NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

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Objectives of National Defense Strategy

The most consequential responsibility of the Government of Japan is to resolutely defend to the end the lives of Japanese nationals and their peaceful livelihood as well as Japan’s territorial land, waters and airspace and it is the very heart of Japan’s national security.

Since the end of World War II (WWII), in the face of the Cold War as well as the dramatic changes in the security environment that ensued its ending, Japan has preserved peace and security for 77 years by: enhancing its diplomatic strength and defense capability and expanding and deepening cooperation with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being the key pillar. In so doing, adhering under the Constitution to the basic precepts of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses threats to other countries, Japan has ensured civilian control of the military and observed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Japan under these basic precepts will not ever change the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation.

As Russia’s aggression against Ukraine attests, the international community, of which Japan is a member, is facing serious challenges, and has entered into a new crisis. China continues to advance its unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. North Korea escalates its activities as it launches ballistic missiles at an unprecedented high frequency, and pursues further miniaturization of its nuclear weapons. Russia has launched an aggression against Ukraine while its military activities in the Far East have been trending upward. Given the foregoing, in the future one cannot rule out the possibility of serious events taking place in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in East Asia, that might shake the foundation of the stable post-war international order. As Japan is situated on the very frontline of these trends, it is no exaggeration to say the future shape of Japan’s security and defense policy has a direct link to the peace and stability of the region and the international community.

The fact that Russia, a permanent member of the United Nation Security Council (hereinafter referred to as the “UNSC”), has launched an aggression against Ukraine, tells us that maintaining Japan’s own sovereignty and independence can be achieved through its own independent and voluntary efforts, and that it is important to expand the role Japan can play to avoid inviting foreign aggression. In today’s circumstance, no country can now protect its own security alone. As challenges to the post-war international order continue, it is critical for Japan to deepen cooperation and collaboration with its ally and like-minded countries with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests. For this cooperation and collaboration to produce meaningful results, Japan must strengthen its own efforts more than ever before, and our ally, like-minded countries and others also expect Japan to play a role commensurate with its national strength. Japan, its ally, like-minded countries and others are called upon to not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts through further synergistic effects from common efforts.
Amid the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII, Japan needs to squarely face the grim reality and fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities, with a focus on opponent capabilities and new ways of warfare, to protect the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals. Japan also needs to strengthen Japan’s architecture for national defense that integrates various elements of national power. Thinking strategically, Japan should promote these two lines of effort as a coherent whole. It is this undertaking that provides the way forward to bolster Japan’s deterrence capabilities and further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and which forms the foundation of security cooperation with like-minded countries and others.

The United States this year devised a new National Defense Strategy. It is therefore timely for Japan and the United States to align their respective strategies and promote defense cooperation in an integrated manner.

Based on this recognition, the Government hereby finalizes the National Defense Strategy (hereinafter referred to as “NDS”) to comprehensively present Japan’s defense objectives, approaches and means by which Japan accomplishes those objectives. The NDS replaces the National Defense Program Guidelines (hereinafter referred to as “NDPG”), which have served as Japan’s basic guidelines for development, sustainment and operation of defense capability with the Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as “SDF”) as its core and formulated six times since 1976.

The policies concerning the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and the levels of defense buildup that underpin it, which have been decided by the Government through the NDS and “Defense Buildup Program” (“DBP,” approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 16, 2022), represent a major turning point for post-war defense policy. By formulating this Strategy, which provides mid- to long-term directions and a breakdown of the reinforcement of defense capabilities, the Government will make efforts to deepen the Japanese public’s understanding about the significance of this major turning point.

II Changes in the Strategic Environment and Defense Challenges

1 Changes in the strategic environment

Following the development of information society and the expansion of international trade, economic and culture interactions among states further expand and deepen. On the other hand, states that do not share universal values or political and economic systems based on these values are expanding their influence. Unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts represent significant challenges to the free and open international order underpinned by the rule of law. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has revealed this in a most blatant way. The international community is facing the greatest post-war trial yet, and has entered a new era of crisis.

In addition, the global power balance has significantly changed and interstate competition
across the political, economy and military spheres is emerging. Such trends are especially notable in the Indo-Pacific region, where China has been continuing and amplifying its unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts. Not only China but also North Korea and Russia have further intensified their activities.

As the interstate competition between China and the United States in particular is expected to further intensify in various fields, the United States has presented a view that the next ten years will be the decisive decade for its competition with China.

Rapid advances in science and technology are fundamentally changing the paradigm of security. Countries are striving to develop cutting-edge technologies that could dramatically alter the character of warfare and thus prove to become “game changers.” China in particular has been rapidly promoting accelerated technological innovation and its application for military purposes under the name of the "military-civilian integration strategy": China is notably accelerating military capability development premised on unmanned assets that leverage artificial intelligence (AI). These trends are resulting in fundamental changes to the way the military is organized as well as the way warfare is prosecuted.

In addition, there exist a range of global security challenges such as increasingly serious risks in cyber and other domains, the expansion of information warfare including the spread of disinformation, and climate change.

2 Military trends of Japan’s neighboring countries and regions

In the report to the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2017 (hereinafter referred to as “NCCPC”), China sets the goals of "basically completing modernization of national defense and the military” by 2035 and building “a world-class forces” by the middle of this century. And in the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Communist Party of China Central Committee in 2020, the achievement of “the centenary goal of the People’s Liberation Army” by 2027 was added as a target. In a report to the NCCPC in 2022, it was newly stated that elevating the People’s Liberation Army to a “world-class standards” at an early stage is a strategic task for fully building “a modern socialist country.” With these goals in mind, China calls for a “new system for mobilizing resources nationwide,” promotes integrated development of “mechanization, informatization and the application of smart technologies” and thereby extensively and rapidly enhancing its military capability in a qualitative and quantitative manner. China defines the next five years as the crucial period to start the full-scale construction of a “modern socialist country.”

China’s published national defense expenditures exceeded Japan’s defense-related expenditures for the first time in Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 and has since increased at a rapid pace, reaching in FY2022 approximately 4.8 times of Japan’s defense-related expenditure. China’s published national defense expenditures are assessed to represent only a portion of actual amount spent for military purposes. Supported by the rapid growth of defense
expenditures, China now possesses modern naval and air assets in larger numbers than does Japan. China is strengthening its capabilities in new domains including the space and cyber. Regarding nuclear forces, it appears highly likely that China intends to possess at least 1,000 deliverable nuclear warheads by the end of the 2020s. With respect to missile forces, China, a non-signatory to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, has deployed numerous surface-launched intermediate-range missiles, which the INF Treaty covered. China is also operationalizing anti-ship ballistic missiles and long-range land-attack cruise missiles, and developing and deploying hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV). These efforts are aimed at improving military capabilities to deny foreign military’s access to, and deployment in, China’s surrounding areas as well as to impede foreign military activities in those areas (the so-called anti-access/area-denial, or “A2/AD” capability). China also continues to develop and deploy unmanned assets. Increased activities of unmanned assets have been confirmed in Japan’s surrounding areas.

Backed by these military capabilities, China has been intensifying its activities across the entire region surrounding Japan, including in the East China Sea, particularly in the areas around the Senkaku Islands, the Sea of Japan, and the western Pacific Ocean including areas around the Izu and Ogasawara Islands, extending beyond the so-called first island chain to the second island chain. China is increasing military pressure on Taiwan. In the South China Sea, it continues to entrench its military foothold.

Chinese naval ships are intensifying their activities in waters around the Senkaku Islands. Under such circumstances, China Coast Guard ships repeatedly make intrusion into Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. Chinese navy vessels have been seen navigating in Japan's territorial waters and contiguous zones around Japan’s southwestern islands.

Regarding Taiwan, the report to NCCPC in 2022 reiterated that China “will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force.” At the same time, the report also stated that “we have thus maintained the initiative and the ability to steer in cross-Strait relations,” and “complete reunification of our country must be realized, and it can, without doubt, be realized.” In recent years, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is rapidly tilting in China’s favor, and China has been intensifying military activities around Taiwan. It is believed that through the series of activities around Taiwan, China seeks to create a fait accompli where Chinese military is continuously operating, and improve its actual combat capabilities. Moreover, China has launched nine ballistic missiles in August 4, 2022, five of which landed within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This was perceived as a threat to local residents. China thus has intensified its coercive military activities around Taiwan, and concerns about the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait are rapidly growing not only in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan but also in the entire international community.
China’s current external stance, military activities, and other activities have become a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan and the peace and stability of the international community, as well as in strengthening the international order based on the rule of law, to which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power including defense capabilities and in cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others.

In order to maintain its regime, North Korea has concentrated its efforts on enhancing its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles. It is assessed that North Korea already possesses the technological capabilities to mount a nuclear warhead on its ballistic missiles, whose range includes Japan and is able to attack Japan with such a missile. Regarding ballistic missiles, a delivery means of WMDs, North Korea is rapidly improving its related technologies and operational capabilities by, for example, diversifying launch modes. In particular, North Korea in recent years has been seemingly aiming to complicate indication and warning, detection, and interception of its missiles, by pursuing the operationalization of ballistic missiles that can fly at low altitudes with irregular trajectories as well as by launching these missiles from various platforms such as Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TEL), submarines and trains. North Korea appears to be advancing its research and development setting its priorities to attain “hypersonic gliding flight warheads” and “solid fuel-propelled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)” with a range covering the U.S. mainland among other things, which renews concerns over its future technological advancements. These nuclear and missile developments and others by North Korea violate a series of UNSC resolutions and others, and significantly undermine the peace, stability and security of the region and the international community. North Korea’s military activities pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has shaken the very foundation of the international order and is perceived as the most significant and direct threat to defense in the European region. As for the areas surrounding Japan, the Russian forces are also accelerating their military activities including through the deployment of newer-model equipment and implementation of large-scale military exercises in the Far East region including the Northern Territories. In recent years, Russia has ramped up its military coordination with China by conducting activities such as joint navigation of their naval vessels and joint flights of their bombers. Russia’s military activities in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, together with its strategic coordination with China, are of strong concern from a defense perspective.

In case that these activities are conducted simultaneously in the Indo-Pacific region, it would be necessary to take a close look at what implication they would have for the region.

3 Defense challenges
An unprecedented situation is unfolding: Russia, a permanent member of the UNSC and a nuclear weapon state that bears primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and stability, has launched an outright aggression against Ukraine, repeatedly taken actions and sent messages that can be interpreted as threat of nuclear weapons use. This is an event that shakes the very foundation of the international order that the international community has built since the end of WWII. Such unilateral change to the status quo by force that is occurring in Europe could also occur in the Indo-Pacific region.

The military background for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was that Ukraine's defense capability against Russia was insufficient, thus failing to discourage and deter Russian aggression; Ukraine did not possess sufficient capabilities.

Also, while no country can defend its own security by itself alone, there is a renewed recognition of the importance of cooperation with allies who have the intention and capability to respond to invasions jointly to deter invasions from outside.

Also worth paying attention to in this event is that a country with strong military capability has one day come to possess the intention to launch an aggression. A threat materializes when the capability to inflict harm is combined with the intention to do so; Accurately gauging other’s intent from outside is inherently difficult. When a state’s decision-making process is opaque, there always exists conditions under which threat may materialize.

To protect one’s own country from such states, it is necessary to have deterrence capability, thereby making said states realize that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are difficult; it is also necessary to build one’s own capability, that is defense capability focusing on opponent capabilities, to discourage opponents from harboring the intention to launch an aggression.

The way of warfare has also drastically changed. In addition to the traditional forms of invasion through air, sea, and land, new ways of warfare have emerged with the combination of massive missile strike by ballistic and cruise missiles with enhanced precision strike capabilities, hybrid warfare including information warfare such as false-flag operations, asymmetric attacks leveraging the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains and with unmanned assets, and public remarks by nuclear powers that could be interpreted as threat using nuclear weapons. Whether or not to be able to respond to these new ways of warfare is a major challenge in building future defense capabilities.

Surrounded by seas and with long coastlines, Japan possesses numerous islands remote from the mainland and is endowed with a vast EEZ and continental shelves: spread widely therein are the life, person, and property of the Japanese nationals, as well as its territory, territorial waters, airspace, and various natural resources, all of which Japan must defend to the end. For Japan, a maritime nation that depends on overseas trade for the majority of its resources and food, it is essential to reinforce the free and open maritime order as well as to ensure the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight.
Japan is prone to natural disasters that exact heavy damage. Industry, population, and information centers concentrate in urban areas and many critical facilities such as nuclear power plants are located in coastal areas. Protecting Japanese nationals and critical infrastructures from various threats is among Japan’s security challenges.

Japan is undergoing rapid population decline and ageing with declining birth rates. Tight fiscal conditions linger. It is essential that Japan make more efficient use of budget and labor force.

### III Japan’s Basic Defense Policy

Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor for ensuring Japan’s security. It will deter threats from extending to Japan, and in the case that a threat does reach Japan, it will be disrupted and defeated, thereby demonstrating Japan’s resolve and capability to defend itself to the end.

Since the end of WWII, Japan has consistently committed to modest and efficient development of its defense capabilities. In particular, since the formulation of the NDPG in 1976 (approved by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet on October 29, 1976), the purpose of Japan’s possessing its own defense capability had been presented as, rather than to counter specific threats, to avoid Japan’s becoming a power vacuum and thus a destabilizing factor in the region surrounding Japan.

After the end of the Cold War, SDF’s roles and missions have expanded to cover various situations including domestic and international large-scale disaster responses and International Peace Cooperation Activities. The 2010 NDPG (approved by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010) stated that defense capability development will no longer depend on the “Basic Defense Force Concept,” which placed importance on the deterrence effect form the existence of defense capability itself. The subsequent 2013 NDPG (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) called to squarely face the reality of increasingly severe security environment and to build a truly effective defense capability. Meanwhile, Japan’s neighboring countries have drastically strengthened their military capabilities, and rapidly expanded and intensified missile launches and coercive military activities, threatening the security of Japan and the region.

As these activities escalate, it is extremely difficult to predict when and how intentions will change and unilateral changes to the status quo by force will occur. It is clear from Russia's aggression against Ukraine that a unilateral change to the status quo by force causes massive human and material damage, with disruption in economy, finance, energy as well as maritime and air traffic felt not only regionally but also globally, seriously affecting people's daily lives.

To account for the foregoing, Japan must clearly demonstrate the intention that Japan will never tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts. To this end, Japan must: fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities with a focus on opponents’ capabilities and the ways they prosecute warfare; and, actively adapt to new ways of warfare. Japan cannot
engage in these efforts alone: Japan needs close cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others. This strategy thus intends to clearly define Japan’s defense objectives and present approaches and specific means to achieve those objectives, thereby ensuring all efforts will be made in an integrated manner.

- Japan’s defense objectives are as follows:
  The first objective is to shape a security environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force;
  The second objective is to deter, through cooperation with our ally, like-minded countries and others, unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts that concern Japan’s peace and security. Should such an eventuality occur, our objective is to swiftly respond in whatever ways and bring the situation under control at an early stage so that the situation would not lead to invasion of Japan;
  The third objective is, should deterrence fail and invasion of Japan occur, to rapidly respond to the invasion in a tailored and seamless manner; to take primary responsibility to deal with the aggression; and, while receiving support from the ally and others, to disrupt and defeat the invasion.
  In dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons, U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential. Japan will defend itself to the end in all situations through the combination of its own efforts to achieve the first, second and third defense objectives and extended deterrence and others provided by the United States.

- Approaches to realize Japan’s defense objectives are as follows. Specific means will be presented later in the description of respective approaches:
  The first approach is, in an effort of strengthening of Japan’s own architecture for national defense, to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities, which constitute the core of national defense, and to reinforce the defense architecture of the whole country.
  The second approach is to further reinforce joint deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by further strengthening cooperation with the United States, our ally.
  The third approach is to reinforce collaboration with like-minded countries and others with whom Japan cooperate to uphold and reinforce a free and open international order.

1 Strengthening Japan’s own architecture for national defense
   It goes without saying that the success of Japan’s national defense depends on its own efforts. Only when a country musters strong will and efforts to defend itself can it protect and support itself and its allies, etc., in times of emergency. The first approach therefore is to make renewed efforts to strengthen Japan's own architecture for national defense that integrates all aspects of national power. At the core of such efforts is the fundamental
reinforcement of defense capabilities.

(1) Fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities

Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of Japan’s security. Japan has aimed to build a defense capability that can respond to and deter a range of possible situations in a truly effective manner. More specifically, in accordance with the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 18, 2018), Japan, in order to operate seamlessly across all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies, has striven to build the Multi-Domain Defense Force, which organically fuses capabilities in space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum with those in ground, maritime and air domains and is capable of sustained and flexible activities through joint operations.

As the international community finds itself in the most challenging time since the end of WWII, Japan has explored the shape of future defense capability, considering the opponent’s capabilities as well as new ways of warfare, performing various analyses, including capability assessment, regarding responses to various possible situations. Building upon these efforts, to continue to protect the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals from unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts, Japan will fundamentally reinforce the current Multi-Domain Defense Force through further accelerated efforts.

The basic thoughts that underpin our efforts to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities are as follows:

a. First, with a fundamentally reinforced defense capability, Japan should be able to take primary responsibility to disrupt and defeat invasion against Japan. This means that Japan will possess a capability that makes the opponent realize that the goal of invasion of Japan is not achievable by military means, and that the damage the opponent will incur makes the invasion not worth the cost. In addition, if Japan possesses a defense capability to enable disrupting and defeating invasion, this capability, coupled with that of the United States, Japan’s ally, will be able to deter not only an invasion against Japan, but also deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts in the Indo-Pacific region. This will help foster a security environment where such forcible actions are not tolerated.

b. Second, a fundamentally reinforced defense capability should be able to deter invasion against Japan through activities such as: persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); training and exercises conducted as Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO); and measures against aircraft intruding into Japan’s territorial airspace. Such a defense capability should also be able to swiftly respond to and address a range of situations in a seamless manner.
Such a defense capability must come with high readiness and response capability. We need to prepare training infrastructures both inside and outside Japan; we also need a flexible work environment so that SDF can, even in the face of ever-increasing volume of peacetime operations, conduct sufficient volume of training and exercises necessary for improving the ability of SDF personnel and the proficiency of SDF units.

c. Third, a fundamentally reinforced defense capability should be able to adapt to new ways of warfare. It must operate with U.S. forces and integrate a variety of missions such as cross-domain operations, hybrid operations including information warfare, and missile interception and counterstrike. To that end, Japan first needs to identify functions and capabilities necessary for national defense, in accordance with the guidance in the National Security Strategy (NSS), NDS and DBP as well as joint operational concepts aligned with the guidance, and then determine how those capabilities should be distributed among the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces.

d. As part of the functions and capabilities required for the defense of Japan described above, Japan needs capabilities with which to disrupt and defeat invading forces over long distances, thereby deterring invasion itself. Japan therefore will strengthen “stand-off defense capabilities” and “integrated air and missile defense capabilities.” Should deterrence fail and an invasion of Japan occur, Japan would need to ensure asymmetric advantage by leveraging, in addition to these capabilities, manned as well as unmanned assets and gain superiority across domains such as underwater, surface, and air. To this end, Japan will strengthen “unmanned defense capabilities,” “cross-domain operation capabilities,” and “command and control/intelligence-related functions.”

Japan would also need to operate in a swift as well as persistent manner to crush to the opponent’s will to invade. Japan will thus strengthen “mobile deployment capabilities, civil protection,” and “sustainability and resiliency.”

e. Japan will need to promptly realize the fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities as when and how unilateral changes to the status quo occurs is hard to predict:

More specifically, by FY2027, five years after the formulation of the Strategy, Japan will strengthen its defense capability to the point where Japan is able to take primary responsibility for dealing with invasions against this nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats with the support of its ally and others. By approximately ten years from now, Japan will make further efforts to attain this defense objective and will reinforce its defense capabilities to the point where Japan is able to disrupt and defeat invasion much earlier and at places further afield.

The top priorities for the next five years are twofold: first, to maximize effective use
of its current equipment, Japan will improve operational rates, secure sufficient munitions and fuel, and accelerate investments in defense facilities for improved resiliency; and second, Japan will strengthen its core capabilities for future operations.

This defense capability development will be constantly reviewed and adapted according to the ever-evolving security environment surrounding Japan.

f. This fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities entails significant costs and a commensurate increase in personnel strength. In a way that serves to realize fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities, Japan will, while adhering to a scrap-and-build approach, optimize SDF’s organization and authorized strength as well as equipment. We will also further the ongoing efforts toward more efficient procurement, which have achieved significant cost reductions, while giving due consideration to the defense production base. In addition, to account for population decrease and declining birthrates/aging population, Japan will robustly promote automation, labor-saving and optimization.

g. The purposes of the above-mentioned fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities are none other than to not allow unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and to deter invasion against Japan.

Fundamentally reinforcing Japan’s own defense capabilities will further enhance deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; collaboration with like-minded countries will be enhanced as well. By doing so, Japan will ensure that opponent fully recognize Japan’s intention and capability, do not underestimate Japan, and do not overestimate their own capabilities, thereby deterring invasion against Japan. This is the purpose of Japan's fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities.

h. A key to deterring invasion against Japan is counterstrike capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities.

In recent years, in Japan’s surroundings, there have been dramatic advances in missile-related technologies, including hypersonic weapons, and practical skills for missile operations, such as saturation attack. Missile forces in the region have significantly improved in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and missiles themselves have been repeatedly launched. Missile attacks against Japan have become a palpable threat. Under these circumstances, Japan will continue its steadfast efforts to both qualitatively and quantitatively enhance its missile defense capabilities by continuing to develop technologies that bring the ability to deal with missiles with irregular trajectories.

Looking ahead, however, if Japan continues to rely solely upon ballistic missile defenses, it will become increasingly difficult to fully address missile threats with the existing missile defense network alone.

For this reason, Japan needs counterstrike capabilities: capabilities which, in the case
of missile attacks by an opponent, enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent to prevent further attacks while defending against incoming missiles by means of the missile defense network.

Counterstrike capabilities are SDF’s capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities. In cases where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent’s territory. Counterstrikes are done as a minimum necessary measure for self-defense and in accordance with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force.

By possessing such capabilities to mount effective counterstrikes, Japan will deter armed attack itself. If an opponent ever launches missiles, it will be able to prevent the opponent’s further armed attacks by counterstrike capabilities, while protecting itself against incoming missiles by the missile defense network, thereby defending the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals.

Counterstrike capabilities are the capabilities on which the Government expressed its view on February 29, 1956, which stated that, under the Constitution, “as long as it is deemed that there are no other means to defend against attack by guided missiles and others, to hit the bases of those guided missiles and others is legally within the purview of self-defense and thus permissible.” These are also capabilities that the Government has chosen not to acquire up to now as a matter of policy decision.

This Government view squarely applies to measures for self-defense taken under the Three New Conditions for Use of Force, presented in the 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security, and the capabilities that Japan has now decided to acquire can be used when the above-mentioned Three Conditions are met in compliance with this view.

Counterstrike capabilities fall within the purview of Japan’s Constitution and international law; they do not change Japan’s exclusively defense-oriented policy; and, they will be used only when the above-mentioned Three New Conditions are fulfilled. Needless to say, preemptive strikes, namely striking first at a stage when no armed attack has occurred, remain impermissible.

While the basic division of roles between Japan and the United States will remain unchanged, as Japan will now possess counterstrike capabilities, the two nations will cooperate in counterstrikes just as they do in defending against ballistic missiles and others.

(2) Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country

To defend Japan, SDF needs to be strong. Also self-evident is that national defense cannot be achieved without a whole-of-country approach. In addition to fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities, Japan will build an overall national defense architecture
by integrating Japan’s national power–diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and technological--as well as by systematically combining all policy means. To enhance the whole-of-government undertaking, it is essential to break down sectionalism within the Government. From this perspective, Japan will enhance the comprehensive defense architecture that draws upon Japan’s national power. This undertaking is an indivisible part of the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities. The national government will also promote cooperation with local governments and private entities.

a. Diplomatic efforts underpinned by Japan’s enhanced defense architecture are important for our efforts to prevent unilateral changes to the status quo by force. By promoting robust diplomatic efforts through the promotion such as the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Japan will: proactively create a peaceful, stable, and predictable international environment; prevent unilateral changes to the status quo by force; and ensure Japan’s peace and security and the peace, stability, and prosperity of the region and the international community.

Working together with these diplomatic efforts, the Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as “MOD/SDF”) will promote cooperation with our ally and multilayered collaboration with like-minded countries and others to create a desirable security environment. Also, in order to continue to demonstrate the intention and capability to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and influence opponent’s actions, it is necessary to improve and enhance training and exercises as FDO and Strategic Communication (SC) with a whole-of-government approach, as well as with our ally and like-minded countries and others.

b. To detect indications of contingencies at early stages, relevant government agencies need to conduct persistent ISR and analysis in collaboration from peacetime. Also important are swift government-level decision-making and inter-agency coordination tailored to the given situation. With respect to integrated information warfare with special regard to the cognitive dimension, Japan will enhance fact-checking and counter-messaging to deal with disinformation, thereby enhancing the whole-of-government response from the current point in time as well as during contingency.

c. It is important not to allow unilateral changes to the status quo by force through acting collaboratively between relevant agencies based on the whole-of-government decision-making. For this purpose, Japan will improve the effectiveness of its response by conducting simulations and joint training and exercises while establishing coordination procedures from peacetime across the whole government. In particular, to protect critical facilities such as nuclear power plants and respond to infringements that do not amount to armed attacks from outside Japan and armed attack situations in the vicinity of remote islands, SDF will conduct training and exercises assuming contingencies with the police and Japan Coast Guard from peacetime, and establish necessary collaboration.
procedures, including the procedure to have the Minister of Defense control the Japan Coast Guard in an armed attack situation.

d. Since the domains of space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum are basic infrastructure in people's daily lives and are vitally important for carrying out cross-domain operations in defense of Japan, Japan will reinforce relevant capabilities across the whole government.

   Regarding the space domain, securing its stable use for information gathering, communication, positioning, etc., is vitally for ensuring the lives of our nationals and our defense, and MOD/SDF will reinforce cooperation and collaboration including research and development with relevant agencies including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and private companies. In doing so, MOD/SDF will further apply civilian technologies into the defense field, facilitate investment in technology development in the private sector and improve space capabilities for Japan as a whole.

   In the cyber domain, it is important to work together with international partners, relevant ministries and agencies, and private companies to gather and share information at all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies as well as to strengthen response capability in the cybersecurity field as a whole country. In line with the government’s overall cybersecurity policy which will be comprehensively coordinated in a centralized manner, MOD/SDF will enhance its cybersecurity capability, while also promoting initiatives that contribute to strengthening cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, critical infrastructure providers, and defense industry.

   With regard to the domain of electromagnetic spectrum, its range of application and use have expanded to cover the ground, maritime, air, space, and cyber domains, making it the frontlines of offense and defense in contemporary warfare. For this reason, ensuring superiority in the domain of electromagnetic spectrum is extremely important for reinforcing deterrence and conducting cross-domain operations. MOD/SDF will work closely with the relevant ministries and agencies to ensure SDF’s stable and flexible use of radio waves both for civilian purposes and for SDF’s command and control as well as intelligence gathering activities.

   e. In an era where victory or defeat is determined by the mastery of new ways of warfare underpinned by advanced technologies, it has become critical to leverage cutting-edge technologies for defense purposes.

   Under the whole-of-government mechanism for strengthening comprehensive defense architecture, Japan will leverage the cutting-edge technology research and development conducted by relevant government organizations for defense purposes based on the needs of MOD/SDF. In addition, MOD/SDF will implement initiatives to link the results of research and development conducted by start-ups and other
companies and various research institutions into early production and deployment of defense equipment, utilizing the defense industry.

f. National administrative agencies, local governments, public entities, and private enterprises must make joint efforts in a cooperative and collaborative manner, in order to respond to an invasion against Japan while protecting the lives of Japanese nationals and in order to respond to various contingencies including large-scale disasters.

First, based on defense needs, under the inter-agency mechanism for strengthening comprehensive defense architecture, the Government will develop and upgrade airports, seaports and other facilities, particularly in the southwestern region. To enable SDF to use, for purposes including peacetime training, facilities such as existing airports and seaports as operation infrastructure, the Government will take necessary measures such as the establishment of a framework for interagency coordination.

Japan will also deepen collaboration with relevant organizations regarding the expansion of the use of civilian vessels and aircraft for SDF's maneuver and deployment, and coordinate and cooperate to systematically implement civil protection measures employing such vessels and aircraft. In addition, MOD/SDF will promote various measures such as reinforcing whole-of-government civil protection training assuming an armed attack situation and other situations, as well as enhancing information transmission function of the national early warning system (J-ALERT) in preparation for an attack by ballistic missiles or other means.

Furthermore, Japan will establish an effective mechanism to balance defense requirements with socioeconomic activities such as the installation of wind power generation facilities so that the defense-related facilities can fully function through the smooth use of sea, airspace and radio waves.

In addition, concerning the transportation and storages of SDF's ammunition and fuel, Japan will reinforce collaboration with the relevant ministries and agencies while taking measures for further facilitation.

Japan will promote similar initiatives for smooth implementation of Japan-U.S. bilateral responses to various contingencies.

g. For Japan, a maritime nation, reinforcing the maritime order and ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight are extremely important for peace and security. To this end, Japan will work to secure the national interest in Japan's territorial waters and the stable use of its important sea lanes.

First, MOD/SDF will promote maritime security cooperation guided by the vision of FOIP, with our ally and like-minded countries as well as coastal states in the Indo-Pacific, while closely cooperating and collaborating with Japan Coast Guard, responsible for maritime security in Japan.

In order to secure the stable use of sea lanes, Japan will make necessary efforts to
conduct counter-piracy operations and ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in cooperation and collaboration with relevant organizations. In this regard, Japan will make stable, long-term use of its operation activity in Djibouti.

h. To enable SDF and U.S. Forces in Japan to seamlessly and effectively conduct activities on a daily basis, Japan will strive to gain understanding and cooperation from local governments and residents around their facilities. Japan will actively engage in public relations activities regarding the policies and activities of the MOD/SDF and also the role of U.S. Forces in Japan on a regular basis, and coordinate to accommodate the requests and situations of local communities, while fulfilling accountability. At the same time, Japan will continue to promote measures to improve the living environment of areas around defense facilities including those against noise from the perspective of promoting cooperation to the defense of Japan.

In some communities, SDF’s emergency patient transport and the very existence of SDF units themselves are making a major contribution to the communities’ maintenance and vitalization. In conducting unit reorganization, establishing as well as administering camps and bases, Japan will give due consideration to regional characteristics and SDF’s contribution to local economy so as to gain understanding of local governments and residents.

2 Joint deterrence and response by the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The second approach is to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The Alliance with the United States is a key pillar of Japan’s security policy, and fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities will lead to more effective employment of U.S. capabilities and will further strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. By demonstrating such joint resolve and capabilities, Japan and the United States will prevent escalation of emergencies from gray-zone situations to conventional armed invasions and eventually the use of nuclear weapons, and deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts. In addition, if an invasion against Japan occurs, Japan-U.S. joint response will disrupt the invasion. To this end, both Japan and the United States constantly modernize the Alliance and strengthen joint capabilities by aligning strategies and prioritizing goals together. In doing so, building upon the fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s own defense capabilities, Japan will play a larger role for the defense of Japan and the peace and stability of the region under the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Specifically, Japan will work on the following measures:

(1) Strengthening Japan and U.S. joint deterrence and response capabilities

Japan’s NDS and the United States’ National Defense Strategy are well aligned in prioritizing the prevention of unilateral changes to the status quo by force through
integrating all approaches and means. Accordingly, from the viewpoint of reinforcing readiness and resiliency, imposing cost on opponents and deterring invasion against Japan, Japan will further deepen discussion with the United States on their roles, missions and capabilities and further reinforce joint deterrence capabilities of both countries in an integrated manner.

Specifically, Japan will further deepen cooperation with the United States to smoothly implement allied cross-domain operations including space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum and to improve interoperability. Regarding Japan’s counterstrike capabilities, Japan will work with the United States to establish a cooperative posture including information gathering in order to effectively employ the capabilities. Furthermore, Japan will reinforce collaboration in such areas as air-defense, anti-surface warfare; anti-submarine warfare; mine-warfare; amphibious operations; airborne operations; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISRT); protection of assets and facilities, and logistic support. In order to effectively realize the division of roles and missions between Japan and the United States in light of the fundamental reinforcement of Japan's defense capabilities, Japan will ensure close operational coordination with the United States through Japan-U.S. bilateral planning. In addition, Japan will work to improve allied response capabilities, including readiness and interoperability of the Alliance, through more advanced and practical exercises and training.

In addition, in order to ensure that U.S. extended deterrence with nuclear deterrence at its core remains credible and resilient, Japan will further actively engage in and deepen bilateral discussions on extended deterrence including those at the ministerial level.

As joint measures from peacetime to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts as to deter various contingencies from emerging, Japan will further expand and evolve operations including joint FDO and ISR. In order to effectively conduct these operations, Japan will actively make such efforts as promoting participation of like-minded countries and others and protecting assets, namely U.S. vessels and aircraft, by SDF.

Furthermore, as part of efforts to strengthen allied deterrence and response capabilities, Japan will on a regular basis increase joint/shared use of Japanese and U.S. facilities, and promote mutual deployment of both units to their respective facilities for training or other purposes.

(2) Reinforcing alliance coordination functions

To conduct aligned joint response of Japan and the United States in any situation, Japan will further upgrade the overall coordination functions centered on the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM).

In addition, in order to enhance collaboration with like-minded countries and others
centered around the Japan-U.S. Alliance, Japan will promote closer operational coordination by leveraging the ACM and others.

(3) Reinforcing the foundation for allied response

Japan will reinforce the foundational elements that support effective allied response in all phases.

First, in order to further reinforce information sharing at all levels, Japan will fundamentally reinforce efforts related to information security and cybersecurity so that Japan and the United States can fully employ their capabilities. Also, in order to ensure the Alliance's technological edge, interoperability, readiness, and persistent warfare capabilities, Japan will further reinforce defense equipment and technology cooperation through joint analysis and joint research in cutting-edge technology, joint development and production of defense equipment, improvement in mutual interchangeability, shared use and reinforcement of various networks, expansion of production and maintenance capability of U.S. military equipment in Japan and reinforcement of supply-chain.

(4) Measures to support stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

Japan will promote various measures to provide stable support for the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan, such as steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and the initiatives to reinforce the readiness and resiliency of U.S. Forces in Japan, while optimizing the bilateral joint posture to respond to the severe security environment.

Particularly in Okinawa, which occupy a critically important location for Japan’s security, Japan will continue to work to mitigate impact by steadily implementing such measures as realignment, consolidation and reduction of facilities and areas of U.S. Forces in Okinawa including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma as well as the relocation of units and training, while dealing with the increasingly severe security environment.

In order to smoothly and effectively implement aforementioned Japan-U.S. undertakings, it is essential to gain understanding of Japanese nationals: Japan will enhance efforts such as active public messaging about their significance and importance.

3 Collaboration with like-minded countries and others

The third approach is to enhance collaboration with like-minded countries and others. In order to counter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and to ensure Japan’s security, it is extremely important to reinforce collaboration with not only our ally but also as many countries as possible. From such perspective, Japan will promote efforts to contribute to realizing the vision of a FOIP.

First of all, Japan will, while placing the Japan-U.S. Alliance the key pillar of its security
policy, proactively promote multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges, taking into account characteristics of the region as well as situation of each country. In doing so, Japan will further promote institutional frameworks such as Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAA), Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA), and Agreements concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.

With Australia, under the “Special Strategic Partnership” in the Indo-Pacific region and the guidance of the renewed “Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation”, Japan will build the closest cooperative relationship second only to the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation and deepen consultations at all levels including the Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”), bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation. In addition, in light of such developments as the RAA, Japan will pursue actions such as exercises and rotational deployment in Australia. Given the prospect of cooperation among Japan, the United States and Australia, in the event of contingencies, Japan will mutually consult and collaborate with Australia, focusing on logistics support and information sharing. From the viewpoint of ensuring effective responses to contingencies, Japan will promote discussions on the scope, objectives and forms of operational cooperation on a regular basis.

With India, Japan has established the Special Strategic and Global Partnership. In order to reinforce strategic collaboration, while utilizing frameworks such as “2+2,” Japan will further deepen bilateral and multilateral defense exchanges including service-to-service exchanges in a broad range of fields including maritime security and cybersecurity, while promoting training and exercises as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation.

With partners like the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, Japan will mutually reinforce involvement in global security issues as well as challenges in Europe and Indo-Pacific. Accordingly, Japan will build close cooperation with them by placing their Alliance with the United States built through such arrangements as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a cornerstone, and implement consultations such as “2+2,” bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation including the joint development of the next-generation fighter aircraft, and mutual dispatch of vessels and aircraft. In doing so, Japan will reinforce cooperation through jointly monitoring illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea and the counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

With NATO and the European Union (EU), based on the bilateral relations with above-mentioned European countries, Japan will reinforce collaboration with regard to international rule-makings and involvement to the security of the Indo-Pacific region.

With the Republic of Korea (ROK), considering the importance to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the U.S.-ROK Alliance in response to the nuclear and missile threats posed by North Korea, Japan will reinforce the
collaboration among Japan, the United States and the ROK through measures including trilateral training and exercises.

With Canada and New Zealand, Japan will promote measures including consultation at each level, bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, and bilateral cooperation with third parties, in a bilaterally coordinated manner in order to further collaborate to tackle the challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.

Japan will reinforce collaboration with Nordic-Baltic states, which are facing unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts, including Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and are working on cutting-edge initiatives such as information warfare, cybersecurity, strategic communication and hybrid warfare. Japan will also reinforce collaboration with Central and Eastern European countries, including the Czech Republic and Poland, countries that show interest in strengthening their relationships with Japan.

With regards to Southeast Asian countries, Japan will support their efforts to reinforce centrality and unity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through such means as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus, and the ASEAN-Japan Defense Ministers' Informal Meeting. Furthermore, from the perspective of stabilizing the security of the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will implement consultations at all levels, including "2+2," strategic port calls and air visits, and bilateral/multilateral training and exercises depending on the situation of each country. In addition, with the aim of stabilizing the region, Japan will implement transfer of defense equipment and capacity building, which contribute to reinforcing defense capabilities of the region.

With Mongolia, in light of its strategic importance as a democratic country geographically located between China and Russia, Japan will promote defense equipment and technology collaboration to elevate cooperation in the political and security fields to a new dimension, in addition to implementing defense exchange at all levels, capacity building and multilateral exercises.

With Central Asian countries, with which Japan has only had a few achievements in defense exchanges despite the fact that these countries are located in a geopolitically important region between Asia and Europe, Japan will accumulate defense exchanges including capacity building in areas of mutual interest.

With Pacific Island countries, Japan, as an important partner, will engage in cooperation including capacity building through collaboration with countries including its ally and like-minded countries. In doing so, Japan will also consider cooperation with organizations other than military forces such as coast guard.

With Coastal States of the Indian Ocean and Middle Eastern countries, Japan will promote defense cooperation, based on the importance of stable use of sea lane and an energy and economic perspective. At the same time, Japan will also develop defense cooperation with
countries including African countries in terms of responding to global challenges. In particular, Japan will strengthen cooperation with Djibouti and secure the long-term and stable use of the SDF operation facility there in order to reinforce our operational base in the region, for activities including counter-piracy and rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas.

While promoting collaboration with like-minded countries and others, Japan will pay attention to communication with China and Russia.

With China, in order to build a “constructive and stable relationship,” Japan will promote multilayered dialogues and exchanges including Japan-China security dialogue. In doing so, Japan will continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, comply with international code of conduct, and improve transparency regarding its strengthening of military capabilities buildup and its defense policies, while also conveying the concerns Japan has in a candid manner. Japan will also make use of the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan-China including the hotline, in order to avoid unexpected contingencies between the two countries.

With regard to Russia, based on the stance that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are unacceptable, Japan condemns the aggression against Ukraine to the maximum extent possible, and will closely cooperate with the international community including G7 in taking appropriate measures. At the same time, Japan will maintain necessary communication with Russia, which is our neighboring country, in order not to incur unexpected contingencies and unnecessary friction.

IV Key Capabilities for Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities

The following are the basic concepts and contents of the seven functions and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan, which are derived from the comprehensive operation concept in line with the basic policies set forth in the Strategies.

1 Stand-off defense capabilities

In order to protect Japan's territory, which stretches approximately 3,000 km along the both north-south and east-west axes: Japan will fundamentally reinforce its stand-off defense capabilities to deal with vessels and landing forces invading Japan, including its remote islands, from locations outside of threat zones.

First of all, Japan will possess necessary and sufficient capabilities in a multilayered manner across the country to be able to disrupt and defeat these vessels and landing forces invading Japan in multilayered manner and from various locations in Japan. Also, Japan will reinforce capabilities that can be launched from various platforms with such diverse capabilities as hyper velocity glides and hypersonic glides which are difficult to intercept.
To this end, by FY2027, Japan will reinforce capability to enable operation of stand-off missiles including surface-launched and ship-launched models. In doing so, to secure sufficient capability in prior to the establishment of increased production of domestic stand-off missile, Japan will promptly procure stand-off missiles manufactured overseas.

In the future, by approximately ten years from now, Japan will reinforce its capability to enable operation of aircraft-launched stand-off missiles and will acquire capability to operate hyper velocity gliding missiles with irregular trajectories, hypersonic guided missiles, and other stand-off missiles.

In addition, Japan will have the capability to persistently gather accurate target information regarding vessels and landing forces, which is essential for stand-off defense capabilities, and possess command and control-related capabilities to transmit the information in real time. Japan will also possess information analysis capabilities including the evaluation of results after a response, as well as the resiliency and redundancy of information networks.

2 Integrated air and missile defense capabilities

As a country surrounded by sea, it is extremely important for Japan to respond to airborne threats. In recent years, along with the improvement of the capabilities of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft, the emergence of anti-ship ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) has diversified, complicated, and advanced airborne threats.

To this end, Japan will fundamentally reinforce detecting, tracking and intercepting capabilities, and establish a system to enable unified and optimized operation of various sensors and shooters through networks to reinforce integrated air and missile defense capabilities.

As a response to the missile attacks from an opponent’s country to Japan, Japan will first intercept missiles flying to Japan over the high seas and Japan’s territorial airspace with its missile defense system. Subsequently, as a measure for self-defense to the minimum required level to prevent missile attacks including ballistic missiles, Japan will utilize capabilities including stand-off defense capabilities to enable itself to conduct effective counterstrike in the opponent’s territory. By having capability to conduct effective counterstrike and facilitate interception by missile defense, Japan will restrict opponent’s missile launches and thereby deter missile attacks from happening.

To this end, by FY2027, Japan will reinforce the capabilities of warning and control radar and surface-to-air missile and procure Aegis System Equipped Vessels. Japan will also reinforce the capability to respond to small UAVs with weapons including directed-energy weapons.

By approximately ten years from now, Japan will reinforce its integrated air and missile defense capabilities by further introducing research on capability to respond to hypersonic
weapons in the gliding phase and interception by non-kinetic means to deal with assets such as small UAVs.

3 Unmanned defense capabilities

Unmanned assets are often relatively affordable compared to manned equipment and have the great advantage of being able to minimize human loss and operate continuously for a long period of time. Furthermore, by combining these unmanned assets with AI and manned equipment, it can be a game-changer that fundamentally transform force structure and way of warfare, enabling Japan to gain asymmetrical advantages in the air, sea, and underwater domains. For this reason, these unmanned assets will be effectively utilized not only for information gathering and surveillance, but also for a wide range of missions including combat support. Japan will also promote initiatives to optimize the equipment system and organization of SDF by automation and labor-saving through the mission replacement of manned assets.

To this end, SDF will acquire practical capabilities in a wide range of missions by introducing unmanned assets through early production and deployment or leasing by FY2027. In particular, Japan will promote the early production and deployment of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) to acquire and maintain underwater superiority.

By approximately ten years from now, Japan will further materialize the style of warfare using unmanned assets, accelerate the development and introduction of equipment based on the geographical characteristics of Japan, and expand full-scale operation. Furthermore, SDF will reinforce the ability to simultaneously control multiple unmanned assets using system such as AI.

4 Cross-domain operation capabilities

It has become increasingly important for Japan to overcome inferiority in individual domains by conducting cross-domain operations which organically fuse capabilities in all domains including space, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, land, sea, and airspace to generate synergy and amplify the overall strength, and thereby ensuring Japan’s national defense.

(1) In the space domain, MOD/SDF will reinforce it operational capabilities in the land, sea, and air domains by proactively integrating novel form of space use including satellite constellation, and by receiving information gathering, communication, and positioning etc. from space. Also, in order to respond to threats to the stable use of space, MOD/SDF will develop ground and space-based surveillance capabilities, build-up a Space Domain Awareness (SDA) structure, and bolster the resiliency of our space assets to enable the continuation of missions in response to various situations.
By FY2027, MOD/SDF will utilize space to develop essential infrastructure for unit operations and enhance our SDA capability.

By approximately ten years from now, MOD/SDF will further enhance our space operation capabilities by increasing multi-layering and redundancy in space use and also by acquiring new space capabilities.

(2) In the cyber domain, MOD/SDF will cooperate with whole-of-government initiatives in the field of cybersecurity, including active cyber defense. MOD/SDF will realize advanced cybersecurity posture by shifting to a posture that is able to conduct continuous risk management primarily on critical information systems, by significantly increasing the number of cyber personnel particularly by utilizing external human resources who have advanced cyber skills. MOD/SDF will protect itself from every cyber threat with these advanced cybersecurity capabilities and will utilize these capabilities to the initiatives to reinforce cybersecurity as a whole country.

To this end, by FY2027, MOD/SDF will establish a cybersecurity posture to secure command and control capabilities and high-priority equipment systems even under cyberattacks and to support cyber defense of the defense industry.

By approximately ten years from now, MOD/SDF will establish a cybersecurity posture to secure command and control capabilities, force projection capabilities and operational bases to perform its missions even under cyberattacks, while reinforcing its posture to support cybersecurity of entities other than the SDF.

(3) In the domain of electromagnetic spectrum, MOD/SDF will effectively function its electronic warfare capabilities and its support capabilities while impairing opponent’s capabilities of accomplishing missions even under a severe electromagnetic spectrum environment including communication jamming by the opponent. Also, MOD/SDF will reinforce electromagnetic spectrum management function for the entire SDF to utilize electromagnetic spectrum more effectively.

(4) MOD/SDF will expand capabilities necessary to disrupt or neutralize the opponent’s use of space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains.

(5) Regarding ground, maritime, and air defense capabilities, which form the basis of cross-domain operations, Japan will fundamentally reinforce these capabilities by steadily introducing naval ships and fighter aircraft to maintain and enhance maritime and air superiority; and, introducing new surface combatants and developing next generation fighter aircraft, while leveraging advanced technologies and bearing in mind collaboration with unmanned assets.

5 Command and control / Intelligence-related functions

The character of warfare will continue to increase in speed and complexity. In order to win in future battles, Japan needs to ensure superiority in decision-making, whereby commanders
at various levels can make decisions more promptly and more accurately than their opposites. For this purpose, Japan will enhance command and control and intelligence-related functions from a cross-domain perspective including prompt and assured materialization of ISRT by building networks that are enhanced by AI and come with real-time responsiveness, resiliency, and flexibility.

By FY2027, Japan will develop intelligence capabilities capable of responding to hybrid warfare and integrated information warfare with special regard to the cognitive dimension. Japan will also develop near-real-time information gathering capabilities by utilizing assets such as satellite constellations, etc.

By approximately ten years from now, Japan will further enhance information gathering and analysis capabilities by utilizing various means including AI to the greatest extent. Japan will also establish a system to share information in real time through further reinforcement of information gathering assets.

In addition, the necessity to continuously and accurately grasp the intentions and capabilities of Japan’s neighboring countries is more crucial than ever. To this end, Japan will reinforce the capabilities of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) based on functions such as signal, imagery, human, and open-source intelligence (SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, and OSINT), and fundamentally reinforce comprehensive analysis capabilities including the utilization of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) to effectively collect, arrange, analyze, share and protect information, from operational intelligence to strategic intelligence. At the same time, Japan will promote cooperation and collaboration with relevant domestic intelligence-related organizations and take necessary measures to more effectively utilize the intelligence collected through information gathering satellites for SDF’s activities.

Moreover, in order to effectively respond to integrated information warfare, including the spread of disinformation, Japan will fundamentally reinforce the organization and functions of MOD/SDF, and conduct information sharing and bilateral/multilateral exercises with its ally and like-minded countries.

6 Mobile deployment capabilities / Civil protection

In response to an invasion of Japan including its remote islands, Japan needs to ensure that deployed units are always operational, and that necessary units are swiftly maneuvered and deployed according to situations to secure maritime and air superiority and disrupt the access/landing of units invading Japan. For this purpose, Japan will make maximum use of civilian transportations including Private Finance Initiatives (PFI), while reinforcing maritime and air transport capabilities of SDF.

In addition, in order to enable smooth and effective transportation and replenishment of units through these initiatives, Japan will reinforce the logistic posture through integrations, expansion of airport and seaport facilities usage capacity in the southwestern region, where
remote islands are particularly concentrated, and conduct improvement of logistics capabilities, while proactively promoting the modernization of logistics bases located throughout the country.

SDF will not only defeat the infringements upon remote islands but also carry out civil protection missions by utilizing its reinforced mobile deployment capabilities for evacuating residents.

To this end, by FY2027, Japan will reinforce its transportation capabilities by measures such as expanding the use of PFI vessels, thereby acquiring the ability to quickly build up defense posture in the southwestern region and working to expedite the evacuation of residents.

By approximately ten years from now, Japan will have further reinforced its transport capabilities and accelerated transport and replenishment through the improvement of supply bases.

7 Sustainability and Resiliency

(1) In order to defend Japan in the future, the current warfighting sustainability of SDF is not necessarily sufficient in the form of ammunitions and fuel, and the number of operationally available equipment. It is necessary to squarely address these realities and strive to ensure and maintain sufficient war sustainability so that SDF can continue persistent activities in contingencies, which serves as an effective deterrent. Therefore, Japan will improve ammunition production capacity, secure ammunition storage commensurate with the amount of ammunition produced, promptly acquire necessary and sufficient ammunition, promptly ensure necessary and sufficient amount of fuel required, and establish a system to enable operation of all equipment except those under planned maintenance.

To this end, by FY2027, Japan will resolve the situation of ammunition shortage. Also, Japan will reinforce its production posture for high-priority ammunition and install more ammunition storage facilities. Furthermore, Japan will resolve parts shortages and ensure that all equipment except those under planned maintenance are operationally available.

By approximately ten years from now, Japan will maintain appropriate inventory of ammunition and parts and complete the installation of further ammunition storage facilities. Regarding defense equipment, Japan will maintain appropriate stock of parts including those for new equipment.

(2) Furthermore, in order to ensure the safety of SDF personnel on a daily basis and preventing an easy loss of operational capabilities even in a contingency, Japan will promote measures such as making major command headquarters underground and reinforcing their structures, relocate and consolidate facilities ensuring stand-off distance, and steady construct barracks and housing and maintain aging buildings. Moreover, Japan
will conceal and deceive equipment to improve resiliency.

In addition, the issue of climate change, including responses to future energy shifts, will inevitably further impact future MOD/SDF operations, including various plans, facilities, defense equipment and security environment surrounding Japan, which demand Japan to deal with a variety of issues related to these matters.

To this end, by FY2027, Japan will promote measures to construct underground command headquarters, and relocating and consolidating facilities in major bases and camps to improve resiliency of respective facilities. In addition, Japan will promote reinforcement of facilities and infrastructure against disasters such as tsunamis, starting from bases and camps that are anticipated to be damaged significantly and are important for operations.

By approximately ten years from now, Japan will have further improved resiliency of defense facilities.

(3) In order to save the lives of SDF personnel and mitigate risks to their person, and thereby enabling them to respond to an invasion of Japan for a longer period of time and with greater strength, Japan will reinforce emergency relief capabilities and transform medical functions by developing a seamless medical care and transportation system from the frontlines to the final rear destination, increasing the chances of survival for each personnel.

V The Future of Self-Defense Forces

1 Role of SDF in the seven key fields

In the seven fields of key capabilities for fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities, Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Force (GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF) will fulfill the following roles.

Regarding stand-off defense capabilities, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will build required and sufficient number of launching stand-off missiles from vehicle, ship and aircraft capable of diverse responses from outside of the threat envelope and against vessels and landing forces invading Japan.

Regarding integrated air and missile defense capabilities, as a basic role, MSDF destroyers will assume interception in the upper layer and GSDF and ASDF will assume interception by surface-to-air missiles in the lower layer, and Japan will reinforce capabilities to respond to future airborne threats such as hypersonic weapons. Also, each SDF service will utilize capabilities such as stand-off defense capabilities etc. as counterstrike capabilities.

Regarding unmanned defense capabilities, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will significantly reinforce their defense capabilities in unmanned aerial, maritime, underwater and ground assets in accordance with their respective division of roles, concurrent to their review of existing units.
Regarding cross-domain operations, in the space domain, ASDF will reinforce various functions including space situational awareness. In the cyber domain, MOD/SDF as a whole will reinforce its capabilities to contribute to the reinforcement of cybersecurity of the entire country; and in particular, GSDF will play a core role to expand foundations such as for human resource development. In the domain of electromagnetic spectrum, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will acquire and reinforce defense equipment for the electronic warfare and also promote introduction of equipment for deception utilizing electromagnetic spectrum. Also, in light of the rapid buildup of conventional forces of neighboring countries, Japan will continue to enhance the quality and quantity of ground, maritime and air defense equipment for conducting cross-domain operations in cooperation with the capabilities in the above-mentioned domains.

Regarding command and control and intelligence-related functions, Japan will reinforce the information gathering capabilities of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, accelerate decision-making based on gathered information, and develop a network that enables definite command and control. Also, Japan will fundamentally reinforce the intelligence functions of the DIH, including the ISRT required for the operation of stand-off missiles, and reinforce collaboration with the command and control function.

Regarding mobile deployment capabilities and civil protection, Japan will reinforce SDF’s mobile deployment capabilities by securing medium-sized and small vessels by GSDF, transport vessels by MSDF, and transport aircraft by ASDF to rapidly deploy units to remote islands, when an invasion against Japan is predicted. Additionally, GSDF will reinforce its architecture including unit reinforcement for the protection of civilians in Okinawa.

Regarding sustainability and resiliency, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will secure the necessary amount of ammunitions, fuel and mobile equipment on a daily basis, to allow for SDF’s continuous operation, and improve the resiliency of defense facilities, which serve as the foundation for exercising capabilities.

2 Concept of developing SDF architecture

Based on the roles in seven fields as mentioned above, development of joint operational architecture as well as development of architectures of GSDF, MSDF, ASDF and DIH will be conducted in following basic concepts.

In order to reinforce effectiveness of joint operational posture, Japan will establish a permanent Joint Headquarters which can unify command of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF by reviewing the existing organization. Furthermore, Japan will promote defense equipment system benefitting joint operation.

GSDF will develop a system that places importance on reinforcing cross-domain operation capabilities and disrupting invading forces from a distance by reinforcing surface-launched stand-off defense capability, which has many advantages, maintaining sustainability and
resiliency, reinforcing rapid maneuver and disperse deployment capabilities to islands located in Southwestern areas, introducing unmanned assets, improving integrated air and missile defense capabilities including response to drones, and command and control and intelligence-related functions, including systems necessary for disperse deployed units.

In light of increasing missile threats in recent years, MSDF will develop a system to reinforce air-defense capability, promote labor-saving and automation measures, reinforce integrated information warfare capability, ensure superiority underwater, reinforce stand-off defense capabilities and surface rear support capability, and enable persistent unit operation that require high level of speed and activity. In particular, MSDF will develop a system which will allow acquiring and sustaining superiority in underwater which is an important factor in cross-domain operations.

In order to persistently execute tasks through resilient and flexible operations under a high-threat environment, ASDF will develop a system which can reinforce quality and quantity of air defense capability, maintain effective stand-off defense capabilities, ensure effective missile and air-defense posture, and introduce various unmanned assets. Also, ASDF will be renewed as the Air and Space Self-Defense Force, reinforcing its space operation capability and developing a system to ensure superiority in use of space.

In addition to collecting and analyzing SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, OSINT, etc., DIH will assume the central role of responding to integrated information warfare concerning the defense of Japan and fundamentally reinforce the capability to grasp military activities of other countries in a persistent, continuous and accurate manner and analyzing and disseminating them. Furthermore, in line with the reinforcement of cross-domain operation capabilities and stand-off defense capabilities, DIH will reinforce existing capabilities and ensure seamless cooperation and collaboration with other relevant organizations.

MOD/SDF will fundamentally reinforce its architecture to contribute to the cybersecurity of Japan as a whole country, in line with the Government's initiatives in the field of cybersecurity including active cyber defense.

3 Reinforcing policy-making function

For SDF to fully exert its capabilities and respond to the increasingly severe, complex, and rapid-paced strategic environment, strategic and agile defense policy planning and making are required, including in domains such as space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum, and MOD/SDF will fundamentally reinforce its functions. In this regard, MOD/SDF will establish a consultation framework to obtain policy advice from experts. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture to comprehensively advance future ways of warfare for SDF and utilize and nurture cutting-edge technologies and apply those technologies to defense equipment necessary for future SDF operations from a strategic perspective, while closely cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, private research institutions, and
private companies particularly defense industry as their core. Furthermore, in order to promote such efforts and support the formulation of policies, Japan will review and reinforce the research system of MOD/SDF led by the National Institute for Defense Studies and reinforce its functions as an intellectual base.

VI Protection of Life, Person and Property of Japanese Nationals and Measures for International Security Cooperation

1 Measures for protection of life, person and property of Japanese nationals

Situations that Japan must be prepared for are not limited to unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts and an invasion of Japan. Large-scale terrorist attacks and related attacks on critical infrastructures including nuclear power plants, large-scale disasters such as earthquakes and typhoons, and infectious disease crisis caused by COVID-19 are serious threats to the life, person and property of Japanese nationals, and Japan must respond to them with its utmost efforts.

As such, MOD/SDF, in close cooperation with relevant organization such as the police, Japan Coast Guard, firefighting services, and local governments, will respond to large-scale terrorist attacks and attacks against critical infrastructures by utilizing fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities, and in the event of a large-scale disaster, will protect lives, conduct emergency recovery, and provide livelihood support. Furthermore, in the event of natural disasters or civil disturbances overseas, MOD/SDF will work closely with the diplomatic authorities to promptly and accurately rescue and transport Japanese nationals.

In order to utilize defense capabilities and smoothly implement such response, it is essential to establish a collaborative framework with relevant organizations from peacetime. Japan will conduct comprehensive training with relevant local governments and infrastructure business enterprises in order to ensure the effectiveness of response plans. Japan will also leverage such coordination to facilitate initiatives for civil protection, including evacuation guidance for residents, when an invasion of Japan is predicted.

2 Measures for international security cooperation

Peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community must be ensured for the peace and security of Japan. For this reason, it is necessary for MOD/SDF to utilize fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities, and, from the perspective of proactive contribution to peace bound to international cooperation, Japan must make proactive efforts towards resolving conflicts and confrontations around the world and responding to global challenges such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the event of large-scale international disasters caused by climate change, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and others.

Regarding International Peace Cooperation Activities including International
Peacekeeping Cooperation Assignments such as UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and International Disaster Relief Activities, in line with the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan will conduct activities with a focus on the areas where Japan has advantages such as engineering and medicine, while collecting detailed information using intelligence-related functions even in remote areas, and swiftly transferring the necessary units using mobile deployment capabilities as necessary. Furthermore, Japan will continue to dispatch SDF personnel to local mission headquarters, taking advantage of the characteristics of Japan's SDF personnel with high levels of expertise. In addition, Japan will make the best use of accumulated experience and will provide capacity building.

From the perspective of improving the security environment surrounding Japan, Japan will also promote initiatives for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations. In doing so, Japan will utilize the knowledge of MOD/SDF to improve the effectiveness of international organizations and multilateral export control regimes.

VII Defense Production and Technology Bases as Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability

Defense production and technology bases are indispensable foundation for a country to secure the research, development, production and procurement of defense equipment in a stable manner on its own and to incorporate the cutting-edge technology necessary for new ways of warfare into defense equipment; it is virtually defense capability itself, and its reinforcement is essential. Therefore, Japan will promote initiatives such as building a strong and sustainable defense industry necessary for a new way of warfighting, dealing with various risks, and expanding sales channels. Regarding whole-of-government initiatives such as protecting the supply-chain for general-purpose products, and managing the security of sensitive technologies and information security for civilian cutting-edge fields, MOD will implement measures necessary for defense purposes and will also collaborate with the initiatives of relevant ministries and agencies.

1 Reinforcing defense production base

Japan's defense industry is important, considered as a partner responsible for national defense along with MOD/SDF in terms of securing equipment for SDF to carry out its missions, and it is necessary to maintain and reinforce the capability to produce high performance equipment and secure high operational rates. To this end, in the defense industry, Japan will secure not only advanced technological capabilities and quality control capabilities through reinforcing the defense technology base, but also the production, sustainment, maintenance, repair, and capacity improvement of defense equipment.

In order to ensure that the defense industry can play this significant role, Japan will
reinforce the bases including the entire supply chain. In doing so, Japan aims to make business attractive by introducing a new profit margin calculation method to appropriately evaluate the cost management and quality control of the defense industry to secure appropriate profits, while promoting measures to maintain and reinforce existing supply chains and promote the entry of new suppliers.

Additionally, Japan will place more emphasis on the viewpoint of maintaining and strengthening the domestic base in acquiring defense equipment, and strive for technological, qualitative, and production-time improvements while ensuring predictability for companies, and if there are no other means available even after taking these measures, Japan will consider the owning manufacturing facilities and others itself.

Furthermore, Japan will deal with supply chain risks in the defense industry, while reinforcing industrial security including cybersecurity based on international standards, as well as strengthening the security of sensitive technologies. From these perspectives, Japan will work with the defense authorities of the ally, like-minded countries and others to engage in initiatives such as supply chain protection and sensitive technology security relating to the defense industry.

2 Reinforcing technology bases

In order to acquire defense equipment required for the new way of warfare, the use of our domestic technologies is extremely important. Therefore, MOD/SDF scrutinizes proposals made by the defense-related companies to see technological potential for the new way of warfare. MOD/SDF will proactively promote initiatives to accelerate efforts to achieve operational capability of future defense equipment technologies solely used for defense equipment, their in-house research results, as well as dual-use technologies from non-defense industries. For projects which are particularly urgent and significant from a policy perspective, MOD/SDF will further accelerate R&D, and operationalize R&D results, by being willing to take risks under the assumption of expected outcomes.

In addition, MOD/SDF will reinforce initiatives to deploy necessary equipment by improving specifications while operating prototype units.

Furthermore, from the defense technology base perspective, Japan will promote cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others by leading international joint development as means to acquire equipment which will benefit the defense of Japan.

Moreover, MOD/SDF will establish a framework for actively exploiting cutting-edge civilian technologies developed by start-up companies, domestic research institutions, and academia, and will utilize a whole-of-government mechanism for comprehensively strengthening defense architecture.

Through the scrap-and-build of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA’s)
research and development-related organization, Japan will establish a new research institution in MOD to find multi-use cutting-edge technologies that contribute to defense equipment development, and to produce equipment that leads to defense innovation; Japan will also expand and enhance systems to comprehensively consider and promote the utilization of cutting-edge technology in terms of policy, operation and technology. In order to increase predictability under this system, Japan will, based on new ways of warfare, strategically publicize information on the technology fields that Japan will focus on and its outlook for research and development.

3 Promoting transfer of defense equipment and technology

Transfer of defense equipment and technology overseas is a key policy instrument to ensure peace and stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force, to create a desirable security environment for Japan, and to provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law, use of force, or threat of force. From this perspective, the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, its Implementation Guidelines, and other systems are to be considered for revisions in order to promote smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology of high security significance and international joint development in a broad array of fields. In doing so, the necessity, requirements, and transparency of the related procedures for transfer of defense equipment and technology will be under adequate consideration, while maintaining the three principles themselves. In addition, Japan will carry forward with the transfer of defense equipment and technology in the joint public and private efforts by establishing a fund, and implementing measures including providing corporate assistance as necessary to smoothly promote such transfers.

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<th>VIII Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities</th>
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<td>1 Reinforcing human resource base</td>
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The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. In order to realize fundamental reinforcement of defense capability, MOD/SDF will secure necessary SDF personnel without increasing capacity. MOD/SDF must create an environment that enables all SDF personnel to demonstrate their own abilities while maintaining high morale and pride, in light of the fact that SDF personnel are required to have more knowledge, skills and experience than before and are required to be well-grounded so as to not to be deceived by disinformation, etc. MOD/SDF will continue to work on improving living and work environments, improving treatment, promoting measures concerning honors and privileges, expanding support for families including collaboration with the families of SDF personnel and related organizations, fostering an environment in which female SDF personnel can play a more active role through
flexible personnel management, promoting work-life balance, and enhancing re-employment support for uniformed SDF personnel who retire at a younger age, etc. In particular, it is necessary to give a certain level of consideration to SDF personnel who work in demanding environments in which high readiness and long-term missions are required and are socially isolated. In addition, each SDF personnel must recognize anew that harassment shakes the foundation of SDF, a human organization, and develops an organizational environment of zero tolerance for any harassment. These initiatives are important not only for preventing the decline of warfighting capabilities due to mid-career retirement but also for securing qualified human resources.

Regarding recruitment, MOD/SDF will further reinforce SDF recruitment capabilities to secure the necessary number of high-quality human resources. At the same time, MOD/SDF will further raise the retirement age and expand the re-enrollment of retired uniformed SDF personnel to effectively utilize experienced skills, while considering the maintenance of military strength. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will promote flexible human resource utilization and secure human resources from a wide range of areas, including personnel in the private sector with specialized knowledge and skills such as in the cyber domain. In particular, MOD/SDF will implement comprehensive measures that contribute to securing human resources, such as crew members with low sufficiency rates in naval vessels and radar site surveillance personnel. Regarding SDF Reserve Personnel and others, which supplement active SDF personnel, MOD/SDF will review its system and reinforce its architecture to drastically increase recruitment including in the cyber domain. In addition, MOD/SDF will reinforce cooperation with retired SDF personnel and others.

With regard to the development of the human resources that SDF has recruited, MOD/SDF will reskill SDF personnel and reinforce the educational infrastructure such as the National Defense Academy and respective SDF educational institutions. In this regard, MOD/SDF will focus on the cyber domain and other fields requiring high expertise as well as reinforcing education and research on joint operations in particular, and implement measures to effectively utilize personnel with scarce and valuable expertise. Furthermore, MOD civilian officials and others play an important role not only in supporting the activities of SDF as an element of defense capability but also in fundamentally reinforcing defense capability, designing policies associated with the fundamental reinforcement, and providing operational support to units. Therefore, MOD/SDF will work to reinforce the human resource base by securing the civilian officials, technical and engineering officials, and others necessary for this purpose and by further considering necessary systems.

In this way, MOD/SDF will implement bold measures focusing on the entire life cycle of SDF personnel, while considering the creation of an organizational environment that enables SDF personnel to demonstrate their abilities even when they are in the middle of various life events including childbirth, childcare, and nursing care.
2. Transformation of medical function

Regarding SDF medical force, MOD/SDF has been placing importance on sustaining health of SDF personnel, but from the perspective of sustainability and resiliency, MOD/SDF will transform SDF medical force into an organization that saves the lives of SDF personnel who carry out their missions in a contingency in spite of danger.

For the purpose, MOD/SDF will develop a joint operations capability by unifying medical roles and functions common to all SDF services so that SDF can respond to various situations and undertake diverse missions both in Japan and abroad and build a posture to mobilize the full strength of SDF's medical force including the National Defense Medical College, and promote fundamental reforms to improve the combat trauma care capabilities.

In this regard, MOD/SDF will establish a seamless posture for medical care and evacuation from the frontlines to the destination hospital, while clarifying the role of each medical establishment from the frontlines of southwestern region to the hospitals in Honshu and other islands, and standardize medical equipment and materials for transportation, and develop a system to share medical information necessary for medical care and transportation across the country including in the frontlines. In addition, MOD/SDF will reinforce SDF units' first aid capabilities, secure medical equipment and materials including blood and oxygen that are essential for combat trauma care, and develop a medical base in the southwestern region.

Furthermore, MOD/SDF will reinforce education and research on combat trauma care in the National Defense Medical College and improve management necessary to further enhance the clinical experience of medical and nursing officers. In addition, MOD/SDF will complement the clinical experience of medical and nursing officers through active external training. Based on this, MOD/SDF will enhance the common knowledge and skills of respective components of SDF through integrated education and training on combat trauma care.

IX Points of Attention

1. This Strategy, under the National Security Strategy, will be implemented in alignment with strategies in other fields. The National Security Council regularly and systematically will evaluate whether the approach and means to achieve defense objectives are taken appropriately, especially whether the strengthening of the defense architecture of the whole country is surely implemented. In addition, Japan will constantly evaluate the capabilities necessary for building defense capabilities that can effectively deal with changes in the security environment, particularly focusing on opponent’s capabilities, based on joint operational concepts.

2. The fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities based on the strategy must be
maintained and reinforced in the future. To this end, Japan will continuously consider how to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities from a mid- to long-term perspective.

3. The strategy will be executed approximately over the coming decade; should Japan expect any significant changes including in international situation and trends in technological level, it will make necessary revisions.