Section 2 Outline of NDPG

Since it was first formulated in 1976, the NDPG has been established six times. The Current NDPG was formulated as "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (2018 NDPG)" in December 2018.

See Fig. II-3-2-1 (Changes in the NDPG)

1 Basic Approach—Building a Multi-Domain Defense Force

Japan's security environment is becoming more testing and uncertain at a remarkably faster speed than expected when the 2013 NDPG[1] were formulated. On such basis, the current NDPG indicates that Japan will build a "Multi-Domain Defense Force" with a truly effective defense capability that: (i) can execute cross-domain operations, which organically fuse capabilities in all domains, including not only traditional domains—land, sea and air—but also new domains—space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum—, to generate synergy and amplify the overall strength; (ii) is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies; and (iii) is capable of bolstering the ability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats and promoting multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation.

In particular, as capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum, could substantially enhance the military's overall capabilities to conduct operations, states are exerting efforts to improve capabilities in these fields. Japan will also focus on enhancing such capabilities as well as capabilities to effectively counter attacks by aircraft, ships, and missiles in combination therewith, and enhancing the sustainability and resiliency of defense capability, including logistics support.

Fig. II-3-2-1 Changes in the NDPG

	Background	Basic ideas
1976 NDPG (October 29, 1976, the National Defense Council/Cabinet Meeting)	○ Détente and Cold War coexisting in global community ○ Balanced relationship among the United States, China, and the Soviet Union in the vicinity of Japan ○ Need to show the target of defense force buildup	・The concept of Basic Defense Capability ・Maintain a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation preventing a power vacuum that destabilizes the region, rather than coping with a direct military threat to Japan
19 years ↓		
1995 NDPG (November 28, 1995, the Security Council/Cabinet Meeting)	○ The end of Cold War ○ International situation with unpredictability and uncertainty ○ National expectations to international contribution	・Basically follow the concept of Basic Defense Capability ・"Dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters" and "contributing to building a more stable security environment" added to the roles of defense capability, joining the existing role of "defense of the nation"
9 years ↓		
2004 NDPG (December 10, 2004, the Security Council/Cabinet Meeting)	○ New threats such as international terrorism and ballistic missile attacks ○ Direct connection between world peace and Japan's peace ○ Necessity to convert the policy from putting weight on deterrence to handling the situation	・Capability to work independently and proactively on implementing international peace cooperation activities, as well as dealing effectively with new threats and diverse contingencies ・Succeeding the effective parts of the concept of Basic Defense Capability
6 years ↓		
2010 NDPG (December 17, 2010, the Security Council/Cabinet Meeting)	○ Change in global power balance ○ Complex military situation surrounding Japan ○ Diversification of the military role in global society	・Build up of a Dynamic Defense Force (Not bound by the concept of Basic Defense Capability) ・Facilitating effective deterrence of and responses to various contingencies, and making it possible to proactively conduct activities to further stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security environment in a dynamic manner
3 years ↓		
2013 NDPG (December 17, 2013, the National Security Council/Cabinet Meeting)	○ Security situation surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe ○ U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region ○ Lessons learned from the Self-Defense Forces experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake	・Build up of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force ・Defense force to be more thorough with the concept of joint operation, which enables the SDF to respond swiftly to the increasingly severe security environment and carry out various activities, such as achieving maritime supremacy and air superiority, seamlessly and flexibly
5 years ↓		
2018 NDPG (December 18, 2018, the National Security Council/Cabinet Meeting)	○ Security situation surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe and uncertain at extremely high speeds ○ Rapid expansion in the use of new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum ○ Clear trends observed in further military build-up and increase in military activities	・Development of "Multi-domain Defense Force" ・Truly effective defense capability that enables cross-domain operations organically fusing capabilities in all domains by strengthening not only those in traditional domains—land, sea and air—but also those in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum

1 National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013)

2 Japan's Basic Defense Policy

The NDPG provides the basic policy of Japan's defense as follows:

1 Basic Policy

In line with the NSS and from the perspective of "Proactive Contribution to Peace," Japan has enhanced its diplomatic strength and defense capability. Japan has also promoted cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being a cornerstone. In so doing, Japan under the Constitution has adhered to the basic precept of maintaining the exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, ensured civilian control of the military, and observed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Based on this premise, Japan, even amid the realities of a security environment it has hitherto never faced, must strive to preserve national interests identified in the NSS—defend to the end Japanese nationals' lives, persons and property, territorial land, waters and airspace, and its sovereignty and independence.

Defense objectives are to create a desirable security environment while deterring threats from reaching, and, should a threat reach Japan, to counter the threat. To this end Japan will strengthen: (1) Japan's own architecture for national defense; (2) the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and (3) international security cooperation. These efforts, including achieving superiority in new domains, which are space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum, must be carried out swiftly and flexibly.

In dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons, U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential: Japan will closely cooperate with the United States. To deal with the threat, Japan will also increase its own efforts. At the same time, Japan will play an active and positive role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

2 Strengthening Japan's Own Architecture for National Defense

In order to squarely address the realities of a security environment that it has hitherto never faced and to securely achieve national defense objectives, Japan will build a national defense architecture that will, in all phases, integrate the strengths at the nation's disposal, enabling not only the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF efforts but also coherent, whole-of-government efforts, as well as cooperation with local governments and private entities. In particular, Japan will accelerate its efforts and cooperation in such fields as space, cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum, ocean, and science & technology, and also promote measures concerning the formulation of international norms in fields such as space and cyberspace. Japan will also further advance steady-state efforts such as strategic communications.

In order to address a range of situations including armed contingencies and "gray-zone" situations, Japan further needs to seamlessly deal with various situations in a coherent, whole-of-government manner by way of swift and pertinent decision-making under even stronger political leadership, which will be assisted by an enhanced support mechanism.

In addition, Japan will also strengthen organization for disaster response and civil protection, build a posture prepared to evacuate Japanese nationals overseas during emergencies and to ensure their safety, and promote measures to protect infrastructure critical to people's daily lives, such as electricity and communication, as well as to protect cyberspace.

In addition to this comprehensive defense system, it is important to build the Multi-Domain Defense Force and fulfill various roles during peacetime using the defense force seamlessly and in a combined manner.

See Fig. II-3-2-2 (Roles to Be Fulfilled by Defense Force)

3 Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements constitute a cornerstone for Japan's national security, and the Japan-U.S. Alliance plays a significant role for the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. In this context, Japan needs to press ahead with such efforts as bolstering the ability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats, enhancing and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas, and steadily implementing measures concerning the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan.

4 Strengthening Security Cooperation

In line with the vision of a "free and open Indo-Pacific," Japan will strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, taking into account the characteristics and situation specific to each region and country. As part of such efforts, Japan will actively leverage its defense capability to work on defense cooperation and exchanges which include bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, and service-to-service exchanges. Furthermore, Japan will also contribute to address global

Fig. II-3-2-2 Roles to Be Fulfilled by Defense Force

Role	Outline
From peacetime to "gray-zone" situations	● The SDF will, in close integration with diplomacy, promote strategic communications including bilateral/multilateral training/exercises and overseas port visits on a steady-state basis. ● The SDF will conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities around Japan. The SDF will prevent the occurrence or escalation of emergencies by employing flexible deterrent options and other measures. ● The SDF will, in coordination with the police and other agencies, immediately take appropriate measures in response to actions that violate Japan's sovereignty including incursions into its territorial airspace and waters.
Attack against Japan including its remote islands	● The SDF will quickly maneuver and deploy requisite units to block access and landing of invading forces while ensuring maritime and air superiority. ● Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, the SDF will block invading forces' access and landing from outside their threat envelopes. ● Should any part of the territory be occupied, the SDF will retake it by employing all necessary measures. ● Against airborne attack by missiles and aircraft, the SDF will respond in a swift and sustained manner by applying optimal means and minimize damage to maintain SDF's capabilities as well as the infrastructure upon which such capabilities are employed. ● In response to attack by guerrillas or special operations forces, SDF will protect critical facilities including nuclear power plants and search and destroy infiltrating forces.
Space, cyber and electromagnetic domains during all phases	● To prevent any actions that impede its activities, the SDF will conduct, on a steady-state basis, persistent monitoring as well as collection and analysis of relevant information. ● In case of an event that impedes its activities, the SDF will promptly take such measures as damage limitation and recovery. ● In case of armed attack against Japan, the SDF will block and eliminate the attack by leveraging capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains. ● SDF will contribute to comprehensive, whole-of-government efforts concerning these domains under appropriate partnership and shared responsibility with relevant organizations.
Large-scale disasters	● The SDF will swiftly transport and deploy requisite units to take all necessary measures for initial response, and, as required, maintain its posture for disaster response for a longer term. ● The SDF will carefully address the needs of affected citizens and local governments. ● The SDF will engage in life saving, temporary repair and livelihood support in appropriate partnership and cooperation with relevant organizations, local governments and the private sector.
Collaboration with the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance	● In all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, Japan will effectively conduct activities by playing on its initiative its own roles in the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
Promotion of security cooperation	● SDF will strategically promote defense cooperation and exchanges such as joint training and exercises, cooperation in defense equipment and technologies, capacity building assistance, and service-to-service exchange.

security challenges. In implementing these initiatives, Japan will position the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone and will work closely with the countries that share universal values and security interests, through full coordination with its diplomatic policy.

3 Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability

For priority capability areas in strengthening defense capability, the NDPG sets forth that Japan will develop those areas as early as possible, allocating resources flexibly and intensively without adhering to existing budget and human resource allocation, and undertake necessary fundamental reforms.

See Fig. II-3-2-3 (Priorities in Strengthening Capabilities Necessary for Cross-domain Operations)

4 Organization of the SDF

The NDPG states that, in order to realize cross-domain operations, including in the new domains of space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum, the SDF will strengthen joint operations as described in 1 and develop the organization of each SDF service as described in sections from 2 to 4. The current Medium Term Defense Program also includes reorganization of the major SDF units based on the above.

See Fig. II-3-2-4 (Transition of the NDPG Annex Tables)

1 Joint Operation to Realize Cross-Domain Operations

In order to further promote jointness of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) in all areas, the SDF will implement such measures as strengthening the Joint Staff Office's necessary posture.

With regard to the space domain, the SDF will establish a space domain mission unit with ASDF, and strengthen its posture for joint operations.

Fig. II-3-2-3 Priorities in Strengthening Capabilities Necessary for Cross-domain Operations

Capabilities that should be acquired and strengthened	Outline
Capabilities in space domain	●The SDF will improve various capabilities that leverage space domain including information-gathering, communication and positioning capabilities. The SDF will also build a structure to conduct persistent space situation monitoring. To ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, the SDF will work to strengthen capability to disrupt opponent's command, control, communications and information. ●The SDF will work to enhance cooperation with relevant agencies and with the United States and other relevant countries. The SDF will also engage in the creation of units specializing in space and develop human resources.
Capabilities in cyber domain	●In order to prevent attack against SDF's command and communications systems and networks, SDF will continue to strengthen capabilities for persistent monitoring of them as well as for damage limitation and recovery in case of attack. ●The SDF will fundamentally strengthen its cyber defense capability, including capability to disrupt, during attack against Japan, opponent's use of cyberspace for the attack. ●The SDF will significantly expand its human resources with specialized expertise and skills, and contribute to whole-of-government efforts.
Capabilities in electromagnetic domain	●The SDF will work to enhance information and communications capabilities as well as information collection and analysis capabilities related to electromagnetics, and develop an information sharing posture. The SDF will improve capabilities to minimize the effect of opponent's electronic jamming. ●The SDF will strengthen capabilities to neutralize radar and communications of opponent who intends to invade Japan. ●In order to smoothly perform these activities, the SDF will enhance its ability to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic spectrum.
Capabilities in maritime and air domains	●The SDF will reinforce its posture for conducting persistent ISR at sea and in the air around Japan. ●The SDF will also strengthen surface and underwater operational capabilities including Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV). ●By taking measures such as developing a fighter force structure that features Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) fighter aircraft, the SDF will improve air operation capability particularly on the Pacific side of Japan, where number of air bases is limited despite its vast airspace. ●Japan will take necessary measures to enable STOVL fighter aircraft to operate from existing SDF ships as required.
Stand-off defense capability	●The SDF will acquire stand-off firepower and other requisite capabilities to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan including remote islands from the outside of their threat envelopes. ●In order to appropriately leverage advances in military technologies, Japan will swiftly and flexibly strengthen stand-off defense capability through measures such as comprehensive research and development of related technologies.
Comprehensive air and missile defense capability	●In order to counter diverse airborne threats of ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft, the SDF will establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces, thereby providing persistent nation-wide protection and also enhancing the capability to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. The SDF will also study ways to counter future airborne threats.
Maneuver and deployment capability	●Requisite SDF units need to conduct sustained, persistent activities in appropriate areas on a steady-state basis. In order to maneuver and deploy according to situation, the SDF will strengthen amphibious operation and other capabilities. ●To enable swift and large-scale transport, the SDF will strengthen joint transport capability including inter- and intra-theater transport capabilities tailored to the characteristics of remote island areas. The SDF will also work to collaborate with commercial transport on a steady-state basis.
Sustainability and resiliency	●The SDF will take necessary measures for securing ammunition and fuel, ensuring maritime shipping lanes, and protecting important infrastructure. In particular, while cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, the SDF will improve sustainability through safe and steady acquisition and stockpiling of ammunition and fuel. ●The SDF will also improve resiliency in a multi-layered way through efforts including dispersion, recovery from damage, and substitution of infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations. Further, the SDF will review existing equipment maintenance methods, thereby ensuring high operational availability.

As for the cyber domain, the SDF will maintain a Cyber Defense Unit as a joint unit in order to fundamentally strengthen cyber defense capability.

In respect to the electromagnetic spectrum domain, the SDF will strengthen the posture of the Joint Staff Office and of each SDF service.

The GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units and ballistic missile defense units, the MSDF will maintain Aegis-equipped destroyers, the ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile unit, and the SDF will build comprehensive air and missile defense capability comprising these assets.

The SDF will maintain a maritime transport unit as an integrated unit that allows SDF units to swiftly maneuver and be deployed in joint operations.

2 Organization of the GSDF

In order to be able to swiftly respond to various situations, the GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. The GSDF will also maintain mobile operating units equipped with specialized functions, in order to effectively perform operations such as: various missions in cyber and electromagnetic domains.

The GSDF will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats to remote islands by taking measures including persistent steady-state maneuvers and stationing of units. To be able to counter an invasion, the GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units and hyper-velocity gliding projectile units for remote island defense.

The GSDF will review their organization and equipment with a focus on tanks, howitzers and rockets. The GSDF will also review their organization and equipment related to aerial

Fig. II-3-2-4 Transition of the NDPG Annex Tables

	Category		1976 NDPG	1995 NDPG	2004 NDPG	2010 NDPG	2013 NDPG	2018 NDPG
Joint Units	Cyber Defense Units							1 squadron
	Maritime Transport Units							1 group
GSDF	Authorized Number of Personnel		180,000	160,000	155,000	154,000	159,000	159,000
	Active-Duty Personnel			145,000	148,000	147,000	151,000	151,000
	Ready Reserve Personnel			15,000	7,000	7,000	8,000	8,000
	Major Units	Regional Deployment Units[1]	12 divisions 2 combined brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	5 divisions 2 brigades	5 divisions 2 brigades
		Rapid Deployment Units	1 armored division 1 artillery brigade 1 airborne brigade 1 training group 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division Central Readiness Force	Central Readiness Force 1 armored division	3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade	3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade
		Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units					5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments	5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments
		Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile Intended for the Defense of Remote Islands Units						2 battalions
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments
		Ballistic Missile Defense Units						2 squadrons
	Major Equipment	Tanks[2]	(approx. 1,200)	approx. 900	approx. 600	approx. 400	(approx. 300)	(approx. 300)
		Artillery (Main artillery)[2]	(approx. 1,000/vehicle)	(approx. 900/vehicle)	(approx. 600/vehicle)	approx. 400/vehicle	(approx. 300/vehicle)	(approx. 300/vehicle)
MSDF	Major Units	Destroyers				4 flotillas (8 divisions) 4 flotillas	4 flotillas (8 divisions) 6 flotillas	4 groups (8 divisions)
		Destroyer and minesweeper vessels For mobile operations[7]	4 flotillas	4 flotillas	4 flotillas (8 divisions)			2 groups (13 divisions)
		Regional deployment[7]	(Regional units) 10 units	(Regional units) 7 units	5 divisions			
		Submarine Units	6 divisions	6 divisions	4 divisions	6 divisions	6 divisions	6 divisions
		Minesweeper Units	2 flotillas	1 flotilla	1 flotilla	1 flotilla	1 flotilla	
		Patrol Aircraft Units	(Land-based) 16	(Land-based) 13	9 squadrons	9 squadrons	9 squadrons	9 squadrons
	Major Equipment	Destroyers	approx. 60	approx. 50	47	48	54	54
		Submarines	16	16	16	22	22	22
		Patrol vessels						12
		Combat aircraft	approx. 220	approx. 170	approx. 150	approx. 150	approx. 170	approx. 190
ASDF	Major Units	Air Warning & Control Units	28 warning groups 1 squadron	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 squadron	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)	4 warning groups 24 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)	28 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (3 squadrons)	28 warning squadrons 1 AEW wing (3 squadrons)
		Fighter Aircraft Units			12 squadrons	12 squadrons	13 squadrons	13 squadrons[6]
		Fighter-Interceptor Units	10 squadrons	9 squadrons				
		Support Fighter Units	3 squadrons	3 squadrons				
		Air Reconnaissance Units	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron		
		Aerial Refueling/Transport Units			1 squadron	1 squadron	2 squadrons	2 squadrons
		Air Transport Units	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	6 fire groups	6 fire groups	6 fire groups	6 fire groups	6 fire groups	4 fire groups (24 fire squadrons)
		Space Domain Mission Units						1 squadron
		Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units						1 squadron
	Major Equipment	Combat aircraft (Fighters)	approx. 430 (approx. 350)[3]	approx. 400 approx. 300	approx. 350 approx. 260	approx. 340 approx. 260	approx. 360 approx. 280	approx. 370 approx. 290
Major Equipment/ Units that may also serve for BMD missions[4]	Aegis-equipped Destroyers				4 ships	6 ships[5]	8 ships	8 ships
	Air Warning & Control Units				7 warning groups 4 warning squadrons	11 warning groups/units		
	Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units				3 groups	6 groups		

Notes: 1. Units that were categorized as those deployed in a steady state (peacetime) until 2010 NDPG
2. Data on tanks and artillery were not included in 1976 NDPG, 2013 NDPG and 2018 NDPG, but are shown here for making comparisons with Annex Tables for 1995 NDPG up to 2010 NDPG.
3. Data on fighters were not included in 1976 NDPG but are shown here for making comparisons with Annex Tables for 1995 NDPG up to 2018 NDPG.
4. Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions were included in MSDF's major equipment or ASDF's major units in 2004 NDPG and 2010 NDPG, but those newly procured are included in the categories of Aegis-equipped destroyers, Air Warning & Control Units, and Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units in 2013 NDPG and 2018 NDPG.
5. In 2010 NDPG, Aegis-equipped destroyers with BMD functions were allowed to be additionally procured within the limited number of destroyers above, when separately determined in light of the progress in BMD technologies and financial circumstances.
6. Including Fighter Aircraft Units consisting of STOVL aircraft
7. Destroyers were expressed as Anti-submarine Surface Units (for mobile operations) or Anti-submarine Surface Units (regional units) in 1976 NDPG, as Destroyers (for mobile operations) or Destroyers (regional units) in 1995 NDPG, and as Destroyers (for mobile operations) or Destroyers (regional deployment) in 2004 NDPG.

firepower. The GSDF will thoroughly implement rationalization and streamlining of these units and appropriately position them to meet the conditions and characteristics of each region.

The number of GSDF personnel will be maintained at 159,000.

3 Organization of the MSDF

The MSDF will maintain reinforced destroyer units including destroyers with improved multi-mission capabilities (FFM), minesweeper units, and embarked patrol helicopter units. The MSDF will organize surface units composed of these units. In addition, the MSDF will maintain patrol ship units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan.

In order to conduct underwater Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and to engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, the MSDF will maintain reinforced submarine units. By introducing a test-bed submarine, the MSDF will work to achieve greater efficiency in submarine operations and accelerate capability improvement, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture.

In order to effectively conduct steady-state, wide-area airborne ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, the MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units.

4 Organization of the ASDF

The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of ground-based warning and control units and reinforced airborne warning units: ground-based warning and control units are capable of conducting surveillance in vast airspace on the Pacific side; and airborne warning units are capable of conducting sustained airborne warning, surveillance and control also during situations with heightened tensions.

The ASDF will reinforce and maintain fighter aircraft units and aerial refueling and transport units.

The ASDF will maintain air transport units which enable it to effectively carry out activities such as maneuver and deployment of ground forces.

The ASDF will maintain unmanned aerial vehicle units which enable it to conduct information collection in areas relatively remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions.

5 Elements Supporting Defense Capability

The NDPG sets forth that the initiatives related to elements supporting defense capability will be emphasized in order for Japan's defense capability to demonstrate its true value.

See Fig. II-3-2-5 (Elements Supporting Defense Capability)

Fig. II-3-2-5 Elements Supporting Defense Capability

Element	Outline
Training and exercises	● The SDF will expand the establishment and utilization of the domestic training areas and conduct effective training and exercises. ● The SDF will facilitate joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas. ● The SDF will facilitate the use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas and the utilization of excellent training environments overseas such as the United States and Australia. ● The MOD/SDF will reinforce coordination with relevant agencies including police, firefighters, and the Japan Coast Guard.
Medical Care	● The MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture for medical care and onward transfer of patients, seamlessly covering the entire stretch between the frontline and final medical evacuation destinations. ● The SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical system through endeavors such as upgrading of SDF hospitals into medical hubs with enhanced functions. ● The SDF will proceed to improve the management of the National Defense Medical College, enhance its research functions and strive to secure high-quality talents, as well as striving to better secure the number of medical officers.
Collaboration with Local Communities	● The MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities regarding defense policies and activities, and will make careful, detailed coordination to meet desires and conditions of local communities. ● Upon reorganization of operation units as well as placement of SDF garrisons and bases, the MOD/SDF will give due considerations to local conditions and characteristics, so as to be able to gain the understanding of the local governments and residents.
Intellectual Base	● The MOD/SDF will strive to dispatch instructors to educational institutions and hold public symposiums so as to enable the public to recognize knowledge and information about securities policies accurately, and will also endeavor to provide efficient and highly trustworthy information. ● The MOD/SDF will expand networks and institutional collaboration with research and education organizations, universities, and think-tanks in Japan and abroad in order to further strengthen the research system of the MOD/SDF with the National Institute for Defense Studies playing central roles.