1 General Situation

Australia maintains a special strategic partnership with Japan and shares universal values, such as strategic interests, respect for freedom and human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Japan’s relationship with Australia is becoming more important than ever before.

The Defence White Paper released in February 2016 sets out a plan to continue to increase troop strength and acquire high performance equipment over the next two decades, to maintain the high level of capability of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The white paper states explicitly that defense funding would be increased over the next decade, setting a specific target of 2% of Australia’s GDP to be reached by 2020. With regard to Australia’s international relationships, the white paper sets forth that Australia would aim to mature and deepen practical engagement with partners across the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, while continuing to give highest priority to its alliance with the United States.

To achieve its strategic defense objective of contributing military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order, Australia makes proactive contributions to the peace and stability of the international community through the deployment of ADF to overseas operations, among other efforts.

2 Security and Defense Policies

The Australian Government launched its first National Security Strategy in January 2013. The Strategy provides a blueprint for national security over the next decade, presenting the recognition that responding to the economic and strategic changes in the Asia-Pacific region is vital to the national security of Australia. The Strategy defines four objectives for the country’s national security: (1) to ensure a safe and resilient population; (2) to protect and strengthen Australia’s sovereignty; (3) to secure Australia’s assets, infrastructure and institutions; and (4) to promote a favorable international environment.1

The Defence White Paper released in February 2016 sets out the Australian Government’s future plans for national defense and the means by which they will be implemented. After presenting an outlook of Australia’s security environment over the next two decades, it outlines the direction of Australia’s defense strategy for dealing with this environment, and the development of the defense force pursuant to this strategy.

Specifically, the white paper maintains that while there is little prospect of a military attack on Australian territory in the period to 2035, Australia will face new complexities and challenges. Based on this understanding, three strategic defense interests are identified, namely: a secure, resilient Australia (including the security of sea lanes); a secure nearer region; and a stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order. Additionally, the following three strategic defense objectives are given: (1) Deter, deny, and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia and its national interests; (2) Make military contributions to support the security of maritime Southeast Asia and support the governments of Pacific Island countries to build and strengthen their security; and (3) Contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order. To maintain the ADF’s high level of capability needed to achieve these objectives, the Government will make important investments. In addition to increasing the troop strength by approximately 4,400 personnel, Australia will acquire high performance equipment, including 12 new submarines, three air warfare destroyers (Aegis vessels), 72 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, and seven MQ-4C unmanned patrol aircraft. Simultaneously, Australia will seek to strengthen intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, electronic warfare capabilities, and cybersecurity capabilities, as well as strengthen the functions of its bases in northern Australia and elsewhere. To support these programs by funding, the white paper also presents the concrete target of increasing defense funding to reach 2% of GDP by 2020.

3 Relations with Other Countries

In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia subscribed to the view that Australia’s security and prosperity are directly linked to the development of the nearer region, the Indo-Pacific region, and the global strategic environment. Based on this view, Australia will build and maintain international security relationships to achieve its strategic defense

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1 Although the National Security Strategy is meant to be reviewed every five years, an updated one has not yet been announced.
objectives. In particular, Australia will aim to mature and deepen practical engagement with partners across the Indo-Pacific region, including Indonesia, Japan, the ROK, New Zealand, India, and China, while continuing to give the highest priority to its alliance with the United States. On November 2017, Australia published the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper for the first time in 14 years.

(1) Relations with the United States

In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that its alliance with the United States pursuant to the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (ANZUS) is based on shared values and will continue to be the centerpiece of Australia’s defense policy. Australia notes that the United States, which remains the pre-eminent global military power over the next two decades, will continue to be its most important strategic partner, and the active presence of the United States will continue to underpin the stability of the region. It is stated that Australia thus welcomes and supports the critical role of the United States in ensuring stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Since 1985, the two countries have been regularly convening the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) to discuss major diplomatic and security issues.

In their joint statement at the AUSMIN held in July 2018, the United States and Australia made their commitment to work together to shape an “Indo-Pacific that is open, inclusive, prosperous, and rules-based,” welcomed the recent U.S.-Australia-India-Japan consultations on the Indo-Pacific, reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen trilateral dialogue with Japan. At the AUSMIN in July 2019, serious concerns about continued militarization in the South China Sea and the Pacific were also expressed. In addition, both sides emphasized the importance of Australia-U.S. defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, indicating the policy to deepen cooperation with Japan, India, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and other countries. Furthermore, they committed to further support Southeast Asian and the Pacific Island countries, and cooperation to maintain pressure on North Korea.

The military forces of the United States and Australia strive to improve interoperability through bilateral exercises. Exercise Talisman sabre is the Australian-U.S. bilateral military exercise conducted biennially since 2005, with the objective of enhancing combat readiness and interoperability. The 2019 exercise was the biggest to date, with more than 34,000 personnel participating from not only the United States and Australia, but also Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, as well as the SDF. It included amphibious operations and ground combat training.

In November 2011, the United States and Australia announced the Force Posture Initiatives, which encompass the rotational deployment of U.S. Marines in northern Australia, the enhancement of access to Australian military facilities and areas by U.S. Air Force aircraft, and the expansion of opportunities for joint exercises and training. Under these initiatives, the rotational deployment of U.S. Marines in northern Australia began in April 2012, with approximately 2,500 Marines deployed in the region as of 2019. It is also reported that under these initiatives, U.S. Air Force B-52 strategic bombers and F-22 fighters deployed to Australia as needed to participate in training. Australia is in the process of formulating and implementing plans to enhance facilities, airfields, and training grounds at bases used by U.S. Forces, including Darwin and Tindal.

(2) Relations with China

In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that its relationship with China is crucial in different ways from its relationship with the United States, and that it welcomes China’s continued economic growth and the opportunities this is bringing for Australia and other countries in the Indo-Pacific. It goes on to say Australia is committed to continuing the development of Australia’s defense relations with China, and working to enhance mutual understanding, facilitate transparency, and build trust.

Based on such policy, Australia and China continuously hold dialogues among their defense authorities, along with exchanges to develop the cooperative relations between their defense forces, including joint exercises and mutual visits by vessels.

Meanwhile, Australia has been showing its wariness toward China, by, among other ways, making Australia’s position on China very clear.

The Australian government expressed strong concerns over China’s recent land reclamation and construction activity in the South China Sea, and called on all claimant states to halt militarization, while also clearly expressing its intention to continue to exercise its rights to free navigation and flight. Furthermore, the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper contained statements to the effect that China is challenging the position of the United States in the Indo-Pacific, the most important region for Australia.

2 A trilateral security treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. Since 1986, the United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand due to its adoption of a non-nuclear policy. The treaty is thus effective only between Australia and the United States and between Australia and New Zealand.
People within and outside Australia expressed their concerns over the acquisition by Chinese businesses of Australian facilities, including Port Darwin, a port that has been used by Australian and the United States fleets among others. In January 2017, the federal government of Australia announced the establishment of the Critical Infrastructure Centre to serve as a dedicated body that will identify facilities requiring surveillance and carefully manage the risks for advising related institutions in order to block the sale of important infrastructure related to national security, including specific ports and harbor facilities, to companies from other countries. The Centre manages the risks arising from foreign involvement by assessing the risks of sabotage, espionage and coercion in Australia’s critical infrastructure sectors, including telecommunications, electricity, gas, water and ports.

With China’s perceived influence on Australia growing larger, including cases of political figures and parties receiving huge political contributions and bribes, the Australian Parliament passed a bill to prevent interference in domestic affairs by foreign actors. The Australian government announced that an Australian company would receive government support and accept an underwater telecommunication cable network project that was to be partially conducted by a Chinese telecommunication company Huawei previously. Moreover, in August 2018, Huawei revealed that the company and ZTE were banned from bidding in an Australian 5G (advanced telecommunication) project that was to receive government support and accept an underwater telecommunication cable network project by the Australian government.

(3) Relations with India

In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that it welcomes India’s increasingly active role in the Indo-Pacific region, and that it sees India as a key security partner. Australia notes that it aims to further mature its defense relationship with India in support of their shared strategic interests.

The Australia-India relationship was elevated to a strategic partnership in November 2009, and the two countries have regularly conducted strategic dialogues, mutual visits by senior military officers, interactions among military services, and mutual dispatches of students to military educational organizations. In November 2014, Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi visited Australia, marking the first visit to Australia by an Indian Prime Minister in 28 years. The two leaders agreed to extend defense cooperation to cover research, development, and industry engagement, to hold regular meetings at the level of Defense Minister and conduct regular maritime exercises, and to convene talks between each of their military services. Since then, mutual exchanges between Australia and India have steadily progressed through such initiatives as mutual visits of naval ships and joint navy training exercises.

Section 7-1-2 of this Chapter (Military Affairs of India)

(4) Relations with Southeast Asia and Pacific Island Countries

In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia regards a secure nearer region encompassing maritime Southeast Asia and South Pacific as its strategic interest. In particular, Australia considers that instability and conflicts in Southeast Asia have the potential to threaten Australia’s security and economic relations with countries. Furthermore, Australia depends on maritime trade with Southeast Asian countries and maritime trade that transits Southeast Asia. In this regard, Australia perceives that the security of these sea lanes must be ensured alongside freedom of navigation. Based on this understanding, Australia seeks to make military contributions to support the maritime security of Southeast Asia and support the governments of Pacific Island and other countries in building and strengthen their security.

Australia has been deepening its relations with Indonesia in the security and defense fields following the signing of the Lombok Treaty—a security cooperation framework concerning cooperation in a wide range of defense fields—in November 2006, the elevation of their relationship to a strategic partnership in March 2010, and the September 2012 conclusion of the Defence Cooperation Arrangement, which included the enhancement of cooperation in the fields of anti-terrorism measures and maritime security. The two countries’ cooperative relations in the security and defense fields have stalled intermittently. However, since mutual visits by ministers and higher-level officials resumed in the second half of 2015, the bilateral relationship has been improving through many initiatives, including regular Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meetings (2+2) and the signing of an agreement on maritime security and terrorism, and of a Maritime Cooperation Plan of Action in 2018.

With Singapore and Malaysia, Australia carries out regular joint combined exercises in the South China Sea and other areas under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA; entered into force in 1971) framework, whereby Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom would consult each other in the event or threat of an armed attack on Singapore or Malaysia, to decide on their response. Australia considers that Singapore is its most advanced defense partner, and that they share Australia’s interest in a secure maritime trading environment. Defense cooperation is also deepening, including the signing of a memorandum of
understanding concerning military training and training area development in Australia under the comprehensive strategic partnership in October 2016. As regards Malaysia, Australia stations the ADF in Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) Base Butterworth, and contributes to maintaining regional security and stability through patrol activities in the South China Sea and the northern Indian Ocean.

Australia plays a leading role in assisting Pacific Island countries, and Timor-Leste in fields such as security maintenance, coping with natural disasters, and maritime patrol. In particular, in the field of maritime patrol, Australia still regularly deploys ADF assets to the South Pacific to assist with patrol activities. It also plans to supply the Pacific Island countries and Timor-Leste with 21 new Guardian-class patrol boats by 2023. In November 2018, Australia announced its largest ever financial package of up to AUS$3 billion for infrastructure development in Pacific Island countries, with the intent of further strengthening relations. In May 2019, immediately after forming his Cabinet following the general election, Prime Minister Scott Morrison expressed his intention to continue active engagement with the Pacific Island countries, called “Pacific Step-up”. He made his first official trip overseas after the cabinet forming to Solomon Islands in June 2019, showing his stance of placing importance on the Pacific Island countries.

(5) Overseas Activities

In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia identifies the following strategic defense objective: to contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order. In line with this objective, the ADF is deployed overseas to conduct operations.

Australia has deployed one E-7A airborne early warning and control aircraft and one KC-30A aerial refueling aircraft to the Middle East to provide support for anti-terrorism operations being conducted by the United States, among others. In Iraq, it is engaged in advising and assisting, as well as providing capacity building assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces on the military front. In Afghanistan, ADF personnel train, advise, and assist NATO-led Afghan forces.

Australia also deploys aircraft and naval vessels to conduct maritime surveillance in the Strait of Hormuz and other parts of the Middle East, as well as in the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and around Pacific Island countries.

Since 2018, ADF patrol aircraft and vessels engaged in patrolling and monitoring activities against illegal maritime activities, including illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korean ships, which is prohibited under the UN Security Council resolution.

New Zealand

In July 2018, New Zealand announced a new defense policy, the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018. This document refers to major changes in the strategic environment since the publication of the previous Defence White Paper in 2016, including intensifying competition among powers, climate change, and cyber and space.

The Statement then presented New Zealand’s security objectives, specifically, ensuring public safety, preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity, protecting lines of communication and the like, strengthening international order, sustaining economic prosperity, maintaining democratic institutions and national values, and protecting the natural environment. In order to achieve these objectives, New Zealand prioritizes the securing of operational capabilities in the primary operation area that stretches from the South Pole to the Equator. The country believes that challenges to the existing order of the Asia-Pacific region could impact its security and prosperity and that it is important to have defense capabilities that can globally support the maintenance of the international rule-based order. The Statement also mentioned other priorities, including capabilities to operate effectively with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, and the maintenance of the scale and quality of New Zealand’s military contributions.

Moreover, the Statement was the first document that mentioned the impact of climate change and the role of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) regarding this issue, which reflects the new administration’s Pacific Reset strategy, which makes a commitment to support the Pacific Island countries that have been exposed to disasters. As for the issues in the South China Sea, New Zealand had refrained from referring to China by name in order to maintain its neutral position in this matter. However, in the Statement, the country made a comment on China’s militarization in the South China Sea, stating, “China’s more confident assertion of its interests has at times raised tensions with neighboring states and with the United States.”

As for diplomatic relations, New Zealand has maintained close relationships with the United States and Australia based on the ANZUS Treaty. In particular, New Zealand
sees Australia as its closest partner. The United States has suspended its defense obligation to New Zealand since 1985, when New Zealand refused the entrance of a U.S. ship following New Zealand’s ban on nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the two countries have strengthened their relationship in the diplomacy and defense fields through the Wellington Declaration (2010), which primarily focuses on strengthening strategic relations in the fields of foreign policy and military affairs, and the Washington Declaration (2012), which mainly deals with expanding defense cooperation. New Zealand has thus established the United States as a very close strategic partner. While New Zealand has deepened its relationship with China through such initiatives as cooperation for the “Belt and Road” Initiative and joint air exercises, it also looks at China with a cautious eye as shown in the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018.

The NZDF has 9,400 personnel.\(^3\) It has contributed to the peace and stability of the region through such activities as engaging in monitoring and surveillance activities by patrol aircraft against illegal maritime activities, including illicit ship-to-ship transfers involving North Korean-flagged vessels prohibited under the UN Security Council resolution, and dispatching its personnel to the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) in the ROK, and to other operations in the Middle East and the South Pacific.

In June 2019, the New Zealand government published “Defence Capability Plan 2019,” which sets out planned investments of NZ$20 billion until 2030. Investments under the Plan are: strengthening of the relationship with the Pacific Island countries; response to the climate crisis; and acquisition of vessels, helicopters, transport aircraft and others to strengthen the maritime surveillance capability.

\(^3\) According to “The Military Balance 2020”