Defense Posture Review Interim Report

Background
- Given the following developments, GOJ decided to review the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) by the end of 2013, and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) established the “Defense Posture Review Commission” in January.
- The regional security environment has become more tense, evidenced by China’s increasing activities in Japan’s vicinity as well as North Korea’s missile launches.
- The U.S. is emphasizing its presence in the Asia-Pacific in cooperation with allies including Japan.
- Lessons from SDF’s activities following the Great East Japan Earthquake need to be addressed.
- The Commission focused on development of joint operations and made an interim report on the directions and issues through its deliberations. The report was briefed to the Defense Council on July 26.

Summary of Interim Report

1. **Security environment**: Global and surrounding security environment of Japan (next page)

2. **Japan's own efforts**: Strengthen government-wide comprehensive efforts

3. **Strengthen Japan-U.S. alliance**:
   - Further strengthen defense cooperation through discussions of roles and missions Japan should carry and review of Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.
   - Steadily proceed with realignment of U.S. Forces Japan, maintain U.S. deterrence while mitigating local impact in particular on Okinawa.

4. **Promote cooperation in Asia-Pacific region and stabilize global security environment**:
   - Strengthen cooperation with U.S., Australia, South Korea; promote dialogue and exchanges with China and Russia; expand capacity building assistance.
   - Stabilize security environment in cooperation with international community including NATO; actively promote international peace cooperation activities.

5. **Defense posture**: (next page)
   - Conduct capability assessment based on joint operations to ensure effectiveness of defense posture in responding to various contingencies. Based on the assessment so far, areas to be emphasized for defense build-up are as follows:
     - Strengthen ISR capabilities
     - Respond to attacks on remote islets
     - Respond to BM and guerilla attacks
     - Respond to cyber attacks
     - Respond to large-scale natural disasters
     - Strengthen joint operations
     - Strengthen capability to operate overseas
     - Promote use of outer space
     - Active efforts for maritime security

6. **Foundations for defense capabilities**:
   - **Exercises and training**: Continuously verify various contingency response plans through regular exercises in peacetime; make full use of environment that enables sufficient exercises (i.e., Hokkaido).
   - **Operational foundation**: Strengthen resilience of bases and others; maintain facilities/lodgings; secure ammunition; raise operational rate.
   - **Human resources**: Deepen consideration of various human resource management measures (including expanding reserves).
   - **Military medicine**: Modernize and functionally upgrade military medicine; improve medevac capabilities in contingency situations.
   - **Defense production and technology base**: Maintain and strengthen defense production and technology base; examine status of implementation of three principles on arms exports and take necessary measures; conduct future-oriented R&D including on unmanned equipment such as robots, cyber, and outer space.
   - **Strengthen cooperation with local communities**: Consider status of local offices.
   - **Public relations**

7. **Linkage with MOD reform**:
   - MOD reform being discussed in separate “MOD Reform Commission” established in February this year.
   - To prevent recurrence of incidents of misconduct and make the SDF more active and efficient, promote reforms to ensure that civilian and uniformed staff work together, strengthen joint operations, and pursue an efficient workflow and organization for defense build-up with optimal resource allocation from joint and whole-of-SDF perspectives. (Beyond individual service-led resource allocation).

8. **Point of note**:
   - Annex table for force structure should be maintained from perspective of defense build-up from mid- to long-term outlook.
Various security issues and instability factors (see below) have emerged and intensified since the 2010 NDPG, while the importance of preparing for large-scale disasters has been reconfirmed domestically. - Prolonged gray zone situations or possibility of situational deterioration - China’s lack of transparency in its broad and rapid military modernization as well as rapid expansion and intensification of maritime activities - North Korea’s further nuclear and missile development - Increased possibility of obstruction of stable use of cyber space etc.

### Interim Report Main Points

**Security environment**

Given the increasingly tense environment, MOD has conducted capability assessments based on joint operations, focusing on the SDF’s functions and capabilities as a whole, to establish functions and capabilities that should be prioritized, in order to pursue more effective build-up of defenses. The MOD will actively conduct defensive improvements from a joint and overall perspective, by clarifying prioritized issues for future defense build-up. Major issues to be prioritized are as follows.

**Direction of SDF defense build-up to be prioritized**

- **Strengthen ISR capabilities**
  - Improvement of early detection capability in various contingencies. Consider such measures as introducing HALE-UAVs that would contribute to strengthening wide-area persistent ISR capability.

- **Respond to attacks on remote islets**
  - To effectively respond to attacks on remote islets, air superiority and command of the sea must be maintained. To rapidly deploy troops as the situation unfolds, mobile deployment capability and amphibious capability are also important.
  - To steadily build-up such mobile deployment capability, consideration of the optimal deployment posture of troops and equipment, joint transport, utilizing civilian transport capacity, creating supply bases, and properly equipping the new unit for the amphibious mission are important.

- **Respond to ballistic missile and guerilla/special force attacks**
  - Given North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capability, consider strengthening deterrence and response capability by improving Japan’s comprehensive defense posture against ballistic missile threats, thereby enhancing comprehensive response capability. In addition, consider building an operational foundation in case of simultaneous special force attacks that occur under a ballistic missile attack, as well as capability to protect critical infrastructure such as nuclear power plants.

- **Respond to cyber attacks**
  - As no organization can single-handedly defend itself from cyber attacks, consider appropriate division of responsibilities among government ministries as well as strengthening coordination and cooperation with countries such as the U.S. and with the private sector. Additionally, consider policies to steadily introduce necessary equipment and train specialists.

- **Respond to large-scale natural disasters**
  - Secure necessary transport capacity to enable large-scale, rapid deployment of troops, and enhance training and exercises, in order to be fully prepared for earthquakes such as the Nankai Trough Great Earthquake and Tokyo Inland Earthquake that are expected to occur in the future.

- **Strengthen joint operations**
  - Given the importance of joint operations, reconsider the capabilities and the role of the Joint Staff, and deepen consideration of establishing a central command organization of the GSDF and defining the relationship of this organization with the regional Army organizations.

- **Strengthen intelligence capabilities**
  - Consider strengthening human intelligence collection functions including defense attachés, expanding collection functions including geospatial intelligence, and fundamentally strengthening the programs which secure and develop information analysts.

- **Promote use of outer space**
  - Deepen consideration toward use of outer space to strengthen C4ISR* capabilities, through such means as coordination with countries such as the U.S. on space situational awareness and effective use of various satellites.

*C4ISR: Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

---

*The following are examples of current priorities.