyutabaru Air Base	Air base	Shintomi Town, Koyu County, Miyazaki							1,833	0	0	1,833
Sakibe Rifle Range	Maneuver area	Sasebo City, Nagasaki							Buildings only	0	0	Buildings only
Hario Dependent Housing Area	Housing	Sasebo City, Nagasaki							354	354	0	0
Hijudai-Jumonjibaru Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Kusu Town, Kusu County, Oita	Kokonoe Town, Kusu County, Oita	Yufu City, Oita	Beppu City, Oita	Hiji Town, Hayami County, Oita	Kitsuki City, Oita	Oita City, Oita	56,317	0	0	56,317
Tsuiki Air Base	Air base	Yukuhashi City, Fukuoka	Chikujo Town, Chikujo County, Fukuoka	Kasuga City, Fukuoka					906	0	0	906
Omura Air Base	Other	Omura City, Nagasaki							Buildings only	0	0	Buildings only
Oyanohara-Kirishima Maneuver Area	Maneuver area	Yamato Town, Kamimashiki County, Kumamoto	Ebino City, Miyazaki	Yusui Town, Aira County, Kagoshima					26,965	0	0	26,965
Camp Kita Kumamoto	Maneuver area	Kumamoto City, Kumamoto							21	0	0	21
Camp Kengun	Maneuver area	Kumamoto City, Kumamoto							39	0	0	39
Kanoya Air Base	Air base	Kanoya City, Kagoshima							490	0	0	490
Northern Training Area	Maneuver area	Kunigami Village, Kunigami County, Okinawa	Higashi Village, Kunigami County, Okinawa						36,590	35,331	0	1,259
Okuma Rest Center	Other	Kunigami Village, Kunigami County, Okinawa							546	546	0	0
Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield	Maneuver area	Ie Village, Kunigami County, Okinawa							8,015	8,015	0	0
Yaedake Communication Site	Communications	Nago City, Okinawa	Motobu Town, Kunigami County, Okinawa						37	37	1	0
Camp Schwab	Maneuver area	Nago City, Okinawa	Ginoza Village, Kunigami County, Okinawa						20,626	20,626	7,077	0
Henoko Ordnance Ammunition Depot	Storage	Nago City, Okinawa							1,214	1,214	0	0
Camp Hansen	Maneuver area	Kin Town, Kunigami County, Okinawa	Ginoza Village, Kunigami County, Okinawa	Onna Village, Kunigami County, Okinawa	Nago City, Okinawa				48,745	48,131	39,385	615

Facility/Area	Purpose	Location							Area (km^2)	2-1(a) Area	2-4(a) Area	2-4(b) Area
Kin Red Beach Training Area	Maneuver area	Kin Town, Kunigami County, Okinawa							14	14	0	0
Kin Blue Beach Training Area	Maneuver area	Kin Town, Kunigami County, Okinawa							381	381	0	0
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	Storage	Yomitan Village, Nakagami County, Okinawa	Okinawa City, Okinawa	Kadena Town, Nakagami County, Okinawa	Onna Village, Kunigami County, Okinawa	Uruma City, Okinawa			26,276	26,276	163	0
Tengan Pier	Port facility	Uruma City, Okinawa							31	31	0	0
Camp Courtney	Barracks	Uruma City, Okinawa							1,339	1,339	0	0
Camp McTureous	Barracks	Uruma City, Okinawa							379	379	0	0
Camp Shields	Barracks	Okinawa City, Okinawa							700	700	0	0
Torii Communication Station	Communications	Yomitan Village, Nakagami County, Okinawa							1,895	1,895	0	0
Kadena Air Base	Air base	Kadena Town, Nakagami County, Okinawa	Okinawa City, Okinawa	Chatan Town, Nakagami County, Okinawa	Naha City, Okinawa	Itoman City, Okinawa			19,856	19,855	23	1
Camp Kuwae	Barracks	Chatan Town, Nakagami County, Okinawa							676	676	0	0
Camp Zukeran	Barracks	Chatan Town, Nakagami County, Okinawa	Kitanakagusuku Village, Nakagami County, Okinawa	Ginowan City, Okinawa	Okinawa City, Okinawa	Uruma City, Okinawa			5,342	5,342	0	0
Awase Communication Station	Communications	Okinawa City, Okinawa							552	552	0	0
White Beach Area	Port facility	Uruma City, Okinawa							1,568	1,568	221	0
Futenma Air Station	Air base	Ginowan City, Okinawa							4,758	4,758	0	0
Makiminato Service Area	Storage	Urasoe City, Okinawa							2,675	2,675	0	0
Naha Port	Port facility	Naha City, Okinawa							559	559	3	0
Army POL Depots	Storage	Uruma City, Okinawa	Chatan Town, Nakagami County, Okinawa	Kadena Town, Nakagami County, Okinawa	Okinawa City, Okinawa	Ginowan City, Okinawa			1,278	1,278	14	0
Tori Shima Range	Maneuver area	Kumejima Town, Shimajiri County, Okinawa							41	39	0	2
Idesuna Jima Range	Maneuver area	Tonaki Village, Shimajiri County, Okinawa							245	245	245	0
Kume Jima Range	Maneuver area	Kumejima Town, Shimajiri County, Okinawa							2	2	0	0
Tsuken Jima Training Area	Maneuver area	Uruma City, Okinawa							16	16	0	0
Kobi Sho Range	Maneuver area	Ishigaki City, Okinawa							874	874	0	0
Sekibi Sho Range	Maneuver area	Ishigaki City, Okinawa							41	41	0	0

Facility/Area	Purpose	Location							Area (km^2)	2-1(a) Area	2-4(a) Area	2-4(b) Area
Oki Daito Jima Range	Maneuver area	Kitadaito Village, Shimajiri County, Okinawa							1,147	1,147	1,147	0
Ukibaru Jima Training Area	Maneuver area	Uruma City, Okinawa							254	0	0	254
Naha Air Base	Other	Naha City, Okinawa							7	0	0	7
National total	130 facilities/ areas								980,098	262,624	75,133	717,473
Mainland total (excluding Okinawa)	97 facilities/ areas								793,417	78,082	26,855	715,335
Okinawa total	33 facilities/ areas								186,680	184,542	48,278	2,138

Notes: · This table lists of the facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces based on Article 2, Paragraph 1 (a) of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (Exclusively used by the U.S., and includes those used by the SDF based on Article 2, Paragraph 4 (a) of the Agreement) and the facilities and areas (controlled by Japan) used by the U.S. forces for a certain period of time based on Article 2, Paragraph 4 (b) of the Agreement.

· The figures in the "Area" column are the total size of facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces based on Article 2, Paragraph 1 (a) of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, and facilities/ areas used by the U.S. military for a certain period of time based on Article 2, Paragraph 4 (b) of the Agreement.

· The figures in the "2-4 (a) Area" column are the sizes of facilities and areas temporarily used by the SDF based on Article 2, Paragraph 4 (a) of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement and are included in the "2-1(a) Area" column.

· Totals may not match because of rounding off.

· "0" indicates that there is no corresponding area.

Reference 67 Outline of Measures to Promote Harmony Between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas

Category	Measures	Description of Measures	Examples of Covered Facilities and Projects
Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities,*1 etc.	Subsidies to finance disturbance prevention projects	Subsidies are granted to local governments' projects to prevent or mitigate disturbance caused by frequent use of armored vehicles and other heavy vehicles, and frequent shooting, bombing and use of other explosives by the JSDF, etc.	– Canals, reservoirs, roads, river improvement, community reception facilities for television broadcast
	Subsidies to finance noise prevention projects	Subsidies are granted to local governments' projects to prevent or mitigate significant noise caused by frequent take-off and landing of aircraft by the JSDF, etc.	– Educational facilities such as elementary schools, junior high schools, and kindergartens; medical facilities such as hospitals and clinics; and welfare facilities such as healthcare centers, day-service centers for the elderly, and special nursing homes for the elderly
	Subsidies to finance soundproofing works for housing	Subsidies are granted for soundproofing works by homeowners, etc. in areas designated by the Defense Minister as areas where disturbance due to noise caused by frequent take-off and landing of aircraft by the JSDF, etc., is serious.	– Housing
	Compensation for relocations	In areas designated by the Defense Minister as areas where disturbance due to noise caused by frequent take-off and landing of aircraft by the JSDF, etc., is especially serious, compensation, etc., is provided for the loss ordinarily incurred by relocating buildings, etc. or by removing them.	– Compensation for relocating buildings – Land purchase – Development of public facilities such as roads, water-supply systems, and sewage facilities in the area where housing, etc., is to be relocated
	Improving green zones	Works such as the development of green zones are conducted on land in areas designated by the Defense Minister as areas necessary for preventing the occurrence of new disturbance due to noise caused by frequent take-off and landing of aircraft by the JSDF, etc., and for improving the living environment in their vicinities.	– Planting trees, installing grass fields
	Subsidies for developing facilities meant to stabilize people's lives	In cases where installation or operations of a certain defense facility is found to disturb daily lives or business activities of the residents of the surrounding areas, subsidies are granted for local government's facility development projects to mitigate such disturbance.	– Roads, radio broadcast facilities, nursing homes for the elderly, fire departments, parks, waste disposal facilities, welfare centers for the elderly – Agricultural facilities, fishing facilities
	Specified Defense Facilities Environment Improvement Adjustment Grants	In consideration of the level of the influence of the installation or operations of a certain defense facility on the living environment and regional development of the surrounding areas, grants are provided to municipalities affected by the specified defense facilities for their projects contributing to the development of public facilities, improvement of the living environment, or smooth implementation of regional development.	– Developing public facilities such as traffic facilities, recreation facilities, and social welfare facilities – Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance of school buildings, etc.
	Training Grants	In consideration of the influence of trainings involving the use of aircraft or Landing Craft Air Cushions (LCAC) by the JSDF or foreign armed forces on the living environment in the surrounding area or on the development of that area, grants are provided for the development of public facilities by the municipalities that accommodate the facilities other than specified defense facilities used for trainings, or for projects for the smooth improvement or development of the living environment.	– Developing public facilities such as traffic facilities, recreation facilities, and social welfare facilities – Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance of school buildings, etc.
Act on Special Measures for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the United States Forces in Japan,*2 etc.	Realignment grants	In consideration of the increase of influence that the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan may exert on residents' stable daily lives, grants are provided to the specified neighboring municipalities affected by the realignment for their projects contributing to the enhancement of residents' convenient lives and promotion of the local industry when they are found necessary to promote smooth and steady realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan.	– Developing public facilities such as traffic facilities, recreation facilities, and social welfare facilities – Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance of school buildings, etc.
	Grants for realignment-related training relocations	Considering that the influence of aircraft noise, etc., on residents' stable daily lives may continue even after the provision of the realignment grants ends in areas around the realignment-related specified defense facilities where training relocations are conducted, grants are provided for projects contributing to the enhancement of residents' convenient lives and promotion of the local industry.	
	Project to develop specified areas affected by the realignment	With the aim of promoting smooth realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, grants are provided to the prefectures that accommodate defense facilities, for which special attention needs to be paid with regard to the significant increase of influence on residents' stable daily lives due to the realignment, for their projects contributing to the enhancement of residents' convenient lives and promotion of the local industry that they implement from a broader point of view.	
	Realignment promotion project	Grants are provided for the development of facilities conducted by the specified neighboring municipalities affected by the realignment, in light of the significance of promoting measures for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan and properly and promptly implementing the realignment.	– Facilities similar to those meant to stabilize people's lives
Special Local Grant for Carrier Aircraft Units' Deployment		In consideration of the important role that carrier-based aircraft squadrons play for Japan's security and the significant influence on residents' stable daily lives including aircraft noise due to the deployment of the squadrons, grants are provided for projects contributing to the enhancement of residents' convenient lives and promotion of the local industry.	– Developing public facilities such as traffic facilities, recreation facilities, and social welfare facilities – Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance of school – buildings, etc.

(Note) *1 Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities (Act No. 101 of 1974)
*2 Act on Special Measures for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the United States Forces in Japan (Act No. 67 of 2007)

Reference 68 Achievements of Antarctic Research Expedition

Expedition	Duration	Days of activity	Days in Antarctica	Transport volume of goods (goods brought in)	Number of passengers on board, including observers (round trip)	Total voyage (nautical miles)
43rd	2001.11.14–2002.4.13	151	91	Approx. 1,110t	96	Approx. 23,000
44th	2002.11.14–2003.4.13	151	99	Approx. 1,230t	107	Approx. 22,000
45th	2003.11.14–2004.4.12	151	99	Approx. 1,120t	108	Approx. 21,000
46th	2004.11.14–2005.4.13	151	99	Approx. 980t	100	Approx. 21,000
47th	2005.11.14–2006.4.13	151	99	Approx. 1,080t	98	Approx. 22,000
48th	2006.11.14–2007.4.13	151	99	Approx. 1,110t	96	Approx. 21,000
49th	2007.11.14–2008.4.12	151	99	Approx. 870t	87	Approx. 20,000
51st	2009.11.10–2010.4.9	151	99	Approx. 1,130t	106	Approx. 21,000
52nd	2010.11.11–2011.4.5	146	99	Approx. 1,310t	106	Approx. 20,000
53rd	2011.11.11–2012.4.9	151	98	Approx. 820t	102	Approx. 19,000
54th	2012.11.11–2013.4.10	151	99	Approx. 680t	104	Approx. 21,000
55th	2013.11.8–2014.4.7	151	99	Approx. 1,160t	88	Approx. 19,000
56th	2014.11.11–2015.4.1	142	87	Approx. 1,040t	95	Approx. 18,000
57th	2015.11.16–2016.4.14	151	89	Approx. 1,040t	90	Approx. 24,000
58th	2016.11.11–2017.4.10	151	99	Approx. 1,030t	110	Approx. 21,000
59th	2017.11.12–2018.4.11	151	99	Approx. 980t	103	Approx. 20,000
60th	2018.11.10–2019.4.9	150	99	Approx. 1,000t	107	Approx. 19,000
61st	2019.11.12–2020.4.6	147	99	Approx. 970t	98	Approx. 21,000
62nd	2020.11.6–2021.2.22	109	51	Approx. 1,040t	72	Approx. 16,000
63rd	2021.11.10–2022.3.28	139	99	Approx. 1,130t	100	Approx. 20,000
64th	2022.11.11–2023.4.10	151	99	Approx. 1,120t	100	Approx. 20,000
65th	2023.11.10–2024.4.8	151	99	Approx. 1,150t	104	Approx. 19,000
66th	2024.11.20–2025.4.22	154	92	Approx. 1,070t	131	Approx. 22,000
67th	2025.11.19–2026.4.23	156	94	Approx. 1,080t	130	Approx. 25,000

Notes: 1 The 50th expedition was not conducted.
2 Starting with the 2025 Defense White Paper, the number of observers (including the wintering party) also indicates other passengers on board, such as reporters and other traveling companions.

Reference 69 External Construction Project Achievements

Fiscal year	Number of projects by construction				
	Total	Grading	Roads	Snow removal	Other
Before 1988	7,987	5,152	2,208	307	320
1989	39	33	4	2	0
1990	40	33	5	2	0
1991	29	23	6	0	0
1992	27	23	4	0	0
1993	25	22	2	0	1
1994	20	19	1	0	0
1995	20	15	5	0	0
1996	10	7	3	0	0
1997	11	9	2	0	0
1998	13	11	2	0	0
1999	12	10	1	0	1
2000	10	9	1	0	0
2001	7	6	1	0	0
2002	5	5	0	0	0
2003	3	3	0	0	0
2004	2	2	0	0	0
2005	1	1	0	0	0
2006	0	0	0	0	0
2007	0	0	0	0	0
2008	2	2	0	0	0
2009	0	0	0	0	0
2010	0	0	0	0	0
2011	1	1	0	0	0
2012	0	0	0	0	0
2013	1	0	1	0	0
2014	2	0	2	0	0
2015	1	1	0	0	0
2016	1	0	1	0	0
2017	0	0	0	0	0
2018	0	0	0	0	0
2019	0	0	0	0	0
2020	1	1	0	0	0
2021	1	0	1	0	0
2022	1	0	1	0	0
2023	0	0	0	0	0
2024	1	1	0	0	0
2025	0	0	0	0	0
Total	8,273	5,389	2,251	311	322

Reference 70 **Prepared by the MOD based on "Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues" (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office)**

Outline of the survey period: November 6-December 14, 2025

For details, refer to (https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/diplomacy_defense/202601/r07/r07-bouei/)

1 Interest in the JSDF



2 Impression toward the SDF



3 Defense capabilities of the JSDF



4 Role expected of the JSDF (multiple responses allowed)



5 Interest in defense-related issues (multiple responses allowed)



6 Overseas transfer of defense equipment



Reference 71 Record of Disclosure of Administrative Documents by the Ministry of Defense [FY2025]

		Ministry of Defense Headquarters	Regional Defense Bureaus and Branches	Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency	Total
1 Number of disclosure requests		2,920	2,103	188	5,211
2 Number of decisions regarding disclosure (Note 1)		3,584	2,227	225	6,036
	Requests accepted	2,245	713	156	3,114
	Requests partially accepted	1,157	1,446	67	2,670
	Requests declined	182	68	2	252
3 Number of requests for review (Note 2)		1,791	0	0	1,791
4 Number of lawsuits (Note 3)		4	1	0	5

Notes: 1 Multiple decisions regarding disclosure might be made in response to each request for disclosure.
2 Number of requests for review by the Defense Minister based on the Administrative Complaint Review Act in cases of complaints regarding administrative action, including decisions regarding disclosure, taken by the Ministry of Defense
3 Number of lawsuits requesting the revocation of administrative action that includes decisions regarding disclosure, etc., number of lawsuits requesting the revocation of decisions regarding requests for the review of decisions regarding disclosure, etc.

Reference 72 Basic Policy on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases

(October 12, 2023)

Introduction

In December 2022, the Government of Japan formulated the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program. These documents state that defense production and technology bases are indispensable foundations for stably ensuring research/development, production, and procurement of defense equipment such as vessels, aircraft, ration, and other supplies including their parts and components that are exclusively used by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) (hereinafter referred to as "defense equipment") in Japan and for incorporating cutting-edge technologies necessary for new ways of warfare into defense equipment; they are a virtually integral part of defense capability itself and need to be strengthened. Japan's defense industry is responsible for each stage of the life cycle of defense equipment (research, development, production, maintenance/improvement, replenishment, decommissioning of use, etc.). In this regard, the defense equipment and defense industry are inseparable, and the Government will take the necessary budgetary measures, develop necessary legislation, and utilize a government-affiliated financial institution to provide funds for highly policy-oriented projects to maintain and strengthen the ability of industry to produce advanced defense equipment and technology and to secure a high operating rate. In February 2023, a bill to realize these goals was submitted to the Diet and deliberated. On June 7, 2023, the "Act on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology bases" (Act No. 54 of 2023, hereinafter referred to as the "Act" or "this Act") was enacted.

Article 3 of the Act stipulates that the Minister of Defense establishes a basic policy (hereinafter referred to as "this basic policy") on enhancing defense production and technology bases.

Measures for enhancing defense production and technology bases (hereinafter referred to as "bases") must contribute to the peace and independence of Japan as well as the safety of the country by ensuring stable manufacturing of defense equipment, building up the defense capability, and ensuring smooth execution of the SDF missions. From this perspective, this basic policy is established to ensure adequate implementation of the measures stipulated in this Act and effective exertion of their effects. In addition, replacing the "Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases" formulated in 2014 with this basic policy newly indicated direction on how to maintain and enhance the bases in the future.

The terminology used in this basic policy follows the terminology used in this Act.

Chapter 1 Basic Matters Concerning the Security Environment of the International Community, Including Japan, and the Trends in Technological Advancements Relating to Defense Equipment

Section 1 Security Environment of the International Community, including Japan

As Russia's aggression against Ukraine attests, the international community, including Japan, is facing serious challenges and has entered into a new era of crisis.

Looking at the military trends of Japan's neighboring countries and regions, China has sustained high-level growth of its defense budget and has been extensively and rapidly enhancing its military power, including nuclear and missile forces, without sufficient transparency. In addition, China has continued and intensified unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the maritime and air domains, including in the East and South China Seas. Furthermore, China is strengthening its strategic ties with Russia and attempting to challenge the international order. The actual state of activities, such as development finance, also lacks adequate transparency. In some cases, China exerts economic coercion on other countries by taking advantage of their dependence on it. While China firmly maintains its policy for peaceful unification with Taiwan, it has not ruled out the possibility of the use of force. It has intensified its military activities in the sea and air space around Taiwan. China's current external stance, military activities, and other activities have become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge ever to secure the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community, and to strengthen the international order based on the rule of law. Japan should respond to it with its comprehensive national power and in cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries, and others. To maintain its regime, North Korea is concentrating on building up its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles and other missiles. In recent years, North Korea has been repeatedly launching ballistic missiles and other missiles at an unprecedentedly high frequency. It is also enhancing its nuclear and missile-related technologies and operational capabilities. Such military activities pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan's national security than ever before. Russia's aggression against Ukraine has shaken the foundations of the international

order and is understood as the most significant and direct threat to defense in the European region. In addition, Russia has actively continued its military operations in the Far East region, including the Northern Territories, around Japan. Russia's military activities, along with its strategic partnership with China, are of grave defense concern in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan.

Furthermore, rapid development in science and technology is fundamentally changing the security paradigm. Countries are developing cutting-edge technologies that could become so-called "game changers," which dramatically alter the future character of warfare. In addition, there exists a range of global security challenges, such as increasing serious risks in cyber and other domains, the expansion of information warfare, including the spread of disinformation, and climate change.

Section 2 Trends in Technological Advancements relating to Defense Equipment

As science and technology have significantly changed not only society and people's lives but also the paradigm of security, in recent years, various technologies have rapidly been developed, especially in the private sector, and have a significant impact on security.

In fields such as artificial intelligence (hereinafter referred to as "AI") and information communication technology, it is becoming extremely difficult to distinguish between civilian and security technologies. In Russia's aggression against Ukraine, attacks and surveillance/reconnaissance activities have been carried out by using unmanned aerial vehicles that use these technologies. AI-equipped unmanned vehicles are under development around the world, and recently, a variety of research and development has been carried out, such as small unmanned aerial vehicles capable of swarm flight, unmanned vessels for detecting submarines, and automation of air-to-air combat. Additionally, since cyberattacks are occurring frequently because of the development of information communication technology, they seriously affect society and pose a real threat to security.

In addition, quantum technology is attracting attention as an essential technology that will change society. In particular, research and development for the practical application of technologies expected to be applied in the military field - such as quantum cryptographic communication, quantum sensors, quantum computers, and post-quantum cryptography, which quantum computers cannot solve - has been carried out in each country. Additionally, the practical use of additive manufacturing technologies such as 3D printers is accelerating, making it possible to produce complex structures at low costs, and it is likely that non-stock procurement could revolutionize military logistics.

It is pointed out that Hypersonic Glide Vehicles would fly in lower orbits than conventional ballistic missiles at hypersonic speed above Mach 5 for a more extended period, and their maneuverability would make them difficult to be detected and intercepted. Additionally, railguns, high-energy laser weapons, and high-power energy weapons such as high-power microwaves are under development to counter various airborne threats.

Furthermore, as an example of future technology, the utilization of biomimetic technology is being researched, such as the one that mimics the structures and functions of birds and insects when they fly. Countries worldwide are researching and developing groundbreaking defense equipment and technologies that have never been seen, such as small insect-sized drones that can collect information.

To defend Japan under these circumstances, it is crucial to identify and encourage the development of important technological fields, and to lead those technologies to the creation of groundbreaking defense equipment by securing advanced capabilities and technological superiority ahead of other countries. For example, the technologies necessary to gain superiority in the physical domain are as follows: unmanned/autonomous system technology; space related technology and micro-robot technology both of which are adaptable to future battles; technology for utilizing previously unused energy, and material technology that realizes new functions, etc.

Additionally, as for technologies in the information domain, there can be mentioned sensing technology for obtaining information more accurately and quickly, computing technology for processing vast amounts of information instantaneously, quantum illumination technology and elementary particle detection technology for making the things detectable that couldn't have been seen before, metaverse technology and 3D hologram projection technology for utilizing virtual and fictitious information, Beyond 5G technology for enabling information to be instantaneously shared inside and outside a unit, and cyber kill-chain automatic shutdown/countermeasures technology for defending cyberspace efficiently and effectively. Examples of technologies in the cognitive domain include training technology for improving cognitive ability using brain science and technology for visualizing the cognitive domain. In addition to those cutting-edge technologies, even in the field of conventional technologies unique to the defense, it is essential to make efforts to steadily improve the capabilities of existing defense equipment by using those advanced and digital technologies.

As mentioned above, the trends in the technological advancement of defense equipment have changed dramatically; new technologies are constantly coming out, replacing old technologies at a remarkably accelerating pace. As the security environment surrounding Japan is rapidly becoming more severe, creation of science, technology, and innovation is the source of Japan's economic and social development. To procure defense equipment necessary for new ways of warfare and to thereby improve Japan's security environment, it is important to actively and promptly utilize the outcomes of advanced technology research in public and private sectors as well as various newly created technologies by thinking outside the box.

Section 3 Environment Surrounding Bases

The bases in Japan have several characteristics. First, as a premise, Japan has no state-run facilities to manufacture defense equipment and relies heavily on private companies to play an important role in producing defense equipment. Therefore, as it is required to reinforce defense capabilities fundamentally, the role of the defense industry becomes even more important because it is responsible for producing defense equipment necessary for the SDF to carry out its missions. Especially when manufacturing defense equipment, it is necessary to respond to a high degree of performance and security measures. From the perspective of economic rationality, indicating a certain degree of predictability is required for companies to step into investments in this sector. These companies are apt to be required to produce many models with unique specifications in small quantities, beside being demanded to secure a manufacturing system over a long period of time due to the long life cycle of defense equipment. Such companies have limited opportunities to recover investments since their customers are basically limited to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the SDF. In Japanese society, having aversion and reputational risks towards defense industry remain a problem.

Due in part to the above characteristics, the bases have been weakening. Since it is necessary to respond to a high degree of

performance and security measures, companies need to invest a great deal of management resources. But in actuality, their profitability is lower than that of the expected level on a procurement system. Some industrial surveys show that there are some defense-related companies in other countries whose operating profit margins exceed 10%; on the other hand, the profit margins of defense industry in Japan remain at only 2-3%. Additionally, with regard to the sales ratio of defense business in each company, the ratio in Japan tends to be lower than that of in other countries. Under such circumstances, companies deciding to withdraw from defense businesses or downsize their operations are appearing intermittently, and business investment and new entrants tend to be sluggish as well. Consequently, it not only interferes with the stable procurement of defense equipment essential for the SDF operations, but also causes the loss of proper competitive environment and innovation in the long term, resulting in losing its ground on Japan's technological superiority in security.

Furthermore, in recent years, various risks involving the bases have become apparent. Nowadays, digitalization proceeds across all industries, and this is a growing trend toward collecting information on advanced technologies, including the ones for civilian application from other countries, and diverting it to military use. In these circumstances, cyberattacks - on suspicion of involvement by national organizations, including military forces - pose more severe threats for the defense industry that keeps sensitive information on defense equipment and technology. For example, in 2021, a group of hackers, which seems to be the case of military intervention by a foreign country launched large-scale cyberattacks on approximately 200 domestic companies and research institutes, including defense-related companies. Additionally, there are concerns about information theft where foreign-origin malicious elements undermine the safety and reliability of supply chains by intruding facilities and parts used for manufacturing defense equipment. Furthermore, as the international trend of hoarding important resources continues - for example, due to the movement of export restrictions - there is a risk of being unable to secure raw materials necessary for the manufacturing of defense equipment. As a result, the risk of jeopardizing stable supply is becoming more realistic. The Government needs to implement measures to alleviate such relatively new risks.

Chapter 2 Basic Concepts of Maintaining and Enhancing Bases

Section 1 Basic Concepts and Directions of Maintaining and Enhancing Bases

1. Significance of Maintaining and Enhancing Bases

The following three points have been mentioned on the significance of maintaining and enhancing domestic bases. Firstly, it is to ensure Japan's independence in security environment. Enhancing the self-reliance of Japan's security is of great importance, assuming from the fact that the following cases presuppose the existence of domestic bases; enabling the acquisition of defense equipment that meets the performance requirements based on operational concepts adopted for the national land characteristics and policies of Japan; facilitating continuous operational supports such as maintenance, buildup, improvement, renovation, technical support, and parts supply for defense equipment after it being acquired, in addition to facilitate an additional acquisition of defense equipment; and enable to procure defense equipment which basically should not depend on foreign countries from the perspective of confidentiality. Such significance is being emphasized with growing demand for acquiring advanced defense equipment for new ways of warfare at early stage and maintaining and assuring sufficient war sustainability of the SDF.

Secondly, it is to have an external effect on national security. Externally being recognized that Japan has built up its defense capabilities of its own will with a certain speed will potentially contribute to improving deterrence. Additionally, in the case of acquiring defense equipment and technology by importing them from foreign countries or conducting defense equipment and technology cooperation, including international joint development and production with other countries, having bases to some extent within Japan has the potential of making negotiation advantageous.

Thirdly, it is to contribute economically and technologically to domestic industries. Japan's defense industry, responsible for essential roles in the bases, is composed of widespread and various suppliers, ranging from prime contractors which have direct contract with the MOD to subcontractors like small and medium-sized enterprises. As technological borders between civilian and military uses are vanishing, technological progress in defense equipment can immediately influence fields in private sector and vice versa. Therefore, efforts to maintain and enhance such domestic bases are expected to be meaningful to make domestic industries, including the ones in the private sector, stronger in the economy and more advanced in technology.

Moreover, considering the significance of maintaining and enhancing domestic bases, new elements have emerged in these years. In the face of external threats imposed through economic means, it has become an urgent issue to enhance Japan's autonomy and to secure technological superiority and indispensability from economic security perspectives. Additionally, with supply chain disruption due to the spread of COVID-19, blockage of critical materials and their supply chains have been developing and other nations have been intensifying activities in prioritizing domestic industries. Even between allies, cutting-edge technologies are less likely to be disclosed/offered under the stricter technology control policies. Under these circumstances, it is increasing the need to maintain and enhance domestic bases with a wide range from finished products of defense equipment to their parts and components in terms of ensuring stable manufacturing of defense equipment, which is directly related to national defense, and of maintaining technological superiority.

2. Subjects for which to Maintain and Enhance Bases

Defense equipment is an aggregation of many parts and components. In addition to prime contractors that deliver finished products to the MOD, many suppliers are taking an essential role in manufacturing defense equipment, such as delivering parts and components to them. Both prime contractors and suppliers are equally essential to stably manufacturing defense equipment. Accordingly, when implementing measures to maintain and enhance bases, the entire supply chain of defense equipment, including not only prime contractors but also suppliers, shall be in the scope of the measures, bearing in mind the maintenance of manufacturing defense equipment as the finished products as well as parts and components thereof.

3. Concepts of Acquisition of Defense Equipment

Deciding acquisition method of defense equipment is equivalent to determining the future of bases in Japan at each stage of the life cycle of the defense equipment so that it directly affects the bases. Therefore, it is necessary to establish an acquisition method based on the aforementioned purpose of maintaining and enhancing the bases in Japan. There are multiple acquisition methods that the MOD is using: domestic development, licensed production, imports, etc. However, no matter which method is adopted, it is a premise to

keep in mind the following points: acquiring defense equipment that meets the standard of required performance, consisting with operational concepts of defense equipment necessary for defense of Japan; being able to continuously acquire and maintain the defense equipment in terms of expenses. On top of that, it is necessary to decide on an acquisition method with the viewpoints of nurturing sectors in which Japan has a comparative advantage and as required, complementing sectors in which Japan is falling behind or lacking, in addition to a growing need to maintain and enhance bases in Japan, as it is described in 1 of this section.

Therefore, when acquiring new defense equipment, procurement of domestic products is pursued, focusing on the following areas:

A. What can meet various conditions, such as operational concepts, performance, acquisition cost, life cycle cost, schedule, etc., with Japanese technologies
B. What is indispensable in light of maintaining war sustainability in the event of a contingency as well as of ensuring the ability to improve operations and maintenance in peacetime (e.g., ammunition and ships)
C. What are the items that should not be dependent on foreign countries from the perspective of confidentiality (e.g., communications and encryption technology)
D. What is indispensable for realizing operational concepts based on Japan's geographical and policy peculiarities
E. What are the latest technologies from foreign countries that are hard to obtain
F. What is a potential target of external threats through economic means

In cases where the procurement of domestic products is difficult, the MOD will pursue acquisition through international joint development and production or licensed production from the viewpoints of improving technological capabilities by transferring technology to Japan and securing flexibility for future renovation by Japan.

When acquiring defense equipment under the circumstance where it is necessary to select either domestic or foreign products that satisfy the conditions shown in A, the MOD should decide which to choose after evaluating the conditions, such as industrial participation by Japanese companies in each stage of the life cycle of defense equipment, and the range and the extent of transferring technologies to Japan. To validate the appropriate selection criteria, the MOD shall make efforts to bring transparency to the process, to determine a milestone for each stage of the life cycle after the selection, and to carry forward thorough management so that cost, schedules, etc., can be explained to the public.

Additionally, what approaches to take for the procurement of defense equipment significantly even affects the business plans of business actors. Therefore, the MOD will make efforts to enhance the predictability in defense business, for example, by estimating scheduled quantity for procurement of defense equipment as clearly as possible.

4. Concepts of International Cooperation

As countries are recently competing fiercely in research and development in the military field and making remarkable technological progress, it is difficult for each country to maintain necessary bases without cooperating with other countries. Considering the abovementioned perspectives, promoting international cooperation in defense equipment and technology is essential. Basically, bases related to defense equipment, which should not be relied upon for other countries, should be maintained and strengthened domestically. Beyond that, it is necessary to promote international joint research and development in addition to active international cooperation and licensed production, contributing to incorporating the excellent technologies of various countries into Japan's defense equipment.

International cooperation, such as international joint development and production, often requires much effort in coordination and project management among participating countries. Nevertheless, such lack of coordination may fail to sufficiently meet the required performance that Japan is seeking. Additionally, as it entails risks such as technological leaks and rising costs that Japan cannot manage, it is necessary to consider those challenges in order to promote international cooperation in defense equipment and technology.

International cooperation in defense equipment and technology helps strengthen cooperative relations and interoperability for security with other countries. It is not only beneficial for Japan itself but also contributes to regional stability by enhancing the capabilities of countries sharing fundamental values with Japan. Japan will promote international cooperation strategically in consideration of such significance.

Additionally, as countries continue to hoard critical technologies and materials, it is impossible to complete supply chains of defense equipment only within Japan so that it is essential for Japan to build a mutually complementary relationship with its ally and like-minded countries. In order to stably procure defense equipment, it is needed to maintain a supply chain, considering not only procurement but also maintenance of the defense equipment after its acquisition. Given abovementioned aspects, it needs to endeavor to alleviate the global vulnerability of supply chains and risks of mutual dependence between nations/regions through strengthening collaboration with its ally and like-minded countries.

Furthermore, it is becoming more apparent the necessity of taking measures such as standardizing specifications of defense equipment to guarantee interoperability and interchangeability with other countries by looking at the situation where countries support Ukraine through providing it with defense equipment, etc. responding to the Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It is necessary to develop defense equipment taking into account whether its specification meets the global standards and beside having perspectives of maintaining war sustainability in the case of contingency and international cooperation.

The transfer of defense equipment and technology is a key policy instrument to ensure peace and stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force, to create a desirable security environment for Japan, and to provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat of force. Accordingly, the Government will carry forward with the transfer of defense equipment and technology in joint public and private efforts by establishing the fund and implementing measures, including providing corporate assistance, to promote the smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology of high-security significance and international joint development in a broad array of fields.

5. The Ideal Future of Defense Industry

Each initiative intended to maintain and enhance bases needs to be promoted to realize the ideal state of the defense industry. From the standpoint of the Government, it is essential in the defense industry to maintain the ability to manufacture the necessary defense equipment and support high operating rates, based on the recognition that the bases are a virtually integral part of the defense capability itself and indispensable to stably ensure the manufacturing of defense equipment in Japan and to incorporate advanced technology necessary for new ways of warfare into the defense equipment. Adequate competitive environments between companies inside and those outside Japan promote market competition, which may

lead to achieving the price optimization of defense equipment and improvement in the relevant technologies, etc. Additionally, it is significant for the activation of defense industry that, not only new companies aggressively enter defense projects, but also companies which already engaged in defense projects still actively invest in new projects and improve production processes. It is especially essential to encourage companies that have conventionally not really been involved in the defense business – for example, startup companies that have cutting-edge software technologies in some areas where remarkable progress in private sector could be seen like AI or information communication technologies – to enter into the defense field. To actively promote international cooperation in defense equipment and technology, including international joint research, development, and production, companies must not only maintain an appropriate competitive environment in Japan but also catch up with technological innovations and gain technological superiority to obtain a competitive edge in the international market. It has been an emergent task to have the ability to adequately address various risks, including external threats by economic means, which have become more apparent.

From the standpoint of companies, each company at each layer of a supply chain needs to expect having benefits of engaging in defense business, from comprehensive viewpoints, including profitability and stability, synergistic effects of technological spin-offs from defense business into commercial business, and a deterrent effect to prevent hostile takeover attempts.

While defense-related companies in foreign countries, such as Western countries, are normally engaged in defense projects for their main businesses, major defense-related companies in Japan are fundamentally engaged in commercial businesses for their primary businesses. In almost all cases, their defense-related sales account for lower than 10% to total sales (defense demand dependence). Low defense demand dependence leads to such a tendency as lower priority of resource distribution, within the companies. In order to make the defense industry internationally competitive, it is important to build a defense industry led by companies for which defense business is their main priority.

However, it is important to keep in mind that the nature of an organization depends on what such a company determines for its management. It is necessary to continuously exchange opinions fully between the public and private sectors, with business affiliation and section consolidation included while collaborating with other ministries and departments on effective policies for making defense industry competitive.

Section 2 Roles of the Government of Japan and the Defense Equipment Manufacturers in Ensuring Stable Manufacturing of Defense Equipment

The Government and business actors such as defense equipment manufacturers (hereinafter referred to as "Defense Equipment Manufacturers") need to recognize that bases are indispensable for ensuring the stable domestic manufacture of defense equipment as well as for incorporating the advanced technologies necessary for new ways of warfare into defense equipment. The Government and Defense Equipment Manufacturers divide tasks between them to make efforts for various policies related to maintaining and enhancing the bases, in addition to measures based on the law. The Government needs to build a system adequate for carrying out the various policies described in the next chapter and Chapter 4.

Of course, since companies aim to make a profit, the Defense Equipment Manufacturers need to be able to expect receiving concrete benefits from engaging in the defense business, from comprehensive viewpoints as follows: there should be profitability and stability as in the case of commercial business; the technology acquired through defense business can be spun off into the company's commercial business and have a synergistic effect; and the company can serve as a deterrent to prevent hostile takeover attempts. Therefore, the Government must go ahead with maintaining and enhancing bases by placing importance on preparing an environment where the Defense Equipment Manufacturers can engage in defense projects and determine to further continue the project.

The Defense Equipment Manufacturers are also expected to make efforts on their initiatives, newly recognizing that they are essential entities responsible for national defense, to maintain and enhance bases while using various measures enforced by the Government. In doing so, they are expected, in consideration of the security environments surrounding Japan and the directions of Japan's security policy, to maintain the productivity/technological capabilities necessary for ensuring stable manufacturing of defense equipment to support the SDF operations. It is also expected that, not only technologies, including in the private sector, which are owned by companies, but also the cutting-edge technologies of startup companies will be actively used in the defense business.

In any case, due to the relation that the MOD/SDF is the defense capability while defense production and technology bases are a virtually integral part of defense capability itself, the MOD/SDF and the Defense Equipment Manufacturers must play each role with shared recognition on matters such as defense buildup and operational concept. Therefore, both parties are required to closely communicate with each other on a continual and daily basis at each level.

Chapter 3 Basic Matters Concerning Measures Based on this Act

As described in Chapter 1, the Defense Equipment Manufacturers in Japan face various problems such as the withdrawal from defense business and business scale reduction in defense projects, the stagnancy of new investment and new entry from existing Defense Equipment Manufacturers, the increasingly serious threat of cyberattacks on the Defense Equipment Manufacturers holding sensitive information on defense equipment and technology, the concern such as information theft that foreign-origin malicious elements undermine the safety and reliability of supply chains by entering facilities and parts used for developing and producing defense equipment and technology, and the risks that stable manufacturing of defense equipment cannot be secured due to restriction on export of raw materials, etc., by foreign governments.

As the bases made up of the Defense Equipment Manufacturers are indispensable foundations of Japan's defense capability, they must be strengthened. This Act stipulates policies for enhancing bases that, from such a viewpoint, especially require immediate countermeasures.

Regarding civilian products, it is more appropriate to take initiatives for strengthening their manufacturing bases through policies other than those stipulated by this Act. Thus, basically, civilian products shall not be included in the scope of measures stipulated by this Act.

Section 1 Basic Matters Concerning Financial and Other Measures for the Defense Equipment Manufacturers to Ensure Stable Manufacturing of Defense Equipment

1. Basic Concepts of Specific Initiatives

For the manufacturing of defense equipment, it is assumed that various risks impede stable manufacturing of defense equipment, such as a risk of unavailability of imported raw materials, etc.,

because of export restriction by a foreign government, a risk of delay delivery or falling short of the performance requirement because dilapidated facilities have not been renewed and productivity and technological standards become sluggish, a risk of major concerns for the parts infected with malware or spyware in the manufacturing process, a risk of leakage of information like performance due to cyberattacks, and risk of withdrawing from defense projects because it has become challenging to continue businesses.

To cope with such risks effectively as well as to make a supply chain consisted of prime contractors and suppliers function more effectively and efficiently, which enables to contribute to stable manufacturing, etc., the following specific initiatives need to be taken and the basic concepts of the specific initiatives shall be clarified by category.

(1) Reinforcing Resilience of the Supply Chain

It is concerned that a supply chain of defense equipment is more vulnerable than the one of general industrial products because it includes suppliers having special facilities and technologies that have little or no substitute and its acquisition channel for some raw materials is limited. If acquisition/withdrawal of a supplier or a natural disaster/accident happens, there is concern over a decline in function of production and logistics as well as delayed procurement and cost increase of parts and components necessary for manufacturing defense equipment. Therefore, it is imperative to respond to supply chain risks by ensuring redundancy and replaceability in a supply chain in order not to hinder the operations of defense equipment.

For these reasons, the Defense Equipment Manufacturers, whose plans for ensuring stable manufacturing of defense equipment (hereinafter referred to as "Stable Manufacturing Plans") are approved by the Minister of Defense, are required to take the following measures, for example, based on the Stable Manufacturing Plans;

- To hedge the risk of supply disruption, shift import sources of raw materials from a foreign country which has such risk to several countries which have less risks.
- Have a stockpile of raw materials in consideration of assumptions based on procurement/replenishment plans.
- Introduce production technologies for initiatives, such as the domestic production of raw materials, or carry out research, development, and improvement for substitute products and specification-modified products in order to make manufacturing of designated defense equipment no longer need raw materials, which have the risk of supply disruption, or make it sufficient to use a small amount of such raw materials.
- Modify manufacturing processes, facilities, etc., to eliminate the possibility of mix-up of parts or programs, which may cause malfunction or leak information of designated defense equipment

(2) Improving Manufacturing Process Efficiency

In the private sector, manufacturing facilities, etc., have been upgraded rapidly in such a manner as to utilize advanced technologies, for example, AI and 3D printers. On the other hand, the defense sector has the features peculiar to defense equipment, such as manufacturing of a wide variety of products in small quantities and a slow rate of invested capital recovery. In addition, it takes on various risks that cause difficulty in stable manufacturing of designated defense equipment, such as decreased productivity and quality due to deteriorating facilities, aging workforce, and so on, as well as the likelihood of withdrawal from the defense industry with a background of uncertainty in future demand through dependence on security environments. To reduce such risks, efforts to make manufacturing processes of designated defense equipment more efficient are required in such manners as reducing costs, building a flexible manufacturing system, and shortening development periods and procurement lead time through the following efforts.

- Streamline manufacturing processes and labor-saving
- Make electronic data and analysis of expertise on manufacturing processes, such as the experience of skilled workers
- Improve manufacturing methods for flexibly responding to diversified and small quantity production and manufacturing of parts, etc., over a long period, which are unique to the manufacturing of defense equipment.
- Reduce the frequency at which facilities for manufacturing, etc., fail to work

From these perspectives, the Defense Equipment Manufacturers whose Stable Manufacturing Plans are approved by the Minister of Defense are required to carry out, based on the Stable Manufacturing Plans, facility investment, and investigation of the introduction feasibility of the facilities, which contribute to better efficiency as follows.

- Make efforts to make manufacturing processes more efficient by introducing instruments provided with advanced technologies such as up-to-date machine tools and 3D printers
- Make efforts to automate manufacturing processes by introducing the programs of AI, etc.
- Make efforts to make manufacturing processes more efficient through digital transformation

(3) Cybersecurity Enhancement

Suppose information to be protected such as important technical and design-related information. In that case, Japan could have its defense strategy and technological superiority adversely affected seriously and be remarkably hindered from stably procuring defense equipment and technology, damaging the trust in the relationship with its ally and like-minded countries. Therefore, the MOD has provided Standards on Cybersecurity Measures for Defense Industry ensuring information security for procurement of defense equipment and services {ATLA No.137. March 31, 2022}) and has successively started to apply it since the 2023 fiscal year. In some cases, it is appropriate that to meet the standards and to respond to cyberattacks becoming more complicated and elaborate, the Defense Security Gateway, which is a cloud shared between the public and private sectors, be utilized, and additional information security measures complying with the standards be taken for information system held by the company. For that, each company needs to make facility investments, such as building up information systems/establishments with functionalities corresponding to advanced information security measures.

For this reason, the Defense Equipment Manufacturers whose Stable Manufacturing Plans are approved by the Minister of Defense are required to take the following measures, for example, based on the Stable Manufacturing Plans.

- Authenticate a system user with multi-factor authentication
- Monitor the system constantly and consistently analyze logs
- Carry out vulnerability scanning and analyze the results
- Carry out response tests for information security accidents, etc.
- Ensure physical security of establishments by using entry/exit management instruments provided with electronic locks, etc.

(4) Support for Business Succession, etc.

The withdrawal of the Defense Equipment Manufacturers engaged in manufacturing all, or most of the designated defense equipment from defense business will be decided based on the judgment of each company.

There is a concern that delayed delivery and lower operational availability of defense equipment may be caused by the disruption

of the supply of defense equipment due to the withdrawal from defense projects or the prolonged adjustment related to business succession, etc. To prevent such situations, it is necessary to acquire manufacturing facilities and technical documents, etc., so that the Defense Equipment Manufacturers can smoothly and steadily proceed with business succession, etc.

For this reason, the Defense Equipment Manufacturers whose Stable Manufacturing Plans are approved by the Minister of Defense are required to take the following measures, for example, based on the Stable Manufacturing Plans.

- Acquire establishments and facilities that can be expected to ensure stable and efficient manufacturing capabilities
- Acquire technical documents and licenses necessary for the manufacturing, etc.
- Train employees through education, drills, etc.

2. Targets of Stable Manufacturing Plans

The "designated defense equipment" to be objects for Stable Manufacturing Plans is defense equipment indispensable for the SDF to carry out its missions and is defense equipment for which, in the case stopping manufacturing by specific Defense Equipment Manufacturers who carry out manufacturing thereof threatens to hinder the adequate procurement by the MOD.

The defense equipment indispensable for the SDF to carry out its missions specifically includes weapons, ammunitions, vehicles, ships, aircraft, radars, guided weapons, information systems, and various other supplies, the lack of which causes the SDF to encounter difficulties in accomplishing its missions.

3. Matters on Financial Measures

Regarding Stable Manufacturing Plans related to specific initiatives that the Defense Equipment Manufacturers have submitted, the Minister of Defense confirms whether or not they comply with policies of manufacturing understood or controlled by suppliers and prime contractors superior to the Defense Equipment Manufacturers and whether or not they are indispensable for stable manufacturing of designated defense equipment to be delivered to the MOD, and then approves the Stable Manufacturing Plans. The MOD shall confirm necessary costs for each specific initiative, conclude contracts for the specific initiatives with Defense Equipment Manufacturers, whose Stable Manufacturing Plans are approved by the Minister of Defense, and make the costs, according to provisions of the contracts, directly paid without delay to them.

Section 2 Basic Matters Concerning Measures to Smoothly Carry Out the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which Contributes to Ensuring Stable Manufacturing of Defense Equipment and Technology under Appropriate Control

1. Basic Concepts Concerning the Adjustment of Specification and Performance for the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

The transfer of defense equipment and technology is a key policy instrument to ensure peace and stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force, to create a desirable security environment for Japan, and to provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat of force. Therefore, Japan is carrying forward with the transfer of defense equipment and technology in joint public and private efforts. It is a strategic tool of foreign and defense policy to build effective partnerships with ally and like-minded countries and to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by forces or invasion of Japan. Furthermore, defense cooperation with foreign governments can be practical for the growth of defense industry since it could result in expanding sales channels through a smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology under appropriate management.

When carrying out the transfer of defense equipment and technology, the Government needs to have the Defense Equipment Manufacturers modify and adjust the specifications and performance of the equipment appropriately from the perspective of Japan's security environment, giving due consideration to the cooperative relations with foreign countries. It is necessary to appropriately address concerns of losing ground on technological superiority in the defense field over other countries by securing information, particularly on advanced technologies used for the SDF equipment.

From such problem awareness, this Act aims to promote initiatives to conduct appropriate equipment transfer under appropriate control of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and decides to subsidize Defense Equipment Manufacturers working on the transfer of defense equipment and technology for necessary adjustments of specifications and performance of the equipment.

2. The Defense Equipment Manufacturers Eligible for Receiving Grants

The adjustment of specifications and performance for the transfer of defense equipment and technology (hereinafter referred to as the "specifications and performance") refers to the adjustment of specifications and performance to meet a certain standard for the usage of destination's countries, following the request by the Minister of Defense, to ensure confidentiality of information regarding defense equipment as well as from the perspective of Japan's national security. The grants are awarded to Defense Equipment Manufacturers who attempt to conduct equipment transfer to foreign governments when they need the expense of adjusting specifications and performance for such equipment transfer. "Defense Equipment Manufacturers," in this case is, not limited to prime contractors that manufacture and sell finished products to foreign governments as transfer destinations but also suppliers that take partial roles such as designing.

3. The Purpose of Usage of Grants

To conduct appropriate equipment transfer from the perspective of national security, a grant will be awarded to the Defense Equipment Manufacturers to cover the cost necessary for changing the design for modifying specifications and performance of goods to be transferred and to work on a series of necessary operations in response to the request by the Minister of Defense, based on plans for adjusting specifications and performance for the transfer of defense equipment and technology (hereinafter referred to as "Adjustment Plans"), which are approved by the Minister of Defense.

Since the adjustment of specifications and performance is requested from the Minister of Defense to the Defense Equipment Manufacturers from the necessity of national security, the Government should cover the cost. Additionally, even if equipment transfer expected in an international competitive bid, etc., was not realized, the Defense Equipment Manufacturers will not be requested to return the costs of the adjustment of specifications and performance they had already spent.

Section 3 Basic Matters Concerning Roles, which the Designated Equipment Transfer Support Corporation should Play, in Equipment Transfer Support Operations and Fund

1. Roles of the Designated Equipment Transfer Support Corporation

The Designated Equipment Transfer Support Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "the Designated Corporation") will provide a necessary grant from fund to Defense Equipment Manufacturers, whose Adjustment Plans are approved by the Minister of Defense for making adjustments to specifications and performance. The Designated Corporation will manage and allocate grants to the Defense Equipment Manufacturers, whose Adjustment Plans are approved by the Minister of Defense, to conduct equipment transfer according to the Adjustment Plans approved by the Minister of Defense. In addition, regarding the matters concerning the adjustment of specifications and performance by the Defense Equipment Manufacturers, the Designated Corporation also receives inquiries, offers consultations, and provides necessary advice for the Defense Equipment Manufacturers.

As stated in the previous section, equipment transfer is a key policy instrument for the defense of Japan, and joint public and private efforts promote it. Therefore, the Designated Corporation needs to provide support, as mentioned earlier, to Defense Equipment Manufacturers, whose Adjustment Plans are approved by the Minister of Defense to smoothly conduct equipment transfer aligned with the political objectives of the MOD. Thus, a corporation qualified to handle such operations should provide such supporting service.

2. Matters Related to the Fund

In supporting Defense Equipment Manufacturers, whose Adjustment Plans are approved by the Minister of Defense, the Designated Corporation shall conduct necessary screening before allocating grants from the fund to them. Once the allocation of the grants is decided, the Designated Corporation is responsible for executing the grants properly through inspections or other methods. As for fund management, the use of the fund should be operated properly within the scope of the guidelines for the support in conducting equipment transfer defined by the Minister of Defense and should not damage the assets of the fund.

Specifically, note the following matters.

- In executing the grants, the Designated Corporation shall cooperate with the Minister of Defense to confirm the proper and reliable operation of the Adjustment Plans approved by the Minister of Defense
- If the Minister of Defense rescinds the approval of the Adjustment Plans or takes other measures, the Designated Corporation shall promptly proceed with the required procedures, including the return of the grants, depending on the measures.
- Given that the fund is accounted for separately from all other business account assets, the accounting process shall proceed appropriately as this Act requires.
- The fund shall be managed by reducing operational risks to the minimum level to ensure safe asset maintenance and transparency of asset management following the stipulation of this Act.

Section 4 Basic Matters Concerning Security Measures to Protect classified Information Regarding Contracts for Defense Equipment and Technology

1. Importance of Protecting Classified Information Contained in Defense Equipment and Technology

The contractors in each stage of the life cycle of defense equipment are inseparable for the steady procurement and usage of such defense equipment.

In the production of defense equipment, for steady procurement of higher quality defense equipment, the classified information contained in defense equipment and technology, such as advanced technology, is provided to contractors.

On the other hand, in recent years, there have been higher risks of the leakage of classified information in defense equipment, including cyberattacks, industrial espionage, and corporate acquisition, by countries of security concern. If such information leaked out from contractors, it would disclose information, including the performance of defense equipment, to hinder the smooth operation of the SDF and the defense of Japan.

In addition, with the advancement of international collaboration in research, development, and manufacturing, including procurement of defense equipment and technology from foreign countries and the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), when exchanging any classified information contained in defense equipment and technology with foreign countries, and in the case where such information leaked from contractors, it would lower our credibility and hinder ongoing collaborative development, resulting in the frustration of the international cooperation.

Considering the necessity to protect classified information contained in defense equipment, a legal obligation to protect classified information is now imposed on contractors handling such classified information through the establishment of penal provisions for compromise in addition to obligation based on the contract currently in place, which will further strengthen defense industrial security system, the trustworthiness between nations, the reliability of contractors with strict information management, thereby strengthening the defense production and security bases.

2. Principles of Protecting Confidential of Defense Equipment

The measures introduced this time specifically label the classified information provided to contractors under the security contract as "Confidential of Defense Equipment." It is explicitly indicated to contractors and their employees handling such classified information that they are concerned with Confidential of Defense Equipment and that such information requires strict management. When it is necessary to share documents containing such classified information with contractors, the MOD designates such information as Confidential of Defense Equipment. It provides the information to the contractors and a "Designation Document of Confidential of Defense Equipment," which describes instructions, including its marking and effective period. Thereby, such contractors and their employees can manage the information more rigorously.

Among the classified information that SDF personnel is prohibited from divulging pursuant to Article 59, paragraph (1) of the SDF Law (Act No. 165 of 1954), the Confidential of Defense Equipment provided in Article 27 of this Act does not include "MDA Secrets" provided in Article 1, paragraph (3) of the Act on Protection of Secrets Incidental to the "Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between Japan and the United States of America" (Act No. 166 of 1954), and "Specially Designated Secrets" provided in Article 3, paragraph (1) of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (Act No. 108 of 2013). This Act assumes to be what is called "Ministerial Confidential" designated as "HI" following Article 16, paragraph (1) of the Directive for Protection of Ministerial Confidential (MOD No. 36 of 2007) and Directive for Protection of ATLA Confidential (ATLA Directive No. 26 of 2015).

The penalties for compromise introduced this time target intentional leakers and external abettors. Such penalties align with those currently imposed on the SDF personnel, which will more effectively prevent compromise from those who handle Defense

Equipment Confidential.

When taking these measures, the MOD will fully explain to contractors the necessity of safeguarding Confidential of Defense Equipment to gain their understanding and continue the steady implementation of existing security measures, including facility security measures, security education, and periodic inspections, so that both the MOD and contractors will prioritize strict information management concerning Confidential of Defense Equipment.

Section 5 Basic Matters Concerning the Government Ownership of Designated Defense Equipment Manufacturing facilities by the Minister of Defense, and the Entrustment of the Management

1. Basic Concepts

Chapter 2 of this Act stipulates measures allowing the MOD to acquire designated equipment manufacturing facilities, etc. which manufacture designated defense equipment if the MOD cannot obtain designated defense equipment produced therein appropriately. Especially when it is difficult to ensure stable manufacturing of the defense equipment even if the measures of Chapter 2 of this Act are applied, the MOD helps to reduce risks that the Defense Equipment Manufacturers are supposed to incur when owning fixed property by MOD acquiring designated equipment manufacturing facilities. This is expected to ensure the sustainability of production for defense equipment and to prevent supply disruptions.

For example, these measures are applied in the following cases.

○ When a contractor withdraws from business such as manufacturing defense equipment and:

- There is a Defense Equipment Manufacturers capable of manufacturing defense equipment if it doesn't need to take on any risk of owning designated defense equipment production facilities by itself.
- Even though there is a Defense Equipment Manufacturers as a business successor, the designated equipment manufacturing facilities related to the withdrawal have exceeded their useful life of the building and have deteriorated so that the successor finds it challenging to acquire new facilities, and the Government would build new ones instead.

○ When designated equipment manufacturing facilities are destroyed due to reasons such as accidents and natural disasters, and the process and duration of recovering the facilities by the Defense Equipment Manufacturers are uncertain, the Government would build new ones.

With these assumptions, specific cases must be examined individually, considering the necessities in various situations. It should be noted that as a precondition that the MOD acquires designated equipment manufacturing facilities, there should be some Defense Equipment Manufacturers, who engage in manufacturing designated defense equipment on consignment from the MOD.

Furthermore, based on Article 30, paragraph (1) of this Act, private companies should be the project entities that manufacture designated defense equipment in the designated defense equipment manufacturing facilities commissioned by the MOD. That won't change anything from the usual business activities, and it is expected to operate the management efficiently.

2. Matters Concerning the Entities to whom the Management of Designed Equipment Manufacturing Facilities is Outsourced

Fundamentally, the Defense Equipment Manufacturers produce designated defense equipment and manage the facilities on behalf of the Minister of Defense. Such facilities are hereinafter referred to as a "consigned facility."

3. Matters Concerning Designed Equipment Manufacturing Facilities acquired by the MOD

The target of the acquisition by the Minister of Defense is the land, facility, and equipment capable of producing designated defense equipment. The designed equipment defense manufacturing facilities to be acquired shall be selected based on specific cases.

4. Matters Concerning Outsourced Facility Management: Details, Rights, and Obligations

Contracted facility managers shall maintain and manage their consigned facilities to manufacture designated defense equipment when required. Additionally, contracted facility managers shall ensure an adequate number of skilled employees to maintain and manage the consigned facilities as well as to maintain their performance.

The Minister of Defense will bear the cost of the maintenance and management of the consigned facilities. However, this may not apply if a consigned facility sustains damage due to the absence of the due care expected of a contracted facility manager, in terms of maintenance and management or manufacturing designated defense equipment.

5. Matters Concerning Extra-Purpose Uses

If consigned facilities achieve the main objective of manufacturing designated defense equipment, the Minister of Defense may exceptionally permit the consigned facilities to be used for extra-purpose.

In pursuit of achieving such main objective, the period of time for the contracted facility managers to manufacture products other than designated defense equipment (hereinafter referred to as "exceptional products") in the consigned facilities shall basically not exceed the time for manufacturing designated defense equipment. When it is required to manufacture designated defense equipment, the manufacturing of these designated defense equipment should be prioritized rather than the manufacturing of exceptional products.

Additionally, the Minister of Defense will collect appropriate fees from contracted facility managers if they use the consigned facilities for such purposes as manufacturing exceptional products.

6. Matters Concerning the Transfer of Consigned Facilities

In view of the fact that the Government's acquisition of designated defense equipment manufacturing facilities is regarded as a policy instrument that should only be implemented when appropriate procurement of designated defense equipment could not be realized even after taking financial measures etc. In line with this, as stipulated in paragraph (1), Article 33 of this Act, it is encouraged for the Government to promptly cede the land acquired for designated defense equipment manufacturing facilities. On the other hand, given that this Act's primary objective is to ensure the consistent manufacturing of defense equipment, it does not mandate the Minister of Defense to cede the land going so far as to cause troubles to hinder this objective.

For this reason, following paragraph (2), Article 33 of this Act, the Minister of Defense shall consider not to hinder consistently manufacturing designated defense equipment. While doing so, the Minister of Defense is obligated to transfer the facilities based on steady procurement and economic rationality as early as possible within the time frame that matches the purpose of this Act. The concrete time of transfer is appropriately decided, considering the specific cases and the opinions of the Defense Equipment Manufacturers commissioned for facility management.

Chapter 4 Other Matters Necessary for Maintaining and Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases

To enhance defense production and technology bases, the following additional measures are implemented beyond those specified in this Act. Furthermore, the MOD will collaborate with other relevant ministries and agencies to enhance the bases as a unified government effort.

1. Making the Defense Business More Attractive (Proper Profit calculation)

Defense business requires a considerable investment of management resources to meet sophisticated performance requirements and information security measures, while profitability is often less than procurement system standards. In explaining to stakeholders the necessity of maintaining the defense business, it is essential for private enterprises, which primarily pursue profit, to perceive the concrete benefits of engaging in the defense business. In this context, factors such as profitability and stability, synergistic effects from the spin-off of technology obtained through the defense business into a company's commercial business, and possible deterrence against hostile takeover attempts will be considered.

In calculating price in the cost accounting system, the MOD will build a system for a fair evaluation of the business efforts and a proper profit calculation to establish the business operation. In addition, for the procurement system, while ensuring propriety, a continuous review of contractual systems will be undertaken to enhance effectiveness. The effort helps the defense business become more attractive.

Additionally, to reduce the aversion and reputation risks associated with the defense business, the Government will take measures to positively appeal to the importance of the defense industry, its technological superiority, and its positive impact on economics and scientific technology.

2. Maintenance and Reinforcement of Competitiveness and Technology of Companies

In the defense industry, where attractiveness is declining, incentives for new investments and new company entries are reduced. If leaving this alone, it might result in the loss of an appropriate competitive environment and innovation, potentially leading to the loss of Japan's technological superiority in the security domain.

Based on the approach to acquiring defense equipment and technology presented in Chapter 2, Section 1, Paragraph 3, the MOD will promote acquiring defense equipment with an even greater emphasis on maintaining and enhancing the domestic bases. In addition, following accounting laws and regulations, while considering the purposes of the Minister of Finance's notification on "Normalization of Public Procurement" (dated August 25, 2006, Finance Calculation No. 2017), the MOD will consider the use of discretionary contracts and promote flexible operation of the contract system. Moreover, to address the demand for long-term funds in the defense business and encourage the sustainable development of the defense industry, support will also be provided financially through the use of government financial institutions, etc. Furthermore, by introducing new research and development methods, establishing research institutions, and promoting various initiatives to strengthen Japan's bases, the MOD aims to promptly realize the functions and equipment necessary to protect our country, directly linked to future warfare strategies. Under the collaboration of the public and private sectors, the MOD will harness our nation's scientific and technological strengths and innovative capabilities to ensure technological superiority in the defense field for the future and achieve advanced capabilities ahead of other nations. In doing so, in the fields in which use is limited to the defense, attention will also be paid to the maintenance and improvement of the existing technologies.

3. Revitalization of the Defense Industry (Promotion of New Entries)

With limited appeal as a business, new entries into the defense industry remain sluggish. If left unaddressed, there is a risk that the industry as a whole will lose its vitality, possibly missing opportunities to incorporate cutting-edge technologies from the private sector into the security domain.

By promoting matching events for companies and establishing consultation counters for new entrants, the MOD will encourage new entries into the defense industry by small and medium-sized enterprises and startups. In addition, the MOD strives to eliminate barriers to entering the defense industry.

4. Appropriate Responses to Withdrawing Companies

In recent years, there have been intermittent decisions by companies to withdraw from the defense business or to reduce the scale of their operations. Such trends not only cause the decline of the defense industry but can also be significant obstacles to the stable manufacturing of defense equipment.

Firstly, initiatives will be promoted to make the defense business more attractive. Through timely explanation, etc., on the outlook for the buildup of defense capability, efforts will be made to improve the future predictability for companies in the defense business, aiming to prevent them from withdrawing. Through the effective implementation of supply chain surveys and other measures, early signs of withdrawal will be detected. If business withdrawal becomes inevitable, efforts will be made to ensure a smooth business succession, striving to guarantee the stable manufacturing of defense equipment.

5. Building a Resilient Supply Chain

Regarding the supply chain for defense equipment, there are potential risks, such as the interruption of raw material supplies due to export controls and the risk of information theft through vulnerable facilities or components. Leaving such vulnerabilities unaddressed could not only threaten the stable production of defense equipment but also risk damaging Japan's relative technological superiority due to information theft.

Through the effective implementation of supply chain surveys and other means, the MOD will promptly identify risks in the supply chain and support initiatives by Defense Equipment Manufacturers to reduce such risks. In implementing the survey, to enhance its effectiveness from the perspective of ensuring stable manufacturing of designated defense equipment, the MOD will encourage proactive cooperation from the Defense Equipment Manufacturers. Furthermore, to construct a mutually complementary relationship for the supply chains of defense equipment, the Government will strengthen cooperation with foreign countries such as the United States.

6. Strengthening Industrial Security

The interstate competition over cutting-edge technologies is intensifying, and there are attempts by states to acquire technical information from military and private sectors through various means. The defense industry is at the forefront of this situation. As the ICT integration of defense equipment and the defense industry rapidly progresses, in recent years, cyberattacks on defense-related companies believed to be carried out by groups with suspected state involvement, have occurred, making countermeasures against cyber threats an urgent necessity. If Japan does not ensure an international security standard at a high level equivalent to that of the United States and other foreign countries, it could potentially hinder the

introduction of state-of-the-art equipment from the United States and further progress in international joint research, development, and production with other countries.

In advancing industrial security measures based on international standards, the Government will provide support through measures such as covering costs in defense procurement when companies invest in addressing these measures. Additionally, efforts will be made to create a secure information-sharing environment between the MOD and companies, ensuring that companies handling sensitive information related to defense business establish the necessary information security framework.

7. Strengthening Sensitive Technology Management

The interstate competition over cutting-edge technologies is intensifying, and advanced technologies, including civilian technologies, are being actively collected and repurposed for military use. It has become essential for the Government to strengthen the management of sensitive technologies.

The MOD sets up a framework to appropriately handle sensitive technologies and foster cooperation with other countries towards this objective.

8. Promotion of Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

The transfer of defense equipment and technology is not only a strategic tool of foreign and defense policy to build effective partnerships with its ally and like-minded countries and to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by forces or invasion of Japan but is also effective in ensuring the growth of the defense industry through the expansion of sales channel for defense equipment. However, it has not progressed far enough.

Therefore, the Government will promote appropriate transfers of defense equipment and technology under further cooperation between the public and private sectors. The Government will also establish a fund and provide corporate assistance as necessary.

9. Rationalization of Foreign Military Sales Procurement

The Foreign Military Sales (hereafter referred to as ”FMS”) is a program that enables U.S. allies and partners to procure defense equipment and services with high performance and confidentiality. By making joint purchases with countries like the United States, there are expected scale merits. However, it also has characteristics such as prices being estimates without confirmed delivery dates and the principle of paying upfront with final adjustments made after delivery. In recent years, the amount procured through FMS has been at a high level, and there is a need to be mindful of balancing this with the maintenance and enhancing of the domestic bases.

The MOD will further strive to rationalize FMS procurement, such as strengthening the activities of ATLA in the United States by utilizing external personnel. In addition, the MOD will promote the participation of domestic companies in the manufacturing of FMS defense equipment and pursue an approach that emphasizes the benefits of such participation.

Reference 73 Defense Technology Guideline 2023 (Executive Summary)

Purpose

This guideline outlines the direction of the reinforcement of the defense technology base to actively promote all Japan Ministry of Defense (JMOD) efforts in accordance with the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program. JMOD publishes this guideline as a message to our partners, including the relevant ministries, research institutes, industry, academia, and allies and like-minded countries. JMOD will improve the predictability of our partners and share the common understanding to promote technological cooperation with our partners.

Current environment and challenges

Rapid advances in science and technology have added to Japan's own economic and social development. These advances are also having huge effects on the national security environment and are changing warfare. As a result of these changes, if we simply continue incremental updates of equipment, we may fail to defend our nation at all times. To adapt to these changes, we need to maximally utilize Japan's capabilities in science, technology, and innovation (STI) for the purposes of national security and defense. We also need to spin off outcomes of JMOD's R&D to the entire society. In JMOD's R&D activities, to achieve the defense of our nation at all times, we need to take new approaches and implement measures that are drastically different from the past.

Our vision of the future (Ends of this guideline)

JMOD / Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) needs to have sufficient defense capabilities. The objective of reinforcement of the defense technology base is to support Japan's defense capabilities through technology solutions. Therefore, our vision of the future is "To defend our nation at all times with technologies."

Approaches to realize our vision (Methods of this guideline)

This guideline will be anchored by two pillars.

1st Pillar: Accelerating delivery of functions and equipment

We will deliver the functions and equipment in the seven fields of key capabilities as mentioned in National Defense Strategy to warfighters in a timely manner (by 5 years until FY 2027 or within approximately the next 10 years). We will develop these functions and equipment through the reformed R&D process.

2nd Pillar: Ensuring technological superiority and creating advanced capabilities

Over the next 10 years and further ahead, we will put the various technologies into practical and operational use as brand new functions and equipment under nationwide collaborations that gather STI capabilities from the public sector and the private sector of Japan. These efforts will create the new values as functions and equipment to resolutely defend our nation, and these values will transform JMOD / JSDF into the organization that is capable of responding to future warfare. In this guideline, we will call this transformation defense innovation, and we will secure technological superiority in the future and realize the advanced capabilities ahead of other countries through defense innovation.

Means to realize our vision (Means of this guideline)

To achieve the 1st and 2nd pillars, we will create our functions and capabilities that JMOD/ JSDF needs, nurture the technologies strategically, and understand the various science and technology factors. We will carry out the various efforts of the three means with the relevant ministries, research institutes, industry, and academia. For this purpose, we will establish the ecosystem that makes continuous growth of JMOD and stakeholders and sustainable cooperation while ensuring technology preservation.

Creating

We will speed up R&D processes by implementing every possible measure to strengthen our defense capabilities rapidly. We will deliver the functions and capabilities to warfighters in a timely manner. To achieve this purpose, we will introduce new R&D methods for early deployment, including trial fielding. In trial fielding, we will produce a prototype that is usable in operational fields and put them into operation as soon as possible. These efforts enable the demonstration of brand-new functions and capabilities and the building of deterrent effects. We will also acquire feedback from operators though the trial use of prototypes and use the feedback for continuous redesign, improvement, and other improvements. We will accelerate the use of R&D resources and ideas outside the ministry as Open Innovation.

Our policy side, operational side, and technology side will work together to create the concept of future warfare and to create the directions of future R&D and acquisition of functions and equipment. We will forecast the future technologies and warfare. And we will create the scheme as to how we utilize new technologies against new threats together with technology specialists outside the ministry.

Technological knowledge, human resources, facilities and test equipment are the essential technology base of R&D. We will share the objectives and goals of our efforts with the technology base, including our ministry's research centers, test centers, and the defense industry, to improve the predictability of industries and gather the capability of the technology base. We will invest in the technology base to maintain and reinforce their capabilities. We will expand communication and collaboration with industries, including start-ups that are not familiar with defense-related programs. We will also establish the framework to promote the participation of various industries in our R&D projects. We will establish the capability in the technology base that can integrate advanced technologies that are developed by start-ups into functions and equipment by the defense sectors. JMOD's competitive research funding program called Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security (ISTIS) focuses on developing the technologies in niche areas that cannot gain investments from the private sector and identifying and developing the basic research to expand the boundary of S&T fields. We continue to utilize this program to create the new technology base. To assign the appropriate personnel to the appropriate positions flexibly and quickly, we will reinforce measures for personnel utilization and recruiting, such as the bringing up of personnel and the expanding of mid-career employment to gain talented people.

Nurturing

We will explore the technologies to be nurtured, including outside defense and experienced technologies. We will actively take the brand-new approaches that differ from the current R&D style, including a challenging research program with the acceptance of unpredictable technological risks.

Based on the limitation of JMOD's resources and the fact that JMOD's R&D investments are just a small part of S&T investments of the government of Japan, we will utilize the various outcomes of S&T activities outside JMOD for defense purposes. For leveraging these outcomes in an effective way, we will concretely show our needs and the directions of our efforts. We will establish an

environment that promotes the participation of the S&T community members into our projects and explore new partners. We will develop a sustainable ecosystem that enables to reward industry's efforts and nurture their businesses. We will fuse the defense sector and the non-defense sector and make the new chemical reactions from that fusion to nurture technological solutions from a different angle that differs from the defense perspective. We will exert the greatest possible efforts to utilize the domestic and international S&T capabilities to nurture technologies.

The outcomes of JMOD's R&D contribute to raising Japan's capabilities in STI. From the perspective of addressing global issues, we will conduct diverse R&D projects and nurture Japan's capabilities in STI. By conducting ISTIS, we will expand the human resources that conduct use-inspired basic research, foster various researchers, explore new frontier of research areas, establish, and reinforce human networks in emerging research areas to expand the range of STI capabilities.

Understanding

We will understand the current STI environment, such as the technological trend in domestic and international private sectors, R&D outcomes from the private sector, including start-ups in Japan, advanced technologies in research institutes and academia, current status, and the results of R&D projects. We will determine what we should do based on the current S&T environment.

Nowadays the various S&Ts are being used on the actual battlefield. Under these circumstances, we need to understand how the various new technologies affect the national security environment and JMOD / JSDF activities in future warfare precisely and quickly. For such S&T changes, we will implement the appropriate measures.

We will actively send the messages outside the JMOD about what we are doing, why we are doing it, and how our efforts in technologies affect the national security environment and defense activities. We will share the future forecasting results and our future R&D plans outside the JMOD to improve the predictability of stakeholders.

Conclusion

We will promote harmony between national security and STI as an organization that can build a bridge between these policies. We will realize the ends of this guideline through achieving the 1st and 2nd pillars with the various efforts of creating, nurturing, and understanding by breaking away from conventional thinking.

Attachment: The important technology areas to defend our nation at all times

In this guideline, we determine the areas that need to gain the superiority for defending our nation at all times and derive the important functions and capabilities for defending our nation at all times. Next, we break down these functions and capabilities to technology areas that are important to realize these functions and capabilities.

We assume the physical area, information area, and cognitive area as the areas to gain superiority. From these three areas we derive the important functions and capabilities to gain the superiority in the physical area, the important functions and capabilities to gain the superiority in the information area, and the important functions and capabilities to gain the superiority in the cognitive area. As the results of this process, we derive 12 areas as the important functions and capabilities to defend our nation at all times as follows. Automation and Autonomy to prevent damage and the workload of warfighters and civilians

- Utilization of unused platforms
- Utilization of unused energy
- New functional materials and manufacturing method
- Faster and more accurate sensing
- Advanced computing that instantly processes vast amounts of information
- Visualization of invisible things (such as distant objects, electromagnetic waves, and the decision-making process of SDF personnel)
- Capabilities that make virtual / imaginary information as real things
- Forecasting our future to enhance recognition capability beforehand
- Network that enables to connect anywhere, anytime, anyone as we like
- More effective and efficient cyber defense capabilities
- Reinforcement of warfighter's cognitive capability

In this attachment, we show examples of the important technology areas to defend our nation at all times by breaking down these as the important functions and capabilities into specific technologies from the technological perspective.

Reference 74 FY2025 Awarded Research Projects for the MOD Basic Research Support Initiative

[Outsourced projects (Type S): 5 projects]

Research Title	Brief Summary	Representative Research Institution
Demonstration of advanced fuel nuclear fusion reactions for small, neutron-free nuclear fusion reactors	This research aims to realize a small, neutron-free reactor, which is impossible with D-T nuclear fusion reactors*1 that are predicated on tritium fuel and large facilities. To this end, it will utilize the FRC*2 developed at Nihon University and its newly developed negative ion beam to demonstrate the p-11B reaction*3 in an open magnetic field and acquire fundamental data.	Nihon University
Research on 3D quantum tunneling integrated circuit*4 chip technology	This research builds a technology to highly integrate a novel vertical switch structure with 3D integrated circuits using a perpendicular III-V nanowire material*5 on an Si platform, thereby creating a fundamental technology for 3D quantum tunneling integrated circuits that offers low power consumption and high computing efficiency that cannot be realized with Si integrated circuits.	Hokkaido University
Power-saving AI computing platform using a combined digital-analog optical accelerator*6	This research aims to realize a combined digital-analog optical accelerator and stacked photoelectronic fusion technology that can reduce the electronic switching elements and associated photoelectric conversion elements that are bottlenecks in AI computing networks, thereby demonstrating an ultralow-power-consumption, low-latency, next-generation AI computing infrastructure.	National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
Life extension system	This research aims to realize a life extension system that can transcend the limits of death by activating the latent natural resuscitation capacity of organisms, which is expected to contribute to resuscitation and lifesaving during disasters and to improving the freshness of perishable foods.	Karydo TherapeutiX, Inc.
Research and development of a 15kV pressure-resistant gallium oxide power device	This research aims to develop a high-pressure-resistant β-Ga_2O_3*7 high-purity thick-film epitaxial wafer*8 fabrication technology and element peripheral structure, etc., which will contribute to low-loss semiconductor switches required in high-voltage regions such as DC power transmission and pulse power supplies in offshore wind power generation, and to demonstrate the operation of a pressure-resistant 15kV β-Ga_2O_3 transistor.	Novel Crystal Technology, Inc.

Notes:
*1 D-T nuclear fusion reactor: a nuclear fusion reactor that generates electricity by causing a reaction between deuterium (D) and tritium (T) to extract the energy of the neutrons produced via heat
*2 FRC: Field Reversed Configuration. This method reverses the direction of the magnetic field using the electric current flowing through the plasma, thereby confining the plasma within the region of the closed magnetic field lines generated as a result of the reversal.
*3 p-11B reaction: nuclear fusion in which protons (p) and boron-11 (11B) react to generate helium (alpha particles), characterized by the fact that it emits almost no neutrons
*4 Quantum tunneling integrated circuit: an integrated circuit which has an element that performs a current switching operation as the basic constituent element of the circuit, by controlling in an electric field the phenomenon of electrons passing through an energy barrier in a semiconductor material with a certain probability
*5 Perpendicular III-V nanowire material: a nanomaterial created through crystalline growth of III-V compound semiconductor materials as fine wire structures with a diameter less than 1/1000th the thickness of a human hair, in a perpendicular direction with respect to the surface of a semiconductor substrate
*6 Combined digital-analog optical accelerator: an optical accelerator element capable of processing digital optical signals and analog optical computing
*7 β-Ga_2O_3: a wide-bandgap semiconductor that is a compound of gallium and oxygen
*8 Epitaxial wafer: a wafer for which a crystalline film is formed on a single crystal substrate

[Outsourced projects (Type A): 10 projects]

Research Title	Brief Summary	Representative Research Institution
Creation of highly efficient, deep-ultraviolet-emitting BN thin film*9 through strong exciton-lattice interaction	Concerning the deep-ultraviolet light sources that are necessary in water and air sterilization and disinfection systems that can contribute to human life even during disasters, this research aims to clarify why boron nitride overturns the conventional wisdom that "indirect transition semiconductors do not emit light" and to realize a safe, compact, lightweight, and energy-saving deep-ultraviolet light source that can be used in human-occupied environments.	Tohoku University
Research on methods for estimating and predicting ocean water temperature, salinity, and density	Concerning observation of the oceans, the methods of analysis using machine learning based on artificial satellites and historical site data which are currently being used have issues with precision. Therefore, this research aims to develop a new method to analyze the state of the oceans with high precision by directly solving an equation that partially simplifies the laws of physical oceanography.	Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA)
Research into a magnetic tunnel junction for high-speed, large-capacity Xpoint memory*10	This research aims to demonstrate the basic operation of a large-capacity Xpoint Magnetoresistive Random Access Memory (MRAM) incorporating a magnetic tunnel junction element with a novel structure, proposed as a memory device that can maintain performance while suppressing power consumption, which is rapidly increasing due to advances in AI technology.	National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
Research and development of optical wireless infrastructure technology for water and air mobile networks	This research focuses on device and system infrastructure technologies, such as mobile optical wireless link system technologies using high-speed optical tracking, ultra-compact and ultra-high-speed optical transmission devices, and technologies for heterogeneous integrated optical devices for different types of materials,*11 in order to extend large-capacity optical wireless networks to mobile objects such as robots, etc. present underwater and in the air.	National Institute of Information and Communications Technology
Development of an artificial molecule production platform for freely detecting viruses	This research aims to develop a platform that applies computer technology to design and select, with high precision, optimal aptamer*12 candidates according to the intended purpose. Aptamers can be artificially synthesized in a short time and are used to specifically detect target viral proteins.	National Agriculture and Food Research Organization
Creation of ceramic-based composites for thermal protection that contribute to reusable space shuttles	This research aims to create reusable high-melting-point oxide ceramic matrix composites as thermal shielding materials for next-generation space shuttles flying at hypersonic speed, and to demonstrate their erosion resistance*13 for single and multiple uses at temperatures of 2,300°C and 1,900°C, simulating atmosphere entry.	National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)

Elucidation of the catalytic reaction mechanism of hydrocarbon fuel for innovative engine cooling performance improvements	This research aims to improve the efficiency of hypersonic flight engine cooling systems by utilizing numerical calculations based on quantum mechanics to carry out atomic rearrangement reaction tracking calculations corresponding to electronically excited states. In coordination with experiments, the research also aims to elucidate the mechanism of endothermic thermal decomposition reactions in hydrocarbon fuel, secure catalyst selection methods, and ascertain various physical properties.	National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)
Synthesis of silicon oxynitride glass with high nitrogen content and elucidation of its physical properties and structure	This research aims to develop silicon oxynitride glass with even higher heat resistance and strength by replacing the oxygen with nitrogen in silica glass, which is heat-resistant and offers excellent light transmission.	National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)
Ultra-high-speed brain-type computing device based on spin wave*14 interference	This research aims to contribute to solving the problem of high power consumption in machine learning by developing an ultrafast brain-type computing device that operates with low power consumption by utilizing the complex and diverse behaviors generated by spin wave interference as a computational resource.	National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)
Development of a quantum error correction decoder	This research aims to develop and demonstrate classical decoder software and a quantum-classical interface for a neutral atom quantum computer.*15 The system should be executable on currently available hardware with an error rate of 10^{-3}, with approximately 1,000 physical quantum bits and a logical error rate of 10^{-6} or less.	BlocQ, Inc.

Notes:
*9 BN thin film: a thin film of boron nitride deposited on an appropriate substrate
*10 Xpoint memory: memory which can realize high density and large capacity by arranging memory elements at each intersection of a large number of intersecting wires
*11 Heterogeneous integrated optical devices for different types of materials: devices that realize functions such as the generation and processing of optical signals by utilizing the properties of various materials such as semiconductors and dielectric bodies and combining those multiple materials into a single chip
*12 Aptamer: a general term referring to nucleic acids such as DNA and RNA that specifically bind to particular molecules, or chain-like compounds consisting of several amino acids linked together
*13 Erosion resistance: resistance to the mechanical wear and delamination that occurs when high-temperature, high-speed fluids repeatedly collide with a material
*14 Spin wave: the collective excited motion of spins which occurs within a magnetic body, a phenomenon in which the precession motion of one spin has an impact on the neighboring spin, and that precession motion is transmitted within the magnetic body like a wave
*15 Neutral atom quantum computer: a quantum computer that uses neutral atoms aligned in a vacuum by laser beams as quantum bits and performs quantum calculations by controlling their interactions

[Outsourced projects (Type C): 5 projects]

Research Title	Brief Summary	Representative Research Institution
Research on a low-friction shaft sealing mechanism for biaxial motion and high water pressure using hydration boundary lubrication*16	This research aims to realize a high-performance shaft sealing structure*17 by working on the research, development, and introduction of hydration boundary lubrication technology, which has previously been considered difficult to develop for practical uses.	Kumamoto University
Development of quantitative and visualization technologies for permeated hydrogen using hyperspectral analysis	This research focuses on the reduction reaction of oxide films caused by hydrogen and uses hyperspectral image analysis*18 technology to develop a technology that can continuously quantify and visualize permeated hydrogen in two dimensions. Permeated hydrogen is one of the factors causing hydrogen embrittlement of structural materials, a concern in realizing a hydrogen energy society.	National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)
Taking on the challenge of creating multi-element printed electronics*19 by designing and printing compositions	This research aims to revolutionize conventional technologies that only printed single metals, using multi-element metal inks to establish multi-element printed electronics that integrate alloy-specific functions (oxidation resistance, energy storage function, magnetism, shape memory, etc.) through printing. It also aims to enable future applications in material design combined with AI.	National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)
A computational mechanism for the metameric nervous system that realizes robust locomotion control	This research aims to elucidate a neural circuit computational mechanism on a millisecond timescale by combining cutting-edge gene technologies using Drosophila with a neural and motion measurement system based on proprietary engineering and physics technologies, to understand how the metameric nervous system, which corresponds to the human spinal cord, controls locomotion.	RIKEN, Japan
Suppression of spurious emissions of phase-conjugated loops*20 for wireless power transmission with minimal leakage	Looking toward the practical implementation of wireless power transmission technology, this research aims to realize safe and efficient wireless power transmission by demonstrating a method to effectively suppress the generation of unwanted radio waves (spurious emissions*21), even over long distances of approximately ten kilometers, in a phase-conjugated loop that minimizes radio wave leakage.	Advanced Telecommunications Research Institute International (ATR)

Notes:
*16 Hydration boundary lubrication: a lubrication phenomenon in which water molecules adhere to a solid surface, forming a thin film that keeps friction low even under high pressure
*17 Shaft sealing structure: a structure under which a shaft is installed on the part of a device which penetrates from the outside to the inside of the device, in order to prevent water from outside of the device getting inside the device
*18 Hyperspectral image analysis: a technology that acquires and analyzes the obtained image data as spectral information for each continuous wavelength region over a wide range
*19 Printed electronics: a technology that uses inks made of metals or semiconductors to form electronic circuits and devices through printing technology
*20 Phase-conjugated loop: a technology that minimizes radio wave leakage by reversing received radio waves to send them back in their original direction, creating a loop between transmission and reception
*21 Spurious emissions: unwanted radio waves that leak out at a frequency different from the original transmitted waves. It is necessary to reduce these as much as possible because they cause noise and interference.

[Subsidized projects (Equivalent to Type S): 9 projects]

Research Title	Brief Summary	Representative Research Institution
Creation of a new principle thermoelectric power generation technology based on exciton engineering*22	This research focuses on the minute thermal energy of several dozen meVs present in normal living environments at room temperature, and aims to realize the organic thermoelectric element in a novel mechanism by utilizing the electric charge separation mechanism of organic electric charge transfer*23 (CT) complexes and the electric charge diffusion force in organic thin films.	Kyushu University
Research into high-resolution 3D sensing technology for identifying objects under the sea	This research aims to construct a high-resolution underwater three-dimensional model with added positional information and material information by combining 3D model construction using photogrammetry technology*24 with spectral information from a hyperspectral camera, in order to ascertain objects in the ocean.	Kyushu University
Elucidation of variations in the Earth's atmosphere, ionosphere, and magnetosphere using a space weather*25 simulator	This research develops numerical models capable of describing the motion of the Earth's atmosphere and plasma extending into outer space, with the aim of realizing predictions of the space weather environment. It will then use supercomputer simulations to ascertain and predict the state of the atmosphere and the plasma.	Kyushu University
Development of a high-toughness magnesium alloy with wide temperature range capability using plasticity anisotropy control	This research aims to develop a crystal plasticity anisotropy control*26 technology that implements a mechanical anisotropy-induced ductility mechanism*27 bringing about high work-hardening, thereby creating a novel high-toughness magnesium alloy that can withstand use in the wide temperature range of -200°C to 200°C and establishing a theory for the alloy design.	Kumamoto University
A terahertz sensor with hybrid integration of heterogeneous device systems	This research aims to realize a terahertz sensor with a resonant tunneling diode*28 terahertz receiver-transmitter at its core and integrated with a circularly polarized IQ demodulation*29 system, dual-frequency comb spectroscopy,*30 and heterogeneous device systems such as liquid crystal and ultrasonic beamformers, and to use the sensor to acquire food and biological information.	Institute of Science Tokyo
Deepening understanding of the AI-Driven AC Nanopore Method*31 and creating smart microbial measurement methods	This research aims to establish the theoretical foundation for the AI-Driven AC Nanopore Method, a measurement technology originating in Japan and the first of its kind in the world, in order to create a microbial sensing method that can be used anytime, anywhere, by anyone. This will enable the realization of a real-time microbial sensor that can be widely utilized in disaster areas, medical settings, and everyday life.	Institute of Science Tokyo
A basic theory of dynamic information security based on programming language theory	This research aims to construct the basic theory for a computational system (programming language model) that can change the security level hierarchy (security lattice*32) and a security certification technique compatible with the practically necessary level reduction operations (declassification), both of which are not present in classical information security theory.	Tohoku University
Basic research and orbital experiments on highly maneuverable electric propulsion for spacecraft	This research proposes an innovative thruster to solve the problems in existing electric propulsion, aiming to increase the maneuverability of spacecraft so they can respond to sudden, unexpected situations such as in-orbit servicing and collision avoidance, etc. Through basic research and orbital experiments, the research aims to elucidate the physical phenomena and ascertain the prospects for development for practical use.	Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA)
Electricity-free displacement sensor using dynamic magnification interference fringes based on lens arrays	In order to contribute to preventive maintenance and management of infrastructure, this research aims to develop an electricity-free, compact displacement visualization sensor utilizing a microlens array and an image processing technology for robotic patrol monitoring, and to verify the applicability of these technologies to multi-point, long-term monitoring of infrastructure.	National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology

Notes:
*22 Exciton engineering: a field of study that is aiming to achieve engineering applications for various photoelectronic function expressions by utilizing the state in which electrons and electron holes form pairs
*23 Organic electric charge transfer: the phenomenon in which electrons transfer between electron-donating (D) and electron-accepting (A) parts of a molecule, either within a molecule or between molecules
*24 Photogrammetry technology: a technology that analyzes multiple digital images using software to generate a 3D model of an object
*25 Space weather: changes in the state of the upper atmosphere and space plasma that affect human life
*26 Crystal plasticity anisotropy control: controlling the phenomenon in which the deformation behavior of a material differs depending on the direction of the load applied when the material deforms
*27 Mechanical anisotropy-induced ductility mechanism: a mechanism that enhances the ductility of a material by dispersing crystals with anisotropy in their deformation behavior within a polycrystalline material under specified geometric conditions
*28 Resonant tunneling diode: a diode with negative resistance characteristics and fast response, which is capable of amplifying and oscillating terahertz signals
*29 Circularly polarized IQ demodulation: a method that uses circular polarization to generate two signals with a 90-degree phase difference, and then separates and measures the amplitude and phase of the received signal
*30 Dual-frequency comb spectroscopy: a multispectral signal with aligned frequency spacing is called a frequency comb. This technology involves superimposing two frequency comb signals with slightly different frequency spacing to convert the absorption spectrum into a frequency domain observable by an oscilloscope for measurement
*31 AI-Driven AC Nanopore Method: a method under which AI identifies particles that have passed through extremely small holes (nanopores) by capturing the characteristics of the slight electric current changes caused by those particles
*32 Security lattice: one type of mathematical structure (partial ordering) that represents a hierarchy of security levels

[Subsidized projects (Equivalent to Type A): 7 projects]

Research Title	Brief Summary	Representative Research Institution
Creation of a radiation-resistant spin computing*33 system	This research aims to solve the problem of the malfunction and destruction of electronic devices due to radiation in outer space and inside nuclear reactors by creating a radiation-resistant spin computing system that utilizes spin, which is inherently expected to be radiation-resistant, and applying cutting-edge IT technology to this field.	Osaka Metropolitan University
Development of a brain function evaluation system using human brain organoids*34 as the information processing platform	This research aims to develop a novel biodevice that can evaluate brain functions such as learning and memory by connecting electrodes to 3D brain organoids that replicate the neural circuits of the brain, in order to realize a system that quantitatively evaluates the effects of drugs and environmental factors on brain function.	National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
Development of ultra-high-speed CVD*35 technology to strengthen the oxidation resistance of composites for use with ultra high temperatures	This research will construct an ultra-heat-resistant ceramic coating process utilizing an ultra-high-speed chemical vapor deposition technology and propose design guidelines for ultra-heat-resistant ceramic components that can withstand high-temperature oxidation exceeding 1600ºC through integration of the coating with carbon fiber reinforced composites.	National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
Creation of a crystal substrate for wide-bandgap*36 complementary analog control circuits	This research aims to contribute to miniaturization and energy saving in electronic devices used in aircraft engines and other applications by developing substrate technologies for electronic circuits that can operate even in high-temperature environments, which was difficult with conventional technologies, using next-generation semiconductor materials.	National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
Irradiation resistance enhancement and radiation repair through high-entropization*37 of materials	This research aims to create novel materials that can be repaired by radiation through the high-entropization of materials, to enhance lattice stability*38 through composition control technology in order to make surface treatment technologies that are resistant to irradiation and corrosion more robust, and to create technological innovations to enhance durability in high-radiation fields.	Japan Atomic Energy Agency
Reductive functionalization of carbon dioxide using a hydride-permeable membrane electrolytic cell	In order to contribute to carbon recycling, this research attempts the electrolytic synthesis of amide compounds and ester compounds from carbon dioxide using a membrane electrode that rapidly transports hydride, a hydrogen anion. The research also aims to establish a technology for synthesizing various molecules from carbon dioxide through low-environmental-impact electrolysis.	National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)
Development of a pulse-controlled portable diamond quantum gradiometer*39	This research aims to develop a magnetic gradiometer that is portable and highly sensitive with room temperature operation, based on a diamond quantum sensor*40 using a pulse control and optical fiber configuration, in order to realize high-precision magnetic measurement usable in a variety of fields in which it was difficult previously, such as resource exploration and infrastructure diagnostics.	National Institutes for Quantum Science and Technology

Notes:
*33 Spin computing: in contrast to conventional electronic devices that use the quantity of electric charge as information, this method carries out computing using the small magnetic property inherent to electrons called "spin" as information
*34 Brain organoid: an artificial neural tissue model, created from human stem cells, a few millimeters in size, and replicating the internal structure of the brain
*35 CVD: an abbreviation for Chemical Vapor Deposition, a thin-film formation and coating technology using the raw materials of the vapor phase
*36 Wide-bandgap: when the energy width necessary for a semiconductor to switch between conducting and not conducting electricity is large
*37 High-entropization: a technique for homogenously mixing many types of elements to improve the properties and stability of materials
*38 Lattice stability: the property that suppresses defect formation in a crystal lattice and enables it to maintain its structure in response to external stimuli such as radiation, etc.
*39 Gradiometer: this device removes environmental noise and realizes high-precision measurements by taking the difference between detected signals from two separate points
*40 Diamond quantum sensor: a sensor that utilizes impurities (defects) in diamonds, operates over a wide temperature range including room temperature, and can measure minute magnetic fields

[Subsidized projects (Type C): 13 projects]

Research Title	Brief Summary	Representative Research Institution
Development of a gene network search platform using artificial intelligence	This research integrates gene expression (RNA-seq*41) data accumulated in public databases to analyze the correlations of gene expression change patterns between genetic modifications and drug treatment conditions. At the same time, the research uses machine learning models to quantify similarities in order to explore novel gene interaction networks and target genes for drugs.	Kitasato University
Construction of a wear-resistant process for stainless steel using open-atmosphere laser nitriding	This research aims to create a new technology utilizing specific plasmas by constructing a process that utilizes induced plasma generated by nanosecond pulsed lasers to instantaneously form a nitride film with both corrosion and wear resistance on stainless steel surfaces in the air and then elucidating the reaction mechanism.	Kitami Institute of Technology
Research on the structural design and output enhancement of transverse thermoelectric conversion*42 modules for use in medium to low temperature ranges	Transverse thermoelectric conversion, in which the current flows perpendicularly to the heat flow, is expected to have high thermoelectric conversion efficiency, but it faces the issue that special materials and environments are necessary. Therefore, this research aims to develop a highly efficient transverse thermoelectric conversion technology using simple and general-purpose thermoelectric materials.	Kyushu University
Establishment of an evaluation system for personal identity*43 using neuroscience, psychiatry, and the performing arts	In order to scientifically evaluate personal identity, which is a fundamental premise of society, this research aims to conduct brain function measurement studies on patients with dissociative identity disorder*44 and on stage actors in order to clarify the differences between alternate personalities as a pathological phenomenon and acting, and then explore the neural basis of personal identity and build a foundation for evaluation methods.	Kyoto Institute of Technology
Research on artificially designed piezoelectric nanocrystalline thin films for piezoelectric MEMS	Seeking to overcome the performance limitations of piezoelectric MEMS actuators, this research aims to investigate artificially designed piezoelectric nanocrystalline thin films with controlled crystallite size, grain boundary quantity, etc. in order to create innovative piezoelectric thin films combining giant piezoelectricity and resilience.	Shibaura Institute of Technology
Creation of nanospike*45 polymer materials for infection control	This research aims for bottom-up construction of an antibacterial nanospike structure inspired by cicada wings, using molecular-level self-organization. The research aims to control the shape and surface properties of the nanospikes in order to diversify and strengthen their effect on bacteria and discover their usefulness in medical and hygienic materials.	Institute of Science Tokyo
Creation of low-friction and anti-fouling functional materials based on the analysis of water molecules at dynamic interfaces	This research aims to analyze the behavior of water molecules at interfaces and their frictional properties in seawater using our unique dynamic interface creation method*46 and interface-selective spectroscopy,*47 in order to elucidate the causal relationship between the microscopic behavior of water and its macroscopic friction and anti-fouling functions and then, based on this, create innovative marine coating materials.*48	Institute of Science Tokyo
Realization of a highly efficient blue photoelectric conversion element for use in optical wireless power transfer using interface control	This research aims to conduct studies on how to improve the overall energy conversion efficiency of devices, with the focus on improving the interface properties between light-absorbing materials and other materials, and to develop a highly efficient photoreceiver suitable for blue light, with the goal of realizing a compact optical wireless power transfer technology intended for installation in mobile devices such as aircraft and underwater drones.	Institute of Science Tokyo
Behavior estimation for underwater cables, etc. using a combination of image analysis and optical fiber measurement	This research aims to develop a new monitoring technology that estimates the vibration of an underwater cable at actual scale with a precision of ±10% over the cable's entire length using real-time assimilation of optical fiber strain measurement, AUV*49/ROV*50 image analysis, and structural modal analysis,*51 in order to contribute to reducing the maintenance costs of offshore wind power cables and oil and gas production infrastructure.	National Institute of Maritime, Port and Aviation Technology (MPAT)
Development of a heat dissipation mechanism using radiative heat transfer*52 in nitride semiconductors	In order to develop heat transport*53 by radiation as a heat transfer mechanism in nitride semiconductors other than thermal conduction, this research aims to construct a model for calculating radiative heat transfer in solids based on fluctuation electromagnetism, and apply the model to nitride semiconductor multilayer membranes to maximize heat transport in the multilayer membranes.	National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)
Development of a porous semiconductor*54 optimized for chemical sensing	This research aims to create a porous semiconductor designed with appropriate metal ions and organic molecules in order to address the poor selectivity which is an issue in current chemical sensors.	National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)
Development of a porous carbon structure for the realization of a high-power metal-air battery*55	This research aims to establish fundamental technologies for the practical implementation of a high-power metal-air battery by developing porous carbon self-supported membranes with hierarchically controlled pore structures and multicomponent electrolyte materials, thereby creating porous carbon structures that enable high-power operation.	National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)
Visualization of killer defects*56 in wide-bandgap oxide semiconductors	This research aims to develop an innovative real-space operando measurement technique using coherent X-rays*57 in order to visualize defects in wide-bandgap oxide semiconductors. It aims to elucidate the mechanisms by which defects that threaten device performance are generated.	National Institutes for Quantum Science and Technology

Notes:
*41 RNA-seq: an analytical technology to comprehensively examine the extent to which genes are functioning
*42 Transverse thermoelectric conversion: a phenomenon in which electricity is generated in the perpendicular direction with respect to the heat that flows through an object
*43 Personal identity: the continuity of feeling like the same self (self-state) even when time and circumstances change
*44 Dissociative identity disorder: a mental disorder leading to a breakdown of personal identity; for example, sometimes there are frequent, unintentional switches to alternative self-states and loss of memory of the times when those switches occur
*45 Nanospike: an extremely small thorn-like structure (at the nanometer scale)
*46 Dynamic interface creation method: a method for utilizing the flow of a liquid to continuously create a "moving" interface between a solid and a liquid
*47 Interface-selective spectroscopy: a special spectroscopic technology that identifies and analyzes molecules that exist only on the "interface" where the surface of a material and a different material meet
*48 Marine coating materials: paints and protective materials applied to the surface of ships and offshore structures to protect them from corrosion caused by seawater and from biofouling
*49 Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (a robot that autonomously navigates underwater, without being connected to any cables from ships or land, in order to carry out observations and surveys)
*50 Remotely Operated Vehicle (a robot that is remotely controlled via cables from ships or land in order to carry out underwater work and inspections)
*51 Structural modal analysis: a method for investigating the vibration patterns of bridges, buildings, cables, etc., when subjected to force
*52 Radiative heat transfer: a phenomenon in which thermal energy is transferred by electromagnetic waves
*53 Heat transport: a phenomenon in which thermal energy transfers from a region of high temperature to a region of low temperature
*54 Porous semiconductor: a semiconductor material containing many small holes (pores)
*55 Metal-air battery: a battery that uses a metal as the negative-electrode active material and oxygen from the atmosphere as the positive-electrode active material
*56 Killer defect: a defect that has a critical impact on the performance of a device
*57 Coherent X-rays: X-rays with aligned wavefronts that can be used at synchrotron radiation facilities such as SPring-8, etc.

Reference 75 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (Before Revision)

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on April 1, 2014, Amendment : December 22, 2023)

The Government made it its basic policy to deal with overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology in a careful manner in accordance with Prime Minster Eisaku Sato's remarks at the Diet in 1967 (hereinafter referred to as "the Three Principles on Arms Exports") and the collateral policy guideline by the Miki administration in 1976. These policy guidelines played a certain role as Japan has been following the path of a peace-loving nation. On the other hand, these policy guidelines including the non-permission of arms exports to communist bloc countries increasingly proved unsuitable for the current situation. Also, the Government had repeatedly taken exemption measures depending on the individual necessity of each case since arms exports to substantially all areas were not permitted, as a result of not promoting arms exports regardless of the destinations. Under these circumstances, on April 1, 2014, the Government reexamined its past policy on the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology, and, while giving due consideration to the roles played by the past policy, comprehensively consolidated it to adapt to the new security environment, reflecting the past exemption measures made to date, and set out clear principles as "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology". Based on the National Security Strategy (adopted on December 16, 2022) the Government has decided to partially amend the Principles.

Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. At the same time, Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II. In addition, the Indo-Pacific region, where Japan is situated, faces a host of security challenges. Japan has the vital importance of striving to realize a free and open international order based on the rule of law and securing regional peace and stability in cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries and others guided by the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

Against this backdrop, Japan will prevent the emergence of situations where unilateral change of the status quo can be easily made and redouble efforts to secure a stable, predictable, free and open international order based on the rule of law, while continuing to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in the international community. Japan will join together with its ally, like-minded countries and others to achieve its own security as well as peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region under the policy of Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the principle of the international cooperation.

In achieving these Japanese security objectives, transfer of defense equipment and technology overseas is a key policy instrument to ensure peace and stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force, to create a desirable security environment for Japan, and to provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat of force. And, an appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology contributes to further active promotion of the maintenance of international peace and security through timely and effective implementation of contribution to peace and international cooperation such as international peace cooperation, international disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, responses to international terrorism and piracy, and capacity building of developing countries (hereinafter referred to as "peace contribution and international cooperation"). Such transfer also contributes to strengthening security and defense cooperation with Japan's ally, the United States, like-minded countries and others, thereby contributing to strengthening regional deterrence. Furthermore, appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology contributes to maintaining and enhancing Japan's defense production and technological bases which are characterized as defense capabilities themselves, thereby contributing to Japan's enhancement of defense capability, given that international joint development and production projects have become the international mainstream in order to improve the performance of defense equipment and to deal with their rising costs.

On the other hand, since the distribution of defense equipment and technology has significant security, social, economic and humanitarian impact on the international community, the need for each government to control the transfer of defense equipment and technology in a responsible manner while taking various factors into account is recognized. In doing so, it is necessary to take into account securing Japan's advantage and indispensability concerning our technologies and others from the perspective of economic security.

In light of the above, while maintaining its basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation, Japan will control the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology based on the following three principles and carry forward with the transfer of defense equipment and technology in the joint public and private efforts. The overseas transfer of facilities related to arms production will continue to be treated in the same manner as defense equipment and technology.

1. Clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited

Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will not be permitted when:

1) the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded,
2) the transfer violates obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions, or
3) the defense equipment and technology is destined for a country party to a conflict (a country against which the United Nations Security Council is taking measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack).

2. Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict examination and information disclosure

In cases not within 1. above, cases where transfers may be permitted will be limited to the following cases. Those cases will be examined strictly while ensuring transparency. More specifically, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted in such cases as the transfer contributes to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, or to Japan's security from the viewpoint of

- implementing international joint development and production projects with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including its ally, the U.S. (hereinafter referred to as "the ally and partners"),
- enhancing security and defense cooperation with the ally and partners, as well as
- supporting the activities of the Self-Defense Forces including the maintenance of its equipment and ensuring the safety of

Japanese nationals.

The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan's security. Then the Government will make a comprehensive judgment in light of the existing guidelines of the international export control regime and based on the information available at the time of export examinations.

Significant cases that require especially careful consideration from the viewpoint of Japan's security will be examined at the National Security Council (NSC). As for the cases that were deliberated at the NSC, the Government will disclose their information in accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 of 1999).

3. Ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-purpose use or transfer to third parties

In cases satisfying 2. above, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured. More concretely, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of control system at the destination in such cases as those where the transfer is judged to be appropriate for active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, when the transfer involves participation in an international system for sharing parts etc., and when the transfer involves delivery of parts etc. to a licenser.

Implementation guidelines for the policy described above will be decided by the NSC. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will implement the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Law No.228 of 1949) appropriately in accordance with the decision. The Implementation Guidelines will be amended in a timely manner in response to changes in the security environment and security needs.

For the purpose of this policy, "defense equipment and technology" refers to "arms and military technologies"; "arms" refers to items listed in Section 1, Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 378 of 1949), and are to be used by military forces and directly employed in combat; and "military technologies" refers to technologies for the design, production or use of arms.

The Government will contribute actively to the peace and stability of the international community under the policy of Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the principle of the international cooperation. Under such policy, it will play a proactive role in the area of controlling defense equipment and technology as well as sensitive dual-use goods and technologies to implement the Arms Trade Treaty and further strengthen the international export control regimes.

Reference 76 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (After Revision)

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on April 1, 2014, Amendment : December 22, 2023, Amendment: April 21, 2026)

The Government made it its basic policy to deal with overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology in a careful manner in accordance with Prime Minster Eisaku Sato's remarks at the Diet in 1967 (hereinafter referred to as "the Three Principles on Arms Exports") and the collateral policy guideline by the Miki administration in 1976. These policy guidelines played a certain role as Japan has been following the path of a peace-loving nation. On the other hand, these policy guidelines including the non-permission of arms exports to communist bloc countries increasingly proved unsuitable for the current situation. Also, the Government had repeatedly taken exemption measures depending on the individual necessity of each case since arms exports to substantially all areas were not permitted, as a result of not promoting arms exports regardless of the destinations. Under these circumstances, on April 1, 2014, the Government reexamined its past policy on the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology, and, while giving due consideration to the roles played by the past policy, comprehensively consolidated it to adapt to the new security environment, reflecting the past exemption measures made to date, and set out clear principles as "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology". Later, based on the National Security Strategy (approved by the National Security Council and Cabinet on December 16, 2022), the Government partially amended the Principles. On this occasion, in light of the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the Government has decided to further amend the Principles.

Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. At the same time, Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II. In addition, the Indo-Pacific region, where Japan is situated, faces a host of security challenges. Japan has the vital importance of striving to realize a free and open international order based on the rule of law and securing regional peace and stability in cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries and others guided by the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

Against this backdrop, Japan will prevent the emergence of situations where unilateral change of the status quo can be easily made and redouble efforts to secure a stable, predictable, free and open international order based on the rule of law, while continuing to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in the international community. Japan will join together with its ally, like-minded countries and others to achieve its own security as well as peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region under the policy of Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the principle of the international cooperation.

In achieving these Japanese security objectives, transfer of defense equipment and technology overseas is a key policy instrument to ensure peace and stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force, to create a desirable security environment for Japan, and to provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat of force. And, an appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology contributes to further active promotion of the maintenance of international peace and security through timely and effective implementation of contribution to peace and international cooperation such as international peace cooperation, international disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, responses to international terrorism and piracy, and capacity building of developing countries (hereinafter referred to as "peace contribution and international cooperation"). Such transfer also contributes to strengthening security and defense cooperation with Japan's ally, the United States, like-minded countries and others, thereby contributing to strengthening regional deterrence. Under the increasingly severe security environment of recent years, greater importance lies in creating a desirable security environment for Japan by reinforcing the deterrence and response capabilities of its ally, like-minded countries and others in a manner that includes improving their interoperability with Japan through promoting the transfer of defense equipment and technology tailored to the needs of Japan's ally, like-minded countries and others. Moreover, a greater number of like-minded countries and others operating the same equipment as Japan will enable the sharing of production and maintenance bases as well as the mutual provision of support in various circumstances.

Furthermore, appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology contributes to maintaining and enhancing Japan's defense production and technological bases which are characterized as defense capabilities themselves, thereby contributing to Japan's enhancement of defense capability, given that international joint development and production projects have become the international mainstream in order to improve the performance of defense equipment and to deal with their rising costs. In addition, given the increasing importance of ensuring sustained operational capability, increasing the number of like-minded countries and others operating the same equipment as Japan as well as establishing and reinforcing a firm defense industry through the promotion of the transfer of defense equipment and technology holds great significance in securing the domestic production capacity needed to underpin the sustained operational capability in the event of a contingency.

On the other hand, since the distribution of defense equipment and technology has significant security, social, economic and humanitarian impact on the international community, the need for each government to control the transfer of defense equipment and technology in a responsible manner while taking various factors into account is recognized. In doing so, it is necessary to take into account securing Japan's advantage and indispensability concerning our technologies and others from the perspective of economic security.

In light of the above, while maintaining its basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation, Japan will control the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology based on the following three principles and carry forward with the transfer of defense equipment and technology in the joint public and private efforts. The overseas transfer of facilities related to arms production will continue to be treated in the same manner as defense equipment and technology.

1. Clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited

Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will not be permitted when:

1) the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded,
2) the transfer violates obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions, or
3) the defense equipment and technology is destined for a country party to a conflict (a country against which the United

Nations Security Council is taking measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack).

2. Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict examination, notification to the Diet and information disclosure

In cases not within 1. above, cases where transfers may be permitted will be limited to the following cases. Those cases will be examined strictly while ensuring transparency. More specifically, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted in such cases as the transfer contributes to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, or to Japan's security from the viewpoint of

- implementing international joint development and production projects with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including its ally, the U.S. (hereinafter referred to as "the ally and partners"),
- enhancing security and defense cooperation with the ally and partners, as well as
- supporting the activities of the Self-Defense Forces including the maintenance of its equipment and ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals.

The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan's security. Then the Government will make a comprehensive judgment in light of the existing guidelines of the international export control regime and based on the information available at the time of export examinations.

Significant cases that require especially careful consideration from the viewpoint of Japan's security will be examined at the National Security Council (NSC). In particular, regarding finished products that fall under the category of arms (including ammunition) under the Self-Defense Forces Law (Law No. 165 of 1954), in cases in which the NSC reaches the conclusion that such transfer may be permitted and that conclusion is disclosed, this fact will be notified to the Diet.

Furthermore, for cases that are deliberated at the NSC, the Government will disclose their information in accordance with the Law on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 of 1999).

3. Ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-purpose use or transfer to third parties

In cases satisfying 2. above, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured. More concretely, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of control system at the destination in such cases as those where the transfer is judged to be appropriate for active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, when the transfer involves participation in an international system for sharing parts etc., and when the transfer involves delivery of parts etc. to a licenser.

Implementation guidelines for the policy described above will be decided by the NSC. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will implement the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Law No.228 of 1949) appropriately in accordance with the decision. The Implementation Guidelines will be amended in a timely manner in response to changes in the security environment and security needs.

For the purpose of this policy, "defense equipment and technology" refers to "arms and military technologies"; "arms" refers to items listed in Section 1, Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 378 of 1949), and are to be used by military forces and directly employed in combat; and "military technologies" refers to technologies for the design, production or use of arms.

The Government will contribute actively to the peace and stability of the international community under the policy of Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the principle of the international cooperation. Under such policy, it will play a proactive role in the area of controlling defense equipment and technology as well as sensitive dual-use goods and technologies to implement the Arms Trade Treaty and further strengthen the international export control regimes.

Reference 77 Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (Before Revision)

April 1, 2014 Adopted by the National Security Council
Amendment : November 24, 2015
Amendment : March 22, 2016
Amendment : March 8, 2022
Amendment : December 22, 2023
Amendment : March 26, 2024

In accordance with the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (hereinafter referred to as "the Three Principles", which was adopted by the Cabinet on April 1, 2014), the Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles (hereinafter referred to as "the Implementation Guidelines") is decided as follows:

Note: Definitions of terms in addition to those in the Three Principles are described in 6. below.

1. Cases in which Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology may be Permitted

Cases in which overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology may be permitted are as follows:

1) Overseas transfers that contribute to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of peace contribution and international cooperation, and when:
   A. the recipient is a foreign government, or
   B. the recipient is the United Nations (UN) System, organizations conducting activities based on a UN resolution, organizations conducting activities on a request of international organizations or organizations conducting activities which are requested by a country which is located in the area of the activity and supported by any of the principal organs of the UN.
2) Overseas transfers that contribute to Japan's security, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of Japan's security, and that:
   A. are related to international joint development and production with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S., and of the following:
      (a) overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology to partner countries for international joint development and production, or
      (b) provision of parts and services to countries other than partner countries of international joint development and production.
      (c) Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology pertaining to finished products to countries other than partner countries of international joint development and production, only if Japan participates in the international joint development and production out of necessity for its defense buildup and direct transfer of finished products to countries other than partner countries is required, as listed below:
         • Global Combat Air Programme, only if Japan and the recipient country have concluded an international agreement obligating the use of defense equipment transferred from Japan in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. However, it excludes the case of the transfer to a country where combat is currently deemed to be taking place as part of an armed conflict.
   B. contribute to enhancing security and defense cooperation with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S., and of the following:
      (a) overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology included in the provision of supplies and services conducted by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in accordance with Japanese laws,
      (b) provision of military technology as a part of mutual exchange of technology with the U.S.,
      (c) provision of defense equipment and technology pertaining to products licensed from countries cooperating with Japan in security area at the request of the license provider country (including further provision by the license provider country) (In the case of further provision of defense equipment and technology pertaining to licensed products that fall under the category of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law (including ammunition. The same applies hereinafter.) to a country other than the license provider country, it excludes the case of the provision to a country where combat is currently deemed to be taking place as part of an armed conflict unless there are special circumstances in consideration of the need in terms of Japan's security),
      (d) provision of repair and other services to countries cooperating with Japan in security area, or
      (e) overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology related to the followings to countries cooperating with Japan in security area.
         (i) parts, or
         (ii) finished products related to cooperation pertaining to rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping (including arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law necessary for the performance of such essential duties or for self-protection).
      (a) are necessary for supporting activities of the governmental agencies including the SDF (hereinafter referred to as "the SDF etc."), which include the activities of foreign governments or private entities etc. related to the activities of the SDF etc., or for ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals, and that are:
      (b) temporary export of equipment, return of purchased equipment or provision of technical information related to the activities of the SDF etc. including replacements of items which need repairing with non-defective items,
      (c) export of equipment for the protection or self-protection of public officials, or
      (d) export of equipment for the self-protection of Japanese nationals operating in danger areas.
3) Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology (excluding arms under the Self- Defense Forces Law and technical information thereto) to a country that is subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat of force.
4) Overseas transfers whose impact from the viewpoint of Japan's security is judged to be very small such as return of misdelivered items, export of samples to be returned later and re-export of equipment that was brought into Japan by police officers of a foreign governmental agency.

2. Focuses of the Strict Examination of Overseas Transfers

1) Export authorization for individual cases

Prior to granting an export authorization for an individual case that is judged as a case in which overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted as referred to in 1. above, the Government will conduct strict examination on desirability of the transfer, taking into consideration the following two focuses in a composite manner:

- appropriateness of the destination and end user
- extent the overseas transfer of the defense equipment and technology may raise concern for Japan's security

More specifically, as for the appropriateness of the destination, the Government will consider it taking into account such factors as what impact the country or region of destination is posing to the international peace and security such as whether the overseas transfer to the destination has positive meaning from the viewpoint of peace contribution and international cooperation as well as Japan's security. As for the appropriateness of the end user, the Government will consider it taking into account such factors as the use of defense equipment and technology by the end user and the certainty of appropriate control. In particular, the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology pertaining to finished products that fall under the category of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law will be carefully considered, taking into account the impact on international peace and security, including whether or not combat is currently taking place in country or region of destination as part of an armed conflict, and the security relationship between Japan and country or region of destination.

As for the extent of the security concern, the Government will consider it taking into account such factors as nature, technical sensitivity, use (purpose), quantity and form (whether finished products or parts, goods or technology, etc.) of the defense equipment and technology to be transferred, as well as the possibilities of extra-purpose use or transfer to third parties (hereinafter referred to as " transfer to third parties etc.").

From the focuses including those described above, the Government will make a comprehensive judgment when deciding whether it will finally approve or disapprove each transfer in light of the existing guidelines of the international export control regimes and based on the information available at the time of the overseas transfers.

2) Prior consent for transfer to third parties etc.

In granting prior consent for transfer to third parties etc., the Government will conduct strict examination on desirability of granting such consent, taking into account the following two focuses as referred to in 1) in a composite manner, while taking into account the security meaning and others for the country granting the consent to.

- appropriateness of the destination country and end user
- extent the transfer to third parties etc. of the defense equipment and technology may raise concern for Japan's security

3. Ensuring Appropriate Control

Prior to overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding transfer to third parties etc. in order to ensure appropriate control of the defense equipment and technology after the overseas transfer. However, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of a control system at the destination in the following cases. Even in such cases, for transfer of those with high technical sensitivity, the Government of the recipient country is, in principle, obliged to do so.

1) the transfer is judged to be appropriate for active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, and when:
   A. the transfer is in urgent need or highly important from humanitarian perspective,
   B. the recipient is the UN System or organizations conducting the activities based on a UN resolution,
   C. the transfer is for the provision of technical information or specimens which are necessary for participating in an international tendering, or
2) the defense equipment to be transferred is small in price and quantity and thus deems to have small security concern.the transfer involves participation in an international system for sharing parts etc.,
3) the transfer involves delivery of parts etc. related to finished products that are properly controlled under the export control system of a country other than the destination country,
4) the transfer involves delivery of parts etc. to a licenser or to an importer,
5) the transfer involves delivery of parts, etc. to participate in the supply chain of defense equipment, etc. led by other governments or companies of other countries,
6) the contribution of parts or technology to be transferred to the recipient country is judged to be considerably small,
7) the overseas transfer is necessary for the activities of the SDF etc. or for ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals, or
8) the transfer is judged to have very small impact from the viewpoint of Japan's security such as return of misdelivered items, export of samples to be returned later and temporary landing of goods.

When confirming the control system at the destination, the Government will conduct the confirmation, in so far as reasonable, through a document such as a certification issued by the recipient government or other person responsible for the control of the defense equipment and technology to be transferred. In addition, the Government will confirm the circumstances surrounding the control of defense equipment and technology at the destination, the reliability of the organization controlling defense equipment and technology, the export control system and the circumstances surrounding its implementation in the country or region of destination, based on the information available at the time of the transfer.

If it is found that the defense equipment and technology is not appropriately controlled after its overseas transfer, the Government will take strict measures against the person etc. who transferred the defense equipment and technology, including imposing penalties in accordance with the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Law No. 228 of 1949, hereinafter referred to as "the Foreign Exchange Act").

In addition, when defense equipment and technology transferred from Japan is transferred to a third country based on prior consent of the Government, the Government may ensure appropriate control of the equipment and technology by confirming the appropriate control over the third country by the recipient of the defense equipment and technology from Japan or its government.

4. Procedures upon the Deliberations

1) Deliberations at the NSC

Overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology will be deliberated at the NSC in the following cases. When judging the possibility of approving the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology falls under B, C or D below in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Act, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will give due consideration to the deliberation.

A. when the basic policy is considered,
B. when especially careful consideration is required as for the application of the conditions for approving the transfers,
C. when especially careful consideration is required as for the appropriateness of the destination and the extent of security concerns, etc. with particular care, for approving the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology or the prior consent for transfer to third parties etc.,
D. when the Government has never made a decision to permit similar types of overseas transfer or prior consent for transfer to third parties etc. of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law (except for the cases where the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted, as listed in 1.-2)-C. or 1.-4)), or
E. when the status of overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology is reported.

2) Deliberations at the NSC board
Overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology will be deliberated at the NSC board in the following cases. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will make a decision based on such deliberations when deciding whether or not to approve overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology that refer to B or C below in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Act.
A. when the basic policy is considered,
B. when the Government has never made a decision to permit similar types of overseas transfers or prior consent for transfer to third parties etc. (except for the provision of technical information at the stage of coordination with other governments or companies of other countries, where the contribution to the recipient country is judged to be considerably small),
C. when the Government newly transfers arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law to a destination for which the Government has made a decision in the past to permit overseas transfers or prior consent for transfer to third parties etc. of the same type of arms (except for the cases where the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted as listed in 1.-2)-C. or 1.-4)), or
D. when the status of overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology is reported.

3) Cooperation among the Government ministries and agencies concerned
Given that a comprehensive judgment is required for deciding whether or not to approve overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology, the Government ministries and agencies concerned will coordinate closely for necessary arrangements and what appropriate control for such overseas transfers should be. The following department or division will serve as a point of contact for each ministry or agency. However, other department or division may also serve as such a point of contact as necessary for each transfer.
A. National Security Secretariat, Cabinet Secretariat (NSS)
B. National Security Policy Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
C. Security Export Control Policy Division, Trade Control Department, Trade and Economic Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)
D. International Cooperation Division, Department for Equipment Policy, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA), Ministry of Defense (MOD)

5. Regular Reporting and Information Disclosure

1) Regular reporting
The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will prepare an annual report on the status of the approval of overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology (including prior consent for transfer to third parties etc.), submit it to the NSC, and publish it.

2) Information disclosure
For transfers that were deliberated at the NSC pursuant to 4 (1) above (including those pertaining to prior consent for transfer to third parties etc.), the Government will disclose relevant information in accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 of 1999). The Government will pay due consideration to information disclosure so that it does not lack transparency compared to the cases where the Government has taken exemption measures on a case-by-case basis.

6. Miscellaneous Items

1) Definition
A. "International joint development and production" refers to international joint development including international joint research or international joint production in which the Government or Japanese companies participate and includes:
(a) International joint development between the Government and a foreign government,
(b) Participation by a Japanese company in the development of defense equipment and technology by a foreign government,
(c) Production licensed from a foreign country that is carried out by a Japanese company in partnership with a foreign counterpart,
(d) Development or production that is carried out by a Japanese company using Japanese and foreign technologies in partnership with a foreign company,
(e) Participation in an international system for sharing parts etc., and
(f) Provision of technical information or specimens for a feasibility study regarding international joint development or international joint production.
B. "Arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law" means firearms, gunpowder, swords, and other machines, instruments, devices, etc. intended to directly kill or wound people or destroy objects as a means of armed struggle (including, arms such as destroyers, fighter aircraft, tanks, etc., which are inherently equipped with firearms etc. and themselves act directly to kill or wound people or destroy objects as a means of armed struggle, but excluding parts).
C. "Parts" means an item that is incorporated as a part of a finished product. However, it excludes the one that can function as equipment by themselves.

2) Relationship with the previous Three Principles on Arms Exports and the collateral policy guidelines
Since the Three Principles is a guideline newly adopted upon reviewing the previous Three Principles on Arms Exports and the collateral policy guidelines, future overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology will be examined in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Act based on the Three Principles. The exemption measures that were taken under the previous Three Principles on Arms Exports and the collateral policy guidelines prior to the adoption of the Three Principles will be examined as the cases that may be

permitted to transfer overseas under the Three Principles.

3) Date of enforcement
The Implementation Guidelines is enforced on April 1, 2014.

4) Revision
The Implementation Guidelines will be revised in a timely manner after promptly reviewing the necessity for revision in response to changes in the security environment and security needs. Given that the Three Principles is an implementation standard for the Foreign Exchange Act, the Implementation Guidelines may be revised when a draft is prepared by METI in consultation with NSS, MOFA and MOD and is adopted by the NSC.

Reference 78 Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (After Revision)

April 1, 2014 Adopted by the National Security Council
Amendment : November 24, 2015
Amendment : March 22, 2016
Amendment : March 8, 2022
Amendment : December 22, 2023
Amendment : March 26, 2024
Amendment: April 21, 2026

In accordance with the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (hereinafter referred to as "the Three Principles", which was adopted by the Cabinet on April 1, 2014), the Implementation Guidelines for the Three Principles (hereinafter referred to as "the Implementation Guidelines") is decided as follows:

Note: Definitions of terms in addition to those in the Three Principles are described in 6. below.

1. Cases in which Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology may be Permitted

Cases in which overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology may be permitted are as follows:

1) Overseas transfers that contribute to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of peace contribution and international cooperation, and when:
   A. the recipient is a foreign government, or
   B. the recipient is the United Nations (UN) System, organizations conducting activities based on a UN resolution, organizations conducting activities on a request of international organizations or organizations conducting activities which are requested by a country which is located in the area of the activity and supported by any of the principal organs of the UN.
2) Overseas transfers that contribute to Japan's security, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of Japan's security, and that:
   A. contribute to enhancing security and defense cooperation with countries cooperating with Japan in the security area including the United States, and of the following:
      (a) the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology pertaining to finished products that do not fall under the category of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law (including ammunition; the same applies hereinafter),
      (b) the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology pertaining to finished products that fall under the category of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law (in cases other than the transfer of defense equipment and technology pertaining to international joint development and production to a partner country or the provision of defense equipment and technology pertaining to licensed products at the request of the license provider country (including further provision by the license provider country), only if Japan and the recipient country have concluded an international agreement obligating the use of defense equipment and technology transferred from Japan in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations),
      (c) overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology pertaining to parts
      (d) provision of repair and other services
      (e) overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology included in the provision of supplies and services conducted by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in accordance with Japanese laws,
   B. are necessary for supporting activities of the governmental agencies including the SDF (hereinafter referred to as the "SDF, etc."), which include the activities of foreign governments or private entities, etc. related to the activities of the SDF, etc., or for ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals, and that are:
      (a) temporary export of equipment, return of purchased equipment or provision of technical information related to the activities of the SDF, etc. including replacements of items which need repairing with non-defective items,
      (b) export of equipment for the protection or self-protection of public officials, or
      (c) export of equipment for the self-protection of Japanese nationals conducting activities in dangerous areas.
3) Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology (excluding arms under the Self- Defense Forces Law and technical information thereto) to a country that is subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat of force.
4) Overseas transfers whose impact from the viewpoint of Japan's security is judged to be very small such as return of misdelivered items, export of samples to be returned later, re-export of equipment that was brought into Japan by police officers of a foreign governmental agency, and provision of technical information at the stage of coordination with other governments or companies of other countries.

2. Focuses of the Strict Examination of Overseas Transfers

1) Export authorization for individual cases

Prior to granting an export authorization for an individual case that is judged as a case in which overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted as referred to in 1. above, the Government will conduct strict examination on desirability of the transfer, taking into consideration the following two focuses in a composite manner:

- appropriateness of the destination and end user
- extent the overseas transfer of the defense equipment and

technology may raise concern for Japan's security

In particular, the Government will in principle not permit the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology pertaining to finished products that fall under the category of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law to countries where combat is currently deemed to be taking place as part of an armed conflict (excluding cases of the transfer of defense equipment and technology pertaining to international joint development and production to the partner country or the provision of defense equipment and technology pertaining to licensed products at the request of the license provider country (not including further provision by the license provider country), and will deem overseas transfers permissible only in special circumstances in consideration of the need in terms of Japan's security. However, the Government will not permit the transfer of finished products from the Global Combat Air Programme to countries where combat is currently deemed to be taking place as part of an armed conflict.

As for the appropriateness of the destination, the Government will consider it by taking into account such factors as what impact the country or region of destination poses to international peace and security, and Japan's security, such as whether the overseas transfer to the destination has positive meaning from the viewpoint of peace contribution and international cooperation as well as Japan's security. As for the appropriateness of the end user, the Government will consider it by taking into account such factors as the use of defense equipment and technology by the end user and the certainty of appropriate control. In particular, the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology pertaining to finished products that fall under the category of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law will be carefully considered, taking into account the impact on international peace and security, including whether or not combat is currently taking place in the country or region of destination as part of an armed conflict; the security relationship between Japan and the country or region of destination; the security environment of the country or region of destination, including its relations with neighboring countries; and the export control system.

As for the extent of security concerns, the Government will consider this by taking into account such factors as the nature, technical sensitivity, use (purpose), quantity, and form (finished product, part, good, technology, etc.) of the defense equipment and technology to be transferred, as well as the possibilities of extra-purpose use or transfer to third parties (hereinafter referred to as "transfer to third parties, etc."). In particular, the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology pertaining to finished products that fall under the category of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law will be carefully considered, taking into account the impact on Japan's security environment, including the impact on Japan's defense buildup and on SDF operations, and other factors.

From the focuses including those described above, the Government will make a comprehensive judgment when deciding whether it will finally approve or disapprove each transfer in light of the existing guidelines of the international export control regimes and based on the information available at the time of the overseas transfers.

2) Prior consent for transfer to third parties etc.

In granting prior consent for transfer to third parties etc., the Government will conduct strict examination on desirability of granting such consent, taking into account the following two focuses as referred to in 1) in a composite manner, while taking into account the security meaning and others for the country granting the consent to.

- appropriateness of the destination country and end user
- extent the transfer to third parties etc. of the defense equipment and technology may raise concern for Japan's security

3. Ensuring Appropriate Control

Prior to overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding transfer to third parties etc. in order to ensure appropriate control of the defense equipment and technology after the overseas transfer. However, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of a control system at the destination in the following cases. Even in such cases, for transfer of those with high technical sensitivity, the Government of the recipient country is, in principle, obliged to do so.

1) the transfer is judged to be appropriate for active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, and when:
   A. the transfer is in urgent need or highly important from humanitarian perspective,
   B. the recipient is the UN System or organizations conducting the activities based on a UN resolution,
   C. the transfer is for the provision of technical information or specimens which are necessary for participating in an international tendering, or
   D. the defense equipment to be transferred is small in price and quantity and thus deemed to pose minimal security concerns.
2) finished products that do not fall under the category of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law, only for products having low technical sensitivity. (However, it excludes the case of the transfer to a country where combat is currently deemed to be taking place as part of an armed conflict.),
3) the transfer involves participation in an international system for sharing parts, etc.,
4) the transfer involves delivery of parts, etc. related to finished products that are properly controlled under the export control system of a country other than the destination country,
5) the transfer involves delivery of parts, etc. to a licenser or to an importer,
6) the transfer involves delivery of parts, etc. to participate in the supply chain of defense equipment, etc. led by other governments or companies of other countries,
7) the contribution to the recipient country made by the parts or technology to be transferred from Japan is judged to be considerably small,
8) the overseas transfer is necessary for the activities of the SDF, etc. or for ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals, or
9) the transfer is judged to have very small impact from the viewpoint of Japan's security such as return of misdelivered items, export of samples to be returned later, temporary landing of goods, and provision of technical information at the stage of coordination with other governments or companies of other countries.

When confirming the control system at the destination, the Government will conduct the confirmation, in so far as reasonable, through a document such as a certification issued by the recipient government or other person responsible for the control of the defense equipment and technology to be transferred. In addition, the Government will confirm the circumstances surrounding the control of defense equipment and technology at the destination, the reliability of the organization controlling defense equipment and technology, the export control system and the circumstances surrounding its implementation in the country or region of destination, based on the information available at the time of the transfer.

Also, in the cases of 3) to 7) above, when it is possible to assess that transferred parts or technology will be appropriately controlled under the jurisdiction of the country where the primary recipient

is located, it is possible to deem appropriate control is ensured by limiting the destination to the primary recipient.

If it is found that the defense equipment and technology is not appropriately controlled after its overseas transfer, the Government will take strict measures against the person etc. who transferred the defense equipment and technology, including imposing penalties in accordance with the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Law No. 228 of 1949, hereinafter referred to as "the Foreign Exchange Act"). In addition, in confirming the post-transfer control status of finished products that fall under the category of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law, the Government will conduct necessary inspections on the government or those responsible for the control of the defense equipment and technology to be transferred.

In addition, when defense equipment and technology transferred from Japan is transferred to a third country based on prior consent of the Government, the Government may ensure appropriate control of the equipment and technology by confirming the appropriate control over the third country by the recipient of the defense equipment and technology from Japan or its government.

4. Procedures upon the Deliberations

1) Deliberations at the NSC

Overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology will be deliberated at the NSC in the following cases. When judging the possibility of approving the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology falls under B, C or D below in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Act, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will give due consideration to the deliberation.

A. when the basic policy is considered,
B. when especially careful consideration is required as for the application of the conditions for approving the transfers,
C. when especially careful consideration is required as for the appropriateness of the destination and the extent of security concerns, etc. with particular care, for approving the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology or the prior consent for transfer to third parties etc.,
D. when the Government has never made a decision to permit similar types of overseas transfer or prior consent for transfer to third parties, etc. of arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law (except for the cases where the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted, as listed in 1.-2)-B. or 1.-4)), or
E. when the status of overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology is reported.

2) Deliberations at the NSC board

Overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology will be deliberated at the NSC board in the following cases. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will make a decision based on such deliberations when deciding whether or not to approve overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology that refer to B or C below in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Act.

A. when the basic policy is considered,
B. when the Government has never made a decision to permit similar types of overseas transfers or prior consent for transfer to third parties, etc. (except for the transfer of parts for prototyping and testing or the provision of technical information at the stage of coordination with other governments or companies of other countries, where the contribution to the recipient country is judged to be considerably small),
C. when the Government newly transfers arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law to a destination for which the Government has made a decision in the past to permit overseas transfers or prior consent for transfer to third parties, etc. of the same type of arms (except for the cases where the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted as listed in 1.-2)-B. or 1.-4)), or
D. when the status of overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology is reported.

3) Cooperation among the Government ministries and agencies concerned

Given that a comprehensive judgment is required for deciding whether or not to approve overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology, the Government ministries and agencies concerned will coordinate closely for necessary arrangements and what appropriate control for such overseas transfers should be. The following department or division will serve as a point of contact for each ministry or agency. However, other department or division may also serve as such a point of contact as necessary for each transfer.

A. National Security Secretariat, Cabinet Secretariat (NSS)
B. National Security Policy Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
C. Security Trade Control Policy Division, Trade Control Department, Trade and Economic Security Bureau, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)
D. International Cooperation Division, Department for Equipment Policy, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA), Ministry of Defense (MOD)

5. Regular Reporting and Information Disclosure

1) Regular reporting

The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will prepare an annual report on the status of the approval of overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology (including prior consent for transfer to third parties etc.), submit it to the NSC, and publish it.

2) Information disclosure

For transfers that were deliberated at the NSC pursuant to 4 (1) above (including those pertaining to prior consent for transfer to third parties etc.), the Government will disclose relevant information in accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 of 1999). The Government will pay due consideration to information disclosure so that it does not lack transparency compared to the cases where the Government has taken exemption measures on a case-by-case basis.

6. Miscellaneous Items

1) Definition

A. "International joint development and production" refers to international joint development including international joint research or international joint production in which the Government or Japanese companies participate and includes:
   (a) International joint development between the Government and a foreign government,
   (b) Participation by a Japanese company in the development of defense equipment and technology by a foreign government,
   (c) Production licensed from a foreign country that is carried out by a Japanese company in partnership with a foreign counterpart,

(d) Development or production that is carried out by a Japanese company using Japanese and foreign technologies in partnership with a foreign company,
(e) Participation in an international system for sharing parts etc., and
(f) Provision of technical information or specimens for a feasibility study regarding international joint development or international joint production.

B. "Arms under the Self-Defense Forces Law" means firearms, gunpowder, swords, and other machines, instruments, devices, etc. intended to directly kill or wound people or destroy objects as a means of armed struggle (including, arms such as destroyers, fighter aircraft, tanks, etc., which are inherently equipped with firearms etc. and themselves act directly to kill or wound people or destroy objects as a means of armed struggle, but excluding parts).

C. "Parts" means an item that is incorporated as a part of a finished product. However, it excludes the one that can function as equipment by themselves.

2) Relationship with the previous Three Principles on Arms Exports and the collateral policy guidelines
Since the Three Principles is a guideline newly adopted upon reviewing the previous Three Principles on Arms Exports and the collateral policy guidelines, future overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology will be examined in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Act based on the Three Principles. The exemption measures that were taken under the previous Three Principles on Arms Exports and the collateral policy guidelines prior to the adoption of the Three Principles will be examined as the cases that may be permitted to transfer overseas under the Three Principles.

3) Foreign direct investment
In cases of foreign direct investment involving the transfer of defense equipment and technology that has been deemed permissible under the Three Principles, the Government will conduct an examination based on the Foreign Exchange Act, consistent with such transfer having been deemed permissible.
In cases of foreign direct investment related to defense equipment and technology that do not involve the transfer of defense equipment and technology, the Government will conduct an examination based on the Foreign Exchange Act, in accordance with the aims of the Three Principles.

4) Date of enforcement
The Implementation Guidelines is enforced on April 1, 2014.

5) Revision
The Implementation Guidelines will be revised in a timely manner after promptly reviewing the necessity for revision in response to changes in the security environment and security needs. Given that the Three Principles is an implementation standard for the Foreign Exchange Act, the Implementation Guidelines may be revised when a draft is prepared by METI in consultation with NSS, MOFA and MOD and is adopted by the NSC.

Reference 79 **Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects**

Item	Summary	Date of conclusion of intergovernmental agreement to implement joint research and development	Completion date
Ducted rocket engine, advanced steel technology, fighting vehicle propulsion technology using ceramic materials, eye-safe laser radar, ejection seat, advanced hybrid propulsion technology, shallow water acoustic technology, ballistic missile defense technology, low vulnerability gun propellant for field artillery, electronic device mounted on successor aircraft to P-3C, software radio, advanced hull material/structural technology, sea-based radar system, combat system for ship, palm-sized automated chemical agent detector, human effects of exposure to aircraft fuel and their engine exhaust, image gyro for airborne applications, hybrid electric drive, High-Speed Multi-Hull Vessel Optimization, Chemical Agent Detector-kit Colorimetric Reader, mission partner gateway extended, comparison of operational jet fuel and noise exposures, next generation amphibious technologies and High-Temperature Case Technologies.		Completed	
SM-3 Block IIA	Development of advanced missile interceptor	June 2006	March 2019 (moved to the joint produce/ deployment stage)
Modular Hybrid Electric Vehicle System	Research on modular hybrid electric vehicle systems	October 2020	Ongoing
Overwhelming Response through Collaborative Autonomy	Research on Artificial Intelligence technology applied to decision-making of UAVs Air Vehicles	December 2023	Ongoing
High Power Microwave System	Research to jointly evaluate the effects of high power microwaves on electronic equipment, etc.	July 2024	Ongoing
Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Resilience (Underwater Obstacle Avoidance)	Research to jointly evaluate the detection and avoidance of underwater obstacles	June 2025	Ongoing
Safety Assurance Technology for AI-equipped Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)	Research to ensure the safety of AI-equipped unmanned aircraft through runtime assurance technology	September 2025	Ongoing

Reference 80 Basic Policy on Improving the Treatment and Working Environments and Establishing New Lifetime Career Plans of Self-Defense Forces Personnel [Provisional translation]

December 20, 2024

Amid an increasingly challenging security environment, it is an urgent priority to improve the treatment of SDF personnel who firsthand fulfill their duties to safeguard Japan's peace and independence, as well as to enhance their working environments and establish new career plans.

Accordingly, recently the "Ministerial Meeting on Improving the Treatment and Working Environments and Establishing New Lifetime Career Plans of Self-Defense Forces Personnel" (hereinafter referred to as the "Meeting") was established on October 9, chaired by the Prime Minister and composed of a broad range of the relevant cabinet ministers, including the Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Defense Minister.

The Meeting convened for the first time on October 25, where the Prime Minister as the Chair ordered the Defense Minister, the Vice-Chair, to take the lead in compiling by the end of the year the direction of the measures that the relevant ministries and agencies should work on in collaboration with each other and the items that should be included in the FY2025 budget.

In response to this, the relevant ministries and agencies have engaged in a series of vigorous considerations and have compiled the "Basic Policy on Improving the Treatment and Working Environments and Establishing New Lifetime Career Plans of Self-Defense Forces Personnel", as follows.

Moving forward, based on this Policy, the Cabinet will continue to collaborate to establish a comprehensive system that enables SDF personnel to serve with peace of mind and dedicate themselves to the vital missions of national defense.

Note that the underlined sections above will also be reflected appropriately in the FY2025 government budget proposal, etc. Furthermore, these items will be gradually incorporated in the FY2026 budget appropriation request, starting with those which are possible.

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Introduction

The Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues conducted by the Cabinet Office shows that 90% of the citizens still hold a favorable impression of the Self-Defense Forces.

This survey result is undoubtedly a testament to the unwavering efforts of SDF personnel, who have been sincerely engaged in disaster relief and various other missions over the 70 years since the SDF's establishment.

Despite the favorable impression of the SDF, recruitment of SDF personnel remains a significant challenge.

In FY2023 the SDF tried to recruit 20,000 people but was only able to hire 10,000 people. The SDF continues to fall short of its target personnel levels, with the fulfillment rate standing at approximately 90%. To achieve the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities to address the most challenging security environment since the start of the postwar period, securing SDF personnel to carry out this mission is a matter of critical importance. If fundamental measures are not implemented, the situation will only continue to deteriorate.

The SDF's organizational culture—where personnel undertaking the demanding mission of national defense are inherently expected to endure harsh conditions on a daily basis—poses a significant obstacle to securing and retaining personnel.

The organization needs to place greater emphasis on individual personnel's satisfaction and ease of working, while also enhancing job satisfaction. The MOD/SDF must address this issue with a strong sense of urgency.

Despite that, SDF personnel firsthand safeguard Japan's peace and independence and maintain national security; given the unique nature of their duties, it is inevitable that they must bear various burdens and restrictions. Therefore, SDF personnel need to get treatment that reflects the unique nature of their duties. Accordingly, personnel management and salary systems that differ from those of other national public employees have been established for SDF personnel as special national public employees. It is crucial to continue appropriately valuing the unique nature of their duties and to provide treatment that ensures they feel proud and honored to choose a career as SDF personnel. Furthermore, given that many SDF personnel retire at age 56, it is crucial to ensure they do not feel insecure about re-employment, re-employment after re-employment and income security to effectively secure personnel. To address SDF personnel's future concerns, it is essential to expand re-employment opportunities that leverage their expertise, skills, and experience, and to guarantee income security for their livelihood.

The Meeting was established based on the recognition of these issues, and it determined to implement the following concrete measures after carrying out vigorous discussions at a high frequency regarding improvement of the treatment and working environment of SDF personnel and establishing of their new lifetime career plans.

I Concrete Measures

1 Improvement of Treatment for SDF Personnel

To truly realize the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities amid the most severe and complex security environment Japan has faced since the end of WWII, it is essential to continually and stably secure outstanding SDF personnel. To this end, it is necessary to establish treatment appropriate for the Reiwa period, in which the generations who will be responsible for Japan's future defense capabilities can perform demanding duties with peace of mind and take pride and honor in choosing a career as SDF personnel, being SDF personnel during their service and, after they retire, the fact that they were SDF personnel.

Given the above, the MOD will newly establish or raise the amounts and increase in the amounts of over 30 different allowances,etc.,which is an unprecedented change (eight new allowances will be established and the amounts of 25 allowances will be raised).

(1) Improving treatment in terms of salary taking into account the special nature of the SDF's missions and working environments

The SDF personnel salary schedule was established in 1950 with the formation of the National Police Reserve, based on the Public Security Service Salary Schedule (-)—originally applied to primarily police officers—and incorporating a certain amount of overtime allowances. This salary schedule has remained largely unreviewed to the present day. To ensure that salaries reflect the special nature of SDF personnel's duties, working environment, and the constraints and burdens imposed on them, based on the findings of the working environments survey currently being conducted and the opinions of external experts to ensure fairness and impartiality, the appropriate standards of the salary schedule and the mechanism for calculating monthly salaries are being reviewed with the aim of revising the salary schedule in FY2028.

Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, to duly recognize the special nature of the SDF's missions and working conditions and to continue securing highly qualified personnel, allowances for those engaged in particularly specialized duties will be enhanced. In FY2025, an allowance for SDF personnel performing air traffic control operations (ex: in the case

of a Captain or Lieutenant, a monthly amount of approximately 29,000 yen), an allowance for aircraft maintenance technician responding to scrambling against airspace incursion (a daily amount of 1,200 yen) and an allowance for personnel engaged in major field exercises and similar operations (a daily amount of 1,400 yen) were newly introduced. Furthermore, there were increases in the flying allowances for aircrew (ex: in the case of a Captain who is a fighter pilot, to a monthly amount of approximately 265,000 yen, an increase of 29,000 yen) and the disaster relief activity allowances (to a daily amount of 2,160 yen, an increase of 540 yen) while special operations allowances were also newly granted to personnel of the cyber-specialized units of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF (ex: in the case of a Captain or Lieutenant, a monthly amount of approximately 29,000 yen).

Given the occurrence of the incident involving fraudulent receipt of diving allowances, an IT system will be established and computerization will be advanced to prevent the fraudulent receipt of allowances. In addition, thorough measures to prevent recurrence, such as providing education on the rules and administrative procedures related to allowances and compliance education, will be implemented and efforts will be made to administer allowances properly.

(2) Improving treatment to secure "shi" and a wide range of other human resources

Even in the context of the number of SDF personnel applicants and recruits decreasing significantly, recruiting "shi" in particular has become a severe and urgent issue. For this reason, a new type of fixed-term "shi" (E1-E3 level), for which individuals will be recruited as SDF personnel from the outset, will be established and these individuals will be prepared to be able to take on missions in times of emergency or disaster from the moment they enlist. It will be ensured that they receive equal treatment to non-fixed-term SDF personnel, and the existing Candidates for Uniformed SDF Personnel System will be abolished from FY2026. Furthermore, a new benefit (the Designated Place Living Adjustment Allowance (tentative name)) for personnel adapting to life in barracks will be established for all personnel who enlist as a general candidate for enlistment (Upper) or a candidate for uniformed SDF personnel, regardless of whether they are fixed-term or non-fixed-term, to enable them to adapt to life in barracks, etc. Under this allowance, 1.2 million yen will be paid over the six years after recruitment, in order to help secure young, healthy human resources and maintain strong units. Moreover, as a measure that can be taken promptly and lasts until the new fixed-term "shi" (E1-E3 level) is introduced, the lump-sum allowance for enlisted SDF personnel will be raised to 344,000 yen in FY2025, an increase of 123,000 yen over the current amount. In addition, regarding the Further Education Support Special Subsidy provided in the case that fixed-term SDF personnel go on to university, etc. after their term expires and are appointed SDF Reserve Personnel or SDF Ready Reserve Personnel while they are still studying, the Higher Education Support Benefits System will be enhanced. For example, in the case of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, the special subsidy will be raised to an annual amount of approximately 536,000 yen, an increase of approximately 245,000 yen from its current level. Also, efforts will be made to strengthen public relations for re-employment support activities for "new graduates from the Self-Defense Force" who cultivated a variety of skills as SDF personnel, completed their term, and proceeded to the next step, and for the enhancement of re-employment opportunities utilizing private employment placement service providers, with a particular focus on improving the treatment of fixed-term SDF personnel who are particularly difficult to recruit.

Furthermore, in order to reinforce the human resource base of the SDF with an eye on future ways of warfare, measures to secure high-quality human resources from a wide range of sources will be promoted. For example, the Self-Defense Force Scholarship Program will be expanded further, with the annual amount raised to 960,000 yen, an increase of 312,000 yen over the current amount.

(3) Improvement of treatment for SDF Reserve Personnel, etc.

SDF Reserve Personnel, etc. will become SDF personnel and play a role in rapidly increasing defense capabilities in times of emergency or disaster, and will also be important in terms of war sustainability, so in order to secure the necessary number of personnel, an environment will be built to ensure that they can play an active role as SDF Reserve Personnel, etc. with peace of mind.

Specifically, the allowance provided to SDF Reserve Personnel, etc. will be raised, for example, the SDF Reserve Personnel allowance will be a monthly amount of approximately 12,000 yen, an increase of 8,000 yen over the current amount. Also, the Continuous Service Incentive Allowance currently provided to SDF Ready Reserve Personnel will be raised to 215,000 yen, an increase of 95,000 yen over the current amount, and in addition a system will be developed to newly provide 70,000 yen to SDF Reserve Personnel. Due to this, in the case of SDF Reserve Personnel, the amount provided per term is planned to become approximately 680,000 yen, an increase of approximately 410,000 yen over the current amount, and in the case of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel (Sergeant/Petty Officer 3rd Class/Staff Sergeant), the amount provided per term is planned to become approximately 2,740,000 yen, an increase of approximately 1,030,000 yen over the current amount. Furthermore, the Higher Education Support Benefits System will be enhanced, and in addition the planned renewing of clothing and the equipment, etc. used by the SDF Reserve Personnel, etc. will also be encouraged.

Moreover, in order to ensure an environment in which it is easy to participate in training, support will be provided in the case that SDF Reserve Personnel, etc. run their own businesses, etc., and the measures necessary to gain greater understanding and cooperation concerning SDF Reserve Personnel, etc. will be implemented. Measures will also be taken to make it easier for national public employees and local public employees who concurrently serve as SDF Reserve Personnel, etc. to participate in training.

(4) Ways of awarding decorations, etc. commensurate with achievements

Honors such as decorations, etc. to SDF personnel are important to commend their diligent achievements in their missions over many years, instilling pride and honor in the fact that they were SDF personnel, and gaining respect from the public. Ways to award decorations, etc. that are commensurate with their achievements will be considered, such as expanding the scope to include those who have not previously had the opportunity to receive survivors decorations.

2 Improvement of Living and Working Environments

(1) Developing living and working environments that align with lifestyles of the younger generation

To enhance the overall performance of the SDF as an organization, it is essential to build an environment that improves both job satisfaction and ease of working, where each SDF personnel member feels a sense of purpose in their work.

Conversely, living environments within the SDF are not always privacy-conscious; for example, multiple personnel may reside together in the same room without any private space such as room dividers, etc. However, given the significant impact of the current personnel shortage on the SDF amid the broader trends of a declining birthrate and an aging population, the SDF will confront

these societal changes head-on and establish living and working environments aligned with the lifestyles of younger generations.

Furthermore, in order to become an organization that can truly meet the expectations of the public, it is necessary to change the organizational culture of the SDF itself to keep up with the changing times while also retaining its good points. The SDF will advance its transformation into an organization in which each member, including the younger generations, can feel self-efficacy.

①Reform of organizational culture

When responding to the new ways of warfare which are currently emerging, it is necessary for the SDF to continue to gain high-quality, diverse human resources. Furthermore, attitudes toward work are changing and diversifying in general public, and in particular the younger generations prefer ways of working which place importance on work-life balance and workplaces where they can gain psychological fulfillment through their own sense of achievement and sense of growth. Given this, it is an urgent task for the SDF, as an organization comprised of human beings, to transform itself in line with future ways of warfare and changes in general public.

Specifically, the MOD/SDF will foster SDF personnel who have acquired leadership skills appropriate for the times, and promote reassessment and education of capabilities required for SDF management, with a particular focus on skills needed for intergenerational management. It is also explicitly stating the direction the SDF is aiming for as an organization, and working toward psychological safety and the creation of an organization in which all SDF personnel are highly engaged. By promoting these efforts, the SDF, as an organization comprised of human beings, will build an environment that does not tolerate harassment. In addition, given that harassment destroys trust among personnel and undermines strength, the SDF will not only clarify the standards concerning harassment but also constantly consider whether it is necessary to revise the standards given changes in social conditions, workloads, and other factors, in order to maintain standards which are suitable for the era. The SDF will then strive to ensure that the standards are assimilated by each member to instill the standards inside the organization.

②Introduction of individual space for each personnel in barracks

Given the domestic and international situations, and in addition to education and training for primary missions, it has become necessary to ensure immediate readiness for various operations, such as disaster relief in response to increasingly severe and widespread disasters, and the evacuation of Japanese nationals overseas. As a result, the psychological and physical burden on personnel has increased more than ever before. For this reason, while SDF personnel at the rank of Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF) and below are, in principle, required to reside in barracks, the scope of those permitted to live outside barracks will be relaxed to improve work–life balance. Furthermore, in light of recent trends among younger generations in recent years, the SDF will aim to complete the introduction of individual space for each personnel in barracks as soon as possible by expediting this in a planned manner to create a living environments within the barracks that respect privacy. When doing so, because collective action is required of the SDF in carrying out missions, care will be taken to ensure that the relationships between each of the members do not become weak, and opportunities will be ensured for the personnel to learn about basic collective action. In addition, meticulous refurbishments and repairs—taking into account SDF personnel needs—will continue to improve living and working environments in office facilities and barracks.

Moreover, since SDF personnel maintain various states of readiness for emergency response, appropriate readiness protocols will be examined for necessary arrangements.

③Improving the living and working environments for onboard crews

Crew members on vessels are required to reside onboard, so the living quarters are particularly cramped and lack privacy, resulting in significant psychological strain during voyages. Accordingly, the living and work environments for these personnel will be improved through measures such as enhancing the appeal of living quarters on new types of vessels and expanding their standby areas.

④Improvement of the housing environment

To enable the SDF to fully demonstrate its capabilities and carry out its missions with high morale, it is also crucial to improve the living environments of personnel and their families. Efforts to renovate aging of housing have been made continuously, and it is essential to continue promoting these initiatives in the future. To this end, renovations of existing housing and PFI-based rebuilding will be expedited in a planned manner. In parallel, initiatives will be pursued to upgrade housing amenities in line with recent residential trends and to balance living convenience with readiness, thereby further enhancing mission execution efficiency.

⑤Promoting the development of the communication environment

Given the lifestyles of younger generations in modern society, communications infrastructure is an indispensable backbone, so the SDF will enhance its communications networks to secure each member's quality of life.

Specifically, the GSDF will expand wireless LAN coverage in the common areas, etc. of welfare facilities and barracks at camps and bases, etc. including equipping every barracks' common area at all camps across Japan with at least one wireless LAN access point by FY2025. Furthermore, a communications environment will be established on major vessels by FY2027 to utilize commercial low-Earth-orbit satellite networks that complement operational communications, enabling crew members to contact their families and access the Internet onboard.

⑥Improving access to bases and garrisons located in areas with limited public transportation

Certain SDF bases and camps are located in remote areas, etc. with limited public transportation and inadequate daily amenities. Thus, external resources will be leveraged to expand bus services to the nearest stations, etc. and implement car-sharing services, thereby improving the living environment.

(2) Balancing work with childcare and nursing care while promoting the empowerment of women

It is expected that an increasing number of SDF personnel, both male and female, will face time and transferring constraints for childcare, and nursing care, etc. due to changes in the social structure. For this reason, the SDF will promote the development of an environment in which SDF personnel can dedicate themselves to their mission without worrying about the balance with childcare/nursing care, for example by enhancing childcare services that take into consideration the special nature of the work of SDF personnel and changes in the balance of supply and demand for childcare in society as a whole.

Furthermore, in order to expand the recruitment and promotion of women, the SDF will expedite in a planned manner the promoting the development of educational infrastructure and the development of women's quarters, women's toilets and bathrooms,

etc. in barracks, etc.

(3) Improvement of clothing, food, and health management systems

The SDF will appropriately maintain and renew the clothing such as uniforms and work clothes worn by personnel on a daily basis so that the personnel can demonstrate their abilities and carry out their various missions. The SDF will also increase the number of items and improve specifications in accordance with actual usage.

Regarding food, the SDF will continuously strive to make it more appealing by enhancing health management based on the nutritional intake standards necessary for the personnel to carry out their activities and by introducing innovations such as providing menus requested by the personnel in order to increase meal satisfaction. In addition, the actual conditions at bases across Japan will be assessed, and costs arising from price increases will also be appropriately reflected.

Regarding the health management systems, the SDF will work to enhance the various medical checkups that have been conducted to date, and will continue to implement infrastructure development that will contribute to the health promotion of the personnel, such as purchasing training equipment, etc. As a new measure, the SDF will also consider developing devices for ascertaining the health status of each member of personnel during education and training.

3 Establishment of New Lifetime Career Plans

(1) Elimination of future concerns in the early retirement system

Given that many SDF personnel retire at age 56 due to the early retirement system, it is crucial to ensure they do not feel insecure about re-employment, re-employment after re-employment and income security to effectively secure personnel. When raising the retirement age of regular service public employees to 65 years old, salary levels from 60 years old to 65 years old have been set at levels of approximately 70% of the levels at 60 years old, taking into account salary levels in the private sector, so the income levels of SDF personnel generally have a structure under which they decline to just over 70% when retiring after the early retirement age and that 70% declines further at 60 years old. Given this situation, it is necessary to secure and raise the income after retirement of SDF personnel who retire even earlier than regular service national public employees. Furthermore, currently the situation is that retired SDF personnel cannot receive the support of the national government in the case that they are re-employed a second time. It is necessary to establish lifetime career plans which are more enhanced than ever before and enable SDF personnel to diligently tackle their mission of national defense with peace of mind.

① Expansion of re-employment opportunities leveraging knowledge, skills, and experience acquired as SDF personnel

In order to establish lifetime career plans which are more enhanced than ever before and enable SDF personnel to diligently tackle their mission of national defense with peace of mind, an environment will be put in place to enable retiring SDF personnel to take advantage of the knowledge, skills, and experience they cultivated in the SDF.

Specifically, the MOD and the relevant ministries and agencies will work together to expand re-employment opportunities by reaching out to companies in a wide range of industries and economic organizations regarding the utilization of retired SDF personnel, thereby enabling smoother re-employment and enhanced wages following re-employment for retiring SDF personnel.

Furthermore, retired SDF personnel are active in a variety of public sectors, such as the police, fire departments, coast guard, and correctional departments. Therefore, in November 2024, the Japan Coast Guard expanded its selection and hiring to include maritime personnel in addition to aviation personnel. The relevant ministries and agencies and the MOD will continue to collaborate to promote greater utilization of retired SDF personnel.

In addition, approximately 700 retired SDF personnel are contributing to regional disaster prevention in the disaster prevention and crisis management sections of local governments throughout the country, and they are playing an important role in improving disaster prevention capabilities in each region. Therefore, in order to further utilize the knowledge, skills, and experience they have cultivated as SDF personnel in regional disaster prevention, the relevant ministries and agencies and the MOD will collaborate to lobby local governments to expand the hiring of retired SDF personnel in local governments, ensure their stable employment, and ensure that their treatment is suitable for their duties and responsibilities. At the same time, to facilitate local governments' hiring of retired SDF Personnel, consideration will be given to establishing an appropriate Regional Disaster Prevention Manager System, including necessary financial measures.

Furthermore, initiatives for re-employment support, namely vocational training for the re-employment of retiring SDF personnel, will be strengthened. Enhancements will include adding new courses on life-planning education for re-employment and adding IT-related items, etc. to vocational training. When doing so, initiatives will also be advanced to collaborate with the learning opportunities provided by relevant institutions such as universities and vocational schools. Moreover, in order to deepen understanding in a wide range of industries of the knowledge, skills, and experience that SDF personnel have cultivated, videos will be created to introduce the career paths, etc. of SDF personnel in order to strengthen public relations for expanding their re-employment opportunities.

In addition, to enhance convenience for retiring SDF personnel and give them access to a wider range of job listings, the Employment Support Information Network System will be introduced to the SDF Personnel Support Association, which facilitates matching between retiring SDF personnel and private-sector employers.

Additionally, the MOD and the relevant ministries and agencies will work together to take measures to simplify the procedures by which retiring SDF personnel can easily obtain public qualifications, such as marine technician and aircraft mechanic, which are acceptable to private companies, based on the skills they gained during their service.

Note that currently the re-employment support which can be offered by the MOD is only one-time support when the SDF personnel retire, but there are some SDF personnel who were re-employed after retirement who are forced to retire due to the employment conditions, etc. of their re-employment opportunities and therefore need to find work again. For that reason, re-employment support for those retired SDF personnel will be allowed to ensure that they can play an active role in society with peace of mind until 65 years old, the age at which receipt of the pension begins.

In conjunction with this consideration of support for re-employment until 65 years old and of the raising of the subsidy level of the Compensation for Retirees under Young-Age Retirement as discussed below, with a view to effectively leveraging the personnel's accumulated knowledge, skills, and experience and establishing their new lifetime career plans, a detailed review will be carried out to raise the retirement age for general personnel by approximately two years from FY2028 onward, while balancing extended healthy longevity with the maintenance of their strength. Furthermore, consideration will be given to extending the sixty-year retirement age—currently applied to select occupational fields—to areas such as space, cyber, and medical sectors where physical demands are low. These specific retirement age and eligibility criteria will be determined by around summer 2025. Measures will

be implemented to secure reappointments of retired personnel, such as extending reappointment eligibility to those who have once left SDF service upon reaching the mandatory retirement age.

② Appropriate subsidy level from the government for SDF personnel following early retirement

In addition to the above expansion of re-employment opportunities and enhancement of wages following re-employment, etc., raising of the subsidy level of the Compensation for Retirees under Young-Age Retirement at an early age will be considered, taking into account the opinions of external experts, with the aim of implementing the new level from FY2026 so that SDF personnel can establish lifetime career plans which are more enhanced than ever before and can live with peace of mind even after their early retirement. When doing so, care will be taken to ensure that a significant sense of unfairness does not arise after implementation of the new level compared to before.

(2) Leveraging retired SDF personnel as external resources

In the context that it is expected that Japan's population will continue to decline, the arrival of a society with a serious manpower shortage will become a reality, and securing the required number of SDF personnel will become difficult, when responding to the personnel requirements for new ways of warfare, realignment of the operations that SDF personnel should be responsible for will continue to be considered, and considerations will be advanced regarding ways to utilize retired SDF personnel as external resources, including outsourcing operations to corporations and organizations primarily comprised of retired SDF personnel who have cultivated knowledge, skills, and experience in the SDF.

4 Other Initiatives

In addition to the above, Japan will also strengthen efforts to secure high-quality human resources as SDF personnel and to gain broad public understanding of their contributions to safeguarding the lives and livelihoods of the people of Japan.

The Japanese people have high expectations especially of the SDF, and it is indispensable for the SDF to gain their support and trust all the time to fully exercise its ability to complete its duties. Regarding this, the series of incidents disclosed in July 2024, which undermine such support and trust, should never have happened. The MOD/SDF will continue to treat these matters with the utmost seriousness, uphold strict discipline, and take thorough measures to prevent any recurrence. Furthermore, compliance and auditing functions will be continually enhanced—including prevention of human error and misconduct through systemization and digitization—to ensure that the SDF and its individual personnel always perform their duties with a high sense of mission and ethics.

Additionally, leveraging the MOD/SDF's expertise and experience, instructors will be dispatched to courses at relevant institutions, and other initiatives will be undertaken to promote public understanding of JDF activities in defense, security, and disaster response.

Moreover, the concrete measures stated in this Basic Policy will be promoted continuously, and from the perspective of strengthening the MOD/SDF's human resource base, an office dedicated to reinforcement of the human resource base will be established within the MOD's Bureau of Personnel and Education to enhance the ministry's human resource consideration framework.

(1) Collaboration with local governments concerning recruitment

In 2013, the number of municipalities providing information on recruitment targets to the SDF, whether electronically or on paper, was about one-third of all municipalities and this percentage has risen year by year, reaching about two-thirds of all municipalities in FY2023. The MOD, in collaboration with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, aims to obtain the provision of electronic data or paper media from all municipalities which have information on recruitment targets information, and the MOD will also promote understanding among local governments of the importance of securing SDF personnel, who are the core of our defense capabilities, and will strengthen collaboration with the local governments.

(2) Enhancement of public relations and recruitment to promote employment of SDF personnel

In order to more effectively convey the appeal of the SDF, including the content of each measure stipulated in this Basic Policy, to the young generation, who are the recruitment targets, the digitalization and online dissemination of recruitment public relations such as social media and targeted advertising, etc. will be promoted further, and recruitment activities will be strengthened by enhancing the human and physical structures of the Provincial Cooperation Offices. Furthermore, in order to strengthen the approach to recruiting candidates for uniformed SDF personnel and general candidates for enlistment (Upper) with respect to graduates, etc., the MOD and the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare have been collaborating since November 2024 to commence recruiting activities utilizing Public Employment Security Offices, and they will continue to actively promote these activities.

Although the recruitment environment remains severe, in order to gain as many recruits as possible and given that the majority of people who wish to enlist apply in the first half of the year, in the remaining period in the fiscal year the MOD will implement active recruitment activities and aim to obtain outcomes from the measures stipulated in this Basic Policy by promptly communicating the initiatives of this Basic Policy in an easy-to-understand manner, including recruitment activities for graduates, etc. and making the case for the SDF to applicants in order to reduce the number of people who decline to be hired.

II The Way Forward

The underlined sections above will also be reflected appropriately in the FY2025 government budget proposal, etc. Furthermore, consideration of items for which legal or institutional revisions are necessary will be advanced promptly and these items will be gradually incorporated in the FY2026 budget appropriation request, starting with those which are possible.

In addition, during 2025, verifications of the effects of each measure stipulated in this Basic Policy will be carried out from the perspective of how they contribute to the recruitment of SDF personnel, reduction of mid-career retirements, improvement of the fulfillment rate, etc., and follow-ups will be carried out once a year thereafter. While taking into account these verifications, new measures contributing to increasing the number of recruits, reduction of mid-career retirements, improvement of the fulfillment rate, etc. will be considered continuously.

(Implement promptly)

○ A review by external experts will be started regarding measures to improve treatment and establish lifetime career plans which are more enhanced than ever before taking into account the special nature of the work of SDF personnel (revision of the salary schedule of SDF personnel and raising of the subsidy level of the Compensation for Retirees under Young-Age Retirement). To this end, the aims are to raise the subsidy level of the Compensation for Retirees under Young-Age Retirement from FY2026 and to revise the salary schedule for SDF personnel in FY2028.

- The regulations will be revised to relax the standards for permitting personnel to reside outside barracks.
- In order to expand re-employment opportunities leveraging acquired knowledge, skills, and experience as SDF personnel, agreements will be gradually concluded between industry, the relevant ministries and agencies, and the MOD, starting with those which are possible, and written requests will be issued jointly by the relevant ministries and agencies and the MOD to industry, etc.
- In order to expand re-employment opportunities leveraging acquired knowledge, skills, and experience as SDF personnel, more active utilization of retired SDF personnel in public sectors will be commenced.
- Reviews will be started regarding ways to utilize retired SDF personnel as external resources, including outsourcing operations to corporations and organizations primarily comprised of retired SDF personnel who have cultivated knowledge, skills, and experience in the SDF.
- Notifications will be issued to local governments calling for greater cooperation with recruitment activities.

(During FY2025)

- Allowances for SDF personnel engaged in particularly specialized duties will be enhanced.
- A new benefit (the Designated Place Living Adjustment Allowance (tentative name)) for personnel adapting to life in barracks will be established for all personnel who enlist as a general candidate for enlistment (Upper) or a candidate for uniformed SDF personnel, to enable them to adapt to life in barracks, etc.
- The lump-sum allowance will be raised for enlisted SDF personnel.
- The Higher Education Support Benefits System and Self-Defense Force Scholarship Program will be expanded.
- The allowances, etc. provided to SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel will be raised.
- The system of the Continuous Service Incentive Allowance for SDF Reserve Personnel will be developed.
- The provision support for SDF Reserve Personnel, etc. who run their own businesses are called up will be newly established.
- The scope covered by the survivors decorations for SDF personnel will also be expanded to SDF officers Colonel [GSDF/ASDF]/Captain [MSDF] (3rd class) and Lieutenant Colonel [GSDF/ASDF]/Commander [MSDF] who have graduated from each SDF officer candidate school.
- To facilitate hiring of retired SDF personnel in local governments, consideration will be given to establishing an appropriate Regional Disaster Prevention Manager System, including necessary financial measures.
- Regarding the public qualifications which retiring SDF personnel attempt to obtain in order to take advantage of the knowledge, skills, and experience they cultivated in the SDF after re-employment, reviews with the relevant ministries and agencies to simplify the process will be advanced and the public qualifications will be implemented promptly, starting with those which are possible.
- Reappointment eligibility will be extended to those who have once left SDF service upon reaching the mandatory retirement age.
- A detailed review will be carried out to raise the retirement age for general personnel by approximately two years. Consideration is being given to extending the sixty-year retirement age—currently applied to select occupational fields—to areas such as space, cyber, and medical sectors where physical demands are low. These specific retirement age and eligibility criteria will be determined by around summer 2025.
- An office dedicated to reinforcement of the human resource base will be established within the MOD's Bureau of Personnel and Education.

(During FY2026)

- With regard to fixed-term SDF personnel, the existing Candidates for Uniformed SDF Personnel System will be abolished with a view to ensuring equal treatment to non-fixed-term SDF personnel. A new type of fixed-term "shi" (E1-E3 level), for which individuals will be recruited as SDF personnel from the outset, will be established and commence recruitment.
- System development will be carried out to facilitate training participation even in the case of national public employees or local public employees who concurrently serve as SDF Reserve Personnel, etc.
- Regarding assistance (support) for re-employment implemented when personnel serving under the early retirement system leave their positions, a system will be developed for the government to provide this assistance (support) for these personnel up to 65 years old, the age at which receipt of the pension begins, subject to certain requirements.
- Based on a review by external experts, the subsidy level of the Compensation for Retirees under Young-Age Retirement will be raised.

(After FY2027)

- Based on a review by external experts, the salary schedule for SDF personnel will be revised in FY2028.
- Based on the results of the reviews concerning raising the retirement age of general personnel and expansion of the occupational fields with a sixty-year retirement age, the raise, etc. will be implemented from FY2028 onward.

End of document

Reference 81 Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed JSDF Personnel and Changes in Them (Over the Past 10 Years)

(As of March 31, 2026)

Category	GSDF	MSDF	ASDF	Joint Staff etc.	Total
Authorized	149,403	45,462	47,131	5,158	247,154
Actual	129,176	41,463	42,324	4,738	217,701
Staffing Rate (%)	86.5	91.2	89.8	91.9	88.1

Category	Non-Fixed-Term Personnel								Fixed-Term Personnel	
	Officer		Warrant Officer		Enlisted (upper)		Enlisted (lower)			
Authorized	46,800		4,943		142,245		53,166			
Actual	43,553	(3,022)	4,677	(151)	138,742	(11,692)	19,383	(3,313)	11,346	(2,083)
Staffing Rate (%)	93.1		94.6		97.5		57.8			

Notes: 1. The number of authorized personnel is determined based on the budget.
2. Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value.
3. The "etc." of the Joint Staff Office refers to Internal Bureaus, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, and joint units.



Reference 82 Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed JSDF Personnel

Classification			Number of Planned Recruited	Number Applied	Number Recruited	Application/Recruitment Ratio	Plan Achievement Ratio
Officer candidates		GSDF	208	1,098 (169)	206 (33)	5.3 (5.1)	99%
		MSDF	112	621 (105)	135 (28)	4.6 (3.8)	121%
		ASDF	92	838 (198)	100 (24)	8.4 (8.3)	109%
		Total	412	2,557 (472)	441 (85)	5.8 (5.6)	107%
Officer Candidate Sergeant		GSDF	133	1,048 (172)	99 (13)	10.6 (13.2)	74%
		MSDF	50	526 (112)	47 (8)	11.2 (14.0)	94%
		ASDF	60	730 (218)	59 (18)	12.4 (12.1)	98%
		Total	243	2,304 (502)	205 (39)	11.2 (12.9)	84%
Specialists		GSDF	58	39 (10)	18 (6)	2.2 (1.7)	31%
		MSDF	27	48 (11)	21 (6)	2.3 (1.8)	78%
		ASDF	29	23 (3)	11 (2)	2.1 (1.5)	38%
		Total	114	110 (24)	50 (14)	2.2 (1.7)	44%
Aviation Cadet		MSDF	74	237 (36)	55 (6)	4.3 (6.0)	74%
		ASDF	72	1,354 (161)	70 (6)	19.3 (26.8)	97%
		Total	146	1,591 (197)	125 (12)	12.7 (16.4)	86%
General candidates for enlistment		GSDF	4,996	9,342 (1,428)	2,365 (267)	4.0 (5.3)	47%
		MSDF	1,800	3,667 (752)	1,216 (222)	3.0 (3.4)	68%
		ASDF	1,850	5,727 (1,621)	1,365 (381)	4.2 (4.3)	74%
		Total	8,646	18,736 (3,801)	4,946 (870)	3.8 (4.4)	57%
Candidates for uniformed JSDF personnel		GSDF	3,004	11,676 (1,799)	2,617 (383)	4.5 (4.7)	87%
		MSDF	800	3,975 (778)	663 (124)	6.0 (6.3)	83%
		ASDF	930	5,085 (1,538)	1,040 (274)	4.9 (5.6)	112%
		Total	4,734	20,736 (4,115)	4,320 (781)	4.8 (5.3)	91%
National Defense Academy Students	Recommended	Humanity and social science	50	164 (43)	55 (25)	3.0 (1.7)	110%
		Science and engineering	165	358 (62)	184 (31)	1.9 (2.0)	112%
		Total	215	522 (105)	239 (56)	2.2 (1.9)	111%
	Selective exam	Humanity and social science	—	76 (14)	19 (6)	4.0 (2.3)	—
		Science and engineering	—	105 (12)	37 (4)	2.8 (3.0)	—
		Total	50	181 (26)	56 (10)	3.2 (2.6)	112%
	General exam	Humanity and social science	40	3,768 (1,604)	48 (10)	78.5 (160.4)	120%
		Science and engineering	175	5,523 (1,399)	185 (28)	29.9 (50.0)	106%
		Total	215	9,291 (3,003)	233 (38)	39.9 (79.0)	108%
	Total	Humanity and social science	90	4,008 (1,661)	122 (41)	32.9 (40.5)	136%
		Science and engineering	340	5,986 (1,473)	406 (63)	14.7 (23.4)	119%
		Total	480	9,994 (3,134)	528 (104)	18.9 (30.1)	110%
National Defense Medical College students	Division of Medicine		85	6,296 (2,271)	84 (25)	75.0 (90.8)	99%
	Division of Nursing (nursing students who are JSDF personnel candidates)		75	1,091 (794)	75 (68)	14.5 (11.7)	100%
	Total		160	7,387 (3,065)	159 (93)	46.5 (33.0)	99%
GSDF High Technical School Students	Recommended		150	493	151	3.3	101%
	General exam		200	1,216	177	6.9	89%
	Total		350	1,709	328	5.2	94%
Others			145	235 (75)	75 (24)	3.1 (3.1)	52%
Total			15,430	65,359 (15,385)	11,177 (2,022)	5.8 (7.6)	72%

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses indicate numbers of females.
2. The numbers are for JSDF regular personnel recruited in FY2025
3. The numbers of planned required National Defense Academy Students (Selective exam) are not broken down by major department.
4. "Other" refers to medical and dental officers, mid-career officers, dental and pharmacist officer candidates, and JSDF scholarship students.

Reference 83 Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Employees, etc.

(As of March 31, 2026)

<table>
<tr><th colspan="3">Special Service</th><th colspan="2">Regular Service</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="9">Defense Minister
State Defense Minister
Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (2)
Senior Adviser to the Defense Minister (up to 1)
Special Advisers to the Defense Minister (up to 3)</td><td>Authorized Strength</td><td>Non-Authorized Strength</td><td>Authorized Strength</td><td>Non-Authorized Strength</td></tr>
<tr><td>Private Secretary of the Defense Minister</td><td></td><td rowspan="8">Defense Officials, Instructors, and others 25</td><td rowspan="8">Part-Time Officials</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">JSDF Personnel</td></tr>
<tr><td>Administrative Vice-Defense Minister</td><td>Candidates for JSDF Personnel</td></tr>
<tr><td>Vice-Defense Minister for International Affairs</td><td>Reserve Personnel 47,900</td></tr>
<tr><td>Director, Director General, and others 882</td><td>Ready Reserve Personnel 7,981</td></tr>
<tr><td>Civilian Officials and others 20,345</td><td>Candidates for Reserve Personnel 4,621</td></tr>
<tr><td>Uniformed JSDF Personnel 247,154</td><td>National Defense Academy students</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3"></td><td>National Defense Medical College students</td></tr>
<tr><td>GSDF High Technical School students</td></tr>
<tr><td>Part-Time Officials</td></tr>
</table>

Notes: 1. Number of personnel refers to the numbers specified in the laws and regulations (as for uniformed JSDF Personnel, the number is the authorized number specified in the laws and regulations)
2. "Others" in the title includes Defense Minister, State Defense Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Defense Minister, Senior Adviser to the Defense Minister, and Private Secretary of the Defense Minister

Reference 84 The MOD Cyber Workforce Comprehensive Strategy

1. Background and Objective

(1) The Defense Buildup Program formulated at the end of 2022 clearly states the establishment of a cybersecurity posture to secure command and control capabilities and high-priority equipment systems, to ensure the ability of the JSDF to execute its mission, and to support the cyber defense of defense-related industries even under cyberattacks and securement of approximately 20,000 JMOD/JSDF cyber personnel by around FY 2027 by expanding cyber units, such as the JCDC (JSDF Cyber Defense Command), to approximately 4,000 personnel and providing education to personnel engaged in cyber-related operations, such as system procurement, maintenance, and operation.

(2) When enhancing cyber capabilities, the core element for delivering the functional performance is personnel, in other words, cyber workforce. It is necessary to expand the system and enhance the capabilities by implementing all possible measures by expanding the internal training of the motivated workforce and actively accepting an external workforce with knowledge.

(3) In today's society, where the population is declining, the environment surrounding the HR recruiting of the JMOD/JSDF is becoming increasingly difficult, which is the case for many companies in Japanese society. Furthermore, cybersecurity is a common challenge for the entire world, and the importance of cyber workforce is increasing not only within the JMOD/JSDF but also in society as a whole. When considering measures for expanding the system under such circumstances, it is important to bring together the resources and ideas of the JGSDF, JMSDF, and JASDF in order to secure and develop human resources as well as to proceed with consideration beyond the constraints on ideas bound by interorganizational barriers and existing frameworks while aiming for integration with national cyber workforce development initiatives in Japan. To this end, it is necessary to share information inside and outside the organization about the image of the cyber workforce of the JMOD/JSDF and the progress of consideration of the measures to implement, such as the needs of cyber-related operations and the roles needed by the organization, the kind of personnel required, the kind of education that is provided, and the kind of career path that is available, in order to accelerate the harmonization and consideration of the entire organization while securing and developing a workforce within the cyber workforce ecosystem in society as a whole.

(4) Therefore, in order to create the following effects, the decision was made to present the basic direction of the JMOD/JSDF cyber workforce as a strategy both internally and externally.

A. To ensure consistency within the JMOD/JSDF policy for securing and developing a workforce and to promote consideration of measures for workforce and cross-departmental cooperation

B. To clarify the ideas of the JMOD/JSDF regarding cyber workforce and to approach those who aspire to join the JMOD/JSDF and external cyber workforce while developing and deepening cooperative relationships with external entities

2. JMOD/JSDF Missions and Cyber Workforce

(1) In response to the recent dramatic technology evolution in cyberspace, the threat is becoming more advanced and complex by organized cyber-attackers based on the division of labor. Given this trend, the defense side also needs to respond to advanced threats by utilizing the technical capabilities of each individual and implementing team initiatives in a systematically organized manner. This is no exception even within the JSDF and, in the cyber units, COs, NCOs, AOs, TOs, and others work together as a team. COs direct the performance of military unit missions, while NCOs accomplish the missions as the core of the unit under the direction of the COs. Working in cooperation with JSDF personnel who perform operations from a military perspective, highly specialized AOs and others perform technically challenging analysis, coordination, and other missions to deliver the functional performance of military units. Meanwhile, for some tasks, such as extremely advanced analyses, where the task of securing and training personnel in a short period of time is difficult, contractors are employed as necessary. Also within the cyber domains, JSDF personnel consisting of COs and NCOs, AOs, and service personnel fulfill their missions as a team by playing their individual roles within military units.

(2) In addition, in particular, the JSDF cyber workforce must understand not only cyber domains but also JSDF activities as well as the operations within the JGSDF, JMSDF, and JASDF fields supported by the cyber domains before performing their activities. Specifically, they are required to have a certain level of understanding of the operations of the various assets of tanks, warships, and fighter aircraft that are connected through cyberspace and to be able to consider the kind of attacks they may face, how they must mount a defense, and the kind of measures they must implement in advance.

(3) One of the characteristics of JSDF cyber operations is that cyber domains support a variety of different assets and operations. However, it is not necessary to have knowledge of JSDF operations or cyber-related knowledge in advance. One of the advantages of the JMOD/JSDF is internal schools, including the JGSDF System and Signal/Cyber School. In addition to the knowledge of various operations, personnel can also acquire cyber knowledge, depending on their level, after joining the JSDF with additional opportunities for training and studying externally. In addition, environments are currently in place for persons well-skilled in the cyber field to hone their skills. Many opportunities are available for practical training and the exchange of opinions during cyber exercises with other national armies and multilateral exercises where top-level personnel from the public and private sectors hone their practical skills, many of which only the JSDF can participate in.

(4) For those interested in the security of systems and networks that support the large JMOD/JSDF organization with a total of approximately 270,000 personnel, and for those simply interested in the JSDF and cyber workforce, the JMOD/JSDF can provide environments where personnel can learn, compete, and enhance their skills. In order to recruit human resources interested in working in the JMOD/JSDF cyber domains and becoming part of a highly skilled cyber workforce, we will promote implementation and consideration of the measures described in the next chapter.

3. Direction of Initiatives

In order to recruit an excellent cyber workforce for the JMOD/JSDF, the organizations must recruit and train a wide range of human resources, including those who are interested in JMOD/

JSDF cyber operations and those with a wealth of cyber knowledge. HR measures are considered from the following five aspects. In other words, comprehensive measures are considered for (1) accurate identification of the skills and capabilities required of a cyber workforce, (2) appropriate recruitment for cyber workforce, (3) appropriate "development," (4) retention of a workforce, and (5) "unification" of the entire HR measures.

(1) Initiatives for Identifying a Cyber Workforce

The roles and skills required of the JMOD/JSDF cyber workforce depend on the post. For this reason, the consideration and design of indicators for assessing the cyber skills of a cyber workforce are implemented as basic measures for the skills and appropriate education systems needed according to the nature of the diverse roles and rank of each individual, including generalists in charge of strategy, specialists in charge of mission operations, and experts in charge of technology.

(2) Initiatives for Recruiting a Cyber Workforce

A. Buildup of a system for personnel to continuously engage in cyber operations as a cyber workforce from the beginning of service

In order to further enhance the expertise of those who aspire to work in the cyber field, we will establish a career path to continuously engage in cyber-related work from the beginning of service. In addition, those who already have specialized expertise, qualifications, and work experience related to the cyber domain will be hired as (specific) fixed-term JSDF personnel, mid-career COs, or technical sergeants and will be flexibly appointed to jobs and posts where they can make use of their experience.

In terms of recruiting personnel as the commanders of cyber units, we will establish a career path in which COs mainly engage in cyber-related work while serving at army HQ or in commands to develop the necessary background and experience as COs at each necessary milestone. In particular, the JGSDF will establish a new cyber-specific exam category and start to recruit from FY 2025 to allow such a career path to start from the beginning of service.

Furthermore, JMOD will establish a career path for COs who will serve as the core of operations as cyber specialists, focusing on cyber-related tasks while also placing emphasis on education and training both inside and outside the organization. In this regard, JMOD will establish a new CO employment system and be recruiting from FY 2025 onwards Additionally, for the cyber personnel, we will ensure that this career path can be initiated from the beginning of the service.

For NCOs, we will establish a career path that centers on cyber field education and assignment to cyber units so that they can continue to hone their skills as technical experts in the cyber field. For graduates of the JGSDF High Technical School who already have knowledge and skills in the cyber field, we will establish a career path so that they can continuously engage in cyber-related work while further improving skills.

In addition, a system is developed in which personnel employed as PVTs who have received cyber-related education are assigned to cyber-related service branch units taking in to account their wishes, which allow them to start a career path from the beginning of service even if they do not have sufficient work experience, in order to prevent early resignations due to a mismatch with their desired work assignments.

Furthermore, we will reinforce recruitment by reaching out to an external cyber workforce while making it easier to imagine working at the JMOD through more visible career paths of personnel engaged in cyber operations and more attractive work experiences in the JMOD.

B. Expansion of "Cyber SDF Reserve Personnel"

For operation of SDF reserve personnel with cyber skills to engage in the different military missions together with regular JSDF personnel (hereinafter referred to as "cyber SDF reserve personnel"), the direction of desired initiatives will be created with the aim of having such personnel play a part in the operation of the JSDF in such a way as to engage in missions that strongly complement regular JSDF personnel.

In addition to further deepening the operational concepts including the current call-up classification and to enable cyber SDF reserve personnel to respond more effectively to JSDF operations in the cyber domains with due attention to secrecy, we will further enhance training while expanding opportunities for the personnel to participate in training in such a way as to conduct drills in practical environments with the armed forces of other countries in order to improve both the individual capabilities of cyber SDF reserve personnel and the organizational capabilities of cyber units.

In addition, we will consider measures to make better use of the specialized skills of cyber SDF reserve personnel for the missions of the JSDF units, and from the perspective of improving the seamless protection posture and sustainability from peacetime to wartime, we will consider measures to enable employees of service contract companies that maintain and manage the JMOD/JSDF systems that support the command and control of the JSDF to serve as SDF reserve personnel.

In order to secure the human resources, the cyber workforce with no experience as JSDF personnel but who are active in external organizations are hired as candidates for SDF reserve personnel, and the initiatives for appointment of the candidates as cyber SDF reserve personnel are reinforced. At this time, through interviews with cyber SDF reserve personnel in active service, we will promote proactive recruitment campaigns by emphasizing the attractiveness and rewarding experiences of working in the JMOD/JSDF, while clarifying recruitment targets. When securing human resources, we will continue the scouting of a highly skilled cyber workforce with due attention to the fact that military units require discipline, actions, and teamwork. At the time of appointment, consideration is made to relax physical examination standards depending on the required role of cyber SDF reserve personnel (including regular JSDF personnel) and early employment of candidates for SDF reserve personnel as cyber reserve JSDF personnel or as regular JSDF personnel.

C. Utilizing the JSDF Scholarship Program

In order to recruit excellent students who are interested in JSDF cyber operations at an early stage, the JSDF scholarship program, which provides a fixed amount of educational funding each month, is utilized and the assistance is provided to excellent students who are interested in cyber operations while reinforcing outreach activities through the later-described JMOD cyber contests and recruitment information sessions, to encourage students to work in a JSDF cyber unit in the future.

D. Holding JMOD Cyber Contests

We will reinforce proactive approaches for those who are motivated to work at the JMOD to enhance initiatives,

such as JMOD cyber contests to discover talented human resources and nationwide recruitment information sessions at universities, high schools, and vocational schools. In addition, we will also carry out the internal scouting of personnel who are interested in cyber operations.

E. Conducting effective PR activities through information sessions at universities, high schools, vocational schools, and via the Web

To further promote the acceptance of external human resources with specialized qualifications and work experience, the situation needs to be resolved where external human resources are not familiar with the various JMOD recruitment categories, such as recruitment of those with experience as an AO/TO, and recruitment as a mid-career CO/technical sergeant and as (specific) fixed-term JSDF personnel or cybersecurity adviser. To this end, in addition to detailed explanation of the various recruitment categories accordingly to each individual's lifestyle and desired career, we will reinforce communication with potential candidates for JSDF personnel by providing recruitment information on the JMOD cyber workforce and attractive work experiences. For example, we will place advertisements at the gathering times and places targeting the cyber workforce to communicate the attractiveness of the duties, career paths, rewarding experiences, and treatment of the JMOD cyber workforce, while creating links to the website for recruitment of JSDF personnel and utilizing career-change websites to secure digital navigation for recruitment.

At this time, JMOD/JSDF-specific attractive work experiences are actively communicated and include the fact that JMOD/JSDF provides opportunities to gain JSDF-specific practical knowledge and experience, including joint drills with the cyber units of the armed forces of other countries.

(3) Initiatives for Developing a Cyber Workforce

A. Expansion of a specialized course in system and cyber engineering at the JGSDF High Technical School

The JGSDF High Technical School opened the specialized course in system and cyber engineering (in FY 2021) in order to develop excellent sergeants who play a central role in cyber units from the early stages and to provide a cyber education to motivated students. We will expand the scale of the cyber education in the specialized course to approximately 60 students, which doubles the current number, by around FY 2025 while aiming to enhance and improve the curriculum of the education, including the acquisition of private qualifications.

B. Reorganization into the Faculty of Cyber and Information Engineering at the National Defense Academy to enhance education

Reorganization of the Faculty of Information Engineering at the National Defense Academy into the Faculty of Cyber and Information Engineering (in FY 2024)

C. Expansion of the educational infrastructure of the JGSDF System and Signal/Cyber School to enhance education

Reorganization of the JGSDF Signal School into the System and Signal/Cyber School (in FY 2023)

D. Enhancement of studying at domestic and international educational organizations and training in private companies

As training after joining the force, opportunities are available to study at internal and external organizations of education and train in private companies. Opportunities will be further expanded while enhancing the support system where the personnel can improve their skills while working in their units, including the opening of new educational courses in Japan by overseas institutions. At this time, we will also push forward enhancement of the programs that allow participation only from the JMOD/JSDF.

(4) Initiatives for Retention of a Cyber Workforce

A. Flexible assignment of a cyber workforce to service branch units

To maintain the workforce as an organization while promoting the improvement of the capabilities of a recruited and developed workforce, maintaining a balance between due consideration for each individual's skills, career history, and motivation and the necessary assignments within an organization to execute JMOD/JSDF missions is necessary. Conversely, for a skilled cyber workforce, we will utilize talented workforce personnel throughout the organization as an important base for delivering military performance that allows flexible assignments to service branch units by further expanding the existing system.

B. Review of the HR management methods, including a Cyber Emblem

JSDF cyber workforce personnel are required to understand not only cyber domains but also JSDF activities as well as the operations within the JGSDF, JMSDF, and JASDF fields as supported by the cyber domains. For this reason, we will recruit human resources from a wide range of fields, and identify personnel with skills above a certain baseline to allow flexible and cross-departmental human resource management. In terms of increasing the incentives and motivation of cyber personnel, we will consider a review of the human resource management methods, including a Cyber Badge and special skill management, as needed with initiatives for indicators for assessing skills.

(5) Measures to Unify Overall initiatives for a Cyber Workforce

A. Installation of JMOD Cyber COE

We will install the JMOD Cyber COE[1] as a platform to promote cross-organizational initiatives by bringing together the knowledge and expertise of a wide range of participants, including policy sides, research institutes, and field units within the JMOD to reinforce the system to promote all cyber-related initiatives together. We will promote communication between the center and the field to reinforce internal organizational cooperation for policy planning, research and study, research and development, human resource development, and international cooperation. Furthermore, we will strengthen cooperation with related external organizations, and deepen the relationships to

1 COE is an acronym that stands for Center of Excellence. Although its definition differs among the respective organizations, including companies, it often refers to a core department or research base in general, which is composed of experts for cross-organizational initiatives in prioritized fields. As an example of COE installed by government agencies, there is the NATO CCDCOE (NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence), which has been installed as a cyber-specific research institute.

provide a virtuous circle between the internal and external cyber workforce.

B. Realization of the Revolving Door

Given that a cyber workforce is becoming increasingly important in society as a whole and that individuals' career development is becoming more diverse, which is not necessarily based on the premise of long-term employment, it is necessary to take the initiative with liquidity as needed that allow human resources to move in and out of an organization. Along with initiatives to ensure that the JMOD/JSDF is recognized as a step in career development by having a cyber workforce who left the JMOD/JSDF and who are now active in society as a whole, it is necessary to create a system that allows a workforce with full-time careers in the private sector to return to the JSDF while changing the internal way of thinking for re-accepting personnel who left the JMOD/JSDF. For example, we will promote initiatives for the employment of a cyber workforce with external work experience and re-employment of alumni[2] to achieve what is known as the "revolving door" for human resources. To this end, will promote initiatives to respond to the diverse life and career plans of applicants through optimization of existing systems, such as technical sergeants and mid-career COs, consideration of treatment based on job duties, and consideration of a review of the existing systems for technical sergeants and mid-career COs. For reemployment of alumni, we will realize an employment system to appropriately evaluate the knowledge and experience obtained externally after reviewing the current calculation method and giving full consideration to the capabilities and experience of personnel, as well as creating a JMOD cyber alumni community and establishing a system that promotes a virtuous circle of human resources while maintaining relationships.

C. Enhancement of industry-government-academia collaboration

To catch up to the latest technological trends in the rapidly changing field of cybersecurity while maintaining the motivation of active-duty personnel, for example, it is necessary to regularly provide JSDF personnel with opportunities to acquire practical skills externally, such as in the private sector, and to promote the use of human resources who have been involved in cybersecurity work in the private sector. Therefore, we will expand the curriculum of external education and the exchanges between the government and the private sector as opportunities for human resource development.

In order to improve the motivation and skills of a cyber workforce within the JMOD/JSDF and to promote a virtuous circle of human resources in the cyber field, we will deepen industry-government-academia collaboration by utilizing the activities of multilateral cyber defense exercises, including Locked Shields, and the JMOD Cyber COE.

2 In this document, those who have left the JMOD/JSDF are referred to as alumni.

Reference 85 Main Measures for Re-employment Support

Classification	Measures for re-employment support		Description
Measures for retiring uniformed JSDF personnel	Occupational aptitude testing		Testing aimed to provide retiring uniformed JSDF personnel with guidance based on individual aptitudes
	Career guidance		Provide retiring uniformed JSDF personnel with knowhow to choose new occupation and right mindset toward reemployment
	Business management training		Support uniformed JSDF personnel retiring at an early age to cultivate social adaptability, as well as provide necessary knowledge to lead a stable life after reemployment and retirement
	Vocational training	Technical training	Provide retiring uniformed JSDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement and eligible for qualifications (large-sized vehicle operation, forklift operation, electrician, hazardous material engineer, boiler engineer, heavy-duty vehicle operation, regular-sized vehicle operation, crane operators, first-level training for nursing care workers, large-sized special vehicle operation, registered seller, financial planner, pharmacy work, electrical work construction management engineer, qualified firefighting equipment inspector, gas welding work supervisor, etc.)
		Disaster prevention and risk management training	Provide uniformed JSDF officer retiring at an early age with technical knowledge on disaster prevention administration and the Civil Protection Plan (attending lectures in this area is a prerequisite for receiving the Cabinet Office's Regional Disaster Prevention Manager license)
		Correspondence courses	Provide retiring uniformed JSDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement and eligible for qualifications (hazardous materials engineer, electrician, financial planner, real estate transaction specialist, property administrator, health manager, boiler engineer, certified administrative procedures legal specialist, fire defense equipment officer, support to personnel who wish to go to university, etc.)
	Internship program		Implement internship programs for uniformed JSDF personnel who plan to retire in order to prevent early retirement due to reemployment mismatches as well as to expand places of re-employment
	Outsourcing career counseling, etc.		Outsource career counseling, etc., to external experts to meet the needs of each retiring uniformed JSDF personnel
Measures for internal support personnel	Training for support personnel		Training of labor administration, support activities, etc. to improve quality of support personnel
Measures for promotion outside of JSDF	Support for publicity aimed at to business owners		Publicizing to business owners, etc., the effectiveness of uniformed JSDF personnel who plan to retire
	Inviting business owners on unit tours		Invite business owners to JSDF units, etc., and provide them with tours, explanations of the re-employment support situation, etc.

Reference 86 Employment of Retired Uniformed JSDF Personnel in Local Government Disaster Prevention Agencies

(As of March 31, 2026 692 personnel)

Prefectural Government	Government employment situation
Hokkaido	Hokkaido Prefectural Government Office (5 persons), Sapporo City Office (2 persons), Hakodate City Office (2 persons), Otaru City Office, Asahikawa City Office, Muroran City Office, Kushiro City Office, Obihiro City Office (3 persons), Iwamizawa City Office, Rumoi City Office, Tomakomai City Office, Wakkanai City Office, Bibai City Office, Ashibetsu City Office, Akabira City Office, Monbetsu City Office, Shibetsu City Office, Nayoro City Office, Nemuro City Office, Chitose City Office (3 persons), Takikawa City Office, Furano City Office, Noboribetsu City Office, Eniwa City Office (2 persons), Date City Office, Kitahiroshima City Office (2 persons), Hokuto City Office (2 persons), Matsumae Town Office, Shiriuchi Town Office, Nanae Town Office, Shikabe Town Office, Mori Town Office, Yakumo Town Office, Oshamambe Town Office, Shimamaki Village Office, Rusutsu Village Office, Kimobetsu Town Office, Kutchan Town Office, Niki Town Office, Kamisunagawa Town Office, Yuni Town Office, Urasu Town Office (3 persons), Numata Town Office, Takasu Town Office, Toma Town Office, Biei Town Office, Kamifurano Town Office, Nakafurano Town Office (2 persons), Minami Furano Town Office, Shimokawa Town Office, Nakagawa Town Office, Teshio Town Office, Esashi Town Office, Toyotomi Town Office, Rebun Town Office, Rishiri Town Office, Bihoro Town Office, Engaru Town Office (2 persons), Sobetsu Town Office, Atsuma Town Office, Abira Town Office, Shinhidaka Town Office, Otofuke Town Office (3 persons), Shihoro Town Office, Shikaoi Town Office, Memuro Town Office, Makubetsu Town Office, Ashoro Town Office, Shibecha Town Office, Teshikaga Town Office, Betsukai Town Office
Aomori	Aomori Prefectural Government Office (3 persons), Aomori City Office (4 persons), Hirosaki City Office, Hachinohe City Office (3 persons), Towada City Office, Misawa City Office, Tsugaru City Office, Ajigasawa Town Office, Fukaura Town Office
Iwate	Iwate Prefectural Government Office, Morioka City Office, Miyako City Office, Hanamaki City Office, Takizawa City Office, Shizukuishi Town Office, Otsuchi Town Office, Iwaizumi Town Office, Noda Village Office, Hirono Town Office
Miyagi	Miyagi Prefectural Government Office, Sendai City Office (2 persons), Ishinomaki City Office, Shiogama City Office, Natori City Office, Kakuda City Office, Tagajo City Office, Iwanuma City Office, Kurihara City Office, Higashimatsushima City Office, Tomiya City Office, Shibata Town Office, Marumori Town Office, Rifu Town Office, Ohira Village Office, Minamisanriku Town Office
Akita	Akita Prefectural Government Office (3 persons), Akita City Office, Odate City Office, Yuzawa City Office, Yurihonjo City Office, Katagami City Office, Daisen City Office, Gojome Town Office, Ikawa Town Office, Ugo Town Office
Yamagata	Yamagata Prefectural Government Office, Yamagata City Office, Yonezawa City Office, Shinjo City Office, Kaminoyama City Office, Murayama City Office, Tendo City Office, Higashine City Office, Obanazawa City Office, Oishida Town Office, Takahata City Office, Shirataka City Office
Fukushima	Fukushima Prefectural Government Office (2 persons), Fukushima City Office (2 persons), Koriyama City Office, Iwaki City Office, Date City Office, Motomiya City Office
Ibaraki	Ibaraki Prefectural Government Office, Mito City Office, Koga City Office, Ryugasaki City Office, Shimotsuma City Office, Hitachiota City Office, Takahagi City Office, Kitaibaraki City Office, Hitachiomiya City Office, Chikusei City Office, Sakai Town Office (2 persons)
Tochigi	Tochigi Prefectural Government Office, Utsunomiya City Office, Sano City Office, Oyama City Office
Gunma	Gunma Prefectural Government Office (2 persons), Nakanojo Town Office
Saitama	Saitama Prefectural Government Office, Saitama City Office, Kawagoe City Office, Gyoda City Office, Iruma City Office, Asaka City Office, Wako City Office, Okegawa City Office, Kuki City Office, Yoshikawa City Office
Chiba	Chiba Prefectural Government Office, Chiba City Office, Ichikawa City Office, Funabashi City Office, Tateyama City Office, Kisarazu City Office, Matsudo City Office, Noda City Office, Mobara City Office, Narita City Office, Sakura City Office, Narashino City Office, Kashiwa City Office, Ichihara City Office, Nagareyama City Office, Yachiyo City Office, Kamagaya City Office, Futtsu City Office, Urayasu City Office, Yotsukaido City Office, Yachimata City Office, Inzai City Office, Shiroi City Office, Tomisato City Office, Katori City Office, Sammu City Office, Isumi City Office, Oamishirasato City Office, Shisui Town Office, Sakae Town Office, Tohnosho Town Office, Kujukuri Town Office, Shibayama Town Office, Mutsuzawa Town Office, Shirako Town Office, Nagara Town Office, Kyonann Town Office
Tokyo	Tokyo Metropolitan Government Office (11 persons), Chuo Ward Office, Sumida Ward Office, Koto Ward Office, Shinagawa Ward Office (3 persons), Meguro Ward Office, Ota Ward Office (2 persons), Setagaya Ward Office, Shibuya Ward Office (2 persons), Toshima City Office, Kita Ward Office, Arakawa Ward Office, Itabashi Ward Office, Adachi Ward Office, Katsushika Ward Office, Fuchu City Office, Chofu City Office, Hino City Office, Komae City Office, Hamura City Office, Akiruno City Office, Mizuho Town Office
Kanagawa	Kanagawa Prefectural Government Office (5 persons), Yokohama City Office (6 persons), Kawasaki City Office, Sagamihara City Office (2 persons), Yokosuka City Office, Hiratsuka City Office, Kamakura City Office, Fujisawa City Office (2 persons), Odawara City Office, Chigasaki City Office, Zushi City Office (2 persons), Miura City Office (2 persons), Atsugi City Office, Ebina City Office (4 persons), Zama City Office, Minamiashigara City Office, Ayase City Office, Hayama Town Office, Oiso Town Office, Nakai Town Office, Oi Town Office, Kaisei Town Office, Hakone Town Office (2 persons), Yugawara Town Office, Aikawa Town Office
Niigata	Niigata Prefectural Government Office, Niigata City Office, Shibata City Office, Kamo City Office, Tsubame City Office, Joetsu City Office, Seiro Town Office, Sekikawa Village Office
Toyama	Toyama Prefectural Government Office (2 persons), Toyama City Office (2 persons), Tonami City Office
Ishikawa	Ishikawa Prefectural Government Office (2 persons), Kanazawa City Office, Wajima City Office, Kaga City Office (2 persons), Hakui City Office, Hakusan City Office, Houdatsushimizu Town Office
Fukui	Fukui Prefectural Government Office (4 persons), Katsuyama City Office, Awara City Office (2 persons)
Yamanashi	Yamanashi Prefectural Government Office, Fujiyoshida City Office, Minobu Town Office, Oshino Village Office, Fujikawaguchiko Town Office
Nagano	Nagano Prefectural Government Office, Nagano City Office, Matsumoto City Office, Chino City Office, Shiojiri City Office, Azumino City Office, Miyota City Office
Gifu	Gifu Prefectural Government Office (2 persons), Gifu City Office, Kakamigahara City Office, Hida City Office
Shizuoka	Shizuoka Prefectural Government Office (5 persons), Hamamatsu City Office, Atami City Office, Kakegawa City Office, Gotemba City Office (3 persons), Susono City Office, Kikukawa City Office, Nishiizu Town Office, Nagaizumi Town Office, Oyama Town Office, Kawanehon Town Office
Aichi	Aichi Prefectural Government Office, Nagoya City Office (2 persons), Toyohashi City Office (2 persons), Kasugai City Office, Kariya City Office, Toyota City Office, Nishio City Office, Gamagori City Office, Tokoname City Office, Komaki City Office, Inazawa City Office, Shinshiro City Office, Tokai City Office, Obu City Office, Chita City Office, Toyoake City Office, Nisshin City Office, Tahara City Office, Kiyosu City Office, Kitanagoya City Office (2 persons), Yatomi City Office (2 persons), Miyoshi City Office, Ama City Office, Nagakute City Office (2 persons), Toyoyama Town Office, Oguchi Town Office, Oharu Town Office, Kanie Town Office, Tobishima Village Office, Mihama Town Office, Taketoyo Town Office, Kota Town Office
Mie	Mie Prefectural Government Office, Tsu City Office, Ise City Office, Kuwana City Office, Nabari City Office, Kameyama City Office, Toba City Office, Shima City Office, Meiwa Town Office
Shiga	Shiga Prefectural Government Office, Takashima City Office
Kyoto	Kyoto Prefectural Government Office, Kyoto City Office, Maizuru City Office, Joyo City Office, Yawata City Office (3 persons), Kyotanabe City Office, Nantan City Office, Kizugawa City Office (2 persons), Seika Town Office (2 persons)
Osaka	Osaka Prefectural Government Office, Osaka City Office, Sakai City Office, Kishiwada City Office, Ikeda City Office, Izumiotsu City Office, Kaizuka City Office, Ibaraki City Office, Yao City Office, Izumisano City Office (2 persons), Tondabayashi City Office, Daito City Office, Takaishi City Office, Sennan City Office, Shijonawate City Office, Toyono Town Office, Chihayaakasaka Village Office
Hyogo	Hyogo Prefectural Government Office (2 persons), Kobe City Office (5 persons), Himeji City Office, Akashi City Office, Nishiwaki Town Office, Kawanishi City Office (2 persons), Ono City Office, Kasai City Office, Kato City Office, Inagawa Town Office

Prefectural Government	Government employment situation
Nara	Nara Prefectural Government Office (2 persons), Nara City Office (4 persons), Yamatotakada City Office, Kashihara City Office, Gojo City Office (2 persons), Ikoma City Office (2 persons), Yamazoe Village Office, Tawaramoto Town Office, Koryo Town Office
Wakayama	Wakayama Prefectural Government Office, Wakayama City Office
Tottori	Tottori Prefectural Government Office (5 persons), Tottori City Office, Yonago City Office, Sakaiminato City Office, Nambu Town Office, Nichinan Town Office
Shimane	Shimane Prefectural Government Office, Matsue City Office, Izumo City Office
Okayama	Okayama Prefectural Government Office, Okayama City Office, Kurashiki City Office, Kasaoka City Office, Maniwa City Office, Asakuchi City Office (2 persons), Kagamino Town Office, Shoo Town Office
Hiroshima	Hiroshima Prefectural Government Office (3 persons), Hiroshima City Office, Kure City Office, Mihara City Office, Fuchu City Office (2 persons), Miyoshi City Office, Otake City Office, Hatsukaichi City Office, Kaita Town Office, Kumano Town Office, Saka Town Office
Yamaguchi	Yamaguchi Prefectural Government Office (2 persons), Ube City Office, Yamaguchi City Office, Hagi City Office, Hofu City Office (2 persons), Kudamatsu City Office, Iwakuni City Office, Hikari City Office, Shunan City Office, Waki Town Office, Hirao Town Office
Tokushima	Tokushima Prefectural Government Office (9 persons), Tokushima City Office, Yoshinogawa City Office, Mima City Office, Miyoshi City Office, Katsuura Town Office, Mugi Town Office
Kagawa	Kagawa Prefectural Government Office, Marugame City Office, Sakaide City Office, Zentsuji City Office, Kanonji City office, Sanuki City Office, Ayagawa Town Office, Manno Town Office
Ehime	Ehime Prefectural Government Office, Imabari City Office, Uwajima City Office, Niihama City Office, Saijo City Office, Shikokuchuo City Office, Seiyo City Office, Kamijima Town Office, Masaki Town Office (2 persons)
Kochi	Kochi Prefectural Government Office, Kochi City Office, Susaki City Office, Konan City Office, Kuroshio Town Office
Fukuoka	Fukuoka Prefectural Government Office, Kitakyushu City Office, Fukuoka City Office (2 persons), Iizuka City Office (2 persons), Chikugo City Office, Ogori City Office, Kasuga City Office, Onojo City Office (2 persons), Munakata City Office, Dazaifu City Office, Asakura City Office, Miyama City Office, Itoshima City office, Nakagawa City Office (2 persons), Sasaguri Town office, Hisayama Town Office, kasuya Town Office, Ashiya Town Office, Okagaki Town office, Tachiarai Town Office
Saga	Saga Prefectural Government Office (5 persons), Karatsu City Office, Tosu City Office, Takeo City Office, Kamimine Town Office
Nagasaki	Nagasaki Prefectural Government Office (5 persons), Sasebo City Office, Shimabara City Office, Isahaya City Office, Omura City Office, Iki City Office, Unzen City Office
Kumamoto	Kumamoto Prefectural Government Office (6 persons), Kumamoto City Office, Yatsushiro City Office, Arao City Office, Minamata City Office, Yamaga City Office, Kikuchi City Office, Kamiamakusa City Office, Aso City Office, Amakusa City Office, Koshi City Office (2 persons), Ozu Town Office, Kikuyo Town Office, Yamato Town Office, Ashikita Town Office, Kuma Village Office, Asagiri Town Office
Oita	Oita Prefectural Government Office, Oita City Office, Beppu City Office, Nakatsu City Office, Saiki City Office, Kitsuki City Office (2 persons), Yufu City Office, Hiji Town Office
Miyazaki	Miyazaki Prefectural Government Office (3 persons), Miyazaki City Office, Miyakonojo City Office (3 persons), Nobeoka City Office (2 persons), Nichinan City Office (2 persons), Kobayashi Office, Hyuga City Office, Kushima City Office, Saito City Office, Ebino City Office, Takaharu Town Office, Shintomi Town Office, Kawaminami Town Office, Tsuno Town Office, Kadogawa Town Office
Kagoshima	Kagoshima Prefectural Government Office (5 persons), Kagoshima City Office, Kanoya City Office, Izumi City Office, Tarumizu City Office, Satsumasendai City Office, Kirishima City Office (2 persons), Aira City Office, Satsuma Town Office, Yusui Town Office, Kinko Town Office, Setouchi Town Office, Amagi Town Office, Yoron Town Office
Okinawa	Okinawa Prefectural Government Office, Urasoe City Office, Chatan Town Office, Yonaguni Village Office

Note: Provided by the Ministry of Defense as of March 31, 2026 (part-time personnel included).

Defense Chronology

Year	Date	Major Events
1945	Aug. 15	World War II ends
	Aug. 17	Higashikuninomiya Cabinet established
	Aug. 17	Republic of Indonesia declares independence
	Aug. 28	Provisional government of People's Republic of Vietnam established
	Sep. 02	GHQ established
	Oct. 09	Shidehara Cabinet established
	Oct. 15	General Staff Office and Military Command abolished
	Oct. 24	United Nations established
	Nov. 30	Army and Navy Ministries abolished
1946	Jan. 04	GHQ orders purge from public office
	Jan. 10	First session of U.N. General Assembly (London, through February 14)
	Jan. 27	GHQ orders the suspension of Japanese administrative right over Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands
	Feb. 26	Far East Commission formed
	Mar. 05	Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech
	Apr. 05	First meeting of Allied Council on Japan
	Apr. 24	Civil administration of Okinawa established
	May 03	International Military Tribunal for the Far East opened
	May 22	Yoshida Cabinet established
	Oct. 01	International War Crimes Tribunal in Nuremberg renders judgment
	Nov. 03	The Constitution of Japan promulgated
	Dec. 19	First Indochina War starts (through 1954)
1947	Mar. 12	Truman Doctrine announced
	May 03	The Constitution of Japan takes effect
	Jun. 01	Katayama Cabinet established
	Jun. 05	Marshall Plan announced
	Aug. 15	India and Pakistan gain independence
	Aug. 15	First India-Pakistan conflict (through 1965)
	Oct. 05	Cominform established
	Dec. 17	Police Law promulgated (National Rural Police and municipal police forces established)
1948	Mar. 10	Ashida Cabinet established
	Apr. 01	USSR imposes Berlin blockade (through May 12, 1949)
	Apr. 27	Japan Coast Guard Law promulgated
	May 14	Israel gains independence; First Middle East War starts (through February 24, 1949)
	Jun. 11	U.S. Senate Vandenberg resolution
	Jun. 26	Berlin airlift starts
	Aug. 15	Republic of Korea (ROK) declares independence
	Sep. 09	North Korea established
	Oct. 19	Inauguration of the second Yoshida Cabinet
	Nov. 12	International Military Tribunal for the Far East renders judgment
1949	Jan. 25	Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON) established
	Feb. 16	Inauguration of third Yoshida Cabinet
	Apr. 04	North Atlantic Treaty signed by 12 nations (becomes effective August 24) (NATO established)
	Apr. 21	Nationalist-Communist talks break up; Chinese Communist Army launches general offensive
	May 06	Federal Republic of Germany established (West Germany)
	Jul. 05	Shimoyama incident
	Jul. 15	Mitaka incident
	Aug. 17	Matsukawa incident
	Sep. 24	USSR declares possession of atomic bomb
	Oct. 01	People's Republic of China established
	Oct. 07	German Democratic Republic established (East Germany)
	Dec. 07	Chinese Nationalist Party takes refuge in Taiwan
1950	Jan. 27	U.S. signs MSA agreement with NATO countries
	Feb. 14	Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed
	Jun. 21	John Foster Dulles, adviser to the U.S. Department of State, visits Japan
	Jun. 25	Korean War (ends July 27, 1953)
	Jun. 28	Inauguration of third reshuffled Yoshida Cabinet
	Jul. 07	United Nations Force formed for dispatch to Korea
	Jul. 08	General MacArthur authorizes the establishment of the National Police Reserve, consisting of 75,000 men, and the expansion of the Japan Coast Guard by 8,000 men
	Aug. 10	National Police Reserve Ordinance promulgated and put into effect
	Aug. 13	Ordinary personnel recruitment for the National Police Reserve begins
	Aug. 14	Masuhara appointed first Director-General of the National Police Reserve
	Sep. 07	National Police Reserve headquarters moves from the National Police Agency headquarters to Etchujima
	Sep. 15	U.N. troops land at Inchon
	Oct. 25	Chinese Communist volunteers join Korean War
	Nov. 24	U.S. announces the seven principles for concluding a peace treaty with Japan
	Dec. 18	NATO Defense Commission agrees to establishment of NATO Forces
1951	Jan. 23	Minister of State Ohashi takes charge of the National Police Reserve
	Jan. 29	First Yoshida-Dulles talks (peace treaty negotiations)
	Mar. 01	Special recruitment of Military and Naval Academy graduates to serve as police officers 1st and 2nd class begins
	Apr. 11	MacArthur was dismissed as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
	Jul. 04	Inauguration of third reshuffled Yoshida Cabinet (second term)
	Aug. 30	U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty signed
	Sep. 01	Australia-New Zealand-U.S. sign ANZUS Treaty
	Sep. 08	49 countries sign Peace Treaty with Japan; Japan-U.S. Security Treaty concluded
	Oct. 20	Ozuki unit dispatched for the first time on a rescue relief operation to Kita Kawachi Village, Yamaguchi Prefecture, in the wake of Typhoon Ruth
	Oct. 26	House of Representatives approves Peace Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (House of Councilors approval given November 18)
	Dec. 26	Inauguration of third reshuffled Yoshida Cabinet (third term)
1952	Jan. 19	ROK proclaims sovereignty over neighboring ocean areas (Rhee Line)
	Feb. 28	Japan-U.S. Administrative Agreement signed
	Apr. 26	Maritime Guard established within the Japan Coast Guard
	Apr. 28	Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty concluded
	Apr. 28	Japan-U.S. Peace Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty enter into force
	Apr. 28	Far East Commission, Allied Council, and GHQ Abolished
	May 01	May Day riot at Imperial Palace Plaza
	May 26	U.S., U.K., and France sign peace agreement with Germany
	May 27	European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty signed
	Jul. 21	Subversive Activities Prevention Law promulgated and enters into force
	Jul. 26	Japan-U.S. Facilities and Areas Agreement signed
	Jul. 31	National Safety Agency Law promulgated
	Aug. 01	National Safety Agency established; Prime Minister Yoshida concurrently becomes Director-General of the National Safety Agency; Coastal Safety Force inaugurated
	Oct. 15	National Safety Force inaugurated
	Oct. 30	Inauguration of fourth Yoshida Cabinet; Kimura becomes Director-General of the National Safety Agency
	Oct. 31	U.K. carries out its first atomic bomb test
	Nov. 01	U.S. carries out its first hydrogen bomb test
	Nov. 12	Japan-U.S. Ship Leasing Agreement signed
1953	Jan. 01	Security Advisory Group in Japan inaugurated
	Apr. 01	National Safety Academy (predecessor of National Defense Academy) established
	May 21	Inauguration of fifth Yoshida Cabinet
	Jul. 27	Korean War Armistice Agreement signed
	Aug. 12	USSR carries out its first hydrogen bomb test
	Sep. 27	Yoshida and Shigemitsu talk
	Oct. 01	U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty signed
	Oct. 30	Ikeda-Robertson talks; joint statement issued on gradual increase in self-defense strength
	Dec. 25	Japanese administrative rule over Amami Islands restored
1954	Jan. 21	U.S. launches world's first nuclear submarine (USS Nautilus)
	Mar. 01	U.S. carries out hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll
	Mar. 01	Daigo Fukuryu maru (Lucky Dragon V) incident
	Mar. 08	Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) agreement signed
	May 14	Japan and U.S. sign Land Lease Agreement on naval vessels
	Jun. 02	House of Councillors passes resolution prohibiting dispatch of troops overseas
	Jun. 09	Promulgation of Defense Agency Establishment Law, Self-Defense Forces Law and Protection of National Secrecy Law pertaining to the MDA
	Jul. 01	Defense Agency established; Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces inaugurated
	Jul. 21	Geneva Agreement on armistice in Indochina signed
	Sep. 03	Chinese People's Liberation Army shells Quemoy and Matsu for the first time
	Sep. 08	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) formed by signing of collective defense pact
	Dec. 02	U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty signed
	Dec. 10	Hatoyama Cabinet established; Omura becomes Minister of State for Defense
1956	Mar. 19	Inauguration of second Hatoyama Cabinet; Sugihara becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Apr. 18	Africa-Asia conference held at Bandung
	May 05	West Germany formally admitted to NATO
	May 06	Live shell fire by U.S. forces at Kita Fuji Maneuver Area; opposition to firing intensifies
	May 08	Protests occuring at Sunagawa Base
	May 14	Signing of Warsaw Pact (WPO starts)
	Jul. 31	Sunada becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Aug. 06	First World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held in Hiroshima
	Aug. 31	Shigemitsu-Dulles meeting; joint statement issued on revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
	Nov. 14	Japan-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement signed
	Nov. 22	Inauguration of third Hatoyama Cabinet; Funada becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Dec. 19	Atomic Energy Basic Law promulgated
1957	Feb. 09	House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bomb tests (House of Councilors, February 10)
	Feb. 14	Stalin criticized at the 20th Congress of Soviet Communist Party in Moscow; Khrushchev proclaims policy of peaceful co-existence with the West
	Mar. 23	Defense Agency moved to Kasumigaseki
	Apr. 17	USSR announces dissolution of Cominform
	Apr. 26	First Japan-made destroyer Harukaze completed
	Jul. 02	National Defense Council Composition Law promulgated
	Jul. 26	Egyptian President Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal
	Sep. 20	First domestically-produced F-86F fighter delivered
	Oct. 19	Joint declaration on restoration of Japanese-Soviet relations
	Oct. 23	Hungarian Revolution
	Oct. 29	Second Middle East War (Suez War; through November 6)
	Dec. 18	Japan joins the U.N.
	Dec. 23	Ishibashi Cabinet established; Prime Minister concurrently becomes Minister of State for Defense
1957	Jan. 31	Acting Prime Minister Kishi concurrently becomes, ad interim, Minister of State for Defense
	Feb. 02	Kotaki becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Feb. 25	Kishi Cabinet established
	Mar. 15	House of Councillors passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs
	May 15	U.K. conducts its first hydrogen bomb test
	May 20	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Basic Guidelines for National Defense
	Jun. 14	National Defense Council decision and Cabinet understanding adopted on First Defense Build-up Plan
	Jun. 21	Kishi-Eisenhower talks; joint statement on the early withdrawal of the USFJ issued
	Jul. 10	Inauguration of reshuffled Kishi Cabinet; Tsushima becomes Minister of State for Defense
1957	Aug. 06	Japan-U.S. Security Council inaugurated
	Aug. 26	USSR announces successful ICBM test
	Aug. 27	Trial startup of reactor at Tokaimura
	Sep. 10	National Defense Council decision to produce P2V-742 aircraft domestically, Cabinet report on September 17
	Oct. 04	USSR launches the world's first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1
	Nov. 23	World Congress of Communist Parties issues the Moscow Declaration
1958	Jan. 01	Japan becomes non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council
	Jan. 01	European Economic Community (EEC) starts
	Jan. 14	First ocean training exercises (Hawaii, through February 28)
	Jan. 31	U.S. successfully launches an artificial satellite
	Feb. 17	ASDF begins scrambling against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace
	Apr. 18	House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs
	Jun. 12	Inauguration of second Kishi Cabinet; Sato becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Aug. 23	Chinese People's Liberation Army attack on Quemoy intensifies
	Sep. 11	Fujiyama-Dulles talks (Washington, D.C.); agreement on revision of the Japan-U.S. Security
	Oct. 04	Treaty Commencement of Japan-U.S. talks on the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
	Oct. 23	Dulles talks with Chiang Kai-shek; joint statement issued denying counteroffensive against mainland China
	Dec. 17	U.S. test-launches Atlas ICBM
1959	Jan. 12	Ino becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Mar. 30	Tokyo District Court rules the stationing of U.S. Forces unconstitutional in the Sunagawa case
	Jun. 18	Inauguration of second reshuffled Kishi Cabinet; Akagi becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Aug. 25	China-India border dispute
	Sep. 18	USSR General Secretary Khrushchev proposes complete military reductions at U.N.
	Sep. 26	Disaster relief teams dispatched after Typhoon Vera
	Sep. 27	U.S.-Soviet Summit Meeting; joint statement issued at Camp David
	Nov. 06	National Defense Council decision to produce 200 F-104 aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet on November 10
	Dec. 01	Antarctica Treaty signed
	Dec. 16	Supreme Court reverses original ruling in the Sunagawa case
1960	Jan. 11	Defense Agency moves to Hinoki-cho
	Jan. 19	New Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed (enters into force June 23)
	Feb. 13	France conducts its first nuclear test in the Sahara
	May 01	U-2 reconnaissance plane belonging to U.S. shot down in Soviet airspace
	May 24	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the earthquake and tsunami in Chile
	Jul. 19	Ikeda Cabinet established; Esaki becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Jul. 20	U.S. conducts successful underwater launch of Polaris SLBM
	Dec. 08	Inauguration of second Ikeda Cabinet; Nishimura becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Dec. 20	Formation of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front
1961	Jan. 13	National Defense Council decides to reorganize GSDF units (into 13 divisions); presented to Cabinet January 20
	Apr. 12	USSR successfully launches manned spacecraft
	May 16	Military junta seizes power in a coup in ROK
	Jul. 06	Soviet-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed
	Jul. 11	Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed
	Jul. 18	Inauguration of second reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet; Fujieda becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Jul. 18	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Second Defense Build-up Plan
	Aug. 13	Construction of Berlin Wall
1962	Jan. 01	Independent of Independent State of Samoa
	Jul. 18	Inauguration of second reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet (second term); Shiga becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Jul. 23	International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos signed in Geneva International Conference
	Aug. 15	GSDF completes 13 division organization
	Oct. 15	Type 61 tank first introduced
	Oct. 20	China-India border dispute (through November 22)
	Oct. 24	U.S. Navy imposes sea blockade of Cuba (through November 20)
	Oct. 28	Premier of the Soviet Union Khrushchev declares dismantling of missile bases in Cuba
	Nov. 01	Defense Facilities Administration Agency established
	Nov. 09	Shiga visits U.S. for first time as Minister of State for Defense (through November 26)
1963	Jun. 20	Agreement signed for U.S.-Soviet hotline
	Jul. 18	Inauguration of second reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet (third term); Fukuda becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Aug. 05	Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed by US.-USSR-U.K. (enters into force on October 10)
	Aug. 14	Japan joins Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
	Sep. 16	Malaysian Federation established
	Dec. 09	Inauguration of third Ikeda Cabinet
	Dec. 17	ROK transits to civilian government, Park Chung-hee becomes President
1964	Jun. 15	Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty enters into force for Japan
	Jul. 18	Inauguration of third reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet; Koizumi becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Aug. 02	Gulf of Tonkin incident
	Oct. 16	China successfully carries out its first nuclear test
	Nov. 09	Sato Cabinet established
	Nov. 12	U.S. nuclear submarine (Sea Dragon) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time
1965	Feb. 07	U.S. starts bombing of North Vietnam
	Feb. 10	Diet debate on Mitsuya study
	Jun. 03	Inauguration of reshuffled Sato Cabinet; Matsuno becomes Minister of State for Defense

Year	Date	Major Events
1965	Jun. 22	Japan-ROK Basic Treaty signed
	Sep. 01	Second India-Pakistan conflict (to September 22)
	Nov. 20	Icebreaker Fuji leaves on first mission to assist Antarctic observation (through April 8, 1966)
1966	May 16	Cultural Revolution starts in China
	Jul. 01	France withdraws from the NATO command (rejoined April 4, 2009)
	Aug. 01	Inauguration of reshuffled Sato Cabinet (second term); Kambayashiyama becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Oct. 27	China successfully carries out its first nuclear missile test
	Nov. 29	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Outline of Third Defense Build-up Plan
	Dec. 03	Inauguration of reshuffled Sato Cabinet; Masuda becomes Minister of State for Defense
1967	Jan. 27	Outer Space Treaty signed
	Feb. 17	Inauguration of second Sato Cabinet
	Mar. 14	National Defense Council decision adopted on Key matters for inclusion in Third Defense Build-up Plan (Cabinet decision on March 14)
	Mar. 29	Sapporo District Court renders judgment on Eniwa Case
	Jun. 05	Third Middle East War (through June 9)
	Jun. 17	China successfully carries out its first hydrogen bomb test
	Jul. 01	Formation of European Community (EC)
	Aug. 08	Formation of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
	Nov. 25	Inauguration of second reshuffled Sato Cabinet
1968	Jan. 16	Prime Minister Wilson announces withdrawal of U.K. troops east of Suez
	Jan. 19	U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (Enterprise) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time
	Jan. 23	Seizure of U.S. Navy intelligence vessel Pueblo by North Korea
	Jan. 31	Independent of Republic of Nauru
	Feb. 26	New Japan-U.S. nuclear agreement signed
	May 13	First formal Vietnamese peace talks held in Paris
	Jun. 26	Ogasawara Islands revert to Japan
	Jul. 01	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed
	Aug. 20	Soviet and Eastern European troops invade Czechoslovakia
	Aug. 24	France carries out its first hydrogen bomb test in the South Pacific
	Nov. 30	Inauguration of second reshuffled Sato Cabinet (second term); Arita becomes Minister of State for Defense
1969	Jan. 10	National Defense Council decision to produce 104 F-4E aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet
	Mar. 02	Armed clashes between Chinese and Soviet forces on Chenpao Island (Damansky Island)
	Apr. 15	North Korea shoots down U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane
	Jun. 10	South Vietnam announces establishment of Provisional Revolutionary Government
	Jul. 25	U.S. President Nixon announce Guam Doctrine (later the Nixon Doctrine)
	Nov. 21	Sato-Nixon joint statement (extension of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, return of Okinawa to Japan by 1972)
1970	Jan. 14	Inauguration of third Sato Cabinet; Nakasone becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Jan. 24	Formation of integrated WPO (Warsaw Pact) forces (involving seven countries)
	Feb. 03	Japan signs Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
	Feb. 11	First domestically produced artificial satellite successfully launched
	Mar. 05	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force
	Mar. 31	Yodo hijacking
	Apr. 16	U.S. and USSR begin SALT I strategic arms limitation talks
	Apr. 24	China successfully launches its first satellite
	Jun. 04	Independent of Kingdom of Tonga
	Jun. 23	Automatic extension of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
	Aug. 12	West Germany-USSR sign non-aggression pact
	Oct. 10	Independent of Republic of Fiji
	Oct. 20	Publication of "The Defense of Japan," the first white paper on defense
	Nov. 25	Yukio Mishima commits suicide by ritual disembowelment at the GSDF Eastern Army Headquarters in Ichigaya
1971	Feb. 11	Signing of treaty forbidding the use of the seabed for military purposes
	Jun. 17	Agreement on the Return of Okinawa signed
	Jun. 29	Okinawa Defense Agreement (Kubo-Curtis Agreement) signed
	Jul. 05	Inauguration of third reshuffled Sato Cabinet; Masuhara becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Jul. 30	All Nippon Airways plane collides with SDF aircraft (Shizukuishi)
	Aug. 02	Nishimura becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Aug. 09	India-Soviet Friendship Treaty signed
	Sep. 30	U.S. and USSR sign agreement on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war
	Oct. 25	U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution to admit China and expel Taiwan
	Nov. 24	House of Representatives resolution on nonnuclear weapons
	Nov. 27	ASEAN declares SEA neutrality
	Dec. 03	Third India-Pakistan conflict
	Dec. 03	Esaki becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Dec. 05	ASDF first domestic supersonic aircraft ASDF XT-2 delivered
1972	Jan. 07	Sato-Nixon joint statement on the agreement of the return of Okinawa and the reduction of bases
	Feb. 08	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Outline of 4th Five-Year Defense Build-up Plan
	Feb. 27	U.S. President Nixon visits China; China-U.S. Joint Communique
	Apr. 10	Japan signs Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)
	Apr. 18	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on SDF deployment in Okinawa
	May 15	Return of Okinawa
	May 26	SALT I and agreement to limit ABM signed during the visit of U.S. President Nixon to USSR
	Jul. 03	India-Pakistan truce signed
	Jul. 04	ROK and North Korea make a Joint Statement for peaceful unification
	Jul. 07	Tanaka Cabinet established; Masuhara becomes Minister of State for Defense
1972	Sep. 29	Prime Minister Tanaka visits China; normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China
	Oct. 09	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Situation Judgment and Defense Concepts in the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, Key Matters for Inclusion in Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, and Measures to Enhance Civilian Control
	Dec. 21	East-West Germany Basic Treaty signed
	Dec. 22	Inauguration of second Tanaka Cabinet
1973	Jan. 23	14th Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting agrees on consolidation of U.S. bases in Japan (Kanto Program)
	Jan. 27	Vietnam peace agreement signed (ceasefire takes effect on January 28)
	Feb. 01	Defense Agency publishes Peacetime Defense Strength
	Feb. 21	Laos Peace Treaty signed
	Mar. 29	U.S. forces complete their withdrawal from Vietnam
	May 29	Yamanaka becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Jun. 22	General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union visits U.S.; convention on the prevention of nuclear war signed
	Jul. 01	Commencement of SDF air defense mission on Okinawa
	Sep. 07	Sapporo District Court rules SDF unconstitutional (Naganuma Judgment)
	Sep. 21	Japan-North Vietnam establish diplomatic relations
	Oct. 06	Fourth Middle East War (ends October 25)
	Oct. 08	Japan-Soviet Summit Meeting (Moscow)
	Oct. 17	Ten OPEC countries decide to reduce crude oil supplies
	Nov. 07	Pakistan formally withdraws from SEATO
	Nov. 25	Inauguration of second reshuffled Tanaka Cabinet
1974	Jan. 05	Japan-China Trade Agreement signed
	Jan. 18	Israel and Egypt sign Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Treaties
	Apr. 20	Japan-China Aviation Agreement signed
	Apr. 25	National Defense Medical College opens
	May 18	India carries out its first underground nuclear test
	Jul. 03	U.S. President Nixon visits USSR, Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty) signed
	Oct. 08	Eisaku Sato, former Prime Minister, receives Nobel Prize
	Nov. 11	Inauguration of second reshuffled second Tanaka Cabinet (second term); Uno becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Nov. 13	Japan-China Marine Transport Agreement signed
	Nov. 15	U.N. forces in Korea discovers a North Korean infiltration tunnel
	Nov. 23	U.S. President Ford visits USSR, makes joint statement on SALT II
	Dec. 09	Miki Cabinet established; Sakata becomes Minister of State for Defense
1975	Apr. 01	Director General instructs to create draft plan for defense forces after FY1977 (second instruction October 29)
	Apr. 23	U.S. President Ford declares end of Vietnam War
	Apr. 30	South Vietnamese Government surrenders unconditionally
	Aug. 01	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) adopts the Helsinki Declaration (Helsinki)
	Sep. 16	Independent of Independent State of Papua New Guinea
	Nov. 17	First summit meeting of most industrialized nations (Rambouillet, through November 17), held annually since
1976	Apr. 05	Demonstrators and police clash in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China (1st Tiananmen Incident)
	Jun. 04	Publication of second white paper on defense, "The Defense of Japan" (henceforth published annually)
	Jun. 08	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force for Japan
	Jul. 02	Socialist Republic of Vietnam (unified Vietnam) proclaimed
	Jul. 08	Sub-Committee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) established
	Aug. 05	Sapporo High Court renders judgment in Naganuma Nike suit
	Aug. 18	U.S. military officers slain at Panmunjom by North Korea
	Sep. 06	MiG-25 forced to land at Hakodate Airport
	Sep. 15	Inauguration of reshuffled Miki Cabinet
	Oct. 29	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Defense Plan for Defense Build-up beyond FY1977
	Nov. 05	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Immediate-term Defense Build-up and Handling Major Items in Preparations for Defense Forces
	Dec. 24	Fukuda Cabinet established; Mihara becomes Minister of State for Defense
1977	Feb. 17	Mito District Court renders judgment in Hyakuri Base suit
	Jun. 30	South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) dissolved (Treaty remains effective)
	Jul. 01	Implementation of two maritime laws, proclaiming a 200- mile fishing zone and 12-mile territorial waters
	Aug. 01	North Korea establishes military demarcation lines in Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea
	Aug. 10	Defense Agency starts Emergency Legislation Study
	Nov. 28	Inauguration of reshuffled Fukuda Cabinet; Kanemaru becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Dec. 29	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on introduction of F-15s and P-3C
1978	Apr. 12	Chinese fishing fleet infringes on waters around Senkaku Islands
	Jul. 07	Independent of Solomon Islands
	Aug. 12	Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China signed in Beijing
	Sep. 21	Defense Agency announces modality and purpose of emergency legislation study
	Oct. 01	Independent of Tuvalu
	Nov. 03	Vietnam-Soviet Friendship Agreement signed
	Nov. 27	(ASDF) First Japan-U.S. bilateral training exercises (east of Misawa and west of Akita, through December 1)
	Nov. 27	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee approves Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Cooperation, presented to and approved by Cabinet following deliberation by the National Defense Council on November 28
	Dec. 05	Afghanistan-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Good Relations and Cooperation signed
	Dec. 07	Ohira Cabinet established; Yamashita becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Dec. 25	Vietnamese troops invade Cambodia (withdrawal completed on September 26, 1989)
1979	Jan. 01	U.S. and China normalize diplomatic relations, U.S. notifies termination of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty after one year
	Jan. 07	Fall of Phnom Penh, establishment of Heng Samrin regime announced
1979	Jan. 11	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on introduction of E-2C
	Feb. 11	Islamic Revolution takes place in Iran
	Feb. 17	Sino-Vietnamese War (through March 5)
	Mar. 26	Egypt-Israel peace treaty signed
	Jun. 18	SALT II signed
	Jul. 12	Independent of Republic of Kiribati
	Jul. 17	Announcement of Mid-Term Defense Estimate (FY1980-FY1984)
	Jul. 25	Minister of State for Defense Yamashita makes first visit to ROK as an incumbent Minister (through July 26)
	Nov. 09	Inauguration of second Ohira Cabinet; Kubota becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Dec. 27	Soviet Union invades Afghanistan
1980	Feb. 04	Hosoda becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Feb. 26	Maritime Self-Defense Force takes part in RIMPAC for the first time (through March 18)
	Apr. 11	Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance lapses
	May 18	China tests an ICBM in the direction of the South Pacific Ocean for the first time
	Jul. 17	House of Councilors
	Jul. 17	establishes special committee for Security Treaty, Okinawa, and Northern Territories issues
	Jul. 30	Suzuki Cabinet established; Omura becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Aug. 18	Independent of Republic of Vanuatu
	Aug. 19	Interceptors begin to be armed with missiles Arming escorts with live torpedoes announced
	Aug. 21	Soviet nuclear submarine has an accident off the main island of Okinawa
	Sep. 03	First meeting of the Japan-U.S. Systems and Technology Forum (Washington, D.C., through September 4)
	Sep. 22	Iran and Iraq enter into full-fledged war
1981	Jan. 06	February 7 decided as Northern Territories Day (Cabinet understanding)
	Apr. 22	Defense Agency announces classification of the laws and regulations subject to the Studies on Emergency Legislation
	Jul. 07	Tokyo High Court renders judgment in Hyakuri Base suit
	Jul. 13	Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgment in 1st and 2nd Yokota Air Base noise suits
	Oct. 01	(GSDF) First Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises (in communications) staged at Higashi Fuji Maneuver Area (through October 3)
	Nov. 30	Inauguration of reshuffled Suzuki Cabinet; Ito becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Dec. 13	Poland declares martial law and establishes the Military Council of National Salvation
1982	Feb. 15	(GSDF) First Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercise (staged at Takigahara, through February 19)
	Apr. 02	Falklands dispute (ends June 14)
	Apr. 25	Israel returns all of Sinai Peninsula
	May 15	Use of some sections of land within facilities and areas located in Okinawa starts under the Special Land Lease Law
	Jun. 06	Israeli forces invade Lebanon
	Jun. 08	BWC enters into force in Japan
	Jun. 09	Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), Protocols I, II and III concluded
	Jun. 29	Commencement of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START-I) U.S.-Soviet Union (Geneva)
	Jul. 23	1981 Mid-Term Defense Estimate presented to and approved by National Defense Council
	Aug. 17	U.S.-China Joint Statement about U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan
	Sep. 09	Supreme Court renders judgment on Naganuma Nike Missile Base Case
	Oct. 12	China successfully tests SLBM water launch
	Oct. 20	Yokohama District Court renders judgment in 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit
	Nov. 27	Nakasone Cabinet established; Tanikawa becomes Minister of State for Defense
1983	Jan. 01	U.S. establishes new Unified Combatant Command (Central Command)
	Jan. 14	Government decides to pave the way for the transfer of military technologies to the U.S. (Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary)
	Mar. 23	U.S. President Reagan announces Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
	Jun. 12	Director Tanigawa first Minister of State for Defense to inspect Northern Islands
	Sep. 01	KAL airliner shot down by Soviet fighters near Sakhalin
	Oct. 09	19 ROK Government officials, including cabinet ministers, killed in Burma by North Korean terrorists
	Oct. 25	U.S. and six Caribbean nations send troops to Grenada
	Nov. 08	Signing of negotiation statement for sharing military technology with the U.S. based on the U.S. and Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
	Dec. 12	(ASDF) First Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercise (Fuchu, through December 15)
	Dec. 27	Inauguration of second Nakasone Cabinet; Kurihara becomes Minister of State for Defense
1984	Jan. 01	Brunei gains independence from the U.K. (joins ASEAN on January 7)
	Jun. 11	(MSDF) First Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercise (Yokosuka, through June 15)
	Oct. 16	Defense Agency announces procedures, etc., of future Studies on Emergency Legislation in Studies on Legislation to Deal with Emergencies
	Nov. 01	Inauguration of second reshuffled Nakasone Cabinet; Kato becomes Minister of State for Defense
1985	Mar. 12	U.S.-Soviet Union arms control talks begin
	Apr. 02	USAF begins to station F-16 fighters at Misawa
	Jun. 04	China announces the reduction of one million personnel from the People's Liberation Army
	Aug. 12	Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the JAL aircraft crash
	Sep. 18	National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Mid-Term Defense Program; National Defense Council decision and Cabinet understanding adopted on introduction of Patriots
	Dec. 27	Detailed arrangements for the supply of military technologies to the U.S. concluded
	Dec. 28	Inauguration of second reshuffled Nakasone Cabinet (second term)
1986	Feb. 24	First Japan-U.S. bilateral joint command post exercise (Hinoki-cho, headquarters of USFJ, etc., through February 28)
	Apr. 09	Tokyo High Court renders judgment in 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit

Year	Date	Major Events
1986	Apr. 26	Accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union
	Jul. 01	Security Council Establishment Law enacted
	Jul. 22	Inauguration of third Nakasone Cabinet; Kurihara becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Aug. 10	U.S. announces suspension of its obligations to New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty in treaty talks (San Francisco, through August 11)
	Aug. 15	Japan, U.S., USSR open hotline operations
	Sep. 05	Government approves the first transfer of military technology to the U.S.
	Sep. 22	Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) adopts final documents (Stockholm)
	Oct. 15	USSR announces partial withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan
	Oct. 21	Independent of Republic of the Marshall Islands
	Oct. 27	First Japan-U.S. bilateral joint field training exercise (eastern and southern part of Honshu island, etc., through October 31)
	Nov. 03	Independent of Federated States of Micronesia
1987	Jan. 24	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on a program for the future build-up of defense capacity
	Jan. 30	Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1)
	May 27	Metropolitan Police Department arrests two employees of Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd., in connection with unfair exports that breach the rules of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM) to Communist areas
	May 29	Director Kurihara first incumbent Director to visit China (through June 4)
	Jul. 15	Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 1st and 2nd Yokota Air Base noise suits
	Jul. 20	U.N. Security Council adopts Iran-Iraq Conflict Cease Fire resolution (Number 598)
	Aug. 26	Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams enacted
	Oct. 06	First Japan-U.S. Meeting on COCOM held (Tokyo, through October 7)
	Oct. 21	Follow-on aircraft for F-1 study results decided and announced
	Nov. 06	Takeshita Cabinet established; Kawara becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Nov. 29	KAL airliner blown up by North Korean terrorists over the Bay of Bengal
	Dec. 08	INF Treaty signed
	Dec. 18	Security Council of Japan approves a study on the state of air defense on the high seas
1988	Mar. 02	Revised protocol of the Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1)
	Mar. 14	Armed clashes between China and Vietnam in the waters around the Spratly Islands
	Apr. 12	Signing of official documents for the transfer of military technologies in certain areas of defense from the U.S. to Japan under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the two countries
	May 29	U.S.-Soviet Union Summit Meeting (Moscow, through June 1, instruments of ratification of INF Treaty exchanged)
	Jun. 01	Supreme Court renders judgment on an appeal against the enshrining of an SDF officer killed in an accident
	Jul. 23	Submarine and civilian fishing boat in collision (off Yokosuka)
	Aug. 17	First joint verification of an underground nuclear test carried out by U.S. and Soviet Union (Nevada)
	Aug. 20	Ceasefire agreement reached in Iran-Iraq War
	Aug. 24	Tazawa becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Sep. 20	First Japan-made T-4 medium trainer introduced
	Oct. 17	U.S. and Philippines sign negotiated agreement on revised Military Bases Agreement
	Nov. 29	Japanese and U.S. Governments sign memorandum and detailed arrangements relating to FS-X joint development
	Dec. 07	General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev delivers speech to the U.N. on the decommissioning of 500,000 Soviet troops
	Dec. 27	Inauguration of reshuffled Takeshita Cabinet
1989	Jan. 07	Demise of Emperor Showa
	Feb. 15	Soviet Union completes the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan
	Feb. 24	Emperor Showa's funeral
	Mar. 09	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) started (Vienna)
	Mar. 09	Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) started (Vienna)
	Mar. 15	Hachioji branch of the Tokyo District Court renders judgment in the 3rd Yokota Air Base noise suit
	Mar. 30	New BADGE system begins operations
	Apr. 01	Consumption Tax Law enforced
	May 10	START-I reopened at U.S.-Soviet foreign ministers conference, agreement achieved (Moscow, through May 11)
	Jun. 03	Uno Cabinet established; Yamasaki becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Jun. 04	Chinese martial law units fire on demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in Beijing (2nd Tiananmen incident)
	Jun. 20	Supreme Court renders judgment in the Hyakuri Base suit
	Jun. 22	Yokohama District Court renders judgment in the Atsugi Air Base suit to vacate the premises
	Jun. 24	Zhao Ziyang relieved of post as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, and replaced by Jiang Zemin
	Aug. 10	Kaifu Cabinet established; Matsumoto becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Sep. 26	Vietnam completely withdraws from Cambodia
	Nov. 09	GDR permits free departures to the West (virtual demolition of the Berlin Wall)
1990	Feb. 13	U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers agree on upper limit of 195,000 U.S. and Soviet troops in Central Europe and 225,000 U.S. troops in Europe
	Feb. 20	Joint Military Technology Commission decides to provide "military technology related to FS-X" to U.S.
	Feb. 28	Inauguration of second reshuffled Kaifu Cabinet; Ishikawa becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Mar. 03	Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Kaifu, G.H.W. Bush, Palm Springs, through March 4)
	May 29	Naha District Court renders judgment in administrative handling suit pertaining to Special Measures Law for USFJ Land
	Jun. 19	Japan-U.S. Joint Committee confirms moves to prepare necessary steps to return U.S. military facilities in Okinawa (23 items)
	Jun. 21	Japan and the U.S. reach agreement in principle on the establishment of a ministerial conference on security
	Aug. 02	Iraq invades Kuwait
	Aug. 02	U.S. President G.H.W. Bush gives speech at Aspen
	Oct. 03	German unification
	Oct. 16	Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations submitted to Diet
	Oct. 24	USSR conducts underground nuclear tests in the Arctic
	Nov. 10	Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations annulled
	Nov. 12	Coronation of Emperor
	Nov. 23	Great Thanksgiving Festival
	Dec. 20	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991-FY1995)
	Dec. 29	Inauguration of second reshuffled Kaifu Cabinet; Ikeda becomes Minister of State for Defense
1991	Jan. 17	Cabinet decision adopted on establishment of the Gulf Crisis Countermeasures Headquarters
	Jan. 17	Coalition forces launch air attacks against Kuwait and Iraq, Operation Desert Storm
	Jan. 24	Government pledges an additional U.S.$9 billion to efforts to restore peace in the Gulf region
	Jan. 25	Cabinet decision adopted on ordinance on interim measures for the airlifting of Gulf Crisis refugees (promulgated and enacted on January 29, annulled April 19)
	Mar. 13	Kanazawa District Court renders judgment on the 1st and 2nd Komatsu Air Base noise suits
	Mar. 31	WPO (Warsaw Pact structures) dismantled
	Apr. 11	Gulf War formally ended
	Apr. 24	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on "Sending minesweepers to the Persian Gulf"
	Apr. 26	Total of six MSDF vessels, including minesweepers, depart for the Persian Gulf
	Jun. 03	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the eruption of Fugendake on Mt. Unzen
	Jul. 31	U.S. and Soviet leaders sign START-I in Moscow
	Sep. 06	Soviet State Council approves independence of three Baltic states
	Sep. 17	U.N. General Assembly approves 7 member nations, including North and South Korea, and 3 Baltic nations
	Oct. 09	SDF personnel join U.N. teams carrying out inspections on Iraq chemical weapons for the first time
	Nov. 05	House of Representatives establishes the Committee on National Security
	Nov. 05	Miyazawa Cabinet established; Miyashita becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Nov. 26	Clark USAF Base formally returned to Philippines
	Dec. 05	Ukrainian independence declared by Supreme Council of Ukrainian Republic
	Dec. 08	CIS agreement signed by leaders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine at Summit Meeting (Brest, Belarus)
1992	Feb. 07	Twelve EC countries sign the European Union Treaty (Maastricht Treaty)
	Feb. 25	China promulgates and enacts Territorial Waters Act, designating the Senkaku Islands as an integral part of China
	Apr. 01	Custody of government aircraft (B-747) transferred to the Defense Agency
	Apr. 01	First female students enter National Defense Academy of Japan
	Apr. 27	Tokyo District Court renders judgment in suits pertaining to the surrender of land for Atsugi Air Base
	May 22	North Korean soldiers invade the South Korean side of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and fire guns
	May 23	START-I Treaty signed between the U.S. and four Soviet States including Russia
	May 25	IAEA officials make the first designated inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities (through June 5)
	Jun. 19	Announcement of "International Peace Cooperation Law" (enacted August 10), announcement and enactment of "Plan to Amend Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams" (enacted June 29)
	Aug. 10	International Peace Cooperation Law comes into force
	Aug. 24	China and the ROK establish diplomatic relations
	Sep. 08	Cabinet Decision on the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Cambodia"
	Sep. 17	Departure of UNTAC Engineering units (Allteams returned to Japan by September 26, 1993)
	Sep. 19	Departure of Cease-fire observers to Cambodia (all teams returned home by March 21, 1993)
	Sep. 30	U.S. returns Naval Base Subic Bay (Philippines)
	Nov. 09	CFE Treaty becomes formally effective
	Nov. 24	U.S. returns Air Station Cubi Point (Philippines) (withdrawal from Philippines complete)
	Dec. 03	U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to allow military action by multinational forces in Somalia
	Dec. 12	Inauguration of reshuffled Miyazawa Cabinet; Nakayama becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Dec. 16	U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to deploy peacekeeping operations in Mozambique
	Dec. 18	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Modification of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991-FY1995)
	Dec. 21	Yokohama District Court renders judgement in 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit
1993	Jan. 03	U.S.-Russia Summit Meeting (Moscow); START-II signed
	Jan. 13	Japan signs CWC
	Feb. 25	Supreme Court renders judgement in 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit and 1st and 2nd Yokota Air Base noise suits
	Mar. 12	North Korea announces secession from NPT
	Mar. 25	Aegis ship (Kongo) enters service
	Apr. 08	Death of U.N. Volunteer (UNV) Atsuhito Nakata in Cambodia
	Apr. 27	Cabinet Decision on the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Mozambique"
	May 04	Multinational forces deployed to Somalia move to United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNISOM II)
	May 04	Death of Superintendent Haruyuki Takada, a civilian police officer in Cambodia
	May 11	Departure of United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) Movement control units (All teams returned home by January 8, 1995)
	May 14	Departure of ONUMOZ headquarters staff officers (all teams returned home by Jan 27, 1995)
	May 29	North Korea launches an object which could be a ballistic missile
	Jun. 01	Along with full operation of the private government plane (B-747), Special Air Transport Squadron newly established
	Jun. 09	Wedding ceremony of His Imperial Highness the Crown Prince
	Jun. 11	North Korea reserves the right to withdraw from the NPT in a joint statement issued during first round of U.S.-North Korea consultations
	Jul. 12	Disaster relief teams dispatched to Hokkaido in response to the earthquake off southwestern Hokkaido (through August 12)
	Aug. 04	Signing of peace treaty in Rwandan civil war
	Aug. 09	Hosokawa Cabinet established; Nakanishi becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Sep. 01	U.S. DoD announces the Bottom Up Review
	Sep. 13	Israel and PLO sign a declaration of the principles of provisional autonomy
	Sep. 23	U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to establish the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)
	Oct. 13	Japan-Russia agreement on prevention of marine accidents signed
	Nov. 01	Maastricht Treaty comes into effect; European Union established
	Dec. 02	Aichi becomes Minister of State for Defense
1994	Feb. 24	Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders judgement in 1st, 2nd and 3rd Kadena Air Base noise suits
	Mar. 23	First female aviation students join MSDF
	Mar. 24	First female aviation students join ASDF
	Mar. 30	Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 3rd Yokota Air Base noise suit
	Apr. 28	Hata Cabinet established; Kanda becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Jun. 08	U.S. DoD submits "Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation" pertaining to weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons
	Jun. 30	Murayama Cabinet established; Tamazawa becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Sep. 13	Cabinet Decision on the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for Rwandan Refugees"
	Sep. 17	Departure of Rwandan Refugee Relief Air Transport Unit (all teams returned home by December 28)
	Sep. 21	Departure of Rwandan Refugee Relief units (all teams returned home by December 25)
	Sep. 22	U.S. DoD announces "Nuclear Posture Review"
	Oct. 01	Independent of Palau
	Oct. 21	U.S.-North Korea talks, both sides sign "Framework Agreement" relating to support for North Korean light water reactors, and provision of substitute energy
	Dec. 01	First Asia-Pacific Security Seminar (under the auspices of the National Institute for Defense Studies, through December 17)
	Dec. 01	Commander of U.S.-ROK Combined Forces devolves operational control in peacetime to ROK forces
	Dec. 05	START-I comes into force
	Dec. 18	Russia starts military operations against Chechnya
	Dec. 20	First visit to Japan by the ROK's naval training vessel (Harumi, through December 23)
	Dec. 26	Kanazawa branch of Nagoya High Court renders judgement in 1st and 2nd Komatsu Air Base noise suits
1995	Jan. 17	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (through April 27)
	Mar. 09	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) established
	Mar. 20	SDF personnel dispatched teams to carry out rescue operations in the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system (through March 23)
	May 11	NPT extended indefinitely
	May 19	Enactment of "Act on Special Measures Incidental to Reversion of Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Offered for Use by United States Forces in Japan" (effective June 20)
	Jun. 05	The defense authorities of Japan and the ROK both issue the "letter concerning the prevention of accidents between aircraft of the Japan Self-defense Forces and military aircraft of the Republic of Korea"
	Jul. 28	Vietnam officially joins ASEAN
	Aug. 01	1st KEDO Meeting (Japan-U.S.-ROK) held (New York)
	Aug. 08	Inauguration of reshuffled Murayama Cabinet; Eto becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Sep. 04	Japanese schoolgirl assaulted by three U.S. soldiers based in Okinawa
	Sep. 15	Ratification of Chemical Weapons Convention
	Oct. 27	Announcement of "Law Relating to the Treatment of Defense Agency Personnel Dispatched to International Organizations" (effective January 1, 1996)
	Nov. 17	Cabinet decision adopted on establishment of a consultation forum to discuss issues relating to U.S. bases in Okinawa
	Nov. 19	Prime Minister Murayama and U.S. Vice President Gore agree on the establishment of the Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO)
	Nov. 28	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on National Defense Program Outline for the period from FY1996
	Dec. 14	Security Council of Japan decision adopted on Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996-FY2000) (Cabinet decision on December 15)
	Dec. 14	Security Council of Japan makes decision "Regarding upgrading of Next-Generation Support Fighter" (December 15, Cabinet approval); Model of Next-Generation Support Fighter "F-2" decided
	Dec. 14	Formal signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement in Paris
	Dec. 15	Cabinet Decision on the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment in the Golan Heights"
	Dec. 20	IFOR, consisting mainly of NATO troops, replaces UNPROFOR and formally commences operations
	Dec. 26	Tokyo High Court renders judgement on remanded appeal trial for 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit
1996	Jan. 11	Hashimoto Cabinet established; Usui becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Jan. 26	START-II ratified by U.S. Senate
	Feb.01	Dispatch of headquarters staff and transport unit to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF (all teams returned home by January 19, 2013)
	Mar. 08	China carries out three missile firing exercises in total, naval and air force live-fire drills and, ground, naval and air force integrated exercises in the waters close to Taiwan March 8-25
	Mar. 23	Taiwan holds its first direct presidential elections; Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui re-elected
	Apr. 15	Prime Minister Hashimoto meets U.S. Ambassador Mondale (agreement reached on the total return of Futenma Air Station, Okinawa, within five to seven years after conditions are satisfied)
	Apr. 16	Signing of Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and its procedural arrangements (effective October 22)
	Apr. 17	Cabinet decision adopted on promotion of solutions to issues relating to facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Okinawa Prefecture
	Jul. 12	Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security issued Inaugural meeting of Wassenaar Arrangement (Vienna)

Year	Date	Major Events
1996	Jul. 20	U.N. Treaty on the Law of the Seas goes into effect in Japan
	Jul. 26	First visit to Russia by MSDF ships (Vladivostok, through July 30, Russian Navy's 300th anniversary naval review)
	Jul. 29	China conducts underground nuclear test (its 45th), then announces moratorium on nuclear testing
	Aug. 28	First visit by MSDF ships to ROK (Pusan, through September 6)
	Aug. 28	Supreme Court renders judgement in lawsuit regarding mandamus pertaining to proxy signature with regard to the Act on Special Measures Concerning USFJ Land Release
	Sep. 10	U.N. General Assembly adopts the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
	Sep. 18	North Korean mini submarine runs aground on the east coast of ROK, its crew intruding into ROK territory (clearing operation completed November 7)
	Sep. 26	Hong Kong protest vessels (Baodiao) etc., intrude into Japan's territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands
	Sep. 27	Taliban gains control of the Afghan capital, Kabul, and declares the establishment of the provisional government
	Oct. 03	Russia-Chechnya ceasefire agreed
	Nov. 07	Inauguration of second Hashimoto Cabinet; Kyuma becomes Minister of State of Defense
	Nov. 18	Basic NATO agreement to keep a multinational stabilization force (SFOR) to succeed IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina
	Dec. 24	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on responses to foreign submarines traveling underwater in Japanese territorial waters
1997	Jan. 02	Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Russian Nakhodka shipwreck and oil spill disaster (through March 31)
	Jan. 20	Establishment of Defense Intelligence Headquarters
	Apr. 29	CWC enters into force
	May 12	Russia-Chechnya peace treaty signed
	Jun. 09	Self-Defense Official (Director General of the Inspection Bureau) dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (through June 2002)
	Jul. 01	Hong Kong reverts to China
	Jul. 03	The first artillery live-fire training by U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa conducted on the mainland of Japan (at Kita Fuji, through July 9)
	Jul. 16	North Korean soldiers cross the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and exchange fire with ROK troops
	Sep. 11	Inauguration of second reshuffled Hashimoto Cabinet
	Sep. 23	Guidelines for New Japan-U.S. defense cooperation approved by Security Consultative Committee (SCC)
	Nov. 10	China-Russia Summit Meeting: China-Russian joint statement signed (Beijing), and demarcation of the China- Russian eastern border declared
	Dec. 03	Final Report of the Administrative Reform Committee
	Dec. 19	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996-FY2000)
1998	Mar. 26	Introduction of a system of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel
	Apr. 28	The signing of an agreement to revise the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
	May 11	India carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 13)
	May 22	Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in 1st, 2nd and 3rd Kadena Air Base noise suits
	May 28	Pakistan carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 30)
	Jun. 06	U.N. Security Council resolution adopted that condemns nuclear tests by India and Pakistan
	Jun. 12	Announcement and enactment of Basic Act on Central Government Reform
	Jun. 12	Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Law promulgated and comes into force (the section concerning use of force enters into force July 12)
	Jun. 22	A North Korean submarine intrudes into the east coast of ROK, seized by ROK forces
	Jul. 27	China publishes its first comprehensive defense white paper, "Defense of China"
	Jul. 29	Bilateral search and rescue exercise between MSDF/ ASDF and Russian Navy — the first full-fledged bilateral exercise between Japan and Russia
	Jul. 30	Obuchi Cabinet established; Nukaga becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Aug. 31	North Korea launches a ballistic missile which flies through Japanese airspace
	Sep. 01	Temporary freezing of Japan-North Korea normalization talks
	Sep. 02	Additional sanctions on North Korea (suspension of charter flights) implemented
	Sep. 30	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty concluded
	Oct. 21	KEDO signed
	Nov. 14	Departure of GSDF dispatch units to Honduras (operations in region November 18-December 1, return to Japan December 5)
	Nov. 15	First joint exercise involving all three branches (a total of 2,400 personnel from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF) (Iwo Jima)
	Nov. 20	Norota becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Dec. 17	U.S. and U.K. forces initiate Operation Desert Fox against Iraq as a punishment for refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM inspections (through December 20)
	Dec. 22	Cabinet decision adopted on introduction of information gathering satellite
	Dec. 22	Aha Training Area returned (the first resolved issue of SACO)
	Dec. 25	Security Council approves Japan-U.S. Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies
1999	Jan. 14	Inauguration of reshuffled Obuchi Cabinet
	Mar. 23	Discovery of a suspicious ship off the Noto Peninsula (Maritime security operations ordered on March 24)
	Mar. 29	GSDF establishes first brigade
	Apr. 01	Establishment of Committee for the Promotion of Information Gathering Satellites (Cabinet)
	May 24	Agreement between Japan and U.S. to amend the "Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement" (adding cooperation for operations to respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan) approved in Diet (effective September 25)
	May 28	Act Concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan promulgated (enters into force August 25), Act for Partial Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Act promulgated and enters into force
	Jun. 15	Shooting incident between North Korean Naval ships which had crossed the Northern Limit Line and South Korean Naval ships
	Jul. 23	Tokyo High Court renders judgment in 2nd Atsugi Air Base noise suit
	Aug. 05	First Bilateral Exercise of Search and Rescue Exercise between MSDF and ROK Navy (waters west of Kyushu)
	Aug. 25	The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan comes into force
	Sep. 02	North Korea announces the invalidation of the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea and the establishment of a new military demarcation line on the sea
	Sep. 23	SDF personnel dispatched to implement the transportation of necessary resources for international disaster relief operations in the Republic of Türkiye (through November 22)
	Sep. 29	Russian military unit advances into the Republic of Chechnya
	Sep. 30	Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the accident at a uranium processing facility in Tokaimura (through October 3)
	Oct. 05	Inauguration of second Obuchi Cabinet; Kawara becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Nov.19	Cabinet Decision on the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for East Timorese Displaced Persons"
	Nov. 22	Departure of East Timor Displaced persons relief unit (all teams returned home by February 8, 2000)
	Dec. 17	U.N. Security Council adopts a comprehensive resolution relating to the Iraq issue and establishes UNMOVIC in place of UNSCOM
	Dec. 20	Rule over Macao transferred to China
	Dec. 27	Decision with the Japan Coast Guard on the "Joint Response Manual for Suspicious Ships"
2000	Jan. 17	Anti-personnel mine disposal begins
	Feb. 16	First assembly of the Research Commissions on the Constitution in the Upper House (Lower House on February 17)
	Apr. 01	Enactment of the "Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Act"
	Apr. 05	Mori Cabinet established
	Apr. 14	Russian Duma ratifies the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START-II)
	May 07	Russian Acting President Putin officially assumes duties as President
	May 08	Defense Agency moves to the Ichigaya building
	Jun. 16	The Special Law for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Establishment of nuclear disaster relief dispatch) comes into force
	Jul. 04	Inauguration of second Mori Cabinet; Torashima becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Jul. 21	Kyushu-Okinawa Summit (through July 23)
	Sep. 13	SDF personnel dispatched to dispose of Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) in China
	Nov. 20	The 22nd Japanese Communist Party Convention decides to accept the SDF
	Dec. 05	Inauguration of second reshuffled Mori Cabinet; Saito becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Dec. 15	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001-FY2005)
2001	Feb. 05	SDF units dispatched to India for International Disaster Relief Operation (through February 11), following the major earthquake which hit western India on January 26
	Feb. 09	Personnel dispatched to UNMOVIC (through March, 2005)
	Feb. 10	Collision between Ehime Maru and U.S. submarine
	Mar. 01	The Ship Inspection Operations Law comes into effect
	Mar. 07	Former Maritime Self-Defense official is given a jail sentence for providing confidential documents to officer of the Russian Embassy
	Apr. 01	Information Disclosure Act (IDA) comes into force
	Apr. 01	Collision between U.S. and Chinese military planes
	Apr. 26	Koizumi Cabinet established; Nakatani becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Jun. 15	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) established
	Aug. 08	Disaster relief teams dispatched for submarine rescue ship Chihaya to cooperate in raising the Ehime Maru (returned December 16)
	Sep. 11	Terrorist attacks in the U.S. occur
	Sep. 12	U.N. Security Council adopts resolution condemning the terrorist attacks
	Sep. 19	Prime Minister Koizumi announces immediate measures in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S.
	Oct. 02	In response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S., NATO invokes Article 5 (on collectiveself-defense) of the North Atlantic Treaty
	Oct. 05	Cabinet Decision on the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for Afghan Refugees"
	Oct. 06	Departure of Afghan Refugees Relief unit (all teams returned home by October 12)
	Oct. 07	U.S. and U.K. forces begin attacks in Afghanistan (October 19, U.S. Forces sends special operation forces, first ground fighting)
	Oct. 08	Government of Japan establishes the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters and decides upon Emergency Response Measures at the first meeting
	Oct. 29	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and other measures passed in the House of Councillors plenary session
	Nov. 02	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and Law to Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law are promulgated and enforced (strengthening penalties to ensure secrecy is separately enforced on November 1, 2002)
	Nov. 25	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, an MSDF supply vessel, minesweeper tender, and destroyers depart for cooperation and support activities
	Nov. 27	Exchange of fire in the Korean demilitarized zone (DMZ)
	Dec. 05	U.S. and Russia complete implementation of START-I
	Dec. 20	U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution establishing an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
	Dec. 22	Afghanistan Interim Authority formed, with Hamid Karzai serving as Chairman
	Dec. 22	Suspicious boat incident in waters southwest of Kyushu
	Dec. 29	Russia withdraws troops from its base in Cuba
2002	Jan. 29	U.S. President G.W. Bush depicts "Axis of Evil" in the State of the Union Address
	Feb. 15	Cabinet Decision on the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment in East Timor"
	Feb. 21	Departure of headquarters staff officers of United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor(UNTAET) (all teams returned home by June 27, 2004)
	Mar. 02	Departure of UNTAET Engineering units (all teams returned home by June 25, 2004)
	Mar. 06	Kanazawa District Court renders judgement in 3rd and 4th Komatsu Air Base noise suits
	Mar. 27	Introduction of Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel System
	Apr. 22	2nd Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise held (the first multilateral exercise organized by Japan, through May 2)
	May 04	Russia completes return of the Cam Ranh base to Vietnam.
	May 20	The United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) switches to the United Nations Mission Support in Timor-Leste (UNMISET)
	May 24	Signing of Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions
	May 30	Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgement in 5th, 6th and 7th Yokota Air Base noise suits
	Jun. 13	U.S. withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
	Jun. 29	Exchanges of fire between ROK patrol boats and North Korean patrol boats which crossed the NLL
	Jul. 16	U.S. Government releases "National Strategy for Homeland Security"
	Sep. 04	Incident in central Sea of Japan (response to a suspicious ship)
	Sep. 17	Japan-North Korea Summit Meeting; Kim Jong- Il, the North Korean President, admits and apologizes for abductions
	Sep. 20	U.S. Government announces "National Security Strategy"
	Sep. 30	Inauguration of reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Ishiba becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Oct. 01	Personnel deployed to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (Head of Operations and Planning Branch) (through July 6)
	Oct. 13	First International Fleet Review in Japan (Tokyo Bay)
	Oct. 15	Five of those abducted return to Japan
	Oct. 16	U.S. Government issues statement that North Korea admitted to having a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, during Assistant Secretary of State Kelly's visit to North Korea
	Oct. 16	Yokohama District Court renders judgement in 3rd, 4th and 5th Atsugi Air Base noise suits
	Oct. 31	Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in the suit pertaining to the surrender of land for Sobe Communication Site
	Nov. 01	Introduction of stricter penalties in order to protect classified information (defense secrets)
	Nov. 14	KEDO Executive Board decides to freeze provision of heavy oil to North Korea from December
	Nov. 18	First SDF and police authority hold joint command post exercise in Hokkaido
	Nov. 21	NATO Prague Summit Meeting decides new membership for seven countries in Central and Eastern Europe
	Dec. 02	SDF personnel dispatched for the first time to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)
	Dec. 12	North Korea announces it will resume operation and establishment of nuclear-related facilities
	Dec. 16	Kirishima, vessel equipped with Aegis air defense systems, departs the port of Yokosuka, according to revision (December 5) in Implementation Plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law
	Dec. 17	U.S. announces deployment of a missile defense system (ground- and sea-based interceptor missiles and PAC-3)
2003	Jan. 10	North Korea announces it is leaving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
	Jan. 24	U.S. Department of Homeland Security established
	Feb. 08	Disposal of antipersonnel landmines complete (with some exceptions)
	Mar. 20	U.S. and U.K. Forces begin military operations in Iraq
	Mar. 27	Act for Partial Revision of the Defense Agency Establishment Act, etc. (changes in SDF personnel quota and number of Ready Reserve Personnel) enters into force
	Mar. 28	Cabinet Decision on the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for Iraqi Refugees"
	Mar. 30	Departure of Iraqi Refugee Relief unit (all teams returned home by April 2)
	May 01	U.S. President G.W. Bush declares termination of major military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
	May 13	Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgement in 4th and 8th Yokota Air Base noise suits
	May 31	U.S. President G.W. Bush proposes Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) for the first time
	Jun. 01	U.S.-Russia Summit Meeting, enforcement of Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions
	Jun. 06	Three Armed Attack Situation Response related laws passed in the House of Councillors plenary session
	Jul. 04	Cabinet Decision on the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for Iraqi Affected Persons"
	Jul. 10	Departure of Afflicted persons relief unit (all teams returned home by August 18)
	Jul. 26	Law concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq passed in the House of Councillors plenary session
	Aug. 27	First Round of the Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through August 29)
	Sep. 12	First PSI exercise held in the Coral Sea northeast of Australia (through September 14)
	Sep. 22	Inauguration of reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet (second term)
	Sep. 30	Cabinet decision adopted on establishment of award for people engaged in dangerous activities (November 3, 2003 Former SDF personnel are conferred the award for people engaged in dangerous activities for the first time)
	Oct. 07	Joint communique signed for the first time at Japan-China-ROK Summit meeting
	Oct. 10	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law remains in force for another two years
	Oct. 15	China launches its first manned spacecraft Shenzhou 5
	Nov. 19	Inauguration of second Koizumi Cabinet
	Nov. 29	Ambassador Oku and First Secretary Inoue shot to death in the central region of Iraq
	Dec. 18	Iran signs IAEA agreement
	Dec. 19	Libya announces abandonment of weapons of mass destruction program
	Dec. 19	Government decides to introduce ballistic missile defense system (Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions)
	Dec. 30	Relief materials transported by air in response to great earthquake in Iran under the Law concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams (January 1-2, 2004)

Year	Date	Major Events
2004	Jan. 22	ASDF main contingent leaves for Kuwait
	Feb. 03	Departure of first SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities
	Feb. 09	Implementation of Iraq-related response measures approved in Diet
	Feb. 20	MSDF unit for marine transport leaves for Kuwait (return on April 8)
	Mar. 04	Disaster relief teams dispatched for the first time in response to bird flu (Tanbacho, Kyoto Prefecture, through March 11)
	Mar. 26	Diet decides on installation of ballistic missile defense system (FY2004 draft budget passed in the House of Councillors plenary session)
	Apr. 15	First transport of Japanese nationals living overseas implemented, 10 nationals transported from Iraq to Kuwait
	Apr. 15	Ceremony commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Defense Agency/SDF
	Apr. 28	U.N. Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1540 calling for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction
	May 22	Japan-North Korea Summit Meeting (Pyongyang). Five family members of abductees return to Japan
	Jun. 01	U.N. Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1546 on reconstruction of Iraq
	Jun. 14	Seven bills on legislation concerning contingency response measures passed in House of Councillors plenary session and conclusion of three treaties approved
	Jun. 14	Special Measures Law for the Embargo on Specific Ships passed
	Jun. 18	Cabinet agreement for SDF's activities in Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance after reestablishment of Iraq sovereignty (joining multinational forces)
	Jun. 28	Transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government
	Aug. 13	U.S. helicopter crash at the university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa
	Sep. 27	Inauguration of second reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Ohno becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Oct. 25	PSI exercise for maritime interdiction operation hosted by Japan for the first time (in the offing of Sagami Bay and in Yokosuka Harbor, through October 27)
	Nov. 10	Intrusion of submerged Chinese nuclear powered submarine into Japan's territorial waters-Maritime security operations order issued (through November 12)
	Nov. 16	Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs expresses regret over its nuclear submarine's intrusion into Japan's territorial waters
	Dec. 10	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on "National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005" and "Mid-Term Defense Program for FY2005-FY2009"
	Dec. 28	MSDF ships dispatched to the offing of Thailand's Phuket Island to engage in the international disaster relief activities for Indonesia's Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami disaster (through January 1, 2005)
2005	Jan. 04	SDF units dispatched to Indonesia to engage in international emergency assistance in response to the major earthquake off the coast of Sumatra and tsunami in the Indian Ocean that occurred on December 26, 2004 (all teams returned home by March 23)
	Jan. 19	The Japanese Government newly formulates measures to cope with intrusion of the submerged submarines in Japan's territorial waters
	Feb. 10	North Korean Foreign Ministry releases a statement implying its manufacture of nuclear weapons (May 11, announces the unloading of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods)
	Feb. 17	Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders judgement in 4th Kadena Air Base noise suit
	Feb. 19	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2," Washington, D.C.) — common strategic objectives confirmed
	Mar. 08	ROK's Government protest over Asahi Shimbun aircraft approaching Takeshima without authorization
	Mar. 14	National People's Congress adopts "Anti-Secession Law"
	Mar. 14	A Japanese boat attacked in the Straits of Malacca, and three crew abducted (Released on March 20)
	Mar. 16	Shimane Prefecture establishes "Takeshima Day"
	Mar. 25	Cabinet decision adopted on Basic Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians
	Apr. 25	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the railroad accident on JR West's Fukuchiyama Line
	Jul. 14	Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry announces permission granted to Teikoku Oil for trial drilling in the East China Sea
	Aug. 05	An MSDF vessel dispatched to conduct international disaster relief activity in connection with the accident of a small submarine of the Russian Navy off Kamchatka (All units returned home by August 10)
	Sep. 09	First China-Russia joint military exercises "Peace Mission 2005" (through August 25)
	Sep. 09	Five destroyers of the Chinese Navy, including Sovremenny Class, are navigating in the sea area surrounding "Kashi" gas field near the median line between Japan and China in the East China Sea
	Sep. 21	Inauguration of third Koizumi Cabinet
	Oct. 12	SDF units dispatched for Japan Disaster Relief operations in response to large-scale earthquake in Pakistan, etc. (All units returned home by December 2)
	Oct. 20	GSDF and Hokkaido Prefectural Police conduct joint field training against terrorist attacks for the first time
	Oct. 29	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2," Washington, D.C.) joint announces "Japan-U.S. Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future"
	Oct. 31	Inauguration of third reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Nukaga becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Oct. 31	Partial amendment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law comes into force (validity is extended for one year)
	Nov. 11	Cabinet decision adopted on "the Government's actions to be taken for the time being in connection with the matters approved at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee held on October 29, 2005"
	Nov. 27	Field training under the Civil Protection Law takes place for the first time in Fukui Prefecture
	Nov. 30	Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 5th, 6th and 7th Yokota Air Base noise suits
	Dec. 14	The first East Asia Summit is held (Kuala Lumpur)
	Dec. 16	U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution criticizing the human rights situation in North Korea
	Dec. 24	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on "Japan-U.S. Joint Development of Interceptor Missiles Having Improved Capability of Ballistic Missile Defense"

Year	Date	Major Events
2006	Jan. 10	Iran begins an uranium enrichment experiment
	Feb. 04	Japan-North Korea negotiations concerning abduction issue, normalization of diplomatic relations and nuclear/missile issues are held (through February 6)
	Mar. 06	At the Japan-China intergovernmental conference, China makes a proposal of joint development of gas field in East China Sea (through March 7)
	Mar. 27	Partial amendment (measures for destructing ballistic missiles, etc., establishment of Joint Staff Office, etc.) of the Defense Agency Establishment Law is enacted. With the creation of the Joint Staff Office, the SDF establishes a joint operations posture
	Apr. 23	Japan and the United States agree to the sharing of expenses of relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam as part of realignment of USFJ
	May 01	The Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2," Washington, D.C.) announces the "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation"
	May 29	First P-3C visit to Australia
	Jun. 01	SDF units dispatched to Indonesia to conduct international disaster relief activity for damages from the earthquake that occurred in central Java on May 27 (through June 22)
	Jun. 20	The Government makes a decision to discontinue the activities of the GSDF contingent dispatched to Iraq. ASDF units continue to support the United Nations and the multinational forces
	Jun. 23	Agreement concerning provision of arms and military technologies to the United States is signed
	Jun. 29	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting, joint document "The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century" announced
	Jul. 05	North Korea launches a total of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan
	Jul. 13	Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 3rd, 4th and 5th Atsugi Air Base noise suits
	Jul. 31	Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law (inc. reinforcement of facilities administration function of the agency, establishment of the Equipment headquarters and reorganization of the Prefecture Liaison Offices into the Provincial Cooperation Offices)
	Aug. 16	A Russian patrol boat fires on a Japanese fishing boat, killing one of its crew members. The Government files a strong protest to Russia
	Aug. 29	U.S. Navy, deploys Aegis ships equipped with SM-3 at Yokosuka naval facility
	Sep. 26	Abe Cabinet established; Kyuma becomes Minister of State for Defense
	Oct. 09	North Korea conducts an underground nuclear test
	Oct. 13	Sanctions implemented against North Korea, which announced that it had conducted a nuclear weapon test
	Dec. 19	U.N. General Assembly adopts draft resolution condemning abduction of foreign citizens by North Korea
2007	Jan. 09	Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law (reorganization of the Defense Agency into the Ministry of Defense and stipulation of the SDF's international peace cooperation activities as its primary mission)
	Jan. 09	Kyuma becomes Minister of Defense
	Jan. 12	China conducts an anti-satellite test
	Feb. 13	North Korea agrees to disable all of its nuclear facilities during the 5th Six-Party Talks
	Mar. 05	First Aviation Training Relocation associated with realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan (Tsuiki, through March 8)
	Mar. 13	Australian Prime Minister Howard visits Japan, and the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed
	Mar. 23	Emergency response procedures for destruction measures against ballistic missiles are prepared
	Mar. 27	Cabinet Decision on the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Nepal"
	Mar. 28	Establishment of the GSDF Central Readiness Force
	Mar. 30	A Patriot PAC-3 system is deployed at the ASDF Iruma Air Base for the first time
	Mar. 30	Departure of the Military Observer Group of United Nations Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) (all teams returned home by January 18, 2011)
	Apr. 16	First Japan-U.S.-India trilateral exercise (MSDF, U.S. Navy and Indian Navy)
	Apr. 16	Kanazawa Branch of Nagoya District Court renders judgment on the 3rd and 4th trials for the suits pertaining to noise generated by the Komatsu Air Base
	May 01	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2," Washington, D.C.) announces the joint statement "Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation"
	May 18	ASDF controllers positioned at the Yokota RAPCON facility
	May 29	Supreme Court renders judgement in 5th, 6th and 7th Yokota Air Base noise suits
	Jun. 01	Partial amendment (abolition of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and its consolidation into the Ministry of Defense, establishment of the Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance and the Local Defense Bureau, joint units of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, etc.) of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law enacted
	Jul. 04	Koike becomes Minister of Defense
	Jul. 20	Enactment of the "Basic Act on Ocean Policy"
	Aug. 10	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-U.S. General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)
	Aug. 27	Inauguration of reshuffled Abe Cabinet; Koumura becomes Minister of Defense
	Aug. 29	Enactment of the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law
	Sep. 01	Local Cooperation Bureau, Equipment and Facilities Headquarters, Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance, and Local Defense Bureau created
	Sep. 26	Fukuda Cabinet established; Ishiba becomes Minister of Defense
	Oct. 03	The Six-Party Talks Joint Statement, the "Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement," is announced
	Oct. 17	First Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise (MSDF, U.S. Navy and the Royal Australian Air Force)
	Nov. 01	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law expires Order issued on termination of response measures based on Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law
	Nov. 16	Council for MOD Reform established
	Nov. 28	Chinese naval vessel visits Japan for the first time (through December 1)
	Dec. 18	Aegis vessel MSDF Kongo conducts a successful test on counter-missile by ballistic missile
	Dec. 19	Front headquarters of 1st Corps headquarters of U.S. forces formed at USFJ Camp Zama in line with the USFJ realignment
	Dec. 24	"Improvement of next fixedwing aircraft" and "Important issues among contents of Defense Capability Buildup in FY2008"
	Dec. 24	Cabinet decisions adopted on "Changes of emergency response measures on destruction measures by ballistic missiles"
2008	Jan. 16	Enactment of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (units depart for Indian Ocean on January 24, 25)
	Jan. 25	New Special Measures Agreement concerning the Cost Sharing on the Stationing of U.S. forces in Japan signed
	Feb. 19	Collision between Aegis vessel MSDF and fishing boat
	Feb. 20	U.S. Navy Aegis ship succeeds in shooting down out-of-control satellite outside the earth's atmosphere with an SM-3
	Feb. 21	Based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, MSDF replenishment ships resume refueling U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean (through January 15, 2010)
	Mar. 18	Cabinet decision adopted on "Basic Plan on Ocean Policy"
	Mar. 26	Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (inc. reorganization of the SDF Command and Communication Unit)
	Apr. 24	Announcement by U.S. Government that North Korea assisted with the construction by Syria of nuclear facilities destroyed in an air attack
	Jun. 24	First visit of MSDF vessel to China (through June 28)
	Jun. 26	Agreement reached between the Government of Japan and Government of China on the joint development of natural gas in the East China Sea
	Jun. 26	Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders judgement in 1st and 2nd Futenma Air Station noise suits
	Jul. 07	G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit (through July 9)
	Jul. 15	Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense released
	Jul. 17	Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 4th and 8th Yokota Air Base noise suits
	Aug. 02	Inauguration of reshuffled Fukuda Cabinet; Hayashi becomes Minister of Defense
	Aug. 08	Russian Armed Forces intervene in military clashes between Georgian and South Ossetian forces
	Aug. 10	Armed groups attack public security facilities in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China
	Aug. 29	TRDI receives prototype of next-generation fixed-wing patrol aircraft XP-1 no. 1
	Sep. 24	Aso Cabinet established; Hamada becomes Minister of Defense
	Sep. 25	The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS "George Washington" arrives in the port of Yokosuka for the first time
	Sep. 25	China launches a manned spacecraft "Shenzhou 7," and conducts successful extravehicular activity for the first time
	Oct. 03	Cabinet Decision on the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Sudan"
	Oct. 03	U.S. DoD informs Congress of sale of PAC-3s, AH-64Ds, attack helicopters, etc., to Taiwan
	Oct. 10	U.S. removes North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism
	Oct. 19	Four Chinese naval warships including a destroyer sail through Tsugaru Strait for the first time
	Oct. 22	Japan-India Summit Meeting: Japan-India Joint Statement on the Advancement of the Strategic and Global Partnership, and Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed
	Oct. 24	Departure of the headquarters staff officers of United Nations Missions in Sudan(UNMIS) (all teams returned home by September 29, 2011)
	Nov. 02	Four Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean for the first time
	Dec. 02	U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1846 on countering piracy off the coast of Somalia
	Dec. 20	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005-FY2009)
	Dec. 23	ASDF Airlift Wing that was deployed under the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq returns to Japan
	Dec. 26	Chinese naval fleet of three destroyers sets off to Somalia for escort mission
2009	Jan. 08	ASDF deploys F-15s to Okinawa (Hyakuri Air Base)
	Jan. 15	Ministry of Defense decides on "Basic Policy Relating to the Development and Use of Space"
	Feb. 10	Order issued relating to the conclusion of withdrawal duties for the Iraq Reconstruction Support Group by the redeployment group
	Feb. 17	Signing of the "Agreement on the Relocation of USMC in Okinawa to Guam"
	Feb. 27	Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in 4th Kadena Air Base noise suit
	Mar. 13	Cabinet decision adopted on counter-piracy Measures Law
	Mar. 13	SDF mobilization order issued for maritime security operations as part of counter-piracy measures off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden
	Mar. 14	Two MSDF ships are dispatched to protect vessels with ties to Japan from the piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden
	Mar. 27	SDF action order for implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued (through April 6)
	Mar. 30	MSDF ships begin escort missions as part of counter-piracy measures
	Apr. 03	Foreign Minister Nakasone signs Status of Forces Agreement with Djibouti
	Apr. 05	North Korea launches a ballistic missile which flies through Japanese airspace
	Apr. 10	Supreme Court renders judgement in 4th and 8th Yokota Air Base noise suits
	May 04	1st ARF Disaster Relief Training (Philippines)
	May 15	Order issued for P-3C to be dispatched to Djibouti for counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden
	May 19	"Agreement on the Relocation of USMC in Okinawa to Guam" comes into force
	May 25	North Korea conducts the 2nd underground nuclear test
	Jun. 02	Basic Plan for Space Policy formulated
	Jul. 04	North Korea launches a total of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan
	Jul. 14	Ratification of Convention on Cluster Munitions
	Jul. 17	Announcement of Law Concerning the Prohibition of Manufacture of Cluster Munitions and Regulation of their Possession

Year	Date	Major Events
	Jul. 24	Counter-Piracy Measures Law enacted, Order issued for anti-piracy operations
	Jul. 31	Completion of withdrawal of non-American multinational forces from Iraq
	Aug. 01	Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (inc. establishment of the Defense Council and the Special Advisors to the Minister of Defense, and abolition of the Defense Councilors System)
	Sep. 16	Hatoyama Cabinet established; Kitazawa becomes Minister of Defense
	Oct. 05	SDF units dispatched to aid international disaster relief activities after the Padang earthquake in Indonesia (though October 17)
	Oct. 27	Destroyer collides with ROK cargo ship in the Kammon Straits
	Nov. 10	North and South Korean ships engage in fire in the Yellow Sea
	Nov. 23	Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) receives the IMO Award for Exceptional Bravery at Sea
	Dec. 01	Lisbon treaty comes into effect
	Dec. 03	Tokyo High Court rejects appeal by MSDF Lieutenant Commander in Aegis information leakage case (appeal to Supreme Court)
	Dec. 05	START I lapses
	Dec. 17	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on the build-up of defense capability for FY2010
2010	Jan. 11	China announces that it has performed missile interception test
	Jan. 17	Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to the earthquake in Haiti (February 14, operation completed)
	Jan. 19	"2+2" joint statement on the 50th anniversary of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
	Jan. 29	First test flight of Russian fifth-generation fighter PAK FA
	Feb. 05	Cabinet Decision on the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Haiti"
	Feb. 06	Departure of United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) Engineer Group (all teams returned home by February 26, 2013)
	Feb. 24	Departure of MINUSTAH Engineer Group (all teams returned home by January 30, 2013)
	Feb. 27	U.S. announces "Quadrennial Defense Review" (QDR) and "Ballistic Missile Defense Review" (BMDR)
	Mar. 07	Russia publishes new Navy doctrine
	Mar. 11	ASDF Hyakuri Air Base, joint civilian use of runway
	Mar. 26	ROK naval patrol ship "Cheonan" sank in the Yellow Sea by a torpedo attack from a North Korean submarine
	Mar. 26	Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (new establishment of the 15th Bridge and reorganization of the Youth Technical School)
	Apr. 01	Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of the job status of GSDF students)
	Apr. 06	U.S. announces "Nuclear Posture Review" (NPR)
	Apr. 12	1st Nuclear Security Summit (Washington, D.C., through April 13)
	May 01	Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to foot and mouth disease in Miyazaki Prefecture (through July 27)
	May 19	Signing of the Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)
	May 23	The MOD/SDF dispatches units to the Pacific Partnership 2010 for the first time (through July 15)
	May 26	Enactment of the "Act on the Preservation of the Law-Water Line and Development of Basic Infrastructure of Remote Islands for the Maintaining and Promoting Utilization of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf"
	May 27	U.S. announces "National Security Strategy" (NSS)
	May 28	Joint Statement of Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2")
	Jun. 08	Kan Cabinet established
	Jun. 09	U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1929 regarding additional sanction on Iran
	Jun. 25	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-NATO General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA)
	Jun. 28	Release of the U.S. "National Space Policy" (NSP)
	Jul. 01	Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of the job status of SDF recruits)
	Jul. 13	Cabinet decision adopted on "Act on the Preservation of the Law-Water Line and Development of Basic Infrastructure of Remote Islands for Maintaining and Promoting Utilization of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf"
	Jul. 16	Cabinet Decision on continuation of anti-piracy operations
	Jul. 29	Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in 1st and 2nd Futenma Air Station noise suits
	Aug. 31	Air transport activities by helicopter in aid of flood disaster in Pakistan (through October 10)
	Sep. 07	Chinese fishing boat collides with Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel in waters near the Senkaku Islands
	Sep. 10	Cabinet Decision on the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Timor-Leste"
	Sep. 17	Inauguration of reshuffled Kan Cabinet
	Sep. 27	Departure of United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) military liaison officers (all teams returned home by September 21, 2012)
	Oct. 01	Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (abolition of the lowest enlisted ranks)
	Nov. 01	Russian President Medvedev visits the Kunashiri Island
	Nov. 23	North Korea shells the ROK's Yeonpyeong island
	Dec. 07	Establishment of a governmental committee to review information security, as a result of the leakage of the video showing the fishing boat collision off the Senkaku Islands
	Dec. 17	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond and the Mid-term Defense Program (FY2011 to FY2015)
2011	Jan. 11	China conducts test flight of fighter aircraft touted as the next-generation stealth aircraft
	Jan. 14	Inauguration of reshuffled Kan Cabinet (second term)
	Jan. 21	Signing of the new Special Measures Agreement in connection with cost-sharing arrangements on the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan (comes into effect on April 1)
	Jan. 27	Supreme Court renders judgement in 4th Kadena Air Base noise suit
	Feb. 04	The United States releases "National Security Space Strategy" (NSSS)
	Feb. 05	New START comes into effect
	Feb. 23	Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to the earthquake in New Zealand (through March 3)
	Mar. 11	Four pirates that had shot at Japanese vessels off the Oman Coast in the Arabian Sea were arrested under the Counter-Piracy Law
	Mar. 11	Great East Japan Earthquake strikes
	Mar. 11	Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (through August 31)
	Mar. 12	Nuclear disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (through December 26)
	Mar. 16	Cabinet decisions adopted on first disaster call-up of SDF Reserve Personnel and Ready Reserve Personnel in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake
	Mar. 16	Disaster relief call-up order is issued to dispatch GSDF Ready Reserve Personnel and Reserve Personnel (through August 31)
	Mar. 19	The coalition force led by the U.S., U.K., and France commence military operations against Libya
	Apr. 11	Reconstruction Design Council in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake established
	Apr. 15	Disaster relief call-up order is issued to dispatch MSDF and ASDF reserve personnel (through August 31)
	Apr. 27	Partial revision to the Environmental Improvement Law (extended target projects for subsidies to improve the environment surrounding specified defense facilities)
	May 02	U.S. President Obama announces the killing of Osama bin Laden, leader of the international terrorist organization Al-Qaeda
	Jun. 01	SDF activity base in Djibouti initiates operation
	Jun. 21	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" in Washington, D.C.) joint statement; release of "Toward a Deeper and Broader Japan-U.S. Alliance: Building on 50 years of Partnership"
	Jun. 22	U.S. President Obama announces guidelines to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan
	Jun. 24	Exercise of the Basic Act on Reconstruction
	Jun. 28	First meeting of the headquarters for reconstruction measures
	Jul. 08	U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1996 to establish UNMISS
	Jul. 08	Cabinet Decision on continuation of anti-piracy operations
	Jul. 09	Independence of the Republic of South Sudan
	Aug. 10	Conducts its first navigation Chinese aircraft carrier Varyag
	Aug. 24	The Chinese fisheries patrol ships enter Japan's territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands
	Sep. 02	Noda Cabinet established; Ichikawa becomes Minister of Defense
	Sep. 09	24 Russian vessels sail through Soya Strait
	Sep. 19	Detection of cyber attacks against defense industry
	Sep. 27	Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting (Tokyo), Japan-Philippines joint statement made
	Sep. 29	Chinese space laboratory "Tiangong 1" launched
	Sep. 30	Cabinet decisions adopted on "Promotion of the operational Quasi-Zenith Satellite System project" and "Promoting development and utilization of aerospace"
	Oct. 10	ATR to Guam as part of the U.S. Forces realignment (through October 28)
	Oct. 11	Supreme Court renders judgement in 1st Futenma Air Station noise suit
	Oct. 24	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-France General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA)
	Oct. 31	NATO ends operations in Libya
	Nov. 15	Cabinet Decision on the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment in South Sudan"
	Nov. 22	Six Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
	Nov. 29	Departure of UNMISS headquarters staff
	Dec. 18	Completion of U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq
	Dec. 20	Decision made by the Security Council and seconded by the Cabinet regarding "acquisition of the next-generation fighter aircraft"
	Dec. 20	Cabinet Decision on revision of the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment in South Sudan (Decision on dispatch of United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan(UNMISS) Engineer group, etc.)"
	Dec. 27	Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment etc.
2012	Jan. 11	Departure of United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Engineering Unit (all teams returned home by May 25, 2017)
	Jan. 13	Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet; Tanaka becomes Minister of Defense
	Feb. 10	Establishment of the Reconstruction Agency
	Mar. 16	Chinese government ship "Haijian" enters Japan's territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands
	Mar. 26	Transfer of ASDF Air Defense Command to Yokota Air Base
	Mar. 27	Prime Minister Noda attends the Nuclear Security Summit
	Mar. 30	SDF action order for implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued (terminated April 13)
	Apr. 13	North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a "Satellite"
	Apr. 13	Kim Jong-un becomes the First Chairman of the National Defense Commission
	Apr. 27	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee "2+2" joint statement
	Apr. 29	Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
	May 17	Signing of the Japan-Australia General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA)
	Jun. 04	Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet (second term); Morimoto becomes Minister of Defense
	Jul. 01	26 Russian vessels sail through Soya Strait (through July 2)
	Jul. 03	First PSI Air Interdiction Exercise hosted by Japan (Hokkaido, through July 5)
	Jul. 11	Three vessels of Chinese Fishery Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) enter Japanese waters near the Senkaku Islands
	Jul. 12	One FLEC vessel enters Japanese waters near the Senkaku Islands
	Jul. 12	Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Law for Establishment of Cabinet Office
	Jul. 13	Cabinet Decision on continuation of anti-piracy operations
	Aug. 10	South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visits Takeshima
	Sep. 07	"Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace by the MOD/JSDF" is released
	Sep. 11	Government's purchase of the three Senkaku Islands
	Sep. 25	The first Chinese aircraft carrier "Liaoning" commissioned
	Oct. 01	Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet (third term)
	Oct. 16	Seven Chinese warships pass through the waters between the Yonaguni Island and the Nakanokami Island for the first time
	Nov. 26	Promulgation and partial enforcement (regarding Japan-U.S. ACSA) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc.
	Dec. 04	Launch of capacity building program in East Timor
	Dec. 07	SDF action order for implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued (terminated December 12)
	Dec. 12	North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a "Satellite"
	Dec. 13	A Chinese aircraft violates Japanese airspace for the first time (airspace surrounding the Senkaku Islands)
	Dec. 26	Inauguration of second Abe Cabinet; Onodera becomes Minister of Defense
2013	Jan. 16	Abduction of Japanese nationals in Algeria
	Jan. 19	A Chinese naval vessel may direct fire-control radar at a helicopter based on a JMSDF destroyer
	Jan. 20	As a measure for the Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas (TJNO) prescribed in the Self-Defense Forces Act, SDF transports Japanese victims of the Algerian hostage crisis from Algeria to Japan (return home on January 24)
	Jan. 25	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on build-up of defense capability for FY2013
	Jan. 25	"Basic Plan on Space Policy" is decided by the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development
	Jan. 30	A Chinese vessel directs fire-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer in the East China Sea
	Jan. 31	Three Chinese vessels sail northeast of Miyako Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Jan. 31	Entry into force of the Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)
	Feb. 01	Partial enforcement (regarding pilot allowance) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc.
	Feb. 07	Russian fighters intrude into Japan's territorial airspace
	Feb. 12	North Korea's underground nuclear test
	Feb. 20	Naha District Court renders judgment on Henoko environmental assessment case
	Feb. 23	Meeting between U.S. President Obama and Prime Minister Abe
	Mar. 01	Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on participation of Japan's industries in the production of the F-35A
	Mar. 15	SDF dispatch for the MINUSTAH mission ended (ceremony to return unit flag)
	Mar. 22	Entry into force of Japan-Australia General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA)
	Mar. 26	Partial enforcement (regarding shift of Air Rescue Wing's affiliation) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc.
	Mar. 30	Four Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean
	Apr. 02	North Korea announces that it will readjust and restart the graphite moderated reactor that was mothballed and disabled under an agreement reached at the Six-Party Talks
	Apr. 26	Cabinet decision adopted on "Basic Plan on Ocean Policy"
	May 07	Two Chinese vessels sail northeast of the Yonaguni Island to the Pacific Ocean
	May 27	Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
	Jul. 04	Signing of the Japan-U.K. Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies and the Japan-U.K. General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA)
	Jul. 05	China-Russia first joint naval exercise "Naval Interaction 2013" (through July 11)
	Jul. 09	Cabinet Decision on continuation of anti-piracy operations
	Jul. 13	Chinese naval fleets sail through Soya Strait to the Sea of Okhotsk
	Jul. 22	China Coast Guard sign put up
	Jul. 24	Chinese early warning aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean for the first time
	Aug. 21	Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
	Aug. 22	Russian bombers intrude into Japan's airspace
	Aug. 27	Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
	Aug. 30	"Direction of the MOD Reform" released
	Sep. 08	Chinese bombers fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island
	Sep. 09	Unmanned aircraft (presumed) of unidentified nationality flies over the East China Sea
	Sep. 10	1st meeting of MOD/SDF Special Action Committee on the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games held
	Sep. 27	UN. Security Council adopts Resolution 2118 on elimination of Syrian chemical weapons
	Oct. 03	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2", Tokyo)
	Oct. 03	Signing of the "Protocol to amend the agreement concerning the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam"
	Oct. 16	Disaster relief teams dispatched after Typhoon No. 26 (through November 8)
	Oct. 23	Five Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
	Oct. 30	Three Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean
	Nov. 12	Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to typhoon disaster in the Philippines (through December 18)
	Nov. 15	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) decide.s on detailed terms of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, etc.
	Nov. 22	Revisions of the Self-Defense Forces Act (e.g., expanded category of people who may be transported by the JSDF, in the event of disasters, insurgencies, and other emergencies overseas) promulgated and entered into force

Year	Date	Major Events
	Nov. 23	China announces establishment of the "East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone"
	Nov. 24	Iran and EU3 (U.K., France, Germany) +3 (U.S., China, Russia) reach first phase agreement for the comprehensive settlement of the nuclear issue
	Dec. 04	National Security Council established
	Dec. 08	The ROK announces establishment of new Air Defense Identification Zone
	Dec. 13	Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets promulgated
	Dec. 14	Chinese lunar probe successfully achieves soft lunar landing
	Dec. 17	National Security Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on "National Security Strategy," "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond," and "Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)"
	Dec. 23	Three Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean
	Dec. 23	Second Russian Borey-class SSBN commissioned (incorporated into Pacific Fleet)
2014	Jan. 01	Entry into force of the Japan-U.K. General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA)
	Jan. 07	National Security Secretariat launched
	Jan. 15	Collision accident between transport vessel and fishing vessel in the Hiroshima Bay
	Jan. 22	Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa established
	Mar. 01	Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
	Mar. 03	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Mar. 11	Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to the missing Malaysian Airplane (through April 28)
	Mar. 18	Russian "annexation" of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
	Mar. 19	A submarine seen navigating underwater in Japan's contiguous zone (waters east of Miyako Island)
	Mar. 24	Prime Minister Abe attends 3rd Nuclear Security Summit (Hague, through March 25)
	Mar. 26	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Apr. 01	Partial enforcement (establishment of Faculty of Nursing at National Defense Medical College) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc.
	Apr. 01	Cabinet decision adopted on "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology"
	Apr. 28	U.S. and Philippines sign Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement: (EDCA)
	May 02	Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
	May 07	Collision and confrontation between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels occur (through mid-July)
	May 14	"Protocol to amend the agreement concerning the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam" comes into force
	May 15	The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security submits its report
	May 21	Yokohama District Court renders judgement in 6th, 7th, and administrative 1st and 2nd Atsugi Air Base noise suits
	May 24	Chinese fighter jets fly abnormally close to SDF aircraft
	Jun. 07	Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
	Jun. 11	Japan-Australia "2+2" (Tokyo)
	Jun. 11	Chinese fighter jets fly abnormally close to SDF aircraft
	Jun. 19	Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases released
	Jun. 21	Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (response to early retirement system)
	Jun. 29	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Jun. 29	ISIL declares establishment of "Islamic State" and caliphate
	Jul. 01	Cabinet decision adopted on "Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People"
	Jul. 08	Japan-Australia Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology is signed
	Jul. 09	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Jul. 13	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Jul. 18	Cabinet Decision on continuation of anti-piracy operations
	Jul. 25	Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs)
	Jul. 26	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Aug. 01	Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (quota for SDF personnel posts of Internal Bureau, establishment of Air Tactics Development & Training Wing, etc.)
	Aug. 8-	U.S. Central Command begins airstrikes on ISIL in Northern Iraq
	Aug. 12	Russian Armed Forces conduct exercises in the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands
	Aug. 19	Chinese fighter jets fly abnormally close to U.S. Forces' patrol aircraft
	Aug. 20	Disaster relief teams dispatched for lifesaving activities in Hiroshima City, Hiroshima Prefecture (through September 11)
	Aug. 28	MOD formulates "Basic Policy Relating to the Development and Use of Space (revised)"
	Sep. 01	Japan-India summit meeting (Tokyo); "Tokyo Declaration for Japan-India Special Strategic and Global Partnership"
	Sep. 03	Eto becomes Minister of Defense
	Sep. 03	2nd Reshuffled Abe Cabinet is established
	Sep. 10	U.S. President Obama announces strategy to counter ISIL
	Sep. 22-	The United States and other coalition countries begin airstrikes on ISIL in Syria
	Sep. 26	Prime Minister Abe attends U.N. Summit Meeting on UN Peacekeeping Operations (New York)
	Sep. 27	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the eruption of Mt. Ontake (through October 16)
	Sep. 29	Afghanistan's new government is launched
	Oct. 26	Air Review commemorating the 60th anniversary of the MOD/SDF (Hyakuri)
	Nov. 16	Candidate Onaga defeats incumbent Governor Nakaima in Okinawa gubernatorial election
	Nov. 21	"Global Hawk" is decided as the model of unmanned aerial vehicle
	Nov. 24	ROK Armed Forces conduct military drill in waters near Takeshima
	Nov. 28	Transport of supplies necessary for Japan Disaster Relief operations in response to the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa (Republic of Ghana, through December 11)
	Dec. 01	Self-Defense Officials dispatched to NATO for the first time
	Dec. 04	Five Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
	Dec. 04-	Chinese People's Liberation Army begins exercise in Western Pacific. Subsequently, some vessels transit Soya Strait (December 24) and Tsushima Strait (December 27) and circle Japan
	Dec. 08	Entry into force of the Japan-Australia Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
	Dec. 10	Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets enters into force
	Dec. 19	Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2)
	Dec. 24	Inauguration of the third Abe Cabinet, Nakatani becomes Minister of Defense
	Dec. 24	Arms Trade Treaty comes into effect
	Dec. 26	Deployment of U.S. Forces TPY-2 ("X-band radar") to Kyogamisaki is completed
	Dec. 31	Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to disappearance of AirAsia plane (through January 11)
2015	Jan. 02	ISIL releases video of Japanese hostages (videos of the murder of the Japanese nationals subsequently released on January 24 and February 1)
	Jan. 09	"Basic Plan on Space Policy" is decided by the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development
	Jan. 21	First Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting (London)
	Feb. 06	The United States releases "National Security Strategy" (NSS)
	Feb. 12	Minsk agreement II (German, French, Russian, and Ukrainian leaders agree on new ceasefire agreement)
	Feb. 13	Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
	Feb. 14	China's intelligence gathering aircraft flies between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island through to the Pacific Ocean (February 15)
	Mar. 02	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Mar. 13	Japan-France Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology is signed (Tokyo)
	Apr. 21	National Defense Medical College instructor dispatched to support WHO's epidemiological studies on the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa, etc. (through May 29)
	Apr. 27	Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to earthquake in Nepal (through May 22)
	Apr. 27	The new "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation" is approved at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting ("2+2," New York)
	Apr. 30	Promulgation and enforcement of the Special Measures Act on the Number of Years of the National Subsidization of Specific Defense Procurements (so-called "Long-term Contract Act")
	May 09	North Korea announces SLBM launch test was conducted successfully
	May 14	Cabinet decision on "Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security" and "International Peace Support Bill"
	May 14	Cabinet decisions on "Responses to Foreign Naval Vessels Carrying Out Navigation through the Territorial Sea or the Internal Waters of Japan that Does Not Fall Under Innocent Passage in International Law," "The Government's Responses to Illegal Landing on a Remote Island or its Surrounding Seas by an Armed Group," and "Responses to Acts of Infringement When Self-Defense Force Ships or Aircraft Detect Foreign Ships Committing Said Acts Against Japanese Private Ships on the High Seas"
	May 21	Two Chinese bombers fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to the Pacific Ocean (Air Force spokesperson announces first flight by Chinese Air Force aircraft in this airspace)
	May 26	China releases defense white paper, "China's Military Strategy"
	May 31	Dispatched MSDF personnel as commander of Combined Task Force (CTF 151) for counter-piracy operations (through August 27)
	Jun. 11	Naha District Court's Okinawa Branch renders judgment in 4th, 6th, 7th and 8th Futenma Air Station noise suits
	Jun. 12	Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
	Jul. 01	U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey releases National Military Strategy
	Jul. 03	Disaster relief teams dispatched to support search of missing persons in Mt. Ontake (through August 7)
	Jul. 07	Cabinet Decision on continuation of anti-piracy operations
	Jul. 18	Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
	Jul. 29	China's intelligence gathering aircraft, early warning aircraft, and two bombers fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island through to the Pacific Ocean (July 30)
	Jul. 30	Tokyo High Court renders judgment in 6th, 7th and administrative 1st and 2nd Atsugi Air Facility noise suits
	Aug. 17	Seven Chinese vessels sail Tsushima Strait north. Subsequently, China-Russia naval combined exercise, Joint Sea 2015 (II), is held (Sea of Japan) (August 20-28). Following the exercise, five vessels sail Soya Strait east (August 29), sail in the high seas in the Bering Sea (statement by U.S. DoD official, September 2), and enter into U.S. territorial waters near the Aleutian Islands (statement by U.S. DoD official, September 4).
	Aug. 20	Shelling incident occurs between North Korea and the ROK
	Aug. 22	Russian Prime Minister Medvedev visits Etorofu Island
	Aug. 26	Signing of agreement on the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan
	Sep. 15	Presumed Russian aircraft intrudes into Japanese territorial airspace over the coast of the Nemuro Peninsula
	Sep. 19	Legislation for Peace and Security ("Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security" and "International Peace Support Bill") is passed in the House of Councillors plenary session
	Sep. 28	Signing of the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship Relating to the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to the Status of U.S. Forces Agreement (SOFA)
	Oct. 01	Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (unification of actual unit operations into Joint Staff, establishment of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency, etc.)
	Oct. 01	Technical Research and Development Institute and Equipment Procurement and Construction Office are abolished; Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency is established
	Oct. 03	Shooting attack in Bangladesh (one Japanese national is killed; ISIL Bangladesh claims responsibility for the attack in a statement)
	Oct. 07	Inauguration of the third reshuffled Abe Cabinet
	Oct. 15	Iwakuni Branch of Yamaguchi District Court renders judgment in 1st, 2nd and 3rd Iwakuni Air Base noise suits
	Oct. 26	U.S. naval destroyer USS Lassen sails within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation
	Nov. 11	A Chinese Navy AGI repeatedly conducts east-west passages near the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands (through November 12)
	Nov. 27	China's four bombers and intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island through to the Pacific Ocean (Air Force spokesperson of China announces flight by PLA Air Force aircraft). At around the same time, four bombers and early warning aircraft conduct operations near the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island
	Dec. 04	Japan-U.S. Joint Press Release "Implementation of Bilateral Plans for Consolidating Facilities and Areas in Okinawa"
	Dec. 07	Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
	Dec. 12	Japan-India Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology is signed (New Delhi)
	Dec. 12	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-India General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)
	Dec. 13	Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
	Dec. 26	A China Coast Guard vessel carrying weapons that appear to be cannons intrudes into Japanese territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands for the first time
	Dec. 31	Russia revises National Security Strategy
2016	Jan. 06	North Korea conducts fourth nuclear test which it called a "hydrogen bomb test"
	Jan. 11	Chinese Ministry of National Defense announces organizational realignment of the Central Military Commission (dismantlement of four general departments, CMC's introduction of multiple section system)
	Jan. 26	Two Russian bombers conduct flight along the perimeter of Japan
	Jan. 30	A U.S. naval destroyer sails within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island, Paracel Islands in the South China Sea and conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation
	Jan. 31	China's intelligence gathering aircraft and early warning aircraft pass Tsushima Strait for the first time through to the Sea of Japan
	Feb. 01	Chinese Ministry of National Defense dismantles seven Military Regions and announces the establishment of five theaters of operations
	Feb. 02	Four Chinese vessels sail through Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean
	Feb. 04	A Chinese Navy AGI conducts round-trip northeast-southwest passages near the contiguous zone southeast of the Boso Peninsula (through February 8)
	Feb. 07	North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a "Satellite"
	Feb. 16	Locations of equipment deemed to be surface-to-air missile in Woody Island, Paracel Islands are confirmed
	Feb. 29	Japan-Philippines Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology is signed (Manila)
	Mar. 04	Entry into force of the Japan-India Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
	Mar. 10	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Mar. 18	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Mar. 22	Terror bombing attacks occur in Brussels, Belgium
	Mar. 28	Two Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
	Mar. 28	Establishment of Camp Yonaguni
	Mar. 29	Enforcement of Legislation for Peace and Security ("Act for the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security" and "International Peace Support Act")
	Mar. 31	Nuclear Security Summit (Washington, D.C.) (through April 1)
	Apr. 07	Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
	Apr. 08	Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
	Apr. 14	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake (through May 30)
	Apr. 15	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Apr. 17	Disaster relief call-up order for to Ready Reserve Personnel is issued (through May 9)
	Apr. 20	China's early warning aircraft flies between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island through to the Pacific Ocean
	Apr. 23	North Korea launches an SLBM
	Apr. 25	Entry into force of the Japan-Philippines Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
	Apr. 28	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Apr. 28	Alleged murder case involving a civilian component member of the USFJ in Okinawa Prefecture
	Apr. 29	Transitional Government of National Unity of South Sudan is established
	May 10	A U.S. destroyer sails within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef, Spratly Islands in the South China Sea as part of the "Freedom of Navigation Operation"
	May 17	A Chinese PLA fighter jet flies abnormally close to a U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea
	May 22	U.S. President Obama visits Vietnam (through May 25), fully lifts arms embargo on Vietnam
	May 31	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Jun. 07	A Chinese PLA fighter jet conducts dangerous flight, approaching a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft at a high speed over the East China Sea
	Jun. 09	A Chinese naval combatant vessel enters the contiguous zone near the Senkaku Islands for the first time

Year	Date	Major Events
2016	Jun. 15	A Chinese naval intelligence gathering vessel sails in Japan's territorial waters near Kuchinoerabu Island and Yakushima Island in Kagoshima Prefecture and then sails within Japan's contiguous zone north of Kitadaito Island. Subsequently, the vessel repeatedly conducts east-west passages outside the contiguous zone near the Senkaku Islands. (June 19 through 20)
	Jun. 16	Five Chinese naval vessels sail between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
	Jun. 17	Cabinet Decision on continuation of anti-piracy operations
	Jun. 20	Ten Russian vessels pass through the Soya Strait and move to the Okhotsk Sea.
	Jun. 22	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Jul. 02	Bangladeshi militants take hostages (7 Japanese nationals are killed); ISIL claims responsibility on the Internet
	Jul. 08	The U.S. and ROK decide on the deployment of THAAD to U.S. Forces Korea
	Jul. 09	North Korea launches a submarine-launched ballistic missile
	Jul. 11	ASDF aircraft dispatched to Juba, the capital of South Sudan, to transport Japanese nationals overseas due to the situation deterioration in South Sudan (through July 26)
	Jul. 12	The arbitral tribunal renders a final award in which nearly all of the Philippines' submissions are ruled in favor of the Philippines with regard to arbitral proceedings pursuant to the South China Sea
	Jul. 15	Terror attack with a truck occurs in Nice, France
	Jul. 18	Chinese Air Force announces that it will be conducting combat patrol in the South China Sea on a regular basis
	Jul. 19	North Korea launches three ballistic missiles
	Aug. 03	2nd Reshuffled 3rd Abe Cabinet is established
	Aug. 03	Inada becomes Minister of Defense
	Aug. 03	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles (one of them fell into Japan's EEZ)
	Aug. 05	200 to 300 Chinese fishing vessels operate in the waters near the Senkaku Islands. Chinese government vessels intrude into Japan's territorial waters following the fishing vessels for the first time (total of 15 vessels in 5 days / through August 9)
	Aug. 12	Three Chinese naval vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
	Aug. 18	A Chinese early warning aircraft and two bombers fly over Tsushima strait and advance to the Sea of Japan
	Aug. 24	North Korea launches a submarine-launched ballistic missile
	Aug. 30	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy rainfall due to Typhoon 10 in Iwate Prefecture (through September 16)
	Aug. 31	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy rainfall due to Typhoon 10 in Hokkaido (through September 18)
	Sep. 05	North Korea launches three ballistic missiles (fell into Japan's EEZ)
	Sep. 09	North Korea conducts its fifth nuclear test
	Sep. 12	First training relocation involves Tilt-Rotor/Rotary wing aircraft outside of Okinawa Prefecture in the context of the realignment of the U.S. Forces (through October 5)
	Sep. 25	Four Chinese bombers, two intelligence gathering aircraft, and two fighter jets (probable) pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean (fighter jets [probable] are observed for the first time passing)
	Oct. 15	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Oct. 20	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Oct. 21	A U.S. destroyer sails around the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea as part of the "Freedom of Navigation Operation"
	Oct. 27	China's early warning aircraft and intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
	Oct. 28	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-U.S.- Australia Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement
	Nov. 01	Cabinet Decision regarding changes to the procedures for responding to piracy (reducing the number of ships to engage in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden from two to one)
	Nov. 15	Cabinet Decision on changes in the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)" (mission of "kaketsuke-keigo" was added)
	Nov. 18	The Russian Forces announces the deployment of surface-to-ship missile on the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri
	Nov. 23	Signing and entry into force of Japan-ROK General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)
	Nov. 25	Two bombers, two intelligence gathering aircraft, and two fighter jets fly over the sky between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island (four aircraft except the fighter jets fly from the south of Sakishima Islands)
	Dec. 01	Entry into force of the Japan-France Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
	Dec. 10	Two Chinese fighter jets, two bombers, and two intelligence gathering aircraft fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island (four aircraft except the fighter jets fly toward the Bashi Channel)
	Dec. 22	The implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the SDF Law (decided by the National Security Council)
	Dec. 22	Transition to the joint production and deployment phases of advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block IIA) (decided at the National Security Council)
	Dec. 25	Six Chinese naval vessels including an aircraft carrier sail between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance into the Pacific Ocean (first time a Chinese aircraft carrier is observed sailing into the Pacific Ocean)
	Dec. 27	"China's Space Activities in 2016" is released
2017	Jan. 09	Six Chinese bombers, an early warning aircraft, and an intelligence gathering aircraft fly over the Tsushima Strait and advance to the Sea of Japan
	Jan. 14	Signing of the new Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)
	Jan. 24	Two Russian bombers fly and circle around Japan
	Jan. 26	Signing of the Japan-U.K. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)
	Feb. 08	U.S. Navy P-3 patrol aircraft and Chinese military aircraft fly abnormally close to each other (South China Sea)
	Feb. 12	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Mar. 02	A Chinese early warning aircraft, six bombers (probable), and six fighter jets (probable) fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean (total of 13 aircraft, the largest fleet so far)
	Mar. 02	Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and moves to the East China Sea
	Mar. 05	Chinese vessels sail west bound from the Osumi Strait
	Mar. 06	North Korea launches four ballistic missiles (three of them fell into Japan's EEZ)
	Mar. 22	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Mar. 23	Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and moves to the East China Sea
	Mar. 27	Transfer of MSDF TC-90 to the Philippines
	Mar. 27	Completion of development of future transport aircraft (XC-2)
	Apr. 02	Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean
	Apr. 05	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Apr. 06	U.S. launches strikes on Syria
	Apr. 16	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Apr. 18	Chinese vessels sail west bound from the Osumi Strait
	Apr. 20	China launches its first unmanned cargo spacecraft "Tianzhou 1"
	Apr. 24	Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean
	Apr. 25	Commencement of seawall construction (Futenma Replacement Facility construction project)
	Apr. 26	China's first domestically built aircraft carrier is launched
	Apr. 29	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	May 14	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	May 18	An object believed to be a small unmanned aerial vehicle (drone) flies over the front of the bridge of a Chinese government ship which is within Japan's territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands
	May 21	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	May 23	Martial law is declared in Mindanao in the Philippines
	May 24	A U.S. naval destroyer sails within 12 nautical miles of the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" (reported)
	May 29	North Korea launches a ballistic missile (fell into Japan's EEZ)
	Jul. 01	Establishment of Southwestern Air Defense Force
	Jul. 02	A Chinese naval Dongdiao-class intelligence gathering ship sails within Japan's territorial waters near the southwest of Kojima Island, Matsumae Town, Hokkaido
	Jul. 02	A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island, Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (reported)
	Jul. 04	North Korea launches a ballistic missile (lands in Japan's EEZ)
	Jul. 05	Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the heavy rain in North Kyushu in July 2017 (through August 20)
	Jul. 05	16 Russian vessels pass through the Soya Strait and move to the Sea of Japan
	Jul. 13	Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean. Four other bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly toward the East China Sea
	Jul. 15	Two China Coast Guard vessels sail in Japan's territorial waters in the southeast of Tsushima- shimojima (Tsushima City, Nagasaki Prefecture) and north of Okinoshima (Munakata City, Fukuoka Prefecture)
	Jul. 17	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-Germany Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
	Jul. 17	Two China Coast Guard vessels sail in Japan's territorial waters in the west-northwest of Henashisaki (Nishitsugaru County, Aomori Prefecture) and northeast of Tappizaki (Higashitsugaru County, Aomori Prefecture)
	Jul. 20	A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft, an intelligence gathering aircraft and four bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly toward the East China Sea. Four bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean
	Jul. 24	Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies toward the East China Sea
	Jul. 28	Minister of Defense Kishida came into office
	Jul. 28	North Korea launches a ballistic missile (lands in Japan's EEZ)
	Aug. 01	China conducts a flag raising ceremony for the Support Base in Djibouti
	Aug. 03	Minister of Defense Onodera came into office
	Aug. 09	A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies toward the East China Sea
	Aug. 10	A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles of the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (reported)
	Aug. 12	A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft and two bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly toward the East China Sea
	Aug. 13	Two Chinese electronic warfare aircrafts pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly toward the East China Sea
	Aug. 14	A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies toward the East China Sea
	Aug. 17	A car runs into pedestrians in Barcelona, Spain
	Aug. 18	Entry into force of the Japan-U.K. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)
	Aug. 23	Two Russian bombers fly and circle around Japan
	Aug. 24	Six Chinese bombers, after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, fly over the Pacific Ocean in the south of Kyushu and Shikoku, turn around off the Kii Peninsula, and fly to the East China Sea on a similar route (First time for a Chinese aircraft to fly northeast bound after advancing to the Pacific Ocean)
	Aug. 26	MSDF SH-60J helicopter falls into the sea west of Tappizaki, Aomori Prefecture
	Aug. 26	India announces agreement between India and China on disagreement of border personnel at Doklam following the confrontation of their forces
	Aug. 29	North Korea launches a ballistic missile (flies over Japan)
	Sep. 03	North Korea conducts sixth nuclear test which it called a "hydrogen bomb test for ICBM"
	Sep. 06	Entry into force of the new Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)
	Sep. 15	North Korea launches a ballistic missile (flies over Japan)
	Oct. 01	Shooting in Las Vegas, United States
	Oct. 10	A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (reported)
	Oct. 11	A U.S. Forces helicopter conducts an emergency landing and catches fire in Higashi-son, Kunigami- gun, Okinawa Prefecture
	Oct. 17	ASDF UH-60J helicopter crashed in the Pacific Ocean south of Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka Prefecture
	Nov. 02	Cabinet Decision on continuation of anti-piracy operations
	Nov. 11	Three U.S. carrier strike groups conduct joint exercises in the western Pacific (through November 14)
	Nov. 18	A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies toward the Bashi Channel
	Nov. 19	Four Chinese bombers, an intelligence gathering aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island from the East China Sea to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the East China Sea
	Nov. 20	The United States re-designates North Korea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism
	Nov. 23	Four Chinese bombers and an intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the East China Sea. An intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island via Sakishima Islands in the South Pacific and flies toward the East China Sea
	Nov. 28	Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and moves to the East China Sea
	Nov. 29	North Korea launches a ballistic missile (lands in Japan's EEZ)
	Dec. 05	Chinese vessels sail east bound from the Osumi Strait and advances to the Pacific Ocean
	Dec. 07	A Chinese early warning aircraft and four bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again
	Dec. 07	A Chinese vessel passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and moves to the East China Sea
	Dec. 09	Four Chinese bombers and an electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the East China Sea
	Dec. 09	The Iraqi government declares liberation of all areas from the ISIL
	Dec. 11	Two Chinese bombers, two fighter jets (probable), an intelligence gathering aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter two fighter jets (probable) turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the continent. The bombers, electronic warfare aircraft and intelligence gathering aircraft fly toward the Bashi Channel via the south of Sakishima Islands on the Pacific Ocean side
	Dec. 11	President Putin visits Syria and announces withdrawal of the main part of troops (The two bases in Syria will continue daily operation)
	Dec. 13	Fall of a U.S. Forces helicopter window onto Futenma Dai-ni Elementary School in Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture
	Dec. 17	A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft and two electronic warfare aircrafts pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly to the East China Sea
	Dec. 18	A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies to the East China Sea
	Dec. 18	The United States releases the National Security Strategy
	Dec. 18	A Chinese Su-30 fighter jet's advance to the Sea of Japan is confirmed for the first time
	Dec. 19	National Security Council and Cabinet approval on the "fundamental improvement in ballistic missile defense capability"
	Dec. 19	The United States denounces North Korea for the cyber attack using malware "WannaCry" in May 2017
	Dec. 20	A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies to the East China Sea

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2018	Jan. 09	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Jan. 12	Japan-Estonia Summit Meeting (Tallinn)	Jan. 09	North-South High Level Official's Meeting
	Jan. 09	FY2017 Japan-U.S. joint exercise (command post exercise) (through February 3)	Jan. 13	Japan-Latvia Summit Meeting (Riga)	Jan. 10	A Chinese submerged submarine enters Japan's contiguous zone near Miyakojima Island and Taisho Island (through January 11)
	Jan .15	Japan-Spain Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 13	Japan-Lithuania Summit Meeting (Vilnius)	Jan. 11	A Chinese vessel enters Japan's contiguous zone near Taisho Island
	Jan. 21	Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 18 (through February 23)	Jan. 14	Japan-Bulgaria Summit Meeting (Sofia)	Jan. 17	A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles of Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea (reported)
	Jan. 26	Deployment of the first F-35A at ASDF Misawa Air Base	Jan. 15	Japan-Serbia Summit Meeting (Belgrade)	Jan. 19	The U.S. National Defense Strategy is released
	Jan. 26	Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo)	Jan. 16	Japan-Romania Summit Meeting (Bucharest)	Jan. 29	A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes Tsushima Strait and advances to the Sea of Japan from the East China Sea
	Jan. 27	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 18	Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 29	A Chinese vessel sails Tsushima Strait north and after advancing to the Sea of Japan temporarily, sails the strait south
	Jan. 29	Disaster relief to provide water supply supports in Sado City, Niigata Prefecture (through February 2)	Feb. 02	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 31	U.S. President Trump delivers the State of the Union address
	Jan. 30	Disaster relief to provide water supply supports in Wajima City, Ishikawa Prefecture (through February 2)	Feb. 06	Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 02	The United States releases the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
	Feb. 06	Disaster relief in response to heavy snow in Fukui Prefecture (through February 10)	Feb. 07	U.S. Vice President Pence pays courtesy visit to Prime Minister Abe	Feb. 05	Maldives declares a state of emergency
	Feb. 15	Disaster relief to help remove snow in Fukui City, Fukui Prefecture (through February 18)	Feb. 09	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting (PyeongChang)	Feb. 08	North Korea conducts a military parade
	Feb. 16	Cabinet Decision on revision of the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)"	Feb. 14	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 09	PyeongChang Olympics (through February 25)
	Feb. 21	Disaster relief for collection of fuel, etc. in Tohoku Town, Kamikita Country, Aomori Prefecture (through March 7)	Feb. 14	Japan-Norway Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 10	Sri Lanka declares a state of emergency
	Feb. 28	Japan-Latvia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 20	U.S. military aircraft throws away a fuel tank into Lake Ogawara in Tohoku Town, Kamikita Country, Aomori Prefecture	Feb. 14	South African President Zuma resigns
	Mar. 26	Transfer of MSDF's five TC-90 training aircraft to the Philippines completed	Feb. 23	Japan-Chile Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 15	Ethiopian Prime Minister resigns
	Mar. 27	22nd Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) (Tokyo) (through March 28)	Mar. 06	Japan-Canada Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 15	The United States and other countries denounce Russia for a large scale of damage caused by ransomware "Not Petya" in June 2017
	Mar. 27	Establishment of the Ground Component Command and the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade,	Mar. 09	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 16	Ethiopia declares a state of emergency
	Apr. 06	and first reorganization to rapid deployment divisions/ brigades	Mar. 13	Naha District Court renders judgement regarding the demand of an injunctive order for actions that crush the reef, etc. (Futenma Replacement Facility construction project)	Feb. 23	U.S.-Australia Summit Meeting
	Apr. 09	Launch of X-band communications satellite "Kirameki1"	Mar. 14	Japan-Sri Lanka Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 26	A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through February 28)
	Apr. 09	Signing of the Japan-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 15	Japan-Germany Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 27	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft's passage of Tsushima Strait Western Channel is confirmed for the first time
	Apr. 09	Disaster relief to provide water supply supports in Oda City, Shimane Prefecture (through April 11)	Mar. 23	Okinawa Prefectural Government appeals against the judgement of the Naha District Court to the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court (Futenma Replacement Facility construction project)	Mar. 01	Russian President Putin introduces new weapons at the annual presidential address
	Apr. 11	Disaster relief for rescue operations in response to the landslide in Nakatsu City, Oita Prefecture (through April 23)	Mar. 31	Return of the land at Makiminato Service Area adjacent to Route 58	Mar. 05	1st session of the 13th National People's Congress (NPC) (through March 20)
	Apr. 18	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-Malaysia Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology	Apr. 05	Japan-Iraq Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 05	ROK special envoys visit North Korea and meet with Chairman Kim Jong-un
	Apr. 20	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Apr. 11	Japan-Bhutan Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 09	PyeongChang Paralympics (through March 18)
	Apr. 21	Signing of the Japan-Canada Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)	Apr. 12	Japan-Switzerland Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 18	President Putin is re-elected as president (4th term)
	Apr. 29	Disaster relief to provide water supply supports in Irabujima, Miyakojima City, Okinawa Prefecture (through May 2)	Apr. 17	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Florida)	Mar. 18	The Turkish government announces taking control of Afrin, Syria
	May 04	Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Helsinki)	Apr. 28	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 23	Four Chinese bombers, an intelligence gathering aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter turn around, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again and fly to the continent. At the same time, two fighter jets (probable) fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island from the East China Sea
	May 06	Japan-Estonia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tallinn)	Apr. 29	Japan-ROK Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 23	Hostage siege in Trèbes, south of France
	May 09	Defense authorities of Japan and China sign the Memorandum on the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism	Apr. 30	Japan-UAE Summit Meeting (Abu Dhabi)	Mar. 23	A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles of the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (reported)
	May 10	Signing of the Japan-UAE Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges	May 01	Japan-Jordan Summit Meeting (Jordan)	Mar. 25	Chairman Kim Jong-un of North Korea visits China (through March 28)
	May 15	Cabinet Decision adopted on "Basic Plan on Ocean Policy"	May 01	Japan-Palestine Summit Meeting (Palestine)	Mar. 26	China-North Korea Summit Meeting
	May 18	Cabinet Decision on revision of the "Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)"	May 02	Japan-Israel Summit Meeting (Israel)	Mar. 26	Presidential election in Egypt
	May 21	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	May 04	Japan-China Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 05	Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean
	May 29	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hawaii)	May 09	Japan-China-ROK Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 10	An aircraft that appears to be a Chinese unmanned aircraft vehicle (BZK-005) flies over the East China Sea (within Japan's air defense identification zone)
	May 31	Revised Japan-NATO Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP)	May 10	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 12	China conducts a naval review on the South China Sea
	Jun. 02	Defense Minister Onodera attends the 17th Shangri-La Dialogue (hosted by IISS) (through June 3)	May 15	Japan-Samoa Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 14	The United States, United Kingdom and France conduct military operations against facilities related to chemical weapons in Syria
	Jun. 02	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	May 16	Japan-Fiji Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 18	Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and fly toward the Bashi Channel
	Jun. 02	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	May 18	Prime Minister Abe attends the 8th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (Fukushima) (through May 19)	Apr. 19	Two Chinese bombers, two fighter jets (probable), an electronic warfare aircraft and an intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter the two bombers, an electronic warfare aircraft and an intelligence gathering aircraft fly toward the Bashi Channel
	Jun. 02	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	May 24	Prime Minister Abe visits Russia (through May 26)	Apr. 20	North Korea announces a halt to "nuclear test and intercontinental ballistic rocket test-fire" and abolishment of nuclear test sites
	Jun. 02	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	May 25	Japan-France Summit Meeting (St. Petersburg)	Apr. 20	Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and fly toward the Bashi Channel
	Jun. 02	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	May 26	Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Moscow)	Apr. 20	A flight of carrier-based fighter jets (probable) of the Chinese aircraft carrier "Liaoning" over the Pacific Ocean is confirmed for the first time
	Jun. 03	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	May 28	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 21	Seven Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and advance to the East China Sea
	Jun. 03	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Jun. 07	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Apr. 24	A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through April 29)
	Jun. 03	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Jun. 08	Prime Minister Abe attends the G7 Summit in Charlevoix (through June 9)	Apr. 26	Two Chinese bombers, two fighter jets (probable), an electronic warfare aircraft and an intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. The two fighter jets (probable) turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again to fly toward the continent. The two bombers, an electronic warfare aircraft and an intelligence gathering aircraft fly toward the Bashi Channel
	Jun. 08	Launch of the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China	Jun. 08	Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Charlevoix)	Apr. 27	The Inter-Korean Summit Meeting, Panmunjom Declaration agreement
	Jun. 14	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Jun. 08	Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Charlevoix)	Apr. 28	A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes Tsushima Strait and advances to the Sea of Japan from the East China Sea
	Jun. 18	Disaster relief in response to Northern Osaka Prefecture Earthquake (through June 26)	Jun. 08	Japan-Italy Summit Meeting (Charlevoix)	May 08	China-North Korea Summit Meeting
	Jun. 19	FY2018 Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR) (through June 22)	Jun. 08	Japan-Canada Summit Meeting (Charlevoix)	May 08	U.S. President Trump announces withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran
	Jun. 29	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 11	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	May 11	Two Chinese bombers and two fighter jets (probable) pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. Thereafter, the two fighter jets (probable) turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again to fly toward the continent. Two bombers fly toward the Bashi Channel. Two bombers, an intelligence gathering aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island from the Pacific Ocean in the direction of the Bashi Channel and move to the East China Sea
	Jul. 06	Disaster relief in response to July 2018 Flooding Disaster (through August18)	Jun. 12	Japan-Laos Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 12	Attack occurs near the Paris Opera House in the center of Paris, France
	Jul. 11	Cabinet Decision on disaster relief call-up order for Ready Reserve Personnel in response to July 2018 Flooding Disaster	Jun. 12	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	May 13	Terror attacks by suicide bombers occur in churches in Subaraya, Indonesia
	Jul. 11	Disaster relief call-up order for Ready Reserve Personnel is issued (through July 31)	Jul. 17	Japan-EU Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 13	China conducts the first sea trial of its first domestic aircraft carrier (through May 18)
	Jul. 13	Signing of the Japan-France Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)	Aug. 01	Japan-Malta Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 18	A Chinese bomber and other aircraft conduct a takeoff and landing training in the South China Sea (pointed out as Woody Island, the Paracel Islands)
	Jul. 31	Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Moscow)	Aug. 07	Japan-Saint Vincent Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 21	The United States releases a new Iran strategy
	Jul. 31	Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Moscow)	Aug. 22	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	May 25	Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island through to the East China Sea
	Aug. 06	Disaster relief to provide water and food in Tozawa Village, Mogami County, Yamagata Prefecture (through August 8)	Sep. 05	Japan-Ecuador Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 26	The Inter-Korean Summit Meeting
	Aug. 10	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Sep. 10	Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Vladivostok)	May 27	A U.S. naval destroyer and cruiser conduct the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (reported)
	Aug. 10	Disaster relief to search for missing aircraft near Mt. Kusatsu-Shirane, Gunma Prefecture (through August 11)	Sep. 11	Japan-Mongolia Summit Meeting (Vladivostok)	Jun. 03	A Chinese vessel passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean
	Aug. 20	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Delhi)	Sep. 12	Japan-China Summit Meeting (Vladivostok)	Jun. 04	A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and after flying toward the Bashi Channel, it turns around and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Aug. 21	Japan-Sri Lanka Defense Ministerial Meeting (Sri Jayawardenepura Kotte)	Sep. 24	Japan-Türkiye Summit Meeting (New York)	Jun. 04	A Chinese vessel passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and moves to the East China Sea
			Sep. 25	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting (New York)	Jun. 12	U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting
			Sep. 26	Japan-Iran Summit Meeting (New York)	Jun. 17	A Chinese vessel sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
			Sep. 26	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (New York)	Jun. 18	U.S. DoD announces suspension of the Freedom Guardian exercise
			Oct. 05	Japan-Tajikistan Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 19	Chairman Kim Jong-Un visits China (through June 20)
			Oct. 08	Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 19	China-North Korea Summit Meeting
			Oct. 08	Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 22	U.S. DoD announces suspension of the Korean Marine Exchange Program
			Oct. 08	Japan-Laos Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 23	A Chinese vessel sails north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
			Oct. 08	Japan-Thailand Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 24	A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through June 29)
			Oct. 09	10th Japan-Mekong Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 24	Presidential election and general election in Türkiye
			Oct. 09	Meeting with State Counsellor of Myanmar Aung San Suu Kyi (Tokyo)	Jun. 27	Permanent ceasefire agreed in South Sudan
			Oct. 12	Japan-Lithuania Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 29	A Chinese hospital ship enters Japan's contiguous zone north of Taisho Island, Senkaku Islands
			Oct. 16	Japan-Spain Summit Meeting (Madrid)	Jun. 29	Relocation of the Headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea from Seoul to Pyeongtaek
			Oct. 17	Japan-France Summit Meeting (Paris)	Jun. 29	U.S. NBC reports that North Korea has increased its production of fuel for nuclear weapons (enriched uranium) at secret sites
			Oct. 18	12th ASEM Summit (Brussels) (through October 19)	Jul. 01	China Coast Guard is integrated into the People's Armed Police
			Oct. 18	2nd "V4 plus Japan" Summit Meeting (Brussels)	Jul. 07	Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
			Oct. 18	Japan-EU Summit Meeting (Brussels)	Jul. 10	ROK Government announces suspension of its independent "Ulchi exercise" in the summer of 2018, followed by suspension of U.S.-ROK joint exercises
			Oct. 18	Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Brussels)	Jul. 12	NATO Summit Brussels 2018
			Oct. 19	Japan-Italy Summit Meeting (Brussels)		
			Oct. 19	Japan-Singapore Summit Meeting (Brussels)		
			Oct. 19	Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Brussels)		
			Oct. 26	Japan-China Summit Meeting (Beijing)		
			Oct. 29	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Nov. 06	Japan-Malaysia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Nov. 09	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk		
			Nov. 14	Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting (Singapore)		
			Nov. 14	Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Singapore)		
			Nov. 15	Japan-Singapore Summit Meeting (Singapore)		
			Nov. 15	21st ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting (Singapore)		
			Nov. 15	East Asia Summit (Singapore)		
			Nov. 15	Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting (Singapore)		
			Nov. 15	Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting (Singapore)		
			Nov. 15	Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting (Singapore) J		
			Nov. 16	apan-Australia Summit Meeting (Australia)		
			Nov. 17	Japan-Papua New Guinea Summit Meeting (Port Moresby)		
			Nov. 17	APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting (Port Moresby) (through November 18)		
			Nov. 18	APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting (Port Moresby)		
			Nov. 18	Japan-Chile Summit Meeting (Port Moresby)		
			Nov. 18	Japan-Canada Summit Meeting (Port Moresby)		
			Nov. 19	Japan-Burkina Faso Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Nov. 27	Japan-Jordan Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
	Sep. 01	FY2018 Exercise for the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas (RJNO) (outside Japan) (through September 9)	Nov. 30	G20 Buenos Aires Summit (Buenos Aires) (through December 1)	Jul. 23	"38 North," a website dedicated to analysis of North Korea, announces the start of dismantlement of the main facility on the satellite launch site in Dongchang-ri *The report on August 22 announces that no new dismantlement activity has been apparent since August 3
	Sep. 03	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Nov. 30	Japan-France Summit Meeting (Buenos Aires)	Jul. 27	A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again
	Sep. 04	Japan-Netherlands Defense Ministerial Meeting (The Hague)	Nov. 30	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Buenos Aires)	Jul. 27	A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan
	Sep. 04	Meeting between Defense Minister Onodera and Director-General of the OPCW (The Hague)	Nov. 30	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Buenos Aires)	Aug. 03	China announces a successful launch test of its new model of a hypersonic projectile
	Sep. 06	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Rome)	Nov. 30	Japan-China Summit Meeting (Buenos Aires)	Aug. 06	Three Chinese vessels sail westbound from the Osumi Strait to the East China Sea
	Sep. 06	Disaster relief in response to the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake (through October 14)	Nov. 30	Tachikawa Branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgement in 9th and 12th Yokota Air Base noise suits	Aug. 08	Three Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
	Sep. 07	Cabinet Decision on disaster relief call-up order for Ready Reserve Personnel in response to the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake	Dec. 01	Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Buenos Aires)	Aug. 14	A car attack occurs in London, U.K.
	Sep. 07	Disaster relief call-up order for Ready Reserve Personnel is issued (through September 24)	Dec. 01	Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Buenos Aires)	Aug. 28	A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through August 29)
	Sep. 11	Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Dec. 01	Japan-Türkiye Summit Meeting (Buenos Aires)	Aug. 29	A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again
	Sep. 11	Signing of the Japan-Malaysia Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges	Dec. 01	Japan-EU Summit Meeting (Buenos Aires)	Aug. 29	14 Russian vessels sail through the Soya Strait and move to the Sea of Okhotsk (through August 30)
	Sep. 21	Japan-Estonia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Dec. 02	Japan-Uruguay Summit Meeting (Montevideo)	Sep. 01	Two Russian patrol aircraft fly and circle around Japan
	Oct. 02	Minister of Defense Iwaya came into office	Dec. 02	Japan-Paraguay Summit Meeting (Asuncion)	Sep. 01	28 Russian vessels sail through the Soya Strait and moved to the Sea of Japan (through September 2)
	Oct. 03	International disaster relief activities in response to the earthquake and tsunami in Indonesia (through October 25)	Dec. 11	Japan-Ghana Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Sep. 06	U.S.-India Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2)
	Oct. 10	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Sydney)	Dec. 13	Japan-Mongolia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Sep. 09	North Korea stages a military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of its foundation as a nation in Pyongyang, without ICBM or other ballistic missiles.
	Oct. 10	Japan-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Sydney)	Dec. 18	Japan-Zambia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Sep. 11	Russia starts the exercise phase of a large scale military exercise "Vostok 2018" (through September 17)
	Oct. 12	Signing of the Japan-Ukraine Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges	Dec. 18	National Security Council and Cabinet Decisions on "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond," and "Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023)"	Sep. 12	Government of South Sudan and relevant parties including anti-government forces sign the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict
	Oct. 13	FY2018 Tomodachi Rescue Exercise (TREX) Joint Disaster Response Exercise with U.S. Forces (through October 14)			Sep. 14	Inter-Korean Liaison Office opens (Kaesong)
	Oct. 14	FY2018 review (Asaka)			Sep. 18	U.S. DoD releases its Cyber Strategy
	Oct. 19	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)			Sep. 18	President of the ROK Moon Jae-in visits North Korea (through September 20)
	Oct. 19	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)			Sep. 18	The Inter-Korean Summit Meeting (through September 19)
	Oct. 19	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)			Sep. 18	Syrian Army accidentally shoots down a Russian aircraft
	Oct. 19	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)			Sep. 19	Three Russian aircraft, including a fighter, make a long-distance flight over the Sea of Japan (an Su-35 fighter is confirmed through scramble for the first time)
	Oct. 20	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)			Sep. 20	U.S. DoD designates the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission of China as a subject to sanctions
	Oct. 20	ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting (Singapore)			Sep. 24	U.S. Government notifies Congress of the sales of weapons to Taiwan (worth US$330 million)
	Oct. 20	5th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (Singapore)			Sep. 30	A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles of Gaven Reefs and Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands (reported)
	Oct. 24	Disaster relief to provide water supply support in Suo-oshima Town, Yamaguchi Prefecture (through November 7)			Sep. 30	A Chinese naval destroyer approaches abnormally close to a U.S. vessel
	Oct. 29	Keen Sword19/30FTX (through November 8)			Oct. 02	Three Chinese vessels sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Nov. 09	Cabinet Decision on continuation of anti-piracy operations			Oct. 02	Inauguration of a new government in Iraq
	Dec. 06	Disaster relief for search and rescue of U.S. aircraft crew off the coast of Shikoku (through December 11)			Oct. 02	A Saudi Arabian journalist dies in the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Türkiye
	Dec. 11	FY2018 Exercise for RJNO (in Japan) (through December 14)			Oct. 04	U.S. releases National Strategy for Counterterrorism
	Dec. 20	Incident of an ROK naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at MSDF patrol aircraft occurs			Oct. 19	U.S. and ROK Governments announce suspension of the Vigilant Ace exercise, a joint military exercise scheduled for December 2018
	Dec. 25	First disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Seki City, Gifu Prefecture (through December 27)			Oct. 20	President Trump announces an intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty
	Dec. 28	Footage of the incident of an ROK naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at MSDF patrol aircraft released			Oct. 20	General election in Afghanistan (House of the People)
					Oct. 22	Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
					Oct. 22	First ASEAN-China maritime exercise (Zhanjiang) (through October 28)
					Oct. 25	Prime Minister Abe visits China (through October 27)
					Oct. 25	Israel-Oman Summit Meeting
					Oct. 28	A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through October 29)
					Oct. 29	A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again
					Nov. 11	Ceremony commemorating the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I (Paris)
					Nov. 17	APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting (Papua New Guinea) (through November 18)
					Nov. 24	Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen resigns as chairperson of the Democratic Progressive Party after suffering a major defeat in the general election
					Nov. 25	A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through November 26)
					Nov. 26	A U.S. naval cruiser conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (reported)
					Nov. 26	A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again
					Nov. 28	Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
					Dec. 01	U.S.-China Summit Meeting (Osaka)
					Dec. 05	A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Peter the Great Gulf (reported)
					Dec. 06	Yemen peace talks (through December 13)
					Dec. 07	A Chinese vessel sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 08	A Chinese vessel sails west between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
					Dec. 11	A Chinese vessel sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 12	A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. After flying to off the coast of Amami Oshima Island, it turns around, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
					Dec. 14	A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. After flying to off the coast of Amami Oshima Island, it turns around, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
					Dec. 14	A Chinese vessel sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
					Dec. 27	UAE reopens its embassy in Syria
					Dec. 27	A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again
2019	Jan. 11	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brest)	Jan. 08	Japan-Canada Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 01	A U.S. Aegis destroyer conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" in the Paracel Islands
	Jan. 11	Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Brest)	Jan. 09	Japan-Netherlands Summit Meeting (Rotterdam)	Jan. 01	Chairman Kim Jong-un expresses his intention to neither make and test nuclear weapons any longer nor use and proliferate them in his "New Year's Address" in 2019
	Jan. 14	Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 19 (through February 23)	Jan. 10	Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (London)	Jan. 07	Chairman Kim Jong-un visits China (through January 10)
	Jan. 17	Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan (Washington, D.C.)	Jan. 22	Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Moscow)	Jan. 07	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles around the Paracel Islands
	Jan. 21	FY2018 SDF Joint Exercises (command post exercise) (through January 26)	Jan. 23	Japan-Brazil Summit Meeting (Davos)	Jan. 15	ROK releases Defense White Paper 2018
	Jan. 21	The MOD published its final statement regarding the incident of an ROK naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at MSDF patrol aircraft	Jan. 29	Japan-Qatar Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 16	A Russian Su-24 tactical reconnaissance aircraft flies from off the coast of Sado Island through off the coast of Akita Prefecture During the same period, another aircraft of the same type flies from off the coast of Rebun Island through off the coast of Okushiri Island
	Jan. 23	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 04	Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 17	United States releases the Missile Defense Review (MDR)
	Jan. 23	Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Tokigawa Town, Hiki County, Saitama Prefecture (through January 25)	Feb. 15	Japan-Austria Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 17	A Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft flies from off the coast of Sanin through off the coast of Hokkaido
	Jan. 24	Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Tanabe City, Wakayama Prefecture (through January 26)	Feb. 20	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 24	Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
	Feb. 05	Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 28	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 24	Three Chinese vessels sail northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Feb. 05	Signing of the Japan-Finland Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges	Mar. 08	Japan-Palau Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 02	U.S. provides Russia with formal notice to withdrawal from the INF Treaty
	Feb. 05	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Aichi Prefecture, etc. (through February 9)	Mar. 24	Replacement of government aircraft from B-747 to B-777	Feb. 11	Two U.S. destroyers conduct the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Mischief Reef
	Feb. 14	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Tahara City, Aichi Prefecture (through February 20)	Mar. 31	Return of the land at Makiminato Service Area near Gate 5	Feb. 15	Two Russian Tu-95 bombers fly from off the coast of Sanin north along the Sea of Japan to the Sea of Okhotsk, two Su-35 fighters fly from off the coast of Sanin to off the coast of Sado Island, and another two Su-35 fighters fly from off the coast of Sado Island to off the coast of Rebun Island
	Feb. 19	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Mizunami City, Gifu Prefecture (through February 21)	Apr. 04	Japan-Panama Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 15	Two Russian Tu-95 bombers fly south from off the coast of Hokkaido over the Pacific Ocean, turn around off the coast of Shikoku, and fly to off the coast of Hokkaido in the Sea of Japan
	Feb. 20	Air rescue in response to a radar losing track of an F-2 of Tsuiki Air Base	Apr. 16	Naha Branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in 3rd and 5th Futenma Air Station noise suits	Feb. 16	Three Chinese vessels advance to the Sea of Japan (through February 24)
	Mar. 08	ADMM-Plus Medicine Field Training Exercise (MEDEX 2019) (Lucknow) (through March 18)	Apr. 23	Japan-France Summit Meeting (Paris)	Feb. 23	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around and flies over the East China Sea again
			Apr. 24	Japan-Italy Summit Meeting (Rome)	Feb. 25	Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
			Apr. 24	Japan-Poland Summit Meeting (Bratislava)	Feb. 27	2nd U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting (through February 28)
			Apr. 25	Japan-Slovakia Summit Meeting (Bratislava)	Mar. 04	Russia notifies the U.S. of the suspension of Russia's obligation under the INF Treaty
			Apr. 25	3rd "V4 plus Japan" Summit Meeting (Bratislava)	Mar. 15	51 people are killed in a shooting incident in Christchurch, New Zealand
			Apr. 25	Japan-Czech Summit Meeting (Bratislava)	Mar. 19	A flight by two Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft within Japan's air defense identification zone in the East China Sea is confirmed for the first time
			Apr. 25	Japan-EU Summit (Brussels)	Mar. 24	General election in Thailand (House of Representatives)
			Apr. 26	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Washington, D.C.)		
			Apr. 28	Japan-Canada Summit Meeting (Ottawa)		
			Apr. 30	Taiirei-Seiden-no-gi		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2019	Mar. 12	23rd Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) (Tokyo) (through March 13)			Mar. 24	Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
					Mar. 25	U.S. President Trump recognizes Israel's sovereign right over the Golan Heights
	Mar. 12	Turnover ceremony for the UH-1H parts, etc., grant of a portion of the parts, etc.			Mar. 27	A Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft flies from off the coast of Sanin through off the coast of Hokkaido
	Mar. 25	Signing of the Japan-Oman Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges			Mar. 28	Three Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
	Mar. 25	Japan-Oman Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)			Mar. 30	Four Chinese H-6 bombers, a Tu-154 intelligence gathering aircraft, and two presumed fighter jets fly from the East China Sea. After passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, the aircraft fly over the Pacific Ocean. Thereafter they turn around, and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Mar. 26	Establishment of Camp Amami and Camp Miyakojima				
	Mar. 27	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Seto City, Aichi Prefecture (through March 30)			Mar. 31	Two Chinese military aircraft cross over the "median line" of the Taiwan Strait
	Mar. 28	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Tahara City, Aichi Prefecture (through April 1)			Apr. 01	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft and two H-6 bombers fly from the East China Sea. After passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and flying over the Pacific Ocean, they turn around, and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Apr. 02	Cabinet Decision on the "Implementation Plan for International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Sinai Peninsula"			Apr. 02	Three Russian vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait south and move to the East China Sea
	Apr. 04	Entry into force of the Japan-Italy Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology			Apr. 02	Three Chinese vessels sail northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Apr. 05	Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Sakuho Town, Nagano Prefecture (through April 7)			Apr. 05	Three Chinese vessels sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island temporarily to the Pacific Ocean
	Apr. 09	Air rescue in response to the crash of an F-35A fighter of Misawa Air Base			Apr. 05	A Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft flies from off the coast of Sanin through off the coast of the Noto Peninsula
	Apr. 10	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Seto City, Aichi Prefecture (through April 13)			Apr. 06	A French vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Apr. 17	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)			Apr. 09	General election in Israel
	Apr. 17	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Ena City, Gifu Prefecture (through April 19)			Apr. 15	A Chinese vessel sails between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island southeast, and advances to the Pacific Ocean temporarily. However, on the same day, the vessel sails between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island northwest to the East China Sea
	Apr. 19	Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan (Washington, D.C.)			Apr. 15	Four Chinese H-6 bombers and an Y-9 electronic warfare aircraft fly from the Bashi Channel, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and fly over the East China Sea
	Apr. 19	Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (Washington, D.C.)			Apr. 15	U.S. Government notifies Congress of the sales of weapons to Taiwan (worth US$500 million)
	Apr. 26	Departure of Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) headquarters staff			Apr. 17	Presidential election in Indonesia
					Apr. 21	Bomb attacks by Islamic extremists occur simultaneously in Colombo and other places, Sri Lanka
	May 02	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi)	May 01	Kenji-to-Shokei-no-gi	Apr. 24	Chairman Kim Jong-un visits Russia (through April 26)
	May 02	Signing of the Memorandum on the orientation of promotion of defense industry cooperation between the Defense authorities of Japan and Vietnam	May 01	Sokui-go-Choken-no-gi	Apr. 26	Five Russian vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
			May 06	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 28	Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
	May 17	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Tahara City, Aichi Prefecture. (through May 20)	May 17	Enactment of the revised Act on Prohibition of Flight of UASs around and over Key Facilities	Apr. 28	Four Russian vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
			May 23	Japan-India Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 29	China-Russia joint naval exercise "Joint Sea 2019" (Qingdao) (through May 4)
	May 18	Disaster relief to rescue stranded residents due to heavy rain in Yakushiima Island, Kagoshima Prefecture (through May 20)	May 27	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 03	Two Russian Tu-142 patrol aircraft pass the Tsushima Strait from the Sea of Japan, and fly to the East China Sea. Thereafter, they pass through the Tsushima Strait again, and fly over the Sea of Japan
			May 29	Japan-Bangladesh Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
	May 19	Disaster relief in response to water supply failure, etc. due to heavy rain in Kuchinoerabujima Island, Kagoshima Prefecture (through May 24)	May 30	Japan-Laos Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 04	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
			May 30	Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit Telephone Talk	May 06	Two U.S. vessels conduct the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles of Gaven Reefs and Johnson South Reef
			May 31	Japan-UAE Summit Telephone Talk		
	May 21	FY2019 Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR) (through May 24)	May 31	Japan-Malaysia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 06	Five Russian vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
			May 31	Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 09	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	May 22	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	May 31	Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 11	Three Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean
	May 23	Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 06	Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 10th and 11th Yokota Air Base noise suits	May 19	Federal election in Australia
					May 19	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles of Scarborough Shoal in Zhongsha Islands
	May 27	Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Hinohara Village, Tokyo (through May 29)	Jun. 10	Japan-Switzerland Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Jun. 12	Japan-Iran Summit Meeting (Teheran)	May 22	Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
	May 27	Disaster relief to rescue missing persons due to ship collision off the coast of Inubosaki, Chiba Prefecture (through May 31)	Jun. 14	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	May 23	Pakistan conducts a test launch of ballistic missiles
			Jun. 25	Japan-UAE Summit Telephone Talk	May 26	A Chinese vessel sails south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and advances to the Pacific Ocean temporarily. However, on May 30, the vessel sails north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	May 27	Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Oumu Town, Hokkaido (through June 4)	Jun. 26	Japan-France Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Jun. 27	Japan-EU Summit Meeting (Osaka)	May 27	Taiwan conducts a military field exercise "Han Kuang 35" (through May 31)
	May 30	Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 27	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Osaka)	May 29	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea. After passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and flying over the Pacific Ocean, it turns around, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again. Just around the same time, a Chinese Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft flies over the East China Sea to near the Tsushima Strait
	May 30	Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo)	Jun. 27	Japan-Argentina Summit Meeting (Osaka)		
			Jun. 27	Japan-Egypt Summit Meeting (Osaka)		
	May 31	Defense Minister Iwaya attends the 18th Shangri-La Dialogue (hosted by IISS) (through June 2)	Jun. 27	Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Osaka)	May 30	Inauguration of 2nd Modi government of India
			Jun. 27	Japan-China Summit Meeting (Osaka)	Jun. 01	U.S. DoD releases the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR)
	Jun. 01	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Jun. 28	G20 Osaka Summit chaired by Prime Minister Abe (through June 29)	Jun. 07	A U.S Navy ship and a Russian Navy ship sail abnormally close to each other in the Philippine Sea
	Jun. 01	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)				
	Jun. 01	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Jun. 28	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Osaka)	Jun. 08	Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Okhotsk
			Jun. 28	Japan-U.S.-India Summit Meeting (Osaka)	Jun. 08	Two Russian vessels sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Jun. 01	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Jun. 28	Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Osaka)		
			Jun. 28	Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Osaka)	Jun. 10	Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning," sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Jun. 03	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 28	Japan-Thailand Summit Meeting (Osaka)		
	Jun. 04	Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan (Tokyo)	Jun. 29	Japan-South Africa Summit Meeting (Osaka)	Jun. 12	Three Russian vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait
			Jun. 29	Japan-Brazil Summit Meeting (Osaka)	Jun. 13	Commercial vessels, including one related to Japan, are suffered near the Straits of Hormuz
	Jun. 05	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Yamagata City, Gifu Prefecture, etc. (through June 8)	Jun. 29	Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Osaka)	Jun. 14	China Coast Guard vessels sail in the Japanese contiguous zone around Senkaku Islands for the longest-ever period of 64 consecutive days
			Jun. 30	Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit Meeting (Osaka)		
	Jun. 17	Establishment of Aegis Ashore Introduction Promotion Headquarters	Jul. 01	Japan-Türkiye Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 16	A Chinese vessel sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
			Jul. 23	Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit Telephone Talk		
	Jun. 18	Signing of the Japan-Pakistan Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges	Jul. 23	Ministerial meeting on the TICAD7 (Tokyo)	Jun. 16	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea. After passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and flying over the Pacific Ocean, it turns around, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Aug. 02	Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Talk		
	Jun. 21	Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Kitagawa Village, Aki County, Kochi Prefecture (through June 22)	Aug. 24	G7 Summit 2019 in Biarritz (France) (through November 26)	Jun. 18	Two Canadian vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
					Jun. 20	Two Russian Tu-95 bombers fly around Japan, and intrude into Japan's territorial airspace twice when flying north over the Pacific Ocean
	Jun. 25	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Aug. 24	Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Biarritz)		
			Aug. 24	Japan-Canada Summit Meeting (Biarritz)	Jun. 20	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps shoot down a U.S. drone over the Straits of Hormuz
	Jun. 26	Effectuation of the Japan-France Acquisition and Cross- Servicing Agreement (ACSA)	Aug. 24	Japan-France Summit Meeting (Biarritz)	Jun. 20-21	President Xi Jinping visits North Korea (the first visit to North Korea by a Chinese president since the last visit by then President Hu Jintao 14 years earlier in 2005. President Xi visits North Korea for the first time in about 11 years since his last visit in 2008 as Vice President)
			Aug. 25	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Biarritz)		
	Jun. 29	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Nishio City, Aichi Prefecture (through July 2)	Aug. 25	Japan-Chile Summit Meeting (Biarritz)	Jun. 21	Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
			Aug. 25	Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Biarritz)	Jun. 23	ASEAN Summit Meeting adopts "ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific" (AOIP)
			Aug. 26	Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Biarritz)	Jun. 23	Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
	Jul. 03	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Ena City, Gifu Prefecture (through July 5)	Aug. 28	7th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD7) (through August 30)	Jun. 30	Leaders of U.S. and North Korea meet at Panmunjom
					Jul. 01	14 sailors were killed in a fire on a Russian submarine
	Jul. 18	Effectuation of the Japan-Canada Acquisition and Cross- Servicing Agreement (ACSA)	Aug. 28	Japan-Egypt Summit Meeting (Biarritz)	Jul. 02	China conducts the first test launch of anti-ship ballistic missiles in the South China Sea from June through July (reported)
			Aug. 28	Japan-South Africa Summit Meeting (Yokohama)		
	Jul. 24	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Inabe City, Mie Prefecture (through July 5)	Aug. 28	Japan-Algeria Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Jul. 06	Two Chinese vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait
			Aug. 28	Japan-Kenya Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Jul. 08	U.S. Government notifies Congress of the sales of weapons to Taiwan (worth US$2.2 billion)
			Aug. 28	Japan-Mali Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Jul. 12	U.S. Force announces the outline of the National Military Strategy
	Jul. 25	Revision of the Guidelines Regarding Off-Base U.S. Military Aircraft Accidents in Japan	Aug. 28	Japan-Guinea Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Jul. 15	Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
			Aug. 28	Japan-Togo Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Jul. 22	A Chinese vessel sails northbound from the Tsushima Strait, and advances to the Sea of Japan temporarily. However, on July 23, the vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
	Jul. 26	Signing of the Japan-Sri Lanka Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges	Aug. 29	Japan-Uganda Summit Meeting (Yokohama)		
			Aug. 29	Japan-Mauritania Summit Meeting (Yokohama)		
	Aug. 07	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Aug. 29	Japan-Burkina Faso Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Jul. 23	Two Chinese H-6 bombers and two Tu-65 Russian bombers pass through the Tsushima Strait and fly south over the East China Sea. Thereafter, the two Chinese bombers fly northwest to the continent, while the two Russian bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and fly over the Pacific Ocean. After turning around, the Russian bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again, fly north over the East China Sea, and pass through the Tsushima Strait again. In addition, an A-50 early warning and control aircraft that reportedly supports the Russian bombers intrudes into Japan's territorial airspace over Takeshima Island
	Aug. 28	Disaster relief in response to the flooding caused by heavy rain accompanying a front in August 2019 (through October 7)	Aug. 29	Japan-Ethiopia Summit Meeting (Yokohama)		
			Aug. 29	Japan-Djibouti Summit Meeting (Yokohama)		
	Sep. 02	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Aug. 29	Japan-Uganda Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Jul. 24	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Sep. 10	Disaster relief in response to the 2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai) (through October 7)	Aug. 29	Japan-Angola Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Jul. 24	China releases the 10th Defense White Paper "China's National Defense in the New Era" (for the first time in about four years)
			Aug. 29	Japan-Guinea-Bissau Summit Meeting (Yokohama)		
			Aug. 29	Japan-Cabo Verde Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Jul. 25	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Sep. 17	Disaster relief to search for a missing fishing boat eastern offshore of Cape Noshappu, Hokkaido	Aug. 29	Japan-Rwanda Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Jul. 25	Four Chinese vessels sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
			Aug. 29	Japan-Mauritius Summit Meeting (Yokohama)		
	Sep. 22	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Ena City, Gifu Prefecture (through September 24)	Aug. 29	Japan-Central African Republic Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Jul. 25	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
					Jul. 27	Two Chinese vessels sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Sep. 23	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Aug. 29	Japan-Namibia Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Jul. 31	North Korea launces two ballistic missiles (probable)
			Aug. 29	Japan-Senegal Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Aug. 01	Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
			Aug. 29	Japan-Niger Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Aug. 01	Six Chinese vessels sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
	Sep. 24	Disaster relief to search for a missing person in Doshi Village, Minamitsuru County, Yamanashi Prefecture (through September 28)	Aug. 29	Japan-Sierra Leone Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Aug. 02	Russian Prime Minister Medvedev visits Etorofu Island
	Oct. 01	Japan-Iran Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Aug. 29	Japan-Sao Tome and Principe Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Aug. 02	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles (probable)
	Oct. 03	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Aug. 29	Japan-Nigeria Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Aug. 02	Termination of the INF Treaty
	Oct. 03	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Aug. 30	Japan-Zimbabwe Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Aug. 06	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Oct. 03	Japan-Saudi Arabia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Aug. 30	Japan-Liberia Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Aug. 08	A Russian vessel sails eastbound from the Soya Strait
	Oct. 09	Signing of the Memorandum between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of National Defence of the Lao People's Democratic Republic on Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defense	Aug. 30	Japan-Benin Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Aug. 08	Two Russian Tu-142 patrol aircraft pass the Tsushima Strait from the Sea of Japan, and fly to the East China Sea. Thereafter, they pass through the Tsushima Strait again, and fly to the Sea of Japan
	Oct. 12	Disaster relief in response to the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis) (through November 30)	Aug. 30	Japan-Democratic Republic of the Congo Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Aug. 08	Several people including personnel of the Russian Ministry of Defence and a national nuclear-related company are killed due to an explosion accompanying radiation leakage at a military facility near Arkhangelsk, northern Russia
	Oct. 14	Cabinet Decision on disaster relief call-up orders for Ready Reserve Personnel and Reserve Personnel in response to the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis)	Aug. 30	Japan-Zambia Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Aug. 10	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Oct. 14	Disaster relief call-up orders for Ready Reserve Personnel and Reserve Personnel are issued (through November 9)	Aug. 30	Japan-Madagascar Summit Meeting (Yokohama)	Aug. 15	Three Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
	Oct. 16	Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Aug. 31	Japan-Seychelles Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Aug. 16	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Oct. 24	Telephone Conversation between Defense Minister Kono and Commander in Chief of Bahrain Defense Force Khalifa	Aug. 31	Japan-Eswatini Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Aug. 16	UN Security Council holds a closed-door on Kashmir
	Oct. 24	Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Aug. 31	Japan-Comoros Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Aug. 18	Two Chinese vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait
	Oct. 25	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Aug. 31	Japan-Cote d'Ivoire Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Aug. 18	U.S. conducts launch tests of ground launched cruise missiles with conventional warheads at mid-range
	Oct. 28	Japan-Oman Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Aug. 31	Japan-Lesotho Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Aug. 20	U.S. Government notifies Congress of the sale of weapons to Taiwan (worth US$8 billion)
	Oct. 29	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Aug. 31	Japan-Tanzania Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Aug. 22	Two Chinese vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait
	Oct. 29	Japan-Denmark Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Aug. 31	Japan-Somalia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Aug. 23	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Nov. 08	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Aug. 31	Japan-Ghana Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Aug. 24	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Nov. 12	Cabinet Decision on continuation of counter-piracy mission	Sep. 05	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Vladivostok)	Aug. 25	Seven Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
	Nov. 16	6th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus and 5th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting (Thailand) (through November 18)	Sep. 05	Japan-Mongolia Summit Meeting (Vladivostok)	Aug. 28	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef, the Spratly Islands
	Nov. 17	Announcement of "Vientiane Vision 2.0"	Sep. 05	Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Vladivostok)	Aug. 29	A U.S military aircraft fly over the Taiwan Strait
	Nov. 17	Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok)	Sep. 11	Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in 5th Kadena Air Base noise suit	Aug. 29	The United States founds the Space Command as the 11th unified combatant command
	Nov. 17	Signing of the Memorandum of Arrangement between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Thailand on Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defense	Sep. 13	Japan-Kosovo Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Sep. 02	First ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise (AUMX) (through September 6)
	Nov. 17	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok)	Sep. 18	Japan-Australia Summit Telephone Talk	Sep. 05	A U.K. vessel sails around the Paracel Islands
	Nov. 17	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok)	Sep. 19	Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Sep. 10	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Nov. 17	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok)	Sep. 23	Attends the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (New York) (through September26)	Sep. 10	A Canadian vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Nov. 17	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok)	Sep. 23	Japan-Jordan Summit Meeting (New York)	Sep. 11	Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
	Nov. 17	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok)	Sep. 24	Japan-Iran Summit Meeting (New York)	Sep. 11	Taiwan releases the 15th National Defense Report (for the first time in two years)
	Nov. 17	Japan-Myanmar Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok)	Sep. 25	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (New York)	Sep. 13	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" in the waters near the Paracel Islands
	Nov. 17	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok)	Sep. 25	Japan-EU Summit Meeting (New York)	Sep. 14	An oil facility in Saudi Arabia is attacked
	Nov. 18	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok)	Sep. 27	Japan-EU Summit Meeting (Brussel)	Sep. 16	SCO member countries including China participate in a large military exercise held in the Central Military District in Russia (through September 21)
	Nov. 18	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok)	Oct. 02	Japan-Samoa Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Sep. 16	Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
	Nov. 20	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 17	Japan-Jordan Summit Telephone Talk	Sep. 16	"Tsentr 2019," a strategic command post exercise by Russia (through September 21)
	Nov. 21	International disaster relief activities for heavy rains and floods in Djibouti (through November 23)	Oct. 21	Japan-Maldives Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Sep. 17	2nd General election in Israel
	Nov. 23	15th IISS Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue) (Manama) (through November 24)	Oct. 21	Meeting between Prime Minister Abe and State Counsellor of Myanmar (Tokyo)	Sep. 17	Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
	Nov. 23	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Manama)	Oct. 21	Japan-Palestine Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Sep. 20	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Nov. 24	Meeting between Defense Minister Kono and Commander in Chief of Bahrain Defense Force Khalifa (Manama)	Oct. 21	Japan-Nepal Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Sep. 21	Solomon Islands establishes diplomatic relations with China (and severs its diplomatic relations with Taiwan [September 16])
	Nov. 24	Meeting between Defense Minister Kono and Advisor to the President of Republic of Yemen (Manama)	Oct. 21	Japan-Slovakia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Sep. 26	A U.S military aircraft flies over the Taiwan Strait
	Nov. 27	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Oct. 21	Japan-Serbia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Sep. 27	Kiribati establishes diplomatic relations with China (and severs its diplomatic relations with Taiwan [September 20])
	Nov. 30	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Delhi)	Oct. 21	Japan-Finland Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 01	China conducts a military parade to celebrate the 70th anniversary of its founding
	Nov. 30	Japan-India Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Delhi)	Oct. 21	Japan-Micronesia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 01	Three Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
	Dec. 02	NATO cyber defense exercise Cyber Coalition 2019 (through December 6) (first official participation)	Oct. 21	Japan-Palau Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 02	North Korea launches an SLBM (fell into Japan's exclusive economic zone [EEZ])
	Dec. 03	Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 21	Japan-Mongolia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 07	Three Russian vessels sail southwest from the Tsushima Strait
	Dec. 14	19th Doha Forum (Doha)	Oct. 21	Japan-Romania Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 09	Türkiye begins military operations in northern Syria
	Dec. 14	Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Meeting (Doha)	Oct. 21	Japan-Ukraine Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 14	Russian Eastern Military District announces that it started a large military exercise in the Sakhalin and Primorsky regions involving up to 8,000 personnel
	Dec. 14	Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Doha)	Oct. 21	Japan-Kosovo Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 15	Grom-2019, a Russian strategic nuclear forces exercise (through October 17)
	Dec. 15	Meeting between Defense Minister Kono and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Jordan (Amman)	Oct. 21	Japan-Lesotho Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 21	Canadian federal election
	Dec. 18	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Beijing)	Oct. 21	Japan-Eswatini Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 22	Two Russian Tu-95 bombers pass the Tsushima Strait from the Sea of Japan, and fly to the East China Sea. Thereafter, they pass through the Tsushima Strait again, and fly to the Sea of Japan
	Dec. 19	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Oct. 21	Japan-Niger Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 25	Two Chinese vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait
	Dec. 20	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 21	Japan-Cote d'Ivoire Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 27	Two Russian bombers fly from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea
	Dec. 21	Disaster relief to search for a fishing boat near Mikurajima Island (Izu Islands)	Oct. 22	Sokuirei-Seiden-no-gi	Oct. 27	Three Chinese vessels sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Dec. 25	Japan-Saudi Arabia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Oct. 23	Japan-Slovenia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 29	Two Chinese vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait
	Dec. 26	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Oct. 23	Japan-Singapore Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 29	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea, and flies to the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around and flies to the East China Sea again
	Dec. 27	Cabinet Decision on the Government's Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East	Oct. 23	Japan-Pakistan Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 31	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Dec. 28	Japan-Djibouti Defense Ministerial Meeting (Djibouti)	Oct. 23	Japan-Thailand Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Nov. 07	The command center of the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) is established in Bahrain
	Dec. 29	Japan-Oman Defense Ministerial Meeting (Muscat)	Oct. 23	Japan-Afghanistan Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Nov. 12	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
			Oct. 23	Japan-Nauru Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Nov. 17	A Chinese indigenous aircraft carrier transits through the Taiwan Strait for the first time
			Oct. 23	Japan-Marshall Islands Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Nov. 17	The United States and the ROK announce the postponement of a U.S.-ROK air exercise as an act of goodwill to contribute to an environment conducive to diplomacy and the advancement of peace
			Oct. 23	Japan-Brazil Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Nov. 20	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef, the Spratly Islands
			Oct. 23	Japan-Kyrgyz Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Nov. 21	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands
			Oct. 23	Japan-Turkmenistan Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Nov. 27	Two Russian Tu-95 bombers pass the Tsushima Strait from the Sea of Japan, and fly to the East China Sea. Thereafter, they pass through the Tsushima Strait again, and fly to off the coast of Hokkaido
			Oct. 23	Japan-Kazakhstan Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Nov. 27	Four Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
			Oct. 23	Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Nov. 28	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
			Oct. 23	Japan-Montenegro Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Nov. 28	A Chinese vessel sails northbound from the Tsushima Strait, and advances to the Sea of Japan temporarily. However, on November 29, the vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
			Oct. 23	Japan-Slovenia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Nov. 29	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter, it turns around and flies over the East China Sea again
			Oct. 24	Meeting between Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister of the ROK (Tokyo)	Dec. 04	A Japanese doctor is killed in eastern Afghanistan due to a shooting incident
			Oct. 24	Japan-Armenia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Dec. 07	A U.K. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
			Oct. 24	Japan-Guatemala Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Dec. 08	North Korea announces that it conducted a "crucial test" at Sohae satellite launching station (Tongch'ang-ri) on December 7
			Oct. 24	Japan-Albania Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Dec. 10	Vietnam releases the 2019 National Defence White Paper
			Oct. 24	Japan-Georgia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Dec. 12	U.S. DoD announces that it conducted a flight test of a prototype of a conventionally-configured ground-launched ballistic missile with a range of more than 500 km
			Oct. 24	Japan-Panama Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Dec. 14	North Korea announces that it conducted a "crucial test" at Sohae satellite launching station (Tongch'ang-ri) on December 13
			Oct. 24	Japan-Bulgaria Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Dec. 16	Four Chinese vessels sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
			Oct. 24	Japan-Czech Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Dec. 16	Three Russian vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait
			Oct. 25	Hiroshima High Court renders judgment in 1st, 2nd and 3rd Iwakuni Air Base noise suits	Dec. 17	China's first indigenous aircraft carrier was named "Shandong" and commissioned in Sanya of Hainan Island
			Nov. 01	Japan-Chile Summit Telephone Talk	Dec. 20	The United States establishes the Space Force as the sixth branch of the military
			Nov. 03	ASEAN-related Summit Meetings (Bangkok) (through November 5)	Dec. 24	A Russian Su-57 5th generation fighter crashes during a test flight
			Nov. 04	Japan-Thailand Summit Meeting (Bangkok)	Dec. 26	Chinese aircraft carrier "Shandong" transits the Taiwan Strait
			Nov. 04	22nd ASEAN Plus Three (Japan-China-ROK) Summit Meeting (Bangkok)	Dec. 26	A Chinese vessel sails northbound from the Tsushima Strait, and advances to the Sea of Japan temporarily. However, on December 27, the vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
			Nov. 04	Japan-China Summit Meeting (Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China) (Bangkok)	Dec. 27	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter, it turns around and flies over the East China Sea again
			Nov. 04	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Bangkok)	Dec. 28	North Korea holds the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the WPK (through Dec. 31)
			Nov. 04	Japan-Singapore Summit Meeting (Bangkok)	Dec. 30	Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodges a diplomatic protest over the illegal operation by Chinese fishing fleet escorted by China's Coast Guard in Indonesia's EEZ around the Natuna Islands
			Nov. 04	14th East Asia Summit (EAS) (Bangkok)		
			Nov. 04	Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting (Bangkok)		
			Nov. 04	22nd Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting (Bangkok)		
			Nov. 04	3rd RCEP Summit (Bangkok)		
			Nov. 04	Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting (Bangkok)		
			Nov. 04	Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting (Bangkok) 11th		
			Nov. 04	Japan-Mekong Summit Meeting (Bangkok)		
			Nov. 10	Shukuga-onretsu-no-gi		
			Nov. 12	Attends Reception for Celebrating 25 Years of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and Palau (Tokyo)		
			Nov. 14	Japan-Micronesia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Nov. 25	Meeting with His Holiness Pope Francis (Tokyo)		
			Nov. 29	Japan-El Salvador Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Dec. 02	Japan-EU Summit Telephone Talk		
			Dec. 06	Japan-Hungary Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Dec. 12	Japan-Jamaica Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Dec. 19	Japan-Uzbekistan Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Dec. 20	Japan-Iran Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Dec. 21	Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Talk		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
			Dec. 21	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk		
			Dec. 23	Japan-China Summit Meeting (China)		
			Dec. 24	8th Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit (Chengdu) (through December 25)		
			Dec. 24	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting (Chengdu)		
2020	Jan. 07	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Jan. 07	Japan-Australia Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 03	The U.S. military kills Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
	Jan. 08	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Uruma City and Okinawa City, Okinawa Prefecture (through January 20)	Jan. 11	Japan-Canada Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 08	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps shoot down a Ukrainian plane
	Jan. 09	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Jan. 12	Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit Meeting (Riyadh)	Jan. 08	Iran carries out a ballistic missile attack on Iraqi bases hosting U.S. troops
	Jan. 09	Japan-Iran Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Jan. 13	Japan-UAE Summit Meeting (Abu Dhabi)	Jan. 11	The Taiwanese presidential election is held, and incumbent President Tsai of the Democratic Progressive Party is reelected
	Jan. 10	Minister of Defense issues an order to implement the information gathering activities necessary to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East.	Jan. 14	Japan-Oman Summit Meeting (Muscat)	Jan. 15	Russian Prime Minister announces the resignation of the Cabinet
	Jan. 14	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Jan. 21	Japan-Poland Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 16	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Jan. 15	International disaster relief activities in Australia (through February 8)	Jan. 23	Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 9th and 12th Yokota Air Base noise suits	Jan. 20	Malaysia releases its first defense white paper
	Jan. 26	Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 20 (through March 9)	Feb. 10	Japan-Estonia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 20	A Chinese Tu-154 intelligence gathering aircraft makes a long-distance flight over the East China Sea
	Jan. 31	Disaster relief for prevention of the spread of COVID-19 (through March 16)	Mar. 12	Kanazawa District Court renders judgment in the 5th and 6th Komatsu Air Base noise suits	Jan. 21	A new Russian Cabinet is launched
	Feb. 02	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Okinawa City, Okinawa Prefecture (through February 4)	Mar. 13	Japan-France Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 25	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around Fiery Cross Reef, the Spratly Islands
	Feb. 13	Cabinet Decision on disaster relief call-up orders for Ready Reserve Personnel and Reserve Personnel for prevention of the spread of COVID-19	Mar. 13	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 31	U.K. departs from the EU
	Feb. 13	Disaster relief call-up order for Reserve Personnel is issued (through March 16)	Mar. 15	Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 04	U.S. DoD announces the deployment of the low-yield nuclear warhead to be carried by SLBMs
	Feb. 15	56th Munich Security Conference (Munich)	Mar. 16	G7 Summit Video Teleconference Meeting	Feb. 06	The United States announces the death of the leader of AQAP
	Feb. 15	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich)	Mar. 24	Japan-Canada Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 09	Four Chinese H-6 bombers fly from the Bashi Channel, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and fly to the East China Sea
	Feb. 15	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich)	Mar. 25	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 10	A Chinese military aircraft crosses over the "median line" of the Taiwan Strait
	Feb. 15	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich)	Mar. 25	Japan-Australia Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 11	The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines notifies the United States of the termination of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
	Feb. 15	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich)	Mar. 26	G20 Summit Video Teleconference Meeting	Feb. 12	Two Russian vessels sail southwest from the Tsushima Strait
	Feb. 15	Meeting between Defense Minister Kono and High Representative of EU Borrell (Munich)	Mar. 30	Telephone Talk between Prime Minister Abe and WHO Director-General	Feb. 12	A U.S military aircraft flies over the Taiwan Strait
	Feb. 15	Meeting between Defense Minister Kono and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg (Munich)	Apr. 03	Japan-Sweden Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 15	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Mar. 01	Disaster relief to search for and rescue crew members of a cargo ship sunk off the coast of Shimokita District, Aomori Prefecture (through March 3)	Apr. 10	Japan-India Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 21	Parliamentary elections in Iran
	Mar. 02	Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Apr. 14	Special ASEAN Plus Three (Japan-China-ROK) Summit on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)	Feb. 22	Transitional government established in South Sudan based on the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS)
	Mar. 28	Disaster relief for reinforcement of quarantine measures against COVID-19 (through May 31)	Apr. 16	G7 Summit Video Teleconference Meeting	Feb. 27	A flight by two Russian Su-34 fighter-bombers within Japan's air defense identification zone in the Sea of Okhotsk is confirmed for the first time
	Apr. 17	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Apr. 17	Japan-Türkiye Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 27	The United States and the ROK announce the postponement of U.S.-ROK joint exercises to curb the spread of the novel coronavirus outbreak
	Apr. 20	Disaster relief for prevention of the spread of community-acquired infection of COVID-19 in Miyagi Prefecture (through May 1)	Apr. 21	Japan-Ethiopia Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 29	The United States signs a peace agreement with the Taliban
	Apr. 24	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Apr. 23	Japan-Jordan Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 02	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Apr. 24	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Apr. 23	Japan-Indonesia Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 09	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Apr. 26	Disaster relief for prevention of the spread of community-acquired infection of COVID-19 in Nagasaki Prefecture (through May 10)	May 04	Japan-Vietnam Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 10	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands
	Apr. 28	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	May 05	Japan-Iran Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 18	Four Chinese vessels sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	May 01	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	May 07	Japan-Russia Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 21	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	May 02	Disaster relief for prevention of the spread of community-acquired infection of COVID-19 in Nagasaki Prefecture (through May 14)	May 08	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 23	A flight by a Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft within Japan's air defense identification zone in the East China Sea is confirmed for the first time
	May 07	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	May 12	Japan-Luxembourg Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 24	A Chinese vessel sails northbound from the Tsushima Strait, and advances to the Sea of Japan temporarily. However, on March 25, the vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
	May 08	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	May 19	Japan-Peru Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 24	Two Russian Tu-95 bombers pass the Sea of Okhotsk from the Sea of Japan to reach the Pacific Ocean. At the same time two Su-35 fighters and two Russian aircraft (presumed) fly over the Sea of Japan
	May 08	Disaster relief in response to a forest fire in Asago City, Hyogo Prefecture (through May 11)	May 26	Japan-EU Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 25	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around and flies to the East China Sea again
	May 12	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Jun. 18	Japan-Spain Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 25	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	May 15	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Jul. 08	The Supreme Court renders judgement in 3rd and 5th Futenma Air Base noise suits	Mar. 26	18 Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
	May 18	Disaster relief to search for missing persons in Kami Town, Miyagi Prefecture (through May 21)	Jul. 09	Japan-Australia Leaders Video Teleconference	Mar. 26	Two Russian vessels sail northeast from the Tsushima Strait
	May 19	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Jul. 16	Japan-Germany Leaders Video Teleconference	Mar. 29	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	May 19	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Aug. 04	Japan-Vietnam Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 03	Two Russian vessels sail southwest from the Tsushima Strait
	May 19	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Aug. 31	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 09	Two Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft make a long-distance flight over from the Sea of Okhotsk to the Sea of Japan
	May 20	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Telephone Convers	Aug. 31	Japan-Russia Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 10	Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Jun. 01	Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Sep. 02	Japan-Canada Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 10	A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
	Jun. 09	Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Sep. 02	Japan-Jordan Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 15	The U.S. the Space Command announces that Russia conducted a launch test of a ground-launched anti-satellite missile
	Jun. 16	Japan-PNG Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Sep. 02	Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 15	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps vessels abnormally approach U.S. military vessels in the Persian Gulf
	Jun. 26	"Revised Japan-NATO Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP)"	Sep. 07	Japan-Israel Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 18	China announces establishment of the Xisha District and the Nansha District under the Sansha City of Hainan Province
	Jul. 04	Disaster relief in response to July 2020 Flooding Disaster (through August 8)	Sep. 07	Japan-Philippines Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 23	A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
	Jul. 05	Cabinet Decision on disaster relief call-up orders for Ready Reserve Personnel and Reserve Personnel in response to July 2020 Flooding Disaster	Sep. 08	Japan-Australia Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 24	Seven Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
	Jul. 05	"Disaster relief call-up order for Ready Reserve Personnel is issued (through July 23)"	Sep. 09	Japan-Austria Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 28	Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Jul. 08	Japan-U.S.-Australia Virtual Trilateral Defense Meeting	Sep. 09	Japan-Türkiye Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 28	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Spratly Islands
	Jul. 09	Disaster relief call-up order for Reserve Personnel is issued (through July 23)	Sep. 10	Japan-India Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 29	Three Chinese vessels sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Jul. 20	Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Sep. 10	Japan-Turkmenistan Summit Telephone Talk	May 05	Standoff between Chinese and Indian forces along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) (border of Ladakh, India)
	Jul. 21	Telephone Conversation between Defense Minister Kono and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg	Sep. 20	Japan-Australia Summit Telephone Talk	May 09	Standoff between Chinese and Indian forces along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) (border of Sikkim, India)
	Aug. 06	Video Teleconference between Defense Minister Kono and Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan Bajwa	Sep. 20	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	May 13	A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
	Aug. 12	Japan-Tonga Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Sep. 22	Japan-Germany Summit Telephone Talk	May 17	A Russian vessels sail southwest from the Tsushima Strait
	Aug. 12	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Sep. 22	Japan-EU Summit Telephone Talk	May 24	North Korea announces that it will hold the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the KWP
	Aug. 18	Disaster relief for prevention of the spread of community-acquired infection of COVID-19 in Okinawa Prefecture (through August 31)	Sep. 23	Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Talk	May 28	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands
	Aug. 19	Japan-Fiji Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Sep. 24	Japan-ROK Summit Telephone Talk	May 29	Three Chinese vessels sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Aug. 25	Conclusion of the contract of Air Surveillance Radar System to the Republic of the Philippines Equipment to be delivered	Sep. 25	Japan-India Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 04	A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
	Aug. 27	Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Sep. 25	Japan-China Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 10	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft passes from off the coast of Rebun Island to off the coast of the Noto Peninsula
	Aug. 29	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Guam)	Sep. 26	Attends the 75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Online)	Jun. 15	Clash between Chinese and Indian forces in the Galwan Valley along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), with fatalities on both sides
			Sep. 29	Japan-Russia Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 16	North Korea blows up Inter-Korean Liaison Office
			Sep. 30	Japan-Canada Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 17	Two Russian vessels sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, then northeast through the Tsushima Strait. On June 19, a Russian vessel sails northeast through the Tsushima Strait
			Oct. 05	Japan-France Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 18	A submerged submarine moves west through the waters northeast of Amami Oshima Island (within the Japanese contiguous zone), and then west through the waters west of Yokoate Island (outside the Japanese contiguous zone) on June 20
			Oct. 06	Japan-EU Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 20	Three Chinese vessels sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
			Oct. 07	Japan-Italy Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 21	A Chinese vessel sails northbound from the Tsushima Strait, and advances to the Sea of Japan temporarily. However, on June 23, the vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
			Oct. 12	Japan-Vietnam Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 21	Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
			Oct. 13	Japan-Indonesia Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 22	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again
			Oct. 19	Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting	Jun. 26	A Chinese vessel sails south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and advances to the Pacific Ocean temporarily. However, on June 28, the vessel sails north to the East China Sea
			Oct. 20	Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting	Jun. 28	Two Chinese H-6 bombers fly from the East China Sea, and after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island they fly over the Pacific Ocean. Thereafter they fly toward the Bashi Channel and then turn around, and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Oct. 28	Japan-Türkiye Summit Telephone Talk	Jul. 04	Two U.S. carrier strike groups conduct joint exercise in the South China Sea
			Oct. 29	Japan-Singapore Summit Telephone Talk	Jul. 13	A Chinese vessel sails south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and advances to the Pacific Ocean temporarily. However, on July 18, the vessel sails north to the East China Sea
			Nov. 12	Telephone Talk between Prime Minister Suga and President-elect Biden		
			Nov. 12	23rd Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting		
			Nov. 13	12th Mekong-Japan Summit Meeting (Online)		
			Nov. 14	15th East Asia Summit (EAS)		
			Nov. 14	23rd ASEAN Plus Three (Japan-China-ROK) Summit Meeting		
			Nov. 15	4th RCEP Summit and signing of the RCEP Agreement (Online)		
			Nov. 17	Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Nov. 20	Japan-New Zealand Summit Telephone Talk		
			Nov. 20	APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting (Online)		
			Nov. 21	G20 Riyadh Summit (Online)		
			Dec. 02	Japan-Israel Summit Telephone Talk		
			Dec. 07	Japan-Netherlands Summit Telephone Talk		
			Dec. 09	The Supreme Court renders judgment in 10th and 11th Yokota Air Base noise suits		
			Dec. 14	Japan-Philippines Summit Telephone Talk		
			Dec. 16	Japan-Norway Summit Telephone Talk		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
	Sep. 04	Disaster relief in response to Typhoon Haishen (through September 7)			Jul. 14	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Spratly Islands
	Sep. 08	Japan-Saudi Arabia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation			Jul. 14	Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
	Sep. 09	Signing of the Japan-India Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)			Jul. 28	Three Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
	Sep. 17	Minister of Defense Kishi came into office			Aug. 05	Three Russian vessels sail southwest from the Tsushima Strait
	Sep. 26	"Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Takasaki City, Gunma Prefecture (through October 1)"			Aug. 10	A Chinese military aircraft crosses over the "median line" of the Taiwan Strait
	Oct. 07	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation			Aug. 14	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft passes from off the coast of Rebun Island to off the coast of the Noto Peninsula
	Oct. 12	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation			Aug. 18	A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
	Oct. 19	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)			Aug. 19	"Two Russian bombers fly over the Sea of Japan from off the coast of the Oki Islands In conjunction with this movement, two presumed Russian aircraft fly from off the coast of the Oki Island to off the coast of Sado Island, another two presumed Russian aircraft fly from off the coast of Sado Island to off the coast of Rebun Island in Hokkaido, and another two aircraft fly from off the coast of Rebun Island in Hokkaido to the Sea of Japan"
	Oct. 23	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference			Aug. 27	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands
	Oct. 26	Keen Sword21/02FTX (field exercise) (through November 5)			Aug. 28	Two Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft make a long-distance flight over the Sea of Japan
	Nov. 02	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference			Aug. 30	A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
	Nov. 05	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Mitoyo City and Higashikagawa City, Kagawa Prefecture (through November 9)			Sep. 14	Six Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
	Nov. 10	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference			Sep. 15	Israel, UAE, and Bahrain sign normalization agreements
	Nov. 10	Cabinet Decision on continuation of counter-piracy mission			Sep. 18	A Chinese military aircraft crosses over the "median line" of the Taiwan Strait
	Nov. 14	Telephone Conversation between Minister of Defense Kishi and U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense Miller			Sep. 19	A Chinese military aircraft crosses over the "median line" of the Taiwan Strait
	Nov. 16	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference			Sep. 23	A Chinese vessel sails south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and advances to the Pacific Ocean temporarily. However, on September 26, the vessel sails north to the East China Sea
	Nov. 25	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation			Sep. 25	Two Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft fly from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and fly over the Pacific Ocean. Thereafter they turn around, and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Nov. 25	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Munakata City, Fukuoka Prefecture (through November 27)			Sep. 27	Three Russian vessels sail northeast from the Tsushima Strait
	Nov. 26	FY2020 Exercise for RJNO (in Japan) (through December 3)			Oct. 02	A Russian Mi-8 helicopter violates airspace over Japan's territorial waters at Cape Shiretoko in Hokkaido
	Nov. 26	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Awaji City, Hyogo Prefecture (through November 28)			Oct. 09	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands
	Nov. 28	FY2020 air review (Iruma)			Oct. 10	North Korea conducts a military parade
	Dec. 02	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Mitoyo City, Kagawa Prefecture (through December 4)			Oct. 14	A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
	Dec. 07	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference			Oct. 23	Signing of the Libya ceasefire agreement
	Dec. 07	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Mihara City, Hiroshima Prefecture (through December 9)			Oct. 23	Israel and Sudan agree to normalize relations
	Dec. 08	Disaster relief for prevention of the spread of community-acquired infection of COVID-19 in Hokkaido (through December 21)			Nov. 06	A Russian early warning and control aircraft flies from off the coast of the Oki Islands north across the Sea of Japan to the Sea of Okhotsk. In addition to this, two presumed Russian aircraft fly from off the coast of the Oki Islands north across the Sea of Japan to the Sea of Okhotsk, another two presumed Russian aircraft fly from off the coast of the Oki Island to off the coast of Sado Island, another two aircraft fly from off the cost of Sado Island to off the coast of Rebun Island in Hokkaido, and yet another two aircraft fly from off the cost of Rebun Island in Hokkaido north across the Sea of Japan to the Sea of Okhotsk
	Dec. 10	7th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus and 6th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting (Online)			Nov. 06	Three Russian vessels sail southwest from the Tsushima Strait
	Dec. 11	Change of Cabinet Decision on the Government's Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East (through December 26, 2021)			Nov. 20	A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
	Dec. 11	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Mimasaka City, Okayama Prefecture (through December 14)			Nov. 21	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft passes from off the coast of Rebun Island to off the coast of the Noto Peninsula
	Dec. 14	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference			Nov. 24	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around Peter the Great Gulf
	Dec. 15	Japan-Germany Defense Ministers' Forum "Indo-Pacific: Japan and Germany's Engagement in the Region" (Online)			Dec. 10	Israel and Morocco agree to normalize relations
	Dec. 15	Japan-Brazil Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference			Dec. 19	A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
	Dec. 15	Signing of the Japan-Brazil Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges			Dec. 21	A Chinese vessel sails northbound from the Tsushima Strait, and advances to the Sea of Japan temporarily. However, on December 23, the vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
	Dec. 15	Disaster relief for prevention of the spread of community-acquired infection of COVID-19 in Osaka (through December 28)			Dec. 22	Two Chinese H-6 bombers and two Russian Tu-95 bombers carried out long distance joint flights from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea
	Dec. 17	Disaster relief in response to heavy snow in Kan-Etsu Expressway (through December 18)			Dec. 22	A Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
	Dec. 18	Cabinet Decision on the "Procurement of a New Missile Defense System, etc., and Strengthening Stand-off Defense Capability"			Dec. 22	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Spratly Islands
	Dec. 22	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation			Dec. 24	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Con Dao Islands
	Dec. 24	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Isumi City, Chiba Prefecture (through December 31)			Dec. 27	Three Russian vessels sail northeast from the Tsushima Strait
	Dec. 29	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Iga City, Mie Prefecture (through January 1, 2021)			Dec. 31	Two U.S. vessel sail through the Taiwan Strait
2021	Jan. 05	Disaster relief in response to heavy snow in Akita Prefecture (through January 10)	Jan. 27	The Supreme Court renders judgement in 9th and 12th Yokota Air Base noise suits	Jan. 05	North Korea holds the 8th Congress of the KWP (through January 12)
	Jan. 10	Disaster relief in response to heavy snow in Hokuriku Expressway (through January 12)	Jan. 28	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 14	North Korea conducts a military parade
	Jan. 10	Disaster relief in response to heavy snow in Niigata Prefecture (through January 12)	Feb. 03	Japan-Canada Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 20	Inauguration of the Biden administration
	Jan. 11	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Isumi City, Chiba Prefecture (through January 19)	Feb. 16	Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 24	China and India agree to push an disengagement of troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC)
	Jan. 14	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Feb. 19	G7 Summit Video Teleconference Meeting	Feb. 02	ROK releases Defense White Paper 2020
	Jan. 15	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Feb. 25	Japan-Australia Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 04	U.S. President Biden announces a complete halt to support for offensive operations in Yemen
	Jan. 24	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Mar. 09	Japan-India Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 04	Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
	Jan. 31	Disaster relief for prevention of the spread of community-acquired infection of COVID-19 in Miyakojima, Okinawa Prefecture (through February 13)	Mar. 12	Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Leaders' Video Teleconference	Feb. 05	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands
	Feb. 02	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Shirosato Town, Ibaraki Prefecture (through February 7)	Mar. 16	Japan-Sweden Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 09	Two U.S. carrier strike groups conduct a joint exercise in the South China Sea
	Feb. 03	Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Online)	Mar. 19	Japan-Italy Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 17	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Spratly Islands
	Feb. 04	Telephone Conversation between Minister of Defense Kishi and Saudi Arabian Deputy Minister of Defense, H.R.H. Prince Khalid	Mar. 22	Japan-Vietnam Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 21	China and India announce that they positively appraised the smooth completion of disengagement of frontline troops in the Pangong Lake area
	Feb. 06	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Asahi City, Tako Town and Sosa City, Chiba Prefecture (through February 14)	Mar. 23	Japan-Poland Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 24	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Feb. 15	Japan-Iran Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Apr. 07	Japan-Laos Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 03	U.S. releases the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance
	Feb. 22	Disaster relief in response to a forest fire in Ashikaga City, Tochigi Prefecture (through March 3)	Apr. 09	Japan-Thailand Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 10	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Feb. 25	Disaster relief in response to a forest fire in Kiryu City, Gunma Prefecture (through February 28)	Apr. 13	The Supreme Court renders judgement in 1st, 2nd and 3rd Iwakuni Air Base noise suits	Mar. 10	House of Representatives approves Libya's provisional Government of National Unity
	Mar. 03	Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD) Preparation Meeting	Apr. 14	Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 11	A Russian A-50 early warning and control aircraft flies from off the coast of the Noto Peninsula to off the coast of Rebun Island, Hokkaido. In addition, two presumed Russian aircraft fly from the northern part of the Oki Islands north over the Sea of Japan, through the Sea of Okhotsk to the Pacific Ocean, while another two presumed Russian aircraft fly from the northern part of the Oki Islands to the Sea of Japan, another two presumed Russian aircraft fly from off the coast of Okushiri Island, Hokkaido to the Sea of Okhotsk, and yet another
	Mar. 10	Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Apr. 16	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Mar. 18	Three Chinese vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
	Mar. 13	89th Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence (Online)	Apr. 26	Japan-India Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 25	Three Chinese vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
					Mar. 25	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
					Mar. 29	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and flies over the Pacific Ocean. Thereafter it turns around, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again. In addition, a Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft flies from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island. Thereafter it turns around, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
					Mar. 29	Two Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft fly from off the coast of the Oki Islands in the Sea of Japan to off the coast of the Oga Peninsula
					Apr. 03	Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
	Mar. 16	Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (Tokyo)			Apr. 04	A Chinese vessel sails south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean temporarily. However, on the same day, the vessel sails back northbound between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Mar. 16	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)			Apr. 04	A Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft flies from the East China Sea passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean, where it turns around and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Mar. 17	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference			Apr. 06	Start of Indirect Talks between the U.S. and Iran about the JCPOA
	Mar. 23	Signing and entering into force of the Japan-Germany General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA)			Apr. 07	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Mar. 25	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation			Apr. 09	A U.S. carrier strike group and an amphibious ready group conducts joint exercise in South China Sea
	Mar. 28	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)			Apr. 14	U.S. announces that it will remove U.S. troops from Afghanistan by September 11
	Mar. 30	Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo)			Apr. 26	Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Mar. 30	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-Indonesia Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology			Apr. 27	A Z-18 early warning helicopter taking off from aircraft carrier "Liaoning" and flying about 50 km to 100 km north of Taisho Island's territorial airspace is confirmed
	Apr. 02	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Maebashi City, Gunma Prefecture (through April 8)			Apr. 30	Two Russian vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
	Apr. 13	Japan-Germany Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2)			Apr. 30	A Chinese vessel sails south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean temporarily. However, on May 1, the vessel sails north between Taiwan and Yonaguni to the East China Sea
	Apr. 13	NATO CCDCOE Cyber Defense Exercise "Locked Shields 2021"(through April 16) (first official participation)			Apr. 30	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft and a Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft fly from the East China Sea, and after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island they fly over the Pacific Ocean. Thereafter they fly toward the Bashi Channel and then turn around, and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Apr. 14	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Tsu City, Mie Prefecture (through April 17)				
	Apr. 15	Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference				
	Apr. 17	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Nasushiobara City, Tochigi Prefecture (through April 20)				
	Apr. 19	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference				
	Apr. 28	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference			May 05	Four Russian vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
	May 19	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	May 11	Japan-Vietnam Summit Telephone Talk	May 15	Four Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
	May 20	Japan-Brunei Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	May 12	Japan-Kazakhstan Summit Telephone Talk	May 16	Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
	May 21	Cabinet Decision on the dispatch of headquarters staff to multinational units for counter-piracy mission (through November 19)	May 12	Japan-Uzbekistan Summit Telephone Talk	May 16	Three Chinese vessels sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	May 25	Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	May 13	Japan-Turkmenistan Summit Telephone Talk	May 18	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	May 28	Disaster relief to search for missing persons in the Kurushima Strait, Imabari City, Ehime Prefecture (through June 1)	May 17	Japan-Vietnam Summit Telephone Talk	May 20	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands
	Jun. 02	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	May 19	Japan-Philippines Summit Telephone Talk	May 21	A ceasefire comes into effect in Gaza Strip, Palestine
	Jun. 03	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	May 25	Japan-Singapore Summit Telephone Talk	May 31	Three Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
	Jun. 09	Japan-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Online)	May 27	Japan-EU Summit	Jun. 14	NATO Summit Meeting's approval of "NATO 2030" to consider a functionally stronger alliance by 2030
	Jun. 16	8th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (Online)	May 28	Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 15	North Korea holds the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK (through June 18)
	Jun. 17	Minister of Defense Kishi's Speech at the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) (Online)	Jun. 11	G7 Cornwall Summit	Jun. 16	Two Russian vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
	Jun. 22	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Jun. 11	Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Cornwall)	Jun. 18	Four Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
	Jun. 23	Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Jun. 12	Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Cornwall)	Jun. 22	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Jun. 25	Japan-Cambodia Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Jun. 12	Japan-France Summit Meeting (Cornwall)	Jun. 25	A flight by a Russian Su-25 attack aircraft within Japan's air defense identification zone in the Sea of Japan is confirmed for the first time
	Jul. 03	Disaster relief in response to heavy rain starting from July 1, 2021 in Atami City, Shizuoka Prefecture (through July 31)	Jun. 13	Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Cornwall)	Jul. 04	Seven Russian vessels sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, then northeast through the Tsushima Strait towards the Sea of Japan
	Jul. 06	Video Teleconference between Minister of Defense Kishi and Sri Lanka President Rajapaksa (Ministry of Defence under his jurisdiction)	Jun. 13	Japan-Canada Summit Meeting (Cornwall)	Jul. 09	France announces the reorganization of its counterterrorism operation in the Sahel region
	Jul. 09	Support for the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games (through September 6)	Jun. 29	Japan-Tuvalu Leaders Video Teleconference	Jul. 09	A Russian vessel sails westbound from the Soya Strait
	Jul. 11	Entering into force of the Japan-India Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)	Jun. 29	Japan-Fiji Leaders Video Teleconference	Jul. 12	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands
	Jul. 20	Japan-England Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 29	Japan-Kiribati Leaders Video Teleconference	Jul. 28	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Jul. 30	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Jun. 29	Japan-Papua New Guinea Leaders Video Teleconference	Jul. 29	Attack on vessels in the Gulf of Oman (through July 30)
	Aug. 10	Disaster relief in response to heavy rain damages in Aomori Prefecture (through August 17)	Jun. 29	Japan-Vanuatu Leaders Video Teleconference	Jul. 30	The Philippine government announces the decision to withdraw the VFA termination notification to the U.S.
	Aug. 12	Disaster relief for prevention of the spread of community-acquired infection of COVID-19 in Okinawa Prefecture (through September 5)	Jun. 29	Japan-Palau Leaders Video Teleconference	Jul. 31	China and India agree on disengagement in the area of Gogra, as well as to maintain dialogue to resolve the standoff in other areas
	Aug. 13	Disaster relief in response to heavy rain in August 2021 (through August 19)	Jun. 30	Japan-Cook Islands Leaders Video Teleconference	Aug. 14	A Chinese vessel sails northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
	Aug. 23	Transportation of Japanese Nationals staying in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (through August 31)	Jun. 30	Japan-Micronesia Leaders Video Teleconference	Aug. 15	The Taliban take control of Afghanistan's capital Kabul
			Jun. 30	Japan-Niue Leaders Video Teleconference	Aug. 22	Three Chinese vessels sail northeast from the Tsushima Strait
			Jun. 30	Japan-Tonga Leaders Video Teleconference	Aug. 24	Three Chinese vessels sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean and sail towards the Sea of Japan
			Jul. 01	Japan-Solomon Islands Leaders Video Teleconference	Aug. 24	Four Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
			Jul. 01	Japan-Nauru Leaders Video Teleconference	Aug. 24	A flight by a Chinese TB-001 reconnaissance/attack unmanned aircraft vehicle (probable) within Japan's air defense identification zone in the East China Sea is confirmed for the first time
			Jul. 02	9th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (Online)	Aug. 25	A Chinese BZK-005 unmanned aircraft vehicle, a Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft, and a Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft fly from the East China Sea, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean. After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, they return and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Jul. 22	Japan-Mongolia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Jul. 24	Japan-Kosovo Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Jul. 24	Japan-Montenegro Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Jul. 24	Japan-Poland Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Jul. 24	Japan-Switzerland Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Jul. 24	Japan-Armenia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Jul. 24	Japan-France Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Aug. 04	Japan-Estonia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Aug. 10	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk		
			Aug. 24	G7 Summit Video Teleconference Meeting about the situation in Afghanistan	Aug. 26	Two Chinese vessels sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
					Aug. 26	A Chinese vessel sails north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
					Aug. 26	A Chinese TB-001 reconnaissance/attack unmanned aircraft vehicle (probable), a Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft, and a Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft fly from the East China Sea, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean. After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, they return and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
					Aug. 26	Terror attack by suicide bomber outside Kabul International Airport in Afghanistan
					Aug. 27	Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
					Aug. 31	The U.S. announces completion of the removal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan
					Aug. 31	A Chinese vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
					Sep. 03	Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
					Sep. 03	Two Chinese vessels sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean. On September 5, the two vessels are joined by another Chinese vessel and sail north between Taiwan and Yonaguni to the East China Sea
			Sep. 15	Japan-Vietnam Summit Telephone Talk	Sep. 04	U.K. carrier strike group makes a port call in Japan
	Sep. 02	Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (Online)	Sep. 15	Japan-Australia Leaders Video Teleconference	Sep. 08	The Taliban announce provisional cabinet in Afghanistan
	Sep. 11	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi)	Sep. 23	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Sep. 08	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Spratly Islands
	Sep. 11	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-Vietnam Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology	Sep. 24	Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Sep. 10	A Russian vessel sails westbound from the Soya Strait
	Oct. 03	Disaster relief to support water supply following the collapse of a water pipe bridge in Wakayama City, Wakayama Prefecture (through October 9)	Sep. 24	2nd Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Summit Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Sep. 10	A presumed Chinese submerged submarine moves west through the waters east of Amami Oshima Island (outside the Japanese contiguous zone), and then west through the waters southwest of Yokoate Island (outside the Japanese contiguous zone) on September 12
	Oct. 20	Disaster relief to search for missing persons in Tottori Prefecture (through October 22)	Oct. 05	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Sep. 11	Four Chinese vessels sail westbound from the Osumi Strait
	Nov. 09	Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Oct. 05	Japan-Australia Leaders Video Teleconference	Sep. 12	Russian An-261 aircraft violates airspace over Japan's territorial waters at Cape Shiretoko in Hokkaido
	Nov. 16	Cabinet Decision on continuation of counter-piracy mission	Oct. 07	Japan-Russia Summit Telephone Talk	Sep. 14	Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
	Nov. 19	FY2021 SDF Joint Exercises (field exercise) (through November 30)	Oct. 08	Japan-China Summit Telephone Talk	Sep. 15	The governments of Australia, the U.S. and the U.K. establish the trilateral security cooperation framework AUKUS
	Nov. 23	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 08	Japan-India Summit Telephone Talk	Sep. 15	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Nov. 23	Signing of the Japan-Vietnam Memorandum on cooperation in the medical care field between the two countries' Defense Authorities	Oct. 12	G20 Summit Video Teleconference Meeting about the situation in Afghanistan	Sep. 16	The EU releases its first Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
	Nov. 23	Signing of the Japan-Vietnam Memorandum on cooperation in the cybersecurity field between the two countries' Defense Authorities	Oct. 13	Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Talk	Sep. 17	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Nov. 27	FY2021 Review (Asaka)	Oct. 15	Japan-ROK Summit Telephone Talk	Sep. 18	A Chinese vessel sails north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Dec. 03	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Oct. 27	24th Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting (Online)	Sep. 19	A Russian vessel sails eastbound from the Soya Strait
	Dec. 09	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Oct. 27	24th ASEAN Plus Three (Japan-China-ROK) Summit Meeting (Online)	Sep. 20	Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
			Oct. 27	16th East Asia Summit (EAS) (Online)	Sep. 21	A Russian vessel sails westbound from the Soya Strait
			Oct. 30	Prime Minister Kishida attends the G20 Rome Submit (Online)	Sep. 23	A Russian vessel sails eastbound from the Soya Strait
			Nov. 02	Prime Minister Kishida attends COP26 (Glasgow)	Sep. 24	A Chinese vessel sails north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
			Nov. 02	Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting (Glasgow)	Sep. 28	North Korea holds the 5th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly (through September 29)
			Nov. 02	Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and UN Secretary-General António Guterres	Sep. 28	North Korea launches what could be a ballistic missile
			Nov. 02	Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Glasgow)		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
	Dec. 12	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Ogawara Town, Miyagi Prefecture (through December 14)	Nov. 02	Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Glasgow)	Sep. 29	A Russian vessel sails westbound from the Soya Strait
			Nov. 12	APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting (Online)	Oct. 10	UN ceasefire monitors start activity in Libya
	Dec. 24	Change of Cabinet Decision on the Government's Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East (through November 19, 2022) (Since then, the existing unit dispatched for counter-piracy operations is utilized for the information gathering activities.)	Nov. 15	Japan-France Summit Telephone Talk	Oct. 11	North Korea holds its Defense Development Exhibition 'Self-Defense-2021' (through October 22)
			Nov. 17	Japan-Philippines Summit Telephone Talk	Oct. 11	Six Chinese vessels sail northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
			Nov. 18	Japan-Indonesia Summit Telephone Talk	Oct. 14	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
			Nov. 22	Japan-Thailand Summit Telephone Talk	Oct. 18	Five Chinese vessels and five Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean
			Nov. 22	Japan-Singapore Summit Telephone Talk	Oct. 18	Five Chinese vessels and five Russian vessels sail southeast in the waters about 40 km southeast of Cape Shiriya in Aomori Prefecture
			Nov. 24	Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting	Oct. 19	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Dec. 27	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Nov. 25	13th ASEM Summit (Online)	Oct. 20	Five Chinese vessels and five Russian vessels sail south about 130 km east of Cape Inubo in Chiba Prefecture
	Dec. 28	Japan-Brunei Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Dec. 01	Japan-Cambodia Leaders Video Teleconference	Oct. 21	Five Chinese vessels and five Russian vessels sail west between the Izu Islands' Smith Island and Tori-shima and then perform shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff
			Dec. 01	Japan-Türkiye Summit Telephone Talk	Oct. 22	Five Chinese vessels and five Russian vessels sail westbound from the Osumi Strait to the East China Sea and, on October 23, perform shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff
			Dec. 02	Japan-Malaysia Summit Telephone Talk	Oct. 23	Five Russian vessels sail northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan and, on October 24, perform shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff
			Dec. 09	Prime Minister Kishida attends the Summit for Democracy hosted by the U.S. (Online)	Oct. 31	A Chinese vessel sails south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
			Dec. 14	Japan-Germany Summit Telephone Talk	Oct. 31	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft and two Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft fly from the East China Sea, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean. After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, they return and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
					Nov. 01	Two Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft fly from the East China Sea, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean. After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, they return and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
					Nov. 02	Ethiopian government declares nationwide state of emergency in Ethiopia following the oppositions from the Tigray People's Liberation Front
					Nov. 03	Start of EU Training Mission in Mozambique
					Nov. 05	German frigate "Bayern" makes a port call in Japan
					Nov. 10	U.S.-Israel-UAE-Bahrain joint exercise (through November 14)
					Nov. 12	Three Chinese vessels sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
					Nov. 13	Two Chinese vessels sail northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
					Nov. 16	A Chinese vessel sails northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
					Nov. 17	A Chinese vessel sails in the territorial waters around Yakushima and Kuchinoerabu-jima islands
					Nov. 18	A Russian vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
					Nov. 18	Two Chinese vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
					Nov. 19	A Chinese vessel sails north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
					Nov. 19	A Chinese vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
					Nov. 19	Two Chinese H-6 bombers and Two Russian Tu-95 bombers carry out long distance joint flights from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea
					Nov. 23	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
					Nov. 23	Five Russian vessels sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and, on November 27, sail northeast from the Tsushima Strait
					Nov. 24	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft and a Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft fly from the East China Sea, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean. After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, they return and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
					Nov. 25	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft and a Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft fly from the East China Sea, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean. After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, they return and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
					Nov. 28	Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait The U.S. releases its Global Posture Review (GPR)
					Nov. 29	North Korea holds the 5th Political Bureau Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK
					Dec. 01	The U.S. announces the end of combat mission from U.S. troops in Iraq
					Dec. 09	A Chinese vessel sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 14	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean via the Sea of Okhotsk. It then turns around over the Pacific Ocean and flies back to the Sea of Japan via the Sea of Okhotsk
					Dec. 14	A Russian vessel sails northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
					Dec. 15	Four Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail southeast in the waters about 350 km west from the Danjo Islands (Nagasaki Prefecture). On December 16, they sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean, and perform carrier-based fighter jet and shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff in the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 15	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean via the Sea of Okhotsk. It then turns around over the Pacific Ocean and flies back to the Sea of Japan via the Sea of Okhotsk Another eight presumed Russian aircraft fly over the Sea of Japan
					Dec. 19	Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail in the waters about 300 km east from Kitadaitojima (Okinawa Prefecture) and perform carrier-based fighter jet and shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff
					Dec. 20	Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail in the waters about 315 km southeast from Okidaitojima (Okinawa Prefecture) and perform carrier-based fighter jet and shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff
					Dec. 25	Five Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Est China Sea
					Dec. 27	North Korea holds the 4th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK (through December 31)
					Dec. 29	Three Russian vessels sail southwest from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
2022	Jan. 04	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Saijo City, Ehime Prefecture (through January 6)	Jan. 06	Japan-Australia Leaders Video Teleconference	Jan. 05	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Jan. 06	Signing of the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement	Jan. 21	Japan-U.S. Leaders Video Teleconference	Jan. 06	The CSTO decides the deployment of Collective Peacekeeping Forces to Kazakhstan
	Jan. 07	Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (Online)	Jan. 31	Japan-Jordan Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 11	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Jan. 11	Disaster relief for prevention of the spread of community-acquired infection of COVID-19 in Okinawa Prefecture (through January 17)	Feb. 09	Japan-Canada Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 14	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Jan. 20	Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Online)	Feb. 09	Japan-Iran Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 17	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Jan. 20	International disaster relief activities in the Kingdom of Tonga (through February 17)	Feb. 11	Prime Minister Kishida attends the One Ocean Summit (Video Message)	Jan. 19	North Korea holds the 6th Political Bureau Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK
	Jan. 27	Japan-U.S. joint exercise 2021 (command post exercise) (through February 3)	Feb. 15	Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 19	The CSTO announces the completed withdrawal of its Collective Peacekeeping Forces from Kazakhstan
	Feb. 17	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Feb. 16	Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 20	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands
	Feb. 10	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Feb. 17	Japan-Russia Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 27	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Feb. 21	Japan-Poland Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Feb. 22	Japan-Germany Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 30	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Feb. 21	Signing of the Japan-Poland Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges	Feb. 24	G7 Summit Video Teleconference Meeting	Feb. 02	Two Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft make a long-distance flight over the Sea of Japan
	Feb. 27	Disaster relief in response to a forest fire in Takamori Town, Aso District, Kumamoto Prefecture (through February 28)	Feb. 28	Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 04	Beijing Olympics (through February 20)
	Mar. 16	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Mar. 01	Japan-Laos Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 04	Two Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft make a long-distance flight over the Sea of Japan
	Mar. 16	Disaster relief in response to a forest fire in Taketa City, Oita Prefecture (through March 18)	Mar. 01	Japan-France Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 11	The U.S. releases its Indo-Pacific Strategy
	Mar. 17	Disaster relief to support water supply following an earthquake measuring upper 6 on Japan's seismic intensity scale with an epicenter off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture (through March 24)	Mar. 02	Japan-Poland Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 14	A Chinese vessel sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Mar. 24	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Mar. 03	Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Leaders' Video Teleconference	Feb. 15	Since February 1, 24 Russian vessels were active in the Sea of Japan and the south part of the Sea of Okhotsk
			Mar. 04	Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 15	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean. After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, it returns and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Mar. 08	Japan-Indonesia Summit Telephone Talk		
			Mar. 16	Kanazawa Branch of Nagoya District Court renders judgment on the 5th and 6th trials for the suits pertaining to noise generated by the Komatsu Air Base	Feb. 16	A Chinese vessel sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Est China Sea
			Mar. 17	Japan-Kenya Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 16	Nine Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
			Mar. 19	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Delhi)	Feb. 16	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean. After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, it returns and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Mar. 20	Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting (Phnom Penh)		
			Mar. 24	Prime Minister Kishida attends the G7 Summit Meeting (Brussels)	Feb. 22	Russian President requests approval from the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of Russia to dispatch troops out of the country
			Mar. 24	Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Brussels)	Feb. 24	Russia begins aggression against Ukraine
			Mar. 24	Japan-Poland Summit Meeting (Brussels)	Feb. 26	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
			Apr. 05	Japan-Türkiye Summit Telephone Talk		
			Apr. 13	Japan-Turkmenistan Summit Telephone Talk		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
	Apr. 07	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 18	Japan-Switzerland Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 27	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Apr. 08	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Yokohama, Aomori Prefecture (through April 11)	Apr. 19	Summit-Level Video Conference on the Situation in Ukraine	Feb. 27	A Chinese vessel sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Apr. 09	Japan-Philippines Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo)	Apr. 20	Japan-Malaysia Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 28	A Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean. After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, it returns and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Apr. 12	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 20	Partial revision of the Self-Defense Forces Act (abolition of the restriction that the means of transportation for TJNO should be government aircraft in principle, revision of the requirements for safety at the time of implementation, and expansion of the scope of the main people eligible for transportation, etc.) promulgated and enters into force	Mar. 02	A Chinese vessel sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Est China Sea
	Apr. 13	Japan-Iran Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference			Mar. 02	A Russian helicopter violates airspace over Japan's territorial waters at the Nemuro Peninsula in Hokkaido
	Apr. 13	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference			Mar. 04	Beijing Paralympics (through March 13)
	Apr. 16	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Shiraoi, Hokkaido (through April 19)	Apr. 21	Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 04	Three Chinese vessels sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Apr. 23	Disaster relief in response to the tourist boat accident off the coast of Shiretoko, Hokkaido (through June 1)	Apr. 23	Japan-Tuvalu Summit Meeting (Kumamoto)	Mar. 05	5th Session of the 13th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (through March 11)
	Apr. 26	A multilateral conference on support for Ukraine (Online)	Apr. 23	Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting (Kumamoto)	Mar. 05	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Apr. 28	Cabinet Decision on "international peace cooperation activity for relief activities of those people affected by the Ukraine War" (through June 27)	Apr. 23	Japan-Laos Summit Meeting (Kumamoto)	Mar. 10	Ten Russian vessels sail westbound from the Tsugaru Strait to the Sea of Japan
	May 02	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-Thailand Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology	Apr. 26	Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 11	China and India agree to maintain dialogue to reach a mutually acceptable resolution of the remaining issues along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) at the earliest possible timing
	May 04	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Apr. 28	Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 14	Six Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait
	May 09	Disaster relief in response to a forest fire in Towada City, Aomori Prefecture (through May 11)	Apr. 29	Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting (Jakarta)	Mar. 14	A Russian vessel sails westbound from the Tsugaru Strait to the Sea of Japan
	May 23	Minister of Defense Kishi participates in a multilateral conference on support for Ukraine (Online)	May 01	Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting (Hanoi)	Mar. 15	Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Tsugaru Strait to the Sea of Japan
	May 26	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	May 02	Japan-Thailand Summit Meeting (Bangkok)	Mar. 16	A flight by a Chinese BZK-007 reconnaissance/attack unmanned aircraft vehicle within Japan's air defense identification zone in the East China Sea is confirmed for the first time
	Jun. 11	Minister of Defense Kishi attends the 19th IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) (through June 12)	May 04	Japan-Vatican City Summit Meeting (Vatican City)	Mar. 16	Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Tsugaru Strait to the Sea of Japan
	Jun. 15	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	May 04	Japan-Italy Summit Meeting (Rome)	Mar. 16	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Jun. 20	FY2022 Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR) (through June 23)	May 05	Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (London)	Mar. 20	A Russian vessel sails south from the Tsushima Strait before turning around in the waters about 70 km southwest of Tsushima, then sails north to the Sea of Japan
	Jun. 22	ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting (Phnom Penh)	May 09	G7 Summit Video Teleconference Meeting	Mar. 24	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Jul. 09	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	May 11	Japan-Finland Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 24	A Russian vessel sails south from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
	Jul. 29	Japan-Tonga Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	May 12	Japan-EU Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 28	Two Chinese vessels sail northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
	Aug. 04	Disaster relief in response to heavy rain starting from August 3 (through August 8)	May 23	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 29	A Russian vessel sails south from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
	Aug. 10	Hamada becomes Minister of Defense	May 23	Summit-level meeting on the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (Tokyo)	Apr. 01	The Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen announces a truce in Yemen
	Aug. 16	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	May 24	Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) Leaders' Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 03	Two Chinese vessels sail southwest from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
	Aug. 19	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	May 24	Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 07	A flight by a Chinese Y-9 electronic warfare aircraft over the Pacific Ocean is confirmed for the first time
	Aug. 30	Japan-Israel Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	May 24	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 11	A Chinese vessel sails northbound from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
	Sep. 08	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting, Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo)	May 26	Japan-Thailand Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 13	A Chinese vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
	Sep. 14	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	May 26	Japan-Singapore Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 19	Six Russian vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
	Sep. 19	Disaster relief in response to the heavy rain due to Typhoon No. 14 (through September 25)	May 27	Japan-Malaysia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 20	A Chinese vessel sails eastbound between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Sep. 26	Disaster relief in response to the heavy rain due to Typhoon No. 15 (through October 3)	Jun. 01	Japan-France Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 25	North Korea conducts a military parade
	Oct. 01	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hawaii)	Jun. 09	Japan-Uzbekistan Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 26	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Oct. 04	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Jun. 11	Japan-Singapore Summit Meeting (Singapore)	Apr. 26	Two Chinese vessels sail northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Oct. 11	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Jun. 29	G7 Elmau Summit (through June 28)	Apr. 26	A Chinese vessel sails in the territorial waters around Kuchinoerabu-jima and Yakushima islands
	Oct. 22	Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (signing of the new Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation)	Jun. 26	Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Elmau)	May 01	Seven Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean, and perform shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff in the East China Sea
	Oct. 26	Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 26	Japan-France Summit Meeting (Elmau)	May 02	A Chinese vessel sails south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Oct. 28	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Kurashiki City, Okayama Prefecture (through October 30)	Jun. 27	Japan-Canada Summit Meeting (Elmau)	May 03	Seven Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail over the Pacific Ocean, and perform carrier-based fighter jet and shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff (through May 15)
	Nov. 01	Cabinet Decision on the Change of Cabinet Decision on the Government's Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East (November 9, 2023)	Jun. 27	Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and President of the European Council (Elmau)	May 04	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Nov. 01	Cabinet Decision on continuation of counter-piracy mission	Jun. 27	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Elmau)	May 07	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Nov. 03	Japan-Germany Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (Online)	Jun. 27	Japan-Senegal Summit Meeting (Elmau)	May 10	A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Nov. 04	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Kurashiki City, Okayama Prefecture (through November 7)	Jun. 27	Japan-South Africa Summit Meeting (Elmau)	May 10	Inauguration of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration in the ROK
	Nov. 04	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Kasumigaura City, Ibaraki Prefecture (through November 8)	Jun. 28	Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and President of the European Commission (Elmau)	May 12	North Korea holds the 8th Political Bureau Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK
	Nov. 06	FY2022 Fleet Review (International Fleet Review) (Sagami Bay)	Jun. 28	Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Elmau)	May 12	North Korea launches three ballistic missiles
	Nov. 10	FY2022 Japan-U.S. joint exercise (Field Training Exercise Keen Sword 23) (through November 19)	Jun. 29	Attendance at the NATO Summit Meeting (Madrid)	May 18	A Russian vessel sails eastbound from the Soya Strait
	Nov. 17	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Jun. 29	Japan-Sweden Summit Meeting (Madrid)	May 18	Two Chinese H-6 bombers fly from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean, where they turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Nov. 17	Disaster relief in response to a forest fire in Nikko City, Tochigi Prefecture (through November 19)	Jun. 29	NATO Asia-Pacific Partners Leaders' Meeting (Madrid)	May 19	Three Chinese vessels sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Nov. 27	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Izumi City, Kagoshima Prefecture (through November 30)	Jun. 29	Japan-Spain Summit Meeting (Madrid)	May 19	A Chinese vessel sails northwest from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
	Dec. 05	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Toyohashi City, Aichi Prefecture (through December 7)	Jun. 29	Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting (Madrid)	May 20	A Chinese vessel sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Dec. 09	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting, Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo)	Jul. 09	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	May 21	Seven Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Dec. 15	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Misawa City, Aomori Prefecture (through December 22)	Jul. 12	Japan-Australia Summit Telephone Talk	May 22	A Chinese vessel sails northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
	Dec. 19	Signing and entry into force of the Japan-Sweden Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology	Jul. 12	Japan-France Summit Telephone Talk	May 23	A Chinese vessel sails northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
	Dec. 19	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Sera, Hiroshima Prefecture (through December 21)	Jul. 13	Japan-Canada Summit Telephone Talk	May 23	A Chinese vessel sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Dec. 20	Disaster relief in response to heavy snow from December 17, 2022 (through December 22)	Jul. 13	Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Talk	May 24	Two Chinese vessels sail southwest from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
	Dec. 30	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Sera, Hiroshima Prefecture (through January 2)	Jul. 20	Japan-Ireland Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 24	Two Chinese H-6 bombers advance to the Sea of Japan from the East China Sea, are joined by two Russian Tu-95 bombers in the Sea of Japan, and carry out joint flights to the East China Sea. Then the two Chinese bombers are replaced, and a total of four aircraft, consisting of two presumed Chinese bombers (H-6s) newly flown in and the two Russian bombers, carry out long distance joint flights from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean. In addition, a Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft passes from off the coast of Rebun Island to off the coast of the Noto Peninsula and a Chinese vessel sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Dec. 31	Disaster relief in response to the landslide disaster in Tsuruoka City, Yamagata Prefecture (through January 2)	Jul. 27	Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	May 25	One Chinese vessel moves northwest through the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, sailing toward the East China Sea
			Aug. 01	Prime Minister Kishida attends the 10th Review Conference of the Parties	May 25	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
			Aug. 01	Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and UN Secretary-General (New York)	Jun. 01	Four Chinese vessels sail eastbound between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island to the Pacific Ocean
			Aug. 06	Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and UN Secretary-General (Hiroshima)	Jun. 02	A Chinese vessel sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
			Aug. 26	Japan-Tunisia Leaders Video Teleconference	Jun. 02	The Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen announces an extension of the truce in Yemen
			Aug. 26	Japan-Comoros Leaders Video Teleconference	Jun. 03	The German Bundestag passes a bill to establish a special fund for the Federal Armed Forces
			Aug. 26	Japan-Congo Leaders Video Teleconference	Jun. 05	North Korea launches eight ballistic missiles
			Aug. 27	Japan-Libya Leaders Video Teleconference	Jun. 07	A Russian vessel sails westbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Japan
			Aug. 27	Japan-Egypt Leaders Video Teleconference	Jun. 07	Four presumed Russian aircraft (presumed) fly from the Sea of Japan and fly straight east from the west side of Hokkaido toward Japan's airspace, and then two of the aircraft (presumed) turn around and carry out circular flights on the west side of Hokkaido, and two of the aircraft (presumed) fly north from the west side of Hokkaido in the direction of Sakhalin
			Aug. 27	Japan-Senegal Leaders Video Teleconference	Jun. 08	North Korea holds the enlarged meeting of 5th General Assembly (Plenary Meeting) of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK (through June 10)
			Aug. 27	Japan-Tanzania Leaders Video Teleconference	Jun. 09	A Russian vessel sails eastbound from the Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean
			Aug. 28	Japan-Djibouti Leaders Video Teleconference	Jun. 09	Five Russian vessels sail in the waters about 170 km southeast from the Nemuro Peninsula
			Sep. 08	Summit-Level Video Conference on the Situation in Ukraine	Jun. 12	A Russian vessel sails westbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Japan
			Sep. 09	Japan-Palau Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 12	A Chinese vessel sails northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
			Sep. 13	Japan-UAE Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 13	Three Chinese vessels sail northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
			Sep. 15	Japan-Qatar Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 15	Seven Russian vessels sail south in the waters about 280 km southeast of Cape Erimo and on the 16th sail southwest about 180 km southeast of Cape Inubo
			Sep. 20	Japan-Türkiye Summit Meeting (New York)	Jun. 16	Two Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean
			Sep. 21	Address by Prime Minister Kishida at the Seventy-Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly	Jun. 16	Two Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
			Sep. 21	Japan-Iran Summit Meeting (New York)	Jun. 16	Five Russian vessels sail southwest in the waters between Smith Island and Tori-shima
			Sep. 21	Prime Minister Kishida attends the High-Level Meeting of the Friends of the CTBT (New York)	Jun. 17	Two Russian vessels sail southwest in the waters between Smith Island and Tori-shima
			Sep. 22	Japan-Pakistan Summit Meeting (New York)	Jun. 17	Nine Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Japan
			Sep. 26	Japan-Gabon Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 19	Five Russian vessels sail northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
			Sep. 26	Japan-Tanzania Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 19	Three Chinese vessels sail south in the waters about 220 km east of Jinhuashan, and on the 20th sail southwest about 220 km southeast of Cape Inubo
			Sep. 26	Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 26	Japan-Papua New Guinea Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 27	Japan-EU Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 27	Japan-Singapore Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 27	Japan-Jordan Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 27	Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 27	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 28	Japan-Morocco Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 28	Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 28	Japan-Lesotho Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 28	Japan-Cuba Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 28	Japan-Togo Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 28	Japan-Bahrain Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 28	Japan-Serbia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 28	Japan-Sri Lanka Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 28	Japan-Kosovo Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 28	Japan-Mongolia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 28	Japan-Comoros Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 28	Japan-Moldova Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
			Sep. 30	Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
			Oct. 04	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 21	Five Russian vessels sail northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
			Oct. 06	Japan-ROK Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 21	North Korea holds the 3rd enlarged meeting of the 8th Central Military Commission of the KWP (through June 23)
			Oct. 11	G7 Summit Video Teleconference Meeting	Jun. 21	Three Chinese vessels sail westbound in the waters between Smith Island and Tori-shima
			Oct. 18	Japan-Luxembourg Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 21	Three Chinese vessels sail south in the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
			Oct. 22	Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Perth)	Jun. 21	Two Chinese vessels sail south in the waters between Yonaguni and Taiwan to the Pacific Ocean
			Oct. 26	Japan-Lithuania Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 22	A Chinese vessel sails south in the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
			Oct. 28	Japan-Uruguay Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 23	Five Chinese vessels sail northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
			Oct. 28	Japan-Indonesia Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 23	Three Chinese H-6 bombers fly from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean, where they turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Nov. 02	Japan-Italy Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 24	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean, where it turns around and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Nov. 04	Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 24	A Chinese vessel sails north in the waters between Yonaguni and Taiwan to the East China Sea
			Nov. 12	ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting (Phnom Penh)	Jun. 24	A U.S military aircraft transits through the Taiwan Strait
			Nov. 12	Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting (Phnom Penh)	Jun. 26	A Chinese vessel sails westbound in the waters between Mikurajima Island and Hachijojima Island
			Nov. 12	Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting (Phnom Penh)	Jun. 29	The NATO Summit Meeting approves a new Strategic Concept
			Nov. 13	Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting (Phnom Penh)	Jun. 29	Three Chinese vessels sail northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
			Nov. 13	East Asia Summit (Phnom Penh)	Jul. 01	Three Russian vessels sail northeast in the waters between Yonaguni and Iriomotejima Island
			Nov. 13	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting	Jul. 04	A Chinese vessel enters Japan's contiguous zone southwest of Uotsurijima Island
			Nov. 13	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Phnom Penh)	Jul. 04	Three Russian vessels sail north inside the contiguous zone between Kubajima Island and Taishojima Island to the East China Sea
			Nov. 13	Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting (Phnom Penh)	Jul. 05	A Chinese vessel sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
			Nov. 14	Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting (Bali)	Jul. 05	Three Russian vessels sail northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
			Nov. 14	Japan-EU Summit Meeting (Bali)	Jul. 06	A Russian vessel sails westbound inside the contiguous zone of Okinotorishima Island
			Nov. 14	Japan-Rwanda Summit Meeting (Bali)	Jul. 07	A Chinese vessel sails south in the waters between Yonaguni and Taiwan to the Pacific Ocean
			Nov. 15	G20 Bali Summit (through November 16)	Jul. 09	A Russian vessel sails northwest in the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
			Nov. 16	Emergency Meeting of the Leaders of the G7/ NATO Member Countries on the Occasion of the G20 Summit	Jul. 11	A Russian vessel sails northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
			Nov. 16	Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Bali)	Jul. 13	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Paracel Islands
			Nov. 17	Japan-China Summit Meeting (Bangkok)	Jul. 16	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Spratly Islands
			Nov. 17	Japan-Chile Summit Meeting (Bangkok)	Jul. 19	A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
			Nov. 17	Japan-Thailand Summit Meeting (Bangkok)	Jul. 20	A Chinese vessel sails in the territorial waters around Yakushima and Kuchinoerabu-jima islands
			Nov. 18	Meeting with Leaders of Like-minded Countries on North Korea's Ballistic Missile Launch (Bangkok)	Jul. 20	A Russian vessel sails eastbound from Soya Strait
			Nov. 18	APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting (Bangkok) (through November 19)	Jul. 21	A Chinese vessel sails south in the waters between Yonaguni and Taiwan to the Pacific Ocean
			Nov. 29	Japan-Mongolia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jul. 22	A Chinese vessel sails south in the waters between Yonaguni and Taiwan to the Pacific Ocean, and on the 27th sails north in the waters about 70 km west of Uotsurijima Island
			Dec. 03	Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and President of the Republic of Iceland	Jul. 25	A Chinese TB-001 reconnaissance/attack unmanned aircraft vehicle flies from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean, where it turns around south of the Sakishima Islands and flies toward the Bashi Channel
			Dec. 03	Japan-Moldova Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jul. 27	Two Chinese vessels sail northeast from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
			Dec. 09	Announcement of joint development of next-generation fighter aircraft by the leaders of Japan, Italy and the United Kingdom	Jul. 27	A Chinese vessel cruises from south to north through the waters from about 120 km to about 70 km west of Uotsurijima Island (through to the 31st) and on the 31st sails north in the waters about 180 km northwest of Uotsurijima Island
			Dec. 13	G7 Summit Video Teleconference Meeting	Jul. 29	A Chinese vessel sails northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
			Dec. 16	National Security Council and Cabinet Decisions adopted on "National Security Strategy," "National Defense Strategy," and "Defense Program"	Jul. 29	A Russian vessel sails eastbound from Soya Strait
			Dec. 19	Japan-Senegal Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jul. 30	A Chinese vessel sails south in the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Jul. 31	A Chinese vessel sails south in the waters between Yonaguni and Taiwan to the Pacific Ocean
					Aug. 01	A Chinese vessel sails north in the waters between Yonaguni and Taiwan to the East China Sea
					Aug. 01	A Chinese vessel sails eastbound from the Soya Strait
					Aug. 01	The U.S. President announces the killing of the leader of al-Qaeda
					Aug. 02	The Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen announces an extension of the truce in Yemen
					Aug. 03	A Chinese vessel sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Aug. 04	A Chinese vessel cruises from south to north through the waters from about 100 km to about 60 km west of Uotsurijima Island and then sails northwest in the waters about 80 km west of Uotsurijima Island
					Aug. 04	A Chinese BZK-005 reconnaissance unmanned aircraft vehicle and a TB-001 reconnaissance/ attack unmanned aircraft vehicle fly from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean, where they turn around south of the Sakishima Islands and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again. In addition, a presumed Chinese unmanned aircraft vehicle (presumed) flies from the East China Sea and carries out circular flights above the high seas off the coast of northeast Taiwan
					Aug. 04	China conducts large military drills in the vicinity of Taiwan and launches ballistic missiles toward waters near Japan, including Japan's EEZ
					Aug. 12	A Russian vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
					Aug. 20	Four Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Japan
					Aug. 21	Ten Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Japan
					Aug. 21	A Russian vessel sails northbound from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
					Aug. 28	Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait
					Aug. 28	A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Aug. 29	Three Chinese vessels sail northeast from the Tsushima Strait and on the 30th sail to the Sea of Japan
					Aug. 30	A Chinese TB-001 reconnaissance/attack unmanned aircraft vehicle flies from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean, where it turns around south of the Sakishima Islands and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
					Aug. 31	A Chinese vessel sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Sep. 01	Russia starts the large scale military exercise "Vostok 2022." A total of 14 countries including China, India, etc. participate (through September 7)
					Sep. 02	Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
					Sep. 03	Three Chinese vessels and three Russian vessels implement shooting using machine guns in the waters about 190 km west of Cape Kamui and on the 4th sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
					Sep. 08	China and India announce the start of disengagement from the Gogra-Hot Springs area on the Line of Actual Control (LAC)
					Sep. 09	A Russian vessel sails eastbound from the Soya Strait
					Sep. 11	Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
					Sep. 12	Two Chinese vessels sail northeast between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Sep. 14	Two Chinese vessels sail northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
					Sep. 15	A Chinese vessel sails in the territorial waters around Yakushima and Kuchinoerabu-jima islands
					Sep. 16	Four Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Japan
					Sep. 20	A U.S. vessel and a Canadian vessel transit through the Taiwan Strait
					Sep. 21	Russia promulgates the Executive Order On Declaring Partial Mobilisation
					Sep. 23	Three Chinese vessels sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Sep. 23	A Chinese vessel sails northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
					Sep. 26	A Chinese vessel sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
					Sep. 25	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
					Sep. 26	Three Chinese vessels sail westbound in the waters between Smith Island and Tori-shima and on the 27th they sail westbound in the waters about 300 km south-southeast of Cape Shionomisaki on the Kii Peninsula
					Sep. 27	Four Russian vessels sail southwest in the contiguous zone between Mikurajima Island and Hachijojima Island

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
					Sep. 27	Three Chinese vessels and four Russian vessels sail westbound from the Osumi Strait and then sail in a formation with each other in the East China Sea
					Sep. 28	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
					Sep. 28	Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Japan
					Sep. 29	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
					Sep. 30	Four Russian vessels sail northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
					Sep. 30	Russia unilaterally declares the "accession" of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine
					Oct. 01	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
					Oct. 02	The Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen announces an extension of the truce in Yemen
					Oct. 02	A Chinese vessel sails northeast toward the Tsugaru Strait in the waters about 100 km west of Cape Tappi, turns around in the waters about 20 km west of Cape Tappi, and then sails southwest to the Sea of Japan
					Oct. 02	A Chinese vessel sails north along the west side of the Nansei Islands and on the 3rd sails westbound in the waters about 90 km southwest of the Kusagaki Islands to the East China Sea
					Oct. 04	A Chinese vessel sails southwest from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
					Oct. 04	North Korea launches a ballistic missile which flies through Japanese airspace
					Oct. 06	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
					Oct. 07	Three Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Japan
					Oct. 09	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
					Oct. 10	A Chinese vessel sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Oct. 12	U.S. announces National Security Strategy
					Oct. 13	Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Japan
					Oct. 14	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
					Oct. 16	20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (through October 22)
					Oct. 27	U.S. announces National Defense Strategy
					Oct. 27	The United States releases the Nuclear Posture Review
					Oct. 27	United States releases the Missile Defense Review
					Oct. 28	A Russian vessel sails westbound in the waters about 160 km west of Cape Tappi (Aomori Prefecture). Then, on the 29th it sails southeast toward the Tsugaru Strait and then turns around and sails northwest to the Sea of Japan
					Nov. 02	A Chinese vessel sails in the territorial waters around Kuchinoerabu-jima and Yakushima islands
					Nov. 02	The Ethiopian government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front agree to a truce
					Nov. 02	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles and an object which could be a ballistic missile
					Nov. 02	North Korea launches an object which could be a ballistic missile
					Nov. 03	North Korea launches six ballistic missiles
					Nov. 05	A Chinese vessel sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Nov. 07	A Chinese vessel sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
					Nov. 09	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
					Nov. 09	The President of France announces the end of the military operation in the Sahel region
					Nov. 09	The President of France announces the "National Strategic Review 2022"
					Nov. 10	A presumed Chinese unmanned aircraft vehicle (presumed) flies from the East China Sea and proceeds south temporarily to the north of the Senkaku Islands, then turns around and proceeds north and proceeds northwest toward the continent
					Nov. 11	ROK announces its first "Indo-Pacific Strategy"
					Nov. 12	Three Chinese vessels sail northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
					Nov. 13	Five Russian vessels sail northeast in the waters between Yonaguni and Iriomotejima Island to the East China Sea
					Nov. 14	A Chinese BZK-005 reconnaissance unmanned aircraft vehicle, a Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft and a Y-9 patrol aircraft fly from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean, where they turn around east of the main island of Okinawa and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
					Nov. 16	Five Russian vessels sail northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
					Nov. 17	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
					Nov. 18	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
					Nov. 27	Canada announces Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy
					Nov. 29	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Spratly Islands
					Nov. 29	Two Chinese vessels sail northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
					Nov. 30	Two Chinese H-6 bombers pass the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan and then fly north toward the continent. In addition, two presumed Russian aircraft (presumed) fly south from the Sea of Japan and then turn around and fly north toward the continent
					Nov. 30	Two Chinese H-6 bombers and two Russian Tu-95 bombers carry out long distance joint flights from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea and then to the Pacific Ocean. When these bombers fly from the East China Sea they are joined by two presumed Chinese fighters, and in addition when these bombers advance to the Pacific Ocean they are joined by two Chinese fighters (presumed J-16) for the advance to the Pacific Ocean
					Nov. 30	Two presumed Russian aircraft (Tu-95) (presumed) pass the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan and then fly north toward the continent
					Nov. 30	U.S. Central Command announces the death of the leader of ISIL
					Dec. 01	A Chinese vessel sails southwest from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
					Dec. 03	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 04	A Russian vessel sails southwest from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
					Dec. 08	A Russian vessel sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 12	A Chinese vessel sails southwest on the west side of the Nansei Islands and then on the 14th sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 14	Three Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 14	Two Russian Tu-95 bombers and two Russian fighters fly from the continent and fly south over the Sea of Japan toward Japan's airspace, and then turn around off the coast of the Noto Peninsula in Ishikawa Prefecture and fly north toward the continent
					Dec. 15	A Chinese vessel sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 16	Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 17	Five Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail in the waters about 260 km southwest of Okidaitojima (Okinawa Prefecture) and perform carrier-based fighter jet and shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff
					Dec. 17	Multiple Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail in the waters of the Pacific Ocean and perform carrier-based fighter jet and shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff (through December 31)
					Dec. 18	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
					Dec. 19	A Chinese vessel sails in the territorial waters around Yakushima and Kuchinoerabu-jima islands
					Dec. 19	Two Chinese H-6 bombers fly from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reach the Pacific Ocean, where they turn around southeast of Okidaitojima and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
					Dec. 21	Four Russian vessels sail southwest from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea
					Dec. 23	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
					Dec. 26	North Korea holds the 6th Enlarged General Assembly (Plenary Meeting) of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK (through December 31)
					Dec. 28	Four Russian vessels sail northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
					Dec. 31	North Korea launches three ballistic missiles
					Jan. 01	Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
					Jan. 01	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
					Jan. 01	It is confirmed for the first time that a Chinese WZ-7 reconnaissance unmanned aircraft vehicle has flown from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reached the Pacific Ocean, flown south of the Sakishima Islands, and then turned around and passed between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
					Jan. 02	A Chinese WZ-7 reconnaissance unmanned aircraft vehicle flies from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean, flies south of the Sakishima Islands, and then turns around and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2023	Jan. 06	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Murakami City, Niigata Prefecture (through January 12)	Jan. 06	Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 03	Three Chinese vessels sail northeast in the waters between Yonaguni and Iriomotejima Island and sail north in the waters about 70 km west of Uotsurijima Island
	Jan. 09	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Shirosato, Ibaraki Prefecture (through January 14)	Jan. 09	Japan-France Summit Meeting (Paris)	Jan. 04	A Chinese vessel sails north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Jan. 11	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (Washington, D.C.)	Jan. 10	Japan-Italy Summit Meeting (Rome)	Jan. 05	A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait
	Jan. 11	Signing of Japan-U.K. Reciprocal Access Agreement	Jan. 11	Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (London)	Jan. 15	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Jan. 12	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Jan. 12	Japan-Canada Summit Meeting (Ottawa)	Jan. 19	A Chinese vessel sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Jan. 10	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Miyoshi City, Hiroshima Prefecture (through January 18)	Jan. 13	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Jan. 19	A Chinese BZK-005 reconnaissance unmanned aircraft vehicle flies from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean, flies south of the main island of Okinawa, and then turns around and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Jan. 19	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Maebashi City, Gunma Prefecture (through January 22)	Jan. 30	Japan-Greece Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 20	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean, turns around and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Jan. 27	SDF Joint Exercises (command post exercise) (through February 3)	Jan. 31	Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and the NATO Secretary General (Tokyo)	Jan. 26	A Chinese vessel sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Jan. 27	Disaster relief in response to heavy snow, etc. from January 20, 2023 (through January 30)	Feb. 02	Japan-Micronesia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 02	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Feb. 02	Disaster relief in response to the collision accident involving a cargo ship off the coast of Kurushima Strait, Ehime Prefecture (through February 7)	Feb. 07	Japan-Cook Islands Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 04	The U.S. military shoots down a Chinese surveillance balloon in the airspace above U.S. territorial waters
	Feb. 03	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Yachiyo, Ibaraki Prefecture (through February 8)	Feb. 09	Japan-Viet Nam Summit Video Teleconference Meeting	Feb. 08	North Korea conducts a military parade
	Feb. 10	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Bando City, Ibaraki Prefecture (through February 14)	Feb. 09	Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 12	A Chinese vessel sails in the territorial waters around Yakushima and Kuchinoshima islands
	Feb. 10	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 13	Japan-Israel Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 16	ROK releases Defense White Paper 2022
	Feb. 13	Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched to the Republic of Türkiye (through March 24)	Feb. 17	Japan-Türkiye Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 18	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Mar. 02	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Fukuoka City, Fukuoka Prefecture (through March 4)	Feb. 22	Japan-Albania Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 18	North Korea launches a ballistic missile (falls into Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ))
	Mar. 06	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Tainai City, Niigata Prefecture (through March 10)	Feb. 24	G7 Leaders' Video Conference	Feb. 20	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Mar. 08	Disaster relief in response to a forest fire in Koriyama City and Shirakawa City, Fukushima Prefecture (through March 10)	Mar. 07	Japan-Romania Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 21	Russia announces that it suspends its participation in New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (new START)
	Mar. 14	Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Hyuga City, Miyazaki Prefecture (through March 16)	Mar. 13	Japan-Angola Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 27	A U.S military aircraft transits through the Taiwan Strait
	Mar. 16	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 14	Japan-Australia Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 02	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Mar. 16	Japan-U.K.-Italy Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 14	Japan-Israel Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 05	1st session of the 14th National People's Congress (NPC) (through March 13)
	Mar. 16	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 16	Japan-Republic of Korea Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 13	U.K. announces the Integrated Review Refresh
	Mar. 18	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Yomogita, Aomori Prefecture (through March 26)	Mar. 18	Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 14	In the skies above the Black Sea, a Russian military aircraft flies dangerously around a U.S. unmanned aircraft vehicle and the U.S. unmanned aircraft vehicle crashes
	Mar. 24	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Chitose City, Hokkaido	Mar. 20	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Delhi)	Mar. 16	A Chinese vessel sails northeast in the waters between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Mar. 28	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Chitose City, Hokkaido (through April 5)	Mar. 21	Japan-Ukraine Summit Meeting (Kyiv)	Mar. 16	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Apr. 03	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Chitose City, Hokkaido (through April 9)	Mar. 22	Japan-Poland Summit Meeting (Warsaw)	Mar. 18	A Chinese vessel sails north in the waters between Yonaguni and Taiwan, and sails northward approximately 80km west of Uotsuri on Mar 19
	Apr. 23	Transportation of Japanese Nationals staying in the Republic of Sudan (through April 28)	Mar. 31	Telephone Talk Between Prime Minister Kishida and the President of the European Commission	Mar. 19	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Apr. 24	Disaster relief in response to a forest fire in Numata City, Gunma Prefecture (through April 27)	Apr. 07	Japan-Brazil Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 23	A Russian vessel sails westbound in the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea
	Apr. 28	Telephone Conversation between Defense Minister Hamada and Marles, MP, Deputy Prime Minister of Australia	Apr. 11	Japan-Jordan Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 26	A Russian vessel sails northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
	May. 09	Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting ("2+2") (Online)	Apr. 26	Japan-Bangladesh Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 26	Three Chinese vessels sail southwest from the Osumi Strait to the East China Sea
	May.12	Cabinet Decision on Revision of the Implementation Plan for the International Peace Cooperation Assignments in Sinai Peninsula (dispatch of two additional headquarters staff)	Apr. 30	Japan-Egypt Summit (Cairo)	Mar. 27	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	May. 16	First telephone call of the Hotline Between Japan-China Defense Authorities by Japanese and Chinese Defense Ministers	May. 01	Japan- Ghana Summit Meeting (Accra)	Mar. 28	A Chinese vessel sails southwest from the Osumi Strait to the Sea of Japan
	May. 25	Signing of the Japan-UAE Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology	May. 03	Japan-Kenya Summit Meeting (Nairobi)	Mar. 29	Three Chinese vessels sail northeast from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan
	Jun. 01	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	May. 04	Japan-Mozambique Summit Meeting	Apr. 03	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through the Tsugaru Strait toward the Pacific Ocean
	Jun. 03	Minister of Defense Hamada attends the 20th IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) (June 4)	May. 07	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting (Seoul)	Apr. 03	Two Chinese vessels sail south through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Jun. 03	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	May. 18	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Hiroshima)	Apr. 04	A Chinese vessel sails north through the waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, and then sails north about 70 km west of Uotsuri Island on the April 5
	Jun. 03	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	May. 18	Japan-Italy Summit Meeting (Hiroshima)	Apr. 04	Finland officially joins NATO
	Jun. 03	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	May. 18	Japan-U.K. Working Dinner Summit (Hiroshima)	Apr. 05	Three Chinese vessels, including the Chinese aircraft carrier "Shandong", sail east through waters about 300 km south of Hateruma Island
	Jun. 03	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	May. 19	G7 Hiroshima Summit (through May 21)	Apr. 05	A Chinese vessel sails north through waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, then north through waters about 80 km west of Uotsuri Island on the April 6
	Jun. 03	Signing and entry into force of the Agreement between Japan and Singapore concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology	May. 19	Japan-Canada Summit Meeting (Hiroshima)	Apr. 06	A Chinese vessel sails south through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Jun. 04	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	May. 19	Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Hiroshima)	Apr. 07	Multiple Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Shandong" sail in the waters of the Pacific Ocean and perform carrier-based fighter jet and shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff (through April 9)
	Jun. 04	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	May. 19	Japan-France Summit Meeting (Hiroshima)	Apr. 08	Three Chinese vessels sail southwest from the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea
	Jun. 04	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	May. 20	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Hiroshima)	Apr. 10	A Chinese vessel sails west through the waters between Mikurajima Island and Hachijojima Island
	Jun. 04	☆Signed Japan-NZ statement of intent between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defense of New Zealand on Defense Cooperation in Maritime Security, staff training and communication training and Climate Change in the Pacific Island Nations Region	May. 20	Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting (Hiroshima)	Apr. 10	A U.S. vessel conducts the "Freedom of Navigation Operation" around the Spratly Islands
			May. 20	Japan-Brazil Summit Meeting (Hiroshima)	Apr. 13	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
			May. 20	Japan-Australia-India-U.S. (Quad) Leaders' Meeting (Hiroshima)	Apr. 14	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent, flies south over the Sea of Japan, turns around off the Noto Peninsula, and flies north toward the continent
			May. 20	Japan-Cook Islands Summit Meeting (Hiroshima)	Apr. 10	Multiple Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Shandong" sail in the waters of the Pacific Ocean and perform carrier-based fighter jet and shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff (through April 16)
			May. 21	Japan-Comoros Summit Meeting (Hiroshima)	Apr. 15	A Chinese vessel sails west through the Osumi Strait toward the East China Sea (through April 16)
			May. 21	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Hiroshima)	Apr. 16	A U.S. vessel passes through the Taiwan Strait
			May. 21	Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Hiroshima)	Apr. 17	Eight Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait (through April 18)
			May. 21	Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting (Hiroshima)	Apr. 17	Multiple Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Shandong" sail in the waters of the Pacific Ocean and perform carrier-based fighter jet and shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff (through April 23)
			May. 21	Japan-Ukraine Summit Meeting (Hiroshima)	Apr. 18	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent, flies south over the Sea of Japan, turns around off the Oki Islands, and flies north toward the continent
			May. 25	Japan-Sri Lanka Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 18	A Chinese vessel sails north through the connecting waters between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island, then north through the waters about 70 km west of Uotsuri Island
			May. 25	Japan-Laos Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 19	Eighteen Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait (through April 20)
			Jun. 07	Law on Strengthening Infrastructure for Development and Production of Equipment Procured by the Ministry of Defense (Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases) enacted	Apr. 21	Two Chinese H-6 bombers fly from the East China Sea passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, fly southeast then northwest over the Pacific Ocean, and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Jun. 09	Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 22	Two Chinese H-6 bombers fly from the East China Sea passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, fly southeast then northwest over the Pacific Ocean, and pass between the main island of Okinawa Island and Miyakojima Island again
			Jun. 14	Japan-Palau Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Apr. 24	Seven Chinese vessels, including the aircraft carrier "Shandong," sail 360 km south of Yonaguni Island, landing fighter jets and helicopters on board
			Jun. 21	Teleconference between Prime Minister Kishida and President of the European Commission	Apr. 27	A presumed Chinese unmanned aircraft vehicle (presumed) flies from the Pacific Ocean, passes between Yonaguni and Taiwan, and flies toward the East China Sea
			Jul. 06	Japan-Türkiye Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 28	A U.S. military aircraft passes the Taiwan Strait
			Jul. 11	Japan-Poland Summit Meeting (Warsaw)	Apr. 29	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
			Jul. 12	Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and the NATO Secretary (Vilnius)	Apr. 29	Three Chinese vessels sail southeast through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the Pacific Ocean
			Jul. 12	Japan-Korea Summit Meeting (Vilnius)	Apr. 30	Five Chinese vessels sail northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
			Jul. 12	Japan-Australia-NZ-ROK (Quad) Leaders' Meeting	May. 02	A presumed Chinese unmanned aircraft vehicle (presumed) flies from the East China Sea after passing between Yonaguni and Taiwan, flies over the Pacific Ocean east of Taiwan, and then flies toward the Bashi Channel
			Jul. 12	Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting (Vilnius)	May. 03	Two Chinese vessels sail south through the waters about 80km west of Uotsuri Island and the waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, and then sail west through the Osumi Strait on the May 8, toward the East China Sea
			Jul. 12	NATO Summit	May. 05	One Chinese vessel sail northeast through the Tsugaru Strait, toward the Pacific Ocean.
			Jul. 12	Japan-Sweden Summit Meeting (Vilnius)	May. 05	Five Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait (through May 6)
			Jul. 12	Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and the President of the Republic of Lithuania (Vilnius)	May. 08	A Chinese vessel sails southwest in the waters between Sumisu Island and Torishima Island
			Jul. 12	Japan-Czech Summit Meeting (Vilnius)	May. 11	Four Chinese vessels west in the waters between Sumisu Island and Torishima Island
			Jul. 13	Japan-Belgium Summit Meeting (Brussels)	May. 12	A Chinese vessel sails west in the waters between Sumisu Island and Torishima Island (through May 13)
			Jul. 13	Japan-EU Summit (Brussels)	May. 12	Three Russian vessels sail southwest through the Tsushima, strait toward the East China Sea
			Jul. 16	Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit Meeting (Jeddah)	May. 14	Three Russian vessels sail southwest in the waters between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the Pacific Ocean
			Jul. 17	Japan-UAE Summit Meeting (Abu Dhabi)	May. 15	A Chinese BZK-005 reconnaissance unmanned aircraft vehicle flies from the East China Sea, flies in the direction between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, then turns around over the East China Sea, and flies northwest toward the continent
			Jul. 18	Japan-Qatar Summit Meeting (Doha)		
			Aug. 18	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Camp David)		
			Aug. 18	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting (Camp David)		
			Aug. 18	Japan-U.S.-ROK Leaders' Meeting (Camp David)		
			Aug. 22	Japan-Peru Summit Video Teleconference		
			Aug. 29	Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk		
			Sep. 06	Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting (Jakarta)		
			Sep. 06	ASEAN Plus Three (Japan-China-ROK) Summit Meeting (Jakarta)		
			Sep. 07	East Asia Summit (Jakarta)		
			Sep. 07	Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting (Jakarta)		
			Sep. 07	Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting (Jakarta)		
			Sep. 08	Japan-Türkiye Summit Meeting (New Delhi)		
			Sep. 09	Prime Minister Kishida attends the G20 New Delhi Summit (through September 10)		
			Sep. 09	Japan-Netherlands Meeting (New Delhi)		
			Sep. 09	Japan-India Summit Meeting (New Delhi)		
			Sep. 09	Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (New Delhi)		
			Sep. 10	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting (New Delhi)		
			Sep. 19	Prime Minister Kishida attends the UN General Assembly (New York) (through September 21)		
			Sep. 20	Japan-Iran Summit Meeting (New York)		
			Oct. 12	Formulated the "Basic Policy on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases"		
			Oct. 03	Summit-Level teleconference on the Situation in Ukraine		
			Oct. 05	Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit Telephone Talk		
			Oct. 17	Japan-Egypt Summit Telephone Talk		
			Oct. 18	Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit Telephone Talk		
	Jun. 07	Japan-Sweden Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)				
	Jun. 26	FY2023 Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR) (through June 30)				
	Jul. 10	Disaster relief in response to heavy rainfall caused by the 2023 rainy season front (through July 14)				
	Jul. 16	Disaster relief in response to heavy rain in Akita Prefecture (July 28)				
	Jul. 31	Japan-Saudi Arabia Defense Minister Meeting (Tokyo)				
	Aug. 13	Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement entered into force				
	Aug. 31	Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak in Karatsu City, Saga Prefecture (through September 5)				
	Sep. 07	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation				
	Sep. 13	Kihara becomes Minister of Defense				
	Sep. 28	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation				
	Oct. 04	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, D.C.)				
	Oct. 15	Japan-U.K. Reciprocal Access Agreement entered into force				
	Oct. 18	Transportation of Japanese Nationals staying in the State of Israel (through March 21,2025)				
	Oct. 19	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Video teleconference				
	Oct. 19	Japan-Australia Defense Minister Meeting (Tokyo)				
	Nov. 01	Disaster relief in response to a forest fire in Ozu City, Ehime Prefecture (through November 5)				
	Nov. 07	Japan-U.K. Defense Minister Meeting (Tokyo)				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
	Nov. 07	Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting ("2 + 2") (Tokyo)	Oct. 18	Japan-Qatar Summit Telephone Talk	May. 15	A Russian vessel sails west through Soya Strait
	Nov. 07	Change of Cabinet Decision on the Government's Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East (through November 19, 2024)	Oct. 18	Japan-UAE Summit Telephone Talk	May. 16	A Chinese vessel sails northwest through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the East China Sea
	Nov. 07	Cabinet Decision on continuation of counter-piracy mission	Oct. 18	Japan-Jordan Summit Telephone Talk	May. 16	Three Chinese vessels sail northeast in the waters between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island, then north through the waters about 60 km southeast of Taisho Island. In addition, two Chinese vessels sail northwest through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island. These five vessels join together and sail northwest in the sea area about 80 km west of Kume Island toward the East China Sea
	Nov. 10	FY2023 SDF Joint Exercises (field exercise) (through November 20)	Oct. 25	Japan-Denmark Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
	Nov. 11	FY2023 air review (Iruma)	Oct. 27	Japan-France Summit Telephone Talk	May. 19	A Russian vessel sails northeast from the Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean.
	Nov. 12	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Nov. 03	Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting (Manila)	May. 23	A Russian vessel sails eastbound from the Soya Strait
	Nov. 15	ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting (Jakarta) (hybrid format)	Nov. 05	Japan-Malaysia Summit Meeting (Kuala Lumpur)	May. 24	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Nov. 20	Japan-U. K-Italy Trilateral Defense Ministerial Video Conference	Nov. 08	Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk	May. 25	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent to the Pacific Ocean via the Sea of Okhotsk, then turns around over the Pacific Ocean, and flies to the Sea of Japan via the Sea of Okhotsk
	Nov. 29	Search by U.S. Osprey off Yakushima Island, Kagoshima Prefecture (through December 23)	Nov. 16	APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting (San Francisco) (through November 17)	May. 25	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent, flies south over the Sea of Japan, turns around off the Sado Island, and flies northwest toward the continent
	Dec. 12	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Nov. 15	Japan-Thailand Summit Meeting (San Francisco)	May. 25	Two Chinese vessels sail north through the waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, and then sail north about 70 km west of Uotsuri Island
	Dec. 14	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Nov. 16	Japan-Canada Summit Meeting (San Francisco)	May. 26	Four Chinese vessels sail north through the waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, and then sail north about 80 km west of Uotsuri Island
	Dec. 14	Japan-U.K.-Italy Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Nov. 16	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting (San Francisco)	May. 30	Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
	Dec. 14	Signing of the Convention on Establishment of the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) International Government Organisation	Nov. 16	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (San Francisco)	May. 31	North Korea conducted launches using ballistic missile technology for the purpose of a satellite launch
	Dec. 22	Partial Revision of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and the Implementation Guidelines	Nov. 16	Japan-China Summit Meeting (San Francisco)	Jun. 03	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through June 4)
	Dec. 22	Cabinet Decision on Government Initiatives to Ensure the Safety of Japanese Abroad in the Middle East and African Regions	Nov. 17	Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (San Francisco)	Jun. 03	A U.S. vessel and a Canadian naval vessel pass through the Taiwan Strait
			Nov. 20	Japan-Kyrgyzstan Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 04	A Chinese naval vessel sails northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through June 5)
			Nov. 22	G20 Summit Video Teleconference Meeting	Jun. 06	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the Pacific Ocean
			Nov. 27	Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 06	Two Chinese H-6 bombers fly to the Sea of Japan from the East China Sea, are joined by two Russian Tu-95 bombers in the Sea of Japan, and carry out joint flights to the East China Sea. While the bombers flying together in the East China Sea, are joined by two presumed Chinese fighters (presumed)
			Nov. 29	Japan-Egypt Summit Telephone Talk		
			Dec. 01	Prime Minister Kishida attends the COP28	Jun. 06	A Chinese vessel sails southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea (through June 7)
			Dec. 01	Japan-Israel Summit Meeting (Dubai)	Jun. 07	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea
			Dec. 01	Japan-Qatar Summit Meeting (Dubai)	Jun. 07	Two Chinese H-6 bombers and two Russian Tu-95 bombers fly from China and carry out joint flights for a long distance to the Pacific Ocean. When these bombers fly, they are joined by several presumed Chinese fighters. In addition, when the Russian bombers fly over the Sea of Japan toward the continent after passing through the Tsushima Strait, they are joined by several presumed Russian aircraft
			Dec. 01	Japan-Türkiye Summit Meeting (Dubai)		
			Dec. 01	Japan-Egypt Summit Meeting	Jun. 08	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies over the Pacific Ocean (first confirmed aircraft)
			Dec. 02	Japan-EU Summit Meeting (Dubai)	Jun. 08	Two Chinese vessels sail northeast in the waters between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island towards the East China Sea
			Dec. 02	Japan-Jordan Summit Meeting (Dubai)	Jun. 08	A Chinese vessel sails in the territorial waters around Yakushima Island and Kuchinoerabujima Island
			Dec. 02	Japan-Italy Summit Meeting (Dubai)	Jun. 12	A Russian vessel sails west from the Tsugaru Strait to the Sea of Japan
			Dec. 02	Japan-Iran Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 14	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent, flies south over the Sea of Japan, turns around off the Sado Island, and flies northwest toward the continent
			Dec. 02	Japan-France Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 15	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles (fell into Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ))
			Dec. 06	Japan-Israel Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 15	Two Russian vessels sail west through Soya Strait
			Dec. 06	G7 Summit Video Teleconference Meeting	Jun. 16	North Korea holds the 8th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK (through June 18)
			Dec. 07	Japan-Norway Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 16	Two Russian vessels sail west through Soya Strait
			Dec. 08	Japan-Marshall Islands Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 17	A Russian vessel sails east through the Tsugaru Strait toward the Pacific Ocean. Then, on June 19, it sails west through the Tsugaru Strait toward the Sea of Japan
			Dec. 11	Japan-UAE Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 19	Ten Russian vessels sail west through the Soya Strait (through June 20)
			Dec. 16	ASEAN-Japan Special Summit Meeting for the 50th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation (Tokyo) (through December 18)	Jun. 26	A Chinese vessel sails southeast in the waters about 70km west of Uotsuri Island, then sails southwest through the connecting waters between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the Pacific Ocean (through June 27)
			Dec. 16	Japan-Malaysia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 27	Two Russian vessels sail north in the waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, then turn around and cruised in the waters around 120 km southeast of Ishigaki Island (through June 29). Then, on June 30, they sail north through the waters of Okinawa Island and Miyako Island
			Dec. 16	Japan-Burunei Working Lunch Summit (Tokyo)		
			Dec. 16	Japan-Singapore Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 28	A Chinese vessel sails eastbound from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean
			Dec. 16	Japan-East Timor Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 29	Two Chinese vessels sail eastbound from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean (through June 30)
			Dec. 16	Japan-Laos Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 29	Two Chinese vessels sail northeast in the waters between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island to the Pacific Ocean
			Dec. 16	Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 29	A Chinese Z-9 helicopter flies in the airspace about 40 km south of Kusagaki archipelago and lands on a Chinese vessel
			Dec. 16	Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 30	Two Russian vessels sail west through the Soya Strait.
			Dec. 17	Japan-Thailand Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jul. 01	Two Russian vessels sail eastbound through the Soya Strait
			Dec. 17	Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jul. 01	Two Russian vessels sail west through the adjacent waters north of Miyakojima (through July 3) Then, from July 3 to 4, they sail north through the East China Sea via the connecting waters between Kuba Island and Taisho Island
			Dec. 18	Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jul. 12	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
					Jul. 12	Two Russian vessels sail northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
					Jul. 13	A U.S. aircraft passes through the Taiwan Strait
					Jul. 14	A Chinese vessel sails northwest through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the East China Sea
					Jul. 16	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through July 17)
					Jul. 17	Five Chinese vessels sail northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
					Jul. 18	Two Chinese naval vessels sail south through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Jul. 18	Five Chinese vessels and four Russian vessels conducted various training exercises, including firing drills, formation maneuvers, and landing and taking off of ship-borne helicopters in the sea area about 400 km north of the Oki Islands (through July 23)
					Jul. 19	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
					Jul. 19	Two Chinese vessels sail north through the waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, and then sails north about 80 km west of Uotsuri Island
					Jul. 24	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
					Jul. 28	Five Chinese vessels and five Russian vessels sail east through the Soya Strait (through July 29)
					Jul. 29	Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
					Jul. 29	A Chinese vessel sails east through the Soya Strait
					Aug. 01	Two Russian vessels sail west through the Soya Strait
					Aug. 04	A Russian vessel sails west through the Tsugaru Strait (through August 5)
					Aug. 06	A Russian vessel sails north-south within the connecting waters on the west side of the Tsugaru Strait before heading south (through August 9). On the August 11, the vessel exits the adjacent waters north of the Noto Peninsula and sail toward the Sea of Japan
					Aug. 15	Six Chinese vessels and five Russian vessels sail west in the sea area about 280 km northeast of Okinotori Island. Then, on the August 16, they sail west in the sea area about 50 km south of Oki Daito Island, and on the 17th, they sail northwest in the sea area between Okinawa Main Island and Miyako Island, and sail toward the East China Sea
					Aug. 18	Two Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft fly from the Sea of Japan through the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea, then fly south through the East China Sea, turns around, and pass through the Tsushima Strait again to the Sea of Japan
					Aug. 18	A Russian vessel sails northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through August 19)
					Aug. 19	A Russian vessel sails east through the Tsugaru Strait toward the Pacific Ocean.
					Aug. 20	A Russian vessel sails south in the sea area including within the contiguous zone from off Sanriku to off the Boso Peninsula, then exits the contiguous zone south of Inubozaki and sails southwest (through August 25)
					Aug. 22	Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait
					Aug. 24	North Korea conducted launches using ballistic missile technology for the purpose of a satellite launch
					Aug. 25	Two Chinese H-6 bombers fly from the East China Sea and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
					Aug. 25	A Chinese BZK-005 reconnaissance unmanned aircraft vehicle and a presumed Chinese unmanned aircraft vehicle fly from the East China Sea, pass between Yonaguni and Taiwan, to reach the Pacific Ocean, then fly over the Pacific Ocean east of Taiwan, turns around, pass between Yonaguni and Taiwan again, and fly into the East China Sea
					Aug. 25	Three Russian vessels sail northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
					Aug. 25	Two Chinese vessels sail northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through August 26)
					Aug. 25	A Russian vessel sails southwest in the waters between Mikurajima Island and Hachijojima Island (through August 26)
					Aug. 26	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
					Aug. 27	A Russian vessel sails south within the connecting waters east of Tanegashima Island, then exits the connecting waters southeast of Tanegashima Island and sails northeastward (through August 28) It then sails northeast in the waters between off Tanegashima Island and Hachijojima Island from August 28 to 29, and then sails northeast in the waters between Mikurajima Island and Hachijojima Island on the 30th
					Aug. 28	A Chinese BZK-005 reconnaissance unmanned aircraft vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between Yonaguni and Taiwan, reaches the Pacific Ocean, turns around south of Sakishima Islands, and then flies toward the Bashi Channel
					Aug. 29	A Russian vessel sails east across the Soya Strait
					Aug. 30	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
					Aug. 30	A Russian vessel sails north in the sea area including within the contiguous zone between off the Boso Peninsula and off Sanriku. (through September 1) Then, from September 2 to 3, it sails northeast in the connecting waters off Kushiro
					Aug. 31	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through the Tsushima Strait
					Sep. 01	Four Russian vessels sail east through the Soya Strait toward the Sea of Japan
					Sep. 01	Two Russian vessels sail west through Soya Strait
					Sep. 07	A Russian vessel sails west through Soya Strait
					Sep. 09	A U.S. vessel and a Canadian naval vessel pass through the Taiwan Strait
					Sep. 11	Eight Chinese vessels sail southeast through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Sep. 12	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea (through September 13)
					Sep. 13	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
					Sep. 13	Six Chinese vessels, including the aircraft carrier "Shandong," sail approx. 650 km south of Miyako Island, landing fighter jets and helicopters on board
					Sep. 13	Multiple Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier “Shandong” sail in the waters of the Pacific Ocean and perform carrier-based fighter jet and shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff (through September 14) Then they sail toward the South China Sea from September 14 to 15
					Sep. 14	Two Chinese vessels sail southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea
					Sep. 14	Three Chinese vessels sail southeast through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Sep. 14	Five Chinese vessels sail north through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island (through September 15)
					Sep. 15	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent to the Pacific Ocean via the Sea of Okhotsk, then turns around over the Pacific Ocean, and flies to the Sea of Japan via the Sea of Okhotsk. On the same day, a Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent, flies south over the Sea of Japan, turns around off the Sado Island, and flies northwest toward the continent
					Sep. 15	A Chinese vessel sails in territorial waters around Kuchinoshima Island
					Sep. 18	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea
					Oct. 07	Palestinian militants, including Hamas, attack on Israel, and Israel responds by launching a large-scale military operation in the Gaza Strip
					Oct. 08	Three Russian vessels sail southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea (through October 9)
					Oct. 09	A Russian vessel sails west through Soya Strait
					Oct. 10	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent, flies south over the Sea of Japan, turns around off the Noto Peninsula, and proceeds northwest toward the continent
					Oct. 11	Three Russian vessels sail southwest in the waters between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Oct. 12	A U.S. military aircraft passes the Taiwan Strait
					Oct. 16	A Russian vessel sails west through Soya Strait
					Oct. 17	Two Russian Tu-95 bombers and two fighters fly from the Sea of Japan, fly southeast toward Japan’s airspace, turn east off the Noto Peninsula, fly along the vicinity of Japanese airspace, turn west off the Oshima, and then turn northwest toward the continent. After that, two Russian Tu-95 bombers and two fighters again fly from the Sea of Japan, and fly east from the west of Hokkaido toward Japan‘s airspace, turn north off the Okushiri Island, fly along the vicinity of Japanese airspace, turn west off Rumoi, and fly west toward the continent
					Oct. 24	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent to the Pacific Ocean via the Sea of Okhotsk, then turns around over the Pacific Ocean, and flies northwest toward the continent via the Sea of Okhotsk
					Oct. 25	A Russian vessel sails west through Soya Strait
					Oct. 26	A presumed Chinese unmanned aircraft vehicle (presumed) flies from the East China Sea, passes between Yonaguni and Taiwan, reaches the Pacific Ocean, turns around southwest of the Sakishima Islands, and then flies toward the Bashi Channel
					Oct. 27	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches and flies over the Pacific Ocean, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
					Oct. 28	A Chinese vessel sails southeast through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Oct. 28	Multiple Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier “Shandong” sail in the waters of the Pacific Ocean and perform carrier-based fighter jet and shipboard helicopter landing and takeoff (through November 5) Then sail to South China Sea on November 6
					Oct. 29	Three Chinese vessels sail northeast in the waters between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island to the Pacific Ocean (through October 30)
					Oct. 30	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Oct. 31	A Russian vessel sails west through Soya Strait
					Oct. 31	A presumed Russian helicopter violates airspace over Japan’s territorial waters off the Nemuro Peninsula in Hokkaido
					Nov. 01	A U.S. vessel and a Canadian vessel pass the Taiwan Strait
					Nov. 08	A Chinese vessel sails west through the Osumi Strait toward the East China Sea (through November 9)
					Nov. 09	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through November 10)
					Nov. 12	Four Chinese vessels sail northeast in the waters between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island towards the East China Sea (through November 13)
					Nov. 15	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea
					Nov. 15	Three Chinese vessels sail west through the Osumi Strait toward the East China Sea
					Nov. 21	North Korea conducted launches using ballistic missile technology for the purpose of a satellite launch
					Nov. 25	A Chinese vessel sails northeast in the waters between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island towards the East China Sea
					Nov. 25	A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea
					Nov. 30	A Chinese vessel sails southeast through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Nov. 30	A Chinese vessel sails in a north-south direction near the sea area about 90 km west of Kume Island (December 2). On the December 4, after sailing south through the waters about 80 km west of Uotsuri Island, the vessel sails south through the waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, heading for the Pacific Ocean.
					Dec. 01	A Chinese vessel sails southeast through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the Pacific Ocean (through December 2)
					Dec. 05	A Chinese vessel sails northwest through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the East China Sea
					Dec. 06	A U.S. military aircraft passes the Taiwan Strait.
					Dec. 09	A Chinese vessel sails northwest through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the East China Sea
					Dec. 11	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through December 12)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
					Dec. 14	Two Chinese H-6 bombers are joined by two Russian Tu-95 bombers in the Sea of Japan, and carry out joint flights for a long distance to the East China Sea. When the bombers jointly fly over the Sea of Japan, they are joined by two presumed Russian fighters (presumed), and then when they jointly fly over the East China Sea, they are joined by two Chinese J-16 fighters and three presumed Chinese fighters (presumed). In addition, a Chinese Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft and two presumed Chinese fighters (presumed) join the Chinese bombers as they fly from the East China Sea toward the Tsushima Strait. In addition, the Russian bombers are joined by two Russian Su-35 fighters as they fly over the Sea of Japan after passing through the Tsushima Strait. Also a Russian Tu-142 patrol aircraft flies over the Sea of Japan, while Russian bombers are flying
					Dec. 15	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea
					Dec. 16	Two Russian vessels sail northeast in the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the East China Sea
					Dec. 17	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
					Dec. 18	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
					Dec. 18	Two Russian vessels sail northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
					Dec. 24	A Russian vessel sails east across the Soya Strait
					Dec. 26	North Korea holds the 8th Plenary Meeting of the 9th Central Committee of the WPK (through December 30)
2024	Jan. 01	Disaster Relief Operation in Response to the Noto Peninsula Earthquake of 2024 (through August 31)	Jan. 10	Japan-Brazil Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 03	Two Chinese vessels sail northeast in the waters between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Jan. 01	Disaster Relief Operation in Response to Avian Influenza Outbreak in Takayama-mura, Agatsuma-gun, Gunma Prefecture (through January 3)	Feb. 05	Japan-Italy Summit Meeting	Jan. 07	Two Chinese vessels sail north through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the East China Sea
			Feb. 08	Japan-Kenya Summit Meeting		
			Feb. 16	Japan-Jordan Summit Meeting	Jan. 12	A Chinese vessel sails southeast in the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island, advances into the Pacific Ocean, then turns northwest in the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island, sailing toward the East China Sea (through January 13)
	Jan. 01	Cabinet Decision to Issue Disaster Call-up Order for SDF Reserve	Feb. 25	G7 Summit Video Teleconference Meeting		
			Mar. 13	Japan-Marshall Islands Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 14	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Jan. 05	Personnel and Disaster Call-up Order for SDF Ready Reserve Personnel in relation to the Noto Peninsula Earthquake of 2024	Mar. 18	Prime Minister participates in the third Summit for Democracy, Leaders' Plenary (Online) (through March 20)	Jan. 16	Two Chinese vessels sail south through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Jan. 05	Disaster relief call-up orders for SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and Reserve Personnel are issued (through February 1)	Mar. 21	Telephone Talk between Prime Minister Kishida and President-elect of Indonesia	Jan. 19	A Chinese vessel sails northeast in the waters between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island to the Pacific Ocean
			Apr. 03	Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 22	A Russian vessel sails southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea
	Jan. 09	Entry into force of the Japan-UAE Agreement concerning the	Apr. 10	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Jan. 22	Two Russian vessels sail southwest through the Tsushima Strait, turn around in the waters about 30 km southeast of Tsushima, and proceeded northeastward through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
			Apr. 11	Japan-U.S.-Philippines Summit (Washington, D.C.)		
	Jan. 29	Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology Signing of the Japan-Germany Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA)	Apr. 14	G7 Leaders' Video Conference	Jan. 24	A Russian vessel sails southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea
			May 01	Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and Prime Minister of France (Paris)	Jan. 24	A Russian vessel sails southwest in the waters between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Feb. 08	Exchange of Letters of Intent on Japan-Kenya on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges	May 03	Japan-Brazil Summit Meeting (Brazil)		
			May 03	Japan-Paraguay Summit Meeting (Paraguay)	Jan. 24	A U.S. vessel passes through the Taiwan Strait
	Feb. 16	Japan-Jordan Defense Ministerial Meeting	May 16	Japan-Singapore Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 25	Two Chinese vessels sail west through the Osumi Strait toward the East China Sea
	Feb. 29	Disaster relief in response to search for missing persons in Mutsu Bay, Aomori Prefecture (through March 3)	May 21	Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 26	A Russian vessel sails southwest in the waters between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the Pacific Ocean
			May 23	Japan-Malaysia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
	Feb. 29	Japan-Mongolia Defense Minister Meeting	May 26	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting (Seoul)	Jan. 31	A Chinese vessel sails southeast through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Mar. 13	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	May 26	Japan-China Summit Meeting (Seoul)		
			May 27	9th Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit (Seoul)	Feb. 01	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Mar. 19	Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (Tokyo) (March 20)	Jun. 04	Japan-Palau Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 03	A Chinese vessel sails northwest through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the East China Sea
	Mar. 26	Partial Revision of the Cabinet Decision and the Implementation Guidelines (Transfer of finished products regarding the Global Combat Air Programme from Japan to countries other than partner countries)	Jun. 13	Prime Minister Kishida attends the G7 Summit in Apulia (Italy) (through June 15)	Feb. 04	A Chinese vessel sails northwest through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the East China Sea
			Jun. 13	Japan-Ukraine Summit Meeting (Italy)	Feb. 05	Two Chinese vessels sail northwest through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the East China Sea
	Apr. 03	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 14	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Italy)	Feb. 09	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent, flies south over the Sea of Japan, turns around off the Noto Peninsula, and flies northwest toward the continent
	Apr. 12	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Jun. 14	Japan-Canada Summit Meeting (Italy)		
			Jun. 15	Prime Minister Kishida attends the Summit on Peace in Ukraine (Switzerland)		A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent, flies south over the Sea of Japan, turns around off the Sado Island, and flies northwest toward the continent
	Apr. 19	Cabinet Decision on revision of the "Implementation Plan for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment in South Sudan" (dispatch of two additional JGSDF personnel)	Jun. 19	Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Feb. 14	Two Chinese naval vessels sail south through the waters between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island toward the Pacific Ocean
			Jul. 06	Japan-U.K. Summit Telephone Talk		
			Jul. 10	Japan-Sweden Summit Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Mar. 02	Two Chinese vessels sail in the sea area from about 180 km south of Ishigaki Island to about 210 km southeast of Miyako Island (through March 14)
	Apr. 21	Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Miyako City, Iwate Prefecture (through April 23)	Jul. 10	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Mar. 03	Then, on March 15, they sail north through the waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, about 80 km west of Uotsuri Island
			Jul. 11	Prime Minister Kishida attends the NATO Summit (Washington, D.C.)		
	May 02	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hawaii)	Jul. 11	Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and the NATO Secretary General (Washington, D.C.)		Sweden officially joins NATO.
	May 02	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hawaii)			Mar. 07	A Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean
			Jul. 11	Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Washington, D.C.)		
	May 02	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hawaii)	Jul. 11	Japan-Finland Summit Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Mar. 09	After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, this returns and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Jul. 11	Japan-Netherlands Summit Meeting (Washington, D.C.)		
	May 02	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hawaii)				A Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean
	May 03	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hawaii)	Jul. 11	Japan-Australia-New Zealand-ROK Leaders' Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Mar. 10	After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, this returns and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Jul. 11	Japan-Australia-New Zealand-ROK + Ukraine Leaders' Meeting (Washington, D.C.)		
	May 05	Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Nanyo City, Yamagata Prefecture (through May 7)				A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft and two H-6 bombers fly from the East China Sea, pass between Okinawa Island and Miyakojima Island, reach the Pacific Ocean
	May 20	FY2024 Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR) (through May 24)	Jul. 12	Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (Berlin)	Mar. 12	After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, they return and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again. While the intelligence gathering aircraft and bomber were turning around over the Pacific Ocean, a presumed Chinese unmanned aircraft vehicle (presumed) flies the same airspace
	May 31	Minister of Defense attends the 21st IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) (through June 2)	Jul. 18	10th Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM10) (Tokyo)		
			Jul. 22	Telephone Talk between Prime Minister Kishida and President-elect of Iran		
	Jun. 01	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)			Mar. 15	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
	Jun. 01	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Aug. 07	Japan-Switzerland Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 16	Two Chinese vessels sail northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan.
			Aug. 08	Japan-Laos Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 16	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through March 17)
	Jun. 01	Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Aug. 09	Japan-Kazakhstan Summit Telephone Talk		
	Jun. 01	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Aug. 09	Japan-Uzbekistan Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 18	North Korea launches three ballistic missiles
	Jun. 01	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Aug. 12	Japan-Tajikistan Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 19	A Russian vessel sails east through the Tsugaru Strait toward the Pacific Ocean
			Aug. 12	Japan-Turkmenistan Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 22	A Chinese vessel sails southeast in the waters about 70km west of Uotsuri Island, then sails southwest through the waters between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Jun. 02	Japan-Australia-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Aug. 13	Japan-Kyrgyzstan Summit Telephone Talk		
			Aug. 13	Japan-Mongolia Summit Telephone Talk		
	Jun. 02	Japan-Fiji Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Sep. 02	Japan-Jordan Summit Telephone Talk	Mar. 23	Two Chinese vessels sail northeast in the waters between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island to the Pacific Ocean
	Jun. 02	Japan-Netherlands Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Sep. 03	Japan-Vietnam Summit Video Teleconference Meeting	Mar. 24	A Russian vessel sails westward from the Tsugaru Strait to the Sea of Japan
	Jun. 02	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Sep. 06	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting (Seoul)	Mar. 24	A Russian vessel sails from the west side of Oshakujima Island to the north side of Sado Island in the adjacent waters, exiting the adjacent waters north of the Noto Peninsula and then proceeding west
	Jun. 02	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Sep. 20	Telephone Talk between Prime Minister Kishida and the IAEA Director General		
	Jun. 02	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Sep. 21	Japan-India Summit Meeting (New York)	Mar. 25	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through the waters between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island, then northwest through the waters about 80 km west of Uotsuri Island
			Sep. 21	Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (New York)		
	Jun. 02	Japan-Lithuania Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Sep. 21	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Delaware)	Mar. 25	Two Chinese vessels sail in the waters from about 150km south of Miyako Island to about 170km south of Ishigaki Island (through March 27), then sail north in the waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, then north in the waters about 80km west of Uotsuri Island (through March 28)
	Jun. 02	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Sep. 21	Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Leaders' Meeting (Delaware)		
	Jun. 02	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Sep. 22	Prime Minister Kishida attends the Summit of the Future (New York)	Mar. 26	A Chinese WZ-7 reconnaissance unmanned aircraft vehicle flies from the continent, turns around over the Sea of Japan, and then flies northwest toward the continent
	Jul. 08	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines)	Sep. 22	Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and the Secretary-General of the United Nations (New York)	Mar. 27	A Russian vessel sails southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea (through March 28)
	Jul. 08	Japan-Philippines Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting ("2 + 2") (Philippines)	Sep. 22	Japan-Canada Summit Meeting (New York)	Mar. 27	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean, flies over the Pacific Ocean south of Sakishima Islands, returns and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Jul. 08	Signing of the Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement	Sep. 22	Japan-Mongolia Summit Meeting (New York)		
			Sep. 22	Japan-Palau Summit Meeting (New York)		
	Jul. 12	Entry into force of the Japan-Germany Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA)	Sep. 22	Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and the President of the European Council (New York)	Mar. 30	A Russian vessel sails southeast through waters about 40 km west of Kume Island, continues southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, enters the Pacific Ocean, and then sails west toward the East China Sea (through April 1)
	Jul. 23	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (London)	Sep. 23	Meeting between Prime Minister Kishida and the NATO Secretary General (New York)		
	Jul. 23	Japan-U.K.-Italy Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting (London)			Mar. 31	Three Chinese vessels sail southwest through waters about 50 km northeast of Tsushima, and continue southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea
			Sep. 23	Japan-Ukraine Summit Meeting (New York)		
	Jul. 23	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (London)	Sep. 23	Prime Minister Kishida attends the High-Level Launch Meeting of the Friends of a FMCT (New York)	Apr. 01	A Russian vessel sails south through waters about 40 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, continues southwest through waters including the contiguous zone between northeast of Miyakojima Island and southeast of Hateruma Island, exits the contiguous zone south of Hateruma Island, and sails southeast (through April 2)
	Jul. 25	Japan-Sweden Defense Ministerial Meeting (Stockholm)				
	Jul. 25	Disaster relief in response to heavy rain in Sakata City and Tozawa Village, Mogami County, etc., Yamagata Prefecture (through July 30)	Oct. 02	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 01	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, flies off the coast of the main island of Okinawa, turns around, and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Oct. 02	G7 Leaders' Teleconference		
			Oct. 02	Japan-ROK Summit Telephone Talk		
	Jul. 28	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 02	Japan-Australia Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 02	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Jul. 28	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 10	27th Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting (Laos)	Apr. 02	Three Chinese vessels sail southwest through waters about 60 km east of Tsushima, and continue sailing southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea
	Jul. 28	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2") (Tokyo)	Oct. 10	27th ASEAN Plus Three (Japan-China-ROK) Summit Meeting (Laos)		
	Jul. 28	Japan-U.S. Ministerial meeting on extended deterrence (Tokyo)	Oct. 10	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting (Laos)	Apr. 02	Two Russian Tu-95 bombers and two fighters aircraft fly from the continent, fly southeast over the Sea of Japan, turn around off the Noto Peninsula, and fly northwest toward the continent

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
	Jul. 29	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 10	Japan-China Summit Meeting (Laos)	Apr. 02	Two Chinese vessels sail south through waters about 80 km northwest of Uotsuri Island, continue south through waters about 80 km west of Uotsuri Island, continue to sail south between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan (through April 3), and sail northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea (on April 10)
	Aug. 05	Japan-Cambodia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Cambodia)	Oct. 10	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Laos)	Apr. 10	A Chinese vessel sails northwest through waters about 90 km southwest of the main island of Okinawa, and then sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
	Aug. 06	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Vietnam)	Oct. 11	Japan-Laos Summit Meeting (Laos)	Apr. 13	A Chinese vessel sails east through waters about 40 km southeast of the Kusagaki Islands, and continues east through the Osumi Strait toward the Pacific Ocean
	Aug. 20	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (India)	Oct. 11	Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting (Laos)	Apr. 13	Iran launches over 120 ballistic missiles, over 30 cruise missiles, and about 170 unmanned aerial vehicles against Israel
	Aug. 20	Third Japan-India 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting ("2+2") (India)	Oct. 11	Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Laos)	Apr. 22	North Korea launches at least one ballistic missile
	Sep. 03	Japan-Norway Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Oct. 11	2nd Asia Zero-Emission Community (AZEC) Leaders Meeting (Laos)	Apr. 24	Two Chinese vessels sail south through waters about 80 km northwest of Uotsurijima Island, continue south through waters about 70 km west of Uotsuri Island, continue to sail south between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, and then sail southwest between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island toward the East China Sea (through April 26)
	Sep. 04	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Australia)	Oct. 11	19th East Asia Summit (EAS) (Laos)	Apr. 25	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent, flies south over the Sea of Japan, turns around off the Noto Peninsula, and flies northwest toward the continent
	Sep. 05	Eleventh Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations ("2+2") (Australia)	Nov. 05	Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit Telephone Talk	Apr. 25	A Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft flies from the continent, flies north over the Sea of Japan, turns around off Okushiri Island and flies west toward the continent
	Sep. 12	Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Nov. 07	Telephone Talk between Prime Minister Ishiba and U.S. President-elect	May 05	Two Chinese vessels sail east through waters about 40 km south of the Kusagaki Islands, and continue east through the Osumi Strait toward the Pacific Ocean
	Sep. 13	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Nov. 15	Prime Minister Ishiba attends the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting (first session) (Peru)	May 09	A Chinese vessel sails northwest through waters about 140 km east of Miyakojima Island, and continues northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
	Sep. 19	Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Yamaguchi City, Yamaguchi Prefecture (through September 22)	Nov. 15	Japan-Malaysia Summit Meeting (Peru)	May 09	Two Chinese vessels sail northwest through waters about 70 km southwest of Yonaguni Island, sail north between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, then continue north through waters about 80 km west of Uotsuri Island
	Sep. 21	Disaster relief in response to heavy rain in Noto Peninsula, Ishikawa Prefecture (through December 15)	Nov. 15	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Peru)	May 13	Three Chinese vessels sail north through waters about 90 km east of Miyakojima Island, and continue to sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
	Sep. 28	FY2024 large-scale earthquake medical activity training	Nov. 15	Japan-U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting (Peru)	May 18	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent, flies south over the Sea of Japan, turns around off Sado Island, and flies northwest toward the continent
	Oct. 02	Nakatani becomes Minister of Defense	Nov. 15	Japan-China Summit Meeting (Peru)	May 27	A Chinese WL-10 reconnaissance/attack unmanned aerial vehicle flies over the East China Sea (first confirmed aircraft)
	Oct. 03	TJNO staying in the Lebanese Republic (through March 21,2025)	Nov. 16	Signing of the "Japan-Ukraine General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA)"	May 27	North Korea launches a ballistic missile using ballistic missile technology for the purpose of a satellite launch
	Oct. 08	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Nov. 16	Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting (Peru)	May 30	North Korea launches multiple ballistic missiles
	Oct. 10	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Nov. 16	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting (Peru)	Jun. 02	Two Chinese vessels sail south through waters about 80 km northwest of Uotsuri Island, continue south through waters about 70 km west of Uotsuri Island, continue to sail south between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, and sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea (through June 6)
	Oct. 11	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Nov. 16	Prime Minister Ishiba attends the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting (third session) (Peru)	Jun. 04	A Chinese TB-001 reconnaissance/attack unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, flies south of the main island of Okinawa over the Pacific to off Amami Oshima Island, turns around and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Oct. 17	Meeting with the NATO Secretary General (Belgium)	Nov. 17	Japan-Peru Summit Meeting (Peru)	Jun. 09	Two Chinese vessels sail northwest through waters about 90 km east of Amami Oshima Island. Two more Chinese vessels sail northwest through waters about 100 km east of Amami Oshima Island, and then sail southwest between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island toward the East China Sea
	Oct. 17	Japan-Ukraine Defense Ministerial Meeting (Belgium)	Nov. 18	G20 Rio de Janeiro Summit (Brazil) (through November 19)	Jun. 13	A Russian vessel sails northeast through waters about 50 km west of Rebun Island, then continues east through the Soya Strait (through June 14)
	Oct. 17	Japan-Netherlands Defense Ministerial Meeting (Belgium)	Nov. 18	Japan-Canada Summit Meeting (Brazil)	Jun. 15	Two Russian vessels sail east through waters about 40 km northwest of Rebun Island, cruise near the Soya Strait, and then sail east (through June 18)
	Oct. 17	IP4 (Japan-Australia-New Zealand-ROK) Defense Authorities' Meeting (Belgium)	Nov. 18	Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Brazil)	Jun. 16	Two Chinese vessels sail south through waters about 150 km north of Miyakojima Island, and then sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Oct. 17	NATO Defense Ministers' Meeting (Belgium)	Nov. 19	Japan-Brazil Summit Meeting (Brazil)	Jun. 16	Two Russian vessels sail west through waters about 40 km east of Cape Soya, cruise near the Soya Strait, and then sail west (through June 19)
	Oct. 18	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Italy)	Nov. 19	Japan-Italy-U.K. Leaders' Meeting on Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) (Brazil)	Jun. 18	Three Russian vessels sail east through waters about 50 km southwest of Oshima, and then sail east through the Tsugaru Strait toward the Pacific Ocean
	Oct. 19	Japan-U.K.-Italy Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting (Italy)	Dec. 04	Japan-Sweden Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 19	A Chinese vessel sails northwest through waters about 180 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
	Oct. 19	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Italy)	Dec. 10	Japan-Finland Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jun. 21	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through waters about 50 km southwest of Tsushima, and continues northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
	Oct. 19	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Italy)	Dec. 13	G7 Leaders' Video Conference	Jun. 22	A Chinese vessel sails northwest through waters about 110 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and continues northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
	Oct. 19	G7 Ministerial Meeting on Defense (Italy)	Dec. 19	Telephone Talk between Prime Minister Ishiba and Acting President and Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea	Jun. 23	A Chinese vessel sails east through waters about 50 km south of Oshima, and continues east through the Tsugaru Strait toward the Pacific Ocean (through June 24)
	Oct. 23	Disaster relief in response to the landslide disaster in Nobeoka City, Miyazaki Prefecture (through October 26)	Dec. 25	Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk	Jun. 25	A Chinese WZ-7 reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the continent, circles over the East China Sea, flies as far as the waters northwest of Amami Oshima Island, then turns around, flies north, circles again over the East China Sea, and flies northwest toward the continent
	Oct. 23	FY2024 Japan-U.S. joint exercise (Field Training Exercise Keen Sword 25) (through November 1)			Jun. 25	A Russian vessel sails west through waters about 40 km northeast of Cape Soya, then sails west through the Soya Strait
	Oct. 31	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Oda City, Shimane Prefecture (through November 2)			Jun. 26	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast through waters about 50 km southwest of the Kusagaki Islands, and continue east through the Osumi Strait toward the Pacific Ocean
	Nov. 01	Meeting between Defense Minister Nakatani and High Representative of EU Borrell			Jun. 26	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Nov. 05	Cabinet Decision on continuation of counter-piracy mission			Jun. 27	Two Chinese vessels sail northeast through waters about 60 km southwest of Tsushima, and continue northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
	Nov. 05	Change of Cabinet Decision on the Government's Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East (through November 19, 2025)			Jun. 27	Two Chinese vessels sail northwest through waters about 40 km southeast of Cape Toi, and continue west through the Osumi Strait toward the East China Sea
	Nov. 06	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Tainai City, Niigata Prefecture (through November 8)			Jun. 28	A Russian vessel sails northwest through waters about 90 km east of Cape Soya, then sails west through the Soya Strait
	Nov. 09	Commemorative Troop Review for the 70th Anniversary of the MOD and SDF (Asaka)			Jun. 28	A Russian vessel sails west through waters about 30 km north of Cape Soya, then sails west through the Soya Strait
	Nov. 17	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Australia)			Jun. 28	Two Chinese vessels sail northeast through waters about 80 km south of Tsushima, and continue northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through June 29)
	Nov. 17	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Australia)			Jun. 28	North Korea holds the 10th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK (through July 1)
	Nov. 17	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Australia)			Jun. 29	Three Russian vessels sail west through waters about 30 km north of Cape Soya, and then sail west through the Soya Strait
	Nov. 17	Exchange of Japan-Peru Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges			Jun. 30	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast through waters about 30 km south of Oshima, and continue east through the Tsugaru Strait toward the Pacific Ocean (through July 1)
	Nov. 21	11th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus ("ADMM-Plus") (Laos)			Jun. 30	A Chinese vessel sails southeast through waters about 60 km southwest of Kume Island, and continues southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Nov. 21	Japan-Australia-Philippines-ROK-U.S. Defense Ministers' Meeting (Laos)			Jul. 01	Two Chinese vessels sail northeast through waters about 40 km west of Rebun Island, then continue east through the Soya Strait
	Nov. 21	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Laos)			Jul. 03	Two Russian vessels sail east through waters about 50 km northwest of Rebun Island, then continue east through the Soya Strait
	Nov. 21	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Laos)			Jul. 03	A Russian vessel sails southwest through waters about 70 km northeast of Tsushima, and continues southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea (through July 4)
	Nov. 21	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Laos)			Jul. 04	A Russian vessel sails southeast through waters about 40 km southwest of the Kusagaki Islands, and then sails east through the Osumi Strait toward the Pacific Ocean (through July 5)
	Nov. 21	Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting (Laos)			Jul. 04	Three Chinese vessels sail east through waters about 40 km southwest of the Kusagaki Islands, and continue east through the Osumi Strait toward the Pacific Ocean (through July 5)
	Nov. 22	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Laos)			Jul. 06	A Russian vessel sails west through waters about 160 km east of Miyakojima Island, and then sails north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
	Nov. 22	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Laos)			Jul. 08	A Chinese TB-001 reconnaissance/attack unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, to reach the Pacific Ocean, circles and turns around over the Pacific Ocean, and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Nov. 22	Japan-Brunei Defense Ministerial Meeting (Laos)			Jul. 07	Two Russian vessels sail south through waters about 60 km northeast of Tsushima, and then sail southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea (July 8)
	Nov. 25	Signing of the Japan-Italy Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)			Jul. 09	Two Russian vessels sail southwest through waters about 60 km north of Iriomote Island, and then sail southwest between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the Pacific Ocean (through July 10)
	Dec. 01	FY2024 Remote Island Disaster Relief Exercise and a Japan-U.S. Bilateral Integrated Disaster Response Exercise			Jul. 09	Multiple Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Shandong" sail in Pacific Ocean waters, and conduct take-off and landing operations of ship-borne fighter aircraft and helicopters (through July 15)
	Dec. 04	Japan-Sweden Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)			Jul. 10	A Russian vessel sails northeast through waters about 100 km southwest of Tsushima, and continues northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through July 11)
	Dec. 10	Entry into force of the Convention on the Establishment of the Global Combat Air Programme – GCAP International Government Organisation				
	Dec. 10	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)				
	Dec. 11	Signing of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Mongolia concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology				
	Dec. 13	Establishment of the Government-Industry Joint Committee for the Promotion for Australia's Next General Purpose Frigate program. The first meeting is held.				
	Dec. 27	Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Saihara area, Uenohara City, Yamanashi Prefecture (through December 29)				
	Dec. 29	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Yachiyo Town, Yuki District, Ibaraki Prefecture (through January 1)				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
					Jul. 11	A Chinese vessel sails south through waters about 80 km northwest of Uotsuri Island. Another Chinese vessel also sails south in waters about 70 km northwest of Uotsuri Island. Later, the vessels both continue south in waters about 70 km west of Uotsuri Island, and sail south between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan. They then sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea (through July 16)
					Jul. 12	A Chinese TB-001 reconnaissance/attack unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, and flies toward the Bashi Channel
					Jul. 17	Multiple Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Shandong" sail in Pacific Ocean waters, conduct take-off and landing operations of ship-borne fighter aircraft and helicopters, and later sail toward the South China Sea (through July 18)
					Jul. 18	A Russian vessel sails northeast through waters about 40 km west of Rebun Island, then continues east through the Soya Strait
					Jul. 19	Three Russian vessels sail north through waters about 130 km southwest of Yonaguni Island, sail northeast between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, continue northeast through waters about 70 km west of Uotsuri Island, and then sail northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through July 21)
					Jul. 21	A (presumed) Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (presumed) flies from the Pacific Ocean, and passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
					Jul. 27	Two Russian vessels sail east through waters about 50 km northwest of Rebun Island, then continue east through the Soya Strait
					Jul. 28	Two Russian vessels sail southwest through waters about 50 km northeast of Cape Soya, then sail west through the Soya Strait
					Jul. 28	A Chinese vessel sails north through waters about 60 km south of Yonaguni Island, sail northeast between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island, then continues north through waters about 70 km west of Uotsuri Island
					Jul. 29	Two Chinese vessels sail northwest through waters about 50 km south of Yonaguni Island, sail north between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, then continue north through waters about 70 km west of Uotsuri Island
					Jul. 29	Two Chinese vessels sail north through waters about 70 km east of Miyakojima Island, and then sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
					Jul. 30	A Chinese WZ-7 reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the continent, flies as far as the waters northwest of Amami Oshima Island, then turns around, flies north, circles over the East China Sea, and flies northwest toward the continent
					Jul. 30	Two Russian Tu-95 bombers and two fighters aircraft fly from the continent, fly east over the Sea of Japan, turn around off the Oki Islands, and fly north toward the continent. The aircraft then fly in again from the continent, proceed east toward Japanese territorial airspace west of Hokkaido, turn north off Okushiri Island, fly along the vicinity of Japanese territorial airspace, change course off Cape Kamui, and fly west toward the continent. Later, the aircraft fly in once more from the continent, proceed southeast toward Japanese territorial airspace, change course off Noto Peninsula, and then fly northwest toward the continent. While Russian bombers are operating off Hokkaido and Ishikawa Prefecture, in addition to the two fighters, one presumed Russian aircraft also flies in the same airspace.
					Jul. 31	Ismail Haniyeh, head of the Hamas Political Bureau, is killed in an attack in Iran
					Aug. 02	Two Chinese vessels sail south through waters about 80 km northwest of Uotsuri Island, sail south through waters 70 km west of Uotsuri Island, and continue south in the waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
					Aug. 03	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, flies off the coast of Yonaguni Island over the Pacific Ocean, circles and turns around, and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
					Aug. 03	A Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (presumed) flies from the East China Sea, passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan to reach the Pacific Ocean, circles over the Pacific Ocean southwest of the Sakishima Islands, and flies toward the Bashi Channel
					Aug. 03	A Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (presumed) flies from the Pacific Ocean, and passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
					Aug. 07	Two Chinese vessels sail southwest between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island toward the East China Sea
					Aug. 09	A Chinese BZK-005 reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, turns around and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
					Aug. 12	Four Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Shandong" sail in waters 420 km south of Miyakojima Island, and conduct take-off and landing operations of ship-borne fighter aircraft and helicopters
					Aug. 12	Four Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Shandong" sail in waters about 530 km south of Yonaguni Island, conduct take-off and landing operations of ship-borne fighter aircraft and helicopters, and later sail toward the South China Sea (through August 13)
					Aug. 13	A Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (presumed) flies from the East China Sea, passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan to reach the Pacific Ocean, circles and turns over the Pacific Ocean, and again passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan again
					Aug. 16	Three Russian vessels sail west through waters about 60 km northeast of Rebun Island, then sail west through the Soya Strait
					Aug. 17	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast through waters about 120 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Aug. 20	Two Russian vessels sail northeast through waters about 60 km southwest of Iriomote Island, and then sail northeast between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the East China Sea
					Aug. 21	Two Russian vessels sail northeast through waters about 110 km southwest of Tsushima, and then continue northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through August 22)
					Aug. 23	Two Chinese unmanned aerial vehicles (presumed) fly from the Pacific Ocean, and pass between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
					Aug. 26	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft intruded into the Japanese territorial airspace over the waters off the Danjo-gunto Islands in Nagasaki Prefecture
					Aug. 30	A Chinese unmanned aerial vehicles (presumed) flies from the East China Sea and passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
					Aug. 30	A Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (presumed) flies from the Pacific Ocean, and passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
					Aug. 31	A Chinese vessel sails east through Japan's contiguous zone west of Kuchinoerabu-jima Island, enters Japan's territorial waters southwest of Kuchinoerabu-jima Island, exits Japan's territorial waters southwest of Yakushima Island, and sails south
					Sep. 01	Two Russian vessels sail west through waters about 30 km north of Cape Soya, then continue west through the Soya Strait
					Sep. 01	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast through waters about 130 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Sep. 07	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through waters about 130 km southwest of Tsushima, and continues northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
					Sep. 07	Four Chinese vessels sail northeast through waters about 130 to 160 km southwest of Tsushima, and continue northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through September 8)
					Sep. 12	Two Russian Tu-142 patrol aircraft fly from off the Oki Islands through the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, fly north over the Pacific Ocean, and fly from off Hokkaido to the continent
					Sep. 12	North Korea launches multiple ballistic missiles
					Sep. 17	Three Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail through waters about 210 km northwest of Uotsuri Island, sail south through waters about 70 km west of Uotsuri Island, and continue to sail south between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the Pacific Ocean (through September 18)
					Sep. 17	Communication devices explode one after the other in Lebanon. Later, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu confirms Israeli involvement.
					Sep. 18	Communication devices explode one after the other in Lebanon. Later, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu confirms Israeli involvement.
					Sep. 18	North Korea launches multiple ballistic missiles
					Sep. 18	Three Chinese vessels sail through waters about 80 km northwest of Uotsuri Island, sail south through waters about 60 km west of Uotsuri Island, and then sail south between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Sep. 18	Two Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail in Pacific Ocean waters, and conduct take-off and landing operations of ship-borne fighter aircraft and helicopters about 1,360 km southeast of Miyakojima Island (through September 20)
					Sep. 20	Multiple Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail in Pacific Ocean waters, and conduct take-off and landing operations of ship-borne fighter aircraft and helicopters (through September 26)
					Sep. 22	Four Chinese vessels and four Russian vessels sail northeast through waters about 300 km west of Okushiri Island, then continue east through the Soya Strait (through September 23)
					Sep. 22	A Chinese vessel sails east through waters about 60 km northwest of Rebun Island, then continue east through the Soya Strait (through September 23)

Year	Defense	Domestic	International	
			Sep. 22	A Russian vessel sails west through waters about 70 km northeast of Cape Soya, then sails west through the Soya Strait
			Sep. 23	A Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft intruded into Japanese territorial airspace over the waters north of Rebun Island, Hokkaido
			Sep. 25	Two Russian vessels sail northeast through waters about 340 km southwest of Rebun Island, then continue east through the Soya Strait (through September 26)
			Sep. 27	A Russian vessel sails west through waters about 90 km northeast of Cape Soya, then sails west through the Soya Strait
			Sep. 27	Multiple Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail in Pacific Ocean waters, conduct take-off and landing operations of ship-borne fighter aircraft and helicopters (through October 1), and later sail southwest through waters east of the Philippines (through October 2)
			Sep. 27	The Israeli military conducts an airstrike on the outskirts of Beirut, Lebanon, killing Hezbollah's top leader Hassan Nasrallah and others
			Oct. 01	Iran launches more than 180 ballistic missiles at Israel
			Oct. 01	The Israeli military begins a ground invasion of Lebanon
			Oct. 05	Four Russian vessels sail southwest through waters about 40 km east of Tsushima, sail southwest through the Tsushima Strait, and then sail between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the Pacific Ocean (through October 7)
			Oct. 06	Three Russian vessels sail east through waters about 40 km northwest of Rebun Island, then continue east through the Soya Strait
			Oct. 09	Two Chinese vessels sail south through waters about 80 km northwest of Uotsuri Island, continue south through waters about 80 km west of Uotsuri Island, continue to sail south between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, and then sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea (through October 15)
			Oct. 11	Four Chinese vessels and two Russian vessels sail west in waters about 400 km northeast of Okinotorishima Island. Later, the four Chinese vessels continue west in waters about 130 km south of Okidaitojima Island and about 370 km south of the main island of Okinawa, while the two Russian vessels sail northwest in waters about 70 km southwest of Okidaitojima Island, then northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea (through October 14)
			Oct. 11	A Russian vessel sails northeast through waters about 40 km northwest of Rebun Island, then continues east through the Soya Strait (through October 12)
			Oct. 13	Two Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail in waters 460 km south of Yonaguni Island, and conduct take-off and landing operations of ship-borne fighter aircraft and helicopters (through October 14)
			Oct. 15	Four Chinese vessels sail north through waters about 130 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
			Oct. 15	A Chinese vessel sails southwest through waters about 110 km east of Tanegashima Island, and then sails west through the Osumi Strait toward the East China Sea
			Oct. 15	Three Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail in waters about 490 km south of Yonaguni Island, conduct take-off and landing operations of ship-borne fighter aircraft and helicopters, and later sail toward the South China Sea
			Oct. 20	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft and H-6 bomber fly from the East China Sea, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, circle and turn around over the Pacific Ocean, and pass again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Oct. 22	Three Russian vessels sail northeast through waters about 120 km southwest of Tsushima, and then continue northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through October 23)
			Oct. 22	A Chinese vessel sails east through waters about 100 km west of Amami Oshima Island, and then sails northeast between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island toward the Pacific Ocean
			Oct. 22	Two Russian Tu-95 bombers and two fighters fly in from the continent, fly southeast toward Japanese territorial airspace, change course off the Noto Peninsula, circle over the Sea of Japan, then head northwest toward the continent. Later, they fly in again from the continent, fly southeast toward Japanese territorial airspace, then head north over the Sea of Japan from west of Aomori Prefecture to west of Hokkaido, and then northwest toward the continent
			Oct. 24	A Chinese vessel sails east through waters about 90 km west of Amami Oshima Island, and then sails northeast between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island toward the Pacific Ocean
			Oct. 26	The Israeli military strikes Iranian military facilities
			Oct. 28	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, flies off the coast of the main island of Okinawa over the Pacific Ocean, turns around, and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Oct. 28	A Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, circles and turns around over the Pacific Ocean, and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Oct. 28	A Chinese BZK-005 reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, turns around and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Oct. 30	A Chinese vessel sails west through waters about 70 km northeast of Tanegashima Island, and then sails west through the Osumi Strait toward the East China Sea (through October 31)
			Oct. 31	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
			Nov. 01	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast through waters about 130 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
			Nov. 03	A Chinese TB-001 reconnaissance/attack unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and flies south to the Pacific Ocean, turns around and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Nov. 04	Three Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Shandong" sail in waters 720 km south of Miyakojima Island, and conduct take-off and landing operations of ship-borne fighter aircraft and helicopters
			Nov. 04	Three Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Shandong" sail in waters about 640 km south of Miyakojima Island, conduct take-off and landing operations of ship-borne fighter aircraft and helicopters, and later sail toward the South China Sea
			Nov. 05	North Korea launches multiple ballistic missiles
			Nov. 11	Four Russian vessels sail west through waters about 80 km northeast of Cape Soya, then sail west through the Soya Strait
			Nov. 11	A Russian vessel sails southwest through waters about 60 km east of Tsushima, and then continues southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea (through November 12)
			Nov. 14	A Russian vessel sails south through waters about 100 km northwest of Kume Island, and then sails east between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
			Nov. 21	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent, flies south over the Sea of Japan, change course off the Noto Peninsula, and flies northwest toward the continent
			Nov. 26	Israel and Lebanon agree to a ceasefire through U.S. and French mediation
			Nov. 27	A Chinese vessel sails southeast through waters about 120 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
			Nov. 28	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through waters about 70 km southwest of Tsushima, and then continues northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
			Nov. 28	A Chinese vessel sails southwest through waters about 80 km southwest of Kume Island, and then sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
			Nov. 29	Two Chinese H-6 bombers fly from the East China Sea to the Sea of Japan. Later, two Chinese H-6 bombers and two Russian Tu-95 bombers conduct a long-range joint flight from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea. While these bombers conduct their joint flight over the Sea of Japan, a Russian Su-35 fighter joins them. In addition, a Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea to the Sea of Japan, and as the Chinese bombers fly from the East China Sea to the Sea of Japan, two Chinese J-16 fighters join them. While the Chinese bombers are conducting the operation, a presumed Chinese aircraft flies over the East China Sea. While the Russian bombers are conducting the operation over the Sea of Japan, a presumed Russian aircraft flies over the Sea of Japan
			Nov. 29	A Chinese vessel sails southwest through waters about 30 km northeast of Tsushima, and then sails southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea (through November 30)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
					Nov. 30	Two Chinese H-6 bombers and two Russian Tu-95 bombers conduct a long-range joint flight. The bombers fly in from China, jointly pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island into the Pacific, then turn around over the Pacific Ocean and again pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea. While the bombers pass jointly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean, four Chinese J-16 fighters, one presumed Chinese fighter, and one Chinese Y-20 aerial refueling aircraft join them. While the bombers turn around over the Pacific Ocean and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea, two Chinese J-16 fighters join them. In addition, two Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft precede the bombers and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island. Furthermore, after the joint flight, the Russian bombers fly back and forth several times between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, then pass through the Tsushima Strait and fly over the Sea of Japan toward the continent. While the bombers are conducting the operation over the Sea of Japan, a presumed Russian aircraft and two presumed Russian fighter fly over the Sea of Japan
					Dec. 01	A Chinese vessel sails northwest through waters about 130 km east of Miyakojima Island, and then sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
					Dec. 03	Two Russian vessels sail northeast through waters about 50 km south of Yonaguni Island, and then sail northeast between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the East China Sea
					Dec. 04	Two Chinese vessels sail south through waters about 100 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 04	A Chinese vessel sails southeast through waters about 120 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 05	Three Chinese vessels sail east through waters about 80 km west of Kuchinoerabujima Island, continue east through the Osumi Strait, and then sail toward the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 07	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast through waters about 120 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 08	Syrian opposition forces seize control of the capital, Damascus. President Assad flees to Russia and resigns his presidency
					Dec. 08	A Chinese vessel sails southeast through waters about 160 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 09	A Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island south to the Pacific Ocean, turns around and again passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island
					Dec. 10	A Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (presumed) flies from the East China Sea, passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan to reach the Pacific Ocean, circles over the Pacific Ocean southwest from the Sakishima Islands, and then flies south
					Dec. 10	Four Russian vessels sail northeast through waters about 130 km southwest of Tsushima, and continue northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through December 11)
					Dec. 11	A Chinese vessel sails northwest through waters about 120 km east of Miyakojima Island, and then sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
					Dec. 12	A Chinese vessel sails northwest in waters about 110 km east of Miyakojima Island. Another Chinese vessel also sails north in waters about 90 km northeast of Miyakojima Island. Furthermore, four Chinese vessels sails northwest in waters about 110 km northeast of Miyakojima Island. Later, these vessels sails northwest through the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward East China Sea
					Dec. 13	A Chinese vessel sails southeast through waters about 100 km west of Kume Island, and then sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 14	Two Russian vessels sail northeast through waters about 100 km southwest of Tsushima, and then sail northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
					Dec. 15	Two Chinese vessels sail south through waters about 120 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 19	Two Chinese vessels sail north through waters about 90 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
					Dec. 19	Four Chinese vessels sail west through waters about 50 km northeast of Tanegashima Island, and then sail west through the Osumi Strait toward the East China Sea (through December 20)
					Dec. 22	Three Chinese vessels sail north through waters about 100 km east of Miyakojima Island, and then sail northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
					Dec. 23	North Korea holds the 11th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK (through December 27)
					Dec. 23	A Chinese vessel sails north through waters about 120 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
2025	Jan. 07	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Indonesia)	Jan. 10	Japan-Malaysia Summit Meeting (Malaysia)	Jan. 02	Two Chinese vessels sail south through waters about 110 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Jan. 11	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Morioka City, Iwate Prefecture (through January 14)	Jan. 11	Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting (Indonesia)		
	Jan. 12	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Choshi City, Chiba Prefecture (through January 14)	Jan. 13	Japan-U.S.-Philippines Leaders' Video Conference	Jan. 05	A Chinese vessel sails west through waters about 70 km northeast of Tanegashima Island, and then sails west through the Osumi Strait toward the East China Sea
	Jan. 14	FY2024 (2nd) Remote Island Disaster Relief Exercise and a Japan-U.S. Bilateral Integrated Disaster Response Exercise (through January 17)	Jan. 21	Telephone Talk between Prime Minister Ishiba and the NATO Secretary General	Jan. 06	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
	Jan. 15	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (London)	Jan. 21	Japan-Laos Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 14	A Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (presumed) flies from the East China Sea, passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan to reach the Pacific Ocean, circles and turns around over the Pacific Ocean, and passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan again
	Jan. 19	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Handa City, Aichi Prefecture (through January 21)	Feb. 06	Japan-Zambia Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
	Jan. 19	Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Kasugai Town, Fuefuki City, Yamanashi Prefecture (through January 22)	Feb. 07	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Washington, D.C.)	Jan. 14	A Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (presumed) flies from the Pacific Ocean, and passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
	Jan. 22	Entry into force of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Mongolia concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology	Feb. 12	Japan-Palau Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 15	Through mediation by the United States, Qatar, and Egypt, Israel and Hamas agree to a three-stage ceasefire and hostage release in Gaza
	Jan. 22	Disaster relief in response to bird flu outbreak in Morioka City, Iwate Prefecture (through January 24)	Feb. 24	G7 Leaders' Video Conference	Jan. 19	The agreement between Israel and Hamas for a three-stage ceasefire and hostage release in Gaza takes effect
	Jan. 29	Japan-Estonia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Mar. 05	Meeting between Prime Minister Ishiba and President of Italy (Tokyo)	Jan. 22	A Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (presumed) flies from the East China Sea and passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
	Jan. 31	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation	Mar. 13	Japan-Marshall Islands Summit Meeting (Tokyo)	Jan. 22	A Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (presumed) from the East China Sea and passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
	Feb. 19	Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Ofunato City, Iwate Prefecture (through February 24)	Mar. 18	Japan-Federated States of Micronesia Working Dinner (Tokyo)	Jan. 30	Two Russian Tu-95 bombers, an Su-35 fighter, and another fighter fly from the continent, change course off Cape Shiretoko, pass over the Soya Strait, and then fly northwest toward the continent. In addition, two Russian Tu-95 bombers, an Su-30 fighter, and another fighter again fly from the continent, fly south over the Sea of Japan from off Okushiri Island to off the Oga Peninsula, and then fly northwest toward the continent. Furthermore, while these aircraft are flying, an Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft flies over the Sea of Japan
	Feb. 24	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines)	Mar. 26	Japan-Brazil Summit Meeting (Tokyo)		
	Feb. 26	Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Ofunato City, Iwate Prefecture (through March 14)	Apr. 28	Japan-Viet Nam Summit Meeting (Japan)		
	Feb. 28	Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Otsuki City, Yamanashi Prefecture (through March 3)	Apr. 29	Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting (Japan)	Feb. 01	A Russian vessel sails south in waters about 50 km southeast of the main island of Okinawa, cruises in an east-west direction in waters including the contiguous zone southeast of the main island of Okinawa, sails northeast through the contiguous zone southeast of Kikaijima Island, cruises in an east-west direction in waters including the contiguous zone east of Miyazaki Prefecture, and then sails west through the Osumi Strait toward the East China Sea (through February 9)
	Mar. 24	Establishment of the JSDF Joint Operations Command	May. 20	Japan-Bulgaria Summit Meeting (Japan)		
	Mar. 24	Disaster relief in response to forest fire in Okayama City, Okayama Prefecture (through March 28)	May. 29	Japan-Laos Summit Meeting (Japan)		
	Mar. 30	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	May. 30	Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting (Japan)		
	Apr. 04	"Balikatan 25" multilateral joint exercise hosted by the U.S. and the Philippines (through May 9)	Jun. 09	Japan-Lithuania Summit Meeting (Japan)	Feb. 03	Three Russian vessels sail southwest through waters about 70 km northeast of Tsushima, and continue southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea
	Apr. 07	International disaster relief activities in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (through April 22)	Jun. 09	Japan-ROK Summit Telephone Talk	Feb. 05	Three Russian vessels sail southwest through waters about 60 km north of Iriomote Island, and then sail southwest between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Apr. 10	2nd Government-Industry Joint Committee meeting	Jun. 15	G7 Kananaskis Summit (Canada) (through June 17)		
	Apr. 16	Japan-Tonga Defense Ministerial Meeting (Japan)	Jun. 17	Japan-Ukraine Summit Meeting (Canada)	Feb. 05	A Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (presumed) flies from the Pacific Ocean, and passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan. In addition, another Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (presumed) flies over the East China Sea
	May 05	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (India)	Jun. 17	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting (Canada)		
	May 15	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference	Jul. 08	Signing of the Japan-Canada Information Security Agreement	Feb. 08	A Chinese vessel sails south through waters about 90 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sails south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	May 28	Japan-Luxembourg Defense Ministerial Meeting (Japan)	Aug. 20	9th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD9) (Japan) (through August 22)	Feb. 10	A Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, circles and turns around over the Pacific Ocean, and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island
	May 28	Japan-Lithuania Defense Ministers Meeting (Japan)	Aug. 23	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting		
	May 31	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Sep. 01	Meeting between Prime Minister Ishiba and Prime Minister Recean of Moldova (Tokyo)	Feb. 10	A Russian vessel sails northwest in waters about 40 km south of the Danjo Islands, continues northeast through waters including the contiguous zone north of Torishima Island, and then continues northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through February 11)
	May 31	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Sep. 04	Japan-Armenia Summit Meeting (Japan)		
			Oct. 28	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Japan)	Feb. 10	Three Chinese vessels sail southeast through waters about 140 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean (through February 11)
			Oct. 31	APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting (ROK) (through November 1)		
			Oct. 31	Japan-China Summit Meeting (ROK)	Feb. 11	Four Chinese vessels sail southeast through waters about 150 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
			Nov. 01	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting (ROK)		
			Nov. 04	Change of Cabinet Decision on the Government's Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East (through November 19, 2026)	Feb. 11	A Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, circles and turns around over the Pacific Ocean, and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Nov. 05	Japan-Ukraine Summit Telephone Talk		
			Nov. 22	G20 Johannesburg Summit (South Africa) (through November 23)		
			Nov. 23	Japan-South Africa Summit Meeting (South Africa)		
			Nov. 23	Japan-India Summit Meeting (South Africa)		
			Nov. 23	Japan-Germany Summit Meeting (South Africa)		
			Nov. 23	Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (South Africa)		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
	May 31	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Dec. 18	Japan-Kazakhstan Summit Meeting (Japan)	Feb. 11	A Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (presumed) flies from the East China Sea, passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan to reach the Pacific Ocean, turns around over the Pacific Ocean, and passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan again
	May 31	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Dec. 19	Signing of the Japan-New Zealand Information Security Agreement	Feb. 11	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent, flies southwes over the Sea of Japan, change course off Kyogamisaki, and flies northwest toward the continent
	May 31	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Dec. 20	Japan-Uzbekistan Summit Meeting (Japan)	Feb. 12	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent, flies southwest over the Sea of Japan, change course off Kyogamisaki, and flies northwest toward the continent
	Jun. 01	Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Dec. 20	Japan-Kyrgyz Summit Meeting (Japan)	Feb. 16	A Russian vessel sails southwest through waters about 70 km northeast of Tsushima, and continues southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea (through February 17)
	Jun. 01	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Dec. 20	Japan-Turkmenistan Summit Meeting (Japan)	Feb. 19	A Russian vessel sails southwest through waters about 50 km north of Torishima Island, sails through waters including the contiguous zone north of Torishima Island to southeast of the main island of Okinawa, exits the contiguous zone southeast of the main island of Okinawa, and continues sailing toward the Pacific Ocean (through February 20)
	Jun. 01	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Dec. 20	Japan-Tajikistan Summit Meeting (Japan)	Feb. 24	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, flies off the coast of the main island of Okinawa over the Pacific Ocean, turns around, and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island
	Jun. 01	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)	Dec. 20	Summit of the "Central Asia plus Japan" Dialogue (Japan)	Feb. 24	A Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, circles and turns around over the Pacific Ocean, and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island
	Jun. 01	Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)			Feb. 26	A Chinese BZK-005 reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, flies south of the main island of Okinawa over the Pacific to off Amami Oshima Island, turns around and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island
	Jul. 07	Japan-U.K.-Italy Trilateral Defense Ministerial Video Conference			Feb. 26	A Chinese GJ-2 reconnaissance/attack unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, flies south of the main island of Okinawa over the Pacific to off Amami Oshima Island, turns around and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again (first confirmed aircraft)
	Jul. 14	FY2025 Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR) (through July 18)			Feb. 28	A Chinese TB-001 reconnaissance/attack unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, flies south of the main island of Okinawa over the Pacific to off Amami Oshima Island, turns around and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island
	Jul. 23	Meeting between Defense Minister Nakatani and High Representative of the EU Kallas			Feb. 28	A Chinese vessel sails west through waters about 140 km northeast of Cape Sata, and then continues west through the Osumi Strait toward the East China Sea. Later, it sails southeast through the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean (through March 3)
	Jul. 29	Disaster relief operations in Kitadaito Village, Okinawa Prefecture, in response to Typhoon No. 8 (through August 3)			Mar. 04	A Russian vessel sails west through waters about 80 km southwest of the main island of Okinawa, sails through the contiguous zone west of Torishima Island, and then exits the contiguous zone toward the East China Sea
	Aug. 02	Disaster relief operations in response to a forest fire in Jinsekikogen Town, Jinseki District, Hiroshima Prefecture (through August 5)			Mar. 06	A Russian vessel sails northeast through waters about 120 km southwest of Tsushima, and continues northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through March 7)
	Aug. 05	Disaster relief operations in response to a forest fire in Yasugi City, Shimane Prefecture (through August 7)			Mar. 16	A Chinese vessel sails southwest through waters about 80 km northwest of Uotsuri Island, sails south through waters 70 km west of Uotsuri Island, and continues south in the waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan. Later, it sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea (through March 20)
	Aug. 07	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference			Mar. 17	A Chinese vessel sails south through waters about 80 km west of Uotsuri Island, and continues south in the waters between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan Later, it sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea (through March 20)
	Aug. 09	Disaster relief operations related to water supply support in Kirishima City and Aira City, Kagoshima Prefecture (through August 13)			Mar. 17	Two Chinese unmanned aerial vehicles (presumed) fly from the East China Sea, pass between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan to reach the Pacific Ocean, circle and turn around over the Pacific Ocean, and pass again between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
	Aug. 18	Meeting between the Defense Minister and the Acting Minister of Defense of Djibouti (Djibouti)			Mar. 21	A Chinese vessel sails east through waters about 70 km southwest of Kuchinoerabujima Island, and then continues east through the Osumi Strait toward the Pacific Ocean
	Aug. 19	Japan-Türkiye Defense Ministerial Meeting (Türkiye)			Mar. 24	A Chinese vessel sails northwest through waters about 140 km east of Miyakojima Island, and continues northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
	Aug. 21	Japan-Jordan Defense Ministerial Meeting (Jordan)			Mar. 27	A Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (presumed) flies from the East China Sea and passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
	Aug. 25	3rd Government-Industry Joint Committee meeting			Mar. 31	Two Chinese vessels sail south through waters about 100 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean. In addition, a Chinese vessel sails southeast through waters about 130 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Aug. 28	Disaster relief operations in response to a forest fire in Itano Town, Itano District, Tokushima Prefecture (through September 4)			Apr. 01	Multiple Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Shandong" sail in Pacific Ocean waters, conduct take-off and landing operations of ship-borne fighter aircraft and helicopters (through April 2), and later sail toward the South China Sea (April 3)
	Aug. 28	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Japan)			Apr. 04	Two Chinese vessels sail northwest through waters about 90 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
	Sep. 05	Entry into force of the Japan-Italy Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)			Apr. 04	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent, flies southwest over the Sea of Japan, change course off Kyogamisaki, and flies northwest toward the continent
	Sep. 05	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Japan)			Apr. 09	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through waters about 50 km southwest of Tsushima, and continues northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
	Sep. 08	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (ROK)			Apr. 11	A Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, circles and turns around over the Pacific Ocean, and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island
	Sep. 09	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (ROK)			Apr. 11	A (presumed) Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan to reach the Pacific Ocean, reverses course over the Pacific Ocean, and passes again between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
	Oct. 02	FY2025 JSDF Joint Exercises (field exercise) (through October 31)			Apr. 11	Two Chinese vessels sail south through waters about 70 km west of Kume Island, and then sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Oct. 07	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference			Apr. 11	Three Chinese vessels sail southeast through waters about 130 km west of Kuchinoerabujima Island, and then continue east through the Osumi Strait toward the Pacific Ocean (through April 12)
	Oct. 09	Disaster relief operations in response to Typhoon No. 22 and No. 23 in Hachijo Town, Tokyo (through November 14)			Apr. 12	A Chinese vessel sails southeast through waters about 60 km southwest of Yokoate Island, and then sails northeast between Amami Oshima Island and Yokoate Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Oct. 21	Koizumi becomes Defense Minister			Apr. 16	A Russian vessel sails northeast through waters about 50 km west of Rebun Island, then continues east through the Soya Strait
	Oct. 29	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Japan)			Apr. 17	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent, flies over the Sea of Japan to the area off the Oki Islands, turns around, and again flies toward the continent
	Nov. 01	9th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting			Apr. 18	A Chinese vessel sails southwest through waters about 40 km northeast of Tsushima, and continues toward the East China Sea
	Nov. 01	12th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus			Apr. 22	Two Russian vessels sail west through waters about 70 km northeast of Cape Soya, then sail west through the Soya Strait
	Nov. 01	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia)			Apr. 23	Multiple Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Shandong" sail in Pacific Ocean waters, conduct take-off and landing operations of ship-borne fighter aircraft and helicopters (through April 25), and later sail toward the South China Sea (April 25)
	Nov. 01	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia)			Apr. 24	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean. After turning around over the main island of Okinawa, it returns and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Nov. 01	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia)			Apr. 24	A Chinese TB-001 reconnaissance/attack unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, flies south of the main island of Okinawa over the Pacific to off Tokunoshima Island, turns around, and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island
	Nov. 01	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia)			Apr. 24	A Chinese GJ-2 reconnaissance/attack unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, flies off the coast of the main island of Okinawa, turns around, and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island
	Nov. 01	Japan-U.S.-Australia-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia)			Apr. 27	A (presumed) Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the Pacific Ocean, and passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
	Nov. 02	Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia)			Apr. 29	A Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, circles and turns around over the Pacific Ocean, and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island
	Nov. 02	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia)			Apr. 29	A (presumed) Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea and passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
	Nov. 03	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia)			Apr. 30	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and reaches the Pacific Ocean. After turning around over the Pacific Ocean, it returns and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
	Nov. 07	Cabinet decision on continuation of counter-piracy mission			May 01	Two Chinese vessels sail south through waters about 80 km southwest of Kume Island, and continue south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Nov. 07	Change of Cabinet Decision on the Government's Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East (through November 19, 2026)			May 03	A helicopter, which took off from a China Coast Guard vessel that violated Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands, violates Japanese territorial airspace
	Nov. 15	FY2025 Japan-Australia-U.S. Tomodachi Rescue Exercise/Remote Island Disaster Exercise (TREX/RIDEX)				
	Nov. 17	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting				
	Nov. 19	Disaster relief operations in response to a large fire in Saganoseki, Oita City, Oita Prefecture (through November 26)				
	Nov. 22	FY2025 Joint eXercise Overseas (JXO) (through December 10)				
	Nov. 25	Japan-U.K.-Italy Trilateral Defense Ministerial Video Conference				
	Dec. 04	Japan-Greece Defense Ministerial Meeting (Japan)				
	Dec. 05	Disaster relief operations in response to the capsizing of a fishing boat off the southern coast of Miyakojima Island, Okinawa Prefecture (through December 7)				
	Dec. 07	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Japan)				
	Dec. 08	Disaster relief operations in response to a forest fire in Tomioka City, Gunma Prefecture (through December 10)				
	Dec. 09	Disaster relief operations related to the transportation of patients due to an earthquake off the eastern coast of Aomori Prefecture (through December 11)				
	Dec. 10	Disaster relief operations in response to a forest fire on Mount Hinata, Isehara City, Kanagawa Prefecture (through December 12)				
	Dec. 10	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference				
	Dec. 17	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference				
	Dec. 18	Signing of the Japan-Netherlands Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)				
	Dec. 18	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference				
	Dec. 19	Signing of the Japan-New Zealand Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)				
	Dec. 19	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Japan)				
	Dec. 22	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference				
	Dec. 26	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Video Teleconference				

Year	Defense	Domestic	International	
			May 04	A Chinese vessel sails northwest through waters about 110 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
			May 04	A Chinese vessel sails north through waters about 60 km southwest of Yonaguni Island, and then continues north through waters about 80 km west of Uotsurijima Island (through May 5)
			May 08	North Korea launches multiple ballistic missiles
			May 15	A Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, circles and turns around over the Pacific Ocean, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			May 16	Five Chinese vessels sail south through waters about 100 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
			May 25	Multiple Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail in waters of the East China Sea, conduct take-off and landing operations of ship-borne fighter aircraft and helicopters (through May 26), advance southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island (May 27), head toward the Pacific, conduct take-off and landing operations of ship-borne fighter aircraft and helicopters (through May 29), and then sail south over the Pacific (May 30)
			May 26	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast through waters about 140 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
			May 29	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast through waters about 120 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
			Jun. 02	A (presumed) Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan to reach the Pacific Ocean, circles and turns around over the Pacific Ocean, and again passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
			Jun. 04	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast through waters about 50 km southwest of the Kusagaki Islands, and continue east through the Osumi Strait toward the Pacific Ocean (through June 5)
			Jun. 04	A Russian vessel sails northeast through waters about 40 km northwest of the Oki Islands, moves east within Japan's contiguous zone northeast of the Oki Islands, sails northeast within the contiguous zone north of Sado Island (June 6), and then continues east through the Soya Strait (June 8)
			Jun. 05	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast through waters about 120 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
			Jun. 07	Multiple Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail in the Pacific Ocean waters, conduct take-off and landing operations of ship-borne fighter aircraft and helicopters (June 8–19), and later advance northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and sail toward the East China Sea (June 20)
			Jun. 07	Multiple Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Shandong" sail in Pacific Ocean waters, conduct take-off and landing operations of ship-borne fighter aircraft and helicopters (June 9–22), and later sail toward the South China Sea (June 23)
			Jun. 07	An incident occurs in which a Chinese military J-15 fighter-bomber makes an unusual close approach to an MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft conducting warning and surveillance over the high seas of the Pacific Ocean
			Jun. 08	An incident occurred in which a Chinese military J-15 fighter-bomber made an unusual close approach to an MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft conducting warning and surveillance over the high seas of the Pacific Ocean
			Jun. 10	A Chinese vessel sails east through waters about 60 km west of Kuchinoerabujima Island, and then continues east through the Osumi Strait toward the Pacific Ocean
			Jun. 12	Four Russian vessels sail northeast through waters about 50 km northwest of Rebun Island, then continue east through the Soya Strait
			Jun. 13	Three Russian vessels sail north through waters about 60 km south of Yonaguni Island, and then sail northeast between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the East China Sea
			Jun. 14	Two Russian vessels sail northeast through waters about 120 km west of Cape Soya, then continue east through the Soya Strait
			Jun. 15	Three Russian vessels sail northeast through waters about 100 km southwest of Tsushima, and then sail northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
			Jun. 21	North Korea holds the 12th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK (through June 23)
			Jun. 22	Four Chinese vessels sail northwest through waters about 110 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
			Jun. 25	A Russian vessel sails west through waters about 30 km north of Cape Soya, and then sails west through the Soya Strait. In addition, a Russian vessel sails west in waters about 40 km north of Cape Soya, and three Russian vessels sail west in waters about 30 km north of Cape Soya and continue west through the Soya Strait (through June 26)
			Jun. 26	A (presumed) Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan to reach the Pacific Ocean, turn around over the Pacific Ocean, and again passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
			Jun. 26	A (presumed) Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the Pacific Ocean and passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
			Jun. 28	A Chinese vessel sails south through waters about 70 km southwest of Kume Island, and continues southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
			Jun. 30	A Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, circles and turns around over the Pacific Ocean, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
			Jun. 30	A Chinese BZK-005 reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, turns around, and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island
			Jul. 02	A (presumed) Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan to reach the Pacific Ocean, turn around over the Pacific Ocean, and again passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
			Jul. 02	A (presumed) Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea and passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
			Jul. 02	Two Chinese vessels sail south through waters about 80 km west of Uotsurijima Island, continue south through the strait between Uotsurijima Island and Taiwan, and later sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea (July 6)
			Jul. 09	An incident occurs in which a Chinese military JH-7 fighter-bomber makes an unusual close approach to an ASDF YS-11EB intelligence-gathering aircraft conducting warning and surveillance over the high seas of the East China Sea
			Jul. 10	An incident occurs in which a Chinese military JH-7 fighter-bomber makes an unusual close approach to an ASDF YS-11EB intelligence-gathering aircraft conducting warning and surveillance over the high seas of the East China Sea
			Jul. 13	A (presumed) Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the Pacific Ocean, circles the area between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, and then flies toward the East China Sea
			Jul. 15	A (presumed) Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the Pacific Ocean and passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
			Jul. 15	A Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, flies off the coast of Yonaguni Island over the Pacific Ocean, circles and turns around, and passes again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island
			Jul. 16	A (presumed) Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea and passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
			Jul. 16	A (presumed) Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan to reach the Pacific Ocean, turn around over the Pacific Ocean, and again passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
			Jul. 22	A Chinese vessel sails west through waters about 130 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
			Jul. 24	A Chinese vessel sails east through waters about 330 km west of the Goto Islands, and continues northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
			Jul. 24	Three Chinese vessels sail northeast through waters about 90 km west of the Goto Islands, and continue northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
			Jul. 29	A Russian IL-38 patrol aircraft flies from the continent, flies southwest over the Sea of Japan from west of Hokkaido, circles over the Sea of Japan, and then heads north toward the continent
			Aug. 01	A Chinese vessel sails north through waters about 120 km east of Miyakojima Island, and then sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
			Aug. 02	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast through waters about 90 km southwest of Kume Island, and continue southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
			Aug. 02	Three Russian vessels sail east through waters about 70 km northwest of Rebun Island, then continue east through the Soya Strait (through August 3)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
					Aug. 02	A Russian vessel sails south through waters about 50 km west of Okushiri Island, continues south through Japan's contiguous zone west of Okushiri Island and southwest of Oshima-Oshima Island, and then sails east through the Tsugaru Strait toward the Pacific Ocean (through August 10)
					Aug. 05	A Chinese vessel sails south through waters about 70 km west of Kume Island, and then sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Aug. 07	A (presumed) Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan to reach the Pacific Ocean, circles and turn around over the Pacific Ocean, and passes again between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
					Aug. 07	Three Chinese and Russian vessels sail northeast through waters about 320 km northwest of Okushiri Island, then continue east through the Soya Strait (through August 8)
					Aug. 10	Two Chinese vessels sail northwest through waters about 140 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
					Aug. 11	A Chinese vessel sails northwest through waters about 70 km northeast of Tanegashima Island, and then sails west through the Osumi Strait toward the East China Sea
					Aug. 12	Two Russian vessels sail east through waters about 70 km northwest of Rebun Island, then continue east through the Soya Strait
					Aug. 13	Two Chinese vessels sail southwest through waters about 60 km northeast of Tsushima, and continue southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea
					Aug. 14	A Russian vessel sails west through waters about 50 km northeast of Cape Shiriya, and then sails west through the Tsugaru Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through August 15)
					Aug. 14	Three Russian vessels sail southwest about 90 km east of Tsushima, and then continue southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea (through August 15)
					Aug. 17	A Russian vessel sails west through waters about 40 km northeast of Cape Soya, then sails west through the Soya Strait
					Aug. 19	Two Russian Tu-95 bombers and two fighter aircraft fly from the continent, fly southeast over the Sea of Japan, change course northeast off Sado Island in Niigata Prefecture, and then fly along the vicinity of Japan's territorial airspace
					Aug. 20	Three Russian vessels sail northeast through waters about 120 km southwest of Tsushima, and then continue northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through August 21)
					Aug. 21	A Russian vessel sails east about 50 km southwest of Oshima-Oshima Island and continues east through the Tsugaru Strait, then advances northeast in the contiguous zone south of Cape Erimo and heads toward the Pacific Ocean (through August 22)
					Aug. 29	Two Russian vessels sail northwest through waters about 70 km east of Cape Shiriya, then continue west through the Tsugaru Strait toward the Sea of Japan
					Aug. 31	Two Chinese vessels sail northwest through waters about 120 km east of Miyakojima Island, and continue northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
					Sep. 06	A Russian vessel sails northeast through waters about 50 km west of Rebun Island, then continues east through the Soya Strait (through September 7)
					Sep. 07	A Russian vessel sails northeast through waters about 170 km southwest of Rebun Island, then continues east through the Soya Strait
					Sep. 08	Two Russian vessels sail west through waters about 40 km northeast of Cape Soya, then sail west through the Soya Strait
					Sep. 09	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through waters about 170 km west of Kuchinoerabujima Island, continues east through the Osumi Strait, and then sails toward the Pacific Ocean (through September 10)
					Sep. 09	A Russian vessel sails southwest through waters about 50 km east of Miyake Island, continues south within the contiguous zone of Miyake Island, and proceeds southwest in the waters between Mikura Island and Hachijojima Island. It then sails southwest through waters including Japan's contiguous zone extending from east to south of the main island of Okinawa, continues northwest through waters including Japan's contiguous zone south of the main island of Okinawa, and proceeds northwest through Japan's contiguous zone southwest of Kume Island toward the East China Sea (through September 15)
					Sep. 11	Three Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Fujian" sail southwest in waters about 200 km northwest of Uotsurijima Island
					Sep. 13	A (presumed) Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan to reach the Pacific Ocean, turn around over the Pacific Ocean, and passes again between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
					Sep. 13	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast through waters about 120 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Sep. 14	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast through waters about 100 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Sep. 15	A (presumed) Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan to reach the Pacific Ocean, turn around over the Pacific Ocean, and passes again between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
					Sep. 15	A Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft flies from the East China Sea, passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, circles and turns around over the Pacific Ocean, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again
					Sep. 16	A Chinese vessel sails north through waters about 110 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sails north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
					Sep. 16	Four Russian vessels sail west through waters 30 km north of Cape Soya, then continue west through the Soya Strait
					Sep. 16	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through waters about 80 km south of Tsushima, and continues northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through September 17)
					Sep. 17	Two Chinese vessels sail northeast through waters about 140 km southwest of Tsushima, and continues northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
					Sep. 20	A Chinese vessel sails southeast through waters about 90 km southwest of Kume Island, and continues southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Sep. 22	Three Chinese vessels sail northeast through waters about 50 km northwest of Rebun Island, then continue east through the Soya Strait (through September 23)
					Sep. 23	A Russian vessel sails northeast through waters about 130 km southwest of Tsushima, and continues northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through September 24)
					Sep. 24	Three Russian vessels sail west through waters about 40 km northeast of Cape Soya, then sail west through the Soya Strait
					Sep. 28	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through waters about 130 km southwest of Tsushima, and continues northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through September 29)
					Oct. 03	Three Russian vessels sail southwest through waters about 80 km northeast of Tsushima, and continue southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea
					Oct. 03	A Russian vessel sails southwest through waters about 90 km northeast of Tsushima, sails southwest through the Tsushima Strait, and then sails south between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean (through October 6)
					Oct. 04	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through waters about 60 km southwest of Cape Tappi, and continues east through the Tsugaru Strait toward the Pacific Ocean
					Oct. 05	Three Russian vessels sail southwest through waters about 60 km northwest of Iriomote Island, and then sail southwest between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the Pacific Ocean (through October 6)
					Oct. 10	Three Chinese vessels sail northwest through waters about 200 km southeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail north between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
					Oct. 10	A Russian IL-20 intelligence-gathering aircraft flies from the direction of Sakhalin, flies over the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk, then turn around and flies from the Sea of Japan toward Sakhalin
					Oct. 10	North Korea conducts a military parade
					Oct. 13	Three Chinese vessels sail southeast through waters about 130 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Oct. 17	Three Chinese vessels sail northwest through waters about 130 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
					Oct. 18	A Chinese vessel sails east through waters about 80 km west of Kuchinoerabujima Island, and then continues east through the Osumi Strait toward the Pacific Ocean (through October 19)
					Oct. 19	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through waters about 40 km west of Kuchinoerabujima Island, and then continues east through the Osumi Strait toward the Pacific Ocean
					Oct. 22	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
					Oct. 24	Two Russian Tu-95 bombers and two Su-35 fighter aircraft fly from the continent, fly southeast over the Sea of Japan, change course northeast off Sado Island in Niigata Prefecture, and then fly along the vicinity of Japan's territorial airspace

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
					Oct. 25	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent, flies southwest over the Sea of Japan, changes course off Kyogamisaki in Kyoto Prefecture, and flies northwest toward the continent
					Oct. 27	Two Chinese vessels sail south through waters about 80 km west of Kume Island, and continue southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Oct. 29	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent to the Pacific Ocean via the Sea of Okhotsk, then flies south as far as off the coast of Iwate Prefecture, reverses course, and flies toward the Sea of Japan via the Sea of Okhotsk
					Oct. 31	A Chinese vessel sails west through waters about 70 km southeast of Cape Toi, and continues west through the Osumi Strait toward the East China Sea
					Nov. 04	A Chinese vessel sails west through waters about 60 km east of Tanegashima Island, and then sails west through the Osumi Strait toward the East China Sea
					Nov. 05	China's third aircraft carrier, "Fujian," is commissioned in Sanya, Hainan Island
					Nov. 07	North Korea launches a ballistic missile
					Nov. 08	A Chinese vessel sails east through waters about 70 km west of Kuchinoerabujima Island, and then continues east through the Osumi Strait toward the Pacific Ocean
					Nov. 11	A Chinese vessel sails east through waters about 120 km west of Kuchinoerabujima Island, and then continues east through the Osumi Strait toward the Pacific Ocean
					Nov. 11	Two Chinese vessels sail east through waters about 60 km west of Kuchinoerabujima Island, and then continue east through the Osumi Strait toward the Pacific Ocean
					Nov. 15	A (presumed) Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan to reach the Pacific Ocean, turn around over the Pacific Ocean, and passes again between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
					Nov. 24	A (presumed) Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle flies from the East China Sea, passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan, flies toward the Pacific Ocean, and then again passes between Yonaguni Island and Taiwan
					Dec. 05	Three Chinese vessels sail northwest through waters about 120 km east of Miyakojima Island, and continue northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
					Dec. 05	Multiple Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" sail in waters of the East China Sea, advance southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island (December 6), head toward the Pacific Ocean, conduct take-off and landing operations of ship-borne fighter aircraft and helicopters (December 6–12), and then sail northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific (December 12)
					Dec. 06	An incident occurs in which a J-15 fighter aircraft, which took off from the Chinese Navy aircraft carrier "Liaoning," conducted radar illumination intermittently against ASDF F-15 fighters which carried out countermeasures against the airspace violation by said aircraft in airspace over international waters southeast of the main island of Okinawa
					Dec. 08	A Chinese vessel sails east through waters about 80 km west of Kuchinoerabujima Island, and then continues east through the Osumi Strait toward the Pacific Ocean
					Dec. 09	Two Russian Tu-95 bombers, which flew from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea, join two Chinese H-6 bombers over the East China Sea, and then carry out joint flights over a long distance from the East China Sea over the Pacific Ocean as far as off the coast of Shikoku. Four Chinese J-16 fighter aircraft are also confirmed to have joined the bombers as they made a round trip through the airspace between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island. In addition, one Russian A-50 early warning and control aircraft and two Russian Su-30 fighter aircraft are also confirmed over the Sea of Japan
					Dec. 09	North Korea holds the 13th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK (through December 11)
					Dec. 10	A Chinese vessel sails west through waters about 70 km east of Tanegashima Island, and then sails west through the Osumi Strait toward the East China Sea
					Dec. 10	A Chinese vessel sails northwest through waters about 140 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
					Dec. 12	A Chinese vessel sails northwest through waters about 120 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
					Dec. 18	A Russian vessel sails northeast through waters about 120 km south of Yonaguni Island, and then sails northeast between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the East China Sea
					Dec. 21	A Russian vessel sails northeast through waters about 130 km southwest of Tsushima, and continues northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
					Dec. 27	A Chinese vessel sails southeast through waters about 110 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean, and then sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea (through December 30)
					Dec. 28	A Russian vessel sails northwest in waters about 160 km east of Miyakojima Island, continues northwest through waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, sails within Japan's contiguous zone near Kume Island, and then continues northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through December 30)
					Dec. 28	A Chinese vessel sails southeast through waters about 130 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean, and then sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea (through December 30)
					Dec. 29	Two Chinese H-6 bombers, two J-16 fighter aircraft, two Y-9 intelligence-gathering aircraft, and two (presumed) Chinese (presumed) fighter aircraft fly from the East China Sea, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, and then pass again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island
					Dec. 30	A Chinese vessel sails north through waters about 80 km east of Miyakojima Island, and then sails northwest between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the East China Sea
2026	Jan. 08	Disaster relief operations in response to a forest fire on Mount Ogiyama, Uenohara City, Yamanashi Prefecture (through January 21)	Jan. 02	Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk	Jan. 04	North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
	Jan. 11	Disaster relief operations in response to a forest fire in Hadano City, Kanagawa Prefecture (through January 13)	Jan. 13	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting (Japan)	Jan. 07	A Russian vessel sails southwest through waters about 80 km northeast of Tsushima, and continues southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea
	Jan. 15	Signing of the Japan-Philippines Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)	Jan. 16	Japan-Italy Summit Meeting (Japan)	Jan. 12	A Russian vessel sails southeast through waters about 60 km northwest of Yonaguni Island, continues northeast through Japan's contiguous zone extending from southwest to north of Yonaguni Island, sails through waters including the contiguous zone extending from north to south of Miyakojima Island, and continues toward the Pacific Ocean (through January 15)
	Jan. 15	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (U.S.)	Jan. 31	Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Japan)	Jan. 17	A Russian vessel sails north through waters about 60 km southwest of Yonaguni Island, continues north through Japan's contiguous zone extending from southwest to northwest of Yonaguni Island, and sails east through the contiguous zone north of Miyakojima Island. It then sails east through the waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, continues through the contiguous zone extending from south to east of the main island of Okinawa, and continues toward the Pacific Ocean (through January 19)
	Jan. 17	Disaster relief operations in response to a forest fire in Fujieda City, Shizuoka Prefecture (through January 23)	Feb. 24	Japan-Germany Summit Telephone Talk		
	Jan. 25	Disaster relief operations in response to a forest fire in Fujioka City, Gunma Prefecture (through January 28)	Mar. 06	Japan-Canada Summit Meeting (Japan)	Jan. 20	A Russian vessel sails west through waters about 70 km east of the main island of Okinawa, and continues through waters including Japan's contiguous zone extending from east to southeast of the main island of Okinawa. It then sails through waters including the contiguous zone extending from southeast of the main island of Okinawa to northwest of Kume Island, continues northeast through the Tsushima Strait, and sails toward the Sea of Japan (through January 26)
	Jan. 27	Signing of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Canada concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology	Mar. 11	G7 Leaders' Online Meeting		
	Jan. 29	Japan-U.S. joint exercise 2025 (command post exercise) (through February 5)	Mar. 13	Japan-Bhutan Summit Meeting (Japan)	Jan. 21	Two Russian Tu-95 bombers and two fighter aircraft fly from the continent, fly east over the Sea of Japan, turn around off of Shimane Prefecture, and fly north toward the continent Later, two Russian Tu-95 bombers fly in again from the continent, and fly northeast off the western coast of Hokkaido. Furthermore, two Russian Tu-95 bombers and two fighter aircraft fly from the continent, fly southeast over the Sea of Japan, turn around off the Noto Peninsula in Ishikawa Prefecture, and fly northwest toward the continent
	Jan. 30	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Japan)	Mar. 19	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (U.S.)		
	Feb. 01	Disaster relief operations in response to heavy snowfall in Aomori City, Aomori Prefecture (through February 9)				
	Feb. 03	Signing and entry into force of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Bangladesh concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology			Jan. 23	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent, flies southwest over the Sea of Japan, changes course off the coast of Kyoto Prefecture, and flies northwest toward the continent
	Feb. 06	Disaster relief operations in response to a forest fire in Chichibu City, Saitama Prefecture (through February 10)			Jan. 24	A Chinese vessel sails southeast through waters about 120 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
					Jan. 26	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent to the Pacific Ocean via the Sea of Okhotsk, then flies south as far as off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture, turns around, and flies toward the Sea of Japan via the Sea of Okhotsk
	Feb. 09	Disaster relief operations in response to heavy snowfall in Uonuma City, Niigata Prefecture (through February 11)			Jan. 27	North Korea launches at least two ballistic missiles
	Feb. 13	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Germany)			Jan. 27	A Chinese vessel sails southeast through waters about 150 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Feb. 13	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Germany)			Jan. 28	A Chinese vessel sails southeast through waters about 130 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sails southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Feb. 13	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Germany)			Jan. 28	Two Chinese vessels sail southeast through waters about 140 km northeast of Miyakojima Island, and then sail southeast between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Feb. 13	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Germany)			Feb. 01	A Russian vessel sails southeast through waters about 130 km southwest of Cape Tappi, and continues east through the Tsugaru Strait toward the Pacific Ocean
	Feb. 14	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Germany)			Feb. 04	A Russian vessel sails west through waters about 50 km northeast of Cape Shiriya, and then sails west through the Tsugaru Strait toward the Sea of Japan
	Feb. 14	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Germany)				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
	Feb. 14	Meeting between Defense Minister Koizumi and High Representative of the EU Kallas			Feb. 06	Milano Cortina Olympic Games (through February 22)
	Feb. 20	Disaster relief operations in response to a forest fire in Hitachiota City, Ibaraki Prefecture (through February 24)			Feb. 11	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent to the Pacific Ocean via the Sea of Okhotsk, then flies south as far as off the coast of Iwate Prefecture, turns around, and flies toward the Sea of Japan via the Sea of Okhotsk
	Feb. 21	Disaster relief operations in response to a forest fire in Kanuma City, Tochigi Prefecture (through February 25)			Feb. 14	Three Russian vessels sail southwest through waters about 90 km northeast of Tsushima, and continue southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the Pacific Ocean
	Feb. 22	Japan-Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (Japan) (through February 24)			Feb. 16	Three Russian vessels sail southwest in the waters between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Feb. 23	FY2025 Japan-U.S. Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense (Defensive) Exercise (through February 26)			Feb. 16	A Russian IL-20 intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the continent, flies over the Sea of Japan to the area off Shimane Prefecture, turns around, and flies toward the continent
	Feb. 23	Japan-Tonga Defense Ministerial Meeting (Japan)			Feb. 19	North Korea holds the 9th Congress of the KWP (through February 25)
	Feb. 23	Japan-Papua New Guinea Defense Ministerial Meeting (Japan)			Feb. 25	North Korea conducts a military parade
	Feb. 23	Japan-Fiji Defense Ministerial Meeting (Japan)			Feb. 28	Two Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft fly from the East China Sea, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean, fly as far as off the Amami Islands, turn around, and pass again between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island
	Mar. 06	Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Japan)			Feb. 28	Attacks between the United States/Israel and Iran begin
	Mar. 17	Disaster relief operations in response to a forest fire in Hokuto City, Yamanashi Prefecture (through March 19)			Mar. 05	Three Russian vessels sail southwest through waters about 60 km northeast of Tsushima, and continue southwest through the Tsushima Strait toward the East China Sea (through March 6)
	Mar. 21	Disaster relief operations in response to a forest fire in Ueno Village, Tano District, Gunma Prefecture (through March 25)			Mar. 09	Three Russian vessels sail southwest through waters about 50 km north of Iriomote Island, and then sail southwest between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the Pacific Ocean
	Mar. 22	Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Japan)			Mar. 14	North Korea launches multiple ballistic missiles
	Mar. 24	Disaster relief operations in response to a forest fire in Higashine City, Yamagata Prefecture (through March 26)			Mar. 15	A Russian vessel sails northeast through waters about 70 km south of Yonaguni Island, and then sails northeast between Yonaguni Island and Iriomote Island toward the East China Sea
					Mar. 17	A Russian vessel sails northeast about 110 km southwest of Tsushima, and continues northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through March 18)
					Mar. 27	Two Russian Tu-142 patrol aircraft fly from the Pacific Ocean, fly over the Sea of Okhotsk and through the airspace over the Sea of Japan as far as off the coast of Akita Prefecture, turn around, and fly toward the continent
					Mar. 27	A Russian vessel sails east through waters about 120 km west of Cape Tappi, continues east through Japan's contiguous zone around the Tsugaru Strait, reverses course in waters about 50 km southwest of Cape Tappi, continues west through the Tsugaru Strait, and sails toward the Sea of Japan (through March 28)
					Mar. 28	A Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft flies over the East China Sea
					Mar. 29	A Chinese vessel sails northeast through waters about 80 km southwest of Tsushima, and continues northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan
					Mar. 30	Three Chinese vessels sail northeast through waters about 80 km northwest of the Goto Islands, and continue northeast through the Tsushima Strait toward the Sea of Japan (through March 31)