

**Reference 1** Number of Nuclear Warheads, Arsenals and Their Major Means of Delivery by Country

		United States		Russia		United Kingdom		France		China	
Missiles	ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles)	400 Minuteman III	400	334 SS-18 SS-19 SS-25 SS-27 RS-24	46 30 63 78 117	_____	_____	_____	_____	60 DF-5 (CSS-4) DF-31 (CSS-10)	20 40
	IRBM MRBM	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	148 DF-4 (CSS-3) DF-21 (CSS-5) DF-26	10 122 30
	SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles)	336 Trident D-5	336	192 SS-N-18 SS-N-23 SS-N-32	48 96 48	48 Trident D-5	48	64 M-45 M-51	16 48	48 JL-2 (CSS-NX-14)	48
Submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles		14		13		4		4		4	
Aircraft		66 B-2 B-52	20 46	76 Tu-95 (Bear) Tu-160 (Blackjack)	60 16	_____	_____	40 Rafale	40	100 H-6K	100
Number of warheads		Approx. 3,800		Approx. 4,350 (including Approx. 1,830 tactical nuclear warheads)		215		300		Approx. 280	

Notes: 1. Data is based on "The Military Balance 2019," the SIPRI Yearbook 2018, etc.

2. In March 2019, the United States released the following figures based on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia as of March 1, 2019: the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for the United States was 1,365 and the delivery vehicles involved 656 missiles/aircraft; the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for Russia was 1,461 and the delivery vehicles involved 524 missiles/aircraft. However, according to the SIPRI database, as of January 2018, the number of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads was approx. 1,750 (including 150 tactical nuclear warheads) and that of Russian ones was 1,600.
3. In November 2015, the U.K.'s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) stipulated that the number of deployed nuclear warheads is to be no more than 120, while the number of nuclear warheads possessed is to be no more than 180.
4. According to the SIPRI database, India possesses 130-140 nuclear warheads, Pakistan 140-150, Israel a maximum of 90, and North Korea 10-20.

**Reference 2** Outline of Military Power of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)

Ground Forces		Maritime Forces			Air Forces	
Country or Region	Ground Forces (10,000 persons)	Country or Region	Tonnage (10,000 tons)	Number of Vessels	Country or Region	Number of Combat Aircraft
India	124	United States	666.8	970	United States	3,521
North Korea	110	Russia	204.2	1,093	China	2,890
China	98	China	178.7	754	Russia	1,468
Pakistan	56	United Kingdom	58.0	130	India	928
Republic of Korea	49	India	47.8	315	Republic of Korea	640
United States	48	France	39.2	298	Egypt	599
Vietnam	41	Indonesia	25.5	176	North Korea	545
Myanmar	38	Italy	23.6	183	Taiwan	495
Iran	35	Republic of Korea	21.5	240	Pakistan	448
Egypt	31	Germany	21.1	118	France	430
Indonesia	30	Australia	21.0	102	Turkey	360
Russia	28	Turkey	21.8	195	Saudi Arabia	418
Turkey	26	Taiwan	20.5	392	Israel	369
Thailand	25	Spain	19.0	173	Iran	339
Colombia	22	Brazil	17.8	109	United Kingdom	295
Japan	14	Japan	49.6	137	Japan	390

Notes: 1. Data on ground forces and air forces is taken from "The Military Balance 2019" and other sources, and data on maritime forces is taken from Jane's Fighting Ships 2017-2018 and other sources.


2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2018, and combat aircraft (Air Forces) include ASDF combat aircraft (excluding transports) and MSDF combat aircraft (only those with fixed wings).
3. Arrangement is in order of the scale of armed strength.

**Reference 3** Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)

Country or Region	Military Service System	Regular (10,000 persons)		Reserves (10,000 persons)	
United States	Volunteer	130		80	
Russia	Conscription / Volunteer	90		200	
United Kingdom	Volunteer	15		8	
France	Volunteer	20		4	
Germany	Volunteer	18		3	
Italy	Volunteer	17		2	
India	Volunteer	144		116	
China	Conscription	204		51	
North Korea	Conscription	128		60	
Republic of Korea	Conscription	62.5		310	
Egypt	Conscription	44		48	
Israel	Conscription	17		47	
Japan	Volunteer	Ground	14	3.3 (0.4)	
		Maritime	4.3	0.05	
		Air	4.3	0.05	

Notes: 1. Data from "The Military Balance 2019" and other sources.

2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2018. The figure in parentheses shows the number of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and is not included in the total figure.
3. Russia uses a personnel augmentation system which adds a contract employment system (a type of volunteer system) to the preexisting conscription system.
4. In Germany, as a result of the enactment of the Military Law Amendment Act in April 2011, the conscription system was suspended effective July 1, 2011, and the volunteer system was newly introduced as a replacement of the former.

**Reference 4 Transition of Military Power in the Area Surrounding Japan****Reference 5 National Security Strategy (Outline)**

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013)

**I. Purpose**

- As Japan's security environment becomes ever more severe, Japan needs to identify its national interests from a long-term perspective, determine the course it should pursue in the international community, and adopt a whole-government approach for national security policies and measures in order to continue developing a prosperous and peaceful society.
- In a world where globalization continues, Japan should play an even more proactive role as a major global player in the international community.
- The Strategy, as fundamental policies pertaining to national security, presents guidelines for policies in areas related to national security.
- With the National Security Council (NSC) serving as the control tower, as well as with strong political leadership, the Government of Japan will implement national security policies in a more strategic and structured manner through a whole-government approach.
- When implementing policies in other areas, the Government of Japan will give due consideration to national security so that Japan can utilize its strengths, such as its diplomatic ability and defense capability, in a smooth and fully-functional way as a whole, based on the Strategy.
- The Strategy will guide Japan's national security policy over the next decade. Through the implementation of concrete policies, the NSC will regularly carry out systematic evaluation and upgrade the Strategy in a timely and appropriate manner.

**II. Fundamental Principle of National Security****1. Principles Japan Upholds**

- Japan is a country with rich culture and tradition, and upholds universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law. Japan has a wealth of highly educated human capital and high cultural standards, and is an economic power with strong economic capacity and high technological capabilities. Japan has achieved its development benefiting from an open international economic system. In addition, Japan as a maritime state has pursued "Open and Stable Seas."
- Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II, and has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.
- Japan has maintained its security, and contributed to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, by enhancing its alliance with the United States (U.S.), as well as by deepening cooperative relationships with other countries. Japan has also contributed to the realization of stability and prosperity in the international community through initiatives for supporting the economic growth of developing countries and for addressing global issues based on the principle of human security, as well as through trade and investment relations with other countries.
- Complying with the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, Japan has been cooperating with the U.N. and other international organizations, and has actively contributed to their activities. Japan has also continuously participated in international peace cooperation activities. In addition, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan has consistently engaged in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, playing a leading role in international initiatives to realize "a world free of nuclear weapons."
- Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and

economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation. This is the fundamental principle of national security that Japan should stand to hold.

**2. Japan's National Interests and National Security Objectives****National Interests**

- To maintain its sovereignty and independence; to defend its territorial integrity; to ensure the safety of life, person, and properties of its nationals, and to ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security and preserving its rich culture and tradition.
- To achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic development, thereby consolidating its peace and security (to this end, it is essential that Japan strengthens the free trade regime and realizes an international environment that offers stability, transparency and predictability).
- To maintain and protect international order based on rules and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law.

**National Security Objectives**

- To strengthen the deterrence necessary for maintaining Japan's peace and security and for ensuring its survival, thus deterring threats from directly reaching Japan; at the same time, if by any chance a threat should reach Japan, to defeat such threat and to minimize the damage.
- To improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct threats to Japan, through strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside the Asia-Pacific region, and promoting practical security cooperation.
- To improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable, and prosperous international community by strengthening the international order based on universal values and rules, and by playing a leading role in the settlement of disputes, through consistent diplomatic efforts and further personnel contributions.

**III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan and National Security Challenges****1. Global Security Environment and Challenges**

- (1) Shift in the Balance of Power and Rapid Progress of Technological Innovation
  - The balance of power between nations is changing due to the rise of emerging countries (e.g., China and India). In particular, China is increasing its presence in the international community. The United States, which has the world's largest power as a whole, has manifested its policy to shift its emphasis of national security and economic policy towards the Asia-Pacific region.
  - The rapid advancement of globalization and technological innovation has increased the relative influence of non-state actors, and the threat of terrorism and crimes committed by non-state actors is expanding.
- (2) Threat of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Related Materials
  - The issue of the transfer, proliferation, and performance improvement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, such as ballistic missiles, the issue of nuclear and missile development by North Korea, and the nuclear issue of Iran remain major threats to Japan and the international community.
- (3) Threat of International Terrorism
  - International terrorism has spread and become diverse in its forms due to the advancement of globalization.
  - Terrorist attacks against Japanese nationals and interests have

actually taken place overseas. Japan and its people face the threat of international terrorism both at home and abroad.

#### (4) Risks to Global Commons

- In recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access to global commons, such as the sea, outer space, and cyberspace, have been spreading and become more serious.
- In the seas, in recent years, there have been an increasing number of cases of unilateral actions in an attempt to change the status quo by coercion with respect to natural resources and the security of respective states.
- Due to these cases as well as piracy and other issues, there is a growing risk of the stability of sea lanes and freedom of navigation coming under threat.
- There exist risks that could impede the continuous and stable use of outer space, including an increasing amount of space debris caused by satellite collisions amongst others.
- Risks of cyber-attacks with the intent to disrupt critical infrastructure and obstruct military systems are becoming more serious.

#### (5) Challenges to Human Security

- Global issues that cannot be dealt with by a single country—namely, poverty, widening inequality, global health challenges including infectious diseases, climate change and other environmental issues, food security, and humanitarian crises caused by civil wars and natural disasters—are emerging as critical and urgent issues of human security, threatening the very survival and dignity of individuals.
- These challenges could have repercussions on peace and stability of the international community.

#### (6) The Global Economy and Its Risks

- The risk of the expansion of an economic crisis from one country to the entire global economy is growing.
- Signs of protectionism and reluctance towards the creation of new trade rules are becoming apparent.
- The rise of resource nationalism in resource rich countries as well as an intensified competition for the acquisition of energy and mineral resources by emerging countries are observed.

### 2. Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region

#### (1) Characteristics of the Strategic Environment of the Asia-Pacific Region

- The region has various political regimes and a host of countries with large-scale military forces including nuclear-weapon states. Yet a regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized.

#### (2) North Korea's Military Buildup and Provocative Actions

- North Korea has enhanced the capability of WMDs including nuclear weapons and that of ballistic missiles. At the same time, North Korea has repeatedly taken provocative military actions including the use of provocative rhetoric against Japan and other countries, thereby increasing the tension in the region. The threat to the security of Japan and of other countries is being substantially aggravated.
- As Kim Jong-un proceeds to consolidate his regime, the domestic situation in North Korea needs to be closely monitored.
- North Korea's abduction is a grave issue affecting Japan's sovereignty as well as the lives and safety of Japanese nationals. It is an urgent issue for the Government of Japan to resolve under its responsibility.

#### (3) China's Rapid Rise and Intensified Activities in Various Areas

- There is an expectation for China to share and comply with international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role for regional and global issues.
- China has been rapidly advancing its military capabilities in a wide range of areas without sufficient transparency.
- China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on their own assertions, which are incompatible with the existing order of international law, in the maritime and aerial domains, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea (e.g., intrusion into Japan's territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands, establishment of its own "Air Defense Identification Zone").
- The cross-strait relationship has deepened economically. Meanwhile, the military balance has been changing. Thus, the relationship contains both orientations towards stability and potential instability.

### IV. Japan's Strategic Approaches to National Security

#### 1. Strengthening and Expanding Japan's Capabilities and Roles

- To ensure national security, Japan needs to first and foremost strengthen its own capabilities and the foundation for exercising those capabilities. Japan must also steadily fulfill the role it should play and adapt its capabilities to respond to future developments.
- Enhancing Japan's resilience in national security, through reinforcing its diplomatic power and defense force, as well as bolstering its economic strengths and technological capabilities, contributes to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community at large.
- In order to overcome national security challenges and achieve national security objectives, as well as to proactively contribute to peace in

cooperation with the international community, Japan needs to expand and deepen cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone. At the same time, Japan needs to make effective use of its diverse resources and promote comprehensive policies.

#### (1) Strengthening Diplomacy for Creating a Stable International Environment

- The key of national security is to create a stable and predictable international environment, and prevent the emergence of threats.
- It is necessary for Japan to realize an international order and security environment that are desirable for Japan, by playing an even more proactive role in achieving peace and stability of the international community as a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation.
- It is necessary to enhance diplomatic creativity and negotiating power to deepen the understanding of and garner support for Japan's position in the international community.
- By highlighting Japan's attractiveness, Japan needs to strengthen its soft power that would benefit the international community. Japan also needs to strengthen its capacity to promptly and accurately identify the needs of Japanese nationals and firms to support their overseas activities.
- Japan will make even more proactive contributions to international organizations such as the U.N., including through increasing the number of Japanese staff in such institutions.

#### (2) Building a Comprehensive Defense Architecture to Firmly Defend Japan

- Amid the severe security environment, Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective joint defense force, adapting to the change in strategic environment with consideration of its national power, and strive to ensure operations with flexibility and readiness based on joint operations.
- Japan will advance coordination within the government and with local governments and the private sector. In doing so, even in peacetime, Japan will maintain and improve a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters.
- In developing the structure of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF), which plays a central role in these efforts, Japan will enhance its defense structure for deterrence and response to various situations, prioritizing important functions from a joint and comprehensive perspective.
- With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence of the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will work closely with the U.S., and take appropriate measures through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people.

#### (3) Strengthening Efforts for the Protection of Japan's Territorial Integrity

- Japan will enhance the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies responsible for territorial patrol activities and reinforce its maritime surveillance capabilities.
- Japan will strengthen coordination among relevant ministries and agencies to be able to respond seamlessly to a variety of unexpected situations.
- Japan will proactively engage in the protection, management, and development of remote islands near national borders, and from a national security viewpoint, review issues related to the use of land in areas such as remote islands near national borders and areas surrounding defense facilities.

#### (4) Ensuring Maritime Security

- As a maritime state, Japan will play a leading role, in maintaining and developing "Open and Stable Seas," which are upheld by maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law, ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with relevant international law, rather than by force.
- Japan will strengthen its maritime domain awareness capabilities in a comprehensive manner that involves the use of outer space, while paying attention to the establishment of international networks.
- Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan.

#### (5) Strengthening Cyber Security

- Japan as a whole will make concerted efforts to defend cyberspace and strengthen the response capability against cyber-attacks, so as to protect cyberspace from malicious activities; to ensure the free and safe use of cyberspace; and to guard Japan's critical infrastructure against cyber-attacks, including those in which state involvement is suspected.

- Japan will constantly strengthen public-private partnership, and will comprehensively consider and take necessary measures with regard to expanding the pool of human resources in the security field, etc.
- Japan will take measures at technical and operational levels to enhance international cooperation, and will promote cyber defense cooperation.
- (6) Strengthening Measures against International Terrorism
  - Japan will first and foremost strengthen its domestic measures against international terrorism such as ensuring the security of nuclear facilities in Japan. In order to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals living abroad, Japan will strengthen such measures as collecting and analyzing intelligence on the situation of international terrorism.
- (7) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities
  - Japan will fundamentally strengthen its information-collecting capabilities from a diverse range of sources, including human intelligence and open source intelligence.
  - Japan will enhance its intelligence analysis, consolidation, and sharing capabilities including by developing experts, and will promote all-source analysis that makes use of the array of information-collecting means at the Government's disposal. Materials and intelligence will be provided to the NSC in a timely manner, and they will be appropriately utilized in policy formulation.
- (8) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
  - From the perspective of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to contribute more proactively to peace and international cooperation including through utilizing defense equipment, and to participate in joint development and production of defense equipment and other related items.
  - While giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment. In this context, considerations will be made with regard to defining cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third party transfer.
- (9) Ensuring the Stable Use of Outer Space and Promoting Its Use for Security Purposes
  - Japan will engage itself in enhancing the functions of information-gathering satellites and in making effective use of satellites. Japan will also enhance a system for space situational awareness.
  - Japan will promote the development and utilization of outer space in a manner that contributes to national security in the medium- to long-term, including the development of technologies.
- (10) Strengthening Technological Capabilities
  - Japan should encourage the further promotion of technologies, including dual use technologies, thereby strengthening Japan's technological capabilities.
  - Japan will constantly grasp science and technology trends, and make effective use of technology in the area of security by combining the efforts of industries, academia, and the Government.
  - Japan will proactively utilize its internationally outstanding technologies in diplomacy.
- 2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance
  - Japan and the U.S. have persistently strengthened and expanded their cooperation on a wide range of areas for peace, stability, and prosperity of not only the two countries themselves, but also the Asia-Pacific region and the broader international community.
  - The U.S., based on its Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizing a rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, aspires to enhance its presence in the region and strengthen cooperation with its allies, including Japan and its partners.
  - In order to ensure the security of Japan and to maintain and enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community, Japan must further elevate the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and realize a stronger Japan-U.S. Alliance.
- (1) Further Strengthening of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas
  - Japan will work with the U.S. to revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, through discussions on a variety of issues such as the concrete manner of defense cooperation and basic concepts of bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, while ensuring consistency with various policies in line with the Strategy.
  - Japan will strive to enhance the deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance through working closely with the U.S. on operational cooperation and policy coordination on issues such as response to contingencies and the medium- to long-term strategy, and strengthening its security cooperation with the U.S. in such broad areas as BMD, maritime affairs, outer space, cyberspace and large-scale disaster response operations.
- (2) Ensuring a Stable Presence of the U.S. Forces
  - While taking measures such as Host Nation Support and increasing deterrence, Japan will steadily implement the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan in accordance with the existing bilateral agreements, in order to reduce the impact on people in host communities including Okinawa.
- 3. Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan's Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community
 

To improve the security environment surrounding Japan, Japan will engage itself in building trust and cooperative relations with partners both within and outside the region through the following approaches.

  - Japan will strengthen cooperative relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region with which it shares universal values and strategic interests.
    - ROK: Japan will strengthen the foundation for security cooperation. Japan, the U.S., and the ROK will work together closely in addressing North Korean nuclear and missile issues.
    - Australia: Japan will further strengthen the strategic partnership by steadily sharing strategic recognition and advancing security cooperation.
    - ASEAN countries: Japan will further deepen and develop cooperative relations with the ASEAN countries in all sectors based on the traditional partnership lasting more than 40 years. Japan will also provide further assistance to ASEAN efforts towards maintaining and strengthening its unity.
    - India: Japan will strengthen bilateral relations in a broad range of areas, including maritime security, based on the bilateral Strategic and Global Partnership.
  - Japan will strive to construct a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests with China from a broad, as well as a medium- to long-term perspective. Japan will encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for the sake of regional peace, stability and prosperity, and Japan will respond firmly but in a calm manner to China's recent attempts to change the status quo by coercion.
  - Japan will endeavor to achieve a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, such as the abduction, nuclear and missile issues, in accordance with the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and relevant Security Council resolutions.
  - Japan will advance cooperation with Russia in all areas, including security and energy, thereby enhancing bilateral relations as a whole.
  - In promoting these efforts, Japan will actively utilize and engage in multilateral and trilateral cooperation frameworks.
  - Japan will cooperate with other partners of the Asia-Pacific region towards ensuring the stability of the region.
  - European countries are partners for Japan which together take a leading role in ensuring the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. Japan will further strengthen its relations with Europe, including cooperation with the EU, NATO, and OSCE.
  - Japan will endeavor to further develop relations with emerging countries, not merely on a bilateral basis, but in cooperative efforts in tackling global challenges.
  - Japan will engage in constructing multilayered cooperative relations with the Gulf States, encompassing political and security cooperation beyond natural resources and energy. In addition, Japan will play a proactive role in the resolution of major issues affecting the stability of the Middle East.
  - Japan will continue to contribute to the development and the consolidation of peace in Africa through various avenues, especially the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process.
- 4. Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community
 

As a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will play an active role for the peace and stability of the international community.

- (1) Strengthening Diplomacy at the United Nations
  - Japan will further engage in active efforts by the U.N. for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security.
  - Japan will continue to strive to achieve the U.N. Security Council reform, including through an expansion of both permanent and non-permanent categories, with Japan becoming a permanent member of the Council.
- (2) Strengthening the Rule of Law
  - In order to establish the rule of law in the international community, Japan will participate proactively in international rule-making from the planning stage, so that Japan's principles and positions are duly reflected.



- Japan will actively engage in realizing the rule of law relating to the sea, outer space and cyberspace, as well as in assistance for the development of legal systems.
  - (3) Leading International Efforts on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
    - Japan will carry out vigorous efforts in pursuit of “a world free of nuclear weapons.”
    - Japan will lead international efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation, including those towards the resolution of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development issues and Iran’s nuclear issues, in a manner consistent with the maintenance of the credibility of extended deterrence under the Japan-U.S. alliance.
  - (4) Promoting International Peace Cooperation
    - Japan will further step up its cooperation with U.N. PKO and other international peace cooperation activities.
    - Japan will promote coordination between PKO and ODA projects, and make further strategic use of ODA and capacity building assistance.
    - Japan will proactively train peacebuilding experts and PKO personnel in various countries in close consultation with countries or organizations concerned.
  - (5) Promoting International Cooperation against International Terrorism
    - Japan will promote consultations and exchanges of views with other countries on the situation on international terrorism and international counter-terrorism cooperation, as well as reinforcement of the international legal framework.
    - Japan will actively extend assistance to developing countries, etc.
  - 5. Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues
 

Japan will endeavor to share universal values and reinforce an open international economic system, which form the basis of peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. At the same time, Japan will advance the following measures towards the resolution of development issues and global issues that could hinder peace and stability of the international community.

  - (1) Sharing Universal Values
    - Through a partnership with countries with which Japan shares universal values, such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, Japan will conduct diplomacy that contributes to addressing global issues.
    - Japan will actively utilize its ODA and other schemes in supporting democratization, the development of legal systems, and human rights.
    - Japan will engage proactively in diplomatic issues on women.
  - (2) Responding to Global Development and Global Issues and Realizing Human Security
    - It is necessary for Japan to strengthen its efforts to address development issues as part of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.
    - Japan will strengthen efforts towards the achievement of the MDGs, and play a leading role in the formulation of the next international development goals.
    - Japan will engage in further efforts in mainstreaming the concept of human security in the international community.
  - (3) Cooperating with Human Resource Development Efforts in Developing Countries
    - Japan will invite a broad range of personnel from developing countries, including students and administrative officials, and provide them education and training. Japan will further promote human resource development in order to ensure that these personnel can contribute to development in their home countries.
  - (4) Maintaining and Strengthening the Free Trade System
    - Japan will promote economic partnership efforts, including through the TPP, the Japan-EU EPA, a Japan-China-ROK FTA, and the RCEP. Through these efforts, Japan will strengthen the vigor and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.
  - (5) Responding to Energy and Environmental Issues
    - Japan will actively utilize diplomatic tools for efforts to achieve the stable supply of energy and other natural resources.
    - In the area of climate change, Japan will implement a proactive strategy for countering global warming.
  - (6) Enhancing People-to-people Exchanges
    - Japan will expand two-way youth exchanges.
    - Japan will promote people-to-people exchanges through sport and culture.
6. Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding
  - In order to fully ensure national security, it is vital to reinforce the domestic foundation for diplomatic power, defense force, and other capabilities to be effectively demonstrated.
  - It is important to seek a deeper understanding of Japan’s security policies both at home and abroad to ensure national security.- (1) Maintaining and Enhancing Defense Production and Technological Bases

- Japan will endeavor to engage in effective and efficient acquisition of defense equipment, and will maintain and enhance its defense production and technological bases, including through strengthening international competitiveness.
- (2) Boosting Communication Capabilities
  - It is imperative that Japan proactively and effectively communicate its national security policy to the world and its people, deepen the understanding among the people of Japan, and build cooperative relations with other countries.
  - With the Prime Minister’s Office serving as the control tower, Japan will enhance its public relations in an integrated and strategic manner through a government-wide approach. Fully utilizing various information technologies and diverse media, Japan will also strengthen its information dissemination in foreign languages.
  - Japan will cooperate with educational institutions, key figures, and think tanks, and in doing so, promote Japanese language education overseas and train personnel who are capable of contributing to strategic public relations efforts and other areas.
  - By precisely and effectively communicating information on Japan’s position based on objective facts, Japan will be able to gain accurate understanding in the form of international opinion.
- (3) Reinforcing the Social Base
  - It is essential that each and every Japanese national hopes to contribute to peace and stability in the region and the world, and to the improvement of the welfare of humanity, as well as that they perceive national security as a familiar and immediate issue for them, and have deep understanding of its importance and complexity.
  - Japan will foster respect for other countries and their people as well as love for the country and region.
  - Japan will advance measures that raise awareness with regard to security on such issues as territory and sovereignty, and that increase understanding of the activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Japan.
- (4) Enhancing the Intellectual Base
  - Japan will seek to enhance education on security-related subjects at institutions of higher education.
  - Exchanges will be deepened between the Government and institutions of higher education, think tanks, etc.
  - Japan will promote the fostering of private-sector experts and government officials.

## Reference 6 NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY2019 and beyond

(December 18, 2018)

### I. NDPG’s Objective

Japan since the end of World War II has consistently treaded the path of a peace-loving nation. This has been accomplished by the persistent efforts of our forerunners under the principle of maintaining peace.

The most consequential responsibility of the Government of Japan is to maintain Japan’s peace and security, to ensure its survival and to defend to the end Japanese nationals’ life, person and property of its nationals and territorial land, waters and airspace. This is the foremost responsibility that Japan must fulfill as a sovereign nation. Carrying out this responsibility by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative is at the very heart of Japan’s national security. Japan’s defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of its security and the clear representation of the unwavering will and ability of Japan as a peace-loving nation. And maintaining Japan’s peace and security is an essential premise for its prosperity.

At present, security environment surrounding Japan is changing at extremely high speeds. Changes in the balance of power in the international arena are accelerating and becoming more complex, and uncertainty over the existing order is increasing. In addition, rapid expansion in the use of new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is poised to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security, which has prioritized responses in traditional, physical domains, which are land, sea and air.

Even under these circumstances, Japan will vigorously march forward as a peace-loving nation. To do so, Japan, amid the dramatically changing security environment, needs to fundamentally strengthen its national defense architecture with which to protect, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, life, person and property of its nationals, territorial land, waters and airspace, and its sovereignty and independence, thereby expanding roles Japan can fulfill. Today, no country can preserve its security by itself alone. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance as well as security cooperation with other countries are critical to Japan’s national security, and this cannot be achieved without Japan’s own efforts. The international community also expects Japan to play roles that are commensurate with its national power.

In strengthening its defense capability, Japan must squarely face the aforementioned realities of national security and ensure necessary

and sufficient quality and quantity so as to build a truly effective defense capability that does not lie on a linear extension of the past. In particular, it has become essential that Japan achieve superiority in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. To build a new defense capability that combines strengths across all domains, Japan needs to engage in a transformation at a pace that is fundamentally different from the past, completely shedding the thinking that relies on traditional division among land, sea, and air. On the other hand, given the rapidly aging population with declining birthrates and severe fiscal situation, Japan cannot strengthen its defense capability without thorough rationalization that does not dwell on the past.

The Japan-U.S. Alliance, together with Japan's own defense architecture, continues to be the cornerstone of Japan's national security. As stated above, Japan's fulfillment of its foremost responsibility as a sovereign nation is the very way to fulfill its roles under the Japan-U.S. Alliance and further enhance the Alliance's ability to deter and counter threats, and is a foundation upon which to strategically promote security cooperation in line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific.

Based on the foregoing thoughts, the Government, in line with "On National Security Strategy" (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013, and hereinafter referred to as "National Security Strategy"), hereby sets forth the "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond" as the new guidelines regarding how Japan's national defense ought to be to form the foundation of Japan's future.

## II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan

### 1. Characteristics of current security environment

In the international community, interdependency among countries further expands and deepens. On the other hand, thanks to further growth of national power of such countries as China, changes in the balance of power are accelerating and becoming more complex, thereby increasing uncertainty over the existing order. Against such a backdrop, prominently emerging are inter-state competitions across the political, economic and military realms, in which states seek to shape global and regional order to their advantage as well as to increase their influence.

These inter-state competitions occur on a continuous basis: In conducting inter-state competitions, states leverage various means such as undermining other country's sovereignty using military and law-enforcement entities, and manipulating foreign country's public opinion by exploiting social media. Also, the so-called gray-zone situations are becoming persistent over a long period of time, playing out as part of inter-state competitions. They may possibly further increase and expand.

Such gray-zone situations harbor the risk of rapidly developing into graver situations without showing clear indications. In addition, methods employed to alter the status quo, such as "hybrid warfare," that intentionally blur the boundaries between the military and non-military realms are forcing affected actors to take complex measures not limited to military ones.

Driven by rapid technological innovation in information & communications and other fields, military technologies are showing remarkable advances. Against the backdrop of such technological advances, contemporary warfare increasingly features capabilities combined across all domains: not only land, sea and air but also new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. Aiming to improve overall military capability, states are seeking to gain superiority in technologies that undergird capabilities in new domains. Since space and cyber domains are widely used for civilian purposes, if stable use of these domains is impeded, it may entail serious consequences for the safety of state and its citizens.

Due to advances in military technologies, a variety of threats can now easily penetrate national borders. States endeavor to develop weapons that leverage cutting-edge, potentially game-changing technologies. They also engage in research of autonomous unmanned weapon systems equipped with artificial intelligence (AI). Further technological innovations hereafter are expected to make it difficult still to foresee future warfare.

In the international community, there is a broadening and diversifying array of security challenges that cannot be dealt with by a single country alone. With respect to space and cyber domains, establishing international rules and norms has been a security agenda. In maritime domain, there have been cases where country unilaterally claims its entitlements or take actions based on its own assertions that are incompatible with existing international order. These have generated undue infringement upon freedom in high seas. In addition, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and ballistic missiles as well as worsening international terrorism remain grave challenges for the international community.

Against such background, qualitatively and quantitatively superior military powers concentrate in Japan's surroundings where clear trends are observed in further military build-up and increase in military activities.

### 2. Situations by country and region

While remaining to possess the world's largest comprehensive national power, the United States, with inter-state competitions in a range of areas prominently emerging, has acknowledged that particularly important challenge is strategic competition with China and Russia who attempt to alter

global and regional order.

To rebuild its military power, the United States is engaged in such efforts as maintaining military advantage in all domains through technological innovations, enhancing nuclear deterrent, and advancing missile defense capabilities. The United States upholds defense commitments to allies and partners and maintains forward force presence, while calling on them to share greater responsibility. The United States frames the Indo-Pacific as a priority region where it adopts a policy of strengthening alliances and partnerships.

Member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) including the United States are reviewing their strategies to deal with coercive attempts to alter the status-quo as well as "hybrid warfare." In view of changes in the security environment, NATO member states have been increasing their defense expenditures.

With an aim to build "world-class forces" by the mid-21st century, China has sustained high-level growth of defense expenditures with continued lack of transparency. China has engaged in broad, rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. In so doing, China attaches importance to ensuring superiority in new domains: it is rapidly advancing capabilities in cyber and electromagnetic domains with which to disrupt opponent's command and control; and continues to enhance space domain capabilities through developing and experimenting anti-satellite weapons. China is also improving missile defense penetration capabilities and amphibious landing capabilities. Such capability enhancement serves to improve the so-called Anti-Access/Area Denial ("A2/AD") capabilities—capabilities to deny access and deployment of foreign militaries to one's surrounding areas and to disrupt their military operations therein—as well as to build capabilities with which to conduct military operations over greater distances. In addition, China is promoting civil-military integration policy in areas of national defense, science & technology and industry, and actively developing and acquiring cutting-edge technologies of potential military utility. Also, maritime law enforcement agencies and the military are improving their collaboration.

China engages in unilateral, coercive attempts to alter the status quo based on its own assertions that are incompatible with existing international order. In the East China Sea and other waters, China is expanding and intensifying its military activities at sea and in the air. Around the Senkaku Islands, an inherent part of Japanese territory, Chinese government vessels continually violate Japanese territorial waters despite Japan's strong protests while Chinese naval ships continuously operate in waters around the Islands. China is also expanding its military activities in the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan. In particular, the Chinese military in recent years has frequently advanced to the Pacific, with its navigation routes and unit composition becoming more diverse. In the South China Sea, China has forcibly conducted large-scale, rapid reclamation of maritime features, which are being converted into military foothold. China in the South China Sea is also expanding and intensifying its maritime and air activities.

Such Chinese military and other developments, coupled with the lack of transparency surrounding its defense policy and military power, represent a serious security concern for the region including Japan and for the international community. Japan needs to continue to pay utmost attention to these developments. China is eagerly expected to play active roles in a more cooperative manner in the region and the international community.

North Korea in recent years has launched ballistic missiles at unprecedented frequency, rapidly improving its operational capabilities such as simultaneous launch and surprise attack. Given technological maturity obtained through a series of nuclear tests, North Korea is assessed to have already successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads. Although North Korea expressed its intention for complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and blew up in public its nuclear test site, it has not carried out the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner: There has been no essential change in North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities.

North Korea is assessed to possess large-scale cyber units as part of its asymmetric military capabilities, engaging in theft of military secrets and developing capabilities to attack critical infrastructure of foreign countries. North Korea also retains large-scale special operation forces.

Such military developments of North Korea pose grave and imminent threats to Japan's security and significantly undermine peace and security of the region and the international community. Through United Nations Security Council resolutions, the international community also has made it clear that North Korea's nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities constitute a clear threat to international peace and security.

Russia is enhancing its military posture by continuing force modernization efforts with a focus on nuclear forces. Russia is in sharp confrontation with Europe and the United States over issues including situation in Ukraine. Russia's military activities are trending upward in the Arctic Circle, Europe, areas around the United States and the Middle East, as well as in the Far East including Japan's Northern Territories. Close attention therefore needs to be paid to its developments.

### 3. Characteristics of Japan

Surrounded by sea on all sides and with long coastlines, Japan possesses numerous islands remote from the mainland and is blessed with vast

Exclusive Economic Zones: spread widely therein are life, person and property of its nationals, territorial land, waters and airspace, as well as various resources, all of which Japan must defend to the end. For Japan, a maritime nation dependent on overseas trade for the bulk of energy resources and food supplies, fundamental to its peace and prosperity is to ensure the safety of maritime and air traffic by strengthening the order of “Open and Stable Oceans,” an order based on fundamental norms such as rule of law and freedom of navigation.

Japan is prone to natural disasters that exact heavy damage. Industry, population and information infrastructure concentrate in Japan’s urban areas, and a large number of critical facilities such as nuclear power plants are located in coastal areas.

In addition, Japan is undergoing population decline and ageing with dwindling birthrate at unprecedented pace. Severe fiscal conditions continue as well.

#### 4. Summary

In light of the foregoing, while the probability of a large-scale military conflict between major countries, which was of concern during the Cold War era, remains low, Japan’s security environment is becoming more testing and uncertain at a remarkably faster speed than expected when the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013 and hereinafter referred to as the “former Guidelines”) was formulated.

To prevent threats to Japan from materializing to menace life and peaceful livelihood of its nationals, it behooves Japan to take measures that are in line with these realities.

### III. Japan’s Basic Defense Policy

In line with the National Security Strategy and from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” Japan has enhanced its diplomatic strength and defense capability. Japan has also expanded and deepened cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being a cornerstone. In so doing, Japan under the Constitution has adhered to the basic precept of maintaining the exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses threat to other countries, ensured civilian control of the military, and observed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

Japan under these precepts will ever not change the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation. Based on this premise, Japan, even amid the realities of security environment it has hitherto never faced, must strive to preserve national interests identified in the National Security Strategy—defend to the end Japanese nationals’ life, person and property, territorial land, waters and airspace, and its sovereignty and independence. To that end, the Government will identify national defense objectives and the means to achieve them, and proactively and strategically promote measures with added variety.

National defense objectives are: first, to create, on a steady-state basis, security environment desirable for Japan by integrating and drawing on the strengths at the nation’s disposal; second, to deter threat from reaching Japan by making opponent realize that doing harm to Japan would be difficult and consequential; and finally, should threat reach Japan, to squarely counter the threat and minimize damage.

Japan will strengthen each of the means by which to successfully achieve these national defense objectives: Japan’s own architecture for national defense; the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and international security cooperation. These efforts, including achieving superiority in new domains, which are space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum, must be carried out swiftly and flexibly in order to deal with increasingly complex security environment that is changing at accelerating speeds.

In dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons, U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential: Japan will closely cooperate with the United States to maintain and enhance its credibility. To deal with the threat, Japan will also increase its own efforts including comprehensive air and missile defense as well as civil protection. At the same time, towards the long-term goal of bringing about a world free of nuclear weapons, Japan will play an active and positive role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

#### 1. Strengthening Japan’s own architecture for national defense

##### (1) Building comprehensive architecture for national defense

In order to squarely address the realities of security environment that it has hitherto never faced and to securely achieve national defense objectives, Japan will build national defense architecture that in all phases integrates the strengths at the nation’s disposal: this structure enables not only Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Self-Defense Forces (SDF) efforts but also coherent, whole-of-government efforts; and enables cooperation with local governments and private entities. In particular, Japan will accelerate its efforts and cooperation in such fields as space, cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum, ocean, and science & technology, and also promote measures concerning the formulation of international norms in fields such as space and cyberspace.

Japan will further advance steady-state efforts such as strategic communications by systematically combining all available policy tools.

In order to address a range of situations including armed contingencies and “gray-zone” situations, Japan has been strengthening its posture under the

principle of civilian control of the military. Japan further needs to seamlessly deal with various situations in a coherent, whole-of-government manner by way of swift and pertinent decision-making under even stronger political leadership, which will be assisted by enhanced support mechanism. In view of protecting the life, person and property of its nationals, Japan will also continue to strengthen organization for disaster response and civil protection, and, in cooperation with local governments, work to secure evacuation facilities. Japan will build a posture fully prepared to evacuate Japanese nationals overseas during emergencies and ensure their safety. Japan will promote measures to protect infrastructure critical to people’s daily lives such as electricity and communication as well as to protect cyberspace.

In addition to making aforementioned efforts, in order to ensure the effectiveness of various policies and measures, Japan will, on a steady-state basis, devise and review relevant plans while systematizing them; also, expand the use of simulations and comprehensive training and exercises to improve the effectiveness of emergency response posture.

#### (2) Strengthening Japan’s defense capability

##### a. Significance and necessity of defense capability

Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of Japan’s national security. Defense capability represents Japan’s will and ability to: deter threat from reaching Japan; and should threat reach Japan, eliminate the threat and, as a sovereign nation, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, defend to the end Japanese nationals’ life, person and property as well as territorial land, waters and airspace.

At the same time, defense capability is essential for Japan to play on its initiative its roles in the Japan-U.S. Alliance at all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. Strengthening Japan’s defense capability to provide for national security is none other than strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Defense capability is essential also for advancing Japan’s efforts in security cooperation with other countries.

Defense capability is the most important strength for Japan in retaining self-sustained existence as a sovereign nation amid security environment it has never faced before. Japan must strengthen this capability on its own accord and initiative.

##### b. Truly effective defense capability – Multi-domain Defense Force

To be able to deter and counter qualitatively and quantitatively superior military threats in increasingly testing security environment, it has become vitally important to adapt to warfare that combines capabilities in new domains—space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum—and traditional domains—land, sea and air.

Japan needs to develop, while qualitatively and quantitatively enhancing capabilities in individual domains, a defense capability that can execute cross-domain operations, which organically fuse capabilities in all domains to generate synergy and amplify the overall strength, so that even when inferiority exists in individual domains such inferiority will be overcome and national defense accomplished.

In order to ensure national defense in increasingly uncertain security environment, it is also important for Japan to be able to seamlessly conduct activities at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies. To date, Japan has endeavored to develop a defense capability that allows to engage in diverse activities in a swift and sustainable manner. In recent years, however, SDF has had to increase the scope and frequency of its steady-state activities such as maintaining presence, as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities: This is exacting a chronic burden on its personnel and equipment, generating a concern that SDF may not be able to maintain proficiency and the volume of its activities.

Japan needs to: improve quality and quantity of capabilities that support sustainability and resiliency of various activities; and develop a defense capability that enables sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities commensurate with the character of given situations.

Further, Japan’s defense capability needs to be capable of strengthening the ability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats as well as promoting multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation.

In light of the foregoing, Japan will henceforth build a truly effective defense capability, “Multi-Domain Defense Force,” which: organically fuses capabilities in all domains including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum; and is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. The development of “Multi-Domain Defense Force” will be done while honing the attributes of “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” under the former Guidelines.

#### (3) Roles that defense capability should play

In order to create a security environment desirable for Japan and to deter and counter threats, Japan’s defense capability must be able to serve the roles specified below in a seamless and combined manner. In particular, in view of protecting the life and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals, it is all the more important for Japan’s defense capability to fulfill diverse roles on a steady-state basis.

##### a. From peacetime to “gray-zone” situations

SDF will enhance its presence on a steady-state basis by actively engaging in, among others, joint training and exercises and overseas port visits, thereby demonstrating Japan’s will and capability. SDF will, in close integration with



diplomacy, promote strategic communications including aforementioned activities by SDF units. SDF will leverage its capabilities in all domains to conduct wide-area, persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (hereinafter referred to as “persistent ISR”) activities around Japan. SDF will prevent occurrence or escalation of emergencies by employing flexible deterrent options and other measures. Leveraging posture in place for these activities, SDF will, in coordination with the police and other agencies, immediately take appropriate measures in response to actions that violate Japan’s sovereignty including incursions into its territorial airspace and waters.

SDF will provide persistent protection against incoming ballistic missiles and other threats, and minimize damage should it occur.

#### b. Attack against Japan including its remote islands

In response to attack on Japan including its remote islands, SDF will quickly maneuver and deploy requisite units to block access and landing of invading forces while ensuring maritime and air superiority. Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, SDF will block invading forces’ access and landing from outside their threat envelopes. Should any part of the territory be occupied, SDF will retake it by employing all necessary measures.

Against airborne attack by missiles and aircraft, SDF will respond in a swift and sustained manner by applying optimal means and minimize damage to maintain SDF’s capabilities as well as the infrastructure upon which such capabilities are employed.

In response to attack by guerrillas or special operations forces, SDF will protect critical facilities including nuclear power plants and search and destroy infiltrating forces.

#### c. Space, cyber and electromagnetic domains during all phases

In space, cyber and electromagnetic domains, to prevent any actions that impede its activities, SDF will conduct on a steady-state basis persistent monitoring as well as collection and analysis of relevant information. In case of such event, SDF will promptly identify incidents and take such measures as damage limitation and recovery.

In case of armed attack against Japan, SDF will, on top of taking these actions, block and eliminate the attack by leveraging capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains.

In addition, in light of the society’s growing dependence on space and cyberspace, SDF will contribute to comprehensive, whole-of-government efforts concerning these domains under appropriate partnership and shared responsibility with relevant organizations.

#### d. Large-scale disasters

In case of large-scale disasters, to protect the life, person, and property of Japanese nationals, SDF will swiftly transport and deploy requisite units to take all necessary measures for initial response, and, as required, maintain its posture for disaster response for a longer term. SDF will carefully address the needs of affected citizens and local governments, and engage in life saving, temporary repair and livelihood support in appropriate partnership and cooperation with relevant organizations, local governments and the private sector.

#### e. Collaboration with the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance

In all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, in line with the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” Japan will effectively conduct activities described in 2. by playing on its initiative its own roles in the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

#### f. Promotion of security cooperation

SDF will actively engage in efforts for enhanced security cooperation as stated in 3.: In accordance with policies that are tailored to individual regions and countries, SDF will strategically promote defense cooperation and exchanges such as: joint training and exercises, cooperation in defense equipment and technologies, capacity building assistance, and service-to-service exchange.

## 2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, together with Japan’s own national defense architecture, constitute a cornerstone for Japan’s national security. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as its core, plays a significant role for peace, stability and prosperity of not only Japan but also the Indo-Pacific region and the international community.

As inter-state competitions prominently emerge, it has become all the more important for Japan’s national security to further strengthen relationship with the United States, with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests. The United States also views that cooperation with its allies has become more important.

While the Japan-U.S. Alliance has been reinforced through activities including those that were made possible by the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan needs to further enhance the Alliance through efforts under the “Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation” in order to achieve its national defense objective as security environment surrounding Japan becomes more testing and uncertain at remarkably fast speeds.

In further strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, it is an essential premise that Japan strengthen its own defense capability on its own accord and initiative. Fulfilling this premise, Japan needs to press ahead with efforts such as: bolstering the ability of the Alliance to deter and counter threats;

enhancing and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas; and steadily implementing measures concerning the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan.

### (1) Strengthening ability of Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats

In all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies as well as during disasters, Japan will enhance information sharing with the United States, conduct effective and smooth bilateral coordination involving all relevant organizations and take all necessary measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security.

For these purposes, Japan will further deepen various operational cooperation and policy coordination with the United States. In particular, Japan will expand and deepen cooperation in: space and cyber domains; comprehensive air and missile defense; bilateral training and exercises; bilateral ISR operations; and bilateral flexible deterrent options. Japan will also promote formulation and renewal of bilateral plans and deepen the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. In addition, Japan will even more actively conduct activities such as logistic support for U.S. force activities and protection of U.S. ships and aircraft.

### (2) Strengthening and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas

In order to create a desirable security environment including maintaining and enhancing free and open maritime order, and with an eye on increasing Japanese and U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will conduct bilateral activities such as capacity building assistance, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) and counter-piracy.

In order for Japan and the United States to be able to fully leverage their capabilities during bilateral activities, Japan will enhance and expand cooperation with the United States in such areas as equipment, technology, facility, and intelligence as well as information security.

In particular, Japan will promote standardization of defense equipment that contributes to Japan-U.S. bilateral activities, and sharing of various networks. In order to support sustainable U.S. force activities around Japan as well as to ensure high operational availability of SDF equipment, Japan will build capacity for in-country maintenance of U.S.-made equipment.

To efficiently improve Japanese and U.S. capabilities, while facilitating common understanding of respective priorities in defense capability enhancement, promote measures such as effective acquisition of advanced U.S. equipment through optimized Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Japan-U.S. joint research and development.

With respect to SDF facilities and U.S. force facilities and areas including training facilities and areas, Japan will promote cooperation on joint/shared use and efforts for improved resiliency.

### (3) Steady implementation of measures concerning stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

Japan will provide stable support for smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan through various measures including Host Nation Support (HNS). Japan will also steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan to mitigate impact on local communities while maintaining deterrence provided by U.S. forces.

Okinawa is located in areas critically important to Japan’s national security and U.S. force stationing in Okinawa greatly contributes to deterrent the Japan-U.S. alliance provides: At the same time, facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Japan are highly concentrated in Okinawa. In light of this, Japan in recent years has been furthering its efforts to mitigate impact on Okinawa including returns of U.S. facilities and areas. Japan will continue to work to mitigate impact on Okinawa by steadily implementing such measures as realignment, consolidation and reduction of facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Okinawa including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma as well as the dispersion of impact on Okinawa.

## 3. Strengthening security cooperation

In line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific, Japan will strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, taking into account characteristics and situation specific to each region and country. As part of such efforts, Japan will actively leverage its defense capability to work on defense cooperation and exchanges which include joint training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, and interchanges among military branches. Furthermore, Japan will also contribute to address global security challenges. In implementing these initiatives, Japan will position the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone and will work closely with the countries that share universal values and security interests, through full coordination with its diplomatic policy.

### (1) Promoting defense cooperation and exchanges

With Australia, to further improve interoperability and by utilizing frameworks such as Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”), Japan will further promote joint training and exercises and defense equipment and technology cooperation, and advance cooperative activities such as bilaterally-aligned capacity building assistance to third parties. Japan will also strengthen cooperative relations under trilateral framework among Japan, Australia and the United States, which share universal values and strategic interests.



With India, in view of enhancing strategic partnership and by utilizing frameworks such as “2+2,” Japan will promote joint training and exercises and defense equipment and technology cooperation in a broad range of areas including maritime security. Japan will also strengthen cooperation among Japan, India and the United States.

With Southeast Asian countries, Japan will continue to support efforts for strengthening the centrality and unity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is the key to regional cooperation, and promote practical bilateral and multilateral cooperation, including joint training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and capacity building assistance.

With the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan will promote defense cooperation in a broad range of fields and strive to establish the foundation for collaboration. Japan will also continue to strengthen trilateral cooperation among Japan, the ROK and the United States to maintain peace and stability in the region.

With the United Kingdom and France, to contribute to the stability of maritime order in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will, while leveraging such frameworks as the “2+2,” promote efforts including more practical joint training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation and bilateral collaboration on third-party engagement. Japan will strengthen cooperation with European countries as well as NATO and the European Union (EU).

With Canada and New Zealand, Japan will promote efforts including joint training and exercises as well as bilateral collaboration on third-party engagement.

With China, in order to enhance mutual understanding and trust, Japan will promote multi-layered dialogues and exchange. In so doing, Japan will continue to encourage China to play responsible and constructive roles for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, comply with international norms of conduct, and improve transparency regarding military capability enhancement. In order to avoid unexpected situations between the two countries, Japan will utilize the “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the defense authorities of Japan and China” in a manner that contributes to building a trusting relationship between the two countries. Japan will calmly and firmly deal with Chinese activities at sea and in the air around Japan.

With Russia, in order to enhance mutual understanding and trust, Japan will promote security dialogues with Russia including the “2+2,” high-level interactions and broad unit-to-unit exchanges, and deepen joint training and exercises.

With island nations of the Pacific Ocean, Japan will promote port and airport visits by SDF as well as exchanges and cooperation that utilize capabilities and characteristics of each service of SDF.

With countries in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa, in order to build and strengthen cooperative relations Japan will promote exchanges at all levels, including high level, and cooperation in such fields as capacity building assistance related to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

Regarding multilateral frameworks, Japan attaches importance to the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that provide significant foundations for discussions, cooperation and exchanges related to security field in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, Japan will contribute to strengthening cooperation and mutual trust among the countries in the region.

## (2) Responding to global issues

From the viewpoint of securing the freedom and security of navigation and flight, Japan will promote cooperation to contribute to the improvement of capabilities pertaining to the maritime security of coastal states in the Indo-Pacific region, which include South Asian countries such as India and Sri Lanka, as well as Southeast Asian countries. Moreover, Japan will promote such activities as joint training and exercises, unit-to-unit exchanges and active port visits at these occasions. Japan will also conduct activities such as anti-piracy efforts in cooperation with relevant countries and cooperation for strengthening capabilities of the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).

Regarding the use of space domain, Japan will promote partnership and cooperation in various fields including the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and mission assurance of the entire space system, through consultations and information sharing with relevant countries and active participation in multilateral exercises among others. Regarding the use of cyber domain, Japan will enhance its partnership and cooperation with relevant countries through measures such as sharing views on threat awareness, exchanging views on response to cyber attacks, and participating in multilateral exercises.

In cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations, Japan will promote non-proliferation efforts regarding: weapons of mass destruction and missiles which can serve as their delivery means; and goods and sensitive technologies of potential military use. Leveraging SDF’s knowledge and human resources, Japan will engage in various activities related to arms control and disarmament undertaken by the United Nations and other bodies, including the discussion on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS).

In line with the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan will actively promote international peace cooperation activities, while giving

comprehensive consideration to such factors as purposes of mission, situation in host country, and political and economic relations between Japan and host country. While making good use of past experiences to develop human resources, Japan will actively contribute through such efforts as sending embedded personnel to mission headquarters and capacity building assistance in areas that Japan excels. Regarding SDF operation facility in the Republic of Djibouti, which is used for anti-piracy efforts, Japan will work towards stable, long-term use of the facility for regional security cooperation and other activities.

## IV. Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability

### 1. Guiding thoughts

In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in security environment, Japan must strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. In view of aging population with declining birth rate and severe fiscal situation, it is essential that Japan use budget and personnel even more effectively.

In strengthening defense capability, Japan will enhance priority capability areas as early as possible, allocating resources flexibly and intensively without adhering to existing budget and human resource allocation, and undertake necessary fundamental reforms.

In taking these measures, SDF will further promote joint-ness of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces in all areas and, avoiding stove-piped approach, optimize their organizations and equipment. In particular, SDF will further promote joint-ness in a wide range of areas such as capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, comprehensive air and missile defense, damage recovery, transportation, maintenance, supply, security, education, medical service and research.

With respect to hedging against invasion scenarios such as amphibious landing employing large-scale ground forces, which were assumed primarily during the Cold War period, SDF will retain forces only enough to maintain and carry on the minimum necessary expertise and skills with which to adapt to changes in situation in the future, and work further to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization.

### 2. Priorities in strengthening capabilities necessary for cross-domain operations

#### (1) Acquiring and strengthening capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains

In order to realize cross-domain operations, SDF will acquire and strengthen capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum by focusing resources and leveraging Japan’s superb science and technology. In doing so, SDF will strengthen and protect command, control, communications and information capabilities that effectively connect capabilities in all domains including the new ones.

##### a. Capabilities in space domain

Effective use of satellites for such purposes as information-gathering, communication and positioning is essential for realizing cross-domain operations. On the other hand, threats to the stable use of space are increasing.

SDF therefore will further improve various capabilities that leverage space domain including information-gathering, communication and positioning capabilities. SDF will also build a structure to conduct persistent ground- and space-based space situation monitoring. To ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will also work to strengthen capabilities including mission assurance capability and capability to disrupt opponent’s command, control, communications and information.

In so doing, SDF will actively leverage civilian technologies and work to enhance cooperation with relevant agencies including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and with the United States and other relevant countries. SDF will also engage in organization building such as the creation of units specializing in space and dedicated career field, and develop human resources and accumulate knowledge and expertise in the space field.

##### b. Capabilities in cyber domain

Information and communications networks that leverage cyberspace are a foundation for SDF’s activities in various domains, and attack against them seriously disrupts organized activities of SDF. In order to prevent such attack, SDF will continue to strengthen capabilities for persistent monitoring of command and communications systems and networks as well as for damage limitation and recovery. In addition, SDF will fundamentally strengthen its cyber defense capability, including capability to disrupt, during attack against Japan, opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack.

In so doing, SDF will significantly expand its human resources with specialized expertise and skills, and take into consideration its contributions to whole-of-government efforts.

##### c. Capabilities in electromagnetic domain

Since the use of electromagnetic spectrum has expanded in range and purpose, it is now recognized as a major operational domain situated on the frontline of offense-defense dynamic in today’s warfare. Ensuring superiority in electromagnetic domain is also critical to realizing cross-domain operations.

SDF will work to enhance information and communications capabilities as well as information collection and analysis capabilities related to electromagnetics, and develop an information sharing posture. SDF will improve capabilities to minimize the effect of opponent’s electronic

jamming. In addition, SDF will strengthen capabilities to neutralize radar and communications of opponent who intends to invade Japan. In order to smoothly perform these activities, SDF will enhance its ability to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic spectrum.

## (2) Enhancing capabilities in traditional domains

SDF will enhance capabilities to effectively counter attacks by aircraft, ships and missiles during cross-domain operations in close combination with capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains.

### a. Capabilities in maritime and air domains

In order to effectively deal with armed attack against Japan, it is extremely important for Japan to establish and maintain maritime and air superiority.

SDF will reinforce its posture for conducting persistent ISR at sea and in the air around Japan.

SDF will also strengthen surface and underwater operational capabilities including Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV).

By taking measures such as developing a fighter force structure that features Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) fighter aircraft which bring operational flexibility, SDF will improve air operation capability particularly on the Pacific side of Japan, where number of air bases is limited despite its vast airspace. In so doing, as number of air bases that allow for take-off and landing of fighters is limited, Japan will take necessary measures to enable STOVL fighter aircraft to operate from existing SDF ships as required, in order to further improve flexibility in fighter operations while ensuring safety of SDF personnel.

### b. Stand-off defense capability

As other countries make remarkable advances in early warning and control capabilities and the performance of various missiles, SDF needs to effectively intercept attack against Japan, while ensuring safety of its personnel.

SDF will acquire stand-off firepower and other requisite capabilities to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan including remote islands from the outside of their threat envelopes. In addition, in order to appropriately leverage advances in military technologies, Japan will swiftly and flexibly strengthen stand-off defense capability through measures such as comprehensive research and development of related technologies.

### c. Comprehensive air and missile defense capability

Japan needs to effectively and efficiently counter increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats of ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft by optimum means and minimize damage.

SDF will establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces, those for missile defense as well as air defense equipment that each SDF service has separately used, thereby providing persistent nation-wide protection and also enhancing capability to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. SDF will also study ways to counter future airborne threats.

Based on basic role and mission sharing between Japan and the United States, in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole, Japan will continue to study a potential form of response capability to address the means for missile launch and related facilities and will take necessary measures.

### d. Maneuver and deployment capability

In order to effectively deal with various situations such as attack on remote islands, requisite SDF units need to conduct sustained, persistent activities in appropriate areas on a steady-state basis and to maneuver and deploy according to situation.

SDF will strengthen amphibious operation and other capabilities. In addition, to enable swift and large-scale transport, SDF will strengthen joint transport capability including inter- and intra-theater transport capabilities tailored to the characteristics of remote island areas. SDF will also work to collaborate with commercial transport on a steady-state basis.

## (3) Strengthening sustainability and resiliency

To be able to sustain a range of requisite activities at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, sustainability and resiliency of defense capability including logistics support needs to be enhanced.

SDF will take necessary measures for securing ammunition and fuel, ensuring maritime shipping lanes, and protecting important infrastructure. In particular, while cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, SDF will improve sustainability through safe and steady acquisition and stockpiling of ammunition and fuel. SDF will also improve resiliency in a multi-layered way through efforts including dispersion, recovery, and substitution of infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations. Further, SDF will work toward more effective and efficient equipment maintenance by reviewing existing maintenance methods, thereby ensuring high operational availability.

## 3. Priorities in strengthening core elements of defense capability

### (1) Reinforcing human resource base

The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. Securing human resources for SDF personnel and improving their ability and morale are essential to strengthening defense capability. This has become an imminent challenge in the face of shrinking and aging population with declining birth

rates. Also in light of sustainability and resilience of defense capability, SDF needs to work even further to reinforce human resource base that sustains SDF personnel.

MOD/SDF will promote efforts, including those address institutional aspects, in order to secure diverse, high-quality talents from a wider range of people. These efforts include: various recruitment measures such as cooperation with local governments and other entities; diversifying applicant pool including college graduates; expanding women's participation; appropriate extension of SDF personnel's mandatory retirement ages; leveraging retired SDF personnel as well as reserve personnel; and measures for raising fulfillment rates. MOD/SDF will also promote manpower saving and automation by leveraging technological innovations such as artificial intelligence.

To enable all SDF personnel to maintain high morale and continue to fully exercise their ability, MOD/SDF will improve living and work environment and promote work style reforms at MOD/SDF to ensure proper work-life balance.

Through such efforts as enhancing joint education and research, MOD/SDF will enrich education and research to improve SDF's capabilities and foster its unity. MOD/SDF will enhance education for organization management skills. In addition, MOD/SDF will improve treatment through measures concerning honors and privileges, and allowance increase that reflects the special nature of SDF's missions. MOD/SDF will also further improve re-employment support for SDF personnel in view of the fact that it is the responsibility of the Government to secure the livelihood of SDF personnel under the mandatory early retirement system.

### (2) Reviewing equipment structure

MOD/SDF will examine the existing equipment structure from joint operation perspective and build an optimized equipment structure. In so doing, while giving due considerations to capabilities each SDF service requires for its operations, MOD/SDF will: develop equipment with multiple functional variants; optimize and standardize specifications of equipment; and jointly procure equipment commonly used across SDF services; reduce types of aircraft; suspend the use of equipment whose importance has decreased; and review or discontinue projects of low cost-effectiveness.

### (3) Reinforcing technology base

As character of warfare changes dramatically due to advances in military technologies, it is becoming all the more important to reinforce technological base that has bearing on defense equipment through whole-of-government approach by leveraging Japan's superb science and technology.

MOD/SDF will make focused investments through selection and concentration in important technologies including artificial intelligence and other potentially game-changing technologies. MOD/SDF will also dramatically shorten research and development timelines by streamlining R&D processes and procedures. In doing so, MOD/SDF will encourage company's prior investments and leverage its strength to full potential by actively using design proposal-based competition scheme and improving foreseeability through the formulation of R&D visions on capabilities required for Japan's future national defense.

In addition, MOD/SDF will work to actively leverage potentially dual-use, advanced commercial technologies through such efforts as: technology exchange with relevant domestic and overseas entities; enhanced collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies; and use of the "Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security" program.

MOD/SDF will reinforce its structure aimed at early discovery of innovative, emerging technologies and fostering thereof by utilizing and creating think tanks that survey and analyze latest foreign and domestic technological trends.

### (4) Optimizing equipment procurement

In order to secure necessary and sufficient quality and quantity of SDF equipment, MOD/SDF needs to acquire high-performance equipment at the most affordable prices possible. MOD/SDF also needs to do thorough cost management and reduction not only during budget development but also during budget implementation.

MOD/SDF will actively use systematic acquisition methods including long-term contracts which facilitate efficient procurement, and streamline equipment maintenance. MOD/SDF will facilitate competition among domestic and foreign companies, and promote defense equipment development that eyes towards international joint development and production as well as overseas transfer. In order to efficiently procure U.S.-made high-performance equipment, MOD/SDF will promote rationalization of FMS procurement and work to align procurement timings and specifications with U.S. forces and other parties. In taking these steps, MOD/SDF will further strengthen efforts on project management throughout the entire life cycle of defense equipment.

### (5) Strengthening defense industrial base

Japan's defense industry is an essential foundation for the production, operation, and maintenance of defense equipment. For the production of high-performance equipment and to ensure their high operational availability, it is necessary to make defense industrial base more resilient by overcoming challenges such as high costs due to low-volume, high-mix production and

lack of international competitiveness, thereby enabling it to effectively adapt to changing security environment.

In addition to taking various measures concerning equipment structure, technological base, and equipment procurement, to create a competitive environment for companies, MOD/SDF will reform the existing contract system including affording incentives to companies. MOD/SDF will enhance supply-chain risk management and work to further expand Japanese defense industry's participation in maintenance work of imported equipment. For whole-of-government efforts to promote appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which permits transfer of defense equipment in cases where the transfer contributes to Japan's security, MOD/SDF will work to make necessary improvements in the Principles' implementation. At the same time, MOD/SDF will strengthen intellectual property management, technology management and information security in order to prevent drain of important defense equipment-related technologies. Through above-mentioned measures, MOD/SDF will work to reduce equipment costs and improve industrial competitiveness, thereby striving to build resilient defense industrial base. MOD/SDF will also examine further measures to that end.

#### (6) Enhancing intelligence capabilities

MOD/SDF will enhance intelligence capabilities to provide timely, effective intelligence support to policy decision and SDF operations. MOD/SDF will strengthen capabilities for each stage of collection, processing, analysis, sharing, and protection so that SDF can promptly detect and swiftly respond to indications of various situations and also take requisite measures based on medium- to long-term military trends.

In so doing, while giving due considerations to technological trends in information processing, MOD/SDF will strengthen capability and posture, including those related to new domains, for the collection of SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, OSINT and others. MOD/SDF will enhance collaboration with relevant domestic agencies including the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center which operates Information Gathering Satellites and with the ally as well as with other parties. MOD/SDF will work to hire, retain and train personnel for information collection and analysis and to acquire and connect information-sharing systems. MOD/SDF also will establish more robust information security regime and strengthen counter-intelligence capability.

### V. Organization of Self-Defense Forces

In order to realize cross-domain operations, SDF will strengthen joint operations as described in 1 and develop organization of each SDF service as described in sections 2 to 4. Organic structure of major units and specific quantities of major equipment in the future are as shown in the Annex table.

#### 1. Joint operation to realize cross-domain operations

- (1) In order to further promote joint-ness of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF in all areas, SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff Office's posture designed for effective SDF operations and for new domains, thereby enabling swift exercise of SDF's capabilities. SDF will examine future framework for joint operation. SDF will also work to flexibly leverage personnel of each SDF service through such efforts as building posture for force protection and damage recovery with an eye on mutual cooperation among SDF services.
- (2) SDF will maintain an ASDF unit that specializes in space domain missions, and strengthen its posture for joint operations in order to conduct persistent monitoring of situations in space, and to ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies through such means as mission assurance and disruption of opponent's command, control, communications and information.
- (3) SDF will maintain a cyberspace defense unit as an integrated unit in order to conduct persistent monitoring of SDF's information and communications networks as well as to fundamentally strengthen cyber defense capability, including capability to disrupt, during attack against Japan, opponent's use of cyberspace for the attack.
- (4) SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff Office's posture in order to appropriately manage and coordinate, from joint operation perspective, the use of electromagnetic spectrum. SDF will strengthen each SDF service's posture to enable SDF to collect and analyze information concerning electromagnetic domain and to neutralize radar, communications and others operated by opponent that intends to invade Japan.
- (5) In order to provide persistent nation-wide protection on a steady-state basis and to be able to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats: GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units and ballistic missile defense units; MSDF will maintain Aegis-equipped destroyers; ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units; and SDF will build comprehensive air and missile defense capability comprising these assets.
- (6) At all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will maintain a maritime transport unit as an integrated unit that allows SDF units to swiftly maneuver and deploy in joint operations.

#### 2. Organization of GSDF

- (1) In order to be able to swiftly respond to various situations, GSDF will

maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades and an armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. GSDF will also maintain mobile operating units equipped with specialized functions, in order to effectively perform operations such as: various missions in cyber and electromagnetic domains; airborne operations; amphibious operations; special operations; air transportation; defense against NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) weapons; and security cooperation with foreign countries.

In view of the excellent training environment it offers, GSDF will maintain half of rapidly deployable basic operational units in Hokkaido, on the premise that these units will deploy and move via joint transport capability.

GSDF will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats by taking measures including: persistent steady-state maneuver such as coordinated activities between ships and Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade and other mobile operating units as well as their various training and exercises; stationing of units in remote islands hitherto without SDF presence; and establishing networks with MSDF and ASDF.

- (2) To be able to counter invasion of remote islands, GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units and hyper-velocity gliding projectile units for remote island defense.
- (3) With respect to basic operational units (divisions and brigades) other than the rapidly deployable ones referred to in (1), GSDF will review their organization and equipment with focus on tanks, howitzers and rockets. With respect to units under the direct command of regional armies, GSDF will also review their organization and equipment related to aerial firepower. GSDF will thoroughly implement rationalization and streamlining of these units and appropriately position them to meet conditions and characteristics of each region.

#### 3. Organization of MSDF

- (1) In order to provide for defense in the waters around Japan and security of maritime traffic through effective prosecution of persistent ISR, antisubmarine operations and mine countermeasure operations, and to be able to effectively engage in security cooperation with other countries, MSDF will maintain reinforced destroyer units including destroyers with improved multi-mission capabilities, minesweeper units and embarked patrol helicopter units. MSDF will organize surface units composed of these destroyer units and minesweeper units. In addition, MSDF will maintain patrol ship units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan.

With respect to the destroyers equipped with improved multi-mission capabilities, MSDF will introduce multi-crew shiftwork and promote collaboration with patrol ships equipped with high ISR capability, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture.

- (2) In order to effectively conduct steady-state, wide-area underwater ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, MSDF will maintain reinforced submarine units.
- By introducing a test-bed submarine, MSDF will work to achieve greater efficiency in submarine operations and accelerate capability improvement, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture.
- (3) In order to effectively conduct steady-state, wide-area airborne ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units.

#### 4. Organization of ASDF

- (1) ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of ground-based warning and control units and reinforced airborne warning units: ground-based warning and control units are capable of conducting persistent surveillance in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side; and airborne warning units are capable of conducting effective, sustained airborne warning, surveillance and control during "gray zone" and other situations with heightened tensions.
- (2) In order to be able to provide for air defense in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side with a comprehensive posture that brings together fighter aircraft and supporting functions, ASDF will maintain fighter aircraft units reinforced by high-performance fighter aircraft. In order to enable fighter aircraft units and airborne warning units to sustainably conduct various operations in wide areas, ASDF will maintain reinforced aerial refueling and transport units.
- (3) In order to be able to effectively carry out activities such as maneuver and deployment of ground forces and security cooperation with foreign countries, ASDF will maintain air transport units.
- (4) In order to be able to conduct information collection in areas relatively remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions, ASDF will maintain unmanned aerial vehicle units.

### VI. Elements Supporting Defense Capability

For Japan's defense capability to demonstrate its true value, SDF needs to constantly maintain and improve its capabilities and foster broad understanding by Japanese nationals.



## 1. Training and exercises

In order to maintain and improve its tactical skills, SDF will conduct more practical, effective and systematic training and exercises while, as necessary, work in partnership with relevant organizations, local governments and the private sector. In so doing, in order to conduct more practical training, SDF will: develop and utilize domestic training ranges such as those in Hokkaido as well as fine training environment overseas; facilitate joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas; facilitate use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas; and more actively introduce training simulators and others. SDF will also actively utilize training and exercises to constantly examine and review various plans for emergencies.

## 2. Medical Care

SDF needs to enhance its medical functions to keep SDF personnel's vitality and enhance their ability to deal with various situations and engage in a diverse range of missions at home and abroad. In order to protect the lives of SDF personnel to the maxim extent possible, MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture for medical care and onward transfer of patients, seamlessly covering the entire stretch between the frontline and final medical evacuation destinations. Taking into account conditions and characteristics of each region, SDF will focus on strengthening medical functions of SDF in Japan's southwestern region. SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care regime through endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into medical hubs with enhanced functions. In order to secure medical personnel in operation units, SDF will: improve the management of the National Defense Medical College; enrich and enhance education and research such as improving medical care capabilities for war injury. In addition, SDF will improve requisite posture for various international cooperation including capacity building assistance.

## 3. Collaboration with local communities

Amid increasingly testing and uncertain security environment, activities, training and exercises of SDF and U.S. forces in Japan are becoming more diverse and defense equipment more sophisticated. As a result, it is becoming all the more important to gain understanding among and secure cooperation from local governments and residents around defense facilities.

MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities regarding defense policies and activities. Upon fielding units and equipment of SDF or U.S. Forces in Japan and conducting training and exercises, MOD/SDF will make careful, detailed coordination to meet desires and conditions of local communities, while sufficiently fulfilling accountability. At the same time, MOD/SDF will continue to promote various impact alleviation measures include noise mitigation.

MOD/SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations including local governments, police and fire departments in order to enable SDF to swiftly and securely conduct its activities in response to various situations.

In certain regions, presence of SDF units makes substantial contributions to maintenance and revitalization of local communities. There are also cases where SDF's emergency patient transport is supporting community medicine. In light of this, MOD/SDF will give due considerations to local conditions and characteristics upon reorganization of operation units as well as placement of SDF garrisons and bases. At the same time, in administering garrisons and bases, MOD/SDF will give due considerations to their contributions to local economies.

## 4. Intellectual Base

In order to facilitate understanding of security and crisis management among the populace, MOD/SDF will work to promote security-related education at educational institutions. Within MOD/SDF, in order to achieve at high levels both academic research and policy-support by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), MOD/SDF will facilitate NIDS' collaboration with the policy-making sector. MOD/SDF will further enhance its defense research regime with NIDS playing central roles. In so doing, MOD/SDF will promote systematic collaboration on education and research with other research and educational institutions within the Government, as well as with universities and think-tanks of excellence both at home and abroad.

## VII. Points of Attention

1. Japan's defense capability these Guidelines set forth envisions approximately 10 years. The National Security Council will conduct periodic, systematic evaluations throughout the course of implementation of various measures and programs. In order to build truly effective defense

Annex Table

Joint Units	Cyber Defense Units Maritime Transport Units		1 squadron 1 group
Ground Self-Defense Force	Authorized Number of Personnel Active-Duty Personnel Reserve-Ready Personnel		159,000 151,000 8,000
	Major Units	Rapid Deployment Units	3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade
		Regional Deployment Units	5 divisions 2 brigades
		Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units	5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments
		Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile Intended for the Defense of Remote Islands Units	2 battalions
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments
		Ballistic Missile Defense Units	2 squadrons
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Surface Vessel Units Destroyers Destroyer and minesweeper vessels Submarine Units Patrol aircraft Units	4 groups (8 divisions) 2 groups (13 divisions) 6 divisions 9 squadrons
	Major Equipment	Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Submarines Patrol Vessels Combat Aircraft	54 (8) 22 12 Approx. 190
Air Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Air Warning & Control Units  Fighter Aircraft Units Aerial Refueling/Transport Units Air Transport Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units Space Domain Mission Units Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units	28 warning squadrons 1 AEW wing (3 squadrons) 13 squadrons 2 squadrons 3 squadrons 4 groups(24 fire squadrons) 1 squadron 1 squadron
	Major Equipment	Combat Aircraft Fighters	Approx. 370 Approx. 290

Notes 1. The current numbers of tanks and howitzers/rockets (authorized number as of the end of FY 2018) are respectively approx. 600 and approx. 500, which will be reduced respectively to approx. 300 and approx. 300 in the future.

2. Fighter Aircraft Units (13 squadrons) includes STOVL Units.

capability while firmly grasping changes in security environment, MOD/SDF will conduct verifications regarding capabilities required for Japan's defense in the future.

- When major changes in situation are anticipated during evaluation and verification processes, these Guidelines will be amended as necessary after examining current security environment and others.
- Considering increasingly severe fiscal conditions and importance of other budgets related to people's daily life, MOD/SDF will work to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development to curb costs. MOD/SDF will work to ensure that defense capability can smoothly and fully perform its functions while harmonizing with other policies and measures of the Government.

## Reference 7 Medium Term Defense Program (FY 2019 - FY 2023)

December 18, 2018

### I. Program Guidelines

In the defense program for FY 2019 - FY 2023, with accordance to "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond" (approved by the National Security Council and Cabinet on December 18, 2018), Japan will significantly strengthen defense capability to build a truly effective defense capability, "Multi-Domain Defense Force," which: organically fuses capabilities in all domains including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum; and is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. The development of "Multi-Domain Defense Force" will be done while honing the attributes of "Dynamic Joint Defense Force" under the "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond" (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013).

In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in security environment, Japan will strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. In view of aging population with declining birth rate and severe fiscal situation, Japan will strengthen its defense capability effectively by allocating resources flexibly and intensively without adhering to existing budget and human resource allocation. Furthermore, SDF will further promote joint-ness of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces in all areas, avoid stove-piped approach and optimize their organizations and equipment.

Given the guiding thoughts above, SDF will effectively and efficiently build, maintain and operate defense capability based on the following program guidelines:

- In order to realize cross-domain operations, SDF will acquire and strengthen capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum by focusing resources and leveraging Japan's superb science and technology, and strengthen and protect command, control, communications and information (C4I) capabilities that effectively connect capabilities in all domains including the new ones. In addition, SDF will enhance capabilities in maritime and air domains, stand-off defense capability, comprehensive air and missile defense capability and maneuver and deployment capability to effectively counter attacks by aircraft, ships and missiles during cross-domain operations in close combination with capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains. Furthermore, to be able to sustain a range of requisite activities at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, sustainability and resiliency of defense capability including logistics support will be enhanced.
- In procuring equipment, by properly combining the introduction of new, high-performance equipment, with life extension and improvement of existing equipment, MOD/SDF will efficiently secure defense capability in necessary and sufficient "quality" and "quantity". In this regard, MOD/SDF will strengthen its project management throughout its equipment life-cycle, including during its research and development activities, and reduce the life-cycle costs to improve cost-effectiveness. Moreover, MOD/SDF will make focused investments through selection and concentration in cutting-edge technologies. MOD/SDF will also dramatically shorten research and development (R&D) timelines by streamlining its processes and procedures.
- In the face of rapidly shrinking and aging population with declining birth rates, to ensure SDF's strength, to strive to secure human resources for SDF personnel and to improve their ability and morale, who are the core element of defense capability, MOD/SDF will comprehensively promote various measures to reinforce human resource base such as securing diverse and high-quality talents including diversifying applicant pool, promoting women's participation and leveraging reserve personnel, improving living and work environment, promoting work style reforms, and improving treatment.
- In order to maintain and strengthen the commitment of the United States (U.S.) to Japan and the Indo-Pacific region and to secure Japan's security, and based on the premise that Japan will strengthen its own capabilities, Japan will further promote a variety of cooperative

activities and consultations with the U.S., in a wide range of areas under "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation". Japan will also actively facilitate measures for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.

In line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific, to strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, Japan will actively leverage its defense capability to promote defense cooperation and exchanges which include joint training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, and interchanges among military branches.

- With respect to hedging against invasion scenarios such as amphibious landing employing large-scale ground forces, which were assumed primarily during the Cold War period, SDF will retain forces only enough to maintain and carry on the minimum necessary expertise and skills with which to adapt to changes in situation in the future, by achieving efficiency and rationalization.
- Considering increasingly severe fiscal conditions and importance of other budgets related to people's daily life, MOD/SDF will work to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development while harmonizing with other policies and measures of the Government.

### II. Reorganization of the Major SDF Units

- In order to build a structure that is capable of realizing cross-domain operations including new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff's posture designed for effective SDF operations and for new domains, thereby enabling swift exercise of SDF's capabilities. For the future framework for joint operations, SDF will take necessary measures after considering how to conduct the operation of organizations in which the functions in the new domains are operated unitarily, and come to conclusions after considering how the integrated structure should be during steady-state to appropriately execute instructions from the Minister based on the posture of the strengthened Joint Staff. SDF will also work to flexibly leverage personnel of each SDF service through such efforts as building posture for force protection and damage recovery with an eye on mutual cooperation among SDF services.

SDF will establish 1 squadron of ASDF space domain mission unit in order to conduct persistent monitoring of situations in space, and to ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies.

SDF will establish 1 squadron of cyber defense unit as joint unit in order to fundamentally strengthen cyber defense capabilities, including capability to disrupt, in the event of attack against Japan, opponent's use of cyberspace for the attack as well as to conduct persistent monitoring of SDF's information and communications networks.

SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff's posture in order to appropriately manage and coordinate, from joint operation perspective, the use of electromagnetic spectrum, and advance efforts to enhance defense capability related to the use of electromagnetic spectrum in each SDF service.

In order to provide persistent nation-wide protection on a steady-state basis and to be able to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats, GSDF will establish 2 squadrons of ballistic missile defense (BMD) units. In addition, in order to operate units more efficiently including command and control in accordance with the enhancement of SDF's ballistic missile response capabilities, ASDF will reorganize surface-to-air guided missile units from 6 fire groups to 4 groups while maintaining 24 fire squadrons.

At all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will establish 1 group of maritime transportation unit as Joint Unit that allows SDF units to swiftly maneuver and deploy in joint operations.

- In order to strengthen operation capabilities in new domains, GSDF will establish cyberspace units and electromagnetic operation units as subordinate units of the Ground Component Command.

In order to respond swiftly, and to deter and counter effectively and swiftly with various situations, GSDF will transform 1 division and 2 brigades respectively into 1 rapid deployment division and 2 rapid deployment brigades that are furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition to rapid deployment divisions and brigades, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade, which will be strengthened by the establishment of 1 amphibious rapid deployment regiment, will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats through conducting persistent steady-state maneuver such as coordinated activities with ships as well as various training and exercises. In addition, through continuing to establish area security units in charge of initial response activities, MOD will newly establish surface-to-air guided missile units and surface-to-ship guided missile units, GSDF will strengthen its defense posture of the remote islands in the southwest region. Furthermore, to counter invasion of remote islands, GSDF will take necessary measures to establish hyper-velocity gliding projectile (HVGP) units for the defense of remote islands.

From the perspective of enabling swift and flexible operations,

while thoroughly facilitating efficiency and rationalizing preparations for invasion, such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, GSDF will steadily implement programs towards successive formation of units equipped with mobile combat vehicles and disuse of tanks deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido and Kyushu. In addition, GSDF will steadily carry out programs that concentrate howitzers deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido into newly organized field artillery units under the direct command of the respective regional armies. Furthermore, GSDF will reduce its combat helicopter units under the direct command of the respective regional armies and consider the review of their deployment to operate them effectively and efficiently.

3. In order to provide for defense in the waters around Japan and security of maritime traffic through effective prosecution of persistent ISR, anti-submarine operations and mine countermeasure operations, to be able to effectively engage in security cooperation with other countries, MSDF will maintain 4 groups mainly consisting of 1 helicopter destroyer (DDH) and 2 Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and maintain 2 groups consisting of new type of destroyers (FFM) with improved multi-mission capabilities and minesweeping vessels. MSDF will newly establish surface units composed of these destroyer units and minesweeper units. In addition, MSDF will establish patrol vessel units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan. Furthermore, by introducing a test submarine, which the type will be changed from an existing submarine, MSDF will work to achieve greater efficiency in submarine operations and accelerate capability improvement, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture. In order to effectively conduct underwater ISR and patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, MSDF will continue to take measures necessary to increase the number of submarines.

4. In order to enhance the air defense posture and operate effectively in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side, ASDF will reorganize 8 warning groups and 20 warning squadrons to 28 warning squadrons and establish 1 airborne early warning (AEW) wing as part of air warning and control units, and take necessary measures to establish 1 squadron of fighter aircraft units.

ASDF will disband 1 squadron of tactical reconnaissance unit with the retirement of its reconnaissance aircraft (RF-4), and will establish 1 squadron of aerial refueling/transport units to enhance its aerial refueling/transport function.

In order to be able to conduct information collection in areas relatively remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions, ASDF will establish 1 squadron of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) unit.

5. The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the end of FY 2023 will be approximately 159,000, with approximately 151,000 being active-duty personnel, and approximately 8,000 being reserve-ready personnel. The authorized number of active-duty personnel of the MSDF and ASDF through FY 2023 will be approximately at the same levels as at the end of FY 2018.

During the period of the program, SDF will promote initiatives to optimize organizations and missions such as reviewing the existing organizations and missions whose importance has declined and assigning personnel mainly to new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum.

### III. Major Programs regarding SDF's Capabilities

1. Priorities in Strengthening Capabilities Necessary for Cross-Domain Operations

- (1) Acquiring and Strengthening Capabilities in Space, Cyber and Electromagnetic Domains

- (A) Capabilities in Space Domain

In order to secure the stable use of space, SDF will build a structure to conduct persistent space monitoring under an appropriate role-sharing with related ministries and agencies by such means as newly establishing space domain mission unit and establishing a space situational awareness (SSA) system and will also newly introduce space-based optical telescopes and SSA laser ranging devices.

In order to further improve various capabilities that leverage space domain including information-gathering, communication and positioning capabilities, SDF will continue to enhance information gathering capabilities through the use of various space satellites equipped with diverse sensors, and strengthen C4I capabilities by continuing to develop a sophisticated X-Band satellite communications system. SDF will also strive to secure redundancy by such means as receiving multiple positioning satellite signals including those of Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) and utilizing information gathering satellites (IGS) and commercial satellites including micro ones. Additionally, in order to use these capabilities continuously, SDF will conduct necessary study and research, and newly introduce training devices to

study and train responses to the vulnerabilities of Japanese satellites, and devices to grasp the state of electromagnetic interference against Japanese satellites. By this strengthening of the structure for grasping the situation, SDF will build the capability to disrupt C4I of opponents in collaboration with the electromagnetic domain.

In this regard, in addition to efforts to establish new job categories and enhance education dedicated to the space domain, SDF will actively leverage civilian technologies and promote to enhance cooperation including the development of human resources, with relevant agencies including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and with the U.S. and other relevant countries, given that cutting-edge technology and knowhow have been accumulated in these organizations.

- (B) Capabilities in Cyber Domain

SDF aims to persistently ensure sufficient security against cyber attack and acquire capability to disrupt, opponent's use of cyberspace in the event of attack against Japan. With consideration to enhancing joint functions and efficient resource allocations, SDF will establish the necessary environment by such measures as expanding the structure of cyber defense squadron and other units, enhancing the resiliency of the C4 systems of SDF, strengthening capabilities of information gathering, research and analysis, and developing a practical training environment that can test SDF's cyber defense capability. In addition, SDF will strive to keep abreast of the latest information including cyber-related risks, counter measures and technological trends, through cooperation with the private sector, and strategic talks, joint exercises and other opportunities with the ally and other parties.

As the methods of cyber attack are becoming increasingly sophisticated and complicated, securing personnel with expertise on a continuing basis is essential. SDF plans to develop personnel with strong cyber security expertise, through efforts such as improving the in-house curriculum for specialized education, increasing learning opportunities at institutions of higher education at home and abroad, and conducting personnel management that cultivates expertise. In addition, SDF will strengthen the cyber defense capability by utilizing superior outside expertise.

In order to enable a comprehensive response through a whole-of-government approach in cyber domain, MOD/SDF seeks to enhance close coordination with relevant ministries and agencies, etc. by providing knowledge and MOD/SDF personnel on a steady-state basis, and enhance training and exercises.

- (C) Capabilities in the Electromagnetic Domain

MOD/SDF will newly establish specialized sections in the internal bureau and the Joint Staff respectively in order to enhance the function to make policies pertaining to effective and efficient use of electromagnetic spectrum in MOD/SDF as well as to improve coordination with other ministries and agencies.

In order to enhance information gathering and analysis capabilities concerning electromagnetic spectrum and develop an information sharing posture, SDF will promote the procurement of radio wave information gathering aircraft and ground-based SIGINT sensor, the upgrade of the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) system, the connection of each SDF service's systems including the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) and the improvement of each SDF service's data links.

In order to neutralize the radar and communications of opponent attempting to invade Japan, SDF will proceed with the procurement of fighters (F-35A) and network electronic warfare devices, and the upgrade of fighters (F-15) and utility aircraft (EP-3 and UP-3D). SDF will also swiftly proceed with studies and R&D aimed at the procurement of standoff electronic warfare aircraft, high-output electronic warfare equipment, high-output microwave equipment and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) ammunition.

- (2) Enhancing Capabilities in Traditional Domains

- (A) Capabilities in the Maritime and Air Domains

- (i) Strengthening a Posture of Persistent ISR

In order to strengthen the posture to conduct persistent ISR in broad areas at sea and in the air around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side, and to detect any signs of significant development at an early stage, SDF will procure new type of destroyers with enhanced capabilities to respond to a wide range of missions (FFM), submarines, patrol vessels, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1), patrol helicopters (SH-60K/K (upgraded version)) and shipborne UAVs, conduct service-extension work on existing



destroyers, submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) and patrol helicopters (SH-60J and SH-60K) and upgrade the capabilities of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1). In this respect, SDF will strengthen the posture of persistent ISR through increasing the number of the operating days by introducing rational shifts of multiple crews and coordination with patrol vessels to be newly introduced for the new type of destroyers (FFM), and through increasing the opportunities for operation of the submarine fleet on a steady-state basis by introducing the test submarine, which the type has been changed from existing submarines. In addition, SDF will maintain a fully-prepared ISR posture through procuring airborne early warning aircraft (E-2D) and a long-endurance UAV (Global Hawk), upgrading the capabilities of the existing airborne warning and control systems (E-767), development of a new fixed air defense radar, establishing 1 AEW wing as part of air warning and control units as stated in II4, preparing an operating base for mobile air defense radars on the islands on the Pacific side and strengthening over-the-horizon radar capabilities.

(ii) Obtaining and Maintaining Air Superiority

SDF will strive for the comprehensive enhancement of air defense capability in airspace around Japan including vast air space on the Pacific side.

SDF will proceed replacing fighters that are not suitable for modernization (F-15) by increasing the number of fighters (F-35A) and will newly introduce fighters that are capable of short take-off and vertical landing (hereinafter referred to as "STOVL aircraft") to enhance the flexibility of fighter operations, as the number of air bases that allow for conventional take-off and landing of fighters is limited. In this regard, SDF will refurbish MSDF's multi-function helicopter carrier destroyers (Izumo class) after studying operation of STOVL aircraft so that the operation where necessary will be possible such as response to air attacks in time of emergency, ISR, training and disaster response, in order to further improve flexibility in fighter operations while ensuring safety of SDF personnel and to improve air operation capability particularly on the Pacific side of Japan, where number of air bases is limited despite its vast airspace. These destroyers shall continue to engage as multi-function destroyers in a wide range of missions after refurbishment, such as the defense of Japan and the response to large-scale disasters. There will be no change in the existing Government opinion concerning equipment that cannot be possessed under the Constitution. In addition, SDF will upgrade the capabilities of modernized fighter aircraft (F-15) including the enhancement of electronic warfare capabilities, mounting stand-off missiles and increasing the number of mounted missiles. Furthermore, SDF will upgrade the capabilities of fighter aircraft (F-2) including the enhancement of network functions.

With regard to future fighter, SDF will procure new fighters that are capable of playing a central role in future networked warfare before the retirement of the fighter aircraft (F-2). MOD/SDF will promote necessary research and launch a Japan-led development project at an early timing with the possibility of international collaboration in sight.

Along with continuing to procure middle-range surface-to-air guided missiles, SDF will continue to improve its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT systems by equipping them with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for ballistic missile defense (BMD). In addition, SDF will continue to procure aerial refueling/transport aircraft (KC-46A) and rescue helicopters (UH-60J).

(iii) Obtaining and Maintaining Maritime Superiority

In defense of the seas surrounding Japan and to ensure the security of maritime traffic by effectively conducting various activities including holding persistent ISR, anti-submarine operations and mine countermeasure operations, SDF will procure equipment such as a new type of destroyers (FFM), conduct service-extension activities on equipment such as existing destroyers, and enhance the capabilities of equipment such as fixed wing patrol aircraft (P-1) as stated in (i), and will procure minesweeping/transport helicopters (MCH-101). In addition, SDF will continue to procure Mine Sweeper Ocean (MSO) vessels and amphibious rescue aircraft (US-2), and will establish the structure for enhancing tactical development and education and training capabilities. Furthermore, SDF

will continue to procure surface-to-ship guided missiles and will introduce new surface-to-ship guided missiles and air-to-ship guided missiles with further extended ranges. In addition, SDF will take necessary measures after considering the introduction of long-endurance UAVs to strengthen surveillance capabilities in the water including on the vast Pacific side. Moreover, SDF will strive to steadily enhance C4I capabilities and will deploy unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) and proceed with R&D aiming at further enhancement of capabilities to utilize them for oceanic observation and ISR.

(B) Stand-off Defense Capability

In order to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan while ensuring safety of SDF personnel, SDF will procure stand-off missiles (JSM, JASSM and LRASM), which are capable of responding from the outside of their threat envelopes, and will proceed with R&D on HVGP intended for the defense of remote islands, new surface-to-ship missiles intended for the defense of remote islands and hypersonic weapons. In addition, in order to appropriately leverage advances in military technology, MOD/SDF will swiftly and flexibly strengthen stand-off defense capability through measures such as comprehensive R&D of related technology.

(C) Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense Capability

In order to effectively and efficiently counter increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats such as ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft by optimum means and minimize damage, SDF will establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces, those for missile defense as well as air defense equipment that each SDF service has separately used, thereby providing persistent nation-wide protection on a steady-state basis and to be able to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. In this regard, SDF will strive to standardize and streamline the means for interception that each SDF service possesses including their maintenance and replenishment systems.

For reinforcing its multi-layered and persistent defense posture for the entire territory of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, SDF will procure its land-based Aegis system (Aegis Ashore), continue to upgrade the capabilities of its existing Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG) and surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT system as stated in (A) (ii). SDF will also conduct bilateral training and exercises to enhance the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. bilateral BMD response posture.

In order to effectively counter missile attacks, SDF will procure its interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 block IB and block IIA), interceptor missiles with upgraded capabilities (PAC-3 MSE), long-range ship-to-air missiles (SM-6) and mid-range ground-to-air guided missiles.

In order to reinforce the detecting and tracking capabilities for missiles and to unitarily command and control the various equipment that each SDF service possesses, SDF will proceed with initiatives such as upgrading its Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) and procuring its air defense command and control system (ADCCS), developing its new fixed air defense radar, adding cooperative engagement capability (CEC) to its E-2D, R&D on a network system that enables engage-on-remote launch of weapons by destroyers (DD) (FC network), and research on satellite-mounted dual-wave-length infrared sensors and will also study ways to counter future airborne threats.

Based on basic role and mission sharing between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole, Japan will continue to study a potential form of response capability to address the means for missile launch and related facilities and will take necessary measures.

In preparation for an attack by guerrilla or special operations forces concurrent with a missile attack, SDF will continue to procure a variety of surveillance/response equipment, mobile combat vehicles, transport helicopters (CH-47JA) and UAVs in order to improve its ISR posture, and its ability to protect key facilities including nuclear power plants, and search and destroy infiltrating units, and also enhance the ability to respond effectively and efficiently by proceeding with the networking of its troops and strengthening information sharing. In sensitive locations such as areas where many nuclear power plants are located, SDF will conduct training with relevant agencies to confirm coordination procedures, and take necessary measures after considering the basis for deployment in areas neighboring nuclear power plants.

(D) Maneuver and Deployment Capability

In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale

transportation and deployment operations for a wide variety of situations and improve effective deterrence and counter capabilities, SDF will take necessary measures after considering how to command and coordinate the transport capabilities of each SDF service unilaterally from a steady-state including the reinforcement of the transport coordination function of the Joint Staff.

SDF will continue to procure transport aircraft (C-2) and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) and introduce new utility helicopters, and will also promote relevant initiatives in order to obtain the cooperation of related local governments and other entities in promptly deploying GSDF Ospreys (V-22). In developing such aerial transport capability, SDF will take necessary measures after considering the further enhancement of efficiency and effectiveness such as avoiding functional redundancy by clarifying the roles and assignments among the various means of transportation.

In order to strengthen the transport function to remote islands, SDF will newly introduce logistics support vessels (LSV) and landing craft utilities (LCU), and consider new vessels necessary to smoothly implement amphibious and other operations in the future. SDF will also continue to actively utilize ships for which the funds and know-how of the private-sector have been utilized and consider further expansion in order to conduct large-scale transportation efficiently for coordination with the transport capabilities of SDF in light of the current situation in which they are being used effectively in dispatches to disasters and transporting its troops.

SDF will equip mobile combat vehicles transportable by airlift to its rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions/brigades) as stated in II- 2, and will establish rapid deployment regiments that immediately respond to various situations. In addition to rapid deployment divisions and brigades, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade, which will be strengthened by the establishment of 1 amphibious rapid deployment regiment, will conduct persistent steady-state maneuver such as coordinated activities with ships as well as various training and exercises. SDF will also establish area security units in charge of initial responses on remote islands in the southwestern region, as well as conduct maneuver training for prompt deployment to remote islands.

### (3) Strengthening Sustainability and Resiliency

#### (A) Securing Continuous Operations

In order to be able to operate units continuously at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will promote measures necessary for securing ammunition and fuel and protecting infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations.

With regard to securing ammunition, SDF will prioritize to procure anti-aircraft missiles that are necessary to secure air superiority, torpedoes that are necessary to secure maritime superiority, stand-off firepower that is necessary for countering from the outside of their threat envelopes and interceptor missiles for BMD while taking account of the needs of joint operation.

With regard to securing fuel, SDF will secure the effective emergency procurement and promote necessary measures such as newly introduction of tankers from the perspective of stabilizing fuel supply during emergencies.

In order to minimize damage from various attacks and quickly recover functions, SDF will proceed with initiatives for the dispersion, recovery, and substitution of infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations while taking the perspective of protection from electromagnetic pulse attacks into consideration, and will construct a posture regarding patrol and damage recovery based on the perspective of mutual cooperation among each SDF service. In addition, SDF will also proceed with various measures to make it possible for SDF to immediately utilize private airports and ports in contingency situations.

With regard to strengthening logistics foundations, for the purpose of establishing readiness capabilities, SDF will store necessary ammunition and spare parts in locations most appropriate for operations and proceed with the establishment of the necessary facilities. SDF will also expand some arsenals and make it possible to have them used jointly by each SDF service and will study and take the measures necessary to optimize combat service support including logistics from the perspective of joint operations.

SDF will steadily construct and maintain necessary living quarters surrounding SDF camps and bases and will also proceed with measures for facilities regarding their deterioration and earthquake resistance. From the perspective

of enabling a sustained response posture over the long term, various measures supporting families of military personnel will be promoted.

#### (B) Ensuring the Operational Availability of Equipment

In order to swiftly and effectively respond to various situations, MOD/SDF will ensure high operational availability of procured equipment by securing the necessary and sufficient funds for sustainment and maintenance of equipment, expanding the use of umbrella contract system, Performance Based Logistics (PBL), under which the price is to be determined according to realized performance regarding sustainment and maintenance, sharing information on supply data between the public and private sectors, promoting the utilization of Additive Manufacturing (3D printers), which can form complex shapes with speed and precision and promoting the procurement of parts and components from international markets.

## 2. Priorities in Strengthening Core Elements of Defense Capability

### (1) Reinforcing Human Resource Base

As equipment becomes more advanced and complex and missions become more varied and internationalized against the context of the rapidly shrinking and aging population with declining birth rate, MOD/SDF will strive to secure diverse, high-quality talents from a wider range of people and also promote initiatives on a priority base towards the establishment of an environment that enables all SDF personnel to maintain high morale and continue to fully exercise ability.

#### (A) Enhancement of Recruitment Initiatives

In order to steadily secure high-quality human resources into the future within the severe recruiting environment accompanying the rapidly aging population and declining birth rates, MOD/SDF will proceed with measures towards expanding the recruitment of untenured troops and expanding the source for prospects including university graduates. MOD/SDF will also proceed with a wide range of solicitation measures including the enhancement of recruiting advertisement and recruiting systems and will also strengthen collaboration with local governments and related organizations, etc. Furthermore, in order to increase attractiveness at the point of recruiting, MOD/SDF will improve living and working environment and strive to improve re-employment support for being rehired as public servants and matriculating at universities after completing tenure.

#### (B) Effective Utilization of Human Resources

In order to further increase the proportion of female SDF personnel among total SDF personnel, MOD/SDF will actively hire women, promote women's participation and proceed with the establishment of the foundations for the education, living and work environment for female SDF personnel.

In order to further utilize advanced-age human resources who have plenty of knowledge, skills and experience while keeping strength, MOD/SDF will raise the early retirement age for SDF personnel and promote the expansion of reenrollment and the utilization by units of the skills of retired SDF personnel in SDF fields requiring high levels of expertise. MOD/SDF will also secure personnel for units that are responsible for fields that require high levels of expertise by effectively utilizing human resources in the private sector.

#### (C) Improving Living and Work Environment

As the duration of the activities of the units becomes longer in response to the severe security environment, MOD/SDF will strive to improve the living and work environment, so that all the troop members who undertake the noble mission of protecting life and peaceful livelihood of Japanese national will be able to fully exercise their capabilities and fulfill their missions with high morale, by such means as steadily renewing aged daily life/workplace fixtures, steadily securing the necessary quantities of daily necessities and reducing the number of days on offshore duty per onboard person through the introduction of shifts by multiple crews, in addition to accelerating the securing and reconstruction of the necessary barracks and housing and proceeding with measures against aging and earthquake resistance for facilities.

#### (D) Promotion of Work Style Reforms

As the number of SDF personnel under time and mobility constraints because of child rearing and nursing care increases due to the consequence of major changes in the social structure, MOD/SDF will promote work style reform at MOD/SDF such as correcting long working hours and promoting the use of holidays in order to ensure proper work-life balance so that all SDF personnel will be able to fully exercise their ability and play prominent roles. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will proceed with initiatives such as establishing workplace nurseries, and

will also promote measures supporting families of military personnel such as providing temporary care for children of SDF personnel who must show up at the workplace for emergency operation, while strengthening our collaboration with local governments and other entities.

(E) Enhancing Education

At each SDF service and the National Defense Academy of Japan (NDAJ), MOD/SDF will strive to enhance the content and organizational structure of the education and training, including the academic knowledge and international sensibilities necessary to nurture broad perspectives concerning security. In addition, MOD/SDF will take necessary measures after considering whether adequate education and research regarding joint operations is possible with the existing organizations, in order to enhance the capabilities and the unity of the SDF and promote cross-sectoral operations, and strive to strengthen education concerning the organizational management capabilities of MOD/SDF. In order to further promote mutual reinforcement between each SDF service, MOD/SDF will strive to standardize the curriculum and will utilize cutting-edge technology in order to promote effective and efficient education. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will strive to build up the network of students from overseas who graduated from NDAJ as a mean of support for strengthening defense cooperation and exchanges. In order to steadily implement education and training, MOD/SDF will take necessary measures after considering the procurement of new primary trainer aircraft as the successor to the existing primary trainer aircraft (T-7).

(F) Improving Treatment and Re-Employment Support

To enable SDF personnel to fulfill their missions with high moral and pride, MOD/SDF will promote improving treatment through measures concerning honors and privileges including the enhancement of the defensive meritorious badges and improving conditions including salaries that reflects the special nature of the missions and working environment and will strive to enhance welfare benefits including family support.

In view of the fact that it is the responsibility of the Government to secure the livelihood of SDF personnel under the mandatory early retirement system, MOD/SDF will strive to further improve re-employment support by such means as promoting the further utilization of retired SDF personnel in the disaster prevention-related departments of local governments and related ministries and agencies while strengthening collaboration with local governments and related organizations from the perspective of utilizing the knowledge, skills and experience of retired SDF personnel in addition to expanding vocational training subjects and support for step-by-step acquisition of qualifications.

(G) Utilization of Personnel including Reserve Staff

In order to support sustainable unit operations in situations that are becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, MOD/SDF will promote the use of ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel in broader areas and opportunities. In order to enhance the fulfillment of the ranks of SDF reserves, MOD/SDF will also increase the number of enrollees as reserve candidates who are drawn from people without experience as SDF personnel, and promote the appointment of SDF reserves who are former reserve candidates as reserve ready personnel. Furthermore, in order to make it easier for SDF reserves to respond to training summons, MOD/SDF will undertake the strengthening of the foundations for education and training and the revision of the content of the training, and will implement measures to obtain the understanding and cooperation of the employers.

(2) Reviewing Equipment Structure

MOD/SDF will examine the existing equipment structure and strengthen the functions of the Joint Staff in order to build an effective and rational equipment structure from a joint operation perspective. MOD/SDF will also develop equipment with multiple functional variants, optimize and standardize specifications of equipment, jointly procure equipment commonly used across SDF services, reduce types of aircraft, suspend the use of equipment whose importance has decreased, and review or discontinue projects of low cost-effectiveness.

In order to maximize defense capability by effectively utilizing the limited human resources to the utmost, MOD/SDF will actively promote initiatives towards automation through such means as the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) to data processing and decision makings regarding unit operation, the procurement of UAVs and R&D of unmanned surface vehicles (USV) and UUVs. MOD/SDF will also actively promote initiatives to save manpower through such means as streamlining in design of new types of

destroyers (FFM) and submarines and use of remote control for radar sites and other equipment.

(3) Reinforcing Technology Base

In order to ensure technological superiority in strategically important areas of equipment and technology by making focused investments in important technologies including artificial intelligence and other potentially game-changing technologies, MOD/SDF will revise Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook and newly formulate R&D visions on technologies that will be important for future joint operation, presenting the future direction of medium to long-term research and development from a strategic perspective.

In order to significantly shorten R&D timelines by streamlining its process, MOD/SDF will adopt new methods such as block approach and modularization for R&D of HVGP for the defense of remote islands, new surface-to-ship missiles for the defense of remote islands, UUVs and hypersonic weapons. MOD/SDF will also provide the capabilities of future equipment promptly through analysis of alternatives by the technological demonstration at the initial stage of R&D.

MOD/SDF will work actively to leverage potentially dual-use, advanced commercial technologies through such efforts as: technology exchange with relevant domestic and overseas entities; enhanced collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies; and use of the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” program. In this regard, MOD/SDF will strengthen and expand cooperation with the countries who are making large-scale investments in game-changing technologies such as the U.S., and promote mutually complementary international joint R&D. MOD/SDF will reinforce its structure aimed at early discovery of innovative, emerging technologies and fostering thereof by utilizing and creating think tanks that survey and analyze latest foreign and domestic technological trends.

(4) Optimizing Equipment Procurement

In order to further promote effective and efficient equipment procurement, MOD/SDF will enhance the effectiveness and flexibility of project management throughout equipment lifecycles. To this end, MOD/SDF will take various initiatives including undertakings that contribute to cost reduction at mass production stage as a requirement at development stage, incorporating successful cases in the civilian sector to the manufacture of defense equipment, actively adopting contracting methods such as the competitive bidding method that contribute to the utilization of private sector knowledge and expertise and tightening cost controls. In this regard, MOD/SDF will expand the items subject to project management and strive to adjust the standards for the specifications and the review of project plans with consideration of life cycle costs, and apply them.

Regarding the cost estimation of equipment without market prices, MOD/SDF will undertake more appropriate costs calculation by making the calculation of the processing costs required for the manufacture more precise and appropriate, and will also conduct the procurement of information systems at appropriate price levels. To implement these initiatives effectively, MOD/SDF will actively develop and allocate human resources by utilizing human resources with specialized expertise, skills and experiences in the private sector, and will also strive to construct the cost-database on component level of equipment based on the information compiled from the cost estimates/contract records.

MOD/SDF will actively use systematic acquisition methods including long-term contracts which facilitate efficient procurement, and streamline equipment sustainment and maintenance including the expansion of PBL and other umbrella contracts. MOD/SDF will also facilitate competition among domestic and foreign companies regarding domestically procured equipment with low cost effectiveness by considering price reduction through imports and considering the deduction of unique specifications for domestic use. Furthermore, in light of the growing importance of the management of price, delivery time and other matters in procurement through Foreign Military Sales (hereinafter referred to as “FMS procurement”), MOD/SDF will collaborate closely with the U.S. Government and other organizations through Japan-U.S. consultations and promote initiatives towards the streamlining of FMS procurement, such as striving to acquire equipment in coordination with U.S. forces regarding the timing of procurement and specifications, and to manage the status of implementation in a timely and appropriate manner.

(5) Strengthening Defense Industrial Base

In order to strengthen the resilience of Japan’s defense industry base, which is an essential foundation for the production, operation, and maintenance of defense equipment, Government will actively take measures such as introducing the competition principle to Japan’s defense industry, which is in a poor competitive environment, incorporating the knowledge, expertise, and technology of the



civilian sector, and strengthen the supply chains of equipment. As part of these measures, MOD/SDF will review the contracting system with the aim of creating a competitive environment, including the introduction of the enterprise evaluation system that assesses how much a contractor company tries to contribute to strengthening of defense industry. MOD/SDF will also encourage the spin-off from defense technology to civilian purposes and the spin-on from cutting-edge technologies in the civilian sector to the defense industry including innovative manufacturing technologies. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will strengthen risk management regarding the vulnerability of supply chains of equipment through research on the supply chains and also promote the participation of Japan's defense industry in the sustainment and maintenance of imported equipment.

The government as a whole will promote appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which permits transfer of defense equipment in cases such as the transfer contributes to Japan's security. In order to do so, based on progress and other elements in defense cooperation with our partners, the Government will make necessary improvements in implementation or related rules, promote public-private partnership in information gathering and dissemination, strengthen technology control and intellectual property management in order to prevent leakage of key defense equipment-related technologies on the occasion of overseas transfer and develop defense equipment with an eye on overseas transfer. MOD/SDF will also strengthen information security measures that will be necessary for Japan's defense industry to participate in international businesses, and develop an information security guidebook for Japan's defense industry. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will actively promote international joint development and production with other countries utilizing Japan's technological strengths.

In addition, MOD/SDF will undertake measures such as making the equipment manufacturing process and thorough cost reduction and will strive to make Japan's defense industry base efficient and resilient while foreseeing possible realignment and consolidation of businesses that may occur as a result of these measures.

#### (6) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities

In order to be able to provide timely and effective intelligence support to policy decision and SDF operations, MOD/SDF will promote initiatives to comprehensively enhance intelligence capabilities at all stages of intelligence capabilities, including gathering, analyzing, sharing and securing of information.

MOD/SDF will drastically strengthen information gathering and analysis capabilities so that MOD/SDF will be fully capable of meeting various intelligence requirements including those related to new domains. This will be conducted by strengthening gathering postures for SIGINT and IMINT through establishing and enhancing capabilities of information collection facilities, utilizing intelligence gathering satellites and commercial satellites, and diversifying means for information collection through new equipment such as long-endurance UAVs. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will also strengthen the gathering posture of HUMINT through enhancing its defense attaché system, reinforce the gathering posture of OSINT and expand its cooperation with allied countries. In this regard, MOD/SDF will strive to achieve its even more effective and efficient posture by proactively utilizing the latest information processing technology, and will also promote all-source analysis, which fuses a wide variety of information sources together. MOD/SDF will also strive to utilize information effectively by successfully developing and connecting systems that will promote information sharing.

In order to respond appropriately to increasingly diversified intelligence requirements, MOD/SDF will promote securing and training of highly capable personnel handling information collection and analysis. Moreover, MOD/SDF will take steady measures in various directions including recruitment, education, training, and personnel allocation to strengthen comprehensive information collection and analysis capabilities.

With regard to information security, MOD/SDF will coordinate with relevant offices to make every effort by such means as education in ensuring information sharing on a need-to-know basis, and in taking preventative measures against information leakage. Also, MOD/SDF will strengthen counter-intelligence capability within MOD/SDF by promoting collaboration with relevant organizations.

#### 3. Large-Scale Disasters

In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as a Nankai Trough earthquake, or a special disaster such as a nuclear emergency, the SDF will respond to it by immediately transporting and deploying sufficient numbers of SDF units based on a joint operational approach, and also will promote measures to strengthen the response posture including the deployment of drones for disasters, a helicopter satellite communication

system (HeliSat), lifesaving systems, and emergency power sources. With close coordination and cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, local governments and the private sector, the MOD will promote such measures as to establish contingency planning and to conduct training and exercises, and secure alternative capabilities when the basis for the SDF's disaster and deployment operations is affected.

#### 4. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

##### (1) Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

In order to ensure Japan's national security and to maintain and strengthen the U.S. commitment to Japan and the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will further strengthen Japan-U.S. defense cooperation under the "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation" while strengthening Japan's own capability as a premise for these efforts.

Japan will continue to promote cooperation in space and cyber domains, comprehensive air and missile defense, joint training and exercises and joint ISR activities. Japan will also further deepen Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination in various areas such as formulation and renewal of bilateral plans and the Extended Deterrence Dialogue.

In order for Japan and the U.S. to be able to fully leverage their capabilities during bilateral activities, Japan will advance efforts for standardization of defense equipment that contributes to Japan-U.S. bilateral activities, sharing of various networks, building capacity for in-country maintenance of U.S.-made equipment and initiatives for intelligence/information security. To efficiently improve Japanese and the U.S. capabilities, while facilitating common understanding of respective priorities in defense capability enhancement, promote measures such as effective acquisition of advanced U.S. equipment through optimized FMS procurement and Japan-U.S. joint R&D. Furthermore, Japan will promote cooperation on joint/shared use of SDF and U.S. force facilities, and efforts for improved resiliency.

##### (2) Steady Implementation of Measures Concerning Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

In order to make the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan more smooth and effective, Japan will steadily secure Host Nation Support (HNS).

#### 5. Strengthening Security Cooperation

In line with the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Japan will further promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges based on the understanding that realizing a security environment that is desirable for Japan is an extremely important and necessary undertaking that contributes to Japan's defense itself and also relates to its basic fundamentals. In particular, in addition to high-level exchanges, policy dialogues and exchanges among military branches, in order to improve interoperability with relevant countries and to strengthen Japan's presence, Japan will appropriately combine and strategically implement specific initiatives such as joint training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation and capacity building assistance, while taking characteristics and situation specific to each region and country into account.

Based on this significance of defense cooperation and exchanges, in order to further collaborate mutually and conduct specific and thoroughgoing initiatives, Japan will proceed with the improvement of operation procedures, development of organizational systems and review of systems, and will further reflect needs concerning defense cooperation and exchanges in SDF operations. Japan will also strive to collaborate with relevant ministries and agencies as well as with other countries, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, and strategically disseminate information on Japan's initiatives. In this regard, Japan will focus on the following in particular.

##### (1) Holding Joint Training and Exercises

Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral joint training and exercises based on their significance as defense cooperation and exchanges. Through this, Japan will represent the will and ability to create a desirable security environment and will also seek to improve interoperability with relevant countries and strengthen cooperative relationships with other countries.

##### (2) Equipment and Technology Cooperation

Japan will strengthen initiatives for equipment and technology cooperation including overseas transfers of defense equipment, and strive to enhance our partners' military capabilities and maintain/strengthen medium and long-term relationships with those countries. In particular, Japan will effectively promote these initiatives by combining other efforts such as training and exercises and capacity building assistance as necessary.

##### (3) Capacity Building Assistance

Japan will work with countries of the Indo-Pacific region to support advance capacity development efforts based on their voluntary ownership, so as to enable counterpart military organizations to contribute further towards international peace and regional stability, thus creating security environment that is desirable to Japan. In this regard, Japan will effectively utilize knowledge

and expertise accumulated by SDF, coordinate thoroughly with diplomatic policy, and coordinate with partner countries such as the U.S. and Australia undertaking capacity building assistance, so as to maximize results by combining various measures efficiently.

(4) Maritime Security

Based on the understanding that open and stable seas are a foundation of the peace and prosperity of Japan as a maritime nation and in line with the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Japan will promote initiatives such as joint training and exercises, equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, information sharing and visits by ships and aircraft as warranted by the occasion, with foreign countries that share the understanding of maritime security. Through these, Japan will show the will and ability to stabilize maritime order in an active and visible manner.

(5) International Peace Cooperation Activities

In line with the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan will actively promote international peace cooperation activities, while giving comprehensive consideration to such factors as purposes of mission, situation in host country, and political and economic relations between Japan and host country. In particular, Japan will actively promote activities such as dispatch of embedded personnel to mission headquarters, dissemination of United Nations (UN) military engineer unit manuals and capacity building assistance in Japan's field of expertise by making good use of accumulated experiences. While Japan will also proceed with education and training that match missions conducted on the basis of the Legislation for Peace and Security, GSDF will take the necessary measures towards newly establishing an International Activities Unit with high-level emergency response capabilities and high-level technology in areas such as facilities and the operation of UAVs by unifying the Central Readiness Regiment and the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit.

The Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center will expand its curriculum, and strengthen cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, foreign countries, and non-governmental organizations through efforts such as providing educational opportunities to not only SDF personnel, but also candidates from various backgrounds.

Regarding SDF operation facility in the Republic of Djibouti, which is used for anti-piracy efforts, Japan will work towards stable, long-term use of the facility for regional security cooperation and other activities.

(6) Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation

In cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations, Japan will promote non-proliferation efforts regarding: weapons of mass destruction and missiles which can serve as their delivery means; and goods and sensitive technologies of potential military use. Leveraging SDF's knowledge and human resources, Japan will engage in various activities related to arms control and disarmament undertaken by the UN and other bodies, including the discussion on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS).

6. Elements Supporting Defense Capability

(1) Training and Exercises

To effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance its deterrence effectiveness, SDF's joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises are to be conducted in a tailored and visible way while fully grasping the environment of the surroundings of the training areas and making absolutely sure that safety is secured. Leveraging the lessons learned from these training and exercises, SDF will conduct regular studies and reviews of its plans to address contingencies. Along with these efforts, SDF will expand the establishment and utilization of the training areas in Hokkaido and elsewhere in Japan and conduct effective training and exercises. SDF will also facilitate to expand joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas with SDF while accounting for relations with local communities. Furthermore, SDF will facilitate the use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas and the utilization of excellent training environments overseas such as the U.S. and Australia, and introduce simulators actively. SDF will also strive to further enhance amphibious operation capability by the implementation of training by GSDF and MSDF in collaboration with U.S. Marines. SDF will strive to enhance the effectiveness of the swift and continuous deployment of units and strengthen their presence on a steady-state basis by organically coordinating such training and exercises that utilize training environments in Japan and abroad.

Seeking to respond to various situations with a whole-of-government approach, coordination with relevant agencies including police, firefighters, and the Japan Coast Guard will be reinforced. SDF will also actively utilize the opportunities presented by the joint training and exercises of SDF and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and

exercises as a way not only for considering and verifying plans for the actual operations of SDF, but also for actively considering and verifying comprehensive issues including civil protection.

(2) Medical Care

SDF will enhance its medical functions to keep SDF personnel's vitality and enhance their ability to deal with various situations and engage in a diverse range of missions at home and abroad.

In order to respond to various situations, SDF will strive to enhance the capacity to rapidly deploy medical bases and conduct Damage Control Surgery (DCS) to stabilize the symptoms of patients, and the capacity to manage patients being sent back as part of strengthening the system to seamlessly cover the entire stretch between the frontline and final medical evacuation destinations including the perspective of joint operations. In this regard, SDF will establish a system to jointly possess patient information from the frontline to final destinations. SDF will also strive to standardize medical supplies for the sake of interoperability and to stockpile necessary supplies. Furthermore, in order to transport patients safely, SDF will take necessary measures to introduce armored ambulances. Taking conditions and characteristics of each region into account, SDF will focus on strengthening medical functions of SDF in Japan's southwestern region.

In order to conduct the control and coordination regarding medical operations of SDF on a steady-state basis, SDF will strive to strengthen the organization of the Joint Staff. SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care regime through further endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into medical hubs with enhanced functions. Furthermore, SDF will proceed to improve the management of the National Defense Medical College, enhance its research functions and strive to secure high-quality talents, as well as striving to enrich the clinical experience of medical officers to better secure the number of medical officers, and promoting the appointment of SDF Reserve Personnel (physicians). In addition, MOD/SDF will proceed with the establishment of hygienic education and training foundations common to each SDF service that are necessary to improve medical care capabilities for combat injuries and the requisite posture for various international cooperation including capacity building assistance.

(3) Collaboration with Local Communities

MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities regarding defense policies and activities. Upon fielding units and equipment of SDF or U.S. Forces in Japan and conducting training and exercises, MOD/SDF will make careful, detailed coordination to meet desires and conditions of local communities, while sufficiently fulfilling accountability. At the same time, MOD/SDF will continue to promote various impact alleviation measures including sound insulation projects at residences. MOD/SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations including local governments, police and fire departments in order to enable SDF to swiftly and securely conduct its activities in response to various situations.

In certain regions, presence of SDF units makes substantial contributions to maintenance and revitalization of local communities. There are also cases where SDF's emergency patient transport is supporting community medicine. In light of this, MOD/SDF will give due considerations to local conditions and characteristics upon reorganization of operation units as well as placement of SDF garrisons and bases. MOD/SDF will also promote various measures that contribute to the local community by such means as striving to secure opportunities for local small and medium enterprises to receive contract orders based on the contracting policy of the nation, etc., concerning small and medium enterprises while also being mindful of efficiency.

(4) Intellectual Base

MOD/SDF will contribute to the promotion of national security education through such means as dispatching instructors to educational institutions and holding public symposiums. In addition, MOD/SDF will provide efficient and highly trustworthy information to increase public access to the research results regarding security. Moreover, MOD/SDF will promote various measures to improve the capabilities for providing information including that in foreign languages, the further utilization of increasingly diversified social networks, and MOD/SDF will also expand networks and institutional collaboration with research and education organizations, and think-tanks in Japan and abroad in order to further strengthen the research system of MOD/SDF with the National Institute for Defense Studies playing central roles. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will contribute to policy development through timely and appropriate supply of high-quality research results, based upon expertise and research capabilities, to the policy development departments.

#### IV. Quantities of Major Procurement

The Annex Table shows details of the quantities of major procurement described in Section III.

#### V. Expenditures

1. The expenditure target for the implementation of the defense capability build-up described in this program amount to approximately ¥27,470 billion in FY 2018 prices.
2. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, substantive funds will be secured by means of thoroughgoing greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development, suspending the use of equipment whose importance has decreased, reviewing or discontinuing projects of low cost-effectiveness, optimizing equipment procurement through cost management/suppression and long-term contracts and securing other revenue. The annual defense budgets target for the implementation of this program is expected to be around approximately ¥25,500 billion over the next five years. In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan must strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. Moreover, to achieve rapid procurement of defense equipment, Japan must pursue flexible and

swift project management, and the budgetary process for each fiscal year which will be conducted taking into account the economic and fiscal conditions among other budgets.

3. The amount of expenses based on contracts (material expenses) to be newly concluded to implement this program will be allocated within the ceiling of approximately ¥17,170 billion in FY 2018 prices (excluding the amount corresponding to payments outside of the program period for contracts that contribute to improving project efficiency such as maintenance), and the future obligation shall be managed appropriately.
4. This program will be reviewed after three years as necessary, with consideration to such factors at home and abroad as the international security environment, trends in technological standards including information communication technology, and fiscal conditions.

#### VI. Other

While maintaining U.S. Forces deterrence, Japan will steadily implement specific measures stipulated in “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” and other SCC documents and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related programs to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa.

Annex Table

Service	Equipment	Quantity
Ground Self- Defense Force	Mobile Combat Vehicles	134
	Armored Vehicles	29
	New Utility Helicopters	34
	Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA)	3
	Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles	3 companies
	Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles	5 companies
	Land-based Aegis Systems (Aegis Ashore)	2
	Tanks	30
	Howitzers	40
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Destroyers	10
	Submarines	5
	Patrol Vessels	4
	Other Ships	4
	Total (Tonnage)	23 (approx. 66,000t)
	Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1)	12
	Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K/K (Upgraded Capability))	13
	Ship-Borne Unmanned Aerial Vehicles	3
	Minesweeping and Transport Helicopters (MCH-101)	1
Air Self-Defense Force	Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft (E-2D)	9
	Fighters (F-35A)	45
	Fighter Upgrade (F-15)	20
	Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft (KC-46A)	4
	Transport Aircraft (C-2)	5
	Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE)	4 groups
	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Global Hawk)	(16 fire squadrons)
		1

1. Japan will basically pursue the establishment of 75 Patrol Helicopters and 20 Ship-borne UAVs at the completion of the “NDPG for FY 2019 and beyond”, but those exact numbers will be considered during the period of the “MTDP (FY 2019 - FY 2023).”

2. 18 aircraft out of 45 aircraft of Fighters (F-35A) would have STOVLs.

#### Reference 8 Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned

(As of March 31, 2019)

Type	Recoilless Guns	Mortars	Field Artillery	Rocket Launchers, etc.	Anti-aircraft Machine Guns	Tanks	Armored Vehicles
Approximate number owned	2,600	1,100	400	60	50	560	990

Notes: Each type of gun, except those of tanks and armored vehicles, includes self-propelled guns.



**Reference 9 Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications**

(As of March 31, 2019)

Service	Type	Model	Use	Number Owned	Maximum Speed (knots)	Crew (number)	Full Length (m)	Full Width (m)	Engine
GSDF	Fixed-wing	LR-2	Liaison and Reconnaissance	7	300	2 (8)	14	18	Turboprop, twin-engines
	Rotary-wing	AH-1S	Anti-tank	55	120	2	14	3	Turboshaft
		OH-6D	Observation	26	140	1 (3)	7	2	Turboshaft
		OH-1	Observation	37	140	2	12	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-1J	Utility	127	120	2 (11)	13	3	Turboshaft
		CH-47J/JA	Transport	55	150/140	3 (55)	16	4/5	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-60JA	Utility	40	150	2 (12)	16	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
MSDF	Fixed-wing	AH-64D	Combat	12	150	2	18	6	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		P-1	Patrol	19	450	11	38	35	Turbofan, quadruple-engine
	Rotary-wing	P-3C	Patrol	55	400	11	36	30	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
		SH-60J	Patrol	24	150	4	20	16	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		SH-60K	Patrol	58	140	4	20	16	Turboshaft, twin-engines
ASDF	Fixed-wing	MCH-101	Minesweeping and transport	10	150	4	23	19	Turboshaft, triple engine
		F-15J/DJ	Fighter	201	mach 2.5	1/2	19	13	Turbofan, twin-engine
		F-4EJ/EJ (improved)	Fighter	34	mach 2.2	2	19	12	Turbojet, twin-engine
		F-2A/B	Fighter	91	mach 2	1/2	16	11	Turbofan, single-engine
		F-35A	Fighter	12	mach 1.6	1	16	11	Turbofan, single-engine
		RF-4E/EJ	Reconnaissance	10	mach 2.2	2	19	12	Turbojet, twin-engine
		C-1	Transport	13	mach 0.76	5 (60)	29	31	Turbofan, twin-engine
		C-2	Transport	10	mach 0.82	2~5 (110)	44	44	Turbofan, twin-engine
		C-130H	Transport	14	320	6 (92)	30	40	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
		KC-767	Aerial refueling transport	4	mach 0.84	4~8 (200)	49	48	Turbofan, twin-engine
		KC-130H	Aerial refueling transport	2	320	6 (92)	30	40	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
		E-2C	Early warning	13	320	5	18	25	Turboprop, twin-engines
		E-2D	Early warning	1	350	5	18	25	Turboprop, twin-engines
		E-767	Early warning and control	4	450	20	49	48	Turbofan, twin-engine
	Rotary-wing	CH-47J	Transport	15	160	5 (48)	16	5	Turboshaft, twin-engines

Notes: 1. Parenthetical figures in the item "Crew" represents the number of people transported.

2. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2019.

**Reference 10 Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service**

(As of March 31, 2019)

Category	Destroyer	Submarine	Mine Warfare Ship	Patrol Combatant Craft	Amphibious Ship	Auxiliary Ship
Number (vessels)	48	19	24	6	11	29
Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)	263	54	23	1	28	127

Notes: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.

**Reference 11** Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Item Fiscal Year	GNP/GDP (Original Estimates) (A)	Annual Expenditures on General Account (B)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	General Annual Expenditures (C)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Defense-Related Expenditures (D)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to GNP/GDP (D/A)	Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to Annual Expenditures on General Account (D/B)	Ratio of Defense-related Expenditures to General Annual Expenditures (D/C)
1955	75,590	9,915	△0.8	8,107	△2.8	1,349	△3.3	1.78	13.61	16.6
1965	281,600	36,581	12.4	29,198	12.8	3,014	9.6	1.07	8.24	10.3
1975	1,585,000	212,888	24.5	158,408	23.2	13,273	21.4	0.84	6.23	8.4
1985	3,146,000	524,996	3.7	325,854	△0.0	31,371	6.9	0.997	5.98	9.6
1995	4,928,000	709,871	△2.9	421,417	3.1	47,236	0.9	0.959	6.65	11.2
2010	4,752,000	922,992	4.2	534,542	3.3	46,826 47,903	△ 0.4 0.3	0.985 1.008	5.07 5.19	8.76 8.96
2011	4,838,000	924,116	0.1	540,780	1.2	46,625 47,752	△ 0.4 △ 0.3	0.964 0.987	5.05 5.17	8.62 8.83
2012	4,796,000	903,339	△2.2	512,450	△5.2	46,453 47,138	△ 0.4 △ 1.3	0.969 0.983	5.14 5.22	9.06 9.20
2013	4,877,000	926,115	2.5	527,311	2.9	46,804 47,538	0.8 0.8	0.960 0.975	5.05 5.13	8.88 9.02
2014	5,004,000	958,823	3.5	564,697	7.1	47,838 48,848	2.2 2.8	0.956 0.976	4.99 5.09	8.47 8.65
2015	5,049,000	963,420	0.5	573,555	1.6	48,221 49,801	0.8 2.0	0.955 0.986	5.01 5.17	8.41 8.68
2016	5,188,000	967,218	0.4	578,286	0.8	48,607 50,541	0.8 1.5	0.937 0.974	5.03 5.23	8.41 8.74
2017	5,535,000	974,547	0.8	583,591	0.9	48,996 51,251	0.8 1.4	0.885 0.926	5.03 5.26	8.40 8.78
2018	5,643,000	977,128	0.3	588,958	0.9	49,388 51,911	0.8 1.3	0.875 0.920	5.05 5.31	8.39 8.81
2019	5,661,000	994,285 (1,014,564)	1.8	599,352 (619,639)	1.8	50,070 52,574	1.4 1.3	0.884 0.929	5.04 5.18	8.35 8.48

Notes: 1. The figures provided show GNP in and before FY1985, and GDP from FY1995 onward, in each case based on original estimates.

2. The upper figures for defense-related expenditures for FY2010 and thereafter exclude SACO-related expenses (16.9 billion yen in FY2010, 10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, 2.8 billion yen in FY2016, 2.8 billion yen in FY2017, 5.1 billion yen in FY2018, and 25.6 billion yen in FY2019), the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) (90.9 billion yen in FY2010, 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, 142.6 billion yen in FY2015, 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, 201.1 billion yen in FY2017, 216.1 billion yen in FY2018, and 167.9 billion yen in FY2019), expenses related to the introduction of new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015, 14.0 billion yen in FY2016, 21.6 billion yen in FY2017, and 31.2 billion yen in FY2018, and 6.2 billion yen in FY2019) as well as expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention/reduction and national resilience (50.8 billion yen in FY2019), while the lower figures include them.

3. Annual expenditure on general account and the lower figures in parentheses in the general annual expenditures column for FY2019 include temporary/special measures.

**Reference 12** Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

FY Item	2015		2016		2017		2018		2019	
	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio
Personnel and provisions	21,121	43.8 42.4	21,473	44.2 42.5	21,662	44.2 42.3	21,850	44.2 42.1	21,831	43.6 41.5
Materials	27,100 28,680	56.2 57.6	27,135 29,069	55.8 57.5	27,334 29,589	55.8 57.7	27,538 30,061	55.8 57.9	28,239 30,744	56.4 58.5
Equipment acquisition	7,404	15.4 14.9	7,659	15.8 15.2	8,406	17.2 16.4	8,191	16.6 15.8	8,329	16.6 15.8
R&D	1,411	2.9 2.8	1,055	2.2 2.1	1,217	2.5 2.4	1,034	2.1 2.0	1,283	2.6 2.4
Facility improvement	1,293	2.7 2.6	1,461	3.0 2.9	1,571	3.2 3.1	1,752	3.5 3.4	1,407	2.8 2.7
Maintenance	11,808	24.5 23.7	11,707	24.1 23.2	10,888	22.2 21.2	11,343	23.0 21.9	12,027	24.0 22.9
Base countermeasures	4,425	9.2 8.9	4,509	9.3 8.9	4,529	9.2 8.8	4,449	9.0 8.6	4,470	8.9 8.5
The cost for SACO-related projects	46	0.1	28	0.1	28	0.1	51	0.1	256	0.5
U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (mitigation of the impact on local communities)	1,426	2.9	1,766	3.5	2,011	3.9	2,161	4.2	1,679	3.2
Introduction of government aircraft	108	0	140	0.3	216	0.4	312	0.6	62	0.1
National resilience-related expenses	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	508	1.0
Others	758	1.6 1.5	744	1.5 1.5	723	1.5 1.4	768	1.6 1.5	723	1.4 1.4
Total	48,221 49,801	100	48,607 50,541	100	48,996 51,251	100	49,388 51,911	100	50,070 52,574	100

Notes: 1. Personnel and food provisions expenses include personnel wage and food expenditures.

2. Equipment acquisition expenses include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships.

3. R&amp;D expenses include those of equipment.

4. Facility improvement expenses include those of airfields and barracks.

5. Maintenance costs include those for housing, clothing and training.

6. Base countermeasures expenses include those for areas surrounding base countermeasures and burden by the USFJ.

7. Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.

8. The upper figures for Budgets and Composition Ratio exclude the cost for SACO-related expenses (4.6 billion yen in FY2015, 2.8 billion yen in FY2016, 2.8 billion yen in FY2017, 5.1 billion yen in FY2018, and 25.6 billion yen in FY2019), the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities; 142.6 billion yen in FY2015, 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, 201.1 billion yen in FY2017, 216.1 billion yen in FY2018, and 167.9 billion yen in FY2019), expenses related to the introduction of new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015, 14.0 billion yen in FY2016, 21.6 billion yen in FY2017, 31.2 billion yen in FY2018, and 6.2 billion yen in FY2019), as well as expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention/reduction and national resilience, while the lower figures include them.



**Reference 13** Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries

Country	FY	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Japan (100 million yen)		48,221	48,607	48,996	49,388	50,070
		49,801	50,541	51,251	51,911	52,574
		0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	1.4%
U.S. (U.S. 1 million dollar)		2.0%	1.5%	1.4%	1.3%	1.3%
		562,499	565,370	568,896	600,714	652,229
		△2.7%	0.5%	0.6%	5.6%	8.6%
China (100 million yuan)		8,896	9,544	10,444	11,070	11,899
		10.1%	7.6%	7.1%	8.3%	7.5%
		31,814	37,753	28,523	28,270	31,134
Russia (100 million RR)		28.3%	18.7%	△24.4%	△0.9%	10.1%
		374,560	387,995	403,347	431,581	466,971
		4.9%	3.6%	4.0%	7.0%	8.2%
Republic of Korea (100 million won)		32,695	32,882	35,191	36,231	38,562
		11.6%	0.6%	7.0%	3.0%	6.4%
		35,200	35,000	35,500	36,000	37,800
Australia (1 million Australian dollar)		2.0%	△0.6%	1.4%	1.4%	5.0%
		36,791	39,939	40,841	42,742	—
		△5.5%	8.6%	2.3%	4.7%	—
U.K. (1 million GBP)		32,974	34,288	37,005	38,520	43,228
		1.7%	4.0%	7.9%	4.1%	12.2%
France (1 million euro)						
Germany (1 million euro)						

Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others.

2. % represents a rate of growth over the previous year.

3. In Japan, the figures in the upper row exclude SACO-related expenditures (4.6 billion yen for FY2015, 2.8 billion yen for FY2016, 2.8 billion yen for FY2017, 5.1 billion yen for FY2018, and 25.6 billion yen for FY2019), the expenditures associated with the U.S. Forces realignment (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) (142.6 billion yen for FY2015, 176.6 billion yen for FY2016, 201.1 billion yen for FY2017, 216.1 billion yen for FY2018, and 167.9 billion yen for FY2019), expenses related to the introduction of new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen for FY2015, 14.0 billion yen for FY2016, 21.6 billion yen for FY2017, 31.2 billion yen for FY2018, and 6.2 billion yen for FY2019), as well as expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention/reduction and national resilience (50.8 billion yen for FY2019), while the figures in the lower row are based on the initial budget and include them.

4. U.S. defense expenditures represent the expense narrowly defined by the Historical Table. Figures for FY2019 are estimated values.

5. The figures for China are based on the initial budget in the Finance Budget Report to the National People's Congress (since FY2015, only the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure [a portion of the central government expenditure] was released; however, for FY2015 and FY2017, the figures are the defense expenditure of the central government expenditure as it was calculable.) The rate of growth over the previous year was calculated by comparing with the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure. However, for FY2015, the rate was calculated by comparing with the defense expenditure in the central government expenditure as it had been released in the previous year. The defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure for FY2015 and FY2017 was 886.9 billion yuan and 1.0226 billion yuan, respectively.

6. Russia's defense expenditure is based on the FY2015-2018 expenditures and the FY2019 budget amount in the Information on Execution of Budgets of the Russian Federation released by the Federal Treasury (initial).

7. The figures for the Republic of Korea are based on the initial budget released on its Ministry of National Defense website.

8. The figures for Australia are based on the initial budget in the Defence Portfolio Budget Statements published by the Australian Department of Defence.

9. The figures for the United Kingdom are based on the initial budget in the budget message.

10. The figures for France are based on the initial budget in "Annuaire Statistique de la Defense." The defense expenditure for FY2019 has not been released as of June 2019.

11. The figures for Germany are based on the initial budget released on its Federal Ministry of Defense website.

## Reference 14 Outline of “Cabinet Decision” and Legislation Development

Items of the Cabinet Decision	Outline	Legislation Development
1. Response to an Infringement that Does Not Amount to an Armed Attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Under the basic policy that relevant agencies including the police and Japan Coast Guard are to respond in close cooperation in accordance with their respective duties and authorities, the Government will further strengthen necessary measures in all areas, including enhancing the respective agency's response capabilities and strengthening collaboration among agencies. In cases of responding to a situation where police forces are not present nearby or police agencies cannot respond immediately, the Government will consider measures for issuing orders swiftly and accelerating procedures for public security operations or maritime security operations.</li> <li>The Government will develop legislation that enables the SDF to carry out very passive and limited “use of weapons” to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. and other countries’ Armed Forces that are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises), in line with the provisions of Article 95 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Acceleration of procedures to issue orders for public security operations/maritime security operations</li> <li>* Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law (Protection of weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. and other countries’ Armed Forces)</li> </ul>
2. Further Contributions to the Peace and Stability of the International Community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>So-called Logistics Support and “Integration with the Use of Force” (*1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➢ The Government is of the recognition that Japan's support activities such as supply and transportation conducted at a place which is not “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by a foreign country are not regarded as “Integration with the use of force” of that country. Based on that recognition, the Government will proceed with developing legislation which enables necessary support activities for the armed forces of foreign countries engaging in activities for ensuring Japan's security or for the peace and stability of the international community.</li> <li>➢ Japan does not conduct support activities in “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by armed forces of a foreign country to which Japan provides support.</li> <li>➢ Japan will immediately pause or cease support activities if the place where Japan is conducting support activities becomes “the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted” due to changes in the situation.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Use of Weapons Associated with International Peace Cooperation Activities <p>Based on the following positions, the Government will proceed with developing legislation in order to enable the SDF's use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to the protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent requests) and the “use of weapons for the purpose of execution of missions” in international peace cooperation activities that do not involve the “use of force,” including U.N. peacekeeping operations, as well as police-like activities that do not involve the “use of force,” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals with the consent from the territorial State.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➢ As for U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc., under the framework of the Five Principles for PKOs, “a quasi-state organization” (*2) other than parties to the conflict who have given consent of acceptance is, in principle, not expected to appear as an adversary.</li> <li>➢ When the SDF units conduct police-like activities that do not involve “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals in a foreign country based on the consent of the territorial State's Government, it is natural that the activities be conducted in the area within which the consent of the territorial State's Government is valid, i.e. the area within which its authority is maintained. This means that no “quasi-state organization” exists in that area.</li> <li>➢ The Cabinet will make a decision on whether the consent of acceptance is stably maintained and whether the area within which the consent of the territorial State's Government is valid, etc., based on deliberations, etc., at the National Security Council.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* The Act Concerning the Measures for the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations That Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security (Revision of the Act Concerning the Measures for the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan), Revision of the Ship Inspection Operations Act, Enactment of the International Peace Support Act</li> <li>* Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Act, revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law (Rescue of measures for Japanese nationals overseas)</li> </ul>
3. Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Government understands that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people's right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan's survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government's view to date.</li> <li>The aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution could have, under international law, a basis on the right of collective self-defense. Although this “use of force” includes that which is triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, it is permitted under the Constitution only when it is taken as a measure for self-defense which is inevitable for ensuring Japan's survival and protecting its people, in other words for defending Japan.</li> <li>The Government will stipulate in the draft legislation that the prior approval of the Diet is in principle required upon issuing orders for operations to the SDF for carrying out “use of force” permitted under the Constitution when an armed attack occurs not against Japan but against a foreign country, in the same manner as the procedures related to defense operations stipulated in the current laws and regulations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Revision of Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations, revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law (The provision concerning defense operations) etc.</li> </ul>

Notes: 1. As for Japan's support activities, however, legal frameworks limiting the area of such activities to “rear area” or so-called “non-combat area,” etc., have been established in past legislations to ensure that the issue of “integration with the use of force” (forming an “integral part” of the use of force) does not arise, in relation to Article 9 of the Constitution. This is intended to avoid Japan from being legally evaluated as carrying out by itself the “use of force” which is not permitted under the Constitution because its support activities would form an “integral part” of the use of force (“integration with the use of force”) by other countries.

2. Use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to the aid of geographically distant units or personnel under attack) or “use of weapons for the purpose of the execution of missions” could constitute the “use of force” prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution if such use of weapons is directed against “a state or a quasi-state organization.”

## Reference 15 Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions
Defense operation (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 76)	<p>(1) When there is a situation in which armed attack against Japan from outside occur or when it is considered that there is an imminent and clear danger of armed attack, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against these attacks.</p> <p>(2) When there is a situation in which an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, which in turn poses an imminent and clear danger of Japan's survival to be threatened and fundamentally overturns people's right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against such a situation.</p>	<p>(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister</p> <p>(2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required in principle)</p> <p>(3) Cabinet decision: required</p>	<p>○ Use of force (only if the case fulfils 3 conditions for exercising the right of self- defense)</p> <p>○ Maintenance of public order (same asfor public security operation)<sup>1</sup></p> <p>○ Others (including control over the Japan Coast Guard, emergency passage, appropriation of supplies, marine transportation restriction, treatment of prisoners, civil protection, etc.)<sup>1</sup></p>
Establishment of defense facilities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-2)	When there are areas in which the deployment of SDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensified and the order for defense operations (only for armed attack situations) is likely to be issued	<p>(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense</p> <p>(2) Consent of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan)<sup>1</sup></p> <p>(3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister)</p>	<p>○ Establishment of positions and defense facilities in the intended deployment area</p> <p>○ Use of weapons to protect one's own lifeor body or other personnel on duty</p>

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions
Measures to be taken before a defense operation order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-3 and U.S. and Others' Military Actions Related Measures Act)	When a defense operation order is expected under a tense situation	(1) Authorized by Minister of Defense or person delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; Minister of Defense for services (2) Consent of the Diet: not required for supplies; required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) for services? (3) Cabinet decision: not required for supplies; required (approval of the Prime Minister) for services	○ Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on U.S. and others' Military Actions Related Measures Act ○ Provision of services as a related measure ○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Civil protection dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-4)	When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: request of prefectural governors or Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief (Prime Minister)	○ Measures concerning guidance of fleeing residents, emergent pursuant to the provision of the Civil Protection Law ○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law weapons (Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.) ○ Use of weapons
Public security operation by order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 78)	When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the law enforcement force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergencies	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (to be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order's issuance) (3) Cabinet decision: required	○ Application of the Police Duties Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ○ Use of weapons ○ Control over the Japan Coast Guard
Information gathering before public security operation order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 79-2)	When situations have intensified and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifles, machine guns, or other weapons are expected; and there is a special need to gather information	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: consultation between the Minister of Defense and the National Public Safety Commission	○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life and body or other personnel on duty
Public security operation by request (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 81)	When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (4) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission	○ Application of the Police Duties Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ○ Use of weapons
Guarding operation (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 81-2)	When special measures are deemed necessary to prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (4) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense consults with the National Public Safety Commission after hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural governor	○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation; measures such as evacuation, etc.; entry (all only when police officers are not present); crime prevention and control) ○ Use of weapons
Maritime security operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82)	When special measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister; when the response is for a submerged submarine, approval of the Prime Minister is not subject to Cabinet decision)	○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ○ Use of weapons
Counter-piracy operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82-2 and Anti-Piracy Law)	When special measures are deemed necessary to combat acts of piracy	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (to be reported to the Diet when the Prime Minister has approved the counterpiracy operation or when a mission has been completed) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense submits the response procedures to the Prime Minister	○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ○ Use of weapons
Destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc. (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82-3)	When it is anticipated that ballistic missiles are flying toward Japan and the measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and properties in Japan's territory from the damage caused by the missiles	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (after-the fact report required) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: for an urgent case, the order can be made in advance according to the emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister	○ Use of weapons
Disaster relief dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 83)	When judged necessary in order to protect lives and property in the event of natural calamities or other disasters <sup>4</sup>	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (4) Additional requirements: request of prefectural governors or other parties designated by Government ordinance (excluding particularly urgent situations when it is deemed there is no time to wait for a request to be made)	○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (Refuge, entry, etc.) (all only when police officers are not present) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (request for cooperation) ○ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (Designation of alert zones, guarantee of passage for emergency vehicles, etc.; only when no municipal mayor or police officer is present)
Earthquake disaster relief dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 83-2)	When the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of emergency measures to deal with earthquakes and other disasters (Article 13-2 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters is established by Cabinet decision) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)
Nuclear disaster relief dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 83-3)	When the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of measures to deal with emergency situations (Article 20-4 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters is established by Cabinet decision) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ Same as in disaster relief dispatch



Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions
Action against violation of territorial airspace (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84)	When a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan's territorial airspace in violation of international law and/or the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required	○ The action necessary to make intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, use of weapons, etc.) <sup>5)</sup>
Elimination of mines and other dangerous objects (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-2)		(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required	○ Elimination and disposition of mines and other dangerous explosive objects found on the sea
Rescue of Japanese nationals overseas (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-3)	Emergency situations overseas	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to conduct rescue measures such as guarding and rescue of Japanese nationals who are at risk for harm to their life or body	○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty, and to execute duties
Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4)	Natural disasters, unrest, and other emergency situations overseas	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: as necessary (4) Additional requirements: request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to evacuate Japanese nationals whose lives and bodies are threatened	○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Logistics support and other activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security, and Ship Inspection Operations Act)	Situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or person who is a delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; Minister of Defense for services, search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior to taking measures in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister to implement response measures, for the draft basic plan and for the prescribed implementation guidelines pursuant to the basic plan)	○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Logistics support and other activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5, International Peace Support Act, and Ship Inspection Operations Act)	Situations where the peace and security of the international community is threatened, where the international community is collectively addressing the situation to remove the threat in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations Charter, and where Japan needs to make independent and proactive contributions to these activities as a member of the international community	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or person who is a delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; Minister of Defense for services, search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required with no exception) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister to implement response measures, for the draft basic plan and for the prescribed implementation guidelines pursuant to the basic plan) ○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty	○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
International disaster relief activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5 and International Disaster Relief Law)	In the case that a large scale disaster has happened or is about to happen overseas, especially in developing countries/areas	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (4) Additional requirements: request of the government of the disaster-stricken country to dispatch international disaster relief teams, and consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs	
International peace cooperation activities (Primary operations of peacekeeping force and "safety-ensuring" operations) (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5 and International Peace Cooperation Act)	United Nations peacekeeping operations and internationally coordinated operations for peace and security (so-called primary operations and "safety-ensuring" operations of peacekeeping activities)	(1) Authorized by: Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister) (SDF personnel dispatched individually) Minister of Defense (SDF personnel dispatched as a unit) (2) Consent of the Diet: required (only if the operations are conducted by SDF units, etc.; prior consent required in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required (for implementation of international peace cooperation operations and the draft implementation plan) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty ○ Use of weapons to execute duties (when conducting so-called "safety-ensuring" operations)
International peace cooperation activities (Operations other than primary operations of peacekeeping force) (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5 and International Peace Cooperation Act)	United Nations peacekeeping operations, internationally coordinated operations for peace and security, and international humanitarian assistance (operations other than the so-called primary operations and "safety-ensuring" operations of peacekeeping activities)	(1) Authorized by: Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister) (SDF personnel dispatched individually) Minister of Defense (SDF personnel dispatched as a unit) (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (for implementation of international peace cooperation operations and the draft implementation plan) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty ○ Use of weapons for so-called "kaketsuke- keigo"

(All authority referred to in the table is prescribed by applicable law)

Notes: 1. Measures based on an assumption of direct armed attacks against Japan and physical damage are not applicable to the situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan's survival.

2. If the Prime Minister gives approval to services in connection with defense facility construction, as well as U.S. military actions before a defense operations order is issued, such approval is specified in the Basic Response Plan and presented to the Diet for consent (Article 9, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack).

3. Full title: Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials. The law shall apply mutatis mutandis only when police officers are not present.

4. Moreover, SDF unit commanders are authorized to dispatch units, should a fire or other disaster occur in or near the Defense Ministry's facilities.

5. The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under "necessary actions."

**Reference 16 Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units**

Type of Operation	Provision	Content
Defense operation	Article 88, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF and units under defense operations may take necessary military action to defend Japan.
	Article 92 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, Article 90 (1) of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law apply mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties to maintain public order by SDF personnel under defense operations.
Establishment of defense facilities	Article 92-4, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming existing danger other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Civil protection dispatch	Article 92-3 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to SDF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including assistant coast guard officers, are not present.
Public security operation	Article 89 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
	Article 90 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other than the use of weapons.
	Article 91 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows stopping the progression of the vessel that meet certain conditions, applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
Information-gathering duties before public security operation order	Article 92-5, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons within the limit judged to be reasonably necessary depending on situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Guarding operation	Article 91-2 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under guarding operations.
	Article 91-2 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons in execution of their duties to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.
Maritime security operation	Article 93 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
	Article 93 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows stopping the progression of the vessel that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
Counter-piracy operations	Article 8 (2), Anti-Piracy Law	Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under counter-piracy operations. If any party perpetrating acts of piracy, including approaching excessively close to a ship or trailing around a ship, continues their acts despite the counter-piracy measures of the other party, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of the ship in question, the use of weapons is permitted to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.
Destruction measures against ballistic missiles	Article 93-3, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles flying headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.
Action against violation of territorial airspace	Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law	The use of force that falls under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code is allowed as part of necessary actions to make aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan. <sup>1</sup>
Rescue of Japanese nationals overseas	Article 94-5, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in duties related to rescue measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations when: (1) there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of Japanese nationals and others, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties stated above; (2) there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas	Article 94-6, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in evacuation of Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in the evacuation, or of Japanese nationals to be evacuated under the management of SDF personnel or of those granted permission to ride the same means of transport. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 11, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security - Logistics support activities, etc.		SDF personnel ordered to provide services as logistics support activities or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which were established within foreign territories and where SDF units and SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as the U.S. Forces personnel, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the SDF units and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 6, Ship Inspection Operations Law - Ship inspection operations		SDF personnel ordered to provide services, etc., as rear area support or to implement rear area search and rescue activities may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 25 and 26, International Peace Cooperation Act - International peace cooperation operations		SDF personnel engaged in duties in international peace cooperation operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, of International Peace Cooperation Corps, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as personnel of foreign armed forces' units, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps; (3) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called "safety-ensuring" operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives, bodies or assets, or those of other individuals, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties, in addition to (1) and (2) above; (4) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called "kaketsuke-keigo (coming to protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent request)" operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, or those of other individuals involved in the operations whom they intend to protect, in addition to (1) and (2) above. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

Type of Operation	Provision	Content
Protection of SDF weapons and other equipment	Article 95, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in duties of protecting weapons, etc. of the SDF may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary in the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to person, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Protection of weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Armed Forces and armed forces of other foreign countries	Article 95-2, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in duties of protecting weapons, etc. of the U.S. Forces and other foreign armed forces, which are actually engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in cooperation with the SDF (including joint exercises and training, and excluding the activities carried out in the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted), may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situations when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Guarding facilities	Article 95-3, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel that meet certain conditions, engaged in duties of guarding the SDF facilities of the SDF in Japan may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary in the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to execute their duties or to protect themselves or others. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Maintenance of internal order	Article 96 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel exclusively engaged in maintaining order within the SDF.
Article 12, The U.S. and others' Military Actions Related Measures Act		SDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies of themselves, those of other SDF personnel who are with them, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 37, Maritime Transportation Restriction Act		Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to MSDF personnel ordered to execute the measures in line with the Marine Transportation Restriction Law. If the crew of the vessel does not obey repeated orders to halt, persistently resists or tries to escape and when there is a considerable reason to believe that there are no other means to halt the vessel, said personnel may use their weapons within an extent that is judged to be reasonably necessary, following the orders of the Captain, etc.
Article 152, Prisoners of War Act		SDF personnel ordered into defense operations and engaged in imprisonment and SDF personnel engaged in guarding prisoners may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 11, International Peace Support Act		SDF personnel ordered to provide services as cooperation and support operations or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which were established within foreign territories and where SDF units and SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as those of foreign armed forces, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the SDF units and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

Notes: The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under "necessary actions."

## Reference 17 MOD's final statement regarding the incident of an ROK naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at an MSDF patrol aircraft (Provisional Translation)

### Introduction

The Ministry of Defense (MOD) has made endeavors in the past for close communication to take place between the defense authorities of Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), and in this spirit, regarding the current issue concerning the fire-control radar irradiation by an ROK destroyer, a series of consultations have been held between Japan and the ROK. However, it is extremely regrettable that even today, the difference between the respective understandings regarding major issues, including whether or not there was an irradiation of fire-control radar, is not yet resolved.

The MOD takes this incident seriously, and in light of firmly seeking for prevention of recurrence, has decided to summarize and make publicly available the objective facts that are possessed by the Japanese side.

We hope that this announcement will lead to the prevention of similar incidents in the future.

### 1. Regarding the fire-control radar irradiation

Because Japan is surrounded by wide sea space, in order to respond to a variety of contingencies in a timely and appropriate manner, and to assure the protection of the lives and property of the people as well as territorial land, water and airspace, during peacetime, the MOD is engaged in persistent intelligence collection and warning and surveillance of foreign vessels conducting activities in Japan's surrounding waters.

As shown in the footage released by the MOD on December 28, 2018, on December 20, around 3PM, an MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft was flying within Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Sea of Japan as part of ordinary intelligence collection and warning and surveillance activities when it observed an ROK destroyer and an ROK patrol and rescue vessel. While photographing the said vessels, the P-1 was suddenly irradiated by a fire-control radar from the ROK destroyer. The MSDF P-1 immediately took actions to ensure safety.

Fire-control radars are directed at its target immediately before firing, and to aim it at foreign aircrafts without a rational reason is an extremely hazardous act that may cause unintended consequences.

According to CUES (Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea), a code adopted in 2014 by navies from 21 countries including Japan and the ROK, aiming fire control radars is considered a simulation of attack, and is stipulated as an action a commander might avoid.

In response to the occurrence of a serious incident of such nature, the MOD lodged a strong protest and requested the prevention of recurrence to the ROK. However, not only did the ROK deny the fact this incident occurred, their actions regarding the incident entirely focus on demanding Japan to "stop distorting facts" and "apologize for conducting a threateningly low-altitude flight".

Upon careful and meticulous analysis by the MOD's specialized unit of the frequency, intensity, waveform, etc. of the radar waves directed at the MSDF P-1, the MOD has confirmed that the P-1 was continuously irradiated for a certain period, multiple times by the fire-control radar (STIR-180) of the ROK destroyer that was being photographed. The STIR-180 was not mounted on the patrol and rescue vessel that was nearby at the time, and the fact the ROK destroyer directed its radar is clear from the footage released by the MOD on December 28, 2018.

The MOD has decided publicly disclose at the Ministry's website, upon processing for information security, the data of the radar waves converted to sound that the P-1 patrol aircraft crew heard inflight, as further evidence of the irradiation of the fire-control radar.

In general, fire-control radars continuously direct radar waves to its target in order to obtain the target's location, speed etc. to fire missiles and ammunition with precision. The data collected from the fire-control radar, such as wave forms, is clearly different from that of a surface search radar, which searches/detects targets in surrounding areas by emitting radar waves while rotating its head. Therefore, by analyzing the emitted radio waves, it is possible to determine its type and source of emission. The radio waves directed at the MSDF P-1 had shown characteristics unique to that of fire-control radars.

Although it is apparent from the result of MOD's analysis that this radar wave was emitted by the ROK destroyer being photographed by the MSDF P-1, for the objective and neutral determination of these facts, it is necessary that a comprehensive assessment is made upon comparison of Japan's data regarding the radar waves it has detected, and the ROK's data regarding the detected capability of the fire-control radar equipped on the ROK destroyer, based on the principle of reciprocity.

In this light, at the working-level meeting held on January 14, 2019, the MOD proposed a joint verification of data based on the principle of reciprocity, by comparing the factual evidence of the incident such as the detected radar waves and its sound conversion, to the ROK radar's capabilities and record of use. However, this proposal was rejected. The MOD had made a proposal of the same intent during the working-level meeting held on December 27,

2018. In addition, the MOD also brought the data of the sound conversion of the detected radar waves, as evidence to contribute to the verification of facts, to the meeting on January 14 and proposed to have the ROK listen to it there, but this proposal was also rejected.

On the following day, January 15, the spokesperson of the ROK's Ministry of National Defense denounced the MOD's proposals as "extremely rude", an expression that is diplomatically rare, and, in violation of the agreement made between Japan and the ROK ahead of the meeting, one-sidedly disclosed information contrary to facts regarding the content of the meeting. These comments by the ROK spokesperson undermine the relationship of mutual trust and hinder the candid exchange of views. It is extremely regrettable that such actions were taken, and on the 16th, the MOD firmly requested that such actions never recur. However, the ROK has failed to provide a sincere response.

Taking into account the series of actions by the ROK and the fact that the ROK's claims have lacked both consistency and credibility, there is no choice but to conclude that the ROK has been repeating claims that by all means differ from truth.

In such a situation, an objective and neutral determination of facts based on the principle of reciprocity must be deemed difficult, and it is unlikely that the truth will ever be made clear even if working-level meetings were to continue to be held. The MOD once again strongly protests against the ROK destroyer's fire-control radar irradiation, and strongly urges the ROK to accept that this incident occurred and conduct thorough measures to prevent the recurrence of such event.

## 2. Regarding other claims made by the ROK

### (1) Regarding the flight by the MSDF P-1

The ROK claims that the MSDF P-1 conducted "a threateningly low-altitude flight" in the vicinity of a ROK destroyer conducting a "humanitarian rescue mission", and is demanding an apology.

There is no international law that directly regulates the minimum safety altitude for military aircrafts, but in order to ensure safety, the MSDF operates under Japan's domestic law that conforms to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, and did not conduct any flight that may threaten the ROK destroyer. It is our understanding that normal operations by the U.S. Forces and NATO are carried out under similar standards.

In fact, as apparent from the footage released by the MOD on December 28 and the MSDF P-1's track chart, the MSDF P-1 maintained a sufficiently safe altitude (approx. 150m) and distance (approx. 500m) from the ROK destroyer even at its closest, and did not conduct flight that may interrupt the ROK destroyer's activities. In addition, because the ROK destroyer did not respond to the P-1's call outs by radio communication, the MSDF P-1 was unable to recognize that the ROK was conducting rescue activities.

No evidence to support the ROK's claim can be found in the ten-second footage released by the ROK of what seems to be the MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft filmed from the ROK patrol and rescue vessel, and no other objective evidence to support the ROK's claim that the MSDF P-1 conducted "a threateningly low-altitude flight" has been presented.

Even prior to this incident, the MSDF has conducted similar flights and has photographed vessels when observing not only Korean but other foreign vessels during its intelligence collection and warning and surveillance activities. Since April 2018, the MSDF has photographed the exact same ROK destroyer "Gwanggaeto-daewang" destroyer three times (April 27, April 28 and August 23), but the ROK did not express its concern regarding these flights.

The MOD had requested additional objective evidence to support the ROK's claim at the working-level meetings, but the ROK has failed to provide such evidence, and has repeatedly responded with claims that entirely lack in objectivity, such as "if the subject of the threat feels threatened, it is then a threat".

For these reasons, the MOD has concluded that the ROK's claim lacks both persuasiveness and support from factual evidence, and was made to dilute other important issues regarding the fire-control radar incident.

### (2) Regarding communication conditions

In general, naval vessel crew will call out by radio communication when feeling threat, but the ROK destroyer, despite seeing the MSDF P-1 aircraft's flight as a problem, had not taken measures by any means to call out to the P-1 about its concern.

In addition, after being irradiated by the fire-control radar, the MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft had called out using three frequencies in international VHF (156.8MHz) and emergency frequencies (121.5MHz and 243MHz), but there was no response at all from the ROK destroyer.

Regarding this issue, the ROK has explained that the destroyer did not respond because the communication condition on site was poor,

and they were unable to catch most of the call outs from the aircraft and thought they heard the phrase "KOREA COAST". In addition, the ROK also explained that the communication equipment on board was not tuned to be able to hear one of the three frequencies.

However, the weather conditions on site that day was sunny with very few clouds, and communication conditions were extremely good. In addition, the MSDF P-1 used the same radio communication equipment (it has been confirmed that this equipment was operating normally before, during, and after flight) used to call out to the ROK destroyer to communicate with on-land stations in Saitama Prefecture, and it has also been confirmed that an ASDF training aircraft flying at a location approximately 240 km away from the P-1 heard the call out made by the P-1 to the ROK destroyer.

It is improbable under normal circumstances that radio communication could not be clearly received in such good communication conditions, and in the footage released by the ROK, the call out from the P-1 to the ROK destroyer can be clearly heard ("KOREAN SOUTH NAVAL SHIP, HULL NUMBER 971, THIS IS JAPAN NAVY.") Considering this point, at the working-level meeting on January 14, the ROK explained for the first time that, upon repeated inspection of the call out from the MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft, it was later found that the communication personnel had misheard the radio communication. Prior to this, the ROK had never disclosed this information in its press conferences and had only explained that the destroyer did not respond because they heard "KOREA COAST".

The MOD strongly calls for the ROK to take measures to improve communication between Japan-ROK defense authorities on site, such as conducting appropriate communication to JSDF aircrafts, improving conditions of communication reception, and conducting education/training to communication personnel, so that such incidents never recur.

## 3. Path forward

For the above reasons, the MOD once again strongly protests against the ROK destroyer's fire-control radar irradiation, and strongly urges the ROK to accept that this incident occurred and conduct thorough measures to prevent its recurrence.

At the same time, given that the ROK refuses to conduct an objective and neutral determination of facts based on the principle of reciprocity, and thus it is unlikely that the truth will ever be made clear even if working-level meetings were to continue, the MOD deems that it has become difficult to continue to hold consultations with the ROK regarding this matter.

That being said, our stance remains unchanged in that the Japan-ROK and Japan-ROK-U.S defense cooperation is extremely important, and is indispensable in confronting security challenges such as the nuclear and missile issue in North Korea and maintaining the stability of the security environment in East Asia. We hope that this announcement will lead to the prevention of similar incidents in the future, and we will continue to make sincere efforts towards continuous Japan-ROK and Japan-ROK-U.S defense cooperation.



**Reference 18 History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan**

1993	May 29: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that fell into the Sea of Japan
1995	Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense
1998	August 31: North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the commencement of the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) for parts of the sea-based upper-tier system
1999	Started the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles
2002	Decision by the United States on the initial deployment of BMD
2003	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started
2005	Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law (ballistic missile destruction measures) The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptors for BMD
2006	July 5: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, six of which fell into the Sea of Japan while the other exploded immediately after the launch
2007	The deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units started SM-3 launch tests by Aegis destroyers started
2009	March 27: First shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued April 5: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a "satellite," which flew over the Tohoku region and passed through to the Pacific Ocean July 4: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, which fell into the Sea of Japan
2012	March 30: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued April 13: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a "satellite," which flew a minute or longer, then separated into several parts and fell into the Yellow Sea December 7: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued December 12: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a "satellite," which flew over Okinawa Prefecture and passed through to the Pacific Ocean
2014	North Korea launched ballistic missiles in March, June, and July March 3: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan March 26: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 600 km and fell into the Sea of Japan June 29: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan July 9: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan July 13: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan July 26: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
2015	March 2: Two missiles were launched and flew approx. 500 km before landing in the Sea of Japan
2016	North Korea launched over 20 ballistic missiles including those claimed to be "satellites" in a single year February 3: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued February 7: Launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a "satellite," which flew over Okinawa Prefecture and passed through to the Pacific Ocean March 10: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan March 18: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 800 km and fell into the Sea of Japan April 15: Launched a ballistic missile April 23: Launched a ballistic missile April 28: Launched two ballistic missiles May 31: Launched a ballistic missile June 22: Launched two ballistic missiles, the first of which flew approximately 100 km and fell near the east coast of North Korea The second flew approximately 400 km and fell into the Sea of Japan July 9: Launched a ballistic missile July 19: Launched three ballistic missiles, the first of which flew approximately 400 km and fell into the Sea of Japan; the second failed to fly on and did not fall into the Sea of Japan, the details being unclear; and the third flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan August 3: Launched two ballistic missiles, one of which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan while the other exploded immediately after the launch August 24: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan September 5: Launched three ballistic missiles, all of which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan October 15: Launched a ballistic missile October 20: Launched a ballistic missile December 22: At the Nine Ministers' Meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), it was decided that the ballistic missile defense enhanced-capability interceptor missile (SM-3 block IIA) would progress to the joint production and deployment stage
2017	North Korea launched more than 10 ballistic missiles beginning in February February 4: Conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA at the sea February 12: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan March 6: Launched four ballistic missiles, which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell into the Sea of Japan (three in the Japanese EEZ) April 5: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 60 km and fell into the Sea of Japan April 16: Launched a ballistic missile that exploded immediately after launch April 29: Launched a ballistic missile, which fell inland approximately 50 km from the launch site May 14: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 800 km and fell into the Sea of Japan May 21: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan May 29: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 400 km and fell into the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan June 22: Conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA at the sea July 4: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 900 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan. July 28: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan. August 29: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew for approximately 2,700 km over Japan and fell in the Pacific. September 15: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 3,700 km over Japan and fell in the Pacific. November 29: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew for approximately 1,000 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan. December 19: NSC and the cabinet meeting approved introducing two units of Aegis Ashore systems.
2018	January 31: The U.S. conducted a test shot of the SM-3 block IIA June 1: The MOD announced candidate sites for the deployment of two units of Aegis Ashore (GSDF Araya Maneuver Area in Akita Prefecture and Mutsumi Maneuver Area in Yamaguchi Prefecture). July 30: The MOD selected the components of Aegis Ashore (LMSSR). October 26: The United States conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA in waters. October 29: The MOD started surveys concerning the deployment of Aegis Ashore. December 11: The United States conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA.
2019	May 4: North Korea launched ballistic missiles. May 9: North Korea launched ballistic missiles. May 27 and 28: The MOD explained results of surveys concerning the deployment of Aegis Ashore and results of study by the MOD to the governors of Akita and Yamaguchi Prefectures. July 25: North Korea launched ballistic missiles. August 6: North Korea launched ballistic missiles.

## Reference 19 Participation of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF in Civil Protection Joint Training Exercises with Central and Local Government Bodies (2018)

Types of Exercise	Training content (estimated)	Date	Location (cumulative times)
Field exercise	Terrorism using explosives	January 11, 2019	Aichi Prefecture (5 times)
Simulation exercise	Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident	November 20, 2018	Shizuoka Prefecture (5 times)
	Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents	February 1, 2019	Kumamoto Prefecture (4 times)
Simulation and Field exercise	Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents	February 17, 2019	Hyogo Prefecture (4 times)
	Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents	January 24-25, 2019	Okinawa Prefecture (4 times)
Field exercise	Terrorism using explosives	September 26, 2018	Oita Prefecture (5 times)
	Terrorism using chemical agents, and a barricade incident	October 31, 2018	Toyama Prefecture (9 times)
	Terrorism using chemical agents	November 20, 2018	Tokyo (7 times)
	Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents	November 21, 2018	Osaka Prefecture (4 times)
	Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents	January 15, 2019	Iwate Prefecture (6 times)
	Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident	January 31, 2019	Miyazaki Prefecture (6 times)
	Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents	February 5, 2019	Osaka Prefecture (5 times)
	Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident	February 24, 2019	Tokushima Prefecture (11 times)
	Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents	March 9, 2019	Kanagawa Prefecture (6 times)
	Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents, and a barricade incident	September 6, 2018	Oita Prefecture (6 times)
Simulation exercise	Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident	November 15, 2018	Yamagata Prefecture (7 times)
	Terrorism using explosives	November 30, 2018	Fukuoka Prefecture (6 times)
	Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident	December 19, 2018	Ibaraki Prefecture (5 times)

Types of Exercise	Training content (estimated)	Date	Location (cumulative times)
Simulation exercise	Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents, and a barricade incident	December 26, 2018	Kagoshima Prefecture (4 times)
	Terrorism using chemical agents, and a barricade incident	January 9, 2018	Fukui Prefecture (13 times)
	Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident	January 22, 2019	Mie Prefecture (5 times)
	Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident	January 24, 2019	Niigata Prefecture (4 times)
	Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents	January 25, 2019	Okinawa Prefecture (4 times)
	Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents	January 30, 2019	Shiga Prefecture (5 times)
	Terrorism using explosives	February 8, 2019	Fukushima Prefecture (4 times)
	Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents, and a barricade incident	February 13, 2019	Ishikawa Prefecture (2 times)

Notes: Implemented in 15 Prefectures in FY2007.  
 Implemented in 18 Prefectures in FY2008.  
 Implemented in 14 Prefectures in FY2009.  
 Implemented in 10 Prefectures in FY2010.  
 Implemented in 12 Prefectures in FY2011.  
 Implemented in 11 Prefectures in FY2012.  
 Implemented in 12 Prefectures in FY2013.  
 Implemented in 13 Prefectures in FY2014.  
 Implemented in 15 Prefectures in FY2015.  
 Implemented in 22 Prefectures in FY2016.  
 Implemented in 28 Prefectures in FY2017.

## Reference 20 Efforts in Recent Years by the Ministry of Defense on Cybersecurity

2012	April:	Agreed in a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting to start a comprehensive dialogue on cybersecurity in order to strengthen the engagement of the governments as a whole
	June:	Cyber Incident Mobile Assistance Team (CYMAT) established in the National Information Security Center (NISC)
	September:	"Towards the Stable and Effective Utilization of Cyberspace by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces" formulated
2013	May:	The First Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue was held in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting.
	July:	The MOD and defense industry members deeply interested in cybersecurity established the Cyber Defense Council (CDC)
	August:	Agreed at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers' Meeting to consider a new framework for cooperation between the defense authorities from the perspective of further promoting Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in the cybersecurity area
	October:	Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) established between the Japanese and U.S. defense authorities
2014	March:	Cyber Defense Group newly formed under the Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command
	November:	The Basic Act on Cybersecurity enacted
2015	January:	Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters established under the Cabinet
	January:	National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) established in the Cabinet Secretariat
	May:	Joint statement issued by the CDPWG
	September:	Cybersecurity Strategy established by Cabinet Decision
2016	April:	The MOD established Deputy Director-General for Cybersecurity and Information Technology
2018	January:	Japan was approved to join the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence located in Estonia.
	July:	Cybersecurity Strategy established by Cabinet Decision
	December:	Cyber Security Basic Act revised
2019	March:	Dispatch MOD personnel to NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Estonia
	April:	Cybersecurity Council established
	April:	Shared the view at the Japan-U.S. "2+2" Meeting on enhancing cooperation on cyber issues, and affirmed that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

## Reference 21 Record of Disaster Relief (Past Five Years)

FY	2014	2015	2016	Kumamoto Earthquake* (2016)	2017	Northern Kyushu torrential rains* (2017)	2018	2018 July Heavy Rain* (2018)	2018 Hokkaido Eastern Ibari Earthquake* (2018)
Number of Dispatches	521	541	515	—	501	—	430	12	1
Personnel	66,267	30,035	33,123	Approx. 814,200	23,838	Approx. 81,950	22,665	Approx. 957,000	Approx. 211,000
Vehicles	9,621	5,170	5,824	—	3,340	Approx. 7,140	3,090	Approx. 49,500	Approx. 17,800
Aircraft	1,232	888	725	2,618	792	169	644	340	230
Vessels	0	2	11	300	39	0	11	150	20

\* Kumamoto Earthquake, Northern Kyushu torrential rains, 2018 July Heavy Rain and 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Ibari Earthquake are excluded from the record of each fiscal year.

(Washington, DC, May 1, 2006)

**Overview**

On October 29, 2005, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, “U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” In that document, the SCC members directed their respective staffs “to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006.” This work has been completed and is reflected in this document.

**Finalization of Realignment Initiatives**

The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan.

The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will finance their realignment associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities.

**Key Implementation Details****1. Realignment on Okinawa****(a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)**

- The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a “V”-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.
- In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.
- Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.
- Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.
- Facility improvements for contingency use at ASDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary, after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.
- Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.
- In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill.
- The USG does not intend to operate fighter aircraft from this facility.

**(b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam**

- Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters.
- The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makimino Service Area.
- The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.
- Of the estimated \$10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide \$6.09 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including \$2.8 billion in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam estimated in U.S. FY2008 dollars at \$3.18 billion in fiscal spending plus approximately \$1 billion for a road.

**(c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities**

- Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma,

and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.

- Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March 2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six candidate facilities will be examined:
  - Camp Kuwae: Total return.
  - Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.
  - MCAS Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above).
  - Makimino Service Area: Total return.
  - aha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging constructed at Urasoe).
  - Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1: Total return.
- All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will occur before the return of designated facilities.
- While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be reevaluated.
- Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. Shared use that requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006.
- ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities.

**(d) Relationships among Initiatives**

- Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected.
- Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.
- The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan’s financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.

**2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability**

- U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed by U.S. FY2008. The headquarters of the GSDF Central Readiness Force subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan FY2012; SDF helicopters will have access to Kastner Heliport on Camp Zama.
- Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.
- In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented.
  - Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and underground rail (approximately 2ha). Affected housing units will be relocated to Sagami-hara Housing Area.
  - A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD (approximately 35ha) will be provided for local use when not required for contingency or training purposes.
  - Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1ha) will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate.

**3. Yokota Air Base and Airspace**

- ASDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base in Japan FY2010. A bilateral master plan for base use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements.
- A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of shared use equipment and systems.
- The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements.
  - Establish a program in Japan FY2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.
  - Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008; specific portions will be identified by October 2006.
  - Develop procedures in Japan FY2006 for temporary transfers of air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.
  - Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control



procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military (U.S. and Japanese) demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be completed in Japan FY2009.

- The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from commencement.
    - The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.
    - Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian-military dual-use.
4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni
- The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.
  - Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to accommodate MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni, taking into account the continued requirement for U.S. operations from Atsugi.
  - The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities. The aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-130 aircraft, necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya.
  - U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam.
  - Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulfill safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces, Japan SDF, and commercial aircraft (including those in neighboring airspace) through coordination by the Joint Committee.
  - A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent fieldcarrier landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter.
  - Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.
5. Missile Defense
- As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will continue.
  - The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as ASDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006.
  - The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ.
  - U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time.
6. Training Relocation
- Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan FY2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan FY2006 can be developed.
  - Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities—Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni—will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future.
  - The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.
  - Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training requirements.
  - In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1–5 aircraft for the duration of 1–7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6–12 aircraft for 8–14 days at a time.
  - At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained.
  - The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness.  
(Attached conceptual diagram omitted)

## Reference 23 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee

(April 27, 2012)

### Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (Outline)

#### Preamble

- (1) The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee decided to adjust the plans outlined in the May 2006 Realignment Roadmap.
- (2) The Ministers decided to delink both the relocation of the Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility.
- (3) The Ministers affirmed that the new posture of the U.S. Marine Corps, coupled with the enhancement of Japan's defense posture and promotion of bilateral dynamic defense cooperation, would strengthen the deterrence capabilities of the overall U.S.-Japan Alliance.

#### I. Unit Composition in Guam and Okinawa

- (1) The United States will locate Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) in Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii and establish rotational deployment in Australia.
- (2) Approximately 9,000 Marines will be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan.
- (3) The end-state for the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa will be consistent with the levels in the Realignment Roadmap.
- (4) There will be approximately 5,000 Marines in Guam.
- (5) The preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation of Marines to Guam is \$8.6 billion. Japan's financial commitment will be the fiscal spending in the 2009 Guam International Agreement (up to \$2.8 billion in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars). Other forms of financial support (investment or loan) will not be utilized.  
Any contributions under the cooperation in 2. (2) below will be a part of the aforementioned commitment.

#### II. New Initiatives to Promote Regional Peace, Stability, and Prosperity

- (1) The Ministers confirmed the importance of promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The government of Japan will take various measures, including strategic use of ODA (ex: providing coastal states with patrol boats).
- (2) The two governments will consider cooperation for developing training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for shared-use by the two countries, and will identify areas of cooperation by the end of 2012.

#### III. Land Returns in Okinawa

- (1)(i) Areas eligible for immediate return upon completion of procedures: Portions of Camp Zukeran (West Futenma Housing area and a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound), portions of Makiminato Service Area (north access road, area near Gate 5)
- (ii) Areas eligible for return following relocation within Okinawa: Portions of Makiminato Service Area (including the preponderance of the storage area), portions of Camp Zukeran (Industrial Corridor, etc.), Camp Kuwae, Naha Port, Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1
- (iii) Areas eligible for return following Marine Corps' relocation to locations outside of Japan: Portions of Camp Zukeran, the remainder of Makiminato Service Area
- (2) The two countries will jointly develop a consolidation plan for facilities and areas remaining in Okinawa by the end of 2012.

#### IV. Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and MCAS Futenma

- (1) The Ministers reconfirmed that the existing relocation proposal is the only viable solution.
- (2) The two countries will contribute mutually to refurbishment projects necessary to safely operate MCAS Futenma until the FRF is fully operational and to protect the environment.

(END)

For the full text of the Joint Statement, see the MOD website. (<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/kyougi/js20120427.html>)

## Reference 24 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

(April 27, 2015)

### I. Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines

In order to ensure Japan's peace and security under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize:

- seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses;
- synergy across the two governments' national security policies;
- a whole-of-government Alliance approach;
- cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and
- the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.



The two governments will continuously enhance the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Each government will maintain its individual defense posture based on its national security policy. Japan will possess defense capability on the basis of the “National Security Strategy” and the “National Defense Program Guidelines.” The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combat-ready forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly.

The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“the Guidelines”) provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination, with a view to improving the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation. In this way, the Guidelines advance peace and security, deter conflict, secure the basis for economic prosperity, and promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

## II. Basic Premises and Principles

The Guidelines, as well as actions and activities under the Guidelines, are and will be consistent with the following basic premises and principles.

- A. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, will remain unchanged.
- B. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and its provisions regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality of States, as well as other relevant international agreements.
- C. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws, and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.
- D. The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specific policies and measures.

## III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies.

The two governments must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral security and defense cooperation. To that end, the two governments will take advantage of all available channels to enhance information sharing and to ensure seamless and effective whole-of-government Alliance coordination that includes all relevant agencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning.

### A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism

Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on the peace and security of Japan and the United States. In order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism. This mechanism will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also will contribute to timely information sharing as well as the development and maintenance of common situational awareness. To ensure effective coordination, the two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises.

The two governments will tailor to the situation the procedures for coordination as well as the exact composition of participating agencies within the Alliance Coordination Mechanism structure. As part of these procedures, contact information will be shared and maintained from peacetime.

### B. Enhanced Operational Coordination

Enhanced bilateral operational coordination for flexible and responsive command and control is a core capability of critical importance to Japan and the United States. In this context, the two governments recognize the continued importance of collocating operational coordination functions to strengthen cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces

will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination from peacetime to contingencies, and to support international activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in close cooperation and coordination, will take action through their respective chains-of-command.

## C. Bilateral Planning

The two governments will continue to develop and update bilateral plans to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated operations by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. To ensure the effectiveness of the plans and the ability to make flexible, timely, and appropriate responses, the two governments will exchange relevant information, including identifying operational and logistic support requirements and sources in advance, as appropriate.

The two governments will conduct bilateral planning in peacetime for contingencies relevant to Japan’s peace and security through an upgraded Bilateral Planning Mechanism, which includes relevant agencies of the respective governments. Bilateral plans will be developed with input from relevant agencies, as appropriate. The Security Consultative Committee (SCC) will continue to be responsible for presenting directions, validating the progress of the planning under the mechanism, and issuing directives as necessary. The SCC will be assisted by an appropriate subordinate body.

Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments.

## IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security

Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on Japan’s peace and security. In this increasingly complex security environment, the two governments will take measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners.

The two governments recognize that these measures need to be taken based on flexible, timely, and effective bilateral coordination tailored to each situation and that interagency coordination is essential for appropriate Alliance responses. Therefore, the two governments will utilize the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to:

- assess the situation;
- share information; and
- develop ways to implement the appropriate Alliance response, including flexible deterrent options, as well as actions aimed at de-escalation.

To support these bilateral efforts, the two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels on issues that could potentially affect Japan’s peace and security.

### A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime

In order to ensure the maintenance of Japan’s peace and security, the two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, including through diplomatic efforts, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance to prepare for all possible situations. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to, the following:

#### 1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

In order to identify at the earliest possible stage any indications of threats to Japan’s peace and security and to ensure a decisive advantage in intelligence gathering and analysis, the two governments will share and protect information and intelligence, while developing and maintaining common situational awareness. This will include enhancing coordination and cooperation among relevant agencies.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities based on the capabilities and availability of their respective assets. This will include conducting bilateral ISR activities in a mutually supportive manner to ensure persistent coverage of developments that could affect Japan’s peace and security.

#### 2. Air and Missile Defense

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain and strengthen deterrence and their defense postures against ballistic missile launches and aerial incursions. The two governments will cooperate to expand early warning capabilities, interoperability, network coverage, and real-time information exchange and to pursue the comprehensive improvement of capabilities to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles. Moreover, the two governments will continue to coordinate closely in responding to provocative missile launches and other aerial activities.

#### 3. Maritime Security

The two governments will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order based upon international law, including freedom of navigation. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, on

various efforts such as maintaining and enhancing bilateral presence in the maritime domain through ISR and training and exercises, while further developing and enhancing shared maritime domain awareness including by coordinating with relevant agencies, as necessary.

#### 4. Asset Protection

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual protection of each other's assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in a cooperative manner, including during training and exercises.

#### 5. Training and Exercises

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct effective bilateral and multilateral training and exercises both inside and outside of Japan in order to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. Timely and realistic training and exercises will enhance deterrence. To support these activities, the two governments will cooperate to ensure that training areas, facilities, and associated equipment are available, accessible, and modern.

#### 6. Logistic Support

Japan and the United States are primarily responsible for providing logistic support for their respective forces in all phases. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual logistic support where appropriate, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services, for such activities as set forth in the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) and its related arrangements.

#### 7. Use of Facilities

In order to expand interoperability and improve flexibility and resiliency of the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, the two governments will enhance joint/shared use and cooperate in ensuring the security of facilities and areas. Recognizing the importance of being prepared for contingencies, the two governments also will cooperate in conducting site surveys on facilities including civilian airports and seaports, as appropriate.

### B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan's Peace and Security

The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. Such situations cannot be defined geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries' respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation. Early recognition and adaptable, resolute decision-making on bilateral actions will contribute to deterrence and de-escalation of such situations.

In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to ensure the peace and security of Japan. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to, those listed below.

#### 1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

When Japanese and U.S. noncombatants need to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals, as well as dealing with the authorities of the affected area. As appropriate, the two governments will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out evacuations of Japanese or U.S. noncombatants. These evacuations will be carried out using each country's capabilities such as transportation means and facilities in a mutually supplementary manner. The two governments may each consider extending evacuation assistance to third-country noncombatants.

The two governments will conduct early-stage coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to carry out cooperation in fields such as the safety of evacuees, transportation means and facilities, customs, immigration and quarantine processing, safe havens, and medical services. The two governments will enhance coordination in noncombatant evacuation operations from peacetime, as appropriate, including by conducting training and exercises.

#### 2. Maritime Security

Taking into account their respective capabilities, the two governments will cooperate closely to enhance maritime security. Cooperative measures may include, but are not limited to, information sharing and inspection of ships based on a United Nations Security Council resolution or other basis under international law.

#### 3. Measures to Deal with Refugees

If a situation develops such that a flow of refugees into Japan becomes likely or actually begins, the two governments will

cooperate to maintain Japan's peace and security while handling refugees in a humane manner consistent with applicable obligations under international law. Primary responsibility for such refugee response lies with Japan. The United States will provide appropriate support upon a request from Japan.

#### 4. Search and Rescue

The two governments will cooperate and provide mutual support, as appropriate, in search and rescue operations. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will provide support to combat search and rescue operations by the United States, where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

#### 5. Protection of Facilities and Areas

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces are responsible for protecting their own facilities and areas in cooperation with relevant authorities. Upon request from the United States, Japan will provide additional protection for facilities and areas in Japan in close cooperation and coordination with the United States Armed Forces.

#### 6. Logistic Support

The two governments will enhance mutual logistic support (which includes, but is not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services), as appropriate, to enable effective and efficient operations. This includes rapid validation and resourcing of operational and logistic support requirements. The Government of Japan will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies as well as private sector assets. The Government of Japan will provide logistic or other associated support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

#### 7. Use of Facilities

The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, temporary use of facilities, including civilian airports and seaports, in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas.

### C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation.

When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will take steps to deter the armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan.

When an armed attack against Japan occurs, the two governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage and to deter any further attacks. The two governments also will take necessary measures including those listed earlier in Chapter IV.

#### 1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated

When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will intensify, through a comprehensive and robust whole-of-government approach, information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to deter the attack and to de-escalate the situation.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will assume appropriate postures for bilateral operations, including the execution of necessary deployments. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for its support of U.S. deployments. The preparations by the two governments may include, but would not be limited to: joint/ shared use of facilities and areas; mutual logistic support, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services; and reinforced protection of U.S. facilities and areas in Japan.

#### 2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs

##### a. Principles for Coordinated Actions

If an armed attack against Japan occurs despite diplomatic efforts and deterrence, Japan and the United States will cooperate to repel promptly the attack and deter any further attacks to return peace and security to Japan. Such coordinated actions will contribute to the reestablishment of peace and security in the region.

Japan will maintain primary responsibility for defending the citizens and territory of Japan and will take actions immediately to repel an armed attack against Japan as expeditiously as possible. The Self-Defense Forces will have the primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations in Japan and its surrounding waters and airspace, as well as its air and maritime approaches. The United States will coordinate closely with Japan and provide appropriate support. The United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces to defend Japan. The United States will take actions to shape the regional environment in a way that supports the defense of Japan and reestablishes peace and

security.

Recognizing that all instruments of national power will be required to defend Japan, the two governments respectively will employ a whole-of-government approach, utilizing their respective chains-of-command, to coordinate actions through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism.

The United States will employ forward-deployed forces, including those stationed in Japan, and introduce reinforcements from elsewhere, as required. Japan will establish and maintain the basis required to facilitate these deployments.

The two governments will take actions as appropriate to provide defense of each other's forces and facilities in response to an armed attack against Japan.

b. Concept of Operations

i. Operations to Defend Airspace

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, defense against attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

ii. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange real-time information for early detection of ballistic missile launches. When there is an indication of a ballistic missile attack, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain an effective posture to defend against ballistic missile attacks heading for Japan and to protect forces participating in ballistic missile defense operations.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

iii. Operations to Defend Maritime Areas

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, coastal defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, anti-air warfare, and air interdiction.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack.

The effectiveness of these activities will be enhanced through information sharing and other forms of cooperation among relevant agencies.

iv. Operations to Counter Ground Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands. If the need arises, the Self-Defense Forces will conduct operations to retake an island. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, operations to prevent and repel airborne and seaborne invasions, amphibious operations, and rapid deployment.

The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with

relevant agencies, also will have primary responsibility for defeating attacks by special operations forces or any other unconventional attacks in Japan, including those that involve infiltration.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces' operations.

v. Cross-Domain Operations

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks. These operations will be designed to achieve effects across multiple domains simultaneously.

Examples of cooperation across domains include the actions described below.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, as appropriate, will strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other's ISR assets.

The United States Armed Forces may conduct operations involving the use of strike power, to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces. When the United States Armed Forces conduct such operations, the Self-Defense Forces may provide support, as necessary. These operations will be based on close bilateral coordination, as appropriate.

The two governments will cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains in accordance with bilateral cooperation set out in Chapter VI.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces' special operations forces will cooperate during operations, as appropriate.

c. Operational Support Activities

The two governments will cooperate in the following activities in support of bilateral operations.

i. Communications and Electronics

The two governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will ensure effective communication between the two forces and maintain a common operational picture for bilateral operations under common situational awareness.

ii. Search and Rescue

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide mutual support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate.

iii. Logistic Support

When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability.

The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support.

iv. Use of Facilities

The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, additional facilities in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas.

v. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection

The Government of Japan will maintain primary responsibility for emergency responses to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents or attacks in Japan. The United States retains primary responsibility for maintaining and restoring the mission capability of the United States Armed Forces in Japan. At Japan's request, the United States will support Japan in CBRN incident or attack prevention and response-related activities in an effort to ensure the protection of Japan, as appropriate.

D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan

When Japan and the United States each decides to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a



third country, and Japan has not come under armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks. Bilateral responses will be coordinated through the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism.

Japan and the United States will cooperate as appropriate with other countries taking action in response to the armed attack.

The Self-Defense Forces will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people's right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan's survival, and to protect its people.

Examples of cooperative operations are outlined below:

1. Asset Protection  
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in asset protection, as appropriate. Such cooperation will include, but not be limited to, protection of assets that are engaged in operations such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations or Ballistic Missile Defense.
2. Search and Rescue  
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate.
3. Maritime Operations  
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in minesweeping, as appropriate, including to secure the safety of sea lines of communication.  
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in escort operations to protect ships and vessels, as appropriate.  
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack, as appropriate.
4. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks  
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in intercepting ballistic missiles, as appropriate, in accordance with their respective capabilities. The two governments will exchange information to ensure early detection of ballistic missile launches.
5. Logistics Support  
When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability.

The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support.

#### E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan

When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. Recognizing that immediate recovery from a large-scale disaster in Japan is essential for Japan's peace and security and that such a disaster could affect the activities of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, the United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan's activities. Such support may include search and rescue, transportation, supply, medical services, incident awareness and assessment, and other specialized capabilities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate.

To improve the effectiveness of the United States Armed Forces' cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities in Japan, the two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. In addition, the United States Armed Forces also may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters.

### V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security

In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. For well over half a century, both countries have worked together to deliver effective solutions to challenges in diverse regions of the world.

When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities for the peace and security of the region and beyond, the two governments, including the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below. This cooperation also will contribute to the peace and security of both countries.

#### A. Cooperation in International Activities

The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable.

The two governments may coordinate the activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, and also will pursue trilateral and multilateral cooperation in these activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will share procedures and best practices, as appropriate, for smooth and effective cooperation. While the two governments will continue to cooperate on a broad array of issues that may not be explicitly included in the Guidelines, common areas for cooperation by the two governments in regional and international activities will include:

1. Peacekeeping Operations  
When the two governments participate in peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations (UN) in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate, to maximize interoperability between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The two governments also may cooperate in providing logistic support for and protecting UN and other personnel who participate in the same mission, as appropriate.
2. International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief  
When the two governments conduct international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale humanitarian and natural disasters, the two governments will cooperate closely to provide mutual support, as appropriate, maximizing interoperability between participating Self-Defense Forces and United States Armed Forces. Examples of cooperative activities may include mutual logistic support and operational coordination, planning, and execution.
3. Maritime Security  
When the two governments conduct activities for maritime security, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate. Examples of cooperative activities may include efforts for: safe and secure sea lines of communication such as counter-piracy and minesweeping; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and counterterrorism activities.
4. Partner Capacity Building  
Proactive cooperation with partners will contribute to maintaining and enhancing regional and international peace and security. The two governments will cooperate in capacity building activities, as appropriate, by making the best use of their capabilities and experience, with the objective of strengthening the capability of partners to respond to dynamic security challenges. Examples of cooperative activities may include maritime security, military medicine, defense institution building, and improved force readiness for HA/DR or peacekeeping operations.
5. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations  
In circumstances when international action is required for the evacuation of noncombatants, the two governments will utilize, as appropriate, all possible avenues including diplomatic efforts to ensure the safety of noncombatants, including those who are Japanese or U.S. nationals.
6. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance  
When the two governments participate in international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in ISR activities, as appropriate, based on the respective capabilities and availability of their assets.
7. Training and Exercises  
In order to enhance the effectiveness of international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct and participate in joint training and exercises, as appropriate, to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. The two governments also will continue to pursue opportunities to work with partners in training and exercises to contribute to enhancing interoperability with the Alliance and the development of common tactics, techniques, and procedures.
8. Logistic support  
When participating in international activities, the two governments will cooperate to provide mutual logistic support. The Government of Japan will provide logistic support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

#### B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation

The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. In particular, the two governments will reinforce efforts and seek additional opportunities to cooperate with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations.

The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promoting cooperation based upon international law and standards.



## VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation

### A. Cooperation on Space

Recognizing the security aspects of the space domain, the two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space.

As part of such efforts, the two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation. The two governments will provide mutual support, as appropriate, to establish and improve capabilities and will share information about actions and events that might affect the safety and stability of the space domain and impede its use. The two governments also will share information to address emerging threats against space systems and will pursue opportunities for cooperation in maritime domain awareness and in space-related equipment and technology that will strengthen capabilities and resiliency of the space systems, including hosted payloads.

To accomplish their missions effectively and efficiently, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate and to contribute to whole-of-government efforts in utilizing space in such areas as: early-warning; ISR; positioning, navigation, and timing; space situational awareness; meteorological observation; command, control, and communications; and ensuring the resiliency of relevant space systems that are critical for mission assurance. In cases where their space systems are threatened, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, in mitigating risk and preventing damage. If damage occurs, they will cooperate, as appropriate, in reconstituting relevant capabilities.

### B. Cooperation on Cyberspace

To help ensure the safe and stable use of cyberspace, the two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and routine manner, as appropriate. The two governments also will share, as appropriate, information on the development of various capabilities in cyberspace, including the exchange of best practices on training and education. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions, including through information sharing with the private sector, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will:

- maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems;
- share expertise and conduct educational exchanges in cybersecurity;
- ensure resiliency of their respective networks and systems to achieve mission assurance;
- contribute to whole-of-government efforts to improve cybersecurity; and
- conduct bilateral exercises to ensure effective cooperation for cybersecurity in all situations from peacetime to contingencies.

In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, including those against critical infrastructure and services utilized by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and based on close bilateral coordination, the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. The two governments also will share relevant information expeditiously and appropriately. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, including those that take place when Japan is under an armed attack, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.

## VII. Bilateral Enterprise

The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation:

### A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

In order to enhance interoperability and to promote efficient acquisition and maintenance, the two governments will:

- cooperate in joint research, development, production, and test and evaluation of equipment and in mutual provision of components of common equipment and services;
- strengthen the basis to repair and maintain common equipment for mutual efficiency and readiness;
- facilitate reciprocal defense procurement to enhance efficient acquisition, interoperability, and defense equipment and technology cooperation; and
- explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on defense equipment and technology.

### B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security

- Recognizing that common situational awareness is essential, the two governments will enhance intelligence cooperation and information sharing at all levels, including the national strategic level.
- In order to enable robust intelligence cooperation and information sharing, the two governments will continue to promote cooperation in strengthening policies, practices, and procedures related to the

protection of classified information.

- The two governments also will explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on information sharing.

### C. Educational and Research Exchanges

Recognizing the importance of intellectual cooperation concerning security and defense, the two governments will deepen exchanges of members of relevant organizations and strengthen communication between each side's research and educational institutions. Such efforts will serve as the enduring foundation for security and defense officials to share their knowledge and reinforce cooperation.

## VIII. Processes for Review

The SCC, assisted by an appropriate subordinate body, will regularly evaluate whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances. The two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan-U.S. Alliance relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time.

**Reference 25 Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2016)**

	Outline and Results
<p>Sep. 15, 2016 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington, D.C.</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Inada Secretary of Defense Carter</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reconfirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands</li> <li>• Agreed to oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas</li> <li>• With regard to North Korea's provocative actions, confirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to closely cooperate on this matter, including utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM)</li> <li>• Agreed to strengthen trilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral frameworks</li> <li>• Confirmed their intention to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance under the Legislation for Peace and Security which recently came into force, and also confirmed that they would continue to make efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines</li> <li>• Regarding the arrest of a member of the U.S. civilian component in Okinawa, confirmed that they would continue to hold working-level consultations in light of the joint announcement of July 2016</li> <li>• The Japanese side stated that Japan's position would remain unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on this matter.</li> <li>• Agreed to address the early return of the facilities and areas south of Kadena Air Base as well as the majority of the Northern Training Area</li> </ul>
<p>Dec. 7, 2016 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Inada Secretary of Defense Carter</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agreed to oppose North Korea's nuclear and missile development as well as unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas</li> <li>• Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands</li> <li>• Agreed to strengthen trilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral frameworks</li> <li>• Agreed that Japan and the United States will continue to collaborate closely with the existing strong Japan-U.S. Alliance serving as the foundation</li> <li>• Welcomed the efforts under way based on the new Guidelines and the Legislation for Peace and Security, including the signing of the Japan-U.S. ACSA and the commencement of Japan-U.S. joint training in accordance with the Legislation for Peace and Security</li> <li>• Regarding the arrest of a member of the U.S. civilian component in Okinawa, confirmed that they would continue to hold working-level consultations in light of the joint announcement of July 2016</li> <li>• Confirmed that Japan and the United States will cooperate to realize the return of a majority of the Northern Training Area in December 2016</li> <li>• With regard to the Futenma Replacement Facility, shared the position that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they would continue to cooperate closely on this matter</li> <li>• The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on this matter</li> </ul>
<p>Feb. 4, 2017 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Inada Secretary of Defense Mattis</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Shared the view that China's activities in the East and South China Seas pose security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region</li> <li>• Shared the view that advances in North Korea's nuclear and missile development constitute grave security threats to the stability of Japan and the United States and the region</li> <li>• Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands</li> <li>• Agreed to strengthen engagement in the East China Sea</li> <li>• Agreed to strengthen trilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral frameworks</li> <li>• The Japanese side stated that it will strengthen its defense capabilities and expand Japan's role in the Alliance</li> <li>• The U.S. side stated that it will remain committed to the defense of Japan, and underscored that the U.S. commitment to the region will be enhanced through its ongoing presence</li> <li>• Confirmed the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the United States' unwavering commitment to extended deterrence</li> <li>• Shared the view on the need to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance while taking into account the Guidelines established in 2015</li> <li>• The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the steady progress of the realignment of the U.S. Forces Japan. The U.S. side stated that it seeks to advance the realignment through Japan-U.S. collaboration.</li> <li>• With regard to the relocation of MCAS Futenma, shared the position that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they would continue to cooperate closely on this matter</li> <li>• The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the two sides agreed to cooperate to ensure the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan</li> </ul>
<p>Jun. 3, 2017 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Singapore</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Inada Secretary of Defense Mattis</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Shared the view that North Korea's successive ballistic missile launches and other acts are flagrant provocations against the stability of Japan and the United States and the region and are absolutely intolerable, and that it is important to have close Japan-U.S.-ROK collaboration in addition to Japan-U.S. collaboration</li> <li>• The Japanese side highly praised the United States' visible commitment to the peace and stability of the region, including the dispatch of its carrier strike group, and stated that it is important to strengthen pressure on North Korea</li> <li>• Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands</li> <li>• Confirmed that Japan and the United States will deepen their cooperation on ensuring peace and stability in the East China Sea and regarding engagement in the South China Sea</li> <li>• Shared the view on the need to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and welcomed the joint training between the SDF and the carrier strike group being conducted in the Sea of Japan as an activity contributing to this end</li> <li>• Agreed that they will continue to coordinate for the prompt holding of a Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting</li> <li>• Agreed to make steady progress on the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and the U.S. side announced its commitment to continue to promote close Japan-U.S. cooperation</li> <li>• Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they would continue to cooperate closely on this matter</li> <li>• The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the two sides agreed to cooperate to ensure the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan</li> </ul>
<p>Aug. 17, 2017 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2") Meeting / Washington, D.C.</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Onodera Minister for Foreign Affairs Kono Secretary of Defense Mattis Secretary of State Tillerson</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reaffirmed the Alliance's commitment to the security of Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces.</li> <li>• Condemned in the strongest terms North Korea's development of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, and agreed on taking concrete actions to bolster the defense capabilities of the Alliance to deter threats of North Korea while closely coordinating between Japan and the U.S., and the two countries and the Republic of Korea.</li> <li>• Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands.</li> <li>• Reaffirmed the importance of working together to safeguard the peace and stability of the East China Sea.</li> <li>• Underlined the significance of continued engagement in the South China Sea, including through respective activities to support freedom of navigation.</li> <li>• Confirmed their shared intent to develop specific measures and actions to further strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance, including through reviewing roles, missions, and capabilities, to ensure seamless Alliance responses across a full spectrum of situations.</li> <li>• Japan intends to expand its role in the Alliance and augment its defense capabilities, with an eye on the next planning period for its Mid-Term Defense Program.</li> <li>• The United States remains committed to deploying its most advanced capabilities to Japan.</li> <li>• Directed respective staffs to proceed with the policy making process based on the guidance given by the ministers.</li> <li>• Reaffirmed the two governments' commitment to implementation of the 2015 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.</li> <li>• Welcomed important steps within the Alliance to operationalize mutual asset protection and to bring into force the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA).</li> <li>• Reaffirmed the critical role that U.S. extended deterrence plays in ensuring the security of Japan as well as the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.</li> <li>• Confirmed their shared commitment to enhance and accelerate cooperation in such areas as bilateral planning, air and missile defense, non-combatant evacuation operations, defense equipment and technology cooperation, intelligence cooperation and information security.</li> <li>• Affirmed their desire to expand bilateral cooperation in space and cyber, and called for deepening consultations for such cooperation.</li> <li>• Highlighted ongoing efforts to advance trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation with other partners in the region.</li> <li>• Emphasized the need to enhance information-sharing and expand trilateral exercises between Japan, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea.</li> <li>• Affirmed their intention to further enhance capacity building programs and defense equipment and technology transfers to Southeast Asian nations.</li> <li>• Confirmed their shared commitment to launch a whole-of-government dialogue on maritime security capacity building.</li> <li>• Reaffirmed the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution.</li> <li>• Reaffirmed the two Governments' commitment to implement the existing arrangements for the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan.</li> <li>• Reaffirmed the overall level of Host Nation Support.</li> <li>• Reaffirmed the two Governments would promote joint/shared use.</li> <li>• Stressed the importance of steadily implementing supplementary agreements to SOFA regarding environmental stewardship and the civilian component.</li> </ul>

	Outline and Results
<p>Aug. 17, 2017 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington, D.C.</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Mattis</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agreed on the importance of establishing trust between defense leaders of Japan and the U.S., and working together to strengthen the Alliance.</li> <li>• Exchanged views on issues regarding North Korea. The Japanese side commented that now is the time to increase pressure on the regime and that Japan will take necessary measures to continue to coordinate with the U.S. Forces to fully respond to various contingencies.</li> <li>• Reaffirmed close communication and coordination between the two governments is vital in order to respond to issues regarding North Korea. Agreed on putting further pressure on North Korea and working on bolstering the defense capabilities to deter threats posed by North Korea.</li> <li>• In light of an increasingly severe security environment, shared their commitment to take initiatives to ensure the effectiveness of the Guidelines and to bolster the capabilities of the Alliance to deter and respond while both Japan and the U.S. work on improving their respective capabilities.</li> </ul>
<p>Oct. 23, 2017 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Philippines</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Mattis</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Shared information on the situation of and prospects for North Korea's nuclear and missile development.</li> <li>• The Japanese side commented that North Korean nuclear and missile development is posing an unprecedentedly serious and immediate threat to the security of this region including Japan, and called for thorough discussion to ensure the Alliance can take an orchestrated response to any situation. The U.S. side shared this view and reaffirmed its commitment to the security of Japan including a commitment to extended deterrence.</li> <li>• Given the increased level of North Korean ballistic missile threat, the two governments agreed on ensuring a reliable defense posture. Also confirmed working together for the introduction of new BMD assets including the Aegis Ashore. Agreed on bringing even closer coordination to the operation of Japanese and U.S. assets including Aegis-equipped ships.</li> <li>• Welcomed the high level of communication through telephone meetings on continued provocations by North Korea, and reaffirmed to continue to share information between Japan and the U.S.</li> <li>• Confirmed the importance of continuously pressuring North Korea in a visible way and the importance of close coordination between Japan and the U.S.</li> <li>• Reaffirmed the two governments' intention to promote close cooperation between Japan, the U.S., and the Republic of Korea.</li> <li>• Shared the position that Japan and the U.S. will work together for the peace and security of the East China Sea while keeping a close watch on the situations.</li> <li>• Agreed on the importance of engagement in the Southeast Asia region while keeping a close watch on the situations in the South China Sea, and welcomed progress in multilateral security cooperation as well as dialogues in the region through the framework of ADMM Plus.</li> <li>• The Japanese side mentioned its intention to take initiatives to help ASEAN with capacity building based on the "Vientiane Vision," Japan's defense cooperation initiatives with ASEAN.</li> <li>• Confirmed that Japan and the U.S. will continue to cooperate closely to provide capacity building assistance to Southeast Asian partners.</li> <li>• The Japanese side requested the U.S. Forces to make efforts to operate safely as understanding from the local communities is vital in ensuring the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan.</li> </ul>
<p>Apr. 20, 2018 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington, D.C.</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Mattis</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Ministers closely compared and adjusted the defense agencies' understandings and policy on the way ahead including the meeting between leaders of United States and North Korea, regarding the issue of North Korea.</li> <li>• Agreed on the need to keep a close watch on North Korea, given no concrete initiatives by North Korea to give up its nuclear development has been confirmed, despite the changes in the regime's posture such as requesting for talks.</li> <li>• The Japanese side spoke about the necessity to put maximum pressure on North Korea in order to make it abolish its nuclear and missile development, and affirmed that the two governments will maintain pressure and sanctions on North Korea with the goal of having North Korea relinquish all weapons of mass destruction and all ballistic missile plans in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.</li> <li>• The U.S. side commended efforts by the MSDF to address the issue of illegal ship-to-ship transfers by North Korean vessels, and showed its commitment to continue these efforts with Japan and other partner nations.</li> <li>• Affirmed the importance of cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and the Republic of Korea and other nations through joint training and exercise.</li> <li>• Agreed on the importance of continuing close information-sharing to ensure the Alliance's response capabilities to any situation.</li> <li>• Welcomed progress in cooperation between Japan and the U.S. under Japan's Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines such as the SDF protecting and providing supplies and services to the U.S. Forces, and reaffirmed the further promotion of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation through the steady enforcement of the Legislation and the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.</li> <li>• The Japanese side talked about moving forward on the review of the National Defense Program Guidelines towards the end of FY2018 and the study of setting forth a next Mid-Term Defense Program, and reaffirmed on sharing information between the ministers.</li> <li>• The Japanese side spoke about the need to introduce high-performance equipment including those used by the U.S. military to bolster Japan's defense capabilities amid an increasingly severe security environment. The two ministers affirmed to work together to make it possible for Japan to smoothly and swiftly acquire equipment made in the U.S. including the Aegis Ashore by addressing the issues regarding FMS.</li> <li>• The Japanese side requested the securing of safe operations by the U.S. Forces, including the CV-22 to be deployed to Yokota Air Base and U.S. Forces aircraft in Okinawa, and the U.S. side acknowledged the importance of ensuring flight safety.</li> <li>• The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on the local community of Okinawa and other places, and concurred that the U.S. will continue to cooperate with Japan on efforts to gain the understanding of the local community.</li> </ul>
<p>May 29, 2018 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Hawaii</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Mattis</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Ministers, taking into account the recent situations regarding the issue of North Korea, closely compared and adjusted the defense agencies' understandings and policy on future response against North Korea issues.</li> <li>• The Japanese side expressed its view that the meeting between the leaders of U.S. and North Korea should be an opportunity to advance outstanding issues of concern such as nuclear, missile and abductions issues. The Ministers confirmed that they will continue exerting pressure and sanctions, under the common principle of realizing abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction including chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles of all ranges in complete, verifiable and irreversible way.</li> <li>• In light of illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods, the Ministers welcomed measures implemented by Japan in coordination with partner countries including United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and agreed that they will continue to take actions with the voluntary countries, and reaffirmed the importance of the deterrent capability of regional U.S. Forces including U.S. Forces Korea.</li> <li>• The U.S. side expressed renewed commitment to Japanese defense. The Ministers agreed that they will continue to maintain close communication to take concerted action as an alliance in response to any situations.</li> <li>• The Ministers exchanged opinions on regional challenges, and in light of China's unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas, agreed that it is important for both countries to continue to closely watch on the situations in the East China Sea, to cooperate for the peace and stability, and to be continuously engaged in the South China Sea.</li> <li>• The Ministers noted that China has enforced its military capability and intensified its activities in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, and also agreed to reinforce the Alliance capability to deter and respond through enhancement of defense capability based on the close cooperation of Japan and U.S. for the peace and stability of the region.</li> <li>• The Ministers reconfirmed the importance of cooperating with the allied countries and various partners to assure the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and agreed that Japan and U.S. or Japan, U.S., and Australia proceed with coordination in the promotion of the basic principles such as rule of law, freedom of navigation, and in capacity building.</li> <li>• The Japanese side requested efforts to ensure safe operations of U.S. Forces and cooperation in efforts to obtain consent from local communities including those in Okinawa.</li> </ul>
<p>Jun. 29, 2018 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Mattis</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Ministers, taking into account the recent situations regarding the issue of North Korea, closely compared and adjusted the defense agencies' understandings and policy on future response against North Korea issues.</li> <li>• The Ministers agreed that, complying with the UNSCRs, they will work together to realize CVID of all of its WMD including biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles of all ranges in coordination with the international community, and confirmed that Japan and U.S. continue to counter illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea in coordination with their partner countries.</li> <li>• The U.S. side explained the suspension of U.S.-ROK combined military exercises, and the Ministers reaffirmed that neither withdrawal nor reduction of the USFK has been considered, and reconfirmed the importance of the deterrent capability of regional U.S. Forces including U.S. Forces Korea.</li> <li>• The U.S. side expressed renewed U.S. commitments to defend Japan, and the Ministers agreed to proceed with the reinforcement of the alliance's deterrence and response capability including conducting Japan-U.S. joint exercises steadily, as planned.</li> <li>• The Ministers exchanged their views based on the U.S. Secretary of Defense's visit to China, and agreed that they will continue to maintain a close channel of communication to take concerted actions as an alliance in response to every situation.</li> <li>• The Ministers reconfirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan's administration of the islands, and agreed to continue to closely watch on the situations in the East China Sea, and to cooperate with each other for the peace and stability.</li> <li>• The Ministers also confirmed the importance to collaborate towards consolidating basic principles such as rule of law and freedom of navigation.</li> <li>• The Ministers welcomed the progress and improvements being made in challenges regarding Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and the Ministers also confirmed the U.S. will continue to work to help Japan achieve efficient procurement.</li> <li>• The Ministers agreed to closely work towards the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, and the Japanese side requested cooperation to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.</li> </ul>

	Outline and Results
<p>Oct. 19, 2018 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Singapore</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Secretary of Defense Mattis</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Ministers shared the understandings about the importance of the free and open Indo-Pacific, and confirmed the significance of cooperation between Japan and the United States and with various partners.</li> <li>• The Ministers welcomed the development of the regional multilateral security cooperation and dialogue under the framework of the ADMM-Plus, and agreed to strengthen the cooperation with partner countries in maintaining basic international principles such as rule of law, freedom of navigation and in implementing measures for peace and stability such as capacity building assistance.</li> <li>• The Ministers, taking into account that China continues unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, confirmed that the two countries work together for the peace and stability of the East China Sea, and it is important for both countries to be engaged in the South China Sea.</li> <li>• The Ministers confirmed they continue to support full implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles of all ranges.</li> <li>• As part of efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the UN Security Council resolutions, the Ministers additionally confirmed the importance of working with partner countries to counter illicit ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea, and welcomed the monitoring and surveillance activities taking place since September with the participation of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, and agreed that the two countries conduct the operation in cooperation with like-minded countries.</li> <li>• The Ministers confirmed that U.S. Forces in ROK is a stabilizing force in the region, and that no change in U.S. Forces in ROK has been considered.</li> <li>• The Ministers also agreed to work together to reinforce the deterrence and response capability including conducting Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises steadily as planned.</li> <li>• The Ministers confirmed to work together to improve efficiency regarding Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Japan's buying U.S.-made defense assets.</li> <li>• The Japanese side explained the current status of the revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines and the formulation of the Mid-Term Defense Program for the next term, and the Ministers concurred to continue to closely exchange information.</li> <li>• The Ministers reconfirmed that the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid its continued use.</li> <li>• The Ministers confirmed to work together closely for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives.</li> <li>• The Japanese side requested for cooperation with efforts to secure the understanding from the local communities, and to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.</li> </ul>
<p>Jan. 16, 2019 Meeting with the U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense / Washington, D.C.</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The U.S. side supported the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond (NDPG) and the Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDP), and welcomed that Japan expressed its strong resolve to enhance its defense architecture and to play a larger role in accordance with the NDPG and the MTDP.</li> <li>• In regards to the current security environment, both sides shared views that competition among states is becoming more apparent. They also agreed that gaining technological superiority in new domains such as space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is increasingly important.</li> <li>• Both sides also confirmed that they will closely coordinate in their efforts to be made pursuant to Japan's NDPG and MTDP, and the United States' National Defense Strategy (NDS) respectively, as well as to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond following the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. With the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific in mind, they agreed to work together to shape a desirable security environment with Japan-U.S. alliance being the cornerstone of cooperation with other nations.</li> <li>• Both sides confirmed to strengthen and expand cooperation in wide range of fields including the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Promote Japan-U.S. cooperation in the "new domains," including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. The United States welcomed Japan's first participation in the Schriever Wargame.</li> <li>○ Closely coordinate in joint exercises and capacity building assistance, taking into account increasing both nations' presence in the Indo-Pacific.</li> <li>○ Welcome and even make progress in the two countries' cooperation in the operational field following Japan's Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines (e.g. U.S. Forces asset protection mission conducted by the SDF, provision of supplies and services).</li> <li>○ Make continued effort in streamlining FMS process, while welcoming the recent progress and improvements in issues related to FMS. Cooperate in ensuring cost transparency, improving late case closure, strengthening activities to realize and promote multi-year procurement.</li> <li>○ Continue cooperation to realize Japan's smooth and prompt introduction, including cost management of U.S.-made advanced defense equipment such as Aegis Ashore, E-2D and F-35.</li> <li>○ Enhance cooperation in defense equipment and technology as well as promoting Japan-U.S. joint development and researches.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Both sides confirmed they continue to support full implementation of the UNSC resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea's WMDs and ballistic missiles of all ranges.</li> <li>• Both sides agreed that Japan and the United States will continue working together with partner countries to counter North Korea's illicit "ship-to-ship" transfers.</li> <li>• Both sides confirmed that deterrence through Japan-U.S. Alliance and U.S.-ROK Alliance is essential in maintaining the security of the region, and agreed that both countries will steadily implement Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises.</li> <li>• In regards to the East and South China Seas, both sides affirmed their position that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion, and that it is important to work together to make sure that Rule of Law and Freedom of Navigation are firmly established.</li> <li>• Both sides also reaffirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan's administration of the islands. Both sides confirmed that Japan and the United States work together for the peace and stability of the East China Sea.</li> <li>• Both sides affirmed the recent progress in the construction project of Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), and reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid its continued use. The Japanese side requested for cooperation with efforts to mitigate impact on the local communities including Okinawa. Both sides confirmed to work together closely for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives and training relocation.</li> <li>• Both sides also affirmed the importance to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.</li> </ul>
<p>Apr. 19, 2019 "2+2" Meeting / Washington, D.C.</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Minister for Foreign Affairs Kono Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan Secretary of State Pompeo</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Ministers shared the view that the Japan-U.S. Alliance serves as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, and that Japan and the United States will work together to realize a "free and open Indo-Pacific."</li> <li>• The Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will jointly increase their presence in the region, while collaborating with partners in the region through joint exercises, port calls, and other activities.</li> <li>• The Ministers welcomed the alignment of the strategic policy documents of both countries, including Japan's NDPG. The Ministers shared the view that the two countries will strengthen cooperation for cross-domain operations, including capability enhancement in new domains, such as space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum.</li> <li>• The Ministers shared the view that they will seek to achieve North Korea's abandonment of all of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. In addition, the Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will continue to work together in cooperation with other partner countries in fully implementing UN Security Council resolutions, including combatting illicit ship-to-ship transfers.</li> <li>• The Ministers also reaffirmed that U.S. force stance in the region would remain robust, and shared the view on deepening consultation on ensuring deterrence and security in the region. The Ministers also shared the view that they will continue to engage in close cooperation between Japan and the United States as well as among Japan, the United States, and the ROK.</li> <li>• The Ministers shared the view on calling upon North Korea to resolve the Japanese abductions issue immediately.</li> <li>• Regarding the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region, the Ministers expressed serious concern about, and strong opposition to, unilateral coercive attempts to alter the status quo in the East China Sea (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS).</li> <li>• The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to work together to safeguard the peace and stability of the ECS, and reconfirmed that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and that both nations oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan's administration of these islands.</li> <li>• The Ministers confirmed that they will deepen cooperation on space capabilities, and shared the view on promoting cooperation for enhancing space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities through Japan's development of a Deep Space Radar and hosting of U.S.-provided SSA payloads on Japan's Quasi Zenith Satellite System.</li> <li>• The Ministers shared the view on enhancing cooperation on cyber issues. They affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace and that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.</li> <li>• The Ministers confirmed that it is important to develop defense capabilities efficiently and effectively in order to enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The Ministers shared the view that the two countries will cooperate to introduce advanced weapon systems to Japan and to further streamline the FMS process.</li> <li>• The Ministers affirmed the importance of information security, and shared the view on the need for greater supply chain security, noting threats to the defense industrial base, national networks, and critical infrastructure required for mission assurance.</li> <li>• In order to improve Japan-U.S. Alliance readiness, the Ministers shared the view on further deepening operational cooperation, such as mutual asset protection, logistical support, and joint ISR operations.</li> <li>• The ministers shared the view that they will steadily implement the realignment of the USFJ, from the perspective of mitigating the impact on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.</li> <li>• The Ministers welcomed the significant progress on the construction of the FRF and reaffirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids its continued use.</li> <li>• Foreign Minister Kono conveyed to the U.S. side that it is important to mitigate the impact on the local people, including making progress, one by one, on the issues surrounding the operation of U.S. forces and the SOFA, while steadily implementing the realignment of U.S. forces.</li> <li>• Defense Minister Iwaya requested the U.S. side to minimize the impact of the operation of U.S. forces on local communities, including noise of transient aircraft.</li> <li>• The two ministers also requested the U.S. side to prevent incidents and accidents.</li> </ul>



Outline and Results	
<p>Apr. 19, 2019 Meeting with Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense / Washington, D.C.</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Ministers welcomed the successful holding of the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting and affirmed that the defense authorities of Japan and the United States will continue to closely cooperate with each other to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance.</li> <li>• The Ministers affirmed the importance of continuing to ensure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions toward complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction and all ranges of ballistic missiles by North Korea.</li> <li>• The Ministers also agreed that Japan and the United States will continue to cooperate with like-minded countries in combatting illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea.</li> <li>• They affirmed the importance of deterrence based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the U.S.-ROK Alliance and agreed to steadily conduct Japan-U.S. joint exercises.</li> <li>• The Ministers agreed to promote Japan-U.S. cooperation for cross-domain operations and affirmed that the two countries will further promote cooperation in space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.</li> <li>• The Ministers affirmed that Japan and the United States will further streamline the FMS process and agreed to strengthen defense equipment and technology cooperation by promoting Japan-U.S. joint research and development.</li> <li>• The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will cooperate closely to make steady progress in implementing the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces.</li> </ul>
<p>Jun. 4, 2019 Meeting between Minister of Defense Iwaya and Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan / Tokyo</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The two ministers affirmed that they will closely cooperate with each other in line with the policy confirmed at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting.</li> <li>• The Ministers affirmed the need to deepen Japan-U.S. cooperation with a sense of urgency with respect to new domains, such as space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. They affirmed that they will promote Japan-U.S. cooperation for cross-domain operations.</li> <li>• Defense Minister Iwaya welcomed the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report by the United States. Both sides agreed to strengthen cooperation with the United States to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific as indicated in the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. The Ministers affirmed the importance of cooperating with diverse partners.</li> <li>• The Ministers discussed the regional situation and other matters in light of the discussions held at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue.</li> <li>• Regarding North Korea, they affirmed the importance of continuing to ensure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions toward the abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction and all ranges of ballistic missiles by North Korea in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and they also confirmed that Japan-U.S. and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation will be maintained.</li> <li>• The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue close cooperation to make steady progress in implementing the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces.</li> </ul>
<p>Aug. 7, 2019 Meeting between Minister of Defense Iwaya and U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper / Tokyo</p> <p>Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea's WMD and ballistic missiles of all ranges.</li> <li>• The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue working together with partner countries to counter illicit ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea.</li> <li>• The Ministers confirmed the importance of the deterrent capability of regional U.S. Forces including U.S. Forces Korea.</li> <li>• The Ministers affirmed their position that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, and that it is important to work together to make sure that the rule of law and the freedom of navigation are firmly established.</li> <li>• The Ministers reaffirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan's administration of the islands, and agreed to cooperate with each other for the peace and stability in the East China Sea.</li> <li>• The Ministers confirmed that they will closely coordinate in their efforts to be made based on the strategy documents of both countries and to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond.</li> <li>• They confirmed the significance of cooperation with various partners, including conducting joint exercises and capacity building assistance to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific with Japan-U.S. Alliance being the cornerstone.</li> <li>• The Ministers confirmed to make continued effort in streamlining FMS process.</li> <li>• The Ministers confirmed that the relocation to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma.</li> <li>• The Japanese side requested for cooperation in the Government of Japan's efforts to mitigate the impact on the local communities including Okinawa. The Ministers confirmed to work closely together for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives.</li> <li>• The Japanese side also requested the U.S. Forces to minimize its operational impact on the local communities and the Ministers affirmed the importance to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.</li> </ul>

**Reference 26** **Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (tentative translation)**

(April 19, 2019)

**Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee**

On April 19, 2019, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee convened in Washington, DC, with the participation of Secretary of State Pompeo, Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan, Minister for Foreign Affairs Kono, and Minister of Defense Iwaya. During the meeting, the Ministers affirmed their strong commitment to realize a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” a shared vision for a region in which all nations are sovereign, strong, and prosperous. Decades after the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed, the U.S.-Japan Alliance serves as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and remains iron-clad amid an increasingly complex security environment. The Alliance will continue to play an indispensable role in upholding a rules-based international order and promoting the shared values of the American and Japanese people.

The Ministers welcomed the alignment of the strategic policy documents of both countries, namely the United States’ National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, and Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines. These strategies show that the U.S.-Japan security partnership continues to adapt to be stronger, more advanced, and more effective, consistent with the objectives of the bilateral 2015 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.

The Ministers acknowledged their shared concern that geopolitical competition and coercive attempts to undermine international rules, norms, and institutions present challenges to the Alliance and to the shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The Ministers highlighted the need for an increasingly networked structure of alliances and partnerships, anchored by the U.S.-Japan Alliance, to counter these challenges. The Ministers also expressed concern about rapidly evolving technological advancement in new domains, including space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. The Ministers highlighted the need to address these challenges jointly to ensure the Alliance’s superiority in a contingency and to safeguard our institutions and rules-based order during peacetime.

The Ministers affirmed that their two nations’ strong bilateral security relationship continues to be the foundation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. As such, the Ministers decided that cooperation in cross-domain operations, enhancing the Alliance’s capabilities, and increasing operational readiness and cooperation should be core objectives to advance our defense relationship. The United States welcomed Japan’s proactive steps to strengthen its defensive capabilities, with the Ministers confirming that both nations need to constantly re-evaluate their roles, missions, and capabilities.

Acknowledging the changing dynamics of warfare, the Ministers highlighted the importance of developing capabilities and increasing operational cooperation in both conventional and non-conventional domains. The Ministers highlighted space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum as priority areas to better prepare the Alliance for cross-domain operations.

On cyberspace issues, the Ministers recognized that malicious cyber activity presents an increasing threat to the security and prosperity of both the United States and Japan. To address this threat, the Ministers committed to enhance cooperation on cyber issues, including deterrence and response capabilities, but as a matter of priority, emphasized that each nation is responsible for developing the relevant capabilities to protect their national networks and critical infrastructure. The Ministers affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace and that a cyber attack could, in certain

circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The Ministers also affirmed that a decision as to when a cyber attack would constitute an armed attack under Article V would be made on a case-by-case basis, and through close consultations between Japan and the United States, as would be the case for any other threat.

The Ministers recognized the critical role that U.S. extended deterrence plays in ensuring the security of Japan, as well as the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. The United States reiterated its commitment to the defense of Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including conventional and nuclear.

The Ministers reiterated the importance of the international community’s ongoing commitment to achieving North Korea’s abandonment of all of its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and related programs and facilities in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The Ministers welcomed the United States’ diplomatic efforts to achieve the final, fully verified denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, including through the U.S.-North Korea Summits. The Ministers affirmed their commitment to lead international efforts in UNSCR implementation, particularly in combatting illicit ship-to-ship transfers, and the Ministers committed to strengthen and enhance cooperation with other partner countries participating in UNSCR implementation. The Ministers also recognized the successful efforts to bring back U.S. nationals held in North Korea, and called upon North Korea to resolve the Japanese abductions issue immediately.

The Ministers reaffirmed that U.S. force posture in the region would remain robust and grounded in a clear-eyed assessment of threats, and they determined to deepen consultation on ensuring deterrence and security in the region. The Ministers also highlighted the importance of cooperation among the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, and committed to work together to promote trilateral security cooperation and exercises.

The Ministers expressed serious concern about, and strong opposition to, unilateral coercive attempts to alter the status quo in the East China Sea (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS). The Ministers renewed their determination to work together to safeguard the peace and stability of the ECS, and reconfirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and that both nations oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands.

The Ministers renewed their commitment to work both together and multilaterally to further support a free and open Indo-Pacific, including through joint exercises and port calls with partners in the region, capacity building in such areas as maritime domain awareness and law enforcement, and promotion of sustainable economic development and connectivity through quality infrastructure. The Ministers also recognized the crucial role of the U.S.-Japan Security arrangements in facilitating the greater presence of U.S. forces in the region.

To enable the United States to continue to maintain forward deployed forces in Japan, the Ministers reaffirmed the two Governments’ commitment to steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces. The Ministers also welcomed the significant progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and reconfirmed that the plan to construct the FRF at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. The Ministers underscored their strong determination to achieve its completion as soon as possible.

In recognition of the depth and breadth of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, the Ministers agreed to release a fact sheet detailing additional areas of bilateral cooperation.

**Reference 27** **Record of Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2018**

**Joint Training**

Exercise	Date	Location	Japan	United States	Remarks
Japan-U.S. bilateral joint field training exercise	Oct. 29-Nov. 8, 2018	SDF facilities, U.S. Forces bases in Japan, waters and airspace surrounding Tsushima and Japan, and Guam, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the United States, and their surrounding waters and airspace	Each Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Ground Component Command, respective Regional Armies, Self-Defense Fleet, respective Regional Districts, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc. Totalling approximately 47,000 personnel Approximately 20 vessels Approximately 170 aircraft	U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Forces in Japan, Missile Defense Agency, etc.	Training and exercises according to the SDF’s operational procedure and the Japan-U.S. bilateral response procedure
Japan-U.S. joint air defense/missile defense exercise	Feb. 22, 25-Mar. 1, 2019	JGSDF Camp Iiduka and Vice-Camp Yaese; MSDF Yokosuka and Sasebo Districts; ASDF Yokota, Kasuga, and Naha Air Bases; and U.S. Yokosuka Naval Base	Joint Staff Office, 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade and 15th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment of Western Army, Self-Defense Fleet HQs, Destroyers JS “Kongou,” “Myoko,” “Suzutuki,” and “Akizuki,” Air Defense Command HQs, Western and Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, and 2nd and 5th Air Defense Missile Group	U.S. 7th Fleet HQs, several vessels, etc.	Simulation training for response to ballistic missiles and Air defense combat

## Ground Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Japan	United States	Remarks
Field training with U.S. Army	May 28-Jun. 30, 2018	Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson and surrounding training area (Alaska, the United States), and Donnelly Training Area	1st Airborne Brigade Totaling approximately 110 personnel	Major units of 4-25 Brigade Combat Team and 1-25 Stryker Brigade Combat Team Totaling approximately 230 personnel	Training for Japan-U.S. coordination, and enhancement of interoperability
Japan-U.S. joint Regional Army command post exercise (United States)	Jun. 13-28, 2018	Fort Shafter Army Base, Hawaii	Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command HQs, Northern Army, Northeastern Army, Training Evaluation Research and Development Command, etc. Totaling approximately 150 personnel	Pacific Command HQs, U.S. Army Japan HQs, I Corps, 3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit, etc. Totaling approximately 150 personnel	Capacity maintenance and enhancement for command and staff activities of the Regional Army
Field training with U.S. Army	Aug. 23-Sep. 22, 2018	Yakima Training Center, Washington	One major unit of the 1st Infantry Regiment, etc. Totaling approximately 130 personnel	Major units of 1-17 Infantry Battalion, 2-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team Totaling approximately 230 personnel	Training for Japan-U.S. coordination, and enhancement of interoperability
Field training with U.S. Army	Aug. 26-Sep. 19	Camp Takigahara, Soumagahara Maneuver Area, etc.	Major units of 21st Infantry Regiment, 9th Division Totaling approximately 1,200 personnel	Major units of 2-151 Infantry Battalion, 76 Brigade Combat Team Totaling approximately 850 personnel	Training for Japan-U.S. coordination, and enhancement of interoperability
Joint exercise with U.S. Marines	Oct. 5-19, 2018	Tanegashima and its surrounding waters (Kagoshima Prefecture)	Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade Command, 2nd Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, and 1st Helicopter Brigade, etc. Totaling approximately 230 personnel	2nd Battalion E, 4th Marine Regiment, etc. Totaling approximately 90 personnel	Training for Japan-U.S. coordination, and enhancement of interoperability
Japan-U.S. joint Regional Army command post exercise (United States)	Dec. 3-17, 2018	Camp Higashi Chitose, Camp Sendai, etc.	Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command, Northern Army, Northeastern Army, Training Evaluation Research and Development Command, MSDF, ASDF, etc. Totaling approximately 5,000 personnel	I Corps, 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, U.S. Army Japan HQs, etc. Totaling approximately 1,600 personnel	Capacity maintenance and enhancement for command and staff activities of the Regional Army
Joint exercise with U.S. Marines	Dec. 7-19, 2018	Hijudai Maneuver Area, Jumorihara Maneuver Area, and ASDF Tsuiki Air Base	Major units from 41st Infantry Regiment, 4th Division Totaling approximately 750 personnel	Major units of 2-23 Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment Totaling approximately 250 personnel	Training for Japan-U.S. coordination, and enhancement of interoperability
Joint exercise with U.S. Marines	Jan. 7-Feb. 16, 2019	Camp Pendleton (California, the United States) and its surrounding waters and airspace	Ground Component Command HQs, Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade Command, 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, etc. Totaling approximately 550 personnel	1st Marine Expeditionary Unit HQs; 1st Marine Division HQs; 1st Marine Regiment; and Amphibious Squadron, 3rd Fleet Totaling approximately 500 personnel	Training for Japan-U.S. coordination, and enhancement of interoperability
Joint exercise with U.S. Marines	Feb. 4-15, 2019	Aibano Maneuver Area, Camp Imazu, and Camp Akeno	Major units of 7th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Division Totaling approximately 600 personnel	Major units of 2-23 Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, and 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit Totaling approximately 340 personnel	Training for Japan-U.S. coordination, and enhancement of interoperability
Field training with U.S. Army in the United States	Jan. 20-Mar. 13, 2019	Fort Irwin (National Training Center) (California, the United States)	Major units of the 72nd Tank Regiment, the 7th Division Totaling approximately 390 personnel	1-25 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, U.S. Army Alaska Totaling approximately 4,500 personnel	Training for Japan-U.S. coordination, and enhancement of interoperability

## Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Japan	United States	Remarks
Japan-U.S. joint training	Apr. 9, 2018	Waters west of Kyushu	1 vessel	Several amphibious assault ships, etc.	Tactical training
Japan-U.S. joint medical training	Jun. 14, 2018	Submarine Rescue Ship JS "Chiyoda," Self-Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka, Hospital Ship USNS "Mercy," and U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka	Self-Defense Fleet HQs, Underwater Medical Center, Self-Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka, Base Service Activity Yokosuka, Medical Service Unit Yokosuka, and Submarine Rescue Ship JS "Chiyoda" Totaling approximately 100 personnel	U.S. 7th Fleet HQs; Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka; U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka; and Hospital Ship USNS "Mercy" Totaling approximately 350 personnel	Training and exercise for Japan-U.S. coordination in the medical area
Joint cruise training	Jun. 16-23, 2018	Waters and airspace surrounding Guam through south of Okinawa	2 vessels	Several carriers, etc.	Tactical training
Joint cruise training	Aug. 15-21, 2018	Waters and airspace south of Kanto through surrounding Okinawa via south of Shikoku	1 vessel	Several carriers, etc.	Tactical training
Japan-U.S. joint training	Aug. 26-27, 2018	Waters surrounding Okinawa	1 vessel	Several Amphibious assault ships, etc.	Tactical training
Japan-U.S. joint training	Aug. 31, 2018	Waters and airspace west of the Philippines	3 vessels	Several carriers, etc.	Tactical training
Medical special training	Sep. 21, 2018	U.S. Yokosuka Naval Base, Self-Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka, and U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka	HQs Yokosuka District, Self-Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka, Base Service Activity Yokosuka, and Medical Service Unit Yokosuka Totaling approximately 160 personnel	Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka; and U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka Totaling approximately 350 personnel	Training and exercise for Japan-U.S. coordination in the medical area
Bilateral training with U.S. Navy	Oct. 8-10, 2018	Waters and airspace east of Okinawa through west of Kyushu via the East China Sea	1 vessel 4 aircraft	Several carriers, etc.	Tactical training
Joint cruise training	Oct. 22-27, 2018	Waters and airspace surrounding Bashi Channel through south of Kyushu via east of Okinawa	1 vessel	Several carriers, etc.	Tactical training
Joint cruise training	Nov. 8-16, 2018	Waters and airspace south of Shikoku through surrounding Okinawa	1 vessel	Several carriers, etc.	Tactical training
Japan-U.S. joint training	Nov. 14-17, 2018	East China Sea	2 aircraft	1 aircraft	Information sharing training
Joint cruise training	Nov. 27-Dec. 5, 2018	Waters and airspace surrounding Bashi Channel through south of Kanto	1 vessel	Several carriers, etc.	Tactical training
Joint cruise training	Jan. 11-12, 2019	Waters west of Kyushu	1 vessel	Several Amphibious assault ships, etc.	Tactical training
Anti-submarine special training	Feb. 13-22, 2019	Off the coast of Shikoku	5 vessels 5 submarines Several aircraft	Submarine	Anti-submarine warfare training

## Air Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Japan	United States	Remarks
Fighter combat training	Apr. 6-12, 2018	Airspace off the coast of Hyakuri	4 aircraft	5 aircraft	Training for Japan-U.S. coordination and air combat, improvement of tactical skills
Fighter combat training	Apr. 23-27, 2018	Airspace west of Hokkaido and east of Misawa	4 aircraft	6 aircraft	Training for Japan-U.S. coordination and air combat, improvement of tactical skills
Fighter combat training	May 9-24, 2018	Airspace east of Misawa and west of Akita, and Misawa Air-to-Ground Range	10 aircraft	8 aircraft	Training for Japan-U.S. coordination and air combat, improvement of tactical skills
Navigation and formation training	May 17, 2018	Airspace surrounding Kyushu	4 aircraft	2 aircraft	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills
Participation in U.S. Air Force exercise (RED FLAG-Alaska)	May 28-Jun. 30, 2018	Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, and their surrounding airspace	10 aircraft Totalling approximately 290 personnel	Aircraft, etc.	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills
Fighter combat training	Jul. 16-20, 2018	Airspace off the coast of Komatsu	4 aircraft	6 aircraft	Training for Japan-U.S. coordination and air combat, improvement of tactical skills
Navigation and formation training	Jul. 27, 2018	Airspace over the Sea of Japan	6 aircraft	2 aircraft	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills
Navigation and formation training	Sep. 27, 2018	Airspace of the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan	16 aircraft	1 aircraft	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills
Fighter combat training	Oct. 27-Nov. 9, 2018	Airspace off the coast of Shikoku	20 aircraft	8 aircraft	Training for Japan-U.S. coordination and air combat, improvement of tactical skills
Fighter combat training	Nov. 5-8, 2018	Airspace off the coast of Shikoku	10 aircraft	6 aircraft	Training for Japan-U.S. coordination and air combat, improvement of tactical skills
Navigation and formation training	Mar. 5, 2019	Airspace surrounding the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea	16 aircraft	1 aircraft	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills
Air defense combat training	Mar. 20, 2019	Airspace off the coast of Shikoku	4 aircraft	10 aircraft	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills

## Reference 28 Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects

Item	Summary	Date of conclusion of intergovernmental agreement to implement joint research and development	Completion date
Ducted rocket engine, advanced steel technology, fighting vehicle propulsion technology using ceramic materials, eye-safe laser radar, ejection seat, advanced hybrid propulsion technology, shallow water acoustic technology, ballistic missile defense technology, lowvulnerability gun propellant for field artillery, electronic device mounted on successor aircraft to P-3C, software radio, advanced hull material/structural technology, sea-based radar system, combat system for ship, palm-sized automated chemical agent detector, human effects of exposure to aircraft fuel and their engine exhaust, image gyro for airborne applications, hybrid electric drive		Completed	
SM-3 Block IIA	Development of advanced missile interceptor	June 2006	Ongoing (moved to the joint produce/deployment stage)
High-Speed Multi-Hull Vessel Optimization	Research aiming to design a multi-hull (trimaran, in particular) vessel featuring high-speed, adequate stability and large deck area	March 2014	Ongoing
Comparison of Operational Jet Fuel and Noise Exposures	Research on the combined effects of exposures to both jet fuel and noise on the risk of hearing loss for flight line personnel	November 2015	Ongoing
Chemical Agent Detector-kit Colorimetric Reader	Research on automatically interpreting the colorimetric response of the Chemical Agent Detector-kit	February 2017	Ongoing
High-Temperature Case Technologies	Research on rocket motor case made of high-temperature CFRP* (CFRP: Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic)	July 2018	Ongoing
Next Generation Amphibious Technologies	Research on the feasibility of the technology by simulations based on digital models of amphibious vehicles	May 2019	Ongoing



Facility	Scope	Area (ha)	Classification				Remarks
			SCC	Gun-Ten-Kyo	Governor	U.S. Forces	
<Already returned>							
Army POL Depots	1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City	4			◎		Returned on December 31, 1990
Camp Zukeran	2. Manhole, etc., for underground communication system (Noborikawa)	0.1		◎			Returned on September 30, 1991
	20. Awase Meadows Golf Course	47			◎		Returned on July 31, 2010
Northern Training Area	3. Kunigami-son (Mt. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) district	480		◎			Returned on March 31, 1993
	4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago-Kunigami line	(256)	◎				
Camp Schwab	5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Henoko)	1	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Makiminato Service Area Annex	6. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on March 31, 1993
Naha Cold Storage	7. In whole	Building	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Sunabe Warehouse	8. In whole	0.3				◎	Returned on June 30, 1993
Yaedake Communication Site	9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Motobu-cho)	19	◎				Returned on November 30, 1994
Onna Communication Site	10. In whole	62			◎		Returned on September 30, 1995
	11. Eastern part	(26)	◎				
Kadena Air Base	12. A part of southern area (Tobaru)	2		◎			Returned on January 31, 1996
Chibana Site	13. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on December 31, 1996
Camp Hansen	14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin)	3		◎			Returned on December 31, 1996
	23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City)	162	◎				Returned on June 30, 2014 (55ha) Returned on June 30, 2017 (107ha)
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	(22. Eastern Side of National Highway 58 (Kino-Hija), Southwestern corner (Yamanaka Area))	74	○				Returned on March 25, 1999
	15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58)	3	○	◎			Returned on March 25, 1999
	(22. Kurahama: site for waste incineration facilities)	9	○				Returned on March 31, 2005
	(22. Continuing use area for GSDF)	58	○				Returned on October 31, 2006
Torii Communication Station	16. Kadena bypass	4		◎			Returned on March 31, 1999
Deputy Division Engineer Office	17. In whole	4	◎				Returned on September 30, 2002
Camp Kuwae	(19. Southern side of the eastern part)	2	○	○			Returned on December 31, 1994
	18. Northern part (Ihei)	38		◎			Returned on March 31, 2003
	(18. Along Route 58)	(5)	○				
MCAS Futenma	21. Lands along eastern side (Nakabaru - Ginowan)	4		◎			Returned on July 31, 2017
	17 facilities, 21 issues	977	7	8	3	3	
<Not yet returned after release agreement was concluded>							
Camp Kuwae	19. Northern side of eastern part (Kuwae)	0.5	◎				Change agreed on December 21, 2001
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	22. Old Higashionna Ammunition Storage Area	43	◎				Release agreed on March 28, 1996
	2 facilities, 2 issues	44	2	0	0	0	
Total	17 facilities, 23 issues	1,021	9	8	3	3	

Notes: 1. For the "Area" column, the value within parentheses is a portion of the value indicated immediately above.

2. A single circle in the "Classification" column expediently indicates that the scope of the case overlaps that of another issue.

3. The numbers in the "Scope" column were assigned only for the purpose of classifying 23 issues.

4. "SCC" in the "Classification" column indicates issues for which release was not achieved by June 1990 with respect to realignment, consolidation, and reduction plans of facilities and areas in Okinawa which were approved by the 15th and 16th Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meetings. "Gun-Ten-Kyo" indicates issues for which release was requested by the Council for promotion of de zoning and utilization of military land and consultation of problems accompanying bases in Okinawa Prefecture chaired by Okinawa's governor. "Governor" indicates issues for which then-Governor Nishime of Okinawa requested the U.S. government to release facilities and areas. "U.S. Forces" indicates issues in which the U.S. side declared to be returnable with respect to facilities and areas in Okinawa.

**Reference 30 The SACO Final Report (tentative translation)**

(December 2, 1996)

The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance.

The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year.

The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996.

The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report.

Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.

Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the yearlong SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary.

The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee.

The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Subcommittee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject.

In accordance with the April 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa related issues at the same time.

**Return Land:**

- Futenma Air Station—See attached.
- Northern Training Area  
Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/9,852 acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions:
  - Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.
  - Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area.
- Aha Training Area  
Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided.
- Gimbaru Training Area  
Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.

- Sobe Communication Site  
Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
- Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield  
Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated.
- Camp Kuwae  
Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa.
- Senaha Communication Station  
Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.
- Makiminato Service Area  
Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area.
- Naha Port  
Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha/87 acres).
- Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran)  
Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.).

**Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:**

- Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104  
Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese FY1997.
- Parachute drop training  
Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.
- Conditioning hikes on public roads  
Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.

**Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:**

- Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station  
Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented.
- Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft  
Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed.
- Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base  
Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996.
- Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base  
Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998.
- Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station  
Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces.

**Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:**

- Accident reports  
Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996. In addition, as part of the U.S. forces' good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces' assets or facilities.
- Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements  
Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.

- Visits to U.S. facilities and areas  
Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
- Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles  
Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on U.S. forces official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all non-tactical U.S. forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997.
- Supplemental automobile insurance  
Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997.
- Payment for claims  
Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:
  - Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.
  - A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by U.S. authorities.
  - In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S. Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount.
- Quarantine procedures  
Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
- Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen  
Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. forces in the United States.
- Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee

#### **The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station**

**(an integral part of the SACO Final Report) (tentative translation)**

(Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996)

1. Introduction
  - a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield's critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF).
  - b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary.
  - c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.-Japan working group under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of its work.
2. Decisions of the SCC
  - a. Pursue construction of an SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station's flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)—capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations.
  - b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions.
  - c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base.
  - d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities, which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available.
  - e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.
3. Guiding Principles
  - a. Futenma Air Station's critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.
  - b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station's operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing U.S. facilities and areas.
  - c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other U.S. military facilities and housing.
  - d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations.
  - e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision.
  - f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation.
4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods  
Studies have been conducted by a "Technical Support Group" comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a "Technical Advisory Group" comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible.
  - a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules)—supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed.
  - b. Pontoon Type—platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater.
  - c. Semi-Submersible Type—platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.
5. The Next Steps
  - a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection.
  - b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility.
  - c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility.

## Reference 31 Progress of the SACO Final Report

### [Return of Lands]

#### 1. Already returned facilities

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Northern Training Area (Return of major portion)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after seven HLZs are relocated, etc.</li> <li>• February 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on changes to the agreement of April 1999 (HLZs: from 7 HLZs to 6 HLZs, reduction of the scale of the site preparation from 75 m to 45 m in diameter)</li> <li>• December 2016: Major portion (approximately 4,010ha) was returned</li> </ul>
Aha Training Area (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• December 1998: Total return completed (release of joint use)</li> </ul>
Gimbaru Training Area (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• January 2008: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the helicopter landing zone (HLZ) is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen</li> <li>• July 2011: Total return completed (approximately 60ha)</li> </ul>
Sobe Communication Site (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after communication systems including communication facilities such as antennas and others are relocated to Camp Hansen</li> <li>• December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53ha) returned</li> </ul>
Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• October 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the Sobe Communication Site is relocated</li> <li>• December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 191ha) returned</li> </ul>
Senaha Communication Station (Return of most areas)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• March 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on return of most land after communication systems including the antenna facilities and others are relocated to Torii Communication Station</li> <li>• September 2006: Partially returned (approximately 61ha excluding the microwave tower portion)</li> <li>• October 2006: The microwave tower portion consolidated into Torii Communication Station</li> </ul>

#### 2. Facilities to be returned as the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
MCAS Futenma (Return of total area → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</li> <li>• December 2015: Japan and the U.S. came to an agreement on partial early land return to be used for municipal roads.</li> </ul> <hr/> <p>[Already returned area]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May 1997: Partially returned (approx. 473m<sup>2</sup>)</li> <li>• September 1997: Partially returned (approx. 62m<sup>2</sup>)</li> <li>• July 2017: Partially returned (approx. 4ha)</li> <li>• March 2018: Partially returned (approx. 0.4ha)</li> </ul>
Camp Kuwae (Return of most areas) → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• July 2002: Youth Center provided</li> <li>• January 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of the Naval Hospital and other related facilities.</li> <li>• December 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the Naval Hospital.</li> <li>• February 2008: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of accessory facility (heliport)</li> <li>• December 2008: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of accessory facility (utility).</li> <li>• May 2009: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facility (barracks for non-accompanied enlisted sailors)</li> <li>• October 2009: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facility (water tank 1)</li> <li>• October 2010: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facility (water tank 2)</li> <li>• September 2011: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities (barracks for non-accompanied officers, blood storage facility, etc.)</li> <li>• February 2013: 13 buildings including the Naval Hospital were furnished</li> <li>• March 2013: The Naval Hospital opened</li> <li>• December 2013: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (preventive medical center, alcohol rehabilitation center, etc.)</li> <li>• December 2015: Related facilities of the Naval Hospital (BOQ and blood storage facility, etc.) were furnished</li> </ul> <hr/> <p>[Already returned Area]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• March 2003: Northern side returned (approximately 38ha)</li> </ul>
Makiminato Service Area (Return of most areas) → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</li> <li>• December 2015: the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on partial land return for the expansion of national highway</li> <li>• March 2018: Partially returned (approximately 3ha)</li> </ul> <hr/> <p>[Already returned area]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May 1997: Partially returned (approx. 38m<sup>2</sup>)</li> <li>• September 2001: Partially returned (approx. 1ha)</li> <li>• August, 2013: Return of north access road (approx. 1ha)</li> <li>• March 2018: Partially returned (approx. 3ha)</li> <li>• March 31, 2019: Return of area near Gate 5 (approx. 2ha)</li> </ul>
Naha Port Facility (Return of total area → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</li> </ul> <hr/> <p>[Already returned area]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• June 2000: Partially returned (approx. 1ha)</li> </ul>



Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Housing Consolidation Camp Zukeran (Return of partial area → Return of partial area)*	(Phase I: Golf Range Area) • April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • July 2002: Two high rises were furnished • July 2006: An underpass was furnished (Phase II: Sada Area) • February 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • September 2005: Two high rises, 38 townhouses, and others were furnished (Phase III: Eastern Chatan Area) • March 2004: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • June 2008: 35 townhouses and others were furnished (Phase IV: Futenma and Upper Plaza Area) • March 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • February 2010: 24 townhouses constructed in Upper Plaza Area were furnished • May 2006: Camp Zukeran was described as partial return in the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation * April 2013: It was written in the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa that the OHC plan will be reassessed under SACO, and that 910 family housing (including alternatives for housing that are to be removed in consolidated areas) will be built in addition to 56 housing already agreed to build based on the request for family housing after the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.
	[Already returned area] • March 1997: Partially returned (approx. 371m <sup>2</sup> ) • May 1997: Partially returned (approx. 598m <sup>2</sup> ) • June 1997: Partially returned (approx. 353m <sup>2</sup> ) • December 1997: Partially returned (approx. 0.3ha) • March 1998: Partially returned (approx. 2ha) • February 2000: Partially returned (approx. 3ha) • December 2006: Partially returned (approx. 145m <sup>2</sup> ) • March, 2015: Return of West Futenma Housing Area (approx. 51ha)

#### [Adjustment in training or operation]

Point	State of Progress
Relocation of Artillery Live-fire Training over Highway 104	• Relocated to five maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan in FY1997
Parachute Drop Training	• Relocation training conducted at Iejima Auxiliary Airfield since July 2000

#### [Implementation of initiatives to reduce noise]

##### 1. Initiatives already taken

Point	State of Progress
Relocation of the U.S. Navy Ramp at Kadena Air Base	• June 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of rinse facility • September 2008: Rinse Facility was furnished • February 2009: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation of Navy Ramp • October 2010: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of area forming and the construction of ramp and taxiway. • April 2011: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of the construction of parking and utility. • February 2013: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of the construction of type II maintenance hangar. • July 2013: Ramp, etc. provided. • July 2014: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of construction of hangars, etc. • December 2016: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the furnishing of maintenance hangar, etc. • January 2017: Relocation completed
Installation of Noise Reduction Baffles at Kadena Air Base	• July 2000: Furnished

##### 2. Ongoing initiatives as the U.S. Forces realignment

Point	State of Progress
Transfer of KC-130 aircraft*	* May 2006: United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation stated that the KC-130 squadron would be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and that the aircraft would regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam.

**Reference 32 Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility**

Month & Year	Background
April 1996	Then Prime Minister Hashimoto and then U.S. Ambassador Mondale held a meeting, and the full return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) was announced. SACO Interim Report. → The airfield will be returned within five to seven years, following the completion of an adequate replacement facility.
December 1996	SACO Final Report → A maritime facility will be constructed off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa (one that can be dismantled).
November 1999	Then Governor of Okinawa Inamine stated that he had chosen the Henoko coast region of Nago City as a candidate for the facility relocation on condition that it would be for joint military-civilian use
December 1999	Then Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF "Government Policy on Relocation of MCAS Futenma" (Cabinet decision) → Construction in the Nago City Henoko coastal region in the water area of Camp Schwab
July 2002	"Basic Agreement Regarding the Use of Replacement Facilities" concluded between the Director General of Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. "Basic Plan for Replacement Facilities for MCAS Futenma" was prepared. → Scale, construction methods, and specific construction site decided
November 2003	Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visited Okinawa.
August 2004	A U.S. Forces helicopter crashed into a university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa.
October 2005	"2+2" Joint Statement → Agreement on a new plan (an L shape plan connecting the coastal area of Camp Schwab with the adjacent water area of Oura bay)
April 2006	"Basic Agreement Regarding the Construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility" concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency, the Mayor of Nago, and the village mayor of Ginoza. → Agreement was reached by creating flight paths avoiding overflight of the surrounding region (the V shape plan).
May 2006	• "2+2" Joint Statement → Final adjustments made for the "U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation," V shape plan approved "Basic Confirmation Regarding the Realignment of U.S. Military Forces in Okinawa" concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. • "GOJ Efforts for USFJ Force Structure Realignment and Others" (Cabinet decision) → The cabinet decision of December 1999 was abolished.
August 2006	Establishment of "the Council on Measures for Relocation of MCAS Futenma"
August 2007	The EIA scoping document was sent to the governor, municipal mayors etc. of Okinawa.
April 2009	Draft Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.
September 2009	Conclusion of a three-party coalition government agreement between the Democratic Party of Japan, the Social Democratic Party, and the People's New Party. → Agreement on reviewing the status of the U.S. Forces realignment and U.S. Forces bases in Japan.
November 2009	Establishment of the Ministerial-Level Working Group on the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station. Japan-U.S. summit meeting → Agreement on resolving the relocation of Futenma Air Station expeditiously through the working group.
December 2009	Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies convened, Exploratory Committee for the Okinawa Bases Issue was established.
May 2010	"2+2" Joint Statement → Confirmed the intention to locate the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas Cabinet approval of "immediate actions by the Government of Japan on items decided by the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee on May 28th, 2010"
August 2010	Futenma Replacement Facility Bilateral Experts Study Group Report
June 2011	"2+2" Joint Statement → Confirming the commitment that a replacement plan should be completed as early as possible after 2014, while deciding that the shape of the runway in the replaced facility should be V-shaped.
December 2011 - January 2012	The Environmental Impact Statement report was sent to the governor of Okinawa.
February 2012	The Japan-U.S. Joint Statement was announced on the realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. → Official discussion was initiated to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.
April 2012	"2+2" Joint Statement → The current plan to relocate the air base from Futenma to Henoko was reconfirmed to be the only viable solution. Agreement reached to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.
December 2012	Revised Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.
March 2013	Application for approval of public water body reclamation was submitted to the governor of Okinawa.
April 2013	Release of "the consolidation plan of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa" → MCAS Futenma can be returned in FY2022 or later through relocation, etc.
October 2013	"2+2" Joint Statement → Recognition was reaffirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma
December 2013	Governor of Okinawa approved reclamation of the public water body related to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project
July 2014	Started the construction of replacement facilities
April 2015	"2+2" Joint Statement → Reconfirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma
October 2015	• Governor of Okinawa revoked the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility project • The Okinawa Defense Bureau requested the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to review the governor of Okinawa's revocation of the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility project, and requested the suspension of its execution • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism decided to suspend execution of the revocation of the landfill permit
November 2015	• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting and Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Reconfirmed that constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed an administrative suit seeking a retraction of revocation of the landfill permit
March 2016	• The government announced it would accept the court's settlement recommendation • Landfill work was suspended • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued a correction instruction to Okinawa Prefecture over its revocation of the landfill permit • Okinawa Prefecture applied for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council of the correction instruction issued by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism

Month & Year	Background
April 2016	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Japan explained that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and that the Government decided to accept a court suggested settlement under the philosophy of "haste makes waste," and stated that it would like to realize the return of MCAS Futenma through the completion of the relocation to Henoko at the earliest possible time and will continue to make joint efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. The U.S. stated that it understands the court-suggested settlement on the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko as Prime Minister Abe's strategic decision, and said that the U.S. will continue its efforts through close cooperation.
June 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council notified the results of the review</li> <li>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Japan stated that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. stated that it fully understands the views of the Japanese Government and will continue to work closely with Japan.</li> </ul>
July 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed a suit seeking confirmation of the violation of law for the failure to act</li> </ul>
September 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Japan stated that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. stated that it will continue to work closely with Japan.</li> </ul>
December 2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, and agreed to continue to work together closely</li> <li>The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Governor of Okinawa in a suit seeking confirmation of the violation of law for the failure to act (finalized victory of the national government)</li> <li>Governor of Okinawa retracted the revocation of the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project</li> <li>Resumed the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project</li> <li>Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Japan explained that its position remains unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, that construction has resumed following the Supreme Court ruling, and that the Government will steadily move forward with the construction</li> </ul>
February 2017	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, and agreed to continue to work together closely</li> <li>Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution</li> </ul>
April 2017	Began construction of the seawall, the main part of the public waters reclamation
July 2017	Okinawa Prefectural Government filed a lawsuit against the central government arguing it is illegal to damage rock on the seabed without securing permission of the governor.
August 2017	Joint statement of "2+2" → The four ministers reaffirmed that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma.
March 2018	Naha District Court dismissed Okinawa Prefecture's claim regarding a suit that demands for an injunctive order for actions that damage the reefs, etc.
August 2018	Okinawa Prefecture revoked (withdrew) the landfill permit for public waters.
October 2018	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Okinawa Defense Bureau requested the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to review Okinawa Prefecture's withdrawal of the landfill permit for public waters, and requested the suspension of its execution.</li> <li>The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism decided to suspend execution of the withdrawal of the landfill permit.</li> </ul>
November 2018	Okinawa Prefecture objected to the decision by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to suspend execution, and applied for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council.
December 2018	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court rejected an appeal by Okinawa Prefecture regarding a suit that demands for an injunctive order for actions that damage the reefs, etc.</li> <li>Landfill work in Henoko side commenced</li> </ul>
February 2019	The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council dismissed the request for review by Okinawa Prefecture.
March 2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit to demand a revocation of the decision to suspend execution of the withdrawal of the landfill permit.</li> <li>Okinawa Prefecture withdrew a petition for acceptance of final appeal with the Supreme Court regarding a suit that demands for an injunctive order for actions that damage the reefs, etc. (finalized victory of the central government).</li> </ul>
April 2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regarding the request for review by the Okinawa Defense Bureau, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism decided to revoke the withdrawal of the landfill permit by Okinawa Prefecture</li> <li>Okinawa Prefecture withdrew its claim regarding the suit to revoke the decision to suspend execution of the withdrawal of the landfill permit.</li> <li>Okinawa Prefecture objected to the decision by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and applied for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council</li> </ul>
June 2019	The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council dismissed the request for review by Okinawa Prefecture

### Reference 33 Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena

Areas Eligible for Immediate Return Upon Completion of Necessary Procedures	
West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	Returned (March 31, 2015)
The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	Returned (August 31, 2013)
Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	Returned (March 31, 2019)
A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2019 or later <sup>1</sup>
Areas Eligible for Return Once the Replacement Facilities in Okinawa are Provided	
Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester)	JFY2025 or later
Lower Plaza Housing area, Comp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2024 or later
A part of Kishaba Housing area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2024 or later
The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2024 or later <sup>2,3</sup>
Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area	JFY2025 or later
Naha Port	JFY2028 or later
Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1	JFY2022 or later
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma	JFY2022 or later

Areas Eligible for Return as USMC Forces Relocate from Okinawa to Locations Outside of Japan	
Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	—
The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	JFY2024 or later <sup>4</sup>

Notes: 1. Shirahi River area can be returned at the same timing.

2. Part of the logistics support units in this area are scheduled to be relocated to locations outside of Japan. Efforts will be made to minimize the impact of the relocation on the approximate timing for return. However, the relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation.

3. Area south of the Industrial Corridor (Camp Foster) can be returned at the same timing.

4. Plans for USMC relocation to locations outside of Japan have not yet been determined. The relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation.

#### Reference 34 Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces

June 6, 2011	The U.S. Department of Defense announced that the CH-46 deployed at MCAS Futenma would be replaced with the MV-22 Osprey in the latter half of 2012.
June 13, 2012-	Provided an explanation on the results of the Environment Review, MV-22 pamphlet, etc. to Okinawa Prefecture, relevant local governments and other organizations.
June 29-	Host Nation Notification and U.S. Department of Defense press release regarding the deployment of the MV-22 Osprey to Okinawa <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deployed a squadron in October 2012 (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in late July).</li> <li>• Deployed an additional squadron in summer 2013.</li> <li>• The results of the investigation of the crash accident were provided to the Government of Japan; the MV-22 Osprey did not conduct any flights in Japan until the safety of flight operations was reconfirmed.</li> </ul>
July 23	Off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.
September 19	Released the report "MV-22 Osprey deployment in Okinawa" (that safety was confirmed by the government). The Joint Committee agreed on matters related to the Osprey's operations.
October 6	Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.
January 28, 2013	The Okinawa Citizens' Council, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, and other organizations sent a statement to the Prime Minister.
April 30	The MOD provided explanation to the relevant local governments and other organizations regarding the U.S. explanation on the deployment of the MV-22 squadron (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in summer 2013).
July 30	The second squadron off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.
September 25	Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.
May 11, 2015	The U.S. Department of Defense announced that it would deploy the CV-22 Osprey at Yokota Air Base starting in the latter half of 2017.
December 13, 2016	Emergency landing of an MV-22 Osprey off the coast of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture.
February 1, 2017	Planned maintenance interval of the MV-22 Osprey was commenced at Camp Kisarazu.
March 14	Informed relevant local governments and other organizations that the U.S. Department of Defense announced the postponement of the arrival of the CV-22 Osprey that were to be deployed at Yokota Air Base.
August 5	Accident of a MV-22 attached to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Force (Futenma) off the east coast of Australia.
April 3, 2018	U.S. Forces in Japan announced that five CV-22 Osprey would be deployed to Japan around summer of 2018, and that a total of ten Osprey would be deployed gradually over the next few years.
August 22, 2018	Informed relevant local governments and other organizations that the U.S. Forces in Japan announced that five CV-22 Osprey would be deployed at Yokota Air Base on October 1, 2018, and that a total of ten CV-22 would be deployed at Yokota Air Base gradually by around 2024.
October 1, 2018	Five CV-22 Osprey were deployed at Yokota Air Base.



## Reference 35 Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan

### 1. Purpose

It is critically important to realize the realignment of the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ), in order to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in Japan and to mitigate the impact of defense facilities on surrounding residents by all of Japan. In this light, the purpose of this Act is to contribute to the smooth implementation of USFJ realignment by taking the following special measures, etc.

### 2. Special Measures, etc.

#### (1) Realignment grants for municipalities incurring greater impacts

- In connection with the realignment of USFJ, the national government designates defense facilities for which it is deemed that consideration must be paid to their increasing impacts on the stability of the lives of the residents in the surrounding areas. Realignment grants are awarded to municipalities in the area of such defense facilities, in order to cover the expenses of the projects that contribute to making the residents' lives more convenient and to developing industries, if the grants are considered necessary to help carry out the USFJ realignment smoothly and infallibly.
- The national government takes into consideration the extent that the stability of the lives of the residents is impacted, and awards the realignment grants based on both the progress of the measures for achieving realignment and the length of time that has passed since the measures were first implemented.

#### (2) Public project special provisions for areas incurring particularly large impacts

- Designate areas that include municipalities incurring particularly large impacts as Special Area for Development concerning Realignment, and promote the development of these areas by establishing special provisions for cost sharing by local governments when developing roads, ports, and other infrastructure.
- Set up at the MOD the Council for Local Development concerning Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces comprised of relevant ministers, and at the Council's meetings discuss matters such as the designation of the Special Area for Development concerning Realignment and the establishment of the development plan for the area (Development Plan for Special Area for Development concerning Realignment).

#### (3) Measures for USFJ local employees

- Implement skills education and training that contribute to the continuous employment of USFJ local employees.

### 3. Expiration of the Law

This Act expires on March 31, 2027; provided, however, that the realignment grants will be awarded until March 31, 2032 at the latest based on the situation of the realignment.

Notes: 1. At the time of its enactment this Act was set to expire on March 31, 2017. However, the term of validity has been extended by 10 years to March 31, 2027 pursuant to the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017.

2. At the time of its enactment, this Act provided for the special measures, etc. under this Act in 2. (1) to (3) above, as well as for special provisions for the operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation for the implementation of investments and loans for family housing and infrastructure development related to USFJ relocation to the United States of America (Guam) for the promotion of said relocation.

However, the said provision was abolished pursuant to the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017, after the 2+2 Joint Statement of April 2012 limited Japan's financial commitment for the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam to direct cash contribution and it was confirmed that other forms of financial assistance (investments and loans) would not be utilized.

## Reference 36 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America on Cooperation with Regard to Implementation Practices Relating to the Civilian Component of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan

(signed on January 16, 2017)

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the "United States Government"), hereinafter referred to as the "Parties";

Confirming that the United States armed forces in Japan (hereinafter referred to as the "United States armed forces") under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the "Treaty") and the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (hereinafter referred to as the "Status of Forces Agreement"), both signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, contribute to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East;

Bearing in mind the "Japan-United States Joint Statement on Reviewing Implementation Practices of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Related to U.S. Personnel with SOFA Status, Including the Civilian Component" announced by the Parties on July 5, 2016, and its recognition of the spirit of Alliance cooperation and the mutual commitment of Japan and the United States to strengthen the Alliance further and to enhance deterrence in a complex regional and global security environment;

Acknowledging the essential role of members of the civilian component defined in subparagraph (b) of Article I of the Status of Forces Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Civilian Component") in fulfilling the United States' obligations under the Treaty, as well as the importance of training and

education processes for United States personnel with Status of Forces Agreement status;

Wishing to strengthen cooperation between the Parties by establishing a framework, including this Agreement which supplements the Status of Forces Agreement, with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian Component;

Affirming the continuing effectiveness of the Joint Committee provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Joint Committee") as the means for consultation between the Parties on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement; and

Convinced that enhanced cooperation with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian Component further contributes to achieving the objective of the Treaty and strengthening the Alliance;

Have agreed as follows:

#### ARTICLE 1

The purpose of this Agreement is to enhance cooperation between the Parties with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian Component.

#### ARTICLE 2

The Parties shall establish a Working Group within the framework of the Joint Committee. Through the Working Group, the Parties shall retain the right to initiate consultations regarding implementation of this Agreement.

#### ARTICLE 3

The Parties shall continue to cooperate fully, through the framework of the Joint Committee, to clarify the scope of the Civilian Component, which plays an essential role in fulfilling the United States' obligations under the Treaty.

1. The United States Government will designate members of the Civilian Component consistent with the categories of persons that the Parties shall direct the Joint Committee to develop.
2. The Parties also shall direct the Joint Committee to develop criteria that the United States Government will use in evaluating contractor employee

positions for eligibility to receive designation as members of the Civilian Component. Such criteria are to be established so that those who are eligible to receive designation as members of the Civilian Component have skills or knowledge required for the accomplishment of mission requirements.

#### ARTICLE 4

Through the framework of the Joint Committee, the Parties also shall cooperate to strengthen mechanisms and procedures to ensure that persons ordinarily resident in Japan are excluded from being members of the Civilian Component.

#### ARTICLE 5

1. The Parties, through the framework of the Joint Committee, shall establish a procedure so that the Government of Japan is notified promptly of contractor employees who have been designated as members of the Civilian Component. The Parties shall consult in the Working Group upon the request of either Party regarding such notification.
2. Upon the development of criteria as directed in Article 3, the United States Government is to establish and maintain procedures for formalized, regular reviews of contractor employees who are designated as members of the Civilian Component to ensure that they are in fact eligible for such status.

3. The Parties, through the Working Group referred to in Article 2, shall establish procedures for regular reports regarding the Civilian Component. The United States Government is to provide such reports to the Government of Japan.

#### ARTICLE 6

If any dispute arises between the Parties relating to the implementation of this Agreement, the Parties shall settle it in accordance with the procedures for resolving matters set out in Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement.

















#### ARTICLE 7

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature.
2. This Agreement shall remain in force as long as the Status of Forces Agreement remains in force.
3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2 of this Article, either Party may terminate this Agreement by giving one year's written notice through diplomatic channels to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed the present Agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Tokyo in the Japanese and English languages, both texts being equally authentic, this sixteenth day of January 2017.

### Reference 37 Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements

	Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement	Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA)	Information Security Agreement	Security and Defense Cooperation Documents
 United States	Signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America in March 1954 and entered into force in May 1954 Established the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America (exchange of notes) in November 1983 Established the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America (exchange of notes) in June 2006	Signed in April 1996 and entered into force in October 1996 Signed in April 1998 and revised in September 1999 Signed in February 2004 and revised in July 2004 Signed in September 2016 and entered into force in April 2017	Signed and entered into force in August 2007	Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Signed in September 1951 and entered into force in April 1952 Signed in January 1960 and entered into force in June 1960 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Set forth in November 1978 Set forth in September 1997 Set forth in April 2015 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996
 Australia	Signed in July 2014 Entered into force in December 2014	Signed in May 2010 Entered into force in January 2013 Signed in January 2017 Entered into force in September 2017	Signed in May 2012 Entered into force in March 2013	Signed memorandum in September 2003 Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security in March 2007 Revised memorandum in December 2008
 United Kingdom	Signed and entered into force in July 2013	Signed in January 2017 Entered into force in August 2017	Signed in July 2013 Entered into force in January 2014	Signed memorandum in January 2004 Revised memorandum in June 2012 Japan-U.K. Joint Declaration on Security in August 2017
 France	Signed in March 2015 Entered into force in December 2016	Signed in July 2018 Entered into force in June 2019	Signed and entered into force in October 2011	Signed statement of intent in July 2014
 India	Signed in December 2015 Entered into force in March 2016	Agreed to begin negotiations for conclusion at the Japan-India Summit Meeting in October 2018	Signed and entered into force in December 2015	Japan-India Joint Declaration on Security in October 2008 Signed memorandum in September 2014
 Republic of Korea	—	Agreed to move forward with opinion exchanges at the Japan-ROK Ministerial Meeting in January 2011	Signed and entered into force in November 2016	Signed statement of intent in April 2009
 Indonesia	Agreed to begin negotiations at the "2+2" Meeting in December 2015	—	—	Signed memorandum in March 2015
 Philippines	Signed in February 2016 Entered into force in April 2016	—	—	Signed statement of intent in July 2012 Signed memorandum in January 2015
 New Zealand	—	Agreed to consider at Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting in July 2014	—	Signed memorandum in August 2013
 Germany	Signed and entered into force in July 2017	—	Affirmed conclusion of an agreement in principle at Japan-Germany Summit Meeting in February 2019	—
 Italy	Signed in May 2017 Entered into force in April 2019	—	Signed in March 2016 Entered into force in June 2016	Signed statement of intent in June 2012 Signed memorandum in May 2017
 Canada	—	Signed in April 2018 Entered into force in July 2019	—	Japan-Canada Joint Declaration on Political, Peace and Security Cooperation in November 2010
 Russia	—	—	—	Signed memorandum in August 1999 Revised memorandum in January 2006
 NATO	—	—	Signed and entered into force in June 2010	Announced: Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) between Japan and NATO in May 2014 Revised in May 2018
 Malaysia	Signed and entered into force in April 2018	—	—	Signed memorandum in September 2018
 UAE	—	—	—	Signed memorandum in May 2018

Notes: Signed Memorandum with Singapore, Vietnam, Mongolia, Bahrain, Cambodia, Sweden, Spain, Qatar, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Colombia the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Czech, Ukraine, Finland and Oman; signed statement of intent with Turkey

## Reference 38

## Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2018)

(Number of students)

Country Institution	Thailand	Philippines	Indonesia	Singapore	Malaysia	Vietnam	Cambodia	Timor- Leste	Laos	Myanmar	India	Pakistan	Republic of Korea	Mongolia	Australia	United States	United Kingdom	Germany	France	New Zealand	Mexico	Spain	Ghana	Qatar	Sri Lanka	Italy	Sub total
National Institute for Defense Studies											1					2		1									4
National Defense Academy	6	2				11	2	2	2	2			3	3	1	5			7								46
Ground Self-Defense Force (Training Evaluation Research and Development Command, etc.)	1						1				1	4	3	2		3											15
Maritime Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)	1										1		2		1												5
Air Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)	1										1		4			1											7
Joint Staff College	1				2						1		4					2		1	2	1	1	1	2	1	19
Total	10	2	0	0	2	11	3	2	2	2	5	4	16	5	2	11	0	3	7	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	96

## Reference 39

## Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (Past Three Years)

(Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019)

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Apr. 2016	Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Army
	Aug. 2016	Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
	Sep. 2016	Visit to Australia by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Jan. 2017	Visit to Australia by Prime Minister of Japan (Summit Meeting)
		✧ Japan-Australia ACSA signed and entered into force in September 2017
	Jan. 2017	Visit to Australia by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Feb. 2017	Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Apr. 2017	Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (7th "2+2" Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting)
	Jun. 2017	Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Army
	Jul. 2017	Visit to Australia by Vice Defense Minister of Japan
	Sep. 2017	Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Air Force
	Sep. 2017	Telephone conference between Japanese and Australian Defense Ministers
	Oct. 2017	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (4th ADMM-Plus))
	Jan. 2018	Visit to Japan by Australian Prime Minister (summit meeting, meeting with Japanese Defense Minister)
	Mar. 2018	Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Sep. 2018	Telephone conference between Japanese and Australian Defense Ministers
	Oct. 2018	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (8th "2+2" Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting)
	Oct. 2018	Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Navy
	Jan. 2019	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting
	Jan. 2019	Visit to Australia by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Feb. 2019	Visit to Australia by Chief of Staff
	Feb. 2019	Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Feb. 2019	Visit to Australia by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Yamada
	Jun. 2019	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Jan. 2018	Japan-Australia Military-Military Consultations (MM)
	May 2019	Japan-Australia Military-Military Consultations (MM)

Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Mar. - May 2016	Participation in Japan-Australia Trident exercise (MSDF)
	May 2016	Participation in Japan-Australia bilateral exercise (MSDF)
	Sep. 2016	Visit to U.S. Yokota Air Base by Australian Air Force aircraft (KC-30A) and implementation of exchanges between inflight refueling and airlift troops
	Dec. 2016	Visit to Chitose Air Base by Australian Air Force aircraft (government plane: B-737) and implementation of exchanges between special airlift troops
	Feb. 2017	Dispatch of ASDF KC-767 to Australia
	Aug. 2017	Visit to Australia by Central Readiness Force
	Oct. 2017	Participation in Japan-Australia Trident exercise (MSDF)
	Oct. 2017	Visit to Iruma Air Base by Australian C-130J, and implementation of exchanges between airlift troops
	Nov. 2017	Participation in Japan-Australia bilateral exercise (MSDF)
	Nov. 2017	Dispatch of C-2 to Australia (overseas flight training) and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges
	Dec. 2017	Implementation of exchanges between Central Readiness Force and Australian Army 1st Division
	Sep. 2018	Participation in Japan-Australia Trident exercise (MSDF)
Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral cooperation (See reference 46 for training and exercise)	Jun. 2016	4th Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff)
	Feb. 2016	Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)
	Oct. 2016	Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)
	Jun. 2017	5th Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Japan) (GSDF Chief of Staff)
	Jun. 2017	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	May 2018	Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)
	Jun. 2018	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	May 2019	Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)
	Jun. 2019	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue))

**Reference 40 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India and Sri Lanka (Past Three Years)**

(Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019)

High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense	India	Jun. 2016	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
		Jul. 2016	Visit to India by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) (Delhi)
		Nov. 2016	Visit to India by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense
		Dec. 2016	Visit to India by ASDF Chief of Staff
		Dec. 2016	Visit to Japan by Chief of the Navy Staff, Indian Navy
		Apr. 2017	Visit to India by GSDF Chief of Staff
		May 2017	Visit to Japan by Indian Defense Minister (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
		Sep. 2017	Visit to Japan by Indian Defense Minister (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
		Jan. 2018	Visit to India by Chief of Staff (participated in the Raisina Dialogue)
		Mar. 2018	Visit to India by Chief of Staff
		Aug. 2018	Visit to India by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) (Delhi)
		Nov. 2018	Visit to India by MSDF Chief of Staff
		Dec. 2018	Visit to Japan by Chief of the Air Staff of Indian Air Force
		Jan. 2019	Visit to India by Chief of Staff (participated in the Raisina Dialogue)
	Sri Lanka	Dec. 2016	Visit to Sri Lanka by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
		Jul. 2017	Visit to Sri Lanka by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
		Nov. 2017	Visit to Japan by Sri Lankan State Minister of Defense
		Mar. 2018	Visit to Sri Lanka by Chief of Staff
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	India	Aug. 2018	Visit to Sri Lanka by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
		Mar. 2017	4th Vice-Minister/Secretary level "2+2" dialogue, 5th Defence Policy Dialogue (Tokyo)
		Jun. 2018	5th Vice-Minister/Secretary level "2+2" dialogue, 6th Defence Policy Dialogue (Delhi)



Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	India	Jun. 2016 Unit-to-unit exchanges involving Indian Air Force transport aircraft crews in ASDF bases. Jul. 2016 ASDF KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft dispatched to India. Aug. 2016 Japan-India goodwill exercise (MSDF) Dec. 2016 Japan-India goodwill exercise (MSDF) Mar. 2017 Unit-to-unit exchanges in the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief area with Indian Air Force helicopter units (Japan) Apr. 2017 3rd India-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security Sep. 2017 Japan-India goodwill exercise (MSDF) Oct. 2017 Japan-India goodwill and bilateral exercise (MSDF) Dec. 2017 Unit-to-unit exchanges in the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief area with Indian Air Force helicopter units (India) Jan. 2018 Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF) May 2018 Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF) Jul. 2018 4th India-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security Sep. 2018 Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF) Oct. 2018 Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF) Oct. - Nov. 2018 Japan-India bilateral exercise (GSDF) Nov. 2018 Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF) Dec. 2018 Japan-India bilateral exercise (ASDF) Feb. 2019 Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF)	
	Sri Lanka	Apr. 2016 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise May 2016 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Jul. 2016 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Dec. 2016 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Apr. 2017 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Jul. 2017 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Aug. 2017 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Dec. 2017 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Aug. 2018 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Oct. 2018 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Jan. 2019 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Mar. 2019 Dispatch of ASDF U-4 to Sri Lanka (overseas flight training and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges)	
Japan-U.S.-India trilateral cooperation (See reference 50 for training and exercise)		Jun. 2016 8th Japan-U.S.-India Consultation (Tokyo) Apr. 2018 9th Japan-U.S.-India Consultation (Delhi)	

**Reference 41 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN member states (Past Three Years)**

(Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019)

High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense	Indonesia	Apr. 2016 Visit to Indonesia by MSDF Chief of Staff Apr. 2016 Visit to Japan by Indonesian Chief of Staff of the army Aug. 2016 Visit to Indonesia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Vice Defense Minister of Indonesia (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Oct. 2016 Visit to Japan by Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff (AFFJ) Nov. 2016 Visit to Indonesia by Chief of Joint Staff Sep. 2018 Visit to Japan by Vice Defense Minister of Indonesia (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))	
	Vietnam	Jul. 2016 Visit to Vietnam by Chief of Joint Staff (Pacific Partnership) Aug. 2016 Visit to Vietnam by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Nov. 2016 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Jun. 2017 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Aug. 2017 Visit to Vietnam by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Oct. 2017 Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (4th ADMM-Plus)) Jan. 2018 Visit to Vietnam by Chief of Joint Staff Apr. 2018 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Minister of Defence (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Jun. 2018 Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Jul. 2018 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Sep. 2018 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Jan. 2019 Visit to Vietnam by ASDF Chief of Staff Mar. 2019 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Chief of General Staff May 2019 Visit to Vietnam by Minister of Defense	

Singapore	Jun. 2016	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jun. 2016	Japan-Singapore Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	May 2017	Visit to Singapore by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Jun. 2017	Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Philippines	Jun. 2017	Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Oct. 2017	Visit to Japan by Chief of Singapore Army
	Feb. 2018	Visit to Singapore by ASDF Chief of Staff
	May 2018	Visit to Japan by Singaporean Minister of Defence (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
	Jun. 2018	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2018	Visit to Singapore by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	Sep. 2018	Visit to Japan by Singaporean Defence Permanent Secretary (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Oct. 2018	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (5th ADMM-Plus))
	May 2019	Visit to Japan by Singaporean Minister of Defence
	May 2016	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Teleconference
Thailand	Sep. 2016	Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Sep. 2016	Visit to the Philippines by Chief of Joint Staff
	Oct. 2016	Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine Air Force (AFFJ)
	Feb. 2017	Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Navy
	Mar. 2017	Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense
	Apr. 2017	Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	May 2017	Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Sep. 2017	Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Oct. 2017	Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	Oct. 2017	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (4th ADMM-Plus))
	Nov. 2017	Visit to the Philippines by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Mar. 2018	Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	Apr. 2018	Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Navy
	Apr. 2018	Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	Jun. 2018	Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Jun. 2018	Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Sep. 2018	Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	Sep. 2018	Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Nov. 2018	Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Cambodia	Nov. 2018	Visit to Japan by Undersecretary for Finance and Materiel of the Philippine Department of National Defense
	Mar. 2019	Visit to Japan by Undersecretary for Finance and Materiel of the Philippine Department of National Defense and Commanding General of Philippine Air Force (Turnover ceremony for the parts, etc. of UH-1Hs)
	Mar. 2019	Visit to the Philippines by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Apr. 2019	Visit to Japan by Philippine Secretary of National Defense
	Jun. 2019	Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff
	May 2016	Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Army Commander
	Jun. 2016	Visit to Thailand by Minister of Defense
	Aug. 2016	Visit to Japan by Thai Chief of Defence Forces
	Aug. 2016	Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	Nov. 2016	Visit to Thailand by ASDF Chief of Staff
Myanmar	Jan. 2017	Visit to Thailand by Administrative Vice Minister of Defense
	Mar. 2017	Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	May 2017	Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Air Force Commander
	Nov. 2017	Visit to Thailand by State Minister of Defense
	Nov. 2017	Visit to Thailand by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Feb. 2018	Visit to Thailand by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (to observe exercise)
	Mar. 2018	Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	Apr. 2018	Visit to Japan by Thai Chief of Defence Forces
	May 2018	Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Air Force Commander
	Sep. 2018	Visit to Thailand by ASDF Chief of Staff
Cambodia	May 2019	Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Air Force Commander
	Aug. 2016	Visit to Cambodia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	Sep. 2016	Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Oct. 2016	Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Cambodian Air Force (AFFJ)
	Sep. 2017	Visit to Japan by Cambodian Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting, Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Sep. 2017	Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Sep. 2018	Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Apr. 2016	Visit to Myanmar by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	Jun. 2016	Visit to Myanmar by Minister of Defense
	Jul. 2016	Visit to Myanmar by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Myanmar	Sep. 2016	Visit to Japan by Myanmar Secretary of National Defense and Deputy Minister of Defence (Tokyo (Defense Ministerial Meeting), Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Oct. 2016	Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Air Force (AFFJ)
	Aug. 2017	Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services of Myanmar
	Sep. 2017	Visit to Japan by Myanmar Deputy Minister of Defense (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Jan. 2018	Visit to Myanmar by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Sep. 2018	Visit to Japan by Myanmar Deputy Minister of Defense (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Laos	Apr. 2016 Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Nov. 2016 Nov. 2016 Sep. 2018 Dec. 2018	Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Minister of National Defense of Laos (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting (Laos (2nd ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting)) Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Laos by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Defense of Laos (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	Malaysia	Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016  Feb. 2017 Jun. 2017 Sep. 2017  Apr. 2018 Sep. 2018 Sep. 2018	Visit to Malaysia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Malaysia (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Visit to Japan by Chief of Navy of Malaysian Navy Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Malaysia (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense vice-Ministerial Forum)) ☆ Signed an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technologies Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Malaysia (Defense Ministerial Meeting, Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Malaysia (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Brunei	Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Sep. 2016 Feb. 2018 Sep. 2018	Visit to Brunei by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Brunei by Administrative Vice Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Brunei (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting)) Visit to Brunei by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Brunei (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))
	Indonesia	Jul. 2017	3rd Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Consultation (PM), 8th Japan-Indonesia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)
	Vietnam	Nov. 2016 Aug. 2017 Jul. 2018	4th Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Tokyo) 5th Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Nha Trang) 6th Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Tokyo)
	Singapore	Apr. 2017	15th Japan-Singapore Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)
	Philippines	Sep. 2016 Feb. 2017	4th Japan-Philippines Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Sendai) 5th Japan-Philippines Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Tokyo)
	Thailand	Aug. 2016 Sep. 2018	13th Japan-Thailand Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 13th Japan-Thailand Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Thailand) 14th Japan-Thailand Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)
	Cambodia	Jul. 2017	5th Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation, 4th Japan-Cambodia Defense Consultation (Phnom Penh)
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Myanmar	Mar. 2017	2nd Japan-Myanmar Military Consultation (MM) (Naypyidaw)
	Laos	Jul. 2017	2nd Japan-Laos Defense Consultation (Vientiane)
	Malaysia	Jun. 2017	6th Japan-Malaysia Defense Consultation (Kuala Lumpur)
	Indonesia	Aug. 16 Jan. 2017 Sep. 2018	Japan-Indonesia goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Indonesia unit-to-unit exchanges (Halim) (ASDF) Japan-Indonesia goodwill exercise (MSDF)
	Vietnam	Dec. 2016 Dec. 2017 May 2018 Sep. 2018 Mar. 2019 Jun. 2019	Japan-Vietnam unit-to-unit exchanges (Da Nang) (ASDF) Japan-Vietnam unit-to-unit exchanges (Da Nang) (ASDF) Japan-Vietnam goodwill exercise (MSDF) Visit to Vietnam by a training submarine (Cam Ranh) (MSDF) Dispatch of ASDF C-130H to Vietnam (overseas flight training and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges) Japan-Vietnam goodwill exercise (MSDF)
	Singapore	May 2017 Oct. 2017 Nov. 2017 Oct. 2018	MSDF Participation in International Fleet Review hosted by the Singapore Navy (Singapore) (MSDF) Japan-Singapore unit-to-unit exchanges (Tokyo, etc.) (GSDF) Japan-Singapore unit-to-unit exchanges (Paya Lebar) (ASDF) Japan-Singapore goodwill exercise (MSDF)
	Philippines	Jul. 2016 Sep. 2016 Jan. 2017 May 2017 Sep. 2017 Nov. 2017 Feb. 2018 May 2018 Sep. 2018 May 2019 Jun. 2019	Japan-Philippines unit-to-unit exchanges (Clark) (ASDF) Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Philippines bilateral exercise (MSDF) Japan-Philippines bilateral exercise (MSDF)
Unit-level exchange, etc.			

Unit-level exchange, etc.	Thailand	Jan. 2017	Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (Chiang Mai) (ASDF)
		Sep. 2017	Japan-Thailand goodwill exercise (MSDF)
		Nov. 2017	Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (U-tapao) (ASDF)
		Nov. 2017	Participation in fleet review hosted by the Royal Thai Navy in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of ASEAN (Pattaya) (MSDF)
		Jan. 2018	Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (Don Mueang) (ASDF)
		Feb. 2018	Japan-Thailand goodwill exercise (MSDF)
		Oct. 2018	Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (Chiang Mai) (GSDF)
		Oct. 2018	Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (Chiang Mai) (ASDF)
	Laos	Jan. 2017	Japan-Laos unit-to-unit exchanges (Vientiane) (ASDF)
	Malaysia	Apr. 2016	Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF)
		Jan. 2017	Japan-Malaysia unit-to-unit exchanges (Subang) (ASDF)
		May 2017	Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF)
		Jan. 2018	Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF)
		Sep. 2018	Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF)
		Apr. 2019	Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF)
	Brunei	May 2017	Japan-Brunei goodwill exercise
		Jul. 2017	Japan-Brunei unit-to-unit exchanges (Bandar Seri Begawan) (ASDF)
		Feb. 2018	Japan-Brunei goodwill exercise (MSDF)
		Apr. 2019	Japan-Brunei bilateral exercise (MSDF)
		Jun. 2019	Japan-Brunei bilateral exercise (MSDF)

**Reference 42 Recent Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and Exchanges (Past Three Years)**

(Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019)

High-level talks between heads of defense and others	Apr. 2016	Visit to Japan by ROK Army Chief of Staff
	Sep. 2016	Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (ROK (Seoul Defense Dialogue))
	Sep. 2016	Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (Seoul (5th Seoul Defense Dialogue))
	Sep. 2016	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Mar. 2017	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	May 2017	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Jun. 2017	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2017	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Sep. 2017	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference
	Sep. 2017	Visit to ROK by GSDF Chief of Staff (participated in PACC)
	Oct. 2017	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (4th ADMM-Plus))
	Apr. 2018	Visit to Japan by Chief of ROK Army
	Jun. 2018	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Oct. 2018	Visit to ROK by MSDF Chief of Staff (participated in Western Pacific Naval Symposium)
	Oct. 2018	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (5th ADMM Plus))
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Mar. 2018	11th Japan-ROK Security Dialogue (Tokyo)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	May 2016	Participation of MSDF vessels in Pacific Reach hosted by the ROK (MSDF)
	May 2016	Visit to the ROK by Western Army Commanding General (GSDF)
	Jun. 2016	Visit to the ROK by Sasebo District Commandant (MSDF)
	Jul. 2016	Visit to Atsugi Air Base by ROK Navy P-3C (MSDF)
	Feb. 2017	Visit to Japan by Commander of the 2nd Operations Command of the ROK (GSDF)
	Oct. 2017	Port visit to Pyeongtaek by MSDF Training Squadron (MSDF)
	Dec. 2017	Port visit to Japan by the training squadron of the Korean navy, Japan-ROK bilateral search and rescue exercise (Yokosuka) (MSDF)
	Sep. 2018	Visit to the ROK by Western Army Commanding General (GSDF)
	Nov. 2018	Port visit to Japan by the training squadron of the Korean navy (Sasebo) (MSDF)



Japan – U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation	Jun. 2016	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Sep. 2016	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference
	Oct. 2016	Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff level Meeting (Washington, D.C.)
	Dec. 2016	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Seoul)
	Mar. 2017	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference
	Apr. 2017	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Tokyo)
	May 2017	Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Video-Teleconference
	Jun. 2017	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Jul. 2017	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference
	Aug. 2017	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference
	Sep. 2017	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference
	Oct. 2017	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (4th ADMM-Plus))
	Oct. 2017	Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Meeting (Hawaii)
	Dec. 2017	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference
	Mar. 2018	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense working level meeting (Washington D.C.)
	May 2018	Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Meeting (Hawaii)
	Jun. 2018	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Oct. 2018	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (5th ADMM-Plus))
	Oct. 2018	Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Meeting (Washington D.C.)
	May 2019	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense working level meeting (Seoul)
	Jun. 2019	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue))

**Reference 43 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries, Canada and New Zealand (Past Three Years)**

(Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019)

High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others	United Kingdom	Jun. 2016	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
		Sep. 2016	Visit to the U.K. by State Minister of Defense
		Nov. 2016	Visit to Japan by U.K. Chief of the Air Staff
		Jan. 2017	☆ Japan-U.K. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed; entered into force in August 2017
		Apr. 2017	Visit to Japan by U.K. Minister of State for Defence
		Jul. 2017	Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff
		Aug. 2017	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Teleconference
		Aug. 2017	Visit to Japan and tour of JS Izumo by U.K. Prime Minister
		Sep. 2017	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Teleconference
		Nov. 2017	Visit to the U.K. by GSDF Chief of Staff
		Dec. 2017	Visit to the U.K. by Minister of Defense (3rd Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting)
		Feb. 2018	Visit to the U.K. by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defence
		Feb. 2018	Visit to Japan by First Sea Lord
		Mar. 2018	Visit to the U.K. by Chief of Joint Staff
		Jun. 2018	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue))
		Jul. 2018	Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff
		Sep. 2018	Visit to the U.K. by State Minister of Defense
		Sep. 2018	Visit to Japan by U.K. Minister of State for Defence
		Feb. 2019	Visit to Japan by U.K. Chief of the General Staff
	France	Jun. 2016	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
		Jun. 2016	Visit to France by State Minister of Defense
		Jan. 2017	Visit to France by Minister of Defense (3rd Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting)
		Jun. 2017	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))
		Jun. 2017	Visit to France by State Minister of Defense (Paris Air Show)
		Sep. 2017	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Teleconference

High-level talks between heads of defense and others	France	Nov. 2017 Jan. 2018 May 2018 Jun. 2018 Jul. 2018 Jan. 2019 Apr. 2019	Visit to France by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Minister of Armed Forces (4th Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to France by MSDF Chief of Staff Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Japan-France Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed; entered into force in June 2019 Visit to France by State Minister of Defense (5th Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the French Army
	Canada	Apr. 2016 Apr. 2016 Jun. 2016 Sep. 2017 Sep. 2017 Nov. 2017 Dec. 2017 Feb. 2018 Apr. 2018 Dec. 2018 Jun. 2019	Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Canada (3rd Japan-Canada Foreign and Defense Vice-Ministerial Dialogue (2+2)) Visit to Japan by Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Canada by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Canada by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Canada by State Minister of Defense (UN PKO Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Commander, Royal Canadian Navy Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Armed Forces ☆ Japan-Canada Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed Visit to Japan by Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence of Canada (4th Japan-Canada Foreign and Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting ("2+2")) Visit to Japan by Minister for National Defence of Canada
	New Zealand	Jun. 2016 Feb. 2017 May 2017 Jun. 2017 Jul. 2017 Jul. 2017 May 2018 Feb. 2019 Jun. 2019	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to New Zealand by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to New Zealand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to New Zealand by State Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by New Zealand Chief of Defense Force Visit to Japan by New Zealand Air Force Commander Visit to New Zealand by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to New Zealand by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	NATO	Jun. 2016 Jan. 2017 Jun. 2017 Oct. 2017 Mar. 2018 Sep. 2018	NVisit to Japan by Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Visit to NATO by Minister of Defense (talks with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg) Visit to Japan by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation NATO Visit to Japan by Secretary General of NATO (talks with Defense Minister) Visit to NATO by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to NATO Allied Joint Force Command Naples by Minister of Defense
	Germany	Sep. 2016 Sep. 2016 Feb. 2017 Jul. 2017 Jul. 2017 Sep. 2017 Feb. 2018 Apr. 2018 May 2018 Jun. 2018 Feb. 2019	Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense Visit to German by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense (Munich Security Conference) Visit to Germany by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs (1st Japan-Germany Vice-Ministerial Strategic Dialogue) ☆ Signed an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technologies Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Teleconference Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense (Munich Security Conference) Visit to Germany by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Berlin International Aerospace Show) Visit to Germany by MSDF Chief of Staff Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense (Munich Security Conference)
	Italy	Jun. 2016 Jun. 2016 May 2017 Sep. 2017 Oct. 2017 Feb. 2018 Sep. 2018 Feb. 2019	Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Italy by State Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Italy (Defense Ministerial Meeting) ☆ Signed an agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Teleconference Visit to Italy by MSDF Chief of Staff Signed a document of exchange between National Institute of Defense Studies and Italian defense research and education organizations Visit to Italy by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Italy by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
	Netherlands	Dec. 2016 Sep. 2018	Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Netherlands (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Netherlands by Minister of Defense
	Spain	Jan. 2018 Jul. 2018	Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Spain (Defense Ministerial Meeting) 1st Japan-Spain Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Barcelona)
	Belgium	Mar. 2018	Visit to Belgium by Chief of Joint Staff
	Sweden	Feb. 2017 Mar. 2017 Jan. 2018	Visit to Sweden by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Sweden by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Sweden by State Minister of Defense
	Finland	Feb. 2017 Mar. 2017 May 2018 Oct. 2018 Feb. 2019	Visit to Finland by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Finland Air Force Commander Visit to Finland by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Finland by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Finland (Defense Ministerial Meeting) ☆ Japan-Finland memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation and exchange signed

High-level talks between heads of defense and others	Norway	Apr. 2018 Apr. 2018	Visit to Japan by State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Norway Visit to Japan by Chief of the Navy of Norway
	Estonia	May 2018 Sep. 2018	Visit to Estonia by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Minister of Defense of Estonia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
	Ukraine	Aug. 2017 Oct. 2018	Visit to Ukraine by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine ☆ Japan-Ukraine memorandum for defense exchange signed
	Latvia	Feb. 2018	Visit to Japan by Minister of Defense of Latvia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
	Czech Republic	Jul. 2017 Jul. 2017	Visit to Japan by Deputy Minister of Defense of the Czech Republic (exchanged opinions with Commissioner of ATLA) Visit to Czech Republic by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense ☆ Japan-Czech Republic memorandum for defense cooperation signed
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	United Kingdom	Oct. 2016 Nov. 2017 Feb. 2019	15th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 11th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities (London) 16th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 12th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 17th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 13th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities (London)
	France	Jul. 2016 Dec. 2017	19th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 17th Japan-France Consultation between defense authorities (Paris) 20th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 18th Japan-France Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
	Canada	Dec. 2016 Dec. 2017	9th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 10th Japan-Canada Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 10th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 11th Japan-Canada Consultation between defense authorities (Ottawa)
	New Zealand	Feb. 2017 Dec. 2018	10th Japan-New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Wellington) 11th Japan-New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Tokyo)
	NATO	May 2017	15th Japan-NATO High-Level Consultation (Tokyo)
	Germany	Jun. 2016 Dec. 2018	15th Japan-Germany Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 13th Japan-Germany Consultation between defense authorities (Berlin) Japan-Germany Vice-Ministerial Level Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities (Tokyo)
	Italy	Sep. 2017 Jan. 2019	4th Japan-Italy Consultation between defense authorities (Rome) 5th Japan-Italy Consultation between defense authorities (Rome)
	Spain	Oct. 2016 Jul. 2017 Jun. 2019	1st Japan-Spain Consultation between defense authorities (Madrid) 2nd Japan-Spain Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 3rd Japan-Spain Consultation between defense authorities (Madrid)
	Sweden	Oct. 2017 Feb. 2019	4th Japan-Sweden Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 5th Japan-Sweden Consultation between defense authorities (Stockholm)
	Finland	Sep. 2017	2nd Japan-Finland Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
	Ukraine	Oct. 2018	1st Japan-Ukraine Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities
	EU	Oct. 2016	1st Japan-EU Consultation on Security and Defense (Belgium)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	United Kingdom	Apr. 2016 Jul. 2016 Jul. - Aug. 2016 Oct. - Nov. 2016 Nov. 2016 Jul. 2017 Apr. 2018 Jul. 2018 Aug. 2018 Sep. 2018 Sep. - Oct. 2018 Dec. 2018 Mar. 2019	Japan-U.K. goodwill exercise (MSDF) Dispatch of ASDF's KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to the U.K. Port call in London by MSDF training squadron Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise (ASDF) Japan-U.K. goodwill exercise (MSDF) Dispatch of ASDF KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to the U.K. and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise (MSDF) ASDF C-2 participated in RIAT Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise (MSDF) Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise (MSDF) Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise (MSDF) Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise (MSDF) Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise (MSDF) Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise (MSDF)
	France	Jun. 2017 Feb. 2018 Feb. 2018 Apr. 2019 Jun. 2019	Dispatch of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to France (participation in International Paris Air Show) Japan-France bilateral exercise (VINEX18) Japan-France goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-France bilateral exercise (MSDF) Dispatch of ASDF C-2 to France (overseas flight training and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges, and participation in Paris Air Show)
	Canada	Jul. 2017 Jul. 2017 Jul. 2017 Dec. 2017 Nov. 2018 Jun. 2019	Japan-Canada unit-to-unit exchange (Komaki) (ASDF) Japan-Canada bilateral exercise "KAEDEX" (MSDF) Japan-Canada unit-to-unit exchange "Komox" (ASDF) Japan-Canada bilateral exercise "KAEDEX" (MSDF) Japan-Canada bilateral exercise "KAEDEX" (MSDF) Japan-Canada bilateral exercise "KAEDEX" (MSDF)

Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	New Zealand	Oct. 2016	Visit to Komaki Air Base by New Zealand Air Force aircraft (C-130H)
		Nov. 2016	Participation in international naval review hosted by New Zealand Navy
		Feb. 2017	Dispatch of ASDF's KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to New Zealand
		Jun. 2017	Japan-New Zealand goodwill exercise
		Nov. 2017	Dispatch of C-2 aircraft to New Zealand (overseas flight training) and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges
	Germany	Apr. 2018	Dispatch of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to Germany (participation in Berlin International Aerospace Show)
	EU	Apr. 2016	Japan-EU bilateral exercise
		May 2016	Japan-EU bilateral exercise
		Jun. 2016	Japan-EU bilateral exercise
		Jul. 2016	Japan-EU bilateral exercise
		Sep. 2016	Japan-EU bilateral exercise
		Nov. 2016	Japan-EU bilateral exercise
		Jan. 2017	Japan-EU bilateral exercise
		Dec. 2017	Japan-EU bilateral exercise
		Jul. 2018	Japan-EU bilateral exercise
		Aug. 2018	Japan-EU bilateral exercise

**Reference 44 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years)**

(Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019)

High-level talks between heads of defense and others	Jun. 2016	Japan-China Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
	Oct. 2018	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (5th ADMM-Plus))
	Jun. 2019	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Nov. 2016	14th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Foreign Affairs and Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting) (Beijing)
	Nov. 2016	6th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China's defense authorities (Tokyo)
	Oct. 2017	15th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Foreign Affairs and Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting) (Tokyo)
	Apr. 2018	7th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China's defense authorities (Beijing)
	May 2018	☆ Signing of the "Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the defense authorities of Japan and China" (Memorandum)
	Oct. 2018	3rd Japan-China defense director-general-level consultations (Tokyo)
	Dec. 2018	1st Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism Annual and Experts Meeting
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Feb. 2019	16th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Foreign Affairs and Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting)
	Nov. 2018	Visit to Japan by delegate of the Eastern Theater Command of the People's Liberation Army

**Reference 45 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years)**

(Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019)

High-level talks between heads of defense and others	Mar. 2017	Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Russia (2nd Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dialogue (2+2), Defense Ministerial Meeting)
	Nov. 2017	Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff, Russian Army
	Dec. 2017	Visit to Japan by Chief of Joint Staff, Russian Military
	Jul. 2018	Visit to Russia by Minister of Defense (3rd Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dialogue, Defense Ministerial Meeting)
	Oct. 2018	Visit to Russia by Chief of Joint Staff
	May 2019	Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Russia (4th Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dialogue (2+2), Defense Ministerial Meeting)
	May 2019	Visit to Russia by GSDF Chief of Staff
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Jan. 2017	16th Japan-Russia bilateral search and rescue exercise
	Oct. 2017	Port visit to Vladivostok by MSDF Training Squadron
	Nov. 2017	17th Japan-Russia bilateral search and rescue exercise
	Jul. 2018	18th Japan-Russia bilateral search and rescue exercise
	Nov. 2018	Counter-piracy exercise
	Jun. 2019	19th Japan-Russia bilateral search and rescue exercise



High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others	Maldives	Dec. 2016	Visit to the Maldives by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	Fiji	Mar. 2018	Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the Republic of Fiji Military Force
	Papua New Guinea	Feb. 2017 Mar. 2019	Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force Visit to Papua New Guinea by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Kazakhstan	Jul. 2017	Visit to Kazakhstan by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense ☆ Japan-Kazakhstan memorandum for defense exchange signed
	Turkey	May 2016 Jun. 2016 Jun. 2019	Visit to Turkey by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Turkey by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defense of Turkey
	Jordan	Feb. 2017 Jul. 2017	Visit to Japan by Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff of Jordan Visit to Japan by Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of Jordan (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
	Saudi Arabia	Sep. 2016 Jan. 2017	Visit to Japan by Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense of Saudi Arabia (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Saudi Arabia by Chief of Joint Staff
	Israel	Jun. 2019	Visit to Israel by Chief of Joint Staff
	UAE	May 2016 Nov. 2017 Apr. 2018 May 2018 Jun. 2019	Visit to Japan by UAE Air Force Commander Visit to UAE by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Dubai Air and Space Show) Visit to Japan by UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Visit to Japan by UAE Minister of State for Defence Affairs (signing ceremony for memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation and exchange, Vice-Ministerial Meeting) Visit to UAE by Chief of Joint Staff
	Bahrain	Dec. 2016 Dec. 2017 Jun. 2018	Visit to Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Manama dialogue) Visit to Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Manama Dialogue) Visit to Bahrain by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Brazil	Apr. 2018	Visit to Brazil by State Minister of Defense
	Mongolia	Jul. 2016 Sep. 2016 Oct. 2016	Visit to Mongolia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Mongolia by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Mongolia Air Force Commander
	Timor-Leste	Jun. 2016	Japan-Timor-Leste Defense Ministerial Meeting (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
	Others	Aug. 2016 Oct. 2016 Nov. 2016 Jan. 2017 Jan. 2017 Feb. 2017 May 2017 Jul. 2017 Aug. 2017 Aug. 2017 Sep. 2017 Dec. 2017 Dec. 2018 Dec. 2018 Mar. 2019 May 2019 Jun. 2019	Visit to Djibouti by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to South Sudan by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Deputy Chief of Staff (equivalent to commander of Army) of Djibouti Visit to South Sudan and Bahrain by State Minister of Defense Visit to Qatar by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Oman by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Djibouti and Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Commander of the Chief of the Army of Chili Visit to Ukraine by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces Visit to Djibouti and Egypt by State Minister of Defense Visit to Austria, Serbia Montenegro by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to South Sudan and Djibouti by State Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Deputy Chief of Staff (equivalent to commander of Army) of Djibouti Visit to Japan by Minister Responsible for Defence Affairs of Oman Visit to Japan by Minister of State for Defense Affairs of Qatar Visit to Egypt by Chief of Joint Staff
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Kazakhstan	Jul. 2018	1st Japan-Kazakhstan Consultation between defense authorities
	Turkey	Nov. 2017	3rd Japan-Turkey Consultation between defense authorities (Ankara)
	Jordan	Nov. 2017	2nd Japan-Jordan Consultation between defense authorities (Amman)
	Saudi Arabia	Nov. 2016	2nd Japan-Saudi Arabia Security Dialogue, 2nd Japan-Saudi Arabia Consultation between defense authorities (Riyadh)
	Israel	Oct. 2018	1st Japan-Israel Security Dialogue (Tel Aviv)
	UAE	Nov. 2017 Dec. 2018	1st Japan-UAE Consultation between defense authorities (Abu Dhabi) 2nd Japan-UAE Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)
	Qatar	Mar. 2018	3rd Japan-Qatar Security Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Bahrain	Dec. 2016	3rd Japan-Bahrain Security Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Mongolia	Aug. 2017	4th Japan-Mongolia Consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and security authorities, 4th Japan-Mongolia Consultation between defense and security authorities (Ulaanbaatar)
	Pakistan	Aug. 2016 Apr. 2018 Jun. 2019	8th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Islamabad) 9th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 10th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Islamabad)
Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.	Turkey	Jun. 2016	Japan-Turkey bilateral exercise
	Saudi Arabia	Apr. 2017	Japan-Saudi Arabia goodwill exercise
	UAE	Jan. 2017 Apr. 2017 Jul. 2017 Nov. 2017 Jun. 2019	Japan-UAE unit-to-unit exchanges (Al Ain) (ASDF) Japan-UAE goodwill exercise Japan-UAE unit-to-unit exchange (Al Dhafra) (ASDF) Dispatch of ASDF C-2 transport aircraft to UAE (overseas flight training and participation in Dubai International Air and Space Show) Dispatch of ASDF C-2 to UAE (overseas flight training and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges)
	Oman	May 2018	Japan-Oman goodwill exercise (MSDF)
	Pakistan	Jan. 2017 May 2017	Japan-Pakistan goodwill exercise Visit to ASDF units, etc. by Pakistan Air Force (Ichigaya, Hamamatsu)

	Dialogue		Date
Participation in Security Dialogues in the Asia-Pacific Region	Intergovernmental	○ ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus)	
		• Ministerial Meeting	(Oct. 2017, Oct. 2018)
		• Senior Officials' Meeting (ADSOM-Plus)	(Apr. 2016, Apr. 2017, Jul. 2018, Apr. 2019)
		• Senior Officials' Meeting Working Group (ADSOM-Plus WG)	(Mar. 2017, Jan. 2018, Mar. 2019)
		• Experts' Working Group (EWG)	
		Counter-Terrorism EWG	(Dec. 2016, Jul. 2017, Aug. 2018, Jan. 2019, Apr. 2019)
		Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief EWG	May 2016, Dec.2016, May 2017, Sep. 2017, Feb. 2018, Apr. 2018, Jul. 2018, Sep. 2018, Mar. 2019, Apr. 2019
		Maritime Security EWG	(Nov. 2016, Nov. 2017, May 2018, Nov. 2018, Feb. 2019)
		Military Medicine EWG	(Jan. 2017, Dec. 2017, Feb. 2018, Dec. 2018, Feb. 2019, Mar. 2019)
	Peacekeeping Operations EWG	(Oct. 2016, May 2017, Oct. 2017, Apr. 2018, Nov. 2018, Mar. 2019)	
Humanitarian Mine Action EWG	(Oct. 2016, May 2017, Oct. 2017, Apr. 2018, Oct. 2018, Mar. 2019)		
Cyber EWG	(Jul. 2017, Nov. 2017, May 2018, Nov. 2018)		
	○ ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting	(Nov. 2016, Oct. 2017, Oct. 2018)	
	○ ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)		
	• Meeting among defense authorities	(Apr. 2016, May 2016, May 2017, Jun. 2017, May 2018, Jun. 2018, May 2019)	
	Hosted by the private sector	• IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)	(Jun. 2016, Jun. 2017, Jun. 2018, May 2019)
Security Dialogue hosted by the Ministry of Defense	○ Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum		(Sep. 2016, Sep. 2017, Sep. 2018)
	○ Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)		(Mar. 2017, Mar. 2018, Mar. 2019)
	○ International Seminar for Military Science		(Jul. 2016)
	○ International Conference of Cadets		(Mar. 2017, Feb. 2018, Feb. 2019)

Security Dialogue		Outline	Recent Situations	
Hosted by Ministry of Defense	Internal Bureau and others			
	Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense since 2009. Vice-ministerial level officials from the defense authorities of ASEAN countries are invited to Japan to hold candid dialogues on regional security issues. The objective is to strengthen multilateral and bilateral relations by building close interpersonal relationships.	In September 2018, the MOD held the tenth Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum in Nagoya, in which vice-ministerial level officials from all ASEAN member states participated to exchange their frank and constructive views on three themes: efforts to share universal values, including the rule of law and challenges; measures for disaster response and challenges; and prospects for Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation.	
	Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 1996 with Director-General-level officials in charge of defense policy and defense exchanges, all of who are from the Asia-Pacific region, participating. The forum is designed to provide defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on ways to promote confidence building focusing on the defense field.	The 23rd Forum, held in March 2019, was attended by 27 countries (25 Asia-Pacific countries, France and the United Kingdom) as well as the ASEAN Secretariat, the EU and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The participants discussed a wide range of matters in the context of the themes of the Forum, "security issues in the Indo-Pacific region" and "changing security challenges and prospects."	
Hosted by Ministry of Defense	GSDF	Multinational Cooperation program in the Asia Pacific (MCAP)	Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 2014, inviting officers in charge of actual work of the militaries from major countries in the Asia-Pacific region to provide them with opportunities to exchange multinational views on concrete cooperation and initiatives toward issues each country in the region has in common.	In November 2018, with participants from 15 countries, including those in the Asia-Pacific region, the GSDF communicated information regarding efforts for disaster response by GSDF in cooperation with local governments and private companies, and conducted the disaster response exercise, Michinoku ALERT 2018.
		G5 Dialogue (G5D)	Hosted by the GSDF for the first time in 2017, this dialogue provides a platform for the army and other services of like-minded countries that has close ties with the GSDF to exchanges views on multilateral engagement in the Asia-Pacific region for the armies to actively contribute to regional peace and stability.	In February 2018, with the participation of 5 service branches from 4 countries to include the U.S. (including the Marines), Australia, the U.K. and France, group discussions under the theme of "Direction of defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region the army should aim for" and field trip to the GSDF Chemical School were carried out.
		Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST)	Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, inviting officers in charge of logistics support from major countries in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on logistic system.	The 22st Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST) meeting was held in November 2018. The participants were working-level officers in charge of logistics sent from armies in 20 countries in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe. Views were exchanged under the theme "Logistic Readiness for Domestic and International Disasters."
	MSDF	Asia Pacific Naval College Seminar (APNCS)	Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1998 with the participation of naval college staff from the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on the roles of naval forces with a view to encouraging school education/research and contributing to the promotion of defense exchange and mutual understanding between participating countries.	The 21st seminar was held in February 2018 with the participation of navy military personnel from 17 countries, personnel from the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), personnel from Keio University, and personnel from the Canon Institute for Global Studies. Presentations by the participants and active opinion exchanges were conducted on the theme of "Changes in the Role of the Navy." In addition, unit and cultural study tours were also held to deepen the understanding of the MSDF as well as Japanese culture and history.
		Western Pacific naval Symposium Short Term Exchange Program (WPNS STEP)	Hosted by the MSDF, this programs has been held annually since 2011, with the participation of junior naval officers from the WPNS countries. The program is designed to provide them with opportunities to deepen their understanding of Japan's security environment, defense policy and buildup, and culture and history.	With the participation of naval officers and other personnel from 25 countries, the 7th WPNS STEP was held in October 2017. Presentations and exchange of candid views were carried out under the theme of "Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific Region of the 21st Century," including new initiatives by each navies and future equipment.

Security Dialogue		Outline	Recent Situations	
Hosted by Ministry of Defense	ASDF	Air Staff College Seminar	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2015, with the participation of officials related to air colleges mainly from the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on officer's education. (From 1996 to 2014, this seminar was held as International Air Force Education Seminar.)	Air college personnel and researchers from four countries were invited in November 2018 to provide keynote speeches and presentations and to exchange their views on the theme of "Future Warfare, Advanced Technology and Innovation."
		International Air Command and Staff Seminar	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with the participation of air college students from the Asia-Pacific region. This program is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on security and roles of nations.	With the participation of air college students from 24 countries and 2 organizations, the 18th seminar was held in October 2018. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of "Regarding How We Should Employ Air Power through Multilateral Cooperation."
	National Defense Academy	International Seminar on Defense Science	Hosted by the National Defense Academy since 1996, this seminar provides opportunities to discuss international affairs and security by inviting military academy representatives from the Asia-Pacific regions.	The 21st International Seminar on Defense Science was held in July 2016, inviting 10 countries. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of "Commitment to national cybersecurity by military academy and services in education and research." This seminar ended in 2016.
		International Cadets' Conference	Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this conference has been held annually since 1998 with the participation of cadets from each country. The conference is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on militaries in the 21st century.	In March 2018, 20 countries were invited to the 21st conference, and opinions were exchanged on the theme of "To Become Ideal Leaders."
	National Institute for Defense Studies	International Security Colloquium	Hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, this seminar has been held annually since 1999 with officials at home and abroad knowledgeable about defense being invited. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities for advanced and professional reports and discussions on security issues.	In January 2019, this symposium was held as an international symposium in collaboration with the International Forum on War History. Recognized researchers and practitioners from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan were invited, and they exchanged opinions under the theme of "New Strategic Environment and Role of Ground Defense Capability."
		International Forum on War History	Hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with participation by military historians. The forum is designed to deepen the mutual understanding of its participants by making comparative studies of military history.	In January 2019, it was held as an international symposium in collaboration with the International Security Colloquium. Recognized researchers and practitioners from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan were invited, and they exchanged opinions under the theme of "New Strategic Environment and Role of Ground Defense Capability."
		Asia-Pacific Security Workshop	Hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, this workshop-style group study session has been held annually since 2010 to discuss emerging security issues that the Asia-Pacific region faces in common. Since 2018, participating regions are limited to ASEAN countries.	In February 2019, researchers from Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam were invited, and they exchanged opinions under the theme of "China's 'Belt and Road' initiative and ASEAN."

Other Multilateral Security Dialogue			Overview
Hosted by the Government	Internal Bureau and others	ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus)	Started in October 2010. This is the only defense ministerial meeting in the Asia-Pacific region hosted by governments, and provides opportunities for exchanging views on issues concerning regional security. It was decided in the 4th ADMM-Plus held in October 2017 that this meeting will take place annually instead of biennially.
		ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting	First held in 2014. A platform for defense ministers of all of the ASEAN nations and Japan to discuss a wide spectrum of security related issues, and to exchange views on concrete action plans to develop future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation.
		ARF: ASEAN Regional Forum	A forum that started in 1994, designed to improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region through political and security dialogue and cooperation. Currently 26 countries (10 ASEAN nations (Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia (since 1995), Myanmar (since 1996)), Japan, Australia, Canada, China, India (since 1996), New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the ROK, Russia, the U.S., Mongolia (since 1998), North Korea (since 2000), Pakistan (since 2004), Timor-Leste (since 2005), Bangladesh (since 2006), Sri Lanka (since 2007)), and 1 organization (EU) are members of the forum. Authorities in charge of diplomacy and defense meet through various government-to-government meetings to discuss the current regional situation and security area.
		Asia-Pacific Military Operations Research Symposium (ARMORS)	ARMORS is a forum held by Asia-Pacific countries on a rotational basis to exchange views on defense operations and research technology. Japan has participated in the forum since the second meeting in 1993.
		Seoul Defense Dialogue (SDD)	This event, hosted by the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK and participated in by the defense vice ministers of Asia-Pacific and Western countries, is a forum for exchanging opinions regarding regional security issues, including the issues of the Korean Peninsula. Japan has participated since the first meeting in 2012.
	Joint Staff	Asia-Pacific Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD)	CHOD is an annual conference hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries on a rotational basis. Senior defense officials and others of Asia-Pacific countries meet to exchange views on security issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1998.
		Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)	PASOLS is a seminar hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis mainly to exchange information on logistic-support activities. Japan's participation in the seminar as an official member started in 1995 when the 24th session was held. The 36th Seminar will be held in Japan with participation of nearly 30 countries.
	GSDF	Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)	PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every other year when PAMS is held. Army chiefs of Asia-Pacific countries and others meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1999. The conference was held in Japan for the first time in 2009.
		Pacific Armies Management Seminars (PAMS)	PAMS is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about efficient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Asia-Pacific region can develop their ground troops. The GSDF has participated in PAMS since the 17th meeting in 1993. The 33rd seminar was held in Japan in 2009 at the same time as PACC.
		Land Forces Pacific (LANPAC)	LANPAC is a symposium hosted by AUSA annually in Hawaii. Through panel discussions and consultations, high-level land force officials from the Indo-Asia-Pacific region exchange opinions on strategic issue in the region.
		Chief of Army Land Forces Seminar	This seminar was called "Chief of Army's Exercise (CAEX)" until 2016. It is an exercise hosted by the Australian Army every other year. Senior officers of the Australian Army as well as the heads of land forces in the Asia-Pacific region and experts attend and exchange a wide range of views on the issues facing the land forces in the region. The GSDF participated in CAEX for the first time in 2012. In September 2014, the GSDF Chief of Staff attended for the first time and delivered an address.
		Pacific Amphibious Leaders Symposium (PALS)	This symposium was held for the first time in May 2015, hosted by the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, from the perspective of contributing to the amphibious operations capacities of friendly countries in the Asia-Pacific region and contributing to regional stability through strengthening relations with the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, and enhancing interoperability. It has been held annually since then. Japan has participated from the first meeting.
		Annual Meeting of the Association of U.S. Army (AUSA)	Hosted annually by AUSA in Washington, D.C., the Chief and Vice-Chief of Staff of the GSDF participate in the meeting, exchange opinions among the General-class officers from the U.S. Army, and deliver speeches.



Other Multilateral Security Dialogue			Overview
Hosted by the Government	MSDF	International Sea Power Symposium (ISS)	ISS is a symposium hosted by the United States every other year. Navy Chief of Staff of member countries and others meet to exchange views on common issues for their navies. Japan has participated in the symposium since the first meeting in 1969.
		Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)	WPNS is a symposium hosted by a member country on a rotational basis every other year when ISS is not held. Senior navy officials and others of Western Pacific countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.
		International MCM Seminar	This seminar is hosted by a WPNS member country on a rotation basis to exchange views on minesweeping in a year when minesweeping exercises are not conducted in the Western Pacific. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 2000. Japan's MSDF hosted this seminar in Yokosuka in October 2007.
		Asia Pacific Submarine Conference	Hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries in the Asia-Pacific region on a rotational basis to exchange views on issues centering around submarine rescue. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2001. The MSDF hosted the conference in October 2006.
		Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)	This symposium is held every two years hosted by a different participating country on a rotational basis. It is a platform for the Navy Chief of Staff from the Indian Ocean coastal countries to exchange their opinions concerning the maritime security of the Indian Ocean. Japan has participated since the third event in 2012.
		RAN Sea Power Conference (SPC)	Held biennially as part of the Pacific International Maritime Exposition. As many navies send their Chief of Staff or Admirals to this conference, the conference serves as a platform for bilateral and multilateral exchange.
		Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS)	Biennially hosted by the Italian Navy. Mostly attended by Chief of Staff of Navy from NATO nations who gather to exchange views on common naval challenges. Japan has participated since the 7th symposium in 2008.
		International Maritime Security Symposium (IMSS)	Hosted by the Indonesian Navy every other year. Chief of Staff of Navy from mostly western Pacific nations exchange opinions on maritime security issues. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2013.
		Galle Dialogue	Hosted by the Sri Lankan Navy annually. Chief of Staff of Navy of nations around the Indian Ocean exchange views on maritime security challenges. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2010.
	ASDF	Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS)	PACS is a conference hosted by the United States every other year with senior air force officials such as Air Chiefs and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1989.
		Space Symposium	Space Symposium is hosted by the United States every year with senior air force officials such as Air Chiefs and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the symposium since the 35th meeting in 2019.
		PACRIM Airpower Symposium	This symposium is held every year and hosted jointly by the U.S. and other participating countries on a rotational basis (it was held twice in 1996 and 1997). It is a platform for the Chiefs of Air Operations in the Pacific Rim to exchange their opinions. Japan has participated in this symposium since the first event held in 1995
		Air Power Conference (APC)	APC is an international conference hosted by Australia every other year to exchange views on air power. Japan has participated in this conference six times since 2000.
		Air Force Symposium	Air Force Symposium is hosted by the Philippine Air Force annually to exchange opinions under the themes concerning security. Japan has participated in this symposium four times since 2015.
		Colombo Air Symposium	Colombo Air Symposium is hosted by the Sri Lankan Navy annually to exchange opinions concerning air power and air strategy. Japan has participated in this symposium twice since 2016.
	Defense Intelligence Headquarters	Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference (APICC)	Hosted in turn by the United States Pacific Command and participating countries, the Conference serves as a place for the exchange of opinions among intelligence chiefs and other officials from the defense ministries of countries in the Asia Pacific region and other areas. Alongside exchanges of opinions on issues pertaining to regional security, the Conference is also aimed at contributing to the nurturing of relationships of trust between the respective countries, as well as at the sharing of information. It was hosted for the first time in February 2011 by the Department of Current and Crisis Intelligence, and was attended by 28 countries.
	National Institute for Defense Studies	ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Heads of Defence Universities, Colleges and Institutions Meeting	Defense universities and other educational institutions from the ARF member countries take turns and hold a meeting once a year. The host plays the central role in making a decision on the themes with respect to global security issues in the Asia-Pacific region and the role of defense educational and research institutions, and the meeting takes place in the form of presentations and question-and-answer sessions based on certain themes. From Japan, National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending all of the meetings since the first meeting in 1997, and hosted the fifth meeting in Tokyo in 2001. In September 2018, the 22nd meeting was held in Tokyo for the first time in 17 years.
		NATO Defense College Conference of Commandants (CoC)	CoC is an annual international conference hosted by the NATO Defense College, defense educational institutions from NATO member countries and NATO partner countries in turns. During the meeting, the heads of participating educational institutions exchange opinions from the perspective of improving advanced defense education, while at the same time the meeting focuses on the promotion of educational exchange among the heads of the educational institutions, NATO member countries, and the dialogue partners in the Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Mediterranean region. From Japan, National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending most of the conferences since FY2009 (no invitation in FY2013). Japan participated in the conference held in Italy in May 2019.

Other Multilateral Security Dialogue		Overview
Hosted by the Private Sector	IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)	Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2002 with defense ministers and others of the Asia-Pacific region and other areas participating to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. From Japan, the Minister of Defense has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2002 (except for the 3rd and 11th conferences in 2004 and 2012; and the State Minister of Defense participated in the 11th conference).
	IISS Fullerton Forum	A Sherpa meeting (preparation meeting) for the Shangri-La Dialogue hosted by the IISS. Defense authorities (director/vice chief level) of the countries that attend the Shangri-La Dialogue exchange opinions on regional security issues. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2013.
	Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)	Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2004. Foreign and defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior official's level for the first time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the State Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th, 12th and 13th Conferences in 2010, 2016, and 2017.
	Munich Security Conference	This Conference was established in 1962. It is one of the most prestigious international conferences on security in Western countries. Foreign dignitaries such as Cabinet members, Diet/Parliament members, officers of defense authorities from Germany, which is the host country, NATO member countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, etc.), Russia, and central and eastern Europe countries attended. Japan participated for the first time in the 45th Conference in 2009, sending the Minister of Defense. The State Minister of Defense participated in the 52nd, 53rd, 54th and 55th Conferences in 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019.
	Halifax International Security Forum	Hosted by Halifax International Security Forum with the support of the Canadian Department of National Defense, the Forum is attended by many government officials from the United States and Europe (including NATO Ministers and Defense Ministers from each EU country), who exchange opinions on security at the Forum. Japan has participated since the first Conference in 2009.
	The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)	Organized mainly by the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California in San Diego, this dialogue is designed for participants—private-sector researchers and government officials from member countries (China, DPRK, Japan, ROK, Russia and the United States)—to freely exchange their views on security situations and confidence-building measures in the region. Japan has participated in the dialogue since the first meeting in 1993.

## Reference 50 Vientiane Vision: Japan's Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN

### Introduction

- “Vientiane Vision: Japan's Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN” is Japan's own initiative for the future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation
- Annually follow up the implementation of the specific and practical activities listed in the Vision through the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum starting from 2017

### Contents

#### 1. Background of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation

- (1) The Asia-Pacific region faces increasingly serious challenges for the security, which makes more difficult for any single country to respond alone
- (2) ASEAN is a hub for the regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region with an increasing importance. Japan and ASEAN have traditionally maintained strong ties; Further enhancement of bilateral/multilateral cooperation is crucial in ensuring a stable regional security environment
- (3) Japan welcomes the establishment of ASEAN Community at the end of 2015 and supports its centrality and unity. Since the establishment, ASEAN-Wide multilateral cooperation has become even more important, in addition to bilateral cooperation with its individual member states

#### 2. Evolution of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation: deepening “exchanges” toward “cooperation”

- (1) Starting defense exchanges from 1990s: enhancing mutual understanding and confidence through defense exchanges
- (2) Developing defense cooperation from 2000s: more practical/ operational defense cooperation with ASEAN member states
- (3) Deepening defense cooperation from 2010s: starting new projects such as capacity building cooperation with further specific and practical activities and promoting multilateral cooperation through regional frameworks such as ADMM-Plus

#### 3. Future Direction of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation: Toward the “ASEAN-Wide” Practical Cooperation

- (1) Purpose: In addition to the cooperation with “Individual ASEAN Member States,” “ASEAN-Wide” cooperation will be expanded through promoting practical cooperation with a view to 1. respecting and promoting shared principles such as freedom, democracy and basic human rights, 2. promoting and enhancing the rule of law, 3. supporting ASEAN efforts to strengthen its centrality and unity which is a cornerstone of regional cooperation
- (2) Direction: In order to contribute to regional peace, security and prosperity, future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation will be focused on the following three points
  - To consolidate the order based on the principles of international law governing peaceful conduct among states, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to uphold principles of international law, especially in the field of maritime and air space
  - To promote maritime security which is a foundation for the regional peace and prosperity, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to build up capabilities for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Search and Rescue (SAR) at sea and air space
  - To cope with increasingly diversifying and complex security issues, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to build up capabilities in various fields
- (3) Measures: Conducting practical defense cooperation by effectively combining the following diverse measures
  - 1) Promotion of International Law (PIL): sharing understanding and experience regarding international law, especially in the field of maritime security, through i.e. conducting researches and sponsoring seminars, etc., with a view to its effective implementation.
  - 2) Capacity Building Cooperation (CBC): conducting CBC in various fields such as HA/DR, PKO, landmine and UXO clearance, cybersecurity, defense buildup planning (sharing know-how), etc.
  - 3) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation (DETC): transferring equipment and technology, developing human resources regarding DETC, holding seminars on defense industries, etc.
  - 4) Joint Training and Exercises (JTE): continued participation in multilateral joint training and exercises, inviting ASEAN observers to Self-Defense Forces' training, etc.
  - 5) Human Resource Development and Academic Exchange (HRD/AE): Inviting Opinion Leaders from ASEAN, etc.
- (4) The JMOD institutional development to better address “ASEAN-Wide” practical cooperation based on the Vision

(Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019)

Exercise		Period (Venue)	Participating countries	Participating SDF units, etc.
Cobra Gold		January - February 2017 (Thailand)	Japan, U.S., Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, China, India	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Northeastern Army, Middle Army, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Support Command, Internal Bureau, etc.
		January - February 2018 (Thailand)	Japan, U.S. Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, China and India	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Northeastern Army, Middle Army, Western Army, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Internal Bureau, etc.
		January - February 2019 (Thailand)	Japan, U.S. Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, China and India	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Ground Component Command, Northeastern Army, Middle Army, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Internal Bureau, etc.
Pacific Partnership		July - August 2016 (Timor-Leste, Vietnam, Palau, Indonesia)	Japan, U.S., Australia, U.K., Canada, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand	1 vessel Approximately 70 personnel
		March - May 2017 (Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Vietnam)	Japan, U.S., Australia, U.K., ROK	2 vessels Approximately 70 personnel
		March - June 2018 (Micronesia, Palau, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Vietnam)	Japan, U.S. Australia, U.K., ROK	Approximately 50 personnel
		March - May 2019 (Marshall Islands, Timor-Leste, Vietnam)	Japan, U.S., Australia, U.K., ROK, Canada, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Honduras, Peru	Approximately 30 personnel
ADMM-Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief/ Military Medicine Exercise		September 2016 (Thailand)	Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, ROK, China, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos, Australia, New Zealand, Russia	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Eastern Army, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Support Command, Internal Bureau
ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise (Counterterrorism Exercise)		May 2016 (Brunei and Singapore)	Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, ROK, China, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Russia	1 vessel
ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise (Mahi Tangaroa 16)		November 2016 (Waters and airspace around New Zealand)	Japan, U.S., Brunei, Australia, New Zealand, etc.	1 vessel
ADMM-Plus Military Medicine Field Training Exercise (MEDEX-2019)		March 2019 (India)	Japan, U.S., India, Myanmar, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, China, New Zealand, ROK, Russia	Approximately 15 personnel
Global Peace Operations Initiative Capstone Exercise	Shanti Prays III	March - April 2017 (Nepal)	Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, Cambodia, ROK, Nepal, Philippines, Malaysia, Australia, etc.	Central Readiness Force 2 personnel
Multilateral Exercise (Khaan Quest)		May - June 2016 (Mongolia)	Japan, U.S., etc.	Approximately 50 personnel *including observers
		July - August 2017 (Mongolia)	Japan, U.S., etc.	Approximately 50 personnel *including observers
		June 2018 (Mongolia)	Japan, U.S., etc.	Approximately 40 personnel
		June 2019 (Mongolia)	Japan, U.S., etc.	Approximately 60 personnel
Australian Army-Hosted Shooting Convention		April - May 2016 (Australia)	Japan, U.S., ROK, Australia, UAE, etc.	Approximately 30 personnel
		April - May 2017 (Australia)		Approximately 20 personnel
		April - May 2018 (Australia)		Approximately 20 personnel
		March - April 2019 (Australia)		Approximately 20 personnel
KOMODO Multilateral Naval Exercise organized by the Indonesian Navy		April 2016 (Indonesia)	Japan, U.S., Indonesia, China, Russia, etc.	1 vessel
		May 2018 (Indonesia)		1 vessel
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training		December 2016 (Waters around Micronesia)	Japan, U.S., Australia	1 aircraft Approximately 25 personnel
		September 2017 (Waters around Japan)		4 vessels 4 submarines 30 aircraft
		December 2017 (Waters around Micronesia)		1 aircraft Approximately 25 personnel
		November 2018 (Waters around Japan)		22 vessels 2 or 3 aircraft
		December 2018 (Waters around Micronesia)		1 aircraft Approximately 30 personnel

Exercise	Period (Venue)	Participating countries	Participating SDF units, etc.
Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Training	June 2016 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii)	Japan, U.S., ROK	1 vessel
	October 2016 (Waters west of Kyushu)		1 vessel
	November 2016 (Waters around Japan)		1 vessel
	January 2017 (Waters around Japan)		1 vessel
	March 2017 (Waters around Japan)		1 vessel
	April 2017 (Waters west of Kyushu)		1 vessel 1 aircraft
	October 2017 (Waters around Japan)		2 vessels
	December 2017 (Waters around Japan)		1 vessel
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise (Pacific Vanguard)	May 2019 (South of Honshu - around Guam)	Japan, U.S., Australia, ROK	2 vessels
Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK-Canada five-country Training	August 2016 (Waters around Hawaii)	Japan, U.S., Australia, ROK, Canada	1 vessel
Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada four- country exercise	June 2017 (South China Sea)	Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada	2 vessels
Japan-Australia-Canada-Singapore four-country exercise	August 2018 (Guam and waters and airspace around Australia)	Japan, Australia, Canada, New Zealand	1 vessel
Japan-Canada-Singapore Trilateral Training	June 2017 (Waters south of Shikoku)	Japan, Canada, New Zealand	1 vessel
U.S. and India-Hosted Maritime Exercise (Malabar)	June 2016 (Waters east of Sasebo - Okinawa)	Japan, U.S., India	1 vessel 3 aircraft
Japan-U.S.-India Trilateral Exercise (Malabar)	June 2017 (Waters and airspace east of India)	Japan, U.S., India	2 vessels
	June 2018 (Waters and airspace around Guam)	Japan, U.S., India	3 vessels 1 submarine 7 aircraft
Japan-U.S.-India Trilateral Exercise	November 2017 (Waters around Japan)	Japan, U.S., India	1 vessel
	July 2018 (Waters around Japan)		19 vessels 8 aircraft
Australian Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Exercise (Kakadu)	September 2016 (Waters around Australia)	Japan, U.S., Australia, etc.	1 vessel 2 aircraft
	August - October 2018 (Waters around Australia)	Japan, U.S., Australia, etc.	1 vessel 1 aircraft
Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise	September 2016 (Waters and airspace around Singapore)	Japan, U.S., Australia, etc.	1 personnel
	September 2017 (Australia and waters and airspace around Australia)		1 aircraft Approximately 20 personnel
	July 2018 (Waters and airspace around Japan)		2 vessels, 2 aircraft Approximately 280 personnel
U.S.-Hosted International Mine Countermeasures Exercise	September 2017 (Waters around the Arabian Peninsula)	Japan, U.S., etc.	2 vessels
U.S.-Hosted International Maritime Exercise	May 2017 (Bahrain)	Japan, U.S., etc.	Several personnel
U.S.-Philippines joint exercise (KAMANDAG)	September - October 2017 (Luzon, the Philippines)	Japan, U.S., Philippines	14 personnel
	September - October 2018 (Luzon, the Philippines)		93 personnel
Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise	June 2017 (Waters around Guam)	Japan, U.S., etc.	5 personnel
Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise	May 2016 (Waters around ROK)	Japan, U.S., ROK, Malaysia, Australia, Singapore	2 vessels
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training (Cope North Guam)	February 2017 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)	Japan, U.S., Australia	Approximately 20 aircraft Approximately 480 personnel
	February - March 2018 (Guam and its surrounding airspace)		Approximately 20 aircraft Approximately 460 personnel
	February - March 2019 (Guam and its surrounding airspace)		Approximately 20 aircraft Approximately 480 personnel
Field Training with U.S. and Australian Forces in Australia (Southern Jackaroo)	May 2016, May 2017, May - June 2018, May - June 2019 (Australia)	Japan, U.S., Australia	Approximately 100 personnel



Exercise	Period (Venue)	Participating countries	Participating SDF units, etc.
Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Nankai Rescue 2017)	July 2016 (Central District)	Japan, U.S., Australia	Middle Army 5,500 personnel, approximately 700 vehicles, 10 aircraft
RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Joint Exercise)	June - August 2016 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii, and waters around U.S. West Coast)	Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, ROK, China, Philippines, Malaysia, Australia, Columbia, Chile, etc.	2 vessels, 2 aircraft, Western Army, etc.
	June - August 2018 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii, and waters around U.S. West Coast)	Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, ROK, Philippines, Malaysia, Australia, Chile, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, etc.	1 vessel, 2 aircraft, Ground Component Command, Western Army, etc.
New Zealand Navy-Hosted Multilateral Training (Ngatahi)	November 2016 (Waters and airspace around New Zealand)	Japan, New Zealand, etc.	2 aircraft
Multilateral Training hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Croix du Sud)	November 2016 (New Caledonia)	Japan, U.S., Singapore, Australia, Tonga, New Zealand, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Canada, Chile, U.K., France	5 personnel
Multilateral Training hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Équateur)	September 2017 (New Caledonia)	Japan, France, U.S., Australia, Tonga, New Zealand, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, U.K.	1 personnel
Japan-France-U.K.-U.S. Four-Country Training	May 2017 (Waters west of Kyushu - Guam - Northern Mariana Islands)	Japan, France, U.K., U.S.	220 personnel, 1 vessel, 2 aircraft
Pakistani Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Training (Aman-17)	February 2017 (Surrounding airspace of Pakistan)	Japan, Pakistan, etc.	2 aircraft
Malaysian Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Exercise	March 2017 (Waters around Malaysia)	Japan, Malaysia, U.S., etc.	1 vessel
Multilateral Counter-Piracy Joint Training	April 2017 (Gulf of Aden)	Japan, U.S., U.K., ROK	1 vessel, 1 aircraft
Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral HA/DR exercise (Christmas Drop)	December 2016 (Guam (U.S.), Micronesia, Palau, Northern Mariana Islands, and their surrounding airspace)	Japan, U.S., Australia	Approximately 6 aircraft Approximately 150 personnel
	December 2017 (Guam (U.S.), Micronesia, Palau, Northern Mariana Islands, and their surrounding airspace)		Approximately 6 aircraft Approximately 150 personnel
	December 2018 (Guam (U.S.), Micronesia, Palau, Northern Mariana Islands, and their surrounding airspace)		Approximately 6 aircraft Approximately 150 personnel
Japan-U.S.-India-Philippines Four-Country Exercise	May 2019 (Waters west of Kyushu through the East China Sea)	Japan, U.S., India, Philippines	2 vessels
Japan-France-Australia-U.S. Four-Country Exercise (La Perouse)	May 2019 (Waters and Airspace west of Sumatra)	Japan, France, Australia, U.S.	2 vessels
Japan-U.S.-U.K. trilateral exercise	December 2018 and March 2019 (Waters and airspace south of Honshu)	Japan, U.S., U.K.	1 vessel 1 aircraft

## (1) Dispatch of Personnel to United Nations Agencies

Period of Dispatch	Position in the Dispatched Organization	Dispatched Personnel
Jun. 9, 1997 - Jun. 30, 2002, Aug. 1, 2004 - Jul. 31, 2007	Inspectorate Division Director, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major General) <sup>1</sup>
Jun. 23, 1997 - Jun. 23, 2000	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF officer (Captain)
Oct. 1, 2002 - Jun. 30, 2007	Head, Operations and Planning Branch, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Jul. 11, 2005 - Jul. 10, 2009	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major)
Jan. 9, 2009 - Jan. 8, 2013	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major)
Aug. 27, 2013 - Aug. 31, 2016	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF officer (Captain)
Dec. 2, 2002 - Jun. 1, 2005	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Nov. 28, 2005 - Nov. 27, 2008	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jan. 16, 2011 - Jan. 15, 2014	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Sep. 18, 2013 - Sep. 17, 2016	Force Generation Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jun. 1, 2015 - Nov. 30, 2017	Senior Military Liaison Officer, Africa I Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Mar. 1 - Aug. 31, 2016	Strategic Support Service, Logistics Support Division, Department of Field Support, United Nations (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel) <sup>2</sup>
Aug. 29, 2016 -	Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) (New York) <sup>3</sup>	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Feb. 11, 2017 -	Strategic Support Service, Logistics Division, Department of Operational Support, United Nations (New York) <sup>4</sup>	1 administrative official
Apr. 1, 2018 -	Group of Experts, Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (New York)	1 instructor

Notes: 1. The OPCW Inspectorate Division Director served in office until July 2009 after his retirement from the SDF on August 1, 2007.

2. Dispatched as an official of Ministry of Foreign Affairs

3. Due to the organizational change on January 1, 2019, the name changed from "Department of Peacekeeping Operations" to "Department of Peace Operations."

4. Due to the organizational change on January 1, 2019, the name changed from "Department of Field Support" to "Department of Operational Support."

## (2) Dispatch of Instructors and Others to PKO Centers, etc.

Period of Dispatch	Position in the Dispatched Organization	Dispatched Personnel
November 21 - 30, 2008	Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
May 22 - June 6, 2009	Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)	1 GSDF personnel (Major General)
August 28 - September 5, 2009	Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
April 10 - 17, 2010	Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel) <sup>Note</sup>
August 14 - 30, 2010	Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
November 15 - 20, 2011	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
July 31 - August 5, 2012	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
December 15 - 19, 2012	Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)	1 ASDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
March 9 - 14, 2013	South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTTC) (South Africa)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
August 28 - September 1, 2013	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
October 5 - 9, 2013	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
March 8 - 13, 2014	South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTTC) (South Africa)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
March 23 - May 25, 2014	Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
August 12, 2014	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya) (dispatched to give lecture in South Sudan)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
October 5 - 9, 2014	International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
October 6 - 23, 2014	Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
March 19 - April 1, 2015	UN Peacekeeping Centre (India)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
June 4 - July 1, 2015	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
September 5 - 20, 2015	South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTTC) (South Africa)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
October 22 - November 7, 2015	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
March 21 - April 1, 2016	UN Peacekeeping Centre (India)	1 MSDF personnel (Captain)
May 31 - June 17, 2016	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
November 4 - 19, 2016	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
March 6 - 19, 2017	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
June 2 - 18, 2017	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
December 1 - 15, 2017	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Aug. 22 - 28, 2018	Indonesian National Defense Forces Peacekeeping Centre (Indonesia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Nov. 2 - 18, 2018	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Mar. 3 - 15, 2019	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jun. 28 - Jul. 12, 2019	Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)

Notes: First dispatch of female SDF personnel.

**Reference 53 Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities**

Item	International Peace Support Act	International Peace Cooperation Act	Japan Disaster Relief Team Law	Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Expired on July 31, 2009)	Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (Expired on January 15, 2010)
Purpose	○ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community	○ Proactive contribution to U.N.-centered efforts towards international peace	○ Contribution to promotion of international cooperation	○ Proactive contribution to the efforts by the international community to support and encourage the self-reliant efforts by the Iraqi people towards the prompt reconstruction of the State of Iraq ○ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan through the reconstruction of Iraq	○ Proactive contribution to the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism ○ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan
Provisions in the SDF Law	○ Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law	○ Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law	○ Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law	○ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law	○ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law
Major Activities	○ Cooperation and support activities <sup>1</sup> ○ Search and rescue activities <sup>1</sup> ○ Ship inspection operations <sup>3</sup>	○ International peacekeeping activities ○ Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security ○ International humanitarian assistance ○ International election monitoring activities ○ Supplies cooperation for the abovementioned activities	○ Rescue activities ○ Medical treatment (including prevention of epidemics) ○ Activities for disaster emergency response and disaster recovery ○ Transportation of personnel or equipment/goods for the abovementioned activities	○ Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities ○ Support activities for ensuring security	○ Replenishment support activities
Areas of Operation	○ Territories of Japan ○ Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration (in such countries) is required. ○ High seas and the airspace above	○ Areas excluding Japan (including the high seas) (A ceasefire agreement between the parties of the dispute and an agreement by the receiving country are required)	○ Regions overseas, especially in less-developed regions	○ Territories of Japan ○ Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration is required in such countries and in Iraq) <sup>2</sup> ○ High seas and the airspace above <sup>2</sup>	○ Territories of Japan ○ Territories of foreign countries (limited to the Indian Ocean States) (consent of such countries is required) <sup>2</sup> ○ High seas (limited to the Indian Ocean, etc.) and the airspace above <sup>2</sup>
Diet Approval	○ Prior approval required without exception	○ To be discussed in advance in the Diet in principle, only for cases where SDF units, etc. conduct so-called ceasefire monitoring and safety-ensuring operations <sup>4</sup>	N/A	○ To be discussed in the Diet within 20 days from the day since the SDF initiates such measures <sup>4</sup>	(Note 5)
Diet Report	○ Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay	○ Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay	N/A	○ Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay	○ Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay

Notes: 1. Limited to sites where combat is not taking place.

2. Limited to areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan's activities are being implemented.

3. Operations shall be conducted in waters where the activities can be clearly distinguished from ship inspection operations carried out by foreign countries.

4. In cases where the Diet is in recess, etc., an approval shall be promptly requested in the Diet at the earliest session.

5. As prescribed by Law, (1) the category and nature of operations shall be limited to supply. (2) As the area of operations is prescribed, including foreign territories, it is not considered necessary to re-obtain the approval of the Diet. Therefore there are no provisions relating to Diet approval.

**Reference 54 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities****(1) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq**

(As of May 31, 2019)

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
GSDF	Southeast Iraq, etc.	Jan. 2004 - Jul. 2006	Approx. 600	• Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities, etc.
	Kuwait, etc.	Jun. - Sep. 2006	Approx. 100	• Operations required for evacuation of vehicles, equipment and others
MSDF	Persian Gulf, etc.	Feb. 20 - Apr. 8, 2004	Approx. 330	• Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipment required for the GSDF's activities
ASDF	Kuwait, etc.	Dec. 2003 - Feb. 2009	Approx. 210	• Transportation of materials for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance

**(2) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law**

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF	Indian Ocean	Nov. 2001 - Nov. 2007	Approx. 320	• Materials supplies for foreign vessels
ASDF	U.S. Forces in Japan, etc.		—	• Transportation of materials

**(3) Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law**

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF	Indian Ocean	Jan. 2008 - Feb. 2010	Approx. 330	• Materials supplies for foreign vessels

**(4) Anti-Piracy Operations (including dispatches as Maritime Security Operations)**

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF (Maritime Force)	Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden	Mar. 2009 - Dec. 2016	Approx. 400	Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.
		Dec. 2016 -	Approx. 200	Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.
MSDF (Air Unit)	Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti	May 2009 - Feb. 2011	Approx. 100	Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden and tasks related to general affairs, accounting, public relations, health, etc.
		Feb. 2011 - Jun. 2012	Approx. 120	
		Jun. 2012 - Jul. 2014	Approx. 110	
	Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti	Jul. 2014 - Jul. 2015	Approx. 70	Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.
	Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti	Jul. 2015 -	Approx. 60	Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.
MSDF (Support Unit)	Djibouti	Jul. 2014 -	Approx. 30	Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation, etc.
MSDF (Combined Task Force 151 Command Unit)	Bahrain, etc.	Aug. 2014 -	Under 20	Communication and coordination with units of various countries participating in CTF151
MSDF (Local Coordination Center)	Djibouti	Jul. 2012 - Jul. 2014	3	Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities necessary for Maritime Force and Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation
GSDF (Air Unit)	Djibouti	May 2009 - Feb. 2011	Approx. 50	Security of activity base and P-3C
		Feb. 2011 - Jun. 2012	Approx. 60	
		Jun. 2012 - Jul. 2014	Approx. 80	
GSDF (Support Unit)	Djibouti	Jul. 2014 -	Approx. 80	Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation, etc.

**(5) International Peace Cooperation Activities**

			Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
PKO	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Ceasefire Monitors	Sep. 1992 - Sep. 1993	8	16	• Monitor custody of weapons collected and observance of ceasefire • Monitor observance of ceasefire at the border
		Engineer unit	Sep. 1992 - Sep. 1993	600	1,200	• Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure • Supply fuel and water to UNTAC components and other groups • Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities for work and medical care to staff of UNTAC components
PKO	United Nations operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Headquarters staff	May 1993 - Jan. 1995	5	10	• Draft mid-and long-term plans, plan and coordinate transport operations at UNUMOZ Headquarters
		Transport coordination unit	May 1993 - Jan. 1995	48	144	• Support customs clearance work and provide other transport related technical coordination in the allocation of transport
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operation for Rwandan Refugees	Rwandan refugee relief unit	Sep. - Dec. 1994	260		• Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies
		Air transport unit	Sep. - Dec. 1994	188		• Air transport of Rwandan refugee relief unit personnel and supplies between Nairobi (in Kenya) and Goma (in former Zaire and current Republic of the Congo) • Make use of spare capacity to airlift personnel and supplies of humanitarian international organizations engaged in refugee relief operations
PKO	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (Golan Heights)	Headquarters staff	Feb. 1996 - Feb. 2009	1st-13th personnel:	2	• Create PR and budgets for UNDOF operations, plan and coordinate transport, maintenance and other operations at UNDOF Headquarters
			Feb. 2009 - Jan. 2013	14th-17th personnel:	3	
		Transport unit	Feb. 1996 - Aug. 2012	1st-33rd personnel:	43	• Transport food and other supplies • Store goods at supply warehouses, repair roads and other infrastructure, maintain heavy machinery, conduct firefighting and snow clearance
			Aug. 2012 - Jan. 2013	34th personnel:	44	
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operations in Timor-Leste	Air transport unit	Nov. 1999 - Feb. 2000	113		• Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR • Make use of spare capacity for the air transportation of UNHCR related personnel



			Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees	Air transport unit	Jan. 2001	138		• Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR
PKO	United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) (United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMISET) from May 20, 2002)	Headquarters staff	Feb. 2002 - Jun. 2004	1st rotation: 10 2nd rotation: 7	17	• Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations at military headquarters
		Engineer unit	Mar. 2002 - Jun. 2004	1st and 2nd rotation: 680 3rd rotation: 522 4th rotation: 405	2,287	• Maintain and repair roads and bridges that are necessary for PKO unit activities • Maintain reservoirs used by units of other nations and local inhabitants that are in Dili and other locations Civic assistance • Public welfare support operations
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Refugees	Air transport unit	Mar. - Apr. 2003	50		• Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Victims	Air transport unit	Jul. - Aug. 2003	98		• Air transport of materials for the relief of Iraqi victims
PKO	United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)	Arms monitors	Mar. 2007 - Jan. 2011	6	24	• Monitor management of weapons of Maoist soldiers and those of the Nepalese government force
PKO	United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)	Headquarters staff	Oct. 2008 - Sep. 2011	2	12	• Coordination in UNMIS concerning overall logistics of the military sector • Database management
PKO	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	Headquarters staff	Feb. 2010 - Jan. 2013	2	12	• MINUSTAH headquarters carries out coordination of overall military logistics, which includes the prioritization of engineering activities such as coordinating facility- related duties, and procurement and transport of military items
		Engineer unit	Feb. 2010 - Jan. 2013	1st rotation: 203 2nd rotation: 346 3rd and 4th rotation: 330 5th and 6th rotation: 317 7th rotation: 297 Withdrawal support unit: 44	2,184	• Remove rubble, repair roads, construct simple facilities, etc.
PKO	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)	Military liaison officer	Sep. 2010 - Sep. 2012	2	8	• Intelligence gathering on the security situation across Timor-Leste
PKO	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)	Headquarters staff	Nov. 2011 -	4	37	• Coordination within the UNMISS units regarding the demand of overall military logistics • Management of database • Planning and coordination of engineering duties • Planning and coordination of aircraft operation supports
		Engineer Unit	Jan. 2012 - May 2017	1st rotation: 239 2nd - 4th rotation: 349 5th and 6th rotation: 401 7th - 10th rotation: 353 11th rotation: 354 Withdrawal support unit: 58	3,912	• Development of infrastructure such as roads (The following duties were added after 5th personnel) • Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities • Coordination regarding logistics
		Local support coordination center	Jan. 2012 - Dec. 2013	(Number of personnel for 1st to 4th rotations includes personnel at the local support coordination center)		• Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities • Coordination regarding logistics
Internationally coordinated operation	International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Sinai Peninsula	Headquarters staff	Apr. 2019 -	2	2	• Liaison and coordination between the Egyptian and Israeli governments or other relevant organizations and the MFO

Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and Timor-Leste) and the ASDF (in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan).

2. An advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part of the Rwandan refugee relief effort.

**(6) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF (past 5 years)**

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International disaster relief activities in response to Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa (infectious disease)	Local coordination center	Dec. 5 - 11, 2014	4	• Coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JICA, UNMEER, and other relevant organizations engaged in international disaster relief activities
	Air transport unit		10	• Transport activities
	Epidemiological study support	Apr. 21 - May 29, 2015	1	• Support for WHO's epidemiological study and other activities in Sierra Leone
International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (airplane accident)	Local support coordination center	Jan. 3 - 9, 2015	3	• Information gathering related to rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501, coordination with relevant organizations and countries
	International disaster relief surface force		Approx. 350	• Rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501
International disaster relief activities in Nepal (earthquake disaster)	Joint operations coordination center	Apr. 27 - May 22, 2015	4	• Coordination with relevant organizations of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal and relevant countries
	Medical support unit		Approx. 110	• Medical treatment for affected people
	Air transport unit		Approx. 30	• Transport of equipment and supplies needed for medical treatment
International disaster relief activities in New Zealand (earthquake disaster)	Air patrol unit	Nov. 15 - 18, 2016	Approx. 30	• Evaluation of damages by aircraft (one P-1 aircraft)
International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (earthquake and tsunami disaster)	Local coordination center	Oct. 3 - 25, 2018	Approx. 10	• Information collection concerning damages and operations in the affected areas
	Air transport unit		Approx. 60	• Coordination with relevant organizations of Indonesia and relevant countries

**Reference 55 Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel**

(As of March 31, 2019)

Category	GSDF	MSDF	ASDF	Joint Staff etc.	Total
Authorized	150,834	45,360	46,936	4,024	247,154
Actual	137,634	42,550	42,750	3,613	226,547
Staffing Rate (%)	91.2	93.8	91.1	89.8	91.7

Category	Non-Fixed-Term Personnel						Fixed-Term Personnel			
	Officer		Warrant Officer		Enlisted (upper)		Enlisted (lower)			
Authorized	45,793		4,923		138,619		57,819			
Actual	42,274	(2,329)	4,603	(76)	137,052	(8,311)	20,734	(2,136)	21,884	(2,882)
Staffing Rate (%)	92.3		93.5		98.9		73.7			

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value.

2. The number of authorized personnel is determined based on the budget.

**Reference 56** Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2018)

Classification		Number Applied	Number Recruited	Competition Ratios	
Officer candidates		GSDF	2,161 ( 286 )	171 ( 27 )	12.6 ( 10.6 )
		MSDF	1,194 ( 159 )	61 ( 8 )	19.6 ( 19.9 )
		ASDF	1,344 ( 289 )	57 ( 12 )	23.6 ( 24.1 )
		Total	4,699 ( 734 )	289 ( 47 )	16.3 ( 15.6 )
Non-commissioned officers	Technical Petty Officer	MSDF	83 ( 16 )	17 ( 2 )	4.9 ( 8.0 )
	Technical Sergeant	ASDF	0	0	—
Aviation students		MSDF	792 ( 96 )	86 ( 4 )	9.2 ( 24.0 )
		ASDF	1,955 ( 188 )	73 ( 6 )	26.8 ( 31.3 )
		Total	2,747 ( 284 )	159 ( 10 )	17.3 ( 28.4 )
Non-commissioned officer candidates		GSDF	15,699 ( 2,867 )	4,001 ( 310 )	3.9 ( 9.2 )
		MSDF	4,388 ( 844 )	1,486 ( 259 )	3.0 ( 3.3 )
		ASDF	7,493 ( 1,417 )	977 ( 243 )	7.7 ( 5.8 )
		Total	27,580 ( 5,128 )	6,464 ( 812 )	4.3 ( 6.3 )
Uniformed SDF personnel candidates (Privates)		GSDF	17,784 ( 3,301 )	4,551 ( 1,002 )	3.9 ( 3.3 )
		MSDF	4,785 ( 922 )	971 ( 204 )	4.9 ( 4.5 )
		ASDF	5,576 ( 1,073 )	1,553 ( 129 )	3.6 ( 8.3 )
		Total	28,145 ( 5,296 )	7,075 ( 1,335 )	4.0 ( 4.0 )
National Defense Academy Students	Recommended	Humanity and social science	152 ( 44 )	30 ( 7 )	5.1 ( 6.3 )
		Science and engineering	256 ( 43 )	102 ( 12 )	2.5 ( 3.6 )
		Total	408 ( 87 )	132 ( 19 )	3.1 ( 4.6 )
	Selective exam	Humanity and social science	128 ( 29 )	14 ( 2 )	9.1 ( 14.5 )
		Science and engineering	193 ( 14 )	37 ( 2 )	5.2 ( 7.0 )
		Total	321 ( 43 )	51 ( 4 )	6.3 ( 10.8 )
	General exam	Humanity and social science	5,779 ( 2,412 )	80 ( 13 )	72.2 ( 185.5 )
		Science and engineering	7,418 ( 1,497 )	253 ( 23 )	29.3 ( 65.1 )
		Total	13,197 ( 3,909 )	333 ( 36 )	39.6 ( 108.6 )
National Defense Medical College students		6,113 ( 1,911 )	84 ( 27 )	72.8 ( 70.8 )	
National Defense Medical College nursing students (SDF regular personnel candidate and nursing school students)		1,905 ( 1,563 )	74 ( 64 )	25.7 ( 24.4 )	
GSDF High Technical School Students	Recommended		152	69	2.2
	General exam		2,076	277	7.5
	Total		2,228	346	6.4

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses indicate numbers of females.

2. The numbers are for SDF regular personnel recruited in FY2018.

**Reference 57** Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel, and Others

(As of March 31, 2019)

Special Service				Regular Service		
Minister of Defense State Minister of Defense Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (2) Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (up to 3)	Authorized Strength		Non-Authorized Strength		Authorized Strength	Non-Authorized Strength
	Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense				Administrative Officials, and others 27	Part-Time Officials
	SDF Personnel					
	Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense		Candidates for SDF Personnel			
	Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs		Reserve Personnel 47,900			
	Director General, and others 675		Ready Reserve Personnel 8,075			
	Administrative Officials, and others 20,226		Candidates for Reserve Personnel 4,621			
	Uniformed SDF Personnel 247,154		National Defense Academy students			
			National Defense Medical College students			
			GSDF High Technical School students			
		Part-Time Officials				

Notes: 1. Number of personnel refers to the numbers specified in the laws and regulations

2. "Others" in the title includes Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense, Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense, and Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense

**Reference 58**
**Major Exercises Conducted in FY2018**

## ○ Joint Training

Exercise	Period	Location	Main Participating Units, etc.	Note
Training for Rescue of Japanese Nationals Overseas	Sep. 1 - 9, 2018	Republic of Djibouti, etc.	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Central Readiness Force, Air Support Command, etc. Approximately 120 personnel	To enhance ability to deploy units overseas and their operational capabilities relating to transport of overseas Japanese nationals and others, and strengthen coordination between SDF and U.S. Forces
Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise (field training exercise)	Oct. 29 - Nov. 8, 2018	SDF facilities, U.S. Forces bases in Japan, waters and airspace surrounding Tsushima and Japan, and Guam, the United States, and its surrounding waters and airspace	Each Staff Office, Ground Component Command, respective Regional Armies, Self-Defense Fleet, respective Regional Districts, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc. Approximately 47,000 personnel, 20 vessels, and 170 aircraft	In order to enhance SDF's readiness and interoperability between Japan and the United States, train and exercise according to the SDF's operational plan in armed attack situations, etc. and the Japan-U.S. Joint Response Plan
Training for Rescue of Japanese Nationals Overseas	Dec. 11 - 14, 2018	Nikko Training Area, Miho Air Base, Camp Yonago, the route linking them, and waters and airspace surrounding them	Joint Staff, Ground Component Command, Western Army, Military Police units, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command, ASDF military police, etc.	To enhance joint operations capabilities relating to protection measures for overseas Japanese nationals and others, and strengthen coordination between SDF and relevant organizations

## ○ GSDF

Exercise	Period	Location	Main Participating Units, etc.	Note
Army Corps field training exercise (Northern Army)	Aug. 29 - Sep. 28, 2018	Camps, bases, maneuver areas and privately owned land inside the Northern Army District	Northern Army, etc. Approximately 11,700 personnel, 3,300 vehicles, 27 aircraft, and 2 vessels	To maintain and enhance Army's capability to respond to various situations
Army Corps field training exercise (Western Army)	Oct. 22 - Nov. 24, 2018	Camps, bases, maneuver areas and privately owned land inside the Western Army District	Western Army, etc. Approximately 17,000 personnel, 4,500 vehicles, 65 aircraft	
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for divisions)	Jun. 15 - Jul. 31, 2018	Middle-Northern Regional Army Districts (Yausubetsu Training Area, Kamifurano Maneuver Area, etc.)	Major units of 13th Brigade Approximately 2,400 personnel, 900 vehicles	To enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for divisions)	Jul. 4 - 11, 2018	Numazu Beach Training Area	Major unit of 14th Brigade Approximately 110 personnel, 45 vehicles	
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)	Oct. 23 - Nov. 12, 2018	Northern-Western Regional Army Districts (Oyanohara Maneuver Area, etc.)	One Infantry Regiment of the 12th Division Approximately 850 personnel, 280 vehicles, 3 aircraft	
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)	Oct. 17, 2018 - Nov. 24	Northeastern-Western Regional Army Districts (Camps, etc. inside the Western Army District)	One Infantry Regiment of the 6th Division Approximately 550 personnel, 100 vehicles	
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)	Oct. 18, 2018 - Oct. 31	Northeastern-Northern Regional Army Districts (Yausubetsu Training Area, etc.)	One Infantry Regiment of the 9th Division Approximately 1,050 personnel, 330 vehicles, 3 aircraft	
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments) 2nd Division, 5th Division	Oct. 29 - Nov. 10, 2018	Middle-Western Regional Army Districts (Hijudai Maneuver Area, etc.)	One Infantry Regiment of the 14th Division Approximately 900 personnel, 300 vehicles, 5 aircraft	

## ○ ASDF

Exercise	Period	Location	Main Participating Units, etc.	Note
ASDF comprehensive training (field training exercise)	Oct. 18 - 26, 2018	ASDF bases, and waters and airspace surrounding Japan	Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command, Air Development and Test Command, Air Materiel Command Approximately 26,000 personnel, 90 aircraft	Train and exercise operations of ASDF, which concerns defense of Japan, to maintain and enhance operational capability of units

**Reference 59**
**Results of Firing Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2018)**

	Exercise	Date	Location	Dispatched Unit
GSDF	HAWK/Medium-range SAM unit level live-fire training	Sep. 18 - Nov. 13, 2018	McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.	16 anti-aircraft companies Approximately 510 personnel
	Surface-to-ship missile unit level live-fire training	Sep. 29 - Oct. 15, 2018	Point Mugu Range in California, U.S.	2 surface-to-ship missile regiments Approximately 180 personnel
MSDF	(First) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine	Aug. 21 - Nov. 17, 2018	Sea areas surrounding Hawaii	1 submarine
	(Second) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine	Mar. 30 - Jun. 29, 2019	Waters surrounding Hawaii	1 submarine
ASDF	Annual service practice by anti-aircraft units	Aug. 30 - Nov. 16, 2018	McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.	6 Air Defense Missiles groups, Air Defense Missile Training Group Approximately 370 personnel



**Reference 60 Main Measures for Re-employment Support**

Classification	Measures for re-employment support	Description
Measures for retiring uniformed SDF personnel	Occupational aptitude testing	Testing aimed to provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with guidance based on individual aptitudes
	Technical training	Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement and eligible for qualifications (large-sized vehicle operation, forklift operation, boiler maintenance, large-sized special vehicle operation, electrician, regular-sized vehicle operation, first-level training for nursing care workers, heavy-duty vehicle operation, chief hazardous material engineer, crane operation, course for civil servant examination, drone operator qualification [new in FY2019], employment counsellor [new in FY2019], etc.)
	Disaster prevention and risk management training	Provide uniformed SDF officer retiring at an early age with technical knowledge on disaster prevention administration and the Civil Protection Plan (attending lectures in this area are a prerequisite for receiving the Cabinet Office's Regional Disaster Prevention Manager license)
	Correspondence courses	Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement and eligible for qualifications (hazardous materials engineer, electrician, financial planner, real estate transaction specialist, property administrator, medical clerk, data security officer, support to personnel who wish to go to university [new in FY2019], etc.)
	Business management training	Support uniformed SDF personnel retiring at an early age to cultivate social adaptability, as well as provide necessary knowledge to lead a stable life after reemployment and retirement
	Career guidance	Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with knowhow to choose new occupation and right mindset toward reemployment
	Outsourcing career counseling, etc.	Outsource career counseling, etc. to external experts to meet the needs of each retiring uniformed SDF personnel
Measures for internal support personnel	Training for support personnel	Training of labor administration, support activities, etc. to improve quality of support personnel
Measures for promotion outside of SDF	Support for publicity aimed at to business owners	Publicizing to business owners, etc. the effectiveness of retiring uniformed SDF personnel who plan to retire
	Inviting business owners on unit tours	Invite business owners to SDF units, etc. and provide them with tours, explanations of the re-employment support situation, etc.

**Reference 61 Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government**

(As of March 31, 2019 495 personnel)

Prefectural Government	Government employment situation
Hokkaido	Hokkaido Prefectural Government (four persons), Sapporo City Government (three persons), Hakodate City Government (two persons), Asahikawa City Government (two persons), Muroran City Government, Kushiro City Government, Obihiro City Government (two persons), Iwamizawa City Government (two persons), Rumoi City Government, Tomakomai City Government, Wakkanai City Government, Bibai City Government, Ashibetsu City Government (two persons), Akabira City Government, Shibetsu City Government, Nayoro City Government, Chitose City Government (four persons), Takikawa City Government, Sunagawa City Government, Eniwa City Government (two persons), Kitahiroshima City Government, Hokuto City Government, Matsumae Town Office, Nanae Town Office, Shikabe Town Office, Kuromatsunai Town Office, Rankoshi Town Office, Naganuma Town Office, Shintotsukawa Town Office, Kamifurano Town Office, Nakafurano Town Office, Toyotomi Town Office, Rebun Town Office, Bihoro Town Office (two persons), Engaru Town Office (two persons), Shiraoi Town Office, Atsuma Town Office, Abira Town Office, Shinhidaka Town Office, Otofuke Town Office, Memuro Town Office, Shibecha Town Office, Teshikaga Town Office
Aomori	Aomori Prefectural Government, Aomori City Government (three persons), Hirosaki City Government, Hachinohe City Government (two persons), Towada City Government, Misawa City Government, Ajigasawa Town Office, Fukaura Town Office, Oirase Town Office
Iwate	Iwate Prefectural Government, Morioka City Government, Miyako City Government, Hanamaki City Government, Kamaishi City Government, Hachimantai City Government, Takizawa City Government, Yamada Town Office
Miyagi	Miyagi Prefectural Government, Sendai City Government (two persons), Ishinomaki City Government, Tagajo City Government, Iwanuma City Government, Tome City Government, Higashi Matsushima City Government, Shibata Town Office, Taiwa Town Office, Ohira Village Office, Minamisanriku Town Office
Akita	Akita Prefectural Government (two persons), Akita City Government, Odate City Government, Yuzawa City Government, Yurihonjo City Government, Daisen City Government (two persons), Senboku City Government
Yamagata	Yamagata Prefectural Government, Yamagata City Government, Sakata City Government, Kaminoyama City Government, Nagai City Government, Tendo City Government, Higashine City Government, Asahi Town Office, Mikawa Town Office
Fukushima	Fukushima Prefectural Government, Fukushima City Government (two persons), Koriyama City Government
Ibaraki	Ibaraki Prefectural Government, Koga City Government, Ryugasaki City Government, Shimotsuma City Government, Joso City Government, Takahagi City Government, Ushiku City Government, Moriya City Government, Hitachi Omiya City Government, Ami Town Office, Sakai Town Office
Tochigi	Tochigi Prefectural Government, Utsunomiya City Government
Gunma	Gunma Prefectural Government, Numata City Government, Shibukawa City Government
Saitama	Saitama Prefectural Government, Saitama City Government, Fukaya City Government, Asaka City Government, Wako City Government, Okegawa City Government, Yoshikawa City Government

Prefectural Government	Government employment situation
Chiba	Chiba Prefectural Government, Chiba City Government, Ichikawa City Government, Funabashi City Government, Tateyama City Government, Matsudo City Government (two persons), Mobara City Government, Narita City Government, Narashino City Government, Kashiwa City Government, Ichihara City Government, Nagareyama City Government, Kimitsu City Government, Urayasu City Government, Yotsukaido City Government, Tomisato City Government, Katori City Government, Sammu City Government, Isumi City Government, Oamishirasato City Government, Shisui Town Office
Tokyo	Tokyo Metropolitan Government (four persons), Shinagawa Ward Office (three persons), Ota Ward Office, Shibuya Ward Office (two persons), Toshima Ward Office, Arakawa Ward Office, Itabashi Ward Office (two persons), Adachi Ward Office, Mizuho Town Office
Kanagawa	Kanagawa Prefectural Government (three persons), Yokohama City Government (nine persons), Kawasaki City Government (two persons), Sagami City Government, Yokosuka City Government, Kamakura City Government, Fujisawa City Government (two persons), Odawara City Government, Chigasaki City Government, Zushi City Government, Miura City Government, Ebina City Government (three persons), Zama City Government, Kaisei Town Office, Hakone Town Office, Yugawara Town Office
Niigata	Niigata Prefectural Government, Niigata City Government, Murakami City Government, Tsubame City Government, Jouetsu City Government, Tainai City Government
Toyama	Toyama Prefectural Government, Toyama City Government, Himi City Government, Tonami City Government
Ishikawa	Ishikawa Prefectural Government, Kanazawa City Government, Nomi City Government
Fukui	Fukui Prefectural Government (three persons), Fukui City Government, Awara City Government, Takahama Town Office
Yamanashi	Yamanashi Prefectural Government (two persons), Fujiyoshida City Government, Minami-Alps City Government, Yamanakako Town Office
Nagano	Nagano Prefectural Government (two persons), Nagano City Government, Matsumoto City Government, Chino City Government, Saku City Government, Azumino City Government
Gifu	Gifu Prefectural Government (three persons), Gifu City Government, Minokamo City Government, Kakamigahara City Government, Hida City Government, Kaizu City Government, Ginan Town Office, Sakahogi Town Office
Shizuoka	Shizuoka Prefectural Government (six persons), Shizuoka City Government, Hamamatsu City Government, Atami City Government, Ito City Government, Shimada City Government (two persons), Gotenba City Government (two persons), Susono City Government, Izu City Government, Makinohara City Government, Kannami Town Office, Oyama Town Office
Aichi	Aichi Prefectural Government, Toyohashi City Government, Okazaki City Government, Handa City Government, Kasugai City Government, Kariya City Government, Nishio City Government, Inazawa City Government, Tokai City Government, Takahama City Government, Toyoake City Government, Kiyosu City Government, Kitanagoya City Government (two persons), Yatomi City Government, Miyoshi City Government, Ama City Government, Nagakute City Government, Toyoyama Town Office, Oharu Town Office, Kanie Town Office, Tobishima Village Office, Mihama Town Office, Taketoyo Town Office
Mie	Mie Prefectural Government, Tsu City Government, Yokkaichi City Government, Ise City Government, Kuwana City Government, Nabari City Government, Owase City Government, Toba City Government, Shima City Government
Shiga	Shiga Prefectural Government, Kusatsu City Government, Konan City Government
Kyoto	Kyoto Prefectural Government, Maizuru City Government, Joyo City Government, Yawata City Government, Kizugawa City Government, Seika Town Office (two persons)
Osaka	Osaka Prefectural Government, Osaka City Government (two persons), Sakai City Government, Ikeda City Government, Kaizuka City Government, Hirakata City Government, Ibaraki City Government, Izumisano City Government, Tondabayashi City Government, Kawachinagano City Government, Daito City Government, Takaishi City Government, Shijonawate City Government, Osakasayama City Government, Toyono Town Office
Hyogo	Hyogo Prefectural Government, Himeji City Government, Akashi City Government, Nishiwaki City Government, Kawanishi City Government, Yabu City Government
Nara	Nara Prefectural Government (three persons), Nara City Government (four persons), Yamato Takada City Government, Gojo City Government (three persons), Gosho City Government, Ikoma City Government
Wakayama	Wakayama Prefectural Government, Wakayama City Government, Hashimoto City Government, Shirahama Town Office
Tottori	Tottori Prefectural Government (three persons), Tottori City Government, Yonago City Government, Sakaiminato City Government, Yurihama Town Office, Nanbu Town Office
Shimane	Shimane Prefectural Government, Matsue City Government, Hamada City Government
Okayama	Okayama Prefectural Government, Kurashiki City Government, Asakuchi City Government, Nagi Town Office
Hiroshima	Hiroshima Prefectural Government, Hiroshima City Government, Kure City Government, Miyoshi City Government, Higashihiroshima City Government, Hatsukaichi City Government, Kaita Town Office
Yamaguchi	Yamaguchi Prefectural Government, Shimonoseki City Government, Yamaguchi City Government, Hagi City Government, Hofu City Government, Iwakuni City Government, Nagato City Government, Shunan City Government, Waki Town Office, Tabuse Town Office
Tokushima	Tokushima Prefectural Government (three persons), Komatsushima City Government, Anan City Government, Yoshinogawa City Government (two persons), Awa City Government, Miyoshi City Government
Kagawa	Kagawa Prefectural Government, Marugame City Government, Sakaide City Government, Zentsuji City Government, Sanuki City Government, Manno Town Office
Ehime	Ehime Prefectural Government, Matsuyama City Government, Imabari City Government, Saijo City Government
Kochi	Kochi Prefectural Government, Kochi City Government, Konan City Government
Fukuoka	Fukuoka Prefectural Government, Kitakyushu City Government, Fukuoka City Government (two persons), Kurume City Government, Iizuka City Government (two persons), Tagawa City Government, Chikugo City Government, Yukuhashi City Government, Nakama City Government, Kasuga City Government, Onojo City Government (two persons), Munakata City Government (two persons), Dazaifu City Government, Asakura City Government, Itoshima City Government, Nakagawa City Government, Kasuya Town Office, Chikuzen Town Office, Tachiarai Town Office
Saga	Saga Prefectural Government (three persons), Karatsu City Government, Yoshinogari Town Office
Nagasaki	Nagasaki Prefectural Government (five persons), Nagasaki City Government, Sasebo City Government (three persons), Shimabara City Government, Omura City Government (two persons), Matsuura City Government, Iki City Government, Saikai City Government
Kumamoto	Kumamoto Prefectural Government (three persons), Kumamoto City Government, Yashiro City Government, Arao City Government, Minamata City Government, Kikuchi City Government, Koshi City Government, Ozu Town Office, Kuma Village Office
Oita	Oita Prefectural Government (two persons), Oita City Government, Beppu City Government, Kitsuki City Government
Miyazaki	Miyazaki Prefectural Government (six persons), Miyazaki City Government, Miyakonojo City Government (three persons), Nobeoka City Government, Nichinan City Government, Kobayashi City Government, Hyuga City Government, Kushima City Government, Saito City Government, Ebino City Government (two persons), Mimata Town Office, Takanabe Town Office, Tsuno Town Office, Kadogawa Town Office
Kagoshima	Kagoshima Prefectural Government (four persons), Kagoshima City Government, Tarumizu City Government, Satsuma-Sendai City Government, Soo City Government, Kirishima City Government (two persons), Aira City Government, Kinko Town Office, Minami Okuma Town Office
Okinawa	Tomigusuku City Government

Notes: Provided by the Ministry of Defense as of March 31, 2019 (part-time personnel included).

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on April 1, 2014)

The Government has made it its basic policy to deal with overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology in a careful manner in accordance with Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's remarks at the Diet in 1967 (hereinafter referred to as "the Three Principles on Arms Exports") and the collateral policy guideline by the Miki administration in 1976. These policy guidelines have played a certain role as Japan has been following the path of a peace-loving nation. On the other hand, these policy guidelines including the non-permission of arms exports to communist bloc countries have increasingly proved unsuitable for the current situation. Also, the Government has repeatedly taken exemption measures depending on the individual necessity of each case since arms exports to substantially all areas were not permitted, as a result of not promoting arms exports regardless of the destinations.

Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. At the same time, surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges, it has become essential for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world commensurate with its national capabilities. Against this backdrop, under the evolving security environment, Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and the world economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation.

From the view point of achieving the fundamental principle of national security by implementing concrete policies, the Government, in accordance with the National Security Strategy adopted on December 17, 2013, decided to review the Government's existing policy guidelines on overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology, and set out clear principles which fit the new security environment while giving due consideration to the roles that the existing policy guidelines have played so far and by consolidating the policy guidelines comprehensively with consideration on the past exemption measures.

An appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology contributes to further active promotion of the maintenance of international peace and security through timely and effective implementation of contribution to peace and international cooperation such as international peace cooperation, international disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, responses to international terrorism and piracy, and capacity building of developing countries (hereinafter referred to as "peace contribution and international cooperation"). Such transfer also contributes to strengthening security and defense cooperation with Japan's ally, the United States as well as other countries. Furthermore, it contributes to maintaining and enhancing Japan's defense production and technological bases, thereby contributing to Japan's enhancement of defense capability, given that international joint development and production projects have become the international mainstream in order to improve the performance of defense equipment and to deal with their rising costs.

On the other hand, since the distribution of defense equipment and technology has significant security, social, economic and humanitarian

impact on the international community, the need for each government to control the transfer of defense equipment and technology in a responsible manner while taking various factors into account is recognized.

In light of the above, while maintaining its basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation, Japan will control the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology based on the following three principles. The overseas transfer of facilities related to arms production will continue to be treated in the same manner as defense equipment and technology.

### 1. Clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited

Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will not be permitted when:

- 1) the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded,
- 2) the transfer violates obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions, or
- 3) the defense equipment and technology is destined for a country party to a conflict (a country against which the United Nations Security Council is taking measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack).

### 2. Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict examination and information disclosure

In cases not within 1. above, cases where transfers may be permitted will be limited to the following cases. Those cases will be examined strictly while ensuring transparency. More specifically, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted in such cases as the transfer contributes to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, or to Japan's security from the viewpoint of—implementing international joint development and production projects with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including its ally, the U.S. (hereinafter referred to as "the ally and partners"), —enhancing security and defense cooperation with the ally and partners, as well as—supporting the activities of the Self-Defense Forces including the maintenance of its equipment and ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan's security. Then the Government will make a comprehensive judgment in light of the existing guidelines of the international export control regime and based on the information available at the time of export examinations.

Significant cases that require especially careful consideration from the viewpoint of Japan's security will be examined at the National Security Council (NSC). As for the cases that were deliberated at the NSC, the Government will disclose their information in accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 of 1999).

### 3. Ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-purpose use or transfer to third parties

In cases satisfying 2. above, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured. More concretely, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of control system at the destination in such cases as those where the transfer is judged to be appropriate for active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, when the transfer involves participation in an international system for sharing parts etc., and when the transfer involves delivery of parts etc. to a licensor.

Implementation guidelines for the policy described above will be decided by the NSC. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will implement the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Law No.228 of 1949) appropriately in accordance with the decision.

For the purpose of this policy, “defense equipment and technology” refers to “arms and military technologies”; “arms” refers to items listed in Section 1, Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 378 of 1949), and are to be used by military forces and directly employed in combat; and “military technologies” refers to technologies for the design, production or use of arms.

The Government will contribute actively to the peace and stability of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. Under such policy, it will play a proactive role in the area of controlling defense equipment and technology as well as sensitive dual-use goods and technologies to achieve the early entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty and further strengthen the international export control regimes.

#### Reference 63 Activities in Civic Life


Items	Details of Activities and Their Past Records
Details of Activities and Their Past Records	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The GSDF disposes of such bombs at the request of municipal governments and others.</li> <li>○ Disposal operations in FY2018: a total of 1,480 disposal operations (average of approximately 28 operations per week), weighing approximately 53.0 tons in total; in particular, the amount of unexploded bombs that were disposed of in Okinawa Prefecture totaled approximately 20.0 tons, (accounting for about 38% of such bombs removed across the nation). (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible in regard to disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)</li> </ul>
Removal of Underwater Mines (Article 84-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The MSDF undertakes minesweeping operations in waters designated as dangerous areas because underwater mines had been laid there during World War II, as well as removes and disposes of explosives after receiving reports from municipal governments and others.</li> <li>○ Minesweeping has been almost completed in the dangerous areas.</li> <li>○ Disposal operations in FY2018: a total 4,456 units were disposed of, weighing approximately 2.8 tons in total (0 underwater mines disposed). (If explosive hazardous materials are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)</li> </ul>
Medical Activities (Article 27 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 4-10 of Defense Ministry Establishment Law, and others)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Medical services are provided to the general public at the National Defense Medical College Hospital in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and some hospitals affiliated with the SDF (seven out of 16 such hospitals, including the SDF Central Hospital in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo).</li> <li>○ The National Defense Medical College Hospital serves as an advanced treatment hospital (provision of advanced medical treatment, etc.) and a medical facility providing tertiary emergency services (acceptance of emergency patients in critical condition).</li> <li>○ In the wake of a disaster, medical units belonging to major SDF units, acting on a request from municipal governments, provide travelling clinics, quarantines and so forth when a disaster occurs.</li> <li>○ The GSDF Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo), MSDF Underwater Medical Center (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), and ASDF Aviation Medicine Laboratory (Tachikawa City, Tokyo and Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture) undertake study on outdoor sanitation, underwater medicine, and aviation medicine, respectively.</li> <li>○ The National Defense Medical College Research Institute (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture) undertakes study on disaster and emergency medicine.</li> </ul>
Cooperation in Supporting Athletic Meetings (Article 100-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ At the request of concerned organizations, the SDF helps operations of the Olympics and Asian games in Japan as well as national sports meetings in the fields of ceremonies, communications, transportation, music performance, medical services, and emergency medical services.</li> <li>○ The SDF provides transportation and communication support to marathon events and ekiden road relays.</li> </ul>
Exchanges with Local Communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Sports facilities such as grounds, gyms and swimming pools at many of the SDF garrisons and bases are open to general citizens in response to requests from local communities. Participation in various events sponsored by general citizens and municipal governments or taking part as sports referees and instructors on an individual basis.</li> </ul>




Outline of the survey period: January 11 - 21, 2018

For details, refer to <<https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h29/h29-bouei/index.html>>


## 1 Interest in the Self Defense Forces




## 2 Impression toward the SDF




## 3 Defense capabilities of the SDF




## 4 Evaluation of overseas activities by the SDF



## 5 Efforts in international peace cooperation activities



## 6 Role expected of the Self Defense Forces



Total (N = 1,671 people, M.T. = 407.7%)

**Reference 65** Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2018)

	Ministry of Defense Headquarters	Regional Defense Bureaus and Branches	Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency	Total
1 Number of disclosure requests	2477	1834	114	4425
2 Number of decisions regarding disclosure	2652	2109	130	4891
Requests accepted	1493	894	41	2428
Requests partially accepted	1035	1203	87	2325
Requests declined	124	12	2	138
3 Number of administrative protests	12404	0	1	12405
4 Number of lawsuits	4	1	2	7