

Section
4

Russia

1

General Situation

President Vladimir Putin, who has been seeking the revival of Russia as a strong and influential power, successfully achieved reelection in 2018. In his inaugural address in May of that same year, President Putin stated that Russia is a strong, active and influential participant in international life, and that the country's security and defense capability are reliably secured. He also stated that quality of life, wellbeing, security and health were his main goals, and that Russia has risen like a phoenix a number of times throughout history, and believes it would achieve a breakthrough again.

At the annual presidential address to the Federal Assembly of Russia in March of that same year, held prior to the presidential election, President Putin said, "Russia ranks among the world's leading nations with a powerful foreign economic and defense potential." At that same time, President Putin talked about modernizing Russia's military equipment, including its strategic nuclear forces, and emphasized that Russia would be developing new weapons as a measure in response to the deployment of missile defense systems by the United States domestically and abroad. President Putin also expressed the recognition that Russia's military power helped maintain strategic parity in the world, and remarked that Russia is prepared to negotiate toward construction of a new system for international security and sustainable development of civilization.

However, the INF Treaty came to an end in August 2019, following the United States' notification of its intention to withdraw from the pact—which became the first-ever convention on the abolition of a specific type of weapon when it was concluded with the United States during the Soviet era—on the grounds that Russia had violated the treaty. Russia and the United States subsequently each announced their intention to develop intermediate-range missiles.


Q See Section 1 of this Chapter (The United States)

Since the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, Russia has faced a diplomatically difficult situation, with its right to attend meetings of the leaders of the Group of Seven major nations (G7 Summits) being suspended and the country being subject to economic sanctions. However, a phenomenon that could be dubbed "sanctions fatigue"—the inability to continue bearing the economic burden of the prolonged imposition of

sanctions—has emerged among some of the countries with a close economic relationship to Russia. On the other hand, Russia's ability to withstand sanctions has been growing, as it has promoted import substitution, while on the foreign policy front, President Vladimir Putin has taken the stance that "there are other organizations which play an important role in world affairs" and the country has been demonstrating a growing presence in the G20 and multilateral diplomatic forums in which Western countries do not participate, such as the SCO and the association of five major emerging economies (BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).

In addition, Russia's presence in the military field in the Middle East and Africa has been growing. Russia has been conducting military intervention in Syria since September 2015. Russia has indicated that it has the ability to swiftly and continually deploy military assets in remote areas while acquiring bases in Syria. Russia has signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkey on the establishment of a DMZ. Russia's growing involvement in the Syrian situation will attract attention as a move aimed at expanding its influence in the Middle East. In September 2019, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu stated that "Russia's military intervention in the Syrian conflict signified not only the liberation of Syria, but also Russia's return to global politics and the multipolarization of the modern world."

That October, Russia dispatched two Tu-160 strategic bombers to South Africa for the first time, and held the first trilateral joint exercise involving the navies of Russia, China,



BRICS Summit 2019 (Brazil in November 2019)
【EPA/Jiji】



Strategic bomber "TU-160" visiting South Africa for the first time; Front: Lieutenant-General Kobylash, commander of Russia's Long-Range Aviation (right) and South African Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, Mapisa-Nqakula [Russian Ministry of Defence]

and South Africa off the coast of South Africa the following month. In December 2019, the first trilateral joint exercise involving the navies of Russia, China, and Iran took place in the northern Indian Ocean.

Russia has been expanding the range of countries to which it exports weapons, including promoting sales of the latest weapons to NATO member Turkey.

Amid this situation, in January 2020, President Putin proposed to the State Duma a constitutional amendment bill that included changes to the president's term of office. With some remarking that this is an effort by President Putin to lay the groundwork for a regime after the end of his term of office in 2024, developments in Russia will be the focus of attention as the president's term of office draws to a close.

2 Security and Defense Policies

1 Basic Posture

Against the backdrop of foreign policy factors, including the Ukrainian crisis and the military intervention in Syria, Russia set out its objectives and strategic priorities of domestic and foreign policies in the "National Security Strategy" revised in December 2015.

The National Security Strategy construes that Russia has an increasingly greater role in a multipolarizing world. The Strategy perceives increased activity of NATO and expansion of its member states as threats to national security, and expresses its vigilance against the U.S. deployment of missile defense (MD) systems to Europe and the Asia-Pacific region for undermining global and regional stability.

In the defense domain, the Strategy commits to giving continued priority to the role fulfilled by Russia's military force, and to ensuring strategic deterrence and preventing military conflict by maintaining a sufficient level of nuclear deterrent capability and combat readiness of Russian military forces, including the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF).

The Military Doctrine, revised in December 2014 as a document substantiating the principles of the National Security Strategy in the military sphere, states the existing view that while the probability of an outbreak of a large-scale war is decreasing, military risks to Russia are increasing, such as the movement of NATO's military infrastructure closer to Russia's borders including the expansion of NATO, and the establishment and deployment of strategic MD systems. In

addition, the doctrine expresses growing alarm, defining the following as new military risks: NATO's military buildup; the realization of the U.S. Global Strike concept; rise of global extremism (terrorism); formation of governments in neighboring countries that carry out policies threatening Russia's interests; and the incitement of ethnic, social, and religious confrontations in Russia.

The doctrine positions nuclear weapons as an essential component for preventing the outbreak of nuclear wars and military conflicts that use conventional weapons, and states that Russia will maintain an adequate level of nuclear deterrent capability. Additionally, it states that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in retaliation not only for the use of nuclear or other WMDs, but also in the event of invasion using conventional weapons, where the survival of the country itself is imperiled.

Furthermore, defending Russian interests in the Arctic was newly added as one of the military's tasks in peacetime.

The Strategy for the Development of Maritime Activities of the Russian Federation up to 2030, which was revised in August 2019 in accordance with Russia's Maritime Doctrine (approved in July 2015), makes clear that, as a "key priority for the long-term development of Russia's maritime activities," Russia will "strive for the development [of naval units], with the objective of providing them with strategic non-nuclear deterrent capabilities."

As for Russia's defense budget, whereas the amounts executed for FY2011-FY2016 showed year-on-year double-digit growth, the budgets executed since FY2017 have been

declining, shrinking from a peak of 4.4% of GDP in FY2016 to 2.9% in FY2020, and look set to remain below 3% for the time being.¹

Q See Fig. I-2-4-1 (Changes in Russia's Defense Budget)

2 Military Reform


Russia has implemented full-scale military reform since 1997 by presenting the three pillars of reform: downsizing; modernization; and professionalization. Moreover, Russia is advancing measures including troop reductions, structural reform (from the division-based command structure to a brigade-based one), strengthening of combat readiness, and modernization of the AFRF such as the development and introduction of new equipment.

Regarding the downsizing of the military forces, it was decided that AFRF would have a strength of one million personnel as of 2016. Since December 2010, Russia reorganized its six military districts into four military districts (Western, Southern, Central and Eastern Districts). On this basis, Russia established a joint strategic command in each military district and is carrying out integrated operations of its entire military forces, such as the ground force, naval force, and aerospace forces under the control of the Military District Commander. In December 2014, the Northern Joint Strategic Command in charge of the Arctic became operational.

Regarding the modernization of the military forces, Russia has been working to increase its percentage of new equipment to 70% by 2020, and announced in December

Fig. I-2-4-1

Changes in Russia's Defense Expenditure



Note: The Information on Execution of Budgets of the Russian Federation announced by the Russian Federal Treasury (figures for FY2011-FY2019 are expenditures and figures for FY2020 are the budget amount).

2019 that it had increased said proportion to an average of 60-65% across the whole military. In addition, the share of modern weapons in the nuclear triad (ICBM, SLBM, and strategic bombers) is believed to have reached 82%.

Regarding the professionalization of the military forces, in order to make the combat readiness of the permanent readiness units effective, Russia promotes the introduction of a contract service system (for noncommissioned officers and soldiers) which selects personnel who would serve under contracts from the conscripted military personnel. In 2015, the number of contract servicemen exceeded the number of conscripted personnel for the first time, and in the future the percentage of contract servicemen is set to increase further.

3 Military Posture and Trends

Russia's military forces are comprised of forces such as the AFRF, the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), and the Federal National Guard Service of the Russian Federation. The AFRF consists of three services and two independent forces: Land Forces; Navy; Aerospace Forces; Strategic Missile Forces; and Airborne Forces.

Q See Fig. I-2-4-2 (Location and Strength of Russian Military [image])

1 Nuclear Forces

Russia emphasizes its nuclear forces to secure its global position, to strike a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States and to supplement its inferiority in conventional forces. It is thus believed that Russia is making efforts to maintain readiness.


Russia still possesses ICBMs, SLBMs, and long range bombers (Tu-95 Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks) comparable to the United States in scale.

Russia is obligated to reduce strategic nuclear arms

¹ According to documents published by Russia's Ministry of Finance and Federal Treasury.

Fig. I -2-4-2

Location and Strength of Russian Military (image)



Russia		
Total military forces		Approx. 900,000 troops
Ground forces	Ground troops	Approx. 330,000 troops
	Tanks	T-90, T-80, T-72, etc. Approx. 2,800 (Not including mothballed tanks. Approx. 13,000 including mothballed tanks)
Maritime forces	Warships	1,130 vessels, Approx. 2,050,000 tons
	Aircraft carriers	1 vessel
	Cruisers	4 vessels
	Destroyers	13 vessels
	Frigates	16 vessels
	Submarines	71 vessels
	Marines	Approx. 35,000 troops
Air forces	Combat aircraft	1,470 aircraft
	Modern fighter aircraft	MiG-29 × 142 Su-30 × 133 MiG-31 × 112 Su-33 × 17 Su-25 × 216 Su-34 × 122 Su-27 × 119 Su-35 × 90 (Fourth generation fighter aircraft: Total 934)
	Bombers	Tu-160 × 16 Tu-95 × 60 Tu-22M × 62
Reference	Population	Approx. 141.94 million
	Term of service	1 year (In addition to conscription, there is a contract service system)

Source: "The Military Balance 2020," etc. Ground troops include 280,000 ground force personnel and 45,000 airborne unit personnel.

pursuant to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty concluded with the United States. Russia is working on accelerating the development and introduction of new weapons under the policy to prioritize the modernization of nuclear forces based on the State Armaments Program (GPV: Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya).

In 2011, Russia started the deployment of “Yars” ICBM, which is considered a multi-warhead version of the “Topol-M” ICBM. It is currently developing the “Sarmat” heavy ICBM, which is believed to be capable of carrying a warhead with the capability to breach missile defense systems. Three Borey-class SSBN vessels, which carry the new-type SLBM “Bulava,” were commissioned. There are plans to deploy four such vessels each to the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet in the future.

As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia scrapped ground-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 km by 1991 in accordance with the INF Treaty with the United States, and the following year removed tactical nuclear weapons from naval vessels for storage onshore. Russia, however, still possesses a broad array of other nuclear forces and has in recent years been moving forward with deployments of the “Iskander” ground-launched ballistic missile system, which is believed to be capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads, and the “Kalibr” SLCM system.


ICBM “Sarmat”

Specifications, performance

Under development

Description

New heavy ICBM. Capable of carrying a broad range of warheads such as hypersonic warheads and of attacking targets via the North Pole or the South Pole with no substantial range limitation; Scheduled to be deployed in 2021.



【Russian Ministry of Defence】

Borey-class submarine

Specifications, performance

Water displacement: 19,711 tons
Maximum speed:
25 knots (approximately 46 km/h)
Main armament: SLBM Bulava
(maximum firing range 8,300 km)

Description

Russian Navy's new type of strategic nuclear-powered submarine carrying ballistic missiles, the first ship being commissioned in 2012. It can carry 16 SLBMs. It has been deployed with the Pacific Fleet since 2015.



【JANES】

Sea-launched cruise missile system “Kalibr”

Specifications, performance

Firing range: Submarine-launched type (antisurface) - approx. 2,000 km; Surface ship-launched type (antisurface) - approx. 1,500 km
Speed: Mach 0.8

Description

Once used in the operation in Syria. It can be loaded on various platforms and some suggest that it served as the basis for 9M729, which is a ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile of the kind whose development and possession has been prohibited under the INF Treaty as alleged by the United States.



【Russian Ministry of Defence】

Column

“Iskander”

The 9K720 Iskander is a Russian tactical surface-to-surface missile system. It can be used with two types of missile: ballistic (such as the 9M723) and cruise (including the 9M728 and 9M729). The former variant is called the “Iskander-M” (U.S. DoD reporting name: SS-26 / NATO reporting name: Stone), while the latter is referred to as the “Iskander-K.” The 9M723 ballistic missile outwardly resembles the SRBMs launched by North Korea in 2019 on May 4 and 9, July 25, and August 6. Unlike conventional ballistic missiles, the 9M723 is believed to fly at lower altitudes and on an irregular trajectory, and the prevailing view is that such missiles are designed to breach missile defense networks. At the same time, it has been noted that the 9M729 cruise missile is a ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile of the kind whose development and possession has been prohibited by the United States since 2014 under the INF Treaty. While Russia claims that the 9M729 has a range of less than 500 km and therefore

does not contravene the INF Treaty, it has been pointed out that the 9M729 was developed on the basis of the “Kalibr” sea-launched anti-surface cruise missile, which is believed to have a range of 2,000 km. It is therefore believed that the 9M729's range could easily be extended. There is also a variant called the 9K720 Iskander-E, which is based on the “Iskander-M” and designed for export, but its capabilities and detailed specifications have not been revealed.

Ground-launched missile system “Iskander”

Specifications, performance

Firing range: 200 km - 500 km
Guidance system:
Inertia + Positioning satellite + Radar, etc.
Propellant system:
Solid propellant system

Description

See “Column”



【Russian Ministry of Defence】

As well as commenting on Russia's breaches of the INF Treaty since May 2013, the United States repeatedly demanded that the country return to compliance with the treaty. However, Russia consistently denied violating the treaty and has criticized the United States, saying that it is itself in breach of the INF Treaty, on the grounds that Aegis Ashore is equipped with a system capable of launching Tomahawk cruise missiles. Thus, with the United States and Russia remaining as far apart as ever, the treaty ended in August 2019. Russia confirmed that the treaty ceased to have effect due to the United States' complete withdrawal, and criticized the United States by saying that all the responsibility for escalating tensions across the world will rest with Washington. Furthermore, Russia stated that it is essential to resume full dialogue to safeguard strategic stability and security, and that Russia is open to that. However, Russia declared that they would take steps to counteract the threat if the United States deployed ground-launched intermediate-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region. Developments involving the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range missiles will need to be watched closely, as they could have a major impact on the security environment surrounding Japan.

2 Conventional Forces and Other Issues

Russia is developing and procuring conventional forces in accordance with its GPV. It is also moving ahead with the development, procurement, and deployment of new equipment, such as the "Su-57" currently under development as the so-called "fifth generation fighter" and the T-14 Armata tank, in addition to the introduction of the Su-35 fighter and the surface-to-surface missile system "Iskander." In August 2019, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that the heavy unmanned combat aerial vehicle "Okhotnik" had successfully completed its first flight. As some have remarked that the "Okhotnik" could conceivably breach anti-aircraft defenses in combination with the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter, close attention will need to be paid to developments involving these new items of equipment. The Russian Navy currently has one conventional powered aircraft carrier, but reportedly plans to acquire a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier by the end of 2030.

The AFRF has also been stepping up its activities in the realms of space and electromagnetic spectrum in recent years. In addition to its own early warning facilities and other radar equipment, Russia has been increasing its

Space Situational Awareness (SSA) through the use of the International Science Optical Network's (ISON) optical telescopes, while also promoting the development of anti-satellite weapons, such as the "Nudol" anti-satellite missile system, for which multiple launch tests are said to have been conducted. Since 2013, Russia has put satellites into both low and geostationary orbits to conduct rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO), which have repeatedly been observed engaging in frequent RPO with other countries' satellites on geostationary orbits. Russia is also suspected of stepping up activities using weapons of electronic warfare, with accusations that AFRF based on the Kola Peninsula in the Arctic Circle jammed GPS signals while the major NATO military exercise Trident Juncture was taking place in 2018.

Su-35 fighter

Specifications, performance

Speed: Mach 2.25
Main armament: RVV-BD air-to-air missiles (maximum firing range 200 km), Kh-59MK air-to-ship missiles (maximum firing range 285 km)

Description

New type of multipurpose fighter of the Russian Air Force, it has been deployed in the Far East since 2014.



【Russian Ministry of Defence】

Fifth-generation fighter "Su-57"

Specifications, performance

Under development
Total length 20.8 m × Width 15.0 m × Height 5.1 m; Stealth aircraft
Maximum takeoff weight: 37 tons
Cruising speed: Mach 1.6

Description

It is considered that Russia is now developing an engine to enable supersonic cruise. The first model crashed during a test flight in 2019.



Su-57 (below) flying jointly with heavy unmanned combat aerial vehicle "Okhotnik"

【Russian Ministry of Defence】


Anti-satellite missile system "Nudol"

Specifications, performance

Under development

Explanation

Anti-satellite missile system launching missiles from a transporter erector launcher (TEL). At least seven launches have been confirmed so far. In April 2020, the U.S. Space Force announced that Russia conducted a test launch of anti-satellite weapons, which was allegedly for the Nudol.



【Russian Ministry of Defence】

3 New Weapons

Talking about priorities for 2019, President Putin mentioned the need for modern strategic nuclear forces with enhanced missile defense system penetration capabilities, as well as laying emphasis on future mass production of the HGV “Avangard.” That February, President Putin ordered that half-yearly progress reports be provided on the development and deployment of new weapons, including the “Avangard” HGV, the “Sarmat” ICBM, and the “Kinzhal” air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM). Additionally, he revealed for the first time that Russia was developing the “Zircon,” a sea-launched hypersonic cruise missile that is believed to have a firing range of over 1,000 km and be capable of speeds up to approximately Mach 9.

In August 2019, an explosion killed several Russian Ministry of Defence personnel and state nuclear energy corporation staff at a Russian military facility near Arkhangelsk in northern Russia. As a special ship for transporting radioactive material was present in nearby waters at the time of the accident, it has been suggested that the AFRF was testing the “Burevestnik” nuclear-powered cruise missile that it is currently developing.

4 Trends Related to the AFRF

Since 2010, the AFRF has been conducting large-scale round-robin exercises in each military district, with the objective of verifying the combat readiness of the military districts, etc. These exercises are helping to improve the long-distance mobilization capability of the AFRF. The large-scale Tsentr 2019 military exercise was held in September 2019, primarily in the Central Military District, with the involvement of approximately 128,000 personnel, around 600 aircraft, 15 ships, and more than 20,000 military vehicles. Like the previous year’s Vostok 2018 exercise in the Russian Far East, China also participated, as did India, Pakistan, and a number of Central Asian countries. In October 2019, the Grom strategic command-post exercises took place at training grounds in each region under President Putin’s leadership. During these exercises, ballistic missiles were fired from nuclear submarines in the Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk, and also from the Plesetsk space base. The Russian Ministry of Defence oversaw the exercise and announced that all tasks prescribed in the strategic nuclear deterrence training process had been completed.

Russia also conducts joint training and exercises with

other countries outside its borders. In 2019, it held joint exercises with Laos and South Africa.


A plan is underway to construct or rebuild 10 airfields in the Arctic, and in November 2019, Russia announced that it had installed radar capable of detecting stealth fighters and hypersonic vehicles on the archipelago of Novaya Zemlya. In the Arctic, the AFRF has not only resumed the operation of such military facilities, but has also been conducting such activities as strategic nuclear deterrence patrols by SSBN and patrol flights by long-range bombers. For example, Tu-95 and Tu-160 long-range bombers have frequently been observed flying through international airspace off the Alaskan coast and over the Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea.

In addition, the AFRF continues to operate several permanent bases within Syria, though in December 2017 it largely terminated the military operations that it had conducted in Syria since 2015.

HGV “Avangard”

Description

Viewed as capable of flying through the atmosphere at a speed exceeding Mach 20 and of avoiding MD systems by changing altitudes and trajectories. Started to be deployed in December 2019.



【Russian Ministry of Defence】

ALBM “Kinzhal”

Specifications, performance

Speed: Mach 10 or more
Firing range: 2,000 km or more

Description

Air-launched ballistic missile loaded on a fighter that can be maneuvered during flight. Some point out that ALBM is an air-launched model of a ground-launched short-range ballistic missile “Iskander.”



【SPUTNIK/Jiji Press Photo】

Nuclear-powered cruise missile “Burevestnik”

Specifications, performance

Under development

Description

Viewed as capable of flying at lower altitudes and on an unpredictable trajectory with no substantial range limitation due to being nuclear-powered. Some point out that the explosion that occurred in a military facility in August 2019 was caused by an experiment in developing this weapon.



【Russian Ministry of Defence】

In June 2019, a detachment from the Northern Fleet visited Cuba. This marked the fourth time in Russia's history that a Russian warship had visited the Caribbean.

Russia thus appears to be stepping up military activities,

so close scrutiny of developments in this regard will be required.

4 Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan

1 General Situation

Russia newly established the Eastern Military District and the Eastern Joint Strategic Command in 2010. Land Forces, the Pacific Fleet, and the Air Force and Air Defense Units have been placed under the Military District Commander, who conducts unified operation of these services.

The current presence of the AFRF in the Far East region is significantly smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear forces, still remains in the region. Russian armed forces in the vicinity of Japan are generally increasing activity, including the trend related to deployment of new units and military facility development.

Given that the AFRF set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear units and dealing with conflicts through the intertheater mobility of its round-the-clock readiness units, it is necessary to keep our attention on the positioning and trends of the AFRF in the Far East region while also keeping in mind the trends of units in other regions.

(1) Nuclear Forces

As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, one Delta III-class SSBN and two Borey-class SSBNs equipped with SLBMs are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk, and approximately 30 Tu-95 long-range bombers are deployed in Ukrainka. Russia is prioritizing the reinforcement of its maritime strategic deterrence posture which had been greatly scaled-down compared to the former Soviet Union, and as part of these efforts, it plans on deploying four Borey-class SSBNs to the Pacific Fleet by 2020.

(2) Ground Forces

As part of its military reforms, Russia is thought to have mostly completed its reorganization of the command structure from a division-based to a brigade-based one, while also shifting

all of its combat forces into permanent readiness units. The Eastern Military District now consists of ten brigades and two divisions with approximately 80,000 personnel in total as well as a marine brigade equipped with amphibious operations capability. The Eastern Military District has introduced new equipment, such as the "Iskander" surface-to-surface missile system, "Bal" and "Bastion" surface-to-ship missiles, and the "S-400" surface-to-air missile system.

(3) Naval Forces

The Pacific Fleet is stationed or deployed at its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. The fleet is comprised of approximately 260 ships with a

Surface-to-ship missile "Bal"

Specifications, performance

Maximum firing range: 130km

Description

Surface-to-ship missile with the objective of coastal defense, etc., it has been deployed to the Pacific Fleet since 2016. An improved missile with a maximum range of 260 km also exists (the 3M-24U).



【Russian Ministry of Defence】

Surface-to-ship missile "Bastion"

Specifications, performance

Maximum firing range: 300km

Description

Surface-to-ship missile with the objective of coastal defense, etc. It has been deployed to the Pacific Fleet since 2014.



【Russian Ministry of Defence】

Anti-air Missile system S-400

Specifications, performance

Maximum firing range: 250km (anti-aircraft); 60 km (anti-ballistic missiles)

Maximum altitude: 27km

Description

This missile has the capability to intercept ballistic missiles and act as an air-defense missile. It was deployed in the Eastern District in 2012. It has been pointed out that a missile with a maximum range of 400 km also exists (the 40N6).



【Russian Ministry of Defence】

total displacement in the region of approximately 610,000 tons, including approximately 20 major surface ships and approximately 20 submarines (approximately 13 of which are nuclear powered submarines) with a total displacement of approximately 290,000 tons. It also plans on deploying four multipurpose **Steregushchiy-class frigates**, and the “Gremyashchiy”—an improved version of the Steregushchiy-class frigate that could soon be deployed—is believed to be the first vessel in the Pacific Fleet to be armed with Kalibr cruise missiles.

(4) Air Forces

In the Eastern Military District, Russia deploys approximately 400 combat aircraft from its Aerospace Forces and Navy combined. Existing models are being modernized and new models, such as the Su-35 fighters and the **Su-34 fighter-bombers**, are being introduced to improve their capabilities.

2 Operations in the Vicinity of Japan

In the vicinity of Japan, the AFRF has been generally increasing its activities, including exercises and drills which are believed to be conducted for objectives such as verifying the results of the military reform.

In September 2018, Vostok 2018, considered the largest since 1981, was carried out in the Eastern Military District. According to a Russian Defense Ministry announcement, approximately 300,000 personnel, 36,000 tanks and other vehicles, 80 vessels, and 1,000 aircraft participated in the exercise. The participating units undertook long-distance maneuvers over distances of up to 7,000 km, while vessels of the Northern Fleet sailed up to 4,000 nautical miles. The Chinese and Mongolian militaries also participated in the exercise. Vostok 2018 is positioned as an annual strategic military exercise hosted in turn by each of four military districts and is regarded as an initiative aimed at giving the participating military forces the capacity to engage in large-scale conflicts with military superpowers over a short period and the ability to wield influence over potential enemies. Notable features of this year’s exercise were the size of the units deployed and the participation of countries other than Russia’s allies.

The number of exercises carried out by the Russian Land Forces in the areas adjacent to Japan has decreased from the peak. However, its activities are generally increasing.

With regard to naval vessels, their activities are generally increasing in recent years. For example, various exercises and

long distance voyages have been carried out by Pacific Fleet vessels, along with assigned missions involving operations in Syria and patrols by nuclear-powered submarines. In September 2018, 28 naval vessels including a Slava-class guided missile cruiser passed through the Soya Strait. This was the largest number of vessels announced by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) as having transited this strait at the same time since the end of the Cold War. Additionally, survey activities have taken place on Matsuwa Island located roughly in the middle of the Chishima Islands, with the objective of studying the feasibility of deploying Pacific Fleet’s forces there in the future, and it is said that a new runway has been completed on that island as well. It is also pointed out that bases will be constructed on Matsuwa Island as well as Paramushir Island, located in the north of Chishima Islands, and that there are plans to deploy Bal and Bastion surface-to-ship missiles there. Attention must be paid to movement towards the construction of a coastal defense system covering the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands. In August 2019, it was reported that a number of Bastion batteries had been deployed on Matsuwa Island.

Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of the patrol activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia has been increasing flights by long-range bombers. Also, there were flights of Tu-95 long-range bombers refueled in mid-flight and supported by A-50 early warning and control

Steregushchiy-class frigate

Specifications, performance

Main armament: SS-N-25 anti-ship missiles (with a maximum firing range of 130 km (or 260 km for the improved version)), 9M96 ship-to-air missiles (maximum firing range 60 km)

Description

Russian Navy’s new frigate, which was first commissioned in 2007. Two frigates of this type have been deployed to the Pacific Fleet and more two are scheduled to be deployed.



【Russian Ministry of Defence】


Su-34 fighter-bomber

Specifications, performance

Speed: Mach 1.6
Main armament: R-27ER1 air-to-air missile (maximum firing range 100 km), and Kh-59ME air-to-surface missile (maximum firing range 200 km)

Description

New type of fighter-bomber of the Russian Air Force, it has been deployed in the Far East since 2016. Confirmed for the first time in February 2020 through scrambles.




aircraft and Su-27 fighters as well as flights of Tu-160. While the number of scrambles against Russian aircraft fell from the previous year, Russian aircraft continued to be active in 2019, with one flight around Japan and three incursions into Japanese airspace confirmed to have occurred. In June 2019, two Tu-95 long-range bombers flew around Japan, and intruded into Japan's territorial airspace twice when they flew northward over the Pacific Ocean. In July of the same year, two Russian Tu-95 long-range bombers carried out "first Russia-China joint air patrol" with two Chinese H-6 bombers from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea. In addition, one Russian A-50 early warning and control aircraft allegedly supporting Tu-95 long-range bombers intruded into Japan's airspace above the territorial waters of Takeshima Island in Shimane Prefecture. In February 2020, two Su-34 fighter-bombers were observed flying over the Sea of Okhotsk for

the first time.

Q See Fig. I-2-4-3 (Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Russian Aircraft)

Fig. I-2-4-3

Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Russian Aircraft



5 Russian Forces in Japan's Northern Territories

Since 1978 during the former Soviet Union era, Russia has redeployed ground troops on Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan. While the Russian troop strength is thought to be far less than that at peak times, one division is still stationed in Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands. Furthermore, tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and anti-air missiles are deployed.

Russia has been proceeding with the development of military facilities in the Northern Territories in recent years. In November 2016, Russia announced that it deployed coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles to Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. In January 2018, the new civilian airport built in 2014 in Etorofu Island in addition to Tennei military airfield was opened up to joint military and civilian use, with three Su-35 fighter aircraft reportedly deployed to the new airport in August 2018. Russia also continues to carry out military exercises on islands that can include the Northern Territories. In October 2019, the Eastern Military District announced that drills to repel landings by a hypothetical enemy assault force were to be held in the Sakhalin and Primorsky regions, involving up to 8,000 personnel, more than 3,000 units of tanks and military equipment, and up to 50 planes and helicopters. It was also reported that in April 2020, a tactical exercise involving about 30 naval and other vessels of the Pacific Fleet was held in waters including the vicinity of

Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands.

As described above, Russia continues to station AFRF in the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan, and has recently been increasing the AFRF's activities in the territories under de facto occupation. Some point out that such developments reflect the Russian people's heightened awareness of territorial integrity due to the Ukrainian crisis, as well as the rising military importance of the Northern Territories adjacent to the Sea of Okhotsk, an operating area of SSBN.

During the Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) held in May 2019, Japan stated that the military build-up in the Northern Territories by AFRF is inconsistent with Japan's legal positions. In addition, Japan expressed a concern about the vigorous activities of Russian military aircraft around Japan and called for a calm response from Russia. Closer attention must be paid to Russian military movements in the Far East, including the Northern Territories.

6 Relations with Other Countries

1 General Situation

Russia considers the realization of its national interests as a guiding principle of its foreign policy, recognizing the multipolarization of international relations, the shift of global power to the Asia-Pacific region, and the growing importance of force in international relations.² Moreover, based on its National Security Strategy, Russia engages in open, rational, and pragmatic diplomacy to protect its national interests. It aims to pursue multidirectional diplomacy by ruling out futile confrontation and acquiring as many partners as possible around the world.

Furthermore, Russia aspires to deepen its relations with the Asia-Pacific countries, seen as drivers of the global economy, and in recent years, has attached importance to China and India. Moves to strengthen collaboration with China in particular have been seen since the Ukrainian crisis, seemingly in inverse proportion to the deepening of Russia's conflict with Western countries.

Meanwhile, Russian efforts to strengthen its cooperative relations with the West are still facing challenges after the Ukrainian crisis. However, with regard to the Syrian situation, Russia is exploring the possibility of cooperation with other countries towards stabilizing Syria and countering international terrorist organizations, including ISIL.

Attention will be paid to how Russia would balance its posture of economic-centered and benefit-focused foreign policy with Russia's politics and diplomacy including security in order to develop its relations with other countries.

2 Relations with the United States

President Putin has striven to deepen cooperative relations with the United States in the economic domain, while opposing the United States on any action Russia considers as "a U.S. attempt to encroach on Russia's strategic interests."

On the military front, feeling that the United States' installation of missile defense systems both at home and abroad—including in Europe and the Asia-Pacific—undermines global and regional security, Russia has criticized these moves for upsetting the strategic balance. Russia is also moving forward with the development of new strategic

weapons that are said to be capable of reliably penetrating missile defense systems.

However, since the United States suspended military exchanges with Russia in March 2014 over the Ukrainian crisis, there have been frequent instances of both countries' aircraft and ships coming into close proximity with each other. In June 2019, a near-miss occurred in the Philippine Sea between a U.S. Forces ship and an AFRF ship, after which the United States and Russia criticized each other for their dangerous actions.

The United States is also demonstrating increasingly vigilance over Russian activities in space. In February 2020, United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) commander Gen. John Raymond described recent Russian satellite behavior as "unusual and disturbing" and criticized Russia for activities that "do not reflect the behavior of a responsible spacefaring nation." In addition, in April 2019, he announced that Russia had conducted an anti-satellite weapons test, noting that this was "further proof of Russia's hypocritical advocacy of outer space arms control proposals designed to restrict the capabilities of the United States while clearly having no intention of halting its own counterspace weapons programs."

Q See Chapter 3, Section 6 (Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction)

3 Relations with China

Russia continues to advance close military cooperation with China. Export agreements on new armaments such as the S-400 surface-to-air missile system and Su-35 fighter jets were concluded in 2015, and since 2012, Russia and China have been conducting joint naval exercise "Joint Sea." Most recently, in July 2019, two Russian Tu-95 long-range bombers flew with two Chinese H-6 bombers from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea. Russia and China called this joint flight the "first Russia-China joint air patrol" conducted in line with the annual military cooperation plan between the two countries. A package of documents on military and military-technical cooperation were signed at a meeting of the Russia-China Intergovernmental Joint Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation held in Moscow September

² According to The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (November 2016)

Column

Trends in Military Cooperation Between Russia and China

In the past, the relationship between Russia (USSR) and China had worsened over a long period of time due to conflicting ideologies and border disputes that had led to armed conflict. However, after reaching the final agreement in 2004 to resolve the border issue, the two countries, despite their mutual distrust, have built a strategic relationship called a “marriage of convenience” against a background of global criticism against Russia for the Ukraine Crisis and China for the South China Sea issue, as well as the unipolar domination by the United States. Recently the two countries are in a honeymoon period under President Putin and President Xi. Military cooperation between the two countries has also progressed as a result of the identity of interest between China, which is promoting military buildup supported by rapid economic development, and Russia, which is planning to recover its military industry from the decline after the collapse of the USSR.

A notable case is arms exports by Russia to China. In the past, China was the largest customer of made-in-Russia weapons, but it is believed that Russia restrained export of the latest weapons to China partly as a result of China’s illegal copying of Russian Su-27 fighters in 2007. However, influenced by the economic sanctions by Western countries against Russia since the Ukraine crisis, seemingly there is a tendency that military technology cooperation between the two countries has been increasing and the latest weapons are exported to China. For example, 24 new-model Su-35 fighters had been delivered to China by 2018 and Russia selected China as the first importer of surface-to-air Missile System S-400s, which receives inquiries from many countries.

Cooperation in exercise also seems to be expanding. The content of the joint naval exercise “Joint Sea,” which has

been implemented almost every year since 2012 is raising the level year by year. In 2018, China and Mongolia for the first time participated in the annual large-scale military exercise carried out by Russia to inspect the mission potentials and posture of its forces. Further in July 2019, two Russian Tu-95 long-range bombers flew with two Chinese H-6 bombers from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea as their first joint air patrol. Because formation flying usually requires close alignment, it seems that this flight was carefully planned beforehand.

There are also moves toward deepening of the military cooperation. For example, the Russia-China Summit Meeting in June 2019 announced a joint statement that expressed “raising of the relationship of the two forces to a new level,” and in September 4 of the same year, the two countries signed a new “document on military and military technology cooperation” in place of the military cooperation agreement signed in 1993 (the contents of which are not disclosed). In this regard, because President Putin described the relationship with China as an “alliance of a strategic partnership in all aspects” in October 2019, for a while there was a view that the Russia-China Military Alliance was restored (the two countries had a military alliance setting up Japan and its allies as hypothetical enemies for the period from 1950 to 1980), but this was officially denied by the foreign affairs and defense authorities of the two countries.

Improvement of the equipment performance and operation capability of Chinese forces through the military/technology cooperation of the two countries can increase concern over security around Japan. It is necessary to pay close attention to the trend of military partnership of the two countries.



Russian President Putin and Chinese President Xi at the signing ceremony for the joint statement (June 2019) [Presidential Executive Office of Russia]




Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu and Vice Chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission Zhang [Russian Ministry of Defence]

2019, which was attended by Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu and Vice Chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission Zhang. At the Russian-Chinese Summit that preceded this meeting in June, the leaders of both countries

issued the Joint Statement on Developing Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Interaction Entering a New Era. As the statement extolled the “upgrade of Russia-China military relations to a new level,” some suggested the possibility that

Fig. I -2-4-4

Russia-China Joint Air Patrol (July 23, 2019)



the two countries had concluded a “military alliance,” but the authorities of both countries both clearly denied that they had formed a military alliance.

Amid the emergence of such examples indicative of advances in the military cooperation between Russia and China and with the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation signed in July 2001 set to expire in 2021, attention will focus on the future trends.

Q See Fig. I-2-4-4 (Russia-China Joint Air Patrol (July 23, 2019))

4 Relations with Ukraine

Following Russia’s “annexation” of Crimea, sporadic clashes between Ukrainian troops and separatist armed forces have continued in eastern Ukraine, with over 10,000 people reported to have died since April 2014. Progress in respect of most of the provisions in the Minsk Protocol³ signed by the OSCE, Russia, and Ukraine with a view to peace has remained elusive, while Russia is gradually extending its de

facto rule over the Crimean Peninsula, opening the Crimean Bridge to serve as a direct link between the Russian mainland and the Crimean Peninsula in May 2018.

Amid this situation, Volodymyr Zelensky became President of Ukraine in May 2019 and expressed the desire to resolve the dispute with Russia and improve the relationship between the two countries, whereupon a spokesperson for the Russian president took the position that the normalization of their relations was up to Ukraine. That December, a four-party summit involving Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany, aimed at resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine, took place for the first time in three years in Paris and the parties agreed to a complete ceasefire and the exchange of captives within the year. Russia and Ukraine exchanged captives in September and December 2019.

5 Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with Former Soviet Republics

Russia positions the development of bilateral and multilateral

³ The Minsk Protocol of September 2014 consists of the following items: (1) ensure the immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons; (2) ensure monitoring and verification by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of the regime of non-use of weapons; (3) enact the Law of Ukraine “With respect to the temporary status of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Luhansk regions” (Law on Special Status); (4) ensure monitoring on the Ukrainian-Russian state border and verification by the OSCE, together with the creation of a security area in the border regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation; (5) immediately release all hostages and unlawfully detained persons; (6) prohibit the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions; (7) conduct an inclusive national dialogue; (8) adopt measures aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in Donbas; (9) ensure the holding of early local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk regions; (10) remove unlawful military formations, military hardware, as well as militants and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine; (11) adopt a program for the economic revival of Donbas and the recovery of economic activity in the region; and (12) provide personal security guarantees for the participants of the consultations.

cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as one of its most important foreign policy objectives. Russia considers that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS, and deploys its troops in Moldova (Transnistria), Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia), which withdrew from the CIS in August 2009 announced its withdrawal from CIS. Through the conclusion of an alliance and strategic partnership treaty with Abkhazia in November 2014, the conclusion of an alliance with South Ossetia in 2015, and other efforts, Russia has been working to ensure its military influence.

Due to increasing activities by Islamic armed insurgents in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia has been pursuing military cooperation primarily on counterterrorism measures in the region, and organized the Collective Rapid Deployment Force in May 2001 within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).⁴ Furthermore, in June 2009, a permanent joint rapid reaction force was established to strengthen the functions of the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force.

President Putin once remarked, “The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the 20th century,” and he has been working to unify and strengthen the sphere of the former Soviet Union through such as the CIS, the CSTO, and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015.

(2) Relations with Asian Countries

Russia recognizes that the significance of the Asia-Pacific region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy, and considers it strategically important to strengthen its status in the region from the viewpoint of socioeconomic development in Siberia and the Far East, and security. To achieve strategic stability and equal strategic partnerships, Russia places particular emphasis on developing a comprehensive partnership relationship and strategic cooperative relationship with China as a key factor in maintaining global and regional stability, and also intends to assign an important role for the privileged strategic partnership with India.

In 2018, Russia concluded agreements to supply India with new armaments such as the S-400 surface-to-air

missile system and Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates. The two countries have completed joint development of the “BrahMos” supersonic cruise missile and are now jointly developing the hypersonic cruise missile “BrahMos-II.” In March 2019, the two countries signed a deal for the lease of another Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, joining the other Akula-class submarine that India has been leasing since 2012. Another example of the ongoing wide-ranging military cooperation between Russia and India is the joint exercise “INDRA,” which has been taking place since 2003 with the involvement of the armies and navies of both countries, with their air forces also taking part in recent years.

Regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, in December 2019, Russia and China together circulated among UN Security Council members a draft resolution that included the partial lifting of sanctions based on Security Council resolutions.

In addition, Russia has been moving ahead with defense cooperation with Laos in the field of procurement of equipment and mine and unexploded ordnance disposal in recent years. In December 2019, Russia held Laros 2019, its first joint army exercise with the country, with the involvement of more than 500 personnel, including tank regiments from both countries.

Regarding the relationship with Japan, Russia states that it will develop mutually beneficial cooperation and is intensifying its approach in many fields including politics, economy and security.

(3) Relations with European Countries

Through the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia has worked with NATO as an equal partner in the areas of common interest, such as by participating in certain decision-making processes. However, following the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, NATO and European countries suspended their practical cooperation with Russia, including that in the military domain, except for the NRC’s ambassador-level meetings. Although NATO has issued statements criticizing Russia over the Ukrainian situation and has deployed additional military capacity in Eastern Europe

⁴ In May 1992, leaders of six countries (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) signed the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. In 1993, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus joined the treaty, which came into effect in April 1994. However, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the treaty in 1999 without renewing it. In May 2002, the CST was reorganized into the CSTO. Uzbekistan returned to the CSTO in August 2006 but gave notice to suspend its participation in the CSTO in June 2012, effectively withdrawing from the organization.

and the Baltic states, there are differences among member countries in their enthusiasm for NATO's response to Russia.

Nevertheless, Russia has maintained its assertive diplomatic behavior, with President Putin stating during a July 2019 official visit to Italy that there are "always chances" to restore relations, but "many things will also depend on Europe."

Russia is also stepping up the pace of dialogue, with the 2+2 joint foreign and defense ministerial consultations between Russia and France taking place for the first time in seven years in Moscow in September 2019.

Russia revealed that it has deployed two army divisions near the border with Ukraine, and one army division near its border with Belarus, and Russia conducted the strategic command and staff exercise Zapad 2017 in its Western Military District and Belarus in September 2017. That exercise was brought up at the NRC meeting held in October of that same year, where it was pointed out that the number of actually participating soldiers and the area used for the exercise were larger than indicated in the announcement made by Russia prior to the exercise. However, there were no invasions into other countries by Russia, and no Russian units stayed in Belarus following the exercise, which were points of concern.

Russian military aircraft have stepped up their activities in the airspace surrounding the Baltic states, where NATO has deployed military capacity. In July 2019, the U.K. Royal Air Force Air Chief Marshal Stephen Hillier disclosed that the U.K. fighters frequently scramble in response to Russian activity over the Baltic Sea. Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force David Goldfein, too, acknowledged that AFRF activity around the Baltic states is on the rise.

(4) Relations with Middle Eastern and African Countries

Since September 2015, while acquiring Tartus Naval Base and Khmeimim Air Base as bases of its operations in Syria, the Russian military has conducted aerial bombing using fighter-bombers and long-range bombers as well as red cruise missiles from surface vessels and submarines deployed to the Caspian Sea and Mediterranean. In December 2016, a nationwide ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia and Turkey took effect between the Assad administration and opposition forces. While Russia has continued to fight ISIL and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS; formerly the "al-Nusra Front") since January 2017, it has also held Syrian peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan together with Turkey and Iran. Russia has been increasing its presence in the Middle East

by promoting initiatives that aim for political resolutions in the future.

In December 2017, President Putin visited a Russian military base in Syria, where he announced that the fight against terrorism in the country had been largely resolved, that Russia would continue to operate two permanent bases within Syria, and that he had decided that most of the Russian forces in Syria would be redeployed back to Russia.

Russia continues to maintain a presence in Syria, with the Russian Ministry of Defence announcing in November 2019 that it had deployed helicopter units at Qamishli airport in northeastern Syria, as well as at its Khmeimim Air Base.

Q See Chapter 3, Section 8 (Trends in International Terrorism)

The objectives of Russian military intervention may include: (1) to sustain the Assad administration which is friendly to Russia; (2) to defend Russian interests including its military bases in Syria; (3) to address the threat of international terrorist organizations including ISIL; and (4) to secure influence in the Middle East. Thus far, Russia seems to have contributed to the recovery of the Assad administration's areas of control and protecting Russian interests. Additionally, operations in Syria using cruise missiles and strategic bombers have provided the ideal setting to demonstrate Russia's long-range precision strike capabilities. Considering the significant influence of Russia's military intervention on the course of the Assad administration, coupled with the expanding partnerships between Russia and surrounding countries such as Turkey and Iran, Russia's influence on future stability in Syria and on the political settlement process cannot be ignored.

While supporting opposing sides in the Syrian conflict, Russia and Turkey coordinate their interests to avoid direct confrontation. When U.S. Forces announced their withdrawal from northern Syria in October 2019, the two countries agreed that Russian military police and the Turkish army would carry out joint patrols in northern Syria. In January 2020, the foreign and defense ministers of the two countries held a meeting in Moscow to discuss the Libyan situation. During this meeting, representatives of the interim Libyan Government of National Accord led by Fayez al-Sarraj and the powerful military organization that opposes it, the Libyan National Army (LNA), attended peace talks. Russia is thus increasing its influence over both the Syrian situation and peace in Libya, while at the same time coordinating its interests with Turkey.

In October 2019, Russia held the first Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi and also dispatched two Tu-160 strategic

bombers to South Africa under a military cooperation agreement that it had signed with South Africa in 1995. The following month, it held the first trilateral joint exercise involving the navies of Russia, China, and South Africa off the coast of South Africa. In December of that year, the first trilateral joint exercise involving the navies of Russia, China, and Iran took place in the northern Indian Ocean. Thus, in partnership with China, Russia is expanding the breadth of its activities in multilateral exercises as well.

6 Arms Exports

Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry and to make economic profit, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country's export value has been increasing in recent years.⁵ In January 2007, the Russian Government granted the exclusive authority to export arms to the Rosoboron Export State Corporation as part of its ongoing initiatives to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards its military industry as an integral part of the nation's military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev.

Russia exports equipment such as fighters, vessels and surface-to-air missiles to countries including Asia, Africa, and Middle East. In recent years, Russia has exported 24 Su-35 "4++ generation" fighters and two S-400 surface-to-



Russian President Putin introducing Su-57 to Turkish President Erdogan at the MAKS-2019 [SPUTNIK/Jiji Press Photo]

air missile systems to China. It has been pointed out that this deal was made possible because the interests of China and Russia coincided: while China promotes indigenous weapons production, it still needs Russian technology for state-of-the-art equipment, whereas Russia aims to avoid diplomatic isolation caused by the Ukrainian crisis and to gain economic profit through arms exports. In recent years, Russia has been aggressively marketing its arms to allies and partners of the United States, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, in addition to traditional export destinations. In particular, the export of S-400 to Turkey, a member country of NATO, has met with strong opposition from the United States. Furthermore, Russia has revealed that it is prepared to export to Turkey not only Su-35 fighters, but also the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter.

Column

Fourth/Fifth-Generation Fighters

While there are no clear criteria for defining jet fighter generations, the term "fourth-generation jet fighter" generally indicates those manufactured since the 1980s, which demonstrate excellent maneuverability thanks to their engine power and are equipped with high-performance weapon-targeting radar. (Russia's Su-27, the United States' F-15, and China's J-16, for example, all fall into this category.) "Fifth-generation jet fighter" refers to advanced jet fighters

manufactured since the 2000s, which feature an array of the latest technologies, including stealth capabilities and networked electronic instruments. (Russia's Su-57, the United States' F-35, and China's J-20, for example, all fall into this category.) Russia uses the unique classification "4++ generation" for jet fighters undergoing a two-stage upgrade from the fourth generation, such as the S-35 and the Mig-35, which is currently under development.

⁵ According to the SIPRI, Russian arms exports between 2015 and 2019 decreased by 18% compared to that of the period between 2010 and 2014. Russia has the second largest share of arms exports in the world (21%) after the United States.