National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program (Outline)

December, 2023
Government of Japan has formulated new National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy and Defense Buildup Program in December 16, 2022

National Security Strategy (2013)
- Supreme national security policy document
- Presents strategic approaches to be taken for national security, with diplomatic and defense policies at their core
  (Executed approximately 10-years timeframe)

- Basic guidelines for development, maintenance and operation of defense capability
- Sets forth the organization of Self-Defense Forces that Japan should possess as a required level of defense capability
  (Executed approximately 10-years timeframe)

Medium-Term Defense Program (2018)
- Details the total cost (limit) over five years and inventorizes key capital equipment

New Strategy Architecture

National Security Strategy
- Supreme national security policy document
- Provides strategic guidance for Japan’s national security policy areas in addition to diplomacy and defense, including economic security, technology, cyber, intelligence etc.
  (Executed approximately 10-years timeframe)

National Defense Strategy
- Sets defense objectives and demonstrates approaches and means by which Japan accomplishes those objectives
  - Fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities (including seven key capabilities)
  - Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country
  - Policy for cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries and others
  (Executed approximately 10-years timeframe)

Defense Buildup Program
- Sets the level of defense capability that Japan should possess, and sets mid- to long-term buildup program to achieve said level that includes the followings:
  - Organization of Self-Defense Forces (by approx. ten years from now)
  - Total expenditures for the next five years and quantities of major procurement (research and development programs and target fiscal year for the delivery etc. of defense equipment including key defense equipment are described in the main text)

※ In general, strategy is defined as a basic policy to stipulate “Ends” and to present “Ways” and “Means” to achieve them
1. Military Trends of Japan’s neighboring countries and regions

Japan’s security environment is severe and complex as it has ever been since the end of WWII. Japan has the vital importance of securing the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region.

### Taiwan

**Issues concerning the Senkaku Islands**
- PLA’s Jiangwei II-class frigate operating around the Senkaku Islands

### China

- Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has shaken the very foundation of the international order and is perceived as the most significant and direct threat in Europe. Russia’s military activities in the Indo-Pacific region, together with its strategic coordination with China, are of strong security concern.
- Unilateral changes to the status quo by force and creation of a fait accompli
- Persistently continues attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force
- An even more grave and imminent threat than ever before.

### North Korea

**A matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community. An unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge.**
- On the other hand, Japan will build a “constructive and stable relationship” on matters of common interests

### Russia

- Improved Kilo-class submarine
  - Deployed since 2021, mounted with Kalibr cruise missile
- Surface-to-ship missile Bastion
  - Deployed since 2016, deployed to Etorofu Island, Chishima Islands, and Southern Sakhalin

### Japan

- Joint navigation by Chinese and Russian vessels (October 2021)
- New ICBM-class ballistic missile “Hwasong-17” launched by North Korea (November 2022)
- New models of equipment deployed in the Far East, including the Northern Territories

### Issues concerning the South China Sea

- Issues concerning the Senkaku Islands
- Of the nine ballistic missiles that China fired near Taiwan, five landed within Japan’s EEZ (August 2022)
2. Emergence of the new way of warfare

- **Massive missile strike** by ballistic and cruise missiles with improved precision strike capability

  - Russia used more than 5,000 ballistic and cruise missiles across Ukraine (as of Feb. 23, 2023)
  - Apartment in Dnipro destroyed by Russian military’s missile attack (Photo released by State Emergency Service of Ukraine on Jan. 14, 2023)

- **Hybrid warfare** including information warfare

  - Image released by Taiwan Ministry of National Defense to deny disinformation on Taoyuan International Airport attacked by PLA

- **Asymmetric attacks** leveraging the space, cyber and electromagnetic domains and with unmanned assets

  - ASAT attack
  - Contact and nearby activities by suspicious satellite
  - Interfere by jamming
  - Interfere by laser weapon

  - Threat to the stable use of outer space

  - ISR UAV of Chinese military that flew between Okinawa and Miyakojima on Jan. 1, 2023

- **Threat using nuclear weapons**

  - "When there is a threat for existence of the state, in our country, we can use nuclear weapons" (Russian Spokesman Dmitry Peskov on March 2022)

  - "If the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we use all available means to protect our people" (Russian President Vladimir Putin on September 2022)
### Military background for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine

1. Ukraine did not have sufficient defense capability to deter Russian aggression.
2. Ukraine had no allies and was not under the nuclear umbrella.
3. A threat materializes when the capability to inflict harm is combined with the intention to do, Russia, with its strong military capability, one day came to possess the intention to launch an aggression.

#### As a result of deterrence against Russia failed, massive damage has occurred, with tens of thousands of dead and injured and millions of displaced persons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total military strength</th>
<th>Ukrainian Military</th>
<th>Russian Military</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>688,000</strong> (active) + <strong>400,000</strong> (reserve)</td>
<td><strong>1,190,000</strong> (active) + <strong>1,500,000</strong> (reserve)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 brigades + 41 regional defense brigades consisting of Reserve Personnel</td>
<td>13 divisions and 53 brigades</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Patrol ships</td>
<td>31 main surface vessels, 128 patrol ships, 43 minesweepers, 20 landing ships</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>70 fighters and attack aircraft</strong></td>
<td><strong>137 bombers</strong> 857 fighters and attack aircraft</td>
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#### Estimated damage on Ukraine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Details</th>
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</table>
| Deaths    | More than 9,806 civilians (as of October 8 2023)  
           | Approx. 13,000 military personnel (as of December 2022) |
| Injured   | More than 17,962 civilians (as of October 8 2023) |
| Refugees (European region) | 4,100,000 people (as of July 31 2023) |
| Internally Displaced Persons | 5,100,000 people (as of July 11 2023) |

Source: OHCHR, Ukrainian military press release etc.
Japan will implement strategic approaches, harnessing its comprehensive national power (diplomatic, defense, economic, technological, and intelligence capabilities).

### Strategic Approaches Prioritized by Japan

#### (1) Develop Efforts Centered on Diplomacy to Prevent Crises, Proactively Create a Peaceful and Stable International Environment, and Strengthen a Free and Open International Order

- Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance
- Maintain and develop a free and open international order and strengthen ties with its ally, like-minded countries and others
- Strengthen diplomacy with Japan’s neighboring countries and regions as well as efforts toward resolution of various issues of concern, including territorial issues
- Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation
- International counter-terrorism
- Climate change measures
- Strategic use of ODA and other international cooperation
- Promotion of people-to-people exchanges

#### (2) Strengthening Japan’s Defense Architecture

1. Fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities as the last guarantee of national security
   - In addition to cross-domain operational capabilities, reinforce stand-off defense capabilities, unmanned defense and other capabilities.
   - Possess counterstrike capabilities
   - In FY2027, Japan will take the necessary measures to make the level of its budget, for both the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and complementary initiatives, reach 2% of the current GDP
   - Consistently strengthen coordination and cooperation between the SDF and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), including control over the JCG by the Minister of Defense in the event of a contingency

2. Coordinating with reinforced comprehensive defense architecture
   - Promoting efforts that complement and are inseparable from the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities under the frameworks of relevant ministries and agencies, namely research and development, public infrastructure development, cyber security and international cooperation with like-minded countries

3. Promoting transfer of defense equipment and technology

4. Reinforcing defense production and technology base, strengthening the foundation for SDF personnel

#### (3) Deepening Security Cooperation with the United States

#### (4) Strengthening Efforts to Seamlessly Protect Japan in All Directions

- Cybersecurity
- Maritime Security and Maritime Law Enforcement Capabilities
- Space Security
- Improving Technical Capabilities and Proactively Capitalizing in the Security Field
- Strengthening Intelligence Capacities
- Reinforcing Response Capabilities within Japan with Contingencies in Mind
- Reinforcing Mechanisms for the Protection of Japanese Nationals
- Protection of Japanese Nationals and Others Overseas
- Securing Resources Essential for Japan's National Security including Energy and Food

#### (5) Promoting Economic Security Policies to Achieve Autonomous Economic Prosperity

#### (6) Maintaining and Strengthening International Economic Order based on Free, Fair, and Equitable Rules

#### (7) Global Efforts for Coexistence and Coprosperity in the International Community

### Domestic Base that should be Strengthened to Support Japan’s National Security

- Strengthening the Economic and Fiscal Bases
- Reinforcing the Social Base
- Enhancing the Intellectual Base
Three Defense Objectives

① Shape a security environment not tolerating unilateral changes to status quo by force

② Deter and respond to unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts through cooperation with our ally, like-minded countries and others and bring the situation under control at an early stage

③ If an invasion of Japan occurs, disrupt and defeat the invasion while taking primary responsibility to deal with the invasion and receiving support from the ally and others

By ensuring all efforts in an integrated manner through three approaches and means to accomplish three defense objectives, Japan will resolutely defend to the end the lives of Japanese nationals and their peaceful livelihood as well as Japan’s territorial land, waters and airspace.
Three approaches to accomplish defense objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| 1. Strengthening Japan’s own architecture for national defense         | Reinforcing the defense architecture of the whole country  
Fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities |
| 2. Reinforce joint deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance | “Demonstrating joint resolve and capabilities”                                                                                               |
| 3. Reinforcing collaboration with like-minded countries and others     | “Reinforce collaboration with as many countries as possible”                                                                                   |

Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (October 2023)  
JPN-USA-GBR-NLD-CAN-NZL Multilateral Exercise (October 2021)
First Approach: Fundamental Reinforcement of Japan’s Defense Capabilities

- **Fundamentally reinforced defense capabilities** is capability which enables to achieve the third defense objective.
- This means that Japan will possess a capability that makes the opponent realize that the goal of invasion of Japan is not achievable by military means, and that the damage the opponent will incur makes the invasion not worth the cost.
- By doing so, Japan will ensure that opponent fully recognize Japan’s intention and capability, do not underestimate Japan, and do not overestimate their own capabilities, thereby deterring invasion against Japan.

Seven key capabilities for fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities

- Disrupt and defeat invading forces over long distances, thereby **deterring invasion itself**
  - ① Stand-off defense capabilities
  - ② Integrated air and missile defense capabilities
- Should deterrence fail, in addition to ① and ②, ensure asymmetric advantage and gain superiority across domains
  - ③ Unmanned defense capabilities
  - ④ Cross-domain capabilities
  - ⑤ Command and control / Intelligence-related functions
- Operate in a swift as well as persistent manner to crush the opponent’s will to invade
  - ⑥ Mobile deployment capabilities / Civil protection
  - ⑦ Sustainability / Resiliency

Top Priorities for the next 5 years

- **Maximizing effective use of its current equipment**: By improving operational rate, secure sufficient munitions and fuel, and accelerate investments in defense facilities for improved resiliency.
- **Strengthening its core capabilities for future operations**: Stand-off defense capabilities, unmanned defense capabilities etc.
In order to protect Japan's territory, which stretches approximately 3,000 km along the both north-south and east-west axes: Japan needs to deal with vessels and landing forces invading Japan from locations outside of threat zones.

- Can be launched from various platforms in multilayered manner and from various location.
- Reinforce capabilities such as hyper velocity glides and hypersonic glides which are difficult to intercept.

### Stand-off Defense Capabilities

#### Domestic stand-off missiles
- Upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missile
- Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (FY2026~)
- Hypersonic Missiles (2030’s~)

#### Foreign stand-off missiles
- JASSM (FY2027~)
- JSM (FY2024~)
- Tomahawk (FY2025~)
Fundamentally reinforce capabilities to respond to hypersonic weapons
Intercept missiles over the high seas and Japan’s territorial airspace with its missile defense system
By having counterstrike capabilities and facilitate interception by missile defense, Japan will deter missile attacks from happening
“Counterstrike Capabilities”
A Key to Deterring Invasion Against Japan

Rationale

- Missile forces in the region have significantly improved in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and missiles themselves have been repeatedly launched. Missile attacks against Japan have become a palpable threat.
- Japan will continue its steadfast efforts to enhance its missile defense capabilities by continuing to develop technologies that bring the ability to deal with missiles with irregular trajectories.
- However, if Japan continues to rely solely upon ballistic missile defenses (BMD), it will become increasingly difficult to fully address missile threats with the existing missile defense network alone.
- Japan needs counterstrike capabilities: capabilities which, in the case of missile attacks by an opponent, enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent to prevent further attacks while defending against incoming missiles by means of the missile defense network.

Significance

- Counterstrike capabilities are:
  - SDF’s capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capabilities and other capabilities. In cases where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent’s territory. Counterstrikes are done as minimum necessary measure for self-defense and in accordance with the Three New Conditions for Use of Forces.
- By possessing such capabilities to mount effective counterstrikes, Japan will:
  - deter armed attack itself
  - prevent the opponent’s further armed attack by counterstrike capabilities, while protecting itself against incoming missiles by the missile defense network
  - thereby defending the lives and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals
By combining unmanned assets with AI and manned equipment, it enables Japan to gain asymmetrical advantages.

Unmanned assets will be effectively utilized not only for information gathering and surveillance, but also for a wide range of missions including combat support.

Promote automation and labor-saving through the mission replacement of manned assets.

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Unmanned Defense Capabilities

- **Opponent Submarine**
  - Reconnaissance/Combat UGV
- **Opponent Vessel**
  - Reconnaissance/Combat UGV
  - Patrol USV
- **Opponent Fighter**
  - Intelligence UAV
  - Combat Support UAV
- **Intelligence UAV**
- **Patrol USV**
- **Patrol UUV**

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Example of collaboration between manned and unmanned aircraft (conceptual image)

- **Sensor/guider (Detect/missile guide)**
  - Control a/c (manned)
  - Jammer (electronic jamming)
  - Shooter (missile launch)
- **Decoy**
  - Control a/c (unmanned)
Sustainability and Resiliency

- Promptly acquire necessary and sufficient amount of ammunition and fuel. Improve operational rate of equipment.
- Promote measures such as making major command headquarters underground and reinforcing their structures and relocate and consolidate facilities.

**Ammunition**

It is necessary to swiftly procure sufficient amount of missiles to secure effective response and deterrence capabilities.

- BMD missile (SM-3 Block IIA)
- BMD missile (PAC-3 MSE)
- AIM-120 (conceptual image)
- Type 17 Ship-to-Ship missile (conceptual image)

**Sustainment and Maintenance**

Securing necessary amount of budget and parts for maintenance to put SDF in a truly operationally ready state during peacetime and in contingency.

**Facility Improvement**

Must establish facility that will secure the safety of SDF personnel during peacetime, and have resiliency to maintain operational ability during contingencies.

- JGSDF Camp Kunihama (constructed in 1942)
- JGSDF Camp Higashi-Chitose (constructed in 1966)

**Aged Facilities**

Approx. 10,000 aged JSDF facilities across Japan.

**Providing earthquake-resistant measures**

Approx. 40% JSDF facilities were constructed with old earthquake resistant standards.

**Providing protective measures**

Approx. 80% not provided protective measures.
Second Approach:
Reinforcing Joint Deterrence and Response Capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

- The Alliance with the United States is a key pillar of Japan’s security policy
- Deter unilateral changes to the status quo and such attempts by representing joint resolve and capabilities
- Disrupt the invasion through Japan-U.S. joint response if an invasion against Japan occurs

- Reinforcing joint deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance (further deepen discussion with the United States on their roles, missions and capabilities and further reinforce joint deterrence capabilities)
- Reinforce alliance coordination function (further develop coordination functions such as the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM))
- Reinforce joint response infrastructure (such as information security, cybersecurity, defense equipment and technology cooperation)
- Measures to support stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan (such as the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan)
To counter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and to ensure Japan’s security, reinforce collaboration with as many countries as possible

Promote multilateral and multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges while taking into account characteristics of the region as well as situation of each country

Australia: As the “Special Strategic Partnership”, build the closest cooperative relationship second only to the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation
India: Further deepen bilateral and multilateral defense exchanges in a broad range of fields including maritime security
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy etc.: Mutually reinforce involvement in global security issues and challenges in Europe and Indo-Pacific
NATO/European Union (EU): Reinforce collaboration with regard to international rule-makings and involvement to the security of the Indo-Pacific region
Republic of Korea: Reinforce collaboration among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK in dealing with North Korea
Canada, New Zealand: Further collaborate on working the challenge in the Indo-Pacific region
Nordic/Baltic/Central and Eastern Europe (Czech, Poland etc.): Reinforce collaboration on information warfare, cybersecurity, SC
Southeast Asian nations: Implement consultations at all levels, bilateral/multilateral training and exercises and transfer of defense equipment etc., depending on the situation of each country
Mongolia: Promote defense equipment and technology collaboration in addition to capacity building and multilateral exercises
Central Asian countries: Accumulate defense exchanges including capacity building
Pacific Island nations: Engage in cooperation including capacity building through collaboration with countries including its ally and like-minded countries
Coastal States of the Indian Ocean, Middle Eastern countries, African countries: Promote defense cooperation. In particular, strengthen cooperation with Djibouti

*Pay attention to communication with China and Russia as well
Expenditures for the Defense Buildup Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Defense Buildup Program (FY2023 - FY2027)</th>
<th>2019 MTDP (FY2019 - FY2023)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target level of defense buildup</td>
<td><strong>Approx. 43 trillion</strong> × 1.5</td>
<td>Approx. 27.47 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total defense budgets under this program</td>
<td>Approx. 40.5 trillion</td>
<td>Approx. 25.5 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenses for new projects (material)</td>
<td><strong>Approx. 43.5 trillion</strong> × 2.5</td>
<td>Approx. 17.17 trillion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Personnel and Provisions Expenses

- ¥11 trillion

Expenditure during the Program

- ¥27 trillion

Outside the Program

- ¥16.5 trillion

Expenditure for the contracts made in accordance with MTDP (FY2019 FY2023)

- ¥5 trillion

Expenditure scheduled to be included in the Next Buildup Program

- Provisional Translation

**Total amount of expenses for new projects (material expenses)**

- ¥43.5 trillion

**Target level of defense buildup (total expenditure*)**

- ¥43 trillion
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>(Reference) 2019MTDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stand-off Defense Capabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 5 trillion</td>
<td>Approx. 0.2 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 3 trillion</td>
<td>Approx. 1 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmanned Defense Capabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 1 trillion</td>
<td>Approx. 0.1 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-Domain Operation Capabilities</td>
<td>Space</td>
<td>Approx. 1 trillion</td>
<td>Approx. 3 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cyber</td>
<td>Approx. 1 trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vehicles/Vessels/Aircraft, etc.</td>
<td>Approx. 6 trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control/Intelligence-related Functions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 1 trillion</td>
<td>Approx. 0.3 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Deployment Capabilities/Civil Protection</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 2 trillion</td>
<td>Approx. 0.3 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability and Resiliency</td>
<td>Ammunition, guided missiles</td>
<td>Approx. 2 trillion (Approx. 5 trillion including other areas)</td>
<td>Approx. 1 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improvement of Operational Availability of Defense Equipment</td>
<td>Approx. 9 trillion</td>
<td>Approx. 4 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilities Improvement</td>
<td>Approx. 4 trillion</td>
<td>Approx. 1 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcing Defense Production Base</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 0.4 trillion (Approx. 3.5 trillion including other areas)</td>
<td>Approx. 1 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and Development</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 1 trillion (Approx. 3.5 trillion including other areas)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Measures</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 2.6 trillion</td>
<td>Approx. 2.4 trillion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training/Education, Fuels</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 4 trillion</td>
<td>Approx. 2 trillion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Security-related expenditures (JFY 2027)

Expenditures for the Defense Buildup Program
Approximately ¥ 8.9 trillion

R&D, Public infrastructure, Cyber security, International cooperation
Approximately ¥ 1 trillion

Coast Guard・PKO etc.
Approximately ¥ 0.9 trillion

SACO・U.S. Forces realignment
Approximately ¥ 0.2 trillion

Complementary initiatives

Security-related expenditures
Approximately ¥ 11 trillion

※“2% of the current GDP” = GDP of the JFY2022 (estimated) ¥ 560.2 trillion × 2% = Approximately ¥ 11 trillion
Based on the roles in seven fields, development of joint operational architecture as well as development of architectures of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF will be conducted in following basic concepts:

|------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| • Establish a permanent Joint Headquarters by reviewing the existing organization  
  • Promote defense equipment system benefitting joint operation  
| • Develop a system that places importance in stand-off defense capabilities, rapid maneuver and disperse deployment, and command and control and information related function  
  • Contribute to cross-domain operations primarily on cyber domain | • Develop a system to reinforce air-defense capability, integrated information warfare capability, and stand-off defense capabilities, promote labor-saving and automation measures, and allow acquiring and sustaining superiority in underwater | • Develop a system to reinforce mobile and disperse operation and stand-off defense capabilities  
  • Develop a system to ensure superiority in use of space, and renew ASDF as the Air and Space Self-Defense Force | • Assume the central role of responding to integrated information warfare and fundamentally reinforce the capability to grasp military activities of other countries and analyzing and disseminating them |

- Reinforce SDF’s architecture to contribute to the cybersecurity of Japan as a whole country
- Fundamentally reinforce policy-making function as strategic and agile defense policy planning and making are required
Establishing PJHQ (tentative name)

- Establishment of a joint operational architecture capable of conducting cross-domain operations
- PJHQ will coordinate with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
- A PJHQ will be established at Ichigaya at the end of JFY 2024.

PJHQ: Permanent Joint headquarters
Defense Related Expenditures for FY2023
("First Year” Budget for Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities)

- In FY2022 under the concept of “Defense Strengthening Acceleration Package,” the initial budget for FY2022 was compiled together with the supplementary budget for FY2021 to secure approximately ¥6 trillion.
- In contrast, for FY2023, a “substantial increase of defense budget“ was achieved only in the initial budget.

* "Defense-Related Expenditures" are the sum of the expenditures under the Ministry of Defense and the expenditures under the Digital Agency related to the system of the Ministry of Defense.