Fundamental Reinforcement of Japan’s Defense Capabilities: Why Now?

To defend the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals in the midst of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII
In order to fully defend the lives and livelihoods of Japanese nationals, we must first and foremost prioritize diplomatic efforts to create an international environment that is desirable for Japan. While continuing to place emphasis on the universal values and principles of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, it is essential to engage in active diplomacy that promotes multilateral cooperation and has the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone.

At the same time, we need defense capabilities that will underpin diplomacy.

As I vowed to do here last year, we have formulated the National Security Strategy of Japan, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program.

In the face of the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II, we ran extremely realistic simulations to determine if we would be able to fully defend the lives of Japanese nationals.

Based on the simulations, we have compiled a list of the necessary defense capabilities.

Examples include having counterstrike capabilities, reinforcing our defense architecture for the southwest part of the country, responses to new domains such as space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum, and enhancing war sustainability. They are all matters of urgency.

Over the next five years, we will urgently reinforce our defense capabilities and further increase Japan’s deterrence and response capabilities.

Address by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio at the Graduation Ceremony of the National Defense Academy (excerpt)
Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II.

China, North Korea, and Russia are enhancing their military capabilities and stepping up military activities. Japan is situated on the frontline of these developments.

We need to take a close look at how the intensification of military activities in the Indo-Pacific will affect the region and the international community as a whole. The way Japan’s security and defense policies shape out will have direct link to regional and international peace and stability.

### Comparison of Japan and China

China surpasses Japan in number of modern vessels and fighter aircraft as well as defense spending.

#### China’s disclosed defense spending and Japan’s defense-related spending in FY2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit: Billion yuan</th>
<th>FY2023</th>
<th>Japan’s defense-related expenditures in FY2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China’s announced defense budget in FY2023</td>
<td>Approx. 1,553.7 billion yuan</td>
<td>6,600.1 billion Japanese yen</td>
</tr>
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</table>

#### Comparison of China and Japan

- **Modern submarines**
  - China: 57
  - Japan: 88

- **Modern destroyers and frigates**
  - China: 1270
  - Japan: 460

- **Fourth- and fifth-generation fighters**
  - China: 1270
  - Japan: 460

#### Joint navigation by Chinese and Russian vessels (October 2021)

Joint navigation of Chinese and Russian vessels.

#### Number of ballistic missiles, etc. launched by North Korea

- Number of launches, practical training launches, have surged under the Kim Jong-Un regime.

#### Issues concerning the Senkaku Islands

- Continued persistent attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force.

#### Japan Fired Near Taiwan

- Of the nine ballistic missiles that China fired near Taiwan, five made impact within Japan’s EEZ (August 2022)

#### Issues concerning the South China Sea

- Unilateral changes to the status quo by force and creation of a fait accompli.

#### PLA’s Jiangwei I-class frigate operating around the Senkaku Islands

- Modern submersibles and frigates.

#### China’s disclosed defense spending and Japan’s defense-related spending in FY2023

- China’s announced defense budget in FY2023: Approx. 1,553.7 billion yuan.
- Japan’s defense-related expenditures in FY2023: 6,600.1 billion Japanese yen.

#### Number of scrambles

- The number in the FY2010s quadrupled compared to the FY2000s.

#### Comparison of China and Japan

- China has 72 modern destroyers and frigates.
- Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II.

#### Network navigations by Chinese and Russian vessels (October 2021)

Joint navigation of Chinese and Russian vessels.

#### Issues concerning the Senkaku Islands

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- Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II.
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine combines different ways of warfare. They include traditional weapons, such as fighter aircraft, vessels, and tanks; large-scale missile attacks; asymmetric attacks using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other means; and information warfare.

**Emerging new ways of warfare**

**Large-scale missile attacks using ballistic and cruise missiles**

Russia used over 5,000* ballistic and cruise missiles against all of Ukraine

*As of Feb. 23, 2023

**Asymmetric attacks using space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains, UAVs, and other means**

To intercept incoming missiles and prevent them from making impact in Japan.

To constrain the opponent from launching missiles and make it difficult to carry out missile attacks.

To engage in warfare tenaciously even if missiles hit facilities, runways, etc., such as by minimizing damage and quickly restoring them.

To urgently enhance Japan’s response capabilities, such as detecting and protecting against attacks in the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic.

To introduce a range of unmanned equipment that can be operated on land, in the sea, and in airspace and have capabilities to deal with opponents’ UAVs.

To quickly detect suspicious signs and share that information as real-time as possible.

To send Self-Defense Forces units to locations which an adversary is expected to attack beforehand. To have transportation capability to immediately evacuate citizens from dangerous areas.

To respond to information warfare, such as the spread of dissemination of disinformation, and avoid confusion and turmoil.
On December 16, 2022, Japan finalized three documents, the National Security Strategy of Japan, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program.

National Security Strategy of Japan

The supreme national security document which represents Japan’s strategic guidelines for policy in areas related to Japan’s national security strategy, including diplomacy, defense, economic security, technology, cyber, and intelligence.

National Defense Strategy

Strategic guidelines for defense that present defense objectives and the approaches/means for achieving them.

Three defense objectives

1. Shape a security environment that does not tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo by force
2. Deter and respond to unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts, in cooperation with Japan’s ally, like-minded countries, and others
3. Take primary responsibility for dealing with invasions of Japan should they occur, and disrupt and defeat them with the support of Japan’s ally and others

Approach (1) Strengthening Japan’s defense architecture

- Fundamentally reinforcing Japan’s defense capabilities
- Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country

Approach (2) Strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Approach (3) Strengthening collaboration with like-minded countries and others

Defense Buildup Program

A medium- to long-term buildup plan, including the organization of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in the next decade and the five-year total expenditures and procurement quantities of key equipment.

Main points of the SDF organizational strengthening

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint operational architecture</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reorganize the existing structure and establish a permanent Joint Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consider defense equipment systems that contribute to joint operations</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reinforce the land defense posture, focusing on the southwestern area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforce stand-off defense capabilities to deal with opposing forces from a distance</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Possess surface units capable of responding quickly and continuously to an increasing number of duties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen air defense capabilities, including against ballistic missiles</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen air defense forces, e.g., having sophisticated and enhanced fighter aircraft units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen space domain functions and rename the “Air Self-Defense Force” to “Air and Space Self-Defense Force”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total expenditure

Annual expenditure necessary over five years to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities from FY2023 to FY2027

Approx.43 trillion yen

Japan must resolutely defend the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese citizens as well as Japan’s territorial land, waters, and airspace. By fundamentally reinforcing our defense capabilities targeted at the capabilities of opponents and new ways of warfare, Japan will make opponents realize that we have the intention and sufficient capability to resolutely defend our nation, which will discourage opponents from launching an aggression against Japan.
Japan will fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities across the following seven key pillars, which constitute the functions and capabilities required for the defense of Japan.

**Stand-off Defense Capabilities**
Reinforce capabilities to deal with opposing forces from a safe distance beyond the reach of their attacks

**Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities**
Reinforce capabilities for responding to increasingly diverse and complex air threats, such as missiles

**Unmanned Defense Capabilities**
Reinforce capabilities for using unmanned equipment to gather information and provide combat support, among other purposes

**Cross Domain Operational Capabilities**
Reinforce space, cyber, electromagnetic, land, sea, and air capabilities, which are required for operations that integrate capabilities across all domains.

**Command and Control / Intelligence-related Functions**
Reinforce command and control and intelligence-related functions for quick and accurate decision-making

**Mobile Deployment Capabilities / Civil Protection**
Reinforce maritime and air transport capabilities to swiftly maneuver and deploy necessary forces. Utilize these capabilities for civil protection.

**Sustainability and Resiliency**
Swiftly stock up on sufficient and necessary ammunition, guided missiles, and fuel. Secure expenditures for acquiring equipment parts, equipment repairing and improving the resiliency of facilities.

**Counterstrike capabilities: Key to deterring invasion against Japan**
The military developments in Japan’s surroundings have made missile attacks against Japan a palpable threat. Under these circumstances, strengthening missile defense capabilities alone is becoming insufficient for fully dealing with the threat.

For this reason, Japan needs counterstrike capabilities: capabilities which enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent to prevent further attacks, while defending against incoming missiles by means of missile defense.

Counterstrike capabilities will complicate the calculations of an adversary who would attempt a missile attack or other types of aggression against Japan, prompt them to thinking that attacking Japan will not be easy and should be avoided.
Stand-off Defense Capabilities  5 trillion yen

- Development of upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship missile
- Acquisition of Tomahawk missile
- Development of hypersonic guided missile
- Development of Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile

Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities  3 trillion yen

- Replacement and deployment of radars (FPS-7)
- Shipbuilding of Aegis system equipped vessel (FPS-5)
- Acquisition of interceptor missiles with upgraded capability (PAC-3 MSE)
- Acquisition of interceptor missiles for ballistic missile defense (SM-3 Block IIA)
- Acquisition of long-range ship-to-air missiles (SM-6)

Unmanned Defense Capabilities  1 trillion yen

- Deployment of medium-altitude reconnaissance UAV (conceptual image)
- Deployment of Utility/Attack UAV (conceptual image)
- Utilization of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft (Global Hawk)
- Deployment of unmanned underwater vehicle for mine search (OZ2-S)

Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities  8 trillion yen

- Development of SDA satellites (conceptual image)
- Acquisition of vehicle-mounted laser equipment (conceptual image)
- Development of stand-off electronic warfare aircraft (conceptual image)
- Acquisition of network electronic warfare system

Mobile Deployment Capabilities / Civil Protection  2 trillion yen

- Acquisition of utility helicopter (UH-2)
- Acquisition of transport vessel (conceptual image)
- Acquisition of transport aircraft (C-2)
- Acquisition of aerial refueling and transport aircraft

Command and Control / Intelligence-related Functions  1 trillion yen

- Analyze images with AI technology.
- Acquisition of signals intelligence aircraft (RC-2)

Sustainability and Resiliency  15 trillion yen

- Sufficiency rate for BMD missiles
  - Approx. 40% Shortage
  - Approx. 60% Sufficiency

- Built in 1966
- Built in 1942

- JGSDF Camp Higashichitose
- JGSDF Camp Kurihama

Classification of equipment availability

- Operational
- Under maintenance
- Non-operational

Elimination of non-operational equipment (aircraft from which parts were removed for cannibalization maintenance)

*Percentages based on certain preliminary estimates.
Indivisible initiatives that complement the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities
We need a strong SDF to defend Japan. However, at the same time, defense of Japan requires a whole-of-country approach.

Enhancement of the comprehensive defense architecture that draws upon Japan’s national power
Japan will take the necessary measures to ensure that the combined budget allocation FY2027 budget level for both the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and complementary initiatives (initiatives for reinforcing the comprehensive defense architecture, such as maritime law enforcement capabilities, peacekeeping operations, research and development (R&D), and public infrastructure development) reaches 2% of the current GDP.

- R&D
  To promote R&D in science and technology that contributes to the enhancement of the comprehensive defense architecture, a whole-of-government mechanism will be established to match R&D based on the views of the Ministry of Defense, with the appropriate technological seeds possessed by relevant ministries and agencies.

- Public infrastructure
  Japan will establish a cross-governmental mechanism to develop and enhance the functions of public infrastructure, such as airports and seaports, based on the needs of the SDF and the Japan Coast Guard. The mechanism will facilitate their smooth utilization and deployment onto such infrastructure for purposes such as civil protection, peacetime training, and contingency response. Rules will also be established for ordinary utilization of airports and seaports with a view to responding to contingencies.
  These efforts will be promoted in cooperation with local governments, residents, and others.

- Cybersecurity
  Japan is taking further steps to develop our information gathering and analysis capabilities in the field of cybersecurity and establishing systems to implement active cyber defense.

- International cooperation
  Japan will establish a new cooperation framework for the benefit of the armed forces, which will provide equipment and supplies as well as infrastructure development assistance to like-minded countries for strengthening their security capacities and improving their deterrence capabilities.

In addition to fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities, Japan will build an overall national defense architecture by integrating Japan’s national power and systematically combining all policy means.

Promotion of cooperation between the national government and local governments/private entities
The whole Government, along with our ally, like-minded countries, and others, will improve and reinforce the Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) and strategic communication, which are adopted according to situation to continue to demonstrate Japan’s intention and capability.

The Government as a whole will continue to strengthen its response capabilities to integrated information Warfare with special regard to cognitive dimension. Establish collaborative process between SDF and the police/Japan Coast Guard (JCG) with a view to responding to contingencies.

Work closely with the relevant ministries and agencies to facilitate the use of the sea and airspace by SDF as well as the transportation and storage of ammunition and fuel

Strengthen whole-of-government civil protection training, etc.

Enhance cooperation and collaboration with local governments and residents

Diplomatic efforts underpinned by Japan’s enhanced defense architecture
Diplomatic efforts underpinned by Japan’s enhanced defense architecture are important for not tolerating unilateral changes to the status quo by force.
Japan will cooperate and coordinate on security issues with our ally, like-minded countries, and others, as well as promote efforts to achieve the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). In addition, Japan will work to proactively create a peaceful, stable, and predictable international environment and prevent unilateral changes to the status quo by force.
Through these efforts, Japan will ensure our peace and security and the peace, stability, and prosperity of the region and the international community.
No single country alone can defend its security in the current international society.

**Cooperation with our ally**

*Strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance*

The Japan-U.S. Alliance plays a significant role in peace, stability, and prosperity in not only Japan but also the Indo-Pacific region and the international community. Japan will continue to further cooperate with the United States.

**Strengthening Japan-U.S. joint deterrence and response capabilities**

To prevent attacks against Japan and, furthermore, to disrupt attacks in the event that Japan is attacked, we will cooperate with the United States in various fields and enhance our capabilities through bilateral/multilateral exercises and other means.

**Reinforcing Japan-U.S. coordination functions**

Japan and the United States will further work for smooth coordination to ensure integrated response to any situation at any time.

**Reinforcing joint response infrastructure**

Japan and the United States will share all levels of information and conduct joint activities, such as research and development of equipment.

**Measures to support the stationing of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ)**

Japan will implement support measures for the stable stationing of the USFJ, which constitutes the core element of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. In particular, Japan will work to mitigate the impact of the USFJ on Okinawa, located in an area critically important for the security of Japan, including relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, while fully addressing the severe security environment.

The defense of Japan will be ensured by strengthening cooperation with the United States, our ally, and collaboration with like-minded countries and others that share our values and interests.

**Collaboration with like-minded countries and others**

*Strengthening collaboration with like-minded countries and others*

**Efforts to contribute to realizing the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)**

FOIP envisions maintaining and strengthening a free and open international order based on the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific in order to ensure peace and prosperity across the entire region and the world. Under this vision, Japan will proactively promote multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges, taking into account the characteristics of the respective areas as well as the situation of each country.

**Australia**

Japan and Australia, as “Special Strategic Partners,” will build the closest defense cooperative relationship second only to the Japan-U.S. relationship.

**India**

Japan and India, as “Special Strategic and Global Partners,” will carry out exchanges in a broad range of fields, including maritime security.

**United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and others**

Japan will cooperate with each country on global and the respective regional issues.

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) / European Union (EU)**

Japan will reinforce collaboration regarding international rulemaking and security of the Indo-Pacific.

Japan will enhance coordination among Japan and the ROK collaboration in view of dealing with North Korea.

**Canada and New Zealand**

Japan will reinforce collaboration to address challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.

**Southeast Asian countries and others**

Japan will promote measures according to the situation of each country, such as consultations at various levels, bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, and transfer of defense equipment.

In addition to the above, Japan will strengthen collaboration with Nordic-Baltic states, Central and Eastern European countries, Mongolia, Central Asian countries, Pacific Island countries, coastal states of the Indian Ocean, Middle Eastern countries, African countries, and others.
Defense production and technology bases are in and of themselves integral parts of defense capability. To keep pace, the defense industry must ensure that such bases remain in Japan and are reinforced domestically.

**Reinforcing the defense production base**

**Building a strong and sustainable defense industry**

- The defense business is not very profitable, according to some companies. However, the defense production base will be lost if companies continue to withdraw and if new investments or new entrants cannot be expected.

**Measures**

- Adapt equipment acquisition methods that further emphasize the importance of maintaining and strengthening domestic bases.
- Establish a system that enables companies to secure appropriate profits through their efforts.
- Create a certification system and implement fiscal measures and financial support for ensuring stable production of equipment, etc.

**Dealing with a variety of risks**

- The defense industry is exposed to various risks, such as theft of important data through cyberattack.
- Support cybersecurity measures taken by companies.
- Strengthen collaboration with Japan’s ally and others to build relationships that complement each other’s supply chains.

**Measures**

- Facilitate transfers by establishing a new fund and providing corporate assistance as necessary. Alleviate excessive burden on companies.
- Support cybersecurity measures taken by companies.
- Strengthen collaboration with Japan’s ally and others to build relationships that complement each other’s supply chains.

**Promoting transfer of defense equipment and technology**

- Transferring equipment overseas is a key policy instrument to create a desirable security environment for Japan, and is effective in ensuring the growth of the defense industry through the expansion of defense equipment market. Nevertheless, there has only been one case of transfer of finished products from Japan.

**Measures**

- Support cybersecurity measures taken by companies.
- Strengthen collaboration with Japan’s ally and others to build relationships that complement each other’s supply chains.

**Reinforcing the defense technology base**

**Research and development that lead to fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities at an early stage**

- Advanced civilian technologies have the potential to change drastically the nature of future warfare. To keep pace with these changes, Japan needs to seamlessly launch research and development to operationalize deployment, and to acquire defense equipments earlier.

**Measures**

- Intensive investment in equipment/technology that are directly linked to future battles.
- Shorten research and development periods to realize early deployment.
- Strategic dissemination to increase company’s predictability.

**Proactively utilizing civilian advanced technologies**

- Japan needs to incorporate a wide range of advanced commercial/basic technologies for securing technological superiority in the future and acquiring cutting-edge capabilities earlier than other countries.

**Measures**

- Promote the finding, developing, and incorporating the innovative commercial/basic technology.
- Establish a new research institution to conduct R&D that realize innovative equipment and technology.
- Collaboration with relevant Ministries and make proactive use of R&D funds and outputs.

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**Bill on Enhancing Defense Production and Technology Bases**

**I. Clarification of the position of the defense industry**

- Clarify the increasing importance of maintaining and strengthening the bases for developing and producing equipment, etc.
- The Minister of Defense will establish and release the basic policy regarding the strengthening of the bases.

**Measures**

- The Government will conduct surveys to directly grasp supply chain risks.
- Companies have an obligation to make efforts to respond to the survey.
- The Government will take stock of the survey results to strengthen the bases.

**II. Supply chain surveys**

**III. Measures to reinforce the bases**

- For the efforts of companies that contribute to strengthening the bases, the Government will directly pay the expenditures (to suppliers as well) with the authorization of the Minister of Defense.
- Address supply chain risks and promote the strengthening of bases.
- Necessary expenses may be granted when modifying such as specifications and performance of equipment to be transferred as required by the Government of Japan for such transfer.

**IV. Measures to facilitate equipment and technology transfers**

**V. Lending of funds**

- The Japan Finance Corporation may give considerations for lending funds necessary for the manufacturing of equipment, etc.

**Measures**

- In cases where stable manufacturing of defense equipment is difficult even with the above measures, the Ministry of Defense itself will own the manufacturing facilities and outsource the management and operation to companies.

**VI. Government ownership of manufacturing facilities**

**VII. Security measures in defense equipment contracts**

- Legal security obligation in addition to security obligation based on contract, which will further strengthen the security of sensitive information on defense equipment and technologies.

**Characteristics of equipment supply chain**

- Certification of suppliers’ efforts, payment of expenses, etc.
- Legal security obligations
- Competition advanced technical equipment
- Contractual security obligations
- Equipment supply chain
- Suppliers, etc., who are supporting industries
- Japan Finance Corporation
- Risks, etc.
Reinforcing the human resource base: SDF personnel demonstrate our defense capabilities

No matter how much advanced equipment we procure, our defense capabilities cannot be brought to bear without personnel to operate them. Japan will promote efforts to strengthen our defense capabilities from a human resource dimension.

**Enhance Recruitment Efforts**

**Challenge:** In order to secure excellent human resources in the severe recruiting environment with a declining number of people eligible for recruitment due to a declining birthrate, it is necessary to strengthen our recruitment efforts, and to secure the necessary number of high-quality human resources from a wide range of sources, including the private sector.

**Measures**

- Promote recruiting measures such as digitalization of recruitment PR, and strengthen the functions of Provincial Cooperation Offices.
- Review the SDF scholarship student system which covers undergraduate/graduate students in science and engineering who choose to work for the SDF.
- Establish a new SDF personnel system in order to incorporate human resources with specialized knowledge and skills who are expected to be active in fields such as cyber domain.

**Utilization of SDF Reserve Personnel and Others**

**Challenge:** In order to effectively supplement regular SDF personnel, it is necessary not only to improve the sufficiency rate but also to review and reinforce the system of SDF Reserve Personnel and Others.

**Measures**

- Review the current system, such as expanding the recruitment for civilians with no experience in the SDF, easing the age limits, and imposing appropriate training periods in order for the personnel to combine their main business and training.
- Promotion and utilization of SDF Reserve Personnel and Others, and others at each SDF service, as well as a coeducational school for undergraduate/graduate students.
- The promotion of the lives of SDF personnel in combat. Personnel injured in combat must be promptly provided medical aid and care for the SDF to continue their activities in difficult situations. MOD/SDF will strengthen measures to protect the lives of SDF personnel in combat.

**Improving the living/working environment and treatment**

**Challenge:** It is necessary to create an environment where all SDF personnel can demonstrate their abilities while maintaining high morale and pride.

**Measures**

- Develop an organizational environment with zero tolerance for harassment.
- Provide new SDF personnel with appropriate training in order for the personnel to combine their main business and training.
- Properly treat personnel, taking into account the special nature of SDF personnel’s missions and working environment.

**Effective use of human resources**

**Challenge:** To make effective use of human resources to improve organizational performance, it is necessary to promote the active participation of female SDF personnel, make effective use of skilled expertise, and curb mid-career retirements.

**Measures**

- Create an environment which promotes the active participation of female personnel.
- Raise the retirement age to leverage personnel with abundant knowledge, skills, and experience.
- Consider effective measures to curb mid-career retirements.

**Human resource development**

**Challenge:** Reinforce educational infrastructure to be able to address security challenges.

**Measures**

- Strengthen the education on joint operations -in the educational institutions, such as Joint Staff College and the staff college of each service.
- Strengthen the education and research content for cyber domain and others at each SDF service, the National Defense Academy, and National Institute for Defense Studies.
- Transform the Japan Self-Defense Force High Technical School into a combined school of each service, as well as a coeducational school by accepting female students to secure skilled human resources at an early stage etc.

**Enhancement of Re-employment Support**

**Challenge:** For the SDF personnel who retire at a younger age than general public officials, it is important to improve and strengthen reemployment support to recruit high-quality human resources and ensure that they can work without any concerns while they are in service.

**Measures**

- Promote recruiting measures such as digitalization of recruitment PR, and strengthen the functions of Provincial Cooperation Offices.
- Review the SDF scholarship student system which covers undergraduate/graduate students in science and engineering who choose to work for the SDF.
- Establish a new SDF personnel system in order to incorporate human resources with specialized knowledge and skills who are expected to be active in fields such as cyber domain.

**The award of honors for more SDF personnel**

**Challenge:** To boost the morale of SDF personnel, it is necessary to promote measures concerning honors and privilege for those well-deserved for achievement through many years of diligent services for their duties as the personnel.

**Measures**

- Confere decorations befitting the achievements of the personnel.

**Transformation of the medical function: Protecting lives of SDF personnel**

Personnel injured in combat must be promptly provided medical aid and care for the SDF to continue their activities in difficult situations. MOD/SDF will strengthen measures to protect the lives of SDF personnel in combat.

**Challenge:** Personnel injured in combat must be promptly provided medical aid and care in order for the SDF to continue their activities in difficult situations.

**Measures**

- To save the lives of personnel who carry out missions in a contingency in spite of danger, establish a seamless posture for medical care and evacuation from the front line to the destination hospital.
- Enhance National Defense Medical College’s education and research on combat trauma care.
## Necessary Expenditures in the Next Five Years

|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Stand-off Defense Capabilities             | 0.2 trillion yen        | 5 trillion yen        |  **The performance of other countries’ missile radars is improving**  
Reinforce capabilities to deal with opposing forces from a safe distance beyond the reach of their attacks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| Integrated Air and Missile Defense         | 1 trillion yen          | 3 trillion yen        | **Increasingly diverse and complex air threats**, e.g., missiles flying at extremely high speeds (hypersonic), at low altitudes, and on irregular trajectories  
Reinforce interception capabilities against air threats                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Capacities                                 |                         |                       | Adapt to the new nature of warfare that makes use of unmanned equipment  
**Strengthen the information gathering functions for missiles and other assets through the use of satellites**  
**Strengthen the organization to deal with increasingly advanced and sophisticated cyberattacks**  
To respond to the rapid buildup of military capabilities of surrounding countries and others, need to improve the capabilities of various equipment and acquire them more rapidly  
**Gather information on the intensifying military activities of other countries seamlessly, constantly, and continuously.**  
**Strengthen intelligence functions to win information warfare, as seen in the aggression against Ukraine.**  
**Strengthen maritime and air transport capabilities to enable swift deployment of forces to island areas and other locations**  
**Eliminate the shortage of ammunition and missiles to deter an invasion of Japan in a contingency**  
**Equipment cannot be available due to a shortage of parts, etc.**  
**Securing adequate maintenance budget to avoid situations where equipment cannot be available due to a shortage of parts, etc.**  
**The defense industry is in and of itself an integral defense capability. Need to appropriately address a range of challenges, such as business withdrawals, discontinuation of raw material supply from overseas, and cyberattacks on companies.**  
**If R&D for future equipment falls behind, a recovery will be difficult to achieve amid rapid advances in science and technology.**  
**Enhance investment in advanced technologies required for future ways of warfare.**  
**Secure necessary budgets for the education and training of personnel, equipment fuel, etc.**  
**Fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities**  
**Planned amount for FY2019–2023**  
**17.2 trillion yen (contract-based)**  
**Necessary expenditures in the next five years**  
**43.5 trillion yen (contract-based)** |
12 Organization of the SDF Services a Decade from Now

The joint operation and SDF service structure will be strengthened by enhancing capabilities in seven focal areas.

Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

Establish a permanent Joint Headquarters to reinforce joint operations
Expand the SDF Cyber Defense Command and enhance cyber defense capabilities (Increase the number of personnel belonging to MOD/SDF cyber specialization units from approx. 890 to approx. 4,000 by the end of FY2027)
Create a maritime transport unit to strengthen the integrated transport architecture of the SDF

Build up forces in charge of defense in the southwestern region (the 15th Brigade will be reorganized into a division)
Deploy stand-off missile units for launching missiles from ground to disrupt and defeat the invading opponent from a distance
Build up units to disrupt and defeat invasion by the opponent’s vessels (establish 2 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments [deployment location undecided])
Establish units to defeat the opponent’s landing forces (establish 2 hyper velocity gliding projectile battalions for defense of remote islands and 2 long-range guided missile units [deployment location undecided])
Change the number of active-duty SDF personnel to transfer personnel to cyber and other units (approx. 151,000 ⇒ approx. 149,000)

Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)

To strengthen space operations capabilities, establish a specialized space domain missions unit commanded by a general or a lieutenant general (deployment location undecided), and rename the “Air Self-Defense Force” to “Air and Space Self-Defense Force”
Increase the number of fighter aircraft (approx. 290 ⇒ approx. 320) to boost air defense capabilities quantitatively (consider replacement with UAVs)
To tenaciously continue combat, build a system for mobile and dispersed operations

Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)

Establish an MSDF information warfare major unit to reinforce integrated information warfare capabilities
In addition to ballistic missiles, procure two more Aegis equipped destroyers, which excel in countering air attacks (10 destroyers)
Procure two Aegis system equipped vessels mainly for ballistic missile defense (2 vessels)

Joint operation structure

- Establish a permanent Joint Headquarters to reinforce joint operations
- Expand the SDF Cyber Defense Command and enhance cyber defense capabilities
- Create a maritime transport unit to strengthen the integrated transport architecture of the SDF

13 Q&A on Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities

Q1. Shouldn’t Japan make diplomatic efforts before fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities?

Answer.

The need for diplomatic efforts goes without saying. At the same time, however, Japan is in a situation in which we must make serious efforts to fundamentally reinforce our defense capabilities.

The National Security Strategy of Japan lists “carrying out vigorous diplomacy” as the first strategic approach. Defense capabilities are the ultimate guarantee of national security. Demonstrating that we can fully defend the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals will also enhance credibility of our diplomacy.

Q2. Will Japan not trigger an arms race among its surrounding countries?

Answer.

Fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities is necessary to protect the lives and peaceful livelihoods of our nationals.

Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II. Under these circumstances, we must fundamentally reinforce our defense capabilities to deal with the situation and have listed up the defense capabilities necessary to protect our nationals. To prevent an arms race, we will clarify our specific defense policy intentions to other countries and take other proactive measures to ensure transparency of our national security policy.

Q3. Having counterstrike capabilities would not violate the Constitution?

Answer.

Counterstrike capabilities are exercised as a minimum necessary measure for self-defense against attacks on Japan by ballistic missiles or other means. The capabilities fall within the purview of the Constitution and international law and adhere to Japan's exclusively defense-oriented policy.

On February 29, 1956, the Government of Japan expressed the view that, under the Constitution, “as long as it is deemed that there are no other means to defend against attack by guided missiles and others, to hit the bases of those guided missiles and others is legally within the purview of self-defense and thus permissible.” However, the Government has chosen not to acquire counterstrike capabilities until now as a matter of policy. Ever since this view was presented, counterstrike capabilities have consistently been regarded as falling within the purview of the Constitution.

Q4. Will the deployment of additional personnel or enhanced capabilities to a region make it a target for attack?

Answer.

The fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities will strengthen Japan’s defense posture and contribute to ensuring security in all areas of Japan, including that region. The objective is to strengthen our deterrence capability to discourage military attacks against Japan.

In the extreme situation where an attack against Japan is anticipated, we will take all possible safety measures, including evacuating residents. It is essential that defense capabilities are exercised in coordination with activities to protect our nationals.

Q5. Are the measures bearing China, North Korea, and Russia in mind?

Answer.

Our measures do not deem any specific country or region as a threat and are not being implemented for the purpose of militarily countering them.

It is important to have deterrence capability which will make states realize that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are difficult to achieve. For this reason, Japan is reinforcing its defense capabilities to demonstrate our intention and ability to defend our nation.

Q6. How much must be budgeted for the five-year period from FY2023 to FY2027?

Answer.

The total amount of payment made between FY2023 and FY2027, including expenses such as salaries and food costs of SDF personnel (personnel and provisions expenses), is approx. 43 trillion yen (expenditure-based). The total amount of allocated costs (program expenses) for the contracts awarded between FY2023 and FY2027 is approx. 43.5 trillion yen (contract-based).