
2019

**DEFENSE
OF
JAPAN**

Pamphlet



DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2019

National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG)

The most consequential responsibility of the Government of Japan is to maintain Japan's peace and security, to ensure its survival and to defend to the end Japanese nationals' life, person and property and territorial land, waters and airspace. This is the foremost responsibility that Japan must fulfill as a sovereign nation. Carrying out this responsibility by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative is at the very heart of Japan's national security. Japan's defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of its security and the clear representation of the unwavering will and ability of Japan as a peace-loving nation. And maintaining Japan's peace and security is an essential premise for its prosperity.

Security Environment Surrounding Japan

At present, security environment surrounding Japan is changing at extremely high speeds. Changes in the balance of power in the international arena are accelerating and becoming more complex, and uncertainty over the existing order is increasing. Rapid expansion in the use of new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is poised to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security, which has prioritized responses in traditional, physical domains, which are land, sea and air.

Situations in the Space, Cyberspace, and Electromagnetic Spectrum



Chinese space operations control station [AFP/Jiji]



Threat message from the WannaCry malware attack, which caused huge damage worldwide [Jiji]




Russian Krasukha-4 electronic warfare system thought to have disrupted North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces' command and control and radar capabilities in Syria [Jane's by IHS Markit]

Qualitatively and quantitatively superior military powers concentrate in Japan's surroundings where clear trends are observed in further military build-up and increase in military activities.

Expansion and Intensification of Chinese Military Activities

High-level growth of defense expenditures (See Part 1, Chapter 2, Section 2)



Expansion and intensification of activities by the Chinese Navy and Air Force



Enhancement of Ballistic Missiles by North Korea



ICBM-class "Hwasong-14" Range: more than 5,500 km (July 2017) [Korea News Service/Jiji]



New-type, ICBM-class "Hwasong-15" Range: more than 10,000 km* (November 2017) [Korea News Service/Jiji]




Image publicly released by North Korea when it launched an IRBM-class ballistic missile (presumed) (September 15, 2017) [Jiji Press]

Note 1: The figure above shows a rough image of the distance each missile can reach from Pyongyang for the sake of convenience.
Note 2: Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea.

Japan, amid the dramatically changing security environment, needs to fundamentally strengthen its national defense architecture with which to protect, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, life, person and property of its nationals, territorial land, waters and airspace, and its sovereignty and independence, thereby expanding roles Japan can fulfill.

Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance as well as security cooperation with other countries are critical to Japan's national security, and this cannot be achieved without Japan's own efforts. The international community also expects Japan to play roles that are commensurate with its national power.

National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG)

Strengthening Japan's Defense Capability

Japan must squarely face the realities of national security and ensure necessary and sufficient quality and quantity so as to build a new defense capability by a truly effective defense capability that does not lie on a linear extension of the past.

In particular, it has become essential that Japan achieve superiority in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. To build a new defense capability that combines strengths across all domains (Multi-Domain Defense Force), Japan needs to engage in a transformation at a pace that is fundamentally different from the past, completely shedding the thinking that relies on traditional division among land, sea, and air.

Strengthening Capabilities in the New domains of Space, Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Spectrum

In order to realize cross-domain operations, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will acquire and strengthen capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum.



Space domain

X-band defense communications satellite (image)



Cyber domain

Cyber Competition



Electromagnetic domain

Improvement of electronic warfare capabilities of fighters (F-15) (image)

Enhancing Capabilities in Traditional Domains

The SDF will enhance capabilities to effectively counter attacks by aircraft, ships and missiles during cross-domain operations in close combination with capabilities in the new domains.



Capabilities in maritime and air domains

Destroyer JS "Izumo"



Stand-off defense capability

JASSM (image)



Comprehensive air and missile defense capability

Aegis Ashore (image)



Maneuver and deployment capability

Transport aircraft (C-2)

Strengthening Sustainability and Resiliency

To be able to sustain a range of requisite activities at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF will promote measures necessary for enhancing sustainability and resiliency of defense capability including logistics support.



Equipment maintenance



Equipment for restoring damaged runways

On the other hand, given the rapidly aging population with declining birthrates and severe fiscal situation, Japan cannot strengthen its defense capability without thorough rationalization that does not dwell on the past.

Reinforcing Human Resource Base

The MOD/SDF will make efforts to secure human resources for and improve the ability and morale of SDF personnel, which constitutes the core element of defense capability.



First Female Fighter Pilot



Type-12 surface-to-ship guided missiles

In strengthening defense capability, Japan will enhance priority capability areas as early as possible, allocating resources flexibly and intensively without adhering to existing budget and human resource allocation.

Reviewing Equipment Structure

The MOD/SDF will examine the existing equipment structure from a joint operation perspective and build an optimized equipment structure.

Japan-U.S. Alliance and Security Cooperation

The Japan-U.S. Alliance, together with Japan's own defense architecture, continues to be the cornerstone of Japan's national security. Japan's fulfillment of its foremost responsibility as a sovereign nation is the very way to fulfill its roles under the Japan-U.S. Alliance and further enhance the Alliance's ability to deter and counter threats, and is a foundation upon which to strategically promote security cooperation in line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific.

Visiting Destroyer JS "Kaga" by Prime Minister Abe and President Trump (May 2019)



[Photo: courtesy of the Cabinet Secretariat Public Relations Office]



The 18th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) (June 2019)

Characteristics of Current Security Environment

▶ P.41


- 1 As uncertainty over the existing order is increasing, inter-state competition is becoming prominent across the political, economic and military realms.
Gray zone situations are becoming persistent over a long period of time. "Hybrid warfare," a method of altering the status quo that intentionally blurs the boundaries between the military and non-military realms, is sometimes adopted.
- 2 Technological progress is about to fundamentally change how security should be managed.
Importance of domains of space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum; and game-changing technologies that could drastically change the conduct of future warfare
- 3 Security challenges, which cannot be dealt with by a single country alone, are prominently emerging.
Security of maritime traffic; securing stable use of new domains: space and cyberspace, response to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs); and response to regional conflict and international terrorism

Military Trends in the Neighboring Countries of Japan

▶ P.43

- 1 The United States possesses the world's largest comprehensive national power. The United States engages in rebuilding of its military power, strengthens alliances and partnerships, and frames the Indo-Pacific as a priority region.
- 2 China is strengthening capabilities in the domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum in addition to nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. China engages in unilateral, coercive attempts to alter the status quo based on its own assertions that are incompatible with existing international order. In the East China Sea and other waters, China is expanding and intensifying its military activities at sea and in the air. Such Chinese military developments represent a serious security concern.
- 3 North Korea has not carried out the dismantlement of all WMDs and ballistic missiles in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner: there has been no essential change in the country's nuclear and missile capabilities. Such military trends in North Korea pose a serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan.
- 4 Russia's military activities are trending upward in the Far East. Continued attention needs to be paid to Russian military development.


Recent Security Related Issues around Japan (image)



Overview

▶ P.47

- 1 The United States recognizes that the primary concern in U.S. security is strategic competition with China and Russia, which are revisionist powers. Especially, the United States is sharpening its deterrence stance against China.
 - As an initial response to China's continued militarization of areas in the South China Sea, the United States disinvited the Chinese navy to the multilateral Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC).
 - The U.S. forces carried out repeated Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea, transit through the Taiwan Strait, and bomber flights over the South China Sea.
 - The United States imposed sanctions on a Chinese military organ and a leader.
 - The United States imposed tariffs on Chinese hi-tech products, heightened scrutiny of Chinese investment in the United States, and charged espionage agents.
- 2 In a speech about the United States' policy towards China, Vice President Mike Pence mentioned an incident in which a Chinese naval vessel approached abnormally close to a U.S. Navy vessel conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations. He went on to say that the U.S. Navy will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows and U.S. national interests demand.
- 3 The Trump administration's stance on China has bipartisan support in Congress, which appears likely to be maintained going forward.
- 4 Under the recognition that North Korea's nuclear capabilities constitute a threat to the United States, it has maintained sanctions and continues its efforts to pursue the denuclearization of North Korea, maintaining firm military readiness including through U.S. Forces in Korea




Vice President Mike Pence making a speech about China

Trends in Security and Defense Policies

▶ P.47

- 1 The United States has positioned the Indo-Pacific region as a priority region, and maintains a forward military presence in the region. In June 2019, the United States released the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR), indicating its policy to ensure combat-credible forces to be forward-postured in the region, and reinforce and expand its alliances and partnerships, and evolve them to be networked.
- 2 The United States has been making efforts to maintain military advantages to deter and defeat aggression by great powers, requesting the largest research and development budget in 70 years, and a 15% and 10% year-on-year increase in the space-related budget and in the cyber-related budget, respectively.
- 3 Regarding nuclear power, the United States released the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in February 2018. It indicates the policy that, in order to deter across a spectrum of adversaries, threats and contexts, in addition to sustaining and replacing the nuclear triad (submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and strategic bombers), the United States will modify a small number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option.
In addition, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019, claiming Russia's material breach. President Trump also mentioned the need for arms control involving China, which has beefed up medium-range missile capabilities outside the scope of the INF Treaty.
- 4 Regarding missile defense, the Missile Defense Review (MDR) was published in January 2019. It notes that North Korea has the ability to threaten the U.S. homeland with its nuclear missiles. It also pointed out that Russia and China are developing advanced cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles that challenge existing missile defense systems. Under this recognition, the MDR sets out a policy of expanding and modernizing existing systems, and promoting development of new technologies taking advantage of space.
- 5 President Trump instructed the Department of Defense (DoD) to start the necessary processes to establish the Space Force. The DoD forwarded to Congress a legislative proposal to create the Space Force within the Department of the Air Force.



MDR released by the United States


China

Rapid Military Modernization

P.58

- In order to fully transform the people's armed forces into world-class forces by the mid-21st century, China has sustained high-level growth of its defense budget without transparency, engaging in broad, rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. In doing so, it has attached importance to strengthening its operational capabilities in order to steadily acquire information superiority, and also enhanced its capabilities in the domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum.
- Bolstering these capabilities will reinforce China's "Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD)" capabilities and lead to the establishment of operational capabilities further afield.
- While implementing a policy of civil-military fusion across the board, with the aim of promoting two-way links between military and civilian resources in various fields, China is striving to develop and acquire cutting-edge technologies that can be used for military purposes, and improve its operational capabilities.

Changes in China's Defense Budget



Chinese small UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles) drones using "swarm" technology

[Jane's by IHS Markit]

Activities in the Surrounding Sea Area and Airspace of Japan

P.70

- The Chinese Navy and Air Force have expanded and intensified their activities in the surrounding sea areas and airspace of Japan, including the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands. They are also conducting activities based on a unilateral claim on the Senkaku Islands, and cases involving the one-sided escalation of activities have been seen, creating a situation of great concern to Japan.
- China is likely planning to make such activities routine, given that the Chinese Navy and Air Force are more frequently advancing to the Pacific Ocean and Sea of Japan in recent years. It appears that China continues to improve the quality of its activities, and efforts can be seen to build practical joint operational capabilities.
- In the South China Sea, China is moving forward with militarization, as well as expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains by deploying aircraft. China continues unilateral efforts to change the status quo by coercion to create a fait accompli.




A Renhai-class destroyer appeared in the international naval review (April 2019)



Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft confirmed for the first time within Japan's Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea (March 2019)

People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s Recent Activities in the Surrounding Sea Area and Airspace of Japan (image)



Activities in Distant Seas

P.77

- China is steadily increasing its capabilities to conduct operations in more distant seas such as the Indian Ocean in recent years.
- While it is thought that the "Belt and Road" Initiative includes a strategic intention to expand its influence in the region, it is possible that the construction of infrastructure based on the initiative will further promote the activities of the PLA in the Indian Ocean, Pacific Ocean and elsewhere. Furthermore, the Chinese military is possibly taking on the role of the shield behind the initiative by such means as the stabilization of areas via counter-piracy activities and joint exercises.

Relations with Countries and Regions

P.81

- While the United States has been toughening its stance on China, China has maintained an uncompromising stance on its "core interests." Concerning trade and military issues, developments feeding mutual antagonism emerged between the United States and China.
 - Raising of import tariffs by China as countermeasures against the same measures by the United States
 - Abnormally close approach by a Chinese naval vessel to a U.S. Navy vessel conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea, etc.
- It has been confirmed that regarding military exchange, which has remained stable in recent years, there are activities indicating a possible change.
- Moves to review projects have been seen among some countries cooperating in the "Belt and Road" Initiative, due to such factors as their deteriorating financial situation.
- Regarding Taiwan, since the inauguration of the Tsai administration, five countries severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan, while they established relations with China. While the United States has continued and reinforced its engagement in Taiwan, China has repeatedly expressed its strong protest against Taiwan's independence.
- The overall military balance between China and Taiwan is shifting in favor of China, and the gap appears to be growing year by year.



Abnormal approach by a Chinese naval vessel to a U.S. Navy vessel, reportedly occurred in the South China Sea

[Jane's by IHS Markit]

North Korea

Overview

▶ P.92

- 1 North Korea has repeatedly expressed the intention to work towards denuclearization at the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in June 2018 and other occasions. North Korea has announced the suspension of nuclear tests and test-firing of ICBMs, and publicly destroyed the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. Moreover, North Korea announced that it will dismantle the missile engine test site and launch platform in the Tongch'ang-ri district in the future, and that it will close the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon if the United States lifts sanctions.
- 2 On the other hand:
 - It is assessed that North Korea has already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads;
 - North Korea possesses and deploys several hundred ballistic missiles capable of reaching every part of Japan and
 - North Korea continues to possess capabilities for conducting surprise attacks against Japan utilizing a Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TEL) and submarines.
- 3 In light of the above, there has been no essential change in North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities. Military trends in North Korea continue to pose a serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan.
- 4 It is now necessary to keep close watch on what kind of concrete actions North Korea will take towards the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and missiles.



The second U.S.-North Korea summit meeting (February 2019)



Nodong

Current Status of the Nuclear and Missile Development

▶ P.94

- 1 The possibility cannot be discounted that the sixth nuclear weapons test in September 2017 was of a hydrogen bomb.
- 2 Given the technological maturity obtained through the past six nuclear tests, it is assessed that North Korea has already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads. In May, July and August 2019, North Korea launched a new type of short-range ballistic missiles (presumed) and others nine times toward the Sea of Japan.
- 3 Regarding ballistic missiles, North Korea aims to:
 1. increase the firing range of ballistic missiles;
 2. enhance the accuracy and operation capabilities necessary for saturation attacks;
 3. improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks; and
 4. diversify the forms of launches.

Ship-to-Ship Transfer

▶ P.108

- 1 North Korea is presumed to be evading the United Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions by conducting ship-to-ship transfers in the high seas, which are forbidden under the terms of the UN Security Council resolutions. It is pointed out that illegal ship-to-ship transfers of oil products and coal by North Korea were increasing rapidly.



A North Korean-flagged tanker strongly suspected of engaging in ship-to-ship transfers (March 2019)

Russia

Trends in the Vicinity of Japan

▶ P.125

- 1 Russia appears to be stepping up military activities not only in the Arctic, Europe, areas near the United States, and the Middle East, but also in the Far East, so close scrutiny of developments in this regard will be required.
- 2 The number of scrambles against Russian aircraft in the Far East has remained high. In addition, Russian aircraft intruded into Japan's territorial airspace in June and July 2019.
- 3 Regarding the Northern Territories, Russia announced that it deployed surface-to-ship missiles to Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands in 2016. It is reported that three Su-35 fighter aircraft were deployed in Etorofu Island in 2018, showing a military build-up by Russia.
- 4 In the large-scale Vostok 2018 exercise, in addition to units of the Eastern Military District, units of the Central Military District and the Northern Fleet participated. Notable features of this year's exercise were that the size was considered the largest since the time of the Soviet Union, and that China and Mongolia participated for the first time.



An Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate: confirmed for the first time by the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) (April 2019)



Vostok 2018, a military exercise by Russia (September)

Modernization of Nuclear Forces and Development of New Weapons

▶ P.120

- 1 In order to supplement its inferiority in conventional forces and to strike a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States, Russia has prioritized the modernization of nuclear forces. Under the recognition that the United States' installation of missile defense systems both at home and abroad undermines the balance of nuclear forces, Russia is moving forward with the development of new weapons such as the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) that are said to be capable of reliably penetrating the systems.
- 2 The United States provided notice of its intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty, and announced its intention to develop surface-launched intermediate-range missiles capable of carrying conventional warheads. In response, Russia announced plans to develop a ground-launched adaptation of the existing sea-launched intermediate-range cruise missile system, along with hypersonic ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missiles.



9M729 ground-launched cruise missiles unveiled by Russia

Chapter 3
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Military Science and Technology

- 1 Major states endeavor to develop weapons that leverage cutting-edge, potentially game-changing technologies that could drastically change the conduct of future warfare.
- 2 States are developing autonomous drones equipped with artificial intelligence (AI).
- 3 The United States indicates that Russia and China are developing advanced hypersonic missile capabilities that challenge existing missile defense systems.
- 4 Reports have been published of successful tests and planned deployment of electromagnetic railguns and high-power laser weapons that are expected to provide more effective firepower.



CH-7 "Caihong-7," stealth unmanned aircraft developed by China

Chapter 3
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Space Domain

- 1 Major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) functions.
- 2 In outer space, various countries are rapidly developing their capabilities to ensure their military superiority. It has also been noted that China and Russia have been enhancing capabilities to impede the United States and its allies from using outer space.
- 3 In order to respond to these threats, the United States is considering creating a space force with status equal to that of the army, the navy and the air force.



Launch of BeiDou 42 and 43, a Chinese satellite positioning system by China on November 19, 2018

Chapter 3
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Cyber Domain

- 1 Information and communications technology (ICT) advancements are further enhancing the dependence of military forces on information and communications networks. For this reason, cyber attacks are recognized as an asymmetrical means to impede the military activities of adversaries at low cost. Many foreign military forces are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace.
- 2 It has been pointed out that China and Russia are bolstering the offensive cyber capabilities of their militaries for the purpose of obstructing the network of military forces and destroying infrastructure.
- 3 Cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against information and communications networks of government organizations and military forces of various countries. Government agencies such as those in Russia, China, and North Korea are suspected of engaging in some cyber attacks.



Threat message from the WannaCry malware attack, which caused huge damage worldwide

Chapter 3
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Electromagnetic Domain

- 1 Securing use of the electromagnetic spectrum is indispensable for the operation of communication equipment and radar systems. Major countries have recognized electronic attacks for interrupting adversaries' use of electromagnetic spectrum as a means to effectively hamper adversaries' military performance, enhancing electronic warfare capabilities.
- 2 It is reported that China routinely conducts jamming operations against communication and radar systems and GPS satellite systems in exercises.
- 3 It is reported that Russia used various electronic warfare systems in eastern Ukraine and Syria to interrupt adversaries' command and control traffic and radar systems, improving electronic warfare capabilities.



Krasukha-4, an electronic warfare system Russia reportedly used in Syria

Chapter 3
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Maritime Domain

- 1 In the waters and airspace in the East and South China Seas, it has become increasingly common for countries to unilaterally assert their rights or take actions, based on their unique assertions which are incompatible with the existing international order.
- 2 Piracy seen at various locations has become a threat to maritime traffic. The international community is collectively conducting counterpiracy operations.
- 3 The Arctic Ocean has traditionally been used for the deployment of strategic nuclear forces and as their transit route. With the decrease in sea ice in recent years, ships have been able to navigate for a longer period of time and more extensively than before. It is therefore considered that the region could be used for maneuvering military forces in the future.

Chapter 3
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WMDs

- 1 The transfer and proliferation of WMDs, such as nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, and ballistic missiles that deliver such weapons, have been recognized as a significant threat since the end of the Cold War.
- 2 In particular, there still remain strong concerns that non-state actors, including terrorists, against which traditional deterrence works less effectively, could acquire and use WMDs. Additionally, the proliferation of ballistic missiles has the risk of leading to the destabilization of that region.

Chapter 3
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International Terrorism and Regional Conflicts


- 1 Conflicts or disputes concerning racial, religious, territorial, resources and other issues are occurring or continuing at various locations in the world.
- 2 International terrorist groups' activities have remained a grave challenge for the international community. Terrorism threats have diffused and deepened on the diversification of terrorist attacks and others.

Chapter 1
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National Security Strategy (NSS)

The NSS developed in December 2013 specifies, as Japan's fundamental principle of national security, that Japan will contribute more proactively than ever before to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while committed to continuing the path as a peace-loving nation, and seeking its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region from the perspective of a "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation.

Relationship among the NSS, the NDPG, the MTDP, and the fiscal year budget



Chapter 3
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The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and Beyond (NDPG)

- The NDPG was approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet in December 2018.
- The NDPG establishes the posture of Japan's defense forces and the level to achieve, envisioning approximately 10 years



Advisory Panel on Security and Defense Capabilities

Security Environment Surrounding Japan

- Changes in the balance of power are accelerating and becoming more complex, thereby increasing uncertainty over the existing order.
- Rapid expansion in the use of the new domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is poised to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security, which has prioritized responses in the domains of land, sea and air. In addition, qualitatively and quantitatively superior military powers concentrate in Japan's surroundings where clear trends are observed in increase in military activities.

Japan's Basic Defense Policy

The following are set forth as national defense objectives:

- to create, on a steady-state basis, a security environment desirable for Japan by integrating and drawing on the strengths at the nation's disposal;
- to deter threats from reaching Japan by making opponents realize that doing harm to Japan would be difficult and consequential; and
- should a threat reach Japan, to squarely counter the threat and minimize damage.

Under the basic precept of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, Japan will strengthen each of the means by which to successfully achieve these national defense objectives: Japan's own architecture for national defense; the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and international security cooperation.

1 Strengthening Japan's Own Architecture for National Defense

- Under the recognition that defense capability is the most important strength for Japan in retaining self-sustained existence as a sovereign nation amid a security environment that it has never faced before, Japan will strengthen this capability on its own accord and initiative.
- As a truly effective defense capability, Japan will build a "Multi-Domain Defense Force."
→ For details, see "Special Feature 1"



Study Committee on Future Defense Capabilities

2 Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

- Japan will press ahead with such efforts as bolstering the ability of the Alliance to deter and counter threats, enhancing and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas, and steadily implementing measures concerning the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan.

3 Strengthening Security Cooperation

- In line with the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, Japan will strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, taking into account the characteristics and situation specific to each region and country.

Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability

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In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan will enhance priority capability areas as early as possible.

1 Strengthening Capabilities Necessary for Cross-Domain Operations

- Strengthening capabilities in the new domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum
- Strengthening capabilities in traditional domains, namely capabilities in maritime and air domains, stand-off defense capability, comprehensive air and missile defense capability, and maneuver and deployment capability
- Strengthening sustainability and resiliency by taking necessary measures for securing ammunition and fuel, ensuring maritime shipping lanes, and protecting important infrastructure

2 Strengthening Core Elements of Defense Capability

- Strengthening core elements of defense capability by reinforcing the human resource base, technology base, and defense industrial base, reviewing equipment structure, etc.

Organization of Self-Defense Forces (SDF)

P.222

1 Joint Operation to Realize Cross-Domain Operations

- Maintaining units in space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic domains; strengthening other postures; building comprehensive air and missile defense capability; maintaining a maritime transport unit as an integrated unit

2 Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

- The GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units furnished with advanced mobility and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and mobile operating units equipped with specialized functions. The GSDF will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats by taking measures including persistent steady-state maneuvers.
- To be able to counter an invasion of remote islands, the GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units and hyper-velocity gliding projectile units for remote island defense.

3 Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)

- The MSDF will maintain reinforced destroyer units including a new type of destroyers (FFM), minesweeper units, and embarked patrol helicopter units, and will organize surface units. The MSDF will maintain patrol ship units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan.
- By introducing a test-bed submarine, the MSDF will work to achieve greater efficiency in submarine operations and accelerate capability improvement, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture.
- In order to conduct wide-area airborne ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, the MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units.

4 Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)

- The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of ground-based warning and control units and reinforced airborne warning units; ground-based warning and control units are capable of conducting persistent surveillance in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side; and airborne warning units are capable of conducting effective airborne warning, surveillance and control during "gray zone" and other situations with heightened tensions.
- The ASDF will maintain fighter aircraft units reinforced by high-performance fighter aircraft, and aerial refueling and transport units.
- The ASDF will maintain unmanned aerial vehicle units which enable it to conduct information collection in areas remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions.

Elements Supporting Defense Capability

P.223


- 1 Training and Exercises: the SDF will conduct more practical, effective and systematic training and exercises while work in partnership with relevant organizations, local governments and the private sector.
- 2 Medical Care: The Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF will strengthen the posture for medical care and onward transfer of patients, seamlessly covering the entire stretch between the frontline and final medical evacuation destinations.
- 3 Collaboration with Local Communities: The MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities, and will make careful, detailed coordination to meet desires and conditions of local communities.
- 4 Intellectual Base: The MOD/SDF will promote security-related education at educational institutions. In order to achieve both academic research and policy-support by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), the MOD/SDF will facilitate the NIDS' collaboration with the policy-making sector.

Chapter 4
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Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019–FY2023; MTDP)

- The MTDP sets forth the policy for the build-up of defense capability, the amount of major equipment to be procured, and the amount of expenditure for the five-year period from FY2019 to FY2023.
- In order to build a structure that is capable of realizing cross-domain operations, the SDF will conduct reorganization of its major units.
- The SDF will conduct programs to strengthen capabilities in both new and traditional domains.
- The SDF will conduct programs to strengthen core elements of defense capabilities, including reinforcement of the human resource base.

Reorganization of the Major SDF Units



Chapter 4
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Build-up of Defense Capability in FY2019

- In FY2019, which is the first fiscal year for implementing the NDPG and the MTDP, the MOD/SDF will steadily build up its defense capability as a truly effective defense capability towards building a Multi-domain Defense Force.

Main Projects of Build-up of Defense Capabilities in FY2019

Category	Main programs	
Priorities in strengthening capabilities necessary for cross-domain operations	Acquiring and strengthening capabilities in domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum	•Acquisition of the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) System •Enhancement and strengthening of Cyber Defense Group •Enhancement of electronic warfare capabilities of fighter aircraft (F-15) •Acquisition of the network electronic warfare system, etc.
	Enhancing capabilities in traditional domains	•Construction of destroyers and submarines •Acquisition of fighter aircraft (F-35A) •Upgrade of fighter aircraft (F-15) •Research and studies for refurbishment of Izumo destroyers •Acquisition of stand-off missiles •Research on hyper-velocity gliding projectile intended for the defense of remote islands •Procurement of a land-based Aegis system (Aegis Ashore)
	Enhancing sustainability and resiliency	•Procurement of ammunition (anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes) necessary for ensuring air and maritime superiority, etc.
Priorities in strengthening core elements of defense capability	Reinforcing human resource base	•Promotion of measures for securing excellent personnel, encouraging women's participation, and achieving a work-life balance, etc.
	Reinforcing technology base	•Promotion of research and development towards early practical use of equipment
	Enhancing intelligence capabilities	•Enhancement of the defense attaché system, etc.

Chapter 4
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
Defense-Related Expenditures

Overview of Defense-Related Expenditures

P.240

In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan must strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. To this end, in light of the NDPG and the MTDP, defense-related expenditures for FY2019 were increased by 68.2 billion yen from the previous fiscal year to 5.007 trillion yen (an increase of 1.4% from the previous year).

Change in Defense-Related Expenditures (Past 15 years; Original Budget Basis)



Chapter 5
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Development of Legislation for Peace and Security and the SDF Activities since Legislation's Enforcement

SDF Activities since Enforcement of Legislation for Peace and Security

P.265

Dispatch of Staff Officers to the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO)

In April 2019, Japan decided to dispatch personnel to the MFO headquarters.

Training and Exercises Related to the Legislation for Peace and Security

Since the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security, the MOD/SDF has been conducting various training and exercises for new missions. The following training and exercises were conducted for approximately the past one year.

- Exercises on the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in multilateral exercise Khaan Quest 18 (June 2018, and June 2019)
- Joint training on rescue of Japanese nationals overseas (September and December 2018)
- Training on rescue of Japanese nationals overseas in multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 19 (January 2019)

Chapter 1
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Japan's Own Architecture for National Defense

Response from Peacetime to Grey Zone Situations

P.270

Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the Area Surrounding Japan

- The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) is engaged in persistent intelligence collection and warning and surveillance during peacetime over Japan's territorial waters and airspace, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly.
- As part of its regular warning and surveillance activities in Japanese territorial waters, the SDF is carrying out information gathering on vessels suspected of violating the United Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions. During the period from 2018 to the end of June 2019, the SDF has confirmed 20 observations of North Korean vessels strongly suspected of engaging in ship-to-ship transfers, and made public announcement on the subject.
- In response to these illicit maritime activities including transshipments, the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and France carried out early warning surveillance activities using aircraft based at the United States Kadena Air Base in Japan. In addition, naval vessels of the U.S. Marine Corps, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and France carried out early warning surveillance activities in sea areas surrounding Japan.
- In December 2018, Gwanggaeto, the Great class destroyer of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy, directed a fire control-radar at a Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) patrol aircraft conducting warning and surveillance activities off the coast of Noto Peninsula (within Japan's exclusive economic zone). The Ministry of Defense (MOD) published its final statement, compiling objective facts, and has been urging the Korean side to take recurrence prevention measures. The MOD will expend all possible means to monitor the situation and gather intelligence.



A North Korea-flagged tanker (left) and a small ship of unidentified nationality strongly suspected of engaging in a ship-to-ship transfer on the high seas of the East China Sea (January 2019)




Falcon 200, a French patrol aircraft conducting warning and surveillance operations against ship-to-ship transfers

Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace

P.273

- The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) detects and identifies aircraft flying in airspace surrounding Japan using warning and control radars as well as early-warning and control aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft heading to Japan's territorial airspace are detected, fighters and other aircraft scramble to approach them in order to confirm the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary.
- In FY2018, ASDF aircraft scrambled 999 times, which is the 2nd highest number. Breaking this figure down, aircraft scrambled 638 times in response to Chinese aircraft, an increase by 138 times compared with the previous fiscal year, and 343 times to Russian aircraft, a decrease by 47 times from the previous fiscal year.

Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War



Defense of Japan including its Remote Islands

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Defense of Japan's Remote Islands

- In response to attack on Japan including its remote islands, the SDF will quickly maneuver and deploy requisite units to block access and landing of invading forces while ensuring maritime and air superiority. Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, the SDF will block invading forces' access and landing from outside their threat envelopes. Should any part of the territory be occupied, the SDF will retake it by employing all necessary measures.
- For defense posture buildup in the southwestern region, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) deployed some units, including an area security unit in Amami Oshima, and an area security unit in Miyakojima Island, in March 2019. The GSDF will deploy an area security unit and other units also in Ishigakijima Island.
- The SDF started research and development on technologies required for new anti-ship missiles and Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectiles (HVGP) for the defense of remote islands to take all initiatives necessary to defend the islands since FY2018.
- In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment of units, initiatives are underway to enhance rapid deployment capabilities through: the improvement of Landing Ship, Tank; and the introduction of V-22 Ospreys and C-2 transport aircraft.



Amphibious vehicle training landings in Iron Fist 19 (from January to February 2019)

Response to Missile Attacks

- Currently, Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is an effective multi-layered defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis equipped destroyers and the lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE).
- The upcoming introduction of the land-based Aegis system, Aegis Ashore, will enable our forces to intercept missiles in the upper tier not just from Aegis destroyers but from land.
- In order to counter increasingly complex and diverse airborne threats and minimize damage, the SDF will establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces, including those for missile defense as well as air defense equipment, and thereby provide persistent nation-wide protection from peacetime. It will also enhance its comprehensive air and missile defense capability so that it can simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats.


Responses in the Domains of Space, Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Spectrum

P.289

Responses in Space Domain

- The MOD aims to establish Space Situational Awareness (SSA) by 2022, and is also working to deploy radar to monitor threats to Japanese satellites, such as space debris, and its operating system.
- Based on the Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDPP), the MOD/SDF will work to enhance capabilities to ensure superiority in use of space. The efforts include;
 - establishing an SSA system;
 - improving various capabilities that leverage space domain including information-gathering, communication and positioning capabilities, and;
 - building the capability to disrupt C4I (command, control, communication, computer, and intelligence) of opponents.


Initiatives for the Development of the SSA System



Response in Cyber Domain

- 1 The MOD/SDF has taken comprehensive measures to ensure the safety of information and communication systems and respond to cyber attacks by a specialized unit, etc.
- 2 In addition to these initiatives, based on the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG), the SDF will fundamentally strengthen its cyber defense capability, including the capability to disrupt, during an attack against Japan in armed contingencies, the opponent's use of cyberspace for the attack.
- 3 The Cyber Defense Group will be expanded by about 70 personnel to approximately 220 in FY2019.

MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks



Response in Electromagnetic Domain

- 1 With the development of the technology, the use of electromagnetic spectrum has expanded in range and purpose, and it is now recognized as a major operational domain in today's warfare.
- 2 The MOD/SDF will;
 - (1) enhance its ability to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic spectrum;
 - (2) strengthen information collection and analysis capabilities related to electromagnetic spectrum, and develop an information sharing posture; and
 - (3) strengthen capabilities to neutralize the radar and communications of opponents who intend to invade Japan.



Network electronic warfare devices to neutralize radar and communications of an opponent

Response to Large-Scale Disasters

Response to Natural Disasters, etc.

- 1 The SDF works in collaboration with local governments, engaged in various activities such as the search and rescue of disaster victims or ships or aircraft in distress, and preventing epidemics. In FY2018, the SDF conducted 443 disaster relief operations.
- 2 The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas. In FY2018, out of a total of 443 cases of disaster relief, 334 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients.



GSDF personnel conducting rescue activities in July 2018
Flooding Disaster (July 2018)



ASDF personnel conducting search and rescue activities by using a police dog in the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake in 2018 (September 2018)



MSDF US-2 landing on water near a vessel to transport emergency patients (October 2018)

Chapter 2
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Japan-U.S. Alliance

Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

- 1 The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, together with Japan's own national defense architecture, constitute a cornerstone for Japan's national security.
- 2 The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as its core, plays a significant role for peace, stability and prosperity of not only Japan but also the Indo-Pacific region and the international community.

Outline of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

The Guidelines manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies.

Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States

1 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting)

On April 19, 2019, the Japan-U.S. "2+2" Meeting was held in Washington, D.C. Both side shared the view that the two countries will strengthen cooperation for cross-domain operations, including capability enhancement in new domains, such as space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum.

2 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting

Since October 2018, on various occasions, including the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meetings, Japan and the United States have confirmed the following points:

- Need to deepen Japan-U.S. cooperation with a sense of urgency with respect to new domains, such as space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum;
- Cooperation with the United States to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific;
- Continuation of ensuring full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions toward the abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and all ranges of ballistic missiles by North Korea in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; and
- Close cooperation to make steady progress in implementing the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces, including the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko



Visiting Destroyer JS "Kaga" by Prime Minister Abe and President Trump (May 2019)
[Photo: courtesy of the Cabinet Secretariat Public Relations Office]



Joint press conference at the Japan-U.S. "2+2" Meeting (April 2019)



Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (August 2019)

Strengthening Ability of Japan-U.S. Alliance to Deter and Counter Threats

In all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies as well as during disasters, in order to ensure Japan's peace and security, Japan is promoting cooperation with the United States in various fields, including "cooperation in space and cyber domains," "comprehensive air and missile defense," "bilateral training and exercises," "ISR activities", "maritime security," "logistics support," and "Cooperation in Response to a Large-Scale Disaster in Japan."


Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas ▶ P.325

In order to create a desirable security environment including maintaining and enhancing free and open maritime order, and with an eye on increasing Japanese and U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will conduct bilateral activities on “capacity building assistance,” “humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR),” and “trilateral and multilateral training and exercises,” and promote “defense equipment and technology cooperation,” “joint/shared use of facilities and areas,” and others.

Significance of the Presence of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) ▶ P.327

- It is necessary to maintain the presence of the USFJ and its readiness to make rapid and agile actions in case of emergency, so that Japan-U.S. Alliance functions enough as a deterrent power that contributes to the peace and stability of the defense of Japan and the region.
- Therefore, Japan accepts the stationing of the US forces based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and it is a cornerstone of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

Changes in the Number and Area of USFJ Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa



Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa ▶ P.333

- Approximately 70% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 14% of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, it is necessary to continue to make utmost efforts to mitigate the impact.
- Regarding distribution of functions offered by MCAS Futenma, the development of facilities is being promoted to transfer the function of accepting transient aircraft in contingencies to Tsuiki Air Base and Nyutabaru Air Base.
- A land-fill operation for the Futenma Replacement Facility has started in the waters south of Camp Schwab.
- The following progress has been made involving the return of USFJ land:
 - March 2015: West Futenma Housing Area within Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) (approximately 51 ha) was returned.
 - December 2016: A major portion of the Northern Training Area (approximately 4,000 ha) was returned. This is the largest of its kind since the reversion of Okinawa to the mainland.
 - July 2017: A portion of MCAS Futenma (approximately 4 ha along Ginowan City road 11) was returned.
 - March 2018: A portion of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (approximately 3 ha of land to expand Route 58) was returned.
 - March 2019: A portion of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (approximately 2 ha of land near Gate 5) was returned.
- Relocation of training of U.S. Marine Corps Ospreys, etc. to outside Okinawa has been conducted.



Relocation of training to outside Okinawa: a U.S. Marine Corps Osprey landing on the Aibano Maneuver Area (Shiga Prefecture) (February 2019)

Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa ▶ P.345

- In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing measures to secure the stable presence of the U.S. Forces by maintaining its deterrence and trying to mitigate the impact on local communities, such as realignment of USFJ and its facilities and areas.

Measures to Mitigate the Impacts of USFJ Facilities and Areas ▶ P.350

- Ensuring the safety of local residents is of prime importance in USFJ operations, and an accident or incident must not occur. Both Japan and the United States cooperate with a prime focus on ensuring the safety.

Chapter 3 Security Cooperation P.353


The MOD/SDF will create a security environment desirable for Japan by promoting multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation.

Strategic Promotion of Multi-Faceted and Multi-Layered Defense Cooperation ▶ P.353

Efforts under the Vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Being home to more than half of the world's population, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the most vital areas in the world. It is important to establish this region as a free and open global commons to secure peace and prosperity in the region as a whole. Pursuing the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, the MOD/SDF has promoted defense cooperation and exchanges, and other efforts with countries in this region.

The MOD/SDF's Efforts for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (image)



Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

- Australia:** The Japan-Australia “2+2” and a Defense Ministerial Meeting were held in October 2018. Defense Ministerial Meetings were also held in January and June 2019. The Ministers agreed to deepen and expand bilateral defense cooperation.
- India and Sri Lanka:** At the Japan-India Summit Meeting in October 2018, Japan and India agreed to establish Japan-India 2+2 Ministerial dialogues, and to commence negotiations on the Japan-India Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). The GSDF and the Indian Army, and the ASDF and the Indian Air Force had their first bilateral exercises in November and December 2018, respectively. Meanwhile, in August 2018, then Defense Minister Onodera made the first visit to Sri Lanka as a Japanese Defense Minister.
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states:** Under “Vientiane Vision,” as a guideline for the Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation, Japan has strengthened cooperation under multilateral frameworks in addition to bilateral cooperation efforts. A Japan-Philippine Defense Ministerial meeting was held in April 2019, and a Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting and a Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting were held in May 2019.
- ROK:** Concerning negative actions by the ROK side related to the flag of the MSDF, and an incident of a destroyer of the ROK Navy directing its fire-control radar at SDF patrol aircraft, the MOD/SDF will continue to call on the ROK side to appropriately deal with these matters. In addition, in August 2019, the Government of the ROK announced its intention to terminate the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). The Minister of Defense made a statement that it was “extremely regrettable,” and that Japan urges the ROK side to wisely respond to secure appropriate cooperation between Japan and the ROK, and between Japan, the United States and the ROK.
- European countries:** The Japan-France “2+2” Meeting was held in January 2019. In October 2018, the GSDF and the British Army held their first bilateral exercise in Japan.
- China:** In October 2018, the Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting was held for the first time in three years. In April 2019, an MSDF destroyer visited China for the first time in about seven and a half years.
- Russia:** In July 2018, then Minister of Defense Onodera became the first Japanese Minister of Defense to pay a visit to Russia. He joined the Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting and the Defense Ministerial Meeting. These Meetings were held in Tokyo in May 2019.
- Pacific Island countries:** At the Pacific Alliance Leaders Meeting held in 2018 and in the NDPG published in the same year, Japan referred to its intention to promote cooperation and exchanges with the Pacific island countries.



Japan-Australia “2+2” (October 2018)



Exchange of the signed Implementing Arrangement between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Indian Navy Concerning Deeper Cooperation at the Japan-India Summit Meeting (October 2018)



Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (October 2018)

Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation

- 1 Multilateral framework initiatives, such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM)-Plus and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have made steady progress and served as an important foundation for discussion and cooperation and exchange in the security field in the Asia-Pacific region.
- 2 Japan has contributed to the enhancement of multilateral cooperation in the region by holding the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum and the Tokyo Defense Forum annually. As the Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation program, Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program (May 2018), the Japan-ASEAN Symposium on International Law (November 2018), and the Japan-ASEAN Invitation Program on HA/DR (January 2019) were conducted.



ASEAN-Japan Defense Ministers' Informal Meeting (October 2018)



Raisina Dialogue, a multilateral forum held in India (January 2019)



GSDF personnel watching the military band in Papua New Guinea preparing for its stage at APEC 2018 (November 2018)

Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building Assistance

- 1 Since 2012, the MOD/SDF has provided capacity building assistance in such areas as HA/DR, peacekeeping operations (PKO), and maritime security to 15 countries and one organization in the Asia-Pacific and other regions.
- 2 Specifically, Japan supported the establishment and training of the military band of the Papua New Guinea Defense Force. The band gave an excellent performance in front of national leaders at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in November 2018. Other programs that have thus far been conducted include seminars on air rescue, PKO, and submarine medicine in Vietnam, and seminars and field training on aviation meteorology for the establishment of a weather services unit of the Myanmar Air Force. In addition, programs have been conducted in Mongolia, Timor-Leste, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Laos, and Djibouti.

Ensuring Maritime Security

P.386

- 1 For Japan, a maritime nation, strengthening the order based on fundamental norms, such as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as ensuring safe maritime transport, is the foundation for its peace and prosperity, which is extremely important.
- 2 The SDF has been dispatching the Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement, the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement, and the Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement since 2009 in order to protect vessels from acts of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.
- 3 In addition to strengthening cooperation with coastal states of the Indo-Pacific region through exercises and port calls, the MOD has been implementing capacity building assistance in maritime security of coastal countries, and working on cooperation for maritime security within regional security dialogue frameworks such as the ADMM-Plus.



Bilateral exercise with the Philippine Navy on the Indo Southeast Asia Deployment

Cooperation in Use of Space and Cyber Domains

P.391

- 1 Regarding cooperation in the use of space domain, the MOD/SDF has taken part in the annual SSA multinational tabletop exercise (Global Sentinel) and the Schriever Wargame, a multinational tabletop exercise on space security, hosted by the U.S. Forces.
- 2 Regarding cooperation in the use of cyber domain, the MOD has held cyber dialogues with the respective defense authorities of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and others. With the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Japan has participated in international conferences, and in a cyber defense exercise as an observer. In addition, the MOD has dispatched personnel to the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) since March 2019.

Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities

P.396

The MOD/SDF is proactively undertaking international peace cooperation activities working in tandem with diplomatic initiatives, including the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for resolving the fundamental causes of conflicts, terrorism and other problems.

Dispatch to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)


- 1 In April 2019, a Cabinet Decision was made to dispatch staff officers, and subsequently Japan started to dispatch 2 staff officers to the MFO Headquarters as the first international peace cooperation activity.
- 2 The two officers are engaging in liaison and coordination between governments of the Egypt and Israel or other relevant organizations and the MFO as a Deputy chief of Liaison and an Assistant Liaison Operation Officer at the MFO Headquarters, which is located in the south camp at Sharm El-Sheikh in the southern part of the Sinai Peninsula.
- 3 These activities express Japan's commitment to more active involvement in the peace and stability of the Middle East. It is also expected to promote collaboration with the other countries dispatching officers, including the United States, and create new opportunities for human resource development.



Staff officers in the MFO Headquarters

United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)

- 1 The peace and stability of South Sudan is not only essential for the country itself; but also for the peace and stability in Africa as a whole, as well as a crucial issue that should be dealt with by the international community.
- 2 After the engineering unit's withdrawal, Japan has continued dispatch of four officers (logistics officer, information database officer, engineering officer, and aviation operations officer) to the UNMISS headquarters, and will contribute to the activities of UNMISS.



Staff officer (database officer) in UNMISS Headquarters making coordination with the security sector by phone

Support to the UN Project for Rapid Deployment of Enabling Capabilities

- 1 Japan has been dispatching GSDF personnel to the International Peace Support Training Centre in Kenya, as instructors since the trial training in September 2015. Training regarding the operation of heavy equipment has been provided in seven sessions to date for a total of 211 members from eight African countries.
- 2 Considering that more than 30% of PKO personnel are from Asia, Japan decided to implement the project for the first time in Asia and the surrounding region. In 2018, trial training took place in Vietnam for 16 personnel from nine Asian and the surrounding regions.



GSDF personnel providing training on operation of heavy equipment as a part of the UN Project for Rapid Deployment of Enabling Capabilities in Vietnam (November 2018)

Revision of the UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Engineer Unit Manual

- 1 The MOD/SDF served as chair of the working group on the engineer unit manual since 2013 with the aim of supporting the development of UN Military Unit Manuals and contributed to the completion of the manual.
- 2 The UN asked Japan to serve as chair of the working group again for revision of the manual, and as chair, the MOD/SDF held the first expert meeting in Tokyo in December 2018. The MOD/SDF will continue to work for the revision of the manual and support for its dissemination.



Expert meeting held in Tokyo for revision of UN Military Engineer Unit Manuals (December 2018)

Chapter 1
P.405

Human Resource Base and Medical Functions that Sustain the Defense Capability

Reinforcing Human Resource Base that Sustains the Defense Capability

P.405

The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) specifies that securing human resources for Self-Defense Force (SDF) personnel and improving their ability and morale are essential to strengthening defense capability. This has become an imminent challenge in the face of shrinking and aging population with declining birth rates. Also in light of the sustainability and resilience of defense capability, the SDF needs to work even further to reinforce the human resource base that sustains the defense capability.

Raise of Upper Age Limit

- The upper age limit of general candidate for enlistment (Upper) and candidates for uniformed SDF personnel was raised from “under 27” to “under 33” in October 2018 in order to secure diverse human resources from a broader range.
- Also regarding SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, recruitment and appointment were expanded, and the upper age limit for recruitment of leading privates and lower personnel was raised.

Effective Use of Human Resources

The mandatory early retirement age will be raised by one year during the period of the Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDP) from 2020, and another one year during the period of the next MTDP in stages for each rank in order to ensure further utilization of older human resources who have rich knowledge, skills, and experience.

Improvement of Living and Work Environment and Treatment

In order to secure readiness, the SDF will steadily renew aged everyday life/workplace fixtures, and secure the necessary quantities of everyday necessities in addition to accelerating the securing and reconstruction of the necessary barracks and housing.

Further Promotion of Work-Life Balance and Women's Participation

P.414

Working Style Reform

With the increase of personnel facing time/commuting constraints for child/family care, the MOD/SDF is promoting correction of long working hours and encouraging taking leave so that every member can exert his/her full potential.

Reform to Combine a Successful Career with Childrearing and Nursing Care

For MOD/SDF staff to balance work with childrearing/nursing care, the MOD/SDF is setting up workplace nurseries, and encouraging its male staff to take childcare leave.



SDF personnel leaving his child at the nursery at Iruma Air Base

Enhancement of Medical Functions

P.418

Enhancing Seamless Medical Care and Evacuation Posture

The MTDP states that, in order to respond to various emergency situations, the MOD/SDF will enhance a seamless medical care and evacuation posture from the frontline to the final transport destination, while considering joint operation. On this occasion, in light of the geological characteristics of Japan, the MTDP places a special focus on the enhancement of medical functions in the southwestern region.


Securing of Medical and Nursing Officers/Enhancement of Education and Research

The NDPG, etc. state that the SDF will endeavor to secure high-quality talents by improving the operations of the National Defense Medical College and enhancing its research functions, as well as striving to better secure medical officers. Also, in order to improve capabilities to treat combat injuries, the SDF will promote development of necessary medical training infrastructure common to all SDFs.

Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join the SDF



Location of Principal SDF Units (for illustrative purposes) (As of March 31, 2019)



- Ministry of Defense; Joint Staff Office; Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Office
- Ground Self-Defense Force**
 - Ground Component Command Headquarters (and Eastern Army Headquarters)
 - Army Headquarters
 - Division Headquarters / Brigade Headquarters
 - Airborne Brigades
 - Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade
 - Helicopter Brigades
- Maritime Self-Defense Force**
 - Self-Defense Fleet Headquarters
 - Headquarters District
 - Principal Naval Bases
 - Principal Air Bases (Fixed-wing Aircraft Units)
 - Principal Air Bases (Helicopter Units)
- Air Self-Defense Force**
 - Air Defense Command Headquarters
 - Air Defense Force Headquarters
 - Fighter Units
 - Surface-to Air Guided Missile Units
 - Aircraft Control and Warning Units (Radar Site)



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