It has been pointed out that the Trump administration, which was inaugurated in January 2017, has significantly changed the patterns of U.S. involvement in the world under the “America First” policy. On the other hand, it can be considered that while the United States is focusing on global competition, the United States has been continuing to play a role for world peace and stability with its comprehensive national power, the largest in the world, based on its belief that the values and influence of the United States, bolstered by its power, would make the world freer, safer, and more prosperous.

The United States branded China and Russia as revisionist powers in its strategy documents outlining the administration’s national security and defense policies, as well as it has clarified its intention to focus on strategic competition with those two countries and has been moving forward with various initiatives aimed at translating such policies into action.

The United States has clearly indicated its willingness to place the greatest emphasis on the security of the Indo-Pacific region to deter China in particular, and has set out a policy of prioritizing the allocation of military forces to the region. The United States has also clarified its stance that it will build new and stronger bonds with nations that share its values across the region and maintain a forward military presence in the region, in order to advance the U.S. vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. In terms of actions focused on China, it is reported that U.S. naval vessels carried out repeated “Freedom of Navigation Operations” in the South China Sea and transit through the Taiwan Strait, and that the United States imposed sanctions on a Chinese military organ and a leader. In August 2019, the U.S. government notified Congress of its intention to sell fighter jets to Taiwan for the first time in 27 years.

The United States is also sharpening its deterrence stance against China through such moves as imposing tariffs on Chinese hi-tech products, heightening scrutiny of Chinese investment in the United States, and tightening measures aimed at preventing technology theft and ensuring competitiveness in fields where there is a risk of technology being diverted to military uses. Congress is maintaining its bipartisan support for the administration’s stance on China, instructing the U.S. government in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 to update its strategy to counter China’s malign influence, as well as expressing its desire to support improvements in Taiwan’s national defense capability, and prohibiting the use and procurement of Chinese-manufactured drones by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD).

The United States has positioned deterrence against Russia in Europe as the next-highest priority in its national defense strategy after deterrence against China in the Indo-Pacific region. In December 2018, immediately after Russia detained the crew members of Ukrainian naval vessels in the Kerch Strait, the United States conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations in the vicinity of Peter the Great Gulf for the first time since 1987. In light of Russian

### Column: Freedom of Navigation Operations

The U.S. Government explains freedom of navigation operations as being activities to counter excessive claims that could infringe the freedom of navigation and overflight and other rights to the legal use of oceans.
actions concerning Ukraine, the United States has sought to strengthen involvement in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security and deterrence by deploying U.S. Forces in Eastern Europe and substantially increasing investment in the European Deterrence Initiative—a program intended to increase the U.S. military presence in Europe—compared with the sums invested under the previous administration. The United States is also undertaking initiatives focused on the development and deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons to fill the capability gap in relation to Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Under the recognition that actions and policies by North Korea, named in the strategy documents as a “rogue regime”—to pursue nuclear and missile programs constitute an extraordinary threat to the United States, it has maintained sanctions and continues its efforts to pursue the complete denuclearization of North Korea.

Although the United States has set out a policy of prioritizing the allocation of military forces to the Indo-Pacific region and Europe, while reducing forces in the Middle East and Africa, it has also been dealing with security issues in the latter regions and it would be hard to describe the transition in the U.S. force posture as a smooth one. In the Middle East, in response to the offensive from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other organizations in Iraq and Syria since 2014, the United States, since August 2014, has led Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), a military operation against ISIL that includes airstrikes. The March 2019 announcement that the United States had liberated all the Iraqi and Syrian territory previously controlled by ISIL was followed in October that year by the announcement that ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was dead after an operation by U.S. Forces. Of the forces involved in OIR, the U.S. Forces deployed in Syria are stationed in the east of the country following their withdrawal from the vicinity of the border with Turkey, due to a military operation undertaken by the Turkish army in northern Syria in October 2019. The U.S. contingent has been cut to some 600 soldiers from a reported 1,000 or so prior to the withdrawal.

With regard to Afghanistan, in February 2020, the United States signed an agreement with the Taliban that included a conditional phased withdrawal by U.S. Forces. The agreement stipulates that the United States will reduce its military forces from a reported 12,000 to 13,000 troops to 8,600 within 135 days and, if the Taliban complies with the agreement, will withdraw all troops, including NATO forces, from Afghanistan within 14 months.

Furthermore, the United States has been increasing pressure on Iran from many aspects, stating it is to bring Iran to the negotiation table to conclude a comprehensive deal that addresses activities that destabilize the Middle East region, including the nuclear program. On January 3, 2020, amid rising tensions with Iran, the U.S. military killed Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, in Iraq. Five days later, in retaliation, Iran launched 16 ballistic missiles at two bases in Iraq where U.S. Forces were stationed. Although 12 of them hit the two bases, there are believed to have been no fatalities as a result. That same day, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated that Iran had concluded its proportionate reprisal and did not seek additional tension or war. Also on January 8, President Trump announced that the United States did not wish to use military force. It thus became clear that both countries wished to avoid further escalation.

In response to growing tensions with Iran and other Middle Eastern countries, the U.S. military has announced a number of troop deployments to the Middle East since May 2019, for such purposes as countering the threat posed by Iran to U.S. troops and interests. In addition to such reinforcements to its posture, in July 2019, the United States advocated the Maritime Security Initiative to promote freedom of navigation and maritime stability in the Middle East. As part of this initiative, it subsequently established the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), through which it undertakes activities using naval vessels, along with countries including the United Kingdom.

The U.S. DoD is considering what constitutes appropriate forces in Africa and in Central and South America, given the need to secure resources. In January 2020, Secretary of
Defense Mark Esper indicated that he wished to achieve some measure of progress in the transition of the U.S. military’s force posture by the October 2020 start of fiscal year 2021.

In its security policies, the United States has indicated its view that certain allies which are pointed out as bearing only a small burden of cost and enjoying security guaranteed by the United States should shoulder their fair share of responsibility. As such, the United States has requested that NATO member states swiftly meet their commitments to increase their national defense spending to 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Moreover, in negotiations over host nation support for U.S. Forces Korea, it has demanded that the Republic of Korea (ROK) shoulder a bigger share of the burden.

Three years have passed since the inauguration of the Trump administration and most of the policies set out in its strategy document have entered the implementation phase. While even the divided Congress continue to support the administration’s paramount policy of deterrence against China and Russia, attention will focus on how U.S. security and national defense policies allocate resources, as the arenas in which the United States pursues its strategic competition with China and Russia expand across the globe.

Within the United States, individual states, territories and the District of Columbia are responding to the novel coronavirus disease that first emerged in 2019 by using the National Guard such as transporting medical supplies and food, while the DoD is supporting domestic measures through a range of efforts such as deploying hospital ships and setting up field hospitals. At the same time, as a number of U.S. Forces personnel have been infected, including crew members on an aircraft carrier, the U.S. military has been taking steps to prevent the infection spreading further, by such means as imposing restrictions on movement and other communicable disease control measures. In March 2020, Secretary of Defense Esper commented that although the virus spreads might have some impact on the readiness of U.S. Forces, routine training was continuing to maintain a high state of readiness and that the virus would not affect the U.S. military’s ability to conduct its missions both at home and abroad. He also stated that the extent of the future impact would depend on the scope of the response to the novel coronavirus and how long it lasts.

1 Perception about Security Environment

The National Security Strategy (NSS) released in December 2017 indicates that changes in a regional balance of power can have global consequences and threaten U.S. interests. It mentions the three main sets of challengers against the United States and its allies and partners, which are the “revisionist powers” of China and Russia, the “rogue states” of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, including jihadist terrorist groups. Of these, China and Russia are said to challenge American power, influence, and interests and attempt to erode American safety and prosperity, while North Korea and Iran destabilize regions and threaten the United States and its allies.

In addition, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) published in January 2018 points out that the primary concern in U.S. security is not terrorism but rather long-term strategic competition with China and Russia. It also mentions that China and Russia are undermining the free and open international order constructed by the United States and its allies, and it is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model. In October 2019, Secretary of Defense Esper stated that the NDS positioned China as its first priority and Russia as its second. In September, he expressed a particularly strong sense of caution with respect to China, commenting that while Russia was the greatest near-term challenge, China’s tremendous economic potential meant it posed a major challenge in the long term.

Furthermore, regarding the military actions carried out with the United Kingdom and France after determining that Syria’s Assad regime had used chemical weapons in April 2018, President Trump stated that establishing strong deterrence against the production, proliferation, and use of chemical weapons is an important interest for the national security of the United States.

In consideration of this recognition, the United States deems as security threats nations and organizations that attempt to undermine the interests of itself and its allies and threaten the international order. The Trump administration is addressing threats posed by China and Russia—with particular emphasis on China—as priority issues and appears to be continuing a policy of dealing with threats posed by North Korea, Iran, radical terrorist groups, and production, proliferation, and use of weapons of mass destruction.

2 Security and NDS

The NSS developed by President Trump is rooted in the America First policy and realism in which power plays a
central role in international politics, and stresses the need to rethink the policies of the past 20 years that were based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in the international community would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. Moreover, the NSS sets up a strategic policy to protect four vital interests in this competitive world: (1) Protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life; (2) Promote American prosperity; (3) Preserve peace through strength; and (4) Advance American influence. In October 2019, Vice President Mike Pence indicated that the views set out in the NSS remained unchanged at that point, stating that the United States did not believe that economic engagement alone would transform Communist China’s authoritarian state into a free and open society that respects private property, the rule of law, and international rules of commerce.

Furthermore, in addition to rebuilding the U.S. military to the strongest armed forces and strengthening capabilities in many areas including space and cyberspace, the United States is also striving to leverage the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. Moreover, while recognizing that allies and partners are a great strength of the United States and close cooperation is necessary, the United States has demanded that its allies and partners demonstrate the will to confront shared threats and contribute the capabilities. It is also pointed out that although the United States is responding to the growing political, economic, and military competition throughout the world, by ensuring American military power is second to none and fully integrating with its allies all instruments of power, the United States will seek areas of cooperation with competitors from a position of strength.

The NDS drawn up by then Secretary of Defense Mattis based on the NSS considers the long-term competition with China and Russia as the principal priorities of the DoD because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity and the potential for those threats to increase. Moreover, to expand the competitive space, the following three lines of effort are raised: (1) building a more lethal Joint Force; (2) strengthening alliances and attracting new partners; and (3) reforming the DoD for greater performance and affordability.

Among these, (1) Building military power prioritizes preparedness for war and in order to defeat aggression by a major power and deter opportunistic aggression elsewhere, it advances building flexible theater postures and force deployment that offer mobility, resilience, and readiness. It also advocates modernizing key capabilities such as nuclear forces, space and cyberspace, C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), missile defense, and advanced autonomous systems, etc. Further, although indicating its commitment to deter aggression, it also demonstrates the stance that dynamic military force employment, military posture, and operations must introduce unpredictability to adversary decision-makers. For (2) Strengthening alliances, the following three matters are emphasized: (i) Uphold a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability, (ii) Expand regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning, and (iii) Deepen interoperability. On the other hand, there are expectations that allies and partners contribute an equitable share to mutually beneficial collective security, including effective investment in modernizing their defense capabilities.

3 Involvement in the Indo-Pacific Region

The Trump administration has positioned the Indo-Pacific region as the highest-priority region for the United States and has shown a stance of placing importance on the region through the United States’ commitment to the region and strengthening its presence.

During his November 2017 trip to Asia, in consonance with Japan’s vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, President Trump expressed his intention to emphasize compliance with principles such as respecting the rule of law and freedom of navigation, and that he would promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region, as well as strengthen alliances in the region.

In relation to this, the NSS emphasizes that China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region and reorder the region in its favor, as well as having mounted a rapid military modernization campaign to limit U.S. access to the region and to provide itself a freer hand there. Moreover, as part of its Indo-Pacific region strategy, while reinforcing its commitment to freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with international law, the United States will seek to increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India and develop a strong defense networks with its allies and partners. In the same way, the NDS points out that China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage and is seeking regional hegemony. It emphasizes that a free and open
Indo-Pacific provides prosperity and security, and that the United States will strengthen its alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains.

Meanwhile, the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR) of the U.S. DoD, which was released in June 2019, fleshes out this policy in accordance with the characteristics of the Indo-Pacific region while retaining the strategic directions of the NSS and the NDS. Noting first of all that it is necessary to establish a force that is prepared to win any conflict from its onset in order to achieve peace through strength, the IPSR states that the United States will ensure that combat-credible forces are forward-postured in the Indo-Pacific region and will prioritize investments that ensure lethality against high-end adversaries. Next, arguing that the network of allies and partners is a force multiplier to achieve deterrence, the IPSR states that the United States will reinforce its commitment to established alliances and partnerships while also expanding and deepening relationships with new partners. The IPSR also indicates that the United States will evolve U.S. alliances and partnerships into a networked security architecture to uphold the international rules-based order.

In May 2018, regarding China’s maritime expansion, the U.S. DoD stated that China had deployed anti-ship missiles and surface-to-air missiles to the features in the Spratly Islands, and pointed out that the placement of these weapon system was only military use. As an initial response to China’s continued militarization of areas in the South China Sea, the United States disinvited the Chinese navy to the multilateral Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in 2018. In a speech about the United States’ policy towards China in October 2019, Vice President Pence remarked that China’s behavior in the region had been increasingly provocative and asserted that no nation has the right to claim the maritime commons as territorial seas. He then stated that the United States had increased the tempo and scope of its Freedom of Navigation Operations and strengthened its military presence across the Indo-Pacific. It is reported that U.S. Forces conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations within 12 nautical miles of the disputed islands and reefs in the South China Sea claimed by China and in surrounding waters four times in 2017, five times in 2018, and eight times in 2019.

As part of its activities around strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. Forces deployed Marine Corps specification F-35B fighters to MCAS Iwakuni in January 2017. The USS America, an amphibious assault ship with enhanced ability to carry F-35B fighters and other carrier-based planes, arrived in Sasebo in December 2019 to replace the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp. In addition, the amphibious transport dock USS New Orleans was also deployed to Sasebo that month. In Guam, the MQ-4C Triton maritime surveillance unmanned aircraft system underwent its first deployment in January 2020. Between January and November 2019, the U.S. Coast Guard deployed patrol boats on a rotational basis in the western Pacific Ocean while working with the Seventh Fleet. The Army plans to deploy a Multi-Domain Task Force in the region, to undertake operations in all domains. In March 2018, the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson made the first port call by a U.S. aircraft carrier in over 40 years in Vietnam. Another port call in the country was made in March 2020, by the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt. The United States reportedly deployed naval vessels on passages through the Taiwan Strait on three occasions in 2018 and 10 in 2019.

Given the perceptions of China and regional strategy described above, the United States appears to be undertaking initiatives based on its vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

In contrast, while talks between the United States and North Korea have been continuing since their first summit meeting in history held in June 2018, little material progress has been seen with regard to the dismantlement of North Korea’s missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Responding to that summit meeting, the U.S. DoD suspended the U.S.-ROK command and control exercise Ulchi-Freedom Guardian and the scheduled Vigilant Ace U.S.-ROK bilateral annual flying exercise, and then decided to conclude the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle series of exercises usually held by the United States and the ROK every spring. Then Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan expressed a willingness to maintain U.S. Forces in ROK, stating that close coordination between the...
military activities of the United States and ROK will continue to support diplomatic efforts and that the two countries were committed to ensuring the continued combined defense posture of U.S.-ROK combined forces and maintaining firm military readiness. Having rearranged the training elements that had been incorporated into these large-scale U.S.-ROK exercises, the U.S. military determined that the majority were covered off with the ROK military and assessed that readiness was being maintained. Amid this situation, as well as firing at least 20 ballistic missiles from May 2019 onwards, North Korea announced in December 2019 that it would continue to develop strategic weapons until the United States rolls back its hostile policy. The United States pointed out that, regardless of their range, North Korea’s ballistic missile launches violated United Nations Security Council Resolutions. While demonstrating a sense of caution about advances in North Korean weapons technology, however, the United States indicated its intention to continue with bilateral talks.

4 Innovation in the National Defense Field

Although the Trump administration has stopped using the name Third Offset Strategy, which was touted by the Obama administration, DoD innovation initiatives are positioned as one of the top priorities. In fact, the NSS outlines a policy that the United States must harness innovative technologies that are being developed outside of the traditional defense industrial base. The NDS also states that the DoD needs innovation to surpass revisionist powers, and calls for extensive investment in military application of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and machine learning (AI/ML), including rapid application of commercial breakthroughs, to gain competitive military advantages.

Giving testimony before Congress in March 2019 about science and technology in the field of national defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin expressed alarm at the pace of Chinese and Russian technological advances, while setting out a policy of regaining and maintaining the United States’ technical advantage through investments in hypersonics, directed energy, space, autonomy, cyber, quantum science, microelectronics, biotechnology, AI/ML, and fully-networked command, control, and communication. In September 2019, Secretary of Defense Esper stated that the United States could no longer afford to focus on development programs that take many years to complete. Commenting that, unlike previous eras where national defense drove technology research and development, the DoD now sees significant innovation in the private sector, he pointed out the need for the U.S. military to integrate game-changing technologies from the private sector into its systems. In addition, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Hyten commented in January 2020 that the DoD has attached greater importance to avoiding risk than to the speed of technology development in recent years and stressed the necessity of learning from failures while moving quickly forward with development, as well as mentioning the need to tap into cutting-edge fields in the private sector.

5 Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released in February 2018 stated that, although the United States had reduced the role and number of nuclear weapons based on the aspiration that if the United States took the lead in reducing nuclear arms, other states would follow, the global threat conditions have worsened markedly since the most recent NPR released in 2010 and there now exist unprecedented threats and uncertainty, as China and Russia have expanded their nuclear forces and North Korea continues its pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Given these circumstances, the following were raised as the roles of U.S. nuclear forces: (1) Deterrence of nuclear and nonnuclear attacks; (2) Assurance of allies and partners; (3) Achievement of U.S. objectives if deterrence fails; and (4) Capacity to hedge against an uncertain future.

Also, while the United States would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners, the NPR clearly states that extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks against the United States and its allies, and a “no first use” policy is not justified today. It also indicates that the United States maintains a policy of retaining some ambiguity regarding the precise circumstances that might lead to a U.S. nuclear response. Furthermore, it also revealed that the United States would apply a tailored approach to deterrence across a spectrum of adversaries, threats and contexts, and in addition, would ensure effective deterrence by enhancing the flexibility and range of its nuclear capabilities through nuclear modernization and the development and deployment of new capabilities. Specifically,
in addition to sustaining and replacing the nuclear triad, as new capabilities, in the near-term, the United States would modify a small number of existing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) warheads to provide a low-yield option, and in the longer term, pursue a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), leveraging existing technologies, as well as incorporate nuclear capability onto F-35A fighters as a replacement for the current aging dual-capable aircraft (DCA). Also, the United States has shown its commitment to extended deterrence for its allies and, if necessary, maintaining the forward-deployed capability with DCA and nuclear weapons in regions outside Europe, including Northeast Asia.

In October 2018, President Trump expressed his intention to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia, due to Russia’s material breach, and in February 2019, the United States provided Russia with formal notice that the United States would withdraw from the treaty. The United States also expressed that if Russia does not return to full and verifiable compliance with the treaty in six months, the treaty would terminate.

On August 2, 2019, Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the U.S. withdrawal pursuant to Article XV of the treaty took effect that day because Russia failed to return to full and verified compliance. On the same day, Secretary of Defense Esper announced that the DoD will fully pursue the development of intermediate-range, conventional, ground-launched cruise and ballistic missile systems whose test launches, production and possession had been restricted by the treaty. In August 2019, the United States conducted a flight test of a conventionally-configured ground-launched cruise missile with a range of more than 500 km and subsequently conducted a flight test of a prototype similarly configured ground-launched ballistic missile that December (See Section 4-3-1). President Trump has mentioned the need for arms control involving China, which has beefed up medium-range missile capabilities outside the scope of the INF Treaty.

At the same time, the Missile Defense Review (MDR) published in January 2019 noted that North Korea continues to pose an extraordinary threat to the United States and, with its nuclear missiles, has the ability to threaten the U.S. homeland, as well as U.S. territories, U.S. Forces, and allies in the Pacific Ocean. It also pointed out that Russia and China are developing advanced cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles that challenge existing missile defense systems. The MDR sets out three principles governing U.S. missile defense: (1) homeland missile defense will stay ahead of rogue states’ missile threats; (2) missile defense will defend U.S. Forces deployed abroad and support the security of allies and partners; and (3) the United States will pursue new concepts and technologies. It cited the elements of missile defense strategy as (1) comprehensive missile defense capabilities; (2) flexibility and adaptability; (3) tighter offense-defense integration and interoperability; and (4) importance of space. The MDR then presented a policy of adopting a balanced and integrated approach based on a combination of (1) deterrence; (2) active and passive missile defenses; and (3) attack operations.

Under this policy, the United States plans to expand investment in expanding and modernizing U.S. homeland missile defense capabilities by such means as deploying an additional 20 ground-based interceptors by 2023, improving and deploying radar systems, and pursuing efforts to counter intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) using SM-3 Block IIA. For regional defense, on the other hand, the United States will procure additional interceptor missiles for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Aegis, and Patriot systems, as well as increasing the number of Aegis BMD-

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**Column**

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

A treaty abolishing land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500-5,500 km and banning their production and flight testing. It was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987 and ended in August 2019.

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1 The nuclear triad consists of Minuteman III ICBM, Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) armed with Trident II D5 SLBM, and strategic bombers B-52 and B-2.
2 In February 2020, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy John Rood disclosed that the U.S. Navy had already deployed the W76-2 low-yield nuclear warhead to be carried by SLBMs. This complementary capability is regarded as showing Russia and other potential adversaries that there is no advantage in the limited use of nuclear weapons.
3 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the countries covered by the treaty have increased: the countries covered at present are the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Under Article 15 of the INF Treaty, notification of withdrawal must be made to all signatory countries of the treaty.
4 In August 2019, Secretary of Defense Esper remarked that it was going to take a few years to actually have newly developed ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles to be able to deploy.
capable ships, and equipping Aegis Ashore sites with the SM-3 Block IIA. Regarding the pursuit of new technologies, the MDR sets out a policy of developing the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) to improve the ability to engage ICBM warheads and decoys, as well as undertaking research and development focused on (1) directed-energy weapons; (2) space-based interceptor systems; and (3) interceptor missiles with which F-35 fighters can be equipped, to enable space-based sensors to be deployed and interception to be carried out in the boost phase, with a view to countering advanced threats, including hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs). As far as collaboration with allies and partners is concerned, the MDR indicates a willingness to focus on deepening interoperability, expanding burden sharing, and encouraging investment by allies in missile defense capabilities that are interoperable with those of the United States.

**6 FY2021 Budget**

Based on an awareness that the U.S. Government’s budget deficit is deepening, the Budget Control Act enacted in 2011 stipulated a significant cut in government spending by FY2021. In March 2013, the sequestration of government spending including defense expenditure was started based on the provisions of the Budget Control Act. However, sequestration was subsequently eased due in part to the passage of bipartisan budget acts on four occasions. In addition, under the Trump administration’s policy to end the sequestration of defense spending in order to rebuild the U.S. military, a defense budget framework was approved that drastically raised the limit set by the sequestration between FY2018 and FY2021.

In these circumstances, the defense budget request in the FY2021 Budget Blueprint submitted to Congress in February 2020 allocated US$705.4 billion for the base budget, which excludes emergencies, representing about a 0.1% increase over the previous year. The DoD positioned the budget as a priority initiative supporting operations in all domains, which forms the next step in implementing the NDS, emphasizing (1) the reconstruction of the nuclear deterrent; (2) U.S. homeland missile defense; (3) cyber and space capabilities; and (4) hypersonic, 5G, AI, and other key technologies. It included a request for an unprecedented sum for research and development (approximately US$106.6 billion), while raising around US$5.7 billion for reallocation to priority initiatives from programs that do not accord with the NDS by such means as rethinking programs undertaken by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The goals for military end strength and procurement presented in the FY2021 budget request included securing 1,351,500 personnel, adding 5,500 more troops to the services’ end strength, and procuring 89 upgraded M-1 tanks (165 tanks in the previous year), 8 battle-force ships (12 in the previous year), and 79 F-35 fighters (98 in the previous year).

![Fig. I-2-1-1 (Changes in the U.S. Defense Budget)](image)

Notes: 1. Figures shown are narrowly defined expenses based on historical tables (outlays).
2. The amount for FY2020 is an estimate.

5 The breakdown is as follows: a base budget of approximately US$636.4 billion, and approximately US$69.0 billion for overseas contingency operations. This represents an increase of about US$0.8 billion from the FY2020 enacted budget level (excluding the approximately US$8.0 billion for emergencies in the FY2020 enacted budget). The total sum of the FY2021 national defense budget request was roughly US$740.5 billion, including defense-related budget requests from other departments of roughly US$35.1 billion (such as the Department of Energy’s nuclear-related programs) and the roughly US$705.4 billion of DoD budget request.
2 Military Posture

1 General Situation

The operation of the U.S. Forces is not controlled by the individual branches of the broader armed forces; rather it is operated under the command of the Unified Combatant Commands, composed of forces from multiple branches of the armed forces. The Unified Combatant Commands consist of four commands with functional responsibilities and seven commands with regional responsibilities.

The U.S. ground forces have about 470,000 Army soldiers and about 190,000 Marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among other countries.

The U.S. maritime forces have about 980 vessels (including about 70 submarines) totaling about 6.9 million tons. The 6th Fleet is responsible for the East Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and Africa; the 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the northwest Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet in the eastern Pacific; the 4th Fleet in South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the 7th Fleet in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. In addition, the Second Fleet was reestablished in August 2018 to take responsibility for the U.S. East Coast, North Atlantic Ocean, and Arctic Ocean.

The U.S. air forces have roughly 3,560 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the ROK, among others.

In regard to strategic offensive weapons including nuclear force, the United States under the former Obama administration proceeded with their reduction based on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that came into force in February 2011. It announced that its deployed strategic warheads stood at 1,373, while its deployed delivery platforms stood at 655. The United States is studying the concept of a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), as an effort contributing to the nation’s new ability to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons.

Moreover, in addressing the increasing threats in cyberspace, in May 2018, the Cyber Command, which was previously a subunified command under U.S. Strategic Command, was elevated to a unified combatant command.

In August 2019, the United States founded the Space Command to serve as a geographic unified combatant command and then established the Space Force as the sixth branch of the military within the Department of the Air Force that December.

2 Current Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region

The United States, a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deploying the Indo-Pacific Command, a combatant command integrating the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps in the region. The Indo-Pacific Command is a geographic combatant command which is responsible for the largest geographical area, and its subordinate unified commands include U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea.

Establishment of the Space Force

In December 2019, the United States established the Space Force under the Department of the Air Force as the sixth military branch, joining the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. It is the first new military service in more than 70 years since 1947, when the Air Force was created.

The Trump Administration has taken a stance to give great importance to space as a foundation of economic prosperity and national defense of the United States and as a domain that can provide integral support for this purpose. In this context, in March 2019 Vice President Pence indicated imperfections of the system where space-related projects pertaining to national security were dispersed over 60 departments and agencies, which resulted in a lack of leadership and responsibility. Based on this recognition, the Trump administration advocated the creation of an organization to take charge of the space domain in a consolidated manner and created the Space Command as a unified combatant command equivalent to other commands such as the Indo-Pacific Command in order to enable joint operations in this domain. The Space Force is expected to play a leadership role by consolidating separated authorities to organize, train, and equip space forces, while eliminating inefficiency in force building. According to its establishment plan, the Space Force will have approximately 15,000 personnel after space-related personnel of the existing military branches are transferred in stages.

At the ceremony pertaining to the establishment of the Space Force, President Trump expressed his recognition that “space is the newest warfighting domain.” The Trump administration expressed a sense of crisis that China, Russia and other countries were developing strategies and capabilities to exploit the vulnerability of the United States in space, which had turned space into a warfighting domain, where the United States could lose its advantage. Based on this recognition, the creation of the Space Force is understood as a fundamental shift of space initiatives from combat support to competition and combat. The Space Forces will carry out both offensive and defensive operations for space superiority as a unique warfighting domain in addition to missions such as space situational awareness, satellite operations and support for the Army, Navy, Air Force and other forces.

Furthermore, the Trump Administration expressed its intention to establish the Department of the Space Force to control the Space Force. Attention will focus on future initiatives of the United States concerning the space domain.

Pacific Air Forces, which are all headquartered in Hawaii.

The Army Pacific’s subordinate commands include the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, the 8th U.S. Army in the ROK, which is the Army component of the U.S. Forces in the ROK, and the U.S. Army Alaska. Additionally, the Army Pacific assigns approximately 2,500 personnel to commands in Japan, such as I Corps (Forward) and the Headquarters, U.S. Army Japan Command.8

The U.S. Pacific Fleet consists of the 7th Fleet, which is responsible for the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, responsible for the East Pacific and Bering Sea. The U.S. Pacific Fleet in total controls about 200 vessels. The 7th Fleet mainly consists of a carrier strike group with main stationing locations in Japan and Guam. Their mission is to defend territorial lands, people, sea lines of communication, and the critical national interests of the United States and its allies. An aircraft carrier, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers among others are assigned to the 7th Fleet.

The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force each in the U.S. mainland and

8 The figures of the U.S. Forces mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded in the published sources of the U.S. DoD (as of December 31, 2019), and could change according to unit deployment.
Japan. Of this force, about 21,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which are equipped with F-35B fighters and other aircraft, in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the Western Pacific.9

The U.S. Pacific Air Force has three air forces, of which three air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters and C-130 transport aircraft) are deployed to the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and two air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters) to the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK.

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9 See footnote 8.