

# Part III

## Three Pillars of Japan's Defense

(Means to Achieve  
the Objectives of Defense)

### Chapter 1

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Japan's Own Architecture for National Defense

### Chapter 2

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Japan-U.S. Alliance

### Chapter 3

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Security Cooperation

# Japan's Own Architecture for National Defense

Concerning the strengthening of Japan's own architecture for national defense, the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) states that Japan will build a truly effective defense capability, "Multi-Domain Defense Force," which: organically fuses capabilities in all domains including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum; and is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies.

Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of Japan's national security. Defense capability represents Japan's will and ability to: deter threat from reaching Japan; and should threat reach Japan, eliminate the threat and, as a sovereign nation, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, defend to the end Japanese nationals' life, person and property as well as territorial land, waters and airspace.

At the same time, defense capability is essential for Japan to play on its initiative its roles in the Japan-U.S. Alliance at all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. Strengthening Japan's defense capability to provide for national security is none other than strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Defense capability is essential also for advancing Japan's efforts in security cooperation with other countries.

## Section 1

### Response from Peacetime to Grey Zone Situations

Among the roles that must be served by Japan's defense capability as set forth in the NDPG, the idea of "(1) response from peacetime to 'gray-zone' situations" is as follows.

The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will enhance its presence on a steady-state basis by actively engaging in, among others, bilateral/multilateral training and exercises and overseas port visits, thereby demonstrating Japan's will and capability. The SDF will, in close integration with diplomacy, promote strategic communications, including the aforementioned activities by SDF units.

The SDF will leverage its capabilities in all domains to conduct wide-area, persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (hereinafter referred to as "persistent ISR") activities around Japan. The SDF will prevent the occurrence or escalation of emergencies by employing flexible deterrent

Defense capability is the most important strength for Japan in retaining self-sustained existence as a sovereign nation amid security environment it has never faced before. Japan must strengthen this capability on its own accord and initiative.

The NDPG states that, in order to create a security environment desirable for Japan and to deter and counter threats, Japan's defense capability must be able to serve the following six roles in a seamless and combined manner: (1) response from peacetime to "gray-zone" situations; (2) countering attacks against Japan, including its remote islands; (3) response in space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains during all phases; (4) response to large-scale disasters, etc.; (5) cooperation with the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and (6) promotion of security cooperation.

In particular, in view of protecting the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals, it is all the more important for Japan's defense capability to fulfill diverse roles on a steady-state basis.



Reference 10 (Conditions Required for Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces)

options and other measures. Leveraging posture in place for these activities, the SDF will, in coordination with the police and other agencies, immediately take appropriate measures in response to actions that violate Japan's sovereignty, including incursions into its territorial airspace and waters.

The SDF will provide persistent protection against incoming ballistic missiles and other threats, and minimize damage should it occur.



Section 2-2 of this Chapter (Response to Missile Attacks)  
Chapter 3 Section 1 (Strategic Promotion of Multi-Faceted and Multi-Layered Defense Cooperation)

# 1 Persistent ISR in the Area Surrounding Japan

## 1 Basic Concept

Japan is comprised of a little over 6,800 islands, and is surrounded by wide sea space, which includes the sixth largest<sup>1</sup> territorial waters (including inland waters) and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world. The SDF is engaged in persistent intelligence collection and warning and surveillance during peacetime over Japan's territorial waters and airspace, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly.

## 2 Response by the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF

The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) monitors ships navigating in the waters surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea from peacetime, using patrol aircraft<sup>2</sup> and other aircraft. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) uses radar sites at 28 locations nationwide, and early warning and control aircraft<sup>3</sup> amongst others, to carry out warning and surveillance activities over Japan and its surrounding airspace. These activities of the MSDF and ASDF are done 24 hours a day. Warning and surveillance activities in major channels are also conducted 24 hours a day by MSDF guard posts, Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) coastal surveillance units, and other assets.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, in order to maintain a posture to swiftly respond to various situations, warning and surveillance activities are carried out with the flexible use of destroyers, aircraft, and so on as required. The information obtained through such surveillance activities is shared with the relevant ministries and agencies, including the Japan Coast Guard, in order to strengthen coordination.

To show an example of the events that were reported from SDF's surveillance, following September 2012 when the Government of Japan acquired property rights to and ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsuri Island, Minamikojima Island, and Kitakojima Island), Chinese government vessels carried out intermittent intrusions into Japan's territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands.<sup>5</sup> In June 2016, a Chinese Navy combatant vessel entered Japan's contiguous zone to the north of the Senkaku Islands



GSDF personnel engaged in warning and surveillance activities



MSDF P-3C engaging in warning and surveillance activities in the waters around Japan



ASDF radar site engaging in warning and surveillance activities 24 hours a day, 365 days a year

<sup>1</sup> Excluding overseas territories. The EEZ is the eighth largest in the world if overseas territories are included.

<sup>2</sup> Aircraft for monitoring with the purpose of gathering information and intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force. The MSDF possesses P-3Cs and P-1s as fixed-wing patrol aircraft, and SH-60Js and SH-60Ks as patrol helicopters.

<sup>3</sup> Aircraft with radar capable of monitoring warning control systems omnidirectionally. Being excellent in speed performance and boasting long cruising time, the aircraft is able to fly to distant areas to engage in warning for a longer time. Moreover, as it is also able to engage in warning at high altitude, it has outstanding flight performance and the warning and surveillance capability, such as a long line-of-sight distance. The ASDF has been operating E-767 based on civil aircraft B-767.

<sup>4</sup> Article 4(1)18 of the Act for Establishment of the MOD (Investigation and research required for the performance of duties within jurisdiction) provides the legal basis for early warning surveillance activities by the SDF.

<sup>5</sup> Since December 26, 2015, Chinese government vessels equipped with weapons, which appear to be machine guns, have intruded into the territorial waters of Japan.

for the first time. In December 2016, six vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” passed through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and entered the Pacific. This was the first time that the entry of this aircraft carrier into the Pacific Ocean was confirmed. In July 2017, a Chinese naval intelligence collection ship entered Japanese territorial waters southwest of Kojima (Matsumae, Hokkaido) passing east through the Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean. In January 2018, the SDF confirmed that a Chinese submarine and warship had been navigating through the Japanese contiguous waters of the Senkaku Islands on the same day. Furthermore, in April, in waters some 350 km south of Yonaguni Island, a number of (presumed) fighter jets were observed taking off from the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” for the first time. Also in June 2019, the SDF confirmed that six vessels, including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning,” passed through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and entered the Pacific. In April 2020, six vessels, including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning,” passed through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea. This time again, carrier-based fighters were observed taking off and landing on the aircraft carrier in the Pacific Ocean. In FY2019 the SDF made public 12 cases of activities involving Chinese naval vessels passing through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island.

It has been pointed out that North Korea is attempting to evade United Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions through smuggling. As part of its regular warning and surveillance activities in Japanese territorial waters, the SDF is carrying out information gathering on vessels suspected of violating the UN Security Council sanctions. During the period from 2018 to the end of March 2020, the SDF patrol aircraft have observed 24 cases<sup>6</sup> of seaborne rendezvous between North Korean tankers and foreign-flagged tankers in the East China Sea. The information was shared with relevant agencies and ministries. In a comprehensive judgment across the government, the vessels concerned are



A North Korea-flagged tanker and a small ship of unidentified nationality confirmed by MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft, which are strongly suspected of committing a ship-to-ship transfer on the high seas of the East China Sea (December 2019)

strongly suspected of engaging in ship-to-ship transfers with the North Korean vessels, which is prohibited by UN Security Council resolution. Japan reported this to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea, shared the information with relevant countries, gave information to the relevant countries regarding the tankers concerned and made public announcements on the subject.

In response to these illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean vessels prohibited under the UN Security Council resolution, the United States and other concerned countries are carrying out early warning surveillance activities with aircraft using the United States Kadena Air Base in Japan.<sup>7</sup> Australian, Canadian,



Video: Response status to illicit ship-to-ship transfer prohibited by the UN Security Council resolution


URL: <https://youtu.be/eCOduAxZ374>

<sup>6</sup> For a specific example, see the MOD website (<https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/sedori/index.html>)

<sup>7</sup> Australia and Canada conducted sanctions enforcement using aircraft from the United States Kadena Air Base in Japan for about one month from late April 2018, followed by Australia, Canada and New Zealand for about six weeks from mid-September of the same year, Australia for about a week from early December of 2018, France for about three weeks from March 2019, Australia for about a month from May 2019, Canada for about three weeks from early June 2019, Australia for about one month from early September 2019, Canada for about one month from early October 2019, New Zealand for about one month from mid-October 2019, and Australia about one month from mid-February (as of the end of March 2020).

**Fig. III-1-1-1**

Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Waters and Airspace Surrounding Japan




New Zealand and French aircraft made patrol flights since April 2018. In addition, naval vessels of the U.S. Navy, the United Kingdom, Canada,<sup>8</sup> Australia and France carried out enforcement of UN Security Council sanctions imposed against North Korea in sea areas surrounding Japan.<sup>9</sup> The MOD/SDF intend to continue their close cooperation with concerned countries to ensure compliance with the UN Security Council resolution.



Fig. III-1-1-1 (Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Waters and Airspace Surrounding Japan); Fig. III-1-1-2 (Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters around the Senkaku Islands by Chinese Coast Guard Ships); Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2-2 (Military Affairs); Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-1 (North Korea)

**Fig. III-1-1-2**

Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters around the Senkaku Islands by Chinese Coast Guard Ships



<sup>8</sup> At the Japan-Canada Summit Meeting held on April 28, 2019, Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, indicated that Canada will extend the period for dispatch of aircraft and vessels for conducting warning and surveillance activities against ship-to-ship transfers of cargo by two years, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed his gratitude.

<sup>9</sup> The United Kingdom's naval frigates (early May, from late May to early June, mid-June and mid-December 2018, and early January and from late February to early March, 2019), the Canadian Navy's frigates (early and late October 2018, and mid-June and late August 2019), the Royal Australian Navy's vessels (early October 2018 and early May and late October 2019) and the French Navy's frigate (spring in 2019) conducted sanctions enforcement in the waters around Japan, including the East China Sea (as of the end of March 2020).

## 2 Measures against Violation of Japan's Sovereignty

### 1 Warnings and Scrambles in Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace

#### (1) Basic Concept

Under international law, countries have complete and exclusive sovereignty over their territorial airspace. Scrambling against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace is conducted as an act to exercise the right of policing intended to maintain public order. Unlike measures taken on land or at sea, this measure can be taken only by the SDF. Therefore, the ASDF is primarily responsible for conducting the actions based on Article 84 of the SDF Law.

#### (2) Response by the MOD/SDF

The ASDF detects and identifies aircraft flying in airspace surrounding Japan using warning and control radars as well as early warning and control aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft heading to Japan's territorial airspace are detected, fighters and other aircraft scramble to approach them in order to confirm the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. Furthermore, in the event that this suspicious aircraft has actually intruded into territorial airspace, a warning to leave the airspace would be issued, among other responses.

In FY2019, ASDF aircraft scrambled 947 times, which was a decrease by 52 times compared with the previous fiscal year. This is the 3rd highest number of times since 1958,

### VOICE

#### Voice of Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft Crew in Charge of Warning and Surveillance

Petty Officer 3rd Class MOTOSHIROMIZU Nanami, Non-acoustic operator, 3rd Air Patrol Squadron, MSDF (Yamato City, Kanagawa Prefecture)

I have been on board P-1 as a non-acoustic operator at the 3rd Air Patrol Squadron in Atsugi since 2019.

P-1 has a variety of missions, including warning and surveillance flights over waters around Japan, which are conducted every day. I am engaged in the warning and surveillance mission on a daily basis.

"Nothing has happened" is the best thing for warning and surveillance, but it is extremely rare that a notable event is not found at sea, which is constantly changing. My principal role while on a flight is to identify ships using radar, etc. In order to

identify all ships in waters under the charge of the P-1 and check for abnormalities, it is not allowed to miss even a small change, which often causes strain during flight. In addition to cooperation between crew members, we exchange information with the U.S. and other navies, and also closely coordinate with the Japan Coast Guard, the Fisheries Agency and others.

When landing after a flight mission, I am freed from tension and feel comfortable tiredness, at the same time, I also find my job rewarding as I am able to get a sense of accomplishment from contributing to the stability of waters around Japan. Nothing can make me happier than improving my skills through daily training and further serving Japan.




The author in preflight inspection



P-1 taking off for warning and surveillance flight in early morning



Video: Fixed-wing patrol aircraft engaged in warning and surveillance  
URL: <https://youtu.be/VHmHSCG5Eww>

**Fig. III-1-1-3** Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War

An ASDF pilot running up to an F-15 fighter aircraft on receiving an order to scramble



Russian Su-34 fighter-bomber confirmed for the first time through a scramble (February 2020)

when scrambles commenced and the number continues to be kept relatively high.

Breaking this figure down, planes were scrambled 675 times in response to Chinese aircraft, an increase of 37 times from the previous fiscal year. Chinese aircraft continue to be highly active, as this is the 2nd highest figure since the number of scrambles by country and region was first made public in 2001.

A distinctive example arose in May 2017 when a drone caused an airspace violation as it flew above a Chinese government vessel entering Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands. Japan lodged protests against the Chinese government through diplomatic channels. In August that year, six Chinese military bombers were observed in an unprecedented flight from the East China Sea over the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island northeast across the Pacific to an area off the Kii Peninsula before returning. Then in December, five aircraft including two fighter jets

flew over the Tsushima Strait and entered the Japan Sea airspace.<sup>10</sup> Then in April 2018, a (presumed) unmanned Chinese aircraft flew across the East China Sea. With these kinds of acts, China is expanding and intensifying the activities of its air force inside Japanese airspace and one-sidedly escalating its actions in some cases. It is a troubling situation.


ASDF aircraft scrambled 268 times in response to Russian aircraft, which was a decrease by 75 times compared to the previous year.

As a distinctive example, in June 2019, two Tu-95 long range bombers intruded into Japan's airspace above the territorial waters of Minamidaitojima Island (Okinawa Prefecture). One of them further intruded into Japan's airspace above the territorial waters of Hachijojima Island (Tokyo). Japan lodged protests against the Russian government through diplomatic channels. In July 2019, two Chinese H-6 bombers and two Russian Tu-95 long-range

<sup>10</sup> This was the first time that a Chinese fighter has been confirmed entering the Japan Sea airspace.

Fig. III-1-1-4

Example Flight Patterns of Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded (image)



fighter-bomber was confirmed for the first time above the Sea of Okhotsk in a scramble. Due attention needs to be paid to the activities of Russian aircraft.

Even after the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)” by Chinese government in November 2013, the MOD/SDF has conducted warning and surveillance activities as before in the East China Sea, including the Chinese ADIZ. The MOD/SDF also engages in strict measures against intrusion of territorial airspace in accordance with international law and the SDF Law.

Q See

Fig. III-1-1-3 (Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War); Fig. III-1-1-4 (Example Flight Patterns of Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded [image]); Fig. III-1-1-5 (Air Defense Identification Zone [ADIZ] of Japan and Those of Neighboring Countries/Regions [image]); Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2-2 (Military Affairs), Part I, Chapter 2, Section 4-4 (Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan); Part II, Chapter 5, Section 1-3-5 (Measures Against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace)

## 2 Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan's Territorial Waters

### (1) Basic Concept

With respect to foreign submarines navigating underwater in Japan's territorial waters,<sup>11</sup> an order for maritime security operations will be issued. The submarine will be requested to navigate on the surface of the water and show its flag, in accordance with international law, and in the event that the submarine does not comply with the request, the SDF will request it to leave Japanese territorial waters.

Q See

Part II, Chapter 5, Section 1-3-2 (Maritime Security Operations)


### (2) Response by the MOD/SDF

The MSDF is maintaining and enhancing capabilities for: expressing its intention not to permit any navigation that violates international law; and responding in shallow water areas by detecting, identifying, and tracking foreign submarines navigating under the territorial waters of Japan. In November 2004, the MSDF observed a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigating under Japanese territorial waters around the Sakishima Islands. In response to this incident, the MSDF issued an order for maritime security operations, and continued to track the submarine with MSDF vessels until it entered the high seas.

Recently, in January 2018, a submerged submarine was spotted by MSDF assets including a destroyer moving through Japanese contiguous zones of the Senkaku Islands. The submarine was then observed surfacing in international

Fig. III-1-1-5

Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and Those of Neighboring Countries/Regions (image)



bombers carried out long distance joint flights from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea. In addition, one Russian A-50 early warning and control aircraft allegedly supporting Tu-95 long-range bombers intruded into Japan's airspace above the territorial waters of Takeshima Island in Shimane Prefecture. A Korean fighter fired warning shots to the Russian aircraft. Japan lodged protests against the Russian government which intruded into Japan's airspace and against the Korean government which fired warning shots to the Russian aircraft through diplomatic channel. In February 2020, a Su-34


<sup>11</sup> The term "territorial waters" also includes inland waters.

## Column

## Scrambling against Aircraft Intruding into Territorial Airspace

Under international law, countries have complete and exclusive sovereignty over their territorial airspace. When a foreign aircraft flies over a state's territorial airspace, it is necessary to obtain permission from the state. Intruding into a state's territorial airspace without the presence of any special circumstance and without permission from the state violates international law, known as "intrusion of territorial airspace."

The ASDF monitors airspace over Japan and the surrounding areas through radar on a 24-hours-a-day, 365-days-a-year basis and identifies flying aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft which may intrude into Japanese territorial airspace is detected, the ASDF scrambles fighters kept on stand-by. Scrambled fighters monitor the behavior of the potentially intruding aircraft and, as necessary, issue a caution against intrusion. If an intrusion occurs, scrambled fighters warn an intruding aircraft to leave the airspace, or forcibly compel it to land at the nearest airfield. Scrambling against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace is a task comprised of a series of activities starting with the monitor of airspace.



Procedures for scrambling against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace (image)

In order to effectively implement scrambling against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace, it is necessary to accurately judge whether or not to scramble fighters. As for this, the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) has been established in a way that encloses Japan. Regarding an aircraft that has been confirmed to have entered the ADIZ by radar, the ASDF judges whether or not to scramble fighters after identifying the aircraft's nationality and assessing the possibility of intrusion into Japanese territorial airspace.

In recent years, the number of scrambles remains at a high level. The number of scrambles in FY2019 (947) was seven times higher than the number in FY2004 (141), which represented the lowest level since the end of the Cold War. The MOD/SDF will devote full-fledged efforts for scrambling against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace in accordance with international law and the SDF Law from the viewpoint of firmly defending Japan's territorial land, seas and airspace.



A F-2 fighter aircraft defending Japanese territorial airspace

waters of the East China Sea flying the Chinese flag. In the past, submerged submarines moving through Japanese contiguous zones were spotted in other sea areas.<sup>12</sup> This was the first time that a Chinese naval submarine has been observed operating in the Japanese contiguous zones of

the Senkaku Islands. Although international law does not forbid foreign submarines navigating underwater in the contiguous zone of coastal states, Japan maintains a posture to appropriately deal with such activities.



Video: Scramble

URL: <https://youtu.be/pq3GE0f38uE>

<sup>12</sup> MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft and others confirmed observations of submerged submarines navigating through the Japanese contiguous zones in waters west of Amamioshima island, south of Kumejima Island and south of Minamidaitojima Island in May 2013, in waters east of Miyakojima Island in March 2014, and in waters southeast of Tsushima Island in February 2016. These incidents were made public.

### 3 Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels

#### (1) Basic Concept

The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to suspicious armed special operations vessels (unidentified vessels). However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued and the situation will be handled by the SDF in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.

#### (2) Response by the MOD/SDF

In light of the lessons learned from the cases of an unidentified vessel off the Noto Peninsula in 1999, an unidentified vessel

in the sea southwest of Kyushu in 2001, and other similar incidents, the MOD/SDF have been making various efforts.

In particular, the MSDF has been taking the following steps: (1) deployment of Patrol Guided Missile Boats; (2) establishment of the MSDF Special Boarding Unit;<sup>13</sup> (3) equipment of destroyers with machine guns; (4) furnishing forcible maritime interdiction equipment (flat-nose shells);<sup>14</sup> (5) improving the sufficiency ratio of military vessel personnel; and (6) enhancing equipment for the Vessel Boarding Inspection Team. In addition, based on “the manual for dealing with suspicious vessels” formulated jointly by the then Defense Agency and the Japan Coast Guard in 1999, they have regularly conducted the training in order to strengthen coordination.

<sup>13</sup> A special unit of the MSDF was newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance, and disarm suspicious vessels in the event of vessel boarding inspections under maritime security operations.

<sup>14</sup> A non-bursting shell launched from the 76-mm gun equipped on destroyer, the flat front nose of which keeps it from bouncing.