

Section 2

Defense of Japan including its Remote Islands

Among the roles that must be served by Japan's defense capability as set forth in the NDPG, the idea of "(2) countering attacks against Japan, including its remote islands" is as follows.

In response to attack on Japan including its remote islands, the SDF will quickly maneuver and deploy requisite units to block access and landing of invading forces while ensuring maritime¹ and air² superiority. Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, the SDF will block invading forces' access and landing from outside their threat envelopes. Should any part of the territory be occupied, the SDF will retake it by employing all necessary measures.

Against airborne attack by missiles and aircraft, the SDF will respond in a swift and sustained manner by applying

optimal means and minimize damage to maintain SDF's capabilities as well as the infrastructure upon which such capabilities are employed.

In response to attack by guerrillas or special operations forces, the SDF will protect critical facilities including nuclear power plants and search and destroy infiltrating forces.

In responding to such attacks, the SDF will implement cross-domain operations that organically fuse capabilities in space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains to block and eliminate attacks.

In view of protecting the life, person and property of the nationals, the SDF will implement measures for civil protection.

1 Defense of Japan's Remote Islands


1 Basic Concept

Japan possesses numerous remote islands. In order to respond to attacks on these islands, it is important to station units and so forth in accordance with the security environment, and also to maneuver and deploy them according to situations on a steady-state basis. It is also important to ensure maritime and air superiority by detecting signs at an early stage through persistent ISR conducted by the SDF.

If signs of attack are detected in advance, units will be maneuvered and deployed in an area expected to be invaded ahead of the deployment of enemy units, and block access and landing of invading forces. Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, the SDF will block invading forces' access and landing from outside their threat envelopes.


Should any part of the territory be occupied, the SDF will retake it by employing all necessary measures such as bringing the enemy under control by ground fire from aircraft

and vessels, and then regaining the territory by the landing of GSDF forces.

 Fig. III-1-2-1 (Conceptual Image of Defending Japan's Remote Islands)

2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

In order to strengthen its defense architecture in the southwestern region, the ASDF established the 9th Air Wing in January 2016 and newly formed the Southwestern Air Defense Force in July 2017. The GSDF, in addition to the Yonaguni coast observation unit formed in March 2016 and other newly-formed units, established the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade with full-fledged amphibious operation capabilities in March 2018. Moreover, the GSDF deployed some units, including an area security unit in Amami Oshima, and an area security unit in Miyakojima Island, in March 2019. A surface-to-air missile unit and a surface-to-ship guided missile unit were deployed to Miyakojima Island in

Video: GSDF Amami Guard
URL: <https://youtu.be/f8XNsMz1vmo>





Video: GSDF Miyako Guard
URL: <https://youtu.be/IDN6bt54MOQ>

¹ Maritime superiority refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force at sea and can carry out maritime operations without suffering substantial damages by the opposing force.

² Air superiority refers to the condition in which one side can carry out airborne operations without suffering a significant level of obstruction by the opposing force.

Fig. III-1-2-1

Conceptual Image of Defending Japan's Remote Islands



Commander of the Airborne Warning and Control Wing granted the wing flag by Minister of Defense Kono (March 2020)


March 2020. The GSDF will deploy an area security unit in charge of the initial response and other units also in Ishigaki Island.

As part of measures to enhance the persistent ISR posture, the SDF has acquired a new type of destroyer (FFM) and

E-2D airborne early warning aircraft. The ASDF established Airborne Warning and Control Wing by upgrading the Airborne Early Warning Group in March 2020 and will establish a temporal unmanned aerial vehicle unit (tentative name) within FY2020.

In order to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan while ensuring the safety of SDF personnel, the SDF procured stand-off missiles which are capable of responding from the outside of their threat envelopes, and has started research and development (R&D) on technologies required for new anti-ship missiles and Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectiles (HVGP) for the defense of remote islands to take all initiatives necessary to defend the islands since FY2018, and technologies required for hypersonic weapons since FY2019.


Also, in order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment of units, initiatives are underway to enhance rapid deployment capabilities through:



Video: Aerial refueling from airplane
URL: <https://youtu.be/Gaqm0koWot8>

Fig. III-1-2-2

Establishment Status of Major Units in Kyushu/Southwestern Region (since 2016) (conceptual diagram)


Chapter
1

Japan's Own Architecture for National Defense



Chief of the Tactical Airlift Group granted the group flag by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Iwata (April 2020)



GSDF amphibious vehicle and U.S. Navy vessel under training in "Iron Fist 20" (February 2020)

the improvement of Osumi class LST (Landing Ship, Tank); and the introduction of V-22 Ospreys and C-2 transport aircraft. In particular, for the operation of V-22 Ospreys, the MOD determined that the KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT was the best airfield to be used as their deployment site due to positional relationships with the amphibious deployment brigade and relevant units in joint operations, the length of the runway, and potential use as relocation destination of JGSDF Camp Metabaru. In August 2018, the Governor of Saga prefecture expressed their acceptance. The MOD/SDF will continue to work to gain understanding on

deployment at the airport from the relevant local authorities and others.³ Meanwhile, in May 2019, the MOD explained their intention to temporarily deploy V-22 Ospreys at Camp Kisarazu, since there is the prospect that the deployment at KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT will take a certain period of time. In response to the statement of Kisarazu Mayor to cooperate with the provisional deployment plan made in December of the same year, the MOD established a Tactical Airlift Wing that operates Osprey in March 2020.

Meanwhile, various types of training to increase the capability for amphibious operations are being undertaken.

³ At the KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT, the ramp, aircraft hangars, etc., are to be developed on the west side of the airport. Approximately 70 aircraft, consisting of 17 newly acquired V-22 Ospreys and approximately 50 helicopters transferred from Camp Metabaru are expected to be deployed.

VOICE

Working at My New Post at the GSDF Miyako Guard

Sergeant First Class IKEHARA Noriaki,
Public Relations Sergeant, the GSDF Miyako Guard
(Miyakojima City, Okinawa Prefecture)

In March 2019, the GSDF Miyako Guard was established, and I started to serve here as public relations sergeant to engage in liaison and negotiation with outside.

As SDF personnel from Miyakojima Island, I made efforts to actively engage with people of the community and cooperators to make ourselves known so that I can act as a bridge between the SDF and people of the community. I also participated in two disaster relief activities, including “disaster relief for collection of waste-oil balls,” which was the first disaster relief mission for the guard. I think we were able to be of help for the community through these activities. In my private life, I was able to share confidence with people of the community

little by little through participation in sport events including international triathlon meeting at Miyakojima Island and a local track meet, as well as through volunteer activities, including coastal cleaning activities and support for local events. In doing so, I started to hear, “We are happy with the SDF,” from islanders. One year after the establishment, I am feeling happy to have served here.

I think the gradual building of a relationship and increase in the number of people who understand and cooperate with the SDF are desirable not only for the Guard but also for the community. I will value and try to continue this relationship and make efforts to further expand the understanding.

Lastly, I give thanks that I can serve in Miyakojima Island and will make efforts everyday to meet the expectations from islanders and to set a pattern for other units.



The author providing an explanation of the camp to trainees



At the goal of Miyakojima Triathlon Meeting

The SDF endeavored to increase its capability through SDF Joint Exercises (field exercise) in October 2019, field training Iron Fist 20 in the United States and other field training in Japan with the U.S. Marines Corps from January to February

2020, as well as field exercises with the U.S. Marine Corps in Japan.

Q See Fig. III-1-2-2 (Establishment Status of Major Units in Kyushu/Southwestern Region [since 2016]) [conceptual diagram]]

2

Response to Missile Attacks

1 Japan's Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense Capability

(1) Basic Concept


Japan began developing the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in FY2004 to be fully prepared for the response against ballistic missile attacks. Necessary amendments were subsequently made to the SDF Law in July 2005, and

in December of the same year, the then Security Council and Cabinet decided to begin Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor. To date, Japan has steadily built up its own defense system against ballistic missile attacks, by such means as installing ballistic missile defense capability to the Aegis-equipped destroyers and deploying the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3).⁴

⁴ The Patriot PAC-3 system is one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type of anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly intercepts aircraft and other targets, the PAC-3 missiles are designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles.

Fig. III-1-2-3

Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense (image)



Currently, Japan's BMD is an effective multi-layered defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis equipped destroyers and the lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE).⁵ The upcoming introduction of the land-based Aegis system, Aegis Ashore, will enable our forces to intercept missiles in the upper tier not just from Aegis destroyers but from land.

Today airborne threats to Japan are increasingly complex and diverse, including ballistic missiles equipped with multiple/maneuverable warheads, high-speed and longer-range cruise missiles, and stealth and multi-role aircraft. In order to effectively and efficiently counter these airborne threats by optimum means and minimize damage, it is necessary to establish a structure to conduct integrated operation of various equipment for missile defense and air defense equipment that each SDF service has separately used, thereby providing persistent nation-wide protection from peacetime and also enhancing the comprehensive air and missile defense capability that can simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. In this regard, the SDF will strive to standardize and

streamline the means for interception that each SDF service possesses, including their maintenance and supply systems.

In case ballistic missiles or other objects are launched against Japan as an armed attack, it will be dealt with by issuing a defense operation order for armed attack situations. On the other hand, when such situation is not yet acknowledged as an armed attack, Japan will take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles.


As a response against ballistic missiles or other objects, the Joint Task Force-BMD is formed, with the Commander of the Air Defense Command serving as its Commander, and various postures for effective defense are to be taken under a unified command through JADGE. Furthermore, the GSDF will play a leading role in dealing with damage caused by the impact of a fallen ballistic missile.

Q See Fig. III-1-2-3 (Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense [concept])
Fig. III-1-2-4 (Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD [image])
Part II, Chapter 5, Section 1-3-4 (Destruction Measures against Ballistic Missiles)

⁵ JADGE is a core system for the command and control as well as communication functions. It centrally processes the information regarding aircraft captured by radar installed nationwide, and it provides fighters instructions required for scrambling against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace and air defense combat operations. In addition, it controls Patriot and radar, etc. in responses to ballistic missiles.

Fig. III-1-2-4

Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD (image)



(2) Response by the MOD/SDF

Since 2016, North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests and launched more than 70 ballistic missiles and others. These military actions by North Korea pose grave and imminent threats to Japan's security. North Korea expressed its intention to fully denuclearize the Korean Peninsula at the North Korea-United States summit held in June 2018, and disclosed destruction of its nuclear test ground. However, the second North Korea-United States summit held in February 2019 ended without any agreement and North Korea has not so far dismantled all its weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. North Korea is assessed to have already successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads through repeated nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches to date, and it possesses and deploys several hundred ballistic missiles capable of reaching almost every part of Japan. Some of the missiles that were launched in 2019 and are presumed to be new models have a shape similar to that of Russian short-range ballistic missile "Iskander," which can fly at a lower altitude than conventional ballistic missiles and on an irregular trajectory. It is suggested that the aim is to penetrate missile defense systems.

The MOD/SDF continues to carefully monitor the concrete actions of North Korea toward the dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and conducts the necessary intelligence, warning and surveillance activities, and other necessary activities while closely cooperating with the United States and other countries.

Further cooperation with the U.S. Government including the U.S. Forces in Japan is essential for efficient and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related measures including constant real-time sharing of BMD operational and relevant information, and the expansion of BMD cooperation have been agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting).

Furthermore, Japan has closely cooperated with the United States in responding to ballistic missiles, by means such as receiving Shared Early Warning (SEW)⁶ from the U.S. Forces, and sharing intelligence gathered by assets including transportable BMD radar (TPY-2 radar) and Aegis-equipped destroyers deployed in Japan by the U.S. Forces.

Maintenance, enhancement and validation of Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities have been actively conducted through training and other activities. Since FY2010, BMD special exercises have been held between the MSDF and the

⁶ Information on the area and time of launch, the projected area and time, where and when objects fall relating to ballistic missiles launched in the direction of Japan, which is analyzed and conveyed to the SDF by the U.S. Forces in a short period of time after the launch (The SDF started to receive the information since April 1996).

U.S. Navy, connecting their ships and other equipment via a network to conduct the integrated air and missile defense exercise. The ASDF participated in 2018, and the GSDF in 2019 in this exercise. The exercise is conducted as an integrated air and missile defense exercise aimed to improve tactical skills and strengthen cooperation.

Beyond Japan-U.S. cooperation, it is significant to bolster the cooperation between Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea. In January, March, October and December 2017, trilateral ballistic missile information sharing exercises were held in waters off Japan with the objective of strengthening coordination.

Sensitive information related to ballistic missiles, etc. is adequately shared with relevant countries, including the United States through a secured infrastructure and framework⁷ to protect secrets.

The SDF engages in various training in peacetime to improve its capability to counter ballistic missiles. It has been conducting PAC-3 maneuver deployment training from June 2017 in an effort to strengthen the SDF's capability to counter ballistic missiles and generate a sense of safety and security among the public. It has conducted 25 training sessions as of the end of March 2020 including deployments to public facilities.

Q See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-1 (North Korea); Chapter 3, Section 1-2-4 (Republic of Korea); Reference 11 (History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan)

(3) Initiatives towards Strengthening of the BMD System

Currently the SDF maneuvers and deploys according to situation Aegis-equipped destroyers for defense of the entire territory of Japan and PAC-3, which is deployed across the country for the defense of stationing locations. On that premise, the SDF has worked to increase the number of Aegis BMD destroyers. So far, the MOD completed refurbishment of two without BMD capabilities, “Atago” and “Ashigara,” to give them BMD capabilities by December 2018. The

MOD also decided to acquire two additional Aegis-equipped destroyers with BMD capabilities using the FY2015 and FY2016 budgets. These projects will increase the number of Aegis-equipped destroyers with BMD capabilities from the existing six to eight by FY2020.

Meanwhile, Japan and the United States are jointly developing advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block IIA), which will be the successor to SM-3 Block IA to be mounted on Aegis-equipped destroyers, and promoting the project to its deployment, in order to deal with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missile attacks. At the National Security Council 9-Minister Meeting in December 2016, a decision was made to transition to joint production and the deployment phase. Since the FY2017 budget, SM-3 Block IIA acquisitions are ongoing. Acquisition and deployment of SM-3 Block IIA are planned to be implemented in FY2021. In comparison with the previous SM-3 Block IA, SM-3 Block IIA will have not only extended interceptable altitude and coverage of protection, but also have enhanced defeating capability and simultaneous engagement capability. In addition, it is expected that the interception capabilities of SM-3 Block IIA will be enhanced against ballistic missiles equipped with interception avoidance measures such as a decoy and ballistic missiles launched with an intention to avoid being



Launched Aegis-equipped Destroyer JS “Maya” (March 2020)


Video: Training on maneuver and deployment of PAC-3
URL: <https://youtu.be/aJ2PQPozQL8>

Video: Turnover ceremony for Destroyer JS “Maya” and hand-over ceremony for the SDF ship flag
URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vSJAv9ibVAE>

⁷ The enforcement of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets in December 2014 (Act No. 108 of 2013) has established the basis for protection of highly confidential information related to national security. In addition, the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Korea on the Protection of Classified Military Information (the Japan-ROK General Security of Military Information Agreement [GSOMIA]) entered into effect on November 2016. GSOMIA serves as a framework for protecting various classified information, including information regarding North Korea's nuclear and missile threat, shared between Japan and the ROK, which is required for practical and effective responses to various situations.

Fig. III-1-2-5

Major Efforts to Improve Ballistic Missile Response Capabilities



intercepted by taking a higher than nominal trajectory (lofted trajectory).⁸

With regard to Patriot PAC-3, the MOD has been working for procurement of the enhanced capability type, PAC-3 (MSE) (Missile Segment Enhancement) and started its deployment at the end of FY2019. Introduction of PAC-3MSE will realize the extension of interception altitude from less than 20 km to tens of km, meaning that the coverage of protection (area) will expand more than twice compared with the current PAC-3.

In this way Japan is taking measures necessary to strengthen its protection structure and plans to continue the efforts.⁹



See Fig. III-1-2-5 (Major Initiatives for Improvement of the Capability to Counter Ballistic Missiles)

(4) Introduction of Aegis Ashore

In the past, the BMD of Japan was based on deploying Aegis-equipped destroyers, etc. in preparation for interception for a required period of time after early detection of signs of missile launch. Under the past posture regarding a possible missile attack on Japan, the MOD has believed that protection of the entire territory of Japan was achievable if about two of the destroyers continued BMD missions in the sea for a certain period of time with a system of eight Aegis-equipped destroyers.

Meanwhile, North Korea has improved its practical launch capability using a transporter erector launcher (TEL) and developed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), which makes it difficult to grasp signs of launch at an early



Video: Test launch of SM3-Block IB from Destroyer JS "Atago"
URL: <https://youtu.be/WRAfkuoQeMQ>

⁸ By taking a higher trajectory than minimum energy trajectories (trajectories that enable efficient flying of a missile and maximize its range), it takes a shorter range than the maximum range, but the falling speed of the missile becomes faster.

⁹ The FY2020 budget includes expenses necessary for upgrading renovations of the Patriot System to use PAC-3MSE missiles.

stage. In light of the changing situation, it is necessary to maintain a persistent 24-hour, 365-day deployment of Aegis-equipped destroyers for a long period of over one year. This fact triggered a review of the past Japanese ballistic missile defense posture itself.

Furthermore, under the current Aegis equipped destroyer system that requires frequent long-term deployment, the working environment for crew onboard these destroyers is extremely severe. The service requires high level of concentration day and night to cope with ballistic missiles that can be launched anytime.

Under these circumstances, with North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles posing grave and imminent threats to Japan's security, Japan must work to drastically upgrade its ballistic missile defense capabilities in order to ensure constant and sustained protection from peacetime. At meetings of the National Security Council and Cabinet in December 2017, a decision was made to introduce two Aegis Ashore units, to be retained by the GSDF. Aegis Ashore refers to a missile defense system that consists of radars, a command communication system, a vertical launch system (VLS), etc. similar to Aegis-equipped destroyers but deployed on the ground. Aegis Ashore conducts exoatmospheric interception of flying ballistic missiles from the ground. It is a piece of equipment with parts other than the ship hull of an Aegis-equipped destroyer on the ground in a fixed position. The introduction of two units of Aegis Ashore would enable seamless defense of the entire territory of Japan 24 hours a day and 365 days a year, and the burden on personnel is anticipated to be lifted significantly. Under the system of eight Aegis-equipped destroyers, about two of them had to focus on BMD mission only in the sea in order to protect the entire territory of Japan. Once Aegis Ashore is deployed, however, the Aegis-equipped destroyers can be used for missions ensuring maritime security, conducting training to maintain these skills, and ensuring sufficient rotation of crewmembers, which will be connected to further strengthen Japan's deterrence capability as a whole. The radar units to be mounted on the Aegis Ashore are state-of-the-art high-performance radar units called SPY-7. This radar will drastically enhance Japan's capabilities to respond to ballistic missiles, including enhancement of the capability against lofted trajectory launches and response to simultaneous majority attacks compared with Aegis-equipped destroyer of the MSDF.

Since GSDF Araya Maneuver Area in Akita Prefecture and Mutsumi Maneuver Area in Yamaguchi Prefecture were selected as candidate sites for the deployment of two units of Aegis Ashore, the MOD has repeated briefing sessions for local governments and residents and provided

explanations on the necessary survey and the need for the deployment. However, there has been much inappropriate conduct, such as mistakes in briefing material and behavior showing a lack of respect by a defense official at the briefing session. The MOD sincerely reflects on our past conduct. In order to prevent a similar incident from occurring and to fundamentally strengthen the internal study framework, the MOD established "Aegis Ashore Introduction Promotion Headquarters" in June 2019, with the State Minister of Defense as the head of the office.

Since October 2019 the MOD has been conducting a feasibility study on deployment at 20 government-owned areas in Aomori, Akita and Yamagata Prefectures and a necessary resurvey at Mutsumi Maneuver Area in Yamaguchi Prefecture by outsourcing, and it has checked and reviewed the contents of explanation by setting up an "expert council on technical verification of various surveys" in order to obtain technical advice. Then in December of the same year, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited Yamaguchi Prefecture and provided the heads of the relevant local governments with explanations anew that Aegis Ashore.

(5) Suspension of Aegis Ashore deployment process

a. Announcement by the MOD

The MOD made the following announcement on June 15, 2020.

Regarding the deployment of Aegis Ashore to the Mutsumi Maneuver Area, since August 2018, the MOD explained to the local communities based on the discussions with the U.S. side up to that time that it would take firm steps to put measures to control the fly-out trajectory of the interceptor (SM-3), to make sure the booster would fall within the Mutsumi Maneuver Area. Meanwhile for Akita Prefecture, since August of the same year, the MOD explained to the local communities that the booster would fall into the sea in the case of the Araya Maneuver Area.

However, as a result of continued discussions with the U.S. side and proceeding with the study after that, it was found out in late May 2020 that not only the software but also the entire system, including the hardware, were required to be refurbished in order to control the fly-out trajectories of SM-3 to surely drop the booster within the Mutsumi maneuver area or at sea, which would require a considerable amount of cost and time.

In light of this finding of additional cost and time, the MOD decided to suspend the process related to the deployment of Aegis Ashore. The MOD would like to apologize and explain to the local people first, and report the situation to the National Security Council and consider the way forward

based on the discussion.

b. Public Statement by Prime Minister Abe

Regarding this matter, Prime Minister Abe made the following statements on June 18, 2020.

We took the decision to suspend the process of deploying the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system. Given that the premise on which our explanations to local communities were based is now different, we must not proceed any further as proposed. That is the decision we reached.

Meanwhile, the security environment surrounding Japan is becoming more and more severe. There has been no change whatsoever in the current state of affairs. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula are now becoming increasingly strained. We will secure the lives and peaceful daily lives of the Japanese people from the threat of ballistic missiles. That is the most important responsibility of the government. We must never allow a gap to arise in our nation's defenses. Peace is not something granted to us by others; it is something we earn through our own efforts. The basis of security policy is none other than Japan's own efforts. What should we do to reinforce our deterrence or our capacity to deal with security matters? What should we do in order to defend Japan to the end? This summer, we intend to thoroughly discuss at the National Security Council our national security strategy, hammer out a new direction, and implement it expeditiously.

2 Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation

(1) Missile Defense of the United States

The United States is developing a multi-tier missile defense

system that combines defense systems suited for each of the following phases of the ballistic missile flight path to provide a mutually complementary response: (1) the boost phase, (2) the mid-course phase, and (3) the terminal phase. Japan and the United States have developed close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense, and a part of the missile defense system of the United States has been deployed in our country in a step-by-step manner.¹⁰

(2) Japan-U.S. BMD Technology Cooperation, etc.

The Government commenced a Japan-U.S. cooperative research project on a sea-based upper-tier system in FY1999. As the result showed good prospects for resolving initial technical challenges, in December 2005, the then Security Council and the Cabinet decided to start Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor by using the results of the project as a technical basis.¹¹ The joint development started in June 2006 with a view to expanding the coverage of protection and dealing with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missiles attacks.

In February and June 2017, Japan and the United States conducted tests of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor in waters off Hawaii. Analysis of the test data confirmed that it meets all performance requirements. Currently, as part of development work, the United States is carrying out validation of the data connection between the Aegis system and the SM-3 Block IIA, and between radars. Japan continues to cooperate as required.

3 Response to Attacks by Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others

In Japan, where most of the towns and cities are highly urbanized, even small-scale infiltrations and attacks can pose a serious threat against the country's peace and security. These cases refer to various mode and forms including illegal activities by infiltrated foreign armed agents¹² etc., and sabotage carried out by foreign guerillas or special forces, which can be deemed as an armed attack against Japan.

1 Basic Concept

In the stage where the actual situation of intruders and the details of the ongoing case are not clear, the police primarily respond to the situation, while the MOD/SDF will collect relevant information and reinforce the security of the SDF facilities. When the situation is clearer and can be dealt

¹⁰ Specifically, a TPY-2 radar (so-called X-band radar) for BMD has been deployed at the U.S. Shariki Communication Site in 2006. In October 2006, Patriot PAC-3 units were deployed in Okinawa Prefecture, and in October 2007, a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTGS) was deployed in Aomori Prefecture. Furthermore, the 2nd TPY-2 radar was deployed at the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site in December 2014. In October 2018, the 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade Headquarters was deployed in Sagami-hara. In addition, BMD-capable Aegis ships of the U.S. Forces were deployed at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture) in October 2015, March 2016 and May 2018.

¹¹ With regard to the Japan-U.S. cooperative development, it is necessary to export BMD related arms from Japan to the United States. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary's statement issued in December 2004, it was determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply to the BMD system and related matters under the condition that strict controls are maintained. Based on these circumstances, it was decided that the prior consent of Japan could be given to the third party transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA under certain conditions. This decision was formally announced in the Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting) in June 2011. The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (Three Principles) received Cabinet approval in April 2014. However, with regard to exceptional measures instigated before the Three Principles were decided, overseas transfers will continue to be organized in the guidelines for the principles as allowable under the Three Principles.

¹² Refers to persons committing illegal acts such as subversive activities in Japan while possessing weapons with significant wounding and killing power.

with by the general police force, various forms of assistance such as transportation of police officers and provision of equipment to the police force will be carried out. If the case cannot be dealt with by the general police force, then public security operations by the SDF will be implemented. Furthermore, if it has been confirmed that an armed attack is being carried out against Japan, the SDF will respond under a defense operation order.

2 Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

Typical forms of attacks by guerrillas or special forces include the destruction of critical private infrastructure and other facilities, attacks against people, and assassinations of dignitaries.

In dealing with attacks by guerrillas or special forces, the MOD/SDF will respond with a particular emphasis on the establishment of a relevant information gathering posture, warning and surveillance to prevent invasions in coastal areas, protection of key facilities, and search and destruction of invading guerrillas or special forces. Efforts will be made for early detection of attacks and indications through

warning and surveillance, and, as required, the SDF units will be deployed to protect key facilities, such as nuclear power plants, and the necessary posture for protection will be established at an early stage. Based on this, in the event of an infiltration of our territory by guerrillas or special operations forces, they will be searched for and detected by reconnaissance units, aviation units and others and combat units will be promptly deployed to besiege and capture or to destroy them.

See Fig. III-1-2-6 (Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces)

3 Response to Armed Agents

(1) Basic Concept

While the police assume primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF will respond in accordance with situational developments. When this happens, the SDF cooperates with the police force. Accordingly, with regard to public security operations of the SDF, the Basic Agreement¹³ concerning cooperation procedures between the SDF and the police, as well as

Fig. III-1-2-6 Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces

local agreements between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces, have been concluded.¹⁴

Q See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 1-3-1, (Public Security Operations)

(2) Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

The GSDF has been conducting field training exercises nationwide with the police of each prefecture, in an effort to strengthen such collaboration by, for example, conducting field exercises at nuclear power plants throughout the country since 2012.¹⁵ Furthermore, joint exercises in dealing with suspicious vessels have also been conducted regularly between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard.

4 Response to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons

In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the danger of NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) weapon proliferation, which can cause indiscriminate mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area, and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment



Policemen of three Prefectural Polices in Hokuriku (Toyama, Ishikawa and Fukui) and GSDF personnel conducting training according to the joint guideline under the order of Public Security Operations (December 2019)

and materials, to terrorists and countries under suspicion of proliferating such weapons.

The sarin gas attack¹⁶ on the Tokyo subway in March 1995 is one of the examples of an incident in which these weapons were used.

(1) Basic Concept

In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a way that corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will conduct defense operations to repel the armed attack and rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of the use of NBC weapons in a way that does not correspond to an armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the armed group and rescue victims in cooperation with related agencies. Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the chemical protection units of the GSDF and other units will cooperate with relevant organizations in information gathering concerning the extent of the damage, decontamination activities, transportation of the sick and injured, and medical activities through disaster relief and civil protection dispatches.

(2) Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

The MOD/SDF possesses and maintains the GSDF Central Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit and the Countermeasure Medical Unit as well as increasing the number of chemical and medical protection unit personnel, in order to improve the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Also, the GSDF has designated personnel to take initial action in the event of extraordinary disasters in order to allow operations to begin within approximately one hour.

The MSDF and the ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases.



Video: Joint exercises in dealing with suspicious vessels conducted between the Japan Coast Guard and the MSDF

URL: <https://youtu.be/EQ673fWJypE>

¹⁴ In 2004, guidelines were jointly formulated between the National Police Agency and the Defense Agency concerning dealing jointly with public security operations in the event of armed agent incidents.

¹⁵ The GSDF also conducted exercises on the ground at Ikata Nuclear Power Plant (Ehime Prefecture) in 2012, at Tomari Nuclear Power Plant (Hokkaido) and Mihama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2013, at Shimane Nuclear Power Plant (Shimane Prefecture) in 2014, at Higashidori Nuclear Power Plant (Aomori Prefecture) and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (Niigata Prefecture) in 2015, at Takahama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2016, at Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant (Shizuoka Prefecture) and Shiga Nuclear Power Plant (Ishikawa Prefecture) in 2017, and at Genkai Nuclear Power Plant (Saga Prefecture) and Ohi Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2019.

¹⁶ An incident in which members of the Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters, claiming the lives of 12 people (this number refers to the number of deaths indicated in the judgment rendered to Chizuo Matsumoto (commonly known as Shoko Asahara, a guru of Aum Shinrikyo)). The SDF conducted decontamination operations on the trains and stations as well as supported police forensics.

4 Readiness against Invasion

The NDPG states that only the necessary level of readiness against land invasions involving the mobilization of large ground forces, which was expected primarily during the Cold War, will be retained.

In the event of a military attack on Japan, the SDF will respond with defensive mobilization. Their operations are categorized into (1) operations for aerial air defense operations, (2) defense operations protecting waters around Japan, (3) operations protecting the land, and (4) operations ensuring security in maritime communication, based on the characteristic of their purposes. In executing these operations, the U.S. Forces will assist the operations implemented by the SDF and deploy operations to complement the capabilities of the SDF, including the use of striking power, in line with the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.

1 Air Defense Operations

Based on the geographic features of Japan, in that it is surrounded by the sea, and the features of modern wars,¹⁷ it is expected that at first, a sudden attack against Japan will be exercised by aircraft and missiles, and such aerial attacks are assumed to be conducted repeatedly, in the case where a full-scale invasion against Japan occurs. Operations for aerial defense¹⁸ aim to deal with enemy aerial attacks at the farthest point from our territory, prohibiting enemies from gaining air superiority and preventing harm to the people and the sovereign territory of Japan. At the same time, efforts will be made to inflict significant damage on the enemy thus making the continuation of their aerial attack difficult.

2 Defense Operations Protecting Waters Surrounding Japan

If an armed attack is carried out against Japan, which is an island country, aerial attacks are expected to be combined with attacks against our ships and territory by enemy destroyers. In addition, transport vessels could be deployed to enable massive enemy ground forces to invade our territory. Our defense operations protecting the waters surrounding Japan

are composed of measures at sea, measures in waters around our coasts, measures in major straits, and aerial defense above waters around Japan. We will protect the waters around our country by combining these multiple operations, blocking the invasion of our enemies, and attacking and depleting their combat capabilities.

3 Operations Protecting the Land

In order to invade the islands of Japan, invading countries are expected to gain sea and air superiority, followed by the landing of ground troops from the sea and airborne troops from the air.

For invading ground and airborne troops, it tends to be difficult to exert systematic combat capabilities while they are moving on their vessels or aircraft or right before or after they land in our territory. As we protect our land, we need to make best use of this weakness to deal with our enemies between coastal and sea areas or at landing points as much as possible and attack them at an early stage.

4 Operations Ensuring Security in Maritime Transportation

Japan depends upon other countries for the supply of much of its resources and food, making maritime transportation routes the lifeblood for securing the foundation of our existence and prosperity. Furthermore, if our country comes under armed attack, etc., maritime transportation routes will be the foundation to maintain continuous warfare capabilities and enable the U.S. Forces to come and assist in the defense of Japan.

In operations to ensure the safety of our maritime transportation, the SDF will combine various operations such as anti-sea, anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-mine operations to patrol,¹⁹ defend SDF ships, and protect straits and ports, as well as setting up sea lanes²⁰ to directly defend Japanese ships, etc. Aerial defense (anti-air operations) for Japanese ships on maritime transportation routes will be conducted by destroyers, and support from fighter jets and other aircraft is

¹⁷ Aerial attacks are important elements influencing the results of modern wars. It is vital to obtain air superiority before or at the same time as implementing ground or maritime operations.

¹⁸ A special characteristic of operations for aerial defense is that initial response is critical and can influence the entirety of operations. Thus, Japan needs to maintain its readiness for a quick initial response on an ongoing basis in peacetime, regularly collect information, and rapidly and comprehensively exert combat capabilities from the outset of operations.

¹⁹ The act of systematically monitoring a specific area with the purpose of gathering information and intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force.

²⁰ Relatively safe marine areas defined to enable the transportation of ships. The locations and width of sea lanes change depending on the situation of a specific threat.

provided as required.

5 Initiatives Related to the Protection of Civilians

1 Basic Policy on the Protection of Civilians and the Role of the MOD/SDF

In March 2005, based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Act, the government established the Basic Guidelines for the Protection of the People. It anticipates four types of armed attack: (1) a land invasion, (2) an attack by guerrillas or special forces, (3) a ballistic missile attack, (4) an air attack and points to consider in taking measures to protect civilians depending on the type of attack.

The MOD/SDF, based on the Civil Protection Act and the Basic Guidelines, have developed a Civil Protection Plan of the MOD and the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency. This plan stipulates that in a situation where Japan is under attack, the SDF would make utmost efforts to fulfill its basic task of repelling the attack. It also states that, within the scope of no hindrance to the task, the SDF would do as much as possible to protect civilians through support on evacuation and disaster relief.

Q See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 1-1-4 (Civil Protection)

2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF to Facilitate Measures for Civilian Protection

(1) Civil Protection Training

For sound and expeditious implementation of measures to protect civilians, it is important to conduct training on a regular basis to ensure effective and efficient collaboration with concerned ministries, agencies and local governments. The MOD and the SDF hold exercises in cooperation with concerned ministries and agencies and with the participation of local governments and others. They also participate and cooperate in civil protection exercises held by other ministries, agencies and local governments.

For example, civil protection training was hosted by the central government (Cabinet Secretariat and the Fire Defense Agency) and local governments (Hokkaido Prefecture and Sapporo City) in Sapporo City, Hokkaido, in January 2020. Joint Staff and units of the GSDF Northern Army

participated in the preparatory training for an incident during an international sports event.

Q See Reference 12 (Participation of the MOD/SDF in Civil Protection Joint Training Exercises with Central and Local Government Bodies [2019])

(2) Ongoing Collaboration with Local Governments

The MOD/SDF are establishing liaison departments in Regional Armies and Provincial Cooperation Offices to ensure ongoing and close collaboration with local governments and other bodies.

Civilian protection councils are also being established in local governments for comprehensive implementation of measures to protect civilians. Representatives of each branch of the SDF and Regional Defense Bureau officials have been appointed to the councils.

Moreover, local governments are recruiting retired SDF officers to serve as crisis managers. For example, they act as coordinators with the MOD/SDF, as well as developing and implementing joint action plans and exercises.



GSD personnel coordinating with relevant organizations in civil protection training conducted in Hokkaido (January 2020)