

**National Security Strategy,
National Defense Strategy, and
Defense Buildup Program
(Outline)**

September, 2024

New Strategy Architecture

Government of Japan has formulated new National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy and Defense Buildup Program in December 16, 2022

Strategy architecture in the past

National Security Strategy (2013)

- Supreme national security policy document
 - Presents strategic approaches to be taken for national security, with diplomatic and defense policies at their core
- (Executed approximately 10-years timeframe)

National Defense Program Guidelines (2018)

- Basic guidelines for development, maintenance and operation of defense capability
 - Sets forth the organization of Self-Defense Forces that Japan should possess as a required level of defense capability
- (Executed approximately 10-years timeframe)

Medium-Term Defense Program (2018)

- Details the total cost (limit) over five years and inventorizes key capital equipment

Strategy architecture from now on

National Security Strategy

- Supreme national security policy document
 - Provides strategic guidance for Japan's national security policy areas in addition to diplomacy and defense, including economic security, technology, cyber, intelligence etc.
- (Executed approximately 10-years timeframe)

National Defense Strategy

- Sets defense objectives and demonstrates approaches and means by which Japan accomplishes those objectives
 - Fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities (including seven key capabilities)
 - Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country
 - Policy for cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries and others
- (Executed approximately 10-years timeframe)

Defense Buildup Program

- Sets the level of defense capability that Japan should possess, and sets mid- to long-term buildup program to achieve said level that includes the followings:
 - Organization of Self-Defense Forces (by approx. ten years from now)
 - Total expenditures for the next five years and quantities of major procurement (research and development programs and target fiscal year for the delivery etc. of defense equipment including key defense equipment are described in the main text)

Changes in the Strategic Environment and Defense Challenges

- Countries surrounding Japan are increasing military activities while strengthening their military capabilities and Japan is positioned at the forefront of such activities.
- Attention should be paid to what impact such activities will have if they are conducted simultaneously in the Indo-Pacific.
- Japan's future security and defense policies are directly linked to the peace and stability of the region and the international community.

Military Trends of Japan's neighboring countries and regions



Joint Navigation by Chinese and Russian ships




Joint Flight by Chinese and Russian bomber



Ballistic missile called "hypersonic missile" by North Korea



[Korean Central News Agency]



Of the nine ballistic missiles that China fired near Taiwan, five landed within Japan's EEZ (August 2022)

Comparison of the Situation in 2013 and Now (1 of 2)

Comparing 2013 (when last NSS was formulated) and now, the **security environment surrounding Japan has dramatically changed**

| | | Before 2013 | As of 2024 |
|-------|-----------------------------------|--|--|
| China | Scrambles | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ FY2002(20yrs ago) : 188 ➤ FY2012(10yrs ago) : 567 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ FY2016 : 1168 (most ever) ➤ FY2023 : 669 |
| | Defense spending | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ 2012 : Approx.650.3 bil yuan | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ 2024 : Approx.1,665.4 bil yuan→2.1 times in 10yrs *about 32 times in 30yrs and 7.9 times in 20yrs |
| | Activities around Senkaku Islands | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ 1,000t class vessels belonging to Chinese maritime law enforcement agencies : 40 vessels (※2012) ➤ Number of days per year that vessels belonging to China's maritime law enforcement agencies enter contiguous waters: 79 days (※2012) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ China Coast Guard vessels 1,000t class and over: 157 (※2022) ➤ Number of days per year that Chinese Coast Guard vessels enter contiguous waters: up to 352 days (※2023) ➤ Since 2016, Chinese naval combat vessels have entered contiguous waters around the Senkaku Islands (※2016, 2018, 2022) |
| | Taiwan Strait | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Activity of Chinese military aircraft crossing the "median line" was very rarely confirmed | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Since Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August 2022, China has been conducting almost daily military aircraft incursions over the "median line" of the Taiwan Strait ➤ Number of aircraft entering Taiwanese airspace by Chinese Military Aircraft announced 2020: 380 aircraft→2021:972 aircraft→2022:1733 aircraft →2023:1703 aircraft |
| | South China Sea | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ De facto control of Scarborough Reef in 2012  <p>August 2014 CSIS / AMTI</p> | <p>Fiery cross reefs⇒</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Rapid and large-scale reclamation and infrastructure development in 7 points in Spratly Islands after 2014  <p>March 2020 Reclaimed Area: App.2.72km² (Completed in 2015) App3,750m Large harbor Runway (app. 3,000m) CSIS AMTI MAXAR</p> |

Comparison of the Situation in 2013 and Now (2 of 2)

| | | | Before 2013 | As of 2024 |
|-------------|---|-------------|--|--|
| North Korea | Ballistic missile | # of launch | ➤ Over a period of about 20yrs until 2013:8times 18 shots in total | ➤ Since 2014, a total of 113times and 186 shots in 10yrs (As of July. 17 2024) 2020:4times 8 shots→2021:4times 6 shots→2022: 31times 59 shots (2023:18times 25shots) |
| | | # owned | ➤ “Nodong” class:200 | (※Developing and enhancing SRBMs with irregular trajectories, IRBM-class and ICBM-class ballistic missiles, SLBMs and other missiles that had not been launched prior to 2013) ➤ “Nodong” class : 315~450 |
| | # of nuclear warheads (estimated) | | ➤ 6 to 8 | ➤ Approx. 50 (※Overall, fissionable materials sufficient to produce a maximum of 90 nuclear warheads will be restored.) |
| Russia | Russian military deployment in the Northern Territories | | ➤ No major modern equipment deployed | ➤ Deployment of new equipment (fighter jets, SSMs and SAMs, etc.) in the Far East, including the Northern Territories <div data-bbox="815 682 1425 856"> <p>Improved Kilo-class submarine: Deployed in and after 2021 and mounts “Kalibr” cruise missile</p> </div> <div data-bbox="1474 676 1850 876"> <p>SSM “Bastion” : Deployed in Etorofu, Chishima and South Sakhalin since 2016)</p> </div> |
| | Situation in Ukraine | | (*February 2014, Maidan revolution) | ➤ 2014:“Annexation” of Crimea/ 2024: Aggression against Ukraine <div data-bbox="834 1053 1323 1378"> </div> <div data-bbox="1352 1053 1893 1378"> </div> <p>Missile attack not carried out Conducted approx. 10,000 missile attacks</p> |

Overview of National Security Strategy

Japan will **implement strategic approaches, harnessing its comprehensive national power** (diplomatic, defense, economic, technological, and intelligence capabilities)

Strategic Approaches Prioritized by Japan

(1) Develop Efforts Centered on Diplomacy to Prevent Crises, Proactively Create a Peaceful and Stable International Environment, and Strengthen a Free and Open International Order

- ① Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance ② Maintain and develop a free and open international order and strengthen ties with its ally, like-minded countries and others ③ Strengthen diplomacy with Japan's neighboring countries and regions as well as efforts toward resolution of various issues of concern, including territorial issues ④ Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation ⑤ International counter-terrorism ⑥ Climate change measures ⑦ Strategic use of ODA and other international cooperation ⑧ Promotion of people-to-people exchanges

(2) Strengthening Japan's Defense Architecture

① Fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities as the last guarantee of national security

- In addition to cross-domain operational capabilities, reinforce stand-off defense capabilities, unmanned defense and other capabilities.
Possess counterstrike capabilities
- In FY2027, **Japan will take the necessary measures to make the level of its budget**, for both the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and complementary initiatives, **reach 2% of the current GDP**
- Consistently strengthen coordination and cooperation between the SDF and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), including control over the JCG by the Minister of Defense in the event of a contingency

② Coordinating with reinforced comprehensive defense architecture

Promoting efforts that complement and are inseparable from the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities under the frameworks of relevant ministries and agencies, namely research and development, public infrastructure development, cybersecurity and international cooperation with like-minded countries

③ Promoting transfer of defense equipment and technology

④ Reinforcing defense production and technology base, reinforcing human resource base

(3) Deepening Security Cooperation with the United States

(4) Strengthening Efforts to Seamlessly Protect Japan in All Directions

- ① Cybersecurity ② Maritime Security and Maritime Law Enforcement Capabilities ③ Space Security ④ Improving Technical Capabilities and Proactively Capitalizing in the Security Field ⑤ Strengthening Intelligence Capacities ⑥ Reinforcing Response Capabilities within Japan with Contingencies in Mind ⑦ Reinforcing Mechanisms for the Protection of Japanese Nationals ⑧ Protection of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas ⑨ Securing Resources Essential for Japan's National Security including Energy and Food

(5) Promoting Economic Security Policies to Achieve Autonomous Economic Prosperity

(6) Maintaining and Strengthening International Economic Order based on Free, Fair, and Equitable Rules

(7) Global Efforts for Coexistence and Coprosperity in the International Community

Domestic Base that should be Strengthened to Support Japan's National Security

- ① Strengthening the Economic and Fiscal Bases ② Reinforcing the Social Base ③ Enhancing the Intellectual Base**

Lesson Learned from the Russian Aggression against Ukraine

- “Intension” may change. If a country has “capability,” it can always have “intention”
- Ukraine’s defense capability against Russia was insufficient, thus **failing to discourage and deter Russian aggression and massive damage has occurred**
- To deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force, **build one’s own capability, that is defense capability focusing on opponent capabilities, is necessary**

Military background for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine

- ① Ukraine did not have sufficient defense capability to deter Russian aggression
- ② Ukraine had no allies and was not under the nuclear umbrella
- ③ A threat materializes when the capability to inflict harm is combined with the intention to do, Russia, with its strong military capability, one day came to possess the intention to launch an aggression

Result As a result of deterrence against Russia failed, massive damage has occurred, with tens of thousands of dead and injured and millions of displaced persons

| Total military strength |  <small>※Equipment are mainly made in the former Soviet Union</small> Ukrainian Military 500,000-800,000(active) + 300,000-400,000(reserve) |  <small>※Announced 71% modernization/new equipment as of end of 2021</small> Russian Military 1,100,000(active) + 1,500,000(reserve) |
|--|---|--|
| |  27 brigades + 43 regional defense brigades consisting of Reserve Personnel | 13 divisions and 50 brigades |
|  | 13 Patrol ships | 33 main surface vessels, 124 patrol ships 43 minesweepers, 19 landing ships |
|  | 78 fighters and attack aircraft | 129 bombers 878 fighters and attack aircraft |

Estimated damage on Ukraine

| | |
|------------------------------|--|
| Deaths | More than 10,582 civilians (as of February 22 2024) Approx. 13,000 military personnel (as of December 2022) |
| Injured | More than 19,875 civilians (as of February 22 2024) |
| Refugees (European region) | 6,168,100 people (as of August 19, 2024) |
| Internally Displaced Persons | 3,314,669 people (as of July 2024) |

2. Emergence of the new way of warfare

- **Massive missile strike** by ballistic and cruise missiles with improved precision strike capability




Russia used approx. 10,000 ballistic and cruise missiles across Ukraine (as of Aug. 25, 2024)



Hotel in Kryvyi Rih destroyed by Russian military's missile and drone attacks (Photo released by State Emergency Service of Ukraine on Aug. 26 2024)

- **Asymmetric attacks** leveraging the space, cyber and electromagnetic domains and with unmanned assets



Threat to the stable use of outer space



ISR UAV of Chinese military that flew between Okinawa and Miyakojima on Jan. 1 2023

- **Hybrid warfare** including information warfare



Image released by Taiwan Ministry of National Defense to deny disinformation on Taoyuan International Airport attacked by PLA

- **Threat using nuclear weapons**

◎“When there is a threat for existence of the state, in our country, **we can use nuclear weapons**” (Russian Spokesman Dmitry Peskov on March 2022)

◎“**If the territorial integrity of out country is threatened, we use all available means** to protect our people” (Russian President Vladimir Putin on September 2022)

Japan's Basic Defense Policy (1 of 2)

By ensuring all efforts in an integrated manner through three approaches and means to accomplish three defense objectives, Japan will resolutely defend to the end the lives of Japanese nationals and their peaceful livelihood as well as Japan's territorial land, waters and airspace


Three Defense Objectives

① **Shape a security environment** not tolerating unilateral changes to status quo by force

Prime Minister Kishida
in the G7 Summit
(May 2023)



② **Deter and respond** to unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts **through cooperation** with our ally, like-minded countries and others and bring the situation under control at an early stage



China intensifying unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force

③ If an invasion of Japan occurs, **disrupt and defeat** the invasion while taking primary responsibility to deal with the invasion and receiving support from the ally and others



Russia's aggression against Ukraine

Japan's Basic Defense Policy (2 of 2)

Three approaches to accomplish defense objectives

① Strengthening Japan's own architecture for national defense


- Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country
- **Fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities**



Next-generation fighter aircraft (conceptual image)

② Reinforce joint deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

“Demonstrating joint resolve and capabilities”



Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (July 2024)

③ Reinforcing collaboration with like-minded countries and others

“Reinforce collaboration with as many countries as possible”



Japan - US - Canada - The Philippines Quadrilateral Exercise (June 2024) 9

First Approach : Fundamental Reinforcement of Japan's Defense Capabilities

- **Fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities** is capability which enables to **achieve the third defense objective**
- This means that Japan will possess a capability that makes the opponent realize that the goal of invasion of Japan is not achievable by military means, and that the **damage the opponent will incur makes the invasion not worth the cost**
- By doing so, **Japan will ensure that opponent fully recognize Japan's intention and capability, do not underestimate Japan, and do not overestimate their own capabilities, thereby deterring invasion against Japan**

Seven key capabilities for fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities

- Disrupt and defeat invading forces over long distances, thereby **detering invasion itself**

① Stand-off defense capabilities

② Integrated air and missile defense capabilities

- Should deterrence fail, in addition to ① and ②, **ensure asymmetric advantage and gain superiority across domains**

③ Unmanned defense capabilities

④ Cross-domain capabilities

⑤ Command and control / Intelligence-related functions

- **Operate in a swift as well as persistent manner** to crush the opponent's will to invade

⑥ Mobile deployment capabilities / Civil protection


⑦ Sustainability / Resiliency

Top Priorities for the next 5 years


- ✓ **Maximizing effective use of its current equipment:** By improving the number of operationally available equipment, securing sufficient munitions and fuel, and accelerating investments in defense facilities for improved resiliency
- ✓ **Strengthening its core capabilities for future operations:** Stand-off defense capabilities, unmanned defense capabilities etc.

Stand-off Defense Capabilities


- In order to protect Japan's territory, which stretches approximately 3,000 km along the both north-south and east-west axes: Japan needs to deal with vessels and landing forces invading Japan from locations outside of threat zones
- Can be launched **from various platforms in multilayered manner and from various location**
- **Reinforce capabilities** such as hyper velocity glides and hypersonic glides which are **difficult to intercept**



Domestic stand-off missiles




Foreign stand-off missiles



Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities

- **Currently deploying system for ballistic missile defense**, including 28 PAC-3 units and 8 Aegis Ships throughout the country
- **Airborne threats are becoming more diverse and complex** due to the advancement of ballistic and cruise missile capabilities and emerging threats such as HGV and small drones
- **Fundamentally reinforce missile defense capability** by equipping 2 Aegis System Equipped vessels and Upgraded medium-range SAM (modified)

Conceptual image of Integrated Air and Missile Defense (Response to HGV, BMD)




* Glide Phase Interceptor

“Counterstrike Capabilities”

A Key to Deterring Invasion Against Japan (1 of 2)

Situation of Missile Attack Threat

- In recent years, in Japan’s surroundings, there have been **dramatic advances in missile-related technologies, including hypersonic weapons, and practical skills for missile operations, such as saturation attack**. **Missile forces in the region have significantly improved in both qualitative and quantitative terms**, and missiles themselves have been repeatedly launched. **Missile attacks against Japan have become a palpable threat**
- Under these circumstances, Japan will **continue its steadfast efforts to both qualitatively and quantitatively enhance its missile defense capabilities** by continuing to develop technologies that bring the ability to deal with missiles with irregular trajectories
- Looking ahead, however, if Japan continues to rely solely upon ballistic missile defenses, it will **become increasingly difficult to fully address missile threats with the existing missile defense network alone**



Need for Possessing Counterstrike Capabilities

- **Japan needs counterstrike capabilities: capabilities which**, in the case of missile attacks by an opponent, **enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent** to prevent further attacks while defending against incoming missiles by means of the missile defense network

“Counterstrike Capabilities”

A Key to Deterring Invasion Against Japan (2 of 2)

Concept of Counterstrike Capabilities

- Counterstrike capabilities are **SDF’s capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities**. In cases where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan to **mount effective counterstrikes** against the **opponent’s territory**. Counterstrikes are done as **a minimum necessary measure for self-defense** and **in accordance with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force**
- By possessing such capabilities to mount effective counterstrikes, Japan will **deter armed attack itself***. If an opponent ever launches missiles, it will be able to **prevent the opponent’s further armed attacks by counterstrike capabilities**, while **protecting itself against incoming missiles by the missile defense network**, **thereby defending the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals**

*By having capability to conduct effective counterstrike and facilitate interception by missile defense;

- **Complicate opponent’s strategic and tactical calculation** compared with now, and
- Make the opponent, who attempts to launch missiles, realize that **the goal is not easily achievable and attacks should be cancelled**

Status of Counterstrike Capabilities

- Counterstrike capabilities **fall within the purview of Japan’s Constitution and international law; they do not change Japan’s exclusively defense-oriented policy; and, they will be used only when the above-mentioned Three New Conditions are fulfilled**. Needless to say, **preemptive strikes**, namely striking first at a stage when no armed attack has occurred, **remain impermissible**
- While **the basic division of roles between Japan and the United States will remain unchanged**, the **two nations will cooperate**

(Ref.) Answers in the Diet and others

Relationship with the Constitution

- Answers in the Diet by Prime Minister Hatoyama, read by Director General of the Defense Agency Funada on behalf of PM (The record of the proceedings of House Committee on the Cabinet, dated February 29, 1956 (excerpt))

It is inconceivable that the purpose of the Constitution would be to sit down and wait for self-destruction in the event of an imminent and unlawful invasion against Japan and an attack against our territory by guided missiles or other means. In such cases, it should be said that **taking measures to the minimum extent unavoidable to prevent such attacks**, for example, as long as it is deemed that there are no other means to defend against attack by guided missiles and others, **to hit the bases of those guided missiles and others is legally within the purview of self-defense and thus permissible**

Three New Conditions for Use of Force

- ① When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people's right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness;
- ② When there is no appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan's survival and protect its people;
- ③ **Use of force to the minimum extent necessary**

Exclusively Defense-oriented Policy

- Answers in the Diet by Director General of the Defense Agency Omura (Upper House Budget Committee, dated March 19, 1981 (excerpt))

The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that **defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, that the extent of the use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense. The policy including these matters refers to the posture of a passive defense strategy in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution.** This is the basic policy for the defense of Japan

Basic division of roles of Japan and the U.S.

As stated in the "Guidelines for Japan-U. S. Defense Cooperation" formulated in 2015,


- **Japan have the primary responsibility to defend Japan**
- **The United States will support and supplement the Self-Defense Force, and will continue to extend deterrence**

Such descriptions indicate the basic division of roles for the defense of Japan.


Unmanned Defense Capabilities

- By combining unmanned assets with AI and manned equipment, it enables Japan to gain asymmetrical advantages
- Unmanned assets will be effectively utilized not only for information gathering and surveillance, but also for a wide range of missions including combat support
- Promote automation and labor-saving through the mission replacement of manned assets

Ground/Maritime/Air/Underwater Unmanned Assets (conceptual image)



Example of collaboration between manned and unmanned aircraft (conceptual image)



Sustainability and Resiliency


- Promptly acquire necessary and sufficient amount of **ammunition and fuel**. Improve the number of operationally available equipment
- Promote measures such as **making major command headquarters underground and reinforcing their structures** and relocate and consolidate facilities

Ammunition

It is necessary to swiftly procure sufficient amount of missiles to secure effective response and deterrence capabilities



AIM-120 (conceptual image)



Type 17 Ship-to-Ship missile(conceptual image)



BMD missile
(SM-3 Block IIA)



BMD missile
(PAC-3 MSE)

Sustainment and Maintenance

Securing the necessary amount of parts and budget for maintenance to ensure the SDF is in a truly operationally ready state during peacetime and in contingency

Operational availability (conceptual image)

Operational

Non-operational

Under Maintenance

Operational availability through
FY2022 budget



Operational

Under Maintenance

Minimize non-operational status due to parts
shortages by FY2027





Facility improvement

Must establish facility that will secure the safety of SDF personnel during peacetime, and have resiliency to maintain operational ability during contingencies

Aged facilities

Approx. 10,000 aged JGSDF facilities across Japan



To be improved from operationally important facilities.

- Japan-U.S. Alliance is **a key pillar of Japan's security policy**
- Deter unilateral changes to the status quo and such attempts **by demonstrating joint resolve and capabilities**
- **Disrupt the invasion through Japan-U.S. joint response** if an invasion against Japan occurs
 - Reinforcing joint deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance (**further deepen discussion with the United States on respective roles, missions and capabilities and further reinforce joint deterrence capabilities**)
 - Reinforce alliance coordination function (further develop coordination functions such as the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM))
 - **Reinforce the foundation for allied response** (such as information security, cybersecurity, defense equipment and technology cooperation)
 - Measures to support stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan (such as the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan)

- To counter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and to ensure Japan's security, **reinforce collaboration with as many countries as possible**
- Promote **multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges** while taking into account characteristics of the region as well as situation of each country
 - **Australia**: As the "Special Strategic Partnership", build the closest cooperative relationship second only to the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation
 - **India**: As the "Special Strategic and Global Partnership", further deepen bilateral and multilateral defense exchanges in a broad range of fields including maritime security, etc.
 - **United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy etc.**: Mutually reinforce involvement in global security issues and challenges in Europe and Indo-Pacific
 - **NATO/European Union (EU)**: Reinforce collaboration with regard to international rule-makings and involvement to the security of the Indo-Pacific region
 - **Republic of Korea**: Reinforce collaboration among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK in dealing with North Korea
 - **Canada, New Zealand**: Further collaborate on working the challenge in the Indo-Pacific region
 - **Nordic/Baltic/Central and Eastern Europe(Czech, Poland etc.)**: Reinforce collaboration on information warfare, cybersecurity, Strategic Communication (SC), and hybrid warfare
 - **Southeast Asian nations**: Implement consultations at all levels, bilateral/multilateral training and exercises and transfer of defense equipment etc., depending on the situation of each country
 - **Mongolia**: Promote defense equipment and technology cooperation in addition to capacity building and multilateral exercises
 - **Central Asian countries**: Accumulate defense exchanges including capacity building
 - **Pacific Island nations**: Engage in cooperation including capacity building through collaboration with countries including our ally and like-minded countries
 - **Coastal States of the Indian Ocean, Middle Eastern countries, African countries**: Promote defense cooperation. In particular, strengthen cooperation with Djibouti

Measures for protection of life, body and property of Japanese nationals

Not only an invasion of Japan, but also **large-scale terrorist attacks including their attacks on critical infrastructure including nuclear powerplant, large-scale disasters, and infectious diseases** are serious threat to Japan, and Japan must respond to them with its utmost efforts



Measures for international security cooperation

Proactively addresses international issues from the perspective of proactive contribution to peace to ensure peace and security of Japan



Defense Production and Technology Bases as Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability (1 of 3)

Defense Production Base

- **Defense industry faces many challenges**, including supply chain risks, withdrawal from the industry, reputation risks, low profit margin, and cybersecurity
- Defense production and technology bases are **a virtually integral part of defense capability itself. It is necessary to implement further efforts** to maintain and reinforce the bases

Direction

Build a strong and sustainable defense industry

- Making defense industry more attractive (securing appropriate profit, etc.)
- Maintaining and strengthening competitiveness and technological capabilities of companies
- **Revitalization of the defense industry (promotion of new entry)**
- Taking appropriate actions against companies withdrawing from the industry

Securing Appropriate Profits by Improving Profit Margin and Others

Ordinally

Profit rate : 8.0%
(Achievement: approx. 2~3%)

Average profit rate on target price calculated of the companies which the MOD calculates their expense rate

FY2023
onward

Encouraging companies

Profit rate
5.0%~10.0%

1.0%~5.0%

QCD evaluation
Q: Quality Management
C: Cost Management
D: Delivery Management

Cost fluctuations adjustment rate

Defense Production and Technology Bases as Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability (2 of 3)


Defense Production Base

Direction

Dealing with various risks

- Building a strong supply chain
- Strengthening Industrial security (cybersecurity measures, etc.)
- Strengthening sensitive technology security


Financial Measures and Financial Support to Reinforce Bases



Expanding cooperation with other countries in the field of defense industry

- Promoting equipment transfer (effective in expanding markets)
- Effectiveness of Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Procurement, etc.

Facilitate Defense equipment transfer



Defense Production and Technology Bases as Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability (3 of 3)

Defense Technology Base


- Need to **realize early deployment through various efforts in R&D process** by identifying R&D projects necessary for future warfare and organizing overall picture of equipment acquisition
- Need to **enhance predictability of companies**, and maintain and reinforce bases such as human resources and technologies in order to accelerate R&D
- Need to actively incorporate and utilize **cutting-edge civilian technologies** to **realize excellent defense functions ahead of other countries**

Original R&D Directly Linked to Defense

① Intensive R&D investment by the MOD

- Examples of major projects for approximately the next 10 years
 1. Stand-off defense capabilities
 2. Interception capabilities to HGV
 3. Interception capabilities to swarming drone
 4. Unmanned equipment
 5. Next-Generation Fighter Aircraft
 6. Other means for deterrence

② R&D to realize the early deployment



③ Maintaining and improving the defense-unique traditional technologies

- Measures to maintain and improve the defense-unique traditional technologies that provide essential bases for advanced capabilities



④ Strategic dissemination to increase company's predictability

- In order to update "Defense Technology Strategy" and others, **new document "Defense Technology Guideline 2023" was announced in June 2023.**



Defense Technology Guideline 2023 (2023)

Incorporating Advanced Cutting-edge Civilian Technologies


⑤ Establishing a New Research Institute for Defense Innovation in ATLA (FY2024 onward)

- The new institute will create breakthrough functions and equipment
- The new institute will introduce new approaches and methods with reference to DARPA and DIU that enable to achieve innovations




⑥ Strengthening of identification, development, and incorporation of the innovative cutting-edge civilian technologies

- Reinforce the **finding, developing, and incorporating commercial/basic technologies** through frameworks such as "Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security" and "Advanced Technology Bridging Research."
- **Greatly expand "Advanced Technology Bridging Research" from FY2023**



⑦ Close cooperation with related ministries to strengthen comprehensive defense architecture

- Utilize a whole-of-government mechanism for comprehensively strengthening defense architecture




Reinforcing Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Element of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate their Abilities

Reinforcing Human Resource Base

SDF personnel: the core element of defense capability

- **Secure the necessary number of personnel** including the civilian officials, technical and engineering officials
- **Create an environment that enables all SDF personnel to demonstrate their own abilities**



Refurbishment of housing



Improvement of communication environment for naval vessels

Transformation of medical function

Transform SDF medical force into an organization that saves the lives of SDF personnel in a contingency instead of placing importance on sustaining health of SDF personnel



Frontline First Aid Training



Promotion of integrated education and training

Expenditures for the Defense Buildup Program

| | Defense Buildup Program (FY2023 - FY2027) | 2019 MTDP (FY2019 - FY2023) |
|---|--|--------------------------------|
| Target level of defense buildup | Approx. 43 trillion | Approx. 27.47 trillion |
| Total defense budgets under this program | Approx. 40.5 trillion | Approx. 25.5 trillion |
| Total expenses for new projects (material) | Approx. 43.5 trillion | Approx. 17.17 trillion |

× 1.5

× 2.5

**【Target level of defense buildup (total expenditure*)】
¥43 trillion**

Personnel and Provisions Expenses
¥11 trillion

Expenditure during the Program
¥27 trillion

¥5 trillion

Outside
the Program
¥16.5 trillion

**【Total amount of expenses for new
projects (material expenses)】
¥43.5 trillion**

Expenditure for the contracts made in
accordance with MTDP (FY2019 FY2023)

Expenditure scheduled to be included in the
Next Buildup Program Provisional Translation

Numbers
being
scrutinized

Breakdown of Total Amount of Expenses for New Projects (Material Expenses)

being scrutinized

| Classification | | Areas | Amount | (Reference) 2019MTDP |
|--|--|--|--|-------------------------|
| Stand-off Defense Capabilities | | | Approx. 5 trillion | Approx. 0.2 trillion |
| Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities | | | Approx. 3 trillion | Approx. 1 trillion |
| Unmanned Defense Capabilities | | | Approx. 1 trillion | Approx. 0.1 trillion |
| Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities | Space | Approx. 1 trillion | Approx. 3 trillion | |
| | Cyber | Approx. 1 trillion | | |
| | Vehicles/Vessels/Aircraft, etc. | Approx. 6 trillion | | |
| Command and Control/Intelligence-related Functions | | | Approx. 1 trillion | Approx. 0.3 trillion |
| Mobile Deployment Capabilities/Civil Protection | | | Approx. 2 trillion | Approx. 0.3 trillion |
| Sustainability and Resiliency | Ammunition, guided missiles | Approx. 2 trillion (Approx. 5 trillion including other areas) | Approx. 1 trillion | |
| | Improvement of Operational Availability of Defense Equipment | Approx. 9 trillion | Approx. 4 trillion | |
| | Facilities Improvement | Approx. 4 trillion | Approx. 1 trillion | |
| Reinforcing Defense Production Base | | | Approx. 0.4 trillion (Approx. 3.5 trillion including other areas) | Approx. 1 trillion |
| Research and Development | | | Approx. 1 trillion (Approx. 3.5 trillion including other areas) | |
| Base Measures | | | Approx. 2.6 trillion | Approx. 2.4 trillion |
| Training/Education, Fuels | | | Approx. 4 trillion | Approx. 2 trillion |

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Securing Resources related to the New Defense Buildup Program

Material from the Government-Ruling Party Policy Meeting
(December 16, 2022)


The level of the Defense Buildup Capabilities : approx. ¥ 43.0 trillion

Total amount of budget : approx. ¥ 40.5 trillion (A + B)

Approx. 2.5 trillion yen

(Various methods to achieve the level of defense force development)

NOTE) The diagram below shows an image




Concepts of Development of SDF Architecture

Based on **the roles in seven fields**, development of **joint operational architecture** as well as development of architectures of **GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF** will be conducted in following basic concepts:

| | |
|--|---|
| Reinforcement of joint operational architecture | <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Establish a permanent Joint Headquarters by reviewing the existing organization● Promote defense equipment system benefitting joint operation |
| Ground Self-Defense Force | <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Develop a system that places importance in stand-off defense capabilities, rapid maneuver and disperse deployment, and command and control and information related function● Contribute to cross-domain operations primarily on cyber domain |
| Maritime Self-Defense Force | <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Develop a system to reinforce air-defense capability, integrated information warfare capability, and stand-off defense capabilities, promote labor-saving and automation measures, and allow acquiring and sustaining superiority in underwater |
| Air Self-Defense Force | <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Develop a system to reinforce mobile and dispersed operations, as well as stand-off defense capabilities● Develop a system to ensure superiority in space utilization, and rename ASDF as the Air and Space Self-Defense Force |
| Defense Intelligence Headquarter | <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Assume the central role of responding to integrated information warfare and fundamentally reinforce the capability to grasp military activities of other countries and analyzing and disseminating them |

- Reinforce SDF's architecture to contribute to the cybersecurity of Japan as a whole country
- Fundamentally reinforce policy-making function as strategic and agile defense policy planning and making are required


Security-related expenditures (JFY 2027)



※"2% of the current GDP" = GDP of the JFY2022 (estimated) ¥ 560.2trillion × 2 % = Approximately ¥ 11 trillion

- JJOC commander controls the SDF operations by taking command of units from peacetime, assigning duties to the necessary commanders and allocating necessary forces to each commander, under the orders of the Minister of Defense.

New Operational Structure of SDFs



Chief of Joint Staff remains as a top-expert staff officer to support the Minister of Defense regarding the SDF operations, and to have JJOC commander execute orders of the Minister of Defense.


JJOC commander conducts integrated operational command from peacetime

FY2025 Budget Request –Implementation of the DBP-


In the FY25 Budget Request, marking the 3rd year under the Defense Buildup Program, JMOD decided to request programs which need to be initiated in FY25, in order to fundamentally reinforce Japan's defense capabilities by FY27. Considering the progress of existing programs and implementation of existing budgets under the DBP, JMOD steadily increased its budget request.

Target level of defense buildup under the DBP (total expenditure) 【¥43tril.】

【Unit: ¥ billion】



Total expense based on contracts for new projects under the DBP (contract basis) 【¥43.5tril.】



* Figures are expenses under the DBP, which do not include SACO-related expenses or U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities).