

## **Twelfth Japan–Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations**

1. H.E. Mr. IWAYA Takeshi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan; H.E. Mr. NAKATANI Gen, Minister of Defense of Japan; the Hon Richard Marles MP, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence of Australia; and Senator the Hon Penny Wong, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, met in Tokyo on 5 September 2025 for the 12th Japan–Australia Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations.
2. We recognised the elevated importance of the Japan–Australia relationship in promoting a peaceful, stable and prosperous region. We acknowledged our unprecedented strategic alignment, shared will and capability to play a leading role in realising a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient. In anticipation of next year’s 50th anniversary of the signing of the Australia and Japan Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, we affirmed our intention to elevate our Special Strategic Partnership and to re-define the direction of our cooperation for the next 50 years based on our shared strategic goals.
3. We, as a central pillar of coordination amongst like-minded countries, reiterated our steadfast commitment to working with the United States and other key partners, to uphold the international system, using all tools of statecraft to deter and prevent conflict, and to maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.
4. We welcomed the expansion of our bilateral cooperation operationally and institutionally, aligned with our 2022 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC), and committed to strengthen our collective deterrence. Consistent with our shared objectives outlined in paragraph 5 of the JDSC, and to take forward paragraph 6, we concurred to strengthen exchanges to share strategic assessments, consider potential contingencies that may affect our sovereignty and regional security interests, and identify potential measures in response. We concurred on doing this through invigorated 2+2 Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) and other relevant meetings.

### **Recognition and response to regional and international issues**

5. We recognised the deteriorating geostrategic environment and emphasised the need for all countries to manage strategic competition responsibly. We reiterated the importance of dialogue and practical measures to reduce the risks of miscalculation, escalation and conflict.
6. We reaffirmed the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an essential element of regional and international security and prosperity. We reiterated our strong opposition to unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. We emphasised that cross-Strait issues should be resolved peacefully through dialogue.

7. We reiterated our strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. We expressed serious concern at the increase in scale and frequency of provocative activities by China in Japan's maritime and air domains. Furthermore, we shared serious concerns over developments in the South China Sea, including an intensification of China's dangerous and provocative activities, particularly towards the Philippines. We reaffirmed our opposition to actions that escalate tensions and undermine regional peace and stability, including interference with offshore resource development, the militarisation of disputed features, dangerous manoeuvres including ramming and the unsafe use of China's military assets, coast guard and maritime militia, which have created risks of miscalculation and escalation. We emphasised the importance of upholding freedom of navigation and overflight, lawful uses of the sea, unimpeded commerce, and the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes in accordance with international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). We reiterated the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal Award is final and legally binding on the parties to the dispute.
8. We underscored transparency at sea and in the air is essential to prevent misunderstanding. From this perspective, we noted unsafe interactions and unusual approaches by Chinese military aircraft, as well as Chinese naval vessels conducting live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea without adequate notification were not conducive to stability and transparency.
9. We strongly condemned North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and reaffirmed our commitment to the complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). We strongly condemned North Korea's continued provocative actions, including its repeated unlawful ballistic missile testing, and urged it to fully comply with its obligations under relevant UNSCRs. We welcomed increased coordination on policies toward North Korea, including sanctions, and determined to continue these coordination efforts. We expressed grave concern over North Korea's malicious cyber activities, including cryptocurrency theft and use of IT workers to fund North Korea's unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. We reaffirmed the importance of the immediate resolution of the abductions issue and affirmed our continued close cooperation between Japan and Australia on this issue.
10. We strongly condemned Russia's illegal, unjustifiable and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine and reiterated the need for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace. We also strongly condemned North Korea's military cooperation with Russia, including the deployment of its troops for use on the battlefield against Ukraine. We called on support from the international community to de-escalate and end the war, including for regional

countries to prevent their companies from supplying dual-use goods to Russia's military, and for China to play a positive role in bringing the war to an end. We committed to strengthen cooperation on ensuring the effectiveness of sanctions, and prevention of evasion and circumvention in our region. We also noted with serious concern the strengthening of military cooperation between China and Russia through joint activities.

11. We expressed grave concern at the worsening humanitarian situation in Myanmar and condemned the military regime's ongoing attacks against civilians. We called for an immediate cessation of violence, the release of all those unjustly detained, and safe and unhindered humanitarian access. We further called for the regime to engage in genuine and inclusive political dialogue with all stakeholders with the view to a return to a more peaceful and stable Myanmar. Elections held without these essential steps risk greater instability. We commended the ongoing efforts of ASEAN to seek a peaceful resolution, including the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus, such as humanitarian assistance by the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre).
12. We expressed grave concern over the situation in the Middle East, particularly the findings of famine in Gaza, reiterating urgent calls for an immense and unimpeded surge in aid to civilians in need. We also urged an immediate ceasefire and release of the hostages. We strongly opposed the expansion of military action in Gaza and reiterated our call for immediate reversal of the E1 Settlement plan. We reaffirmed the critical need for a two-state solution, acknowledging the collective international efforts to break the cycle of violence in the Middle East. We remained unequivocal in our condemnation of Hamas for the atrocities of October 7.
13. We share the fundamental objective that Iran never seeks, acquires or develops a nuclear weapon. We call on Iran to comply with its nuclear safeguards obligations. It must restore full IAEA access, address concerns about its nuclear stockpile and enrichment, and return to negotiations.
14. We condemned acts of transnational repression to intimidate political opponents and disrupt social cohesion as an unacceptable violation of sovereignty.

### **Multilateral Cooperation**

15. We reaffirmed our longstanding and unwavering commitment to multilateralism, and reiterated the importance of international rules, norms and standards that underpin global peace, prosperity and security. We underscored the need to strengthen multilateral cooperation in a time of global uncertainty, and to find collective solutions to shared challenges. We concurred on expanding our strategic multilateral cooperation and dialogue,

with a focus on support for critical multilateral functions and mandates, including greater cooperation in relation to multilateral peacebuilding and gender equality.

16. We affirmed the need for deeper bilateral engagement and with regional partners to support the full implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda ahead of the 25th anniversary of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in October this year, including promoting women's equal participation and leadership across all levels of conflict prevention, peace and security.
17. We reiterated our deep concern for the safety and security of humanitarian personnel, who continue to face an escalating risk of harm in conflict zones around the world. We acknowledged our collaboration as part of the Ministerial Group that developed the Declaration for the Protection of Humanitarian Personnel. We reaffirmed our commitment to take forward the aims of the Declaration and drive practical action to protect humanitarian workers. We called on all countries to endorse the Declaration, recommit to humanitarian principles and uphold and respect international humanitarian law.
18. We reaffirmed our commitment to work together to advance realistic and practical measures to strengthen the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. We concurred to continue our close cooperation to strengthen the cornerstone Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including as co-founders of the twelve-country Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). We supported efforts to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force and to maintain the moratorium on nuclear testing, and to work to create conditions conducive to immediately commence negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). We also committed to strengthen international cooperation on the universalisation of IAEA safeguards including its Additional Protocols.

### **Economic security, cyber, space, foreign interference and information cooperation**

19. Acknowledging economic security is fundamental to Australia and Japan, with significant implications for national security, prosperity and resilience, we committed to deepen economic security cooperation and develop concrete actions through the Japan–Australia Economic Security Dialogue.
20. We concurred on continuing to work together to support the rules-based multilateral system, strengthen trade and investment ties, and exchange information and share experiences in addressing shared economic security challenges. This included challenges around critical minerals, supply chain resilience, critical and emerging technologies, and building regional economic resilience.

21. We welcomed continued cooperation in strengthening critical minerals supply chains. This included the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security's (JOGMEC's) recent investments in Australian critical minerals projects. Increasing bilateral cooperation in critical minerals projects will help achieve our respective supply chain objectives.
22. We shared our ambition to deepen communication between Japan's newly established National Cybersecurity Office and Australian Government counterparts, and to expand cybersecurity cooperation. We committed to further elevating our bilateral cybersecurity cooperation, building on frameworks such as the Japan–Australia Cyber Policy Dialogue.
23. We emphasised the importance of implementing resilient and trusted technology systems in adopting critical technologies. We committed to jointly promote the safe, secure and trustworthy adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) in the Indo-Pacific, including through the Hiroshima AI Process.
24. We reiterated continued efforts in strengthening Japan–Australia cooperation in the space domain through dialogues and unit-level exchanges.
25. We welcomed progress in bilateral cooperation on strategic communications to counter foreign information manipulation and interference. We committed to deeper engagement bilaterally and with regional partners to address information threats in the Indo-Pacific, including to support governments, civil society and media to build resilient, open and fact-based information environments.
26. We confirmed that we will accelerate efforts to update the Japan–Australia Information Security Agreement (ISA) aimed to strengthen the foundation for promoting cooperation in the field of information, including in security, between Japan and Australia. We committed to regular information sharing, coordination, and collaboration where appropriate, on Indo-Pacific foreign interference vulnerabilities and threats, and resilience-and-awareness building in Indo-Pacific countries.

### **Development and infrastructure cooperation**

27. We committed to support an Indo-Pacific region that is resilient and secure through our respective international development programs. At a time of disruption, we are pivoting and reprioritising our programs, ensuring we respond to the most acute needs and contribute to a more equitable future for our region. We reaffirmed our strong commitment and responsibility to be reliable, trusted development partners in our region, working in ways that are accountable, transparent, and respect our partners' sovereignty. We reiterated our

commitment to upholding shared values and continuing to invest in sustainable development, gender equality, disability equity and social inclusion, which underpin global prosperity. To support sustainable development, we concurred on deepening cooperation with emerging donors of development assistance, to diversify funding, enhance development effectiveness, share lessons and build trust and transparency with partners. We committed to work with partners to deliver sustainable solutions for Small Island Developing States (SIDS). We recognised their unique vulnerabilities and will work to ensure meaningful engagement in international processes, including Official Development Assistance (ODA) graduation.

28. We determined to continue advancing shared strategic infrastructure priorities across the Indo-Pacific to improve the quality and resilience of regional infrastructure, including through transformative digital infrastructure, and to deepen our contribution to the region's energy transition. This builds upon existing deep cooperation in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.
29. We committed to continue promoting secure undersea cables in the Indo-Pacific to ensure a peaceful, prosperous and secure region. We concurred on communicating more closely on undersea cable damage to address this issue together.

### **Deepening defence cooperation**

30. We committed to explore elevating our enduring defence partnership to reflect our unprecedented strategic alignment and increasing number of joint activities and exercises.
31. We recognised the importance of the Scope, Objectives and Forms (SOF) dialogue for accelerating operational cooperation between Japan and Australia, deepening interoperability and aligning shared strategic objectives.
32. In efforts to deter unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion, we welcomed joint cooperation including through increased information sharing, further alignment of activities, and deepening discussions on current and future deterrence activities such as Flexible Deterrent Options.
33. We highlighted progress made by the Japan–Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) in expediting mutual deployment processes; and the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, which standardises services, including refuelling, and medical, that facilitates mutual support in logistics. We welcomed the RAA streamlining and standardising processes, and reaffirmed our determination to advance these efforts. We reflected on the high tempo of operational cooperation between Japan and Australia, with over 40 activities

having now taken place under the RAA, and acknowledged particular achievements, including:

- a. the largest ever Japanese participation in Exercise TALISMAN SABRE 2025, with over 1,500 Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) personnel participating;
- b. Australia's inaugural participation in Exercise ORIENT SHIELD; and
- c. plans for HMAS *Brisbane* to pursue possible opportunity to undergo its first assisted maintenance period in a Japanese port as part of its Regional Presence Deployment.

34. We welcomed increased JSDF participation in Australia-based activities since the last 2+2, with eight activities held in Australia and four port visits by Japanese vessels. Our enhanced cooperation in the air domain has also accelerated since we last met, with:

- a. Japanese aircraft, including a P-1 (September 2024), a U-4 (March 2025) and a C-2 (July 2025) having visited Australia; and
- b. the third iteration of trilateral Japan–Australia–United States F-35 training in two years scheduled for July 2026 in Australia (following Exercise COPE NORTH in Guam in February 2025 and Exercise BUSHIDO GUARDIAN in Japan in September 2025).

35. We reiterated our commitment to increasing cooperation on joint activities, including Exercise NICHI GOU TRIDENT and enhanced contribution from Japan Ground Self-Defense Force to Exercise SOUTHERN JACKAROO 2026. We reaffirmed our intent to conduct an inaugural regional air and missile defence live-fire event at Exercise TALISMAN SABRE 2027.

36. We welcomed the commencement of Australia's first liaison officer to JSDF Joint Operations Command (JJOC) on 1 September, as the first placement of a foreign military liaison officer in JJOC, following Japan's first liaison officer to Australia's Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) who commenced in November.

37. We welcomed the signing of Terms of Reference for the Japan–Australia–United States Navy Logistics Working Group. We also affirmed our intent to further explore cooperation on bilateral and trilateral air logistics, building on increased air cooperation announced at last year's 2+2.

38. We highlighted progress in enhancing bilateral defensive cyber cooperation, including through cyber activities and senior officials' engagements, and building on Japan and Australia's joint participation in Exercise LOCKED SHIELDS 2025 this year.

39. We affirmed the importance of enhancing ICT infrastructure to elevate secure communications and operational coordination. Supporting efforts, including through network provisioning, will further deepen our cyber interoperability.

40. We welcomed increased bilateral defence cooperation between JSDF and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in support of the full implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, including in Australian-led Exercises SOUTHERN JACKAROO, TALISMAN SABRE 2025 and Japan-led Joint Exercise for Rescue.

### **Defence industry, advanced capabilities and AUKUS Pillar II cooperation**

41. We highlighted the selection of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' upgraded Mogami-class frigate, as the preferred platform for Australia's future general purpose frigates. We noted it was a significant milestone in what is the largest-ever Japan–Australian defence industrial collaboration.

42. We look forward to future opportunities to advance defence equipment and technology cooperation between our defence industrial bases. We were pleased with the signing of the Provision of Defence Articles and Defence Services Memorandum of Arrangement (in May), which will enable increased bilateral cooperation on defence capability initiatives.

43. We expressed our shared aspiration for continued and substantive progress in the Boobook project on cutting-edge laser technology, the first co-development project between Japanese and Australian defence industries. We underscored its importance in advancing industrial collaboration between the two nations.

44. We welcomed the completion of two Japan–Australia joint research projects on “Marine Hydrodynamics and Hydroacoustics” and “Multi-Vehicle Autonomy”. We acknowledged the ongoing joint research projects, especially the Robotic and Autonomous System for Undersea Warfare (RASUW) work under our bilateral Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) Arrangement.

45. We look forward to the inaugural Japan–Australia-United States project on composite aerospace materials, intending to finalise planning and commence the project by mid-2026 under the trilateral RDT&E Arrangement.

46. We acknowledged progress in autonomy and Collaborative Combat Aircraft, including plans to enable increased Japan–Australia collaboration on MQ-28A under the Provision of Defence Articles and Defence Services Memorandum of Arrangement, and Japan Air Self Defence Forces (JASDF) participation in MQ-28A flight test observation and training in 2026.

47. We applauded the successful firing of JSDF Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air-missile (SAM) and Type-12 surface-to-ship missile at Exercise TALISMAN SABRE 2025, which

represented the first time members of the ADF integrated into Japan's targeting system to conduct a sophisticated Live Fire Activity.

48. We welcomed the convening of the inaugural Defence Materiel and Industry Cooperation Meeting in August 2025 as a significant milestone for bilateral defence materiel and industry cooperation. We anticipated upcoming negotiations to finalise the Materiel and Industry Memorandum of Cooperation, which will enable the exploration of opportunities for bilateral collaboration across a broad range of defence capabilities.
49. We highlighted ongoing trilateral cooperation between Japan, Australia and the United States on joint capabilities, including on networked air and missile defence architecture, and the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) as announced at the May 2025 Trilateral Defence Ministers' Meeting (TDMM).
50. We welcomed Japan's inaugural participation in an AUKUS Pillar II Maritime Big Play activity as part of Exercise TALISMAN SABRE 2025. AUKUS partners and Japan successfully tested underwater autonomous systems using an advanced acoustic communications capability. We reaffirmed our commitment to discussing further opportunities for cooperation between AUKUS partners and Japan on advanced capability projects under AUKUS Pillar II.

#### **Evacuation of nationals overseas in crises**

51. We welcomed the signing of a Memorandum of Cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia on assisting our nationals overseas. We look forward to strengthening cooperation on assisting each other's nationals overseas in the event of a crisis, including through sharing information and best practices.

#### **Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific to promote security and prosperity**

52. We recognised that strengthening cooperation with the United States and our network of partnerships is critical to realising our shared objectives. Through inclusive and transparent engagement, we committed to work more closely with key partners, including through minilateral groupings and reaffirmed our steadfast support for regional institutions.
53. Japan and Australia, together with the United States, continue to progress our practical cooperation on regional security issues through the Trilateral Defence Consultations, and consult each other on security matters through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue. Recognising the important role our trilateral cooperation plays in enhancing regional deterrence and response capabilities, we acknowledged enhanced interoperability between our three

forces and noted the success of two Trilateral Defence Ministers' Meetings (TDMM) since the last 2+2 (November 2024 and May 2025).

54. We reaffirmed the Quad's steadfast commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient. We welcomed the Quad's leadership in driving practical cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, in relation to maritime and transnational security, economic prosperity and security, critical and emerging technologies, and humanitarian assistance and emergency response. We look forward to the first Quad Indo-Pacific Logistics Network field training exercise later this year.
55. We emphasised the importance of enhanced cooperation between Japan, Australia and the Republic of Korea (ROK) to advance shared interests in the region, building on the success of the inaugural Japan, Australia, ROK trilateral defence ministers' meeting and the foreign ministry officials' level Trilateral Indo-Pacific Dialogue.
56. We underscored the importance of ongoing defence cooperation and operational coordination between Japan, Australia, the Philippines and the United States in the South China Sea, including through regular Maritime Cooperative Activities and exercises to support regional maritime security consistent with international law. We acknowledged the increasing operational cooperation between Japan, Australia, the Philippines and the United States, and explored opportunities for increased multilateral participation in exercises such as Exercise BALIKATAN. In addition, we discussed JSDF's potential future participation in Exercise ALON.
57. We noted efforts to enhance Japan–Australia–India–United States maritime domain awareness cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, including through Exercise MALABAR this year.
58. We reaffirmed our unwavering support for ASEAN centrality and unity, as well as the ASEAN-led regional architecture. We committed to continue to work with ASEAN to preserve a region that is peaceful, stable and prosperous; support ASEAN's leadership role in convening strategic dialogue, prevent conflict, including in the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus; and support practical implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, including in maritime cooperation, connectivity, the Sustainable Development Goals, and economy and finance.
59. We underscored our steadfast commitment to support Southeast Asia's peace, stability and prosperity, listening and responding to regional priorities, including through strengthening our coordination to:
  - a. enhance civil maritime cooperation with partners in the region, including support for the Philippine Coast Guard;

- b. contribute to the region's energy transition
  - i. including through support for ASEAN's efforts to realise the ASEAN Power Grid by 2045;
  - ii. and our respective investments in Singapore's Financing Asia's Transition Partnership ("FAST-P") and the Muara Laboh geothermal power plant in West Sumatra, Indonesia; and
- c. bolster the resilience and prosperity of the Mekong subregion.

60. We concurred on continuing our cooperation to advance regional priorities as set out in the Pacific Islands Forum's 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, to make the Pacific more resilient and stable.

- a. We concurred on aligning support for innovative measures to address climate change impacts and disaster risk, ensuring investments are embedded through Pacific governments, regional organisations and Pacific-led initiatives.
- b. We welcomed the growing pledges of support for the Pacific Resilience Facility, a high priority for Pacific Island countries, and committed to encourage other donors to contribute and to work towards improved access to multilateral climate funds including the Green Climate Fund.
- c. We committed to continue to coordinate on respective approaches to the Multilateral Development Banks to encourage reform consistent with the Pacific Quality Infrastructure Principles.
- d. We welcomed Japan's inaugural participation in Operation RENDER SAFE and Exercise PUK PUK, demonstrating our shared commitment to working in partnership with Pacific Island countries to support regional priorities.
- e. We concurred on working closely to reinforce Pacific regionalism and a 'Pacific-first' approach for peace and security, in line with the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Communique in 2022.

61. Recognising the importance to the Pacific of practical action to build infrastructure, we committed to continue exploring further cooperation in support of the Nadi Flood Alleviation Project in Fiji.

62. We affirmed that security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions are increasingly interconnected. We committed to deepen cooperation with European partners across a broad range of areas, including cyber cooperation, maritime domain awareness, joint exercises, defence technology, and supply chain resilience, leveraging cooperation with the EU and with NATO, including as part of the IP4 grouping. We also recognised the importance of collaboration in emerging technologies, critical infrastructure protection, economic security, and countering foreign information manipulation and interference. We welcomed European presence in the Indo-Pacific, including the UK and French Carrier Strike

Groups. We concurred on the need to work across regions to shape a world characterised by adherence to rules and norms, rather than force or coercion.