2020
DEFENSE OF JAPAN
2020
DEFENSE OF JAPAN
Thank you very much for taking a look at the 2020 version of the Defense White Paper.

The Defense White Paper was first published exactly 50 years ago, in 1970, based on then Defense Agency Director-General NAKASONE Yasuhiro’s strong conviction that “more than anything else, it is the understanding, active support, and cooperation of the people that is essential to the defense of the nation,” at a time when the general public still had a strong negative perception of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF).

Since then, as the international situation has changed dramatically and the uncertainty over the security environment surrounding Japan has grown rapidly, the role and the field of activities of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF have broadened to cover the space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains.

Although dramatic changes unimaginable half a century ago have occurred, widespread understanding and support from the Japanese people continue to be essential in any era in order to defend their peaceful lives and Japan’s territorial land, seas and airspace.

We believe that Mr. Nakasone’s conviction lives on in the current Defense White Paper, which marks the 50th anniversary of publication. We are looking forward to your reading it.

In compiling the 2020 version of the Defense White Paper, we pursued ease of understanding and user-friendliness. Below, let me explain the notable features of the white paper.
First, in order to provide an overall picture, we summarized important international developments and the MOD/SDF’s activities that we would like you to understand in the Special Feature “Defense Chronology” and “Digest.” These include North Korea’s repeated ballistic missile launches; China’s persistent continuation of the unilateral attempt to alter the status quo; the MOD/SDF’s dedicated contributions to bringing the outbreak of the novel coronavirus disease under control; disaster relief operations conducted in response to large-scale natural disasters; the start of information gathering activity in order to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East; and defense cooperation and exchange with the United States and other countries.

In addition, in the current white paper, we introduce to readers around 50 SDF personnel, a higher number than previously, in order to convey the voices of SDF personnel engaging in various activities inside and outside of the country with a strong sense of mission so that you can feel more familiar with the MOD/SDF.

In addition, in a new departure, we have prepared more than 50 videos related to the contents of the main text and placed QR codes linked to them in the main text.

As you can easily play various videos via a smartphone, we hope that you will enjoy watching them.

We also changed the coverage period of the white paper. Previously, the white paper covered a period of approximately one year to around June, but the period was changed to approximately one year to the end of March, namely the end of a fiscal year. As a result, the 2020 version of the Defense White Paper mainly covers activities and incidents in FY2019. However, it also covers some important incidents, such as those related to the novel coronavirus, that occurred by June this year.

Furthermore, while the Defense White Paper can be accessed through the MOD’s website, the 2020 version for the first time contains editable data in the Reference section at the end. I hope that this will be very useful for readers.

As indicated above, I expect that more people, including security experts and ordinary people, will find the 2020 version of the Defense White Paper enjoyable and satisfying to read.

I sincerely hope that by using the white paper as a convenient reference, you will deepen your understanding of matters related to the security of Japan and activities of the MOD/SDF.
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**Note:** Maps in this White Paper may contain omissions depending on the design and layout and may not necessarily show the entire Japanese territory.

The period covered by this White Paper is up to the end of March 2020, in principle.
Call for Essays Regarding Defense of Japan 2020

Essay Competition: Impressions upon Reading Defense of Japan 2020

Essay Competition: Impressions upon Reading Defense of Japan will be held just as last year. We are looking forward to receiving impressions upon reading the Defense of Japan from many people.

Entry requirements are as below. Please see the website of the Ministry of Defense, too.

Book for the essay competition: Defense of Japan 2020

Application method

(1) Postal application
- Write only the text of your essay on up to 5 sheets of manuscript paper for 400 characters
- Write the following on other paper (free style)
  - title of your essay
  - your address
  - your name with furigana
  - your occupation
  - your age
  - your phone number
- E-mail address
- Send the two items above to the following address
  Section in charge of Defense of Japan Essay Competition, Policy Planning and Evaluation Division, Ministry’s Secretariat, Ministry of Defense
  5-1 Ichigaya Hommuracho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 162-8801

(2) Application through the MOD website
- Download the form and write the text of your essay (up to 2,000 characters).
- Upload the text using the application form and send the text after entering necessary items.

Award

Essays will be selected for the following awards and recognized during March 2021 at the Ministry of Defense
- First Award
  Honorable certificate and extra prize (two tickets to both Fuji Fire Power Exercise and SDF Marching Festival)
- Award for Excellence
  Honorable certificate and extra prize (two tickets to either Fuji Fire Power Exercise or SDF Marching Festival)

See Part IV (p. 470) for details.
Since March 28, 2020, the SDF has conducted various activities, including support of quarantine at airports to reinforce border control against COVID-19, and education on prevention of infection for employees of private accommodation facilities to prevent the spread of community-acquired infection. The SDF Central Hospital admitted patients infected via community spread of the virus.
Activities in the SDF Central Hospital

Among other activities, the SDF Central Hospital admitted and cared for patients suffering from COVID-19.

Sharing Information at Home and Abroad

The MOD/SDF set up special pages on their and other websites that published detailed measures to prevent and control the spread of COVID-19. In addition, the MOD/SDF shared information, lessons learned, and knowledge obtained through measures to fight COVID-19 with other countries via their embassies in Tokyo and also telephone conversations with defense ministers of 15 countries. (As of June 16)

Main MOD/SDF Activities Against COVID-19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disaster relief operations to prevent the spread of infections</td>
<td>January 31-March 16, 2020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster relief operations of reinforced border control</td>
<td>From March 28 to May 31, 2020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requests from prefectural governors and other authorities</td>
<td>April 3, 2020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities by SDF Hospitals, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing of information about lessons/ findings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note 1) Quarantine support by the second and third chartered flights was conducted prior to disaster relief operations and cooperation with other government agencies in response to a request from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.

(Note 2) Conducted as disaster relief operations on the basis of cooperation with other government agencies in response to a request from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.

Defence of Japan
Disaster Relief Operations

In FY2019, Japan saw various natural disasters. The SDF provided flexible support in response to those disasters by appropriately identifying needs as they shifted according to changes in the situation. In the disaster relief operations in response to the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Habigis), the SDF established a joint task force led by the Commander of the Ground Component Command and mobilized SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel.

Disaster Relief Operations in Response to Heavy Rain Accompanying a Weather Front

August 2019

Disaster Relief Operations in Response to the 2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai)

September 2019
Disaster Relief Operations in Response to the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Habigis)

October 2019

ASDF personnel using a rescue helicopter to save lives

GSDF personnel assisting in supplying water

GSDF personnel rescuing a stranded person

ASDF water tankers being filled up with water from the MSDF JS "Uraga" to assist in supplying fresh water

ASDF personnel searching for missing persons

GSDF personnel providing bathing support

ASDF personnel covering the roof of a typhoon-damaged house with blue tarpaulins

GSDF personnel disposing of disaster waste

GSDF personnel providing meals support
North Korea is proceeding with ballistic missile development at an extremely rapid pace and launched more than 30 missiles and other objects, including what are presumed to be new short-range ballistic missiles and a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) since May 2019. These short-range ballistic missiles presumed to be new types are distinctive in that they use solid fuel and fly at lower altitudes than conventional ballistic missiles. North Korea is therefore believed to be trying to breach missile defense networks by making it more difficult to detect signs of a launch and making early detection harder. There are concerns that such advanced technologies will be applied to longer-range missiles. North Korea is relentlessly pursuing increasingly complex and diverse modes of attack and is steadily strengthening and improving its attack capabilities. These enhancements in its capabilities make early detection of the signs of a launch and the interception of the missiles more difficult, thereby posing new challenges for the intelligence gathering, early warning, and interception postures of relevant countries, including Japan. Working closely with relevant ministries and agencies, as well as countries including the United States, the MOD/SDF take all possible measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security, sparing no effort in gathering and analyzing the necessary information and undertaking warning and surveillance activities.

### Launched of Ballistic Missiles by North Korea (since 2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Presumed type of missile</th>
<th>Number of launches</th>
<th>Flight distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 4, 2019</td>
<td>Short-range ballistic missiles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Max. approx. 250 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 9, 2019</td>
<td>Short-range ballistic missiles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Approx. 400 km/approx. 250 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 25, 2019</td>
<td>Short-range ballistic missiles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Approx. 600 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 6, 2019</td>
<td>Short-range ballistic missiles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Approx. 450 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 10, 2019</td>
<td>Short-range ballistic missiles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Approx. 400 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 16, 2019</td>
<td>Short-range ballistic missiles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Approx. 250 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 24, 2019</td>
<td>Short-range ballistic missiles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Approx. 350 to 400 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 10, 2019</td>
<td>Short-range ballistic missiles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Max. approx. 300 to 350 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2, 2019</td>
<td>SLBM “Pukguksong-3”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Approx. 450 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 31, 2019</td>
<td>Short-range ballistic missiles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Approx. 350 to 400 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 28, 2019</td>
<td>Short-range ballistic missiles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Approx. 380 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2, 2020</td>
<td>Short-range ballistic missiles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Approx. 240 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 9, 2020</td>
<td>Short-range ballistic missiles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Max. approx. 200 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 21, 2020</td>
<td>Short-range ballistic missiles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Approx. 400 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 29, 2020</td>
<td>Short-range ballistic missiles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Approx. 250 km</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Aegis-equipped Destroyer (DDG) JS “Maya”

Commissioned in March 2020. Equipped with BMD capability from the outset.

Warning and control radar currently being rolled out. Able to detect and track over long distances and wide areas.

PAC-3MSE

Deployment began in March 2020. Offers protection over more than double the area covered by the existing PAC-3.

FPS-7

Deployment began in March 2020. Offers protection over more than double the area covered by the existing PAC-3.

Warning and control radar currently being rolled out. Able to detect and track over long distances and wide areas.
In the Middle East region, amidst rising tensions, attacks took place on ships, including a case in which a Japan-related vessel suffered damage in June 2019. Under these circumstances, Japan has decided to dispatch a Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) vessel for the purpose of information gathering and the utilization of the existing counter-piracy unit as a part of Japan’s independent efforts.

Two MSDF P-3C left Japan on January 11, 2020, along with the replacement of the counter-piracy unit and began information gathering activities on the 20th. JS “Takanami” left port on February 2 and started to engage in information gathering activities in the field on February 26.
Sokui-no-rei, Ceremony of the Accession to the Throne

The SDF presents ceremonies including guards of honor, lining up and gun salutes to the Emperor, state guests and others at national events. A guard of honor to state guests from foreign countries at their welcome reception is essential for diplomatic procedure. At the Sokuirei-Seiden-no-gi (Ceremony of the Enthronement of His Majesty the Emperor at the Seiden [State Hall]), the GSDF fired salutes in the Kita-no-maru area of the Outer Gardens of the Imperial Palace. At the celebration parade in November of the same year, the GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, the National Defense Academy and National Defense Medical College conducted guards of honor, playing music and lining up. In addition to the members who were assigned to these duties, many other members participated in the event, including preparation for the implementation by the SDF.

November 2019
2020 marked the 60th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. “Today, more than ever, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is a pillar that is indestructible, a pillar immovable, safeguarding peace in Asia, the Indo-Pacific, and in the world, while assuring prosperity therein,” Prime Minister Abe said in his speech at a reception to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Security Treaty, which was held on January 19 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Ikura Guest House.

The Prime Minister expressed his determination to continue working to enhance the Alliance, saying, “it is incumbent upon us to make it even more robust, to make it a pillar for safeguarding peace and security in both outer space and cyberspace. Let us keep and enhance [the Alliance], ... to make it a pillar safeguarding freedom, liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law ... sixty years, one hundred years down the road.”
After assuming the office of the Minister of Defense, Minister Kono actively held meetings with his counterparts and visited foreign countries. Defense cooperation and exchanges with foreign countries were stepped up to an unprecedented extent in FY2019.

**Defense Dialogue by Minister Kono**

Minister Kono participated in the Manama Dialogue and the Doha Forum for the first time as a Japanese Minister of Defense, and also attended the Munich Security Conference for the first time in 11 years, highlighting the presence and the position of the government of Japan to the international community. On the occasion of the ADMM-Plus, Minister Kono introduced the Vientiane Vision 2.0, an updated guideline for Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation, which had been announced at the Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting, thereby further deepening defense cooperation between Japan and ASEAN member countries.

**Bilateral Dialogues with Many Countries**

A number of bilateral dialogues were held, including the first ministerial-level “2+2” meeting with India, the first Defense Ministerial Meeting with Ukraine, and the Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting held during the first official visit to China as a Japanese Minister of Defense in ten years.

**Active Utilization of Telephone Conversation**

Minister Kono has been more proactive in holding telephone conversations than ever and has endeavored to deepen communications with other countries. In FY2019, telephone conversations took place with as many as 12 countries.

**Active Participation in Multilateral Conferences**

Minister Kono participated in the Manama Dialogue and the Doha Forum for the first time as a Japanese Minister of Defense, and also attended the Munich Security Conference for the first time in 11 years, highlighting the presence and the position of the government of Japan to the international community. On the occasion of the ADMM-Plus, Minister Kono introduced the Vientiane Vision 2.0, an updated guideline for Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation, which had been announced at the Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting, thereby further deepening defense cooperation between Japan and ASEAN member countries.
Nowadays, various kinds of satellites have been launched for observation, communication/broadcasting and positioning, making outer space key infrastructure for both the public and private sectors in such areas as society, economics and science. Also in the security area, major countries have been making proactive efforts to use outer space for maintaining peace and safety. When using outer space, it is necessary to ensure its stable use. However, there has been a rapid increase in the volume of space debris in outer space, raising the risk of significant damage to satellite functions caused by collision between debris and satellite. In addition, it is pointed out that the development and verification test of a killer satellite, which approaches a target satellite to disturb, attack, and capture it, is underway, increasing the threat to the stable use of outer space.

Owing to the advancement of information and communications technology in recent years, information and communications networks such as the Internet have become essential components across all facets of life. Therefore, cyber attacks against information and communications networks have the potential to seriously impact the lives of individuals. Under such circumstances, cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against information and communications networks of not only government organizations and military forces but also business corporations and academic organizations in various countries. Attacks attempting to steal critical technologies, secrets or personal information have been confirmed. For the MOD/SDF, information and communications networks that leverage cyberspace form a foundation for the SDF’s activities in various domains, and any attack against them would seriously disrupt the organized activities of the SDF.

In everyday life, electromagnetic spectrum is used for various purposes ranging from television and mobile communications to geolocation information through global positioning systems. In the security area, electromagnetic spectrum has been used for command/communication, and warning/surveillance. With the development of the technology, its use has expanded in range and purpose, and it is now recognized as the frontline of the offense-defense dynamic in today’s warfare. Therefore, ensuring superiority in electromagnetic domains such as these is essential for realizing cross-domain operations.
Contemporary warfare combines the traditional domains of land, sea, and air with new domains such as space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum. In such situations, it is essential to block and eliminate attacks by leveraging capabilities in such new domains as space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum so as to effectively deter and counter threats. Cross-domain operations that organically fuse capabilities in the new domains and the traditional domains of land, sea, and air to exercise domain-crossing capabilities have thus become vitally important.
Defense of Japan published for the first time
The impetus for its publication was the belief of NAKASONE Yasuhiro, Director General of what was then the Defense Agency, that “more than anything else, it is the understanding, active support, and cooperation of the people that is essential to the defense of the nation.”

Published for the first time in 1970, the Defense of Japan white paper has been published annually since 1976. This year marks the 50th anniversary of its first publication. The objective of Defense of Japan is to provide a widespread awareness of the current state of our nation’s defense, as well as related issues and initiatives, thereby gaining the understanding of readers both within Japan and overseas. To achieve this, various approaches have been devised in order to ensure that as many citizens as possible can obtain a copy of Defense of Japan. Efforts will continue to ensure that this publication is comprehensible, readable, and user-friendly, to promote understanding of the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces.

This year’s edition features columns highlighting the voices of around 50 SDF personnel deployed in various settings both within Japan and overseas (about twice as many voices as last year). There are also QR codes that you can scan to watch related videos immediately!

The 1977 edition contained no photographs, only illustrations (the one below was used in an explanation about the GSDF).

Watch related videos immediately!

Published for the second time
Provided more enhanced content than the first edition. Total number of pages increased to 174
Took on roughly the same structure it has today
Both Japanese and English editions published annually ever since
Was published in A5 format until 1999, but the total number of pages grew to 498 in the 1999 edition

94 pages long

The impetus for its publication was the belief of NAKASONE Yasuhiro, Director General of what was then the Defense Agency, that “more than anything else, it is the understanding, active support, and cooperation of the people that is essential to the defense of the nation.”

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1976
Photographs (black and white) begin to be used

First use of color diagrams and of feature columns

Color photographs first appeared in the 1983 edition

CD-ROM included (until 2002)

Began to be published in a more readable A4 format
Overall visual appearance enhanced, with pictures of equipment on the cover
Special features first published at the beginning

Index first published at the end

The first Defense of Japan special feature, “Towards 2000,” was published.
Part I

Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Overview

Current Trends in Security Environment

- Uncertainty over the existing order is increasing, and inter-state competition is becoming prominent across the political, economic and military realms.
  - Complex measures required due to “hybrid warfare”
  - Prolonged gray-zone situations
- Technological progress exerting significant influence on security
  - Importance of domains of space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum
  - Game-changing technologies that could drastically change the conduct of future warfare (artificial intelligence (AI), hypersonic, and high-power energy technologies, etc.)
- Emergence of security challenges, which cannot be dealt with by a single country alone
  - Need to secure stable use of new domains: space and cyberspace; need to ensure security of maritime traffic; response to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs); and response to international terrorism
- It is necessary to keep an eye on the COVID-19 infection, which is bringing about diverse impacts and restrictions to military activities of respective countries.

Security Environment Surrounding Japan

- Military powers with high quality and quantity are concentrated in Japan’s surroundings, where clear trends such as further military buildup and an increase in military activities are observed.
- A regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized in the Indo-Pacific region and longstanding issues of territorial rights and reunification continue to remain.
- Recent years have seen a continued tendency towards the prolongation of “gray zone” situations that are associated with territories, sovereignty and economic interests, and such situations may increase and expand in the future.

Regional Security Environment surrounding Japan etc.

Legend

- Ground Forces
- Maritime Forces
- Combat aircraft

Large-scale military capabilities are concentrated surrounding Japan.

North Korea’s continued nuclear weapons and missile programs

China’s attempt to change the status quo in the East China Sea / Rapid expansion and increase of military activities

Territorial disputes over the Northern Territories

Active advancements to the Sea of Japan by China

Issues concerning the South China Sea

Issues concerning the Korean Peninsula

Japan’s attempt to strengthen military activities in the East China Sea

In the vicinity of Japan, moves toward strengthening military forces and increasing military activities are notable.

Russia

United States

China

India

France

United Kingdom

North Korea

ROK

Germany

Italy

Iran

Israel

Large-scale military capabilities are concentrated surrounding Japan.

GDP (billions)

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

2020

2010

Japan

North Korea

China

Russia

The United States

The Philippines

South Korea

Thailand

Indonesia

Vietnam

Malaysia

BRICs

2020

2010

GDP (billions)

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

2020

2010

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China

Russia

The United States

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South Korea

Thailand

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Vietnam

Malaysia

BRICs

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Japan’s attempt to strengthen military activities in the East China Sea

In the vicinity of Japan, moves toward strengthening military forces and increasing military activities are notable.
The United States recognizes strategic competition with revisionist powers, namely China and Russia, as the central challenge to U.S. security. Especially, the United States ranks China at the top of its list of priorities and places the greatest emphasis on the security of the Indo-Pacific region to strengthen deterrence against China.

- Under the recognition that nuclear capabilities of North Korea, classified as “rogue regimes” in its strategic documents, constitute an extraordinary threat to the United States, it has maintained sanctions and continues to pursue denuclearization of North Korea, while maintaining strong military readiness of the U.S. forces including U.S. Forces Korea.

- The United States prioritizes the allocation of military forces to the Indo-Pacific region and Europe while reducing forces in the Middle East and Africa. The United States, however, still needs to deal with security issues in the latter regions, which makes it difficult to describe that such transition of the U.S. force posture is smoothly progressing.

- The United States has indicated that certain allies, which are pointed out as bearing a small burden, should bear it appropriately. It has requested NATO member states to swiftly achieve their national defense spending goals, and has required the Republic of Korea (ROK) to shoulder a bigger share of the costs associated with U.S. Forces Korea.

- Amid rising tensions between Iran, the U.S. military killed the commander of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iraq. In response, Iran launched ballistic missiles towards Iraq bases where U.S. Forces were stationed.

- Against growing tensions in the Middle East, the U.S. military reinforced its posture in the region. Additionally, the United States established the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) and conducted activities by naval vessels and other equipment, along with countries including the United Kingdom.

Trends in Security and Defense Policies

- Based on the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released in February 2018, the United States modified a portion of its existing SLBM warheads into low-yield warheads. Additionally, the United States conducted test launches of its intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile and ballistic missile, which had been restricted by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. It also mentioned the necessity for arms control that includes China, which has beefed up medium-range missile capabilities outside the scope of the INF Treaty.

- The United States founded the Space Command as a Unified Combatant Command and then established the Space Force as the sixth branch of its military, within the Department of the Air Force (a new military service established for the first time in 70 years after the establishment of the Air Force).
Rapid Military Modernization

In order to fully transform the people’s armed forces into world-class forces by the mid-21st century, China has sustained high-level growth of its defense budget without transparency, engaging in broad, rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. In doing so, it has attached importance to strengthening its operational capabilities in order to steadily acquire information superiority, and also enhanced its capabilities in the domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum.

Bolstering these capabilities will reinforce China’s “Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD)” capabilities and lead to the establishment of operational capabilities further afield.

While implementing a policy of civil-military fusion across the board, with the aim of promoting two-way links between military and civilian resources in various fields, China is striving to develop and acquire cutting-edge technologies that can be used for military purposes, and improve its operational capabilities.

Chinese forces’ efforts to use artificial intelligence (AI) technology under the awareness that “intelligent warfare is on the horizon”

Activities in the Surrounding Sea Area and Airspace of Japan

China has relentlessly continued unilateral attempts to change the status quo by coercion in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands, leading to a grave matter of concern.

The Chinese Navy and Air Force have in recent years expanded and intensified their activities in the surrounding sea areas and airspace of Japan, and there are cases involving the one-sided escalation of activities.

China is believed to be aiming to build up capabilities for operations in more distant waters and airspace, including those to project armed forces to waters including the so-called second island chain, beyond the first island chain.

China has been continuing activities viewed as training of maritime and air forces making forays into the Pacific and the Sea of Japan, being suspected of intending to regularize these activities.

In the South China Sea, China is moving forward with militarization, as well as expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains, thereby continuing unilateral attempts to change the status quo by coercion to create a fait accompli.

Changes in China’s Defense Budget

Changes in number of days on which Chinese government vessels intruded into the Japanese territorial waters

Identification in the contiguous zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of days (days)</th>
<th>Total number of identified vessels (vessels)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>1,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The figure for 2012 is that from September to December, and the figure for 2020 is as of the end of March.
Activities in Further Distant Seas

- China is steadily increasing its capabilities to conduct operations in more distant seas such as the Indian Ocean in recent years.
- China has been promoting its “Belt and Road” Initiative, and China’s support for the construction of port infrastructure in Indian Ocean countries as well as Pacific island countries could lead China to secure bases available for its military purpose. The Chinese military is possibly taking on the role of the shield behind the initiative by such means as the stabilization of areas via counter-piracy activities and the improvement of counter-terrorism capabilities in coastal states through joint exercises.

Relations with Countries and Regions

- There are various issues between the United States and China, such as trade issues, issues concerning the South China Sea, the Taiwan issue, the Hong Kong issue, and human rights issues regarding Uighur and Tibet.
- While the United States has been toughening its stance on China, China has maintained an uncompromising stance on its “core interests.” Concerning trade and military issues, mutually keep themselves in check between the United States and China.
- While the United States has continued and reinforced its engagement in Taiwan, China has repeatedly expressed its strong protest against Taiwan’s independence.
- Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen was reelected with the highest-ever number of votes and has reiterated her opposition to the “One country, Two Systems” principle, which China keeps in check.
- The Solomon Islands and Kiribati established diplomatic relations with China, and as a result, the number of countries having diplomatic relations with Taiwan declined to 15 from 22 in May 2016, when President Tsai took office.
- The overall military balance between China and Taiwan is shifting in favor of China, and the gap appears to be growing year by year. The United States continues selling arms (such as F-16 fighters) to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act.
- Moves to review projects have been seen among some countries cooperating in the “Belt and Road” Initiative, due to such factors as their deteriorating financial situation.
North Korea

Overview

- North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests so far, and is assessed to have already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads. In addition, North Korea repeatedly launches ballistic missiles in recent years at an unprecedented frequency, aiming to promote the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles and the enhancement of its operation capabilities. Such military trends in North Korea pose grave and imminent threats to Japan's security.

- At the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting held in June 2018, Chairman Kim expressed his intention to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but the second U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in February 2019 ended without any agreement being reached between the two countries.

- At the December 2019 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP, Chairman Kim announced the intention to continue developing strategic weapons until the United States rolls back its hostile policy towards North Korea.

Current Status of the Nuclear Development

- The possibility cannot be discounted that the sixth nuclear weapons test in September 2017 was of a hydrogen bomb.

- Given the technological maturity obtained through the past six nuclear tests, it is assessed that North Korea has already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads.

Current Status of the Missile Development

- Since 2016, North Korea has launched more than 70 ballistic missiles and others, and the following characteristics have been observed: (i) increase the firing range of ballistic missiles; (ii) enhance the accuracy, continuous fire capability, and operational capabilities necessary for saturation attacks; (iii) improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks; (iv) develop ballistic missiles that fly at low altitudes on irregular trajectories; and (v) diversify the forms of launches.

- In particular, North Korea has developed more advanced missile-related technologies in recent years. The three types of new short-range ballistic missiles that have been involved in a series of launches since May 2019 are distinctive in that they use solid fuel and fly at lower altitudes than conventional ballistic missiles. North Korea is thus believed to be trying to breach missile defense networks, and there are concerns that such advanced technologies will be applied to longer-range missiles.

- North Korea is relentlessly pursuing increasingly complex and diverse modes of attack and is steadily strengthening and improving its attack capabilities. These enhancements in its capabilities make early detection of the signs of a launch and the interception of the missiles more difficult, thereby posing new challenges for the information gathering, early warning, and interception postures of relevant countries, including Japan.

Current Status of Ship-to-Ship Transfer, etc.

- North Korea is presumed to be evading the UN Security Council sanctions by conducting ship-to-ship transfers on the high seas and other techniques, and it is pointed out that in 2019, North Korea illicitly imported a volume of petroleum products far in excess of the cap set by UN Security Council resolutions.
Overview

- Russia is modernizing its military equipment, including strategic nuclear forces, and is stepping up military activities, so close scrutiny of developments in this regard will be required.
- Regarding conventional forces, Russia is developing fifth generation fighters and heavy unmanned combat aerial vehicles, and is also stepping up its activities in the realms of space and electromagnetic spectrum.

Advancement in the Military Cooperation with China

- In July 2019, two Russian Tu-95 long-range bombers carried out joint air patrol with two Chinese H-6 bombers from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea.
- In September 2019, Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu and Vice Chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission Zhang, signed a package of documents on military and military-technical cooperation.
- The authorities of both countries clearly denied that they would form a military alliance, but attention should be paid to future developments in light of recent advancement in their military cooperation.

Activities in Japan’s Northern Territories and the Vicinity of Japan

- Russia continues to station AFRF in the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan, and has recently been increasing the AFRF’s activities.
- In June 2019, two Tu-95 long-range bombers flew around Japan, and intruded into Japan’s territorial airspace twice when they flew northward over the Pacific Ocean. In July, one Russian A-50 early warning and control aircraft intruded into Japan’s airspace above the territorial waters of Takeshima Island. In February 2020, two Su-34 fighter-bombers deployed to the Far East were observed for the first time.
- In October 2019, the Eastern Military District announced that drills to repel landings by a hypothetical enemy assault force were to be held in the Sakhalin and Primorsky regions, involving up to 8,000 personnel, more than 3,000 units of tanks and military equipment, and up to 50 planes and helicopters.
- Even amid the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic within the forces, military activities have remained active.
Part I
Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 2
Middle East, North Africa, and Other Regions

Overview

- The Middle East is a major source of energy supply for the world and contains major routes for international commerce. Japan is also dependent on the region for approximately 90% of its crude oil imports. Peace and stability in the Middle East region is extremely important for the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan.

- On the other hand, the Middle East and Africa region has been experiencing constant conflicts and unrest throughout the 20th century. In recent years, tensions have risen due to the situation in the Gulf region and the Middle East peace process.

- In some countries that experienced the Arab Spring, which occurred at the beginning of 2011, civil wars and the activities of terrorist organizations are ongoing.

Situation in the Gulf Region

- Opposing the resumption of sanctions by the United States, Iran has implemented its measures to reduce compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by stages since May 2019. The United Kingdom, France and Germany referred the developments to the JCPOA Joint Commission under the JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism. In response, Iran suggested the possibility of considering withdrawal from the NPT, but stated that if Europe observes the agreement, it would return to compliance with the agreement.

- Since May 2019, the United States has expanded the number of U.S. troops deployed to the Middle East in response to Iran’s threats. On the other hand, since October 2019, there have been multiple attacks on U.S. military bases in Iraq and one American was victimized, which triggered military retaliation between the United States and Iran. However, both countries clearly showed their intent to avoid further escalation.

- Since May 2019, sporadic events affecting the navigation safety of civilian vessels have occurred in the waters of the Middle East. The United States and other countries including European countries promote efforts to safeguard maritime security in the region.
  - The United States advocated the Maritime Security Initiative and subsequently established the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), in which seven countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, participate, in addition to the United States.
  - Eight European countries, including France, Denmark, and the Netherlands, issued a statement to politically support the creation of a European-led maritime surveillance mission in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH).

- Iran also presented a plan named HOPE (Hormuz Peace Endeavor) as an independent effort to maintain maritime security. In addition, Iran conducted the Maritime Safety Belt, the first trilateral military exercise with the Chinese and Russian navies in the Gulf of Oman and other areas.

Damage to an Iraqi military base hosting U.S. military caused by a ballistic missile attack by Iran [AFP/"Jiji"

An oil tanker on fire after having been attacked in the Gulf of Oman in June 2019 [EPA/"Jiji"]
Chapter 3

Trends Concerning New Domains and Relevant Challenges Facing the International Community

Military Science and Technology
- As civilian technologies have been rapidly developing, further technological innovation is expected to dramatically change battle scenes in the future.
- It has been pointed out that the rapid AI progress has been exerting a great impact on the military field, including the application for autonomous unmanned vehicles and the cyber domain, in addition to the improvement in data processing capacity.
- The United States indicates that China and Russia are developing advanced hypersonic weapons that challenge existing missile defense systems.
- High-power energy weapons, such as electromagnetic railguns, high-power laser weapons, and high-power microwaves, are being expected as a means to counter various airborne threats.

Space Domain
- Major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) functions.
- In outer space, various countries are promoting use thereof in order to maintain their own peace and security. It has also been noted that China and Russia have been enhancing capabilities to impede the United States and its allies from using outer space.
- In order to respond to these threats, countries are restructuring space-related organizations within their forces.

Cyber Domain
- Information and communications technology (ICT) advancements are further increasing the dependence of military forces on information and communications networks. For this reason, cyber attacks are recognized as an asymmetrical means to impede the military activities of adversaries at low cost. Many foreign military forces are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace.
- It has been pointed out that China and Russia are bolstering the offensive cyber capabilities of their militaries for the purpose of obstructing the network of adversaries’ military forces and destroying their infrastructure.
- Cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against information and communications networks of not only government organizations and military forces but also business corporations and academic organizations in various countries. Attacks attempting to steal critical technologies, secrets or personal information have also been confirmed.

Electromagnetic Domain
- Securing use of the electromagnetic spectrum is indispensable for the operation of communication equipment and radar systems. Major countries recognize electronic attacks for interrupting adversaries’ use of electromagnetic spectrum as an asymmetrical means to effectively hamper adversaries’ military performance, enhancing electronic warfare capabilities.
- China regularly conducts force-on-force exercises to effectively accomplish missions in complicated electromagnetic environments, thereby improving practical capabilities.
- It is reported that Russia used various electronic warfare systems in eastern Ukraine and Syria to interrupt adversaries’ command and control traffic and radar systems, improving electronic warfare capabilities.

COVID-19 Infection
- The COVID-19 infection poses not only sanitary problems but exerts influence broadly on society and economy of respective countries, revealing the vulnerability of supply chains and causing serious damage on local economies and concerns over prolonged economic sluggishness worldwide.
- Respective countries are utilizing their military forces’ sanitary capabilities and transportation capacity to deal with the infection domestically, and have also been contributing to the prevention of global spread of the infection. In the meantime, military training or bilateral/multilateral exercises have been suspended or postponed, and the infection has brought about diverse impacts and restrictions to military activities as well. If the spread of infection is further prolonged, this may exert various impacts on countries’ military capability.
- It is said that while actively providing medical goods and dispatching medical experts to countries where the infection is spreading, China has been making propaganda efforts in various manners, including the spread of disinformation, amid growing social uncertainties and confusion due to the spread of infection.
- The COVID-19 pandemic may expose and intensify strategic competition among countries intending to create international and regional orders more preferable to themselves and to expand their influence. We need to closely watch such moves with great concern as security issues.
To fulfill their mission of defending Japan, the MOD/SDF consists of various organizations, mainly the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as armed forces.

Location of Principal SDF Units (for illustrative purposes) (As of March 31, 2019)

Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense
The NSS developed in December 2013 specifies, as Japan’s fundamental principle of national security, that Japan will contribute more proactively than ever before to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while committed to continuing the path as a peace-loving nation, and seeking its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region from the perspective of a “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.

The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and Beyond (NDPG)

- The NDPG was approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet in December 2018.
- The NDPG establishes the posture of Japan’s defense forces and the level to achieve, envisioning approximately 10 years

### Changes in NDPG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976 NDPG</td>
<td>(October 29, 1976, the National Defense Council/Cabinet Meeting)</td>
<td>19 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 NDPG</td>
<td>(November 28, 1995, the Security Council/Cabinet Meeting)</td>
<td>9 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 NDPG</td>
<td>(December 10, 2004, the Security Council/Cabinet Meeting)</td>
<td>6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 NDPG</td>
<td>(December 17, 2010, the Security Council/Cabinet Meeting)</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 NDPG</td>
<td>(December 17, 2013, the National Security Council/Cabinet Meeting)</td>
<td>5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018 NDPG</td>
<td>(December 18, 2018, the National Security Council/Cabinet Meeting)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Basic Ideas in 1976 NDPG
- The concept of Basic Defense Capability
  - Maintain a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation preventing a power vacuum that destabilizes the region, rather than coping with a direct military threat to Japan

### Basic Ideas in 1995 NDPG
- Basically follow the concept of Basic Defense Capability
  - “Dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters” and “contributing to building a more stable security environment” added to the roles of defense capability, joining the existing role of "defense of the nation"

### Basic Ideas in 2004 NDPG
- Capability to work independently and proactively on implementing international peace cooperation activities, as well as dealing effectively with new threats and diverse contingencies
  - Succeeding the effective parts of the concept of Basic Defense Capability

### Basic Ideas in 2010 NDPG
- Build up of a Dynamic Defense Force (Not bound by the concept of Basic Defense Capability)
  - Facilitating effective deterrence of and responses to various contingencies, and making it possible to proactively conduct activities to further stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security environment in a dynamic manner

### Basic Ideas in 2013 NDPG
- Build up of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force
  - Defense force to be more thorough with the concept of joint operation, which enables the SDF to respond swiftly to the increasingly severe security environment and carry out various activities, such as achieving maritime supremacy and air superiority, seamlessly and flexibly

### Basic Ideas in 2018 NDPG
- Development of “Multi-domain Defense Force”
  - Truly effective defense capability that enables cross-domain operations organically fusing capabilities in all domains by strengthening not only those in traditional domains—land, sea and air—but also those in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum

### Relationship among the NSS, the NDPG, the MTDP, and the fiscal year budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSS</th>
<th>Basic Policy on National Security, centered around diplomatic and defense policies (approx. 10-year time frame)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NDPG</td>
<td>Prescribes future defense force and target levels of defense force that Japan should achieve (approx. 10-year time frame)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTDP</td>
<td>Indicate (limits of) five-year total expenditures and quantity of major equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual budget</td>
<td>Examine based on the current situations, appropriate annual budget as necessary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Japan’s Security and Defense Policy

Japan’s Basic Defense Policy

The following are set forth as national defense objectives:

- to create, on a steady-state basis, a security environment desirable for Japan by integrating and drawing on the strengths at the nation’s disposal;
- to deter threats from reaching Japan by making opponents realize that doing harm to Japan would be difficult and consequential; and
- should a threat reach Japan, to squarely counter the threat and minimize damage.

Under the basic precept of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, Japan will strengthen each of the means by which to successfully achieve these national defense objectives: Japan’s own architecture for national defense; the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and international security cooperation.

Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability

In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan will enhance priority capability areas as early as possible.

- Strengthening Capabilities Necessary for Cross-Domain Operations
  - Strengthening capabilities in the new domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum
  - Strengthening capabilities in the traditional domains, such as capabilities in maritime and air domains, stand-off defense capability, comprehensive air and missile defense capability, and maneuver and deployment capability
  - Strengthening sustainability and resiliency by promoting necessary measures for securing ammunition and fuel, ensuring maritime shipping lanes, and protecting important infrastructure.

- Strengthening core elements comprising defense capability
  - Strengthening core elements of defense capability by reinforcing the human resource base, technology base, and defense industrial base, reviewing equipment structure, etc.

Organization of Self-Defense Forces (SDF)

- Joint Operation to Realize Cross-Domain Operations
  - The SDF will establish new units in the domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, strengthen its posture, build comprehensive air and missile defense capability, and maintain a maritime transport unit as an integrated unit.

- Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)
  - The GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units furnished with advanced mobility and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and mobile operating units equipped with specialized functions. The GSDF will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats by taking measures including persistent steady-state maneuvers.
  - To be able to counter an invasion of remote islands, the GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units and hyper-velocity gliding projectile units for remote island defense.

- Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)
  - The MSDF will maintain reinforced destroyer units including a new type of destroyers (FFM), minesweeper units, and embarked patrol helicopter units, and will organize surface units. The MSDF will establish patrol ship units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan.
  - In order to conduct underwater ISR, and to engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, the MSDF will maintain reinforced submarine units.
  - In order to conduct wide-area airborne ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, the MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units.

- Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)
  - The ASDF will maintain ground-based warning and control units capable of conducting sustained surveillance in the airspace around Japan, and air warning and control units capable of conducting airborne warning, surveillance and control also during situations with heightened tensions, such as “gray-zone” situations.
  - The ASDF will maintain fighter aircraft units reinforced by high-performance fighter aircraft, and aerial refueling and transport units.
  - The ASDF will maintain unmanned aerial vehicle units which enable it to conduct information collection in areas remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions.

Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019–FY2023; MTDP)

- The MTDP sets forth the policy for the build-up of defense capability, and main projects for the five-year period from FY2019 to FY2023.
- In order to build a structure that is capable of realizing cross-domain operations, the SDF will conduct reorganization of its major units.
- The SDF will conduct programs to strengthen capabilities in both new and traditional domains.
- The SDF will conduct programs to strengthen core elements of defense capabilities, including reinforcement of the human resource base.
In FY2020, as the second year of the NDPG and the MTDP, the MOD/SDF will steadily implement initiatives toward building a Multi-domain Defense Force based on the NDPG and the MTDP.

### Main Projects of Build-up of Defense Capabilities in FY2020 (Priorities in strengthening capabilities necessary for cross-domain operations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capabilities that should be acquired and strengthened</th>
<th>Outline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capabilities in space domain</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Development of systems for Space Operations Squadron etc.</td>
<td>Procurement of SSA system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Procurement of SSA satellites (space-based optical telescopes)</td>
<td>Strengthening of information-gathering capability using outer space, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capabilities in cyber domain</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Enhancement of Cyber Defense Group, etc.</td>
<td>Enhancement and strengthening of the systems and networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Securing and development of cyber talents</td>
<td>Utilization of cutting-edge cyber technologies, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capabilities in electromagnetic domain</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Research and development of devices to neutralize the radar of opponents who intend to invade Japan, including development of standoff electronic warfare aircraft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strengthening of capabilities to minimize electromagnetic jamming from opponents who intend to invade Japan through procurement of fighters F-35AB with superior electronic protection capability, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Enhancement of systems of electronic warfare units, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capabilities in Maritime and Air Domains</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Procurement of P-1 patrol aircraft (x 3), Procurement of SH-60K patrol helicopters (x 7)</td>
<td>Establishment of Squadron for Aerial Refueling and Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Construction of destroyers (x 2), a submarine, and a minesweeping vessel</td>
<td>Establishment of F-35A squadron in Misawa Air Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establish a Temporal Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Unit (Tentative name)</td>
<td>Introduction of small UUV for underwater defense, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Partial refurbishment of Destroyer JS “IZUMO” for takeoff and landing by F-35B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Japan-led development of F-X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stand-off defense capability</strong></td>
<td>Procurement of stand-off missiles, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comprehensive air and missile defense capability</strong></td>
<td>Procurement of SM-3 Block IIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maneuver and deployment capability</strong></td>
<td>Procurement of type-16 mobile combat vehicles (x 33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainability and resilience</strong></td>
<td>Procurement of Type-20 5.56mm rifle (x 3,283)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defense-Related Expenditures in FY2020</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan must strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. To this end, in light of the NDPG and the MTDP, defense-related expenditures for FY2020 were increased by 61.8 billion yen from the previous fiscal year to 5.068 trillion yen (an increase of 1.2% from the previous year). Defense-related expenditures has increased for the eight consecutive years.

### Change in Defense-Related Expenditures (Past 15 years; Original Budget Basis)

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<th>(100 million)</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>47,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>46,826</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figures above do not include SACO-related expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), expenses for the introduction of new government aircraft, and expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention/reduction and national resilience. Including these expenses, total defense-related expenditures were as follows: 4,813.6 billion yen in FY2006, 4,801.3 billion yen in FY2007, 4,779.6 billion yen in FY2008, 4,774.1 billion yen in FY2009, 4,780.3 billion yen in FY2010, 4,775.2 billion yen in FY2011, 4,713.8 billion yen in FY2012, 4,735.8 billion yen in FY2013, 4,884.8 billion yen in FY2014, 4,980.1 billion yen in FY2015, 5,054.1 billion yen in FY2016, 5,125.1 billion yen in FY2017, 5,191.1 billion yen in FY2018, 5,257.4 billion yen in FY2019, and 5,313.3 billion yen.
### Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the Area Surrounding Japan

- The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) is engaged in persistent intelligence collection and warning and surveillance during peacetime over Japan’s territorial waters and airspace, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly.

- As part of its regular warning and surveillance activities in Japanese territorial waters, the SDF is carrying out information gathering on vessels suspected of violating the UN Security Council sanctions. During the period from 2018 to the end of March 2020, the SDF has observed 24 cases of seaborne rendezvous by (ship-to-ship transfer) North Korean vessels.

- In response to these illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers by North Korean vessels, the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and France carried out early warning surveillance activities with aircraft using the U.S. Kadena Air Base in Japan. In addition, naval vessels of the U.S. Navy, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and France carried out enforcement of United Nations Security Council sanctions imposed against North Korea in sea areas surrounding Japan.

### Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace

- The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) detects and identifies aircraft flying in airspace surrounding Japan using warning and control radars as well as early-warning and control aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft heading to Japan’s territorial airspace are detected, fighters and other aircraft scramble to approach them in order to confirm the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary.

- In FY2019, ASDF aircraft scrambled 947 times, the third largest ever recorded. Breaking this figure down, ASDF aircraft scrambled 675 times in response to Chinese aircraft, and 268 times in response to Russian aircraft.

### Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>1,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>1,766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>1,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>2,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>2,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>3,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>4,578</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Peaked during the Cold War
Defense of Japan including its Remote Islands

In response to attack on Japan including its remote islands, the SDF will quickly maneuver and deploy requisite units to block access and landing of invading forces while ensuring maritime and air superiority. Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, the SDF will block invading forces' access and landing from outside their threat envelopes. Should any part of the territory be occupied, the SDF will retake it by employing all necessary measures.

In order to strengthen its defense architecture in the southwestern region, a surface-to-air missile unit and a surface-to-ship guided missile unit were deployed to Miyakojima Island in March 2020. The GSDF will deploy an area security unit in charge of the initial response and other units also in Ishigaki Island.

As part of measures to enhance the persistent ISR posture, the ASDF established Airborne Warning and Control Wing by upgrading the Airborne Early Warning Group in March 2020 and will establish a temporal unmanned aerial vehicle unit (tentative name) within FY2020.

In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment of units, the MOD established a Tactical Airlift Wing that operates Osprey in March 2020.

Response to Missile Attacks

Currently, Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is an effective multi-layered defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis equipped destroyers and the lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE).

In order to effectively and efficiently counter increasingly complex and diverse airborne threats by optimum means and minimize damage, the SDF will establish a structure to conduct integrated operation of various equipment for missile defense and air defense equipment, thereby providing persistent nation-wide protection from peacetime and also enhancing the comprehensive air and missile defense capability that can simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats.

As for the introduction of the land-based Aegis system (Aegis Ashore), in June 2020, it was decided to suspend the process. Future direction will be examined based on the discussion at the NSC.

Responses in the Domains of Space, Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Spectrum

Responses in Space Domain

The MOD aims to establish SSA system by FY2022 to monitor and maintain an accurate picture of conditions in space. The MOD is also working to deploy radar to monitor threats to Japanese satellites, such as space debris, and its operating system.

In preparation for full-scale SSA operation and introduction of defense equipment, the ASDF established Space Operations Squadron in May 2020.

Response in Cyber Domain

The MOD/SDF has taken comprehensive measures to ensure the safety of information and communication systems and respond to cyber attacks by a specialized unit, etc.

The Cyber Defense Group will be further expanded by about 70 personnel to approximately 290 in FY2020.
Three Pillars of Japan’s Defense
(Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense)

Response in Electromagnetic Domain

- The MOD/SDF will: enhance its ability to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic spectrum; strengthen information collection and analysis capabilities related to electromagnetic spectrum, and develop an information sharing posture; and strengthen capabilities to neutralize the radar and communications of opponents who intend to invade Japan.

- In addition to the establishment of the GSDF Electronic Warfare Unit, in FY2020, the SDF will also proceed with development of standoff electronic warfare aircraft for jamming, and R&D aimed at the procurement of potentially game-changing technologies, such as high-power microwave devices and a high-energy laser system (HEL).

Efforts of the MOD/SDF in response to the Spread of Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)

- In order to prevent the spread of COVID-19, the MOD/SDF gathered all their strength to carry out various activities. None of the SDF personnel engaged in the activities got infected (as of May 31, 2020.)

- In addition to activities in the cruise ship Diamond Princess, the MOD/SDF implemented disaster relief pertaining to rescue for prevention of the spread of COVID-19, disaster relief for reinforcement of border control against COVID-19, and education on infection protection for employees of the local governments.

- The SDF hospitals and the National Defense Medical College Hospital (NDMCH) have been accepting COVID-19 patients. A clinical trial of Avigan (favipiravir) tablets was also started.

- The MOD/SDF disclosed protective measures of “JSDF’s standards” in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19. At the same time, through the ministerial telephone conversations, the defense authorities shared information, lessons learned and knowledge obtained primarily while taking infection control measures.

Response to Large-Scale Disasters

- The SDF works in collaboration with local governments, engaged in various activities such as the search and rescue of disaster victims and ships and aircraft in distress, and preventing epidemics. In FY2019, the SDF conducted 449 disaster relief operations, including the disaster relief in response to the flooding caused by heavy rain accompanying a front in August 2019 (Northern Kyushu Heavy Rain), the 2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai) and the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis).

- At the beginning of a disaster, the SDF will maintain response readiness to any damage and need for activities while giving the first priority to life-saving activities. For livelihood support, the SDF will coordinate the division of roles, response policy, activity period, and other matters with relevant parties including the local governments and ministries concerned at the local response headquarters, etc.

- The SDF strengthened dissemination of information so that people can easily access the information related to support.

Information Gathering Activities for Ensuring the Safety of Japan-related Vessels in the Middle East

- In order to ensure peace and stability in the Middle East and the safety of Japan-related vessels, as a part of Japan’s independent initiative, the Cabinet decided to dispatch MSDF vessels for the purpose of gathering information and to utilize the existing counter-piracy unit.

- On January 11, 2020, two P-3C (fixed-wing patrol aircraft) left Japan to replace the counter-piracy unit and began information gathering activities on the 20th. Destroyer JS “Takanami” left port on February 2 and began information gathering activities in the field on February 26. On May 10, 2020, Destroyer JS “Kirisame” left Japan to replace “Takanami.”
Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

- The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which marked the 60th anniversary in 2020, together with Japan’s own national defense architecture, constitute a cornerstone for Japan’s national security.
- The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as its core, plays a significant role for peace, stability and prosperity of not only Japan but also the Indo-Pacific region and the international community.

Outline of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

The Guidelines manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies.

Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States

- Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting
  At the meeting held in New York on September 25, 2019, the leaders reaffirmed the recognition that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is stronger than ever before, and shared the view on continuing to further strengthen the unwavering Japan-U.S. Alliance.
- Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting
  At the meeting held in Washington D.C. on January 14, 2020, Minister of Defense Kono explained the cabinet decision made in December 2019, which is to send the SDF to the Middle East, and Japan and the United States have confirmed the following points:
  - The Ministers confirmed that we have to avoid further escalation of the situation in the Middle East;
  - The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missiles of all ranges;
  - The Ministers confirmed that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, and work together to make sure that the rule of law and the freedom of navigation are firmly established;
  - The Ministers confirmed that they continue to closely work together to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond, and to materialize the aligned strategies of both countries;
  - The Ministers reaffirmed that they cooperate with various partners, including conducting joint exercises and capacity building to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific with Japan-U.S. Alliance being the cornerstone;
  - The Ministers confirmed to work closely together for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives, including the acquisition of Mageshima, a candidate site for a permanent FCLP facility;
  - The Ministers confirmed that the relocation to Henokosaki is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma, and;
  - The Ministers reaffirmed that Japan and the United States continue to work together with the shared recognition that understanding and cooperation from the local communities is crucial for the maintenance of operational readiness of the USFJ.

Strengthening Ability of Japan-U.S. Alliance to Deter and Counter Threats

In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security, Japan and the United States are advancing cooperation in various fields, including “Cooperation in Space and Cyber Domains,” “Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense,” “Bilateral Training and Exercises,” “ISR Activities,” “Maritime Security,” “Logistics Support,” and “Cooperation in Response to a Large-Scale Disaster in Japan.”
Three Pillars of Japan’s Defense
(Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense)

Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas

In order to create a desirable security environment including maintaining and enhancing free and open maritime order, and with an eye on increasing Japanese and U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan and the United States are conducting bilateral activities in such areas as “Maritime Security,” “Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief,” and “Trilateral and Multilateral Training and Exercises,” and promoting cooperation in the areas of “Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation” and “Joint/Shared Use.”

Steady Implementation of Measures Concerning the USFJ

The presence of USFJ provides deterrence, while on the other hand, given the impacts of the stationing of the USFJ on the living environment of the local residents, it is necessary to make efforts appropriate for the actual situation of each area in order to mitigate the impacts.

Stationing of the USFJ

It is necessary to maintain the presence of the USFJ and its readiness to make rapid and agile responses in case of emergency in Japan and its surrounding areas even in peacetime, so that Japan-U.S. Alliance based on Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements provides enough as a deterrence contributing to the peace and stability of the defense of Japan and the region.

Therefore, Japan accepts the stationing of the U.S. Forces based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and it is a cornerstone of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa

Approximately 70% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 8% of the land area of the prefecture and approximately 14% of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, it is necessary to make utmost efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, while also considering the above-mentioned security standpoints.

Regarding distribution of functions offered by MCAS Futenma, the development of facilities is being promoted to transfer the function of accepting transient aircraft in contingencies to Tsuiki Air Base and Nyutabaru Air Base.

For the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility, the land-fill operation has been carried out in the waters south of Camp Schwab. In April 2020, the Okinawa Defense Bureau submitted to Okinawa Prefecture an application for change of land-fill work related to addition of the work to improve the soil foundation, etc., based on the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface.

The following progress has been made involving the return of USFJ land:

- March 2015: West Futenma Housing Area within Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) (approximately 51 ha) was returned.
- December 2016: A major portion of the Northern Training Area (approximately 4,000 ha) was returned. This is the largest of its kind since the reversion of Okinawa to the mainland.
- July 2017: A portion of MCAS Futenma (approximately 4 ha along Ginowan City road 11) was returned.
- March 2018: A portion of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (approximately 3 ha of land to expand Route 58) was returned.
- March 2019: A portion of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (approximately 2 ha of land near Gate 5) was returned.
- March 2020: Portions of land at Camp Zukeran (Warehouse Area of Facilities and Engineering Compound) (approximately 11 ha) were returned.

Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa

In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing measures to secure the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces by maintaining its deterrence and trying to mitigate the impact on local communities, such as realignment of USFJ and its facilities and areas.

As a permanent FCLP facility, in December 2019, the MOD acquired more than half of the land on Mageshima in Nishinoomote City, Kagoshima Prefecture, and is conducting various surveys in preparation for the development of SDF facilities.
The MOD/SDF will create a desirable security environment for Japan by promoting multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation.

**Strategic Promotion of Multi-Faceted and Multi-Layered Defense Cooperation**

**Efforts under the Vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”**

### Three pillars of the vision

(i) Promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation and free trade

(ii) Pursuit of economic prosperity (improving connectivity, etc.)

(iii) Commitment to peace and stability

MOD's Approach to the Vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”

1. Securing the stable use of major sea lanes by way of defense cooperation and exchange activities
2. Preventing contingencies through confidence building and mutual understanding
3. Contributing to peace and stability through active engagement in the region, in cooperation with partner countries

The Indo-Pacific region is the center of the world vitality, and home to more than half the world’s population. It is important to establish this region as a free and open global commons to secure peace and prosperity in the region as a whole.

In order to promote a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” the MOD/SDF will strengthen defense cooperation and exchanges with countries in the region.

### Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

- **Australia**: In November 2019, a Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting was held. The Ministers agreed to deepen and expand bilateral defense cooperation.

- **India**: In September 2019, a Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting was held. In November of the same year, a Defense Ministerial Meeting and the first Japan-India 2+2 Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting were held. The Ministers reiterated their commitment to advance bilateral security cooperation.

- **ASEAN**: In November 2019, at the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting, Vientiane Vision 2.0, an updated version of Vientiane Vision, was announced. Meetings with the defense ministers of each country were held.

- **ROK**: In November 2019, the ROK government announced the suspension of the notification to terminate the Japan-ROK GSOMIA. In response, Defense Minister commented that Japan-U.S. and Japan-ROK bilateral cooperation and Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation are important amid the severe security environment in East Asia, and that he considered that the ROK government made its decision from a strategic perspective taking into account the current security situation in the region.

- **European countries, Canada, and New Zealand**: Meetings with the defense ministers of European countries and New Zealand were held on the occasion of the ADMM-Plus in November 2019, and meetings with the defense ministers of European countries and Canada were held at the Munich Security Conference in February 2020. In October 2019, the Chief of Staff, GSDF visited Canada for the first time.

- **China**: In October 2019, the Chinese vessel visited Japan for the first time in about 10 years. In December of the same year, Defense Minister visited China for the first time in 10 years and held a meeting with China’s Defense Minister.

- **Russia**: In August and September 2019, the GSDF band participated for the first time in the Spasskaya Tower International Military Music Festival in Moscow. In November of the same year, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy visited Japan for the first time in 18 years.

- **Pacific Island Countries**: From January to February 2020, State Minister of Defense visited Fiji, PNG, and Tonga for the first time as a political officer of the Ministry of Defense.

- **Middle Eastern Countries**: Defense Minister attended the Manama Dialogue held in November and the Doha Forum in December 2019 for the first time as a Japanese Defense Minister. In addition, the Minister visited Jordan and Oman for the first time and held defense ministerial meetings. He also had telephone conversations with defense ministers of various other countries in the Middle East.

*U.K.*

*France*

*Other European countries*

*Japan*

*U.S.*

*Canada*

*South Asia*

*Middle East and Africa*

*Indian Ocean*

*Pacific Ocean*

*Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (November 2019)*

*Japan-India “2+2” (November 2019)*

*State Minister of Defense Yamamoto talking with Minister for Defence, National Security and Foreign Affairs of Fiji (January 2020)*
Part III

Three Pillars of Japan’s Defense
(Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense)

Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation

- Multilateral framework initiatives, such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)-Plus and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have made steady progress and served as an important foundation for dialogue and cooperation and exchanges on the security of Asia-Pacific. Based on Vientiane Vision 2.0, a guideline for future ASEAN-Japan defense cooperation, in addition to bilateral cooperation, Japan has strengthened cooperation under multilateral frameworks.
- Japan has contributed to the enhancement of multilateral cooperation in the region by holding the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum and the Tokyo Defense Forum annually.
- Moreover, Japan has proactively participated in international conferences hosted by international organizations and private organizations, as well as service-to-service exchange initiatives.

Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building

- Since 2012, the MOD/SDF has provided capacity building in such areas as HA/DR, peacekeeping operations (PKO), and maritime security to 15 countries and one organization in the Asia-Pacific and other regions.
- In 2019, the number of capacity building programs conducted by means of dispatch was 126 (11 countries, 20 officials), and the number of those conducted by means of invitation was 75 (four countries, one organization and six trainees).
- Specifically, from September to October 2019, Japan has provided guidance on techniques to PNG Military Band, which participated in the Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo in Australia, hosted by the United Kingdom. In addition, Japan implemented programs in Laos, Mongolia, Cambodia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Myanmar, Djibouti and other countries.

Ensuring Maritime Security

- For Japan, a maritime nation, strengthening the order based on fundamental norms, such as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as ensuring safe maritime transport, is the foundation for its peace and prosperity, which is extremely important.
- The SDF has been dispatching the Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement, the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement, and the Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement since 2009 in order to protect vessels from acts of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.
- In addition to strengthening cooperation with coastal states of the Indo-Pacific region through exercises and port calls, the MOD has been implementing capacity building in maritime security of coastal countries, and working on cooperation for maritime security within regional security dialogue frameworks such as the ADMM-Plus.

Cooperation in Use of Space and Cyber Domains

- Regarding cooperation in the use of space domain, the MOD/SDF has taken part in the annual SSA multinational tabletop exercise (Global Sentinel) and the Schriever Wargame, a multinational tabletop exercise on space security, hosted by the U.S. Forces.
- Regarding cooperation in the use of cyber domain, the MOD has held cyber dialogues with the respective defense authorities of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and others. In December 2019, Japan formally participated for the first time in the cyber defense exercise hosted by NATO, in which Japan used to participate as observer. Additionally, the SDF is expanding its scope of cooperation such as by holding a follow-up seminar for cybersecurity personnel of the People’s Army of Vietnam.
**Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation**

- The proliferation of WMDs and missiles that can deliver them, as well as the proliferation of not only conventional arms but also goods and sensitive technologies of potential military use, pose a pressing challenge to the peace and stability of the international community. International discussions related to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) are also under way.
- Since April 2018 the MOD/SDF has been sending a personnel as a member of the Group of Experts of the 1540 Committee established pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (adopted in April 2004) to prevent the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery to non-state actors.

**Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities**

The MOD/SDF has been proactively undertaking international peace cooperation activities working in tandem with diplomatic initiatives, including the use of ODA for resolving the fundamental causes of conflicts, terrorism and other problems.

**Dispatch to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)**

- In April 2019, the Government of Japan decided to dispatch staff officers, and later two staff officers were dispatched to the MFO headquarters as the first “Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security.”
- The dispatched officers engage in liaison and coordination between Egypt and Israel, and the MFO as a Deputy Chief of Liaison and an Assistant Liaison Operation Officer at the MFO headquarters, which is located in the south camp at Sharm El-Sheikh in the southern part of the Sinai Peninsula.

**Dispatch to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)**

- The peace and stability of South Sudan is not only essential for the country itself; but also for the peace and stability in Africa as a whole, as well as a crucial issue that should be dealt with by the international community.
- Japan currently dispatches four officers (logistics, information database, engineering, and aviation operations officers) to the UNMISS headquarters.

**Support to the UN Triangular Partnership Project (UNTTP)**

- The UNTTP was founded using funds from Japan as a project to support training for military engineers and the procurement of heavy equipment by the UN DOS. Japan has been dispatching a total of 164 GSDF personnel to Africa to provide nine training sessions for a total of 277 members from eight African countries.
- Considering that 30% or more of PKO personnel are from Asia, Japan has been implementing the projects in Asia and the surrounding regions.
- In addition, given that strengthening sanitation capacity to ensure the safety of deployed personnel has become an issue in UN peacekeeping operations, medical training was implemented in October 2019.

**International Disaster Relief Activities**

- To contribute to the advancement of international cooperation, the SDF has engaged in international disaster relief activities proactively from the viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and improvement of the global security environment.
- In recent years, international disaster relief activities were carried out from November to December 2019 in response to the heavy rains and floods in the republic of Djibouti and from January to February 2020 in response to the major bush fires in Australia.
Reinforcing Human Resource Base

The NDPG specifies that the core element of defense capability is SDF personnel, and that securing human resources for SDF personnel and improving their ability and morale are essential to strengthening defense capability. This has become an imminent challenge in the face of shrinking and aging population with declining birth rates. Also in light of the sustainability and resilience of defense capability, the SDF needs to work even further to reinforce the human resource base that sustains the defense capability.

Effective Use of Human Resources

The NDPG and others plan to raise the mandatory early retirement age by one year during the period of the MTDP from 2020, and another one year during the period of the next MTDP in stages for each rank. The retirement age of personnel from the rank of Ichii (Captain (GSDF, ASDF)/Lieutenant (MSDF)) to Isso (Master Sergeant (GSDF, ASDF)/Petty Officer 1st Class (MSDF)) was raised in 2020. In addition, in order to ensure an operating ratio with a limited number of personnel, the crew system was introduced in some MSDF vessels, where some crews take shifts to increase the number of operation days. The introduction of this crew system to new types of destroyers (FFM) is being considered.

Improvement of Living and Work Environment and Treatment

The SDF will steadily renew aged everyday life/workplace fixtures, secure the necessary quantities of everyday necessities in addition to accelerating the securing and reconstruction of the necessary barracks and housing, and proceed with measures against aging and earthquake proofing of facilities. In addition, the SDF will improve their treatment based on the special nature of their missions and work environment. Specifically, in order to ensure appropriate treatment in accordance with the risk and special nature of their missions and the characteristics of the area of the office, the SDF will make improvements to special work allowance, etc. and procure portable beds and better emergency rations to improve their ability to respond to disasters.

Further Promotion of Work-Life Balance and Women’s Participation

Working Style Reform

The MOD/SDF is promoting correction of long working hours and encouraging taking leave to ensure proper work-life balance so that every member can exert his/her full potential.

Women’s Participation

In terms of employing and promoting female SDF personnel, the MOD/SDF sets out a personnel management policy to ensure equal opportunity between men and women and assign the right person to the right place based on the person’s motivation and ability/aptitude. In December 2019, a woman assumed the role of commanding officer of an Aegis destroyer for the first time, promoting active participation of female SDF personnel. In addition, the MOD/SDF has been reviewing the restriction of assignment of female personnel. With the removal of the restriction on female assignments in submarines in December 2018, assignment restriction against females was completely removed with the exception of the units where female personnel cannot be assigned for reasons of maternity protection (a part of the GSDF Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit [chemical] and Tunnel Company Units).
Reinforcing Technology Base

- Review of the Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook is now underway in order to ensure Japan’s technological superiority in the strategically important equipment and technology field, including technologies pertaining to new domains and other potentially game-changing important technologies.
- As for development of the fighter (F-X), improving technological reliability and reducing the development cost, the MOD is pursuing the best approach to realize Japan led development with international cooperation in sight.

Optimizing Equipment Procurement

- The MOD has been promoting effective and efficient equipment acquisition by selecting 18 items for major programs designated for project management. At the same time, the MOD strives to cut equipment procurement costs by making bulk orders utilizing long-term contracts.
- To enhance the level of performance management, the MOD makes every effort. The specific efforts include constant monitoring of goods and service deliveries from both sides, facilitating the internal management system concerning the execution process of FMS procurement, and strengthening cooperation with the U.S. government through close Japan-U.S. consultations.

Strengthening Defense Industrial Base

- In order to strengthen Japan’s defense industrial base, the MOD identifies four lines of effort: (1) reforming the existing contract system towards creating a competitive environment among defense companies; (2) strengthening risk management of supply chain for defense equipment; (3) further participation of Japan’s defense industry in sustainment and maintenance of imported equipment, etc.; and (4) promoting appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.

Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

- Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with other countries in order to contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of technological and industrial bases, as well as contributing to the promotion of our national security, peace and international cooperation.
  - Transfer of parts and maintenance equipment of the UH-1H utility helicopters to the Philippines started in March 2019, and was completed in September 2019.
  - From the viewpoint of promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation, the ATLA has participated in international defense equipment exhibitions. Moreover, the Public-Private Defense Industry Forum was held with the Philippines and other countries.

Core Elements Comprising Defense Capability, etc.

Chapter 3

Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities

For formulating defense policy accurately in response to the changes in the situation and for operating defense capabilities effectively in dealing with various situations, it is necessary to grasp medium- to long-term military trends in the neighboring countries of Japan and to detect the indications of various situations promptly. To this end, the MOD/SDF is making efforts to collect information swiftly and accurately daily by using various methods.

Examples of intelligence collection means used by the MOD/SDF include: (1) collecting, processing and analyzing military communications and signals emanating from electronic weapons in the air over Japan; (2) collecting, processing, and analyzing data from various imagery satellites (including Information Gathering Satellite); (3) surveillance activities by ships, aircraft and other assets; (4) collecting and organizing a variety of open source information; (5) information exchanges with defense organizations of other nations; and (6) intelligence collection conducted by defense attachés and other officials.

Chapter 4

Elements that Sustain Defense Capability

SDF Training

Training and exercise conducted by units in each service can be broadly divided into training for individual SDF personnel to improve the necessary proficiency for their respective fields, and training and exercise for units to enhance their systematic capabilities. Training for individuals is conducted one-on-one in stages based on occupational specialties and individual ability. Training and exercise for units is conducted depending on the size of unit, from small to large; meanwhile, large-scale comprehensive training including coordination between units is also conducted.

In order to effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance its deterrence effectiveness, based on the NDPG and MTDP, SDF’s joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises are to be conducted in a tailored and visible way. While leveraging the lessons learned from these training and exercises, the SDF is conducting regular studies and reviews of its plans to address contingencies.

Enhancement of Medical Functions

For the SDF to perform its mission, SDF personnel must remain in good health through appropriate health management. Also, it is important for the SDF to make continued efforts to enhance and strengthen its capabilities in military medicine for maximally protecting the lives of the personnel who respond to a variety of services.

Under the circumstances where the SDF’s missions are becoming more diverse and internationalized, it is important to appropriately and accurately carry out various medical activities, such as medical support in disaster relief and international peace keeping activities, and capacity building in the medical field.

Efforts of the MOD/SDF in response to the spread of COVID-19, the SDF hospitals and the National Defense Medical College Hospital (NDMCH) have been accepting COVID-19 patients since February 1, 2020. As of May 31, the SDF Central Hospital, the SDF hospitals in Sapporo, Yokosuka, Hanshin, Fukuoka, and Kumamoto, and the NDMCH accepted 430 COVID-19 patients.
Collaboration with Local Communities

The MOD/SDF conducts various cooperation activities to support the lives of citizens, including the disposal of unexploded ordnance and underwater mines. At the Sokuirei-Seiden-no-gi (Ceremony of the Enthronement of His Majesty the Emperor at the Seiden [State Hall]), a national event, the GSDF presented ceremonies. As for Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games to be held in 2021, SDF athletes are going to participate in the games. In addition, the MOD/SDF would take security measures, including warning and surveillance over Japan’s territorial waters and airspace, including the area around the venues, relief provisions for victims in an event of a large-scale terrorist attack, and response to cyber attacks.

Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas

In order to promote harmony between defense facilities and surrounding areas, the MOD has taken measures to prevent, reduce or mitigate aircraft noise and other impacts caused by activities or by the establishment/operation of airport and other defense facilities in the surrounding area.

For stable stationing of the USFJ, it is essential to develop understanding and cooperation of the local governments and residents in vicinities of U.S. bases. The MOD will work to constantly take various other measures, including coordination for unit operation of the USFJ with the local governments and other parties, provision of subsidies pertaining to the USFJ realignment, immediate report to the local governments in cases of an incident or accident, and exchange promotion between the USFJ and local residents.

Moreover, in response to the acceleration of domestic and overseas initiatives to achieve sustainable global environment, the MOD, as a member of the government, also needs to contribute to solving environmental problems, while at the same time implementing measures with more focus on the coexistence of SDF/USFJ facilities and areas with surrounding areas.

Events and PR Facilities

The MOD/SDF conducts activities to widely inform nationals of the current circumstances of the SDF. These activities include the GSDF Fuji Fire Power Exercise, cruises to experience MSDF vessels, and demonstration flights and boarding experiences on aircraft. Furthermore, as part of the commemoration of the SDF anniversary, the SDF Marching Festival is held at Nippon Budokan arena every year. In 2019 the festival was held in Gymnasium 1 of the National Yoyogi Stadium due to renovation of Nippon Budokan, and approximately 38,500 visitors in total came.

Initiatives for Public Document Management and Information Disclosure

The MOD/SDF is working for proper management and response to requests for information disclosure by reforming the awareness of personnel and the organization culture, enhancing the checking framework, for example.
Part I

Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 1
Overview

Chapter 2
Defense Policies of Countries

Chapter 3
Trends Concerning New Domains including Outer Space, Cyberspace, and Electromagnetic Spectrum, and Relevant Challenges Facing the International Community
"Gray-Zone Situations" and "Hybrid Warfare"

The so-called gray-zone situations simply represent a wide range of situations that are neither peacetime nor wartime.

In a gray-zone situation, for example, a country that confronts another over territory, sovereignty or maritime and other economic interests uses some forceful organization to demonstrate its presence in the relevant disputed region in a bid to alter the status quo or force other countries to accept its assertions or demands.

The so-called hybrid warfare represents methods to alter the status quo while intentionally blurring the boundaries between the military and non-military realms, forcing affected actors to take complex measures not limited to military actions.

The means of hybrid warfare include operations using military units of unidentified nationality, cyberattacks to affect communications and other critical infrastructure, the spread of false information through the internet and the media, and other influential operations. The combination of these measures is considered as amounting to hybrid warfare. In hybrid warfare, a country takes measures that are difficult to identify definitively as an “armed attack” based on its outward appearance. It is said that such an approach is taken with an intent to make it difficult for the target country to address the situation, such as delaying the military’s initial response, while denying the attacker country’s own involvement.

Amid emerging inter-state competition, hybrid warfare and other various measures tend to cause gray-zone situations to last for a long period of time.
technologies will have a major impact on improvements in the military capabilities of each country. Further technological innovations hereafter are expected to make it difficult still to foresee future warfare.

Thirdly, security challenges, which cannot be dealt with by a single country alone, are prominently emerging.

First of all, securing the stable use of new domains such as space and cyberspace has become an important challenge for the security of the international community. In recent years, countries are moving ahead with a reinforcement of their comprehensive ability to combat cyber attacks. There are also moves seen in the international community to promote the rule of law in space and cyberspace, including an establishment of certain norms of behavior.

In the maritime domain, there have been cases where a country unilaterally claims its entitlement and takes actions based on its own assertions that are incompatible with the existing international order, thereby unduly infringing upon the freedom of navigation in high seas and of overflight. In addition, piracy acts have taken place in various parts of the world.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), such as nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and of ballistic missiles that serve as the means of delivery of WMDs, and international terrorism are still viewed as significant threats to the international community.

Moreover, COVID-19 (coronavirus disease 2019), which emerged since the end of 2019, has become a challenge that should be addressed through cooperation across the international community. How to deal with the spread of COVID-19 is not only an issue of responding to an infectious disease, but it also affects states’ economic activities. As it is also generating various effects and constraints on states’ military activities, it is necessary to pay attention to the impact on the security front.

Military powers with high quality and quantity are concentrated in Japan’s surroundings, where clear trends such as further military buildup and an increase in military activities are observed.

States in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, abound in political, economic, ethnic, and religious diversity. Also, each country has different security views and threats perceptions. Therefore, a regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized, and longstanding issues of territorial rights and reunification in this region continue to remain.

In the Korean Peninsula, the Korean people have been divided for more than half a century, and the faceoff continues between the military forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea. Issues are existing concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea. Furthermore, with regard to Japan, territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of which are inherent parts of the territory of Japan, remain unresolved.

On top of this, recent years have seen a continued tendency towards the prolongation of so-called gray-zone situations, or situations that are neither pure peacetime situations nor contingencies and are associated with territories, sovereignty and economic interests, and such situations may increase and expand in the future. The gray-zone situations harbor the risk of rapidly developing into more serious situations without any clear forewarning.
Military Forces in Major Countries/Regions (Approximate Strength)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground forces (10,000 troops)</th>
<th>Maritime Forces</th>
<th>Air forces (aircraft)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. India</strong></td>
<td><strong>1. United States</strong></td>
<td><strong>1. United States</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>689 (980)</td>
<td>3,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. North Korea</strong></td>
<td><strong>2. Russia</strong></td>
<td><strong>2. China</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>205 (1,130)</td>
<td>3,020</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3. China</strong></td>
<td><strong>3. China</strong></td>
<td><strong>3. Russia</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>197 (750)</td>
<td>1,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. United States</strong></td>
<td><strong>4. United Kingdom</strong></td>
<td><strong>4. India</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>66 (130)</td>
<td>890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Pakistan</strong></td>
<td><strong>5. India</strong></td>
<td><strong>5. ROK</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>48 (320)</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>40 (260)</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7. ROK</strong></td>
<td><strong>7. Indonesia</strong></td>
<td><strong>7. North Korea</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8. Vietnam</strong></td>
<td><strong>8. ROK</strong></td>
<td><strong>8. Taiwan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>26 (240)</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>23 (180)</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10. Russia</strong></td>
<td><strong>10. Turkey</strong></td>
<td><strong>10. Pakistan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>22 (200)</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>—. Japan</strong></td>
<td><strong>—. Japan</strong></td>
<td><strong>—. Japan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>50 (140)</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Notes)

1. Figures for ground forces are basically the numbers of Army personnel in “The Military Balance 2020.” Figures for naval vessels show their tonnages compiled by the MO Def based on “Jane’s Fighting Ships 2019-2020.” Figures for combat aircraft are the total numbers of bombers, fighters, attack aircraft and surveillance aircraft, etc. compiled by the MO Def based on “The Military Balance 2020.”

2. Figures for Japan indicate the strength of each SDF as of the end of FY2019; the number of combat aircraft (air forces) is the sum of ASDF aircraft (excluding transport aircraft) and MSDF aircraft (fixed-wing aircraft only).

* Figures are rounded off to the nearest 10,000 personnel. Figures for the United States include 490,000 Army personnel and 190,000 Marines personnel. Figures for Russia include 50,000 airborne unit personnel in addition to 280,000 ground force personnel. Figures for Iran include 560,000 ground force personnel of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in addition to 300,000 Army personnel.
Countries in this region abound in political, economic, ethnic, and religious diversity and views on security and the perceptions of threats are different by country.

- A regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized.
  - (NATO’s collective defense in Europe)
- Longstanding issues of territorial rights and reunification in this region continue to remain.
  - (e.g. Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, South China Sea)
- Inter-state competition across the political, economic and military realms is prominently emerging in recent years.
  - Gray-zone situations may increase and expand, which harbors the risk of developing into graver situations.

(Note) Figures for modern destroyers and frigates for China show the total number of Luhu-class, Luhai-class, Sovremenny-class, Luyang-class, and Luzhou-class destroyers and Jiangwei-class and Jiangkai-class frigates. Additionally, China has 42 Jiangdao-class corvettes (in 2020).
It has been pointed out that the Trump administration, which was inaugurated in January 2017, has significantly changed the patterns of U.S. involvement in the world under the “America First” policy. On the other hand, it can be considered that while the United States is focusing on global competition, the United States has been continuing to play a role for world peace and stability with its comprehensive national power, the largest in the world, based on its belief that the values and influence of the United States, bolstered by its power, would make the world freer, safer, and more prosperous.

The United States branded China and Russia as revisionist powers in its strategy documents outlining the administration’s national security and defense policies, as well as it has clarified its intention to focus on strategic competition with those two countries and has been moving forward with various initiatives aimed at translating such policies into action.

The United States has clearly indicated its willingness to place the greatest emphasis on the security of the Indo-Pacific region to deter China in particular, and has set out a policy of prioritizing the allocation of military forces to the region. The United States has also clarified its stance that it will build new and stronger bonds with nations that share its values across the region and maintain a forward military presence in the region, in order to advance the U.S. vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. In terms of actions focused on China, it is reported that U.S. naval vessels carried out repeated “Freedom of Navigation Operations” in the South China Sea and transit through the Taiwan Strait, and that the United States imposed sanctions on a Chinese military organ and a leader. In August 2019, the U.S. government notified Congress of its intention to sell fighter jets to Taiwan for the first time in 27 years.

The United States is also sharpening its deterrence stance against China through such moves as imposing tariffs on Chinese hi-tech products, heightening scrutiny of Chinese investment in the United States, and tightening measures aimed at preventing technology theft and ensuring competitiveness in fields where there is a risk of technology being diverted to military uses. Congress is maintaining its bipartisan support for the administration’s stance on China, instructing the U.S. government in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 to update its strategy to counter China’s malign influence, as well as expressing its desire to support improvements in Taiwan’s national defense capability, and prohibiting the use and procurement of Chinese-manufactured drones by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD).

The United States has positioned deterrence against Russia in Europe as the next-highest priority in its national defense strategy after deterrence against China in the Indo-Pacific region. In December 2018, immediately after Russia detained the crew members of Ukrainian naval vessels in the Kerch Strait, the United States conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations in the vicinity of Peter the Great Gulf for the first time since 1987. In light of Russian...
actions concerning Ukraine, the United States has sought to strengthen involvement in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security and deterrence by deploying U.S. Forces in Eastern Europe and substantially increasing investment in the European Deterrence Initiative—a program intended to increase the U.S. military presence in Europe—compared with the sums invested under the previous administration. The United States is also undertaking initiatives focused on the development and deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons to fill the capability gap in relation to Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Under the recognition that actions and policies by North Korea, —named in the strategy documents as a “rogue regime”—to pursue nuclear and missile programs constitute an extraordinary threat to the United States, it has maintained sanctions and continues its efforts to pursue the complete denuclearization of North Korea.

Although the United States has set out a policy of prioritizing the allocation of military forces to the Indo-Pacific region and Europe, while reducing forces in the Middle East and Africa, it has also been dealing with security issues in the latter regions and it would be hard to describe the transition in the U.S. force posture as a smooth one. In the Middle East, in response to the offensive from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other organizations in Iraq and Syria since 2014, the United States, since August 2014, has led Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), a military operation against ISIL that includes airstrikes. The March 2019 announcement that the United States had liberated all the Iraqi and Syrian territory previously controlled by ISIL was followed in October that year by the announcement that ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was dead after an operation by U.S. Forces. Of the forces involved in OIR, the U.S. Forces deployed in Syria are stationed in the east of the country following their withdrawal from the vicinity of the border with Turkey, due to a military operation undertaken by the Turkish army in northern Syria in October 2019. The U.S. contingent has been cut to some 600 soldiers from a reported 1,000 or so prior to the withdrawal.

With regard to Afghanistan, in February 2020, the United States signed an agreement with the Taliban that included a conditional phased withdrawal by U.S. Forces. The agreement stipulates that the United States will reduce its military forces from a reported 12,000 to 13,000 troops to 8,600 within 135 days and, if the Taliban complies with the agreement, will withdraw all troops, including NATO forces, from Afghanistan within 14 months.

Furthermore, the United States has been increasing pressure on Iran from many aspects, stating it is to bring Iran to the negotiation table to conclude a comprehensive deal that addresses activities that destabilize the Middle East region, including the nuclear program. On January 3, 2020, amid rising tensions with Iran, the U.S. military killed Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, in Iraq. Five days later, in retaliation, Iran launched 16 ballistic missiles at two bases in Iraq where U.S. Forces were stationed. Although 12 of them hit the two bases, there are believed to have been no fatalities as a result. That same day, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated that Iran had concluded its proportionate reprisal and did not seek additional tension or war. Also on January 8, President Trump announced that the United States did not wish to use military force. It thus became clear that both countries wished to avoid further escalation.

In response to growing tensions with Iran and other Middle Eastern countries, the U.S. military has announced a number of troop deployments to the Middle East since May 2019, for such purposes as countering the threat posed by Iran to U.S. troops and interests. In addition to such reinforcements to its posture, in July 2019, the United States advocated the Maritime Security Initiative to promote freedom of navigation and maritime stability in the Middle East. As part of this initiative, it subsequently established the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), through which it undertakes activities using naval vessels, along with countries including the United Kingdom.

The U.S. DoD is considering what constitutes appropriate forces in Africa and in Central and South America, given the need to secure resources. In January 2020, Secretary of
Defense Mark Esper indicated that he wished to achieve some measure of progress in the transition of the U.S. military’s force posture by the October 2020 start of fiscal year 2021.

In its security policies, the United States has indicated its view that certain allies which are pointed out as bearing only a small burden of cost and enjoying security guaranteed by the United States should shoulder their fair share of responsibility. As such, the United States has requested that NATO member states swiftly meet their commitments to increase their national defense spending to 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Moreover, in negotiations over host nation support for U.S. Forces Korea, it has demanded that the Republic of Korea (ROK) shoulder a bigger share of the burden.

Three years have passed since the inauguration of the Trump administration and most of the policies set out in its strategy document have entered the implementation phase. While even the divided Congress continue to support the administration’s paramount policy of deterrence against China and Russia, attention will focus on how U.S. security and national defense policies allocate resources, as the arenas in which the United States pursues its strategic competition with China and Russia expand across the globe.

Within the United States, individual states, territories and the District of Columbia are responding to the novel coronavirus disease that first emerged in 2019 by using the National Guard such as transporting medical supplies and food, while the DoD is supporting domestic measures through a range of efforts such as deploying hospital ships and setting up field hospitals. At the same time, as a number of U.S. Forces personnel have been infected, including crew members on an aircraft carrier, the U.S. military has been taking steps to prevent the infection spreading further, by such means as imposing restrictions on movement and other communicable disease control measures. In March 2020, Secretary of Defense Esper commented that although the virus spreads might have some impact on the readiness of U.S. Forces, routine training was continuing to maintain a high state of readiness and that the virus would not affect the U.S. military’s ability to conduct its missions both at home and abroad. He also stated that the extent of the future impact would depend on the scope of the response to the novel coronavirus and how long it lasts.

1 Perception about Security Environment

The National Security Strategy (NSS) released in December 2017 indicates that changes in a regional balance of power can have global consequences and threaten U.S. interests. It mentions the three main sets of challengers against the United States and its allies and partners, which are the “revisionist powers” of China and Russia, the “rogue states” of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, including jihadist terrorist groups. Of these, China and Russia are said to challenge American power, influence, and interests and attempt to erode American safety and prosperity, while North Korea and Iran destabilize regions and threaten the United States and its allies.

In addition, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) published in January 2018 points out that the primary concern in U.S. security is not terrorism but rather long-term strategic competition with China and Russia. It also mentions that China and Russia are undermining the free and open international order constructed by the United States and its allies, and it is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model. In October 2019, Secretary of Defense Esper stated that the NDS positioned China as its first priority and Russia as its second. In September, he expressed a particularly strong sense of caution with respect to China, commenting that while Russia was the greatest near-term challenge, China’s tremendous economic potential meant it posed a major challenge in the long term.

Furthermore, regarding the military actions carried out with the United Kingdom and France after determining that Syria’s Assad regime had used chemical weapons in April 2018, President Trump stated that establishing strong deterrence against the production, proliferation, and use of chemical weapons is an important interest for the national security of the United States.

In consideration of this recognition, the United States deems as security threats nations and organizations that attempt to undermine the interests of itself and its allies and threaten the international order. The Trump administration is addressing threats posed by China and Russia—with particular emphasis on China—as priority issues and appears to be continuing a policy of dealing with threats posed by North Korea, Iran, radical terrorist groups, and production, proliferation, and use of weapons of mass destruction.

2 Security and NDS

The NSS developed by President Trump is rooted in the America First policy and realism in which power plays a
central role in international politics, and stresses the need to rethink the policies of the past 20 years that were based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in the international community would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. Moreover, the NSS sets up a strategic policy to protect four vital interests in this competitive world: (1) Protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life; (2) Promote American prosperity; (3) Preserve peace through strength; and (4) Advance American influence. In October 2019, Vice President Mike Pence indicated that the views set out in the NSS remained unchanged at that point, stating that the United States did not believe that economic engagement alone would transform Communist China’s authoritarian state into a free and open society that respects private property, the rule of law, and international rules of commerce.

Furthermore, in addition to rebuilding the U.S. military to the strongest armed forces and strengthening capabilities in many areas including space and cyberspace, the United States is also striving to leverage the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. Moreover, while recognizing that allies and partners are a great strength of the United States and close cooperation is necessary, the United States has demanded that its allies and partners demonstrate the will to confront shared threats and contribute the capabilities. It is also pointed out that although the United States is responding to the growing political, economic, and military competition throughout the world, by ensuring American military power is second to none and fully integrating with its allies all instruments of power, the United States will seek areas of cooperation with competitors from a position of strength.

The NDS drawn up by then Secretary of Defense Mattis based on the NSS considers the long-term competition with China and Russia as the principal priorities of the DoD because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity and the potential for those threats to increase. Moreover, to expand the competitive space, the following three lines of effort are raised: (1) building a more lethal Joint Force; (2) strengthening alliances and attracting new partners; and (3) reforming the DoD for greater performance and affordability.

Among these, (1) Building military power prioritizes preparedness for war and in order to defeat aggression by a major power and deter opportunistic aggression elsewhere, it advances building flexible theater postures and force deployment that offer mobility, resilience, and readiness. It also advocates modernizing key capabilities such as nuclear forces, space and cyberspace, C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), missile defense, and advanced autonomous systems, etc. Further, although indicating its commitment to deter aggression, it also demonstrates the stance that dynamic military force employment, military posture, and operations must introduce unpredictability to adversary decision-makers. For (2) Strengthening alliances, the following three matters are emphasized: (i) Uphold a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability, (ii) Expand regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning, and (iii) Deepen interoperability. On the other hand, there are expectations that allies and partners contribute an equitable share to mutually beneficial collective security, including effective investment in modernizing their defense capabilities.

3 Involvement in the Indo-Pacific Region

The Trump administration has positioned the Indo-Pacific region as the highest-priority region for the United States and has shown a stance of placing importance on the region through the United States’ commitment to the region and strengthening its presence.

During his November 2017 trip to Asia, in consonance with Japan’s vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, President Trump expressed his intention to emphasize compliance with principles such as respecting the rule of law and freedom of navigation, and that he would promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region, as well as strengthen alliances in the region.

In relation to this, the NSS emphasizes that China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region and reorder the region in its favor, as well as having mounted a rapid military modernization campaign to limit U.S. access to the region and to provide itself a freer hand there. Moreover, as part of its Indo-Pacific region strategy, while reinforcing its commitment to freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with international law, the United States will seek to increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India and develop a strong defense networks with its allies and partners. In the same way, the NDS points out that China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage and is seeking regional hegemony. It emphasizes that a free and open
Indo-Pacific provides prosperity and security, and that the United States will strengthen its alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains.

Meanwhile, the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR) of the U.S. DoD, which was released in June 2019, fleshes out this policy in accordance with the characteristics of the Indo-Pacific region while retaining the strategic directions of the NSS and the NDS. Noting first of all that it is necessary to establish a force that is prepared to win any conflict from its onset in order to achieve peace through strength, the IPSR states that the United States will ensure that combat-credible forces are forward-postured in the Indo-Pacific region and will prioritize investments that ensure lethality against high-end adversaries. Next, arguing that the network of allies and partners is a force multiplier to achieve deterrence, the IPSR states that the United States will reinforce its commitment to established alliances and partnerships while also expanding and deepening relationships with new partners. The IPSR also indicates that the United States will evolve U.S. alliances and partnerships into a networked security architecture to uphold the international rules-based order.

In May 2018, regarding China’s maritime expansion, the U.S. DoD stated that China had deployed anti-ship missiles and surface-to-air missiles to the features in the Spratly Islands, and pointed out that the placement of these weapon system was only military use. As an initial response to China’s continued militarization of areas in the South China Sea, the United States disinvited the Chinese navy to the multilateral Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in 2018. In a speech about the United States’ policy towards China in October 2019, Vice President Pence remarked that China’s behavior in the region had been increasingly provocative and asserted that no nation has the right to claim the maritime commons as territorial seas. He then stated that the United States had increased the tempo and scope of its Freedom of Navigation Operations and strengthened its military presence across the Indo-Pacific. It is reported that U.S. Forces conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations within 12 nautical miles of the disputed islands and reefs in the South China Sea claimed by China and in surrounding waters four times in 2017, five times in 2018, and eight times in 2019.

As part of its activities around strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. Forces deployed Marine Corps specification F-35B fighters to MCAS Iwakuni in January 2017. The USS America, an amphibious assault ship with enhanced ability to carry F-35B fighters and other carrier-based planes, arrived in Sasebo in December 2019 to replace the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp. In addition, the amphibious transport dock USS New Orleans was also deployed to Sasebo that month. In Guam, the MQ-4C Triton maritime surveillance unmanned aircraft system underwent its first deployment in January 2020. Between January and November 2019, the U.S. Coast Guard deployed patrol boats on a rotational basis in the western Pacific Ocean while working with the Seventh Fleet. The Army plans to deploy a Multi-Domain Task Force in the region, to undertake operations in all domains. In March 2018, the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson made the first port call by a U.S. aircraft carrier in over 40 years in Vietnam. Another port call in the country was made in March 2020, by the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt. The United States reportedly deployed naval vessels on passages through the Taiwan Strait on three occasions in 2018 and 10 in 2019.

Given the perceptions of China and regional strategy described above, the United States appears to be undertaking initiatives based on its vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

In contrast, while talks between the United States and North Korea have been continuing since their first summit meeting in history held in June 2018, little material progress has been seen with regard to the dismantlement of North Korea’s missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Responding to that summit meeting, the U.S. DoD suspended the U.S.-ROK command and control exercise Ulchi-Freedom Guardian and the scheduled Vigilant Ace U.S.-ROK bilateral annual flying exercise, and then decided to conclude the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle series of exercises usually held by the United States and the ROK every spring. Then Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan expressed a willingness to maintain U.S. Forces in ROK, stating that close coordination between the
military activities of the United States and ROK will continue to support diplomatic efforts and that the two countries were committed to ensuring the continued combined defense posture of U.S.-ROK combined forces and maintaining firm military readiness. Having rearranged the training elements that had been incorporated into these large-scale U.S.-ROK exercises, the U.S. military determined that the majority were covered off with the ROK military and assessed that readiness was being maintained. Amid this situation, as well as firing at least 20 ballistic missiles from May 2019 onwards, North Korea announced in December 2019 that it would continue to develop strategic weapons until the United States rolls back its hostile policy. The United States pointed out that, regardless of their range, North Korea’s ballistic missile launches violated United Nations Security Council Resolutions. While demonstrating a sense of caution about advances in North Korean weapons technology, however, the United States indicated its intention to continue with bilateral talks.

Section 3-1-5 (1) of this Chapter (Relations with the United States)

4 Innovation in the National Defense Field

Although the Trump administration has stopped using the name Third Offset Strategy, which was touted by the Obama administration, DoD innovation initiatives are positioned as one of the top priorities. In fact, the NSS outlines a policy that the United States must harness innovative technologies that are being developed outside of the traditional defense industrial base. The NDS also states that the DoD needs innovation to surpass revisionist powers, and calls for extensive investment in military application of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and machine learning (AI/ML), including rapid application of commercial breakthroughs, to gain competitive military advantages.

Giving testimony before Congress in March 2019 about science and technology in the field of national defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin expressed alarm at the pace of Chinese and Russian technological advances, while setting out a policy of regaining and maintaining the United States’ technical advantage through investments in hypersonics, directed energy, space, autonomy, cyber, quantum science, microelectronics, biotechnology, AI/ML, and fully-networked command, control, and communication. In September 2019, Secretary of Defense Esper stated that the United States could no longer afford to focus on development programs that take many years to complete. Commenting that, unlike previous eras where national defense drove technology research and development, the DoD now sees significant innovation in the private sector, he pointed out the need for the U.S. military to integrate game-changing technologies from the private sector into its systems. In addition, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Hyten commented in January 2020 that the DoD has attached greater importance to avoiding risk than to the speed of technology development in recent years and stressed the necessity of learning from failures while moving quickly forward with development, as well as mentioning the need to tap into cutting-edge fields in the private sector.

5 Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released in February 2018 stated that, although the United States had reduced the role and number of nuclear weapons based on the aspiration that if the United States took the lead in reducing nuclear arms, other states would follow, the global threat conditions have worsened markedly since the most recent NPR released in 2010 and there now exist unprecedented threats and uncertainty, as China and Russia have expanded their nuclear forces and North Korea continues its pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Given these circumstances, the following were raised as the roles of U.S. nuclear forces: (1) Deterrence of nuclear and nonnuclear attacks; (2) Assurance of allies and partners; (3) Achievement of U.S. objectives if deterrence fails; and (4) Capacity to hedge against an uncertain future.

Also, while the United States would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners, the NPR clearly states that extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks against the United States and its allies, and a “no first use” policy is not justified today. It also indicates that the United States maintains a policy of retaining some ambiguity regarding the precise circumstances that might lead to a U.S. nuclear response. Furthermore, it also revealed that the United States would apply a tailored approach to deterrence across a spectrum of adversaries, threats and contexts, and in addition, would ensure effective deterrence by enhancing the flexibility and range of its nuclear capabilities through nuclear modernization and the development and deployment of new capabilities. Specifically,
in addition to sustaining and replacing the nuclear triad, as new capabilities, in the near-term, the United States would modify a small number of existing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) warheads to provide a low-yield option, and in the longer term, pursue a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), leveraging existing technologies, as well as incorporate nuclear capability onto F-35A fighters as a replacement for the current aging dual-capable aircraft (DCA). Also, the United States has shown its commitment to extended deterrence for its allies and, if necessary, maintaining the forward-deployed capability with DCA and nuclear weapons in regions outside Europe, including Northeast Asia.

In October 2018, President Trump expressed his intention to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia, due to Russia’s material breach, and in February 2019, the United States provided Russia with formal notice that the United States would withdraw from the treaty. The United States also expressed that if Russia does not return to full and verifiable compliance with the treaty in six months, the treaty would terminate.

On August 2, 2019, Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the U.S. withdrawal pursuant to Article XV of the treaty took effect that day because Russia failed to return to full and verified compliance. On the same day, Secretary of Defense Esper announced that the DoD will fully pursue the development of intermediate-range, conventional, ground-launched cruise and ballistic missile systems whose test launches, production and possession had been restricted by the treaty. In August 2019, the United States conducted a flight test of a conventionally-configured ground-launched cruise missile with a range of more than 500 km and subsequently conducted a flight test of a prototype similarly configured ground-launched ballistic missile that December (See Section 4-3-1). President Trump has mentioned the need for arms control involving China, which has beefed up medium-range missile capabilities outside the scope of the INF Treaty.

At the same time, the Missile Defense Review (MDR) published in January 2019 noted that North Korea continues to pose an extraordinary threat to the United States and, with its nuclear missiles, has the ability to threaten the U.S. homeland, as well as U.S. territories, U.S. Forces, and allies in the Pacific Ocean. It also pointed out that Russia and China are developing advanced cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles that challenge existing missile defense systems. The MDR sets out three principles governing U.S. missile defense: (1) homeland missile defense will stay ahead of rogue states’ missile threats; (2) missile defense will defend U.S. Forces deployed abroad and support the security of allies and partners; and (3) the United States will pursue new concepts and technologies. It cited the elements of missile defense strategy as (1) comprehensive missile defense capabilities; (2) flexibility and adaptability; (3) tighter offense-defense integration and interoperability; and (4) importance of space. The MDR then presented a policy of adopting a balanced and integrated approach based on a combination of (1) deterrence; (2) active and passive missile defenses; and (3) attack operations.

Under this policy, the United States plans to expand investment in expanding and modernizing U.S. homeland missile defense capabilities by such means as deploying an additional 20 ground-based interceptors by 2023, improving and deploying radar systems, and pursuing efforts to counter intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) using SM-3 Block IIA. For regional defense, on the other hand, the United States will procure additional interceptor missiles for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Aegis, and Patriot systems, as well as increasing the number of Aegis BMD-
capable ships, and equipping Aegis Ashore sites with the SM-3 Block IIA. Regarding the pursuit of new technologies, the MDR sets out a policy of developing the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) to improve the ability to engage ICBM warheads and decoys, as well as undertaking research and development focused on (1) directed-energy weapons; (2) space-based interceptor systems; and (3) interceptor missiles with which F-35 fighters can be equipped, to enable space-based sensors to be deployed and interception to be carried out in the boost phase, with a view to countering advanced threats, including hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs). As far as collaboration with allies and partners is concerned, the MDR indicates a willingness to focus on deepening interoperability, expanding burden sharing, and encouraging investment by allies in missile defense capabilities that are interoperable with those of the United States.

6 FY2021 Budget

Based on an awareness that the U.S. Government’s budget deficit is deepening, the Budget Control Act enacted in 2011 stipulated a significant cut in government spending by FY2021. In March 2013, the sequestration of government spending including defense expenditure was started based on the provisions of the Budget Control Act. However, sequestration was subsequently eased due in part to the passage of bipartisan budget acts on four occasions. In addition, under the Trump administration’s policy to end the sequestration of defense spending in order to rebuild the U.S. military, a defense budget framework was approved that drastically raised the limit set by the sequestration between FY2018 and FY2021.

In these circumstances, the defense budget request in the FY2021 Budget Blueprint submitted to Congress in February 2020 allocated US$705.4 billion for the base budget, which excludes emergencies, representing about a 0.1% increase over the previous year. The DoD positioned the budget as a priority initiative supporting operations in all domains, which forms the next step in implementing the NDS, emphasizing (1) the reconstruction of the nuclear deterrent; (2) U.S. homeland missile defense; (3) cyber and space capabilities; and (4) hypersonic, 5G, AI, and other key technologies. It included a request for an unprecedented sum for research and development (approximately US$106.6 billion), while raising around US$5.7 billion for reallocation to priority initiatives from programs that do not accord with the NDS by such means as rethinking programs undertaken by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The goals for military end strength and procurement presented in the FY2021 budget request included securing 1,351,500 personnel, adding 5,500 more troops to the services’ end strength, and procuring 89 upgraded M-1 tanks (165 tanks in the previous year), 8 battle-force ships (12 in the previous year), and 79 F-35 fighters (98 in the previous year).

Fig. I-2-1-1 (Changes in the U.S. Defense Budget)

The breakdown is as follows: a base budget of approximately US$636.4 billion, and approximately US$69.0 billion for overseas contingency operations. This represents an increase of about US$0.8 billion from the FY2020 enacted budget level (excluding the approximately US$8.0 billion for emergencies in the FY2020 enacted budget). The total sum of the FY2021 national defense budget request was roughly US$740.5 billion, including defense-related budget requests from other departments of roughly US$35.1 billion (such as the Department of Energy’s nuclear-related programs) and the roughly US$705.4 billion of DoD budget request.
Military Posture

1 General Situation

The operation of the U.S. Forces is not controlled by the individual branches of the broader armed forces; rather it is operated under the command of the Unified Combatant Commands, composed of forces from multiple branches of the armed forces. The Unified Combatant Commands consist of four commands with functional responsibilities and seven commands with regional responsibilities.

The U.S. ground forces have about 470,000 Army soldiers and about 190,000 Marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among other countries.

The U.S. maritime forces have about 980 vessels (including about 70 submarines) totaling about 6.9 million tons. The 6th Fleet is responsible for the East Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and Africa; the 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the northwest Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet in the eastern Pacific; the 4th Fleet in South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the 7th Fleet in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. In addition, the Second Fleet was reestablished in August 2018 to take responsibility for the U.S. East Coast, North Atlantic Ocean, and Arctic Ocean.

The U.S. air forces have roughly 3,560 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the ROK, among others.

In regard to strategic offensive weapons including nuclear force, the United States under the former Obama administration proceeded with their reduction based on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that came into force in February 2011. It announced that its deployed strategic warheads stood at 1,373, while its deployed delivery platforms stood at 655. The United States is studying the concept of a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), as an effort contributing to the nation’s new ability to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons.

Moreover, in addressing the increasing threats in cyberspace, in May 2018, the Cyber Command, which was previously a subunified command under U.S. Strategic Command, was elevated to a unified combatant command.

In August 2019, the United States founded the Space Command to serve as a geographic unified combatant command and then established the Space Force as the sixth branch of the military within the Department of the Air Force that December.

2 Current Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region

The United States, a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deploying the Indo-Pacific Command, a combatant command integrating the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps in the region. The Indo-Pacific Command is a geographic combatant command which is responsible for the largest geographical area, and its subordinate unified commands include U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea.


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6 Warheads that have been equipped in deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and nuclear warheads equipped in deployed heavy bombers (a deployed heavy bomber is counted as one nuclear warhead).  
7 The figure as of March 1, 2020.
In December 2019, the United States established the Space Force under the Department of the Air Force as the sixth military branch, joining the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. It is the first new military service in more than 70 years since 1947, when the Air Force was created.

The Trump Administration has taken a stance to give great importance to space as a foundation of economic prosperity and national defense of the United States and as a domain that can provide integral support for this purpose. In this context, in March 2019 Vice President Pence indicated imperfections of the system where space-related projects pertaining to national security were dispersed over 60 departments and agencies, which resulted in a lack of leadership and responsibility. Based on this recognition, the Trump administration advocated the creation of an organization to take charge of the space domain in a consolidated manner and created the Space Command as a unified combatant command equivalent to other commands such as the Indo-Pacific Command in order to enable joint operations in this domain. The Space Force is expected to play a leadership role by consolidating separated authorities to organize, train, and equip space forces, while eliminating inefficiency in force building. According to its establishment plan, the Space Force will have approximately 15,000 personnel after space-related personnel of the existing military branches are transferred in stages.

At the ceremony pertaining to the establishment of the Space Force, President Trump expressed his recognition that “space is the newest warfighting domain.” The Trump administration expressed a sense of crisis that China, Russia and other countries were developing strategies and capabilities to exploit the vulnerability of the United States in space, which had turned space into a warfighting domain, where the United States could lose its advantage. Based on this recognition, the creation of the Space Force is understood as a fundamental shift of space initiatives from combat support to competition and combat. The Space Forces will carry out both offensive and defensive operations for space superiority as a unique warfighting domain in addition to missions such as space situational awareness, satellite operations and support for the Army, Navy, Air Force and other forces.

Furthermore, the Trump Administration expressed its intention to establish the Department of the Space Force to control the Space Force. Attention will focus on future initiatives of the United States concerning the space domain.

### Pacific Air Forces, which are all headquartered in Hawaii.

The Army Pacific’s subordinate commands include the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, the 8th U.S. Army in the ROK, which is the Army component of the U.S. Forces in the ROK, and the U.S. Army Alaska. Additionally, the Army Pacific assigns approximately 2,500 personnel to commands in Japan, such as I Corps (Forward) and the Headquarters, U.S. Army Japan Command.\(^8\)

The U.S. Pacific Fleet consists of the 7th Fleet, which is responsible for the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, responsible for the East Pacific and Bering Sea. The U.S. Pacific Fleet in total controls about 200 vessels. The 7th Fleet mainly consists of a carrier strike group with main stationing locations in Japan and Guam. Their mission is to defend territorial lands, people, sea lines of communication, and the critical national interests of the United States and its allies. An aircraft carrier, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers among others are assigned to the 7th Fleet.

The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force each in the U.S. mainland and

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8. The figures of the U.S. Forces mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded in the published sources of the U.S. DoD (as of December 31, 2019), and could change according to unit deployment.
Japan. Of this force, about 21,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which are equipped with F-35B fighters and other aircraft, in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the Western Pacific.9

The U.S. Pacific Air Force has three air forces, of which three air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters and C-130 transport aircraft) are deployed to the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and two air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters) to the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK.

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9 See footnote 8.
General Situation

China, the world’s most populous country, has a vast landmass surrounded by a long borderline as well as a long coastline. It also has various races, religions, and languages. China’s pride in its unique history of having shaped a distinct culture and civilization, and semi-colonial experience in and after the 19th century are driving its desire for a strong nation and fueling its nationalism.

In recent years, China has increased its presence in the international community including the global economy. China takes a proactive stance towards efforts in security areas, contributing to United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, and various humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. There continues to be high expectations for China to recognize its responsibility in the international community, accept and comply with international norms, and play an active role in a more cooperative manner on regional and global issues.

China faces various domestic problems including human rights issues. Among the problems emerging are the spread of bribery and corruption among the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and such issues as disparities between urban and rural areas, and between coastal and inland regions, as well as disparities within cities and environmental pollution. More recently, the pace of China’s economic growth has slowed and the country is also expected to face issues associated with the rapid aging of the population, including problems related to pensions and other aspects of the social security system. The range of factors potentially destabilizing government administration has thus been expanding and becoming increasingly diverse. Additionally, there have been protests about human rights violations against ethnic minorities in China and campaigns pursuing separation and independence of the Tibet Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and elsewhere. The international community has grown interested in human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In 2019, large-scale protest rallies occurred in Hong Kong over such issues as a bill to amend an ordinance to allow criminal suspects to be extradited to mainland China. Combined with public concern about the security measures taken by the Chinese central government and the Hong Kong government in light of the series of protests, there is no prospect of the volatility of the situation diminishing. Amid these circumstances, the Chinese Government has been tightening its control over society. While it has been suggested that the development of the Internet and other areas of information and communications technology (ICT) has made it difficult to control activities of the masses, it has been noted that rapidly developing ICT technologies are exploited for social control. Since 2014, China has enacted laws based on “a holistic view of national security” that covers not only external threats but also culture and society. Those laws include the Anti-Spy Law enacted in November 2014 to enhance domestic counter-espionage arrangements, a new National Security Law in July 2015, an Anti-Terrorism Law in January 2016 to strengthen state control, the Law on Management of Domestic Activities of Overseas Non-governmental Organizations in January 2017 to enhance control on foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the National Intelligence Law in June 2017.

The “anti-corruption” movement following the launch of the Xi Jinping leadership has made inroads under the policy of cracking down on both “tigers” and “flies,” targeting both dominant figures and junior officials. People including former prominent leaders of the Party and military have...
strictly been charged with “corruption.” General Secretary Xi has stated that “corruption is the greatest threat our Party faces,” indicating that the “anti-corruption” movement will continue.

Through these developments, the Party has demonstrated a growing willingness in recent years to further bolster the power base of General Secretary Xi in the CCP. For example, it decided at the 19th National Congress in October 2017 to incorporate “thoughts,” namely the political philosophy, under the name of General Secretary Xi Jinping into the Party constitution as a guideline. This was the first time since President Mao Zedong that a leader had his name in a guideline before retirement. Moreover, at the first plenary session of the 13th National People’s Congress held in March 2018, a resolution was adopted to revise the constitution and abolish term limits for China’s president, which indicates that Xi Jinping is further consolidating power as president.

2 Military Affairs

1 General Situation

For more than 30 years, China has sustained high-level growth of its defense budget without transparency, engaging in broad, rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. In doing so, it has attached importance to strengthening its operational capabilities for steadily acquiring information superiority as a means of both enhancing operational capabilities throughout the Chinese military and gaining asymmetrical capabilities to effectively impede enemies with overall military superiority from exerting their strength. Specifically, China has been increasingly emphasizing endeavors to achieve dominance in new domains. For example, it has been rapidly expanding its capabilities in the cyber domain, enabling it to disrupt enemy communications networks, and in the field of electromagnetic spectrum, which offers the potential to render enemy radar and other equipment ineffective, thereby hampering their ability to exercise their military might. In addition, it continues to build capacity to make it possible to restrict enemies’ use of space. Bolstering these capabilities will reinforce China’s “Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD)” capabilities and lead to the establishment of operational capabilities further afield. China is also prioritizing efforts to increase practical joint operational capabilities through military modernization including reforms. Additionally, while implementing a policy of civil-military fusion across the board, with the aim of promoting two-way links between military and civilian resources in technology development and various other fields, China is striving to develop and acquire cutting-edge technologies that can be used for military purposes. Cutting-edge technologies that China seeks to develop and acquire include game changing technologies that would dramatically change future warfare.

China’s 2019 white paper, “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” released in July 2019, notes that “intelligent warfare is on the horizon,” indicating that attention should be paid to Chinese forces’ efforts to use artificial intelligence (AI) technology.

Along with efforts to reinforce its operational capabilities, China is engaging in unilateral and coercive attempts to change the status quo based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing international order, and has been expanding and intensifying its military activities in

Column Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities

The A2/AD capabilities represent a concept given by the United States. Anti-Access or A2 capabilities refer mainly to long-range capabilities to block adversaries from entering some operating zones. Area-Denial or AD capabilities refer to short-range capabilities to limit adversaries’ freedom of action within operating zones.

Column Civil-military fusion

Civil-military fusion is an initiative promoted by China as a national strategy designed to promote the military use of civilian resources and the civilian use of military technologies in peacetime as well as emergency, in addition to the traditional development of defense mobilization arrangements for emergency. In particular, initiatives in seas, outer space, cyberspace, artificial intelligence (AI), which are referred to as “emerging areas” for China are viewed as priority areas for civil-military fusion.
maritime and aerial domains, notably in the East China Sea. China, particularly regarding maritime issues where its interests conflict with others’, continues to act in an assertive manner, which includes dangerous acts that could cause unintended contingencies. Additionally, China continues to demonstrate its willingness to realize its unilateral assertions without making any compromises, steadily moving forward with efforts to change the status quo by coercion and to create a fait accompli.

The Chinese military leadership has exhibited the “struggle” against the Senkaku Islands, an inherent territory of Japan, the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ),” its Navy and Air Force’s “regular patrols,” and others as the achievements of the military forces’ activities and emphasized to continue improving the Chinese military’s operational capabilities. Furthermore, the Chinese military forces have rapidly expanded and intensified activities including those in the areas surrounding Japan, such as the East China Sea, Pacific Ocean and Sea of Japan. Given these facts, there is a high probability that China would not only attempt to make such activities routine but also further expand and intensify them both qualitatively and quantitatively. Such Chinese military trends, combined with insufficient transparency about China’s defense policies and military affairs, have become a matter of grave concern to the region including Japan and the international community and should continue to be closely monitored in the future.

2 Defense Policies

China has described the objectives of its defense policies and the missions of its military forces as: supporting the CCP’s leadership, China’s characteristic socialism system, and the modernization of its socialism, defending the nation’s sovereignty, unification and security, backing the nation’s sustainable “peaceful development” through protecting its maritime and overseas national interests, building strong national defense and massive military forces commensurate with the interests of the nation’s security and the interests of development, and providing strong assurances for realizing the “Chinese dream” of the great revival of the Chinese nation. China contends that these national defense policies are “defensive” in nature.

For the development of national defense and military forces, China has employed a policy of building the “system of modern military power with Chinese characteristics” by sustaining the military development under the party, the military buildup through reforms, military promotion based on science and technology, and law-based military governance, by pursuing practical capabilities that “can fight and win a war” by giving greater priority to the civil-military fusion, by promoting the fusion and development of mechanization and informatization, and by accelerating the intelligentization of military forces. This might have apparently deepened a policy of giving priority to the informatization of military forces based on a military strategy to win informatized local wars in response to the global trend of military development. Such military buildup in China apparently indicates that China has given top priority to dealing with a Taiwan contingency by improving its capabilities to deter or deny Taiwan’s independence and foreign military support for the Taiwanese independence, and has recently considered the improvement of operational capabilities in more distant waters to protect its expanding overseas interests.

Furthermore, China seems to emphasize not only physical means but also non-physical means in military affairs and warfare. It regards the concept of “Three Warfares” — “Media Warfare,” “Psychological Warfare,” and “Legal Warfare” — as part of the political work of the military. In addition, China has set forth a policy of coordinating military struggle closely with political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legal endeavors.

As for the future goals of the development of national defense and military forces, General Secretary Xi Jinping’s report to the 19th CCP National Congress in October 2017 and the defense white paper released in 2019 noted that China would try to (1) basically achieve mechanization and make great progress in informatization to dramatically improve strategic capabilities by 2020, (2) basically complete the modernization of national defense and military forces by 2035, and (3) generally transform Chinese forces into world-class forces by the mid-21st century. These goals reportedly

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1 On November 23, 2013, China established the “East China Sea ADIZ” including the Senkaku Islands misleadingly indicated as if they were China’s territory. China requires aircraft flying in the zone to abide by rules set by its Ministry of National Defense and claims to take military “defensive emergency measures” against aircraft failing to do so, unduly infringing on the principle of freedom of overflight. Over the move to unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea, not only Japan but also the United States, the ROK, Australia, and the European Union (EU) expressed concerns.

2 According to the defense white paper “China’s National Defense in the New Era” (July 2019).
indicate that the third stage of the “Three Stage Development Strategy” for the basic modernization of national defense and military forces by the middle of the 21st century would be achieved 15 years ahead of schedule. The goals thus might have been based on faster-than-expected progress in the military modernization for China itself. Particularly since late December 2015, China has tackled the military reform to improve practical joint operational capabilities, achieving steady, rapid progress. However, China has recognized a wide gap between the real military modernization level and the level required for national security, and between Chinese and world-class military forces. Based on that recognition, China may further accelerate the military modernization against the backdrop of national power development and General Secretary Xi’s enhancement of his power base in the CCP and expansion of his power as Chairman of the Central Military Commission.³

3 Transparency Concerning Defense Policies and Military Affairs

China has neither set out a clear and specific future vision of its military strengthening, nor ensured adequate transparency of its decision-making process in relation to military and security affairs. Moreover, China has not fully disclosed information such as specific weapons in possession, procurement goals and results, organization and locations of major units, records of main military operations and exercises, and a detailed breakdown of its national defense budget.

Incidents in which Chinese authorities provide factually inaccurate explanations or refuse to admit facts regarding Chinese military activities have been confirmed, inciting concerns over China’s military decision-making and actions. For example, the submerged transit of a Chinese Navy submarine through Japan’s contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands was confirmed in January 2018, but China did not acknowledge this. In recent years, amid the significant changes in the environment surrounding the military, including advances in specialization of the military and diversification of missions associated with strengthening of operational capabilities, some see that relations between the CCP leadership and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have become increasingly complex. Others opine that the military’s influential power on foreign policy decisions has been changing. Attention is to be paid to such situations in terms of crisis management as well.

Explanations that stoke concerns about Chinese military decision-making and actions are also evident in comments about the South China Sea, where China is seeking to unilaterally change the status quo and to create a fait accompli. At the press conference after the U.S.-China Summit Meeting in September 2015, President Xi Jinping stated “China does not have any intention to pursue militarization” in the South China Sea, but in February the following year, Foreign Minister Wang Yi described the facilities in the South China Sea as “necessary self-defense facilities” that China was developing in accordance with international law. In 2017, reports in official media asserted that China had rationally expanded the area of its “islands and reefs” in the South China Sea to “strengthen the necessary military defense.”

China has released a defense white paper almost every two years since 1998. Most recently, it released a defense white paper in July 2019 for the first time in approximately four years. The latest one was titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era.” Although defense white papers released in 2013 and 2015 covered specific topics only, with the volume of descriptions reduced, the 2019 white paper covered defense policies in general.

China’s influence in the international community has risen politically, economically, and militarily. It has become increasingly important for China to improve its transparency regarding defense policies and military affairs, provide fact-based explanations about its activities, and share and observe international rules as a responsible country in the international community to allay concerns about China. It is strongly hoped that China will increase transparency through such efforts as specific and accurate information disclosure.

4 National Defense Budget

China announced that its national defense budget for FY2020 was approximately 1,268 billion yuan (approximately 20,288.1 billion Japanese yen when the value is mechanically converted at 16 yen per yuan).⁴ This initial budget amount

³ The Central Military Commission is a leading and commanding organ to China’s armed forces. Formally, there are the CCP CMC and the People’s Republic of China CMC. However, each consists of the same members, indicating both commissions as an organ for the party to control the armed forces.
⁴ China’s announced defense budget exceeded Japan’s defense-related expenditures in FY2007 and reached approximately four times in FY2020 (automatically converted based on exchange rates of respective fiscal years). Japan’s defense-related expenditures have remained almost unchanged for around 20 years (approximately 1.2 times in 30 years).
represented a growth of approximately 6.6% (approximately 78.1 billion yuan) compared to the initial budget amount for the previous fiscal year. China’s announced national defense budget recorded a double-digit increase almost every year between FY1989 and FY2015. The nominal size of China’s announced national defense budget grew approximately 44-fold in the 30 years from FY1990 and approximately 2.4-fold in the 10 years from FY2010. China positions the buildup of defense capabilities as important a task as economic development. It is believed that China has continued to invest resources in the improvement of its defense capabilities in tandem with its economic development. However, there have been many years in which the announced annual national defense budget increase rate exceeded the economic growth (an increase in gross domestic product). Attention is to be paid to how the slowdown in China’s economic growth would affect its national defense budget.

In addition, it is noted that the amount of the announced defense budget is considered to be only a part of its actual military expenditures. For example, it is believed that the announced defense budget does not include foreign equipment procurement costs or research and development (R&D) expenses. According to an analysis of the U.S. DoD, actual defense spending in FY2018 was US$30 billion more than the announced national defense budget amount.\(^5\)

As for a breakdown of the national defense budget, past defense white papers specified personnel, training and sustainment, and equipment expenses for the announced national defense budgets for FY2007, FY2009 and FY2010-2017 (and expenses for active, reserve and militia forces for FY2007 and FY2009). However, no more details have been given.


**5 Military Posture**

China’s armed forces are composed of the PLA, the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP), and the militia. It is provided that these bodies be instructed and commanded by the Central Military Commission (CMC). The PLA is defined as a people’s force created and led by the CCP, comprising the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Rocket Force, the Strategic Support Force, the Joint Logistics Support Force, etc.

The PAP is designed to engage mainly in patrol, emergency response, counterterrorism, maritime rights protection and law enforcement, emergency rescue, defense operations, etc. The militia is planned to engage in economic construction, etc. in peacetime and undertake logistic support missions in emergency.
(1) Military Reforms

China is currently carrying out military reforms seen as the largest in its history. In November 2015, Chairman Xi unveiled China’s official position on a specific direction of the military reforms for the first time, announcing that the military reforms would be carried out by 2020.

By the end of 2016, the so-called “above-the-neck” reforms in the center of the military were reported to have basically been completed. Specifically, they abolished the PLA’s seven Military Regions and created five new Theaters with primary responsibility for command of operations, namely, the Eastern Theater, Southern Theater, Western Theater, Northern Theater, and Central Theater. In addition, they also formed the PLA Army (PLAA) Headquarters—ranked equally with the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Headquarters—the Rocket Force (PLARF), the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), and the Joint Logistics Support Force. Moreover, the headquarters for the entire PLA were replaced by 15 functional sections under the CMC, including the Joint Staff Department, Political Work Department, Logistics Support Department, and Equipment Development Department. Since 2017, military reforms have been making steady progress with the start of what are called full-scale “below-the-neck” military reforms at the field level. For example, the expansion of the Navy Marine Corps, whose missions include amphibious landing operations, has been confirmed along with the unification of PAP leadership and command system under the CMC, and the reorganization of 18 Group Armies into 13, a reduction of 300,000 soldiers, the transfer of the coast guard to the PAP, etc.

It is considered that these series of reforms are designed to build more practical military forces by improving their joint operational capabilities and strengthening the military’s readiness, including the development of military capabilities and organizational management in peacetime. In addition, it has been noted that the reorganization of the headquarters is a means of tackling corruption at the center of the military by decentralizing the leading organs. Since the 19th CCP National Congress in October 2017, many members seen as connected deeply to Chairman Xi have been appointed to the CMC. It has been noted that many officers trusted deeply by Chairman Xi have been promoted to senior positions and the rank of general. Given these points, it is thought that Chairman Xi is attempting to further enhance his leadership in the CMC and the military.

There are views that dissatisfaction is growing within the military and among veterans because of the rapid reforms. Given that China plans to promote military reforms until 2020, attention will focus on the outcome of these military reforms.

(2) Nuclear and Missile Forces

China has continued independent efforts to develop nuclear weapons and missiles for their delivery since the mid-1950s, indicating its apparent attempt to ensure nuclear deterrence, supplement its conventional forces with nuclear capabilities and secure its influence on the international community. It is regarded that China’s nuclear strategy is to deter any nuclear attack on its territory by maintaining a nuclear force structure able to conduct retaliatory nuclear attacks on a limited number of targets such as cities in adversary countries, should China be subject to nuclear attacks. China has explained that it is committed to “no first use” of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, to “unconditional negative security assurance” that it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones unconditionally, and to keeping its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security. In recent years, however, doubts have been expressed about the explanation.6

China is viewed as having given priority to conventional missile capabilities since the 1990s because of the growing significance of precision-strike capabilities in the global military trend. China is expected to continue to attach importance to its nuclear and missile forces.

China possesses ballistic missiles of various types and ranges, including ICBMs, SLBMs, intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs)/medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). The update of China’s ballistic missile forces from a liquid propellant system to a solid propellant system is improving their survivability and readiness. Moreover, it is believed that China is working to increase their performance by such means as extending ranges, improving targeting accuracy, and employing maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

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China’s main ICBMs, its strategic nuclear asset, had been the fixed-site liquid-propellant DF-5 missiles. However, China has in recent years deployed the DF-31, which is a mobile-type ICBM with a solid propellant system mounted onto a transporter erector launcher (TEL). China is developing the new DF-41 ICBM, which is viewed to be able to fly up to approximately 11,200 km and carry 10 warheads. It made its first appearance in the military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China in October 2019. With regard to SLBMs, it is considered that Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to carry the JL-2 SLBMs with the estimated range of approximately 8,000 km are operational. It is believed that China’s strategic nuclear capabilities will improve significantly through nuclear deterrence patrols using the Jin-class SSBNs. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that China is also developing the JL-3 SLBM with the extended range of 12,000 to 14,000 km and a new SSBN for carrying the JL-3.

China’s missile forces have been put outside the framework of the U.S.-Russia INF Treaty and include numerous ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km that had been subjected to the INF treaty. As for the IRBMs/MRBMs covering the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, China has the mobile solid-propellant DF-21 and DF-26, which can be transported and operated on TELs. These are viewed as capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. China possesses ballistic missiles carrying conventional warheads with high targeting accuracy based on the DF-21, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), called “carrier killer,” which carries conventional warheads to attack overwater ships including aircraft carriers. The DF-26, which has a range including Guam and is called “Guam killer,” is considered a “second-generation ASBM” developed on the basis of the DF-21D. It was announced in April 2018 that the DF-21D had “formally joined the order of battle.” China also possesses the CJ-20 (CJ-10) long-range land-attack cruise missile with a range of at least 1,500 km, as well as the H-6 bomber that is capable of carrying this cruise missile. It is deemed that these missiles complement ballistic missile forces, covering the Indo-Pacific region including Japan. In the military parade to celebrate the 70th anniversary of its founding in October 2019, CJ-100/DF-100, which is said to be a supersonic cruise missile, also made its first public appearance. The deployment of these ASBMs and cruise missiles is expected to strengthen China’s “A2/AD” capabilities. Concerning SRBMs, China has deployed a large number of solid-propellant DF-16, DF-15, and DF-11 missiles facing Taiwan. It is believed that their ranges cover a part of Japan’s Southwestern Islands including the Senkaku Islands.

Furthermore, China is believed to be rapidly developing several HGVs that would be launched with ballistic missiles to penetrate missile defenses. Their flight tests have reportedly been conducted since 2014. In the military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of China’s founding in October 2019, the DF-17 MRBM viewed as capable of carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle made its first public appearance. In August 2018, China is believed to have tested a hypersonic vehicle featuring the “waverider” design. These vehicles are said to be more difficult for missiles to intercept, because they fly low at very high speeds and are highly maneuverable.
China is also thought to be devoting energies to the development of missile defense technology. It is believed to have conducted several tests on midcourse missile interception technology since 2010. In October 2019, Russian President Putin noted that Russia was supporting China’s development of “a missile-attack early warning system.” Given that ballistic missile defense technology has the potential to be applied to missiles capable of destroying satellites, attention will focus on future Chinese missile defense trends including ballistic missile defense technology development.
downsizing, multifunctionality, and modularization of military units. Specifically, it is believed to be improving ground forces’ mobility using measures such as shifting from theater defense to trans-theater mobility and working to motorize and mechanize infantry units. China is also believed to be strengthening its airborne troops (belonging to the Air Force), amphibious forces belonging to the Army and Navy, special operations forces, and helicopter units. China has continued to build up the Navy Marine Corps, which is expected to have more than 30,000 troops by 2020 and undertake overseas expedition operations in addition to amphibious assault landing operations and regional defense in the South China Sea.7 China undertakes efforts to build a command system for improving its joint operational capabilities and operational efficiency and tackles reforms to improve its logistical support capabilities.

China has annually conducted Stride, Firepower, and Sharp Sword maneuver-exercises that cut across multiple regions. They are aiming at verifying and improving the capabilities necessary to deploy army troops to remote areas, such as long-distance maneuvering capabilities of the Army, and logistical support capabilities that include mobilizing militias and public transportation. China has also conducted combined military branch and service exercises under Joint Action since 2014. Furthermore, it has been reported that force-on-force training has been frequently conducted to improve practical operational capabilities. These facts suggest China’s attempt to improve its practical joint operational capabilities.

(4) Naval Forces

The naval forces consist of three fleets: North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet. China’s naval forces are rapidly modernizing, and the Chinese Navy promotes the mass production of its indigenous Yuan-class submarines with improved quietness, as well as surface combatant ships with improved air defense and anti-ship attack capabilities. In January 2020, the Navy commissioned the first Renhai-class destroyer among its largest destroyers. The Renhai-class destroyer is said to be equipped with a vertical launch system (VLS) with 112 launch cells, almost twice the number of launch cells as the new Luyang III-class destroyer. The VLS is capable of launching long-range land-attack cruise missiles and YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles with a supersonic terminal attack capability. In addition, the Navy is increasing the number of large landing ships and supply ships. Since September 2019, Type-075 large landing ships have been launched in sequence. Since September 2017, Fuyu-class fast combat support ships (comprehensive supply ships) have been in operation for replenishment for the aircraft carrier group. It has also been pointed out that China is developing new submarines capable of carrying land-attack cruise missiles.

With regard to aircraft carriers, China’s first aircraft carrier “Liaoning,” following its commission in September 2012, reportedly made its first advance to the South China Sea in November 2013 and to the Pacific Ocean in December 2016. In the same month of 2016, the “Liaoning” conducted its first comprehensive live action, including live firing by carrier-based fighters, in the Bohai Sea. It was announced that the “Liaoning” participated in a naval review in the South China Sea and advanced to the Pacific Ocean for force-on-force...
training including carrier-based fighters from March to April 2018. China’s first indigenous aircraft carrier (its second carrier) was launched in April 2017 and then it was named Shandong and commissioned in Sanya of Hainan Island in December 2019. The Shandong, with a ski-jump flight deck, is an improved version of the “Liaoning,” reportedly carrying a greater number of aircraft than the “Liaoning.” China is reportedly building its second indigenous aircraft carrier, which could be equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system to operate fixed-wing early warning aircraft. It has also been pointed out that China has plans to build nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.

China is believed to have been developing and deploying unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned
underwater vehicles (UUVs) that are available for military purposes. Such equipment, though being relatively cheap, are viewed as representing an asymmetric force to effectively prevent adversaries from winning maritime supremacy, particularly underwater supremacy.

Given these developments concerning the naval forces, China appears to be steadily building up capabilities for conducting operations in more distant waters in addition to near sea defense.

The PAP, one of the China’s armed forces other than the military, has the Coast Guard as a maritime law enforcement organization under its umbrella. The Coast Guard consists of three groups: North, East and South Sea Sub-bureaus. Chinese government ships belonging to the Coast Guard have recently been designed to be larger and armed. At the end of 2019, the China Coast Guard was viewed as one of the world's largest maritime law enforcement organizations, possessing 130 ships with full displacement of 1,000 tons or more, including two 10,000-ton-class patrol ships, among the world’s largest ones. Some Coast Guard ships have been confirmed as armed with 76 mm guns that may be as powerful as large-diameter guns on naval ships.

The organizational enhancement of the Coast Guard has also been confirmed. China’s maritime surveillance had been conducted by the China Coast Guard Bureau under control of the State Council’s Ministry of Public Security, as a unified body consisting of the China Marine Surveillance (Haijian) of the State Oceanic Administration under the Ministry of Natural Resources, the China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (Yuzheng) of the Fisheries Management Bureau under the Ministry of Agriculture, the Maritime Anti-Smuggling Force of the General Administration of Customs, etc. In July 2018, the Coast Guard was transferred to the PAP under unified control and command of the CMC and renamed PAP Coast Guard. After the transfer, former naval officers were reportedly given major Coast Guard posts, indicating enhanced cooperation between the military and Coast Guard. It has been noted that retired naval destroyers and frigates were delivered to the Coast Guard, suggesting that the military has been supporting the Coast Guard in terms of equipment as well as personnel.

At a ceremony to give the PAP a flag in January 2018,
Chairman Xi stated that the PAP would be incorporated into the military forces’ joint operations system. It has been pointed out that the military forces and the Coast Guard have conducted joint exercises. The military forces and the PAP including the Coast Guard are believed to be attempting to steadily strengthen their joint operational capabilities through the enhancement of cooperation. Given these trends, progress in cooperation between the Coast Guard and the Navy and between the Coast Guard and military services other than the Navy should be watched closely.

It is pointed out that, among the militia, whose status is China’s armed force other than the military, the so-called maritime militia is playing the role of the front guard for supporting China’s maritime interests. The maritime militia is said to operate in the South China Sea, etc. and consist of fishermen and residents of isolated islands. However, the details of the maritime militia have not been revealed. In March 2009, when Chinese naval and other ships intercepted the Impeccable, a U.S. Navy ocean surveillance ship, maritime militia members were reportedly seen aboard a fishing boat that was trying to remove a sonar from the U.S. ship. In 2019 when Chinese maritime survey ships were operating in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, maritime militia ships were reportedly seen along with Chinese government ships. Given the China’s emphasis on the necessity of “fully exerting the overall power of the military, police and militia” on the seas, attention should be paid to these asymmetrical forces, too.

(5) Air Forces

China’s air forces consist mainly of the Navy’s air units and the Air Force. As for fourth-generation fighters, China has introduced from Russia the Su-27 and Su-30 and the Su-35 latest fourth-generation fighter. China is also developing its own domestic modern fighters. China has started the mass production of the J-11B fighter, a suspected copy of the Su-27, and the J-16 fighter, a suspected copy of the Su-30, as well as the domestic J-10 fighter. The J-15 fighter aboard the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” is viewed as a copy of the Russian Su-33. China has also reportedly begun to deploy the J-20 fifth-generation fighter and been developing the J-31. It has been pointed out that the J-31 fighter could be the base for developing the replacement for the J-15 carrier-based fighter. As China is continuing the modernization of its bombers as well, the Air Force has increased the number of H-6 bombers, which are believed to be capable of carrying long-range land-attack cruise missiles with nuclear capability. In an attempt to improve bombers’ long-range operation capabilities, the Air Force has reportedly begun to operate H-6N bombers that can take advantage of aerial refueling to fly longer. It is believed to be developing a new long-range stealth bomber called H-20. It is also pointed out that China is developing an air-launched ballistic missile with nuclear capability to be carried by such bombers, and a stealth fighter bomber.

China is also making continuous efforts to improve capabilities which are essential for operations of modern air power by introducing the H-6U and IL-78M aerial refueling tankers and the KJ-500 and KJ-2000 early warning and control aircraft. Since July 2016, China has promoted the deployment of the indigenously developed Y-20 large transport aircraft, which has reportedly become a base for
developing aerial refueling tankers and other mission support aircraft.

China is rapidly developing a variety of domestic unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) UAVs for reconnaissance and other purposes as well as those capable of carrying weapons such as missiles. Some of these are deployed and actively exported. In fact, it is suggested that the Chinese Air Force has created a UAV unit for attack missions and frequently used UAVs for reconnaissance and other purposes in waters and airspace surrounding China. At the military parade to celebrate the 70th anniversary of China’s founding in October 2019, the GJ-11 known as a stealth attack UAV and the WZ-8 claimed to be a high-altitude, high-speed reconnaissance UAV were displayed for the first time. It has been noted that China is improving “Swarm” technology to operate a large number of small low-cost UAVs.

Given such modernization of the air forces, it is believed that China is steadily improving not only its defense capabilities for its national airspace but also capabilities for conducting combat operations, and supporting ground and maritime forces in more distant areas.
(6) Space, Cyber, and Electromagnetic Spectrum Capabilities

Information gathering, and command and communication in the military sector have increasingly relied on satellites and computer networks. As such, China stated that “outer space and cyberspace have become new commanding heights (capture point) in strategic competition among all parties,” indicating that it has recognized the importance of taking on information mastery in wartime when it must protect its own information systems and networks while neutralizing those of its adversaries. In fact, the PLASSF established at the end of 2015 apparently takes charge of outer space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare missions for intelligence support for all military forces.

In its white paper titled “China’s Space Activities” and released in December 2016, China does not rule out its use of outer space for military purposes. Given that administrative organizations and state-owned enterprises involved in the use of outer space in China are pointed out as having close cooperative ties with the military, it is considered that China is planning to improve its capabilities for military operations in outer space. China is said to have developed its space program in the shortest time in the world. Specifically, China has rapidly increased the number of satellites available for military purposes in recent years. For example, the “BeiDou” global satellite positioning system, which is called a Chinese-version GPS and pointed out as available for ballistic missiles and other guided weapons systems, started its global operation service in late 2018 and has reportedly been continuing to be improved. Moreover, China is thought to be developing weapons including anti-satellite weapons using missiles and laser equipment, as well as killer satellites, in order to restrict and interfere with the use of space-based assets by adversaries in wartime.

As for the cyber domain, China sees cyber security as a serious national security threat it faces and vows that China’s armed forces will build cyber defense capabilities, reinforce national cyber border defense, immediately find and block crackers, secure information network security, and unshakably protect national cyber sovereignty, information security, and social stability. It has been noted that current major military exercises always contain cyber operations covering both attacks on and defense of command systems. Cyberattacks on enemy networks are likely to bolster China’s “A2/AD” capabilities. The militia as a part of China’s armed forces reportedly includes “cyber militias” with excellent cyber domain capabilities.

It has also been pointed out that the Chinese military routinely conducts various force-on-force exercises in an electronic warfare environment. In addition, the presence of aircraft with electronic warfare capabilities has been noted. Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft, which frequently fly near Japan, are pointed out along with J-15 carrier-based fighters, J-16 fighters and H-6 bombers that appear to be equipped with electronic warfare pod systems giving them electronic warfare capabilities.

(7) Efforts to Develop Joint Operational Capabilities

In recent years, initiatives have been under way to improve joint operational capabilities in areas from the front line to logistics. The CMC Joint Operations Command Center is believed to have been established under the initiatives for the CCP to carry out decision making at the highest strategic level. The five new theaters established in February 2016 are seen as representing permanent joint operation headquarters. Given that the Navy’s Vice-Admiral Yuan Yubai became the first non-Army theater commander in January 2017, it is assumed that progress is being made towards joint operations in the area of human resources. In recent years, China has implemented tri-service joint exercises giving priority to practicality and other drills to improve its joint operational capabilities. These drills are apparently designed to secure the effectiveness of the abovementioned organizational reforms and other initiatives to improve joint operational capabilities. In response to the novel coronavirus disease, which emerged in China from late 2019, China has reportedly implemented not only joint military operations but also the mobilization of civil resources. The Joint Logistics Support Force specialized in logistics has played a core military role in the response while receiving support from each theater and service. In addition, militias and national-defense-mobilized personnel have also reportedly participated in the response, which has attracted attention as a case indicating comprehensive joint logistic support capabilities.

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11 According to the defense white paper “China’s National Defense in the New Era” (July 2019).
Given that General Secretary Xi spoke about enhancing joint operational capabilities at the 19th CCP National Congress in October 2017 and has reiterated the pursuit of a military that “can fight and win a war,” the abovementioned moves towards joint operations are expected to progress further.

6 Maritime and Airspace Activities

(1) General Situation

Recently, China is believed to be aiming to build up capabilities for operations in more distant waters and airspace, including those to project power to waters including the so-called second island chain, beyond the first island chain. In such efforts, China has rapidly expanded and intensified its activities in the maritime and aerial domains using its naval and air powers. In waters and airspace surrounding Japan, particularly, Chinese naval vessels, and naval and air force aircraft suspected as conducting training and information gathering activities have been observed frequently, along with Chinese naval ships heading for the Pacific and Indian Ocean and numerous Chinese Coast Guard ships and aircraft operating under the name of protecting maritime interests. Their activities include Chinese government ships’ intermittent intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters, Chinese aircraft’s intrusions into Japan’s airspace, and dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences, such as the directing of fire-control radar at Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) ships and aircraft, Chinese military fighter jets’ abnormally close approach to Japanese SDF and U.S. military aircraft, and the establishment of the “East China Sea ADIZ” and other activities that could infringe upon the freedom of overflight. These activities have become a grave matter of concern and are very deplorable. In the South China Sea, China is moving forward with militarization, and expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains, attempting to create a fait accompli for unilaterally changing the status quo by coercion. It is strongly hoped that China will act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law and play active roles in the region and the international community in a more cooperative manner.

(2) Military Activities in Japan’s Surrounding Waters and Airspace

The Chinese Navy and Air Force have in recent years expanded and intensified their activities in the surrounding sea areas and airspace of Japan, including the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands. These activities include those allegedly based on China’s unilateral claim on the Senkaku Islands, and cases involving the one-sided escalation of activities, creating a situation of great concern to Japan. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) has continued to make frequent scrambles against Chinese aircraft, as indicated by an all-time high of 851 scrambles in FY2016. China has also continued naval ships’ passage through waters near Japan for navigation to distant waters such as the Indian Ocean, as well as activities viewed as training of maritime and air forces making forays to the Pacific and the Sea of Japan. Although China can be suspected of intending to “regularize” these activities, there is a view that China is attempting to take advantage of the “regularization” to alleviate concerns over these activities. At the same time, it appears that China continues to improve the complexity of its activities. Given that Chinese efforts are also seen to improve practical joint operational capabilities, Chinese military activities in Japan’s surrounding waters and airspace should be closely watched with grave attention.

a. Activities in the East China Sea (including the Areas around the Senkaku Islands)

Chinese naval vessels have been conducting operations in the East China Sea continuously and actively. Stating its own position regarding Japan’s Senkaku Islands, China claims that patrols by Chinese naval vessels in the sea areas under its jurisdiction are completely justifiable and lawful. Chinese naval vessels have been continuously operating in the areas near Japan’s Senkaku Islands. In June 2016, a Jiangkai I-class frigate became the first ever Chinese Navy combatant vessel to enter Japan’s contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands. Furthermore, in January 2018, a Shang-class submerged submarine and a Jiangkai II-class frigate passed into the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands on the same day. This was the first time a submerged Chinese submarine was identified and announced as transiting through the contiguous waters off the Senkaku Islands. In recent years, Chinese Navy intelligence gathering vessels (AGIs) have also been found conducting activities in multiple cases. A Chinese Navy Dongdiao-class AGI

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12 According to Taiwan’s 2009 National Defense Report.
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In April 2018, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” and multiple other vessels passed through the Bashi Channel to advance Miyakojima Island to advance to the Pacific for the first time. In December 2016, the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” navigated the East China Sea together with other vessels and deployed through the Bashi Strait to the South China Sea. Later, the fleet again passed through the Bashi Strait and entered the Pacific Ocean. Within the same month it passed through the waters of the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and Nakanokamishima Island near Iriomote Island to the East China Sea. In this voyage, carrier-based fighters have been seen taking-off and landing in the Pacific too. The activities are worthy of attention as indicating the enhancement of the capabilities of China’s naval forces, including the aircraft carrier, and the improvement of its capabilities to project power to more distant areas. Given a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine’s submerged passage through Japan’s territorial waters around the Sakishima Islands in November 2004 and a Chinese Navy Shang-class submarine’s submerged passage from the Pacific Ocean toward the East China Sea through Japan’s contiguous zone northeast of Miyako Island in January 2018, it is thought that Chinese submarines also have conducted some activities in the Pacific.

Regarding air forces, the advancement of a PLAN Y-8 early warning aircraft into the Pacific Ocean, passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, was confirmed for the first time in July 2013. The advancement of Air Force aircraft into the Pacific was also confirmed in 2015. Since 2017, advances into the Pacific Ocean via this airspace have become more active. The types of aircraft passing through the airspace have also diversified year by year. H-6K bombers and Su-30 fighters were confirmed by 2016 and the first Y-8 EW aircraft in July 2017. At least one bomber was confirmed as carrying objects in the form of missiles.

China’s air forces are also actively conducting activities in the East China Sea on a routine basis. Their activities are thought to include warning and surveillance, combat air patrols (CAPs), and training. Chinese military aircraft have recently become more active in airspace closer to Japan’s Southwestern Islands. Their activities have possibly been intended to operate the “East China Sea ADIZ.” In April 2018, an alleged Chinese BZK-005 unmanned reconnaissance vehicle was identified flying over the East China Sea. Furthermore, Chinese military aircraft have been confirmed as operating in airspace close to the Senkaku Islands in recent years.

### b. Advancements into the Pacific Ocean

Chinese Navy combatant vessels continue to transit the waters near Japan to advance into the Pacific Ocean and return to base with high frequency. The advancement routes are multiplying. Chinese naval vessels have been confirmed as transiting the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, and have been found passing through the Osumi Strait, the sea area between Yonagunijima Island and Nakanokamishima Island near Iriomote Island, the sea area between Amamijima Island and Yoko Island, the Tsugari Strait, and the Soya Strait. Through these activities, China has apparently attempted to “regularize” naval ships’ advancements into the Pacific Ocean through waters near Japan and improve its capabilities for accessing the open ocean and conducting operations there. In December 2016, the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” navigated the East China Sea together with other vessels and passed the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to advance to the Pacific for the first time. In April 2018, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” and multiple other vessels passed through the Bashi Channel to advance to the Pacific and conducted force-on-force exercises that included carrier-based fighters. At that time, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), conducting warning and surveillance, confirmed for the first time the carrier used for what were presumed to be carrier-based fighters for take-off and landing in the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” advanced to the Pacific Ocean through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island in June 2019, together with vessels such as a Fuyu-class fast combat support ship pointed out to be for supplying the aircraft carrier group. Furthermore, in April 2020, a fleet, including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning,” passed through the waters of the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to enter the Pacific Ocean, and deployed through the Bashi Strait to the South China Sea. Later, the fleet again passed through the Bashi Strait and entered the Pacific Ocean. Within the same month it passed through the waters of the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to the East China Sea. In this voyage, carrier-based fighters have been seen taking-off and landing in the Pacific too. The activities are worthy of attention as indicating the enhancement of the capabilities of China’s naval forces, including the aircraft carrier, and the improvement of its capabilities to project power to more distant areas. Given a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine’s submerged passage through Japan’s territorial waters around the Sakishima Islands in November 2004 and a Chinese Navy Shang-class submarine’s submerged passage from the Pacific Ocean toward the East China Sea through Japan’s contiguous zone northeast of Miyako Island in January 2018, it is thought that Chinese submarines also have conducted some activities in the Pacific.
indicated the Chinese forces’ training targeting the United States and its allies.\(^\text{13}\) Flight patterns of Chinese military aircraft have also been changing. Flights from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean, passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and from the direction of the Bashi Channel to the Pacific Ocean, both with the return trips on the same shuttle routes, have been repeatedly made. Since November 2016, H-6K bombers and other aircraft were confirmed as flying around Taiwan. In August 2017, H-6K bombers were confirmed as flying to waters off the Kii Peninsula after advancing to the Pacific Ocean via waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island. Through frequent long-distance flights of bombers and other aircraft, including advancements to the Pacific, and their advanced flight paths and composition, China is thought to be demonstrating its presence around areas including those surrounding Japan, and planning further enhancements to more practical operational capabilities.

Additionally, activities considered planned to improve sea and air joint operational capabilities in more distant areas, such as what seemed to be air-to-ship attack drills including advancements to the Pacific Ocean, have been seen in recent years. In April 2019 and February 2020, the PLA Eastern Theater Command announced that joint training was conducted in waters east of Taiwan. China is expected to further expand and intensify naval and air activities in the Pacific Ocean.

c. Activities in the Sea of Japan

While the Chinese Navy has been active in the Sea of Japan during training and on other occasions for some time, its Air Force activities in the area have also intensified of late. “Force-on-force exercises” in the Sea of Japan by Chinese Navy ships were announced for the first time in August 2016. Three aircraft apparently participated in the exercises, including two H-6 bombers that passed through the Tsushima Strait into the Sea of Japan for the first time.

In December 2017, Chinese Air Force aircraft (H-6K bombers) passed through the Tsushima Strait and advanced to the Sea of Japan for the first time. Then, Chinese fighter aircraft (Su-30 fighters) were confirmed as advancing to the Sea of Japan for the first time. In February 2018, it was confirmed for the first time that the Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft entered the Sea of Japan via the Western Channel of Tsushima Strait (the strait between Tsushima in Nagasaki Prefecture and the Korean Peninsula).

Since 2018, China’s sea and air forces have further intensified activities in the Sea of Japan involving passages through the Tsushima Strait. It is considered that the PLA will continue to expand and intensify its activities in the Sea of Japan.

(3) Activities of Chinese Ships Including Government Vessels, and Aircraft around the Senkaku Islands, etc.

Chinese government vessels have been seen almost every day in the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands, Japan’s inherent territory, and intruded into Japan’s territorial waters around the islands three times a month on average. Despite Japan’s strong protests, they continued to intrude into the Japanese territorial waters in FY2019. In May 2020, Chinese government vessels entered Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands for three consecutive days. From May 9 to 10, they continued to cruise in Japan’s territorial waters for more than 26 hours and approached and followed a Japanese fishing boat.

In December 2008, China Maritime Surveillance vessels intruded into Japan’s territorial waters and hovered and drifted, running counter to international law. Later, China Maritime Surveillance and China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command vessels gradually intensified their activities in the Japanese territorial waters. Such activities have intensified greatly since September 2012, when the Japanese Government acquired the ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsurishima Island, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island). The number of Chinese government ships intruding into the Japanese territorial waters in a day had been limited to two or three until August 2016. Later, however, the number has reached four frequently.

China is seen to be steadily strengthening an operational posture intended to use government vessels to intrude into Japan’s territorial waters. Specifically, government vessels sent to waters near the Senkaku Islands have grown larger in size. At least one of the government vessels intruding into Japan’s territorial waters has been a 3,000-ton or larger vessel since August 2014. Since February 2015, three 3,000-ton or larger government vessels have been confirmed as entering Japan’s territorial waters simultaneously. Since December 2015, Chinese government ships armed with what appear to be cannons have repeatedly intruded into the Japanese territorial waters.

Cases indicating the improvement of Chinese government vessels’ operational capabilities have been also confirmed. From April to June 2019, Chinese government vessels were seen in the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands for a record 64 consecutive days. In that year, the number of days when Chinese government vessels were seen in the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands hit an all-time high of 282. The total number of Chinese government vessels seen in the zone also reached an all-time high of 1,097.

Additionally, cases indicating China’s capabilities to send numerous government vessels to waters around the Senkaku Islands simultaneously have also been identified. In early August 2016, approximately 200 to 300 Chinese fishing boats advanced to the contiguous zone of the Senkaku Islands. At that time, as many as up to 15 Chinese government vessels were confirmed in the contiguous zone simultaneously. Over five days, a large number of Chinese government vessels and fishing boats repeatedly intruded into Japan’s territorial waters.

In December 2012, a fixed-wing aircraft of the State Oceanic Administration was identified as the first Chinese aircraft to intrude into Japan’s airspace around the Senkaku Islands. Until March 2014, aircraft of the State Oceanic Administration were frequently confirmed as approaching the airspace. In May 2017, it was confirmed that an object that appeared to be a small drone was flying above a Chinese government vessel intruding into the Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. This flight also constitutes an invasion of Japan’s territorial airspace.

China has thus relentlessly continued attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by coercion in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands, leading to a grave matter...
Number of Announcements of Chinese Combatant Ships’ Activities around the Southwestern Islands and the Soya and Tsugaru Straits

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※ The figure for 2020 is as of the end of March.

Number of Announcements of Chinese Military Aircraft’s Passage between the Main Island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island

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Number of Announcements of Chinese Combatant Ships’ Passage through the Tsushima Strait

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Number of Announcements of Chinese Military Aircraft’s Passage through the Tsushima Strait

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※ The figure for 2020 is as of the end of March.

Changes in number of days on which Chinese government vessels intruded into the Japanese territorial waters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of days (days)</th>
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<td>407</td>
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<td>2020</td>
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※ The figure for 2012 is that from September to December, and the figure for 2020 is as of the end of March.
of concern. Japan cannot accept China’s actions to escalate the situation.

Among waters other than those around the Senkaku Islands, Chinese government vessels were confirmed as passing through the territorial waters of Japan around Tsushima Island (Nagasaki Prefecture), Okinoshima Island (Fukuoka Prefecture) and the Tsugaru Strait in July 2017. The same vessels were also confirmed to have sailed in Japan’s territorial waters from Sata Cape to the Kusagaki Islands (both in Kagoshima Prefecture) in August that year. In July 2019, a Chinese government vessel was seen sailing in Japan’s territorial waters around Tappisaki and Omasaki (both in Aomori Prefecture).

(4) **Trends of Activities in the South China Sea**

China has also been intensifying its activities based on its own assertions in the South China Sea, including waters around the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, over which territorial disputes exist with neighbors, including some member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Since 2014, on seven features of the Spratly Islands (Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, Cuerteron Reef, Gaven Reefs, Hughes Reef, and Johnson South Reef), China pressed ahead with large-scale and rapid land reclamation. The Philippines-China arbitration award issued in July 2016 denied the “historic rights” as the basis of the “nine-dash line” claimed by China, and determined the illegality of China’s activities such as land reclamation. However, China has made it clear that it would not comply with the award and is currently continuing military activities while promoting the development of military facilities, such as batteries, and various kinds of infrastructure that can be used for military purposes, including runways, ports, hangars, and radar facilities, to militarize these features.

On Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief Reefs, called the Big Three of the Spratly Islands, China has developed batteries for anti-aircraft guns, missile shelters, underground storage facilities pointed out to be munitions storage, large ports capable of accommodating combatant ships and runways available for takeoff and landing of fighters and bombers. On Fiery Cross Reef in April 2016, a Navy patrol aircraft flying over the South China Sea landed for a nominal purpose of evacuating emergency patients. On Subi and Mischief Reefs in July of the same year, China forced aircraft test flights on runways available for the takeoff and landing of large aircraft. Reportedly, a Y-7 transport aircraft was confirmed on Mischief Reef in January 2018 and a Y-8 special mission aircraft on Subi Reef in April that year. Additionally, in April 2018, it was reported that anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missiles were deployed on Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief Reefs for military training and that radar jamming systems were deployed on Mischief Reef. Furthermore, it was reported in May 2020 that China possibly deployed aircraft including Y-8 patrol and Y-9 early warning aircraft and other aircraft to the Fiery Cross Reef in rotation. On the other four features, it is pointed out that the construction of facilities, such as harbors, helipads, and radars, has made progress and that what appears to be large anti-aircraft guns and close in weapon systems (CIWS) may have already been deployed. If these features are used for full-scale military purposes, it could significantly change the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region.

China carried out the militarization of the Paracel Islands before that of the Spratly Islands. China has reportedly extended the runway to nearly 3,000 m on Woody Island since 2013. In October 2015, October 2017, and June 2019, China was reported to have deployed J-11, J-10 and other fighters on the island. In February 2016 and January 2017, the existence of equipment likely to be surface-to-air missiles was confirmed. It has been noted that the takeoff and landing training of the H-6K bombers in the South China Sea announced by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense in May 2018 was carried out on Woody Island.

In recent years, Chinese vessels have allegedly been conducting what are likely to be survey activities in Scarborough Shoal, where a standoff took place between Chinese and Philippine government ships in April 2012. It
is pointed out that new land reclamations on the shoal might be seen in the future. It is also pointed out that if China conducts land reclamations and installs radar facilities, runways, and other infrastructure on Scarborough Shoal, it could possibly increase its ability for situation awareness and power projection capabilities in the surrounding sea area and ultimately enhance its operational capabilities throughout all the areas of the South China Sea. Attention must continue to be paid to the situation going forward.

The activities in sea and airspace are expanding and intensifying as well. In March 2009, December 2013 and September 2018, Chinese naval and other vessels approached and intercepted U.S. Navy vessels navigating in the South China Sea. In May 2016, February 2017 and May 2017, PLA fighters allegedly flew close to U.S. Forces aircraft. In July and August 2016, after the Philippines-China arbitration award was rendered, PLAAF H-6K bomber aircraft conducted “combat air patrol” in the airspace close to Scarborough Shoal. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that this patrol would “become normal.” In December 2016, H-6 bombers reportedly flew along the so-called nine-dash line. In September of the same year, the China-Russia bilateral naval exercise “Joint Sea 2016” was conducted for the first time in the South China Sea. A field training exercise by naval vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” and a naval review ceremony, regarded as the largest since the founding of China, were conducted in the same area from the end of March until April 2018. In 2019, anti-ship ballistic missile tests were reportedly conducted in the South China Sea for the first time. In 2019 and in April 2020, the deployment of the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” accompanied by Fuyu-class fast combat support and other ships in the South China Sea was reported. Furthermore, Chinese government vessels reportedly fired warning shots at fishing boats of neighboring countries. When Chinese government vessels interrupted Vietnam’s oil and natural gas development within its exclusive economic zone from July to October 2019, they reportedly visited Fiery Cross Reef for supply. In this way, it appears that China seeks to expand its military and other forms of presence and enhance war-sustaining and other joint operational capabilities in the South China Sea.

Such activities conducted by China based on its own assertions unilaterally change the status quo and further...

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14 According to the statement by U.S. Chief of Naval Operation John Richardson in March 2016.
Defense Policies of Countries

Chapter 2

Advance its efforts to create a fait accompli. Japan is deeply concerned about these activities, and the concern is shared with the international community, including the United States and other G7 Member States. China asserts that some of the ASEAN member states including the Philippines and Vietnam are illegitimately occupying features. However, China’s development work on the features is of a scale incomparable to the activities carried out by other countries and is conducted at a rapid pace.\(^{15}\)

In any case, the issues surrounding the South China Sea are directly related to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and are a legitimate concern not only for Japan, which has major sea lanes in the South China Sea, but also for the entire international community. Countries concerned, including China, are urged to refrain from unilateral actions that heighten tension and act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law.


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(5) Trends in the Indian Ocean and Other More Distant Waters

The Chinese Navy is considered to be shifting towards “protection missions on the far seas” and has been steadily increasing its capabilities to conduct operations in more distant waters, such as the Indian Ocean, in recent years. Progress has been seen in the Navy’s development of such equipment as large combatant ships and replenishment ships and in its operational initiatives. For example, since December 2008, Chinese Navy vessels have been deployed off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden to take part in international counter-piracy efforts. In December 2019, the Chinese Navy conducted its first multilateral exercise with its Russian and Iranian counterparts in the northern Indian Ocean. Activities of Chinese Navy submarines have also been confirmed continuously in the Indian Ocean. They have been reported to make port calls at Sri Lanka’s Colombo, Pakistan’s Karachi, and Malaysia’s Kota Kinabalu. In January 2020, China reportedly sent a submarine for drills with Pakistan in the northern Arabian Sea.

Chinese forces have expanded activities not only in the Indian Ocean but also in other waters. In September 2016, China-Russia “Joint Sea” bilateral naval exercises took place in waters including the Mediterranean Sea. In November 2019, the Chinese Navy conducted its first multilateral exercises with its Russian and South African counterparts in waters around the Cape of Good Hope. China has also deployed a space observation support ship in the southern Pacific and dispatched a military hospital ship to waters including the southern Pacific as well as those near Latin America under “Mission Harmony.”

In September 2015, five Chinese military vessels reportedly sailed in the high seas of the Bering Sea and in U.S. territorial waters near the Aleutian Islands. Moreover, in January 2018, China published a white paper entitled “China’s Arctic Policy,” which mapped out a policy of active involvement in Arctic initiatives, including efforts to build a “Polar Silk Road” through the development of Arctic sea routes. It is pointed out that China could take advantage of scientific survey and commercial activities to increase its presence including military activities in the Arctic sea.\(^{16}\)

Additionally, China has been remarkably trying to secure overseas outposts such as harbors, which would help support its operations in far seas. For example, in August 2017, China

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began to operate a “support base” for logistics support of the PLA in Djibouti, a strategic point in Eastern Africa facing the Gulf of Aden. Since April 2018, a pier viewed as potentially accommodating large replenishment ships has been under construction on the “support base” coast. In recent years, China has been promoting its “Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI) whose main purpose is advertised as establishing an economic zone in regions including the Eurasian continent, with the Chinese military possibly taking on the role of the shield behind the initiative by such means as the stabilization of areas via counter-piracy activities and the improvement of counter-terrorism capabilities in coastal states through bilateral and multilateral exercises. While it is thought that the initiative includes a strategic intention to expand its influence in the region, it is possible that the initiative will further improve the PLA’s operational capabilities in the Indian Ocean, Pacific Ocean and elsewhere. For example, China’s support for the construction of port infrastructure in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and other Indian Ocean countries as well as Pacific island countries including Vanuatu could lead China to secure outposts available for its military purposes.

(6) Objectives of Activities in Waters and Airspace

The development and activities of Chinese naval and air forces, descriptions in defense white papers, China’s geographical conditions and globalizing economy, and other factors indicate that the recent water and airspace activities of the Navy, Air Force and other Chinese organizations have the following objectives:

The first is to intercept operations by adversaries in waters and airspace as far as possible from China in order to defend its territorial land, waters and airspace. Behind this objective is an increase in the effectiveness of long-range attacks due to recent progress in science and technology.

The second is to develop capabilities to deter and prevent Taiwan’s independence. China maintains that it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the unification of China. To ensure the prevention of foreign intervention in the Taiwan issue, China needs to enhance its operational capabilities at sea and airspace as Taiwan is surrounded by the sea in all directions.

The third is to weaken the control of other countries on islands subject to China’s territorial claims and enhance the claims through various surveillance activities and use of force in waters and airspace surrounding these islands. Such activities are considered to also have the purpose of creating a fait accompli as part of the reasons for unilaterally changing the status quo and justifying China’s claims based on its own concept of “legal warfare.”

The fourth is to acquire, maintain, and protect its maritime rights and interests. China is engaged in oil and gas drilling as well as building facilities and surveying in the East and South China Seas. It has been confirmed that in addition to the existing four platforms, China has built 12 additional offshore platforms on the Chinese side of the Japan-China median line of the East China Sea since June 2013. In late June 2016, the installment of an anti-surface vessel radar and a surveillance camera was confirmed on one of the platforms. Attention is to be paid to matters regarding the platforms, including the purpose of such equipment. Japan has repeatedly lodged protests against China’s unilateral development and demanded the termination of such work.

The fifth is to defend its sea lanes of communications. In the background is the fact that its sea lanes, including its oil transportation routes from the Middle East, are essential for the Chinese economy. Given the recent strengthening of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, it is believed that they have been expanding military capabilities to cover distant waters beyond China’s near seas.

Given these objectives of China’s water and airspace activities and recent trends, it is believed that China plans to further expand the sphere of its activities, and further intensify its operations in waters surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, as well as in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Meanwhile, in recent years, China has shown interest in taking steps to avoid and prevent unexpected contingencies in sea areas and airspace. For example, in April 2014, China, together with other countries such as Japan and the United States, adopted the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which sets forth the standards of behavior in the case that the naval vessels or aircraft of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) member states have unexpected encounters. Also, in June 2018, Japan and China started the implementation of their Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities to avoid unexpected collisions between SDF and PLA vessels and aircraft.
7 International Military Activities

In recent years, the PLA has been indicating its positive attitude on nontraditional security missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counterpiracy, dispatching numerous units for such overseas missions.

China has vowed to consistently support and actively participate in UN PKO, increasing its presence in UN PKO. According to the Chinese UN delegation, China has sent more than 40,000 military personnel to UN PKO (as of February 20, 2020). According to the UN, as of the end of January 2020, China had a total of 2,544 troops, civilian police and military observers — the largest number of peacekeepers among the permanent members of the UN Security Council — engaged in UN peacekeeping activities, including the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). China has also largely increased its share of the UN PKO budget. The Chinese share has remained the second largest, after the U.S. share, since 2016.

Moreover, China has been actively participating in counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. In 2011, in view of the deteriorating situation in Libya, China carried out a military evacuation of Chinese nationals for the first time.

It is pointed out that factors behind such Chinese attitude include the growing need for protecting and promoting China’s national interests overseas following the expansion of national interests beyond its national borders, China’s attempt to verify military capabilities including units’ long-distance deployment, its intent to raise its status by demonstrating its will to fulfill its responsibilities to the international community, its hope to diffuse the military’s peaceful and humanitarian images, and its attempt to enhance relations with PKO regions including African countries.

8 Education and Training

In recent years, the PLA under the policy of building a military that “can fight and win a war” has promoted practical exercises including large-scale ones such as joint exercises led by theater commands, force-on-force exercises, landing exercises, inter-theater exercises, and large exercises including distant ones, as well as night-time exercises and joint exercises with other countries, in order to strengthen its operational capabilities. The new military training regulations in effect since January 2018 referred to the execution of joint and full-spectrum operation based on network information systems, in addition to the definite implementation of practical training as a principle. Moreover, the trial regulation on the supervision of military training that took effect in March 2019 is regarded as China’s first attempt to put in place a system that prescribes measures for rectifying practices that are inconsistent with the requirements of actual combat and criteria for identifying malpractice and discipline violations during military training.

In the education spectrum as well, the PLA aims to train soldiers who have the ability to execute joint operations. In 2003, it launched a human resource strategy project to develop human resources capable of directing joint and informatized operations, and of building joint and informatized armed forces. It was reported in 2017 that the PLA National Defense University began training to develop human resources capable of directing joint operations.

China outlined the promotion of the “rule of law” at the fourth plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee in 2014, with Chairman Xi referring to the military as being controlled by law, indicating that the PLA is required to thoroughly implement the “rule of law.” In another development for the indication, Miao Hua, Director of the Political Work Department, and Zhang Shengmin, Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, were selected as members of the 19th Central Military Commission, the supreme decision-making body in the military. The issuance of the trial regulation on military supervision work in January 2020 also suggests the rule of law promotion.

China has been developing defense mobilization systems in order to effectively utilize private resources in case of emergencies, including wars. It enforced the National Defense Mobilization Law as the basic law for defense mobilizations in 2010 and the National Defense Transportation Law for the transportation area in 2016. The “civil-military fusion” policy that China is currently promoting is believed to have its sights set on the routine military use of civilian resources not only in emergencies but also in peacetime. The military use of civilian resources includes civilian ships’ transportation of military equipment. As such initiative
generally augments China’s forces available for military missions and is expected to proactively be promoted in the future, the initiative’s implications for the Chinese military forces’ operational capabilities should be watched closely.

9 National Defense Industry Sector

Under the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, a department of the State Council, China’s main national defense industry had consisted of 12 corporations to develop and produce nuclear weapons, missiles and rockets, aircraft, vessels, information systems and other military equipment. The Chinese national defense industry’s arms sales were pointed out as the second largest after those in the United States in 2017. After China State Shipbuilding Corporation merged with China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation in 2019, the industry now comprises 11 corporations including China State Shipbuilding Corporation.

While China imports highly sophisticated military equipment and parts that it cannot produce domestically from other countries such as Russia, it is believed that China places emphasis on the enhancement of its military industrial sector, including the domestic production of equipment, to modernize its military. It has been pointed out that China is acquiring technologies ambitiously not only through domestic technology research and development and foreign direct investment, but also via illegal means in the form of secret information theft. The trend of the national defense industry sector is directly linked to the modernization of the military and should be closely watched with strong attention.

China’s civil-military fusion policy has been evident in the technology area. China promotes two-way technological exchanges where military technologies are utilized for developing the national economy while civilian technologies are absorbed for national defense development. It also seems interested in absorbing foreign technologies available both for military and civilian purposes. It is pointed out that China’s civil-military fusion policy gives priority to initiatives in seas, outer space, cyber, AI, and other emerging areas for China.

In recent years, China has reportedly promoted the standardization of civilian products for their military adoption from the production stage under the civil-military fusion policy. This initiative is expected to allow the military to more effectively utilize civilian resources.

3 Relations with Countries and Regions

1 General Situation

China, particularly regarding maritime issues over which its interests conflict with others’, continues to demonstrate its attitude of realizing its unilateral assertions without compromise, while promoting assertive actions including those to change the status quo by coercion and create a fait accompli for such changes, based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing international order. China has been promoting its BRI as a national strategy, but some BRI-participating countries have recently reconsidering BRI projects due mainly to their fiscal deterioration. Furthermore, it has been pointed that there have been moves toward creating China’s own international order, including the establishment of China-led multilateral mechanisms in security, financial and other areas. It has also been noted that China has tried to influence political decisions in other countries through efforts such as winning over foreign politicians.

At the same time, China recognizes that a peaceful and stable international environment is necessary for maintaining sustainable economic development and enhancing China’s overall national power. Based on such recognition, China has advocated building a “community of shared future for mankind” and referred to promoting the building of “a new type of international relations based on mutual respect, equity and justice, and win–win cooperation.” China proactively carries out military exchanges with other countries. In recent years, China has been engaged in active military exchanges not only with major powers such as the United States and Russia and with its neighboring countries including Southeast Asian countries, but also with countries in Africa and Latin America. The objectives of China’s promotion of

19 According to the statement by then Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull in December 2017.
military exchanges are thought to include alleviating other countries’ concerns regarding China by strengthening its relations with these countries, creating a favorable security environment for China, enhancing China’s influence in the international community, exploring overseas arms markets, securing stable supplies of natural resources, and ensuring foreign bases.

### Relations with Taiwan

Relations with Taiwan

See 4-1 of this section (Relations with China)

### Relations with the United States

There are various issues between the United States and China, such as trade issues, issues concerning the South China Sea, the Taiwan issue, the Hong Kong issue, and human rights issues regarding Uighur and Tibet. However, China deems its relationship with the United States as one of the world’s most important bilateral relationships and appears to be aware that a stable U.S.-China relationship is essential in enhancing its national power, including the development of its economy. Accordingly, it is likely that China is trying to further develop relations with the United States through mutual respect and “win-win” cooperation. At the same time, however, it must be noted that China has indicated its attitude of making no compromise regarding its “core interests and major concerns.” Recently, the moves of the United States and China keeping each other in check have been attracting strong attention.

Since the start of the Trump administration, the United States has made frequent statements on the necessity of cooperation between the United States and China on issues such as North Korea. At the same time, it also called on China to uphold international rules and norms on global issues, including international trade and maritime security. Amid this situation, the Trump administration has been toughening its stance on China since June 2018 through such measures as the phased raising of tariffs, on the grounds of China’s unfair trade practices over many years. China has also responded with countermeasures such as the phased raising of tariffs. In January 2020, however, the United States and China reached the Phase 1 deal, which places China’s expansion of import volumes from the United States as a pillar. The deal came into force on February 14 of the same year. On the same day, the two countries also reduced some tariffs. The United States has also criticized the initiative of “Made-In China 2025,” which exploits subsidies and other means for promoting China’s high-technology industries, as representing unfair economic practices to unduly hurt U.S. and other economies.

Furthermore, the United States has indicated that the re-emergence of long-term strategic competition from revisionist powers including China is a central challenge to its prosperity and security. With this as a backdrop, the United States recognizes that China is pursuing regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific in the near future through the modernization of its military and other efforts. Additionally, in the MDR published in January 2019, the U.S. DoD indicated that it perceives the missile capabilities of China and other states as a threat to the military forces of both the United States and its allies. China has strongly opposed such a perception by the United States.

The United States has reiterated that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. This was confirmed in a document between the Japanese and U.S. leaders for the first time in February 2017, in the joint statement from the first Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting since the inauguration of the Trump administration, which explicitly referred to the application of Article 5 of the Treaty to the Senkaku Islands. China has shown its strong protest against these stances. With regard to the issues over the South China Sea, the United States is concerned about such dimensions as obstruction to the freedom of navigation in sea lanes, restrictions on the activities of U.S. Forces, and the worsening security situation in the entire region. The United States has requested China to comply with international norms, and has repeatedly criticized China’s unilateral and assertive actions. And the United States also implements the Freedom of Navigation Operation in the South China Sea and other waters to counter excessive claims to maritime interests by other countries such as China and calls for demilitarizing the South China Sea.

While embracing these differences, the United States and China apparently continued military exchanges in a relatively stable manner. As seen in China’s response to the U.S. DoD’s notification of arms sales to Taiwan to Congress, for example, China has recently indicated restrained responses to the

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United States. In April 2008, a hotline between the defense authorities of the two countries was set up. In November 2014 and September 2015, the United States and China announced that they agreed on confidence-building measures aimed at reducing the risk of unintended encounters. China has also dispatched observers to U.S. military exercises, and exercises have been conducted between the Chinese and U.S. navies on the occasions of mutual port visits. In addition, the U.S. and Chinese forces have engaged in annual humanitarian and disaster relief exercises since November 2013. After the inauguration of the Trump administration, both countries frequently mentioned the importance of bilateral military exchanges, and a series of new dialogue frameworks were launched, including the “Diplomatic and Security Dialogue” and the “Joint Staff Dialogue Mechanism.”

However, there are movements which indicate changes in the military exchanges that have remained rather stable in recent years. The second dialogue under the Joint Staff Dialogue Mechanism, which was due to take place in September 2018, was reportedly postponed. Moreover, the U.S. Defense Authorization Act for FY2019, which includes a clause to prohibit the United States from inviting China to RIMPAC until the demilitarization of the South China Sea is achieved, was enacted. And the United States decided not to send its vessels to the International Fleet Review that China hosted in April 2019.

While wanting a better relationship with China, the United States has demonstrated an uncompromising stance on matters concerning its own security. Developments in U.S.-China relations will continue to require close monitoring with keen attention.

While the United States has mentioned the need for a framework including China to control missile forces, China denies its involvement.

4 Relations with Russia

Ever since the so-called China-Soviet confrontation ended in 1989, China and Russia have placed importance on their bilateral relationship. They have emphasized the deepening of their “strategic partnership” since its establishment in the mid-1990s. In 2001, the China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation was concluded. In 2004, the long-standing issue of border demarcation between the two countries came to a settlement. The two countries have a common view on promoting the multipolarization of the world and the establishment of a new international order and have further deepened their relations.

On the military front, since the 1990s, China has purchased modern weapons from Russia, including fighters, destroyers, and submarines. Russia is currently the largest supplier of weapons to China. Although China-Russia arms transactions in value in recent years have been lower than in some past period, China has apparently continued to indicate its strong interests in importing advanced Russian defense equipment and in joint equipment development with Russia. For example, China has introduced what are believed to be the latest fourth generation Su-35 fighters and the S-400 surface-to-air missile system from Russia. China has been reported as the first country to import the Russian S-400 missile system. At the same time, it is pointed out that Russia has differentiated the performance of some of the weapons it exports to China, due to its concerns about China’s reverse engineering and its policy of not providing China having a ground border with Russia with sophisticated weapons that would pose a threat to Russia. It is also suggested that Russia has concerns about competing with China in arms exports taking into consideration China’s improvement of technological power.

Military exchanges between China and Russia take place in such forms as routine mutual visits by senior military officers and bilateral and multilateral exercises. For example, China participated in the Vostok 2018 exercise, viewed as one of the largest Russian military exercises since the end of the Cold War, and in the Tsentr-2019 exercise. Additionally, the two countries have held the large-scale bilateral naval exercise “Joint Sea” since 2012. The annual exercise for 2016 took place in the South China for the first time, and that for 2017 was held in the Baltic Sea and Sea of Okhotsk for the first time. In 2016 and 2017, the two countries held the “Aerospace Security” missile defense computer-simulated exercise. Furthermore, China has held the counter-terrorism exercise “Peace Mission” between China and Russia or among the member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), established in June 2001 including Russia. China likely regards these exchanges as an opportunity to learn about how to operate Russian-made weapons and the operational doctrine of the Russian Armed

21 According to “Arms Transfers Database,” SIPRI
Forces, which have combat experiences.

In addition, moves indicating deepened China-Russia relations have been confirmed in recent years. In the two countries’ “first joint strategic flight” of bombers in July 2019, their bombers joined in the Sea of Japan and flew to the East China Sea. In September 2019, China and Russia signed a series of documents on cooperation in the military and military technologies.22

5 Relations with North Korea

China has kept close relations with North Korea under the 1961 Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty. Although Chinese and North Korean leaders’ reciprocal visits have been viewed as decreasing since North Korea’s transition to the Kim Jong-un regime, Xi Jinping in June 2019 became the first Chinese president to visit North Korea in 14 years and held his fifth meeting with Chairman Kim.

China has reportedly adopted three principles on the Korea Peninsula – (1) the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, (2) the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and (3) the resolution of problems through dialogue and consultations – indicating that China gives priority to the maintenance of stability and dialogue as well as the denuclearization. Under these principles, China, while agreeing to UN Security Council resolutions to enhance sanctions on North Korea, cooperated with Russia in distributing a draft resolution including a proposal to lift some of the UN sanctions at the council in December 2019.

Although China has vowed to have seriously observed its international obligations, it has been pointed out that Chinese ships have been involved in illegal ship-to-ship transfer that has been banned by the UN Security Council resolutions on North Korean sanctions.

6 Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries

As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia, reciprocal summit-level visits and other activities continue to be actively carried out. China is also actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN Plus One (China), ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China and the ROK), East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Furthermore, China has developed bilateral relations through infrastructure development support, etc. under the BRI.

On the military front, there seems to be moves that China has made efforts toward military confidence building, such as the first ASEAN-China Maritime Field Training Exercise, which took place in October 2018. Recently, the PLA’s attempt to secure an outpost for its activities in Cambodia has been reported, although the countries concerned denied this.

In July 2016, an arbitration award based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) adjudicating the Philippines’ case against China in the South China Sea was rendered, accepting most of the Philippine claims. After that, the Philippines was said to have refrained from referring to the arbitration award because of China’s substantial economic support and pressure. In September 2019, however, a Philippine Presidential Office spokesperson noted that the arbitration award was still a subject in bilateral talks. In April 2019, the Philippines announced a protest statement against China over massive Chinese fishing boats confirmed as near Thitu Island under effective Philippine control among the Spratly Islands.23

In July 2017 and March 2018, the Vietnamese government reportedly made foreign companies, engaged in oil drilling in the South China Sea with the permission of the Vietnamese government, cancel the drilling under the pressure from China. Chinese and Vietnamese government ships staged a standoff over oil and natural gas drilling within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone from July 2019 until Vietnam withdrew its HAKRYU-5 drilling rig in October of that year to end the standoff.

Indonesia has had frequent disputes with China over Chinese fishing boats’ operations within Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone and taken strong actions including the explosion of foreign fishing boats engaging in alleged illegal operations. Recently, the Indonesian government filed a strong protest against Chinese fishing boats’ illegal operations near Indonesia’s Natuna Islands from December 2019 to January 2020, rejecting China’s assertion on the nine-dash line anew.

China and ASEAN have continued talks to discuss the formulation of the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South

22 According to the Russian military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (the “Red Star”) on September 6, 2019.
23 According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines on April 4, 2019.
China Sea (COC) and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang announced in November 2018 that he hoped to complete negotiations within three years. In July 2019, China announced at the Chinese and ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting that they had completed the first reading of the Single Draft COC Negotiating Text.

(2) Relations with Central Asian Countries

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in the western part of China, is situated next to Central Asia. Therefore, China is deeply concerned about the political stability and security situations, such as terrorism by Islamic extremists, in Central Asian states. Such concerns of China appear to be reflected in China’s tightened border control and its engagement in the SCO and the stabilization of Afghanistan. Moreover, China is strongly interested in Central Asia, with a view to diversifying its supply sources and procurement methods for resources. China promotes cooperation in the energy field with Central Asian countries, such as the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines between China and Central Asian nations.

(3) Relations with South Asian Countries

China has traditionally maintained a particularly close relationship with Pakistan, and mutual visits by their summit leaders take place frequently. Their cooperation in the military sector, including bilateral exercises, exporting weapons and transferring military technology, is also considered to be deepening. As the importance of sea lanes increases for China, it is believed that the importance of Pakistan is rising for China accordingly, partly because of the geopolitical features of Pakistan which faces the Indian Ocean. China has also conducted various bilateral military exercises with Pakistan, including naval search and rescue training and anti-terrorism drills. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a China-supported development plan for power facilities and transportation infrastructure in the region stretching from the Port of Gwadar to Kashgar in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, is a flagship project of the BRI. While some have pointed out that the project has run into difficulties as indicated by delays and partial withdrawals due to Pakistan’s deteriorating financial situation, the project’s progress is expected to further increase China’s influence in Pakistan.

China and India have not demarcated their borders in areas such as Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh. As China and Bhutan, which has close relations with India, have claimed territorial rights over the Doklam Plateau, Chinese and Indian military forces staged a standoff at the plateau from June to August 2017. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that China has recently striven to improve its relationship with India, while giving consideration to a balance between its relations with Pakistan and India. Because China identifies the relationship with India as a strategic partnership, the leaders of the two countries actively conduct mutual visits. In December 2018, China and India resumed their “Hand in Hand” bilateral anti-terrorism drill that had been suspended since the Doklam standoff. The background for progress in China’s relations with India seems to include an emphasis on economic growth of the two countries and a response to closer U.S.-India relations.

In recent years, China has also been deepening its relations with Sri Lanka. Initially after taking office, President Maithripala Sirisena, who won the election in January 2015, suspended the Colombo Port City development projects financed by China. However, he subsequently announced the resumption of the projects in January 2016, and new development projects with China have also been showing progress. In July 2017, an agreement was reached to lend interests to Chinese enterprises at the Port of Hambantota, which was being constructed with Chinese loans. Some have noted that these moves constitute what has been described as a “debt trap.” Additionally, China is deepening its relations with Bangladesh through its port development in Chittagong where a naval base is located, arms exports, and other deals.

(4) Relations with European Countries

For China, the European Union (EU) countries have become an important partner especially in the economic field.

European countries possess more advanced military technologies than China or Russia regarding information and communication technology, avionics/aeroengines, air independence propulsion (AIP) systems for submarines, and other areas. The EU countries have maintained their arms embargo on China since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 and China has requested them to lift the embargo. If the EU arms embargo on China were lifted, sophisticated...
military technologies could be transferred to China and to third countries via China, dramatically changing the security environment in the Indo-Pacific and other regions.

Additionally, China and Ukraine have close ties in the field of arms procurement, as indicated by China’s purchase of the unfinished Ukrainian Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier “Varyag,” which was the basis of the aircraft carrier “Liaoning.” Therefore, the relationship between these two countries will attract attention going forward.

China’s recent rise has attracted attention from the NATO as well. The London declaration adopted at a NATO summit conference in December 2019 referred to China’s growing influence as both “opportunities and challenges” and noted necessity to address China as an Alliance. After the summit, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mentioned China’s deployment of numerous intermediate-range missiles and noted that NATO was considering how China could be included in future arms control.

China’s relations with European countries, including EU discussions on the arms embargo on China and NATO’s China policy related to future arms control, should be continuously watched.

(5) Relations with Middle East and African Countries, Pacific Island countries, and Central and South American Countries

China has been enhancing its relations with Middle Eastern and African nations in the economic realm. In recent years, it has also strengthened military relations with them. Not only intensive interactions among state leaders and senior military officials but also arms exports and exchanges between military forces are actively conducted. China also actively dispatches personnel to undertake UN PKO in Africa. Some suspect that underlying these movements could be China’s aim to ensure a stable supply of natural resources and to secure overseas bases in the future. In December 2016, São Tomé and Príncipe severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan and re-established relations with China, followed by Burkina Faso in May 2018.

Australia, while continuing to give priority to economic relations with China, is apparently concerned about China regarding the security area including the information and communications sector. A Chinese company’s agreement with the Northern Territory Government of Australia to lease Darwin Port has raised debates over security. China has also been boosting its relations with Pacific island countries by providing them with proactive and continuous economic support and medical services deploying a military hospital ship. China has promoted resources development in Papua New Guinea and signed an agreement with the island country on military cooperation. China has also been moving to enhance military relations with Vanuatu, Fiji, and Tonga. While China has been enhancing relations with Pacific island nations, Australia and some other countries have expressed concerns about such Chinese moves. In September 2019, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan and established such relations with China.

China has been striving to further deepen its relations with Central and South American countries, holding ministerial meetings with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) since 2015. In the military field, China has dispatched senior officials and sold arms to these countries and enhanced relations with them in medical services, counterterrorism and other areas. In Argentina, China operates an outer space observation facility. In June 2017, Panama severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan and established such relations with China, followed by the Dominican Republic in May 2018 and by El Salvador in August 2018.

7 International Transfer of Weapons

China’s arms exports have surpassed imports since 2013. China has been expanding exports of weapons such as small arms, tanks, aircraft including drones, and ships. China’s major arms export destinations include Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. China has also been reportedly exporting arms to Algeria, Tanzania, Nigeria, Sudan, and other African countries, Venezuela and other Latin American countries, and Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Middle Eastern countries. Recently, Serbia has been reported likely to become the first European country to introduce Chinese UAVs. Some claim that China has transferred weapons to foreign countries in order to strengthen its strategic relationships with friendly nations, enhance its influence in the international community, and secure natural resources. China has not participated in some of the frameworks for international arms export control, and some point out that missile-related and other technologies have been transferred from China to other
countries.

4 Military Capabilities of Taiwan

1 Relations with China

China upholds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China and that the Taiwan issue is a domestic one. China maintains that the “One China” principle is the underlying premise and foundation for dialogue between China and Taiwan. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic Progressive Party, who took office in 2016, has noted that she has never accepted the “1992 Consensus” that China claims as embodying the “One-China” principle.25 In response, China has criticized the Democratic Progressive Party for destroying the political foundation of the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations by rejecting the “1992 Consensus” unilaterally, emphasizing that the maintenance of the “1992 Consensus” would be the unshakable foundation for peace and stability of cross-Strait relations. China is strongly opposed to any foreign intervention in the unification of China as well as any move towards the independence of Taiwan and has repeatedly stated that it has not renounced the use of force. “The Anti-Secession Law,” enacted in March 2005, clearly lays out China’s policy of not renouncing the use of force, providing that in the event that the “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces (those seeking Taiwan’s independence) should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In a January 2019 speech at an event commemorating the 40th anniversary of China’s “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” General Secretary Xi Jinping advocated a five-point proposal for managing relations with Taiwan, stating “the specific form of the ‘one country, two systems’ model in Taiwan will give full consideration to the situation in Taiwan.” In her immediate response to the speech, President Tsai issued a statement firmly rejecting the “one country, two systems” model and called for negotiations between “government-authorized agencies.” After winning reelection with the highest ever number of votes in a Taiwanese presidential election in January 2020, President Tsai told a press conference the election results represented the value of Taiwanese people and rejected the “one country, two systems” model. In a manner to check the Taiwanese side, China noted that regardless of how the Taiwanese situation changed, there would be no change to the basic fact that there is only one China in the world, with Taiwan being a part of China.

Since around the inauguration of President Tsai for her first term, Taiwanese delegates were refused attendance at or had their invitations deferred from meetings held by international organizations, including ones in which they had participated up to that point.26 As the Solomon Islands and Kiribati severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan and established such relations with China in September 2019, the number of countries having diplomatic relations with Taiwan declined to 15 from 22 in May 2016, when President Tsai took office. Taiwan is strongly protesting these actions, claiming them to be “actions taken by China that compress the international space of Taiwan.” Both China and Taiwan have put forth their own assertions regarding the Senkaku Islands, but Taiwan has a negative attitude toward cooperating with China.27

2 Military Capabilities of Taiwan

Under President Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan has put forth visions such as the military strategy of “resolute defense and multidomain deterrence,” the overall defense concept of “force protection, decisive battle in littoral zone, and destruction of enemy at landing beach,” and the “strengthening of information, communications, and electronic operational capabilities.” The Taiwan National Defense Report 2019, released in September 2019 as the second such report under

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25 The “1992 Consensus” is referred to what represents a common understanding reached between Chinese and Taiwanese authorities in 1992 on the “One-China” principle. The CCP and Taiwan’s Kuomintang Nationalist Party (Taiwan’s ruling party at the time), viewed as parties to the consensus, have reportedly differed over the interpretation of the consensus. Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party has clarified that it has not accepted the “1992 Consensus.”
26 According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan on September 24, 2019.
27 According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan on February 8, 2013.
President Tsai, followed these visions and clarified Taiwan as an important security partner to the United States in the Indo-Pacific region. The United States has made decisions to sell arms to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act. Since President Trump took office in 2017, six such decisions have been made. In 2019, the president notified Congress of its plan to sell such weapons as 66 F-16C/D Block 70 fighters to Taiwan, the first U.S. fighter sales to Taiwan in the 27 years since 1992.

Aside from the purchases from the United States, Taiwan is moving forward with its own development of defense equipment, and the Quadrennial Defense Review (2017 QDR) published in March 2017 emphasizes Taiwan’s willingness to promote the development of the defense industry, especially the indigenous production of weapons and equipment. For example, in June 2016, the Taiwan Navy announced a policy to switch over major ships, including submarines, to an indigenous shipbuilding program. The National Defense Report 2019 set forth a target of delivering a prototype of an indigenous submarine by 2025.

Taiwan adopted conscription in 1951, but it has been switching to a volunteer system mainly to improve the expertise of its military personnel, and the last of the conscripts were enlisted by the end of 2018. However, the obligation to undergo four months of military training is being maintained and Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense describes the Taiwanese system of military service as a dual-track mix of conscripts and volunteers.28

With regard to Taiwan’s military power, at present, ground forces, including the Navy Marine Corps, have a total of approximately 93,000 personnel. In addition, it is assessed that approximately 1.66 million reserve personnel of the air, naval, and ground forces would be available in case of war. Regarding naval capabilities, in addition to Kidd-class destroyers which were imported from the United States, Taiwan possesses the indigenously built “Tuo Chiang” stealth corvette, among other vessels. Regarding air capabilities, Taiwan possesses F-16 (A/B and C/D) fighters, Mirage 2000 fighters, Ching-kuo fighters, and other assets.

### 3 Military Balance between China and Taiwan

While China has continued to increase its defense budget by a significant margin, Taiwan’s defense budget, at 351.2 billion Taiwan dollars for FY2020, has remained almost unchanged for nearly 20 years. China’s announced military budget in FY2020 totals 1,268 billion yuan, roughly 16 times the amount of Taiwan’s in terms of U.S. dollars based on exchange rates announced by the Taiwanese Central Bank. It is pointed out that China’s actual defense expenditure has been larger than the published defense budget, indicating that the China-Taiwan defense expenditure gap could be greater. Amid this situation, President Tsai has ordered an increase in Taiwan’s defense budget.29

In the National Defense Report 2019, Taiwan acknowledges that China is capable of conducting joint landing operations to take over Taiwan’s offshore islands, of early warning on the western side of the second island

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28 According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan on December 17, 2018.
29 According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan on March 31, 2019.
As for the military balance between the Taiwanese forces and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which face off across the Taiwan Strait, the Taiwanese forces were previously said to possess military superiority in accordance with Taiwan’s superiority in such areas as technological prowess. However, the military balance is considered to have been changing in recent years. China has continuously increased its national defense spending at a high pace against the backdrop of its rapid economic growth in recent years, and based on that, it has rapidly and extensively strengthened its military power in terms of quality and quantity. As a result, since the 2000s, the military balance between the PLA and Taiwan has changed in favor of the PLA on the whole, with its lead widening year after year as a trend. For example, “Annual Report to Congress—Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 (May 2019),” published by the U.S. Department of Defense, offered an analysis indicating that in addition to naval and air powers vastly numerically superior to those of Taiwan, the PLA possesses a missile arsenal including 750 to 1,500 short-range missiles, whose range is presumed to cover all or parts of Taiwan.

Under these circumstances, Taiwan is also making efforts to strengthen its self-defense capability while increasing its national defense spending. However, as Taiwan apparently recognizes a gap with China in terms of deployable resources, it intends to develop the “asymmetric” warfare concept and capabilities. It has been pointed out that as part of those efforts, Taiwan is strengthening offensive and defensive electronic warfare capability and capabilities to promptly deploy and sweep mines, and is introducing high-speed stealth vessels.

While the PLA proceeds to expand its missile, naval, and air forces, the Taiwan military is struggling in the modernization of its equipment.

The military capabilities of China and Taiwan are generally characterized as follows:

(1) Regarding ground forces, while China possesses an overwhelming number of troops, its capability of landing and invading the island of Taiwan is limited at present. In
recent years, however, China has been steadily improving its landing and invasion capabilities by building large amphibious ships.

(2) Regarding naval and air forces, China, which overwhelms Taiwan in terms of quantity, has also been rapidly strengthening its naval and air forces in recent years in terms of quality, where Taiwan used to have superiority over China. In this situation, Taiwan focuses on developing asymmetric forces including stealth corvettes.

(3) Regarding missile attack capabilities, Taiwan has been strengthening its ballistic missile defense, upgrading the PAC-2 to the PAC-3 and introducing the PAC-3. However, China possesses numerous short-range ballistic missiles and other assets with ranges covering Taiwan. Taiwan is deemed to lack effective countermeasures.

Comparison of military capabilities should be made based not only on the troop strength and the performance and quantity of equipment but also on various other factors such as the purpose and aspects of assumed military operations, operational arrangements, the skill level of personnel, and logistics. Nevertheless, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is tilting to China’s favor, and the gap appears to be growing year by year. Going forward, attention needs to be paid to trends such as the strengthening of Chinese and Taiwanese forces, the sale of weapons to Taiwan by the United States, and Taiwan’s own development of its main military equipment.

Fig. I-2-2-16 (Changes in Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense Budget)
Fig. I-2-2-17 (Changes in the Number of Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan)
On the Korean Peninsula, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two—north and south—for more than half a century. Even today, the ROK and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.6 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

Peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula under such security environment is an extremely important challenge not only to Japan but also to the entire region of East Asia.

**Fig. I-2-3-1** Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>U.S. Forces Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total armed forces</strong></td>
<td>Approx. 1.28 million personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 600,000 personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 30,000 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground troops</td>
<td>Approx. 1.1 million personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 460,000 personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 20,000 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>T-62, T-54/55, etc. Approx. 3,500</td>
<td>M-48, K-1, T-80 etc. Approx. 2,220</td>
<td>M-1A2SEPv2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>Approx. 800</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>Approx. 550</td>
<td>Approx. 620</td>
<td>Approx. 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third and fourth generation fighters</td>
<td>Mig-23 × 56</td>
<td>F-4 × 30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mig-29 × 18</td>
<td>F-16 × 162</td>
<td>F-15 × 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>Approx. 25.51 million</td>
<td>Approx. 51.64 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Term of service</strong></td>
<td>Men: 12 years</td>
<td>Army: 18 months</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women: 7 years</td>
<td>Navy: 20 months</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Air Force: 21 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
1. Data from “The Military Balance 2020,” etc.
2. ROK is reducing the mandatory military service period in stages from 2018 to 2021.
North Korea has been advocating the building of a strong socialist state in all areas—ideology, politics, military affairs, and economy, and it adopts “military-first (Songun) politics” to realize this goal. “Military-first (Songun) politics” has been defined as a basic form of socialist politics that leads the great undertaking of socialism to victory by giving priority to the military forces in all activities under the principle of military first, and strengthening and relying on the actors in the revolution with the Korean People’s Army (KPA) acting as the central and main force.¹ At the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) in March 2013, Chairman Kim Jong-un² adopted the “Byungjin line” policy of simultaneous economic and nuclear development. At the Seventh KWP Congress in May 2016, he made it clear that he would uphold the “Byungjin line” as well as the “Songun politics.” Between 2016 and 2017, North Korea pushed ahead with three nuclear tests and as many as 40 ballistic missile launches. The international community responded by imposing sanctions under relevant UN Security Council resolutions, while Japan and the United States were among those who strengthened their own sanctions against North Korea.

On the other hand, at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP in April 2018, Chairman Kim declared that the “Byungjin line” had been successfully carried out as the development of the state nuclear force had been completed. He also announced that the KWP’s “new strategic line” was that the whole of the party and the whole of the state will fully concentrate efforts on the construction of a socialist economy, indicating his policy of concentrating on economic development. In addition, North Korea decided to discontinue “nuclear test and inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire” and to dismantle the northern nuclear test ground, announcing in May 2018 that the nuclear test ground had been blown up. During the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting that June, Chairman Kim expressed the intention to work toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, the February 2019 U.S.-North Korea summit meeting ended without any agreement being reached between the two parties. At the December 2019 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP, Chairman Kim stated that, since the United States was holding U.S.-ROK joint military exercises, there were no grounds for North Korea to be unilaterally bound any longer by a commitment that no other party honors. He also announced the intention to continue developing strategic weapons until the United States rolls back its hostile policy towards North Korea. In addition, Chairman Kim stated that North Korea should take an offensive for making a breakthrough head-on aimed at neutralizing the sanctions and pressure by the hostile forces and opening a new avenue for socialist construction, declaring the economy to be the key. Moreover, he stated at the same meeting that powerful political, diplomatic and military guarantees would be needed, indicating that North Korea will continue to make efforts to maintain and enhance its military capabilities and combat readiness. According to the official announcement at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2020, the proportion of the defense budget in the FY2019 budget of North Korea was 15.9%. However, it is believed that this represents only a fraction of the real defense expenditures.

North Korea has continued to promote the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles and the enhancement of its operation capabilities, including by conducting six nuclear tests so far and repeatedly launching ballistic missiles in recent years at an unprecedented frequency. In addition, North Korea is assessed to possess large-scale cyber units as part of its asymmetric military capabilities, engaging in theft of military secrets and developing capabilities to attack critical infrastructure of foreign countries. It also retains large-scale special operation forces. In addition, North Korea has repeatedly used provocative rhetoric and behavior against relevant countries, including Japan.

Such military trends in North Korea pose grave and imminent threats to Japan’s security and significantly undermine the peace and security of the region and the international community.

Needless to say, North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated. At the same time, sufficient attention needs to be paid to the development and deployment of ballistic missiles, the military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, and the threat of cyber attacks and other asymmetric threats posed by North Korea.

¹ According to a written decision of the Seventh Congress of the KWorkers’ Party, “Report on the Work of the KWP Central Committee” (May 8, 2016).
² In 2013, he held the title of First Chairman of the National Defense Commission. At the Supreme People’s Assembly in June 2016, the National Defense Commission was renamed the State Affairs Commission, presided over by Chairman Kim Jong-un. For consistency purposes “Chairman of the State Affairs Commission” is used for the title of Kim Jong-un in this white paper.
Peninsula, and the proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles by North Korea.

Partly because North Korea maintains its extremely closed regime, it is difficult to accurately capture the details and intentions of its behavior. However, it is necessary for Japan to pay utmost attention to them. As for North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals, utmost efforts continue to be made to realize the return of all abductees to Japan as quickly as possible by close cooperation with related countries, including the United States.

2 Military Posture

(1) General Situation

North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines (extensive training for all soldiers, modernizing all military forces, arming the entire population, and fortifying the entire country).3

North Korea’s military forces are comprised mainly of ground forces, with a total troop strength of roughly 1.28 million. While North Korea still maintains substantial military forces, its conventional forces are markedly inferior to those of the ROK’s military and U.S. Forces Korea, and most of its equipment is outdated. Contributory factors to this situation include the reduction in military assistance from the former Soviet bloc due to the collapse of the Cold War structure, limitations on defense spending caused by the weak economy, and the rapid modernization of ROK’s defense capability.

North Korea is thought to be attempting to compensate for its consequent disadvantage by focusing its efforts on building up its arsenal of WMDs and ballistic missiles. North Korea also has forces such as a large-scale special operations force that can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence gathering and sabotage, to guerrilla warfare. Moreover, North Korea seems to have many underground military related installations across its territory.

(2) Military Capabilities

The North Korean Army comprises about 1.10 million personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them are believed to be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army is infantry, but the army also maintains armored forces including at least 3,500 tanks and artillery. North Korea is believed to regularly deploy long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240 mm multiple rocket launchers and 170 mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities and bases in the northern part of the ROK including the capital city of Seoul.

The Navy has about 800 ships with a total displacement of approximately 111,000 tons and is chiefly comprised of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile craft. Also, it has about 20 of the former model Romeo-class submarines, about 50 midget submarines, and about 140 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and transportation of the special operations forces.

The Air Force has approximately 550 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union. However, some fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29 fighters and Su-25 attack aircraft are also included. North Korea has a large number of outdated An-2 transport aircraft as well, which are believed to be used for transportation of special operations forces.

In addition, North Korea has so-called asymmetric military capabilities, namely, special operations force whose size is estimated at 100,000 personnel.4 In recent years, North Korea is seen to be placing importance on and strengthening its cyber forces.5

3 The Four Military Guidelines were adopted at the fifth plenary meeting of the fourth KWP Central Committee in 1962.
4 James Thurman, then Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, stated, “North Korea possesses the world’s largest special operations force of over 60,000” in his speech at the Association of U.S. Army in October 2012. Additionally, the ROK Defense White Paper 2018 notes, “Special operation forces are currently estimated at approximately 200,000 strong.” The white paper pointed out that North Korea’s special operations force has become an independent military branch.
5 Regarding North Korean cyber attacks, see Chapter 3, Section 3.
undermine the peace and security of the region and the international community. Additionally, such development poses a serious challenge to the entire international community with regard to the non-proliferation of weapons, including WMDs.

On the other hand, at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP held on April 20, 2018, decisions were made to discontinue “nuclear test and inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire,” and to dismantle the northern nuclear test ground. In the subsequent inter-Korean summit meeting held on April 27 and in the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting held on June 12, North Korea expressed its intention to work towards denuclearization. Then, on May 24, international press representatives were invited to witness the destruction of the northern nuclear test ground.

However, North Korea has not yet carried out the dismantlement of all WMDs and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. Having repeatedly carried out ballistic missile launches in breach of relevant Security Council resolutions since May 2019, it seems that North Korea has been striving to develop more advanced technologies and operational capabilities in this field. Japan cannot possibly turn a blind eye to this series of missile launches, which is an issue of serious concern to the international community as well. At the December 2019 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP, Chairman Kim stated that, since the United States was holding U.S.-ROK joint military exercises, there were no grounds for North Korea to be unilaterally bound any longer by a commitment that no other party fails to honor. He also announced the intention to continue developing strategic weapons until the United States rolls back its hostile policy towards North Korea. Furthermore, at the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the KWP in May 2020 guided by Kim Jong-un, North Korea announced that new policies for further increasing nuclear war deterrence and putting the strategic armed forces on a high alert were set forth and crucial measures for considerably increasing the firepower strike ability of the KPA’s artillery were taken.

Looking to the future, it will be necessary to continue to carefully monitor moves by North Korea, including what kind of concrete actions it will take towards the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

(1) Nuclear Weapons

a. The Current Status of the Nuclear Weapons Program

Details of the current status of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are largely unclear, partly because North Korea remains an extremely closed regime. In light of the unclear status of past nuclear developments, and considering North Korea has already conducted six nuclear tests including the nuclear test in September 2017, it is conceivable that North Korea has made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program.

With regard to plutonium, a fissile material that can be used for nuclear weapons, North Korea has suggested its production and extraction on several instances. As for recent activities, in September 2015, North Korea announced that all nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, including the nuclear reactor and the reprocessing facility, the disablement of which was agreed upon at the fifth and the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks in February and September 2007, respectively, had been readjusted and had started normal operation. Because the restarting of the reactor could lead to the production and extraction of plutonium by North Korea, those activities are causes of great concern.

As for highly enriched uranium that can also be used for nuclear weapons, in June 2009, North Korea declared the commencement of uranium enrichment. In November 2010, North Korea disclosed its uranium enrichment facility to American nuclear specialists and later announced that it was operating a uranium enrichment plant equipped with thousands of centrifuges. The expansion of this uranium enrichment plant has been suggested in August 2013; in this regard, North Korea could have increased its enrichment capabilities. The series of North Korean behaviors related to uranium enrichment indicate the possibility of the development of nuclear weapons using highly enriched

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6 Plutonium is synthetically produced in a nuclear reactor by irradiating uranium with neutrons, and then extracting it from used nuclear fuel at a reprocessing facility. Plutonium is then used as a basic material for the production of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in order to use uranium for nuclear weapons, it is necessary to extract uranium 235 (U235), a highly fissile material, from natural uranium. This process is called enrichment. Generally, a large-scale enrichment facility that combines thousands of centrifuges is used to boost the U235 concentration to nuclear weapon levels (over 90%).

7 North Korea announced in October 2003 that it had completed the reprocessing of 8,000 used fuel rods that contain plutonium, and in May 2005 that it had completed extraction of an additional 8,000 used fuel rods. The ROK’s Defense White Paper 2018 estimates that North Korea possesses around 50 kg of plutonium, retaining the assessment given in the Defense White Paper 2016.

8 The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of January 2016 notes, “North Korea has followed through on its announcement by expanding the size of its enrichment facility and restarting the reactor that was previously used for plutonium production.” It is said that the reactor was restarted at the end of August 2013. It has been noted that if the reactor is restarted, North Korea would have the capability to produce enough plutonium (approximately 6 kg) to manufacture approximately one nuclear bomb in one year.
uranium in addition to plutonium.9

Regarding these nuclear-related activities, activities that are inconsistent with a “commitment to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” which North Korea insists it upholds, have been pointed out. For example, U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo testified in the Senate in July 2018 that North Korea was continuing to produce nuclear fuels. In addition, at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, then IAEA Director General Amano pointed out in March 2019 that the IAEA continued to observe signs of North Korea using the enrichment facility at nuclear facilities in Yongbyon.

With regard to the development of nuclear weapons, North Korea has conducted nuclear tests on October 9, 2006, May 25, 2009, February 12, 2013, January 6, 2016, September 9, 2016, and September 3, 2017. It is highly likely that North Korea has made strides in its nuclear weapons program, collecting the necessary data through these nuclear tests.

It is believed that North Korea seeks to miniaturize nuclear weapons and develop them into warheads that can be mounted on ballistic missiles, as part of its nuclear weapons program. On September 3, 2017, it was announced that Chairman Kim Jong-un had visited North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Institute and had seen a hydrogen bomb capable of being loaded into an ICBM,10 in addition to which, following North Korea’s sixth nuclear test that was forced through on the same day, North Korea announced that it “successfully carried out a test of H-bomb for ICBM.” In general, miniaturizing a nuclear weapon small enough to be mounted on a ballistic missile requires a considerably high degree of technological capacity. However, considering, for example, that the United States, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s, as well as the technological maturity that is estimated to have been reached through North Korea’s previous six nuclear tests, it is assessed that North Korea has already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads.11

Furthermore, the yield of the sixth nuclear weapons test in 2017 was estimated to be the largest ever, with a maximum yield of approximately 160 kt. Given the size of the estimated yield, the possibility cannot be discounted that the test was of a hydrogen bomb.12

In any case, North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, considered in conjunction with North Korean efforts to enhance ballistic missile capabilities, including extending the range of ballistic missiles that are the delivery vehicles of WMDs, poses grave and imminent threats to Japan’s security, and significantly undermines peace and security of the region and international community. Therefore, it can never be tolerated.

b. Background of the Nuclear Program

As regards the objective of North Korea’s nuclear development, North Korea is deemed to be developing nuclear weapons as an indispensable deterrent for maintaining the existing regime in light of the following: North Korea’s ultimate goal is allegedly the maintenance of the existing regime;13 North Korea considers that it needs its own nuclear deterrence to counter the nuclear threat of the United States and in no position at least in the short-term to overturn its inferiority in conventional forces vis-à-vis the United States and the ROK; North Korea asserts that the Iraqi and Libyan regimes collapsed and that Syria was attacked by U.S. Forces in April 2017 due to their lack of nuclear deterrence;14 and North Korea has reiterated that nuclear weapons will never be traded away at negotiations.

With regard to the issue of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, Chairman Kim expressed the desire on a number of occasions—including at the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting held on June 12, 2018—to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

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9 The ROK Defense White Paper 2018 assesses that North Korea possesses a substantial amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU). It has been noted that a uranium enrichment facility different from the one in Yongbyon exists in Kangson.
10 On September 3, 2017, in a report on a visit by Chairman Kim Jong-un to North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Institute, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced that North Korea is able to conduct an “ultra-powerful electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack over a wide area.”
11 Over ten years have already passed since North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006. Furthermore, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests to date. This timetable for technology development and the number of tests are reaching levels that are by no means inadequate, even when compared to the processes of developing technologies to miniaturize and lighten nuclear weapons in the United States, former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. The ROK’s Defense White Paper 2018 assesses that “North Korea’s ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons seems to have reached a considerable level.”
12 The ROK’s Defense White Paper 2018 noted that the explosive yield of the sixth nuclear test was approximately 50 kt, significantly larger than the yield of the past tests and that this was assessed to be a hydrogen bomb test. North Korea also insisted that its fourth nuclear test, conducted in January 2016, was a hydrogen bomb test. However, given that the yield of that test is estimated at 6 to 7 kt, it is difficult to conceive that this was a hydrogen bomb test as generally defined.
14 For example, a comment in the Rodong Sinmun dated December 2, 2013, contends that the situation in Iraq and Libya teaches an acute lesson that countries under the constant threat of U.S. preemptive nuclear attack have no choice but to become a victim of U.S. state terrorism, unless the countries have powerful deterrent capability. In addition, the “Statement by the Spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” dated April 8, 2017, states with regard to the U.S. attack on Syria two days earlier on April 6 as follows: “Swaggering as a superpower, the US has been picking only on countries without nuclear weapons and the Trump administration is no exception.”
However, he is presumed to have done so on the premise that North Korea would continue to possess a nuclear arsenal. In fact, North Korea has frequently asserted to the international community its claim to the status of “a nuclear weapon state” and has repeatedly insisted that it will not agree to unilateral denuclearization. For example, at the December 2019 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP, Chairman Kim stated that if the United States persists in its hostile policy, there will never be denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, and that North Korea will maintain a powerful nuclear deterrent capable of guaranteeing its long-term security. In addition, it has been noted that even after announcing a commitment to full denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea has continued nuclear development and that a uranium enrichment facility not disclosed by North Korea exists. In light of the above, it is now necessary to keep a close watch on what kind of concrete actions it will take towards the dismantlement of all WMDs and all ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

(2) Biological and Chemical Weapons

North Korea is an extremely closed regime. In addition, most materials, equipment, and technology used for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for both military and civilian uses, which in turn facilitates camouflage. For these reasons, details of the status of North Korea’s biological and chemical weapons development and arsenals are unclear. However, with regard to chemical weapons, North Korea is suspected to have several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and already a substantial stockpile of such agents. North Korea is also thought to have some infrastructure

 (**Fig. I–2–3–3**) Range of North Korea’s Ballistic Missiles

- Taepodong-2 variant
  - ICBM-class “Hwasong 15” (Range: more than 10,000km*)
- ICBM-class “Hwasong 14” (Range: more than 5,500km)
- IRBM-class “Hwasong 12” (Musudan, and “Hwasong-12”) (Range: approx. 2,500 to 4,000km)
- IRBM-class “Hwasong-12” (Scud, Nodong, and “Pukguksong-2”) (Range: approx. 1,300km/1,500km)
- SRBM/MRBM (Scud, Nodong, and “Pukguksong-2”) (Range: approx. 1,000km)
- Taepodong-2

*Note 1: The figure above shows a rough image of the distance each missile can reach from Pyongyang for the sake of convenience.
Note 2: Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea.

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(**Fig. I–2–3–4**) Major Trends in North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Launches

**Number of Ballistic Missiles Launched by North Korea**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Taepodong</th>
<th>Taepodong-2 variant</th>
<th>SRBM/MRBM</th>
<th>IRBM-class</th>
<th>SLBM</th>
<th>IRBM-class</th>
<th>ICBM-class</th>
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**Section 3: Korean Peninsula**

1. **Increase of ranges**: Development of intercontinental-range ballistic missiles-class ballistic missiles (since 2017) with a range exceeding 10,000km
2. **Enhancement of the accuracy and operational capabilities necessary for saturation attacks**: Repeated launches from unprecedented locations in the early morning and late hours of the night using TELs, often in multiple numbers (since 2014). Some ballistic missiles are said to be equipped with a Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle (MaRV) (since 2017).
3. **Enhancement of secrecy and instantaneity and the ability to conduct surprise attacks**: Launches of SLBMs (since 2016) and promotion of the development of solid-fueled ballistic missiles (since 2016)
4. **Irregular trajectories**: Launches of short-range ballistic missiles having a shape similar to that of the Russian “Iskander,” which are said to be able to fly at a lower altitude than conventional ballistic missiles and on an irregular trajectory (since 2019)
5. **Diversification of the forms of launches**: Ballistic missile launches assumed to have used a lofted trajectory have been confirmed (since 2016).
for the production of biological weapons. Possession of sarin, VX, mustard and other chemical weapons, and of anthrax, smallpox, pest and other biological agents that could be used as biological weapons have been pointed out.

The possibility cannot be denied that North Korea is able to load biological and/or chemical weapons on warheads.

(3) Ballistic Missiles

As is the case with WMDs, many of the details of North Korea’s ballistic missiles are unknown, partly owing to the country’s extremely closed regime. It appears, however, that North Korea gives high priority to the development of ballistic missiles out of political and diplomatic considerations and from the viewpoint of earning foreign currency, in addition to enhancing its military capabilities. The ballistic missiles currently deemed to be possessed and developed by North Korea are the following.

a. Types of Ballistic Missiles Possessed or Developed by North Korea

(a) Toksa

Toksa is a short-range ballistic missile with a range estimated to be approximately 120 km. It is transported and operated on a TEL. It is deemed that Toksa is the first ballistic missile...
possessed or developed by North Korea which adopts a solid fuel propellant.

(b) New SRBM launched since 2019

Since 2019, North Korea has launched at least three types of short-range ballistic missile that are presumed to be new models. From images published by North Korea, it can be ascertained that these three types of SRBM were launched from a wheeled-drive or continuous-tracked TEL, with the characteristic radial exhausts of solid fuel propellant engines identifiable on each of the images.

(i) SRBM A

The SRBM (described by North Korea as “new type of tactical guided weapon”) launched in 2019 on May 4 and 9, July 25, and August 6 are all presumed to have the same system and to be of a new and different type from missiles such as Nodong and Scud. Two missiles were launched on each of the aforementioned dates and flew approximately 200-600 km. The launched missiles have a shape similar to that of the Russian short-range ballistic missile “Iskander,” which is said to be able to fly at a lower altitude than conventional ballistic missiles and on an irregular trajectory.

(ii) SRBM B

The SRBM (described by North Korea as “new weapon” or as “tactical guided weapon”) launched on August 10 and 16, 2019 and on March 21, 2020 are all presumed to have the same system and to be of a new and different type again from the aforementioned A-type. Two missiles were launched on each of the aforementioned dates and flew approximately 250-400 km.

(iii) SRBM C

The SRBM (described by North Korea as “super-large multiple rocket launcher”) launched in 2019 on August 24, September 10, October 31, and November 28, and on March 2 and 9, 2020 are all presumed to be of a new and different type again from the aforementioned A- and B-types. Two missiles were launched on each of the aforementioned dates and flew approximately 300-400 km. The interval between launches was estimated at about 3 minutes in the case of the October 31, 2019 launches, and less than 1 minute during the launches on November 28, 2019 and March 2, 2020, suggesting that North Korea is trying to improve the continuous fire capability required for saturation attacks and the like.

In addition, North Korea carried out two launches of what could have been SRBMs on July 31, 2019 and another two a couple of days later, on August 2. Another two SRBMs were launched on March 29, 2020; analysis of the specific type of shell is still under way.

Through such launches, North Korea appears to be pursuing enhancement of related technologies and operational capabilities, including enhancing secrecy and instantaneity, to make it difficult to detect signs of a launch, as well as improving its ability to conduct surprise attacks and its continuous fire capability. Considering the distances flown, it would appear that not only the ROK, but also parts of Japan would be within range of some of the SRBMs launched. There is also a concern that this short-range ballistic missile technology will be applied to longer-range missiles in due course.
Scud

The Scud is a liquid fuel propellant single-stage ballistic missile and is transported and operated on a TEL. Scud B and Scud C, a variant of Scud B with extended range, are SRBMs with ranges estimated to be about 300 km and 500 km, respectively. It is believed that North Korea has manufactured and deployed them, and has exported them to the Middle East and other countries.

The Scud ER (Extended Range) is a ballistic missile that has an extended range due to the extension of the Scud’s body as well as the reduction in weight of the warhead, among other factors. The range of a Scud ER is estimated to reach approximately 1,000 km, and it appears that a part of Japan falls within this range.

In addition, North Korea is developing a ballistic missile that appears to be an improvement of the Scud missile. This ballistic missile was launched on May 29, 2017. A day after the launch, North Korea announced that it had successfully conducted a test launch of a newly developed ballistic rocket incorporating a precision navigation guidance system. In addition, while the images released by North Korea show that the ballistic missile was launched from a continuous track TEL and had what appears to be small wings on its warhead, i.e., characteristics different from those of existing Scud missiles, the shape other than the warhead and length are similar to existing Scud missiles. Another similarity is that it can be confirmed that the missile has straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel-propelled engine. It has also been noted that this ballistic missile is equipped with a MaRV. Given that North Korea announced that Chairman Kim Jong-un had ordered the development of ballistic missiles capable of precision attacks on enemy ships and other individual targets, the intent appears to be to enhance the accuracy of ballistic missile attacks.

(d) Nodong

The Nodong is a liquid fuel propelled single-stage ballistic missile and is transported and operated on a TEL. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300 km, reaching almost all of Japan.

Although the details of Nodong’s performance have not been confirmed, Nodong may not have the accuracy to carry out precise strikes on specific target installations, as this ballistic missile is likely based on Scud technology. However, it has been suggested that North Korea is working to increase the Nodong’s accuracy. In this regard, it had been suggested that there is a type of Nodong aimed at enhancing accuracy by improving the shape of the warhead (whose range is deemed to reach approximately 1,500 km through the weight reduction of the warhead). Against this backdrop, the launch of this type of ballistic missile was confirmed for the first time in the images published by North Korea a day after the launch of one Scud and two Nodong missiles on July 19, 2016.

(e) SLBM

(i) SLBM “Pukguksong”

It has been suggested that North Korea is developing an SLBM and a new submarine which is designed to carry the SLBM (referred to by North Korea as “Pukguksong”). Since it announced in May 2015 through its media that it conducted a successful test launch of an SLBM, it has made public SLBM “Pukguksong” launches on four occasions. Judging from the images and footage that it has made public so far, North Korea may have succeeded in operating the “cold launch system,” in which the missile is ignited after it is ejected into the air. Moreover, in the launches in April and August 2016, it appears, based on observations such as the shape of the flame coming out of the missile and the color of the smoke, that the solid fuel propellant system was adopted.

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19 For example, according to “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia” (accessed in March 2020), the launch on May 29, 2017, was presumed to have been the first launch of a short-range ballistic missile based on a Scud missile, equipped with a MaRV, suggesting that North Korea has made advances in its precision guidance systems.

20 On May 9, 2015, North Korea announced that it had succeeded in a test launch of an SLBM. On January 8, 2016, it released footage of an SLBM test launch that appears to be different from the one unveiled in May 2015. On April 24 and August 25, 2016, it again announced that it had succeeded in SLBM test launches. Moreover, the MOD predicts that North Korea also launched one ballistic missile presumed to be an SLBM on July 9, 2016, although North Korea has not made an announcement about the launches.
A ballistic missile presumed to be an SLBM “Pukguksong” has been confirmed in flight in the direction of Japan, launched from the vicinity of Sinpo, on the east coast of North Korea, on August 24, 2016. The SLBM flew approximately 500 km. Considering that this was its first SLBM to fly approximately 500 km, the possibility cannot be denied that North Korea had striven to solve the problems through the preceding launches and achieved certain technological progress. Furthermore, it is predicted that the ballistic missile that was launched at this time flew on a somewhat higher than nominal trajectory. If it were launched on a nominal trajectory, the firing range is expected to surpass 1,000 km.

North Korea’s “Pukguksong” SLBMs are believed to be launched from a Gorae-class submarine (displacement 1,500 tons). North Korea has one such submarine. It is also pointed out that North Korea seeks to develop a larger submarine to launch SLBMs.  

(ii) SLBM “Pukguksong-3”

On October 2, 2019, North Korea launched what was presumed to be a new type of SLBM (described by North Korea as a “Pukguksong-3”) that differed from the SLBM “Pukguksong.” The missile in question flew for about 450 km and is presumed to have fallen into Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). As the ballistic missile launched on this occasion reached a maximum altitude of about 900 km, it is surmised to have been launched on a lofted trajectory. If launched on a nominal trajectory, it is estimated that it could have a range of approximately 2,000 km. The characteristic radial exhausts of solid fuel propellant engines are identifiable on images published by North Korea. The ballistic missile in question could potentially have been launched from underwater launch test equipment.

It is deemed that through developing the SLBM and a new submarine to carry it, North Korea intends to diversify its ballistic missile attack capabilities and improve survivability.

(f) Ballistic Missile Modified from the SLBM

North Korea launched a ballistic missile on both February 12 and May 21, 2017, both of which appeared to be a modified version of the SLBM “Pukguksong” for ground launch (referred to by North Korea as “Pukguksong-2”). This ballistic missile is estimated to have flown approximately 500 km on both occasions, on somewhat higher trajectories than normal. If it were launched on a nominal trajectory, the firing range is assessed to surpass 1,000 km. A day after the launch on February 12, North Korea announced that it was developed as a ground-to-ground ballistic missile based on the results of the August 2016 SLBM launch. It also announced a day after the launch on May 21, 2017 that it had again successfully conducted the test launch of the Pukguksong-2 and that Chairman Kim Jong-un had authorized its “operational deployment.” Moreover, the launch by a “cold launch system,” in which the missile is ignited after it is ejected into the air from a continuous track TEL, and the characteristic radial exhausts of solid fuel propellant engines, can be confirmed from each of the images that North Korea released. It has the characteristics of appearing to be using “cold launch system” and solid fuel propellant engines in common with the SLBM “Pukguksong.” Given that North Korea has made references to its operational deployment, there is a possibility that North Korea will newly deploy a solid fuel propellant engine that includes Japan within its firing range.

(g) Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)-class

To date North Korea has launched three liquid fuel-propelled IRBM-class ballistic missiles (referred to by North Korea as “Hwasong-12”). This ballistic missile was launched on May 14, 2017 and based on this flight pattern, it is presumed that the ballistic missile was launched on a lofted trajectory. Had it been launched on a nominal trajectory, the maximum firing range is assessed to be close to approximately 5,000 km. In addition, the straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine can be confirmed from the images released by North Korea a day after the launch, suggesting that the ballistic missile uses liquid fuel. On August 29 and September 15, 2017, single missiles of this class were...
launched and flew over Japan’s territory in the vicinity of the Oshima Peninsula and Cape Erimo. These launches were the first cases of North Korea launching what it calls ballistic missiles that flew over Japan’s territory.

In view of their flight paths, these missiles appear to demonstrate a certain level of function as an IRBM. Also, the fact that missiles that overflew Japan were launched in succession in a short time period would suggest that North Korea is steadily improving its ballistic missile capabilities. Furthermore, although at the time of launches in May and August 2017 the missiles were confirmed to have been launched after being separated from the wheel-drive TEL, at the time of the September launch the missile was confirmed to have been launched while still attached to the wheel-drive TEL. Considering this point, together with North Korea’s claims at the time of the launch that it was for the purposes of “confirming practical operational procedures” and “realize the potential of the ‘Hwasong-12,’” there is a possibility that North Korea is improving its practical operational capabilities.

In 2016 North Korea conducted repeated launches of an IRBM-class ballistic missile that is presumed to be the Musudan, but although the missile launched in June flew for a certain distance on a lofted trajectory, the fact that there were two successive launch failures in October would suggest that there may still be obstacles remaining towards the operationalization of the Musudan and that North Korea may be concentrating on the development and operationalization of the “Hwasong-12” as an IRBM instead.

(h) Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missile (ICBM)-class

(i) ICBM-class “Hwasong-14”

North Korea has launched ICBM-class ballistic missile (referred to by North Korea as “Hwasong-14”) on July 4 and 28, 2017. From the flight pattern, it is presumed that the two ballistic missiles were launched on a lofted trajectory. If they were to have been launched on a normal trajectory, it is estimated that they would have a maximum range of at least 5,500 km. On July 4, the day of the launch, North Korea made an “important announcement,” announcing that it had successfully conducted a test launch of a new type of ICBM. Furthermore, on the day following the July 28 launch, North Korea announced that the “nuclear bomb detonation device” had functioned normally, emphasizing that the safety of the warhead in an atmospheric reentry environment had been made maintained. This suggests that North Korea is aiming to operationalize long-range ballistic missiles.

Based on images released by North Korea, the ballistic missiles launched on July 4 and 28 have the following in common with the IRBM-class ballistic missile launched on May 14: (1) the engine system consists of one main engine and four auxiliary engines; (2) the shape of the lower part of the propulsion system is conical; and (3) the straight-line flame of liquid-propulsion systems can be confirmed. Based on these facts and the respective ranges that can be estimated for the missiles, the possibility can be deduced that the ICBM-class ballistic missile that were launched on July 4 and 28 were developed on the basis of the new-type IRBM-class ballistic missile that had been launched on May 14.

Also based on images published by North Korea, it can be confirmed that the ballistic missiles that were launched on July 4 and 28 had been mounted on the wheeled eight-axle TEL similar to KN-08/14 (see (j) below). However, it can be confirmed from the images at the time of the launches that they were launched from simplified launch pads, not TELs. Furthermore, the images suggest that the missile was of two-stage construction.

(ii) ICBM-class “Hwasong-15”

On November 29, 2017, North Korea launched a single missile that is presumed to have been an intercontinental-range ballistic missile-class ballistic missile (referred to by North Korea as “Hwasong-15”) different from the aforementioned “Hwasong-14” missiles. From the flight pattern it is presumed that the missile was launched on a lofted trajectory. On the day of the launch, North Korea made a “government statement,” declaring that it had successfully conducted a test launch of the “Hwasong-15,” a newly developed type of ICBM with the capability to strike all areas of the U.S. mainland, and asserting that it had now completed development of its state nuclear force.

The following points would suggest that this missile is an intercontinental-range ballistic missile-class ballistic missile, different from the ICBM-class ballistic missile launched twice in July 2017: (1) its flight distance and altitude; (2) the fact that North Korea announced the successful test launch of a new type of ICBM, the “Hwasong-15;” (3) the fact that the missile was deployed on a previously unseen nine-axle wheel-drive TEL;

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22 It has been suggested that, given its range of between 2,500 and 4,000 km, all parts of Japan and Guam may fall within the Musudan’s firing range. Similar to its Scud and Nodong counterparts, it is liquid fuel-propelled and is loaded onto a TEL to transport and operate. It has been noted that Musudan is a revamped version of the Russian SLBM SS-N-6 that North Korea acquired in the early 1990s.
and (4) that the nose of the warhead was more rounded than previous missiles. In addition, according to images released by North Korea, the missile was of a two-stage design, and it can be confirmed that it was removed from the TEL prior to launch and that its straight-line exhausts are characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine.

Furthermore, based on the flight altitude, distance flown and released images, it can be assumed that this missile could have a range in excess of 10,000 km, depending on the weight of the warhead deployed, etc., thus renewing concerns over the increasing ranges of North Korea’s ballistic missiles.

In addition, although the wheel-drive TELs possessed by North Korea are thought to be modified versions of Russian and Chinese TELs, it is noteworthy that North Korea has claimed to have developed its own TEL.

(j) Taepodong-2

Taepodong-2 are long-range ballistic missiles launched from fixed launch pads. Taepodong-2 is believed to use in its first stage, four engines, each of which is developed based on the technologies of Nodong, and the same type of engine in its second stage. Its range is estimated to be approximately 6,000 km for the two-stage type, while the range of its three-stage variant can be more than approximately 10,000 km assuming that the weight of the warhead is not over 1 ton. Taepodong-2 missiles and its variants have been launched a total of five times so far.

Most recently, in February 2016, North Korea conducted a launch of a missile disguised as a “satellite” from the Tongch’ang-ri district in the northwest coastline of North Korea using a Taepodong-2 variant after notifying international organizations. It is assessed that North Korea’s long-range ballistic missiles’ technological reliability had been advanced by this launch because it is estimated that (1) it successfully launched two similar types of ballistic missiles in a row; (2) the missile flew in almost the same way as the last launch; and (3) it put an object into orbit around the Earth.

Accordingly, it is believed that these test launches of long-range ballistic missiles can contribute to the development of shorter-range missiles in such ways as increasing the range and payload capability and improving the circular error probability (CEP). Also, related technology such as the separation technology of multi-stage propelling devices and the technology of posture control and thrust modulation of long-range ballistic missiles can be applied to other middle-range and long-range ballistic missiles that North Korea is newly developing. Therefore, the launch may lead not only to the improvement of other types of its ballistic missiles including Nodong but also to the advancement of North Korea’s entire ballistic missile program including the development of new ballistic missiles and diversification of attack measure.

North Korea announced twice that it had conducted a “crucial test” in December 2019 at its Sohae satellite launching station in Tongch’ang-ri district. It has been suggested that these were ICBM-class ballistic missile engine tests.

(j) KN-08/KN-14

The details of the new missile “KN-08” which was showcased at the military parade in April 2012 and July 2013 are unknown. However, the missile is believed to be an ICBM. At the military parade in October 2015, a new missile thought to be the “KN-08” was showcased with a different-shaped warhead from the previous version. The new missile, considered a variant of the “KN-08,” is called the “KN-14.”

b. Major Trends in Ballistic Missile Launches

North Korea has repeatedly launched various types of ballistic missiles. In particular, since 2016 it has conducted more than 70 launches, including launches of what appear to be new types of missiles.

As for trends in North Korea’s ballistic missile launches, the following characteristics have been observed. Firstly, it appears that the country seeks to increase the firing range
of ballistic missiles. An intercontinental-range ballistic missile-class ballistic missile launched in November 2017, which could have a range in excess of 10,000 km, depending on the weight of the warhead deployed, etc. Although it is considered necessary for the operationalization of long-range ballistic missiles to further verify technology for protecting the re-entry vehicle from the ultrahigh temperature that is generated during the atmospheric re-entry of the warhead part, North Korea, with announcements such as the one in November 2017 on the day of the launch of what is believed to have been an intercontinental-range ballistic missile-class ballistic missile, claiming that it had re-verified warhead reliability in a reentry environment, is displaying an intention to seek to secure and enhance technology aimed at the operationalization of long-range ballistic missiles. Should North Korea make further progress in the development of ballistic missiles, including the acquiring of reentry technologies, it may come to have a one-sided understanding that it has secured a strategic deterrence against the United States. However, if North Korea has such a false sense of confidence and recognition regarding its deterrence, it could lead to an increase and escalation of military provocations by North Korea in the region and could create situations that are deeply worrying also for Japan. North Korea is presumed to have acquired the atmospheric re-entry technologies required for the operationalization of Nodong and Scud-ER ballistic missiles, within whose range Japan lies, suggesting that it already has the ability to attack Japan with nuclear weapons fitted to these ballistic missiles.

Secondly, North Korea may be aiming to enhance the accuracy, continuous fire capability, and operational capabilities necessary for saturation attacks and the like. As for the Scud and Nodong, which are already deployed, since 2014, they have been launched from unprecedented locations, cutting across the Korean Peninsula, in the early morning and late hours of the night using TELs, often in multiple numbers. This indicates that North Korea is capable of launching Scuds and Nodongs from any place and at any time, from which it is deemed that it has increased confidence in the performance and reliability of its ballistic missiles.

As for Scuds and Nodongs, since the August 2016 Nodong launch, there have been launches where it is presumed that warheads fell in Japan’s EEZ, posing a major threat to Japan’s security. The four ballistic missiles, apparently Scud ERs, launched on March 6, 2017, were launched simultaneously.

It is possible that through these launches, North Korea’s intentions are not only research and development of ballistic missiles but also the enhancement of their operational capabilities. Since Chairman Kim Jong-un has repeatedly instructed the military troops to reject formality and conduct practical training, it can be considered that these instructions underpin the launches of ballistic missiles that have already been deployed.

Some have noted that a ballistic missile which appears to have been modified from the Scud missile launched in May 2017 is equipped with a MaRV. Furthermore, images of the 2019 ballistic missile launches published by North Korea show that the missiles were launched from different places and hit the specific target.

This suggests that North Korea is aiming to enhance the accuracy of attack by upgrading ballistic missiles that have already been deployed and developing new ballistic missiles.

Furthermore, in the short-range ballistic missile launches on November 28, 2019 and March 2, 2020, the interval between launching the two missiles on both occasions was estimated at less than 1 minute, suggesting that North Korea is trying to improve the continuous fire capability required for saturation attacks and the like.

In recent years, North Korea also appears to have been striving to improve its practical operational capabilities, conducting target practice using a combination of new SRBMs and various types of artillery.

Thirdly, North Korea appears to be seeking to improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks by enhancing secrecy and instantaneous to make it difficult to detect signs of a launch. Using a TEL or submarine, a ballistic missile can be launched from any point, making it difficult to detect signs of a launch in advance. North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles from TELs and SLBMs. In addition, all the ballistic missiles launched in 2019 appear to use solid fuel. It is therefore believed that North Korea is proceeding with the development of solid-fueled ballistic missiles.

Generally solid fuel-propelled ballistic missiles are pre-loaded with solid fuel, and therefore, they can be launched instantly and the signs of their launch are more difficult to detect. Furthermore, they can be reloaded more quickly, and they are relatively easier to store and handle in comparison to liquid fuel-propelled missiles. In this respect, they are considered to be superior militarily. From these factors, North Korea is deemed to be aiming to enhance its surprise attack capabilities.

Fourthly, North Korea could possibly be developing ballistic missiles that fly at low altitudes on irregular trajectories, in an attempt to breach other countries’ missile
North Korea, which is significantly inferior to the ROK Forces and the U.S. Forces Korea in terms of conventional forces, has been promoting the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and enhancing operational capabilities in order to make up for the inferiority.

In order to launch an attack using ballistic missiles fitted with a nuclear weapon, technologically, it is essential to miniaturize a nuclear weapon sufficiently to be carried by a ballistic missile and to acquire atmospheric reentry technology that prevents the deforming, destruction and other damage to the warhead due to heat generated at the time of reentry into the atmosphere.

For the miniaturization of nuclear weapons, substantial technological capability is considered to be required. However, considering, for example, that the United States, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s, as well as the technological maturity that is estimated to have been reached through North Korea’s previous six nuclear tests, it is assessed that North Korea has already miniaturized nuclear weapons.

Generally speaking, it is considered that the longer the range of a ballistic missile is, the more difficult it is to acquire sufficient atmospheric reentry technology because of such factors as a rise in the temperature of the generated heat due to a higher speed. However, North Korea is presumed to have already acquired the necessary technology with respect to ballistic missiles whose range covers Japan, such as Pukguksong and Pukguksong-2, in addition to the Nodong and Scud ER missiles, which are already deployed. Moreover, in March 2016, North Korea conducted a mock ballistic missile atmospheric re-entry environment test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and announced the successful implementation of the test. This indicates that North Korea is seeking to acquire technology for longer-range missiles.

In light of the above, North Korea is considered to have miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit in ballistic missile warheads and to possess the capability to launch an attack on Japan with a ballistic missile fitted with a nuclear warhead. On the other hand, it is necessary to continue careful analysis as to whether or not North Korea has acquired a technology necessary for operationalizing longer-range ballistic missiles.

If North Korea makes further progress in the development of ballistic missiles and acquires a technology to fit nuclear warheads on ICBMs, it may come to have a one-sided understanding that it has secured strategic deterrence against the United States. Should North Korea have such a false sense of confidence and recognition regarding its deterrence, this could lead to increases and the escalation of military provocations by North Korea in the region and could create situations that are deeply worrying also for Japan.

In light of the above, North Korea’s military activities, including nuclear and missile development, pose serious and imminent threats to the security of Japan and significantly undermine the peace and security of this region and the international community. Therefore, Japan never tolerates the possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea, and will continue to support the U.S.-North Korea process and closely cooperate with countries such as the United States and the ROK toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Fifthly, North Korea may be attempting to diversify the forms of launches. It has been confirmed that the June 22, 2016, May 14, July 4, July 28, and November 29, 2017, and October 2, 2019 ballistic missile launches used a lofted trajectory, in which missiles are launched to high altitudes at higher angles than normal. Generally, when a launch is made on a lofted trajectory, interception is considered to be more difficult.

North Korea is proceeding with ballistic missile development at an extremely rapid pace and is believed already to have the ability to attack Japan with nuclear weapons fitted to Nodong and Scud-ER ballistic missiles, within whose range our nation lies. Furthermore, North Korea has developed more advanced missile-related technologies in recent years. The three types of SRBMs that are presumed to be new models and have been involved in a series of launches since May 2019 are distinctive in that they use solid fuel and fly at lower altitudes than conventional ballistic missiles. North Korea is therefore believed to be trying to breach missile defense networks by making it more difficult to detect signs of a launch and making early detection harder. There are concerns that such advanced technologies will be applied to longer-range missiles.

Thus, North Korea is relentlessly pursuing increasingly complex and diverse modes of attack and is steadily strengthening and improving its attack capabilities. These enhancements in its capabilities make early detection of the signs of a launch and the interception of the missiles more difficult, thereby posing new challenges for the information gathering, early warning, and interception postures of relevant countries, including Japan.

c. Future Outlook for Ballistic Missile Development

At the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP in April 2018, Chairman Kim Jong-un announced the suspension of ICBM test launches. Then, at the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in June, he clearly expressed the intention to work towards denuclearization. However, at the December 2019 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP, Chairman Kim stated that, since the United States was holding U.S.-ROK joint military exercises, there were no grounds for North Korea to be unilaterally bound any longer by a commitment that no other party honors. He also announced the intention to continue developing strategic weapons until the United States rolls back its hostile policy towards North Korea.

Given these points, it will be necessary to continue to carefully monitor trends in North Korea’s ballistic missile development program.

4 Domestic Affairs

(1) Developments Related to the Kim Jong-un Regime

In North Korea, the power base centered on Chairman Kim is being solidified. The constitution was amended in April and August 2019, strengthening Chairman Kim’s authority through such provisions as the stipulation that the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission is “the supreme leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who represents the state.” Since the transition to the new regime, there has been a number of announcements of party-related meetings and decisions, and in May 2016, the Seventh KWP Congress was held for the first time since the last Congress in October 1980, 36 years earlier. These developments suggest that the state is run under the leadership of the party.

On the other hand, with senior officials unable to dispute the decisions of Chairman Kim Jong-un due to an atrophy effect created by the frequent executions, demotions, and dismissals of senior officials, it is believed that there is growing uncertainty, including over the possibility of North Korea turning to military provocations without making adequate diplomatic considerations. In addition, it has been suggested that there is declining social control caused by widening wealth disparities and information inflow from other countries. In this regard, attention will be paid to the stability of the regime.

(2) Economic Conditions

In the economic domain, North Korea has been facing chronic stagnation and energy and food shortages due to the vulnerability of its socialist planned economy and diminishing economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War. Especially for food, it is deemed that North Korea is still forced to rely on food assistance from overseas. Furthermore, the strengthening of sanctions by countries including Japan and the United States, and the sanctions of the related UN Security Council resolutions in response to the implementation of nuclear tests and missile launches can be assumed to have had a certain effect, when considered together with the severe economic situation of North Korea. Accordingly, if China, North Korea’s largest trading partner, and other relevant countries continue to rigorously implement sanctions, an even more severe economic situation could beset North Korea. In 2020, North Korea implemented a
number of measures to prevent infection with the novel coronavirus, such as halting the tourism and the operation of international rail and air services, which suggests that it might be suffering economic losses.24

To tackle a host of economic difficulties, North Korea has made attempts at limited improvement measures and some changes to its economic management systems, and promotes the establishment of economic development zones and the enlargement of the discretion of plants and other entities over production and sales plans. Furthermore, at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP in December 2019, Chairman Kim stated that North Korea should take an offensive for making a breakthrough head-on aimed at neutralizing the sanctions and pressure by the hostile forces and opening a new avenue for socialist construction, declaring the economy to be the key. It therefore appears that North Korea regards the rebuilding of the economy as being of paramount importance. Nevertheless, as North Korea is unlikely to carry out any structural reforms that could lead to the destabilization of its current ruling system, it faces various challenges in making fundamental improvements to its current economic situation.

North Korea is presumed to be evading the UN Security Council sanctions by conducting ship-to-ship transfers on the high seas, which are forbidden under the terms of the UN Security Council resolutions.25 The final report of the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts assisting the North Korea Sanctions Committee, released in April 2020, pointed out that in 2019, North Korea illicitly imported a volume of petroleum products far in excess of the cap set by UN Security Council resolutions.

In June 2018, the historic first-ever U.S.-North Korea summit meeting was held and both sides confirmed that they would join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Chairman Kim Jong-un made clear his intention to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and confirmed that negotiations would continue with the United States.

However, the second U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in February 2019 ended without any agreement being reached between the two countries. At the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2019, Chairman Kim Jong-un stated that he was ready to hold a third U.S.-North Korea summit meeting on the condition that the United States find out “with a proper attitude a methodology that can be shared with us” and that North Korea would “wait for a courageous decision from the U.S. till the end of this year.”

When President Trump visited the ROK in June 2019, he met the North Korean leader at Panmunjom and they agreed to proceed with dialogue at the working level. A working-level meeting took place that October, but North Korea subsequently announced that talks had broken down.

At the December 2019 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP, Chairman Kim stated that, since the United States was holding U.S.-ROK joint military exercises, there were no grounds for North Korea to be unilaterally bound any longer by a commitment that no other party honors. He also announced that there will never be denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, and that North Korea will continue developing strategic weapons until the United States rolls back its hostile policy towards North Korea. Furthermore, Chairman Kim remarked that North Korea would maintain its nuclear deterrence capability was necessary in response to the nuclear threat posed by the United States, and continued to engage in provocative rhetoric and behavior, coupled with military provocations such as ballistic missile launches.

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5 Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with the United States

The U.S. Trump administration announced that it would deal with North Korea’s nuclear and missile issue based on the concept of “all options are on the table” and adopted the policy of exerting pressure on North Korea to abandon plans to develop and proliferate nuclear weapons and missiles by strengthening economic sanctions and diplomatic measures. In response, North Korea repeated its previous assertions that developing its own nuclear deterrent capability was necessary in order to respond to the nuclear threat posed by the United States, and continued to engage in provocative rhetoric and behavior, coupled with military provocations such as ballistic missile launches.

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However, no concrete progress has yet been observed in

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24 North Korea itself has stated on Unrimokkiri, the website of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, that it is suffering huge economic losses (dated March 10, 2020).

25 Between the beginning of 2018 and the end of March 2020, MSDF patrol aircraft have observed 24 cases in which a North Korean-flagged tanker and a foreign-flagged vessel were anchored side-by-side on the high seas. As a result of comprehensive judgment by the government, there are strong suspicions that the observed vessels were engaging in illegal ship-to-ship transfers. For details of these cases and information about Japan’s response, see Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1.
the North Korea’s dismantlement of WMDs and missiles.

(2) Relations with the ROK

Chairman Kim’s remarks in his January 2018 New Year Address on the need for inter-Korean dialogue triggered substantial progress in inter-Korean relations that year. The inter-Korean summit meeting was held in April, resulting in the issuance of the Panmunjom Declaration, which confirmed among other matters that the two parties agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain, and confirmed the common goal of realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. In addition, in another inter-Korean summit meeting held in May, Chairman Kim Jong-un reiterated his desire for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, at the inter-Korean summit meeting in September, Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018, which referred to an ending of military hostilities, was issued. In addition, the “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain,” which prescribed concrete measures to ease inter-Korean military tensions, was signed. In 2018, North and South Korea conducted activities related to the implementation of the measures based on these documents. The Panmunjom Declaration also notes that the two countries will aim to declare an end to the Korean War, and the Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018 notes that Chairman Kim Jong-un will visit Seoul soon. In March 2020, the ROK presidential office announced that President Moon Jae-in had received a letter from Chairman Kim. However, 2019 saw no major advances in inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation programs, unlike the year before. Moreover, North Korea has frequently issued remarks critical of the ROK of late. For example, it has used statements by the foreign ministry press secretary to criticize ROK’s efforts to upgrade its defense capability and the U.S.-ROK joint military exercises held in March and August 2019. In addition, North Korea frequently demonstrates an attitude...
Inimical to dialogue with its southern neighbor, with North Korean media reporting that, although President Moon had asked Chairman Kim to attend the November 2019 ASEAN-ROK Commemorative Summit, the North Korean leader had refused, on the grounds that a purely ceremonial face-to-face meeting between the two leaders would be worse than no meeting at all. Future developments in inter-Korean relations will be closely watched.

(3) Relations with China

The China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which was concluded in 1961, is still in force. In addition, China is currently North Korea’s biggest trade partner. In 2018, trade volume between China and North Korea was very large, accounting for approximately 90% of North Korea’s total trade (excluding trade between North Korea and the ROK), suggesting North Korea’s dependence on China.

With regard to the situation in North Korea and its nuclear issue, China has expressed support for denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and solving problems through dialogue and consultations. While it has endorsed the series of UN Security Council Resolutions, which strengthen sanctions on North Korea. It has also stated that sanctions alone will be unable to achieve a fundamental solution to the nuclear issue and that a solution should be found through dialogue and consultations. In this respect, China has expressed support for the U.S.-North Korea dialogue, including U.S.-North Korea summit meetings. China, as well as North Korea and Russia, insists that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be gradual and simultaneous, with relevant countries taking corresponding measures. In December 2019, China and Russia together circulated among UN Security Council members a draft resolution proposing adjustments to sanctions imposed by Security Council resolutions.

Following the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in June 2018, Russia has continued to demonstrate an active stance in supporting political and diplomatic processes in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula and has called on relevant countries to give consideration to consultations in a multilateral format. In April 2019, Chairman Kim Jong-un visited Vladivostok and held a meeting with President Putin to exchange opinions on the development of the bilateral relationship and the Korean Peninsula situation. In addition, President Putin is said to have accepted Chairman Kim’s invitation to visit North Korea.

(5) Relations with Other Countries

Since 1999, North Korea has made efforts to establish relations with a series of West European countries and others, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with European countries and participation in the ARF ministerial meetings. Meanwhile, it has been reported that North Korea has cooperative relationships with countries such as Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Cuba in military affairs including arms trade and military technology transfer.

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26 According to an announcement by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA)
In recent years, North Korea is deemed to be strengthening its relations with African countries. The underlying purposes for enhancing relations with these countries include the usual objective of deepening political and economic cooperation. In addition, it appears that North Korea hopes to acquire foreign currency by expanding its arms trade and military cooperation with African countries – activities which are becoming increasingly difficult due to sanctions based on UN Security Council resolutions and political turmoil in the Middle East. It is actually the case that transactions that violate the terms of UN Security Council Resolutions have been observed, and the possibility that North Korea’s illegal activities could provide a funding source for nuclear and ballistic missile development is a cause for concern.

The ROK and the U.S. Forces Korea

1 General Situation

With regard to its North Korea policy, the Moon Jae-in administration, which was inaugurated in May 2017, is placing emphasis on improving the inter-Korean relationship and easing tensions based on the Panmunjom Declaration, issued at the inter-Korean summit meeting in April 2018 and Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018, issued at the inter-Korean summit meeting in September of the same year. How the North Korea policy of the Moon administration will impact inter-Korean relations will continue to require close attention.

The U.S. Forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the ceasefire of the Korean War. The ROK has established very close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. Forces Korea have been playing an important role in securing peace and stability of the region such as playing a vital role in deterring the outbreak of large-scale armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

2 Defense Policies and Defense Reform of the ROK

The ROK has a defensive weakness, namely, its capital Seoul, which has a population of approximately 10 million, is situated close to the DMZ. The ROK has set the National Defense Objective as follows: “to protect the country from external military threats and invasions, to support peaceful unification, and to contribute to regional stability and world peace.” As one of the “external military threats,” the ROK, in its Defense White Paper, used to designate North Korea as the “main enemy” or state that “the North Korean regime and its armed forces…will remain as our enemies.” In the ROK Defense White Paper 2018, published in January 2019, while continuing to describe North Korea’s WMDs as a threat to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula, the designation of the country as an enemy was eliminated. Instead, the white paper states as follows: “The Republic of Korea’s armed forces regard any forces that threaten and encroach upon our sovereignty, territory, people and assets as our enemies.” In addition, the white paper emphasizes the importance of omni-directional response to security threats.

The ROK has continued to undertake reforms of its national defense. In recent years, in July 2018, the ROK released the “Defense Reform 2.0,” which has set the following three main goals: making omni-directional response to security threats, enhancing military power based on advanced science and technology and developing armed forces appropriate for a developed country. This plan calls for continued promotion of efforts to secure combat capabilities necessary for responding to the threat from North Korea and also includes the reduction of the troops and the mandatory military service period.

3 Military Posture of the ROK

The ROK’s military capacity is as follows. The ground forces consist of 21 army divisions and 2 marine divisions, totaling 460,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of 240 vessels with a total displacement of approximately 255,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy combined) consist of approximately 620 combat aircraft.

The ROK has been modernizing its military forces— not only its Army but also its Navy and Air Force—in order to establish an omni-directional defense posture to deal with future potential threats, not least threats from North Korea. The Navy has been introducing submarines, large transport ships, and domestically built destroyers. The Air Force is currently promoting a program for the installation of the F-35A as a next-generation fighter with stealth property.

In November 2017, the ROK Government announced a

27 According to the final report of the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts assisting the North Korea Sanctions Committee (April 2020)
revision of its missile guidelines, which were agreed by the U.S. and ROK governments in 1979 and stipulate the range of ballistic missiles it possesses; the revision included the elimination of warhead weight limits on ballistic missiles, in order to enhance deterrence against military provocation by North Korea. Furthermore, to address North Korean nuclear and missile threats, as well as expanding the missile capabilities of the ROK Forces, the ROK is engaging in efforts to build a “strategic strike system,” which would use missiles and other means to launch rapid preemptive strikes directly targeting the North Korean command, and also a missile defense system called Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD). In addition, the focus of defense has changed from responding to the threat of North Korean missiles to an omni-directional response to security threats.

In terms of ballistic missiles, the ROK appears to have operationally deployed Hyunmoo-2 missiles with an estimated range of 300-800 km and is believed to be developing new ballistic missiles, following the abolition of warhead weight limits in the 2017 revision of the missile guidelines. With regard to cruise missiles, the ROK appears to have operationally deployed the Hyunmoo-3 surface-to-surface cruise missile, which is believed to have a range of about 500-1,500 km, and Haeseong series ship-to-ship/ship-to-surface cruise missiles, which are believed to have a maximum range of 1,000-1,500 km. The Dosan Ahn Changho submarine and the arsenal ship expected to be introduced under the 2020-2024 mid-term defense plan will reportedly be equipped with ballistic missiles in the future.

In recent years, the ROK has actively promoted equipment export, which reached approximately US$3.2 billion on a contract value basis in 2017. Since 2006, the amount has increased by nearly 13-fold in 11 years. It is reported that export items have diversified to include communication electronics, aircraft, and naval vessels.

Defense spending in FY2020 (regular budget) increased by about 7.4% from the previous fiscal year to nearly KRW 50.1527 trillion, marking the 21st consecutive year of increases since 2000. According to the Defense Reform 2.0, the ROK will increase the defense budget 7.5% on an annual average.

4 U.S.-ROK Alliance and U.S. Forces Korea

The United States and the ROK have taken various steps to deepen the U.S.-ROK Alliance in recent years.

While regularly confirming the strengthening of the U.S.-ROK Alliance at the summit level, as specific undertakings, the two countries signed the U.S.-ROK Counter-Provocation Plan for dealing with North Korea’s provocations in March 2013, and approved the Tailored Deterrence Strategy, designed to enhance deterrence against North Korean nuclear and other WMD threats, at the 45th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October of the same year. At the 46th SCM in October 2014, the two countries agreed on “Concepts and Principles of ROK-U.S. Alliance Comprehensive Counter-missile Operations (4D Operational Concept)” to tackle North Korean ballistic missile threats. At the 47th SCM in November 2015, the implementation guidance on the 4D Operational Concept was approved. Additionally, after North Korea went ahead with its nuclear test in January 2016, the
United States and the ROK officially decided to deploy THAAD\(^{28}\) to U.S. Forces Korea in July 2016, concluding the temporary deployment of it in September. In addition, in a U.S.-ROK summit meeting also held in September, the enhanced deployment of U.S. strategic assets in and around the ROK on a rotational basis was agreed.

With regard to U.S.-ROK joint military exercises, the two countries announced in June 2018 that, in light of progress in dialogue with North Korea, the U.S.-ROK joint military exercise “Freedom Guardian” planned for August had been suspended, along with two U.S.-ROK Marine Exchange Program training exercises scheduled to occur within the next three months. In October, they announced the cancellation of the Vigilante Ace, a regular air force exercise conducted in November-December in usual years, in order to provide every possible opportunity to continue the U.S.-North Korea diplomatic process. Furthermore, in March 2019, they announced the “conclusion” of the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle exercise, which has been conducted in March-April in usual years, and the implementation of Alliance (Dong Maeng), a combined command exercise. They also carried out a combined command exercise in August 2019, but did not clearly disclose its size or name. That November, the United States and the ROK announced the postponement of a U.S.-ROK joint air exercise, as an act of goodwill to contribute to an environment conducive to diplomacy and the advancement of peace. In February 2020, they announced the postponement of U.S.-ROK joint exercises to curb the spread of the novel coronavirus outbreak.

At the same time, the two countries have worked to deal with such issues as the transition of operational control (OPCON) to the ROK\(^{29}\) and the realignment of U.S. Forces Korea. For the transition of OPCON to the ROK, the roadmap for the transfer “Strategic Alliance 2015” was established in October 2010. Aiming to complete the transition by December 1, 2015, the two countries have reviewed the approach of transitioning from the existing combined defense arrangement of the U.S. and ROK Forces, to a new joint defense arrangement led by the ROK Forces and supported by the U.S. Forces. Nevertheless, based on the increasing seriousness of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, the two sides decided at the 46th SCM to re-postpone the transition of OPCON, and to adopt a conditions-based approach, i.e., implementing the transition when conditions such as the ROK Forces’ enhanced capabilities are met. The ROK plans to develop core military competencies for deterrence against and response to the threats from nuclear weapons and missiles, which are required for the transition of OPCON, by 2023. At the 50th SCM in October 2018, it was decided that following the transition of OPCON, an ROK military officer will serve as commander of the Future Combined Forces Command, replacing the current arrangement of a U.S. military officer serving as the commander of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces. It was also decided that regarding the ROK Forces’ operational capabilities, their Initial Operating Capability (IOC) will be assessed in 2019. In August 2019, an IOC assessment was carried out during a combined command exercise. At the 51st SCM in November 2019, the two parties concurred that the exercise had played an important role in verifying IOC and decided to pursue an assessment of Full Operational Capability for the Future Combined Forces Command in 2020.

With regard to the realignment of the U.S. Forces Korea, an agreement had been reached in 2003 on the relocation of the U.S. Forces’ Yongshan Garrison located in the center of Seoul to the Pyeontaek area, south of Seoul, and on the relocation of the U.S. Forces stationed north of the Han River to the south of the river. Subsequently, however, the agreement has been partially revised, due to various factors, including: the relocation to the Pyeontaek area being delayed due to logistical reasons such as increases in relocation costs; in relation to the postponement of the transition of OPCON, it has been necessary for some U.S. Forces personnel to remain at Yongshan Garrison; and it was decided that the counter-fires forces of U.S. Forces Korea would remain in their location north of the Han River to counter the threat of North Korea’s long-range rocket artillery. In July 2017 the U.S. Eighth Army headquarters relocated to the Pyeontaek area, and in June 2018 the headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea and UN Command also relocated to the same area. The realignment of U.S. Forces Korea could have a significant impact on U.S. and ROK defense postures on the Korean Peninsula, and as such it will be necessary to follow future developments.

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\(^{28}\) A ballistic missile defense system designed to intercept short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase from the ground. It captures and intercepts targets at high altitudes outside of the atmosphere or in the upper atmosphere. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2 regarding the ballistic missile defense system

\(^{29}\) The United States and the ROK have had the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to operate the U.S.-ROK combined defense system to deter wars on the Korean Peninsula and to perform effective combined operations in the case of a contingency. Under the U.S.-ROK combined defense system, OPCON over the ROK Forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, who concurrently serves as the Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in a contingency.
Concerning **defense burden sharing**, whereby the ROK government bears a portion of the total stationing costs of the U.S. Forces Korea to ensure a stable stationing environment, the United States and the ROK are engaged in negotiations aimed at concluding the 11th edition of Special Measures Agreement (SMA) (as of May 2020).

(1) **Relations with China**

China and the ROK have made continuous efforts to strengthen their relations. Meanwhile, outstanding issues have emerged between China and the ROK. The “ADIZ” issued by China in November 2013 overlapped in some areas with the ROK’s ADIZ. Furthermore, it included the airspace above the sea areas surrounding the reef, Ieodo (Chinese name: Suyan Rock), regarding which China and the ROK have conflicting claims to the jurisdictional authority over the EEZ. Against this backdrop, the ROK Government announced the expansion of its own ADIZ in December 2013 and enforced it from the same month. The ROK is protesting that Chinese aircraft are repeatedly intruding into the ROK’s ADIZ.

China has protested that the deployment of THAAD to U.S. Forces Korea would undermine China’s strategic security interests. On this point, in October 2017 the governments of China and the ROK announced that they had agreed to utilize military channels to reach a mutual understanding relating to China’s concerns about THAAD. In December 2017 President Moon Jae-in made his first visit to China since his inauguration and the two leaders agreed to establish a hotline and continue to maintain close communication, as well as vitalizing high-level strategic dialogue. The ROK Defense White Paper 2018 also makes clear that the ROK will strengthen strategic communication with China.

(2) **Relations with Russia**

The ROK and Russia have agreed on cooperation in the areas of military technology, defense industry, and military supplies. In 2012, the two countries held the first ROK-Russia defense strategic dialogue and agreed to regularize the dialogue. In November 2013, President Vladimir Putin visited the ROK, and a joint statement was issued in which the two sides agreed to strengthen dialogue in the areas of politics and security.

In June 2018, President Moon Jae-in visited Russia as a state guest, becoming the first ROK president to do so in 19 years. In August 2018, defense strategic dialogue was held, and it was agreed that the dialogue will be upgraded to the vice minister level and that a hotline will be established between the two countries’ air forces.

On the other hand, Russia opposes the deployment of THAAD by U.S. Forces Korea for the reason that it is part of the U.S. missile defense network and harms the strategic stability of the region.
President Vladimir Putin, who has been seeking the revival of Russia as a strong and influential power, successfully achieved reelection in 2018. In his inaugural address in May of that same year, President Putin stated that Russia is a strong, active and influential participant in international life, and that the country’s security and defense capability are reliably secured. He also stated that quality of life, wellbeing, security and health were his main goals, and that Russia has risen like a phoenix a number of times throughout history, and believes it would achieve a breakthrough again.

At the annual presidential address to the Federal Assembly of Russia in March of that same year, held prior to the presidential election, President Putin said, “Russia ranks among the world’s leading nations with a powerful foreign economic and defense potential.” At that same time, President Putin talked about modernizing Russia’s military equipment, including its strategic nuclear forces, and emphasized that Russia would be developing new weapons as a measure in response to the deployment of missile defense systems by the United States domestically and abroad. President Putin also expressed the recognition that Russia’s military power helped maintain strategic parity in the world, and remarked that Russia is prepared to negotiate toward construction of a new system for international security and sustainable development of civilization.

However, the INF Treaty came to an end in August 2019, following the United States’ notification of its intention to withdraw from the pact—which became the first-ever convention on the abolition of a specific type of weapon when it was concluded with the United States during the Soviet era—on the grounds that Russia had violated the treaty. Russia and the United States subsequently each announced their intention to develop intermediate-range missiles.

Since the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, Russia has faced a diplomatically difficult situation, with its right to attend meetings of the leaders of the Group of Seven major nations (G7 Summits) being suspended and the country being subject to economic sanctions. However, a phenomenon that could be dubbed “sanctions fatigue”—the inability to continue bearing the economic burden of the prolonged imposition of sanctions—has emerged among some of the countries with a close economic relationship to Russia. On the other hand, Russia’s ability to withstand sanctions has been growing, as it has promoted import substitution, while on the foreign policy front, President Vladimir Putin has taken the stance that “there are other organizations which play an important role in world affairs” and the country has been demonstrating a growing presence in the G20 and multilateral diplomatic forums in which Western countries do not participate, such as the SCO and the association of five major emerging economies (BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).

In addition, Russia’s presence in the military field in the Middle East and Africa has been growing. Russia has been conducting military intervention in Syria since September 2015. Russia has indicated that it has the ability to swiftly and continually deploy military assets in remote areas while acquiring bases in Syria. Russia has signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkey on the establishment of a DMZ. Russia’s growing involvement in the Syrian situation will attract attention as a move aimed at expanding its influence in the Middle East. In September 2019, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu stated that “Russia’s military intervention in the Syrian conflict signified not only the liberation of Syria, but also Russia’s return to global politics and the multipolarization of the modern world.”

That October, Russia dispatched two Tu-160 strategic bombers to South Africa for the first time, and held the first trilateral joint exercise involving the navies of Russia, China,
and South Africa off the coast of South Africa the following month. In December 2019, the first trilateral joint exercise involving the navies of Russia, China, and Iran took place in the northern Indian Ocean.

Russia has been expanding the range of countries to which it exports weapons, including promoting sales of the latest weapons to NATO member Turkey.

Amid this situation, in January 2020, President Putin proposed to the State Duma a constitutional amendment bill that included changes to the president’s term of office. With some remarking that this is an effort by President Putin to lay the groundwork for a regime after the end of his term of office in 2024, developments in Russia will be the focus of attention as the president’s term of office draws to a close.

**Security and Defense Policies**

1 **Basic Posture**

Against the backdrop of foreign policy factors, including the Ukrainian crisis and the military intervention in Syria, Russia set out its objectives and strategic priorities of domestic and foreign policies in the “National Security Strategy” revised in December 2015.

The National Security Strategy construes that Russia has an increasingly greater role in a multipolarizing world. The Strategy perceives increased activity of NATO and expansion of its member states as threats to national security, and expresses its vigilance against the U.S. deployment of missile defense (MD) systems to Europe and the Asia-Pacific region for undermining global and regional stability.

In the defense domain, the Strategy commits to giving continued priority to the role fulfilled by Russia’s military force, and to ensuring strategic deterrence and preventing military conflict by maintaining a sufficient level of nuclear deterrent capability and combat readiness of Russian military forces, including the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AFRF).

The Military Doctrine, revised in December 2014 as a document substantiating the principles of the National Security Strategy in the military sphere, states the existing view that while the probability of an outbreak of a large-scale war is decreasing, military risks to Russia are increasing, such as the movement of NATO’s military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders including the expansion of NATO, and the establishment and deployment of strategic MD systems. In addition, the doctrine expresses growing alarm, defining the following as new military risks: NATO’s military buildup; the realization of the U.S. Global Strike concept; rise of global extremism (terrorism); formation of governments in neighboring countries that carry out policies threatening Russia’s interests; and the incitement of ethnic, social, and religious confrontations in Russia.

The doctrine positions nuclear weapons as an essential component for preventing the outbreak of nuclear wars and military conflicts that use conventional weapons, and states that Russia will maintain an adequate level of nuclear deterrent capability. Additionally, it states that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in retaliation not only for the use of nuclear or other WMDs, but also in the event of invasion using conventional weapons, where the survival of the country itself is imperiled.

Furthermore, defending Russian interests in the Arctic was newly added as one of the military’s tasks in peacetime.

The Strategy for the Development of Maritime Activities of the Russian Federation up to 2030, which was revised in August 2019 in accordance with Russia’s Maritime Doctrine (approved in July 2015), makes clear that, as a “key priority for the long-term development of Russia’s maritime activities,” Russia will “strive for the development [of naval units], with the objective of providing them with strategic non-nuclear deterrent capabilities.”

As for Russia’s defense budget, whereas the amounts executed for FY2011-FY2016 showed year-on-year double-digit growth, the budgets executed since FY2017 have been...
Defense Policies of Countries

Chapter 2

Defense Policies of Countries

Declining, shrinking from a peak of 4.4% of GDP in FY2016 to 2.9% in FY2020, and look set to remain below 3% for the time being.1

See Fig. 1-2-4-1 (Changes in Russia’s Defense Budget)

2 Military Reform

Russia has implemented full-scale military reform since 1997 by presenting the three pillars of reform: downsizing; modernization; and professionalization. Moreover, Russia is advancing measures including troop reductions, structural reform (from the division-based command structure to a brigade-based one), strengthening of combat readiness, and modernization of the AFRF such as the development and introduction of new equipment.

Regarding the downsizing of the military forces, it was decided that AFRF would have a strength of one million personnel as of 2016. Since December 2010, Russia reorganized its six military districts into four military districts (Western, Southern, Central and Eastern Districts). On this basis, Russia established a joint strategic command in each military district and is carrying out integrated operations of its entire military forces, such as the ground force, naval force, and aerospace forces under the control of the Military District Commander. In December 2014, the Northern Joint Strategic Command in charge of the Arctic became operational.

Regarding the modernization of the military forces, Russia has been working to increase its percentage of new equipment to 70% by 2020, and announced in December 2019 that it had increased said proportion to an average of 60-65% across the whole military. In addition, the share of modern weapons in the nuclear triad (ICBM, SLBM, and strategic bombers) is believed to have reached 82%.

Regarding the professionalization of the military forces, in order to make the combat readiness of the permanent readiness units effective, Russia promotes the introduction of a contract service system (for noncommissioned officers and soldiers) which selects personnel who would serve under contracts from the conscripted military personnel. In 2015, the number of contract servicemen exceeded the number of conscripted personnel for the first time, and in the future the percentage of contract servicemen is set to increase further.

3 Military Posture and Trends

Russia’s military forces are comprised of forces such as the AFRF, the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), and the Federal National Guard Service of the Russian Federation. The AFRF consists of three services and two independent forces: Land Forces; Navy; Aerospace Forces; Strategic Missile Forces; and Airborne Forces.

See Fig. 1-2-4-2 (Location and Strength of Russian Military [image])

1 Nuclear Forces

Russia emphasizes its nuclear forces to secure its global position, to strike a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States and to supplement its inferiority in conventional forces. It is thus believed that Russia is making efforts to maintain readiness.

Russia still possesses ICBMs, SLBMs, and long range bombers (Tu-95 Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks) comparable to the United States in scale.

Russia is obligated to reduce strategic nuclear arms
### Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total military forces</th>
<th>Approx. 900,000 troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-90, T-80, T-72, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>Approx. 2,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Not including mothballed tanks. Approx. 13,000 including mothballed tanks)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warships</td>
<td>1,130 vessels, Approx. 2,050,000 tons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
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<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>4 vessels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>13 vessels</td>
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<td>Frigates</td>
<td>16 vessels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>71 vessels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>Approx. 35,000 troops</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>1,470 aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modern fighter aircraft</td>
<td>MiG-29 × 142</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MiG-31 × 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Su-25 × 216</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Su-27 × 119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Fourth generation fighter aircraft: Total 934)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>Tu-160 × 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tu-95 × 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tu-22M × 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Approx. 141.94 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term of service</td>
<td>1 year (In addition to conscription, there is a contract service system)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “The Military Balance 2020,” etc. Ground troops include 280,000 ground force personnel and 45,000 airborne unit personnel.
pursuant to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty concluded with the United States. Russia is working on accelerating the development and introduction of new weapons under the policy to prioritize the modernization of nuclear forces based on the State Armaments Program (GPV: Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya).

In 2011, Russia started the deployment of “Yars” ICBM, which is considered a multi-warhead version of the “Topol-M” ICBM. It is currently developing the “Sarmat” heavy ICBM, which is believed to be capable of carrying a warhead with the capability to breach missile defense systems. Three Borey-class SSBN vessels, which carry the new-type SLBM “Bulava,” were commissioned. There are plans to deploy four such vessels each to the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet in the future.

As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia scrapped ground-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 km by 1991 in accordance with the INF Treaty with the United States, and the following year removed tactical nuclear weapons from naval vessels for storage onshore. Russia, however, still possesses a broad array of other nuclear forces and has in recent years been moving forward with deployments of the “Iskander” ground-launched ballistic missile system, which is believed to be capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads, and the “Kalibr” SLCM system.

**Column**

**“Iskander”**

The 9K720 Iskander is a Russian tactical surface-to-surface missile system. It can be used with two types of missile: ballistic (such as the 9M723) and cruise (including the 9M728 and 9M729). The former variant is called the “Iskander-M” (U.S. DoD reporting name: SS-26 / NATO reporting name: Stone), while the latter is referred to as the “Iskander-K.” The 9M723 ballistic missile outwardly resembles the SRBMs launched by North Korea in 2019 on May 4 and 9, July 25, and August 6. Unlike conventional ballistic missiles, the 9M723 is believed to fly at lower altitudes and on an irregular trajectory, and the prevailing view is that such missiles are designed to breach missile defense networks. At the same time, it has been noted that the 9M729 cruise missile is a ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile of the kind whose development and possession has been prohibited by the United States since 2014 under the INF Treaty. While Russia claims that the 9M729 has a range of less than 500 km and therefore does not contravene the INF Treaty, it has been pointed out that the 9M729 was developed on the basis of the “Kalibr” sea-launched anti-surface cruise missile, which is believed to have a range of 2,000 km. It is therefore believed that the 9M729’s range could easily be extended. There is also a variant called the 9K720 Iskander-E, which is based on the “Iskander-M” and designed for export, but its capabilities and detailed specifications have not been revealed.
As well as commenting on Russia’s breaches of the INF Treaty since May 2013, the United States repeatedly demanded that the country return to compliance with the treaty. However, Russia consistently denied violating the treaty and has criticized the United States, saying that it is itself in breach of the INF Treaty, on the grounds that Aegis Ashore is equipped with a system capable of launching Tomahawk cruise missiles. Thus, with the United States and Russia remaining as far apart as ever, the treaty ended in August 2019. Russia confirmed that the treaty ceased to have effect due to the United States’ complete withdrawal, and criticized the United States by saying that all the responsibility for escalating tensions across the world will rest with Washington. Furthermore, Russia stated that it is essential to resume full dialogue to safeguard strategic stability and security, and that Russia is open to that. However, Russia declared that they would take steps to counteract the threat if the United States deployed ground-launched intermediate-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region. Developments involving the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range missiles will need to be watched closely, as they could have a major impact on the security environment surrounding Japan.

2 Conventional Forces and Other Issues

Russia is developing and procuring conventional forces in accordance with its GPV. It is also moving ahead with the development, procurement, and deployment of new equipment, such as the “Su-57” currently under development as the so-called “fifth generation fighter” and the T-14 Armata tank, in addition to the introduction of the Su-35 fighter and the surface-to-surface missile system “Iskander.” In August 2019, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that the heavy unmanned combat aerial vehicle “Okhotnik” had successfully completed its first flight. As some have remarked that the “Okhotnik” could conceivably breach anti-aircraft defenses in combination with the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter, close attention will need to be paid to developments involving these new items of equipment. The Russian Navy currently has one conventional powered aircraft carrier, but reportedly plans to acquire a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier by the end of 2030.

The AFRF has also been stepping up its activities in the realms of space and electromagnetic spectrum in recent years. In addition to its own early warning facilities and other radar equipment, Russia has been increasing its Space Situational Awareness (SSA) through the use of the International Science Optical Network’s (ISON) optical telescopes, while also promoting the development of anti-satellite weapons, such as the “Nudol” anti-satellite missile system, for which multiple launch tests are said to have been conducted. Since 2013, Russia has put satellites into both low and geostationary orbits to conduct rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO), which have repeatedly been observed engaging in frequent RPO with other countries’ satellites on geostationary orbits. Russia is also suspected of stepping up activities using weapons of electronic warfare, with accusations that AFRF based on the Kola Peninsula in the Arctic Circle jammed GPS signals while the major NATO military exercise Trident Juncture was taking place in 2018.
Talking about priorities for 2019, President Putin mentioned the need for modern strategic nuclear forces with enhanced missile defense system penetration capabilities, as well as laying emphasis on future mass production of the HGV “Avangard.” That February, President Putin ordered that half-yearly progress reports be provided on the development and deployment of new weapons, including the “Avangard” HGV, the “Sarmat” ICBM, and the “Kinzhal” air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM). Additionally, he revealed for the first time that Russia was developing the “Zircon,” a sea-launched hypersonic cruise missile that is believed to have a firing range of over 1,000 km and be capable of speeds up to approximately Mach 9.

In August 2019, an explosion killed several Russian Ministry of Defence personnel and state nuclear energy corporation staff at a Russian military facility near Arkhangelsk in northern Russia. As a special ship for transporting radioactive material was present in nearby waters at the time of the accident, it has been suggested that the AFRF was testing the “Burevestnik” nuclear-powered cruise missile that it is currently developing.

Since 2010, the AFRF has been conducting large-scale round-robin exercises in each military district, with the objective of verifying the combat readiness of the military districts, etc. These exercises are helping to improve the long-distance mobilization capability of the AFRF. The large-scale Tsentr 2019 military exercise was held in September 2019, primarily in the Central Military District, with the involvement of approximately 128,000 personnel, around 600 aircraft, 15 ships, and more than 20,000 military vehicles. Like the previous year’s Vostok 2018 exercise in the Russian Far East, China also participated, as did India, Pakistan, and a number of Central Asian countries. In October 2019, the Grom strategic command-post exercises took place at training grounds in each region under President Putin’s leadership. During these exercises, ballistic missiles were fired from nuclear submarines in the Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk, and also from the Plesetsk space base. The Russian Ministry of Defence oversaw the exercise and announced that all tasks prescribed in the strategic nuclear deterrence training process had been completed.

Russia also conducts joint training and exercises with other countries outside its borders. In 2019, it held joint exercises with Laos and South Africa.

A plan is underway to construct or rebuild 10 airfields in the Arctic, and in November 2019, Russia announced that it had installed radar capable of detecting stealth fighters and hypersonic vehicles on the archipelago of Novaya Zemlya. In the Arctic, the AFRF has not only resumed the operation of such military facilities, but has also been conducting such activities as strategic nuclear deterrence patrols by SSBN and patrol flights by long-range bombers. For example, Tu-95 and Tu-160 long-range bombers have frequently been observed flying through international airspace off the Alaskan coast and over the Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea.

In addition, the AFRF continues to operate several permanent bases within Syria, though in December 2017 it largely terminated the military operations that it had conducted in Syria since 2015.
In June 2019, a detachment from the Northern Fleet visited Cuba. This marked the fourth time in Russia’s history that a Russian warship had visited the Caribbean.

Russia thus appears to be stepping up military activities, so close scrutiny of developments in this regard will be required.

## 4 Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan

### 1 General Situation

Russia newly established the Eastern Military District and the Eastern Joint Strategic Command in 2010. Land Forces, the Pacific Fleet, and the Air Force and Air Defense Units have been placed under the Military District Commander, who conducts unified operation of these services.

The current presence of the AFRF in the Far East region is significantly smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear forces, still remains in the region. Russian armed forces in the vicinity of Japan are generally increasing activity, including the trend related to deployment of new units and military facility development.

Given that the AFRF set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear units and dealing with conflicts through the intertheater mobility of its round-the-clock readiness units, it is necessary to keep our attention on the positioning and trends of the AFRF in the Far East region while also keeping in mind the trends of units in other regions.

### (1) Nuclear Forces

As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, one Delta III-class SSBN and two Borey-class SSBNs equipped with SLBMs are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk, and approximately 30 Tu-95 long-range bombers are deployed in Ukrainka. Russia is prioritizing the reinforcement of its maritime strategic deterrence posture which had been greatly scaled-down compared to the former Soviet Union, and as part of these efforts, it plans on deploying four Borey-class SSBNs to the Pacific Fleet by 2020.

### (2) Ground Forces

As part of its military reforms, Russia is thought to have mostly completed its reorganization of the command structure from a division-based to a brigade-based one, while also shifting all of its combat forces into permanent readiness units. The Eastern Military District now consists of ten brigades and two divisions with approximately 80,000 personnel in total as well as a marine brigade equipped with amphibious operations capability. The Eastern Military District has introduced new equipment, such as the “Iskander” surface-to-surface missile system, “Bal” and “Bastion” surface-to-ship missiles, and the “S-400” surface-to-air missile system.

### (3) Naval Forces

The Pacific Fleet is stationed or deployed at its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. The fleet is comprised of approximately 260 ships with a
total displacement in the region of approximately 610,000 tons, including approximately 20 major surface ships and approximately 20 submarines (approximately 13 of which are nuclear powered submarines) with a total displacement of approximately 290,000 tons. It also plans on deploying four multipurpose Steregushchiy-class frigates, and the “Gremyashchiy”—an improved version of the Steregushchiy-class frigate that could soon be deployed—is believed to be the first vessel in the Pacific Fleet to be armed with Kalibr cruise missiles.

(4) Air Forces

In the Eastern Military District, Russia deploys approximately 400 combat aircraft from its Aerospace Forces and Navy combined. Existing models are being modernized and new models, such as the Su-35 fighters and the Su-34 fighter-bombers, are being introduced to improve their capabilities.

2 Operations in the Vicinity of Japan

In the vicinity of Japan, the AFRF has been generally increasing its activities, including exercises and drills which are believed to be conducted for objectives such as verifying the results of the military reform.

In September 2018, Vostok 2018, considered the largest since 1981, was carried out in the Eastern Military District. According to a Russian Defense Ministry announcement, approximately 300,000 personnel, 36,000 tanks and other vehicles, 80 vessels, and 1,000 aircraft participated in the exercise. The participating units undertook long-distance maneuvers over distances of up to 7,000 km, while vessels of the Northern Fleet sailed up to 4,000 nautical miles. The Chinese and Mongolian militaries also participated in the exercise. Vostok 2018 is positioned as an annual strategic military exercise hosted in turn by each of four military districts and is regarded as an initiative aimed at giving the participating military forces the capacity to engage in large-scale conflicts with military superpowers over a short period and the ability to wield influence over potential enemies. Notable features of this year’s exercise were the size of the units deployed and the participation of countries other than Russia’s allies.

The number of exercises carried out by the Russian Land Forces in the areas adjacent to Japan has decreased from the peak. However, its activities are generally increasing.

With regard to naval vessels, their activities are generally increasing in recent years. For example, various exercises and long distance voyages have been carried out by Pacific Fleet vessels, along with assigned missions involving operations in Syria and patrols by nuclear-powered submarines. In September 2018, 28 naval vessels including a Slava-class guided missile cruiser passed through the Soya Strait. This was the largest number of vessels announced by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) as having transited this strait at the same time since the end of the Cold War. Additionally, survey activities have taken place on Matsuwa Island located roughly in the middle of the Chishima Islands, with the objective of studying the feasibility of deploying Pacific Fleet’s forces there in the future, and it is said that a new runway has been completed on that island as well. It is also pointed out that bases will be constructed on Matsuwa Island as well as Paramushir Island, located in the north of Chishima Islands, and that there are plans to deploy Bal and Bastion surface-to-ship missiles there. Attention must be paid to movement towards the construction of a coastal defense system covering the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands. In August 2019, it was reported that a number of Bastion batteries had been deployed on Matsuwa Island.

Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of the patrol activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia has been increasing flights by long-range bombers. Also, there were flights of Tu-95 long-range bombers refueled in mid-flight and supported by A-50 early warning and control
aircraft and Su-27 fighters as well as flights of Tu-160. While the number of scrambles against Russian aircraft fell from the previous year, Russian aircraft continued to be active in 2019, with one flight around Japan and three incursions into Japanese airspace confirmed to have occurred. In June 2019, two Tu-95 long-range bombers flew around Japan, and intruded into Japan’s territorial airspace twice when they flew northward over the Pacific Ocean. In July of the same year, two Russian Tu-95 long-range bombers carried out “first Russia-China joint air patrol” with two Chinese H-6 bombers from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea. In addition, one Russian A-50 early warning and control aircraft allegedly supporting Tu-95 long-range bombers intruded into Japan’s airspace above the territorial waters of Takeshima Island in Shimane Prefecture. In February 2020, two Su-34 fighter-bombers were observed flying over the Sea of Okhotsk for the first time.

Since 1978 during the former Soviet Union era, Russia has redeployed ground troops on Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan. While the Russian troop strength is thought to be far less than that at peak times, one division is still stationed in Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands. Furthermore, tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and anti-air missiles are deployed.

Russia has been proceeding with the development of military facilities in the Northern Territories in recent years. In November 2016, Russia announced that it deployed coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles to Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. In January 2018, the new civilian airport built in 2014 in Etorofu Island in addition to Tennei military airfield was opened up to joint military and civilian use, with three Su-35 fighter aircraft reportedly deployed to the new airport in August 2018. Russia also continues to carry out military exercises on islands that can include the Northern Territories. In October 2019, the Eastern Military District announced that drills to repel landings by a hypothetical enemy assault force were to be held in the Sakhalin and Primorsky regions, involving up to 8,000 personnel, more than 3,000 units of tanks and military equipment, and up to 50 planes and helicopters. It was also reported that in April 2020, a tactical exercise involving about 30 naval and other vessels of the Pacific Fleet was held in waters including the vicinity of Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands.

As described above, Russia continues to station AFRF in the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan, and has recently been increasing the AFRF’s activities in the territories under de facto occupation. Some point out that such developments reflect the Russian people’s heightened awareness of territorial integrity due to the Ukrainian crisis, as well as the rising military importance of the Northern Territories adjacent to the Sea of Okhotsk, an operating area of SSBN.

During the Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) held in May 2019, Japan stated that the military build-up in the Northern Territories by AFRF is inconsistent with Japan’s legal positions. In addition, Japan expressed a concern about the vigorous activities of Russian military aircraft around Japan and called for a calm response from Russia. Closer attention must be paid to Russian military movements in the Far East, including the Northern Territories.
Russia considers the realization of its national interests as a guiding principle of its foreign policy, recognizing the multipolarization of international relations, the shift of global power to the Asia-Pacific region, and the growing importance of force in international relations. Moreover, based on its National Security Strategy, Russia engages in open, rational, and pragmatic diplomacy to protect its national interests. It aims to pursue multidirectional diplomacy by ruling out futile confrontation and acquiring as many partners as possible around the world.

Furthermore, Russia aspires to deepen its relations with the Asia-Pacific countries, seen as drivers of the global economy, and in recent years, has attached importance to China and India. Moves to strengthen collaboration with China in particular have been seen since the Ukrainian crisis, seemingly in inverse proportion to the deepening of Russia’s conflict with Western countries.

Meanwhile, Russian efforts to strengthen its cooperative relations with the West are still facing challenges after the Ukrainian crisis. However, with regard to the Syrian situation, Russia is exploring the possibility of cooperation with other countries towards stabilizing Syria and countering international terrorist organizations, including ISIL.

Attention will be paid to how Russia would balance its posture of economic-centered and benefit-focused foreign policy with Russia’s politics and diplomacy including security in order to develop its relations with other countries.

President Putin has striven to deepen cooperative relations with the United States in the economic domain, while opposing the United States on any action Russia considers as “a U.S. attempt to encroach on Russia’s strategic interests.”

On the military front, feeling that the United States’ installation of missile defense systems both at home and abroad—including in Europe and the Asia-Pacific—undermines global and regional security, Russia has criticized these moves for upsetting the strategic balance. Russia is also moving forward with the development of new strategic weapons that are said to be capable of reliably penetrating missile defense systems.

However, since the United States suspended military exchanges with Russia in March 2014 over the Ukrainian crisis, there have been frequent instances of both countries’ aircraft and ships coming into close proximity with each other. In June 2019, a near-miss occurred in the Philippine Sea between a U.S. Forces ship and an AFRF ship, after which the United States and Russia criticized each other for their dangerous actions.

The United States is also demonstrating increasingly vigilance over Russian activities in space. In February 2020, United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) commander Gen. John Raymond described recent Russian satellite behavior as “unusual and disturbing” and criticized Russia for activities that “do not reflect the behavior of a responsible spacefaring nation.” In addition, in April 2019, he announced that Russia had conducted an anti-satellite weapons test, noting that this was “further proof of Russia’s hypocritical advocacy of outer space arms control proposals designed to restrict the capabilities of the United States while clearly having no intention of halting its own counterspace weapons programs.”

Russia continues to advance close military cooperation with China. Export agreements on new armaments such as the S-400 surface-to-air missile system and Su-35 fighter jets were concluded in 2015, and since 2012, Russia and China have been conducting joint naval exercise “Joint Sea.” Most recently, in July 2019, two Russian Tu-95 long-range bombers flew with two Chinese H-6 bombers from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea. Russia and China called this joint flight the “first Russia-China joint air patrol” conducted in line with the annual military cooperation plan between the two countries. A package of documents on military and military-technical cooperation were signed at a meeting of the Russia-China Intergovernmental Joint Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation held in Moscow September
In the past, the relationship between Russia (USSR) and China had worsened over a long period of time due to conflicting ideologies and border disputes that had led to armed conflict. However, after reaching the final agreement in 2004 to resolve the border issue, the two countries, despite their mutual distrust, have built a strategic relationship called a “marriage of convenience” against a background of global criticism against Russia for the Ukraine Crisis and China for the South China Sea issue, as well as the unipolar domination by the United States. Recently the two countries are in a honeymoon period under President Putin and President Xi. Military cooperation between the two countries has also progressed as a result of the identity of interest between China, which is promoting military buildup supported by rapid economic development, and Russia, which is planning to recover its military industry from the decline after the collapse of the USSR.

A notable case is arms exports by Russia to China. In the past, China was the largest customer of made-in-Russia weapons, but it is believed that Russia restrained export of the latest weapons to China partly as a result of China’s illegal copying of Russian Su-27 fighters in 2007. However, influenced by the economic sanctions by Western countries against Russia since the Ukraine crisis, seemingly there is a tendency that military technology cooperation between the two countries has been increasing and the latest weapons are exported to China. For example, 24 new-model Su-35 fighters had been delivered to China by 2018 and Russia selected China as the first importer of surface-to-air Missile System S-400s, which receives inquiries from many countries.

Cooperation in exercise also seems to be expanding. The content of the joint naval exercise “Joint Sea,” which has been implemented almost every year since 2012 is raising the level year by year. In 2018, China and Mongolia for the first time participated in the annual large-scale military exercise carried out by Russia to inspect the mission potentials and posture of its forces. Further in July 2019, two Russian Tu-95 long-range bombers flew with two Chinese H-6 bombers from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea as their first joint air patrol. Because formation flying usually requires close alignment, it seems that this flight was carefully planned beforehand.

There are also moves toward deepening of the military cooperation. For example, the Russia-China Summit Meeting in June 2019 announced a joint statement that expressed “raising of the relationship of the two forces to a new level,” and in September 4 of the same year, the two countries signed a new “document on military and military technology cooperation” in place of the military cooperation agreement signed in 1993 (the contents of which are not disclosed). In this regard, because President Putin described the relationship with China as an “alliance of a strategic partnership in all aspects” in October 2019, for a while there was a view that the Russia-China Military Alliance was restored (the two countries had a military alliance setting up Japan and its allies as hypothetical enemies for the period from 1950 to 1980), but this was officially denied by the foreign affairs and defense authorities of the two countries.

Improvement of the equipment performance and operation capability of Chinese forces through the military/technology cooperation of the two countries can increase concern over security around Japan. It is necessary to pay close attention to the trend of military partnership of the two countries.
the two countries had concluded a “military alliance,” but the authorities of both countries both clearly denied that they had formed a military alliance.

Amid the emergence of such examples indicative of advances in the military cooperation between Russia and China and with the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation signed in July 2001 set to expire in 2021, attention will focus on the future trends.

Relationships with Ukraine

Following Russia’s “annexation” of Crimea, sporadic clashes between Ukrainian troops and separatist armed forces have continued in eastern Ukraine, with over 10,000 people reported to have died since April 2014. Progress in respect of most of the provisions in the Minsk Protocol signed by the OSCE, Russia, and Ukraine with a view to peace has remained elusive, while Russia is gradually extending its de facto rule over the Crimean Peninsula, opening the Crimean Bridge to serve as a direct link between the Russian mainland and the Crimean Peninsula in May 2018.

Amid this situation, Volodymyr Zelensky became President of Ukraine in May 2019 and expressed the desire to resolve the dispute with Russia and improve the relationship between the two countries, whereupon a spokesperson for the Russian president took the position that the normalization of their relations was up to Ukraine. That December, a four-party summit involving Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany, aimed at resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine, took place for the first time in three years in Paris and the parties agreed to a complete ceasefire and the exchange of captives within the year. Russia and Ukraine exchanged captives in September and December 2019.

Relationships with Other Countries

(1) Relations with Former Soviet Republics

Russia positions the development of bilateral and multilateral...
cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as one of its most important foreign policy objectives. Russia considers that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS, and deploys its troops in Moldova (Transnistria), Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia), which withdrew from the CIS in August 2009 announced its withdrawal from CIS. Through the conclusion of an alliance and strategic partnership treaty with Abkhazia in November 2014, the conclusion of an alliance with South Ossetia in 2015, and other efforts, Russia has been working to ensure its military influence.

Due to increasing activities by Islamic armed insurgents in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia has been pursuing military cooperation primarily on counterterrorism measures in the region, and organized the Collective Rapid Deployment Force in May 2001 within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Furthermore, in June 2009, a permanent joint rapid reaction force was established to strengthen the functions of the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force.

President Putin once remarked, “The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the 20th century,” and he has been working to unify and strengthen the sphere of the former Soviet Union through such as the CIS, the CSTO, and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015.

(2) Relations with Asian Countries

Russia recognizes that the significance of the Asia-Pacific region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy, and considers it strategically important to strengthen its status in the region from the viewpoint of socioeconomic development in Siberia and the Far East, and security. To achieve strategic stability and equal strategic partnerships, Russia places particular emphasis on developing a comprehensive partnership relationship and strategic cooperative relationship with China as a key factor in maintaining global and regional stability, and also intends to assign an important role for the privileged strategic partnership with India.

In 2018, Russia concluded agreements to supply India with new armaments such as the S-400 surface-to-air missile system and Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates. The two countries have completed joint development of the “BrahMos” supersonic cruise missile and are now jointly developing the hypersonic cruise missile “BrahMos-II.” In March 2019, the two countries signed a deal for the lease of another Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, joining the other Akula-class submarine that India has been leasing since 2012. Another example of the ongoing wide-ranging military cooperation between Russia and India is the joint exercise “INDRA ,” which has been taking place since 2003 with the involvement of the armies and navies of both countries, with their air forces also taking part in recent years.

Regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, in December 2019, Russia and China together circulated among UN Security Council members a draft resolution that included the partial lifting of sanctions based on Security Council resolutions.

In addition, Russia has been moving ahead with defense cooperation with Laos in the field of procurement of equipment and mine and unexploded ordnance disposal in recent years. In December 2019, Russia held Laros 2019, its first joint army exercise with the country, with the involvement of more than 500 personnel, including tank regiments from both countries.

Regarding the relationship with Japan, Russia states that it will develop mutually beneficial cooperation and is intensifying its approach in many fields including politics, economy and security.

(3) Relations with European Countries

Through the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia has worked with NATO as an equal partner in the areas of common interest, such as by participating in certain decision-making processes. However, following the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, NATO and European countries suspended their practical cooperation with Russia, including that in the military domain, except for the NRC’s ambassador-level meetings. Although NATO has issued statements criticizing Russia over the Ukrainian situation and has deployed additional military capacity in Eastern Europe.
and the Baltic states, there are differences among member countries in their enthusiasm for NATO’s response to Russia. 

Nevertheless, Russia has maintained its assertive diplomatic behavior, with President Putin stating during a July 2019 official visit to Italy that there are “always chances” to restore relations, but “many things will also depend on Europe.”

Russia is also stepping up the pace of dialogue, with the 2+2 joint foreign and defense ministerial consultations between Russia and France taking place for the first time in seven years in Moscow in September 2019.

Russia revealed that it has deployed two army divisions near the border with Ukraine, and one army division near its border with Belarus, and Russia conducted the strategic command and staff exercise Zapad 2017 in its Western Military District and Belarus in September 2017. That exercise was brought up at the NRC meeting held in October of that same year, where it was pointed out that the number of actually participating soldiers and the area used for the exercise were larger than indicated in the announcement made by Russia prior to the exercise. However, there were no invasions into other countries by Russia, and no Russian units stayed in Belarus following the exercise, which were points of concern.

Russian military aircraft have stepped up their activities in the airspace surrounding the Baltic states, where NATO has deployed military capacity. In July 2019, the U.K. Royal Air Force Air Chief Marshal Stephen Hillier disclosed that the U.K. fighters frequently scramble in response to Russian activity over the Baltic Sea. Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force David Goldfein, too, acknowledged that AFRF activity around the Baltic states is on the rise.

(4) Relations with Middle Eastern and African Countries

Since September 2015, while acquiring Tartus Naval Base and Khmeimim Air Base as bases of its operations in Syria, the Russian military has conducted aerial bombing using fighter-bombers and long-range bombers as well as red cruise missiles from surface vessels and submarines deployed to the Caspian Sea and Mediterranean. In December 2016, a nationwide ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia and Turkey took effect between the Assad administration and opposition forces. While Russia has continued to fight ISIL and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS; formerly the “al-Nusra Front”) since January 2017, it has also held Syrian peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan together with Turkey and Iran. Russia has been increasing its presence in the Middle East by promoting initiatives that aim for political resolutions in the future.

In December 2017, President Putin visited a Russian military base in Syria, where he announced that the fight against terrorism in the country had been largely resolved, that Russia would continue to operate two permanent bases within Syria, and that he had decided that most of the Russian forces in Syria would be redeployed back to Russia.

Russia continues to maintain a presence in Syria, with the Russian Ministry of Defence announcing in November 2019 that it had deployed helicopter units at Qamishli airport in northeastern Syria, as well as at its Khmeimim Air Base.

The objectives of Russian military intervention may include: (1) to sustain the Assad administration which is friendly to Russia; (2) to defend Russian interests including its military bases in Syria; (3) to address the threat of international terrorist organizations including ISIL; and (4) to secure influence in the Middle East. Thus far, Russia seems to have contributed to the recovery of the Assad administration’s areas of control and protecting Russian interests. Additionally, operations in Syria using cruise missiles and strategic bombers have provided the ideal setting to demonstrate Russia’s long-range precision strike capabilities. Considering the significant influence of Russia’s military intervention on the course of the Assad administration, coupled with the expanding partnerships between Russia and surrounding countries such as Turkey and Iran, Russia’s influence on future stability in Syria and on the political settlement process cannot be ignored.

While supporting opposing sides in the Syrian conflict, Russia and Turkey coordinate their interests to avoid direct confrontation. When U.S. Forces announced their withdrawal from northern Syria in October 2019, the two countries agreed that Russian military police and the Turkish army would carry out joint patrols in northern Syria. In January 2020, the foreign and defense ministers of the two countries held a meeting in Moscow to discuss the Libyan situation. During this meeting, representatives of the interim Libyan Government of National Accord led by Fayez al-Sarraj and the powerful military organization that opposes it, the Libyan National Army (LNA), attended peace talks. Russia is thus increasing its influence over both the Syrian situation and peace in Libya, while at the same time coordinating its interests with Turkey.

In October 2019, Russia held the first Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi and also dispatched two Tu-160 strategic
bombers to South Africa under a military cooperation agreement that it had signed with South Africa in 1995. The following month, it held the first trilateral joint exercise involving the navies of Russia, China, and South Africa off the coast of South Africa. In December of that year, the first trilateral joint exercise involving the navies of Russia, China, and Iran took place in the northern Indian Ocean. Thus, in partnership with China, Russia is expanding the breadth of its activities in multilateral exercises as well.

6 Arms Exports

Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry and to make economic profit, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country’s export value has been increasing in recent years. In January 2007, the Russian Government granted the exclusive authority to export arms to the Rosoboron Export State Corporation as part of its ongoing initiatives to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards its military industry as an integral part of the nation’s military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev.

Russia exports equipment such as fighters, vessels and surface-to-air missiles to countries including Asia, Africa, and Middle East. In recent years, Russia has exported 24 Su-35 “4++ generation” fighters and two S-400 surface-to-air missile systems to China. It has been pointed out that this deal was made possible because the interests of China and Russia coincided: while China promotes indigenous weapons production, it still needs Russian technology for state-of-the-art equipment, whereas Russia aims to avoid diplomatic isolation caused by the Ukrainian crisis and to gain economic profit through arms exports. In recent years, Russia has been aggressively marketing its arms to allies and partners of the United States, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, in addition to traditional export destinations. In particular, the export of S-400 to Turkey, a member country of NATO, has met with strong opposition from the United States. Furthermore, Russia has revealed that it is prepared to export to Turkey not only Su-35 fighters, but also the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter.

Column

Fourth/Fifth-Generation Fighters

While there are no clear criteria for defining jet fighter generations, the term “fourth-generation jet fighter” generally indicates those manufactured since the 1980s, which demonstrate excellent maneuverability thanks to their engine power and are equipped with high-performance weapon-targeting radar. (Russia’s Su-27, the United States’ F-15, and China’s J-16, for example, all fall into this category.) “Fifth-generation jet fighter” refers to advanced jet fighters manufactured since the 2000s, which feature an array of the latest technologies, including stealth capabilities and networked electronic instruments. (Russia’s Su-57, the United States’ F-35, and China’s J-20, for example, all fall into this category.) Russia uses the unique classification “4++ generation” for jet fighters undergoing a two-stage upgrade from the fourth generation, such as the S-35 and the Mig-35, which is currently under development.

5 According to the SIPRI, Russian arms exports between 2015 and 2019 decreased by 18% compared to that of the period between 2010 and 2014. Russia has the second largest share of arms exports in the world (21%) after the United States.
Australia maintains a special strategic partnership with Japan and shares universal values, such as strategic interests, respect for freedom and human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Japan’s relationship with Australia is becoming more important than ever before.

The Defence White Paper released in February 2016 sets out a plan to continue to increase troop strength and acquire high performance equipment over the next two decades, to maintain the high level of capability of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The white paper states explicitly that defense funding would be increased over the next decade, setting a specific target of 2% of Australia’s GDP to be reached by 2020. With regard to Australia’s international relationships, the white paper sets forth that Australia would aim to mature and deepen practical engagement with partners across the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, while continuing to give highest priority to its alliance with the United States. To achieve its strategic defense objective of contributing military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order, Australia makes proactive contributions to the peace and stability of the international community through the deployment of ADF to overseas operations, among other efforts.

The Australian Government launched its first National Security Strategy in January 2013. The Strategy provides a blueprint for national security over the next decade, presenting the recognition that responding to the economic and strategic changes in the Asia-Pacific region is vital to the national security of Australia. The Strategy defines four objectives for the country’s national security: (1) to ensure a safe and resilient population; (2) to protect and strengthen Australia’s sovereignty; (3) to secure Australia’s assets, infrastructure and institutions; and (4) to promote a favorable international environment.1

The Defence White Paper released in February 2016 sets out the Australian Government’s future plans for national defense and the means by which they will be implemented. After presenting an outlook of Australia’s security environment over the next two decades, it outlines the direction of Australia’s defense strategy for dealing with this environment, and the development of the defense force pursuant to this strategy.

Specifically, the white paper maintains that while there is little prospect of a military attack on Australian territory in the period to 2035, Australia will face new complexities and challenges. Based on this understanding, three strategic defense interests are identified, namely: a secure, resilient Australia (including the security of sea lanes); a secure nearer region; and a stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order. Additionally, the following three strategic defense objectives are given: (1) Deter, deny, and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia and its national interests; (2) Make military contributions to support the security of maritime Southeast Asia and support the governments of Pacific Island countries to build and strengthen their security; and (3) Contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order. To maintain the ADF’s high level of capability needed to achieve these objectives, the Government will make important investments. In addition to increasing the troop strength by approximately 4,400 personnel, Australia will acquire high performance equipment, including 12 new submarines, three air warfare destroyers (Aegis vessels), 72 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, and seven MQ-4C unmanned patrol aircraft. Simultaneously, Australia will seek to strengthen intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, electronic warfare capabilities, and cybersecurity capabilities, as well as strengthen the functions of its bases in northern Australia and elsewhere. To support these programs by funding, the white paper also presents the concrete target of increasing defense funding to reach 2% of GDP by 2020.

In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia subscribed to the view that Australia’s security and prosperity are directly linked to the development of the nearer region, the Indo-Pacific region, and the global strategic environment. Based on this view, Australia will build and maintain international security relationships to achieve its strategic defense

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1 Although the National Security Strategy is meant to be reviewed every five years, an updated one has not yet been announced.
objectives. In particular, Australia will aim to mature and deepen practical engagement with partners across the Indo-Pacific region, including Indonesia, Japan, the ROK, New Zealand, India, and China, while continuing to give the highest priority to its alliance with the United States. On November 2017, Australia published the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper for the first time in 14 years.

(1) Relations with the United States

In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that its alliance with the United States pursuant to the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (ANZUS)\(^2\) is based on shared values and will continue to be the centerpiece of Australia’s defense policy. Australia notes that the United States, which remains the pre-eminent global military power over the next two decades, will continue to be its most important strategic partner, and the active presence of the United States will continue to underpin the stability of the region. It is stated that Australia thus welcomes and supports the critical role of the United States in ensuring stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Since 1985, the two countries have been regularly convening the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) to discuss major diplomatic and security issues.

In their joint statement at the AUSMIN held in July 2018, the United States and Australia made their commitment to work together to shape an “Indo-Pacific that is open, inclusive, prosperous, and rules-based,” welcomed the recent U.S.-Australia-India-Japan consultations on the Indo-Pacific, reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen trilateral dialogue with Japan. At the AUSMIN in July 2019, serious concerns about continued militarization in the South China Sea and the Pacific were also expressed. In addition, both sides emphasized the importance of Australia-U.S. defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, indicating the policy to deepen cooperation with Japan, India, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and other countries. Furthermore, they committed to further support Southeast Asian and the Pacific Island countries, and cooperation to maintain pressure on North Korea.

The military forces of the United States and Australia strive to improve interoperability through bilateral exercises. Exercise Talisman Sabre is the Australian-U.S. bilateral military exercise conducted biennially since 2005, with the objective of enhancing combat readiness and interoperability. The 2019 exercise was the biggest to date, with more than 34,000 personnel participating from not only the United States and Australia, but also Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, as well as the SDF. It included amphibious operations and ground combat training.

In November 2011, the United States and Australia announced the Force Posture Initiatives, which encompass the rotational deployment of U.S. Marines in northern Australia, the enhancement of access to Australian military facilities and areas by U.S. Air Force aircraft, and the expansion of opportunities for joint exercises and training. Under these initiatives, the rotational deployment of U.S. Marines in northern Australia began in April 2012, with approximately 2,500 Marines deployed in the region as of 2019. It is also reported that under these initiatives, U.S. Air Force B-52 strategic bombers and F-22 fighters deployed to Australia as needed to participate in training. Australia is in the process of formulating and implementing plans to enhance facilities, airfields, and training grounds at bases used by U.S. Forces, including Darwin and Tindal.

(2) Relations with China

In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that its relationship with China is crucial in different ways from its relationship with the United States, and that it welcomes China’s continued economic growth and the opportunities this is bringing for Australia and other countries in the Indo-Pacific. It goes on to say Australia is committed to continuing the development of Australia’s defense relations with China, and working to enhance mutual understanding, facilitate transparency, and build trust.

Based on such policy, Australia and China continuously hold dialogues among their defense authorities, along with exchanges to develop the cooperative relations between their defense forces, including joint exercises and mutual visits by vessels.

Meanwhile, Australia has been showing its wariness toward China, by, among other ways, making Australia’s position on China very clear.

The Australian government expressed strong concerns over China’s recent land reclamation and construction activity in the South China Sea, and called on all claimant states to halt militarization, while also clearly expressing its intention to continue to exercise its rights to free navigation and flight. Furthermore, the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper contained statements to the effect that China is challenging the position of the United States in the Indo-Pacific, the most important region for Australia.

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\(^2\) A trilateral security treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. Since 1986, the United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand due to its adoption of a non-nuclear policy. The treaty is thus effective only between Australia and the United States and between Australia and New Zealand.
People within and outside Australia expressed their concerns over the acquisition by Chinese businesses of Australian facilities, including Port Darwin, a port that has been used by Australian and the United States fleets among others. In January 2017, the federal government of Australia announced the establishment of the Critical Infrastructure Centre to serve as a dedicated body that will identify facilities requiring surveillance and carefully manage the risks for advising related institutions in order to block the sale of important infrastructure related to national security, including specific ports and harbor facilities, to companies from other countries. The Centre manages the risks arising from foreign involvement by assessing the risks of sabotage, espionage and coercion in Australia’s critical infrastructure sectors, including telecommunications, electricity, gas, water and ports.

With China’s perceived influence on Australia growing larger, including cases of political figures and parties receiving huge political contributions and bribes, the Australian Parliament passed a bill to prevent interference in domestic affairs by foreign actors. The Australian government announced that an Australian company would receive government support and accept an underwater telecommunication cable network project that was to be partially conducted by a Chinese telecommunication company Huawei previously. Moreover, in August 2018, Huawei revealed that the company and ZTE were banned from bidding in an Australian 5G (advanced telecommunication system) network project by the Australian government.

(3) Relations with India

In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that it welcomes India’s increasingly active role in the Indo-Pacific region, and that it sees India as a key security partner. Australia notes that it aims to further mature its defense relationship with India in support of their shared strategic interests.

The Australia-India relationship was elevated to a strategic partnership in November 2009, and the two countries have regularly conducted strategic dialogues, mutual visits by senior military officers, interactions among military services, and mutual dispatches of students to military educational organizations. In November 2014, Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi visited Australia, marking the first visit to Australia by an Indian Prime Minister in 28 years. The two leaders agreed to extend defense cooperation to cover research, development, and industry engagement, to hold regular meetings at the level of Defense Minister and conduct regular maritime exercises, and to convene talks between each of their military services. Since then, mutual exchanges between Australia and India have steadily progressed through such initiatives as mutual visits of naval ships and joint navy training exercises.

(4) Relations with Southeast Asia and Pacific Island Countries

In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia regards a secure nearer region encompassing maritime Southeast Asia and South Pacific as its strategic interest. In particular, Australia considers that instability and conflicts in Southeast Asia have the potential to threaten Australia’s security and economic relations with countries. Furthermore, Australia depends on maritime trade with Southeast Asian countries and maritime trade that transits Southeast Asia. In this regard, Australia perceives that the security of these sea lanes must be ensured alongside freedom of navigation. Based on this understanding, Australia seeks to make military contributions to support the maritime security of Southeast Asia and support the governments of Pacific Island and other countries in building and strengthen their security.

Australia has been deepening its relations with Indonesia in the security and defense fields following the signing of the Lombok Treaty—a security cooperation framework concerning cooperation in a wide range of defense fields—in November 2006, the elevation of their relationship to a strategic partnership in March 2010, and the September 2012 conclusion of the Defence Cooperation Arrangement, which included the enhancement of cooperation in the fields of anti-terrorism measures and maritime security. The two countries’ cooperative relations in the security and defense fields have stalled intermittently. However, since mutual visits by ministers and higher-level officials resumed in the second half of 2015, the bilateral relationship has been improving through many initiatives, including regular Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meetings (2+2) and the signing of an agreement on maritime security and terrorism, and of a Maritime Cooperation Plan of Action in 2018.

With Singapore and Malaysia, Australia carries out regular joint combined exercises in the South China Sea and other areas under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA; entered into force in 1971) framework, whereby Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom would consult each other in the event or threat of an armed attack on Singapore or Malaysia, to decide on their response. Australia considers that Singapore is its most advanced defense partner, and that they share Australia’s interest in a secure maritime trading environment. Defense cooperation is also deepening, including the signing of a memorandum of agreement with Singapore in May 2018 to further strengthen defense cooperation.
understanding concerning military training and training area development in Australia under the comprehensive strategic partnership in October 2016. As regards Malaysia, Australia stations the ADF in Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) Base Butterworth, and contributes to maintaining regional security and stability through patrol activities in the South China Sea and the northern Indian Ocean.

Australia plays a leading role in assisting Pacific Island countries, and Timor-Leste in fields such as security maintenance, coping with natural disasters, and maritime patrol. In particular, in the field of maritime patrol, Australia still regularly deploys ADF assets to the South Pacific to assist with patrol activities. It also plans to supply the Pacific Island countries and Timor-Leste with 21 new Guardian-class patrol boats by 2023. In November 2018, Australia announced its largest ever financial package of up to AUS$3 billion for infrastructure development in Pacific Island countries, with the intent of further strengthening relations. In May 2019, immediately after forming his Cabinet following the general election, Prime Minister Scott Morrison expressed his intention to continue active engagement with the Pacific Island countries, called “Pacific Step-up”. He made his first official trip overseas after the cabinet forming to Solomon Islands in June 2019, showing his stance of placing importance on the Pacific Island countries.

(5) Overseas Activities

In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia identifies the following strategic defense objective: to contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order. In line with this objective, the ADF is deployed overseas to conduct operations.

Australia has deployed one E-7A airborne early warning and control aircraft and one KC-30A aerial refueling aircraft to the Middle East to provide support for anti-terrorism operations being conducted by the United States, among others. In Iraq, it is engaged in advising and assisting, as well as providing capacity building assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces on the military front. In Afghanistan, ADF personnel train, advise, and assist NATO-led Afghan forces.

Australia also deploys aircraft and naval vessels to conduct maritime surveillance in the Strait of Hormuz and other parts of the Middle East, as well as in the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and around Pacific Island countries.

Since 2018, ADF patrol aircraft and vessels engaged in patrolling and monitoring activities against illegal maritime activities, including illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korean ships, which is prohibited under the UN Security Council resolution.

In July 2018, New Zealand announced a new defense policy, the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018. This document refers to major changes in the strategic environment since the publication of the previous Defence White Paper in 2016, including intensifying competition among powers, climate change, and cyber and space.

The Statement then presented New Zealand’s security objectives, specifically, ensuring public safety, preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity, protecting lines of communication and the like, strengthening international order, sustaining economic prosperity, maintaining democratic institutions and national values, and protecting the natural environment. In order to achieve these objectives, New Zealand prioritizes the securing of operational capabilities in the primary operation area that stretches from the South Pole to the Equator. The country believes that challenges to the existing order of the Asia-Pacific region could impact its security and prosperity and that it is important to have defense capabilities that can globally support the maintenance of the international rule-based order. The Statement also mentioned other priorities, including capabilities to operate effectively with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, and the maintenance of the scale and quality of New Zealand’s military contributions.

Moreover, the Statement was the first document that mentioned the impact of climate change and the role of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) regarding this issue, which reflects the new administration’s Pacific Reset strategy, which makes a commitment to support the Pacific Island countries that have been exposed to disasters. As for the issues in the South China Sea, New Zealand had refrained from referring to China by name in order to maintain its neutral position in this matter. However, in the Statement, the country made a comment on China’s militarization in the South China Sea, stating, “China’s more confident assertion of its interests has at times raised tensions with neighboring states and with the United States.”

As for diplomatic relations, New Zealand has maintained close relationships with the United States and Australia based on the ANZUS Treaty. In particular, New Zealand
sees Australia as its closest partner. The United States has suspended its defense obligation to New Zealand since 1985, when New Zealand refused the entrance of a U.S. ship following New Zealand's ban on nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the two countries have strengthened their relationship in the diplomacy and defense fields through the Wellington Declaration (2010), which primarily focuses on strengthening strategic relations in the fields of foreign policy and military affairs, and the Washington Declaration (2012), which mainly deals with expanding defense cooperation. New Zealand has thus established the United States as a very close strategic partner. While New Zealand has deepened its relationship with China through such initiatives as cooperation for the “Belt and Road” Initiative and joint air exercises, it also looks at China with a cautious eye as shown in the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018.

The NZDF has 9,400 personnel.3 It has contributed to the peace and stability of the region through such activities as engaging in monitoring and surveillance activities by patrol aircraft against illegal maritime activities, including illicit ship-to-ship transfers involving North Korean-flagged vessels prohibited under the UN Security Council resolution, and dispatching its personnel to the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) in the ROK, and to other operations in the Middle East and the South Pacific.

In June 2019, the New Zealand government published “Defence Capability Plan 2019,” which sets out planned investments of NZ$20 billion until 2030. Investments under the Plan are: strengthening of the relationship with the Pacific Island countries; response to the climate crisis; and acquisition of vessels, helicopters, transport aircraft and others to strengthen the maritime surveillance capability.

3 According to “The Military Balance 2020”
Southeast Asia occupies a strategic position for traffic, linking the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. It is an important region for Japan, which relies on maritime transport for many of the supplies needed for economic activities and the lives of the Japanese people. Such economic development has deepened interdependence within the region and with countries outside the region. In late 2015, the establishment of the ASEAN Community was declared as an outcome of the strides made in ASEAN cooperation towards its integration.

Meanwhile, this region still has destabilizing factors, including the territorial disputes over the South China Sea, ethnic minority issues, separatist and independence movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Moreover, there are incidents, such as piracy, by which the safe passage of ships is obstructed. In order to cope with these issues, the countries in Southeast Asia are working to build military forces for national defense and maintenance of domestic public security, as well as for addressing new security issues such as terrorism and piracy. They are also pursuing cooperation with such countries as the United States, China, Russia, Australia, and India to this end. Recently, against the backdrop of economic development, the countries have been modernizing their military forces, mainly their naval and air forces, as well as strengthening their maritime law enforcement capacities.

Indonesia is a country of importance in Southeast Asia, with the world’s largest Muslim population. At the same time, as it is the largest archipelago country in the world, it has vast land and territorial waters and strategic importance for maritime traffic.

Under the banner of the maritime nation concept, President Joko Widodo, who first took office in October 2014, strives to revive maritime culture, address territorial disputes through maritime diplomacy, and build maritime defense power supported by satellite technology and drone systems. President Joko was reelected in the April 2019 presidential elections and appointed Prabowo Subianto, who had stood against him, as Minister of Defence when forming the cabinet for his second administration in October. Defence Minister Prabowo firstly visited neighboring Malaysia in November 2019, and the following month he made visits to countries including Australia, China, and the ROK, where he held talks on bolstering bilateral defense cooperation.

As part of its military force reform, Indonesia aims to meet the requirements for minimum defense capabilities—what it calls “Minimum Essential Force (MEF).” However, Indonesia has indicated that its maritime defense capabilities, in particular, are still very much inadequate. Accordingly, Indonesia has announced a defense budget increase as well as a policy to bolster its deployment of assets to the Natuna Islands, in the South China Sea, and other locations. In December 2018, it was reported that Indonesia deployed an army composite battalion, Indonesian National Air Defense Forces Command’s radar squadron, and Indonesian Marines composite battalion on the Natuna Islands for an opening ceremony of a military base with piers which can also accommodate submarines, and hangars for unmanned vehicles. The Indonesian military established three Combined Defence Area Command (Pangkogabwilhan), in September 2019. Kogabwilhan is a representation of the concept of Indonesian Military’s interoperability, which is currently a priority policy for Indonesian Military. Kogabwilhan serves as an initial action in the event of a conflict in its area for war military operations and military operations other than war and as a deterrent force in the event of external threats.

Concerned about the “nine-dash line” claimed by China, which overlaps with Indonesia’s EEZ in the vicinity of the Natuna Islands, Indonesia has enhanced its patrol activities in the area. In December 2019, Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a note of protest on the grounds that a China Coast Guard vessel had been found to have operated illegally in Indonesia’s EEZ around the Natuna Islands by escorting their fishing fleet. The Indonesian military announced that it had tightened its monitoring of the surrounding waters and airspace, and President Joko visited the Natuna Islands later
that month.

Indonesia emphasizes cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries, and adopts a free and active foreign policy. In relation to this, at the June 2019 ASEAN Summit, President Joko Widodo played a leading role in the adoption of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), which focuses on ASEAN Centrality. With the United States, it is strengthening its cooperative relationship in such fields as military education and training and military equipment procurement, and is carrying out joint training, including “Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT)”1 and the “Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT)”2 exercises.

2 Malaysia

Malaysia’s first defense white paper, which was published in December 2019, highlights the country’s geography as a nation with two territories—Peninsular Malaysia, and Sabah and Sarawak, on the island of Borneo—located between the vast Pacific and Indian Oceans. The document identifies Malaysia’s potential to serve as a bridging linchpin between the two oceans, and also demonstrates an awareness of the fact that, while Malaysia’s strategic location and natural resources are a blessing, they also pose a challenge. Given these attributes, Malaysia has historically been affected by the political dynamics of major powers. Even today, Malaysia sees in its defense white paper that uncertain big power relations, which refers to the U.S.-China, is the most important strategic factor for Malaysia. Moreover, the white paper also demonstrates an awareness that Malaysia faces increasing non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, cyberthreats, piracy, and natural disasters.

Based on this recognition, Malaysia’s defense policy aims to defend national interests in each of three concentric areas of interest, consisting of the Core Area, which includes both the country’s land masses and its territorial waters; the Extended Area, which encompasses the surrounding waters and airspace; and the Forward Area, which incorporates locations beyond the extended area where Malaysia’s national interests are affected. The policy consists of three key pillars: (1) “Concentric Deterrence,” which aims to deter all forms of external intrusion or conflicts by enhancing the capability of the nation’s armed forces; (2) “Comprehensive Defense,” which seeks to build resilience as a nation throughout society, including among the people; and (3) “Credible Partnerships,” which focuses on the promotion of regional stability via the expansion and enhancement of defense cooperation with other countries as a highly credible partner.

On the other hand, in connection with the recent continued anchoring of Chinese government vessels around South Luconia Shoal, over which Malaysia claims sovereignty, Malaysia has announced that its Navy and maritime law enforcement agencies would conduct around-the-clock monitoring, and that Malaysia would defend its sovereignty. Along with this strengthening of its maritime defense force, Malaysia also has striven to bolster its defense posture in eastern Malaysia, constructing a new naval base in April 2017 in Bintulu, close to James Shoal and South Luconia Shoal. In July 2019, the Air Force carried out live-fire missile exercises in Sabah state, on Borneo in eastern Malaysia. In December 2019, Malaysia made a submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, aimed at setting the limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.

Malaysia and the United States hold joint exercises such as CARAT and SEACAT, and promote military cooperation including capacity-building in the maritime security field.

The Mahathir administration formed in May 2018 has been pushing forward reconsiderations of large-scale infrastructure projects as a part of fiscal reconsolidation efforts. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad informed China that Malaysia would cancel or postpone the long-distance railway project that started in August 2017 with China’s cooperation. However, in April 2019, the two countries agreed to resume the long-distance railway project after making cost reductions, and the Malaysian and Chinese companies involved signed a supplementary agreement.

In February 2020, the Malaysian king appointed Muhyiddin Yassin as the country’s next prime minister, after receiving a letter of resignation from Prime Minister Mahathir. Muhyiddin was sworn in as prime minister that March.

3 Myanmar

Myanmar shares borders with China and India and is a gateway to the Indian Ocean for China and some ASEAN countries. In light of these factors, Myanmar is noted for its strategic significance. In Myanmar, the armed forces had control over the government following the collapse of the socialist regime in 1988. However, with an economic slowdown caused by the economic sanctions imposed by

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1 A general term that refers to a series of bilateral exercises that the United States conducts with Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Timor-Leste.

2 A general term that refers to counter-terrorism joint exercises that the United States conducts with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
the West, transition to civilian rule based on the road map to democracy was completed.³

Including the release of political prisoners and ceasefire agreements with ethnic minorities, the Government of Myanmar has actively taken steps toward democratization. The international community has shown some level of appreciation for these steps, with the West, including the United States, easing economic sanctions on Myanmar.

However, following an August 2017 attack on a police station by Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), forces including Myanmar’s military launched mop-up operations in Rakhine state and more than 600,000 refugees—primarily Muslims—fleeing to the neighboring country, Bangladesh, in two months. The international community denounced Myanmar for the purported massacre and human rights violation. Myanmar faced criticism from Western countries over the situation, with the United States announcing in August 2019 that it would tighten sanctions against the commanding officers of Myanmar’s military forces. In addition, the Gambia brought a case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for breaching the Genocide Convention, with the aim of preventing all acts under Article 2 of the Convention. In January 2020, the ICJ issued provisional measures which indicated that Myanmar should use all means to prevent oppression.⁴

In terms of foreign policy, Myanmar continues to uphold a policy of neutrality and non-alignment, while for its national defense policy, continues to emphasize the three national causes of Non-disintegration of the Union, Non-disintegration of National Solidarity, and Perpetuation of Sovereignty, as well as resolutely repelling foreign invasions and interference in domestic matters.

China has maintained a good relationship with Myanmar since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1950 and is regarded as a major supplier of equipment. Myanmar has also received Chinese aid for pipeline construction and the development of Kyaukpyu Port. In January 2020, President Xi Jinping became the first Chinese leader to visit Myanmar for 19 years and affirmed China’s policy of promoting economic cooperation through the BRI.

Myanmar has maintained a cooperative relationship with Russia in the military field, including during the military regime, and Russia has been a destination for students from Myanmar and a supplier of major defense equipment. As for India, since the transition to civilian rule, Myanmar has

deepened cooperative relations in the fields of the economy and military, which has developed into defense cooperation and exchanges such as the hosting of various seminars and friendly visits to Myanmar by Indian naval vessels.

Cooperative relations with North Korea, including weapons trades, were maintained under Myanmar’s military regime. Following the transition to democracy, although Myanmar denies that it has military ties to North Korea, the report issued by the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea in March 2018 reported that the country has received a ballistic missile system and other weapons from North Korea.

4 The Philippines

The Philippines considers that its archipelagic attributes and geographic location are a source of both strength and vulnerability. Moreover, the country sees that its strategic location and rich natural resources have also provided a strong temptation to expansionist powers. Based on this perception, although resolving internal armed conflicts remains its top security concern, rising tensions in the South China Sea have prompted the Philippines to give the same attention to territorial defense as it does to internal security threats.

The Philippines, with a historically close relationship with the United States, has maintained a cooperative relationship with the United States under their mutual defense treaty and military assistance agreement, even after the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces in 1992. The two countries conduct a number of bilateral exercises, including Balikatan, KAMANDAG, and Maritime Training Activity Sama Sama. In March 2016, the two countries agreed on five locations for carrying out defense cooperation under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) they signed in April 2014 for strengthening cooperation in such areas as the capacity enhancement of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and disaster relief: Antonio Bautista Air Base, Basa Air Base, Fort Magsaysay, Lumbia Air Base, and Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base. During his visit to the Philippines in March 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made it clear that the South China Sea is part of the Pacific Ocean and thus any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea would trigger mutual defense obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty. In September 2019, the

³ The National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi won the general election in November 2015. However, Aung San Suu Kyi was not eligible for the position of President according to the Constitution, as some of her family members have foreign citizenship. Therefore, she has led the administration as the newly created State Counselor and as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The country’s second general election since the restoration of democracy is due to take place in 2020.
United States and the Philippines held the Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board (MDB-SEB), at which they reaffirmed the importance of their defense cooperation. However, President Rodrigo Duterte hinted in January 2020 that he intended to terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which prescribed the legal status of U.S. military personnel when U.S. Forces undertook joint military exercises or other activities in the Philippines, and notified the United States of its termination in February. Attention will be paid to further action by the two countries moving forward.

The Philippines and China have competing claims over the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. Seeking a settlement under international law, in January 2013, the Philippines launched arbitral tribunal proceedings pursuant to UNCLOS against China. In July 2016, a final award was rendered, accepting nearly all of the Philippines’ submissions. The Government of the Philippines released a statement that it welcomed the award by the arbitral tribunal and strongly affirms its respect for the decision. Also, President Duterte stated in his State of the Nation Address held in the same month that the Philippines would strongly affirm and uphold the award handed down for the arbitration case between the Philippines and China. In September 2019, the Office of the President of the Philippines revealed that China had vowed to adopt a 60-40 sharing scheme favoring the Philippines in the proposed joint development of resources in the South China Sea in exchange for setting aside the arbitral court ruling. The Office of the President of the Philippines, however, made it clear that it would not abandon the ruling.

In April 2019, the Philippines criticized China when it confirmed the presence of more than 200 Chinese vessels near and around Thitu Island (Filipino name: Pag-asa Island), which is occupied by the Philippines. In June, in response to a claim that the Chinese aircraft carrier “Liaoning” and other ships had passed through the Sibutu Strait, Secretary of National Defense Lorenzana said that it was not innocent passage.

5 Singapore

Given its limited land area, population, and resources, Singapore’s existence and development depend on the peace and stability of the region in a globalized economy. Singapore gives high priority to national defense, with defense spending accounting for about one-fifth of its national budget.

Singapore identifies deterrence and diplomacy as twin pillars of its national defense policy. Because it is a very small country, Singapore’s armed forces make use of the training facilities of other countries, including the United States and Australia, while continually dispatching military personnel to take part in training exercises overseas.

Singapore emphasizes the importance of cooperative relations with ASEAN and the FPDA,5 and has concluded

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5 Entered into force in 1971. This agreement states that Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom will discuss what response should be adopted in the event of aggression towards or the threat of an attack on Malaysia or Singapore. The five countries carry out various exercises based on these arrangements.
defense cooperation agreements with countries within and outside the region. With the aim of contributing to peace and stability in the region, Singapore supports U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific and permits it to use military facilities in Singapore. Since 2013, U.S. littoral combat ships (LCSs) began their rotational deployments. In December 2015, the P-8 patrol aircraft of the U.S. Forces were deployed to Singapore for around one week for the first time. The two countries have committed to continuing to carry out similar deployments routinely. In addition, Singapore conducts joint exercises with the United States, such as CARAT and SEACAT. In September 2019, the two countries signed the Protocol of Amendment to the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding United States Use of Facilities in Singapore.

Singapore has strong economic ties with China. Both countries also conduct joint naval exercises. In October 2019, the two countries signed the enhanced Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation (ADESC). On the other hand, diplomatic relations with China have been strained partly due to Singapore’s belief in following the arbitration award when it comes to the resolution of the South China Sea disputes and partly due to Singapore’s defense relationship with Taiwan.

Singapore concluded the Bilateral Agreement for Navy Cooperation with India in November 2017 and the two countries undertake Exercise Bold Kurukshetra, a bilateral armor exercise, and the Singapore India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX). In addition, Singapore, India, and Thailand held their first trilateral joint exercise in September 2019, which took place near the Andaman Islands.

Thailand’s defense policy includes: strengthening defense cooperation through ASEAN, international organizations, and other entities; defense that makes comprehensive use of political, economic, and other national strengths; and effective defense aimed at increasing the readiness of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) and developing the defense industry.

The submission of an amnesty bill intended to pave the way for the pardon and return of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra by ruling parties to the National Assembly in 2013 exacerbated domestic disorder. In May 2014, then Commander-in-Chief Prayut Chan-o-Cha of the Royal Thai Army issued a declaration of martial law nationwide, and then seized power via the National Council for Peace and Order, which mostly comprises the Thai military. Subsequently, under the interim administration led by Prayut, who was selected as interim Prime Minister, the government worked towards a transition to a new administration based on the road map to civilian rule. The new constitution was promulgated and entered into force in April 2017. In March 2019, a general election was held for the first time in approximately 8 years. In June 2019, King Maha Vajiralongkorn approved the appointment of Prayut as prime minister and the following month granted approval for the new cabinet. Prime Minister Prayut concurrently serves as defense minister.

Under its flexible omni-directional diplomatic policy, Thailand pursues cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries and coordination with major countries. Exercise Cobra Gold, which is co-sponsored by the U.S and Thailand and has been implemented since 1982, is currently one of the largest multilateral exercises in the Southeast Asia.

Since the conclusion of the Military Assistance Agreement in 1950, Thailand and its ally the United States have maintained a cooperative relationship. However, following the coup d’état in 2014, the U.S. suspended some military aid. After the coup, the United States scaled down the size of U.S. forces participating in the Cobra Gold. However, this was restored under the Trump Administration. In addition, the two countries have continued their bilateral naval training CARAT and counter-piracy and trafficking exercise SEACAT.

Thailand and China have conducted joint exercises such as Blue Strike among their marines and Falcon Strike among their air forces. It has been pointed out that Thailand’s military relationship with China has become closer after the freezing of U.S. military assistance following the coup.

In September 2019, Thailand and the ROK signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).
Vietnam recognizes that, while the Asia-Pacific region continues to be a center for dynamic economic development and occupies an increasingly important geo-economic, geopolitical, and strategic location, the region still remains the ground for major powers’ rivalry and influence intensification, harboring destabilizing elements. Based on its viewpoint that the sea is closely associated with the national construction and defense, Vietnam has established the objective of becoming a strong marine country, particularly prioritizing the modernization of its military forces and law enforcement forces at sea as well as ensuring the capability to properly handle sea situations, maritime independence, sovereignty, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and national interests at sea.

Vietnam and the United States have strengthened their military relations in recent years. This has taken such forms as joint exercises with the U.S. Navy and port calls by U.S. Navy vessels in Vietnam. In 2017, mutual visits were conducted by the leaders of both countries, and an agreement was reached on the deepening of defense cooperation. March 2018 marked the first port call by a U.S. aircraft carrier to Vietnam since the end of the Vietnam war. In addition, the U.S. aircraft carrier and cruiser made a call at Da Nang in March 2020.

Vietnam and Russia continue to strengthen cooperation in the area of national defense, with Vietnam dependent on Russia for the majority of its defense equipment. In April 2018, the two countries signed a military and technical cooperation roadmap, while in July 2019, a Vietnamese naval vessel visited the port of Vladivostok for the first time. In December 2019, a submarine rescue vessel from Russia’s Pacific Fleet visited the port of Cam Ranh and participated in the first bilateral joint submarine rescue exercise.

Vietnam and China, under their comprehensive strategic cooperation partnership relations, proactively conduct exchanges among their senior government officials. However, the two countries have competing claims concerning issues such as sovereignty over the South China Sea. In summits and many other other occasions, the two countries have agreed to process the differences in their opinions on maritime issues and to refrain from activities that would complicate the matters. However, they have disputes regarding resources development and the operation of fishing boats. The defense white paper published in November 2019 demonstrates an awareness that Vietnam and China need to be settled with precaution, avoiding negative impacts on general peace, friendship, and cooperation for development between the two countries. As such, it recognizes that the two countries should continue negotiations and consultations to find peaceful solutions on the basis of international law. Between July and October 2019, a standoff took place between Vietnamese and Chinese government ships over an oil development project that had been taking place off the coast of Vietnam since May.

Vietnam and India have been deepening their cooperative relationship in a broad range of areas, including security and economy. In the area of defense cooperation, it is noted that the Indian Armed Forces support the training of Vietnam’s Navy submarine personnel and Air Force pilots, and Indian Navy vessels make friendly visits to Vietnam. In September 2016, Prime Minister Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit Vietnam in 15 years. During the visit an agreement was reached on raising the status of the bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, while an announcement was made concerning a loan of US$500 million for deepening defense cooperation.

In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have increased their defense spending against the backdrop of economic development and other reasons, and are modernizing their military forces, focusing on inducting equipment such as submarines and fighters, including fourth-generation modern fighters.

In February 2018, Indonesia concluded an agreement to purchase an additional 11 Su-35 fighters from Russia. With the ROK, Indonesia concluded an agreement to purchase three ROK-made 209-class submarines, the third of which was reportedly produced in Indonesia and completed diving trials in January 2020. In January 2016, the two countries also concluded a detailed agreement on cost sharing and bilateral cooperation in the joint development of the 4.5 generation KF-X/IF-X fighter. Indonesia plans to receive 14 ScanEagle UAVs from the United States by March 2022. As well as showcasing Chinese CH-4 UAVs at an October 2019 celebration for Indonesian National Armed Forces Day, in December 2019 Indonesia unveiled the prototype Black Eagle UAV, a domestically produced unmanned aerial vehicle.
that has incorporated several aspects of China’s CH-4 UAV. Malaysia announced a plan to build six indigenous LCSs. The first of these vessels was launched in August 2017. Furthermore, in November 2016, Malaysia concluded an agreement with China to purchase four littoral mission ships (LMSs). In June 2019, Malaysia announced that it was to receive 12 ScanEagle UAVs from the United States by March 2022.

Myanmar’s December 2019 procurement of its first submarine—a Kilo-class submarine received from India—is attracting attention from neighboring countries.

The Philippines has taken steps in recent years to modernize its defense equipment against the backdrop of conflicts over territorial rights in the South China Sea.

In terms of air force capabilities, between November 2015 and May 2017, the Philippines successively introduced 12 FA-50PH light fighters purchased from the ROK. It is currently planning to initiate a multi-role fighter program. In addition, the Philippines plans to receive eight ScanEagle UAVs from the United States by March 2022.

As for naval forces, the Philippines received three Hamilton-class frigates from the United States by 2016. The Philippines introduced two Indonesian-made landing dock vessels by 2017. In October 2016, the Philippines concluded an agreement to purchase two frigates from the ROK. The August 2019 commissioning of a Pohang-class Corvette received from the ROK marked the restoration of the antisubmarine capability that the Philippines had long lacked. That September, the Philippines conducted the DAGIT-PA multi-service military exercise involving the Army, Navy, and Air Force, during which the four AAV-7 assault amphibious vehicles that it had commissioned the previous June were operated.

Singapore is actively striving to modernize its forces. Today, it is one of the largest arms importers in the world. It introduced 24 U.S.-made F-15 fighter jets by 2012 and also participates in the F-35 JSF Program. In January 2020, the U.S. Government officially approved the sale of F-35B fighter jets to Singapore and delivered the required certification notifying Congress of the sale.

As for Thailand, in July 2014, the country established the Submarine Squadron Headquarters. In April 2017, the Royal Thai Navy drew up a plan to purchase three Yuan-class submarines from China over the next 11 years, and the Thai Cabinet approved the purchase of one vessel. In addition, the Cabinet approved in September 2012 a plan to introduce two frigates. The first frigate was received from the ROK in December 2018. In September 2019, Thailand signed an agreement to purchase a Type 071 landing platform dock from China. In addition, by 2013, Thailand had introduced 12 Swedish-made JAS-39 Gripen fighters. In September 2019, it received the first 10 of 60 Stryker armored vehicles purchased from the United States.

By January 2017, Vietnam successively introduced six Russian-made Kilo-class submarines. By February 2018, Vietnam started the operation of four Russian-made Gepard-class frigates. As for its air force capabilities, Vietnam started to successively introduce Russian-made Su-30 fighters in 2004, and to date, the total number of delivered Su-30 fighters came to 36. In January 2020, it was reported that Vietnam had ordered 12 Yak-130 training aircraft from Russia. It is also due to receive six ScanEagle UAVs from the United States by March 2022.

### Intra-and Extra-Regional Cooperation

ASEAN member states utilize ASEAN as the multilateral security framework of the region. ASEAN holds mechanisms such as the ARF and ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM), which provide opportunities for dialogue on security issues. Furthermore, ASEAN has made efforts to improve the security environment in the region and promote mutual trust, for example, by holding the ASEAN Militaries’ Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table-Top Exercise (AHR). In addition, ASEAN attaches importance to expanding its relations with countries outside of the region. It holds the ADMM-Plus, a platform that adds eight non-ASEAN countries including Japan to ADMM, under which humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) exercises have been conducted. ASEAN and the United States held their first ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise (AUMX) in September 2019. With China, ASEAN held the first naval table-top exercise in August 2018, and the first naval field training exercise in October 2018. In relation to this, it was reported that China requested during the meeting for the formulation of COC of Parties in the South China Sea to include a clause on regular implementation of China-ASEAN joint military exercises and a clause stating that no military exercises shall be held jointly with countries from outside the region, unless the parties concerned are notified beforehand and express no objection.

At the June 2019 ASEAN Summit, ASEAN announced the AOIP, which is based on such principles as ASEAN Centrality, openness, and transparency amid dynamism in...
the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, and expresses the intention to promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. Moving forward, ASEAN member states are expected to further develop initiatives to build trust with non-ASEAN countries, in accordance with the principle and concepts of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC).
1 General Situation

With a population of more than 1.3 billion on its vast land, India is the world’s largest democratic country. It has achieved steady economic growth in recent years, and has significant influence in the South Asian region. Also, it is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, which is of strategic and geopolitical importance in terms of sea lines of communication, connecting the Asia-Pacific region with the Middle East and Europe. With the permeation of the concept of “Indo-Pacific” in the international community, India has increased its presence as a geopolitical player, while the international community in return has increasingly high expectations for the country’s role.

On the diplomatic front, the second Modi administration that was inaugurated in May 2019 has maintained the neighborhood first policy, which emphasizes strengthening relations with South Asian countries, while expanding the focus of strengthening India’s external relations to the Asia-Pacific region, in accordance with the “Act East” policy. In addition, the administration has carried out proactive foreign policy, placing priority also on India’s relations with the United States, Russia, Europe, among other areas. In the defense domain, too, the administration has attached importance to ensuring maritime security, especially in the Indian Ocean, and deepened collaboration with other countries. As well as attaching importance to the Indian Ocean, on which India depends for its trade, the Indian Maritime Security Strategy published in October 2015 defines the nation’s primary areas of maritime interest as an extensive marine area centered on India, encompassing the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Strait of Malacca. In addition, the strategy states that India will become a “net security provider” in the maritime neighborhood.

India has non-demarcated border issues with China and Pakistan. India has multiple ethnic groups, religions, cultures, and languages, and there are concerns about the activities of ultra-leftists and secession and independence movements, as well as the movements of Islamic extremists stationed across the India-Pakistan border.

2 Military Affairs

As a part of the efforts to modernize its naval and air forces, India is expanding procurement of equipment from foreign countries as well as joint development with them, and has emerged as the world’s second-largest arms importer. Furthermore, under the “Make in India” initiative, the administration is promoting expansion of foreign companies’ direct investment in India’s defense industry and the domestic production of equipment through enhancing technological cooperation with other countries.

With respect to its naval capabilities, India operates the Russian-built conventional powered aircraft carrier INS “Vikramaditya,” and is also building one indigenous conventional powered aircraft carrier INS “Vikrant” with aid from France and Italy. With regard to submarines, India acquired one Russian-built Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine INS “Chakra” in April 2012 under a lease arrangement and the two countries signed a deal in March 2019 for the lease of another Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine. It also reportedly placed into service its first indigenous ballistic missile and nuclear submarine INS “Arihant,” which was built with support from Russia, in August 2016. In January 2020, India test-fired a K-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile from an underwater platform. Furthermore, India is making progress with the indigenous production of six conventional submarines in collaboration with France, commissioning the first of six license-built submarines, INS “Kalvari,” in December 2017, and the second, INS “Khanderi,” in September 2019. In January 2019, India decided to move forward with a project to produce another six conventional submarines locally in partnership with a foreign company. It has deployed the eight P-8I patrol aircraft purchased from the United States to a base in southern India and, in July 2016, concluded a purchase agreement for an additional four P-8Is.

With respect to its air force capabilities, India signed an agreement to purchase 36 Rafale fighter aircraft from France in September 2016 as part of India’s plan to introduce medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA). Handover of the fighters began in October 2019.
Based on the nuclear doctrine of 2003, India adheres to the following policies: credible minimum deterrence, no-first-use nuclear policy, no use against non-nuclear weapon nations, and maintaining the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests that it announced immediately after the nuclear test in 1998. India promotes the development and deployment of various ballistic missiles. As well as conducting the test launches of “Agni 5” in December 2018 and “Agni 3” in November 2019, India has reportedly started developing “Agni 6,” which is believed to have a range of up to 10,000 km. It is deemed that the country aspires to extend the ranges of ballistic missiles and make other performance improvements. In regard to cruise missiles, India has deployed the supersonic cruise missile “BrahMos” jointly developed with Russia and is also developing the hypersonic cruise missile “BrahMos II” and a ballistic missile defense system.2

3 Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with the United States

India is actively striving to strengthen bilateral relations with the United States. In line with the expansion of the relationship derived from the economic growth of India, the United States is also promoting engagement with India. It sees India as a partner that shares universal values and strategic interests with the United States in the region. The two countries conduct the exercises, such as Malabar3 with Japan taking part, on a regular basis. In addition, in recent years, the United States has become one of India’s major equipment procurement destinations.4

When Prime Minister Modi visited the United States in June 2016, the United States recognized that India is a “Major Defense Partner.” In August 2016, in a joint statement of the U.S. and Indian defense ministers, the United States agreed to elevate defense trade and technology sharing with India to a level commensurate with its closest allies and partners. Also, a memorandum was signed concerning logistics support cooperation.

In June 2017, Prime Minister Modi visited the United States. At his first summit meeting with President Trump, the two sides agreed to continue to strengthen their strategic partnership. In September 2018, the first U.S.-India “2+2” Meeting was held. In this meeting, the two countries signed the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), which aims to promote access to advanced defense systems and ensure the optimal use of a U.S.-made platform owned by India. In November 2019, the two countries held their first tri-service exercise “Tiger Triumph,” with the participation of India’s Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

(2) Relations with China

See Section 2-3-6 (3) of this Chapter

(Relations with South Asian Countries)

(3) Relations with Russia

See Section 4-6-5 (2) of this Chapter (Relations with Asian Countries)

(4) Relations with South Asian and Southeast Asia Countries

In the “Transformational Diplomacy” published in June 2015, India clearly set out the neighborhood first policy, aimed at strengthening relations with other South Asian countries. Based on this policy, India agreed in November 2019 to provide Sri Lanka with US$4.5 billion in aid to fund anti-terrorism measures, and agreed in December 2018 to provide the Maldives with US$4.7 billion in support for economic development. In the case of Bangladesh, India agreed in April 2017 to provide US$4.5 billion to support economic development and also concluded a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation, which included US$500 million in defense-related aid.

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2 Reports specify these missiles as follows. Agni 5: a mobile, three-stage solid-fueled ballistic missile with a range of about 5,000–8,000 km. Agni 6: a three-stage solid/liquid-fueled ballistic missile with a range of about 8,000–10,000 km. BrahMos: a solid/Ramjet supersonic cruise missile with a range of about 300–500 km. Also, India is reportedly developing a ballistic missile defense system. According to reports, it is a two-stage intercept system consisting of a missile for high altitude interception (PAD) up to 80 km in altitude and a missile for low altitude interception (AAD) up to 30 km in altitude.

3 The Malabar was initially a bilateral maritime exercise between the United States and India. Japan has participated in the Malabar since 2007, and Malabar 17, Malabar 18 and Malabar 19 were conducted as trilateral exercises among Japan, the United States and India.

4 According to the statistics from 2014 to 2018 in SIPRI YEARBOOK 2019, edited by SIPRI.
Based on its Act East policy, India continues to engage with Southeast Asian nations and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region on a bilateral, regional, and multilateral basis, promoting economic and cultural relations, as well as pursuing the development of strategic relationships. Leveraging its experience of using Russian equipment, India provides Vietnam, Malaysia, and other users of such equipment with support for capacity building. In September 2019, India, Singapore, and Thailand held their first trilateral maritime exercise.

2 Pakistan

1 General Situation

Wedged between the powerful South Asian nation of India and politically-unstable Afghanistan, and sharing borders with China and Iran, Pakistan is placed in a geopolitically significant and complex position. In particular, Islamic extremists conduct activities across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and Pakistan’s attitude towards the war against terrorism draws much attention from the international community.

While supporting the United States’ war against terrorism in Afghanistan, the Government of Pakistan has been struggling as its domestic security situation has worsened, with issues such as growing anti-U.S. sentiment and retaliatory terrorism by Islamic extremists. Although the Pakistan Armed Forces’ reinforced operation to crackdown on militant groups has reportedly drastically decreased terrorism, terrorist attacks have continued to occur sporadically.

Against such backdrop, the Pakistani government has continued its counter-terrorism operation, “Radd-ul-Fasaad,” since 2017, while also working on the construction of fences and guarding stations along the border with Afghanistan to prevent the entrance of extremist groups.

2 Military Affairs

Pakistan takes the position that maintaining nuclear deterrence against the nuclear threat posed by India is essential to ensure national security and self-defense. It is believed to have begun nuclear development in the 1970s and conducted its first nuclear test in 1998.

Pakistan has been actively proceeding with the development of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and has conducted a number of test launches in recent years. In 2015, Pakistan conducted two test launches of the ballistic missile “Shaheen 3” in March and December, and a test launch from an aircraft of the cruise missile “Raad” in January 2016. Pakistan also conducted its first test launch of the ballistic missile “Ababeel,” which is capable of delivering multiple warheads, using Multiple Independently-Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology, in January 2017. Like it did in the previous year, it conducted another test fire of the submarine launched cruise missile “Babur” in March 2018. Pakistan is thought to be steadily increasing the capabilities of its missiles, firing the “Shaheen I” ballistic missile in November 2019, following India’s launch of a ballistic missile.5

Pakistan is the world’s 11th-largest importer of weapons, and it is pointed out that approximately 60% of its weapons are imported from China.6 Pakistan jointly developed the Al-Khalid tank and the JF-17 fighter aircraft with China. It is currently using the 85 indigenously produced JF-17 Block I and Block II aircraft, and has begun manufacture of the JF-17 Block III. Pakistan is reportedly also planning to purchase from China eight submarines, which Pakistan is positioning as the “backbone of the Navy.” Four will be built in China, with the remainder to be built in Pakistan.

3 Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with the United States

Besides supporting the activities of the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan cooperates with the war on terror by launching mop-up operations against Islamic extremists in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area.

Meanwhile, Pakistan urges the United States to immediately end its drone attacks on Islamic extremists in Pakistani territory, and the Pakistan Government has protested repeatedly.

The United States, on the other hand, has condemned Pakistan for allowing Islamic extremists in Afghanistan to take haven, which poses a threat to the United States. In August 2017, “No partnership can survive a country’s harboring of militants and terrorists who target U.S. Service members,” President Trump said. The same month, the United States announced the suspension of $205 million in

5 Reports specify these missiles as follows. Shaheen 3 (Hatf 6): a mobile, two-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 2,750 km. Ababeel: a new ballistic missile with a range of about 2,200 km. Raad (Hatf 8): a cruise missile with a range of about 350 km. Babur (Hatf 7): a supersonic cruise missile with a range of about 750 km.
6 According to the statistics from 2014 to 2018 in SIPRI YEARBOOK 2019, edited by SIPRI
Foreign Military Assistance to Pakistan, which was provided by the Department of State (DOS). Following this, it also announced the suspension of DOS’ security assistance to Pakistan in January 2018 and the suspension of $300 million of the Coalition Support Funds in September 2018.

Amid ongoing tense relations between the two countries, Prime Minister Imran Khan visited the United States in July 2019 and held his first summit with President Trump. During these talks, they exchanged views on anti-terrorism measures and peace in Afghanistan, as well as discussing ways of restoring the two countries’ relationship. Just before Prime Minister Khan’s visit to the United States, Pakistan sought to highlight its anti-terrorism efforts to the United States by arresting Hafiz Saeed, a co-founder of the Pakistan-based Islamist extremist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, on whom the U.S. Government had placed a bounty for being a ringleader of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. After the talks, Prime Minister Khan disclosed his feeling that the two countries had gained a deeper understanding of each other, stressing that “Pakistan will do everything possible to ensure that this [Afghan] peace process goes forward.” With the desire for an improvement in relations evident in such developments, the response by both countries will be the focus of attention.

(2) Relations with China

India and Pakistan have disputes over the sovereignty of Kashmir, and have had three armed conflicts of significant scope. The territorial dispute over Kashmir has long been in contention between India and Pakistan, with dialogues repeatedly resuming and suspending due to frequent cross-border attacks along the Line of Control (LOC).

7 India asserts the accession of Kashmir to India, based on the Instrument of Accession document by which the ruler of Kashmir acceded to India at the time of Pakistan’s independence, and contends that this matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations on the basis of the 1972 Simla Agreement (an agreement on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the withdrawal of their military forces that was reached following a summit meeting held in Simla in northern India). On the other hand, Pakistan declares that this should be decided through a referendum, in line with a 1948 UN resolution. The two countries have taken a significantly different fundamental stance towards the resolution of the dispute.
1 General Situation

With the end of the Cold War, many European countries now recognize the need to address diverse security challenges, such as outbreaks of regional conflicts within and around Europe, the rise of terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, and the growing seriousness of cyber threats. At the same time, these countries had recognized that the threat of large-scale invasion by other countries had disappeared. Nevertheless, since the heightening of tensions in Ukraine in February 2014, there is a growing need to revisit existing strategies and plan new concepts in order to deal with Russia’s changes to the status quo with force in the background and “hybrid warfare.” With regard to international terrorism, the incidents of terrorism occurring within European nations have made counterterrorism efforts an urgent task. In addition, border security problems remain a challenge, including those regarding refugees and migrants that have rapidly increased due to Middle East turmoil such as the prolonged civil war in Syria.

To respond to such challenges and situations, Europe has sought to further strengthen and expand multilateral frameworks, such as NATO and the EU. At the same time, it is working to contribute to the security and stability of the international community by proactively participating in activities outside the European region. Moreover, steps are taken at the national level by reviewing security and defense strategies, reforming national defense systems, and strengthening bilateral and multilateral defense and security cooperation.

2 Enhancement of Multinational Security Frameworks

1 NATO

Founded for the core task of collective defense among member states, NATO has expanded the scope of its activities to conflict prevention and crisis management since the end of the Cold War.

In the NATO Summit in November 2010, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept for the first time in 11 years to...
propose a guideline for the next decade for the creation of a more efficient and flexible alliance. The document cites major threats such as proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles, terrorism, conflict or instability beyond NATO borders, and cyber attacks, and prescribes three core tasks as follows: (1) collective defense in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty; (2) crisis management including conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction assistance; and (3) cooperative security including active contribution to arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

Defense spending has been trending downwards in recent years, but in light of changes in the security environment, and the expanding gap of defense expenditure between the United States and other member states, NATO member states in 2014 agreed on the goal to allocate 2% or more of their GDP to defense spending by 2024. The London Declaration was adopted at NATO’s 70th anniversary summit in December 2019. The participating leaders reaffirmed therein their solemn commitment to collective defense as enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and stated that they will increase defense expenditure further. Acknowledging that NATO faces not only the challenges of Russia and terrorism, but also cyber and hybrid threats, they also affirmed that NATO will address Russia’s deployment of intermediate-range missiles and declared space an operational domain. China’s rise to prominence was discussed for the first time and the Declaration explicitly states that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that NATO members need to address together as an Alliance. With member countries highlighting a diverse array of issues, including matters concerning 5G and other critical infrastructure, discussions are continuing with a view to strengthening NATO unity.

Following Russia’s development of “hybrid warfare” as well as the frequent “unusual flights” of Russian Armed Force aircraft over northern and eastern Europe, including the Baltic states, NATO and member states have recognized anew the threat posed by Russia and are working to bolster deterrence. At the NATO Summit in September 2014, leaders adopted a joint declaration demanding Russia to retract its “annexation” of Crimea and adopted the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) for enhancing existing readiness forces.1 Based on this plan, NATO has continued to maintain its presence in eastern allies, while steps have been taken to significantly improve the readiness of the existing multinational NATO Response Force (NRF) and create the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) that can be mobilized within two to three days. Furthermore, at the NATO Summit in July 2016, members decided to deploy four multinational battle groups to the three Baltic nations and Poland on a rotational basis. These became fully operational in 2017. At the NATO Summit in July 2018, members decided to put in place a readiness initiative called the “Four Thirties,” to maintain a situation in which, by 2020, 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 combat vessels can be ready to be used within 30 days or less. They also decided on reforms of the command headquarters, establishing the Joint Force Command Norfolk in the United States with the objective of strengthening the defense of Atlantic sea lines of communications between the United States and Europe, as well as establishing the Joint Support and Enabling Command in Ulm, Germany, to expedite the transport of troops and equipment within and outside Europe. Views on Russia differ between NATO member states against the backdrop of their different geographical distances from Russia and others. While taking measures to address Russian influence, NATO members have maintained opportunities for dialogue with Russia to narrow their differences in views and increase predictability.

Alongside collective defense, NATO’s core tasks include crisis management operations both within and outside the region. In the Mediterranean, a permanent maritime force has been deployed to the Aegean Sea since February 2016 due to the influx of illegal immigrants transiting the Mediterranean. This force monitors the influx of illegal immigrants and shares information with Turkey, Greece, and other countries. Also, in November 2016, Operation Active Endeavor, focused on collective defense held since 2001, was succeeded by Operation Sea Guardian, focused on crisis management, resulting in a wider array of missions including counterterrorism and capacity building assistance, among others.

Since January 2015, NATO has been leading the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), whose primary tasks are to provide

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1 The RAP was approved as one of the concrete efforts of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). The CFI is intended to provide a framework for conducting joint training and exercises among member states. Furthermore, it is designed to strengthen joint training among member states and with partner countries, enhance interoperability, and make use of advanced technology.
training, advice, and assistance to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). At the NATO Summit in July 2018, NATO decided to maintain its presence in Afghanistan until seeing signs of changes in the local situation and enhance support for Afghanistan by extending financial assistance for ANDSF until 2024. It has stationed 17,000 personnel in Afghanistan.

With regard to ISIL, while taking the stance of emphasizing prevention over intervention, NATO has affirmed that it would activate its collective defense if any member state were attacked by ISIL. Furthermore, the Warsaw Summit Communiqué of July 2016 set forth the decision to dispatch early warning and control aircraft forces to fight against ISIL. Under the decision, NATO surveillance and reconnaissance missions started October 2016. NATO announced the commencement of the new NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) at the NATO Summit in July 2018, providing training and capacity building assistance for Iraqi security forces. At the February 2020 meeting of NATO defense ministers, participants agreed to enhance NATO’s training mission in Iraq, to contribute to the stabilization of the situation in the Middle East.

NATO is also carrying out missions in Kosovo and other countries.

2 EU

The EU seeks to enhance its security initiatives under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and in June 2016, Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy detailing the EU’s fundamental approach to foreign and security policy was adopted by the European Council for the first time in approximately 10 years. This document calls for initiatives towards enhancing the EU’s internal and external resilience against threats to order in Eastern Europe, and the threat of terrorism or other events in the Middle East and Africa, in accordance with the principles of rules-based order and democracy. In November 2016, the European Commission released an action plan for reinforcing defense cooperation in Europe, including the establishment of the European Defence Fund (EDF).

In December 2017, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was launched as a defense cooperation framework for 25 countries among the member countries. Under this framework, the participating countries finance and cooperate in joint projects including the joint development of equipment and infrastructure that will contribute to developing readiness. It is expected that the framework would strengthen the EU’s defense capabilities. In this way, the EU is trying to enhance capabilities for undertaking security and its strategic independence by responding to the present and future security demand in Europe.

In response to the crisis in Ukraine, the EU has condemned the military measures of Russia and implemented economic sanctions against Russia. In addition, to support the economic and political reforms in Ukraine, the EU continues its engagement in nonmilitary affairs, including the provision of large-scale financial assistance to Ukraine.

To deal with the threat of ISIL, the EU extends funds to carry out humanitarian assistance for Syria and Iraq. Additionally, the EU works with countries in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa to provide capacity building assistance in counterterrorism measures, among other activities. In November 2015, in accordance with a request from France after the terror attacks in Paris, the EU, for the first time, activated the “mutual assistance clause” stipulating a mutual defense obligation, and EU member states provided their support to France.

Since 2003, the EU has proactively undertaken both military operations and nonmilitary missions under the CSDP. Operation Atalanta, the EU’s first maritime mission to combat piracy, has been under way off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden since December 2008. Under this mission, vessels and aircraft dispatched from each country protect ships in the area and conduct surveillance in these waters. In addition, those vessels and aircraft conduct joint exercises with SDF units. In May 2015, the EU started Operation Sophia conducted by European Union Naval Forces.
Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFORMed) due to the surge of refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea into Europe. The operation’s main mission is to block smuggling and human trafficking, with its adjunctive mission being to train the Libyan Navy Coast Guard and enforce the UN arms embargo on the high seas. Since July 2017, the scope of activities has been expanded through the assignation of new missions, including reconnaissance on illegal transactions in crude oil exported from Libya and information sharing with relevant organizations on human trafficking. The EU Foreign Affairs Council agreed at a February 2020 meeting to undertake a new maritime operation in the Mediterranean, Operation IRINI, whose primary mission is to monitor the arms embargo against Libya. Operation Sophia was therefore concluded in March 2020.

The United Kingdom left the EU on January 31, 2020, about three and a half years after the June 2016 referendum. Even after its exit from the EU, the United Kingdom is expected to retain the recognition of NATO as the cornerstone of security in Europe and pursue new security relations with the EU in which it would participate in the PESCO permanent EU defense cooperation framework open to non-EU countries if cooperation in research and development is concluded as benefiting both the country and the EU. Given the notion that the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU would reduce the EU’s influence on security, attention will be paid to the degree of the United Kingdom’s engagement in EU security initiatives.

3 Cooperation between NATO and the EU

Advancements have been seen in cooperation between NATO and the EU in addressing unprecedented challenges efficiently. At the NATO Summit in July 2016, a joint declaration was released citing hybrid threats, cybersecurity and other fields in which NATO and the EU should prioritize cooperation. The NATO Summit in July 2018 issued a joint declaration that identified substantial progress in NATO-EU cooperation and cited the mobility of military forces, counterterrorism and other fields for further cooperation. Based on these declarations, NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian and the EU’s Operation Sophia are now mutually collaborating through information support in the Mediterranean. The EU’s PESCO includes a project for developing arrangements for smooth movement of military personnel and assets inside and outside the EU and is expected to contribute to NATO’s quick military deployment in emergency. In this way, NATO and the EU are advancing their cooperation in a manner to complement each other for the purpose of enhancing security initiatives.

Security/Defense Policies of European Countries

1 The United Kingdom

After the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom, perceiving that there is no direct military threat against the country, has advanced national defense reform with particular focus on improving its overseas deployment capability and readiness, in order to deal with new threats such as international terrorism and proliferation of WMDs.

Against this backdrop, in November 2015, the Cameron administration released the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (NSS-SDSR2015) in the face of destabilization in the Middle East, including the rise of ISIL, the crisis in Ukraine, and the threat posed by cyber attacks. Recognizing that the United Kingdom confronts threats from both states and non-state actors, the NSS-SDSR2015 sets out the challenges that the United Kingdom should address in the coming decade as follows: terrorism and extremism; resurgence of state-based threats; technological developments including cyber threats; and the erosion of the rules-based international order. While the previous SDSR2010 committed to cutting the troop strength, reducing key equipment, and reviewing procurement plans due to pressure to decrease defense spending, the NSS-SDSR2015 calls for ending the defense spending cuts and explicitly proposes to increase the defense force in order to develop capacities to address the entire list of expanded threats. The NSS-SDSR2015 lays out that the United Kingdom would continue to be a key player in the international community, and promote procurement of equipment and formation of units with high readiness and...
mobility, in view of dealing with threats such as terrorism and cyber security.\(^4\)

Since September 2014, the United Kingdom has conducted airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq. In addition, it carries out ISR activities using UAVs, provides education and training to forces engaged in ground warfare such as the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga, a military organization of the Kurdistan Regional Government, as well as extends humanitarian assistance to refugees. Furthermore, following the terror attacks in Paris, the United Kingdom decided in December 2015 to extend the scope of the airstrikes from Iraq to Syria, and commenced airstrikes in Syria on the day after the Parliament gave its approval.

In the NSS-SDSR2015, the United Kingdom recognizes the Asia-Pacific region as offering significant economic opportunities for the country and as exerting considerable influence on the future integrity and credibility of the rules-based international order, indicating its commitment to attaching importance to working with security partners in the region. In particular, the United Kingdom considers Japan as its closest security partner in Asia, conducting exercises with Japan. It has also participated in the multilateral exercise RIMPAC and deployed naval ships in the region, enhancing its engagement in regional security. In February 2019, Gavin Williamson, then Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, announced that the aircraft carrier HMS “Queen Elizabeth” was to be sent to the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Pacific. Recently, to assist in international efforts to monitor illegal maritime activities, including illicit ship-to-ship transfers involving North Korea-flagged ships, the Royal Navy frigate HMS “Argyll” conducted patrol and monitoring activities in the seas around Japan, including the East China Sea, in December 2018 and January 2019, while the frigate HMS “Montrose” did the same between late February and early March 2019. Japan and the United Kingdom have also been cooperating in the sharing of information, with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of UN Security Council resolutions. Such Royal Navy deployment in the Asia-Pacific region is viewed as unprecedented since the Korean War. Future developments in the United Kingdom’s involvement in the region are set to attract attention.

**France**

Since the end of the Cold War, France has focused on maintaining independence of its defense policies, while having led initiatives to enhance the defense structure and capability in Europe. It has worked on the development of its military capacity by streamlining and integrating military bases, dealing with operational requirements to strengthen its defense capability, as well as enhancing its intelligence capabilities and modernizing equipment required in the future.

The Defence and National Security Strategic Review announced by the Macron administration in October 2017 states that the threats that France faces, including domestic terrorism, the refugee issue, and the Ukraine crisis, are diversifying, increasing in complexity, and rapidly becoming more violent, and amidst the increasingly multipolar international system, competition is intensifying among major military powers and the danger of escalation is growing. Under these conditions, France will fulfill its duties within NATO, including for collective defense and contributing to security, and will take a leading role in efforts to strengthen the EU’s defense capabilities. In June 2018, the Military Planning Law for 2019-2025 was enacted, consisting of four pillars—human resources, equipment modernization, contributions to Europe’s strategic independence, and technological innovation—to materialize the national security strategy given in the Strategic Review. The law confirms a plan to allocate a total of approximately 300 billion euros to defense by 2025 to fulfill President Macron’s

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\(^4\) The “NSS-SDSR2015” will maintain the size of the British Army personnel and increase the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force by 700 personnel combined. It also decided to build two aircraft carriers, introduce nine new maritime patrol aircraft, and maintain a fleet of four strategic nuclear submarines. Underpinned by a stable economy, the NSS-SDSR2015 is to maintain defense expenditure amounting to 2% of GDP which is the NATO’s target and to further increase defense spending, especially equipment procurement spending.
commitment to the goal of raising defense spending to 2% of France’s GDP by 2025.

Having positioned the fight against ISIL as one of its top national defense priorities, France has been conducting airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq since September 2014 and in Syria since September 2015. The aircraft carrier “Charles de Gaulle” supported anti-ISIL operations while at sea in the eastern Mediterranean in April 2019 and was among the naval task force dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean for a month in January 2020 to provide similar operational support. In addition, France has continued to provide education and training to the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga, as well as humanitarian assistance for refugees. In January 2020, France and seven other European nations, including the Netherlands and Denmark, issued a political statement supporting the creation of the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH) surveillance mission, which has been launched in response to a series of incidents affecting the safe passage of civilian vessels in the Gulf of Oman since May 2019. Before the month was out, France dispatched a frigate to the gulf, where it has been conducting warning and surveillance operations.

Since France has territories in the Indo-Pacific region, it places importance on its commitment to the region. The Strategic Review points out the potential for a threat to interests, such as the freedom of navigation, due to the worsening strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific region, and clearly states that France will maintain its stance of protecting the sovereignty of its overseas territories in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. France’s Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific, which was published in June 2019, states that China’s growing influence is shifting the balances of power in the Indo-Pacific region and highlights the importance of strengthening partnerships with the United States, Australia, India, and Japan. In addition, France has proactively organized the multilateral exercises Croix du Sud and Equateur in the South Pacific. In February 2018, France had the frigate “Vendémiaire” make a port call in Japan and conduct joint exercises with the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF). In March 2019, a carrier strike group including the aircraft carrier “Charles de Gaulle” left France, and conducted a multinational exercise with Australian, U.S. and Japanese ships including MSDF Destroyer JS “Izumo” in May 2019, when the group was deployed in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, France dispatched Falcon 200 reconnaissance aircraft to conduct warning and surveillance operations against illegal maritime activities, including illicit ship-to-ship transfers involving North Korea-flagged ships. In 2019, the frigate “Vendémiaire” conducted patrol and monitoring activities in the seas around Japan, including the East China Sea. From the viewpoint of enhancing the effectiveness of the UN Security Council resolutions, Japan and France engaged in cooperation activities, including information sharing.

3 Germany

While Germany has been implementing a large-scale reduction of its military personnel since the end of the Cold War, it has been gradually expanding the dispatch of its federal forces overseas. At the same time, Germany has advanced the reform of its armed forces to enable them to execute multiple responsibilities encompassing conflict prevention and risk management in the context of multilateral organizations, including NATO, the EU, and the UN. However, following a worsening in the security environment, in May 2016 Germany changed policy and announced that it would increase military personnel by around 7,000 by 2023.

The country’s defense white paper released in July 2016 for the first time in about 10 years explains that Germany’s security environment has grown more complex and unstable, causing gradually rising uncertainty, citing specific threats such as international terrorism, cyber attacks, interstate conflict, and the influx of refugees and immigrants. The white paper also states that Germany would continue to emphasize multilateral cooperation and cross-government approaches, while striving to realize rules-based international order. Furthermore, with regard to the number of military personnel, the white paper notes that although an upper limit was in place following the end of the Cold War and Germany has continually worked to reduce personnel, it would shift to a policy with no upper limit and perform regular reviews of its military force plan to adjust the number of personnel flexibly.

In Iraq, Germany has provided support for capacity building, including providing education and training to the Iraqi Security Forces since 2015. In December 2015 following the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015, Germany expanded logistics support missions, such as
reconnaissance and aerial refueling, for the Coalition that was conducting counter-ISIL military operations. In September 2019, the German cabinet decided to extend the nation’s capacity building support mission until October 31, 2020, and its logistical support missions until March 31, 2020. In March 2020, the German cabinet reviewed the logistical support missions and decided to conclude the reconnaissance mission, but extended the aerial refueling mission until October 31, 2020.

With regard to the Asia-Pacific region, Germany considers it to be important from the standpoint of its large population and economic strength, and expresses the view that the region plays a central role in international politics. However, Germany has allocated most of its military assets for NATO and EU missions outside the Asia-Pacific region and limited its military engagement in the region to disaster relief missions and goodwill visits, failing to participate in joint exercises involving naval ships in the region. Given that Germany is attempting to enhance its naval power by launching four new frigates by 2020, the German Navy’s future engagement in the region will attract attention.
The Middle East and Africa has long been one of the world’s centers of civilization, religion, and trade, as well as a geopolitical bastion connecting Asia and Europe. Today, the Middle East is a major source of energy supply for the world and contains major routes for international commerce. Japan is also dependent on the region for approximately 90% of its crude oil imports. Peace and stability in the Middle East region is extremely important for the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan.

On the other hand, the Middle East and Africa region has been experiencing constant conflicts and unrest throughout the 20th century. In recent years, tensions have risen due to the situation in the Gulf region and the Middle East peace process. In addition, the Arab Spring that occurred at the beginning of 2011 prompted regime change in some countries, but due to the turmoil that followed, almost a decade later, civil wars and the activities of terrorist organizations are ongoing in some of those countries.

With Hassan Rouhani winning the presidential election in Iran in June 2013, the discussions with the E3+3 (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the United States, China, and Russia) were advanced, resulting in the announcement of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) towards the comprehensive resolution of nuclear issues in November 2013. The execution of the first step measures of the JPOA commenced in January 2014. On July 14, 2015, the final agreement concerning the nuclear issues of Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was announced. Following this, on July 20, 2015, UN Security Council Resolution 2231 approving the JCPOA was adopted. In the agreement, it was decided that Iran would reduce its enriched uranium stockpile and the number of centrifuges, ban the production of weapons grade plutonium, and accept IAEA inspections, among other measures, in exchange for ending the sanctions of previous UN Security Council resolutions and the U.S. and EU’s nuclear-related sanctions. On January 16, 2016, the IAEA released a report confirming Iran’s completion of the necessary preparatory steps to start the implementation of the JCPOA. Accordingly, the United States suspended its nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. In addition, the EU terminated some of its sanctions, and the provisions imposed by previous UN Security Council resolutions concerning the nuclear issues of Iran ended, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Subsequently, the IAEA has repeatedly confirmed that Iran is complying with the agreement. However, in May 2018, President Trump pointed out that with the current agreement, Iran can still be on the verge of a nuclear breakout in a short period of time even if Iran fully complies with the agreement, and also the agreement fails to address Iran’s development of ballistic missiles. He then announced that the United States would withdraw from the agreement. In November 2018, the Trump administration resumed all sanctions that had been lifted under JCPOA and emphasized its readiness to cut a more comprehensive deal with Iran, urging Iran to sit down on the negotiating table. Meanwhile, Iran opposed the resumption of sanctions by the United States and announced in May 2019 that it would not observe
the restrictions on the storage of enriched uranium and heavy water prescribed under JCPOA, while denying an intention to withdraw from JCPOA. Iran announced the suspension of its commitment to the uranium enrichment limit in July as the second step of reducing compliance with JCPOA, the promotion of unrestricted research and development of advanced centrifuges in September as the third step, and the commencement of uranium enrichment activities at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) in November as the fourth step. In January 2020, as the final step of reducing compliance with JCPOA, Iran announced that it would waive its commitment to the restrictions on enrichment capacity. In the same month, Britain, France and Germany referred the developments to the JCPOA Joint Commission under the JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism and called for Iran to once again fully fulfill its obligations under JCPOA. In response, Iran said that it would consider withdrawing from the NPT if the nuclear agreement issue is referred to the UN Security Council, and that if Europe observes the agreement, Iran would return to compliance with the agreement.

In the meantime, since May 2019, the United States has announced the dispatch of carrier strike groups and bomber units in response to Iran’s threats to its own troops and interests. In June, Iran announced that it had shot down a U.S. drone with a surface-to-air missile in its territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. acknowledged the fact that it was shot down, but claimed it was in international airspace, and revealed that U.S. President Trump had called off the retaliatory attack at the brink of execution. In July 2019, the U.S. revealed that a U.S. amphibious assault ship had shot down an Iranian drone over the Strait of Hormuz as a defensive measure.

Furthermore, in May 2019, an oil pipeline facility in central Saudi Arabia was attacked by drones, temporarily halting the transportation of crude oil. In September, an oil facility in eastern Saudi Arabia was attacked, temporarily halving the country’s oil production. The Houthis, a Yemeni anti-government armed group allegedly supported by Iran, initially issued a statement of responsibility for these attacks, but the United States and others have pointed to Iranian involvement in the September attacks. Iran has consistently denied this.

In response to this situation, the United States has expanded the number of U.S. troops deployed to the Middle East since May 2019 to reinforce its stance against Iran. For example, in July, it stationed troops in Saudi Arabia for the first time in nearly 16 years since 2003. In September and October, it announced the deployment of additional troops, including air defense missile forces.

On the other hand, since October 2019, there have been multiple attacks on U.S. military bases in Iraq. In December, a rocket landed on a base in northern Iraq, killing one American. The U.S. claimed Iranian involvement in the attack and bombed the stronghold of Kata’ib Hezbollah, one of the four Shiite armed groups allegedly supported by Iran. In addition, in January 2020, the United States killed Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who was operating inside Iraq with the organization’s leaders, as a deterrent to further attack plans. The United States has long viewed the activities of the Quds Force as problematic for supporting terrorist organizations abroad. In April 2019, it designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization. Iran carried out a ballistic missile attack on Iraqi bases hosting U.S. military in retaliation for the killing of Commander Soleimani. However, the attack reportedly did not result in any deaths, and Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif expressed that Iran had completed commensurate retaliatory measures and did not want further tensions or war. President Trump also said the same day that he did not want to use military force against Iran. Both the

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1 One of the two major sects of Islam. The division with the Sunnis originated in differences in views on the successors (caliph) to the Prophet Muhammad (died in 632), the founder of Islam. At present, Shia Islam is the state religion in Iran, and Shiites make up about 60 percent of the population in Iraq. The largest sect, the Sunnis, have a majority in most of the Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa region.
United States and Iran made it clear that they wanted to avoid any further escalation. Meanwhile, since May 2019, events affecting the navigation safety of civilian vessels have occurred sporadically in the waters of the Middle East. Specifically, in May 2019, four tankers (two Saudi Arabia-flagged and one each from the United Arab Emirates and Norway) were attacked in the Gulf of Oman. In June, two vessels, including the chemical tanker Kokuka Courageous operated by a Japanese shipping company, were attacked in the Gulf of Oman. With regard to the series of attacks, the United States and others have pointed out that they were committed by Iran, while Iran has consistently denied any involvement. Based on a comprehensive review of the information on the attack on the Kokuka Courageous, technical analysis of the damage to the vessel, and testimony from the parties concerned, Japan believes that the damage to the vessel is highly likely to have been caused by limpet mines.4

Amidst rising tensions in the Middle East, countries launched efforts to safeguard maritime security in the region. The United States proposed the Maritime Security Initiative in July 2019 and established the IMSC with its command center opened in Bahrain in November. In addition to the United States, IMSC has been joined by seven countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Albania, and Lithuania (as of April 2020). In Europe, eight countries (France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Greece, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Portugal) issued a statement in January 2020 to politically support the creation of a European-led maritime surveillance mission in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH). France and the Netherlands have dispatched their assets so far.

On the other hand, in September 2019, Iran presented a plan named HOPE (Hormuz Peace Endeavor) as an independent effort to maintain security in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, and called on the countries concerned to join. In addition, in December, Iran conducted the Maritime Safety Belt, the first trilateral military exercise with the Chinese and Russian navies in the Gulf of Oman and other areas to ensure the safety of maritime traffic routes.

Japan needs to continue to pay close attention to the future developments surrounding the situation in the Gulf region.

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**KEY WORD**

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is part of the Iranian national organization established on the occasion of the 1979 Iranian Revolution with the role of defending the Iranian Revolution and the achievements of the Revolution. Together with the regular army and the security forces under the Ministry of Interior, it constitutes the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Unlike regular forces that conduct symmetric warfare, the IRGC is generally considered to have the primary mission of conducting asymmetric warfare and operating equipment such as small boats and ballistic missiles.

It is also noted that the IRGC has the Quds Force under its wing, which is responsible for overseas operations, and exerts influence in the region through support for pro-Iranian activities abroad and their leaders.

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4 A type of underwater weapon. Generally, they are placed on the hull of a ship and denoted for the purpose of making it impossible for the ship to navigate.
Since the foundation of Israel in 1948, there have been four wars between Israel and Arab countries. Subsequently, the Oslo Accords, signed between Israel and Palestine in 1993, initiated a full-fledged, negotiated peace process. In 2003, both Israel and Palestine accepted the Roadmap for Peace that laid out a path to the realization of the two-state peace initiative based on peaceful coexistence, but it has not been implemented. In the Palestinian territories, the moderate Fatah, which governs the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the Islamic fundamentalist Hamas, which effectively controls the Gaza district, are in conflict, splitting the area. Since October 2017, the Fatah and Hamas have continued direct negotiations on the transfer of the administrative control of the Gaza Strip to the Fatah under Egyptian auspices, but the talks have remained stalled.

In such circumstances, the U.S. Trump administration announced its recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in December 2017 and moved the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in May 2018. In reaction, protests have been repeated mainly in Gaza, with protesters killed and injured through their clashes with Israeli forces. Tensions have increased intermittently as Israel carried out air strikes on Gaza to counter rocket attacks from Gaza. In addition, in March 2019, the Trump administration recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, drawing criticism from various Middle Eastern countries. In January 2020, the administration announced a new Middle East peace plan, but the Palestinian side has refused to negotiate, opposing the plan’s descriptions concerning the Israeli-Palestinian border and the possession of Jerusalem. A close eye will be kept on future developments regarding the Middle East peace process, including the United States’ engagement, as well as the direction of negotiations on the transfer of the administrative control of the Gaza Strip.

Violent clashes in Syria since March 2011 pit four parties, the Syrian government forces, opposition forces, Islamic extremist forces, and Kurdish forces against each other. However, the government forces have gained the upper hand overall with support from Russia, recapturing Aleppo, which was once the largest stronghold of rebel forces, the suburbs of the Syrian capital of Damascus and areas close to the Syria-Jordan border.

In Idlib, a rebel stronghold even at present, Russia, which had been supporting Syrian government forces, and Turkey, which had been backing up rebels, agreed in September 2018 to establish a DMZ Idlib and withdraw heavy artillery and militant groups from the zone. However, there was no progress with regard to the withdrawal of the militant groups. Since April 2019, Syrian government forces and Russian forces had expanded air and ground operations into Idlib and besieged some of the Turkish military ceasefire monitoring stations set up around Idlib. In February 2020, the Turkish forces dispatched reinforcements to Idlib in response to the advance of the Syrian government forces, but the forces were shelled by the Syrian government forces, against which the Turkish forces retaliated, reportedly causing casualties on both sides. Subsequently, the fighting between the Turkish forces and the Syrian government forces expanded. The Syrian government forces were faced with intensified resistance from the dissidents and the militants, who were reinforced by the Turkish forces. The forces and militants fought back and forth over the key points of traffic through Idlib. In March 2020, Turkey held a summit with Russia, which had been backing Syria, and agreed to a ceasefire in Idlib. Although the Syrian president has expressed his satisfaction with the agreement, Turkey has warned that it will resume operations if Syria violates the agreement, raising a concern about a possible resumption of the battle.

Meanwhile, the peace talks have so far made little progress. Since January 2016, there have been talks between the government and opposition forces under UN auspices. However, the fighting between both sides did not abate, disrupting the talks. Under the circumstances, peace talks led by Russia, Turkey, and Iran have continued in Astana (current Nur-Sultan), Kazakhstan, since January 2017. In January 2018, the Syrian National Dialogue Congress was held in Sochi, Russia, where an agreement was reached to establish a constitutional committee towards the enactment
of a new constitution. In December 2018, Russia, Iran and Turkey agreed to hold the first meeting of the committee as early as possible in 2019. The first meeting was held in October 2019 under the auspices of the UN, but to date there has been no substantive progress in the political process.

In addition, conflicts among the countries and forces involved over the Kurds inside Syria have surfaced. In October 2019, following a telephone summit with Turkey, the United States issued a statement that Turkey would soon begin an operation in the northern part of Syria and that U.S. forces would withdraw from the immediate area of operation. After the release of the statement, Turkey launched a military operation against Kurdish forces, which the country perceives as terrorist organizations, as well as ISIL, in order to eliminate the terrorist threat from the border zone with Syria and establish a “safe zone” that would enable the return of Syrian refugees inside Turkey, and took control of parts of the northeastern region of Syria. Subsequently, Turkey and the United States agreed on the suspension of military operations and the withdrawal of Kurdish forces from the “safe zone.” Turkey also held talks with Russia, and agreed on the withdrawal of Kurdish forces from the border zone and joint patrols by Russian military police and Turkish forces in northeastern Syria. Over these developments, Russia’s growing military presence has been noted, including the reported deployment of a helicopter unit at the airport in the northeastern Syrian city of Qamishli as part of the patrol operation. Furthermore, the Syrian government agreed with the Kurdish forces to send the Syrian government troops to the northeast, advancing into Manbij, one of the Kurdish forces’ strongholds, which indicates coordination between the Kurdish forces and the Syrian government to counter Turkey’s military operations. The agreement was allegedly mediated by Russia, suggesting that Russia’s influence is expanding. It has also been pointed out that in the wake of Turkey’s military operations, counterterrorism activities by Kurdish forces, which has played a central role in the fight against ISIL, were suspended, and some ISIL fighters and their families fled from camps controlled by Kurdish forces.

Moreover, concerning Iranian presence in Syria, confrontation between Iran and Israel has come to the surface. In January 2019, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu announced an attack on a weapon storage facility at Syria’s Damascus Airport, expressing his determination to take resolute actions against the Iranians in Syria. It is a concern that the escalation of confrontation between Israel and Iran would affect Syrian and regional stability.

Amid the still unstable situation in Syria, the United States said it would leave some of its troops to mop up ISIL. Relations between various forces over the Syrian situation have been complicated, with peace talks being stalled. Further initiatives from the international community towards the stabilization of Syria are required.

### Situation in Yemen

In Yemen, following anti-government protests that occurred from February 2011 and international pressure afterward, the then President Ali Abdullah Saleh agreed to resign in accordance with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative. Through the election held in February 2012, the then Vice President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi was elected new President.

Meanwhile, the confrontation intensified between the government and the opposition insurgent group Houthis, based in northern Yemen. As the Houthis invaded the Yemeni capital of Sana and the southern Yemeni city of Aden to which President Hadi evacuated, the president requested support from Arab countries. In response, in March 2015, coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia began air strikes against the Houthis. In response, the Houthis also launched attacks on the mainland of Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles and other weapons.

A series of peace talks mediated by the UN took place between April and August of the same year, but no final peace agreement was reached, with the talks suspended. Peace talks were planned for September 2018 but failed to be implemented with the Houthis refusing to participate. In December 2018, however, peace talks were held in Stockholm, the capital of Sweden, leading to the signing of an agreement on a ceasefire in Hodeidah, which has the biggest port in the country, and the exchange of prisoners. In January 2019, the UN Security Council decided to send a ceasefire monitoring group to Hodeidha.
Despite the progress in the peace talks, negotiations on specific measures toward the ceasefire did not go smoothly, with the terms of the agreement, including the ceasefire in Hodeidah, failing to be implemented. On the other hand, the Houthis, stating that they had carried out attacks against Saudi Arabia, including an attack on an oil facility in Saudi Aramco in September 2019, declared in September 2019 that they would cease attacks on the country on the condition that the coalition forces ceased its air strikes. Also, in November 2019, as there were reports that Saudi Arabia and the Houthis were engaged in negotiations behind the scenes, Saudi Arabia announced that it had released 200 Houthi prisoners of war. In addition, in the same month, the UN Special Envoy for Yemen reported that airstrikes by the coalition forces had decreased significantly. Despite the momentum for a ceasefire, Saudi Arabia carried out air strikes against the Houthis after a missile launched by the Houthis landed on a Yemeni government’s military base and killed more than 100 soldiers in January 2020. In retaliation, the Houthis announced that they had carried out drone and missile strikes against oil facilities in southern Saudi Arabia. Since then, there have been sporadic attacks on Saudi Arabia by the Houthis, and the Saudi-led coalition has also continued to bomb the Houthis. As such, there is no prospect of a ceasefire or eventual peace agreement across Yemen.

In addition, it has been pointed out that the Houthis receive weapons supplies from Iran. In fact, in February 2020, the U.S. forces announced that it had boarded and inspected a small vessel in the Arabian Sea and seized a large amount of weapons from the vessel. The U.S. forces affirmed that the seized weapons were made in Iran, concluding that they were intended to be supplied to the Houthis in Yemen, and pointing to them as a violation of the UN Security Council resolution prohibiting the supply, sale and transfer of weapons to the Houthis.

While the situation surrounding the Houthis was changing, in August 2019, fighting broke out between the Yemeni government and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group in southern Yemen, which led to the STC’s occupation of Aden (Yemen’s interim capital). However, after mediation efforts by Saudi Arabia and others, the Yemeni government and STC signed the Riyadh Agreement in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, in November 2019. The agreement established a new government with the participation of both sides.

6 Situation in Libya

In Libya, following the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, elections for a General National Congress were held in July 2012, establishing a congress consisting mainly of Islamists. In June 2014, elections for a Council of Representatives were held to establish a new congress to replace the General National Congress. However, since secularists became the majority, the confrontation between Islamic and secular groups over the transfer of power to the Council of Representatives intensified, and consequently, Libya became fragmented between east and west, with two assemblies existing in parallel – the Islamic groups’ General National Congress based in the capital city of Tripoli and the secular groups’ Council of Representatives based in Tobruk in eastern Libya. In December 2015, the UN mediated a political agreement for Libya, and the Government of National Accord (GNA) was established as a national consensus government under the agreement. However, as Islamic groups took control of the new government, secular groups turned their back and refused to join the GNA. As a result, Libya remains divided between the east and the west. Furthermore, militias supporting either the east or the west have continued sporadic military clashes. In September 2018, militias active in the west clashed, leading to an emergency declaration. In April 2019, Commander Hafter’s LNA, the largest forces in eastern Libya, advanced into a suburb of the capital city of Tripoli and clashed with militias subordinate to the GNA in western Libya, leading to an exchange of air strikes.

Some have pointed out that the fact that both Eastern and Western forces are receiving military support from the countries involved, including UAVs, has also led to the escalation of the war, and the struggle between the two
parties has been described as a “drone war.” It has also been pointed out that mercenaries from a Russian private military company have been dispatched to Libya to support the LNA, while Turkey has dispatched Turkish forces and the Syrian fighters it has been supporting to Libya at the request of the GNA.

Amid this situation, an international conference on Libya was held in Berlin in January 2020. The conference was attended by Western countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, and Turkey, as well as the UAE and Egypt, which are said to be supporting the LNA. The countries agreed to strengthen cooperation toward a ceasefire, stop military intervention in Libya, and enforce an arms embargo. However, the agreement has not yet been implemented, and Libya continues to be unable to establish governance and domestic security.

Furthermore, ISIL, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations are taking advantage of the unstable situation to expand into Libya, clashing with militias across the country. In particular, ISIL is believed to have been divided into small groups and hiding mainly in the southern desert areas, conducting suicide bombing and other terrorist attacks in such cities as Tripoli, the capital, indicating that terrorist attacks may continue in the future.

Situation in Egypt

In Egypt, where then President Mubarak, who had been serving as the president for approximately three decades, resigned in 2011, and then President Mursi, who had been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni political organization founded in 1928 as a mass organization working for the “revival of Islam,” took office. However, in June 2013, large-scale public protests occurred amidst the poor economic situation and the deterioration of security. The military intervened in response and dismissed the president. In May 2014, then Defense Minister Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi was inaugurated as president. Since its inauguration, the el-Sisi administration has undertaken economic reforms including a shift to a floating exchange rate system and the abolition of subsidies. However, enhancing domestic security measures is still a major challenge. In particular, the country’s mainland was subject to sporadic large-scale terrorist attacks from 2013, when political turmoil took place, to 2017, and in November 2018, a terrorist attack occurred in the central part of the country, targeting Egypt’s minority Coptic Christians. Moreover, in the Sinai Peninsula, terrorist attacks on military and police forces have occurred sporadically mainly in the northern part, while the southern part is overall peaceful. Since February 2018, Sinai 2018, a counter-terrorism operation conducted by the Egyptian Armed Forces, has been underway in the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula.

Situation in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, the Taliban intensified its offensive as the NATO-led RSM launched education, training and advice for the ANSF in the wake of ISAF’s withdrawal in December 2014. Meanwhile, the ANSF faces challenges regarding logistics, morale, air capabilities, and troop-commander leadership, allowing the Taliban to expand its control in Afghanistan. Furthermore, ISIL–KP (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province) has sustained terrorist attacks mainly in the capital city of Kabul and eastern Afghanistan since 2015. As a result, suicide bombing and assaults in which the Taliban or ISIL is believed to be involved have occurred one after another across the country, leaving Afghanistan in an unstable security situation. According to a report released by the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in October 2018, the areas controlled or influenced by the Afghan Government accounted for approximately 55.5% of Afghan territory, the lowest since December 2015, when the survey started.

Since the fall of 2018, the United States has conducted peace talks with the Taliban after appointing Khalilzad as
the Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation. The talks had some twists and turns, including a three-month suspension from September 2019, but in February 2020, an agreement was signed between the United States and the Taliban that included the conditional phase-out of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and the start of negotiations among Afghans. In March 2020, the United States announced that it had begun the withdrawal of its forces. Also in the same month, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution in support of the agreement. However, the Taliban have continued their attacks on Afghan security forces after the agreement. President Ghani, who was re-elected in the September 2019 presidential election in Afghanistan, held a presidential inauguration ceremony in March 2020. However, another candidate accused Ghani of fraud in the election and held his own presidential inauguration ceremony, causing political turmoil. Under these circumstances, a close eye will be kept on the future progress of the agreement between the United States and the Taliban and the commencement of negotiations between the Afghans.

Situation in South Sudan

The second North-South civil war in Sudan, which had continued since 1983, came to an end in 2005 with the entry into force of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan was separated and gained independence from the Republic of the Sudan. At the same time, the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was established.

However, after the independence, a political confrontation emerged between a mainstream faction led by President Salva Kiir Mayardit, a Dinka, and a nonmainstream faction including Vice President Riek Machar, a Nuer.

The “Intergovernmental Authority on Development” (IGAD) assisted by the UN and the AU initiated efforts to start dialogues among South Sudanese leaders and enable their reconciliation. In January 2014, the government and the pro-Machar faction signed an agreement on ceasing hostile activities.

In August 2015, the government, the pro-Machar faction and others reached the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS), the key elements of which include the establishment of a transitional government. In April 2016, the Transitional Government of National Unity was established, in which Mr. Kiir serves as president and Mr. Machar as first vice president.

In July 2016, a shooting occurred in Juba between the security forces of President Kiir and First Vice President Machar. After First Vice President Machar fled the country, and President Kiir dismissed First Vice President Machar, clashes started to occur again between the government and the Machar faction.

In response to the situation, in August 2016, the UN Security Council created the Regional Protection Force (RPF) for the purpose of maintaining security in Juba and surrounding areas. The RPF launched its operations in April 2017. In December 2017 and February and May 2018, the High-Level Revitalization Forum was held under the leadership of IGAD, where the government agreed with the pro-Machar faction and others on the cessation of hostilities. As a result of the efforts, in June 2018, President Kiir, former First Vice President Machar and others signed the “Khartoum Declaration of Agreement on South Sudan,” which includes a permanent ceasefire. They agreed on security arrangements in July and on provisional government arrangements in August, before signing the “Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS)” in September 2018. Initially, a new provisional government was scheduled to be established by May 2019. However, the preparations for its establishment were not completed by that time. In May 2019, the government and representatives of the pro-Machar faction agreed on the extension of the pre-transitional period by six months. In November, they further agreed to extend the period for another 100 days. On February 22, 2020, the last day of the pre-transitional period, a provisional government was established.

See Fig. I-2-9-1 (Ongoing UN Peacekeeping Operations)
Part III, Chapter 3, Section 5-2-3 (UNMISS)
Situation in Somalia

Somalia plunged into anarchy on the collapse of its government in 1991, facing a serious humanitarian crisis with massive refugees generated. In 2005, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was inaugurated through the intermediation of the neighboring countries. In 2012, a unified government was established for the first time in 21 years.

Even after the establishment of the unified government, Somalia has faced two major issues—terrorism and piracy. Al-Shabaab, a Sunni extremist organization based in the central south, has repeatedly conducted terrorist attacks against the government and other targets. In 2007, the African...
Defense Policies of Countries

Chapter 2

Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established with the approval of the UN Security Council. As a result of attacks by the AMISOM forces and mop-up operations by the Somali government forces under reconstruction with support from Western countries, Al-Shabaab lost its control on major cities and weakened to some extent. However, its threat has still existed. Al-Shabaab frequently stages attacks against the bases of the Somali and AMISOM forces and terrorist attacks within Somalia and in AMISOM member countries. It has been pointed out that ISIL fighters have been flowing into Somalia in recent years.

In Somalia, especially in its northeastern part, there are believed to be outposts of pirates who are active off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The international community has continued anti-piracy operations and implemented a series of initiatives to enhance the security capabilities of Somalia based on the perception that instability of Somalia has caused the piracy issue. As a result, the number of reported pirate attacks has remained low.

With a presidential election anticipated around the end of 2020 or later, we should keep paying close attention to whether the situation in Somalia will start to stabilize, while also looking at the international community’s response.

*See Part III, Chapter 3, Section -2-2 (Counter-Piracy Operations)*
Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology

1 General Situation

Recent developments in science and technology have impacted a variety of areas, triggering significant and revolutionary changes in many areas such as economy, society, and lifestyle. As civilian technologies have been rapidly developing, further technological innovation is expected to dramatically change battle scenes in the future. In particular, major countries have focused on the aggressive utilization of artificial intelligence (AI), high-power energy, quantum technology, and other cutting-edge technologies.

2 Military Cutting-edge Technology Utilization Trends

(1) AI Technology

AI technology is one of the technology areas that shows rapid progress in recent years. It has been pointed out that the rapid AI progress has been exerting a great impact on the military field, including the application for autonomous unmanned vehicles and the cyber domain as well as supporting for command and decision-making and improving data processing capacity, among other areas.

The United States, China, and Russia have formulated their AI strategies and promoted relevant research and development under industry-government-academia collaboration. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) in June 2018 and indicated its policy of using AI in a lawful and ethical manner in “Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy” released in February 2019. The Chinese government announced the “Next Generation AI Development Plan” in 2017, setting a target for China to become a major global AI innovation center by 2030. In Russia, President Vladimir Putin in 2017 acknowledged that AI leaders would rule the world. Its national AI development strategy through 2030, released in October 2019, cited such targets as the acceleration of AI technology development, support for scientific research, and the improvement of human resources development systems.

AI-using technologies being studied include situation assessment support systems to display data collected through various sensors in an easy-to-understand manner, as well as decision-making support systems to provide commanders with available options. The United States conducted demonstration tests on the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) in December 2019. The system is reportedly designed to link various systems to networks, analyze collected data with AI, and allow combat troops to promptly access the data. It is noted that China is interested in introducing AI-based decision-making support systems for commanders, allegedly having a plan to develop a decision-making support system for nuclear-powered submarine commanders.

The United States, China, and Russia are developing autonomous unmanned vehicles equipped with AI. Autonomous unmanned vehicles would generally combine unmanned vehicles technologies expected to be utilized in dangerous, dirty, and dull missions with AI technology capable of detecting adversary actions and battle situation changes, and enables intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions in a wide range of areas over a long time, without risking human lives. The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is developing AI-equipped unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including swarms of reusable, air-launched and air-recovered small UAVs for ISR missions, as well as unmanned surface vessels for locating submarines. Under its Gremlins program, for example, DARPA conducted the first flight test for the X-61A UAV in November 2019, testing its aerial launching and flying it for more than 90 minutes to verify aerial and ground command and control systems.
In May 2018, China Electronics Technology Group Corporation successfully performed a swarm flight of 200 AI-equipped unmanned vehicles, demonstrating its advanced AI technology. It is assumed that military operations including such swarm flights will be difficult to counter with conventional air defense systems. The Caihong-7 (CH-7), whose prototype was exhibited at the Airshow China, China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition, in November 2018, is described as a fighter UAV that can perform advanced autonomous flights.

Russia is developing a nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle (Poseidon) that can carry nuclear warheads, claiming that it has been tested successfully.

Some have argued that autonomous unmanned vehicles could develop into so-called Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). Within the framework of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), discussion on LAWS is continued from the perspectives of their characteristics, human elements, and international law.

Meanwhile, some people indicate that UAVs would not acquire the autonomy at the same level as human pilots until 2040.

(2) Hypersonic Weapons

The United States, China, and Russia are developing hypersonic weapons, including Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) that would be launched from ballistic missiles, maneuvered to glide at hypersonic speed (Mach 5 or above) after their entry into the atmosphere, and hit targets, as well as Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCMs) using scramjet engines and other technologies that enable hypersonic flights. It is suggested that hypersonic weapons would fly in lower orbits than ballistic missiles at hypersonic speed above Mach 5 for a longer period of time and have high maneuverability, which makes it difficult to be detected and intercepted.

The United States, in its Missile Defense Review (MDR) (January 2019), indicates that Russia and China are developing advanced hypersonic weapons that challenge existing missile defense systems. The United States also announced in March 2020 that it had conducted a successful flight test on hypersonic weapons.

In the military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of China’s founding in October 2019, the DF-17 ballistic missile viewed as capable of carrying an HGV made its first public appearance, suggesting the possibility that hypersonic weapons would be deployed as early as in 2020. Russia announced its deployment of an HGV called “Avangard.” It is also continuing the development of an HCM called “Zircon.”

(3) High-power Energy Technology

High-power energy weapons, such as electromagnetic railguns, high-power laser weapons, and high-power microwaves, are being developed as a means to counter various airborne threats.

The United States and China are developing...
Currently, major countries are developing highly autonomous UAVs capable of concerted actions with crewed aircraft. It is believed that such technologies can greatly change future air battle. These autonomous UAVs divide roles with crewed aircraft, and are tasked with information gathering, reconnaissance and surveillance in a dangerous situation, combat and other tasks. They are expected to have advanced functions and capabilities, including planning tactics to be taken by each plane based on the battlefield situation and proposing them to the pilot of crewed aircraft to reduce the burden on human operators. Furthermore, the use of UAVs, which have the characteristics of both low costs and no risk to human life, can reduce the risk of missions.

The realization of these technologies requires flight control technology, airframe control technologies including swarm technology for flying in flocks, communication technology to connect UAVs with crewed aircraft, other UAVs, ground-based stations and others, and command and control technology to analyze collected information and develop, update and present tactics in a timely manner. UAVs intended for combat role, such as XQ-58A Valkyrie, which is being developed by the United States, require not only a high level of autonomy but also combat-capable aircraft performance. At the same time, such UAVs tasked for high-risk missions are expected to cost less than crewed aircraft. For this reason, 3D printer and other advanced technologies that can contribute to price reduction are also attracting attention.

In order to ensure Japan’s technological superiority, the MOD published “R&D Vision on Future Unmanned Equipment: Focusing on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles” in 2016 and has been also continuing R&D on technologies for coordination between crewed aircraft and UAVs. The ministry believes that the research can contribute to: automation, labor saving and optimization of command and control; expansion of autonomy range of equipment, and; speeding up and high-precision of information collection and judgment.

The United States is promoting research that plans to fly highly-automated UAVs alongside with crewed aircraft. As a part of the research, the Air Force Research Laboratory has been developing XQ-58A jointly with Kratos, a private company. The USAF expects to obtain game-changing fighting capability at low procurement and maintenance/operation costs. It is reported that the unit cost of the XQ-58A is several million dollars. Details of the performance of the airframe are not disclosed, but according to Kratos, XQ-58A is a long-range subsonic UAV with a total length of 9.4 meters and total width of 8.2 meters, and does not require any runway facilities. In September 2019, Russia announced that the country had implemented a cooperative flight test of S-70 heavy unmanned combat aerial vehicle “Okhotnik” and the 5th generation fighter Su-57 for approximately 30 minutes and disclosed a video of the flight test.

It is reported that in this test the S-70 flew to the front of the Su-57 and communicated the targeting information to its pilot by using mounted sensors. Australia is developing Boeing ATS (Air Teaming System) jointly with Boeing with a view to coordination with F-35A, E-7A early warning and control aircraft, and other crewed aircraft. As exemplified by the success in a swarm flight of 200 fixed wing UAVs in 2018, China is believed to be investing a significant amount of budget and excellent talents in the development of autonomous UAVs in an approach of Civil-Military Fusion while using the ones in the military sector. The military media expressed the effectiveness of the coordination of crewed aircraft and UAVs and suggested that this could change even the organizational configuration of militaries in the future.
electromagnetic railguns that use electromagnetic fields generated from electric energy to launch projectiles. U.S. Forces aim to develop a railgun with a range of approximately 370 km, about 10 times that of the existing 5-inch (127mm) guns. Unlike missiles, projectiles for electromagnetic railguns have no propulsion systems and are smaller, less costly, and can be stored in smaller space, which supposedly makes it possible for electromagnetic railguns to efficiently counter massive missile attacks, if they become available for intercepting missiles. The United States has offered plans to mount electromagnetic railguns on warships by 2025 and to use electromagnetic railguns not only for anti-ground and anti-ship attacks but also for anti-aircraft attacks. It is pointed out that China has tested its railguns at sea and would deploy them by 2025.

The United States, China, and Russia are developing high-power laser weapons to destroy targets with laser energy. Laser weapons are expected as an effective and less costly means to intercept attacks by multiple small unmanned vehicles and boats. Though it depends on the technological maturity, high-power laser weapons would excel in the speed of response compared with conventional weapons, and they can be free from ammunition constraints. Therefore, laser weapons, if strengthened enough to intercept missiles, would be able to efficiently counter massive missile attacks. The U.S. Air Force acquired an anti-UAV laser system in 2019. The United States has also successfully tested a 30 kW ship-based solid laser weapon system (LaWS) to counter small UAVs in the Persian Gulf since 2014. In a test conducted in the Pacific Ocean in 2020, the U.S. Navy successfully neutralized a flying unmanned vehicle with its shipboard high-powered laser demonstrator. The United States is planning to test mount an Aegis ship with the 100 kW HELIOS solid laser weapon system available for countering projectiles in 2020.

China exhibited the 30-100 kW “Silent Hunter” laser weapon system, capable of countering small UAVs, at the IDEX 2017 international defense exhibition. It is pointed out that China is developing higher-power laser weapon systems to attack satellites.

It is suggested that Russia has deployed the 10 kW Peresvet laser weapon system and been developing a megawatt-class chemical laser weapon system for attacking satellites.

High-power microwave technology can cause destruction and malfunction in the electronic systems responsible for such functions as intelligence-gathering and command & communications aboard UAVs, missiles and other airborne threats. The United States has acquired the Phaser high-power microwave system in 2019. In a U.S. Army drill, the system reportedly countered two to three UAVs at one time and 33 UAVs in total.

(4) **Quantum Technology**

Quantum technology is positioned as an important technology which brings innovation to society by applying quantum mechanics that differs from familiar physics that people sense every day. For example, quantum cryptographic communications is a communication system which utilizes quantum cryptographic technology taking advantage of quantum characteristics, and reportedly cannot be deciphered by third parties. It is pointed out that quantum radar may be able to neutralize the stealth advantage of stealth aircraft by utilizing quantum characteristics. It is pointed out that quantum computers can compute problems in a short amount of time and with less electricity consumption than existing supercomputers and can also be applied to areas such as decryption.

China has developed the world’s longest quantum cryptographic communications network, extending over approximately 3,000 km and connecting Beijing and Shanghai. In addition, in August 2016, China launched “Mozi,” the world’s first satellite to test quantum cryptographic communications. In January 2018, China said that it succeeded in using Mozi for long-distance quantum cryptographic communication between China and
Austria. Positioning quantum computer development as a key science and technology project, China has also invested approximately 7 billion yuan in a national laboratory for quantum information and technology and other facilities. 

(5) Other Civilian Technologies Seen as Available for Defense Purposes

As civilian technological innovation has been remarkable, each major country has been trying to proactively utilize cutting-edge civilian technologies for defense purposes.

For example, fifth-generation (5G) mobile communication systems, subjected to commercial services in various countries from April 2019 as a new civilian mobile communication infrastructure, have been attracting attention. The 5G systems achieve far faster speed, less delays, larger capacity and more simultaneous connections than the previous 4G systems. Compared to 4G systems, 5G technology allows for providing services with better quality (high speed, low latency, high capacity, high number of simultaneous connections, and high reliability) despite complicated data processing, by combining advanced information communications technologies, including directional antennas to communicate in higher frequency bands, data processing quality-based segregation and decentralization in the cloud space, and data processing control using AI. The U.S. Defense Innovation Board (DIB) has evaluated 5G as a promising technology that can improve real-time information sharing, communications across military service branches, geographic divergence, and territories, and enhance the ability to connect multiple systems to a broader network.¹

Additive manufacturing technology as typified by three-dimensional printing can produce goods that are too complex to be produced conventionally, at a much lower cost. Given this, 3D printer technology can bring revolutionary changes in logistics, such as not depending on the stock when procuring parts, and nations point out the military use of the technology. For example, the U.S. Army named 3D printer technology as one of the top 10 technologies regarding science and technology development on its website in December 2019, noting that the technology could trigger a real logistics revolution by making the transportation of spare goods unnecessary. In February 2019, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Norway launched a four-year joint project to study potential applications of 3D printer technology. The Australian Navy is considering using 3D printers for producing parts for patrol boats. In India, state-run and private companies agreed in January 2020 to cooperate in a 3D printer project for armed forces.

In recent years, the sophistication of military science and technology, and the greater complexity of equipment have caused a steep rise in equipment development and production costs and have raised unit prices for equipment procurement, while Western countries in particular have continued to face difficulties in increasing defense budgets significantly. Under these circumstances, many countries are taking on a variety of initiatives in order to maintain and enhance their national defense technological and industrial bases.

Western countries have set a target to increase competitiveness through the realignment of their defense industry, in light of the aforementioned situation related to national defense budgets. The United States has experienced repeated mergers and integrations among domestic corporations, while Europe has experienced cross-border mergers and integrations of the defense industry, especially in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy. In response to the escalation of development and production costs, Western countries are promoting joint development and production of equipment and technological cooperation among their allies and partners. This move aims for (1) sharing development and production costs, (2) expanding demand in all countries participating in joint development and production, (3) mutual complement of technologies, and (4) raising domestic technology levels by obtaining state-of-the-art technology.

For example, the joint development and production of the F-35 fighter jet led by the United States is the largest joint program. At present, there is anticipated demand for more than 3,300 aircraft.² This project will have impacts on the defense technological and industrial bases of the countries involved, through the operation, sustainment and maintenance stages...
of the aircraft. The European Union (EU) has created the European Defence Fund (EDF)\(^5\) to provide funding for joint research and development by the EU member states in order to promote their cooperation in developing and acquiring defense equipment and facilitate the efficient production of state-of-the-art and interoperable equipment.

There is an increasing number of cases where governments provide funding for national defense-related research and development conducted by the private sector. In the United States, for example, approximately US$3.556 billion in research and development funding was requested for FY2020 for DARPA, whose mission is to make investments in breakthrough technologies that will contribute to national security. The U.S. defense authority has long provided substantial funding for the research conducted by companies and universities. In some other countries, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, responding to the recent utilization of dual-use technologies in defense equipment development, the governments have launched initiatives to provide funding for private sector research and development on innovative technologies in order to acquire advanced civilian technologies.\(^4\)

Countries have exported equipment overseas since the Cold War era, and still today, many countries are taking measures to promote exports. While the United States, Russia, European countries and China have remained as leading defense equipment exporters, countries such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Turkey have been expanding exports of affordable equipment, which is an outcome of their success in developing the equipment manufacturing bases, together with their history of importing equipment in the past and improvement of capabilities in science and technology.

Defense equipment imports by Asian and Oceanian countries have continued an uptrend in recent years, seemingly against the background of economic growth in the region as well as the expansion of the influence of China, the existence of territorial disputes, and responses to the military buildup in neighboring countries.

Some of defense equipment importing countries adopt offset policies\(^5\) in order to keep a good balance between improving defense capabilities through imports and developing domestic defense technological and industrial bases by requesting domestic companies’ participation in parts production and others as conditions for procuring equipment and services from abroad.

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3 The EDF was founded in June 2017.

4 In 2016, the United Kingdom launched the Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA) to build an innovation network of government, private sector and academics and created a fund for innovative research. In the same year, Australia established a Next Generation Technologies Fund for emerging technologies as well as a fund for innovative technology development.

5 Offsets in defense trade are defined as encompassing a range of industrial and commercial benefits, such as co-production, licensed production, subcontracting, technology transfer, and assistance in purchase and payment, according to “Offsets in Defense Trade Twenty-First Study” by the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security.
Approximately 60 years have passed since a satellite was launched into outer space for the first time in the history of mankind. In recent years, technology leveraging outer space has been applied to various areas, growing more important as key infrastructure for both the public and private sectors. As the Outer Space Treaty, which took effect in October 1967, stipulates that outer space is not subject to national appropriation and that all states parties to the treaties shall use it freely for peaceful purposes, major countries have been making proactive efforts to use outer space for maintaining peace and safety in the security area.

There is no concept of national borders in outer space, meaning that the utilization of satellites enables the observation of, communication at, and positioning on any area on the Earth. Thus, major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), functions. Such satellites include satellites for reconnoitering military facilities and targets, early warning satellites for detecting the launch of ballistic missiles, satellites for gathering radio signals, communication satellites for communications between military units, and satellites for the positioning, navigation and time synchronization of naval vessels and aircraft and enhancing the precision of weapons systems. In outer space, various countries are thus rapidly developing their capabilities to ensure their military superiority.

From the viewpoint of ensuring their military superiority, various countries are also rapidly developing their capabilities to impede each other’s use of outer space. In January 2007, China conducted a test to destroy its aging satellite with a ground-launched missile. Russia also conducted a similar test in April 2020. Space debris caused by directly destroying satellites spread across the satellite’s orbit and came to be seen as a risk against space assets such as satellites owned by various countries.

Furthermore, countries including China and Russia are thought to be also developing an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) that does not directly hit and destroy a satellite by a missile, thus creating less space debris. For example, it has been noted that ASATs under development include a “killer satellite” to approach a target satellite and utilize a robot arm to capture the target and disable its functions. On this point, it has been noted that China has carried out experiments in outer space in which they have maneuvered satellites close to other satellites to simulate the movements of a killer satellite. The United States has claimed that a satellite launched by Russia in 2017 fired a high-speed flying object, exhibiting characteristics of a weapon. It has also criticized Russia for launching in 2019 another satellite that actively maneuvers near a U.S. satellite and had an “unusual and disturbing behavior” and condemned that such activity has the potential to create dangerous situations in outer space.

Furthermore, it has been pointed out that China and Russia are developing not only missiles and killer satellites but also jammers for interfering with communications between target satellites and ground stations, and laser weapons for attacking target satellites with directed energy. It has also been noted that China and Russia have been enhancing capabilities to...
operate these anti-satellite capabilities and impede the United States and its allies from using outer space. While threats in outer space, including the development of such various countermeasures, are pointed out to be growing, the United States and other countries increasingly position outer space as a warfighting domain or an operational domain, making outer space security an urgent challenge.

As the above illustrates, the risk to the stable use of outer space has become one of the critical security challenges for countries, thus it has become necessary to deal with this risk effectively in an effort to ensure stability in the use of outer space.

Against this backdrop, the existing international agreements do not have direct provisions on prohibiting the destruction of space objects and refraining from actions triggering space debris. Discussion on guidelines has been under way recently by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC). Moreover, countries are working on Space Situational Awareness (SSA) by monitoring the solar activity with a potential impact on satellites and electronic equipment on the Earth, and threats caused by meteors reaching Earth, in addition to threats posed by ASATs and space debris to space assets.

### Various Countries' Outer Space Initiatives

#### 1 The United States

Since its first satellite launch in January 1958, the United States has proceeded with a variety of space activities in fields including military, science, and resource exploration, such as launching the world’s first reconnaissance satellite and landing on the Moon. Today, the United States is the world’s leading space power. The U.S. Forces clearly recognize the importance of outer space for their actions, and on this point, actively utilize outer space for security purposes.

The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) released in December 2017 pointed out that some countries are pursuing a variety of ASATs on the basis of belief that the capability to attack assets in outer space will give them asymmetrical advantages. It also indicated that unlimited access to and freedom in activities in outer space were vital interests of the United States, and that the National Space Council would consider long-term goals in outer space to develop strategies. The United States released its National Space Strategy in March 2018, demonstrating its recognition that its adversaries had turned space into a warfighting domain and vowing to deter and defeat threats in the space domain to protect the national interests of the United States and its allies. The National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) announced in January 2019 indicated the recognition of threats in the space domain of which the previous NIS made no mention, warning that adversaries were increasing their presence in the space domain with plans to exceed the United States in some areas. The National Military Strategy (NMS) announced in July 2019 introduced the notion of an operational art through the integration of joint capabilities in all domains, giving priority to space and cyberspace in addition to land, sea and air.

Among U.S. government organizations, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) under direct control by the President is responsible mainly for non-military space development, while the DoD undertakes research, development, and operation of military observation and reconnaissance satellites. In August 2019, the United States inaugurated the U.S. Space Command as a new geographic unified combatant command based on the Strategic Command’s component in charge of space missions. In December 2019, the United States created the Space Force under the Department of the Air Force as the sixth military branch, with approximately 16,000 personnel.

#### 2 China

China began working on space development in the 1950s and launched its first satellite “Dong Fang Hong I” in 1970. China has thus far conducted activities such as crewed space flight and lunar rover launches. In January 2019, China succeeded in landing unmanned spacecraft “Chang’e 4” on the far side of the moon, the first ever such attempt and landing. It is speculated that China’s space development is intended to enhance national prestige and develop space resources.

In its 2019 defense white paper, released in July 2019 and titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” China asserts that outer space is a critical domain in international strategic competition and that outer space security provides strategic assurance for national and social development. “China’s Space Activities in 2016,” China’s white paper on space activities released in December 2016, presented a vision to “build China into a space power” and for “the
realization of the Chinese Dream." It also gave a schedule to launch lunar, Mars, asteroid, and Jupiter explorers by around 2020.

While traditionally emphasizing international cooperation and the peaceful use of space, China has not ruled out its military use of space and proactively used space for military purposes, including information collection, communications, and positioning through satellites. China continues to develop ASATs. In January 2007, China conducted a test using a ground-launched missile for destroying its own satellite. In July 2014, China implemented an anti-satellite missile test without actually destroying any satellite. It is also suggested that China is developing killer satellites, jammers, and directed-energy weapons, including laser beams. It is pointed out that the BeiDou satellite positioning system, which reportedly started global services in December 2018, could be used for military purposes. A Chinese state-owned corporation, which develops and produces launch vehicles, has claimed to continue the launch of new rockets in the Long March series and develop a launch vehicle that can carry a large satellite. However, the corporation has been reported to have been developing and producing ballistic missiles as well, indicating that the technology used in the development of satellite launch vehicles is applicable to the development of ballistic missiles. China is thus expected to focus on space development through close cooperation between government, military, and private sectors. China is considered to have become one of the space powers through investments, research and development, and the introduction of technologies from the United States and other countries. It has been suggested that China could threaten U.S. superiority in outer space in the future.

The Strategic Support Force, established in December 2015 as a force under direct control by the Central Military Commission, is considered to be in charge of outer space, cyber, and electronic warfare missions, including the launching and tracking of satellites, although the details of its missions and organization have not been published. The Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission is believed to be in charge of crewed space programs. The Ministry of Science and Technology takes charge of planning and making China’s science and technology policy covering outer space. The State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, which belongs to the State Council’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, works out and implements space-related programs. The China National Space Administration takes charge of civilian programs and represents the Chinese Government externally by concluding international agreements.

### 3 Russia

Russia’s space activities have been continuing since the former Soviet Union era. The former Soviet Union successively launched multiple satellites after it launched the first satellite in the history of mankind, Sputnik 1, in October 1957, and had the largest number of launched satellites in the world until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia’s space activities have declined since the former Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. However, the country has recently started to expand its space activities once again.

Regarding the country’s trends in security, the National Security Strategy, approved in December 2015, states that the opportunities for maintaining global and regional stability are shrinking significantly with the deployment of the U.S. weapons in outer space. In response to the United States’ release of the annual MDR in 2018, Russia expressed concern that the implementation of plans in the MDR would trigger an arms race in space with hugely negative consequences for world peace and stability.

In March 2016, Russia released the Federal Space Program for 2016-2025 as a specific future guideline for space activities, including the development and deployment of domestic space satellites and crewed flight programs.

Meanwhile, it is pointed out that Russia has used its outer space capabilities for military operations in Syria and reconnoitering globally operating forces of the United States and its allies. It is also noted that Russia has continued

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2 According to “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (February 2015).
5 According to “Competing in Space,” National Air and Space Intelligence Center (December 2018).
ASAT development, repeated tests to fire ground-launched anti-satellite missiles, and has been developing anti-satellite missiles launched from MiG-31 fighter jets, as well as laser weapon systems, such as the Sokol Eshelon system for aircraft.

From an organizational perspective, State Space Corporation ROSCOSMOS is in charge of space activities related to Russia’s scientific and economic areas, while the Russian Ministry of Defence is involved in space activities for security purposes. The Russian Aerospace Forces, into which the Air Force and the Aerospace Defence Forces were integrated in August 2015, conduct actual space activities for military purposes and manage facilities for launching satellites.

4 Europe

Regarding European outer space activities, the EU, the European Space Agency (ESA), and European countries are promoting their own unique space activities and are cooperating with each other to implement space activities. France succeeded in launching its own satellite for the first time in 1965, and the United Kingdom in 1971. Italy and Germany used launch vehicles developed by the United States to own satellites in 1964 and 1965, respectively. Meanwhile, the ESA launched its first satellite in 1979.

The EU and ESA at their joint ministerial council meeting in 2007 approved the European Space Policy, which noted that it would be important to improve synergy effects between space activities for civil and defense purposes and secure space activities based on coordinated efforts among member states and an internationally competitive space industry, identifying security as one of the policy priorities. In September 2019, before taking office as President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen stated she would establish a defense and space branch to take charge of military fundraising, development and deployment within the commission. A satellite positioning system called “Galileo” and an Earth observation program named “Copernicus” under planning by the EU and ESA, and a reconnaissance satellite project called “Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS)” of the European Defense Agency (EDA) are expected to be utilized for the security field in Europe.

In July 2019, France released the Space Defence Strategy as its first document specialized in space defense. The document referred to the creation of a space command and the enhancement of threat identification and space situation surveillance capabilities. In September 2019, France created the space command under the Air Force to integrate functions and personnel of a military space surveillance operation center, a joint space command and a military satellite surveillance center within the Armed Forces Ministry.

5 India

India has promoted programs to develop communications, positioning and observation satellites. At the end of January 2019, it released a space mission calling for promoting research and development on a crewed space initiative by 2020. At their second meeting of their foreign and defense ministers in December 2019, the United States and India offered to discuss their potential defense cooperation in outer space in 2020.

India is believed to have operated the Navigation Indian Constellation (NavIC) satellite as a positioning satellite that can position locations around India and launched an Earth observation satellite, which is believed to be used for security purposes as well. In February 2017, India successfully launched a satellite launch vehicle loaded with 104 satellites at low cost, marking the largest number ever carried on a single rocket in the world, which indicates its high technological capabilities. In March 2019, Prime Minister Modi announced that the country successfully tested a missile to shoot down a low-orbit satellite.

Among organizations, the Space Agency oversees the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), which implements space development policy, develops and launches launch vehicles, and develops and manufactures satellites. It has been reported that the Ministry of Defence approved the creation of the Defence Space Agency (DSA) to control ASATs and other space assets, and to plan defense policies regarding outer space in April 2019. The ministry also approved the establishment of the Defence Space Research Agency (DSRA) to develop weapons and technology for outer space warfare in June 2019.

6 The ROK

The ROK is considered to have started full-scale space development from the latter half of the 1990s. Current space development is promoted based on the Third Basic Space Development Promotion Plan announced by the Moon administration under the Space Development Promotion Act implemented in 2005. The plan proposes a vision towards 2040, giving priority to (1) the establishment of its own launch vehicle technology, (2) the advancement of satellite-using services and satellite development, (3) the initiation of space exploration, and (4) the development of the Korean Positioning System (KPS).

In November 2018, the ROK, which had traditionally depended on other countries for launching satellites, announced that it successfully tested the “Nuri” domestic...
launch vehicle under development.

Among organizations, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute leads research and development as an implementation agency. Furthermore, the Korea Agency for Defense Development is engaged in the development and use of various satellites. The Air Force has offered to create a satellite surveillance and control unit to monitor satellite activities above the Korean Peninsula.6

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Trends in Cyber Domain

1 Cyberspace and Security

Owing to the advancement of information and communications technology (ICT) in recent years, information and communications networks such as the Internet have become essential components across all facets of life. Therefore, cyber attacks against information and communications networks have the potential to seriously impact the lives of individuals.

Types of cyber attacks include functional disruption, data falsification and data theft caused by unauthorized access to information and communications networks or through the transmission of viruses via e-mail, functional impairment of the networks through simultaneous transmission of large quantities of data, and attacks intended to shut down or take over a system belonging to critical infrastructure, such as power systems. Also, network-related technologies are constantly evolving, with cyber attacks becoming more and more advanced and sophisticated by the day.

For military forces, information and communications capability form the foundation of command and control, which extend from central command to ground-level forces. In this regard, ICT advancements are further increasing the dependence of military forces on information and communications networks. Furthermore, in some cases, military forces need various critical infrastructures, including electricity, to execute their missions. Accordingly, cyber attacks against such critical infrastructures could become a major impediment to their missions. For this reason, cyber attacks are recognized as an asymmetrical means to impede the military activities of adversaries at low cost. It is believed that many foreign military forces are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace. It has been pointed out that China and Russia in particular are bolstering the offensive cyber capabilities of their militaries for the purpose of obstructing the networking of adversaries’ military forces and destroying their infrastructure.¹

2 Threats in Cyberspace

Under such circumstances, cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against information and communications networks of not only government organizations and military forces but also business corporations and academic organizations in various countries. Attacks attempting to steal critical technologies, secrets or personal information have been confirmed. For example, advanced persistent threat (APT) and other relentless cyber attacks focusing on specific bodies require abundant resources, arrangements and capabilities, being viewed as organized activities. To respond to such advanced cyber attacks, Japan is required to share threat awareness with foreign countries for technological and operational cooperation. The United States has assessed that China, Russia, Iran and North Korea have been conducting more diverse and aggressive cyber attacks,² indicating that their military forces have enhanced their offensive cyber capabilities.

1 China

It has been alleged that cyber warfare units have been formed under the Strategic Support Force that was created as part of China’s military reforms in late December 2015. The units are estimated to consist of 175,000 troops, including 30,000 for cyber attacks. In its “National Cyberspace Security Strategy” published in 2016, China recognized sovereignty in cyberspace as an important component part of national sovereignty. Its 2019 defense white paper, released in July 2019 and titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” stated that China’s armed forces accelerate the building of

¹ According to “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” Director of National Intelligence (March 2018)
² According to “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” Director of National Intelligence (January 2019)
their cyberspace capabilities. Given the above, China is believed to have been enhancing its military’s cyber warfare capabilities.

For example, its involvement in the following incidents has been pointed out.

- In June 2015, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) became a target of a cyber attack in which, as it later came to light, personal information of about 22 million people, including U.S. federal employees and U.S. Forces personnel, were stolen.

- In January and February 2018, Chinese government hackers hacked a U.S. Navy contractor, leading to a leak of classified information on supersonic anti-ship missiles mounted on submarines.

- In December 2018, such countries as the United States announced that the APT10 cyber group related to China’s Ministry of National Security conducted cyber attacks on intellectual and other properties in at least 12 countries.

- In Japan, it has been confirmed that the APT10 group conducted extensive cyber attacks on private enterprises, academic organizations and other targets.

- In 2017, a U.S. consumer credit information company came under a cyber attack stealing personal information including names, birthdates, social security numbers, driver’s license numbers, and credit card numbers. In February 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice prosecuted four Chinese military-related persons for their alleged involvement in the cyber attack.

It has been pointed out that the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU) and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) are involved in cyber attacks. It has also been revealed that the Russian military has its own cyber command unit, which is believed to be responsible for conducting offensive cyber activities, including inserting malware into command and control systems of adversaries, with approximately 1,000 personnel. Russia’s “Doctrine of Information Security,” released in December 2016, acknowledged an increase in threats related to the use of information technology for military and political purposes. In November 2019, Russia enforced the so-called sovereign Internet law to secure the continuity of Russian networks by shutting them out from global networks in the event of an incident like a cyber attack.

It is pointed out that Russia has taken advantage of cyberspace for intelligence operations not only to steal information and conduct sabotage operations but also to challenge democratic processes and has been involved in the following incidents:

**KEY WORD**

**Malware**

Malware stands for malicious software, meaning software that takes advantage of various vulnerabilities for cyber attacks.

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3 According to “Cyber Strategy,” U.S. DoD (September 2018)
5 According to a statement made by Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu during a briefing for the lower house in February 2017, that the Russian military has a cyber command for countering political propaganda in Russia’s ongoing information war with Western countries. However, the minister fell short of naming the command.
6 According to then U.S. Director of National Intelligence Clapper’s written testimony on “Worldwide Cyber Threats” at the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in September 2015.
7 According to the “Cyber Strategy,” U.S. DoD (September 2018)
- In 2014, more than 500 million user accounts were leaked from a major U.S. Internet company. In March 2017, the U.S. government indicted four hackers, including two officers of the Russian Federal Security Service, for their alleged cyber attack on the company.\(^8\)

- In December 2015, a cyber attack triggered a large-scale power outage in Ukraine. It was reported that military forces of Russia confronting with Ukraine over the Crimea annexation and other issues were suspected of having contributed to the cyber attack.

- Cyber attacks to affect the outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election.\(^6\)

- In June 2017, cyber attacks using the so-called NotPetya ransomware occurred in Ukraine and other countries. In February 2018, the U.S. and U.K. governments attributed the attacks to the Russian military.

- In October 2018, the U.S. and U.K. governments announced that the Main Intelligence Directorate of the GRU was responsible for cyber attacks on the World Anti-Doping Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the U.S. Democratic convention, and other targets.

- In October 2019, the U.S. and U.K. governments announced that the GRU was responsible for large-scale cyber attacks on Georgian government agencies and media organizations in October 2019.\(^10\)

### 3 North Korea

It has been pointed out that the North Korean authority trains hackers\(^11\) and has intensively built up cyber units operating some 6,800 personnel.\(^12\) In September 2019, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced sanctions targeting three cyber groups\(^13\) supported by the North Korean authority responsible for their involvement in malicious cyber activities targeting key infrastructure.

North Korea is believed to have been developing capabilities to steal money and secret military information through cyber attacks and inflict such attacks on key foreign infrastructure. It is suspected of having been involved in the following incidents.

- In September 2016, cyber attacks occurred in the internal network of the ROK Armed Forces. In May 2017, the ROK Ministry of National Defense was reported to have concluded that the cyber attacks had been conducted by what was believed to be a North Korean hacker group.\(^12\)

Moreover, it has been pointed out that documents containing military secrets of the ROK were stolen through the cyber attacks.

- In May 2017, a cyber attack used a malware called WannaCry to encrypt and neutralize electronic data held by hospitals, schools, businesses, and other entities in more than 150 countries. Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand announced a statement blaming North Korea for its involvement in the attack. It has been pointed out that this cyber attack succeeded in collecting 140,000 dollars in Bitcoins.

- In September 2017, multiple U.S. electric power utilities were inflicted with cyber attacks using spear phishing emails. In October 2017, FireEye, a U.S. cybersecurity company, announced that the attacks had been conducted by a cyber threat group allegedly affiliated with North Korea.

- According to the final report released by the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea in April 2020, the Panel concluded, based on information provided by member states and publicly available information, that North Korea has continued to carry out cyber attacks on financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges and that the attacks are becoming more sophisticated.

### 4 Trends Concerning Other Threats

Supply chain risks, including products embedded with deliberately and fraudulently altered programs, and the existence of advanced malware designed to attack industrial

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8 According to a U.S. Department of Justice release in March 2017.
10 According to a U.S. Department of Justice release in February 2020.
11 According to the ROK’s 2016 Defense White Paper (January 2017)
12 According to the ROK’s 2018 Defense White Paper (January 2019)
13 In the private cybersecurity industry, the North Korean APT attack groups are known as Lazarus Group, Bluenoroff, and Andariel.
control systems are also pointed out. In this respect, the U.S. Congress in August 2018 passed the National Defense Authorization Act of 2019 including provisions prohibiting government agencies from using products of major Chinese communications equipment manufacturers, such as Huawei Technologies Co. The United States has provided its allies with information about risks accompanying Chinese communications equipment and urged them not to use such equipment. In response, Australia has banned China’s Huawei and ZTE Corporation from taking part in its 5G next-generation mobile network development project.

Cyber attacks on telecommunication networks of a government and military forces or on critical infrastructure could have a serious effect on the security of states, and it is believed that state-sponsored cyber attacks have been on the rise in recent years. Given this situation, there is a need for continuous monitoring of trends in the threats in cyberspace.

Initiatives against Cyberspace Threats

Given these growing threats in cyberspace, various initiatives are under way.

It is regarded that the international community has diverging views concerning the fundamental matters of cyberspace, including how international law applies. For instance, the United States, Europe, and Japan have called for maintaining a free cyberspace, while Russia, China, and most emerging countries sought to strengthen state control on cyberspace. Against this backdrop, there has been a movement to promote the rule of law in cyberspace in the international community. For instance, discussions are being held on the establishment of international rules within the framework of global conferences on cyberspace.

The United States

In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for protecting federal government networks and critical infrastructure against cyber attacks, and the Department’s Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) works to protect the networks of government agencies.

The U.S. NSS (December 2017) points out that many countries now view cyber capabilities as tools for projecting influence and that cyberattacks have become a key feature of modern conflict. It also notes that the United States would deter, defend, and when necessary defeat malicious actors who inflict cyber attacks on the United States. The U.S. DoD in its National Defense Strategy (January 2018) described a policy of investing in cyber defense, resilience, and the continued integration of cyber capabilities into the full spectrum of military operations. Furthermore, the DoD Cyber Strategy (September 2018) points out that the United States is engaged in a long-term strategic competition with China and Russia, and that China and Russia have expanded that competition to include persistent campaigns in and through cyberspace that pose long-term strategic risk to the United States as well as to its allies and partners. The strategy presents such approaches as (1) the acceleration of cyber capability development, (2) defense to counter and deter malicious cyber activity, and (3) the promotion of cooperation with U.S. allies and partners.

In April 2019, at the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2), the two countries agreed to enhance cooperation on cyber issues and affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace and that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

The U.S. Forces include Cyber Command, which was elevated to a unified combatant command in May 2018 to control cyberspace operations. The Command consists of the Cyber Protection Force (68 teams), which operates and defends the DoD Information Network, the Cyber National Mission Force (13 teams), which supports the U.S. defense against national-state threats, and the Cyber Combat Mission Force (27 teams), which supports the operations conducted by unified combatant commands on the cyber front (these three Forces are collectively referred to as the Cyber Mission Force, consisting of 133 teams including 25 support teams, with approximately 6,200 personnel).
The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence and its action plan, which were adopted in June 2011: (1) clarify the political and operational mechanisms of NATO’s response to cyber attacks; (2) clarify that NATO would provide assistance to member states to develop their cyber defense, and provide assistance to member states if they are subject to cyber attacks; and (3) set out principles on cooperation with partners. Furthermore, at the NATO Summit in September 2014, an agreement was reached that NATO’s collective defense applies to cyber attacks against member states.

On the organizational front, in November 2017, an agreement was reached on the creation of a new Cyber Operations Center and the integration of NATO member countries’ cyber defense capabilities into NATO missions and operations. The Cyber Operations Center located in Belgium is expected to be fully operational with cyber attack capabilities by 2023. Furthermore, NATO has conducted cyber defense training exercises annually since 2008 to heighten cyber defense capabilities. In addition, NATO has expanded cooperation with the EU in the fields of cybersecurity and cyber defense.

In 2008, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) was authorized to serve as a research and training institution, and was established in Estonia’s capital of Tallinn. CCDCOE carries out research on the relationship between cyber activities and international law, creating the “Tallinn Manual.” In February 2017, “Tallinn Manual 2.0” was published as the second edition of the previous manual based on a review of broad discussion points, from peacetime legal regimes, such as laws on state responsibility, human rights, aviation, space, and maritime affairs, to contingency legal regimes, such as laws on armed conflict. In December 2019, NATO held its “Cyber Coalition 2019” exercise, in which Japan officially participated for the first time in addition to 27 NATO member countries and the EU.

In its first “National Security Strategy” published in January 2013, Australia positions integrated cyber policies and operations as one of the top national security priorities. In April 2016, a new “Cyber Security Strategy” through 2020 was released, which provides that Australia will ensure the safety of the people, that private companies will participate in cybersecurity, and that threat information will be shared.

On the organizational front, cybersecurity capabilities across the government were converged to establish the Australian Cyber Security Center (ACSC), which addresses major cybersecurity issues related to government agencies and critical infrastructure. In July 2015, the ACSC issued its first report on cybersecurity, which contends that the number, type, and sophistication of cyber threats to Australia are all increasing. Moreover, the Australian Defence Force created the Information Warfare Division under the Joint Capabilities Group in July 2017 and established the Defence Signals Intelligence and Cyber Command under the division in January 2018. In October 2019, the Royal Australian Air Force offered to recruit cyber skills officers to protect networks, data and information systems.

In December 2018, the ROK released the “National Security Strategy of the Moon Jae-in Government,” pledging to enhance cyber threat prevention and response capabilities based on cooperation among private, government and capabilities to strengthen the functions for identifying and analyzing cyberspace threats. In November 2016, the country announced a new “Cyber Security Strategy” that presents a vision for the United Kingdom, which is to be secure and resilient to cyber threats, prosperous and confident in the digital world. To achieve this vision, the Strategy requires the United Kingdom to deter cyber threats by having effective defensive and offensive means and to “develop” cutting-edge technologies.

On the organizational front, in October 2016, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) was newly established under the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to promote public-private partnerships for responses to national cyber incidents.
military sectors in responding to cyber threats and to activate relevant international cooperation. The ROK also formulated its first “National Cybersecurity Strategy” in April 2019 to protect the safety of the people and enhance national security, and released the “National Cybersecurity Basic Plan” to materialize the strategy in September 2019.

In the national defense sector, the Cyber Measures Technology Team was established by the Ministry of National Defense to respond to cyber and hacking threats. The sector has also worked out procedures for quick response to cyber crises under the “National Cyber Security Strategy” and the “National Cybersecurity Crisis Response Manual.” In 2015, the Joint Chiefs of Staff centralized the cyber attack tactical system mainly around the Joint Chiefs of Staff by newly establishing the Cyber Tactics Department, assigning control authority concerning cyber tactics to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and issuing a field manual on “joint cyber tactics.”
The electromagnetic spectrum is propagated by the oscillations of electric and magnetic fields. In everyday life, it is used for various purposes ranging from television and mobile communications to geolocation information through global positioning systems.

In the defense field, the electromagnetic spectrum is used for command and control communications equipment, radar systems for detecting enemies, missile guidance systems, and other equipment. Securing superiority in the electromagnetic domain is indispensable for modern operations. Activities using the electromagnetic domain include electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum control. Electronic warfare means or approaches are generally classified into three – electronic attack, electronic protection and electronic warfare support.

“Electronic attacks” are designed to reduce or neutralize adversary communications and search capabilities by sending stronger radio waves or radio waves pretending to be adversary waves aimed at an adversary’s communications and radar equipment to jam waves coming from such equipment. They include radio wave jamming, radio wave deception and physical destruction using high-power electronic waves (such as high-power laser and high-power microwaves).

“Electronic protection” makes equipment stealthy or difficult to be detected by adversaries and reduces or neutralizes adversary electronic attacks on communications and radar equipment by changing electronic wave frequency for use or increasing its power.

“Electronic warfare support” consists of activities designed to collect information on adversary electromagnetic spectrum for electronic warfare purposes. It is necessary for effective electronic attacks or protection to detect and analyze what electromagnetic spectrum is usually used by adversaries for communications equipment, radar and electronic attack aircraft. It is desirable to be able to conduct electronic warfare effectively even if electromagnetic spectrum used by adversaries is not detected or analyzed in advance. For example, AI may be mounted on or used for equipment to immediately analyze jamming and automatically select frequency bands that are the most invulnerable to jamming.

“Electromagnetic spectrum control” means the control and adjustment of electromagnetic spectrum use to facilitate electromagnetic domain activities such as electronic attacks and protection. Specific measures for the control include the detection of how electromagnetic spectrum is used in a theater of operation, as well as the adjustment of frequencies, directions and durations of electromagnetic spectrum used for friendly forces and equipment to avoid electromagnetic spectrum interference. At present, research is being conducted on technologies for detecting and visualizing how electromagnetic spectrum is used.
Major countries apparently recognize electronic attacks as an asymmetric means similar to cyber attacks to effectively hamper adversaries’ military performance, emphasizing and enhancing electronic warfare capabilities, including electronic attacks.

**2 Each Country’s Electronic Warfare Initiatives**

**1 The United States and Europe**

The United States is committed to expanding electronic warfare training and equipment and to enhancing cooperation with its allies under an initiative to aggressively achieve its dominance in the electromagnetic domain. Major U.S. electronic warfare units include the Navy’s 13 electronic attack squadrons armed with EA-18G electronic warfare aircraft as well as Marine Corps flight squadrons with electronic warfare aircraft. As an example of military operations using electronic warfare equipment, there is an assessment that U.S. electronic warfare units used EA-18G aircraft in Libya in 2011 to jam ground radar of the Libyan government forces, preventing their attacks on NATO aircraft. It is pointed out that the LMADIS (Light Marine Air Defense System) counter unmanned aircraft system with electronic warfare capabilities was used for leading an Iranian drone to crash over the Strait of Hormuz in July 2019.

The U.S. Air Force activated the 16th Air Force in October 2019 to integrate functions for ISR, cyber warfare, electronic warfare and information warfare. The Army plans to deploy multi-domain task forces integrating long-range precision attack, electronic warfare, cyber and other capabilities in the Indo-Pacific and other regions from FY2021.

Many other NATO member countries are also developing equipment for severe electronic warfare environments and allegedly conducting electronic warfare-oriented exercises with Russian forces’ electronic warfare equipment in mind.¹

**2 China**

China has set an initiative to put cyber warfare and other electronic elements, and physical destruction and other non-electronic elements under unified control.² Under the initiative, China conducts force-on-force exercises on a routine basis to effectively accomplish missions in complicated electromagnetic environments, improving practical capabilities. It is pointed out that China’s armed forces have taken advantage of such exercises to assess electronic warfare weapon research and development achievements.³ The Strategic Support Force, established for improving overall military operational capabilities, may be responsible for such domains as electronic warfare, cyber and space.

China’s TU-154 intelligence and Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft have been seen flying around the Nansei Islands and the Sea of Japan in the vicinity of Japan. It is also reported that China has mounted electronic warfare pods for jamming missions on J-15 fighters, H-6 bombers, and other aircraft, and deployed a jamming system on Mischief Reef of the Spratly Islands.⁴ In a military parade to mark the 90th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in July 2017, unmanned aircraft reported as mounted with electronic warfare equipment were displayed.

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¹ According to “All quiet on the eastern front: EW in Russia’s new-generation warfare,” Jane’s International Defence Review (April 2018)
⁴ According to “An Accounting of China’s Deployments to the Spratly Islands,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (May 2018)
Russia, in its Military Doctrine, positions electronic warfare equipment as important equipment in modern military conflict. It is noted that Russia used electronic warfare equipment in the “Vostok 2018” exercise in September 2018, the “Tsentr 2019” exercise in September 2019 and other exercises. It is also pointed out that Russian forces have positioned electronic warfare as part of offensive means and improved practical electronic warfare capabilities in recent years.¹

Russia’s electronic warfare force reportedly has five brigades led mainly by the Army.⁶ It is reported that Russia used various electronic warfare systems in eastern Ukraine to block Ukrainian forces’ command and control traffic and jam GPS waves to interrupt their drone operations, affecting Ukraine’s military performance.⁷ It is also reported that Russia used Krasukha-4 and other electronic warfare systems in Syria to interrupt NATO forces’ command and control traffic and radar systems.⁸ In the vicinity of Japan, Russian electronic reconnaissance aircraft’s long-range flights over the Sea of Japan have been seen.

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¹ According to “Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025,” Estonian Ministry of Defense
⁶ According to “All quiet on the eastern front: EW in Russia’s new-generation warfare,” Jane’s International Defence Review (April 2018)
⁷ According to “Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025,” Estonian Ministry of Defense
⁸ According to “All quiet on the eastern front: EW in Russia’s new-generation warfare,” Jane’s International Defence Review (April 2018)
COVID-19, which first broke out in China at the end of 2019, has been posing serious challenges that the international community has to address in close collaboration. The infection poses not only sanitary problems but exerts influence broadly on society and the economy of respective countries. In a globalized international society with increased mutual dependence, governments were pressed to take countermeasures, such as restrictions on outings and suspension or decrease of corporate activities. The infection has thus been exerting a tremendous influence on the daily lives of many people, revealing the vulnerability of supply chains and causing serious damage to local economies. Amid concerns over prolonged economic sluggishness worldwide, governments are utilizing their military forces’ sanitary capabilities, transportation capacity and facilities, in addition to functions of medical institutions, to deal with the COVID-19 infection for early resumption of their domestic socioeconomic activities, and have been contributing to the prevention of the international spread of the infection. However, in some countries, military personnel have also been infected and military training and bilateral/multilateral exercises have been suspended or postponed. The infection has brought about diverse impacts and restrictions to military activities as well.

In China, where a large scale and rapid spread of the COVID-19 infection was confirmed first in the world, under a significant instruction concerning the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) active contribution issued by President Xi Jinping, the PLA took full-fledged countermeasures against the COVID-19 infection. Huoshenshan Hospital was built in around ten days in Wuhan, the epicenter of the infection, and was handed over to the Joint Logistic Support Force specialized in logistics missions on February 2, 2020. The Joint Logistic Support Force played the central role in coping with the COVID-19 infection and engaged in the operation of temporary hospitals, medical treatment, and transportation of relief goods. It is said that the Air Force’s Y-20 large transport aircraft was deployed for a disaster relief mission for the first time. In this manner, not only the Joint Logistic Support Force, but also the Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and strategic logistics support unit are said to have been mobilized. Additionally, militias and personnel mobilized for national defense also engaged in countermeasures against the infection and conducted such duties as measurement of citizens’ body temperature, disinfection of vehicles, and assistance of corporate activities. On March 10, President Xi observed Wuhan and announced that the spread of infection had been curbed.

China seems to consider that the domestic spread of COVID-19 had basically been curbed, and the Academy of Military Medical Sciences of the PLA Academy of Military Science declared that it will start the second phase of COVID-19 vaccine clinical trials, ahead of other countries. Furthermore, China actively provides medical supplies and dispatches medical experts to countries where the COVID-19 infection is spreading, showing its intention to play a leading role in countering the infection in the international community. On the other hand, the current infection has spread worldwide starting from China, and the international community is strengthening the criticism questioning China’s responsibility for the infection. Some point out that China has been endeavoring to stabilize the surrounding international environment through such international contribution, and at the same time, seeking to increase its own political and economic interests, create international and regional order to its own advantage and expand its influence, while strategically challenging the existing international order, by taking advantage of its assistance regarding countermeasures against the COVID-19 infection.

Under such circumstances, the PLA seems to have reviewed the annual operation plan for the Eastern Theater Command Navy and there seems to be a certain impact of the infection on military activities. However, even after the PLA’s full-fledged operation against the infection started, China has been continuing to expand and increase military activities in the sea areas and airspace surrounding Japan.

Against the background that international cooperation and collaboration is urgently required due to the global spread
members of aircraft carrier “Theodore Roosevelt” and other vessels. Under such circumstances, Secretary of Defense Esper and other senior military officers, alleging that an enemy is trying to take advantage of this opportunity when the U.S. Forces are coping with the COVID-19 infection, emphasize the significance of maintaining the readiness to take quick actions, and have reiterated that the infection does not affect the readiness and ability to conduct to national security missions of the U.S. Forces as a whole.

North Korea repeatedly publicized that there is no one in North Korea who is infected with COVID-19, but is said to have been taking measures to prevent infection by closing borders with China, suspending services of international flights and cross-border railway connections, and restricting moves of foreigners and residents. North Korea might be suffering economic losses. In March 2020, General Abrams, Commander of United States Forces Korea, mentioned that he was confident that there are people infected with COVID-19 in North Korea, and stated that the North Korean Forces were on lockdown for about 30 days and regular training was just resumed recently. In March, North Korea repeated launches of ballistic missiles four times, and seems to be making efforts to enhance missile-related technologies and operational capability, but some point out that the intention of the regime is to tighten internal control and externally demonstrate the maintenance of its leadership and military force in the face of the global spread of COVID-19.

In ROK, Minister of National Defense Jeong Kyeong-doo instructed in February 2020 to input all resources for countering the COVID-19 infection, referring to the current situation as being equivalent to wartime. Under such instruction, the ROK Forces offer support in the fields of epidemic prevention and transportation. For enhancing efficiencies and accelerating countermeasures, the National Defense Prompt Support Unit was organized in March 2020. In the meantime, field training was all suspended nationwide in February, and troops under field training were provided with guidance to return to their bases immediately. COVID-19 thus exerted influence on military activities.

In February 2020, Russia dispatched aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces to China to transport its people back to Russia, and has carried out support activities such as transportation of medical relief goods for other countries since March. Within the country, a countermeasures headquarters was established in the Russian Forces and 49 sanitation and infection units were newly organized to take thorough countermeasures. However, in April for the first time, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation announced the infection case found in the Russian Forces, and the number of infected personnel is increasing. Efforts
have been made to increase the number of hospital beds with the aim of also offering medical support to the private sector, such as increasing the number of beds of the hospital ship held by the Pacific Fleet and newly constructing 16 medical centers nationwide. Although President Putin announced the postponement of the military parade, which was scheduled in May 2020, until sometime within the year, drills and training of the Russian Forces seem to be carried out as usual, and active military activities have been confirmed, including launching tests of antisatellite missiles and a near-midair collision with U.S. aircraft above the Mediterranean Sea. Also around Japan, Russian aircraft continue proximate flights, and it was reported that the Pacific Fleet conducted a military exercise in the waters including sea areas near the Northern Territories in April 2020.

In countries in Europe, where the infection spread rapidly, military forces are used for countermeasures, such as the establishment of field hospitals, transportation of medical personnel, patients and medical supplies, and assistance with private hospitals by military medical personnel. For example, the U.K. Forces supply logistics and help with the construction of new hospitals, the French Forces offer support at field hospitals and transport patients using their aircraft, and the German Forces transport patients with severe symptoms. In France, it was confirmed in April 2020 that crew members of Aircraft Carrier “Charles de Gaulle” were infected with COVID-19.

In this manner, the spread of the COVID-19 infection has not only significantly affected global socioeconomic activities, but has also had influences on the military activities of respective countries. If the spread of infection is further prolonged, this may exert various impacts on countries’ military capability. Furthermore, it is said that while actively dispatching medical experts and providing medical goods to countries where the infection is spreading, China has been making propaganda efforts in various manners, including the spread of false information, amid growing social uncertainties and confusion due to the spread of infection. The COVID-19 pandemic may expose and intensify strategic competition among countries intending to create international and regional orders more preferable to themselves and to expand their influence. We need to closely watch such moves with great concern as security issues.
Japan is a maritime nation surrounded by sea and depends on maritime transportation for importing energy resources. In this sense, securing maritime traffic safety is vital for the nation’s existence. At the same time, ensuring the stable use of the maritime domain as infrastructure supporting international logistics is recognized as a primary concern for the international community.

Nevertheless, some countries unilaterally claim their rights or take actions based on their own assertions that are incompatible with the existing international order, leading the principle of the freedom of the high seas to be violated unduly. Attacks on ships in the Middle East and piracy seen at various locations have become a threat to maritime traffic.

**Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas”**

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides for the principles of freedom of navigation in the high seas and freedom of overflight. Nevertheless, in the waters and airspace in the periphery of Japan, especially the East and South China Seas, it has become increasingly common for countries to unilaterally assert their rights or take actions, based on their own assertions which are incompatible with the existing international order. This has caused situations of undue infringement upon such principles.

(1) **East China Sea**

Numerous cases of acts that go against the principles of freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight have been recently seen in the East China Sea. Japan is concerned about such cases since these are profoundly dangerous that could escalate the situation by unilaterally changing the status quo and may cause unintended consequences.

On November 23, 2013, for example, the Chinese Government announced that it would establish “the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS ADIZ),” including the Senkaku Islands as if they were a part of China’s territory. China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that it would require aircraft flying in the zone to follow their instructions and warned that China’s armed forces would adopt “defensive emergency measures” in the event that aircraft refuse to follow the instructions. Japan is demanding China to revoke any measures that could go against the principle of freedom of overflight. The United States, the ROK, Australia, and the European Union (EU), too, have expressed concern about China’s establishment of such zone. Increased activities by Chinese military aircraft have been confirmed in recent years in the airspace close to the various southwestern islands of Japan, including the main island of Okinawa. The expansion of these activities may be an attempt to enforce the ECS ADIZ. Moreover, fighters of the PLA flew abnormally close to aircraft of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and U.S. Forces, which were flying over the East China Sea.

Furthermore, in January 2013, a Chinese naval vessel directed a fire-control radar at a Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) destroyer navigating on the high seas of the East China Sea on 30th. Moreover, it is believed that other Chinese naval vessel directed a fire-control radar at a helicopter mounted on an MSDF destroyer on 19th. Projecting fire-control radar is normally conducted prior to firing at a target and thus it is a dangerous act that may cause unintended consequences.

(2) **South China Sea**

In the South China Sea as well, there are acts to unilaterally change the status quo and advance its efforts to create a fait accompli based on its own assertions have frequently been seen along with its coercive, dangerous acts that could invite unintended consequences.

For example, China has gone ahead with land reclamation on seven features on a massive and rapid scale on the Spratly Islands since 2014. In July 2016, the “historical rights” asserted by China as the basis of the “nine dash line” were
denied in the arbitration award between the Philippines and China and the illegality of China’s reclamation activities was acknowledged. However, China has clearly stated its intention not to comply with the award and has continued the militarization of the features by developing military facilities such as batteries and various infrastructure that can be used for military purposes, such as runways, harbors, hangars and radar facilities. Moreover, in July and August 2016 after the arbitration award between the Philippines and China was rendered, an H-6K bomber of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) conducted combat air patrols in the airspace around Scarborough Shoal, with China’s Ministry of National Defense announcing that it would conduct these patrols regularly from now on. This shows the PLA has been intensifying its operations in the South China Sea. Under these circumstances, a further increase in China’s aerial presence in the area could lead to the establishment of a “South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” in the future.

Furthermore, Chinese government vessels have obstructed fishing and other vessels of other countries approaching the features by firing warning shots and water cannons at the vessels. Claimants as well as the international community including the United States have repeatedly expressed their deep concerns over such conducts. In a dangerous act that could cause unintended consequences, PLA Navy and other ships approached and obstructed a U.S. Navy ship sailing in the South China Sea in September 2018.

(3) Unintended Contingency Avoidance Initiatives

Despite these numerous acts that could pose risks to securing the stable use of oceans and airspace, in recent years progress has been made in efforts to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies. First, at the Japan-China Summit Meeting held on May 9, 2018, Japan and China agreed to establish a “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China” with the aim of avoiding unintended confrontations between the naval vessels and aircraft of the SDF and PLA. The mechanism went into operation in June of the same year.

As for multi-national initiatives, in April 2014, navies of participating countries of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), including Japan, the United States, and China, adopted the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). CUES sets forth a code of conduct such as procedures and communication method to ensure safety for unexpected encounters by vessels or aircraft of the navies of these countries. In November 2014, the United States and China agreed on measures pertaining to mutual notification of military activities, together with rules of behavior to avert collisions in waters and airspace in accordance with CUES and other frameworks. In September 2015, the two countries announced an agreement concerning an additional annex stipulating rules of behavior to avert air encounters. Between ASEAN and China, official discussions have been held for the establishment of the Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC).

It is strongly hoped that these initiatives designed to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies will supplement the existing international order and that the countries concerned, including China, refrain from unilateral actions that add to tension and act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law.

National Maritime Security Initiatives

(1) Maritime Security in the Middle East

The Middle East has seen intermittent attacks on ships in recent years.

Since a coalition force led by Saudi Arabia launched bombing campaigns against the Houthis in Yemen in 2015, sporadic attacks on military and commercial ships have been seen in waters such as those off Yemen and the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb.

In the Strait of Hormuz and its vicinity, attacks on private sector oil tankers have been seen since May 2019. As tensions including those over U.S.-Iran relations have increased in the Middle East, U.S. and French initiatives have been launched to secure safe navigation.

See Chapter 2, Section 9-2 (Situation in the Gulf Region)

This code is not legally binding and does not supersede the annexes of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and other international treaties.
(2) Piracy

Piracy seen at various locations has become a threat to maritime traffic. The number of maritime piracy and armed robbery incidents (hereinafter referred to as piracy incidents) in the world\(^3\) came to a peak of 445 in 2010, followed by 439 in 2011, and 297 in 2012, indicating a downtrend (the number stood at 162 in 2019). The decline has depended heavily on the fall in the number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

The number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden rose rapidly from 2008 to 218 in 2009, 219 in 2010, and 237 in 2011, following a persistent uptrend, accounting for more than a half of the global total and attracting great international concern as a threat to safe navigation. In the recent years, however, the number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has remained low as a result of various initiatives taken by the international community including Japan (the number stood at zero in 2019; see Part III for Japan’s initiatives).

The international counterpiracy initiatives in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden include counterpiracy operations by the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF151), a multinational force that was created in January 2009 by the U.S. Force-led Combined Maritime Force (CMF)\(^4\) based in Bahrain. So far, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Turkey, the ROK, Pakistan and other countries have participated in the CTF151, conducting zone defense operations to counter piracy. The EU for its part has conducted Operation Atalanta to counter piracy since December 2008. In the operation, naval vessels and aircraft dispatched by EU member countries escort ships and monitor the waters off the coast of Somalia. It has been decided that the operation will continue until the end of 2020.

In addition, some countries have conducted their exclusive operations outside the abovementioned frameworks. Since December 2008, for example, China has deployed naval vessels for counterpiracy operations in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

While the number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has remained low thanks primarily to such international initiatives, Somalia’s unstable security and poverty as fundamental factors behind piracy have not been resolved.

Meanwhile, in Africa, piracy incidents occurred in the Gulf of Guinea (the number of incidents was 64 in 2019). The international community has continued counterpiracy initiatives in this region.

The number of piracy incidents in Southeast Asian waters came to 53 in 2019. Traditionally, maritime armed robbery incidents, including the theft of cash, crewmembers’ belongings, ship equipment and other items, have accounted for most of piracy incidents in the waters. In recent years, however, they included grave incidents in which crewmembers were kidnapped for ransom purposes in the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea off the Philippines.

Counterpiracy measures in Asia include international information sharing and cooperation based on the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP),\(^5\) which was worked out at Japan’s initiative and put into force in 2006. In addition, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand conduct the Malacca Strait Patrols.\(^6\) The cases of abduction for ransom have been confirmed in the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea. In order to respond to this, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines began sea patrols in the area in June 2017 and air patrols in October of the same year.

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3 The numbers of piracy incidents cited in the main text are based on a report by the International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce.
4 The CMF is a multinational force, which operates to promote maritime security, stability, and prosperity, under the U.S. Central Command. Forces from 32 countries participate in the CMF, and the Commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet concurrently serves as the CMF Commander. The CMF is comprised of three combined task forces: Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), which is tasked with maritime security operations; Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) with counter-piracy operations; and Combined Task Force 152 (CTF-152) with maritime security operations in the Persian Gulf. The SDF deploy units to CTF-151.
5 The contracting parties to ReCAAP are the following 20 countries: Australia; Bangladesh; Brunei; Cambodia; China; Denmark; India; Japan; the ROK; Laos; Myanmar; the Netherlands; Norway; the Philippines; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Thailand; the United Kingdom; the United States; and Vietnam.
6 The Malacca Strait Patrols are comprised of: the Malacca Strait Sea Patrols which commenced in 2004; aircraft patrol activities which commenced in 2005; and information sharing activities which commenced in 2006.
Trends in the Arctic Ocean

The area north of latitude 66 degrees 33 minutes is called the Arctic Region. The Arctic Region includes Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. These eight are called Arctic countries. In 1996, the Arctic countries established the Arctic Council to promote cooperation in their common challenges, including sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic Region.

In recent years, moves towards the utilization of trans-Arctic navigation routes and the development of natural resources in the Arctic Ocean have gained momentum in line with a decline in sea ice. From the perspective of security, the Arctic Ocean has traditionally been used for the deployment of strategic nuclear forces and as their transit route. With the decrease in sea ice in recent years, ships have been able to navigate for a longer period of time and more extensively than before. It is therefore considered that the region could be used for deploying maritime forces or maneuvering military forces in the future. In this situation, moves to deploy new military capabilities in the ocean are seen.

In the Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy revised in December 2015, Russia continues to maintain that it would secure its interests in resource development and use of the sea route.

Russia has been developing natural gas on the Yamal Peninsula. In 2018, liquefied natural gas produced on the peninsula was transported to China for the first time via an Arctic Ocean route. As for military arrangements, Russia has set up a joint strategic command for each of the four military districts to unify all of ground, maritime, air and other forces. In 2014, Russia created the Northern Joint Strategic Command reportedly to integrate the Northern Fleet with ground and air forces and cover waters, remote islands and the Arctic coast between the Barents Sea and the East Siberian Sea. In the Arctic Region, Russia is constructing 10 airfields. As for military operations, the Northern Fleet has annually conducted a long-distance navigation to the Novo Sibirski Islands since 2012. Russia has intensified other Arctic military operations including SSBN submarines’ strategic nuclear deterrence patrols and long-range bombers’ patrol flights.

In its Arctic Strategy published June in 2019, the U.S. DoD expressed concern against actions of China and Russia in the Arctic region and a desire for the Arctic to become a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is protected, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges. The United States reportedly plans to increase the number of U.S. Marines in Norway on a rotation basis from about 300 to about 700 from 2017. In October 2018, it sent an aircraft carrier to the Arctic Region for the first time in 27 years for air drills in the Norwegian Sea ahead of the NATO exercise “Trident Juncture 2018”. In December 2016, then U.S. President Obama decided to ban new drilling for oil and natural gas in a majority of U.S. territorial waters in the Arctic to protect marine resources, showing a negative stance towards resource development. However, President Trump signed an executive order repealing this decision of then U.S. President Obama in April 2017.

Aside from coastal states in the Arctic Ocean, 13 countries including Japan, China, the ROK, the United Kingdom, Germany and France, have observer status in the Arctic Council. Notably, China has shown active involvement in the Arctic Ocean, deploying the polar research vessel Xue Long to the Arctic Ocean for 10 times since 1999. In January 2018, they published a white paper titled “China’s Arctic Strategies”. As for Russia, the U.S. DoD pointed out in its Arctic Strategy that Russia is strengthening its presence above the Arctic Circle by deploying Arctic units and establishing new military bases. Moreover, Russia has reportedly threatened to use force against vessels that fail to abide by Russian regulations. The DoD pointed out that Russia could utilize its military capabilities in an effort to deny access to disputed Arctic waters or resources. As for China, the DoD pointed out in its strategy that its operations of icebreaking vessels and civilian research activities could support a future Chinese military presence in the Arctic Ocean including deployment of submarines to the region, and also pointed out that it was attempting to gain a role in the Arctic in ways that may undermine international rules and norms, and there is a risk that its predatory economic behavior globally may be repeated in the Arctic. In May 2019, during his visit to Finland, Secretary of State Pompeo made a speech concerning Arctic policy, in which he stated that all relevant parties should follow the same rules and expressed caution against efforts by China and Russia to expand into the Arctic region.

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8 In August 2019, U.S. President Trump stated that buying Denmark’s autonomous territory Greenland was “strategically interesting.” In response, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen described the Trump statement as “absurd” and the Greenland government issued a statement noting that Greenland was not for sale. President Trump countered that he would postpone his visit to Denmark as the prime minister was not willing to discuss any Greenland deal.

9 In 2012, Xue Long became the first polar research vessel to sail across the Arctic Ocean. In 2013, the cargo freighter Yong Sheng became the first Chinese commercial ship to cross the Arctic Ocean. Canadian scientists took part in Xue Long’s voyage to the Arctic Ocean in 2017, and they succeeded for the first time in trial navigation of the Arctic Northwest Passage (along the north coast of Canada). China launched its second polar research vessel named Xue Long 2 in 2018.
Policy” in which they claimed to be one of the geographically closest states to the Arctic Circle with rights pertaining to the development of resources. They also announced their intention to build a “Polar Silk Road.” In September 2015, it was reported for the first time that five Chinese naval vessels sailed in the Bering Sea between the Arctic Ocean and the Pacific and sailed in the U.S. territorial waters near the Aleutian Islands. The PLA Navy’s future moves in the Arctic Ocean will attract attention.
Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)

The transfer and proliferation of WMDs, such as nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, and ballistic missiles that deliver such weapons, have been recognized as a significant threat since the end of the Cold War. In particular, there still remain strong concerns that non-state actors, including terrorists, against which traditional deterrence works less effectively, could acquire and use WMDs.

Nuclear Weapons

During the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 raised awareness of the danger of a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that took effect in 1970 prohibited countries, other than those that exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device in or before 1966 (the United States, the then Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, as well as France and China, which acceded to the NPT in 1992), from having nuclear weapons, and provided that arms control and disarmament of nuclear forces would be pursued through two-way negotiations.

As of January 2020, the NPT had been signed by 191 countries and regions. While some countries that had previously possessed nuclear weapons became signatories to this treaty as non-nuclear weapon states by abandoning these weapons, India, Israel, and Pakistan still refuse to accede to this treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. Meanwhile, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests and declared the development and possession of nuclear weapons.

The U.S.-Russia New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is set to expire in February 2021 or be extended for up to five years if agreed between the countries. While Russia has proposed an early extension, the United States has not specified its stance on the matter. The treaty’s future course, including its extension, is still uncertain. The United States has indicated its hope to pursue an arms control framework including China. However, China, which is deemed to have increased its inventory of nuclear warheads as well as developed and deployed their means of delivery and continued to enhance the capability of its nuclear force, has reiterated that it has no intention to participate in any U.S.-Russian arms control framework. In the future, it may be important to launch some international arms control and disarmament initiative including not only the United States and Russia but also China and others. Future trends regarding nuclear arms control and disarmament should be closely watched.

See Fig. I-3-7-1 (Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals and Their Major Means of Delivery by Country)

KEY WORD

New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)

The treaty stipulates that each country would reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and the number of deployed delivery vehicles to 700 in seven years following the treaty’s entry into force. Both the United States and Russia have claimed that they accomplished the reduction target by February 2018. As of March 2020, the United States had 1,373 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 655 deployed delivery vehicles, while Russia had 1,326 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 485 deployed delivery vehicles.

1 See Chapter 2, Section 2-2 for China’s ballistic missile development
Biological and chemical weapons are easy to manufacture at relatively low cost and are easy to disguise as most materials, equipment, and technology needed to manufacture these weapons can be used for both military and civilian purposes. These weapons are attractive to states and non-state actors, such as terrorists, seeking asymmetric means of attack. Biological weapons have the following characteristics: (1) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive; (2) there is usually an incubation period of a few days between exposure and onset; (3) their use is hard to detect; (4) even the threat of use can create great psychological effects; and (5) they can cause mass casualties and injuries depending on the circumstances of use and the type of weapon. As has been pointed out, advancements in life science could be misused or abused for the development of biological weapons.

The United States, United Kingdom, and France launched missile strikes on chemical weapons-related facilities in Syria in April 2018, determining that its Assad regime had used chemical weapons in Eastern Ghouta. North Korea is an example of an actor that is still presumed to possess these chemical weapons and has not entered into the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In addition, such incidents as the Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995 showed that the threat of the use of WMDs by terrorists is real and that these weapons could cause serious damage if used in cities. The United Kingdom criticized Russia over its highly likely involvement in the use of Novichok, a military-grade chemical weapon developed by Russia, in the attack on a former Russian intelligence agent that occurred in the United Kingdom in March 2018. In retaliation, countries including European countries and the United States expelled Russian diplomats. In September 2018, the United Kingdom released its joint statement with the United States, France, and Germany, emphasizing Russia’s involvement in the attack.
3 Ballistic Missiles and Other Missiles

Ballistic missiles are propelled by rockets for parabolic flights and are capable of attacking distant targets. They can be used as a means of delivering WMDs, such as NBC weapons. As they fall at a steep angle and high speed, highly accurate systems are required for intercepting them effectively.

The deployment of ballistic missiles in a region where an armed conflict is under way runs the risk of intensifying or expanding the conflict. Additionally, it has the risk of further heightening tension in a region where military confrontation is ongoing, leading to the destabilization of that region. Furthermore, ballistic missiles are used as a means of attacking from a distance or threatening another country that has superior conventional forces.

In recent years, along with the threat of ballistic missiles, analysts have pointed to the threat of cruise missiles as a weapon which is comparatively easy for terrorists and other non-state actors to acquire and has the potential for proliferation. Because cruise missiles are cheaper to produce compared to ballistic missiles and are easy to maintain and train with, many countries either produce or modify cruise missiles. At the same time, it is said that cruise missiles have a higher degree of target accuracy and that they are difficult to detect while in flight. Moreover, because they are smaller than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be concealed on a ship to secretly approach a target and present a serious threat if they carry WMDs in their warheads.

4 Growing Concerns about Transfer and Proliferation of WMDs and Other Technologies

Even weapons that were purchased or developed for self-defense purposes could easily be exported or transferred once domestic manufacturing becomes successful. For example, certain states that do not heed political risks have transferred WMDs and related technologies to other states that cannot afford to invest resources in conventional forces and attempt to offset this with WMDs. Some of these states that seek WMDs do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk, and furthermore, due to their weak governance, terrorist organizations are active in their territories. Therefore, it is conceivable that in general, the possibility of actual use of WMDs would increase.

Moreover, since it is uncertain whether such states can effectively manage the related technology and materials, there is a concern that chemical or nuclear substances will be transferred or smuggled out from these states with high likelihood. For example, there is a danger that even terrorists who do not possess related technologies would use a dirty bomb to release radioactive materials for pollution as a means of terrorist attack so long as they gain access to such materials. Nations across the world share concerns regarding the acquisition and use of WMDs by terrorists and other non-state actors.

The proliferation of WMDs and other related technologies has been noted in numerous instances. For example, in February 2004, it came to light that nuclear-related technologies, mainly uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists in Pakistan. It has also been suggested that North Korea supported Syria’s secret nuclear activities.4

Furthermore, there has been significant transfer and proliferation of ballistic missiles that serve as the means of delivery of WMDs. The former Soviet Union and other countries exported Scud-B to many countries and regions, including Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan. China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable number of countries now possess ballistic missiles. In addition, Pakistan’s Ghauri and Iran’s Shahab-3 missiles are said to be based on North

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4 According to “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” U.S. Director of National Intelligence (January 2014)
Korea’s Nodong missiles. Furthermore, North Korea is alleged to have provided conventional arms and ballistic missiles to the Houthis of Yemen, have sent ballistic missile engineers to Syria, have transferred special tiles used for chemical weapon production facilities to Syria, and have continued military relations with Myanmar, including ballistic missile system trade.  

North Korea made rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches in the 1980s and 1990s. It is believed that an underlying factor behind this fact was North Korea’s imports of various materials and technologies from outside of North Korea. It is also noted that North Korea transfers ballistic missile airframes and related technologies and promotes the further development of missiles using funds procured through such transfer.  

The international community’s uncompromising and decisive stance against the transfer and proliferation of WMDs and other technologies has put significant pressure on countries engaged in related activities, leading some of them to accept inspections by international organizations or abandon their WMD and other programs altogether. Meanwhile, it is pointed out that, in recent years, states in which transferring is a concern have sustained their external transfer while averting international monitoring by falsifying documentation, diversifying transport routes, and utilizing multiple front companies and intermediaries to illicitly export WMDs. Additionally, intangible technology transfer has arisen as a cause for concern. Namely, those states have obtained advanced technologies which could be adapted for the development and manufacturing of WMDs and other technologies via their nationals—researchers and students who have been dispatched to leading companies and academic institutions in developed countries.

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5 According to reports released by the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee (March 2018 and March 2019)  
6 According to the report titled “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” which was submitted by U.S. DoD to Congress in May 2018, etc.
Conflicts or disputes concerning racial, religious, territorial, resources and other issues are occurring or continuing in various places in the world. Human rights violations, refugees, famine, poverty, or any other consequences of conflicts or disputes can have impacts on not only parties to the conflicts or disputes but also a wide range of other countries.

There are prominent cases where power vacuums in some countries with political instability or weak governance have become a hotbed for activities of international terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). These organizations are leveraging inadequate border control to obtain personnel, weapons and funds, and to send fighters to various places to carry out organized terrorist attacks or give some instructions to local individuals or groups, expanding and stepping up their operations across national borders. In recent years, they have also been spreading their violent extremist ideologies through the Internet and other means across the world. As a result, there were cases where young people in Western and other developed countries felt sympathy for the violent radical beliefs due to their social discontent, participating as fighters in international terrorist groups and carrying out terrorist attacks in their home countries. Terrorist organizations such as ISIL and Al Qaeda have propagated practical tactics of terrorism through their journals and other media and encourage their supporters to implement them. Under the circumstances, what is called “home-grown” terrorism, in which residents are inspired by violent extremism spread by terrorist organizations to conduct terrorist attacks at home, remains a threat. In recent years, particularly, “lone-wolf” terrorist attacks, planned and committed by individuals or groups who have no official relations with international terrorist organizations but have become influenced by them in some ways, have occurred in Western and other countries.

The characteristics of “lone-wolf” terrorism include that it uses items that are relatively easy for individuals to obtain, such as knives, vehicles, and guns, and that it is difficult to detect signs of planned attacks and prevent them from happening.

In March 2019, an unprecedented incident occurred in Christchurch, New Zealand, where the perpetrator of a terrorist attack (a shooting) live-streamed the crime on social media and the footage was instantaneously disseminated.

Concerning international counterterrorism measures, international cooperation has grown even more important as terrorism threats have diffused and deepened on the diversification of terrorist attacks and the improvement of terrorist groups’ attack capabilities. Currently, countries are cooperating not only in military measures but also in initiatives in various other fields to cut off funding sources for terrorist organizations and prevent the international movement of terrorists and the diffusion of violent radical beliefs.

The objective of ISIL as an organization is to claim the establishment of the caliphate based on its own interpretation of Sharia law and the protection of Sunni Muslims. ISIL expanded its presence from 2013 in Iraq and Syria, which had been destabilized due to religious disputes and civil war, and took control of northern and eastern Syria and northern Iraq from January 2014. In June 2014, ISIL unilaterally declared the establishment of the Islamic State, with Baghdadi as its leader.

In response to the expansion of ISIL’s reach, the Coalition forces led by the United States have been conducting air strikes in Iraq and Syria since August and September of the same year, respectively. The coalition forces have also

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1. The term means “successor” in Arabic. After Prophet Muhammad died, the term was used to refer to the leader of the Islamic community. Afterwards, monarchs of hereditary dynasties, including the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, utilized this title.

2. One of the two major sects of Islam. The split from the Shia sect originated in the difference in views on the successors (caliphate) to the Prophet Muhammad (died in 632), who founded Islam. Sunni Islam, currently the largest sect, is the majority in most of the Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa region. Shia Islam is the state religion in Iran and Shiites are also the majority in Iraq.
engaged in providing local forces with education, training, and weapons, and conducting hostage rescue by the special forces. In cooperation with such military operations and with support from the United States and other countries, the Iraqi Security Forces and local forces in Iraq and Syria proceeded to recapture ISIL’s strongholds. In March 2019, U.S. President Trump declared in a statement that the United States and coalition forces had liberated 100% of ISIL-controlled areas in Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, with the support from Russia, the Assad administration conquered ISIL strongholds mainly in southern and eastern Syria. In December 2017, Russia declared that Syria’s entire territory had been liberated from ISIL. In October 2019, the United States announced that it had killed ISIL’s leader Baghdadi in northwestern Syria.

While anti-ISIL military operations have made progress, it is pointed out that about 11,000 ISIL fighters remain in hiding in Iraq and Syria.3 In this regard, terrorist attacks believed to be conducted by ISIL are occurring in various regions of Iraq and Syria, targeting security forces, the Coalition forces, citizens and others, indicating that ISIL remains still active. In Syria, in particular, it is pointed out that ISIL may regain strength by exploiting the drawdown of some U.S. forces in northeastern Syria and the launch of Turkish military operations against Kurdish forces in October 2019 to reconstitute its capabilities and resources in Syria and strengthen its ability to plan attacks abroad.4

Meanwhile, after ISIL declared the establishment of the “Islamic State,” multiple “provinces” have been established outside of Iraq and Syria as the “Islamic State” territories, and these “provinces” have been conducting terrorist acts in various places.

Organizations supporting ISIL exist in Southeast Asia and have conducted terrorist attacks targeting security forces and citizens. Moreover, in South Asia, large-scale explosions occurred simultaneously in Sri Lanka in April 2019, claiming the life of a Japanese national. The Sri Lanka authority exposed a local Islamic extremist organization as the perpetrator while referring to possible support for the organization from a foreign terrorist organization. After the attack, ISIL claimed responsibility for it, and the United

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3 According to “U.S. Forces Reset in Syria, ISIS Struggles to Re-form” (November 27, 2019) posted on the website of the U.S. DoD.

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See Fig. I-3-8-1 (Major Terrorist Groups Based in Africa and the Middle East)
States points out that the terrorist attacks may have been inspired by ISIL. As ISIL is spreading violent extremist ideologies through social media and other means, there are concerns that the threat is spreading to South Asia and other areas.

In addition, there continues to be a concern in Western countries that foreign fighters entering Iraq and Syria will return to their home countries to carry out a terrorist act after receiving combat training and gaining combat experience in the countries. Terrorist attacks in which ISIL fighters with fighting experience in Syria have allegedly engaged have taken place in Europe, including simultaneous attacks in Paris in November 2015 and serial bombings in Belgium in March 2016. Western countries have begun to accept some of these foreign fighters following Turkey’s announcement in November 2019 that it would repatriate as many as the 1,200 ISIL fighters it had detained. The international community will need to continue various efforts to prevent terrorism by foreign fighters.

3 Movements of International Terrorist Organizations Other Than ISIL-Affiliated Groups

Al Qaeda, which operates primarily in Pakistan and Afghanistan, is believed to have weakened as many of the group’s senior members were killed by U.S. operations. However, it continues activities as a central organization, such as issuing instructions and recommendations to its affiliates in North Africa and the Middle East. In addition, the current Al Qaeda leader Zawahiri has repeatedly issued statements calling for terrorist acts against the West. The possibility of Al Qaeda attacks has not disappeared.

Other currently active Sunni Islamist militant organizations associated with Al Qaeda include Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) based in Yemen, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) based in Algeria and operating in neighboring Mali, Tunisia and Libya, and Al-Shabaab based in Somalia.

The Taliban, an Islamic extremist organization based in Afghanistan, continues to conduct armed activities in various parts of Afghanistan. Although an agreement was signed between the United States and the Taliban in February 2020 that included a conditional phase-out of U.S. troops in Afghanistan and the start of negotiations between Afghans, the Taliban has since carried out attacks on Afghan security forces and there is no denying that it may continue to carry out suicide bombings and shootings targeting the government and foreigners.
Japan’s Security and Defense Policy

Chapter 1
Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security and Defense

Chapter 2
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Chapter 3
Japan’s Security and Defense Policy

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Build-up of Defense Capability, etc.

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Chapter 1

Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security and Defense

Section 1

Measures to Ensure Japan’s Security

The independent state of a nation must be protected in order for it to determine its own direction in politics, economy, and society, as well as maintaining its culture, tradition, and sense of values. In addition, peace and security are essential for the people to live with a sense of safety and for Japan to continue to prosper. However, peace, safety, and independence cannot be secured by simply wishing for them. The essence of national security can be found in creating an international environment that is stable and predictable, while preventing the emergence of threats before they occur, through diplomacy. Nevertheless, the reality of the current international community suggests that it is not necessarily possible to prevent invasions from the outside by employing only nonmilitary means such as diplomatic efforts, and in the event that the nation were to be invaded it would not be able to remove such a threat. Defense capabilities are the nation’s ultimate guarantee of security, expressing its will and capacity to eliminate foreign invasions, and they cannot be replaced by any other means.

For this reason, Japan is striving to develop appropriate defense capabilities to protect the life and properties of its nationals and to defend the territorial land, sea, and airspace of Japan. At the same time, it is strengthening the Japan–U.S. Alliance with the United States, which shares basic values and interests with Japan. This underlines that the peace and security of Japan is ensured through developing seamless defense measures by coupling Japan’s own defense capabilities with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

Moreover, from the perspective of improving the security environment surrounding Japan and preventing the emergence of threats to Japan, the importance of the role played by defense capabilities is increasing in cooperative efforts as a member of the Indo-Pacific region and the international community.

Upon recognizing the role of defense capabilities, Japan aims to ensure national security as well as bringing peace and safety to the Indo-Pacific region, and eventually to the entire world through making its utmost efforts in a variety of fields.

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1 In general, this refers to the relationship, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, whereby both nations, as countries sharing fundamental values and interests, coordinate and cooperate closely in a range of areas in security, politics, and economics.
Chapter 1
Basic Concepts of Japan's Security and Defense

Section 1
Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense

Since the end of World War II, Japan made a decision not to repeat the ravages of war and has worked hard to build a peace-loving nation. The Japanese people desire lasting peace, and the principle of pacifism is enshrined in the Constitution. Article 9 of which prescribes the renunciation of war, the prohibition of war potential, and the denial of the right of belligerency of the state. Of course, since Japan is an independent nation, these provisions do not deny Japan’s inherent right of self-defense as a sovereign state. Thus, the Japanese Government interprets this as a constitutional right to possess the minimum armed forces needed to exercise that right. Therefore, Japan, under the Constitution, maintains the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as an armed organization, holding its exclusively defense-oriented policy as its basic strategy of defense, and continues to keep it equipped and ready for operations.

Section 2
The Government’s View on Article 9 of the Constitution

1 Permitted Self-Defense Capability

Under the Constitution, Japan is permitted to possess the required minimum self-defense capability. The specific limit is subject to change according to the prevailing international situation, the level of military technologies, and various other factors, and it is discussed and decided through annual budget and other deliberations by the Diet on behalf of the people. Whether such capability constitutes a “war potential” that is prohibited by Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution must be considered within the context of Japan’s overall military strength. Therefore, whether the SDF should be allowed to possess certain armaments depends on whether such possession would cause its total military strength to exceed the constitutional limit.

The possession of armaments deemed to be offensive weapons designed to be used only for the mass destruction of another country is not permissible under any circumstance as it would, by definition, exceed the minimum necessary level. For example, the SDF is not allowed to possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), long-range strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers.

2 Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution

In the past, the Government had interpreted Article 9 of the Constitution to mean that armed force could be used to exercise the right of self-defense only when the following three conditions (Three Conditions for “Use of Force”) were met: (1) When there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan; (2) When there are no appropriate means to deal with such aggression other than by resorting to the right of self-defense; and (3) When the use of armed force is confined to be the minimum necessary level. However, it has been concluded in the Cabinet’s decision made on July 1, 2014, “Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People,” that “the use of force” should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense when the following “Three New Conditions” are met: (1) When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness; (2) When there is no appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people; (3) Use of force to the minimum extent necessary. The following is the interpretation of the measures for self-defense permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution defined in the abovementioned Cabinet decision.

The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit “use of force” in international relations in all forms. However, when considered in light of “the right (of the people) to live in peace” as recognized in the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution which stipulates, “their (all the people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” shall be the supreme consideration in governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of self-defense necessary to maintain its peace and security and to ensure its survival. Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful situations where the people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness is fundamentally overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence, “use of force” to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted. This is the basis, or the so-called basic logic, of the view consistently expressed by the government to date with regard to “use of force” exceptionally permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution, and clearly shown in the document “Relationship between the Right of Collective Self-Defense and the Constitution” submitted by the Government to the Committee on Audit of the House of Councillors on October 14, 1972.

This basic logic must be maintained under Article 9 of the Constitution.

To date, the Government has considered that “use of force” under this basic logic is permitted only when an “armed attack” against Japan occurs. However, in light of the situation in which the security environment surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed and continuously evolving by shifts in the global power balance, the rapid progress of technological innovation, and threats such as weapons of mass destruction, etc., in the future, even an armed attack occurring against a foreign country could actually threaten Japan’s survival, depending on its purpose, scale, and manner, etc.

Japan, as a matter of course, will make the utmost diplomatic efforts, should a dispute occur, for its peaceful settlement and take all necessary responses in accordance with the existing domestic laws and regulations developed based upon the constitutional interpretation to date. It is still required, however, to make all necessary preparations in order to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people.

Under such recognition and as a result of careful examination in light of the current security environment, it has been concluded that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date.

As a matter of course, Japan’s “use of force” must be carried out while observing international law. At the same time, a legal basis in international law and constitutional interpretation need to be understood separately. In certain situations, the aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution is, under international law, based on the right of collective self-defense. The Government has reached a conclusion that although this “use of force” includes those which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted under the Constitution, only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words, for defending Japan.

3 Geographical Boundaries within Which the Right of Self-Defense May Be Exercised

The use of the minimum necessary force to defend Japan under the right of self-defense is not necessarily confined to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory, territorial waters, and airspace. However, it is difficult to give a general definition of the actual extent to which it may be used, as this would vary with the situation.

Nevertheless, the Government interprets that, as a general rule, the Constitution does not permit armed troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas deployment of troops would exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level of self-defense.

4 Right of Belligerency

Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution prescribes that “the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” However, the “right of belligerency” does not mean the right to engage in battle; rather, it is a general term for various rights that a belligerent nation has under international law, including the authority to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force and to occupy enemy territory. On the other hand, Japan may of course use the minimum level of force necessary to defend itself. For example, if Japan inflicts casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force in exercising its right of self-defense, this is conceptually distinguished from the exercise of the right of belligerency, even though those actions do not appear to be different. Occupation of enemy territory, however, would exceed the minimum necessary level of self-defense and is not permissible.
Under the Constitution, Japan has efficiently built a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military, observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

1 Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy

The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, that the extent of the use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense. The policy including these matters refers to the posture of a passive defense strategy in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution.

2 Not Becoming a Military Power

There is no established definition for the concept of a military power. For Japan, however, not becoming a military power that could threaten other countries means that Japan will not possess and maintain a military capability strong enough to pose a threat to other countries, beyond the minimum necessary for self-defense.

3 Non-Nuclear Principles

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles refers to those of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not allowing them to be brought into Japan. Japan adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a fixed line of national policy.

Japan is also prohibited from manufacturing and possessing nuclear weapons under the Atomic Energy Basic Law. In addition, Japan ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and as a non-nuclear weapons state, has an obligation not to manufacture and acquire nuclear weapons.

Civilian control refers to the priority of politics to the military in a democratic state or democratic political control of military strength. Japan has, by giving serious reflection to the regrettable state of affairs that happened until the end of World War II, adopted the following strict civilian control system that is entirely different from the one under the former Constitution. Civilian control aims to ensure that the SDF is maintained and operated in accordance with the will of the people.

The Diet, which represents Japanese nationals, makes legislative and budgetary decisions on such matters as the allotted number of the SDF personnel and main organizations of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF. It also issues approval for defense operations of the SDF. The function of national defense entirely falls under the executive power of the Cabinet as a general administrative function. The Constitution requires that the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State who constitute the Cabinet be civilians. The Prime Minister, on behalf of the whole Cabinet, holds the authority of supreme command and supervision of the SDF. The Minister of Defense, who is exclusively in charge of national defense, exercises general control and supervises over the SDF duties. In addition, the National Security Council of Japan under the Cabinet deliberates important matters.

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1 Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that “The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management.”

2 Article 2 of the NPT states that “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes...not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...”

3 The Cabinet’s control over military matters was strictly limited.
matters on national security.\textsuperscript{4}

At the MOD, the Minister of Defense takes charge of and manages the matters concerning national defense, and as the competent minister also manages and operates the SDF. The Minister of Defense is assisted in policy planning and political affairs by the State Minister of Defense, the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) and the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense.

In addition, the Special Adviser to the Minister of Defense provides the Minister of Defense with advice on important affairs under the jurisdiction of the MOD based on their expertise and experience. The Defense Council consisting of political appointees, civilian officials and uniformed SDF personnel deliberates on basic principles concerning affairs under the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Through these ways, the MOD aims to further ensure civilian control.

As mentioned above, the civilian control system is well established. However, in order to ensure that the system achieves good results, it is necessary to continue making practical efforts in both political and administrative aspects, along with a deep interest in national defense taken by the people.

\textsuperscript{4} See Chapter 2, Section 1
As the security environment surrounding Japan grows increasingly testing, Japan faces mounting security challenges that it needs to address. Under such circumstances, it is necessary to carry forward the policies pertaining to national security from a strategic perspective under strong political leadership with the Prime Minister at its core. For this reason, the National Security Council was established in the Cabinet to provide a platform to discuss important matters with regard to Japan’s security, and has been serving as a control tower for foreign and defense policies. Since its establishment in December 2013, the Council has met 224 times (as of the end of April 2020). The National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) are also deliberated and approved in this National Security Council.

The National Security Secretariat established within the Cabinet Secretariat provides constant support to the National Security Council as its secretariat. The Secretariat is also tasked with planning and designing, and overall coordination of basic guidelines and important matters with regard to foreign and defense policies pertaining to national security. Administrative organs that are deeply involved in policies support the Secretariat with both personnel and information. Considering that the coverage of security has been expanding to the economic and technology fields in recent years, in order to address challenges to the national security in the economic field, “Economy Group” was set up in the Secretariat in April 2020. The Secretariat has many civilians and uniformed personnel of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) with concurrent posts, who are engaged in the planning and designing of policies, as well as the utilization of respective specialized knowledge. In addition, global military trends and other information are shared in a timely manner.

The enhanced ability to formulate national security policies has led to the systematic alignment of Japan’s national security, and to the provision of a direction for policies with regard to new security challenges. Furthermore, individual defense policies are formulated and efforts to accelerate decision-making are made based on the basic guidelines discussed at the National Security Council, and this is contributing significantly to improved development and implementation of policies within the MOD.

See Fig. II-2-1 (Organization of the National Security Council)

Fig. II-2-1 Organization of the National Security Council
Organization of the MOD/Self-Defense Forces (SDF)

1. Organizational Structure Supporting Defense Capability

To fulfill their mission of defending Japan, the MOD/SDF consists of various organizations, mainly the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as armed forces.

2. Systems to Support the Minister of Defense

The Minister of Defense takes charge of and manages the matters related to the defense of Japan as the competent minister, and is in overall charge of the SDF duties in accordance with the provisions of the SDF Law. The Minister is supported by the State Minister of Defense, the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) and the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense. There are also the Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense, who advise the Minister of Defense, and the Defense Council, which deliberates on basic principles concerning affairs under the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, there are the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, who organizes and supervises the administrative affairs of each bureau and organization to support the Minister of Defense, and the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, who is responsible for the overall coordination of duties such as those related to international affairs.

Moreover, the Internal Bureaus of the MOD, Joint Staff, Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Air Staff Office, and the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA), as an external bureau, have been established in the MOD. The Internal Bureaus of the MOD are responsible for basic policy relating to the duties of the SDF. The Director-General of the Minister’s Secretariat and the Directors-General of each Bureau within the Internal Bureaus, along with the Commissioner of ATLA who is in charge of defense equipment administration, support the Minister of Defense in accordance with their respective responsibilities, by providing assistance from a policy perspective – namely, to ensure that the affairs under the jurisdiction of the MOD are properly carried out in accordance with laws and regulations in order to accomplish the duty of the MOD. The Joint Staff is a staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning the operation of the SDF. The Chief of Joint Staff provides centralized support for the operations of the SDF for the Minister of Defense from a military expert’s perspective.

The Ground Staff, Maritime Staff and Air Staff are the staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning their respective services except operations of the SDF, with the Chiefs of Staff for the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) acting as the top ranking expert advisers to the Minister of Defense regarding these services. In this manner, the MOD has ensured that the support for the Minister from a policy perspective and the support for the Minister from a military expert’s perspective are provided in a well-balanced manner like the two wheels of a cart, so to speak, in order for the Minister of Defense to appropriately make decisions. This existing concept regarding the support system for the Minister of Defense has been made even more explicit by Article 12 of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Act, which has been amended to stipulate that the support for the Minister of Defense provided by the Director-General of the Minister’s Secretariat and the Directors-General of each Bureau as well as the Commissioner of ATLA shall be conducted in cooperation with the support for the Minister by each Chief of Staff, since 2015, when the Act was amended for the establishment of ATLA and the reorganization of Joint Staff, etc., as part of an initiative for the MOD reform.

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1. The MOD and the SDF form a single organization. Whereas the term “Ministry of Defense” refers to the administrative aspects of the organization, which manages and operates the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, the term “SDF” refers to the operational aspects of the organizations whose mission is the defense of Japan.

2. The Government has made replies regarding civilian control and the role of the civilian officials in the Internal Bureaus during the Diet deliberations on the Amendment Act, stating: “Civilian control means prioritizing politics over the military in democratic countries. Civilian control in our country consists of control by the Diet, control by the Cabinet (including the National Security Council), and control within the MOD. Control within the MOD means that the Minister of Defense, a civilian, manages, operates, and controls the SDF. In addition to support from political appointees, such as the State Minister of Defense and Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense, support from civilian officials in the Internal Bureaus also plays an important role in aiding the exercise of civilian control by the Minister of Defense. The role of civilian officials in the Internal Bureaus in civilian control is to support the Minister of Defense, and there is no relationship in which civilian officials of the Internal Bureaus issue commands to units.”
3 Base of Defense Administration in Regional Areas

The MOD has Regional Defense Bureaus in eight locations across the country (Sapporo City, Sendai City, Saitama City, Yokohama City, Osaka City, Hiroshima City, Fukuoka City, and Kadena Town) as its local branch in charge of comprehensive defense administration.

In addition to implementing measures to alleviate the impact on local communities hosting bases and inspecting equipment, Regional Defense Bureaus carry out various measures to obtain the understanding and cooperation of both local public entities and local residents towards the MOD/SDF activities.

See Part IV, Chapter 5, Section 1 (Collaboration with Local Communities)
Organizations Responsible for Japan’s Security and Defense

Chapter 2

Fig II-2-2-1 Organizational Chart of the MOD/SDF

Cabinet
Prime Minister

Minister of Defense

National Security Council

Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense

State Minister of Defense

Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (up to three people)
Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two)
Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense
Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense

Internal Bureaus
- Bureau of Defense Policy
- Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning
- Bureau of Personnel and Education
- Bureau of Local Cooperation

Councils, etc.
- Defense Personnel Review Board
- Central Council on Defense Facilities

Institutions
- National Defense Academy
- National Defense Medical College
- National Institute for Defense Studies
- Defense Council
- Joint Staff
- Ground Staff Office
- Maritime Staff Office
- Air Staff Office
- Defense Intelligence Agency
- Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance

Attached Organizations
- Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency
- Regional Defense Bureaus (eight)
- Cooperative Organization
- Cooperative Units
- SDF Intelligence
- Security Command
- SDF Supervised Units of Communication Systems
- SDF Physical Training School
- SDF Central Hospital
- SDF Regional Hospitals
- Provincial Cooperation Offices

Units and Organizations
- Units and organizations of the Ground Self-Defense Force
- Units and organizations of the Maritime Self-Defense Force
- Units and organizations of the Air Self-Defense Force

Cooperative Units
- SDF Security Force
- SDF Special Operations
- SDF Physical Training School
- SDF Central Hospital
- SDF Regional Hospitals

Cooperative Organization
- Provincial Cooperation Offices

"Excluding temporary or special positions

Video: GSDF—toward a new dimension
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WzWSOKSknc4

MSDF official PR video ～STRENGTH & READINESS～
URL: https://youtu.be/tqvQCZy9icY

Video: Protecting our Peaceful Sky—six ASDF missions
URL: https://youtu.be/QvQxurm0BMQ

Video: ATLA official PR video (digest)
URL: https://youtu.be/N7iy0vqULUI
## Organizations Responsible for Japan's Security and Defense

### Outline of the MOD/SDF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Outline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Bureaus</strong></td>
<td>Responsible for basic policy relating to the duties of the SDF (defense and security affairs, basic conduct of the SDF [political and administrative affairs such as planning and drafting of laws and regulations or government-level policies], personnel affairs, budgets, etc.)&lt;br&gt;Composed of the Bureau of Defense Policy, Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning, Bureau of Personnel and Education, and Bureau of Local Cooperation, in addition to the Minister’s Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Staff (JS)</strong></td>
<td>A staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning the operation of the SDF&lt;br&gt;Responsible for making plans on defense and security affairs concerning joint operation and making action plans&lt;br&gt;The Minister’s commands concerning the operations of the SDF are delivered through the Chief of Staff, JS and orders concerning operations of the SDF are executed by the Chief of Staff, JS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground Staff Office</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Maritime Staff Office</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Air Staff Office</strong></td>
<td>Staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning the duties of each SDF unit&lt;br&gt;Responsible for making plans on defense and security affairs of each SDF unit and making plans on buildup of defense capabilities, education and training, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GSDF</strong></td>
<td>Ground Component Command&lt;br&gt;Composed mainly of Airborne Brigades, Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigades, etc.&lt;br&gt;Assumes unified command over GSDF troops.&lt;br&gt;Regional Armies&lt;br&gt;Composed of multiple divisions and brigades, and other directly controlled units (such as engineer brigades and antiaircraft artillery groups)&lt;br&gt;There are five regional armies, each mainly in charge of the defense of their respective regions&lt;br&gt;Divisions and Brigades&lt;br&gt;Composed of combat units, combat support units, logistics support units and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MSDF</strong></td>
<td>Self-Defense Fleet&lt;br&gt;Consists of key units such as the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Air Force (consisting of fixed-wing patrol aircraft units and such), and the Fleet Submarine Force&lt;br&gt;Responsible for the defense of sea areas surrounding Japan primarily through mobile operations&lt;br&gt;Regional Districts&lt;br&gt;There are five regional districts who mainly protect their responsible territories and support the Self-Defense Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASDF</strong></td>
<td>Air Defense Command&lt;br&gt;Composed of four air defense forces&lt;br&gt;Primarily responsible for general air defense duties&lt;br&gt;Air Defense Force&lt;br&gt;Composed of key units such as air wings (including fighter aircraft units and others), the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (including aircraft warning and control units), and Air Defense Missile Groups (including surface-to-air guided missile units and others)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Defense Academy of Japan</strong></td>
<td>An institution for the cultivation of future SDF personnel&lt;br&gt;Offers a science and engineering postgraduate course and a comprehensive security postgraduate course equivalent to master’s or doctoral degree from a university (undergraduate and postgraduate courses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Defense Medical College</strong></td>
<td>An institution for the cultivation of future SDF medical personnel&lt;br&gt;An institution for the cultivation of future SDF officers who are public nurses, nurses, and SDF engineering personnel&lt;br&gt;Offers a medical course that complies with university establishment standards for PhD programs for schools of medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Institute for Defense Studies</strong></td>
<td>An organization that functions as a “think tank” of the Ministry of Defense&lt;br&gt;Conducts basic research and studies related to the administration and operation of the SDF&lt;br&gt;Conducts research and studies on security&lt;br&gt;Conducts research and compiles data on military history&lt;br&gt;Management and publication of data on military history&lt;br&gt;Educates and trains SDF personnel and other senior officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defense Intelligence Headquarters</strong></td>
<td>Central intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense, which collects, analyzes and reports on information related to Japan’s national security&lt;br&gt;Collects various military information including imagery and geographical information, signal data, and publicized information; comprehensively analyzes and assesses the information; and provides intelligence to related organizations within the ministry and relevant ministries and agencies&lt;br&gt;Consists of the Directorate for Administration, Directorate for Programs, Directorate for Joint Intelligence, Directorate for Assessment, Directorate for Geospatial Intelligence, and Directorate for Signal Intelligence, as well as six communication sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance</strong></td>
<td>An organization that inspects overall tasks of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF from an independent position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Defense Bureau (eight locations nationwide)</strong></td>
<td>Responsible for making plans on defense and security affairs of each SDF unit and making plans on buildup of defense capabilities, education and training, etc.&lt;br&gt;Responsible for making plans on defense and security affairs concerning joint operation and making action plans&lt;br&gt;The Minister’s commands concerning the operations of the SDF are delivered through the Chief of Staff, JS and orders concerning operations of the SDF are executed by the Chief of Staff, JS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency</strong></td>
<td>An external bureau in charge of effective and efficient procurement of defense equipment and international defense equipment and technology cooperation&lt;br&gt;Implementation of constant project management throughout the life cycle of defense equipment from an integrated perspective&lt;br&gt;Smooth and prompt reflection of each unit’s operational needs in equipment procurement&lt;br&gt;Proactive initiatives in new areas (further internationalization of defense equipment and investments in advanced technological research, etc.)&lt;br&gt;Achievement of procurement reform and maintenance and strengthening of the defense technological and industrial bases at the same time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces

Chapter 2
Organizations Responsible for Japan's Security and Defense

Part 2
Japan's Security and Defense Policy
Fig. II-2-2-4 Location of Principal SDF Units [for illustrative purposes] [As of March 31, 2020]
Joint Operations System of the SDF

In order to rapidly and effectively fulfill the duties of the SDF, the MOD/SDF has adopted the joint operations system in which the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF are operated integrally. Furthermore, in the future, it will work toward building an architecture that is capable of realizing cross-domain operations including new domains, which are space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum.

Outline of Joint Operations System

(1) Role of Chief of Joint Staff
a. The Chief of Joint Staff develops a joint operations concept for SDF operations, and centrally supports the MOD on SDF operations from a military expert’s perspective.
b. The Minister’s commands concerning the operations of the SDF are delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff, and orders concerning operations of the SDF are executed by the Chief of Joint Staff. In doing this, the Minister’s commands and orders are delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff not only in cases where a joint task force is organized, but also in cases where a single SDF unit is employed to respond.

(2) Relationship between Chief of Joint Staff, and Other Chiefs of Staff
The Joint Staff undertakes functions relating to the operations of the SDF, while the Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Offices undertake functions for unit maintenance, such as personnel affairs, building-up defense capability, and education and training.

See Fig. II-2-2-5 (Operational System of the SDF and Roles of the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces)

Strengthening Joint Operational Functions

(1) Past Initiatives
In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making relating to the operations of the SDF and to make the process swifter, in October 2015, the Bureau of Operational Policy was abolished and some of its functions, such as the planning and drafting of laws and regulations relating to unit operations, were transferred to the Bureau of Defense Policy in order to unite affairs concerning actual operations of the units into the Joint Staff. This change has made the Joint Staff assume...
work that the Internal Bureaus had previously conducted, such as external explanations, including replies at the Diet, and communication and coordination with related ministries and governmental agencies. Regarding this work, therefore, the Administrative Vice Chief of Joint Staff, a Vice-Chief of Joint Staff level post for civilian officials, and the Joint Staff Councilor, a post for civilian officials at the level of a division director and department director general have been established to conduct external coordination duties, etc., taking advantage of the expertise of civilian officials concerning actual operations of the units.

(2) Future Initiatives

In order to realize cross-domain operations, the Joint Staff’s posture designed for efficient SDF operations and for new domains will be strengthened, thereby enabling swift and effective exercise of the SDF’s total capabilities. In addition, the future framework for joint operations will be examined.

### Duties of the Self Defense Forces

The Ministry of Defense and Self Defense Forces are national administrative entities and obviously require a legal basis in carrying out their respective duties. The Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense defines the administrative scope of the Ministry of Defense, and Article 5 of the Act states that the Self Defense Forces Law determines the duties, actions, and authority of the Self Defense Forces. The Self Defense Forces Law provides a list (similar to an index) of what the Self Defense Forces are allowed to do in accordance with specified procedures to address various situations.

Article 3 in the Self Defense Forces Law divides the duties of the Self Defense Forces into main duties (item 1 of the same article) and secondary duties (items 1 and 2 of the same article). Defense actions to defend Japan correspond to main duties, and only the Self Defense Forces carry out these duties.

Secondary duties consist of “duties for maintaining public order as necessary” (secondary duties under item 1) and duties defined by other laws “to an extent that does not interfere with performance of the main duties” (secondary duties under item 2). The former includes public security operations that police entities cannot handle alone, maritime security operations, destruction measures against ballistic missiles and other weapons, and measures against intrusion of territorial airspace. The latter covers responses to situations that will have an important influence (logistics support activities), international peace cooperation activities (international peace cooperation operations and international disaster relief operations), and activities related to Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security (Cooperation and Support Activities, etc.). These main and secondary duties are jointly known as “inherent duties.”

Activities handled by the Self Defense Forces on the basis that it is appropriate to utilize skills, experience, and organizational functions cultivated by the Self Defense Forces over many years are known as “additional duties” (separate from inherent duties). These include transportation for national guests, education and training consignments, and cooperation with athletic events.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duties for the Self Defense Forces in ensuring Japan’s peace, independence, and national security</th>
<th>Main duties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activities by the Self Defense Forces that directly ensure Japan’s peace, independence, and national security</td>
<td>Defense of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities by the Self Defense Forces that directly ensure Japan’s public peace and protects the lives and assets of Japanese people (including mine disposal and Rescue and Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas)</td>
<td>Sustaining public order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities that contribute to Japan’s peace and security through responses to situations that will have an important influence</td>
<td>Responses to situations that will have an important influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities that contribute to maintaining peace and security in international society, including Japan, through promotion of international cooperation</td>
<td>International peace cooperation activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secondary duties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activities by the Self Defense Forces that directly ensure Japan’s peace, independence, and national security (Inherent Duties)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities that contribute to Japan’s peace and security through responses to situations that will have an important influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities by the Self Defense Forces that directly ensure Japan’s public peace and protects the lives and assets of Japanese people (including mine disposal and Rescue and Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities that contribute to maintaining peace and security in international society, including Japan, through promotion of international cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Japan’s Security and Defense Policy

Chapter 3

Outline of the National Security Strategy (NSS)

1 Japan’s National Security Policy Framework

The NSS approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet in December of 2013 represents Japan’s first ever basic policy on national security with a focus on diplomatic affairs and defense policy. The NSS defines approaches that Japan should follow based on a long-term view of its national interests. It replaces the Basic Policy on National Defense, which had served as the basis for Japan’s defense policies theretofore.

The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which was established based on the NSS, defines basic policies for Japan’s future defense, the role of its defense capabilities, and objectives for specific Self-Defense Forces (SDF) equipment. The NDPG was formulated with a medium-to-long-term outlook because the acquisition of defense equipment and the establishment of troop operational systems cannot be accomplished overnight and requires many years of planning. The NSS and NDPG are mainly designed for the next decade or so.

The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) specifies a maximum budget and the amount of mainstay defense equipment to be acquired over the subsequent five-year period in order to achieve the defense capability targets defined in the NDPG. The fiscal year budget is drawn on the MTDP substantiated as projects, and the necessary expenses for each fiscal year will be appropriated based on relevant situations.

To date, the NDPG has contained mention of nationwide basic security policies focusing on defense policy to a certain extent. The NSS carries great meaning as the definitive statement of the Government’s basic policy on national security, with a focus on diplomatic affairs and defense policy.

2 Outline of the NSS: Proactive Contribution to Peace

Japan is committed to continuing the path it has followed to date as a peace-loving nation and, as a major player in international politics and business, it also seeks its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region from the perspective of a Proactive Contribution to Peace. Japan will contribute more proactively than ever before to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community.

In achieving the aforementioned fundamental principle of national security, the NSS makes national interests and goals clear, and demonstrates a strategic approach that needs to be employed.

See Fig. II-3-1-1 (Relationship among the NSS, the NDPG, the MTDP, and the fiscal year budget)
Fig. II-3-1-2 (Outline of the NSS)
Reference 1 (National Security Strategy [Outline])
### Fig. II-3-1-1  Relationship among the NSS, the NDPG, the MTDP, and the fiscal year budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSS</th>
<th>Based on NSS</th>
<th>Basic Policy on National Security, centered around diplomatic and defense policies (approx. 10-year time frame)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NDPG</td>
<td>Achieve target defense capabilities prescribed</td>
<td>Prescribes future defense force and target levels of defense force that Japan should achieve (approx. 10-year time frame)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTDP</td>
<td>Indicate (limits of) five-year total expenditures and quantity of major equipment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Annual budget</td>
<td>Examine based on the current situations, appropriate annual budget as necessary</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Fig. II-3-1-2  Outline of the NSS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Interests</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Japan’s Strategic Approaches to National Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fundamental Principle of National Security = Proactive Contribution to Peace Based on the Principle of International Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintain Japan’s peace and security, and ensure its survival</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consolidate Japan’s peace and security</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintain and protect international order based on universal values and rules</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reinforce necessary deterrence and prevent direct threats to Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and prevent the emergence of and reduce threats through strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance and enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside of the region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve the global security environment and build a prosperous international community</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening and Expanding Japan’s Capabilities and Roles</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen diplomacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Build a comprehensive defense architecture</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen efforts for the protection of Japan’s territorial integrity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ensure maritime security</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen cybersecurity</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen measures against international terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhance intelligence capabilities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defense equipment and technology cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure the stable use of outer space and promote its use for security purposes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen technological capabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Further strengthen the security and defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure a stable presence of the U.S. Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan’s Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhance the cooperative relations with the ROK, Australia, ASEAN countries, and India</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” with China</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Encourage North Korea to take concrete actions to achieve a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, such as the abduction, nuclear and missiles issues</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Advance cooperation with Russia in all areas</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actively utilize regional and trilateral cooperation frameworks</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperate with partners of the Asia-Pacific region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperate with countries outside the Asia-Pacific region</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen diplomacy at the United Nations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen the rule of law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lead international efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote international peace cooperation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote international cooperation against global terrorism</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share universal values; address development issues and realize “human security”; cooperate with human resource development efforts in developing countries; maintain and strengthen the free trade system; respond to energy and environmental issues; enhance people-to-people exchanges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintain and enhance defense production and technological bases</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boosting communication capabilities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social base</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhancing the intellectual base</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Since it was first formulated in 1976, the NDPG has been established six times. The Current NDPG was formulated as “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (2018 NDPG)” in December 2018.

1 Basic Approach—Building a Multi-Domain Defense Force

Japan’s security environment is becoming more testing and uncertain at a remarkably faster speed than expected when the 2013 NDPG\(^1\) were formulated. On such basis, the current NDPG indicates that Japan will build a “Multi-Domain Defense Force” with a truly effective defense capability that: (i) can execute cross-domain operations, which organically fuse capabilities in all domains, including not only traditional domains—land, sea and air—but also new domains—space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum—, to generate synergy and amplify the overall strength; (ii) is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies; and (iii) is capable of bolstering the ability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats and promoting multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation.

In particular, as capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum, could substantially enhance the military’s overall capabilities to conduct operations, states are exerting efforts to improve capabilities in these fields. Japan will also focus on enhancing such capabilities as well as capabilities to effectively counter attacks by aircraft, ships, and missiles in combination therewith, and enhancing the sustainability and resiliency of defense capability, including logistics support.

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1 National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013)
The NDPG provides the basic policy of Japan’s defense as follows:

1 Basic Policy

In line with the NSS and from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” Japan has enhanced its diplomatic strength and defense capability. Japan has also promoted cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being a cornerstone. In so doing, Japan under the Constitution has adhered to the basic precept of maintaining the exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, ensured civilian control of the military, and observed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Based on this premise, Japan, even amid the realities of a security environment it has hitherto never faced, must strive to preserve national interests identified in the NSS—defend to the end Japanese nationals’ lives, persons and property, territorial land, waters and airspace, and its sovereignty and independence.

Defense objectives are to create a desirable security environment while deterring threats from reaching, and, should a threat reach Japan, to counter the threat. To this end Japan will strengthen: (1) Japan’s own architecture for national defense; (2) the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and (3) international security cooperation. These efforts, including achieving superiority in new domains, which are space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum, must be carried out swiftly and flexibly.

In dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons, U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential: Japan will closely cooperate with the United States. To deal with the threat, Japan will also increase its own efforts. At the same time, Japan will play an active and positive role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

2 Strengthening Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense

In order to squarely address the realities of a security environment that it has hitherto never faced and to securely achieve national defense objectives, Japan will build a national defense architecture that will, in all phases, integrate the strengths at the nation’s disposal, enabling not only the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF efforts but also coherent, whole-of-government efforts, as well as cooperation with local governments and private entities. In particular, Japan will accelerate its efforts and cooperation in such fields as space, cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum, ocean, and science & technology, and also promote measures concerning the formulation of international norms in fields such as space and cyberspace. Japan will also further advance steady-state efforts such as strategic communications.

In order to address a range of situations including armed contingencies and “gray-zone” situations, Japan further needs to seamlessly deal with various situations in a coherent, whole-of-government manner by way of swift and pertinent decision-making under even stronger political leadership, which will be assisted by an enhanced support mechanism.

In addition, Japan will also strengthen organization for disaster response and civil protection, build a posture prepared to evacuate Japanese nationals overseas during emergencies and to ensure their safety, and promote measures to protect infrastructure critical to people’s daily lives, such as electricity and communication, as well as to protect cyberspace.

In addition to this comprehensive defense system, it is important to build the Multi-Domain Defense Force and fulfill various roles during peacetime using the defense force seamlessly and in a combined manner.

3 Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements constitute a cornerstone for Japan’s national security, and the Japan-U.S. Alliance plays a significant role for the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. In this context, Japan needs to press ahead with such efforts as bolstering the ability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats, enhancing and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas, and steadily implementing measures concerning the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan.

4 Strengthening Security Cooperation

In line with the vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” Japan will strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, taking into account the characteristics and situation specific to each region and country. As part of such efforts, Japan will actively leverage its defense capability to work on defense cooperation and exchanges which include bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, and service-to-service exchanges. Furthermore, Japan will also contribute to address global
security challenges. In implementing these initiatives, Japan will position the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone and will work closely with the countries that share universal values and security interests, through full coordination with its diplomatic policy.

### Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability

For priority capability areas in strengthening defense capability, the NDPG sets forth that Japan will develop those areas as early as possible, allocating resources flexibly and intensively without adhering to existing budget and human resource allocation, and undertake necessary fundamental reforms.

### Organization of the SDF

The NDPG states that, in order to realize cross-domain operations, including in the new domains of space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum, the SDF will strengthen joint operations as described in 1 and develop the organization of each SDF service as described in sections from 2 to 4. The current Medium Term Defense Program also includes reorganization of the major SDF units based on the above.
As for the cyber domain, the SDF will maintain a Cyber Defense Unit as a joint unit in order to fundamentally strengthen cyber defense capability.

In respect to the electromagnetic spectrum domain, the SDF will strengthen the posture of the Joint Staff Office and of each SDF service.

The GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units and ballistic missile defense units, the MSDF will maintain Aegis-equipped destroyers, the ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile unit, and the SDF will build comprehensive air and missile defense capability comprising these assets.

The SDF will maintain a maritime transport unit as an integrated unit that allows SDF units to swiftly maneuver and be deployed in joint operations.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Units</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Authorized Number of Personnel</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>154,000</td>
<td>159,000</td>
<td>159,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active-Duty Personnel</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>148,000</td>
<td>147,000</td>
<td>151,000</td>
<td>151,000</td>
<td>151,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized Number of Personnel</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Major Units</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyber Defense Units</td>
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<td>Maritime Transport Units</td>
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<td>Authorized Number of Personnel</td>
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<td>Active-Duty Personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Major Units</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Deployment Units</td>
<td>12 divisions</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
<td>5 divisions</td>
<td>5 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 combined brigades</td>
<td>6 brigades</td>
<td>6 brigades</td>
<td>6 brigades</td>
<td>2 brigades</td>
<td>2 brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Deployment Units</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
<td>3 rapid deployment divisions</td>
<td>3 rapid deployment divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 artillery brigade</td>
<td>1 airborne brigade</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
<td>Central Readiness Force</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
<td>1 armored division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 training group</td>
<td>1 helicopter brigade</td>
<td>Central Readiness Force</td>
<td>Central Readiness Force</td>
<td>1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade</td>
<td>1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1 helicopter brigade</td>
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<td>1 helicopter brigade</td>
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<td><strong>Major Units</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units</td>
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<td><strong>Major Units</strong></td>
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<td>Joint Units</td>
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<td>Authorized Number of Personnel</td>
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<td><strong>Major Equipment/Equipment</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyber Defense Units</td>
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<td>Maritime Transport Units</td>
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<td>Authorized Number of Personnel</td>
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<td><strong>Notes:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Units that were categorized as those deployed in a steady state (peace-time) until 2010 NDPG</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Data on tanks and artillery were not included in 1976 NDPG, 2013 NDPG and 2018 NDPG, but are shown here for making comparisons with Annex Tables for 1995 NDPG up to 2010 NDPG.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Data on fighters were not included in 1976 NDPG but are shown here for making comparisons with Annex Tables for 1995 NDPG up to 2010 NDPG.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions were included in MSDF’s major equipment or ASDF’s major units in 2004 NDPG and 2010 NDPG, but those newly procured are included in the categories of Aegis-equipped destroyers, Air Warning &amp; Control Units, and Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units in 2013 NDPG and 2018 NDPG.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. In 2010 NDPG, Aegis-equipped destroyers with BMD functions were allowed to be additionally procured within the limited number of destroyers above, when separately determined in light of the progress in BMD technologies and financial circumstances.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Including Fighter Aircraft Units consisting of STOVL aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Destroyers were expressed as Anti-submarine Surface Units (for mobile operations) or Anti-submarine Surface Units (regional units) in 1976 NDPG, as Destroyers (for mobile operations) or Destroyers (regional units) in 1995 NDPG, and as Destroyers (for mobile operations) or Destroyers (regional deployment) in 2004 NDPG.</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
firepower. The GSDF will thoroughly implement rationalization and streamlining of these units and appropriately position them to meet the conditions and characteristics of each region.

The number of GSDF personnel will be maintained at 159,000.

3 Organization of the MSDF

The MSDF will maintain reinforced destroyer units including destroyers with improved multi-mission capabilities (FFM), minesweeper units, and embarked patrol helicopter units. The MSDF will organize surface units composed of these units. In addition, the MSDF will maintain patrol ship units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan.

In order to conduct underwater Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and to engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, the MSDF will maintain reinforced submarine units. By introducing a test-bed submarine, the MSDF will work to achieve greater efficiency in submarine operations and accelerate capability improvement, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture.

In order to effectively conduct steady-state, wide-area airborne ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, the MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units.

4 Organization of the ASDF

The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of ground-based warning and control units and reinforced airborne warning units: ground-based warning and control units are capable of conducting surveillance in vast airspace on the Pacific side; and airborne warning units are capable of conducting sustained airborne warning, surveillance and control also during situations with heightened tensions.

The ASDF will reinforce and maintain fighter aircraft units and aerial refueling and transport units.

The ASDF will maintain air transport units which enable it to effectively carry out activities such as maneuver and deployment of ground forces.

The ASDF will maintain unmanned aerial vehicle units which enable it to conduct information collection in areas relatively remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions.

5 Elements Supporting Defense Capability

The NDPG sets forth that the initiatives related to elements supporting defense capability will be emphasized in order for Japan’s defense capability to demonstrate its true value.

Fig. II-3-2-5 (Elements Supporting Defense Capability)
The current MTDP formulated in December 2018 indicates that the SDF will endeavor to build up defense capability based on the five basic policies, in accordance with the NDPG.

Specifically, the SDF will strengthen its structure and capability based on the “Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capabilities” and “Structure of the SDF” of the NDPG.

### Program Guidelines

The MOD/SDF will comprehensively promote various measures to reinforce human resource base such as securing diverse and high-quality talents including diversifying applicant pool, promoting women’s participation and leveraging SDF Reserve Personnel, improving living and work environment, promoting work style reforms, and improving treatment, etc.

In procuring equipment, by properly combining the introduction of new, high performance equipment, with life extension and improvement of existing equipment, the MOD/SDF will efficiently secure defense capability in necessary and sufficient “quality” and “quantity.”

The MOD/SDF will strive to reduce the life-cycle costs and improve cost-effectiveness by reinforcing project management.

In considering increasingly severe fiscal conditions and the importance of other budgets related to people’s daily life, the MOD/SDF will work to dramatically shorten R&D timelines by streamlining its processes and procedures.

Evaluating the operational structure and capability, the MOD/SDF will effectively secure defense capability in necessary and sufficient “quality” and “quantity.”

**Fig. II-3-3-1** Five Basic Policies of the MTDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Category Main Programs</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1.  | Acquiring and Strengthening Capabilities Essential for Realizing Cross-domain Operations | • The SDF will acquire and strengthen capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum.  
• The SDF will strengthen and protect command, control, communications and information (C4I) capabilities that effectively connect capabilities in all domains including the new ones.  
• The SDF will enhance capabilities in traditional domains, such as capabilities in maritime and air domains, stand-off defense capability, comprehensive air and missile defense capability and maneuver and deployment capability.  
• The SDF will enhance sustainability and resiliency of defense capability including logistics support. |
| 2.  | Improving the Efficiency of Acquisition of Equipment and Reinforcing the Technology Base | • In procuring equipment, by properly combining the introduction of new, high performance equipment, with life extension and improvement of existing equipment, the MOD/SDF will efficiently secure defense capability in necessary and sufficient “quality” and “quantity.”  
• The MOD/SDF will strive to reduce the life-cycle costs and improve cost-effectiveness by reinforcing project management.  
• The MOD/SDF will make focused investments through selection and concentration in cutting-edge technologies. The MOD/SDF will also dramatically shorten R&D timelines by streamlining its processes and procedures. |
| 3.  | Reinforcing Human Resource Base | • The MOD/SDF will comprehensively promote various measures to reinforce human resource base such as securing diverse and high-quality talents including diversifying applicant pool, promoting women’s participation and leveraging SDF Reserve Personnel, improving living and work environment, promoting work style reforms, and improving treatment, etc. |
| 4.  | Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance and Security Cooperation | • Japan will further promote a variety of cooperative activities and consultations with the United States, in a wide range of areas under “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.” Japan will also actively facilitate measures for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.  
• In line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific, to strategically promote multilayered security cooperation, Japan will promote defense cooperation and exchanges which include bilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, and interchanges among military branches. |
| 5.  | Greater Efficiency and Streamlining in the Build-Up of Defense Capability | • With respect to hedging against invasion scenarios such as amphibious landing employing large-scale ground forces, the SDF will retain forces only enough to maintain and carry on the minimum necessary expertise and skills, by achieving efficiency and rationalization.  
• Considering increasingly severe fiscal conditions and the importance of other budgets related to people’s daily life, the MOD/SDF will work to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development while harmonizing with other policies and measures of the Government. |

**Fig. II-3-3-2** Projects pertaining to the Priorities in Strengthening Capabilities Essential for Cross-domain Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category Main Programs</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Space, cyber and electromagnetic domains | • Establishment of Space Operations Squadron  
• Development of the Space Situational Awareness System |
| Cyber domain | • Enhancement of structure for Cyber Defense Group, etc.  
• Improvement of the survivability of SDF’s command and communications systems and networks |
| Electromagnetic domain | • Establishment of new specialized units in internal subdivisions and the Joint Staff Office  
• Installation of electronic data collectors and ground radio wave measuring apparatuses |
| Maritime and air domains | • Procurement of new types of destroyers (FFM), submarines, patrol vessels, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1), patrol helicopters (SH-60K, SH-60K upgraded capability), and carrier-borne unmanned aerial vehicles  
• Increase of F-35A, introduction of F-35B, refurbishment of izumo-type destroyers, and enhancement of abilities of F-15 |
| Traditional domains | • Procurement of stand-off missiles (JSM, JASSM, and LRASM)  
• Promotion of R&D concerning hyper velocity gliding projectiles intended for the defense of remote islands |
| Stand-off defense capability | • Procurement of transport aircraft (C-2) and transport helicopters (CH-47JA), and introduction of new utility helicopters |
| Comprehensive air and missile defense capability | • Enhancement of capabilities of Aegis destroyers and Patriot surface-to-air guided missiles  
• Promotion of efforts to obtain cooperation from related local governments for persistent monitoring of GSD Osprey aircraft (V-22) |
| Maneuver and deployment capability | • Preferential procurement of anti-aircraft missiles, torpedoes, stand-off firepower, and intercepter missiles for ballistic missile defense  
• Promotion of efforts for dispersion, recovery from damage, and substitution of infrastructure and other foundations for the SDF operations |
| Securing continuous operations | • Preparing for an umbrella contract for the SDF operations |
| Ensuring the operational availability of equipment | • Preparing for a sufficient budget for maintenance of equipment  
• Expansion of PBL (Performance Based Logistics) and other umbrella contracts |
Quantities of Major Procurement

The Annex Table of the MTDP (FY2019–FY2023) shows details of the quantities of major procurement.

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### Annex Table of the MTDP (FY2019–FY2023) and Unit Prices of the Equipment Items Listed on the Annex Table of the MTDP (FY2019–FY2023)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Unit prices (¹)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Mobile Combat Vehicles</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>Approx. 0.8 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armored Vehicles</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Approx. 1.8 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Utility Helicopters</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Approx. 8.9 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Approx. 5.6 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles</td>
<td>3 companies</td>
<td>Approx. 14.3 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles</td>
<td>5 companies</td>
<td>Approx. 122.4 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land-based Aegis Systems (Aegis Ashore)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Approx. 1.5 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Approx. 0.7 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Howitzers (excluding mortars)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Approx. 1.5 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Approx. 47.6 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Approx. 64.7 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Vessels</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Approx. 7.3 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Ships</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Approx. 7.3 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Approx. 7.3 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Tonnage)</td>
<td>(Approx. 66,000 tons)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Approx. 22.1 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K/K (Upgraded Capability))</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Approx. 7.3 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ship-Borne Unmanned Aerial Vehicles</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Approx. 7.3 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minesweeping and Transport Helicopters (MCH-101)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Approx. 7.3 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft (E-2D)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Approx. 26.2 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fighters (F-35A)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Approx. 11.6 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fighter Upgrade (F-15)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Approx. 3.5 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft (KC-46A)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Approx. 24.9 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transport Aircraft (C-2)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Approx. 22.3 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE)</td>
<td>4 groups (16 fire squadrons)</td>
<td>Approx. 4.5 billion yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Global Hawk)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Approx. 17.3 billion yen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Japan will basically pursue the establishment of 75 Patrol Helicopters and 20 Ship-borne UAVs at the completion of the “NDPG for FY2019 and beyond”, but those exact numbers will be considered during the period of the “MTDP (FY2019–FY2023).”
2. 18 aircraft out of 45 aircraft of Fighters (F-35A) would have STOVLs.
3. The quantity of surface-to-ship-guided missiles includes that of improved ones under development.
4. Regarding surface-to-ship-guided missiles and mid-range surface-to-air guided missiles, the maximum unit prices are indicated, as unit prices vary by acquisition year due to differences in components.
5. Other ships are minesweeping vessels, ocean surveillance ships, and oceanographic research ships, and their unit prices are approximately 16.2 billion yen, 22.1 billion yen, and 20.3 billion yen, respectively.
6. Assembly cost for 16 fire squadrons is scheduled to be allocated during the period of the MTDP.
7. Assembly cost for one Global Hawk is scheduled to be allocated during the period of the MTDP.

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Expenditures

The expenditure target for the implementation of the defense capability build-up described in the MTDP (FY2019–FY2023) amount to approximately ¥27.47 trillion in FY2018 prices.

For the duration of the MTDP (FY2019–FY2023), in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, substantive funds will be secured by means of thoroughgoing greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development, suspending the use of equipment whose importance has decreased, reviewing or discontinuing projects of low cost-effectiveness, optimizing equipment procurement through cost management/suppression and long-term contracts and securing other revenue. The annual defense budgets target for the implementation of this MTDP is expected to be around approximately ¥25.5 trillion over the five years.
Concerning the budgetary process for each fiscal year, in order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan must strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are different from the past. Moreover, to achieve rapid procurement of defense equipment, Japan must pursue flexible and swift project management, and the budgetary process for each fiscal year which will be conducted taking into account the economic and fiscal conditions among other budgets.

The amount of expenses based on contracts (material expenses) to be newly concluded to implement this MTDP will be allocated within the ceiling of approximately ¥17.17 trillion in FY2018 prices (excluding the amount corresponding to payments outside of the program period for contracts that contribute to improving project efficiency such as maintenance), and the future obligation shall be managed appropriately.

The neighboring countries of Japan are making remarkable progress in the modernization of the air forces, for example by deploying the so-called fifth generation fighter aircraft and the latest models of the fourth generation aircraft. In order to secure the defense of Japan in this situation, it is extremely important for the SDF to develop a system that enables flexible operations, including flying aircraft from more airfields, so that air superiority can be constantly secured through the use of high-performance fighter aircraft.

However, out of the 45 air bases and other airfields (including those that are co-used with civilian aircraft; excluding heliports) across Japan that are used by the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, only 20 have a runway with a length of 2,400 meters, which is usually used by fighter aircraft possessed by the ASDF. In particular, in the Pacific Ocean, there is only one such air base, the one on Iwo To, which means that the SDF has limited operational infrastructure in the region.

In this respect, generally speaking, fighter aircraft capable of Short Take-off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) are expected to be able to take off from a runway with a length of around hundred meters. In theory, such fighter aircraft can take off from and land at almost all air bases and airfields (45 locations) used by the SDF.

In light of the limited number of runways usable for conventional fighter aircraft in a small country like Japan, the SDF has decided to introduce STOVL aircraft in order to continuously secure air superiority under the Mid-Term Defense Program that was formulated in 2018.

Accordingly, in 2019, the SDF made a model selection and decided to introduce the F-35B fighter, which, like the F-35A fighter, is the most advanced aircraft that possesses high capabilities in terms of networking and stealth performance. During the period of the current Mid-Term Defense Program (from 2019 to 2023), the SDF is scheduled to acquire a total of 18 F-35B fighters.

In addition, in order to deal with the new security environment and to ensure a full-fledged posture to defend Japan’s sea and airspace, which includes part of the vast Pacific Ocean, while securing the safety of personnel, the SDF will refurbish the Izumo-class destroyers, which are multi-function destroyers, so that the F-35B can be operated from them when necessary.

The SDF will secure the defense of Japan by steadily introducing the F-35B fighter and promoting collaboration with the Izumo-class destroyers.

### Column

#### Acquisition of the F-35B Fighter Aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>F-35B (Lockheed Martin)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fuselage dimensions</td>
<td>Length: approx. 15.5 m; span: approx. 10.5 m; height: approx. 4.5 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat type</td>
<td>Single seat (one pilot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>Maximum of Mach 1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take-off distance</td>
<td>168 m (550 ft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting year of operation</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In FY2020, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will steadily implement initiatives toward building a Multi-domain Defense Force based on the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) and the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDP).

In particular, in order to realize cross-domain operations, the MOD/SDF will acquire and strengthen more capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. In addition, the MOD/SDF will continue to enhance capabilities in maritime and air domains, stand-off defense capability, comprehensive air and missile defense capability, and maneuver and deployment capability, in order to effectively deal with various situations by employing them in combination with the capabilities in the new domains. Moreover, in addition to enhancing the sustainability and resiliency of defense capability including logistics support, Japan gives priority to reinforcing the human resource base in light of the aging population with a declining birth rate and reinforcing the technology base due to advances in military technologies. The MOD/SDF will also strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance as well as security cooperation with other countries in view of changes in the security environment.

At the same time, in this process, the MOD/SDF will strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past and by allocating resources flexibly and intensively. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will further promote jointness of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces in all areas and, avoiding a stove-piped approach, optimize their organizations and equipment.

In addition, considering the increasingly severe fiscal conditions and other factors, Japan will strictly work to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining.

Under the fiscal year 2020 budget, the SDF will steadily acquire and enhance capabilities in new domains, such as the space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains, in light of the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Program.

Regarding the space domain, in order to secure stable use of space, the SDF will proceed with activities such as (i) the development of the organizational structure, including the establishment of the new Space Operations Squadron, (ii) the development of the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) System and SSA satellites (space-based optical telescopes), and (iii) acquisition of equipment capable of identifying the status of electromagnetic interference against Japanese satellites.

Regarding the cyberspace domain, in order to technologically enhance the cyberspace defense capability, the SDF will implement projects to secure and foster highly skilled personnel, including projects to (i) strengthen the organizational structure, including by increasing the staff of the Cyber Defense Group, (ii) make use of the most advanced technology concerning cyberspace, including the use of artificial intelligence and the development of information gathering equipment, and (iii) dispatch SDF personnel to study in special courses at the U.S. National War College and develop an organizational structure of cyberspace education at the GSDF Signal School and High Technical School.

Regarding the electromagnetic domain, in order to acquire superiority in the domain, the SDF will implement projects related to training, exercises and human resource development, including projects to (i) enhance the organizational structure, such as the establishment of a new electronic warfare unit, (ii) conduct research and development of the equipment, such as stand-off electronic warfare aircraft, (iii) strengthen capability of electromagnetic spectrum management through study on technology to support the management of electromagnetic spectrum, and (iv) participate in international exercises.

Through these activities, the SDF will promote the development of truly effective defense capability by acquiring and enhancing capabilities in these new domains.
### Fig. II-4-1-1 Main Projects of Build-up of Defense Capabilities in FY2020 (Priorities in strengthening capabilities necessary for cross-domain operations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capabilities that should be acquired and strengthened</th>
<th>Outline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Capabilities in Space Domain**                     | ○ Development of systems for Space Operations Squadron, etc.  
  - Establishment of Space Operations Squadron in the ASDF  
  - Establishment of Space Domain Planning Group (tentative name) in the Joint Staff  
  ○ Development of the SSA system  
  ○ Development of SSA satellites (space-based optical telescopes)  
  ○ Strengthening of information-gathering capability using outer space, etc. |
| **Capabilities in Cyber Domain**                      | ○ Enhancement of systems of Cyber Defense Group, etc.  
  - Expansion of the system of Cyber Defense Group (from about 220 personnel to about 290 personnel)  
  - Establishment of Cyber Protection Group (tentative name) in the GSDF  
  ○ Enhancement and strengthening of the system and network  
  ○ Securing and development of cyber talents  
  ○ Utilization of cutting-edge cyber technologies, etc. |
| **Capabilities in the Electromagnetic Domain**        | ○ Research and development of devices to neutralize the radar of opponents who intend to invade Japan  
  - Development of stand-off electronic warfare aircraft  
  - Research on anti-air electronic war devices  
  ○ Strengthening of capabilities to minimize electromagnetic jamming from opponents who intend to invade Japan  
  - Procurement of fighters (F-35A/B) with superior electronic protection capability  
  - Improvement of electronic warfare capabilities of F-15 fighters  
  ○ Enhancement of systems of electronic warfare units  
  - Establishment of Electronic Warfare Unit in the GSDF  
  ○ Enhancement of electromagnetic information gathering and analysis capabilities  
  ○ Enhancement of capability of electromagnetic management, etc. |
| **Capabilities in Maritime and Air Domains**          | ○ Procurement of P-1 patrol aircraft (× 3)  
  ○ Procurement of SH-60K patrol helicopters (× 7)  
  ○ Life extension of EP-3 signal reconnaissance aircraft  
  ○ Construction of destroyers ( > 2), a submarine, and a minesweeping vessel  
  ○ Establishment of Temporal Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Unit (tentative name)  
  ○ Establishment of Squadron for Aerial Refueling and Transport  
  ○ Partial refurbishment of Destroyer JS “izumo” for takeoff and landing by F-35B  
  ○ Establishment of F-35A squadron in Misawa Air Base  
  ○ Japan-led development of F-X  
  ○ Introduction of small UUV for underwater defense, etc. |
| **Stand-off defense capability**                      | ○ Procurement of stand-off missiles, etc. |
| **Comprehensive air and missile defense capability**  | ○ Procurement of SM-3 Block IIA  
  ○ Modification to the Patriot system  
  ○ Research and study on the concept of the comprehensive air and missile defense capability, etc. |
| **Maneuver and deployment capability**                | ○ Procurement of type-16 mobile combat vehicles (× 33)  
  ○ Procurement of type-19 155mm wheeled self-propelled howitzers (× 7)  
  ○ Research on testing device for future amphibious technology  
  ○ Maneuver, deployment and field training in remote islands by rapid deployment division and brigade |
| **Sustainability and resilience**                     | ○ Procurement of Type-20 5.56-mm rifle (× 3,283)  
  ○ Procurement of 9mm pistol SFP9 (× 323), etc. |

Type-20 5.56-mm rifle to be newly introduced to the GSDF  
MSDF Destroyer, JS “izumo,” which is to be partially renovated to enable landing and take-off of F-35B fighters  
F-35B fighter aircraft

**Video**: Flight Test of ASDF F-35A (courtesy of Lockheed Martin)  
URL: https://youtu.be/nuK38sIHFfQ

**Video**: Landing of F-35B (STOVL) (courtesy of F-35 Lightning II Joint Program Office)  
URL: https://youtu.be/iqupeS4VXoA
Defense-related expenditures include expenses for improving defense capabilities and maintaining and managing the SDF, as well as expenses necessary for the implementation of measures against neighborhood affairs in the vicinity of defense facilities.

In comparison with the previous fiscal year, defense-related expenditures for FY2020 were increased by 61.8 billion yen to 5,068.8 trillion yen, rising for the eighth consecutive year. When including expenses related to SACO and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), expenses for the introduction of new government aircraft, and expenses for the three-year emergency response plan for disaster prevention, disaster mitigation, and national resilience building, defense-related expenditures were increased by 55.9 billion yen from the previous fiscal year to 5,313.3 trillion yen.

Additionally, the supplementary budget for FY2019 contains an appropriation of 428.7 billion yen to ensure the stable operation of the SDF in response to the security environment surrounding Japan and frequent natural disasters. The first supplementary budget for FY2020 contains 12.1 billion yen for medical instruments to accept infected people in SDF hospitals. The second supplementary budget for the year includes 6.3 billion yen for response to the spread of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) infection.

Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into “personnel and food provision expenses,” which covers items such as wages and meals for SDF personnel, and “material expenses,” which finance the repair and maintenance of equipment, the purchase of fuel, the education and training of SDF personnel and the procurement of equipment and others. Material expenses are further classified into “obligatory outlay expenses,” which are paid based on contracts concluded in previous fiscal years, and “general material expenses,” which are paid under current-year contracts. Material expenses are also referred to as “program expenses,” and since general material expenses include repair...

### Fig. II-4-2-1 Comparison between Defense-Related Expenditures (Initial Budget) of FY2019 and FY2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>FY2019</th>
<th>FY2020</th>
<th>Fiscal YOY growth ((\triangle) indicates negative growth)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual expenditure (note)</td>
<td>50,070</td>
<td>50,688</td>
<td>618 (1.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel and food provisions</td>
<td>21,831</td>
<td>21,426</td>
<td>(\triangle)405 (1.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material expenses</td>
<td>28,239</td>
<td>29,262</td>
<td>1,023 (3.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future obligation (note)</td>
<td>51,627</td>
<td>52,106</td>
<td>479 (0.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New contracts</td>
<td>24,013</td>
<td>24,050</td>
<td>37 (0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing contracts</td>
<td>27,615</td>
<td>28,056</td>
<td>441 (1.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Does not include SACO-related expenses, U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), expenses for the introduction of new government aircraft based on “The Policy Concerning Government Aircraft” (August 7, 2013 decision by the Review Committee on Government Aircraft), and expenses for the three-year emergency response plan for disaster prevention, disaster mitigation, and national resilience. If these are included, the figures are 5,257.4 billion yen for FY2019 and 5,313.3 billion yen for FY2020; and for future obligation, 5,361.3 billion yen for FY2019 and 5,431.0 billion yen for FY2020. Figures may not add up to the total due to rounding.

1 Some projects for build-up of defense capabilities extend over multiple years. In these cases, the fiscal year in which the contract is concluded is different from the fiscal year in which the payment to the contractor is made. Therefore, the future maximum obligation is allocated to the budget as a contract resulting in a Treasury obligation (type of budget that only grants an authority to incur obligations; the contracts can be concluded, but the payment cannot be made). Based on such budgeting, in the fiscal year in which the construction is completed or the equipment is procured, expenses necessary for payment are allocated as budget expenditure, in principle (type of budget that grants authorities to incur obligations and make payment; the contracts can be concluded and the payment can be made). Budget expenditure for payments incurred under contracts concluded in previous fiscal years is called “obligatory outlay expenses,” while expenditure for future fiscal years is termed “future obligation.” For cases where a continued project over multiple years is necessary, there is also a system of continuing expenditure as a means to grant the authority to incur obligations and make payment over multiple years by obtaining a resolution of the Diet integrally for the total cost and the amounts of yearly instalments for the project in advance.
costs for equipment, education and training expenses for personnel, and the purchase of fuel, they are referred to also as “activity expenses.” The MOD terms this classification method as “classification by expenses.”

Personnel and food provision expenses as well as obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory expenses, account for 80% of the total defense-related budget. The remaining 20% of the budget includes spending for repairing equipment and for implementing measures to alleviate the impact on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan. As such, a high percentage of the budget is allocated for maintenance purposes. For this reason, the breakdown of the defense-related expenditures cannot be easily altered in a significant manner on a single-year basis.

In addition to the annual budget expenditure, the amount of future obligations concerning new contracts also indicates payments for the following year and beyond (the amount of future obligation arising in the applicable fiscal year). In the build-up of defense capabilities, it is common to take multiple years from contract to delivery or completion, in areas such as the procurement of vessels, aircraft, and other primary equipment, as well as the construction of buildings such as aircraft hangars and barracks. Consequently, for such items, a procedure is undertaken whereby a multi-year contract is arranged, and it is promised in advance at the time of the contract that payments will be made in the following fiscal year and beyond (within five years, in principle). The sum of money to be paid in the following fiscal year and beyond, based on such a multi-year contract, is called the amount of future obligation. The amount of future obligation concerning new contracts arising in FY2020 increased from the previous fiscal year by 3.7 billion yen (0.2%).

Furthermore, if looked at on a contract basis, which shows the scale of operations, there is an increase from the previous fiscal year of 15.5 billion yen (0.5%).

The comparison with the previous year concerns expenditure excluding the SACO-related expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), expenses for the introduction of a new government aircraft, and expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention/reduction and national resilience. Including these expenses, total defense-related expenditures were as follows: 4,813.6 billion yen in FY2006, 4,801.3 billion yen in FY2007, 4,779.6 billion yen in FY2008, 4,774.1 billion yen in FY2009, 4,790.3 billion yen in FY2010, 4,775.2 billion yen in FY2011, 4,713.8 billion yen in FY2012, 4,753.9 billion yen in FY2013, 4,884.8 billion yen in FY2014, 4,980.1 billion yen in FY2015, 5,054.1 billion yen in FY2016, 5,125.1 billion yen in FY2017, 5,191.1 billion yen in FY2018, 5,257.4 billion yen in FY2019, and 5,313.3 billion yen.
When improving defense capabilities, it is common for work in areas like the procurement of equipment and the upgrading of facilities to be carried out over several years. Consequently, a procedure is undertaken whereby a contract that extends for multiple years is arranged (five years in principle), and the government promises in advance at the time of the agreement to make the payment at a fixed time in the future. Future obligation refers to the sum of money to be paid in the following year and beyond under such contracts, which extend for multiple years.

Example: A case in which 10 billion yen of equipment is procured under a contract that runs for four years.
Initiatives for Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement

In order to achieve further streamlining and rationalization in the build-up of defense capability, the current MTDP sets forth that the MOD will work to secure substantial financial resources through suspension of the use of equipment whose importance has decreased, review of projects of low cost-effectiveness, optimization of equipment procurement such as thoroughgoing cost management and control and efficient procurement including long-term contracts, and securing of other revenues.

In the FY2020 budget, the MOD aims to realize a cost reduction of approximately 431.3 billion yen by implementing the aforementioned streamlining measures. Concrete initiatives introduced in the FY2020 budget are as follows.
- Reduction of approximately 192.2 billion yen through project review, including suspension of the use of equipment of lowered priority
- Reduction of approximately 83.9 billion yen through communalization and optimization of specifications, including use of convertible modules and civilian goods
- Reduction of approximately 32.4 billion yen through efficiency improvement by bulk procurement and joint procurement
- Reduction of approximately 5.3 billion yen through making over five-year long-term contracts
- Reduction of approximately 117.6 billion yen through scrutiny of prices and related costs of equipment

The MOD will also study securing of revenues.

Comparison with Other Countries

It is not possible to accurately compare the amounts of defense expenditures of countries due to a number of factors: there is no internationally unified definition of defense expenditures in the first place; even if defense expenditures were publicly disclosed, their overall amount or their breakdown is sometimes unclear; and the budget system varies by country.

On such basis, if Japan’s defense-related expenditures and those of other countries officially published by each government were converted into dollar amounts, using the purchasing power parity of each country reported by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the results would be as shown in Fig. II-4-2-5 (The Defense Expenditures of Major Countries).

In addition, Fig. II-4-2-6 (Changes in Defense Expenditures in Major Countries Over the Past Ten Years) shows the changes in defense expenditures of Japan’s neighboring countries over the past ten years.
Fig. II-4-2-6 Changes in Defense Expenditures in Major Countries Over the Past Ten Years

Notes: 1. The ratios (rounded to two decimal places) of respective countries’ officially publicized defense expenditures for FY2011 onward when considering their defense expenditures for FY2010 as 1.
2. Regarding Australia, the ratios for 2010 up to 2019 are indicated, as the initial budget for FY2020 was not publicized as of May 2020.
Chapter 5

Development of Legislation for Peace and Security and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Activities since Legislation’s Enforcement

Section 1

Framework for Activities of the SDF and Others

This section gives an outline of a full picture of the framework for the Government’s responses to various contingencies as well as the main operations of the SDF.

1 Responses to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations

The Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and a Survival-Threatening Situation specifies items that should be stipulated as basic principles and basic policies (the Basic Response Plan) regarding responses to an Armed Attack Situation and Anticipated Armed Attack Situation (Armed Attack Situations, etc.) and Survival-Threatening Situations as well as the responsibilities of national and local governments in order to establish a system to respond to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations and thereby contribute to the peace and independence of Japan as well as the safety of the country and the people.

1 Armed Attack Situations, etc. and Survival-Threatening Situations

Based on the Law for Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations etc. (Armed Attack Situation Response Law), in situations such as an Armed Attack Situation, etc. or a Survival-Threatening Situation, the Government is required to adopt the Basic Response Plan, which includes the following items, and ask for approval by the Diet. In addition, once the Basic Response Plan is adopted, a temporary Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) is to be established within the Cabinet, to implement these measures.

a. The Following Items concerning Situations that Need to Be Dealt with:

(1) Sequence of events of the situation, the confirmation of occurrence of an Armed Attack Situation, etc., or a Survival-Threatening Situation, and the facts that support this confirmation

(2) When the situation is confirmed as an Armed Attack Situation, etc., or a Survival-Threatening Situation, the reason why there are no other appropriate means available to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, and the use of force is necessary to respond to the situation

b. An Overall Plan Related to the Response
c. Important Matters Related to the Response Measures

See Fig. II-5-1-1 (Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation)

2 Emergency Situations other than Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations

Based on the Armed Attack Situation Response Law, the government will also implement appropriate and rapid response measures in emergency situations other than an Armed Attack Situation, etc. and Survival-Threatening Situations in order to ensure the peace and independence of the country, and to

References:
1 Official title: Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and a Survival-Threatening Situation

2 "Armed Attack Situations" refers to situations in which an armed attack against Japan from outside occurs or in which it is considered that there is an imminent and clear danger of an armed attack. "Expected Armed Attack Situations" refers to situations in which an armed attack is not yet made but the tension increased and an armed attack is expected. Both situations are collectively called "Armed Attack Situations, etc."

3 A "Survival-Threatening Situation" means a situation where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, which in turn poses a clear risk of threatening Japan’s survival and of overturning people’s rights to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness fundamentally.

4 A contingency situation, other than an Armed Attack Situation and Survival-Threatening Situation, and a situation that may have a significant impact on the security of the nation and the people, including an emergency response situation (a situation where actions that may kill or injure many people by using methods equivalent to those used in an armed attack, or a situation where it is recognized that the relevant actions represent a clear and present threat that necessitate an emergency response by the state).
3 Responses of the SDF

The Prime Minister can issue a Defense Operation order to the whole or part of the SDF when it is deemed necessary for the defense of Japan in Armed Attack Situations and Survival-Threatening Situations. Prior Diet approval is required for a Defense Operation order in principle. The SDF under Defense Operation duty is allowed to exercise the use of force only when the “three conditions for ‘the use of force’” are satisfied.

4 Civil Protection

The Civil Protection Act specifies responsibilities of the national and local governments as well as measures for evacuation, relief, and response to the armed attack induced disasters in order to protect the lives, bodies and property of the people and to minimize the impact on the livelihood of the people in an Armed Attack Situation, etc. and emergency response. If the Minister of Defense finds it unavoidable after receiving a request from prefectural governors, or receives a request from the Task Force Chief, upon approval by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense can issue a civil Protection Dispatch Order to the SDF units, etc. to conduct civil protection measures or emergency response protection measures (including assisting with the evacuation of residents, providing relief to the evacuees and immediate restoration).

Note: The Task Force will be established in the Cabinet for the comprehensive promotion of measures to respond to armed attack situations or a situation where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival.
Responses to Situations that Will Have an Important Influence

The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security\(^7\) aims to strengthen cooperation with foreign countries to respond to the situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security (Situations that Will Have an Important Influence\(^8\)) with the central focus on contribution to the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty by carrying out measures such as logistics support activities and thereby contributing to the peace and security of Japan.

1 Coverage

The armed forces, etc., responding to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, which the SDF may support, are “U.S. Armed Forces engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,” “armed forces of other foreign countries engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the UN Charter” and “other similar organizations.”

2 Response Measures to Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security

Measures to respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security are: (1) logistics support activities, (2) search and rescue activities, (3) ship inspection operations,\(^9\) and (4) other measures necessary to respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.

3 Measures to Avoid Integration with the Use of Force

The law sets forth the following measures in order to avoid integration with the use of force by a foreign country and also to ensure the safety of the SDF personnel:

- The SDF does not conduct activities in “the scene where a combat is actually taking place.” Regarding search and rescue operations, however, when stranded personnel have been located and rescue operations have commenced, the SDF units are allowed to continue search and rescue activities as long as the safety of these units is ensured.
- The commanding officers, etc., of the SDF units order the temporary suspension of activities, etc., if combat operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity.
- The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing activities, and if it is deemed difficult to implement operations smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, the Minister must promptly change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the activities being implemented there.

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7 Official title: Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security.
8 “Situations that will have an important influence” refers to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, including situations that, if left without response, could lead to a direct armed attack on Japan.
9 Operations to inspect and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others) and to request, if necessary, a change of sea route, or destination port or place, for the purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures concerning trade or other economic activities to which Japan is a party, conducted based on the UN Security Council resolutions or with the consent of the flag state (the state that has the right to fly its flag as prescribed in Article 91 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea).
Chapter 5

Development of Legislation for Peace and Security and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Activities since Legislation's Enforcement

Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3 (Response to Attacks by Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others)

Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-2 (Measures against Violation of Japan’s Sovereignty)

3 Maintenance of Public Order and Responses to Aggression that Do Not Amount to an Armed Attack

1 Public Security Operations

(1) Public Security Operations by Order

In the event of an indirect aggression or another emergency situation, the Prime Minister can order the whole or part of the SDF to deploy if it is deemed impossible to maintain public security with the general police force. In principle, the Prime Minister must bring the order to the Diet for deliberation, and request for its approval within twenty days from the day the order has been given.

(2) Public Security Operations by Request

Upon consulting with the Public Safety Commission of the prefecture concerned, the governor of that prefecture can request the Prime Minister to dispatch units, etc., of the SDF if it is deemed unavoidable as the situation will have a serious influence on public security. Following such a request, the Prime Minister can order the SDF to mobilize when a situation calls for such action.

3 Counter-Piracy Operations

When there is a special need to respond to acts of piracy, the Minister of Defense may order SDF units to conduct operations at sea against such acts upon approval by the Prime Minister. In order to obtain approval, the Minister of Defense shall create a response guideline and submit it to the Prime Minister.

4 Destruction Measures against Ballistic Missiles or Other Objects

In cases where ballistic missiles or other objects are flying to Japan as an armed attack or flying to Japan in a Survival-Threatening Situation, and where the “Three Conditions” are met, the SDF can respond with the defense operation.

In cases where ballistic missiles or other objects are flying to Japan but which are not found as an armed attack, the Minister of Defense can take the following measures:

(1) If the Minister of Defense judges that ballistic missiles or other objects are likely to fly to Japan and that it is necessary to prevent damage to human lives and property due to its fall in the territory of Japan, the Minister, upon the approval of the Prime Minister, can order the SDF units to take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles or other objects in the airspace over the territory of Japan or the high seas when such...
objects are actually flying to the country.

(2) In addition to the cases of (1) above, there may be cases where the situation suddenly changes with little information available on the launch, for example, and the Minister of Defense cannot have time to obtain approval from the Prime Minister. In preparation for such cases, the Minister of Defense may create an emergency response manual beforehand and obtain approval from the Prime Minister. Following the emergency response manual, the Minister of Defense can order, for a specified period of time, the SDF units to take measures to destroy ballistic missiles or other objects in the airspace over the territory of Japan or the high seas when such objects are actually flying to the country.

(2) Requirements for Implementation

When all of the following conditions are satisfied, the rescue measures may be implemented:

a. It needs to be confirmed that in the areas where the rescue measures are taken, the competent authorities of the country concerned are maintaining public safety and order at the time, and no act of combat will be conducted;

b. The country concerned consents to the SDF taking the rescue measures (including the use of weapons); and

c. It is expected that coordination and cooperation can be ensured between the units of the SDF and the competent authority of the country concerned in order to carry out the rescue measures as smoothly and safely as possible in response to anticipated dangers.

5 Measures against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace

The Minister of Defense may order SDF units to take necessary measures to make intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, use of weapons, etc.) when a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan’s territorial airspace in violation of international law, the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations.

6 Rescue and Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas

In order to protect Japanese nationals, etc. overseas in emergency situations, the SDF is able to transport those people who need protection of their lives or bodies to a safe place. Moreover, when their lives or bodies can be harmed, the SDF may conduct “rescue measures” that include guarding and rescue of Japanese nationals, etc. if the following requirements are satisfied.

(1) Procedures

Upon a request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and after subsequent consultations between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Defense issues an order following approval by the Prime Minister.

7 Protection of Weapons and Other Equipment of the Units of the U.S. Forces and the Armed Forces of Other Foreign Countries

Based on Article 95-2 of the SDF Law, it has been established that the SDF personnel may protect weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Forces and the armed forces of other foreign countries actually engaging in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in cooperation with the SDF. The basic principles of the article and the Cabinet’s involvement in its operation are provided by “The Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law” decided by the National Security Council.

(1) Coverage

Weapons, etc. of the units of the United States Forces, armed forces of other foreign countries and other similar organizations, that are, in cooperation with the SDF and are, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including bilateral/multilateral exercises but excluding activities in the scene where the combat activities are actually being conducted).

(2) Procedures, etc.

When a request is made by the United States Forces, etc., and only when the Minister of Defense deems it necessary, SDF personnel provide asset protection.

10 It includes an organization, if any, that administers the said country in accordance with a resolution of the General Assembly or the Security Council of the UN.

11 For “The Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law,” see the website of the Prime Minister’s Office for Japan (https://www.kantei.go.jp/content/2016122201.pdf)
Disaster Relief Dispatches and Others

1 Disaster Relief Dispatches

In principle, Disaster Relief Dispatch is conducted as follows: prefectural governors or other officials ask the Minister of Defense, or an officer designated by the Minister, to dispatch the SDF units, etc., in the event of a natural disaster; the Minister or the designated officer will dispatch the units if it is deemed necessary for the SDF to respond to the disaster. This procedure is based on the idea that prefectural governors and other officials should grasp the overall conditions of the disaster and their own disaster relief capabilities first, and then decide whether to make a request for the SDF disaster relief dispatch.

2 Earthquake Disaster Prevention Dispatch and Nuclear Disaster Relief Dispatch

When a warning declaration is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes or a declaration of a nuclear emergency situation is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, the Minister of Defense is authorized to order dispatching units upon a request of the Director of the Seismic Disaster Warning Headquarters or the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister).

See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 5 (Response to Large-Scale Disasters)

Framework for Contributing to the Peace and Stability of the International Community

1 Response to Situations Threatening the International Peace and Security that the International Community Is Collectively Addressing

Under the International Peace Support Act, in order to ensure peace and security of the international community, Japan is allowed to conduct cooperation and support operations for the armed forces of foreign countries engaged in operations for international peace and security in Situations Threatening the International Peace and Security that the International Community is Collectively Addressing. From the perspective of enabling seamless responses to any situation, the International Peace Support Law, enacted as a general law, enables Japan to conduct support operations more expeditiously and effectively for the military forces of foreign countries operating for international peace and security, making it possible to proactively contribute to international peace and security on Japan’s own initiative.

(1) Requirements

The requirement for Japan to offer cooperation and support to the operations of foreign armed forces is the issuance of one of the following UN resolutions (by the General Assembly or the Security Council).

- a. Resolutions that decide, call upon, recommend or authorize the country, which is subject to Japan’s support operations to respond to situations that threaten the peace and security of the international community
- b. Other than (a), resolutions that regard the situations as a threat to peace or a breach of peace and call on United Nations (UN) member states to respond to the situations concerned

(2) Response Measures

The following response measures can be implemented in situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing.

- a. Cooperation and Support Activities

Supplies and services to armed forces of foreign countries (supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport services, base services, lodging, storage, use of facilities, training services and construction) are to be provided.

While the provision of weapons is not included as in the

12 The Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard, the Director General of the Regional Coast Guard Headquarters, and the Director of the Airport Administrative Office may request a disaster relief dispatch. With regard to disaster relief dispatch, earthquake disaster prevention dispatch, and nuclear disaster relief dispatch, (1) SDF personnel ordered for the dispatch may take measures such as evacuation (Article 4 of the Police Duties Execution Law) based on Article 94 of the SDF Law (Authority in Disaster Relief Dispatch, etc.); (2) SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be called up for service in the event of disaster relief dispatch, and SDF Ready Personnel in the event of earthquake disaster prevention dispatch or nuclear disaster relief dispatch; and (3) special units may be temporarily formed as necessary.

13 The Prime Minister issues an earthquake alert with the endorsement of the Cabinet in the event that an earthquake prediction was reported by the Director-General of the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) and when it is deemed necessary to urgently implement emergency earthquake disaster prevention measures.

14 Official title: Law Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, etc. in Situations where the International Community is Collectively Addressing for Peace and Security

15 These refer to situations that threaten the peace and security of the international community, and the international community is collectively addressing the situations in accordance with the objectives of the UN Charter to remove the threat; Japan, as a member of the international community, needs to independently and proactively contribute to these activities.
Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security, the revised law now allows the “provision of ammunition” and “refueling and maintenance of aircraft ready to take off for combat operations.”

b. Search and Rescue Activities
c. Ship Inspection Operations 16 (Those Set Forth in the Ship Inspection Operations Law)

(3) Measures to Avoid Integration with the Use of Force
The following measures are set forth in order to avoid integration with the use of force by a foreign country and also to ensure the safety of SDF personnel:
- Japan does not implement support activities in the scene where a combat is actually taking place. However, when the personnel having been stranded have already been found and rescue operations have commenced, the SDF units are allowed to continue search and rescue activities concerning them as long as the safety of these units is ensured.
- The commanding officers of the SDF units, etc., order a temporary suspension of support activities if combat operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity.
- The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing activities, and if it is deemed difficult to implement operations smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, the Minister must promptly change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the activities being implemented there.

2 International Peace Cooperation Activities

The International Peace Cooperation Act is to set forth a framework for the Implementation of International Peace Cooperation Assignments, with a view to extending appropriate and prompt cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 17 Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security, 18 International Humanitarian Relief Operations, and International Election Observation Operations, and to take measures to extend Contributions in Kind for those operations, thereby enabling active contribution by Japan to international peace efforts centering upon the United Nations.

(1) Requirements for Participation

a. UN PKO
While maintaining the framework of the so-called Five Principles for Participation in PKO, 19 the new law stipulates that the consent for acceptance of countries to which the areas where these operations are conducted belong needs to be recognized as being stably maintained throughout the period of the operations if the SDF conducts so-called safety-ensuring operations or so-called kaketsuke-keigo operations.

b. Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security
Japan is able to participate in Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security whose nature or details are similar to those of UN PKO, when any of the following conditions is satisfied, in addition to the fulfillment of the Five Principles for Participation.

(1) Based on resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council, or the Economic and Social Council of the UN
(2) At the requests of any of the following international organizations:
- The UN
- Organs established by the UN General Assembly or Specialized Agencies, Funds and Programmes of the UN such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or otherwise specified by a Cabinet Order
- Regional organizations, as prescribed in Article 52 of the UN Charter or organs established by multilateral treaties, acknowledged as having the actual achievements or expertise pertaining to the activities of Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security such as the European Union or otherwise specified by a Cabinet Order
(3) At the requests of the countries to which the areas where those operations are to be conducted belong (limited to only those cases that are supported by any of the principal organs of the UN as prescribed in Article 7 (1) of the UN Charter).

(2) Description of Tasks
- Ceasefire monitoring and humanitarian relief operations for afflicted people

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16 Official title: Law Concerning Ship Inspection Operations in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security and Other Situations
17 “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” means the operations that are conducted under the control of the United Nations to respond to conflicts and maintain international peace and security, and that are implemented by two or more participating countries at the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and with the consent of the Parties to Armed Conflict, etc.
18 “Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security” means the operations other than those implemented as United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to respond to conflicts and maintain international peace and security, provided that such operations are implemented under the coordination of two or more participating countries, and with the consent of the Parties to Armed Conflict, etc.
19 Agreements on a ceasefire shall have been reached among the Parties to Armed Conflict; (2) Consent for the conduct of UN PKO as well as Japan’s participation in such operations shall have been obtained from the countries to which the areas where those operations are to be conducted belong as well as from the Parties to Armed Conflict; (3) The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, and not favor any of the parties to the armed conflict; (4) Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline cease to be satisfied, the International Peace Cooperation Corps participating from Japan may terminate the International Peace Cooperation Assignments; and (5) The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessity for the protection of the lives of personnel dispatched, in principle.
- Monitoring, stationing, patrol, inspections at checkpoints and security escort for the protection of safety of specified areas including prevention and suppression of injury or harm against lives, bodies and property of local population, afflicted people and other populations requiring protection (so-called “safety-ensuring” operations)
- Protection of lives and bodies of individuals engaging in international peace cooperation operations or providing support for those operations, in response to urgent requests when unexpected dangers to lives or bodies of such individuals related to operations occur or are imminent (so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations)
- Tasks such as provision of advice or guidance related to works for the purpose of assisting in establishing or re-establishing organizations of the Government relating to national defense or other organizations
- Tasks conducted at organizations for supervision and coordination of tasks to include planning, drafting, coordination or collection and updating of information in Headquarters Office or coordination offices conducting UN PKO and Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security, for the implementation of tasks (of mission headquarters’ operations)

(3) Others
- Dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel to the UN (dispatch of Force Commanders of UN PKO)
  It is possible to dispatch uniformed SDF personnel and have them engage in the tasks of the UN and those concerning overall management of tasks implemented by units of the SDF, etc., or units of armed forces of foreign states participating in UN PKO, at the request of the UN, with the consent of the Prime Minister.20
- Provision of supplies and services to the U.S. Forces, etc., for their operations to cope with large-scale disasters
  It is possible for the SDF to provide the U.S. Forces, the Australian Defence Force, or the Armed Forces of the U.K., Canada or France with supplies or services when they request the provision and are located in an area together with the units of the SDF, etc., and is undertaking operations to cope with large-scale disasters, so far as it does not hinder the performance of International Peace Cooperation Assignments, etc., of the SDF.

3 International Disaster Relief Operations

When large-scale disasters occur in regions overseas, especially in less-developed regions, and the governments of the affected countries or international organizations request assistance, the Minister for Foreign Affairs shall consult with the chief of relevant administrative agencies including the Ministry of Defense (MOD) as well as the National Public Safety Commission regarding the details of such request if dispatch is deemed appropriate.

Following such consultation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs may consult with the MOD to ask for cooperation with regard to operations of SDF units if there is a special need.

The Minister of Defense can order units of the SDF to carry out rescue and medical activities as well as transportation of personnel and supplies based on the consultation above.21

20 The dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel is limited to cases where the consent of the countries hosting the UN PKO for which the dispatched uniformed SDF personnel will conduct operations and of state parties to the conflict regarding the implementation of the UN PKO (when the state parties to the conflict are nonexistent, the consent of the countries where the UN PKO is to be conducted) is deemed to be stably maintained throughout the duration of the dispatch and where circumstances that lead to the suspension of the dispatch are deemed unlikely to occur.

21 The Japan Disaster Relief Team is not to be dispatched if the use of weapons is recognized to be necessary in order to protect the lives and bodies of people engaged in international disaster relief operations or transport, and equipment necessary for such operations due to apparent danger in accordance with the level of security in the disaster-affected country. Therefore, members of the team will not carry weapons in the country concerned for the purpose of protecting the lives and bodies of people engaged in international disaster relief operations and equipment necessary for such operations.
Promotion of Various Preparations for New Missions Based on the Legislation for Peace and Security

Since the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security in March 2016, the MOD/SDF has undertaken various preparations for a variety of new missions based on the Legislation for Peace and Security, such as activities to raise awareness of legal systems and intra-unit rules that were established, education of SDF personnel, as well as development of educational materials necessary for the actual training of various units and the nurturing of instructors. In August 2016, as these preparations were all but completed, each unit of the SDF sets out to implement necessary training in connection with the Legislation for Peace and Security. Between Japan and the United States, and other bilateral and multilateral joint training, Japan started to conduct necessary training related to the Legislation for Peace and Security after coordinating with the countries concerned.

Training and Exercises

In July 2017, the SDF conducted the first exercise on the protection of U.S. vessels based on SDF Law Article 95-2 with the intention to enhance the relationship with the U.S. Navy.

From July to August 2017, the SDF participated in multilateral exercise Khaan Quest 17 to improve various capabilities through conducting exercises on the UN PKO. Between January and February 2019, the SDF participated in multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 19 and conducted training on rescue of Japanese nationals overseas to improve its joint operation capabilities. In Staff Exercise, the SDF also conducted activities including training on cooperation and support activities under the International Peace Support Act.

Dispatch of Staff Officers to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)

In April 2019, Japan decided to dispatch personnel to the MFO headquarters, which conducts activities, such as monitoring of the ceasefire between Egypt and Israel in the Sinai Peninsula.

In making this decision, in accordance with the International Peace Cooperation Act, careful study was made on whether the MFO’s activities satisfied the Five Principles for Participation and whether the activities constituted Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security under the Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations. As a result, since the MFO’s activities were determined to satisfy the Five Principles for Participation and constitute Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security, the dispatch of personnel was decided.
Since the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security, the MOD/SDF have been explaining to and coordinating with the United States and also engaged in the work to develop necessary rules and regulations in order to ensure appropriate operation of the system for the protection of weapons, etc., of the units of the U.S. Forces and the armed forces of other foreign countries (SDF Law Article 95-2). Upon completion of these works, in December 2016, at the National Security Council (NSC) the Government decided on the Implementation Guidelines concerning Article 95-2 of the SDF Law, and the Article became ready to be applied to the U.S. Forces operations. This operationalization helps to further strengthen coordinated surveillance between the SDF and the U.S. Forces and also to further enhance deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the SDF Law set forth the Government’s basic understanding on the article as well as basic principles on the involvement of the Cabinet and disclosure of information in implementing the article. An outline of the guidelines is as follows:

a. Purpose of Article 95-2

This Article is to enable SDF personnel to carry out very passive and limited use of weapons to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment (“the weapons, etc.”) of units of the U.S. Forces, armed forces of other countries or other similar organizations (“the U.S. Forces, etc.”), that are concurrently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including bilateral/multilateral exercises but excluding activities conducted in places where combat activities are actually occurring) in cooperation with the SDF, from infringements which do not amount to an armed attack, because the weapons, etc. can be regarded as an important material means which constitute the defense capability of Japan.

Through the provision of Paragraph 1 of the Article that “excluding activities conducted in places where combat activities are actually occurring,” it is ensured that asset protection is not to be, nor to be legally regarded as being integrated (“ittaika”) with the use of force of the U.S. Forces, etc. and that the SDF personnel never respond to any combat activities by the use of weapons pursuant to the Article. The SDF personnel thus never conduct use of force and this prevents the situation from evolving into combat activities as a result of the use of weapons under the provision of the Article.

This use of weapons does not fall under “use of force” which is banned in Article 9 of the Constitution.

b. Activities that Contribute to the Defense of Japan

“Activities that contribute to the defense of Japan” in the Article may include mainly the following ones, while the Government of Japan is to examine each activity on a case-by-case basis: (1) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities including ballistic missile alert; (2) transportation and replenishment activities in “situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security”; and (3) bilateral/multilateral exercises to enhance capabilities required for defending Japan.

c. Judgment on Whether or Not to Conduct Asset Protection

When the Minister of Defense receives a request from the U.S. Forces, etc., the Minister subjectively should judge whether the activities conducted by the units of the U.S. Forces, etc. in cooperation with the SDF are “activities that contribute to the defense of Japan” and whether asset protection by the SDF personnel is necessary, by considering the objective and content of the activities, capability of the unit, and surrounding circumstances as well as the impacts on performance of the SDF’s regular operations.

(2) Involvement of the Cabinet

Requests from the U.S. Forces, etc. based on Paragraph 2 of the Article should be deliberated in the NSC before the Minister of Defense judges on conducting asset protection if the Minister receives requests in the following cases. However, in case there is no time for dealing with an urgent request by the U.S. Forces, etc., the Minister should promptly report to the NSC regarding judgment of providing asset protection.

(1) The U.S. Forces, etc. makes a request for the first time after the operationalization of asset protection.

(2) The request is made for asset protection in the territory of a third country.

(3) The request is recognized as peculiarly important, although not falling under the above two categories.

In addition, in case asset protection under the situations that will have an important influence is requested, the Prime Minister should clearly state it in the Basic Plan and should
ask for a Cabinet decision on it after deliberations in the NSC.

The NSC Board is to be held flexibly and support the full NSC. In addition, the relevant ministries and agencies are to share information on requests for protection and closely cooperate with each other.

**3) Disclosure of Information**

In the implementation of Article 95-2, if an unusual event occurs in conducting asset protection operation, the Government promptly discloses such an event, and releases a basic plan that specifies matters concerning the implementation of asset protection operations in a situation that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. The Government also strives for appropriate disclosure of information in light of the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Act No. 42 of 1999).

**4 Track Record of Asset Protection Operations in 2019**

In 2019, during ISR activities including ballistic missile alert, SDF vessels conducted asset protection for U.S. military vessels four times, and during joint exercises, SDF vessels conducted asset protection for U.S. military vessels once and SDF aircraft for U.S. military aircraft nine times, totaling 14 times.

See Section 1-3-7 of this Chapter (Protection of Weapons and Other Equipment of the Units of the U.S. Forces and the Armed Forces of Other Foreign Countries)

**5 Conclusion of the New Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)**

In September 2016, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and U.S. Ambassador to Japan signed the Japan-U.S. ACSA. ACSA was approved by the Diet and took effect in April 2017.

The ACSA was prepared as a new agreement to replace the previous Japan-U.S. ACSA to enable the application of existing settlement procedures to the provision of supplies and services from the SDF to the U.S. Forces that become possible under the newly enacted Legislation for Peace and Security.

The new ACSA enables the smooth and expeditious provision of a broad range of supplies and services between the SDF and the U.S. Forces, thereby raising the levels of specific on-site cooperation between them.

Japan also signed ACSAs with the U.K and Australia other than the United States in light of the Legislation for Peace and Security, etc., which obtained Diet approval along with the Japan-U.S. ACSA and took effect in the same year. Subsequently, Japan signed ACSAs with Canada and France, both of which obtained Diet approval in May 2019. The Japan-France ACSA and Japan-Canada ACSA took effect in June and July 2019, respectively.

See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2-6 (Logistics Support)

**5 Assignment of New Mission for the South Sudan PKO**

Japan deployed engineering units to the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) from January 2012 to the end of May 2017. Following the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security, after a comprehensive consideration in light of the local situation and the training for the new additional mission, the Government decided to assign the duty of so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” to the 11th Engineering Unit to be deployed to UNMISS, as well as the duty of joint protection of camps. Following the approval obtained at the 9-Minister Meeting of the NSC, the Cabinet approved the revision of the Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for UNMISS on November 15, 2016.
Three Pillars of Japan’s Defense
(Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense)

Chapter 1
Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense

Chapter 2
Japan-U.S. Alliance

Chapter 3
Security Cooperation
Concerning the strengthening of Japan’s own architecture for national defense, the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) states that Japan will build a truly effective defense capability, “Multi-Domain Defense Force,” which: organically fuses capabilities in all domains including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum; and is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies.

Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of Japan’s national security. Defense capability represents Japan’s will and ability to: deter threat from reaching Japan; and should threat reach Japan, eliminate the threat and, as a sovereign nation, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, defend to the end Japanese nationals’ life, person and property as well as territorial land, waters and airspace.

At the same time, defense capability is essential for Japan to play on its initiative its roles in the Japan-U.S. Alliance at all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. Strengthening Japan’s defense capability to provide for national security is none other than strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Defense capability is essential also for advancing Japan’s efforts in security cooperation with other countries.

Defence capability is the most important strength for Japan in retaining self-sustained existence as a sovereign nation amid security environment it has never faced before. Japan must strengthen this capability on its own accord and initiative.

The NDPG states that, in order to create a security environment desirable for Japan and to deter and counter threats, Japan’s defense capability must be able to serve the following six roles in a seamless and combined manner: (1) response from peacetime to “gray-zone” situations; (2) countering attacks against Japan, including its remote islands; (3) response in space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains during all phases; (4) response to large-scale disasters, etc.; (5) cooperation with the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and (6) promotion of security cooperation.

In particular, in view of protecting the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals, it is all the more important for Japan’s defense capability to fulfill diverse roles on a steady-state basis.

Response from Peacetime to Grey Zone Situations

Among the roles that must be served by Japan’s defense capability as set forth in the NDPG, the idea of “(1) response from peacetime to ‘gray-zone’ situations” is as follows.

The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will enhance its presence on a steady-state basis by actively engaging in, among others, bilateral/multilateral training and exercises and overseas port visits, thereby demonstrating Japan’s will and capability. The SDF will, in close integration with diplomacy, promote strategic communications, including the aforementioned activities by SDF units.

The SDF will leverage its capabilities in all domains to conduct wide-area, persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (hereinafter referred to as “persistent ISR”) activities around Japan. The SDF will prevent the occurrence or escalation of emergencies by employing flexible deterrent options and other measures. Leveraging posture in place for these activities, the SDF will, in coordination with the police and other agencies, immediately take appropriate measures in response to actions that violate Japan’s sovereignty, including incursions into its territorial airspace and waters.

The SDF will provide persistent protection against incoming ballistic missiles and other threats, and minimize damage should it occur.
1 Persistent ISR in the Area Surrounding Japan

1 Basic Concept

Japan is comprised of a little over 6,800 islands, and is surrounded by wide sea space, which includes the sixth largest\(^1\) territorial waters (including inland waters) and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world. The SDF is engaged in persistent intelligence collection and warning and surveillance during peacetime over Japan’s territorial waters and airspace, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly.

2 Response by the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF

The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) monitors ships navigating in the waters surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea from peacetime, using patrol aircraft\(^2\) and other aircraft. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) uses radar sites at 28 locations nationwide, and early warning and control aircraft\(^3\) amongst others, to carry out warning and surveillance activities over Japan and its surrounding airspace. These activities of the MSDF and ASDF are done 24 hours a day. Warning and surveillance activities in major channels are also conducted 24 hours a day by MSDF guard posts, Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) coastal surveillance units, and other assets.\(^4\) Furthermore, in order to maintain a posture to swiftly respond to various situations, warning and surveillance activities are carried out with the flexible use of destroyers, aircraft, and so on as required. The information obtained through such surveillance activities is shared with the relevant ministries and agencies, including the Japan Coast Guard, in order to strengthen coordination.

To show an example of the events that were reported from SDF’s surveillance, following September 2012 when the Government of Japan acquired property rights to and ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsuri Island, Minamikojima Island, and Kitakojima Island), Chinese government vessels carried out intermittent intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands.\(^5\) In June 2016, a Chinese Navy combatant vessel entered Japan’s contiguous zone to the north of the Senkaku Islands.

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1 Excluding overseas territories. The EEZ is the eighth largest in the world if overseas territories are included.
2 Aircraft for monitoring with the purpose of gathering information and intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force. The MSDF possesses P-3Cs and P-1s as fixed-wing patrol aircraft, and SH-H-60Js and SH-60Ks as patrol helicopters.
3 Aircraft with radar capable of monitoring warning control systems omnidirectionally. Being excellent in speed performance and boasting long cruising time, the aircraft is able to fly to distant areas to engage in warning for a longer time. Moreover, as it is also able to engage in warning at high altitude, it has outstanding flight performance and the warning and surveillance capability, such as a long line-of-sight distance. The ASDF has been operating E-767 based on civil aircraft B-767.
4 Article 4(1)(b) of the Act for Establishment of the MOD (Investigation and research required for the performance of duties within jurisdiction) provides the legal basis for early warning surveillance activities by the SDF.
5 Since December 26, 2015, Chinese government vessels equipped with weapons, which appear to be machine guns, have intruded into the territorial waters of Japan.
for the first time. In December 2016, six vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” passed through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and entered the Pacific. This was the first time that the entry of this aircraft carrier into the Pacific Ocean was confirmed. In July 2017, a Chinese naval intelligence collection ship entered Japanese territorial waters southwest of Kojima (Matsumae, Hokkaido) passing east through the Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean. In January 2018, the SDF confirmed that a Chinese submarine and warship had been navigating through the Japanese contiguous waters of the Senkaku Islands on the same day. Furthermore, in April, in waters some 350 km south of Yonaguni Island, a number of (presumed) fighter jets were observed taking off from the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” for the first time. Also in June 2019, the SDF confirmed that six vessels, including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning,” passed through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and entered the Pacific. In April 2020, six vessels, including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning,” passed through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and entered the Pacific. In the same month, the SDF confirmed that the same vessels passed through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea. This time again, carrier-based fighters were observed taking off and landing on the aircraft carrier in the Pacific Ocean. In FY2019 the SDF made public 12 cases of activities involving Chinese naval vessels passing through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island.

It has been pointed out that North Korea is attempting to evade United Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions through smuggling. As part of its regular warning and surveillance activities in Japanese territorial waters, the SDF is carrying out information gathering on vessels suspected of violating the UN Security Council sanctions. During the period from 2018 to the end of March 2020, the SDF patrol aircraft have observed 24 cases of seaborne rendezvous between North Korean tankers and foreign-flagged tankers in the East China Sea. The information was shared with relevant agencies and ministries. In a comprehensive judgment across the government, the vessels concerned are strongly suspected of engaging in ship-to-ship transfers with the North Korean vessels, which is prohibited by UN Security Council resolution. Japan reported this to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea, shared the information with relevant countries, gave information to the relevant countries regarding the tankers concerned and made public announcements on the subject.

In response to these illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers with North Korean vessels prohibited under the UN Security Council resolution, the United States and other concerned countries are carrying out early warning surveillance activities with aircraft using the United States Kadena Air Base in Japan. Australian, Canadian,
New Zealand and French aircraft made patrol flights since April 2018. In addition, naval vessels of the U.S. Navy, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and France carried out enforcement of UN Security Council sanctions imposed against North Korea in sea areas surrounding Japan. The MOD/SDF intend to continue their close cooperation with concerned countries to ensure compliance with the UN Security Council resolution.

Fig. III-1-1-1 (Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Waters and Airspace Surrounding Japan); Fig. III-1-1-2 (Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters around the Senkaku Islands by Chinese Coast Guard Ships)

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8 At the Japan-Canada Summit Meeting held on April 28, 2019, Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, indicated that Canada will extend the period for dispatch of aircraft and vessels for conducting warning and surveillance activities against ship-to-ship transfers of cargo by two years, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed his gratitude.

9 The United Kingdom's naval frigates (early May, from late May to early June, mid-June and mid-December 2018, and early January and from late February to early March, 2019), the Canadian Navy's frigates (early October 2018), the Royal Australian Navy's vessels (early October 2018 and early May and late October 2019) and the French Navy's frigate (spring in 2019) conducted sanctions enforcement in the waters around Japan, including the East China Sea (as of the end of March 2020).
Measures against Violation of Japan’s Sovereignty

1 Warnings and Scrambles in Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace

(1) Basic Concept
Under international law, countries have complete and exclusive sovereignty over their territorial airspace. Scrambling against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace is conducted as an act to exercise the right of policing intended to maintain public order. Unlike measures taken on land or at sea, this measure can be taken only by the SDF. Therefore, the ASDF is primarily responsible for conducting the actions based on Article 84 of the SDF Law.

(2) Response by the MOD/SDF
The ASDF detects and identifies aircraft flying in airspace surrounding Japan using warning and control radars as well as early warning and control aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft heading to Japan’s territorial airspace are detected, fighters and other aircraft scramble to approach them in order to confirm the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. Furthermore, in the event that this suspicious aircraft has actually intruded into territorial airspace, a warning to leave the airspace would be issued, among other responses.

In FY2019, ASDF aircraft scrambled 947 times, which was a decrease by 52 times compared with the previous fiscal year. This is the 3rd highest number of times since 1958.
Chapter 1
Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense

10 This was the first time that a Chinese fighter has been confirmed entering the Japan Sea airspace.

when scrambles commenced and the number continues to be kept relatively high.

Breaking this figure down, planes were scrambled 675 times in response to Chinese aircraft, an increase of 37 times from the previous fiscal year. Chinese aircraft continue to be highly active, as this is the 2nd highest figure since the number of scrambles by country and region was first made public in 2001.

A distinctive example arose in May 2017 when a drone caused an airspace violation as it flew above a Chinese government vessel entering Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands. Japan lodged protests against the Chinese government through diplomatic channels. In August that year, six Chinese military bombers were observed in an unprecedented flight from the East China Sea over the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island northeast across the Pacific to an area off the Kii Peninsula before returning. Then in December, five aircraft including two fighter jets flew over the Tsushima Strait and entered the Japan Sea airspace. Then in April 2018, a (presumed) unmanned Chinese aircraft flew across the East China Sea. With these kinds of acts, China is expanding and intensifying the activities of its air force inside Japanese airspace and one-sidedly escalating its actions in some cases. It is a troubling situation.

ASDF aircraft scrambled 268 times in response to Russian aircraft, which was a decrease by 75 times compared to the previous year.

As a distinctive example, in June 2019, two Tu-95 long range bombers intruded into Japan’s airspace above the territorial waters of Minamidaitojima Island (Okinawa Prefecture). One of them further intruded into Japan’s airspace above the territorial waters of Hachijojima Island (Tokyo). Japan lodged protests against the Russian government through diplomatic channels. In July 2019, two Chinese H-6 bombers and two Russian Tu-95 long-range
bombers carried out long distance joint flights from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea. In addition, one Russian A-50 early warning and control aircraft allegedly supporting Tu-95 long-range bombers intruded into Japan’s airspace above the territorial waters of Takeshima Island in Shimane Prefecture. A Korean fighter fired warning shots to the Russian aircraft. Japan lodged protests against the Russian government which intruded into Japan’s airspace and against the Korean government which fired warning shots to the Russian aircraft through diplomatic channel. In February 2020, a Su-34 fighter-bomber was confirmed for the first time above the Sea of Okhotsk in a scramble. Due attention needs to be paid to the activities of Russian aircraft.

Even after the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)” by Chinese government in November 2013, the MOD/SDF has conducted warning and surveillance activities as before in the East China Sea, including the Chinese ADIZ. The MOD/SDF also engages in strict measures against intrusion of territorial airspace in accordance with international law and the SDF Law.

![Fig. III-1-1-5](image)

**Fig. III-1-1-5** Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and Those of Neighboring Countries/Regions (image)

![Fig. III-1-1-4](image)

**Fig. III-1-1-4** Example Flight Patterns of Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded (image)

**2 Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan’s Territorial Waters**

(1) Basic Concept

With respect to foreign submarines navigating underwater in Japan’s territorial waters, an order for maritime security operations will be issued. The submarine will be requested to navigate on the surface of the water and show its flag, in accordance with international law, and in the event that the submarine does not comply with the request, the SDF will request it to leave Japanese territorial waters.

(2) Response by the MOD/SDF

The MSDF is maintaining and enhancing capabilities for: expressing its intention not to permit any navigation that violates international law; and responding in shallow water areas by detecting, identifying, and tracking foreign submarines navigating under the territorial waters of Japan. In November 2004, the MSDF observed a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigating under Japanese territorial waters around the Sakishima Islands. In response to this incident, the MSDF issued an order for maritime security operations, and continued to track the submarine with MSDF vessels until it entered the high seas.

Recently, in January 2018, a submerged submarine was spotted by MSDF assets including a destroyer moving through Japanese contiguous zones of the Senkaku Islands. The submarine was then observed surfacing in international...
Under international law, countries have complete and exclusive sovereignty over their territorial airspace. When a foreign aircraft flies over a state’s territorial airspace, it is necessary to obtain permission from the state. Intruding into a state’s territorial airspace without the presence of any special circumstance and without permission from the state violates international law, known as “intrusion of territorial airspace.”

The ASDF monitors airspace over Japan and the surrounding areas through radar on a 24-hours-a-day, 365-days-a-year basis and identifies flying aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft which may intrude into Japanese territorial airspace is detected, the ASDF scrambles fighters kept on stand-by. Scrambled fighters monitor the behavior of the potentially intruding aircraft and, as necessary, issue a caution against intrusion. If an intrusion occurs, scrambled fighters warn an intruding aircraft to leave the airspace, or forcibly compel it to land at the nearest airfield. Scrambling against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace is a task comprised of a series of activities starting with the monitor of airspace.

In order to effectively implement scrambling against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace, it is necessary to accurately judge whether or not to scramble fighters. As for this, the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) has been established in a way that encloses Japan. Regarding an aircraft that has been confirmed to have entered the ADIZ by radar, the ASDF judges whether or not to scramble fighters after identifying the aircraft’s nationality and assessing the possibility of intrusion into Japanese territorial airspace.

In recent years, the number of scrambles remains at a high level. The number of scrambles in FY2019 (947) was seven times higher than the number in FY2004 (141), which represented the lowest level since the end of the Cold War. The MOD/SDF will devote full-fledged efforts for scrambling against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace in accordance with international law and the SDF Law from the viewpoint of firmly defending Japan’s territorial land, seas and airspace.

Video: Scramble
URL: https://youtu.be/pq3GE0f38uE

12 MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft and others confirmed observations of submerged submarines navigating through the Japanese contiguous zones in waters west of Amamioshima island, south of Kumejima Island and south of Minamidaitojima Island in May 2013, in waters east of Miyako Island in March 2014, and in waters southeast of Tsushima Island in February 2016. These incidents were made public.
3 Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels

(1) Basic Concept
The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to suspicious armed special operations vessels (unidentified vessels). However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued and the situation will be handled by the SDF in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.

(2) Response by the MOD/SDF
In light of the lessons learned from the cases of an unidentified vessel off the Noto Peninsula in 1999, an unidentified vessel in the sea southwest of Kyushu in 2001, and other similar incidents, the MOD/SDF have been making various efforts. In particular, the MSDF has been taking the following steps: (1) deployment of Patrol Guided Missile Boats; (2) establishment of the MSDF Special Boarding Unit; (3) equipment of destroyers with machine guns; (4) furnishing forcible maritime interdiction equipment (flat-nose shells); (5) improving the sufficiency ratio of military vessel personnel; and (6) enhancing equipment for the Vessel Boarding Inspection Team. In addition, based on “the manual for dealing with suspicious vessels” formulated jointly by the then Defense Agency and the Japan Coast Guard in 1999, they have regularly conducted the training in order to strengthen coordination.

13 A special unit of the MSDF was newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance, and disarm suspicious vessels in the event of vessel boarding inspections under maritime security operations.

14 A non-bursting shell launched from the 76-mm gun equipped on destroyer, the flat front nose of which keeps it from bouncing.
Among the roles that must be served by Japan’s defense capability as set forth in the NDPG, the idea of “(2) countering attacks against Japan, including its remote islands” is as follows.

In response to attack on Japan including its remote islands, the SDF will quickly maneuver and deploy requisite units to block access and landing of invading forces while ensuring maritime\(^1\) and air\(^2\) superiority. Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, the SDF will block invading forces’ access and landing from outside their threat envelopes. Should any part of the territory be occupied, the SDF will retake it by employing all necessary measures.

Against airborne attack by missiles and aircraft, the SDF will respond in a swift and sustained manner by applying optimal means and minimize damage to maintain SDF’s capabilities as well as the infrastructure upon which such capabilities are employed.

In response to attack by guerrillas or special operations forces, the SDF will protect critical facilities including nuclear power plants and search and destroy infiltrating forces.

In responding to such attacks, the SDF will implement cross-domain operations that organically fuse capabilities in space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains to block and eliminate attacks.

In view of protecting the life, person and property of the nationals, the SDF will implement measures for civil protection.

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1. Maritime superiority refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force at sea and can carry out maritime operations without suffering substantial damages by the opposing force.
2. Air superiority refers to the condition in which one side can carry out airborne operations without suffering a significant level of obstruction by the opposing force.
March 2020. The GSDF will deploy an area security unit in charge of the initial response and other units also in Ishigaki Island.

As part of measures to enhance the persistent ISR posture, the SDF has acquired a new type of destroyer (FFM) and E-2D airborne early warning aircraft. The ASDF established Airborne Warning and Control Wing by upgrading the Airborne Early Warning Group in March 2020 and will establish a temporal unmanned aerial vehicle unit (tentative name) within FY2020.

In order to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan while ensuring the safety of SDF personnel, the SDF procured stand-off missiles which are capable of responding from the outside of their threat envelopes, and has started research and development (R&D) on technologies required for new anti-ship missiles and Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectiles (HVGPs) for the defense of remote islands to take all initiatives necessary to defend the islands since FY2018, and technologies required for hypersonic weapons since FY2019.

Also, in order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment of units, initiatives are underway to enhance rapid deployment capabilities through:
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the improvement of Osumi class LST (Landing Ship, Tank); and the introduction of V-22 Ospreys and C-2 transport aircraft. In particular, for the operation of V-22 Ospreys, the MOD determined that the KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT was the best airfield to be used as their deployment site due to positional relationships with the amphibious deployment brigade and relevant units in joint operations, the length of the runway, and potential use as relocation destination of JGSDF Camp Metabaru. In August 2018, the Governor of Saga prefecture expressed their acceptance. The MOD/SDF will continue to work to gain understanding on deployment at the airport from the relevant local authorities and others. Meanwhile, in May 2019, the MOD explained their intention to temporarily deploy V-22 Ospreys at Camp Kisarazu, since there is the prospect that the deployment at KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT will take a certain period of time. In response to the statement of Kisarazu Mayor to cooperate with the provisional deployment plan made in December of the same year, the MOD established a Tactical Airlift Wing that operates Osprey in March 2020.

Meanwhile, various types of training to increase the capability for amphibious operations are being undertaken.

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3 At the KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT, the ramp, aircraft hangars, etc., are to be developed on the west side of the airport. Approximately 70 aircraft, consisting of 17 newly acquired V-22 Ospreys and approximately 50 helicopters transferred from Camp Metabaru are expected to be deployed.
In March 2019, the GSDF Miyako Guard was established, and I started to serve here as public relations sergeant to engage in liaison and negotiation with outside.

As SDF personnel from Miyakojima Island, I made efforts to actively engage with people of the community and cooperators to make ourselves known so that I can act as a bridge between the SDF and people of the community. I also participated in two disaster relief activities, including “disaster relief for collection of waste-oil balls,” which was the first disaster relief mission for the guard. I think we were able to be of help for the community through these activities. In my private life, I was able to share confidence with people of the community little by little through participation in sport events including international triathlon meeting at Miyakojima Island and a local track meet, as well as through volunteer activities, including coastal cleaning activities and support for local events. In doing so, I started to hear, “We are happy with the SDF,” from islanders. One year after the establishment, I am feeling happy to have served here.

I think the gradual building of a relationship and increase in the number of people who understand and cooperate with the SDF are desirable not only for the Guard but also for the community. I will value and try to continue this relationship and make efforts to further expand the understanding.

Lastly, I give thanks that I can serve in Miyakojima Island and will make efforts everyday to meet the expectations from islanders and to set a pattern for other units.

The SDF endeavored to increase its capability through SDF Joint Exercises (field exercise) in October 2019, field training Iron Fist 20 in the United States and other field training in Japan with the U.S. Marines Corps from January to February 2020, as well as field exercises with the U.S. Marine Corps in Japan.

4 The Patriot PAC-3 system is one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type of anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly intercepts aircraft and other targets, the PAC-3 missiles are designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles.
Currently, Japan’s BMD is an effective multi-layered defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis equipped destroyers and the lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE). The upcoming introduction of the land-based Aegis system, Aegis Ashore, will enable our forces to intercept missiles in the upper tier not just from Aegis destroyers but from land.

Today airborne threats to Japan are increasingly complex and diverse, including ballistic missiles equipped with multiple/maneuverable warheads, high-speed and longer-range cruise missiles, and stealth and multi-role aircraft. In order to effectively and efficiently counter these airborne threats by optimum means and minimize damage, it is necessary to establish a structure to conduct integrated operation of various equipment for air defense of each SDF service, not limited to those for missile defense.

Fig. III-1-2-3 (Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense (image))

Establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces for air defense of each SDF service, not limited to those for missile defense
Ascertain the status of operations in common by linking to JADGE* via a network
Simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats under unified command and control (allocation and direction of optimal means for interception, etc.) through JADGE

*SJADGE: Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment is a core system for the command and control as well as communication functions. It centrally processes the information regarding aircraft captured by radars installed nationwide, and it provides fighters with instructions required for scrambling against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace and air defense combat operations. In addition, it controls Patriot and radar, etc. in response to ballistic missiles.

In case ballistic missiles or other objects are launched against Japan as an armed attack, it will be dealt with by issuing a defense operation order for armed attack situations. On the other hand, when such situation is not yet acknowledged as an armed attack, Japan will take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles.

As a response against ballistic missiles or other objects, the Joint Task Force-BMD is formed, with the Commander of the Air Defense Command serving as its Commander, and various postures for effective defense are to be taken under a unified command through JADGE. Furthermore, the GSDF will play a leading role in dealing with damage caused by the impact of a fallen ballistic missile.

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5 JADGE is a core system for the command and control as well as communication functions. It centrally processes the information regarding aircraft captured by radar installed nationwide, and it provides fighters instructions required for scrambling against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace and air defense combat operations. In addition, it controls Patriot and radar, etc. in response to ballistic missiles.

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Fig. III-1-2-3 (Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense [concept])
Fig. III-1-2-4 (Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD [image])
Part II, Chapter 5, Section 1-3-4 (Destruction Measures against Ballistic Missiles)
Response by the MOD/SDF

Since 2016, North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests and launched more than 70 ballistic missiles and others. These military actions by North Korea pose grave and imminent threats to Japan’s security. North Korea expressed its intention to fully denuclearize the Korean Peninsula at the North Korea-United States summit held in June 2018, and disclosed destruction of its nuclear test ground. However, the second North Korea-United States summit held in February 2019 ended without any agreement and North Korea has not so far dismantled all its weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. North Korea is assessed to have already successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads through repeated nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches to date, and it possesses and deploys several hundred ballistic missiles capable of reaching almost every part of Japan. Some of the missiles that were launched in 2019 are presumed to be new models have a shape similar to that of Russian short-range ballistic missile “Iskander,” which can fly at a lower altitude than conventional ballistic missiles and on an irregular trajectory. It is suggested that the aim is to penetrate missile defense systems.

The MOD/SDF continues to carefully monitor the concrete actions of North Korea toward the dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and conducts the necessary intelligence, warning and surveillance activities, and other necessary activities while closely cooperating with the United States and other countries.

Further cooperation with the U.S. Government including the U.S. Forces in Japan is essential for efficient and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related measures including constant real-time sharing of BMD operational and relevant information, and the expansion of BMD cooperation have been agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting).

Furthermore, Japan has closely cooperated with the United States in responding to ballistic missiles, by means such as receiving Shared Early Warning (SEW) from the U.S. Forces, and sharing intelligence gathered by assets including transportable BMD radar (TPY-2 radar) and Aegis-equipped destroyers deployed in Japan by the U.S. Forces.

Maintenance, enhancement and validation of Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities have been actively conducted through training and other activities. Since FY2010, BMD special exercises have been held between the MSDF and the

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Footnote:
6 Information on the area and time of launch, the projected area and time, where and when objects fall relating to ballistic missiles launched in the direction of Japan, which is analyzed and conveyed to the SDF by the U.S. Forces in a short period of time after the launch (The SDF started to receive the information since April 1996).
U.S. Navy, connecting their ships and other equipment via a network to conduct the integrated air and missile defense exercise. The ASDF participated in 2018, and the GSDF in 2019 in this exercise. The exercise is conducted as an integrated air and missile defense exercise aimed to improve tactical skills and strengthen cooperation.

Beyond Japan-U.S. cooperation, it is significant to bolster the cooperation between Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea. In January, March, October and December 2017, trilateral ballistic missile information sharing exercises were held in waters off Japan with the objective of strengthening coordination.

Sensitive information related to ballistic missiles, etc. is adequately shared with relevant countries, including the United States through a secured infrastructure and framework\(^7\) to protect secrets.

The SDF engages in various training in peacetime to improve its capability to counter ballistic missiles. It has been conducting PAC-3 maneuver deployment training from June 2017 in an effort to strengthen the SDF’s capability to counter ballistic missiles and generate a sense of safety and security among the public. It has conducted 25 training sessions as of the end of March 2020 including deployments to public facilities.

\(\text{See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-1 (North Korea); Chapter 3, Section 1-2-4 (Republic of Korea); Reference 11 (History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan)}\)

\(\text{(3) Initiatives towards Strengthening of the BMD System}\)

Currently the SDF maneuvers and deploys according to situation Aegis-equipped destroyers for defense of the entire territory of Japan and PAC-3, which is deployed across the country for the defense of stationing locations. On that premise, the SDF has worked to increase the number of Aegis BMD destroyers. So far, the MOD completed refurbishment of two without BMD capabilities, “Atago” and “Ashigara,” to give them BMD capabilities by December 2018. The MOD also decided to acquire two additional Aegis-equipped destroyers with BMD capabilities using the FY2015 and FY2016 budgets. These projects will increase the number of Aegis-equipped destroyers with BMD capabilities from the existing six to eight by FY2020.

Meanwhile, Japan and the United States are jointly developing advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block IIA), which will be the successor to SM-3 Block IA to be mounted on Aegis-equipped destroyers, and promoting the project to its deployment, in order to deal with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missile attacks. At the National Security Council 9-Minister Meeting in December 2016, a decision was made to transition to joint production and the deployment phase. Since the FY2017 budget, SM-3 Block IIA acquisitions are ongoing. Acquisition and deployment of SM-3 Block IIA are planned to be implemented in FY2021. In comparison with the previous SM-3 Block IA, SM-3 Block IIA will have not only extended interceptable altitude and coverage of protection, but also have enhanced defeating capability and simultaneous engagement capability. In addition, it is expected that the interception capabilities of SM-3 Block IIA will be enhanced against ballistic missiles equipped with interception avoidance measures such as a decoy and ballistic missiles launched with an intention to avoid being launched.

\(^7\) The enforcement of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets in December 2014 (Act No. 108 of 2013) has established the basis for protection of highly confidential information related to national security. In addition, the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Korea on the Protection of Classified Military Information (the Japan-ROK General Security of Military Information Agreement [GSOMIA]) entered into effect on November 2016. GSOMIA serves as a framework for protecting various classified information, including information regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat, shared between Japan and the ROK, which is required for practical and effective responses to various situations.
intercepted by taking a higher than nominal trajectory (lofted trajectory). With regard to Patriot PAC-3, the MOD has been working for procurement of the enhanced capability type, PAC-3 (MSE) (Missile Segment Enhancement) and started its deployment at the end of FY2019. Introduction of PAC-3MSE will realize the extension of interception altitude from less than 20 km to tens of km, meaning that the coverage of protection (area) will expand more than twice compared with the current PAC-3.

In this way Japan is taking measures necessary to strengthen its protection structure and plans to continue the efforts.

(4) Introduction of Aegis Ashore

In the past, the BMD of Japan was based on deploying Aegis-equipped destroyers, etc. in preparation for interception for a required period of time after early detection of signs of missile launch. Under the past posture regarding a possible missile attack on Japan, the MOD has believed that protection of the entire territory of Japan was achievable if about two of the destroyers continued BMD missions in the sea for a certain period of time with a system of eight Aegis-equipped destroyers.

Meanwhile, North Korea has improved its practical launch capability using a transporter erector launcher (TEL) and developed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), which makes it difficult to grasp signs of launch at an early stage.
stage. In light of the changing situation, it is necessary to maintain a persistent 24-hour, 365-day deployment of Aegis-equipped destroyers for a long period of over one year. This fact triggered a review of the past Japanese ballistic missile defense posture itself.

Furthermore, under the current Aegis equipped destroyer system that requires frequent long-term deployment, the working environment for crew onboard these destroyers is extremely severe. The service requires high level of concentration day and night to cope with ballistic missiles that can be launched anytime.

Under these circumstances, with North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles posing grave and imminent threats to Japan’s security, Japan must work to drastically upgrade its ballistic missile defense capabilities in order to ensure constant and sustained protection from peacetime. At meetings of the National Security Council and Cabinet in December 2017, a decision was made to introduce two Aegis Ashore units, to be retained by the GSDF. Aegis Ashore refers to a missile defense system that consists of radars, a command communication system, a vertical launch system (VLS), etc. similar to Aegis-equipped destroyers but deployed on the ground. Aegis Ashore conducts exoatmospheric interception of flying ballistic missiles from the ground. It is a piece of equipment with parts other than the ship hull of an Aegis-equipped destroyer on the ground in a fixed position. The introduction of two units of Aegis Ashore would enable seamless defense of the entire territory of Japan 24 hours a day and 365 days a year, and the burden on personnel is anticipated to be lifted significantly. Under the system of eight Aegis-equipped destroyers, about two of them had to focus on BMD mission only in the sea in order to protect the entire territory of Japan. Once Aegis Ashore is deployed, however, the Aegis-equipped destroyers can be used for missions ensuring maritime security, conducting training to maintain these skills, and ensuring sufficient rotation of crewmembers, which will be connected to further strengthen Japan’s deterrence capability as a whole. The radar units to be mounted on the Aegis Ashore are state-of-the-art high-performance radar units called SPY-7. This radar will drastically enhance Japan’s capabilities to respond to ballistic missiles, including enhancement of the capability against lofted trajectory launches and response to simultaneous majority attacks compared with Aegis-equipped destroyer of the MSDF.

Since GSDF Araya Maneuver Area in Akita Prefecture and Mutsumi Maneuver Area in Yamaguchi Prefecture were selected as candidate sites for the deployment of two units of Aegis Ashore, the MOD has repeated briefing sessions for local governments and residents and provided explanations on the necessary survey and the need for the deployment. However, there has been much inappropriate conduct, such as mistakes in briefing material and behavior showing a lack of respect by a defense official at the briefing session. The MOD sincerely reflects on our past conduct. In order to prevent a similar incident from occurring and to fundamentally strengthen the internal study framework, the MOD established “Aegis Ashore Introduction Promotion Headquarters” in June 2019, with the State Minister of Defense as the head of the office.

Since October 2019 the MOD has been conducting a feasibility study on deployment at 20 government-owned areas in Aomori, Akita and Yamagata Prefectures and a necessary resurvey at Mutsumi Maneuver Area in Yamaguchi Prefecture by outsourcing, and it has checked and reviewed the contents of explanation by setting up an “expert council on technical verification of various surveys” in order to obtain technical advice. Then in December of the same year, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited Yamaguchi Prefecture and provided the heads of the relevant local governments with explanations anew that Aegis Ashore.

(5) Suspension of Aegis Ashore deployment process
a. Announcement by the MOD

The MOD made the following announcement on June 15, 2020.

Regarding the deployment of Aegis Ashore to the Mutsumi Maneuver Area, since August 2018, the MOD explained to the local communities based on the discussions with the U.S. side up to that time that it would take firm steps to put measures to control the fly-out trajectory of the interceptor (SM-3), to make sure the booster would fall within the Mutsumi Maneuver Area. Meanwhile for Akita Prefecture, since August of the same year, the MOD explained to the local communities that the booster would fall into the sea in the case of the Araya Maneuver Area.

However, as a result of continued discussions with the U.S. side and proceeding with the study after that, it was found out in late May 2020 that not only the software but also the entire system, including the hardware, were required to be refurbished in order to control the fly-out trajectories of SM-3 to surely drop the booster within the Mutsumi maneuver area or at sea, which would require a considerable amount of cost and time.

In light of this finding of additional cost and time, the MOD decided to suspend the process related to the deployment of Aegis Ashore. The MOD would like to apologize and explain to the local people first, and report the situation to the National Security Council and consider the way forward.
b. Public Statement by Prime Minister Abe

Regarding this matter, Prime Minister Abe made the following statements on June 18, 2020.

We took the decision to suspend the process of deploying the Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system. Given that the premise on which our explanations to local communities were based is now different, we must not proceed any further as proposed. That is the decision we reached.

Meanwhile, the security environment surrounding Japan is becoming more and more severe. There has been no change whatsoever in the current state of affairs. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula are now becoming increasingly strained. We will secure the lives and peaceful daily lives of the Japanese people from the threat of ballistic missiles. That is the most important responsibility of the government. We must never allow a gap to arise in our nation’s defenses. Peace is not something granted to us by others; it is something we earn through our own efforts. The basis of security policy is none other than Japan’s own efforts. What should we do to reinforce our deterrent or our capacity to deal with security matters? What should we do in order to defend Japan to the end? This summer, we intend to thoroughly discuss at the National Security Council our national security strategy, hammer out a new direction, and implement it expeditiously.

(1) Missile Defense of the United States

The United States is developing a multi-tier missile defense system that combines defense systems suited for each of the following phases of the ballistic missile flight path to provide a mutually complementary response: (1) the boost phase, (2) the mid-course phase, and (3) the terminal phase. Japan and the United States have developed close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense, and a part of the missile defense system of the United States has been deployed in our country in a step-by-step manner.10

(2) Japan-U.S. BMD Technology Cooperation, etc.

The Government commenced a Japan-U.S. cooperative research project on a sea-based upper-tier system in FY1999. As the result showed good prospects for resolving initial technical challenges, in December 2005, the then Security Council and the Cabinet decided to start Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor by using the results of the project as a technical basis.11 The joint development started in June 2006 with a view to expanding the coverage of protection and dealing with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missiles attacks.

In February and June 2017, Japan and the United States conducted tests of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor in waters off Hawaii. Analysis of the test data confirmed that it meets all performance requirements. Currently, as part of development work, the United States is carrying out validation of the data connection between the Aegis system and the SM-3 Block IIA, and between radars. Japan continues to cooperate as required.

In Japan, where most of the towns and cities are highly urbanized, even small-scale infiltrations and attacks can pose a serious threat against the country’s peace and security. These cases refer to various mode and forms including illegal activities by infiltrated foreign armed agents12 etc., and sabotage carried out by foreign guerillas or special forces, which can be deemed as an armed attack against Japan.
with by the general police force, various forms of assistance such as transportation of police officers and provision of equipment to the police force will be carried out. If the case cannot be dealt with by the general police force, then public security operations by the SDF will be implemented. Furthermore, if it has been confirmed that an armed attack is being carried out against Japan, the SDF will respond under a defense operation order.

2 Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

Typical forms of attacks by guerrillas or special forces include the destruction of critical private infrastructure and other facilities, attacks against people, and assassinations of dignitaries.

In dealing with attacks by guerrillas or special forces, the MOD/SDF will respond with a particular emphasis on the establishment of a relevant information gathering posture, warning and surveillance to prevent invasions in coastal areas, protection of key facilities, and search and destruction of invading guerrillas or special forces. Efforts will be made for early detection of attacks and indications through warning and surveillance, and, as required, the SDF units will be deployed to protect key facilities, such as nuclear power plants, and the necessary posture for protection will be established at an early stage. Based on this, in the event of an infiltration of our territory by guerrillas or special operations forces, they will be searched for and detected by reconnaissance units, aviation units and others and combat units will be promptly deployed to besiege and capture or to destroy them.

See Fig. III-1-2-6 (Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces)

3 Response to Armed Agents

(1) Basic Concept

While the police assume primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF will respond in accordance with situational developments. When this happens, the SDF cooperates with the police force. Accordingly, with regard to public security operations of the SDF, the Basic Agreement concerning cooperation procedures between the SDF and the police, as well as

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13 The Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations, which was concluded between the then Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission (concluded in 1954 and fully revised in 2000).
local agreements between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces, have been concluded.\(^{14}\)

(2) Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

The GSDF has been conducting field training exercises nationwide with the police of each prefecture, in an effort to strengthen such collaboration by, for example, conducting field exercises at nuclear power plants throughout the country since 2012.\(^ {15}\) Furthermore, joint exercises in dealing with suspicious vessels have also been conducted regularly between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard.

4 Response to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons

In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the danger of NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) weapon proliferation, which can cause indiscriminate mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area, and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment and materials, to terrorists and countries under suspicion of proliferating such weapons.

The sarin gas attack\(^ {16}\) on the Tokyo subway in March 1995 is one of the examples of an incident in which these weapons were used.

(1) Basic Concept

In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a way that corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will conduct defense operations to repel the armed attack and rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of the use of NBC weapons in a way that does not correspond to an armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the armed group and rescue victims in cooperation with related agencies. Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the chemical protection units of the GSDF and other units will cooperate with relevant organizations in information gathering concerning the extent of the damage, decontamination activities, transportation of the sick and injured, and medical activities through disaster relief and civil protection dispatches.

(2) Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

The MOD/SDF possesses and maintains the GSDF Central Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit and the Countermeasure Medical Unit as well as increasing the number of chemical and medical protection unit personnel, in order to improve the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Also, the GSDF has designated personnel to take initial action in the event of extraordinary disasters in order to allow operations to begin within approximately one hour.

The MSDF and the ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases.

\(^{14}\) In 2004, guidelines were jointly formulated between the National Police Agency and the Defense Agency concerning dealing jointly with public security operations in the event of armed agent incidents.

\(^{15}\) The GSDF also conducted exercises on the ground at Ikata Nuclear Power Plant (Ehime Prefecture) in 2012, at Tomari Nuclear Power Plant (Hokkaido) and Mihama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2013, at Shimane Nuclear Power Plant (Shimane Prefecture) in 2014, at Higashidori Nuclear Power Plant (Aomori Prefecture) and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (Niigata Prefecture) in 2015, at Takahama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2016, at Hamachoka Nuclear Power Plant (Shizuoka Prefecture) and Shiga Nuclear Power Plant (Shiga Prefecture) in 2017, and at Genkai Nuclear Power Plant (Saga Prefecture) and Ohi Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2019.

\(^{16}\) An incident in which members of the Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters, claiming the lives of 12 people (this number refers to the number of deaths indicated in the judgment rendered to Chizuo Matsumoto (commonly known as Shoko Asahara, a guru of Aum Shinrikyo)). The SDF conducted decontamination operations on the trains and stations as well as supported police forensics.
Readiness against Invasion

The NDPG states that only the necessary level of readiness against land invasions involving the mobilization of large ground forces, which was expected primarily during the Cold War, will be retained.

In the event of a military attack on Japan, the SDF will respond with defensive mobilization. Their operations are categorized into (1) operations for aerial air defense operations, (2) defense operations protecting waters around Japan, (3) operations protecting the land, and (4) operations ensuring security in maritime communication, based on the characteristic of their purposes. In executing these operations, the U.S. Forces will assist the operations implemented by the SDF and deploy operations to complement the capabilities of the SDF, including the use of striking power, in line with the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.

1 Air Defense Operations

Based on the geographic features of Japan, in that it is surrounded by the sea, and the features of modern wars, it is expected that at first, a sudden attack against Japan will be exercised by aircraft and missiles, and such aerial attacks are assumed to be conducted repeatedly, in the case where a full-scale invasion against Japan occurs. Operations for aerial defense aim to deal with enemy aerial attacks at the farthest point from our territory, prohibiting enemies from gaining air superiority and preventing harm to the people and the sovereign territory of Japan. At the same time, efforts will be made to inflict significant damage on the enemy thus making the continuation of their aerial attack difficult.

2 Defense Operations Protecting Waters Surrounding Japan

If an armed attack is carried out against Japan, which is an island country, aerial attacks are expected to be combined with attacks against our ships and territory by enemy destroyers. In addition, transport vessels could be deployed to enable massive enemy ground forces to invade our territory. Our defense operations protecting the waters surrounding Japan are composed of measures at sea, measures in waters around our coasts, measures in major straits, and aerial defense above waters around Japan. We will protect the waters around our country by combining these multiple operations, blocking the invasion of our enemies, and attacking and depleting their combat capabilities.

3 Operations Protecting the Land

In order to invade the islands of Japan, invading countries are expected to gain sea and air superiority, followed by the landing of ground troops from the sea and airborne troops from the air.

For invading ground and airborne troops, it tends to be difficult to exert systematic combat capabilities while they are moving on their vessels or aircraft or right before or after they land in our territory. As we protect our land, we need to make best use of this weakness to deal with our enemies between coastal and sea areas or at landing points as much as possible and attack them at an early stage.

4 Operations Ensuring Security in Maritime Transportation

Japan depends upon other countries for the supply of much of its resources and food, making maritime transportation routes the lifeblood for securing the foundation of our existence and prosperity. Furthermore, if our country comes under armed attack, etc., maritime transportation routes will be the foundation to maintain continuous warfare capabilities and enable the U.S. Forces to come and assist in the defense of Japan.

In operations to ensure the safety of our maritime transportation, the SDF will combine various operations such as anti-sea, anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-mine operations to patrol, defend SDF ships, and protect straits and ports, as well as setting up sea lanes to directly defend Japanese ships, etc. Aerial defense (anti-air operations) for Japanese ships on maritime transportation routes will be conducted by destroyers, and support from fighter jets and other aircraft is

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17 Aerial attacks are important elements influencing the results of modern wars. It is vital to obtain air superiority before or at the same time as implementing ground or maritime operations.
18 A special characteristic of operations for aerial defense is that initial response is critical and can influence the entirety of operations. Thus, Japan needs to maintain its readiness for a quick initial response on an ongoing basis in peacetime, regularly collect information, and rapidly and comprehensively exert combat capabilities from the outset of operations.
19 The act of systematically monitoring a specific area with the purpose of gathering information and intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force.
20 Relatively safe marine areas defined to enable the transportation of ships. The locations and width of sea lanes change depending on the situation of a specific threat.
Chapter 1

5 Initiatives Related to the Protection of Civilians

1 Basic Policy on the Protection of Civilians and the Role of the MOD/SDF

In March 2005, based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Act, the government established the Basic Guidelines for the Protection of the People. It anticipates four types of armed attack: (1) a land invasion, (2) an attack by guerrillas or special forces, (3) a ballistic missile attack, (4) an air attack and points to consider in taking measures to protect civilians depending on the type of attack.

The MOD/SDF, based on the Civil Protection Act and the Basic Guidelines, have developed a Civil Protection Plan of the MOD and the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency. This plan stipulates that in a situation where Japan is under attack, the SDF would make utmost efforts to fulfill its basic task of repelling the attack. It also states that, within the scope of no hindrance to the task, the SDF would do as much as possible to protect civilians through support on evacuation and disaster relief.

See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 1-1-4 (Civil Protection)

2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF to Facilitate Measures for Civilian Protection

(1) Civil Protection Training

For sound and expeditious implementation of measures to protect civilians, it is important to conduct training on a regular basis to ensure effective and efficient collaboration with concerned ministries, agencies and local governments. The MOD and the SDF hold exercises in cooperation with concerned ministries and agencies and with the participation of local governments and others. They also participate and cooperate in civil protection exercises held by other ministries, agencies and local governments.

For example, civil protection training was hosted by the central government (Cabinet Secretariat and the Fire Defense Agency) and local governments (Hokkaido Prefecture and Sapporo City) in Sapporo City, Hokkaido, in January 2020. Joint Staff and units of the GSDF Northern Army participated in the preparatory training for an incident during an international sports event.

See Reference 12 (Participation of the MOD/SDF in Civil Protection Joint Training Exercises with Central and Local Government Bodies [2019])

(2) Ongoing Collaboration with Local Governments

The MOD/SDF are establishing liaison departments in Regional Armies and Provincial Cooperation Offices to ensure ongoing and close collaboration with local governments and other bodies.

Civilian protection councils are also being established in local governments for comprehensive implementation of measures to protect civilians. Representatives of each branch of the SDF and Regional Defense Bureau officials have been appointed to the councils.

Moreover, local governments are recruiting retired SDF officers to serve as crisis managers. For example, they act as coordinators with the MOD/SDF, as well as developing and implementing joint action plans and exercises.

GSDF personnel coordinating with relevant organizations in civil protection training conducted in Hokkaido (January 2020)
Among the roles that must be served by Japan’s defense capability as set forth in the NDPG, the idea of “(3) response in space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains during all phases” is as follows.

In order to prevent any actions that impede its activities in space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains, the SDF, on a steady-state basis, conducts persistent monitoring as well as collection and analysis of relevant information. In the event of the above-mentioned interference, the SDF will promptly identify incidents and take such measures as damage limitation and recovery. In case of an armed attack against Japan, the SDF will, on top of taking these actions, block and eliminate the attack by leveraging capabilities in space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains.

Furthermore, in light of society’s growing dependence on space and cyberspace, the SDF will contribute to comprehensive, whole-of-government efforts concerning these domains under appropriate partnership and shared responsibility with relevant organizations.

### Responses in Space Domain

#### 1 The Whole-of-Government Approach

The National Space Policy Secretariat established in the Cabinet Office in April 2016 engages in the planning, drafting, coordinating, and other policy matters relating to the Government’s development and use of space. In light of the environmental changes surrounding space policy and the new security policies stated in the National Security Strategy (NSS) that was approved by the Cabinet in 2013, the Basic Plan on Space Policy was decided upon in the Strategic Headquarters for National Space Policy which was established within the Cabinet in June 2020. This Basic Plan was prepared as a 10-year development plan focusing on approximately the next 20 years to sufficiently secure necessary budgets and strengthen the space policy to which the Government of Japan provides full efforts, including measures seen from the perspective of space security, setting goals of (1) Contributions to a variety of national interest; and (2) Strengthening comprehensive bases that support Japan’s space activities, including industrial and science and technology bases. In particular, concerning the contributions to a variety of national interest, the plan states that Japan should advance: (1) Ensuring space security; (2) Contributing to conducting disaster responses, building national resilience and solving global issues; (3) Creating new knowledge based on space science and exploration; and (4) Realizing economic growth and innovations using space as an impetus.

Responding to Japan’s progress in development and use of outer space, the Diet approved the Act on Ensuring Appropriate Handling of Satellite Remote Sensing Data (Remote Sensing Data Act) and Act on Launching of Spacecraft, etc. and Control of Spacecraft (Space Activities Act) in November 2016, and the Remote Sensing Data Act and part of the Space Activities Act went into effect in November 2017. The Space Activities Act fully went into effect in November 2018.

The Space Activities Act stipulates matters necessary to secure public safety and provide prompt protection of the victims from damages in Japan’s space development and use, such as a launch permit system, obligation for reparation, and government compensation. In addition, the Remote Sensing Data Act established (1) a license pertaining to use of satellite remote sensing instruments, (2) a certification of persons handling satellite remote sensing data and (3) a system that enables the Prime Minister to issue an order to a satellite remote sensing data holder to prohibit provision of data under certain occasions.

#### 2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

Effective use of satellites for such purposes as information-gathering, communication and positioning is essential for realizing cross-domain operations. On the other hand, threats to the stable use of space are increasing.

The MOD/SDF has sought to ensure effective and efficient use of space by strengthening information gathering, C2 (command & control) and communication capabilities by using satellites and through Space Situational Awareness (SSA). In addition to these initiatives, based on the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP), the MOD/SDF will work
to enhance capabilities to ensure superiority in the use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies. The efforts include (1) establishing an SSA system in order to secure the stable use of space; (2) improving various capabilities that leverage space domain including information-gathering, communication and positioning capabilities; and; (3) building the capability to disrupt C4I (command, control, communication, computer, and intelligence) of opponents in collaboration with the electromagnetic domain.

In so doing, the SDF will (4) work to enhance cooperation with relevant agencies, including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), and with the United States and other relevant countries. The SDF will also engage in such organization building as the creation of units specializing in space and a dedicated career field, and develop human resources and accumulate knowledge and expertise in the space domain. In FY2020, a space domain planning section (tentative name) responsible for planning pertaining to joint operation in the space domain will be established in the Joint Staff.

For this to happen, the government agencies and ministries concerned need to work together to build an effective operating system. On this point, JAXA is devising a plan to...
deploy radar able to monitor low Earth orbit (at altitudes of up to 1,000 km) and a ground-based optical telescope to monitor geostationary orbit (at altitudes of around 36,000 km). Combined with the radar of the MOD that will principally be dedicated to geostationary orbit monitoring, Japan is planning an effective SSA program. For its operation system, necessary adjustment is in progress to link the system to the U.S. Forces’ system in addition to JAXA by FY2022.

For the future, in addition to radar to monitor threats to Japanese satellites such as space debris as mentioned above, the MOD will introduce SSA satellites that are space-based optical telescopes and ground-based SSA laser ranging devices to measure distance from low earth-orbit satellites. The expenses necessary for acquisition of SSA satellite components are included in the FY2020 budget.

(2) Improving Various Capabilities to Leverage Space Domain Including Information-Gathering, Communication and Positioning Capabilities

The MOD/SDF has conducted information-gathering, communication and positioning using satellites, but in order to fulfill its missions effectively and efficiently, it is necessary to further enhance these capabilities.

For this purpose, the MOD/SDF will strengthen its intelligence and surveillance capabilities through multi-layered acquisition of satellite images using Information Gathering Satellites (IGS) and commercial satellites, including microsatellites. It will also continue to use images from the satellite operated by JAXA (ALOS-2) and information from Automatic Identification System (AIS), etc., and conduct research on dual wavelength infrared sensors.²

Regarding communications, the MOD/SDF launched X-band defense communications satellites called Kirameki-2 in January 2017 and Kirameki-1 in April 2018, owned and operated by the MOD for the first time, to be used for the communications, which is essential for command and control in unit operations. Going forward, in light of the future increase in communication requirements, the MOD will conduct steady development of Kirameki-3 to realize integrated communications as well as high-speed and large capacity communications, thereby aiming for the early realization of a three-satellite constellation with all of the three X-band defense communications satellites. The ministry will also conduct research and surveys on the next defense communication satellites.

With regard to positioning, the MOD/SDF has mounted GPS receiving terminals on a large number of equipment and used them as important means to support troop movement,

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² Research is underway to mount dual wavelength infrared sensors with excellent detection and identification performance on the Advanced Optical Satellite planned at JAXA and activate them in the space environment.
Chapter 1

Part 3 Three Pillars of Japan’s Defense (Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense)

Activities of Personnel Dispatched to JAXA

Tsukuba Space Center,
Space Tracking and Communications Center,
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA)
Major SAITO Takuya,
Defense Plans/Policies and Program Division,
Defense Planning and Policy Department, Air Staff Office

“Evolution into the Air and Space Self-Defense Force is no longer a pipe dream.” This is a statement made by Prime Minister ABE at the MOD Ichigaya in September 2019.

I am working as a member of ASDF personnel at JAXA Tsukuba Space Center. However, unlike the Astronaut YUI, former member of ASDF and my great senior, I am not aspiring to become an astronaut.

Unwanted artificial objects orbiting around the earth are called space debris. It is said that there are almost 20,000 of space debris that are larger than a softball. In order to prevent crashing of space debris with positioning, communication, broadcasting, weather and other satellites that are closely related to our daily lives, we need the ability to know what is happening in space right now (Space Situational Awareness (SSA)).

Currently, the MOD is working to gain and strengthen abilities in new domains, including outer space. For this purpose, the ASDF is preparing to establish an SSA operation system in cooperation with JAXA. In order to establish the operation system, I am involved in coordination pertaining to data-sharing by the MOD and JAXA and specific cooperation procedures, while at the same time gaining specialized knowledge concerning SSA at JAXA.

Because the ASDF established a new job specialty in the space domain, the development and securing of human resources specialized in space will become essential. If you are inspired by this article, would you like to evolve into space people with me? “We are aerospace people!”

including highly accurate self-positioning and improvement of missile guidance. In addition to these efforts, the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) of the Cabinet Office started service in November 2018. With this in mind, the MOD/SDF will secure redundancy by using multiple positioning satellite signals, including QZSS.

(3) Enhancing Capabilities to Ensure Superiority in Use of Space

Utilization of satellites plays a vital role as the basic infrastructure for security, while some countries appear to be developing anti-satellite weapons, including killer satellites and anti-satellite missiles. In this context, the MOD/SDF needs to improve the resilience of the X-band defense communications satellite and other satellites.

To this purpose, the SDF will newly introduce training devices to study and train responses to the vulnerabilities of Japanese satellites, and devices to grasp the state of electromagnetic interference against Japanese satellites. Expenses necessary for acquisition of devices to grasp the state of electromagnetic interference are included in the FY2020 budget.

The SDF will build the capability to disrupt C4I of opponents in coordination with the electromagnetic domain capabilities.

(4) Enhancing Cooperation with Relevant Agencies and with the United States and Other Relevant Countries

For the MOD to promote space development and use effectively, it is essential to enhance cooperation with relevant agencies with advanced knowledge, including JAXA, and with the United States and other relevant countries.

Currently the MOD and JAXA are cooperating in the development of SSA described above and technical...
demonstration of dual wavelength infrared sensors. In addition, the ministry exchanges human resources, including the dispatch of ASDF personnel to the JAXA Tsukuba Space Center.

Also, from the perspective of further promoting cooperation in the space field between the defense authorities of Japan and the United States, the two countries established the “Japan-US Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG)” in April 2015 and so far held six meetings. The SCWG continues to promote consideration in broader fields such as: (1) promotion of space policy-related consultation, (2) closer information sharing, (3) cooperation for training and securing space experts, and (4) implementation of tabletop exercises.

As part of such initiatives, the MOD has taken part in the Global Sentinel, an annual SSA multinational tabletop exercise hosted by the U.S. Strategic Command since 2016 with the purpose of acquiring knowledge related to the SSA operation as well as of strengthening cooperation with the United States and other partner countries. These efforts to enhance the SSA capabilities also contribute to enhancing deterrence against new threats in outer space. Japan engages in space security dialogues not only with the United States but also with France, the European Union (EU), and India.

September 2015, the Cybersecurity Strategy was formulated for the comprehensive and effective promotion of measures pertaining to cybersecurity, with the aims to create and develop free, fair and safe cyberspace to enhance the vitality of the economy and society and realize their sustainable development, to realize a society in which citizens can live safely and with peace of mind, and to contribute to the peace and stability of the international community as well as the security of Japan. Furthermore, in July 2018 the strategy was reviewed to promote cybersecurity for sustainable development and initiatives from three perspectives ((1) mission assurance by service providers, (2) risk management, and (3) participation, cooperation and collaboration), while sticking with the basic position of the strategy.

With regard to cybersecurity, the number of cases that were detected as suspicious communication to Japanese governmental organizations and required confirmation as to whether or not they need coping, there were 111 suspicious malware infections and 66 targeted attacks in FY2018. This is a situation which requires sufficient and continuous attention.

In order to deal with the increasing threat to cybersecurity, in November 2014, the Cybersecurity Basic Act was enacted. The Act aims to contribute to the security of Japan by comprehensively and effectively promoting the measures regarding cybersecurity.

In response to this, in January 2015, the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters was established in the Cabinet, and the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) was established in the Cabinet Secretariat. The NISC is responsible for planning and promotion of cybersecurity-related policies and serves as the control tower in taking measures and responding to significant cybersecurity incidents in government organizations and agencies, as well as critical infrastructures. Furthermore, in

4 Cybersecurity 2019 (approved by the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters on May 23, 2019)
5 With the enactment of the Basic Act on Cybersecurity in January 2015, the National Information Security Center (NISC) was reorganized as the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC). The NISC is responsible for the planning and promotion of cybersecurity-related policies and serves as the control tower in taking measures and responding to significant cybersecurity incidents in government organizations and agencies, as well as critical infrastructures.
order to ensure the safety of information and communication systems; development of defense systems, such as the security and analysis devices for cyber defense; monitoring of MOD/SDF communications networks around the clock and response to cyber attacks by the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command and others; enactment of regulations stipulating postures and procedures for responding to cyber attacks; research on cutting-edge technology; development of human resources, and collaboration with other organizations.

In addition to these initiatives, based on the NDPG, the SDF will fundamentally strengthen its cyber defense capability, including the capability to disrupt, during an attack against Japan in time of emergency, the opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack. Specifically, the MTDP stipulates (1) establishment of the necessary environment for ensuring cybersecurity, (2) keeping abreast of the latest information including cyber-related risks, counter measures and technological trends, (3) development and securing of human resources, and (4) contribution to the whole-of-government initiatives.

**Fig. III-1-3-3 MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks**

1) **Ensuring safety of information systems**
   - Introduction of firewall and virus detection software
   - Separation of the network into the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) open system and closed system
   - Implementation of system audit, etc.

2) **Responses by special units to cyber attacks**
   - 24-hour monitoring of networks and information systems as well as advanced measures against cyber attacks (malware analysis) by the Cyber Defense Group (Joint Staff), System Protection Unit (GSDF), Communication Security Group (MSDF), and Computer Security Evaluation Squadron (ASDF)
   - Implementation of cyber defense exercises
   - Responses to supply chain risks
   - Development of response posture at the time of cyber attack occurrence

3) **Maintenance and development of a response posture to cyber attacks**
   - Implementation of cyber defense exercises
   - Responses to supply chain risks
   - Developing of response posture at the time of cyber attack occurrence

4) **Research of cutting-edge technology**
   - Research on cyber resilience technology
   - Research on cyber resilience technology

5) **Development of human resources**
   - For the purpose of human resources development, implementing studying abroad programs at organizations affiliated with Carnegie Mellon University and studying programs at graduate schools in Japan, as well as education at professional courses at the SDF
   - For the purpose of fostering security awareness, offering education at workplaces and professional education at the National Defense Academy
   - Implementation of outside training

6) **Coordination with other organizations and agencies**
   - Information sharing with the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity, the U.S. Armed Forces, and other relevant nations
   - Dispatch of MOD personnel to NATO Cooperation Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE)
   - Dispatch of liaison officers to the U.S. Army’s cyber educational institution
   - Public-private personnel exchange

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6. Illegal intrusion, information theft, alteration or destruction, operation stop/malfunction of information system, execution of unauthorized program, DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks, etc. which are made through cyberspace by abusing information communication networks, information systems, etc.

7. There are directives relating to the information assurance of the MOD (MOD Directive No. 160 of 2007).
Establishing an Environment for Ensuring Cyber Security

a. Expanding the System of Cyber Defense Group and Other Units
The Cyber Defense Group was established under the SDF C4 Systems Command in March 2014. In order to appropriately deal with cyber attacks that are becoming more sophisticated and skillful day by day, the Cyber Defense Group has strengthened the system. The group will be further expanded by about 70 personnel to approximately 290 in FY2020.

b. Strengthening Capabilities of Information Gathering, Research and Analysis
In order to secure functions of the system and network of the MOD/SDF under any circumstance, it is necessary to strengthen the capabilities of information gathering, research and analysis, and develop a practical training environment.

To this end, the MOD/SDF will continue initiatives such as (1) upgrade of information gathering devices for indications and techniques of cyber attacks, (2) enhancing functions of analysis devices for cyber protection taking advantage of AI and other advanced technologies, and (3) development of an environment for cyber exercises carried out as competition between an attacking team and a defense team.

Keeping Abreast of the Latest Information Including Risks, Counter Measures and Technological Trends

In order to respond to cyber attacks in a swift and appropriate manner, it is necessary to keep abreast of the latest information, including cyber-related risks, counter measures and technological trends, through cooperation with the private sector, and strategic talks, joint exercises and other opportunities with allies and other parties. For this purpose the MOD/SDF will effectively cooperate with private companies and foreign countries, including the United States, which is Japan’s ally.

a. Cooperation with Private Companies and Others
In Japan, in July 2013, the Cyber Defense Council (CDC) was set up, and its core members consist of around ten companies in the defense industry with a strong interest in cybersecurity. The MOD/SDF and the defense industry have made efforts to deal with cyber attacks through joint exercise and other initiatives.

The MOD/SDF will further expand the cooperation.

b. Cooperation with the United States
Since comprehensive defense cooperation, including joint response, between Japan and its ally the United States is vital, the two countries set up the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) as a framework between the defense authorities of Japan and the United States. Under this framework, meetings have been held seven times to discuss the following topics: (1) promotion of policy discussions regarding cyber issues, (2) closer sharing of information, (3) promotion of joint exercises incorporating response to cyber attacks, and (4) matters such as cooperation for training and retaining experts. Moreover, in May 2015, the two countries announced a joint statement on the specific future direction of the cooperation.

In addition, Japan’s cooperation with the United States is to be further strengthened by such means as participation in the Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue, a whole-of-government approach by both nations, holding of the Japan-U.S. IT Forum, a framework between the defense authorities since 2002, and dispatching liaison officers to the U.S. Army’s cyber educational institution.

c. Cooperation with Other Countries etc.
Japan has held cyber dialogues with the respective defense authorities of the United Kingdom, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and others. Furthermore, Japan has participated in cyber defense exercises organized by NATO or the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). In December 2019 the MOD for the first time officially participated in “Cyber Coalition 2019,” a cyber defense exercise organized by NATO, to enhance cooperation with NATO. In addition, the IT Forum has been held between the defense authorities of Singapore, Vietnam, and other countries to exchange views on initiatives in the information communications area including cybersecurity and current trends in technology.

Keeping Abreast of the Latest Information Including Risks, Counter Measures and Technological Trends

Development and Securing of Human Resources

In order to strengthen the cyber defense capability of the SDF, it is necessary to secure human resources who have advanced and broad-ranging knowledge on cybersecurity. To this end, a common cyber course\(^8\) to learn common and sophisticated knowledge on cyber security has been provided since FY2019. The FY2020 budget includes expenses for sending SDF personnel to universities and educational institutions, both international and domestic, including the National War College of the United States, which provides a course for cyber warfare commanders. It also includes expenses necessary for holding a cyber competition to identify highly skilled cyber talents in the private sector. The MOD/SDF will also work to ensure appropriate treatment for security and IT human resources who work as a bridge.

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\(^8\) Common cyber security education provided for graduates of an IT-related program that is provided by each SDF service.
between highly professional human resources and general administration departments in the MOD and consider the utilization of external human resources through a public-private personnel exchange system to employ people with practical experience in private companies as well as contracts for service, for example.

(4) Contribution to the Whole-of-Government Approach

Along with the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MOD, as one of the five government agencies that are members of Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters, participates in cyber attack response training and personnel exchanges, and provides information about cyber attacks, etc. to the cross-sector initiatives led by the NISC as well as sending personnel to the CYber incident Mobile Assistant Team (CYMAT).

The MOD is considering applying the knowledge and experience of the SDF to penetration tests of the IT systems of government ministries and agencies conducted by NISC.

3 Response in Electromagnetic Domain

Electromagnetic spectrum has been used for command/communication, and warning/surveillance. With the development of the technology, its use has expanded in range and purpose, and it is now recognized as a major operational domain situated on the frontline of the offense-defense dynamic in today’s warfare. In response, the MOD/SDF, based on the NDPG, etc., will (1) enhance its ability to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic spectrum, (2) strengthen information collection and analysis capabilities related to electromagnetic spectrum, and develop an information sharing posture, (3) strengthen capabilities to neutralize the radar and communications of opponents who intend to invade Japan, and thereby acquire and enhance capabilities to ensure superiority in the electromagnetic domain.

1 Enhancing the Ability to Appropriately Manage and Coordinate the Use of Electromagnetic Spectrum

In order to gain an advantage in warfare by using electromagnetic spectrum proactively and effectively, it is necessary to build capabilities to manage electromagnetic spectrum by centrally grasping and coordinating wave frequencies and status of use, and appropriately allocating frequency resources to units, etc. in addition to electronic warfare capabilities to ensure the use and effect of electromagnetic spectrum while interfering with the use and effect by an enemy.

For this purpose, the FY2020 budget includes expenses for capacity building in electromagnetic management, which includes the start of research on electromagnetic management supporting technologies that help with grasping and visualizing electromagnetic utilization status in order to effectively conduct electronic warfare, etc.

2 Strengthening Information Collection and Analysis Capabilities Related to Electromagnetic Spectrum, and Building an Information Sharing Posture

In order to gain an advantage in electromagnetic warfare, it is important to gather and analyze information on electromagnetic spectrum at all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies and appropriately share the information among SDF units.

To this end, the MOD/SDF plans to enhance information gathering and analysis capabilities through: establishment of electromagnetic operation units to gather information regarding electromagnetic spectrum as subordinate units of the Ground Component Command; and, under the FY2020 budget, implementation of research for improving the capabilities of electromagnetic information gathering units for combatant vessels. In order to share the information among SDF services while ensuring security of the information, the SDF will continue to promote the upgrade of the JADGE system, the connection of each SDF service’s systems, including the Defense Information Infrastructure

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9 Measures based on the Comprehensive Policy for Enhancing the Development of Security and IT Human Resources at Governmental Organizations (Approved by the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters on March 31, 2016)

10 Collective term for radio waves, infrared rays, visible rays, etc. Concerning radio waves used in Japan, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications has centralized control over radio wave frequencies, and the MOD/ SDF obtains approval for radio wave frequencies from the Ministry when using them in training and other initiatives.

11 One of the attacks using electromagnetic waves is electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks, which place an extreme burden on electronics by generating instantaneous powerful electromagnetic waves through nuclear explosions and other means leading to their malfunctioning or destruction. This type of attack would impact not just the defense field but Japanese people’s lives in general. The Government of Japan as a whole will deliberate on necessary countermeasures.

12 In addition, the MOD/SDF is advancing the multiplication of the communications network required for information sharing among the services, and conducting research in light of the viewpoint of EMP protection.
3 Strengthening Capabilities to Neutralize Radar and Communications of an Opponent who Intends to Invade Japan

Neutralizing use of electromagnetic spectrum, including radar and communications of an opponent who intends to invade Japan based on information gathering and analysis in peacetime is effective as a means for the defense of Japan so that even when inferiority exists in individual domains such inferiority will be overcome and national defense accomplished.

For this purpose, in FY2020, the SDF will proceed with capability development through the procurement of fighters (F-35A/B) superior in electronic countermeasures for self-protection and network electronic warfare devices, capability enhancement like installation of new electronic warfare equipment on fighters (F-15), as well as development of standoff electronic warfare aircraft for jamming from outside of the threat envelopes of the opponent, and research on surface-to-air electronic war devices. Furthermore, the SDF will also swiftly proceed with studies and R&D aimed at the procurement of potentially game-changing technologies, such as high-power microwave devices that can instantaneously disable a large number of drones, etc., a high-energy laser system (HEL) that responds to such threats as drones and mortar shells at a low cost and with a short reaction time.

4 Training / Exercise and Human Resource Development

In order to strengthen the SDF’s capability in the electromagnetic domain, it is also important to enhance training/exercise and education.

In the FY2020 budget, in addition to usual training/exercise and education, the SDF will start to install the latest electronic warfare education devices used by the ASDF. Furthermore, ASDF personnel is planned to be joining to the electronic warfare education course in the United States again this year.

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13 This refers to a common network across all SDF as an information communication infrastructure necessary for the SDF to perform its duties, in which the SDF makes use of a variety of communication lines: self-employed micro lines that the MOD owns as well as external lines and satellite lines that it leases from communication carriers, thereby composing data communication networks and sound communication networks.
A pandemic of COVID-19 is a grave threat to the security of the international community, including Japan. In order to prevent the spread of infection, the MOD/SDF gathered all their strength to carry out various activities.¹ None of the SDF personnel engaged in the activities got infected (as of May 31, 2020.)

**1 Dispatching Nursing Officers to the Chartered Airplane Leaving Wuhan**

In response to the spread of COVID-19 in China in January 2020, a chartered airplane was sent to Wuhan. By request of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, the MOD/SDF supported the quarantine for Japanese returnees and others on the airplane. Two nurses of the SDF Central Hospital boarded each of the chartered airplanes from the second to the fifth airplane and provided support.

**2 Disaster Relief in Response to COVID-19**

1 Disaster Relief pertaining to Rescue for Prevention of the Spread of COVID-19

In January 2020 the SDF implemented disaster relief for Japanese returnees due to the spread of COVID-19 in China (for 46 days from January 31 to March 16, 2020). Given that supporting for the returnees in order to prevent the spread of infection had an overriding emergency, it was hardly possible to expect the governors and other authorities to request the dispatch of the SDF concerning the overall situation. Therefore, the SDF conducted the operation by its judgement without request.

Accordingly, the SDF provided life and medical support at the temporary accommodation facilities where Japanese returnees and others stayed and the cruise ship Diamond Princess (approximately 3,700 passengers and crews) where a number of infected persons were identified as well as transportation of people leaving the ship. Specifically, SDF medical officers and others collected approximately 2,200 PCR samples in total on the ship. In addition, SDF ambulances and motor coaches transported approximately 2,000 passengers/crews including positive patients leaving the ship. Approximately 1,300 passengers/crew in total returning to their countries by the chartered aircraft prepared by the respective governments (e.g. the United States, Australia, and Canada) were transported to Haneda Airport.

The activities on the “Diamond Princess” were huge, complex and unprecedented operations and also involved a high risk of infection. However, none of the approx. 2,700 personnel who were engaged in the field activities caught the infection in total.

In addition, SDF hospitals accepted patients and approximately 10 SDF Reserve Personnel with qualification as doctor, nurse, etc. were called up to provide medical support.

¹ As for specific activities, see the MOD website (https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/saigai/2020/covid/index.html).
This mission involved approximately 8,700 personnel who engaged in the field activities in total (overall approximately 20,000 personnel engaged in the activities in total) and two vessels, including private ship Hakuou under contract with the MOD.

2 Disaster Relief for Reinforcement of Border Control against COVID-19

In March 2020, considering the government’s policy to further reinforce border control for entrants and returnees in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19, the SDF implemented Disaster Relief Operations for reinforcement of border control against COVID-19 (65 days from March 28 to May 31). Given that supporting for reinforcement of border control required a especially urgent response, it was hardly possible to expect governors and other authorities to request the dispatch of the SDF concerning the overall situation, the SDF conducted the operations by its judgment without request.

Specifically, the SDF medical officers and others supported quarantine at Narita and Haneda airports by collecting specimens from approximately 20,400 of the approximately 46,000 returnees and entrants. The specimens accounted for approximately 44% of all the specimens collected at the airports during the period from March 28 to May 31. The SDF also transported approximately 6,100 returnees and entrants in total from Narita, Haneda, Kansai and Chubu airports to the accommodation facilities where they stayed until PCR test results came out, and provided life support including meal support for approximately 17,200 returnees and entrants in total staying in the accommodation facilities, for example.

This mission involved approximately 8,700 field personnel (overall approximately 13,400 personnel) in total but none of them became infected.

3 Disaster Relief in Response to Community-acquired Infection of COVID-19, etc.

Since April 3, 2020, after receiving a disaster relief request from the Nagasaki Governor, and in response to disaster relief requests from the governors of 29 prefectures, the SDF sent liaison officers to the prefectures in order to prevent the spread of community-acquired infection of COVID-19. In close coordination, they carried out air transportation of patients, life support in accommodation facilities, support of education on infection protection for employees of the local governments and the private accommodation facilities (approximately 1,700 employees in total) and other support activities (as of May 31, 2020). To the cruise ship Costa Atlantica (approximately 620 crew members) where a mass infection occurred while being moored at a quay in Nagasaki Prefecture, the SDF sent a CT diagnosis vehicle in addition to collection of specimens necessary for PCR tests and medical support for the crew.

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2 Number of overall personnel includes maintenance, communication, command, standby/backup and other rear-service personnel in addition to the personnel worked in the field.

3 Hotel Grand Hill Ichigaya run by the MOD mutual aid association also accepted 840 returnees and entrants waiting for the result of a PCR test (as of May 31, 2020).
Mr. INOUE Shiro,
Captain of Hakuo, Yutaka Shipping K.K

Since 2016 the company has been operating a passenger ship “Hakuo” for unit training and response to large-scale disasters by the MOD/SDF. The ship has transported SDF personnel and equipment, and provided support for victims of earthquake or wind and flood damage.

Against the spread of the COVID-19 infection, after receiving an emergency request from the MOD to use the ship as a temporary accommodation facility for the returnees from Wuhan, the company made an emergency call to seamen across the country while preparing Hakuo for departure. The ship left its home port, Aioi (Hyogo Prefecture) on January 31, 2020, and arrived at Tokyo Bay on the next day. Usually preparation for departure takes approximately 72 hours but we were able to complete the preparation in 32 hours or so as a result of the united efforts by the people involved.

Later, the ship moved to the MSDF Yokosuka Base (Kanagawa Prefecture) and was preparing for acceptance of returnees by loading bedding, daily commodities and the like, when a large number of the COVID-19 infections were found on a large cruise ship Diamond Princess. In response, it was decided to move Hakuo to Honmoku Wharf of Yokohama Port to use the ship as the activity base of the SDF personnel who provided medical and living support on Diamond Princess.

At first we were a little confounded by the sudden change in the work contents but we worked thinking that we were playing a very important role that directly supported the SDF mission to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 infection. During about a month of disaster relief activities at Yokohama Port, the SDF personnel were busy leaving Hakuo in the early morning and returning late at night. We strived to ensure their recovery from exhaustion and nutrition support through boiler works for bathing late in the night and well-balanced meals cooked on the ship for each personnel, for example. None of the personnel worked on Diamond Princess became infected and we are proud that our support for the activities contributed to the wonderful achievement. This has become a big asset for us.

At first, COVID-19 caused a big concern also for us, but clear separation of the activity area of the SDF personnel and that of the crew members as well as education provided by SDF medical troops to prevent infection established sufficient infection control measures on the ship, which dispelled the initial concern and we were able to work without fear.

As the spread of the COVID-19 infection is a national crisis that Japan has never experienced before, we had various difficulties but were able to gain a very valuable experience through the activities. I pray for a speedy end to the spread of the COVID-19 infection and wish to serve the SDF well through a quick departure of Hakuo at the time of a natural disaster or other emergency based on the knowledge and experience obtained through the activities.
From January 31 to March 16, 2020, the SDF engaged in disaster relief operations in order to prevent the expansion of the outbreak of the infectious disease caused by the novel coronavirus based on an order issued by the Minister of Defense.

During this period, the SDF personnel who engaged in the disaster relief operations conducted various support activities for Japanese people who had stayed at government facilities after returning from abroad, and for the crew and passengers of the cruise ship Diamond Princess at Daikoku Pier. In this fight against an “invisible enemy” in the form of the new coronavirus, the SDF achieved no secondary infections among the dispatched personnel.

The disaster relief operations were concluded without any secondary infections among the dispatched SDF personnel because the MOD/SDF constantly reviewed and revised the standards for protective gear and other matters in accordance with the job duties and the commanders at all levels fully enforced the standards, and also because individual personnel had a high level of awareness about guarding against infection. Here, we explain the standards for protective gear and for health management, and the manual for the improvement of the environment.

The standard for protective gear prescribes the types of protective gear that should be worn by personnel when engaging in on-site activity according to their job duties. The standard requires personnel at the greatest risk to wear full infection protective clothing and personnel at the lowest risk to wear only masks, gowns, and gloves.

The standard for health management stipulates that all personnel should undergo a PCR test on the premise that following the completion of onsite activity, the personnel should either be subjected to follow-up observation in isolated rooms or return to their respective units in accordance with the level of infection risk. (As a result of the PCR test, no personnel tested positive. Personnel who tested positive should be hospitalized at SDF Central Hospital. In addition to accepting people who tested positive among cruise ship crew and passengers (including foreigners) and returnees from abroad, the SDF Central Hospital conducted PCT tests.)

The manual for the improvement of the environment prescribes the procedures for implementing disinfection, zoning (segregation between the hot zone, where infection risk exists, and the cold zone, where safety is assured) and waste disposal.

Meanwhile, the Ground Component Command included personnel from the GSDF’s NBC Countermeasure Medical Unit, who are knowledgeable about prevention of infection in the dispatched unit. As a result, by taking advantage of those personnel’s knowledge, it became possible to fully ensure protection against infection and provide education to members of the dispatched unit who came from the MSDF and the ASDF.

Furthermore, MSDF Yokosuka District and Air Defense Command actively implemented measures to guard against infection through medical personnel. As a result, the SDF achieved no secondary infections.

This achievement represents the synergy of the results of NBC exercises routinely conducted by various units, the maintenance of good health due to sufficient diet, rest and bathing, and efforts made by all personnel who engaged in on-site disaster relief activities, worked at command and control facilities, or provided logistics support (including GSDF Central Transportation Command, which was responsible for supervising activity on the “Hakuo,” on which dispatched personnel stayed, and the “Silver Queen,” a private ferry).
such patients to beds for general patients in response to the increase in patient numbers. The SDF Sapporo Hospital and other district hospitals also started to accept patients according to the requests from the local governments. The SDF Central Hospital accepted the people infected on the Diamond Princess, compiled an analysis of the symptoms of the 104 patients in a short period of time, and published the results on March 19, 2020. The SDF hospitals and NDMCH accepted 430 COVID-19 patients (as of May 31, 2020).

The SDF Central Hospital and NDMCH started a clinical trial of Avigan tablets (favipiravir) (developed by FUJIFILM Toyama Chemical Co., Ltd.) concerning COVID-19 infection. Since March 2020, the MOD has been gathering experience in treatment using Avigan tablets within the framework of compassionate use of unapproved drugs and also participated in the process of its validation through clinical trials, which is necessary for the drug to be officially approved as a remedy for COVID-19 infection.

The MOD/SDF actively fulfilled their roles in the fight against COVID-19 infection not only by treating patients but also through cooperation with the development of therapeutic drugs for the treatment of COVID-19.

**Response to the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)**

**Captain KODAMA Tatsuya,**

**Medical Officer of Pulmonary Medicine,**

**the SDF Central Hospital (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo)**

I have been treating COVID-19 patients at the SDF Central Hospital since February 2020 as a member of the COVID-19 intense care team from many departments of the hospital. We, as one team, have been working together, while bouncing ideas off each other, to best provide medical care to critically ill patients who need intense care including a ventilator support.

Since early February the hospital has been accepting COVID-19 patients, starting from returnees from Wuhan and passengers/crew members of the Diamond Princess cruise ship. At first, medical practitioners and hospital personnel were working under significant physical and mental stress because many things were unclear about the disease state and treatment of the infection, and there were a risk of nosocomial infection and a language barrier in communication with foreign patients.

However, I was filled with a sense of fulfillment as a medical practitioner when seriously ill patients recovered and left the hospital. As a medical officer, I am also proud that I can work at the front line of the national crisis and that we received a high evaluation for our efforts to publicize new insights on this infectious disease and to effectively prevent hospital infection. Hereafter, I would like to share this experience with my juniors, which would be useful for response to a future spread of the next emerging or re-emerging infectious disease.
As part of the SDF’s disaster relief activities to prevent the spread of COVID-19, the SDF Central Hospital accepted foreign passengers and crew members of the Diamond Princess. Units and others engaged in the disaster relief vigorously worked for foreign and other passengers and crew members and successfully completed the activity.

Let us introduce a letter of thanks from a German couple, Mr. Janssen and Ms. O’Neal, to the Chief of Staff, GSDF. They were passengers of the ship, admitted to the SDF Central Hospital and returned to their home country later.

After returning to their country, the couple sent us a letter of thanks: “We are especially grateful for the medical team of the SDF Central Hospital. We will never forget their professionalism and empathic support. Support for us was wonderful. When patients of many nationalities flooded the ward and the medical stuff faced a difficult situation, all members of the medical team welcomed and provided vigorous support for us who were feeling insecure in the hospital. —snip— We made good memories about Japan and Japanese people.”

Minister of Defense Kono referred to the letter of thanks at the Japan-Germany telephone conversation on April 24, 2020, and German Federal Minister of Defence Kramp-Karrenbauer expressed her gratitude for the SDF assistance. The letter is symbolic of the fact that the disaster relief activities were beneficial not only for Japan but also for other countries too. The SDF is proud of this.

The MOD/SDF disclosed protective measures of “JSDF’s standards” in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19 infection and also shared through embassies, etc. with the defense authorities the materials compiling the SDF activities in response to the infection, factors that prevented infection of the SDF personnel while working on the Diamond Princess, an outline of symptom analysis at the SDF Central Hospital and other matters.

Since April, Minister of Defense Kono held conference calls with the defense ministers of 15 countries, including the United States, Australia, India, the Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries, the United Kingdom, France and other European countries, Canada and New Zealand, and exchanged opinions on the roles of the defense authorities in light of the global expansion of the COVID-19 infection. Japan-US defense minister conference calls, in particular, were made twice in total in April and May. During the calls, the ministers confirmed that the two countries would ensure close coordination and maintenance of their response capabilities amid the current situation in addition to close collaboration to win the battle against COVID-19. Through conference calls with other countries, the defense authorities agreed to share information, lessons and knowledge obtained primarily while taking infection control measures and confirmed the need to share the understanding of the threat based on the current situation and the understanding of the impact of the infection expansion on the countries’ defense policy considering the roles of the defense authorities. The ministers also agreed to continue communication between the defense authorities and strong promotion of defense cooperation and exchange toward maintenance and strengthening of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”

In the situation where the COVID-19 infection is spreading, it is important to actively communicate with foreign countries. It is also necessary to pay great attention to the new international order after the end of COVID-19 pandemic. The MOD/SDF recognizes the importance of further cooperation with foreign countries that share values and interests in order to maintain the free and open international order that has supported the world’s peace and prosperity.

**5 Efforts of the MOD/SDF to Prevent the Spread of COVID-19 Infection**

With the recognition that the MOD/SDF, whose purpose is to defend the lives and safety of the people, never allows those lives and safety to be threatened through its activities, the MOD/SDF is powerfully promoting initiatives of reducing contact with other people in its education/training, working patterns, holding of events, and visits from outside, for example.

**6 Other Efforts**

On May 29, 2020, in order to pay the MOD/SDF’s respect and gratitude to medical professionals handling COVID-19 infection as an organization also responding to the infection, Blue Impulse made a demonstration flight in the sky over central Tokyo.

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5 Conference calls were held with 15 countries: France, Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, India, the Philippines, New Zealand, Singapore, Indonesia, Italy, Mongolia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Papua New Guinea in the order of the implementation (as of June 16.)
When disasters such as natural disasters occur, the SDF works in collaboration with local governments, engaged in various activities such as the search and rescue of disaster victims or ships or aircraft in distress, controlling floods, offering medical treatment, preventing epidemics, supplying water, and transporting personnel and goods.

1 Basic Concept

Among the roles that must be served by Japan’s defense capability as set forth in the NDPG, the idea of “(4) response to large-scale disasters, etc.” is as follows.

In the event of a major disaster, all possible measures will be taken to rapidly transport and deploy the SDF units required and if necessary, to sustain the mobilization for a long period. Not only will the SDF units respond to the needs of affected residents and local authorities through care, proper collaboration and cooperation, but they will also be engaged with institutions concerned, local authorities and the private sector to save lives, achieve urgent rehabilitation and provide life support.

Since the damage situation is unclear at the beginning of a disaster, the SDF will maintain response readiness to any damage and need for activities while giving the first priority to life-saving activities. For livelihood support, the SDF will coordinate the division of roles, response policy, activity period, utilization of private companies and other matters with relevant parties including the local governments and ministries concerned at the local response headquarters, etc.

In addition, based on the “Examination Report on the Initial Response to the Heavy Rain in July 2018” (November 2018), in order to rescue and support more victims in the event of a large-scale disaster and considering possible confusion of the local authorities, the MOD/SDF will not only wait for requests from the authorities but also actively propose specific support activities by the SDF. In actual activities, the SDF will provide flexible support by accurately gathering needs, which change depending on the situation.

For this purpose, the SDF is strengthening dissemination of information so that people who truly need support by the SDF can easily access the information related to support.

Furthermore, the SDF has put in place arrangements for an initial response to ensure that disaster relief operations are conducted promptly. This is called “FAST-Force.”

(1) Response by the MOD/SDF

a. Disaster Relief in Response to the Flooding Caused by Heavy Rain Accompanying a Front in August 2019

In August 2019 a heavy rain around northern Kyushu caused river flooding. In response to disaster relief requests from the governor of Saga Prefecture, the SDF sent liaison officers to coordinate closely with local governments to save lives, provide bathing facilities and meals, respond to an oil leak from iron works, support accumulation of disaster waste and epidemic control, distribute goods, supply water at hospitals and music by a band, for example. This mission involved approximately 32,000 personnel in total, 7,500 of whom engaged in the affected area, and 50 aircraft. In total, approximately 150 people were rescued, and 4,200 were provided with bathing facilities.

b. Disaster Relief in Response to the 2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai)

In September 2019 a violent storm accompanying the 2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai) caused a large-scale blackout due to fallen utility poles and other damage. In response to disaster relief requests from the governors of Chiba and Kanagawa Prefectures, the SDF sent up to 50 liaison officers to coordinate closely with the Tokyo
Electric Power Company Holdings, Incorporated (TEPCO) Headquarters and six offices to supply water, lift patients, remove fallen trees and soil for outage restoration work, provide bathing facilities and help covering with blue sheets, for example. For removal of fallen trees to restore power supply, SDF-TEPCO coordination centers were set up in the TEPCO Headquarters and six offices in Chiba Prefecture to respond to the challenge together with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism and the TEPCO. During the mission, the SDF flexibly provided support in response to the needs of the victims: for example, personnel for other activities were temporarily sent to implement blue sheet covering, which became urgent as the forecast said the weather would worsen. This mission involved approximately 96,000 personnel in total, 54,000 of whom engaged in the affected area, and 20 aircraft. In total, approximately 1,300 tons of water was supplied, 28,000 people were provided with bathing facilities and blue sheets were installed at around 1,820 places in 27 cities and towns.

c. Disaster Relief in Response to the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis)

In October 2019, the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (“Typhoon Hagibis”) was expected to approach East Japan while maintaining its great intensity. Since there was a risk of human damage and infrastructure damage including damage to houses, power and water outage from the Tokai to Kanto regions in particular, due to sediment disaster and flooding...
On October 11, 2019, the MOD launched a Twitter account aiming at widely disseminating information on activities related to the MOD/SDF’s disaster response. Regarding the disaster relief operations in response to the East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis) in 2019, tweets were sent out on a round-the-clock basis to spread information with respect to locations and time for disaster-affected people to receive support (meals, water supply, and bathing assistance), and reconstruction activities, including clearing of roads and disposal of disaster-related wastes.

In order to mitigate the concerns of disaster-affected people, the MOD will continue to disseminate necessary information in the event of various disasters. Please follow the Official Twitter Account (For Disaster Response).

https://twitter.com/modjapan_saigai

Video: Disaster relief in response to Typhoon Hagibis, etc.
URL: https://youtu.be/EeCpz8QFNOg
In August 2019, GSDF units in charge of regional disaster relief operations were equipped with drones for disasters. Drones for disasters are information gathering equipment that can be expected to play an active role at the time of various disasters in such activities as surveying disaster-affected areas and identifying the damage status in areas that are difficult to be accessed by land.

The drone for disasters introduced at this time is composed of the main body itself, remote controller, and a tablet device with controlling software installed. It is capable of taking photographs with a resolution of 24 mega pixels (MP) and video at a frame rate of 60 fps.

At the disaster relief activities after the Boso Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai) and the East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis") of 2019, which caused severe damage in September to October 2019, following videos and photographs are taken:

- Took videos and photographs of the areas that were difficult to be accessed by land due to clusters of fallen trees.
- Took aerial video and photographs of the damage status of private residences in areas hit by strong winds.
- Took video and photographs of river floods
- Took video and photographs of the whole of the massive amount of disaster debris collected

The activity to take video and photographs was conducted by teams of three members each.

The video and photographs taken through the above activity were provided to units engaging in disaster relief operations at the disaster sites and were used to identify the damage status and also used as a reference for those units’ activities. Some video and photographs were also provided to and used by relevant local governments.

In addition, the teams used video transmission equipment to distribute real-time or recorded video to senior organizations, such as the Joint Staff Office and Ground Staff Office (Camp Ichigaya) for the purpose of information sharing.

As explained above, information gathered through drones is effective in identifying the damage status at the time of disasters. Therefore, the SDF will continue to disseminate drones further and will prepare for disasters by enhancing the drone operation capability.
Chapter 1

Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense

Provision of Allergy-Conscious Meals

The responsibility for providing meals at emergency shelters in the event of a disaster rests primarily with local governments. When the SDF has received a request for meal provision support from local governments having difficulty providing meals themselves, it provides evacuees with meals prepared using its field cooking appliances based on food materials and menus prepared by local governments.

However, regarding meals provided at emergency shelters in the event of a disaster, no information on the ingredients was indicated. As a result, there were concerns over a lack of meals that people with a food allergy could eat without worry.

Therefore, when the SDF conducted disaster relief activities after the East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis) of 2019, the dispatched SDF units, in response to requests for meal provision support, provided meals with due consideration of the needs of people with a food allergy in cooperation with relevant local governments. To be more precise, the dispatched SDF units (i) posted a reminder notice regarding food allergies, (ii) indicated food allergy information concerning the food materials used (prepared by local governments), and (iii) placed the packages and bottles of the food materials and seasonings used in front of the places where meals were distributed.

Consequently, it became possible for evacuees themselves to check on food allergy information regarding the food materials and seasonings used for the provision of meals, and for people with a food allergy to judge whether or not they could eat the meals provided without worry.

The SDF will continue to cooperate with local governments in providing meals with due consideration of the needs of people with a food allergy.

Indication of food allergy information concerning the food materials used

GSDF personnel providing meals

this, approximately 2,040 people were rescued, 7,030 tons of water were supplied, and 70,230 people were provided with bathing facilities in total.

d. Disaster Relief in Response to Classical Swine Fever (CSF) Outbreak

Between July 2019 and the end of March 2020, the occurrence of CSF was confirmed in Aichi, Gifu, Mie, and Okinawa Prefectures. As prompt epidemic prevention measures, including slaughter of pigs, were required, the SDF assisted with the slaughter and other measures in response to disaster relief requests from the governors of the prefectures.2 These missions engaged around 9,250 personnel and 1,440 vehicles.

e. Disaster Relief in Response to Forest Fire

Over the period from July 2019 to the end of March 2020, local authorities conducted firefighting operations against fighting forest fires but were unable to settle the situation despite their efforts. Based on requests issued by the governors of Hiroshima, Miyazaki and Ibaraki Prefectures, the SDF contributed to aerial firefighting and other resources. The SDF dispatches were conducted three times in total, including a total of some 380 personnel, around 30 vehicles and around 20 aircraft. Approximately 260 tons of water was applied on 45 occasions.

2 As a countermeasure to classical swine fever (CSF) outbreak, the MOD/SDF cooperated with the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in aerial application of an oral vaccine for wild boars. The MOD/SDF carried out aerial application of the oral vaccine in the national forest in Nikko, Tochigi Prefecture in December 2019, and in Gunma and Tochigi Prefectures in April 2020.
(2) Transportation of Emergency Patients

The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with insufficient medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients). In FY2019, out of a total of 449 cases of disaster relief, 365 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients, with dispatches to remote islands such as the Southwestern Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures), the Ogasawara Islands (Tokyo), and remote islands of Nagasaki Prefecture representing the majority of such cases.

In addition, the SDF conducts long-distance transportation for serious-case patients, by the ASDF transport aircraft C-130H utilizing its mobile medical units.

Fig. Ⅲ-1-5-3 Record of Disaster Relief (FY2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number of dispatches</th>
<th>Total number of personnel working in the field</th>
<th>Total number of vehicles</th>
<th>Total number of aircraft</th>
<th>Total number of vessels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responses to storm, flood, and earthquake disasters</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8,889</td>
<td>4,279</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transporting emergency patients</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td></td>
<td>402</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and rescue</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,545</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assisting firefighting</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6,228</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>179</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24,663</td>
<td>2,646</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>43,285</td>
<td>7,597</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The number of overall personnel includes maintenance, communication, command, standby/backup and other rear-service personnel in addition to personnel working in the field.

VOICE Activities at Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc. (TEPCO) during the Disaster Relief in Response to the 2019 Boso Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai)

Captain KUBOYAMA Nobutoshi, researcher at the Airborne Training Unit, GSDF (Funabashi City, Chiba Prefecture)

Typhoon Faxai occurred in September 2019, causing much damage in Chiba Prefecture. Damage to the power supply was particularly severe. Power failure due to fallen utility poles and disconnection continued for a long time all over the prefecture. Power restoration took time because disconnection, etc. due to fallen trees occurred over a wide area. The fallen trees were major obstacles for recovery operation.

In order to remove fallen trees and contribute to early power restoration, the SDF units in Chiba and other areas carried out disaster relief activities. I was sent as a liaison officer to Narita branch of TEPCO and engaged in tasks for liaison and coordination between the branch and SDF units.

At the beginning of the activities, due to the use of different maps and differences in the operation organizations, we had difficulty in sharing recognition of the damage situation and establishing a joint operation manual. In order to solve the problems, we used common tools to simultaneously share information on damage location and made efforts to understand what the other party was able and not able to do with each other. As a result, these efforts reduced the time required from identifying damage location to joint operation and contributed to effective operation of SDF personnel on the site.

In recent years, natural disasters causing enormous damage have been increasing year by year. In order to meet the high expectations from the public toward the SDF, I will push forward with my duties as SDF personnel and the lessons of this disaster relief in mind.
Participating in Disaster Relief

Lieutenant Commander HATANO Yuka, Disaster Relief Team, 2nd Operation Section, Operation Department, Joint Staff, MOD (Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo)

The Joint Staff Office is an organization which centrally assists the Minister of Defense in SDF operation. The disaster relief team where I belong has a role to assist the Chief of Joint Staff to back up disaster relief activities as a mediator among GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, including coordination for timely input of personnel and equipment in the event of a disaster.

I joined the disaster relief team in March 2018. At that time I had little knowledge of the duties and equipment of the GSDF and ASDF. However, through disaster relief activities in response to the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake and repeated typhoon disasters, I was able to gain extensive knowledge of their organizations and capabilities, which include the capacity of GSDF’s large-scale facility and advanced medical technology, and the ASDF’s transportation capacity across the country and high water supply capacity using fresh water generators.

Each of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF have their respective views and ceremonial manners that can be expressed with the word “culture.” When there is a disagreement with GSDF/ASDF members in the disaster relief team, we may argue, jokingly saying, “This is a cultural difference.” However, once a disaster occurs, in any situation, we share our knowledge cultivated in our respective cultures and take advantage of our respective characteristics across the boundaries of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF to carry out broad-ranging support activities and complete the mission. My workplace is not on disaster sites but the Ministry of Defense. Even so, through disaster relief activities, I can feel that GSDF, MSDF and ASDF units are tied and working together through disaster relief activities.

Recently, some cases require rescue operations, such as livelihood support and other operations that are different from usual disaster relief activities. In such cases, too, I am working with the goal of making “cross-cultural communication” smoother and becoming a skillful mediator together with colleagues of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF in their respective uniform colors.

Participating in Disaster Relief Activities in Response to the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis)

Airman 1st Class FUKUI Keita, 2nd Section, 1st Flight, 2nd Air Civil Engineering Squadron, Central Air Civil Engineering Group, ASDF (Komatsu City, Ishikawa Prefecture)

I participated in disaster relief in response to the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis) that occurred last fall. Before I participated in the first disaster relief, I had seen disaster relief activities only on television news. When I was informed that I would be sent to the disaster area, I firmly resolved to do anything that I could do for victims.

I was sent to Matsushiro Elementary School in Nagano City, Nagano Prefecture. Its playground was covered with driftwood, sludge and waste from the flooding rivers, so I strongly wanted to restore the site back to its normal state as soon as possible.

It was extremely difficult to restore the playground. We removed driftwood and sludge from the ground using a few heavy equipment units and by hand, but no matter how much we dug, we could not see the surface of the ground. When we caught a glimpse of the ground, more heavy rain spread the sludge and we were put back to the beginning. It was not showy activity and, we were in a harsh situation.

However, the local elementary school children sang songs between the activities and sent letters to us. We were able to complete the mission thanks to their encouragement.

I hope that a disaster requiring our relief activity would never occur again but, if I am called to the mission again, I will be genuinely committed to my duty with a strong sense of responsibility and pride as I did in this mission.
in certain occasions.

Furthermore, in FY2019, the SDF carried out 46 dispatches of firefighting support, with 28 cases responding to fire in the areas near SDF facilities.

(3) The MOD/SDF Response to Nuclear Disaster

In order to respond to nuclear disasters, the MOD/SDF has formulated “The SDF Nuclear Disaster Response Plan.”

The SDF also participates in general nuclear disaster prevention drills jointly implemented by the government, local governments, and nuclear operators, to confirm the effectiveness of municipal governments’ evacuation plan and to strengthen cooperation with relevant agencies in a nuclear disaster emergency. Moreover, since October 2014, SDF personnel (five personnel as of March 31, 2020) were transferred (on temporary assignment) to a section in charge of nuclear disaster prevention within the Cabinet Office as part of an effort to enhance the effectiveness of nuclear disaster response capabilities.

(4) Formulating Plans for Responding to Various Disasters

In the event of the occurrence of various disasters, the MOD/SDF will take all possible measures such as swift transportation and deployment of sufficiently sized units in their initial response. By establishing a rotating staffing posture based on a joint operational approach, the MOD/SDF will ensure that it is able to sustain a well-prepared condition for a long-term response. In doing so, the MOD/SDF will fully take into account the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake and other disasters.

The MOD/SDF formulates various contingency plans for responses to large-scale earthquakes, which are under consideration at the Central Disaster Management Council, based on the Ministry of Defense Disaster Prevention Plan to respond to such earthquakes.

(5) Exercises Involving the SDF

In order to respond to large-scale and various other disasters in a speedy and appropriate manner, the SDF carries out various disaster prevention drills, and also actively participates in disaster prevention drills organized by the Japanese Government or local governments and is seeking to ensure cooperation with various ministries and agencies, and local governments.

a. Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR)

The SDF conducts disaster drills concerning its command and staff activities, and coordination between its major units and with organizations related to disaster prevention in the event of a large-scale earthquake to maintain and enhance the SDF’s earthquake response capability. In FY2018 the SDF carried out training in preparation for an earthquake directly hitting the Tokyo area. In FY2019, the SDF carried out training assuming the occurrence of an earthquake directly hitting the Tokyo area during the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games.

b. Tomodachi Rescue Exercise (TREX) Joint Disaster Response Exercise with U.S. Forces

In February 2020, joint exercises were held with U.S. Forces stationed in Japan in the scenario of the Nankai Trench earthquake. The purpose of the exercise was to maintain and enhance earthquake disaster relief capabilities in collaboration between the SDF and U.S. forces and to strengthen cooperation with relevant local authorities.

c. Remote Island Disaster Relief Exercise (RIDEX)

In September 2019, the SDF participated in general disaster prevention training planned and organized by Okinawa Prefecture and a disaster drill of Ishigaki citizens and conducted a field training exercise to deal with sudden large-scale disasters in a remote island to maintain as well as enhance the SDF’s ability to respond to disasters in remote islands and strengthen collaboration with relevant local authorities.

d. Drill for medical treatment activities following a large-scale earthquake

In September 2019, the SDF participated in a drill organized by the Cabinet Office for medical treatment activities following a large-scale earthquake. In this drill, the SDF practiced various activities for disaster relief and coordination with organizations related to disaster prevention to maintain and enhance the SDF’s disaster response capability.

e. Other

They also took part in the Ministry of Defense Disaster Preparedness Plan.

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3 On March 20, 2020, it was decided that the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games will take place between July 23 and August 8, 2021, and between August 24 and September 5, 2021, respectively.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emergency measures</th>
<th>Outline of the measures</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency measures for concrete block walls, etc. of SDF facilities</td>
<td>After the earthquake occurred in Northern Osaka in 2018, safety inspections were conducted with regard to concrete block walls, etc. on the borders of the SDF facilities adjacent to private properties and public roads and it was found that there are approximately 110 old concrete block walls and other structures that do not comply with the current Building Standards Act and pose safety risks. Therefore, the MOD will take emergency measures, such as removal of such dangerous walls and installation of new fences.</td>
<td>By FY2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency measures for SDF facilities</td>
<td>After the earthquake occurred in Northern Osaka in 2018, emergency inspections were conducted for the SDF’s significant disaster response bases regarding their resilience to earthquakes, deterioration levels and the status of installation of power generators, and some of these facilities were found likely to cause hindrance to the SDF’s prompt and appropriate performance of duties. Therefore, the MOD will take seismic reinforcement measures for around 10 facilities, countermeasures against deterioration for around 40 facilities, and measures to enhance power supplying capability for around 30 facilities.</td>
<td>By FY2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency measures for SDF equipment related to disaster prevention</td>
<td>As it is urgently necessary to develop equipment required for the SDF’s relief activities upon a disaster from the perspective of preventing functional failures due to deterioration and of strengthening such relief activities, the MOD will take emergency measures for securing necessary equipment, communication devices, and vehicles for camps nationwide where old dysfunctional equipment was found.</td>
<td>By FY2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Management Headquarters drill, the comprehensive disaster prevention drills on Disaster Prevention Day, and more.\(^4\)

(6) **Collaboration with Local Governments and Other Relevant Organizations**

It is important for the MOD/SDF to strengthen collaboration with local governments and other relevant organizations under normal circumstances for the purpose of conducting disaster relief operations smoothly. For this reason, the SDF implements various measures including: (1) Assignment of the post of Liaison Officer for Civil Protection and Disaster Management (administrative official) at the SDF Provincial Cooperation Offices; (2) Temporary assignment of SDF officers to the department in charge of disaster prevention at the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, and mutual exchange between administrative officials of both the GSDF Middle Army and Hyogo Prefectural Government; and (3) Recommendation of retired SDF personnel with knowledge in disaster prevention in accordance with requests from local governments.

As of the end of March 2020, as many as 575 retired SDF personnel are working in disaster prevention and other sections in 398 local governments in 46 prefectures throughout the country. Such cooperation in human resources is a very effective way of strengthening collaboration between the MOD/SDF and local governments, and its efficacy was confirmed through the experiences of the Great East Japan Earthquake and other disasters. In particular, each GSDF regional Army establishes a forum for interaction with senior directors for crisis management and other officials from local governments and share information and exchange opinions to strengthen collaboration with those local governments.

In the event of a disaster, liaison officers are sent quickly and effectively from the units to the local municipalities in order to ensure smooth coordination.

\(\text{See Reference 56 (Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government)}\)

(7) **Actions Based on the Three-Year Emergency Measures for Disaster Prevention, Mitigation, and Building National Resilience**

In December 2018, the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention, mitigation, and building national resilience\(^5\) were approved by the Cabinet. Under the measures, the MOD is focusing on emergency measures for concrete block walls, etc. of SDF facilities, for SDF facilities and for SDF equipment related to disaster prevention, from the perspective of maintaining functions including important infrastructure for disaster prevention.

\(\text{See Fig. III-1-5-4 (List of the Three-Year Emergency Measures for Disaster Prevention, Disaster Mitigation, and Building National Resilience [MOD])}\)

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\(^4\) In addition, the following drills were conducted and participated in, in 2019: (1) government tabletop drills, (2) the Nuclear Energy Disaster Prevention Drill, (3) the large tsunami disaster prevention drill, (4) a drill related to the Comprehensive Disaster Prevention Drill of Nine Prefectural and City Governments, (5) a drill related to the joint disaster drill among the Kinki prefectures, (6) comprehensive disaster prevention drills conducted by local governments or other bodies.

\(^5\) In recent years, the Heavy Rain in July 2018, Typhoon Jebi in 2018, Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake in 2018 and other natural disasters caused function loss of important infrastructures necessary for living and economic activities of the people, including the occurrence of blackouts and closure of airport terminals, which had a major effect on the activities. Learning from the experience, the Emergency Countermeasures stipulate physical and non-physical measures that individual ministries and agencies should implement intensively for the period of three years from the perspective of maintaining functions including important infrastructure for disaster prevention and important infrastructure supporting the national economy and people's lives.
Response to Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.

1 Basic Concept

In the event of natural disasters, insurgencies, and other emergencies overseas, the Minister of Defense can order SDF units to rescue or transport Japanese nationals and other people overseas upon request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to guard, rescue or transport Japanese nationals overseas, etc. and upon subsequent consultations with the Minister, on the basis of Article 84-3 (rescue Japanese nationals overseas, etc.) or Article 84-4 (transport of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.) of the SDF Law.

2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

For prompt and appropriate implementation of rescue or transport of Japanese nationals overseas, the SDF is prepared to dispatch its units swiftly. Specifically, the SDF maintains operational readiness, with the GSDF designating personnel to a helicopter unit and a unit responsible for land transportation, the MSDF designating vessels such as transport ships (including ship-based aircraft), and the ASDF designating airlift units and personnel for dispatch.

Since these activities require close coordination among the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, the MOD/SDF constantly conducts joint exercises. In December 2019, the SDF carried out an exercise in Japan for the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas to practice the whole process of the actions and coordination with related organizations in order to enhance integrated operational capabilities and to strengthen the coordination with the related organizations. Furthermore, from February to March 2020, the MOD/SDF also utilized the opportunity of the annual multilateral exercise Cobra Gold taking place in Thailand as training in a series of activities to protect Japanese nationals overseas in cooperation with the relevant ministries and the Embassy of Japan in Thailand.

The MOD/SDF has conducted the transportation of Japanese nationals in four cases. Responding to the kidnapping of foreigners and Japanese in Iraq, 10 Japanese evacuated to Kuwait by an ASDF C-130H plane in April 2004. In January 2013, a government aircraft was deployed to bring seven Japanese nationals and the remains of a further nine nationals back to Japan following the kidnapping in Algeria. With respect to the terrorist attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh, which occurred in July 2016, the bodies of Japanese victims (seven nationals), their families, and other involved parties were transported to Japan by a government aircraft.

In relation to the deterioration of the situation in South Sudan in July of the same year, the ASDF transport aircraft C-130H transported four embassy staff from Juba to Djibouti.
Background of the Deployment of the SDF to the Middle East

Peace and stability in the Middle East are crucial to the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan. In addition, it is very important to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East, which is the world’s major energy source and on which Japan depends for about 90% of its crude oil imports.

In the Middle East, amidst rising tensions, there were incidents of attacks on ships. In June 2019, Japan-related vessels suffered damage. Under these circumstances, the United States, European countries, and other countries are taking steps to ensure the safety of navigation in the region by utilizing ships and aircraft.

In order to ease tensions and stabilize the situation in the Middle East, the Japanese government has actively promoted diplomatic initiatives, including Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Iran in the same month, and the Japan-U.S. summit meeting during the UN General Assembly and the Japan-Iran summit meeting in September.

In this context, based on the discussions that took place among the Prime Minister and other relevant ministers at the National Security Council and other meetings, Japan has decided to take its own initiative to ensure peace and stability in the Middle East and the safety of Japan-related vessels. On October 18, the Chief Cabinet Secretary held a press conference to announce the government’s policies that consisted of the following three pillars: (1) further diplomatic efforts to ease tensions in the Middle East and stabilize the situation; (2) thorough implementation of navigation safety measures, including close information sharing with relevant industries; and (3) commencement of specific studies on the use of SDF assets to strengthen information gathering posture.

On December 27, following the above studies and the discussions held subsequently among the National Security Council, the Prime Minister, and other relevant ministers, the Cabinet decided on the government’s policy on the efforts to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels (details are given in the next section). While the information gathering activities could have been implemented within the scope of the MOD’s jurisdiction, it was decided to carry out a Cabinet decision not just because comprehensive measures were to be taken under cooperation of different ministries and agencies as a whole-of-government approach, but also in order to clarify the importance of the deployment of the SDF overseas and ensure accountability to the public. For the same reasons, it was stipulated that the Diet is to receive a report whenever a Cabinet decision regarding the activities is made (including any changes to it) and a report on the results of such activities upon termination. At the time of the Cabinet decision, the report to the Diet was made immediately after the Cabinet decision was issued.

Following the Cabinet decision on the same day, the Minister of Defense instructed the MOD to begin various preparations, including preparations for the formation of units and education and training. With the participation of the relevant departments of the MOD and other relevant ministries and agencies, the MSDF took all possible measures to ensure the smooth execution of its activities, such as conducting a wargaming exercise on January 8 and 9, 2020, in order to strengthen the capabilities of commanders...
at different levels to judge the situation and practice unit operation and liaison.

On January 10, a Defense Council meeting was held. After deliberations based on reports from the Chief of Joint Staff and the MSDF Chief of Staff on the preparations for the dispatch, the Minister of Defense ordered the implementation of information gathering activities necessary to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East. In addition to the dispatch of a new destroyer for the Deployment Surface Force for Information Gathering, two P-3C fixed-wing patrol aircraft of the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DAPE) will be utilized to the extent that it does not interfere with the counter-piracy mission. The area of operation includes three waters of high seas: the Gulf of Oman, the northern Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the east of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (including the exclusive economic zones of the coastal states). Two fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) left Japan on January 11 to replace the counter-piracy unit and began an information gathering task on the 20th of the same month. Destroyer JS “Takanami” left port on February 2 and started to engage in information gathering activities in the sea areas above on February 26.1 On May 10, 2020, Destroyer JS “Kirisame” left Japan to replace “Takanami.”

Information gathered by the SDF is shared with the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), the MOFA, and other relevant ministries and agencies, as well as with relevant industries when necessary through public-private liaison meetings, to be used for the government’s navigation safety measures.

![Fig. III-1-6-1 Units Engaged in Information Gathering Activities in the Middle East](image)

![Fig. III-1-6-2 Information Gathering Activities by the SDF](image)

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1 From the start of the information gathering activity to the end of May 2020, no Japan-related vessels have been reported to encounter a distinctive event in the waters of operation. During this period, in the waters of operation, Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) confirmed about 7,617 vessels in total, and DAPE confirmed about 9,150 vessels in total.
relevant industries; and (3) the use of SDF vessels and aircraft to strengthen information gathering capabilities. The Cabinet decision was made with an understanding of the significance of these measures, which are to be carried out by the following means.

1 Further diplomatic efforts

Japan has built good relations with countries involved in the stability of the Middle East, such as maintaining good relations with Iran for many years while being an ally of the United States. Taking advantage of these relations, Japan will make further diplomatic efforts, including reaching out to the countries concerned at various levels, to ease tensions and stabilize the situation in the Middle East. In addition, Japan will continue to seek cooperation from the coastal countries that play an important role in the safe navigation of vessels. Continued efforts will be made to gain the understanding of the countries concerned in the region regarding the SDF’s information gathering activities.

2 Thorough implementation of navigation safety measures

Japan will thoroughly implement its navigation safety measures, including meticulous information sharing with related industries. Specifically, a system of cooperation within the government and between the government and related industries will be established, which will also cover the sharing of information obtained through the SDF’s information gathering activities by related ministries and agencies. In addition, whenever information that suggests the existence of a risk to the safe navigation of vessels is obtained, the government will promptly share such information with related industries to call for vigilance in a timely manner, encouraging them to thoroughly implement navigation safety measures at their own initiative.

3 Information gathering activities by the SDF

Although there is no immediate need to implement protective measures for Japan-related vessels in the Middle
East, given the rising tensions in the region, it is necessary to strengthen the information gathering system to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels. Therefore, Japan has decided to have the SDF conduct information gathering activities, considering the distance from Japan to the Middle East region, the SDF’s experience in operating in the region, and the importance of cooperation with units and organizations from other countries.

The SDF’s information gathering activities are part of the government’s navigation safety measures and are aimed at collecting information necessary to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels. The activities are to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, paragraph (1), item (xviii) of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense, as they would need smooth decision making and order issuance in relation to Maritime Security Operations as measures for unforeseen circumstances or other changes in the situation, which are provided in Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

(1) Information to Be Gathered
The SDF will gather information that directly affects or is necessary for ensuring safe navigation in the waters described in (3) below.

(2) Equipment
After necessary adjustments, one new destroyer will be dispatched. In addition, the SDF will also use fixed-wing patrol aircraft P-3C of the units currently engaged in the Counter-Piracy Operations under Article 7, paragraph (1) of the Acts on Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy (Anti-Piracy Measures Act). Information gathering activities by the counter-piracy units will be carried out to an extent that does not interfere with the counter-piracy operation.

(3) Geographical Scope of Activities
The geographical scope of the information gathering activities by destroyers and fixed-wing patrol aircraft described in (2) consists of three waters of high seas: the Gulf of Oman, the northern Arabian Sea, and the Gulf of Aden to the east of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (including the exclusive economic zones of the coastal states). For resupply, destroyers will call at a port facing the three seas.

(4) Responding to Unforeseen Circumstances Or Other Changes in the Situation
In the event of unforeseen circumstances or other changes in the situation, the relevant ministries and agencies will work together to understand the situation, share information closely and promptly with each other, and strengthen the government’s response. Then, if further measures by the SDF are deemed necessary in response to the situation in question, Maritime Security Operations will be ordered in accordance with Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. When issuing such an order, the MOD will make best efforts for prompt decision making.

The measures that can be taken in the course of Maritime Security Operations will be based on international laws, including the flag state principle, and will vary depending on the circumstances, such as whether the protected vessel is a Japanese or foreign-flagged vessel and the type of infringement.

(5) Ensuring the Safety of the SDF Units
In conducting information gathering activities, the SDF units take all possible measures to ensure their own safety, including the collection of sufficient information on the situation in the areas of operation, the installation of equipment necessary to ensure safety, and appropriate prior education and training.

(6) Cooperation among Relevant Ministries and Agencies
In order to ensure the effectiveness of information gathering activities and responses to changes in the situation including the rise of unforeseen circumstances, relevant ministries and agencies will work closely together to share understanding regarding such responses, improve response capabilities through training, and develop a system that allows for a prompt response to the situation.

(7) Cooperation with Other Countries
Although Japan does not participate in any specific framework related to the safety of navigation in the Middle East and the SDF’s information gathering activities are to be conducted at its own initiative, Japan will communicate and cooperate with other countries as necessary.
(8) Duration of the SDF’s Activities

The period during which the SDF should engage in the information gathering activities (including preparation and training periods) under the Cabinet decision is from December 27, 2019, to December 26, 2020. If it is deemed necessary to extend the SDF’s activities based on the Cabinet decision, another Cabinet decision or any changes to it will be made in that regard. If, prior to the expiration of the above period, the SDF’s activities are no longer deemed necessary in light of the necessity described in this paragraph, the SDF will terminate such activities at that point. If there is a noticeable change in the situation, the National Security Council will consider a response.

4 Report to the Diet

In view of the fact that matters pertaining to the SDF operations under the Anti-Piracy Measures Act are reported to the Diet in accordance with Article 7, paragraph (3) of the Anti-Piracy Measures Act, the Diet is to receive a report whenever a Cabinet decision or any changes to it is made and a report on the results of such activities upon termination.

See Reference 15 (Government’s Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East)

VOICE Engaging in Information Gathering Activities in the Middle East

Captain INABA Yosuke, Escort Flotilla 6 Commander, MSDF

As the commander of the Deployment Surface Force for Information Gathering (DSIG), on our unit, Destroyer JS “Takanami,” I have engaged in information gathering in the waters of the Middle East since February 2020. Considering the fact that Japan depends on the Middle East region for approximately 90% of its crude oil imports, it is vital for Japan to ensure the safety of navigation for Japan-related vessels in the Middle East, which is a major energy source of the world. In the open sea of the Gulf of Oman and the northern Arabian Sea where we are working, a large number of tankers laden with crude oil, etc. are navigating from the Gulf countries toward Japan. Through these information gathering activities, all personnel of the Deployment Surface Force are proud of being able to contribute to the safety of Japan-related vessels by gathering information that directly impacts the safety of navigation of vessels and other information necessary to secure safe navigation.

Since this is the first such activity, we were groping through trial and error for the mission. However, we were able to overcome challenges with significant support from various quarters and unified efforts of all personnel of the DSIG, who understand how important the mission is.

Today, too, we are making full efforts to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in this water.

Video: Information gathering activities necessary to ensure the safety of Japanese vessels in the Middle East
URL: https://twitter.com/oointstaffpa/status/1232620231605899265?s=09

2 Refers to “3 Intelligence gathering activities by the SDF”
Communication and Cooperation with Relevant Countries

1 United States

As a result of a comprehensive review of what measures Japan should take to ensure the safe navigation of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East, Japan has started to implement efforts as Japan’s independent initiative without participating in the International Maritime Security Construct led by the United States, considering the need for ensuring a stable supply of crude oil, relations with the United States, and relations with Iran. At the same time, to ensure safe navigation in the Middle East, the SDF has been cooperating closely with the United States in various ways. In the information gathering activities, the SDF will also appropriately cooperate with the United States as an ally, while observing the government’s policy of conducting navigation safety measures independently from any other country’s initiatives. For this reason, an MSDF officer has been dispatched to the U.S. Central Naval Command in

Response from Relevant Industries to the Information Gathering Activities in the Middle East

Based on a cabinet decision made in December 2019, the SDF has been carrying out information gathering activities in the Middle East. In this Column, we introduce responses from the relevant industries (The Japanese Shipowners’ Association, the Petroleum Association of Japan and the All Japan Seamen’s Union ) to the activities.

Mr. NAITO Tadaaki, (President, the Japanese Shipowners’ Association)

The Japanese Shipowners’ Association welcomes the initiative of the Government of Japan that was approved by the cabinet on December 27, 2019. As tension has been rising in the Middle East since last year, crew members of ships navigating the waters are conducting operations with concern about safety. In this situation, the provision of information obtained by the SDF will contribute to the safe navigation of Japanese merchant vessels and increase the sense of security for crew members. The ocean shipping industry will closely share information with the government to fulfill our social responsibility to surely transport goods necessary for Japan.

Mr. TSUKIOKA Takashi (President, the Petroleum Association of Japan)

I would like to express my gratitude for the initiative by the government for the safety of the navigation in the Middle East waters, which is an artery for energy supply to the country, as well as the SDF personnel who are gathering information in the field. Crude oil from the Middle East accounts for about 90% of the crude oil imports of Japan. The industry believes that safe navigation in the region is the foundation for Japan’s stable energy supply and the peace of people’s daily lives. The industry will continue to work for the stable supply of petroleum. I am grateful to the SDF personnel who are engaging in information gathering activities in the field every day and hope that all of them will safely return home after performing their duty.

Mr. MORITA Yasumi (President, All Japan Seamen’s Union)

As Japan, an ocean trade nation, transports 99.6% of export/import cargoes that are necessary for the maintenance of daily lives of its people and economic development by sea, in order to maintain stable marine transport, the safety of navigation is absolutely vital. We seamen can work in relief when the safety of the sea and waterways is confirmed.

On behalf of seamen, I would like to offer my genuine appreciation for activities by people of the MOD/SDF to ensure the safety of the sea and waterways.
Bahrain as a liaison officer to share information with the U.S. Forces. At the Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meeting on January 14, 2020, Defense Minister Kono explained the deployment of the SDF to Secretary of Defense Esper, and the Secretary expressed his gratitude.

2 Coastal States in the Middle East

It is important to gain the understanding of the coastal states, including Iran, regarding the information gathering activities that Japan is undertaking as an independent initiative, and Japan has been explaining these activities to them with transparency. In addition, the coastal states play an important role in ensuring safe navigation in the Middle East. Japan has been reaching out to the coastal states to gain their understanding of Japan’s efforts.

At the Japan-Iran Summit Meeting on December 20, 2019, Prime Minister Abe gave a detailed explanation of Japan’s efforts. In response, President Rouhani said that Iran appreciates Japan’s diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions in the region, understands Japan’s intention to contribute to the safety of navigation through its own initiative, and also appreciates that Japan is explaining its efforts to Iran in a transparent manner. Iran maintained the same stance as this also at the Japan-Iran foreign ministers’ meeting held on February 15, 2020.

In a telephone conference between Defense Minister Kono and Iranian Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Hatami on January 9, 2020, Minister Kono explained the SDF’s information gathering activities and asked Iran to cooperate as a coastal country to ensure the safety of navigation.

In January, Prime Minister Abe visited Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman, and held summit meetings with each of these countries. At the summit meetings, the Prime Minister gave an explanation on Japan’s efforts, gaining support from the countries. Defense Minister Kono also explained the SDF’s information gathering activities to Defense Minister Badr during his visit to Oman in December 2019, and to UAE Minister of State for Defense Affairs Bowardi in a telephone conference in March 2020. Japan intends to continue to communicate with the coastal states, including Iran.
This year marked the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) states that the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, as well as Japan’s own national defense architecture, constitute a cornerstone for Japan’s national security, and that the Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as its core, plays a significant role for peace, stability and prosperity of not only Japan but also the Indo-Pacific region and the international community.

The NDPG also explains that, as inter-state competitions prominently emerge, it has become all the more important for Japan’s national security to further strengthen relationship with the United States, with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests, and that the United States also views that cooperation with its allies has become more important.

On that basis, the NDPG provides that, while the Japan-U.S. Alliance has been reinforced through activities including those that were made possible by the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan needs to further enhance the Alliance through efforts under the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” in order to achieve its national defense objective as security environment surrounding Japan becomes more severe and uncertain at remarkably fast speeds.

At the same time, the NDPG provides that, in further strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, it is an essential premise that Japan strengthens its own defense capability on its own accord and initiative. Fulfilling this premise, Japan needs to press ahead with efforts such as: bolstering the ability of the Alliance to deter and counter threats; enhancing and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas; and steadily implementing measures concerning the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ).

This chapter explains activities related to the enhancement of the Japan-U.S. Alliance while taking account of the concept of the NDPG.

Outline of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

1 Maintenance of Japan’s Peace and Security

In the current international community, a robust defense system capable of responding to every contingency, ranging from all types of armed attacks, including the use of nuclear weapons, to coercion or intimidation by military power, is necessary to secure the peace, security, and sovereignty of the nation.

However, it is difficult even for the United States to guarantee its security on its own. Much more than that, it would be difficult for Japan to ensure its national security solely through its unilateral efforts given its population, land, and economy. Moreover, such a strategy would not necessarily contribute to regional stability.

Consequently, Japan has maintained its peace and security, centered on the Security Arrangements with the world’s dominant military power, the United States, with which it shares basic values such as democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and a capitalist economy as well as an interest in maintaining the peace and security of the world, and has strong economic ties.

Specifically, Japan and the United States will take bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against Japan, based on Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and Japan will provide facilities and areas for the U.S. Forces, based on Article 6 of the treaty. If a nation plans to attack Japan, the attacker must be prepared to confront not only the defense capability of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), but also the overwhelming military strength of the United States, due to the U.S. obligation to defend Japan in the event of an armed
attack. As a result, the opposing nation clearly recognizes that it will suffer grievously if it carries out an invasion, and such desires will be abandoned at the planning stage. In other words, this serves as deterrence against attacks.

Japan intends to create a seamless posture and secure its peace and security by effectively utilizing the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. military together with Japan’s own national defense architecture.

2 Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region surrounding Japan

Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty states that contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East is the purpose of the use of facilities and areas by the USFJ. This provision is based on the recognition that the security of Japan is closely tied to the peace and security of the Far East region to which Japan belongs.

In the regions surrounding Japan, there are many states and the like with massive military power, including some states that retain nuclear weapons or continue nuclear development. In addition, uncertainty over the existing order is increasing due to changes in the balance of power. The so-called gray-zone situations harbor the risk of rapidly developing into graver situations without showing clear indications.

In such a security environment, the military presence of USFJ provides deterrence against unexpected contingencies caused by various security issues or destabilizing factors, not only protecting the interests of Japan and the United States but also providing a great sense of security to the nations in the region and thus fulfilling a role as public goods.

Also, the close bonds of cooperation based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements constitute the foundation of the United States’ commitment to the peace and stability of the region surrounding Japan. These arrangements, complemented by the alliances established between the United States and other countries in the region such as the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, and also by the friendly relations developed with other countries, play an indispensable role in maintaining the peace and stability of the region.

3 Responding to Global Issues

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, not only in defense but also in a wide range of areas, including politics, economy, and society.

The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements at its core, also forms the axis of Japan’s foreign policy. It contributes to Japan’s ability to implement positive efforts to maintain the peace and security of the international community, including the promotion of multinational security dialogue and cooperation, and cooperation with the United Nations.

Currently, we are confronted with global security challenges that are difficult for any single country to tackle alone, including risks concerning stable use of the seas, outer space and cyberspace, the acts of piracy, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and international terrorism, and it is important for countries to work together from peacetime. The strong bonds forged between Japan and the United States are also playing an important role in the efforts implemented by Japan to effectively respond to such challenges.

In particular, under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and the U.S. Forces are working together in peacetime in a variety of areas to strengthen their cooperation. This close coordination lays the foundation for various forms of global collaboration such as antipiracy, undertaken by the SDF and the U.S. Forces, and leads to enhancement of the operational effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

The peace and prosperity of the international community are closely linked to those of Japan. Accordingly, by advancing initiatives for resolving global issues in cooperation with the United States, which has remarkable operational capabilities, Japan will be able to further ensure its security and prosperity.
2 Background to the Strengthening of the Alliance

Since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960, Japan and the United States have built a robust alliance based on democratic ideals, respect for human rights, and the rule of law and common interests.

During the Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ensured the safety of Japan as a country of liberal democracy and contributed to the peace and stability in the region, including the formulation of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“Guidelines”) in 1978 with a focus on responses to an armed attack on Japan.

Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of Japan and the United States announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, reaffirming the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region following the Cold War. Upon the Declaration, the final report was compiled at the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) at the end of the same year. As part of the promotion of cooperative relations presented in the Declaration, the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting) held in the following year (1997) approved the aforementioned 1997 Guidelines and expanded cooperation to responses in situations in areas surrounding Japan in light of changes in the security environment, such as the end of the Cold War.

In light of further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, following the “2+2” Meeting in December 2002, Japan and the United States held working-level and other consultations as a part of bilateral strategic dialogue on security from the perspective of how to make the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s capacity more effective to adapt to the changing times.

As a result of a number of these Japan-U.S. consultations, the direction of the Japan-U.S. Alliance was arranged in three stages. These stages are: confirmation of common strategic objectives to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region (first stage) in February 2005; announcement of the results of the examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage) in October 2005; and finalization of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (Realignment Roadmap), a program for implementing specific measures for the realignment of USFJ, (third stage) in May 2006.


At the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011, the two countries reviewed and revalidated their common strategic objectives set forth in the Joint Statements of the previous “2+2” Meetings, including maintenance of maritime security domain by defending the principle of freedom of navigation and maintenance of bilateral cooperation with respect to protection of and access to outer space and cyberspace, and discussed a diverse range of areas, including an expansion of information sharing and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities.

In the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, Japan and the United States announced the decision to adjust the plans outlined in the Realignment Roadmap of 2006, considering significant progress on the realignment of the USFJ since the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 as well as the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.

Since the formulation of the 1997 Guidelines, various issues and destabilizing factors have emerged, and become more visible and aggravated in the security environment surrounding Japan; such as more active military activities of neighboring countries, new threats including international terrorist organizations and risks against the stable use of global commons such as oceans, outer space and cyberspace. In addition, the activities of the SDF have expanded to a global scale, as exemplified by anti-piracy activities, peacekeeping operations (PKO), and international disaster relief activities. As a result, it had become necessary for the manner of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation to be adapted to

1 The 1997 Guidelines define the roles of Japan and the United States, and the cooperation of the two countries under three categories: (1) under normal circumstances, (2) in response to an armed attack against Japan, and (3) in situations in areas surrounding Japan. They also stipulated that they would review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner.
these changes in the security environment and the expansion of the SDF’s activities and missions.

Against such backdrop, both governments decided at the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013 to revise the 1997 Guidelines by the end of 2014. The new Guidelines were approved at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2015 after a vigorous review between the two governments.

Q See Fig. III-2-1-1 (Chronology of the Japan-U.S. Alliance)

### Content of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

The Guidelines, which replace the 1997 Guidelines, update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies.

Q See Reference 18 (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (April 27, 2015) [tentative translation]) Fig. III-2-1-2 (Outline of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation)

#### 1 Strengthened Coordination within the Alliance

(1) Establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM)

In November 2015, the Japanese and U.S. Governments established the ACM in order to seamlessly and effectively address any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security...
The Guidelines provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination.

In this way, the Guidelines promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

- By means of the Japan-U.S. bilateral security and defense cooperation, the following points will be emphasized:
  - seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses;
  - synergy across the two governments' national security policies;
  - a whole-of-government Alliance approach;
  - cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and
  - the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

### III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination

- **A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism**
  - In order to address issues seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan's peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, and will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the SDF and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. The two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises.

- **B. Enhanced Operational Coordination**
  - The two governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities.

- **C. Bilateral Planning**
  - In peacetime, the two governments will develop and update bilateral plans through the Bilateral Planning Mechanism. Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments.

#### IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security

- The two governments will take measures to seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments will also promote further cooperation with partners.

- The two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism as appropriate, for assessment of the situation, sharing of information, as well as flexible deterrent options and actions aimed at de-escalation. The two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels.

#### A. Cooperative Measures during Peacetime

- The two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
- The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to: (1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; (2) Air and Missile Defense; (3) Maritime Security; (4) Asset Protection; (5) Training and exercises; (6) Logistic Support; and (7) Use of Facilities.

#### B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security

- The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations cannot be defined geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’ respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation.

- In addition to continuing cooperative measures during peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to: (1) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations; (2) Maritime Security; (3) Measures to Deal with Refugees; (4) Search and Rescue; (5) Protection of Facilities and Areas; (6) Logistics Support; and (7) Use of Facilities.

#### C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

Bilateral actions remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation.

1. **When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated**
   - The two governments will take measures to deter an armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan.

2. **When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs**
   - **Principles for Coordinated Actions**
     - The two governments will take appropriate and coordinated actions to promptly repel the attack and deter any further attacks. The SDF will have primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations, and the United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the SDF.
     - **Concept of Operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self-Defense Forces (SDF)</th>
<th>United States Armed Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operations to Defend Airspace</td>
<td>Conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority</td>
<td>Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks</td>
<td>Conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan</td>
<td>Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations to Defend Maritime</td>
<td>Conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations</td>
<td>Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Outline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operations to Counter Ground Attacks</strong></td>
<td>SDF: Conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces&lt;br&gt; Have primary responsibility to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands, and have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority&lt;br&gt; Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISR</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-domain Operations</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Space / cyberspace</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Special operations</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strike operations</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- **Operational Support Activities**
  - The Guidelines identify the following operational support activities: (1) Communications and Electronics; (2) Search and Rescue; (3) Logistic Support; (4) Use of Facilities; and (5) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Protection.
  - **Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan**
    - When the SDF and the United States decide to take action, they will conduct operations involving the use of force in accordance with international law, full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under an armed attack, they will cooperate closely to prevent the armed attack and to deter further attacks.
    - The SDF will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people.
    - Examples of cooperative operations are: (1) Asset Protection; (2) Search and Rescue; (3) Maritime Operations; (4) Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks; and (5) Logistics Support.
  - **Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan**
    - When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The SDF, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. The United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate.
    - The two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. The United States Armed Forces may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters.

- In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
- When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities, the two governments will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below.

**V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security**

- **A. Cooperation in International Activities**
  - The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the SDF and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable.
  - Common areas for cooperation will include: (1) Peacekeeping Operations; (2) International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief; (3) Maritime Security; (4) Partner Capacity Building; (5) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations; (6) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; (7) Training and Exercises; and (8) Logistics support.

- **B. Triilateral and Multilateral Cooperation**
  - The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promote cooperation based upon international law and standards.

**VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation**

- **A. Cooperation on Space**
  - The two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space.
  - The two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation.
  - The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate in such areas as early-warning, ISR, positioning, navigation and timing, space situational awareness, meteorological observation, command, control, and communications.

- **B. Cooperation on Cyberspace**
  - The two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and appropriate manner. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the SDF and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions.
  - The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will maintain posture to monitor their respective networks and systems, conduct educational exchanges, ensure the resiliency of their respective networks and systems, contribute to all Japanese and U.S. government efforts, and conduct bilateral exercises.
  - In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.

**VII. Bilateral Enterprise**

- **A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation**
- **B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security**
- **C. Educational and Research Exchanges**

**VIII. Processes for Review**

Regular evaluations will be conducted on whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances, and the two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner if deemed necessary.
or any other situation that may require an Alliance response.

Based on the framework shown in Fig. III-2-1-4, this mechanism coordinates policy and operational aspects related to activities conducted by the SDF and the U.S. Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also contributes to timely information sharing as well as to the development and maintenance of common situational awareness.

The characteristics of the mechanism include that (1) it is the standing mechanism utilizable from peacetime; (2) it can be utilized for large-scale natural disasters in Japan as well as for cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and globally; and (3) it enables whole-of-government coordination while ensuring the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations. These characteristics enable the Japanese and U.S. Governments to respond appropriately and promptly when the need for coordination arises. For example, in the event of a large-scale natural disaster in Japan, it would require a diversity of coordination in the policy and operational aspects related to activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces. The utilization of this mechanism makes it possible to conduct close and appropriate coordination with the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations at various levels.

Since the establishment of the mechanism, Japan and the United States have been utilizing the mechanism to coordinate closely, including in response to the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake, the ballistic missile launches by North Korea, and Chinese activities in the waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands.

(2) Enhanced Operational Coordination

Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. Governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the U.S. Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities.

(3) Establishment of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM)

Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. Governments established the BPM in November 2015 for the purpose of implementing the development of bilateral plans in peacetime in line with the Guidelines in order to enable effective bilateral responses to contingencies relevant to Japan’s peace and security.

In the development of bilateral plans, this mechanism performs the functions of ensuring Ministerial-level directions and supervision and the involvement of relevant
government ministries and agencies, as well as conducting coordination for various forms of Japan-U.S. cooperation conducive to the development of bilateral plans. The two governments will conduct bilateral planning through this mechanism.

Section 2 of this Chapter (Strengthening Ability of Japan-U.S. Alliance to Deter and Counter Threats)

Section 3 of this Chapter (Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas)

Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States

1 Various Policy Consultations

Japan and the United States have maintained close coordination at multiple levels, including the summit level and ministerial level, and have continually strengthened and expanded cooperative relations for the peace, stability and prosperity of not only the two countries but also the entire international community, including the Indo-Pacific region.

Close policy consultations on security are conducted through diplomatic channels as well as between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels in the
Japanese Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus on the defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation. Furthermore, the Japanese State Minister of Defense and the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense work together, and MOD officials, including the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and the Chiefs of Staff of the SDF, have working-level meetings when necessary and exchange information with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and others under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

The sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United States is undoubtedly conducive to the increased credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and results in the further enhancement of close collaboration between the two countries. Therefore, the MOD is proactively engaging in these initiatives.

### Consultative Forum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consultative Forum</th>
<th>Participants Japanese Side</th>
<th>U.S. Side</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Legal Basis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting)</td>
<td>Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense</td>
<td>U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of Defense</td>
<td>Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security</td>
<td>Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960, in accordance with Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Subcommittee (SSC)</td>
<td>Participants are not specified</td>
<td>Participants are not specified</td>
<td>Exchange of views on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States</td>
<td>Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)</td>
<td>Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of the Bureau of Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense; Representative from Joint Staff</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Representative from the U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ, Joint Staff, USINDOPACOM</td>
<td>Study and consideration of consultative measures to Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies</td>
<td>Established on July 8, 1976, as a subentry under the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee in its 16th meeting reorganized at the Japan-U.S. vice-ministerial consultation on June 28, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S. Joint Committee</td>
<td>Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of the Bureau of Local Cooperation, Ministry of Defense; and others</td>
<td>Deputy Commander of USFJ, Minister at the U.S. Embassy, and others</td>
<td>Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement</td>
<td>Article XV of the Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command before December 26, 1990.
2. Meetings are held from time to time between working-level officials of the two Governments, such as officials corresponding in rank to vice-minister or assistant secretary.
3. A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy-Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996.
### Recent Major Policy Consultations

#### Fig. Ⅲ -2-1-6 Recent Japan-U.S. bilateral meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Meeting/Venue</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Summary of the outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| August 7, 2019  | Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo | Then Minister of Defense Iwasa U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper | • The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMDs and ballistic missiles of all ranges.  
• The Ministers confirmed that they will closely coordinate in their efforts to be made based on the strategy documents of both countries and to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond. |
| August 25, 2019 | Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / Biarritz | Prime Minister Abe President Trump                 | • The leaders reaffirmed the recognition that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is stronger than ever before, and shared the view on continuing to further strengthen the unwavering Japan-U.S. Alliance.  
• The leaders exchanged views on the situation on North Korea, including issues of concern such as the abductions, nuclear, and missiles issues, and confirmed that Japan and the United States, as well as Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea would continue to closely cooperate on these issues.  
• The leaders shared the view that Japan and the United States would continue to cooperate toward easing tensions and stabilizing the situation in the Middle East.  
• The two leaders strongly criticized the recent attacks on the crude oil facilities in Saudi Arabia.  
• Prime Minister Abe stated that in light of the capabilities of the Houthis it was difficult to conclude that these attacks had been carried out by the Houthis, while Japan has been undertaking information gathering and analysis to evaluate this incident, and would continue to work together with the countries concerned, including the United States.  
• Prime Minister Abe said that he had called on President Rouhani to ensure that Iran exercised self-restraint to ease the situation and to ensure that Iran exercised its influence constructively.  
• Prime Minister Abe also said that he intended to work closely with the United States to bring about peace and stability in the Middle East. |
| September 25, 2019 | Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting / New York | Prime Minister Abe President Trump                 | • The ministers confirmed that the recent series of ballistic missile launches by North Korea are a serious threat to regional security. The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMDs and ballistic missiles of all ranges.  
• The Ministers affirmed their position that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, and that it is important to work together to make sure that Rule of Law and Freedom of Navigation are firmly established.  
• The Ministers confirmed that they continue to closely work together to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond, including promotion of bilateral cooperation in new domains, to materialize aligned strategies of both countries.  
• The Ministers reaffirmed the significance of cooperation with various partners including conducting joint exercises and capacity building assistance to maintain and strengthen a Free and Open Indo-Pacific with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being the cornerstone.  
• The Ministers reaffirmed that it is important to sustain the operational readiness of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and Japan and the U.S. continue to work together with the shared recognition that understanding and cooperation from local communities is crucial for maintenance of the operational readiness. |
| November 18, 2019 | Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Bangkok | Minister of Defense Kono U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper | • The Ministers exchanged views on the regional situation in the Middle East.  
• Minister of Defense Kono explained the cabinet decision to send the SDF to the Middle East.  
• The Ministers confirmed that repeated ballistic missile launches by North Korea are a serious challenge not only to Japan but also to the international community.  
• The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missiles of all ranges.  
• The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue working together with partner countries to counter illicit “ship-to-ship” transfers of goods by North Korea.  
• The Ministers welcomed that the Japan-U.S. Alliance has become stronger than ever before and confirmed that they continue to closely work together to further strengthen the Alliance capability to deter and respond, and materialize aligned strategies of both countries”.  
• The Ministers reaffirmed the significance of cooperation with various partners including conducting joint exercises and capacity building assistance with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being the cornerstone.  
• The ministers welcomed the recent progress made by the Japanese Government in acquisition of Mageshima, a candidate site for a permanent FCLP facility, and confirmed to work closely together for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives. |
• The Ministers confirmed that they will closely coordinate in their efforts to be made based on the strategy documents of both countries and to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond.  
• The Ministers reaffirmed the recognition that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is stronger than ever before, and shared the view on continuing to further strengthen the unwavering Japan-U.S. Alliance.  
• The leaders exchanged views on the situation on North Korea, including issues of concern such as the abductions, nuclear, and missiles issues, and confirmed that Japan and the United States, as well as Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea would continue to closely cooperate on these issues.  
• The leaders shared the view that Japan and the United States would continue to cooperate toward easing tensions and stabilizing the situation in the Middle East.  
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• Prime Minister Abe said that he had called on President Rouhani to ensure that Iran exercised self-restraint to ease the situation and to ensure that Iran exercised its influence constructively.  
• Prime Minister Abe also said that he intended to work closely with the United States to bring about peace and stability in the Middle East. |
The NDPG provides that, for strengthening the ability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats, in all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies as well as during disasters, Japan will enhance information sharing with the United States, conduct effective and smooth bilateral coordination involving all relevant organizations and take all necessary measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security.

For these purposes, Japan will further deepen various operational cooperation and policy coordination with the United States. In particular, Japan will expand and deepen cooperation in: space and cyber domains; comprehensive air and missile defense; bilateral training and exercises; bilateral ISR operations; and bilateral flexible deterrent options. Japan will also promote development and update of bilateral plans and deepen the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. In addition, Japan will even more actively conduct activities such as logistic support for U.S. force activities and protection of U.S. ships and aircraft.

1 Cooperation in Space and Cyber Domains

1 Cooperation on Space

With regard to cooperation on space, based on the agreement at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in November 2009 to promote cooperation in the area of space security as part of initiatives to deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the two countries have periodically been working together to discuss how they should cooperate in the future, such as the holding of the 1st Japan-U.S. Space Security Dialogue in September 2010 with the participation of relevant ministries and agencies.

Furthermore, the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in April 2012 decided to deepen the space-based partnership for civil and security purposes and to create a whole-of-government comprehensive dialogue on space, enabling relevant ministries and agencies to hold the 1st whole-of-government Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space in March 2013. The two countries have been sharing information on their respective space policies and discussing plans for future cooperation on a regular basis.

Moreover, based on the instructions given by the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting of April 2015, the two countries established the Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) to further promote the cooperation among bilateral defense authorities in the area of space. The SCWG has held six meetings in total since its establishment in October 2015 (the most recent meeting was in February 2020). Going forward, Japan and the United States will leverage this working group to deepen discussions in a wide variety of areas, including (1) promoting space policy dialogue, (2) reinforcing information sharing, (3) working together to develop and secure experts, and (4) continued participation in tabletop exercises.

See Chapter 3, Section 3-1 (Cooperation in the Use of Space Domain)

2 Cooperation on Cyberspace

Concerning cooperation on cyberspace, the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) was established in October 2013 as a framework between the MOD and the DoD to discuss a broad range of professional and concrete issues, including the sharing of information at the policy level, human resources development, and technical cooperation.

The Guidelines released in April 2015 and the CDPWG Joint Statement published in May 2015 cited the prompt and appropriate establishment of an information sharing structure and the protection of the critical infrastructure upon which the SDF and the U.S. Forces depend to accomplish their missions as examples of cooperation between the Japanese and U.S. Governments. In addition, as part of cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. Forces, the securing of the resiliency of their respective networks and systems and the implementation of educational exchanges and joint exercises were also cited. Japan and the United States will further accelerate bilateral cyber defense cooperation in line with the direction presented by the Guidelines and the CDPWG Joint Statement. At the “2+2” Meeting in April 2019, Japan and the United States agreed to strengthen cooperation in the field of cyberspace, affirming that international law applies in cyberspace and that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

See Chapter 3, Section 3-2 (Cooperation in the Use of Cyber Domain)
Regarding the response to airborne threats coming to Japan, such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft, Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities have been enhanced by sharing operation information and establishing response procedures.

For the repeated ballistic missile launches by North Korea, Japan and the United States have conducted coordinated responses utilizing the ACM. Also, in the systems and technology field, the cooperative development of a new ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptor with enhanced capabilities (SM-3 Block IIA) is steadily in progress. In January 2019, the United States released its Missile Defense Review (MDR) in which it clearly indicated the importance of cooperation with allies, including Japan.

Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense

Bilateral Training and Exercises

Bilateral training in peacetime not only contributes greatly to maintaining and enhancing the Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities by improving interoperability including mutual understanding of tactics and communication, but is also beneficial for improving tactical skills for each participant. In particular, the knowledge and techniques that the
Japanese side can learn from the U.S. Forces, which have vast experience in actual fighting, are invaluable and greatly contribute to improving SDF capabilities.

In addition, conducting bilateral training at effective times, places, and scales demonstrates the unified commitment and capabilities of Japan and the United States, which has a deterrent effect. In light of these perspectives, the MOD/SDF is continuing its initiatives to enrich the contents of bilateral training and exercises.

Bilateral training has been expanded not only within Japan but also to the United States by dispatching SDF units there. Continuous efforts are being made to enhance interoperability and Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities at the military branch and unit levels, including the Japan-U.S. bilateral regional army command post exercises, special anti-submarine exercises, and Japan-U.S. bilateral fighter combat training.

Since FY1985, mostly on an annual basis, command post exercises and field training exercises have been conducted alternately as the Japan-U.S. bilateral joint exercise. In 2020, a command post exercise was conducted in January in the MOD’s Ichigaya area and other locations.

As for recent training and exercises, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) and the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) participated in a field exercise (Talisman Saber 19) with U.S. forces held in Australia from June to August 2019, which included multinational and bilateral command and staff operations and landing exercises. In December 2019, the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps participated in the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army command post exercises, Yamasakura 77 in Japan. In January 2020, the GSDF participated for the first time in a field training exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center in the United States.

In addition, Japan and the United States have conducted bilateral training in various sea and airspace areas. In August 2019, the MSDF destroyer JS “Myoko” and the U.S. aircraft carrier USS “Ronald Reagan,” among others, conducted bilateral training in sea and airspace areas from the vicinity of the Bashi Strait to the southern part of the Kanto region. In October 2019, the MSDF destroyer JS “Fuyuzuki” and the U.S. aircraft carrier USS “Ronald Reagan” and other vessels conducted bilateral training in the sea and air areas from southern Okinawa to southern Kanto. In November 2019, the MSDF conducted a field exercise (including Japan-U.S. bilateral maritime exercises) in the seas and airspace around Japan, practicing various maritime operations for the defense of the country. Since 2017, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) has conducted various training with U.S. Air Force strategic bomber B-52 in airspace over the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, etc.

These series of bilateral training were conducted with the
aim of enhancing the tactical skills of the SDF and bolstering collaboration with the U.S. Forces. It is believed that strengthening Japan-U.S. collaboration and demonstrating the bilateral ties as an outcome will effectively enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the overall Japan-U.S. Alliance further and demonstrate Japan’s determination and high capacity towards stabilizing the region in an increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan.

In recent years, the USFJ have also participated in disaster drills organized by local governments, thereby deepening cooperation with relevant institutions and local governments.

The expansion of these ISR activities will function as deterrence capabilities, and will also ensure information superiority over other nations and enable the establishment of a seamless cooperation structure in all phases from peacetime to contingencies.

Japan-U.S. cooperation is also being steadily promoted through logistics support based on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed in 1996 and revised in 1999 and 2004. The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and to initiatives for international peace taken under the leadership of the United Nations (UN). Its scope of application includes various occasions such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, disaster relief activities, UN PKO, international disaster relief activities, situations in areas surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations. If either the SDF or the U.S. Forces request the other party to provide supplies or services, the Agreement, in principle, allows the requested party to do so.\(^1\)

Following the passage of the Legislation for Peace and Security in September 2015, the new Japan-U.S. ACSA was signed in September 2016, ratified by the Diet on April 14, 2017, and entered into force on April 25. This has enabled the same framework as the existing Japan-U.S. ACSA, such as settlement procedures, to be applied to the provision of supplies and services that had become possible under the Legislation for Peace and Security, so that since April 2017 food and fuel have been provided to the U.S. Forces engaged in information collection and other activities.

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\(^1\) The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food; water; billeting; transportation (including airlift); petroleum, oils, and lubricants; clothing; communications; medical services; base support; storage services; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance services; airport and seaport services; and ammunition (provision of weapons is not included).
In the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, the SDF and the U.S. Forces demonstrated their high-level joint response capabilities based on the strong ties they had developed. The success of the joint response between the SDF and the U.S. Forces through Operation Tomodachi was the result of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises over many years, and will lead to the Alliance being deepened further in the future. Operation Tomodachi involved the deployment of a large-scale force at its peak, including troops of approximately 16,000 personnel, around 15 ships, and around 140 aircraft, resulting in relief activities that were unprecedented in scale and contributing greatly to Japan’s restoration and reconstruction. Not only those affected but numerous Japanese at large were filled with a deepened sense of appreciation and trust for the USFJ.

On the other hand, some issues have emerged, such as clarifying the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan and the United States in the event of a disaster within Japan, as well as stipulating more concrete joint guidelines to facilitate greater participation by the U.S. Forces in disaster prevention drills, and examining mechanisms for the sharing of information and more effective coordination mechanism.

In light of these issues, the December 2013 Response Plan for a Massive Earthquake in the Nankai Trough listed the Japan-U.S. Joint Response Plan, and the two countries have conducted several bilateral comprehensive disaster prevention exercises aimed at maintaining and enhancing earthquake disaster handling capabilities to be demonstrated through collaboration between the SDF, USFJ, related ministries and agencies, and related local governments in the event of occurrence of a Nankai Trough earthquake.

In response to the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016, Japan-U.S. cooperation was manifested in the form of the transportation of daily necessities by the Osprey (MV-22) of the U.S. Marine Corps and the transportation of SDF personnel by C-130 transport aircraft. The ACM was utilized on that occasion, including the Japan-U.S. Joint Coordination Office locally established by the joint task force organized for the earthquake response.
Creation of a Desirable Security Environment

The NDPG provides that in order to create a desirable security environment including maintaining and enhancing free and open maritime order, and with an eye on increasing Japanese and U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will conduct bilateral activities.

1 Maritime Security

Both Japan and the United States have made efforts as maritime nations to maintain and develop “open and stable seas” according to fundamental rules such as securing the freedom and safety of navigation, and the rule of law including peaceful dispute resolution based on international law.

For example, Japan and the United States have worked closely together in various multilateral maritime security cooperation frameworks with such countries as those along the sea lanes, including Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) maritime interdiction exercises. In addition, the SDF has dispatched its officers to the U.S. Central Naval Command in Bahrain to carry out intelligence gathering activities in the Middle East, which began as a Japan-initiated activity in 2020.

The two countries have also been working closely together on providing multilateral capacity building in the maritime domain to countries including those along the sea lanes.

2 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

The SDF has conducted activities in close cooperation with the United States and other participating countries through activities pursuant to the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act, and international disaster relief activities and international peacekeeping operations in the Philippines and Haiti.

Japan and the United States worked closely together at local multilateral coordination centers to respond to the typhoon disaster that hit the Philippines in November 2013. To respond to the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease, Japan started to dispatch liaison officers to the U.S. Africa Command in October 2014, coordinating efforts and collecting information with relevant countries including the United States, for close cooperation.

3 Trilateral and Multilateral Training and Exercises

Japan and the United States are promoting and enhancing trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. The SDF is participating in trilateral (e.g., Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan-U.S.-India, and Japan-U.S.-ROK) and multilateral training, in addition to bilateral training and exercises between Japan and the United States.
The NDPG provides that in order for Japan and the United States to be able to fully leverage their capabilities during bilateral activities, Japan will enhance and expand cooperation with the United States in such areas as equipment, technology, facility, and intelligence as well as information security.

1 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

Japan proactively promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with the U.S. based on the mutual cooperation principle from the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America, while bearing in mind the maintenance of the technological and industrial bases.

In view of the progress in technology cooperation between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States regardless of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and related guidelines. In 1983, Japan established the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America. In 2006, the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America was established to replace the foregoing Exchange of Notes. Under these frameworks, Japan decided to provide the United States with 20 items of arms and military technologies, including military technologies related to joint technological research on BMD. Japan and the United States consult with each other at forums such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF) and conduct cooperative research and development regarding the specific projects agreed upon at these forums.

At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in June
2016, the Ministers signed a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Memorandum of Understanding (RDP MOU). The MOU promotes measures concerning the procurement of equipment by Japanese and U.S. defense authorities based on reciprocity (providing information necessary to submit bids to businesses of the other country, protecting submitted corporate information, waiving restrictions on participation by businesses of the other country, etc.).

Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 5-2 (Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) explains initiatives for the common maintenance base for the 24 MV-22 Ospreys deployed by the U.S. Marine Corps at MCAS Futenma and the V-22 Osprey deployed by the GSDF as well as initiatives for the maintenance depot (regional MRO&U Capability) in the Asia-Pacific region for F-35 fighter aircraft.

2 Joint/Shared Use

The expansion of joint/shared use of facilities and areas increases bases for the SDF’s activities such as maneuver areas, ports, and airfields, which in turn enhances the diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises, and expands the scope and raises the frequency of activities such as ISR. The SDF has only a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, including Naha Air Base, and most of them are located in urban areas, which results in operational limitations. The joint/shared use of facilities and areas of the USFJ in Okinawa will greatly improve the SDF’s training environment in Okinawa, and facilitate implementation of joint training and exercises and increased interoperability between the SDF and the U.S. Forces. It will also improve readiness and contribute to ensuring the safety of local people in case of a disaster.

Thus, while taking into account the SDF defense posture in the regions, including the Southwestern Islands, and relations with local communities, Japan and the United States are proactively engaged in consultations, and specific initiatives are steadily progressing. For example, the GSDF has been using Camp Hansen since March 2008 for exercises purpose. Moreover, the relocation of the ASDF Air Defense Command to Headquarter Yokota in April 2012 and the relocation of the then GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters to Zama in March 2013 were carried out. In addition, the development of training ranges in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands (Tinian Island, Pagan Island, etc.) for shared use by the SDF and the U.S. Forces is under consideration.
Under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the presence of USFJ functions as deterrence, while on the other hand, given the impacts of the stationing of the USFJ on the living environment of the local residents, it is necessary to make efforts appropriate for the actual situation of each area in order to mitigate the impacts. In particular, the realignment of the USFJ is a very important initiative for mitigation of the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa, and maintaining the deterrent capability of the U.S. Forces. Therefore, the MOD will advance the realignment and other initiatives and make continuous efforts to gain the understanding and cooperation of the local communities hosting USFJ facilities and areas.

Stationing of the USFJ

1 Significance of the Stationing of the USFJ

Given the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, it is necessary to maintain the presence of the USFJ and its readiness to make rapid and agile actions in case of emergency in Japan and the surrounding areas even in peacetime, so that Japan-U.S. Alliance based on Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements functions enough as a deterrent power that contributes to the peace and stability of the defense of Japan and the region.

Therefore, Japan accepts the stationing of the U.S. Forces based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and it is a cornerstone of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

Also, it is essential to realize the stable stationing of the USFJ in order to make a swift joint response to an armed attack to Japan based on Article 5 of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In addition, the actions of U.S. Forces for the defense of Japan are conducted not only by the USFJ but also by timely reinforcements. The USFJ is supposed to be the basis for them.

While Article 5 of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty stipulates the duty of the U.S. to defend Japan, the U.S. is granted the use of facilities and areas in Japan based on Article 6 for the purpose of maintaining the security of Japan and international peace and security in the Far East. Therefore, though the duties of each side are not the same, they are balanced overall.

2 Measures concerning the Stationing of the USFJ

The SOFA stipulates matters pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas and the status of the USFJ, including the furnishing of facilities and areas for use by the USFJ (USFJ facilities and areas), and satisfying the labor requirements of the USFJ. In addition, the Supplementary Agreement on the Environment enhances cooperation for environmental stewardship relating to the USFJ, and the Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component intends to clarify the scope of the civilian component, etc.

(1) Furnishing of USFJ Facilities and Areas

Japan furnishes USFJ facilities and areas under the provision of the SOFA, in accordance with agreements reached through the Joint Committee between the Governments of Japan and the United States.

The Government of Japan concludes lease contracts with owners of private and public lands on which USFJ facilities and areas exist in order to ensure the stable use of these facilities and areas. However, should the Government be unable to obtain the approval of landowners, it shall acquire title under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, compensating the landowners for any loss they may have suffered in the process.

(2) Satisfying Labor Requirements of the USFJ

The SOFA stipulates that the manpower (labor) required by the USFJ shall be satisfied with the assistance of the
Government of Japan.

As of the end of FY2019, there were 25,869 USFJ local employees (hereinafter referred to as the “employees”) at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan, working as clerks at headquarters, engineers at maintenance/supply facilities, members of security guards and fire departments on base, and sales staff at welfare/recreational facilities. They support the smooth operations of the USFJ.

The Government of Japan hires these employees in accordance with the provisions of the SOFA. The MOD supports the stationing of the USFJ by performing administrative work for personnel management, payment of wages, health care, and welfare, etc.

(3) Supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship

In September 2015, the Governments of Japan and the United States signed and effectuated the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship relating to the USFJ, supplementary to the SOFA. This supplementary agreement represents an international commitment with legal binding force and sets forth provisions concerning the issuance and maintenance of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS) and the establishment and maintenance, etc. of procedures for access to USFJ facilities and areas. This agreement was the first of its kind created to supplement the SOFA since the SOFA had entered into force and has a historical significance that differs essentially in nature from conventional improvements in the operations of the SOFA.

(4) Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component

In January 2017, the Governments of Japan and the United States signed the Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component, which came into force on the same day. The agreement clarifies the scope of the civilian component, which is addressed only by a general provision in SOFA, develops criteria used in evaluating contractor employee positions for eligibility to receive designation as members of the civilian component, and stipulates the procedures for notification and review, etc. together with the exclusion of ordinary residents from the civilian component. The initiative to formulate the Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component is the second case, following the creation of the Supplementary Agreement on the Environment that supplements the SOFA.

(5) The Revision of the Guidelines Regarding Off-Base U.S. Military Aircraft Accidents

In July 2019, the Governments of Japan and the United States agreed on the revision of the Guidelines Regarding Aircraft Accidents in Japan. This revision aims at further refining the procedures for access to the site by Japanese and U.S. Government officials in the event of off-base U.S. military aircraft accidents that occur in Japan, and so on.

The major changes include clarification of expeditious early entry of USG and GOJ representatives into the inner cordon (restricted area) designated in the event of an accident. The revised guidelines also stipulate as follows; entry into the site will be preferentially made by USG and GOJ representatives with responsibilities associated with accident site mitigation to include hazardous material observation, the aircraft accident investigation, or claims investigations; relevant information especially on hazardous materials will be provided to Japanese authorities as soon as possible after an accident; in removing wreckage that has the potential to significantly and negatively affect the condition of the underlying Japanese property, the U.S. Forces will basically coordinate with the landowner through the Regional Defense Bureau of the Ministry of Defense basically; and that when the U.S. authorities, GOJ authorities, or local authorities conduct environmental surveys, the results will be shared within the Joint Committee framework. These changes enable more effective, expeditious and proper response to future U.S. military aircraft accidents.

3 Costs Associated with the USFJ

Various costs associated with the USFJ include the costs of stationing USFJ, costs for implementing the stipulations of the SACO Final Report for mitigating the impact on the people of Okinawa, as well as costs for implementing measures that contribute to mitigating the impact on local communities associated with the initiatives for the realignment of the U.S. Forces.

4 Host Nation Support (HNS)

HNS plays an important role to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Due to soaring prices and wages in Japan since the mid-1970s, and changes in the international economic situation, Japan began to bear labor costs such as
welfare costs in FY1978. Then in FY1979, it started to bear costs for the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP).

Furthermore, as labor costs soared due to changes in economic conditions that affected both countries, the employment stability of the employees would be influenced adversely, and there was even concern that it would affect the activities of the USFJ. Therefore, in 1987, Japan and the United States concluded an agreement that sets forth special measures regarding Article 24 of the SOFA (the Special Measures Agreement) as exceptional, limited and provisional measures under the cost principle in the SOFA.

Based on this agreement, Japan started to bear labor costs of eight categories such as the adjustment allowance (currently replaced by the regional allowance). As the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was revised later on, the costs shared by Japan expanded to cover labor costs including base pay, and utilities costs from FY1991, and training relocation costs from FY1996.

Japan has been reviewing HNS, paying full attention to its tight fiscal conditions, and as a result, HNS has been on a steady decline after peaking out in the FY1999 budget on an expenditure basis.

5 Current Special Measures Agreement

As the former SMA was effective until the end of March 2016, the current SMA was intended to “open discussions pertaining to future arrangements for an appropriate level for sharing of the costs of U.S. Forces stationed in Japan” based on the “2+2” agreement of April 2015. Following this agreement, Japan and the United States held consultations on a new SMA, and in December 2015, the Governments of Japan and the United States reached agreement as follows: Subsequently, after the current SMA was signed in January 2016 and approval by the Diet, the current agreement took effect in April of the same year.

The United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (Roadmap) was set forth in May 2006.
Subsequently, the following factors were set forth: (1) The necessity of implementing measures to realize visible mitigation of the impact on Okinawa promptly and steadily; (2) The necessity of balancing the realignment package and the strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, which was set out in the U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance released in January 2012; and (3) The reduction in the cost associated with the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps to Guam demanded by the U.S. congress. Full-fledged consultation on the coordination of the realignment package took place between the two countries in light of those factors. The achievements thereof were announced as part of the Joint Statements of the “2+2” Meeting and through other means.

The 2006 Roadmap stated that, among the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) stationed in Okinawa, the main focus of the relocation to Guam would be the command elements, but at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, the United States decided to alter the composition of the units and to deploy the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)—consisting of command, ground, aviation and logistics support elements—in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, as well as in Australia as a rotational unit. In addition, the Governments of Japan and the United States decided to delink both the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land returns south of Kadena Air Base from the progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF).

Thus, the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa, including the U.S. Marine Corps, which can deal with a wide range of missions with high mobility and readiness and is in charge of first response for a variety of contingencies, with the above-mentioned geographical characteristics, further ensures the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, strengthens deterrence, and contributes greatly not only to the security of Japan but also to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

On the other hand, Okinawa has many USFJ facilities and areas such as air bases, maneuver areas and logistics facilities. As of January 1, 2020, approximately 70% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 8% of the land area of the prefecture and approximately 14% of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, it is necessary to make utmost efforts to
Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in the “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”-1

1 Realignment in the Kanto Area

[Legend: ○ implemented □ Continuing]

[Yokota related]
- Implementation of the bilateral joint operations coordination center (BJOCC) at Yokota Air Base
- Partial return of airspace, relocated on September 25, 2008 (specific conditions and modalities are considered between Japan and the U.S.)

- Deliberation on civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base
- [Relocation of the JASDF Air Defense Command]
  - Implementation of the Air Defense Command and relevant units (Completed on March 26, 2012)

- Implementation of military dual-use of Yokota Air Base
- [Camp Zama]
  - Reorganization of the headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan
  - Relocation of the JASDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters (then)
    - (Completed on March 26, 2013)

- Joint/shared use of heliport (Joint use started on March 26, 2013)
- [Relocation of operations outside Okinawa Prefecture]
  - Transport capabilities using helicopters
  - Replacement facilities constructed in Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas
  - [Relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps]
  - III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), about 8,000 personnel
  - and about 9,000 of their dependents will relocate to Guam
  - “2+2” Joint Statement of April 27, 2012 states that about 9,000 personnel and their dependents would be relocated outside of Japan and the authorized strength of U.S. Marine Corps in Guam will be about 5,000.

2 Realignment in Okinawa

[Legend: ○ implemented □ Continuing]

[Joint/Shared Use]
- Camp Hansen is used for JGSDF training
  - * Implemented on March 17, 2008
- JASDF uses Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. Forces, while taking into account the noise impact on local communities

[Land Returns]
- Formulated a detailed plan (Consolidation Plan) for returning of significant land area south of Kadena Air Base by consolidating the remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa
  - * Announced the Consolidation Plan on April 5, 2013

- Formulation of a detailed plan (Consolidation Plan) for returning of significant land area south of Kadena Air Base by consolidating the remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa
- [Relocation within Okinawa Prefecture]
  - Transport capabilities using helicopters
  - Replacement facilities constructed in Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas
- [Relocation of operations outside Okinawa Prefecture]
  - Transport capabilities using helicopters
  - Replacement facilities constructed in Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas

- [Relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters (then)]
  - (Completed on March 26, 2013)

- Joint/shared use of heliport (Joint use started on March 26, 2013)
- [Relocation of operations outside Okinawa Prefecture]
  - Transport capabilities using helicopters
  - Replacement facilities constructed in Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas
- [Relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters (then)]
  - (Completed on March 26, 2013)

- Joint/shared use of heliport (Joint use started on March 26, 2013)
- [Relocation of operations outside Okinawa Prefecture]
  - Transport capabilities using helicopters
  - Replacement facilities constructed in Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas
- [Relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters (then)]
  - (Completed on March 26, 2013)

- Joint/shared use of heliport (Joint use started on March 26, 2013)

- Relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters (then)
  - (Completed on March 26, 2013)

- Joint/shared use of heliport (Joint use started on March 26, 2013)
mitigate the impact on Okinawa, while also considering the above-mentioned security standpoints.

Fig. III-2-4-4 (The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Significance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa [image])

Fig. III-2-4-5 (Location of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Okinawa [As of March 31, 2019])

1 Initiatives for Realignment, Consolidation, and Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa

When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas covering approximately 278 km² for exclusive use by the...
U.S. Forces. However, their concentration in Okinawa has led to strong calls for their realignment, consolidation and consolidation and consolidation. In the eyes of neighboring countries, Okinawa’s location is strategically important in both enabling access to the Pacific from the continent and rejecting access from the Pacific to the continent.

*1 Japan is dependent upon marine transportation for at least 99% of the total volume of its trade.

The Significance & Roles of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa

It is essential to maintain defense capabilities for the area of the Southwestern Islands in the main island of Okinawa, which is important as a strategic location for Japan for the security of Japan. The stationing of the U.S. Marine Corps (*2), which is capable of rapid response and high mobility and also has readiness for a wide variety of missions ranging from armed conflicts to natural disasters, in Okinawa, which features such geographical advantages plays an important role in ensuring not only the security of Japan but also the peace and safety of East Asia.

*2 The Marine Corps constantly utilizes all combat elements (land, sea and air) during its drills and deployments, so it is suited to providing a rapid response in the event of any kind of situation.

Geographical Advantage of Okinawa

- Okinawa holds a position of great strategic importance
- Access from continental Asia to the Pacific
- Japan’s sea lane
- Approximately 500 km
- Approximately 2,750 km
- Approximately 3,200 km
- Approximately 1,250 km
- Approximately 650 km

Okinawa is located roughly in the center of the Southwestern Islands and also close to key sea lanes (*1) for Japan, and thus its location is extremely important from the perspective of Japan’s security.

- Okinawa is located close (but not overly so) to potential conflict areas that could affect Japan’s peace and security, including the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait.

- Okinawa is located at a distance that makes it possible to expeditiously send units to potential conflict areas and at the same time has sufficient distance so as not to heighten military tension unnecessarily and is not overly close in terms of protecting units.

- In the eyes of neighboring countries, Okinawa’s location is strategically important in both enabling access to the Pacific from the continent and rejecting access from the Pacific to the continent.

Note: Based on information on the U.S. Forces Japan website and other sources.
reduction on the grounds that they seriously affect the lives of people in Okinawa Prefecture.

Both countries have continued their initiatives to realign, consolidate, and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, centering on those subject to the strong local requests, and, in relation to the so-called 23 issues, it was agreed in 1990 that both sides would proceed with the required coordination and procedures toward the return of land. Moreover, it was agreed in 1995 that initiatives would also be made to resolve the so-called Three Okinawa Issues, including the return of Naha Port (Naha City).

Subsequently, in response to an unfortunate incident that occurred in 1995, as well as the refusal of the then Governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal documents under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, the Government of Japan decided to devote even greater initiatives towards realignment, consolidation, and reduction, believing that the impact should be shared by the whole nation. In order to hold consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, the Government of Japan established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture, and SACO between Japan and the United States, and the so-called SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996.

Reference 23 (Outline of 23 Issues)

3 Outline of SACO Final Report

The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land, the adjustment of training and operational procedures, noise reduction, and the improvement of operational procedures regarding the SOFA procedures, and also refers to the related facilities and areas covered. The land to be returned based on the SACO Final Report represents approximately 21% (about 50 km²) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa at that time, exceeding the amount of land returned during the period between the reversion of Okinawa and the implementation of the SACO Final Report, which is roughly 43 km².

Reference 24 (The SACO Final Report [tentative translation]);
Reference 25 (Progress of the SACO Final Report);
Fig. III-2-4-6 (Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Final Report [image]);
Fig. III-2-4-7 (Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities and Areas [Exclusive Use] in Okinawa)

3 Return of a Major Portion of the Northern Training Area

The condition for returning the Northern Training Area was to relocate seven helipads in the area to be returned to the preexisting training area. However, the Government of Japan reached an agreement with the U.S. side to give considerations for the natural environment and to relocate not all seven but the minimum number of six helipads necessary, and proceeded with the construction work. The relocation of the helipads completed in December 2016, and the return of approximately 4,000 ha, a major portion of the Northern Training Area located in the villages of Kunigami and Higashi, was achieved based on the SACO Final Report.

The returned land accounts for approximately 20% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) in Okinawa. The return is the largest one since the reversion of Okinawa to the mainland, and had been an issue for 20 years since the SACO Final Report in 1996.

Based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Use of the Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Previously Provided for Use by
the Stationed Forces, the MOD took measures to remove obstacles (such as soil contamination survey, etc.) so that the landowners, etc. can use returned lands effectively and appropriately, and transferred the land to the landowners in December 2017.

4 Relocation and Return of MCAS Futenma

Along with the initiatives set forth in the Roadmap related to the realignment of the U.S. Forces, measures have been implemented to alleviate the impact on the local communities in Okinawa while maintaining the deterrence capabilities.

The Government of Japan believes that it is imperative not to allow MCAS Futenma to remain indefinitely at its current location, which is in the vicinity of houses, schools, etc. in the center of Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture, and considers that this is a fundamental idea shared between the Government of Japan and the people of Okinawa.

As for the relocation of MCAS Futenma, the Government of Japan has not changed its stance that the current plan to construct the FRF at the Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma.

The Government of Japan will make further efforts to achieve the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma as early as possible and to mitigate the impact on Okinawa in a speedy manner. The return of MCAS Futenma is expected to eliminate danger in the area and to contribute to the further growth of Okinawa, including Ginowan City, through the reuse of the area (approximately 476 ha with a land area 100 times larger than Tokyo Dome).

(1) Background Concerning the Futenma Replacement Facility

Considering the occurrence of the U.S. Forces helicopter crash in Ginowan City in August 2004, bilateral discussions on the realignment have been made towards realizing the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma at the earliest possible date in order to resolve the concern of the residents living in the vicinity.

In the SCC (“2+2”) document compiled in October 2005, the initiative to “locate the FRF in ‘L’-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay” was approved. However, since this L-shape meant that U.S. military aircraft would fly over settlements in Nago City and Ginoza Village, a request was submitted to avoid flights over these settlements. In light of this, based on negotiation and agreement with the local municipalities including Nago City, it was decided to stipulate in the Roadmap that the FRF be located in a V-shape configuration that “combines Henokosaki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays.” With regard to construction of this replacement facility, “a Memorandum of Basic Understanding” was exchanged between the then Governor of Okinawa Inamine and the then Minister of State for Defense Nukaga in May 2006.

After the change of government in September 2009, the Exploratory Committee for Okinawa Base Issues was established. After reviews conducted by the Committee, both governments, at the “2+2” Meeting held in May 2010, confirmed the intention to locate the FRF in the Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and the adjacent waters, and decided that a study by experts regarding the replacement facility’s location, configuration and construction method would be completed promptly. The two sides also agreed to take concrete measures to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in June 2011, it was decided that the runway would take a “V” shape.

During the deliberation process which led to these conclusions, first of all, it was determined that, from a security perspective, the deterrence of the U.S. Forces, including that of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa that is located in a crucial area for the security of Japan, cannot be lessened while there remains instability and uncertainty in the security environment in East Asia. Furthermore, concern was expressed that the functions of the U.S. Marine Corps such as mobility and readiness would be weakened if the helicopter units stationed at MCAS Futenma were to be detached from the other Marine units stationed in Okinawa and moved abroad or out of the prefecture. Therefore, it was concluded that the FRF had to be located within Okinawa Prefecture.

Also at the “2+2” Meetings in April 2012, October 2013, April 2015, August 2017, and April 2019, and in other instances including the joint statement issued at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in February 2017, the Governments of Japan and the United States confirmed that the plan to construct the FRF at Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma.

(2) Relocation of MCAS Futenma and Mitigation of the Impact on Okinawa

The relocation of MCAS Futenma holds more significance
than merely moving the facility from one location to another. Rather, it involves reduction in the base’s functions and area in Okinawa, and contributes greatly to mitigating the impact on Okinawa.

a. Distribution of Functions Offered by MCAS Futenma

MCAS Futenma fulfills the following functions relating to the aviation capabilities of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa: (1) Operation of the Osprey and other aircraft; (2) Operation of air refueling aircraft; and (3) Accepting transient aircraft in contingencies. Of these three functions, only (1) “operation of the Osprey and other aircraft” will be relocated to Camp Schwab. As for (2) “operation of air refueling aircraft,” all 15 KC-130 air refueling aircraft were relocated to MCAS Iwakuni (in Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture) in August 2014. This marked the completion of a task that has remained unresolved for 18 years since the SACO Final Report in 1996, enabling a vast majority of fixed-wing aircraft located in MCAS Futenma to be moved outside Okinawa Prefecture. This move also led to the relocation of approximately 870 USFJ personnel, civilian employees, and dependents.

Moreover, the function of (3) “accepting transient aircraft in contingencies” will also be transferred to Tsuiki Air Base and Nyutabaru Air Base. In October 2018, Japan and the United States agreed on developing facilities that would be necessary for relocating the function, and related work such as construction of the facilities has been carried out.

b. Reduction in Area

The area required for the land reclamation to build the FRF is approximately 150 ha, less than one-third of the approximately 476 ha of MCAS Futenma, and the new facility will be equipped with a significantly shorter runway at 1,200 m (1,800 m including the overruns) compared to the current runway length of 2,740 m at MCAS Futenma.

c. Reduction in Noise and Risks

Two runways will be constructed in a V-shape, which enables the flight path for both takeoff and landing to be located over the sea, in line with the requests of the local community. In MCAS Futenma, flight paths used daily for training and other purposes are located over residential areas, whereas flight paths in the FRF will be changed to over the sea, thereby reducing noise and risks.

For example, while more than 10,000 households are located in areas requiring housing noise insulation near MCAS Futenma, there will be zero households requiring such insulation around the FRF. This means that the noise levels experienced by all households will comply with the environment criteria applied to exclusive housing areas. In the case that an aircraft encounters any contingency, safety on the ground can be ensured by diverting the aircraft offshore.

(3) The Necessity of Constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility within Okinawa Prefecture

The U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa consists of air, ground, logistics, and command elements. The interaction of those elements is indispensable for U.S. Marine Corps operations characterized by great mobility and readiness, so the FRF needs to be located within Okinawa Prefecture so that rotary-
wing aircraft stationed at MCAS Futenma will be located near the elements with which they train, operate, or otherwise work on a regular basis.

(4) Completion of Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures

The MOD sent the environmental impact assessment scoping document in 2007 to the Governor of Okinawa and other parties. After the MOD worked on revising the document based on the opinions provided by the governor, the MOD completed the environmental impact assessment procedures by sending the revised assessment document to related parties including the governor in December 2012, while making the assessment document available for public review. Throughout these procedures, the MOD received a total of 1,561 opinions from the Governor of Okinawa on six occasions, made all the required revisions, and reflected them in the content of the environmental assessment. In this way, the MOD had taken steps to comply with relevant laws, asked opinions and ideas from Okinawa Prefecture over a sufficient period of time, and reflected them in the assessment.

(5) Promotion of the Futenma Replacement Facility Construction Project

a. Suits over the Revocation of the Land-Fill Permit

The Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau submitted the land-fill permit request on public waters to Okinawa Prefecture in March 2013, and then Governor of Okinawa Nakaima approved this in December 2013. However, then Governor of Okinawa Onaga revoked the land-fill permit by then Governor of Okinawa Nakaima in October 2015, leading to the filing of three suits over the revocation of the land-fill permit between the Government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture.

Under these circumstances, the court came up with a settlement recommendation, and the Government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture reached a court-mediated settlement agreement in March 2016. In the settlement, the Government of Japan and Okinawa mutually affirmed that after the final judicial ruling is handed down by the Supreme Court, they would abide by the ruling and take steps in line with the spirit of the text of the ruling and the reasons conducive to the text, and continue to take responses in good faith by cooperating with each other in accordance with the purpose of the ruling.

Pursuant to the provisions of the settlement agreement, the Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau immediately suspended the land-fill work while the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued an instruction for correction based on the Local Autonomy Act to then Governor Onaga to repeal the revocation of the land-fill permit. Subsequently, in December 2016, after examination by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council and deliberation by the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court, the Supreme Court set forth the decision that the revocation of the land-fill permit by then Governor Onaga was illegal.

b. Judgment of the Supreme Court

In the judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that then Governor Nakaima’s decision was not illegal. The court stated that no circumstances could be found indicating that then Governor Nakaima’s decision that the landfill was in compliance with the condition in Article 4 (1) (ii) of the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface, “that it is appropriate and reasonable as the use of national land,” had no foundation in fact, or clearly lacked reasoning under socially accepted conventions. The reasons given by the court include: (1) the area of the replacement facilities and the landfill area will be significantly reduced from the area of the MCAS Futenma facilities, and (2) aircraft flying over residential areas can be avoided by the land-fill in the coastal area that puts the runway extension out to the sea, and the replacement facilities will be installed using part of Camp Schwab, which is already provided to the U.S. Forces.

Moreover, regarding whether the construction of replacement facilities takes environmental protection and other considerations into adequate account, the Supreme Court, finding that construction methods, environmental protection measures and countermeasures that can conceivably be taken at this point in time have been taken and that there is sufficient consideration for disaster prevention, determined that it cannot be said that then Governor Nakaima’s decision was illegal. The court did not find that there was anything particularly unreasonable in then Governor Nakaima’s decision-making process and the content of the decision that the construction met the condition of Article 4 (1) (ii) of the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface, “the land-fill gives sufficient consideration to the protection of the environment and prevention of disasters.”

c. Retraction of the Revocation of the Land-Fill Permit

Following this Supreme Court ruling, in December 2016, then Governor Onaga retracted the revocation of the land-fill permit and the Okinawa Defense Bureau resumed the
replacement facilities construction project. In April 2017, it started the construction of the seawall, the main part of the public waters reclamation.

d. Lawsuit Related to Damage to the Reefs on the Seafloor, Etc.
In July 2017, Okinawa Prefecture filed suit in the Naha District Court, requesting that this seawall construction not be allowed to damage the reefs on the seafloor, etc., without permission from the Governor of Okinawa based on the regulations of Okinawa Prefecture. Subsequently, the district court dismissed Okinawa Prefecture’s claim in March 2018, and the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court dismissed Okinawa Prefecture’s appeal in December of the same year. In the same month, Okinawa Prefecture filed a petition of final appeal with the Supreme Court, but withdrew the petition in March 2019.

e. Situation Surrounding the Land-Fill Work
In August 2018, Okinawa Prefecture revoked the land-fill permit again on the basis of problems concerning environmental protection measures and the soil foundation of the land-fill area. In October of the same year, the Okinawa Defense Bureau filed a request for review and a petition for a stay of execution under the Administrative Complaint Review Act against the revocation of the permit, and the stay of execution was upheld. Following the ruling, the Okinawa Defense Bureau resumed the land-fill operation in December of the same year in the waters south of Camp Schwab.

In April 2019, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism determined that the revocation of the land-fill permit by Okinawa Prefecture should be repealed. Dissatisfied with this decision, the Governor of Okinawa filed a request for a review with the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council in the same month. The Council dismissed this request in June 2019. In July 2019, protesting the dismissal of the Council, the Governor of Okinawa filed a lawsuit with the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court to revoke the government’s involvement (determination by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism), and in August 2019 filed a lawsuit with the Naha District Court seeking the revocation of the determination by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. In October 2019, the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court dismissed the Governor of Okinawa’s suit. In the same month, the Governor of Okinawa filed a petition for acceptance of final appeal with the Supreme Court, which was dismissed in March 2020.

In implementing the relocation, the MOD has conducted environmental impact assessment for about five years, and given the utmost consideration for the natural environment. Throughout the procedures, the MOD received more than 1,500 opinions from the Governor of Okinawa on six occasions, all of which the MOD reflected in the content of the environmental assessment.

If the waters are enclosed by the seawall, the coral will be isolated from the surrounding sea with the flow of seawater shut down, a situation which will affect the coral habitat. Therefore, corals living in the land-fill area on the southern side which were designated for conservation were transplanted before the area was enclosed.

The standard for conservation of corals is stricter than the standard that was applied to the land-fill related to the second runway of Naha Airport.8

Regarding coenobita, which are nationally designated protected species, and the shellfish and crustaceans designated as endangered species, relocation from the seashore and seafloors in the construction area on the southern side to other areas is also being appropriately implemented based on instructions and advice from experts. Regarding the soil foundation of the land-fill area, as a result of a study conducted on the stability of seawalls and other structures in the waters north of Camp Schwab in light of the results of a boring survey, it has been confirmed that although the work to improve the soil foundation is necessary, it is possible to implement the construction of seawalls and land-fill while ensuring the required stability through prevailing and adequately proven construction methods.9

Since September 2019, the Technical Review Committee on Futenma Replacement Facility Construction Project, consisting of experts in the fields of geotechnical, structural, coastal, and pavement engineering, has been held to obtain objective technical recommendations and advice in order to make the design, construction, and maintenance of seawalls and land-fill sites more rational for the future implementation of the project. In December 2019, the Okinawa Defense Bureau announced that, based on the results of the studies that had been conducted, it would take nine years and three months from the commencement to the completion of construction based on the revised plan, and take about 12 years to complete the “admin procedures” described in the Okinawa Consolidation Plan and a fund of about 930 billion yen. Hearing experts’ insights on the environment and others, after due consideration, in April 2020, the Okinawa Defense Bureau submitted to Okinawa Prefecture a request for revision of land-fill permit due to addition of the soil

8 Specifically, in relation to the construction of the second runway of Naha Airport, around 37,000 clusters of small corals were transplanted. If the same standard as the one applicable to the construction of the alternative facility was applied, the number of clusters of small corals transplanted would have been around 170,000.
9 The standard methods are the sand compaction pile method, the sand drain method, and the paper drain method. Among examples of projects in which these methods were used is the construction work to expand Tokyo International Airport (Haneda Airport).
improvement work, etc., based on the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface.

In February 2019, Okinawa Prefecture held a referendum on whether or not to support the land-fill work related to the relocation of MCAS Futenma to the Henokosaki area in Nago City. As a result, 114,933 voters voted for the work, 434,273 voters voted against it, and 52,682 voters voted neither (the total number of votes cast was 605,385 and the voter turnout was 52.48%).

The present situation in which U.S. bases are concentrated in Okinawa is in no way acceptable, and it is a grave responsibility of the government to mitigate the impact on Okinawa.

The government takes the results of the prefectural referendum seriously and will continue to do its utmost efforts to mitigate the impact of the U.S. bases in Okinawa.

It is imperative to prevent MCAS Futenma, which is surrounded by houses and schools and which is said to be the most dangerous base in the world, from continuing to be used indefinitely and to pose a danger. The government believes that this view is shared with the people of residents in Okinawa.

The relocation to Henoko does not mean that all functions of MCAS Futenma will be relocated there. Of MCAS Futenma’s three functions, two will be moved out of Okinawa while the remaining one will be relocated to Henoko, resulting in the total return of the site of MCAS Futenma.

Indeed, from the viewpoint of sharing the impact, progress is being made in implementation of measures to realize the total return of the site of MCAS Futenma based on understanding and cooperation by local public entities outside Okinawa. The measures include the relocation of air refueling aircraft to Yamaguchi Prefecture and the relocation of the function of accepting transient aircraft in contingencies to Fukuoka and Miyazaki Prefectures.

Although more than 20 years have passed since Japan and the United States agreed on the total return of the site of MCAS Futenma, it has not been achieved yet. The MOD believes that the return must not be postponed any longer.

The MOD intends to continue making efforts to secure the understanding of local residents in Okinawa through years of persistent dialogue, and do its utmost to achieve the total return of MCAS Futenma as early as possible.

## 5 Force Reduction and Relocation to Guam

Since the Roadmap was announced in May 2006, the Governments of Japan and the United States held a series of consultations on the reduction of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.

### (1) Timing and Size of Relocation

The 2006 Roadmap stated that approximately 8,000 personnel of the III MEF and their approximately 9,000 dependents would relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, but the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 and other agreements set the timing of the relocation for the earliest possible date after 2014.

Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April 2012, the Governments of Japan and the United States decided to delink both the relocation of III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land return south of Kadena Air Base from the progress on the FRF and to adjust the composition of the units and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam. As a result, MAGTF is to locate in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, approximately 9,000 personnel are to be relocated to locations outside of Japan (about 4,000 of whom are to be relocated to Guam), the authorized strength of the U.S. Marine Corps forces in Guam is to be approximately 5,000 personnel, and an end-state for the U.S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa is to be consistent with the level of approximately 10,000 personnel envisioned in the Roadmap.

Accordingly, the “2+2” Meeting held in October 2013 agreed that, under the relocation plan described at the 2012 “2+2” Meeting, the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam is to begin in the first half of the 2020s. The plan is expected to facilitate progress in implementing the consolidation plan for facilities and areas in Okinawa of April 2013.

### (2) Costs of the Relocation

Under the Roadmap, the two sides reached an agreement that, of the estimated US$10.27 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs, Japan would provide US$6.09 billion, including US$2.8 billion in direct cash contribution, while the United States would fund the remaining US$4.18 billion. In February 2009, the Japanese Government and the U.S. Government signed “the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III MEF Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam” (the Guam International Agreement). The Agreement legally guarantees and ensures actions taken by Japan and the United States, such as Japan’s long-term funding for projects to which Japan provides direct cash contributions. As part of measures based on this Agreement, the Japanese Government has been providing cash contributions to the U.S. Government in relation to the projects for which Japan
has provided financial support since FY2009.\textsuperscript{10} Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April 2012, the unit composition and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam were adjusted and it was agreed that the preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation was US$8.6 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2012 dollars). With regard to Japan’s financial commitment, it was reaffirmed that it was to be the direct cash contribution of up to US$2.8 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars) as stipulated in Article 1 of the Guam International Agreement. It was also confirmed that Japan’s equity investment and loans for family housing projects and infrastructure projects would not be utilized.\textsuperscript{11} Moreover, it was stipulated that any funds that had already been provided to the U.S. Government under the Guam International Agreement would be counted as part of the Japanese contribution. Furthermore, as a new initiative, a portion of the direct cash contribution of US$2.8 billion mentioned above would be used to develop training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as shared-use facilities by Japan and the United States. In addition, it was agreed that the remaining costs and any additional costs would be borne by the United States, and that the two governments were to complete a bilateral cost breakdown.

At the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013, a Protocol Amending the Guam International Agreement was also signed to add the stipulations concerning the development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the use of these training areas by the SDF. The limit on Japanese cash contributions remains unchanged at US$2.8 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars). Both countries also completed work reflecting the breakdown of the associated costs.

Furthermore, the National Defense Authorization Act for U.S. Fiscal Year 2015 was enacted in December 2014, which lifted the freeze on the use of funds for the relocation to Guam imposed by the U.S. Congress in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012.

\section*{(3) Completion of Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures}

As for the environmental impact assessment for Guam, the required procedures were conducted to reflect the revisions to the project made by the adjustments to the plan for realignment, and the assessment was completed in August 2015.

Furthermore, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Joint Military Training Environmental Impact Statement (CJMT-EIS), is now being implemented.

\section*{(4) Progress of the Guam Relocation Project}

While the environmental impact assessment for Guam was being conducted, the Government of the United States implemented infrastructure development projects at the Andersen Air Force Base and the Apra area of the Naval Base Guam as projects unaffected by the assessment. The U.S. Government is currently implementing relocation construction work in all project areas, following the lifting of the freeze on the Guam relocation funds pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act and the completion of the environmental impact assessment for Guam.

\section*{6 Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air base}

The Roadmap stated that following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base. Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, it was decided to delink the progress on the FRF from both the relocation of the III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land returns south of Kadena. In addition, with regard to the land to be returned, it was agreed to conduct consultations focusing on three categories, namely (1) land eligible for immediate return; (2) land eligible for return once the relocation of functions is completed; and (3) land eligible for return after the relocation abroad.

\subsection*{(1) Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa}

Since the change of administration at the end of 2012, Japan and the United States have continued consultation under the basic policy of the Abe administration to dedicate all its strength to mitigate the impact of the U.S. Forces on Okinawa communities. Japan strongly requested an early return of land areas south of Kadena, including Makinimato Service Area (Camp Kinser) in Urasoe City of which

\textsuperscript{10} As for projects for which Japan provides financial support, cash contributions of approximately 229.8 billion yen have been provided to the U.S. side using the budgets from FY2009 to FY2019.

\textsuperscript{11} In line with this, the special provisions for the operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (investment and loan) that had been prescribed by the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan were abolished by an act revising part of that act that was enacted on March 31, 2017.
Okinawa has particularly made a strong request for the return and coordination with the United States. As a result, both countries announced the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (Consolidation Plan) in April 2013, which stipulated the return schedule, including the specific years of return.

The return of all land according to the plan will enable the return of approximately 70% (approximately 1,048 ha, the equivalent of 220 Tokyo Domes) of six USFJ facilities located in densely populated areas in the central and southern parts of the main island of Okinawa.

In the Consolidation Plan, both sides confirmed that they would implement the plan as early as possible. The Government of Japan will continue to work with all its strength so that land areas south of Kadena would be returned at the earliest possible date.

Furthermore, following the announcement of the Consolidation Plan, consultations have been held since April 2013, involving Ginowan City, Ginowan City Military Land Owners Association, Okinawa Prefecture, Okinawa Defense Bureau, and Okinawa General Bureau in a bid to contribute to the promotion of the effective and appropriate use of West Futenma Housing Area within Camp Zukeran, and the MOD has also been providing necessary cooperation.

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12 Naha Port, Makiminato Service Area, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, Camp Kuwae, and Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1

13 In addition to the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Okinawa Office) and the Cabinet Office also participate in the consultations as observer.
(2) Progress in the Return of Land

Efforts have been made to enable the early return of land areas, including the land areas that are to be returned as soon as required procedures are completed (shown in red in Fig. III-2-4-11), since the announcement of the Consolidation Plan in April 2013. These efforts resulted in the realization of the return of the north access road of Makiminato Service Area (approximately 1 ha) in August 2013, West Futenma Housing Area of Camp Zukeran (approximately 51 ha) at the end of March 2015 (transferred to the landowners at the end of March 2018), the area near Gate 5 of Makiminato Service Area (approximately 2 ha) at the end of March 2019, and portions of land at Camp Zukeran (Warehouse Area of Facilities and Engineering Compound) (approximately 11 ha) at the end of March 2020.

Additionally, in December 2015, Japan and the United States agreed to such measures as the early return of partial land at MCAS Futenma (approximately 4 ha) for a municipal road, and the early return of partial land at Makiminato Service Area (approximately 3 ha) for the purpose of widening National Route to reduce traffic congestion, for which there had been particularly strong demand for return among local people, and the former return was realized at the end of July 2017, whereas the latter return was realized at the end of March 2018. Furthermore, such measures as relocation to Kadena Ammunition Storage Area (Chibana Area), Torii Communication Station, Camp Hansen and Camp Zukeran have been implemented to advance the land return.

All-out initiatives are being continuously made to steadily implement the return of land areas south of Kadena Air Base under the Consolidation Plan and to realize the respective returns of land in the shortest possible time for more visible mitigation of the impact on Okinawa.

(2) Deployment of CV-22 Osprey by the U.S. Air Force to Yokota Air Base

In May 2015, the United States announced that CV-22, specified for U.S. Air Force, would be deployed to Yokota Air Base (which encompasses Fussa City, Tachikawa City, Akishima City, Musashi Murayama City, Hamura City and Mizuho Town of Tokyo Prefecture). A total of 10 CV-22 Ospreys are scheduled to be deployed in stages by around 2024, with the first five CV-22s deployed to Yokota Air Base in October 2018.

The CV-22 deployed to Yokota Air Base plays a role in transporting personnel and supplies of the special operation units of the U.S. Forces to address crises and emergencies in the Asia-Pacific region, including humanitarian assistance and natural disasters.
As Japan faces the increasingly severe security environment, the deployment of high-performance CV-22 enhances the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and contributes to the defense of Japan and the stability of the region from the perspective of the commitment by the U.S. to the Asia-Pacific region and the building-up of readiness by the United States.

(3) Safety of Osprey

Prior to the deployment of MV-22s to MCAS Futenma in 2012, Japan established an analysis and assessment team composed of aircraft pilots and experts from inside and outside the Government and confirmed the safety of MV-22 by conducting its own survey, etc. In addition, when Japan made the decision to introduce Ospreys in 2014, the Government reconfirmed their safety by collecting and analyzing all kinds of technical information, not only in the preparation phase, but also after the decision of introduction. The MOD has dispatched the GSDF Osprey personnel to the U.S. for stable maneuvering and maintenance.

Additionally, the CV-22 has the same propulsion system as the MV-22 and the structure of both aircraft is basically in common; therefore, the safety of both aircraft is at the same level.

Japan considers that ensuring safety is of prime importance in operations of the U.S. Forces, and on various occasions, Minister of Defense requested Secretary of Defense and other high-ranking officials to give consideration to local communities and ensure safety. The Government of Japan will continue to ask for the maximum consideration for safety.

(4) Usability of Osprey Deployed by the U.S. Forces in Case of Disaster

In the aftermath of the devastating typhoon that hit the central part of the Philippines in November 2013, 14 MV-22 aircraft, deployed in Okinawa, were dispatched for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities to support Operation Damayan. The MV-22s were deployed promptly to affected areas that were difficult to access, and transported several hundred isolated victims and about six tons of relief materials in a day.
In April 2014, the MV-22, deployed in Okinawa, was dispatched for search and rescue activities in the wake of an accidental sinking of a passenger ship off the coast of Jindo in the ROK.

Furthermore, in response to the large earthquake that hit Nepal in April 2015, four MV-22s deployed in Okinawa were dispatched to the country to transport personnel and supplies.

In Japan, when the Kumamoto Earthquake occurred in 2016, MV-22s were dispatched to deliver daily necessities to the disaster stricken areas.

In this manner, the MV-22 is capable of conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities immediately and over a large range when large-scale disasters occur because of its high performance and multi-functionality. It has also been used for disaster prevention drills since 2014. In September 2016, two MV-22s participated in the comprehensive disaster prevention drills of Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture and conducted delivery drills for isolated islands.

Like the MV-22, the CV-22 can conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities, including search and rescue missions, both immediately and over a large range, in the case of a large-scale disaster.

As such, it is expected that the superior capabilities of the Osprey deployed by the U.S. Forces can be showcased in a variety of operations in the future as well.

Consultation Structures for Mitigating the Impact of Bases on Okinawa

In order to mitigate the concentrated impact on Okinawa, the Government of Japan has been committed to further mitigating the impact, listening to, for example, the opinions of the local residents through various consultative bodies.

Initiatives for the Use of Lands Previously Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces

The Act on Special Measures Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Use of the Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Previously Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces stipulates various measures concerning lands in Okinawa provided for use by the USFJ (“USFJ Land”) agreed to be returned. The MOD mainly conducts the following initiatives, and will continue its initiatives to promote the effective and appropriate use of returned lands by coordinating and cooperating with related ministries, the prefectoral government and local municipalities. The MOD:

1. conducts mediation in relation to access for surveys, etc., to be implemented by the prefectoral government and local municipalities on the USFJ Land which are agreed to be returned;
2. conducts measures applying to all the returned lands to remove obstacles for use such as soil contamination and unexploded ordnance, not only those caused by the activities of the stationed forces, before handing over the land to the owners and
3. provides financial benefits to alleviate the impact on the owners of the returned lands and to promote use of the land.

Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa

In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing measures to secure the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces by maintaining its deterrence and trying to mitigate the impact on local communities.

Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture

With regard to the realignment of USFJ facilities and areas in Kanagawa Prefecture, etc., the return of facilities and areas including the Kamiseya Communication Station and the Fukaya Communication Site has already been realized based
on the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement of October 2004.

However, more than 10 years have passed since the initial agreement, and Japan’s security environment has become increasingly severe. Therefore, there have been changes in the U.S. Navy’s posture and capabilities, as represented by the increased operation of U.S. vessels at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka. In light of such circumstances, the following were agreed at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee meeting in November 2018: (1) development of facilities for satisfying the U.S. Navy’s facility requirements; (2) start of negotiation on joint use of the Negishi Dependent Housing Area to conduct site restoration works; and (3) cancellation of the plan to construct family housing in the Yokohama City area of the Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex. Subsequently, joint use of the Negishi Dependent Housing Area was agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee meeting in November 2019.
### Fig. III - 2-4-13 Consultative Bodies on the Mitigation of Impact of Bases on Okinawa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (year)</th>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa Policy Council (1996)</td>
<td>Entire cabinet excluding Prime Minister and Governor of Okinawa</td>
<td>Consultation concerning issues pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa and basic policies relating to Okinawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcommittee of the Okinawa Policy Council (2013)</td>
<td>Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of State for Okinawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, and Governor of Okinawa</td>
<td>Responses to various issues relating to the mitigation of the impact of bases on Okinawa and measures to revitalize the economy of Okinawa Prefecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa (2014)</td>
<td>Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of State for Okinawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, Governor of Okinawa, and Mayor of Ginowan</td>
<td>Consultation concerning the mitigation of the impact of MCAS Futenma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa (2014)</td>
<td>State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister for International Affairs, Director General of Minister’s Secretariat, Director General of Bureau of Defense Policy, Director General of Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning, Director General of Bureau of Local Cooperation, Chief of Staff of Joint Staff, Chief of Staff of GSDF, Chief of Staff of MSDF, and Chief of Staff of ASDF</td>
<td>Deliberation on basic policies regarding the early return of USFJ facilities and areas, and regarding the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa with the aim of smooth and effective implementation of measures based on those policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation between the Central Government and Okinawa Prefecture (2016)</td>
<td>Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of State for Okinawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, Governor of Okinawa, and Deputy Governor of Okinawa</td>
<td>Consultation concerning the mitigation of the impact of bases on Okinawa and measures to revitalize the economy of Okinawa Prefecture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Fig. III - 2-4-14 Locations of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Japan (Excluding Okinawa Prefecture) (As of March 31, 2019)

#### Us Army
- US Army, Japan
- US Army, Yokota
- US Army, Sagami General Depot
- US Army, Misawa

#### USAF
- US Air Force, Yokota
- US Air Force, Misawa
- US Air Force, Atsugi
- US Air Force, Yokosuka
- US Air Force, Sasebo

#### USN
- US Navy, Yokosuka
- US Navy, Sasebo
- US Navy, Yokota

#### USMC
- US Marines, Sasebo
- US Marines, Misawa
- US Marines, Atsugi

#### Other
- U.S. Forces, Japan Headquarters
- Joint Tactical Ground Station
- Naval Air Facility, Misawa
- Naval Air Facility, Yokota
- Naval Air Facility, Sasebo
- Naval Air Facility, Yokosuka
- Naval Air Facility, Atsugi

Note: Based on information on the U.S. Forces Japan website and other sources.

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### 2 Current Situation regarding the Realignment of the USFJ as Stipulated in the Roadmap

#### (1) Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and Control Capability

The headquarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) at Camp Zama (Sagamihara City and Zama City in Kanagawa Prefecture) was reorganized into the headquarters of the USARJ & I Corps (Forward) in December 2007. The subsequent reorganization project to improve the capabilities of the U.S. Army Headquarters in Japan is shown in Figure III-2-4-16. The GSDF Ground Component Command HQs has set up the Japan-U.S. Joint Headquarters at Camp Zama to ensure...
close communication and coordination with the USARJ as well as swift response to various events.

(2) Yokota Air Base and Airspace

a. Commencement of the Operation of the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) and the Relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command Headquarters (HQ)

Enhancement of coordination between the headquarters of both countries, combined with the transition to joint operational posture, is highly important to ensure a response with flexibility and readiness of the SDF and the U.S. Forces.

Therefore, at the end of FY2011, the BJOCC commenced its operations at Yokota Air Base and the ASDF Air Defense Command HQ and its relevant units were relocated to Yokota Air Base. These arrangements have made it possible to enhance coordination between the headquarters of the SDF and the U.S. Forces, including the sharing of information concerning air defense and BMD.

b. Yokota Airspace

To facilitate the operations of civilian aircraft in Yokota airspace, where the U.S. Forces conduct radar approach control, measures have been taken since 2006 to temporarily transfer the responsibility for air traffic control of portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese authorities, to deploy ASDF
officers at the Yokota Radar Approach Control (Yokota RAPCON), and to reduce the airspace by about 40% (i.e., the release of air traffic control from USFJ).

c. Civilian-Military Dual Use of Yokota Air Base
At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in May 2003, it was agreed that the joint civilian-military use of Yokota Air Base would be studied, and a Liaison Conference was then established as a working panel attended by relevant government ministries and agencies and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. The Governments of Japan and the United States are also conducting a study on the specific conditions and modalities, with the understanding that both countries will not compromise the military operations and safety of Yokota Air Base.

(3) Deployment of U.S. Aircraft Carrier to Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka
The presence of the U.S. Pacific Fleet plays an important role in ensuring maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region as well as regional peace and stability. The U.S. aircraft carrier provides the core capability of the Fleet.

The U.S. Navy affirms that it will continue to ensure that all of its forward-deployed nuclear-powered vessels, including USS “Ronald Reagan,” which anchored at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), adhere to the relevant safety policies. For example, the nuclear reactor will normally be shut down while the aircraft carrier is anchored, and repairing and refueling will not be carried out in Japan. The Government of Japan will continue taking all possible measures to ensure safety.

(4) Measures Relating to Naval Air Facility Atsugi and MCAS Iwakuni

a. Relocation of Carrier-Based Aircraft
Since Naval Air Facility Atsugi (Ayase City and Yamato City in Kanagawa Prefecture) is located in an urban district, the noise of carrier jets taking off and landing in particular had been a problem for a long time.

Thus, after the completion of the runway relocation project at MCAS Iwakuni (Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture), which made aircraft operations possible with less impact on the living environment of the surrounding communities, it was decided that CVW-5 squadrons would be relocated from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni. The relocation began in August 2017 and completed in March 2018. As a result, the noise in areas around Naval Air Facility Atsugi was alleviated to a significant extent, while maintaining the forward deployment of a U.S. aircraft carrier and carrier-based aircraft.

In order to mitigate impacts of the increased operations at MCAS Iwakuni due to the relocation, the related measures listed in Fig. III-2-4-17 have been implemented. If all of these measures are fully implemented, the noise problems are expected to be mitigated from the current situation, with the area requiring residential noise-abatement work, or the so-called first category area, decreasing from approximately 1,600 ha to approximately 650 ha.

b. Field-Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP)
The 2006 Roadmap prescribes that a bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent FCLP facility is to be established with the goal of selecting a permanent site at the earliest possible date. In December 2019, the MOD acquired more than half of the land on Mage Island in Nisinoomote City,
Kagoshima Prefecture, and is conducting various surveys in preparation for the development of SDF facilities. This SDF facility would be used to support operations in response to a variety of situations, including large-scale disasters, as well as regular exercises and other activities, including use by the U.S. Forces as a permanent site for FCLP.

In addition, the 2005 SCC document confirmed that the U.S. Forces will continue to conduct FCLP at Iwo-To in accordance with existing temporary arrangements until a permanent training facility is identified.

c. Resumption of Civil Aviation Operations at MCAS Iwakuni

Considering that the local public entities, etc., including Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City, had been working together to request the resumption of civil aviation operations, it was agreed in the Roadmap that “portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.” Based on this agreement, Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport was opened in December 2012, resuming regular flights of civil aviation aircraft for the first time in 48 years.

(5) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

In June 2006, an AN/TPY-2 radar (so-called “X-Band Radar”) system was deployed to the U.S. Shariki Radar Site (Tsugaru City, Aomori Prefecture).\(^{17}\) Also in October 2006, U.S. Army Patriot PAC-3 units (Patriot Advanced Capability) were deployed to Kadena Air Base (Kadena Town, Okinawa City and Chatan Town in Okinawa Prefecture) and Kadena Ammunition Storage Area (Yomitan Village, Okinawa City, Kadena Town, Onna Village and Uruma City in Okinawa Prefecture). In December 2014, the second TPY-2 radar in Japan was deployed to the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site (Kyotango City in Kyoto Prefecture).

The United States deployed Aegis destroyers with BMD capabilities to Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka in October 2015, March 2016 and May 2018.\(^{18}\)

\(^{17}\) The radar was deployed to ASDF Shariki Sub Base (in Aomori Prefecture) in June 2006, but was thereafter transferred to the neighboring U.S. Shariki Communication Site.

\(^{18}\) USFJ aircraft conduct bilateral and other trainings at SDF facilities, etc.

(6) Training Relocation

a. Aviation Training Relocation (ATR)

Based on the decision that U.S. aircraft from three USFJ facilities and areas—Kadena, Misawa (Misawa City and Tohoku Town in Aomori Prefecture) and MCAS Iwakuni—would participate for the time being in bilateral training with the SDF at SDF facilities, the Aviation Training Relocation (ATR)\(^{18}\) has been underway since 2007. The MOD has been improving its infrastructure, as required, for the training relocation.

The ATR contributes to enhancing interoperability between the two countries, and also to relocating part of air-to-ground training conducted by using Kadena Air Base. Thus, this training relocation will help noise abatement around Kadena Air Base, thereby contributing to the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa.

In addition to assisting the USFJ, the MOD/SDF is making efforts to ensure the safety and security of the local community, such as the establishment of a liaison office, facilitating communication with related government agencies, and response to requirements from the local community. These efforts have been contributing to successful training....

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Status of Progress, etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni</td>
<td>After explanation in January 2017 to Yamaguchi Prefecture, Iwakuni City, and other municipalities that the relocation of carrier-based aircraft to MCAS Iwakuni would commence in the latter half of 2017, etc., Yamaguchi Prefecture, Iwakuni City, and other municipalities expressed their approval by June 2017. Started relocation in August 2017. Completed relocation in March 2018.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relocation of MSDF EP-3, etc., from MCAS Iwakuni to Naval Air Facility Atsugi</td>
<td>Following bilateral consultations upon request from the local community and from the perspective of the defense system, Japan and the United States confirmed in 2013 that EP-3 aircraft will remain at MCAS Iwakuni.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relocation of the KC-130 air refueling aircraft from MCAS Futemura to MCAS Iwakuni</td>
<td>Relocation completed in August 2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotational deployment of the KC-130 to Kanoya Air Base and Guam</td>
<td>Rotational deployment of the KC-130 to MSDF Kanoya Air Base (Kanoya City, Kagoshima Prefecture) started in September 2019. Regarding rotational deployment to Guam, training commencement confirmed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relocation of CH-53D helicopters from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam</td>
<td>Japan and the United States confirmed that CH-53D helicopters, which had been sent to the Middle East, will return to the U.S. mainland without returning to MCAS Iwakuni, and will then be relocated to Guam.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Table showing measures and status of progress]
relocation.

b. Relocation of Training for MV-22

The Government of Japan and the United States Government decided in the “2+2” joint statement of October 2013, to utilize the opportunities to participate in various operations in mainland Japan and across the region to reduce the amount of time that MV-22s are deployed and used for the training in Okinawa so that training outside of Okinawa Prefecture, including mainland Japan, can be increased while maintaining the deterrence of the Alliance. Based on above, both the governments have been moving forward with the training of the MV-22 deployed at MCAS Futenma outside of Okinawa Prefecture, etc.

In September 2016, it was agreed at the Joint Committee to relocate the training activities of Tilt-Rotor/Rotary Wing aircraft, such as AH-1, CH53, and the MV-22 that are currently deployed at MCAS Futenma out of Okinawa Prefecture at Japan’s expense in order to further promote training outside of Okinawa to mitigate the impact of training activities there.

Three bilateral training (field training by the GSDF and U.S. Marines) were conducted in FY2019 (in Shiga and Kagawa prefectures in December 2019, and in Hokkaido, Kumamoto, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima prefectures in January 2020). From the date of the agreement up to March 2020, a total of ten training, including the ones mentioned above, have been conducted in Guam and in Japan at the exercise sites in Miyagi, Gunma, Niigata, Fukuoka and Oita prefectures.

The MV-22’s amount of time deployed and training in Okinawa will continue to be reduced by relocating exercises held in mainland of Japan and Guam, and the Government will continue to promote initiatives that contribute to further mitigating the impact on Okinawa.

### Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the USFJ

In order to smoothly implement the realignment of the USFJ based on the Roadmap, the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan (USFJ Realignment Special Measures Act) was enacted in August 2007. Realignment grants, Special Subsidy Rates for Public Projects, etc. and other systems were established based on the law.

In addition, under the U.S. Forces realignment, some USFJ facilities and areas will be returned, and the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa will be relocated to Guam. Since these developments may affect the employment of USFJ local employees, the Government of Japan will take measures to include education and skills training, which is to help retain their employment.

The Realignment Special Measures Act was supposed to cease to be effective as of March 31, 2017. However, since there remain realignment projects that require implementation, on March 31, 2017, an act revising part of the Act including a ten-year extension of the time limit of the Act to March 31, 2027 was enacted.
In situations where the need and potential for international cooperation in the security and defense areas are increasing unprecedentedly, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) is required to actively contribute to ensuring the security of Japan, the peace and stability of the region, and the peace, stability, and prosperity of the entire international community from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. In line with the free and open Indo-Pacific vision, and in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG), Japan will strengthen bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges as part of multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation, while paying attention to its partner nations’ regional characteristics and situations. Japan will also actively advance its efforts to solve global security issues, including securing the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, coordination and cooperation with relevant countries in relation to the use of the space and cyber domains, international peace cooperation activities, arms control and disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These efforts will be promoted mainly under the framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and in close coordination with countries that share the same universal values and security interests as Japan. The MOD/SDF further intends to create a desirable security environment for Japan by engaging in the routine activities.

Section 1
Strategic Promotion of Multi-Faceted and Multi-Layered Defense Cooperation

1 Significance and Evolution of Security Cooperation and Dialogue, and Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

(1) Significance of Security Cooperation and Dialogue, and Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
The peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region is closely related to Japan’s security. In addition, with increasingly changeable and complicated global power dynamics, and escalation of political, economic, and military inter-state competition, they are also becoming a more important issue for the international community. While nations with large-scale military power concentrate in the region, no framework for regional security cooperation has been sufficiently institutionalized. As political, economic and social systems in each nation widely differ in the region, visions of security vary from country to country. Furthermore, there has been an increasing number of unilateral actions attempting to change the status quo by coercion without paying respect to existing international law. The issues involving the South China Sea, in particular, cause concerns over the maintenance of the rule of law at sea, freedom of navigation and overflight, and the stability of the Southeast Asian region. Thus, responses to these issues have become an important challenge to ensure the regional stability.

In order to build mutual trust among nations and establish a foundation for cooperation for solving regional security issues, the MOD/SDF intends to strategically promote multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation, while taking into account the international situation, regional characteristics, and situations and security issues other nations faced.

(2) Forms and History of Security Cooperation and Dialogue, and Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
Defense cooperation and exchanges have been delivered in the forms of high-level dialogues and exchanges, bilateral/multilateral exercises, capacity building for recipient countries (such as human resources development and...
technical cooperation in the security and defense fields), and defense equipment and technology cooperation aimed at ensuring Japan’s security and promoting international peace and cooperation.

The MOD/SDF has long strived to alleviate any conditions of confrontation and tension, and to foster a collaborative and cooperative atmosphere by building face-to-face relationships through bilateral dialogues and exchanges. In addition, the MOD/SDF has recently enhanced bilateral defense relationships from traditional exchanges to deeper cooperation in a phased manner by appropriately combining various means, including bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, capacity building, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and the development of institutional frameworks such as the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA).

In addition, multilateral regional security cooperation and dialogue are in the process of evolving from those that focus on dialogue to those that focus on cooperation that seeks to build regional order. It is important to promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges in a multi-layered, practical manner in order to create an ideal security environment.

In response to the cancellation of meetings with foreign countries, such as the Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD, in connection with measures against novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19), the MOD has held more telephone conversations than usual, deepening communication with foreign countries and promoting defense cooperation and exchanges from the government office in Ichigaya, Tokyo.

On the other hand, a range of challenges exist for the promotion of FOIP in the region, including Japan’s vicinity, such as a rapid modernization of military forces and an increase in military activities.

(2) Direction of the MOD’s Initiatives
In light of this situation, the MOD/SDF are promoting defense cooperation and exchanges to ensure that Japan can secure the stable use of major sea lanes. In addition, the MOD/SDF are promoting mutual understanding and confidence building with countries that have modernized their military forces and intensified their military activities to prevent contingencies and ensure Japan’s security. Furthermore, for countries in the region that are taking steps to respond to changes in the environment, the MOD/SDF aim to contribute to regional peace and stability by supporting their efforts through defense cooperation and exchanges.

(3) Areas with Which Japan Will Enhance Cooperation for the Realization of FOIP
With respect to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Pacific Island countries, the Middle East and Djibouti, the MOD/SDF will enhance cooperation toward the realization of FOIP, utilizing a wide range of means for defense cooperation and exchanges, including cooperation and exchange of personnel, cooperation and exchange of troops, capacity building, and defense equipment and technology cooperation. Specifically, the MOD/SDF are promoting defense cooperation and exchanges to help countries in these regions to play more effective roles in achieving stability in the Indo-Pacific region, and to secure the stable use of sea lanes by establishing good relations with these countries and ensuring that the SDF has stable access to their ports and airports.

(4) Countries That Japan Works With to Realize FOIP
The United States as Japan’s ally, Australia, India, the United Kingdom, France and other European countries, Canada and New Zealand are countries that not only share fundamental values with us, but also have geographic and historical ties to the Indo-Pacific region. The MOD/SDF have been encouraging these countries to become more involved in the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, the MOD/SDF have also been promoting defense cooperation and exchanges with them so that we can work together as partners when promoting efforts for realizing FOIP in the areas listed in (3) above. This way, we aim to achieve stronger effects than when promoting efforts on our own.
Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

"Defense cooperation and exchanges" refers to efforts to strengthen bilateral and multilateral defense relations by using various tools, which are significant initiatives for securing the peace and stability of Japan and the international community.

Purpose of defense cooperation and exchanges

- To create a security environment desirable for Japan
- To deter threats from reaching Japan by making opponents realize that doing harm to Japan would be difficult and consequential
- To prevent contingencies through promoting confidence-building and mutual understanding

Tools for defense cooperation and exchanges

**Tool 1: Cooperation and exchanges among people**

On such occasions as the “2+2” Meeting, defense ministerial meetings, chief of staff-level meetings or other high-level meetings, working-level consultations among defense authorities, and multilateral international conferences, participants frankly exchange views on defense policies, regional situations, defense cooperation and exchanges, etc., thereby developing mutual understanding and building confidence among them and further promoting defense cooperation and exchanges thereafter. Exchanges of students and interchange in education and research aim to facilitate understanding of defense policies and statuses of military units of other countries and promote relations of trust through network building.

**Tool 2: Cooperation and exchanges among troops**

Through goodwill exercise, mutual visits of naval ships and aircraft (calling at ports and airports), and exchange events among units, mutual trust with partner countries is developed and cooperative relationships are promoted. Bilateral and multilateral exercises aim to enhance SDF’s capability to cooperate with troops of other countries and strengthen defense relations among relevant countries, in addition to improve personnel’s skills.

**Tool 3: Capacity building**

Capacity building project by holding seminars and field training in various fields, providing technical guidance, and organizing observation of education and training programs and opinion exchanges, etc. aims to improve the capabilities of partner countries in a concrete and steady manner over a certain period of time and help their military forces play roles in contributing to international peace and regional stability.

**Tool 4: Defense equipment and technical cooperation**

Through overseas transfers of equipment, joint research and development, participation in international exhibitions, and holding of the Defence Industry Forum, efforts are made to strengthen and maintain Japan’s defense industrial base, enhance capacity both of the SDF and military forces of partner countries, and strengthen and maintain defense cooperation with those partner countries.

(Reference) Conclusion of various defense cooperation agreements

Through concluding such agreements as Information Security Agreements, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements, Agreements concerning Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, the framework of cooperation has been materialized and institutionalized with the aim of promoting defense cooperation and exchanges more smoothly and stably.
Countries with Which High-level Bilateral Dialogues and Consultations were Conducted (April 2019–March 2020)
In this figure, “high-level bilateral dialogues and consultations” refers to bilateral meetings of the Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and Chiefs of Staff with their respective counterparts.
High-level bilateral dialogues and consultations were conducted with the following countries between April 2019 and March 2020, but had also been conducted with other countries prior to that period together with other types of defense cooperation and exchanges. It should be noted that Japan has conducted high-level bilateral dialogues and consultations with various countries across the globe.

(5) Countries with Which Japan Will Promote Mutual Understanding and Confidence Building
With regard to China and Russia, the MOD/SDF aim to avoid unforeseen events and ensure Japan’s security by tapping into defense exchange opportunities and conveying Japan’s concerns about the increased military activities and military expansion in Japan’s vicinity to promote mutual understanding and confidence building.
Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision: FOIP

In August 2016, Prime Minister Abe unveiled the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept in his keynote address at TICAD VI in Kenya. Japan’s fundamental aim is to foster regional stability and prosperity by improving connectivity between Asia and Africa through a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

Three pillars of the vision
(i) Promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation and free trade.
(ii) Pursuit of economic prosperity (e.g., improving connectivity)
(iii) Commitment to peace and stability

MOD’s Specific Efforts for FOIP

The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond clearly states that in line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific, Japan will strategically promote multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation, taking into account characteristics and situation specific to each region and country.

MOD’s Specific Efforts for FOIP

MOD’s Specific Efforts for FOIP

MOD’s Specific Efforts for FOIP

MOD/SDF’s Efforts under the Vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (image)
Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In promoting security cooperation and exchanges, it is important to enhance bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges using optimal combinations of various cooperative means, while taking matters such as regional situations, the situations of partner countries and their relationships with Japan into account.

1 Australia

(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia

Australia is a “Special Strategic Partner” for Japan in the Indo-Pacific region as both Japan and Australia are allied with the United States and share not only universal values but also security strategic stakes and interests. In recent years, particularly, Japan and Australia as responsible countries in the Indo-Pacific region are strengthening mutual cooperation focusing on areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) activities and cooperation in capacity building.

With the background of the deepening defense cooperation between Japan and Australia, the two countries in March 2007 announced the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, Japan’s first such joint declaration focusing on security with a country other than the United States. Japan and Australia have also developed the foundation for cooperation such as the ACSA, the Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement, and the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology.

Regarding the Japan-Australia ACSA, a new agreement for expanding the situations in which the provision of supplies and services is possible was signed by the two countries in January 2017. The new agreement was concluded in light of the expansion of cases in which the SDF and the ADF conduct operations together due to the further advances in their defense cooperation and exchanges, and the development of the Legislation for Peace and Security in Japan. The agreement was approved by the National Diet in April 2017 and put into force in September 2017. Relevant domestic laws were developed then.

Japan will continue deepening its cooperative relationship with Australia, a “Special Strategic Partner,” that has both the intention and ability to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region with Japan.

(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In November 2019, a Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting was held between Defense Minister Kono and Australian Defense Minister Reynolds. In this meeting, the Ministers emphasized that as Indo-Pacific security dynamics became more challenging, the strategic logic underpinning Japan-Australia cooperation was only getting stronger, and agreed to deepen the special strategic partnership between the two countries and aimed at contributing to a free, open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. They also affirmed that they will accelerate defence cooperation in the coming years including in the fields of military exercises, personnel exchanges, space and cybersecurity policy, defence science and technology, and continue to make efforts towards concluding a reciprocal access agreement which would improve administrative, policy, and legal procedures to facilitate bilateral-multilateral operations and exercises. The two ministers reiterated their determination to work bilaterally to enhance defence and security cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific region including in the fields of, capacity building, maritime security and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. They also exchanged their views on the regional issues, including the South China Sea, the East China Sea and North Korea, remained committed to efforts to achieve North Korea’s complete, verifiable

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2 The National Security Strategy stipulates “freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law” as universal values.


In addition to the activities this agreement currently applies to, the following activities and situations will also be newly subject to the agreement: (1) Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security; (2) Situations threatening international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing; (3) Perilous situations; (4) Armed attack situations, etc.; (5) Activities in situations threatening survival; (6) Rescue measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas; (7) Counter-piracy activities; (8) Elimination of mines and other dangerous objects; and (9) Intelligence gathering activities.
and irreversible dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges of North Korea, and confirmed the coordination between the two countries on the issue of North Korea, including countermeasures against ship-to-ship transfers of goods to or from North Korean-flagged vessels, which is prohibited by the UN Security Council.

In October and December 2019, Defense Minister Kono and Defence Minister Reynolds held a total of three telephone conversations. They agreed that, as the Indo-Pacific region faces a range of challenges, defense cooperation between the two countries, which share universal values and strategic interests in security, is more important than ever, and that they would continue to work closely together to deepen the special strategic partnership. They also exchanged views on defense exchanges between Japan and Australia and the security situation surrounding the two countries. Defense Minister Kono also explained the SDF’s information gathering activities to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East.

As for bilateral service-to-service cooperation and exchanges, in November 2019, the Chief of Staff, JS met with Chief of the Defense Force Angus Campbell and confirmed the promotion of defense cooperation and exchange between the SDF and Australian forces under the FOIP initiative. In September and October 2019, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the Royal Australian Navy conducted the Nichi Gou Trident, a bilateral exercise to improve tactical skills and strengthen cooperation. From September to October 2019, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) conducted the first Japan–Australia bilateral exercise Bushido Guardian 19 using fighter jets at Chitose Air Base and other locations in Japan to improve tactical skills and interoperability, and to deepen defense cooperation. In the same month, the Royal Australian Air Force KC-30A made its first call at Komaki Air Base and conducted a unit-to-unit exchange by refueling and transport aircraft units between Japan and Australia. In November 2019, Australian Chief of Joint Operations visited the Air Defense Command Headquarters and they exchanged views on the regional situation, defense cooperation and exchanges.

(3) Cooperative Relationship Etc. between Japan, the United States, and Australia.

Japan and Australia are both allied with the United States and share universal values. They cooperate closely to resolve the various challenges the Indo-Pacific region and the international community face. In order to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of such cooperation, it is important for Japan and Australia to proactively promote trilateral cooperation with the United States, whose presence is indispensable for regional peace and stability.

The Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF), a Director General-level meeting among the three countries of Japan, the United States and Australia, has been held 10 times since April 2007.

In June 2019, a Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting was held on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue. At the meeting, the Strategic Action Agenda, which articulates their shared long-term vision for trilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region was agreed on and released.

As for trilateral service-to-service cooperation and exchanges, in August 2019, the Chief of Staff, Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) participated in the Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior Leaders Seminar in Hawaii and exchanged views with the top officials of the U.S. Army Pacific, the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, and the Australian Army. They shared a common understanding of cooperation and coordination for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. In November 2019, the MSDF hosted a Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise (a special mine warfare exercise) with three minesweepers from the United States and Australia in Hyuga-nada Sea. The ASDF conducted a multilateral HA/DR exercise Christmas Drop, which included air transport, material packing, and air drop exercises, in the Federal States of Micronesia, Republic of Palau, and the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas in December 2019. From February

See Reference 33 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia [Past Three Years])
to March 2020, the ASDF cohosted a Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise “Cope North” which included a trilateral HA/DR exercise.

Through various training and exercise opportunities, Japan will continue its efforts to improve mutual understanding and interoperability among Japan, the United States and Australia. In addition, Japan will also work to promote quadrilateral defense cooperation among Japan, the United States, Australia and India.

Moreover, the two countries signed the Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of India in September 2014 and saw the conclusion of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of India concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology as well as the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of India concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information in December 2015, further solidifying the institutional basis of Japan-India defense cooperation and exchanges. In October 2018, Japan and India agreed to begin the negotiations on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). These agreements have strengthened the relationship between the two partners, which are capable of dealing with regional and global issues, as well as the foundation of this partnership.

**2 India**

(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India

India is increasing its influence against a backdrop of its population—the world’s second largest—, its high economic growth, and its latent economic power. Located in the center of sea lanes that connect Japan with the Middle East and Africa, India is an extremely important country for Japan. Furthermore, Japan and India share universal values as well as common interests in the peace, stability, and prosperity of Asia and the world, and have established the “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.” In this context, Japan and India have promoted cooperation in maritime security and various other areas, while utilizing some frameworks including the “2+2” meeting.

Defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and India have steadily deepened since October 2008, when the two countries signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India. Meetings and consultations at various levels such as the ministerial level, as well as service-to-service exchanges including bilateral and multilateral exercises, have been regularly conducted.

In September 2019, a Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting was held between then Defense Minister Iwaya and Defense Minister Singh. At the meeting, the two ministers agreed to further deepen strategic and defense cooperation between Japan and India, and affirmed their intention to hold the first-ever India-Japan Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) to advance cooperation towards peace and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. They also welcomed the regular exchanges at all levels between the Japanese and Indian defense authorities, including bilateral exercises between all military services by the end of 2018, and agreed to promote defense cooperation and exchanges with the aim of further concrete cooperation among all military services.

In November 2019, a Defense Ministerial Meeting and the first Japan-India 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting were held. The four Ministers—Defense Minister Kono, Foreign Minister Motegi, Defence Minister Singh and External Affairs Minister Jaishankar—acknowledged emerging security challenges at the meeting and reiterated their commitment to advancing bilateral security cooperation based on the 2008 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation and the 2009 Action Plan to advance security cooperation based on the Declaration. They also shared the view to make continuous efforts for holding the bilateral exercises between the defence forces regularly and to expand them for the first Japan-India bilateral fighter aircraft exercise in Japan. The Ministers also appreciated the commencement of exchange of information based on the Implementing Arrangement for Deeper Cooperation between the MSDF and the Indian
Navy. With regard to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), the two sides welcomed the significant progress made in the negotiations of the ACSA and expressed their desire for early conclusion of the negotiations. With regard to defense equipment and technology cooperation, they expressed hope for productive discussions at the working-level consultations, and exchanged views on multilateral cooperation and the regional affairs. In light of the first “2+2” meeting, they shared recognition on the importance of continuing exchange of opinions and decided to hold the next “2+2” Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo. In October 2019 and January 2020, Defense Minister Kono held telephone conversations with Defence Minister Singh to exchange views on the situation in the Indo-Pacific region and other topics.

As for defense equipment and technology cooperation, Japan and India have conducted the Cooperative Research on the Visual SLAM Based GNSS Augmentation Technology for UGV/Robotics since July 2018. With the aim to launch concrete projects more, Japan and India held the Japan-India Defence Industry Forum in September 2017 and February 2019.

As for service-to-service exchanges, in January 2020, the Chief of Staff, JS visited India to participate in the multilateral forum Raisina Dialogue 2020, paid a courtesy call on Defence Minister Singh, and held the first-ever meeting with General Rawat, who became the first Chief of Defense Staff in the same month. At the meeting, the two sides shared an understanding of the regional situation and security environment in Japan and India, and exchanged views on deepening defense cooperation and exchanges. The Chief of Staff, GSDF visited India in October 2019, which was followed by a visit to Japan by then Chief of the Army Staff Rawat in December, realizing an intra-year mutual visit between the top brass of the Japanese and Indian ground service. In addition, in February 2020, the Chief of Staff, MSDF visited India to exchange views on a wide range of topics, including naval cooperation and exchanges and the regional situation.

Japan and India have also conducted service-to-service exchanges through training and exercises. From October to November 2019, the GSDF and the Indian Army had the bilateral exercise, Dharma Guardian 19. In October 2019, the ASDF conducted the bilateral exercise with the Indian Air Force, SHINYUU Maitri 19.

The three countries of Japan, the United States, and India have been conducting a trilateral naval exercise “Malabar” since 2017. In September 2019, Japan hosted “Malabar 2019” in the waters near Japan to promote trilateral cooperation.

Following the first Japan-U.S.-India Summit Meeting held in November 2018, the second Japan-U.S.-India Summit Meeting was held in June 2019, and the leaders reaffirmed the critical importance of their trilateral cooperation in efforts to maintain and promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region, sharing their understanding of an increasingly complex security situation. Furthermore, the three leaders confirmed their views to further promote trilateral cooperation in various fields, such as maritime security, space and cyberspace.

### 3 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

ASEAN member states, which continue to experience high economic growth and gather international attention for their potential as an open growth center of the world, and Japan have been traditional partners sharing a history of exchanges and a close economic relationship over the past nearly 50 years.

ASEAN nations, located in strategically important areas occupying strategic points on sea lanes of Japan, are also playing an important role in ensuring the peace and prosperity of Japan as well as the entire region. Therefore, it is
important for Japan to strengthen cooperation in the security and defense areas and promote confidence with ASEAN member states, while supporting their efforts to enhance the centrality, unity, and resilience of ASEAN, which is the center of regional cooperation.

Based on this principle, Japan is promoting confidence-building and mutual understanding through high-level and working-level exchanges as well as practical cooperation, such as capacity building, bilateral/multilateral exercises, and defense equipment and technology cooperation with ASEAN member states. In addition to bilateral cooperation, Japan has strengthened cooperation under multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The Vientiane Vision, which was presented as a guideline for future ASEAN-Japan defense cooperation at the second ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting in November 2016, outlined the full picture of the future direction of defense cooperation for ASEAN as a whole in a transparent manner. In November 2019, at the 5th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in Thailand, Defense Minister Kono announced the Vientiane Vision 2.0, an updated version of the Vientiane Vision, and ASEAN ministers welcomed.

From the viewpoint of actively promoting such bilateral and multilateral cooperation and stabilizing the security environment of the Indo-Pacific region, the MOD will strive to enhance defense cooperation and exchanges with ASEAN member states.

See
Section 1-3 of this Chapter (Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation)
Section 1-4 of this Chapter (Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building)
Reference 35 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN member states [Past Three Years])
Reference 47 (Vientiane Vision 2.0)

(1) Indonesia
Indonesia conducts active defense cooperation and exchanges with Japan. During the Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting in March 2015, Prime Minister Abe and President Joko agreed

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**VOICE**
**Voice of SDF Personnel Who Participated in Japan-India bilateral exercise SHINYUU Maitri 19**

First Lieutenant TATEYAMA Masaki,
C-130 pilot, 401st Squadron, 1st Tactical Airlift Wing, ASDF

I am a C-130 pilot of 1st Tactical Airlift Wing, ASDF. I would like to communicate a small part of what I felt when I participated in the Japan-India bilateral exercise (commonly known as SHINYUU Maitri 19) last fall. SHINYUU is a Japanese word for “best friend” and Maitri is Hindi for “friendship.”

This occasion was the first time for me to both participate in an exercise abroad and visit India. When carrying out the bilateral exercise with the Indian Air Force, I was at a loss at first due to differences in weather characteristics and other factors, but eventually I could personally experience the difference in operation procedures between the two air forces, which was a valuable experience for me as a pilot. From the cockpit on the way to the exercise airspace, I saw a great river the width of which is unimaginable in Japan calmly flowing through a vast land. I will never forget the view.

Spending time together with Indian Air Force officers was also a valuable experience for me. It may be little known that the Indian Air Force is small for the country’s population. For this reason, its officers are true elites and I am impressed by their knowledge and sense of humor.

Would you like to participate in overseas exercises together with me some day? You would have a truly unique experience.

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Video: The Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program based on the Vientiane Vision
URL: https://youtu.be/Mm9w7Y0B1l0
Security Cooperation

Deputy Director ISHIDA Tomonori, International Policy Division, Bureau of Defense Policy, Internal Bureau

The MOD/SDF, announcing “Vientiane Vision,” a guideline for the Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation in 2016, has carried out initiatives to contribute to ASEAN as a whole with particular emphasis on the realization of international order based on the “rule of law” in the maritime domain. In order to amplify such efforts, “Vientiane Vision 2.0” was set forth at the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting in November 2019.

The main point of this update is to redefine the aim of our efforts to contribute to ASEAN’s resilience. ASEAN, consisting of diverse member states, is making earnest efforts to show its international presence by playing a central role in the development of regional cooperation with its unity. With a view to upholding ASEAN centrality and unity, the updated vision sets forth the idea that it is important to contribute to its resilience so that it can withstand and repel external stress flexibly without losing its autonomy.

In addition, redefining the Vision in the much broader context of Japan’s vision for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” is another important point of this update.

For the development of the Vision, studies were made by the entire ministry from the Bureau and four Staff Offices to experts of the National Institute for Defense Studies. Through this process, we discussed new initiatives beyond the Vision and I am confident that solid progress has been made on the Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation.

Announcement of “Vientiane Vision 2.0”: Voice of Personnel Who Engaged in its Development

The MOD/SDF, announcing “Vientiane Vision,” a guideline for the Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation in 2016, has carried out initiatives to contribute to ASEAN as a whole with particular emphasis on the realization of international order based on the “rule of law” in the maritime domain. In order to amplify such efforts, “Vientiane Vision 2.0” was set forth at the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting in November 2019.

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The 5th ASEAN-Japan Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting, where “Vientiane Vision 2.0” was announced

The author during a meeting

to strengthen their Strategic Partnership underpinned by sea and democracy and reaffirmed their intention to hold a Japan-Indonesia “2+2” Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting. At the first “2+2” Meeting held in Tokyo in December of the same year, the two countries agreed to initiate negotiations over an Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, actively participate in the multilateral naval exercise (KOMODO 2016), and further advance capacity building. The Joint Statement of a Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting in January 2017 confirmed the importance of continuing dialogues between their foreign and defense authorities at various levels, including the regular Japan-Indonesia “2+2” Meeting and foreign and defense authorities’ meetings.

In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono met with Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto on the occasion of the 6th ADMM-Plus held in Thailand. At the meeting, Defense Minister Kono stated that Japan would like to promote cooperation such as port calls by vessels and aircraft, and JSDF’s participation in the multilateral naval exercise KOMODO. In response, Minister Prabowo stated that Indonesia welcomes those proposals. Both ministers agreed to further enhance defense cooperation in broad fields including this cooperation mentioned above. In December of the same year, Defense Minister Kono again met with Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto. During the meeting, they exchanged views on the defense policies of both countries and the regional situation, and agreed to promote cooperation in HA/DR, which is a shared priority area for both countries, and to continue to promote personnel exchanges in the field of education.

Similarly, at the working level, various exchanges have

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been carried out, including Politico-Military Consultation, Military-Military Consultation, and other educational and academic exchanges.

In November 2019, the SDF started HA/DR capacity building project for Indonesia, and held an HA/DR seminar for about 100 Indonesian military officials in the capital city, Jakarta. In the seminar, the SDF’s lessons in disaster response was shared so that the Indonesian officials could better understand the SDF’s capabilities and improve their disaster response capabilities.

(2) Vietnam

With Vietnam, which is a coastal country facing the South China Sea with a population of approximately 90 million, Japan has developed cooperation and exchanges between their defense authorities. At the Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting held in March 2014, the two leaders agreed to elevate the relationship between the two countries to an “Extensive Strategic Partnership.” At the Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting in May 2018, both countries confirmed that they would strengthen cooperation in the security and defense areas.

At the Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting in April 2018, the “Joint Vision Statement on Japan-Vietnam Defense Cooperation (Japan-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement)” was signed to further promote Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation and exchanges into the future. In the meeting, concerning the regional situation, both ministers exchanged opinions and called for self-restraint on militarization and other unilateral actions to change the status quo made in the South China Sea, and agreed on the importance of the peaceful conflict resolutions based on international law and the conclusion of an effective Code Of Conduct in the South China Sea at an early time.

In May 2019, then Defense Minister Iwaya visited Vietnam as Japanese defense minister for the first time in about three and a half years. In addition to a Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial meeting with Defense Minister Lích, he paid a courtesy call to Prime Minister Phúc and exchanged opinions with the Commander of the Navy Nam. At the Defense Ministerial meeting, the Ministers shared the policy to promote Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation in a broad range of fields based on the Joint Vision Statement, which was announced in 2018. Regarding the regional situation, they agreed to cooperate toward denuclearization of North Korea, shared concerns about the unilateral moves in the South China Sea to change the status quo and establish the change as a fait accompli, and agreed that Japan and Vietnam should closely work together on these issues. In addition, the Memorandum on the Orientation of Promotion of Defense Industry Cooperation was signed by the defense authorities of Japan and Vietnam at the vice-ministerial level. The two countries agreed to promote bilateral cooperation on defense equipment and technology based on this memorandum. Furthermore, at the Japan-Vietnam Leaders’ Working Lunch held in July 2019, the leaders agreed on commencing negotiations for an agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology. In November 2019, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited Vietnam to pay a courtesy visit to Defense Minister Lích and hold a vice-ministerial consultation with Vice Defense Minister Vinh to exchange views on the regional situation and on defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. Japan and Vietnam will co-chair framework of the Experts’ Working Group (EWG) in the PKO field held under the ADMM-plus from 2020 to 2023.

As for the major service-to-service exchanges, in March 2020, the Chief of Staff, JS visited Vietnam to pay a courtesy call on Defense Minister Lích. He also held talks with Chief of the General Staff Giang, agreeing to promote defense cooperation and exchanges based on the Japan-Vietnam Joint Vision and sharing their understanding of the security environment surrounding the region. In July 2019, Major General Dũng, Director of the Military Science Academy of Vietnam, and four others visited the GSDF Military Intelligence School. In October 2019, the GSDF and ASDF officials who participated in the Japan-India bilateral exercise Dharma Guardian 19 visited the Vietnamese units in Da Nang to deepen exchanges. In December, the Chief of Staff, MSDF made a visit to Vietnam and held talks with the Commander of the Vietnam People’s Navy Nam, where they agreed to strengthen relations between the two countries’ navies.

As for capacity building the ASDF held a follow-up seminar in Hanoi in August 2019 for 18 cybersecurity personnel of the People’s Army of Vietnam in order to check the retention of the cybersecurity training that had been conducted twice in the past. In December 2019, a workshop on the disposal of unexploded ordnance in water was held for about 30 officials from the Vietnam People’s Navy on board the minesweeping tender JS “Bungo,” which was in port in Da Nang. The participants were briefed by the ship’s crew on the system for the disposal of unexploded ordnance in water, which was followed by a briefing by the ship’s underwater disposers on the procedures for disposal. They were also trained on various equipment on board the ship.

It remains vital that Japan and Vietnam strengthen their relationship in order to achieve more concrete and practical cooperation, based on the memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges.
(3) Singapore
In December 2009, Singapore became the first country in Southeast Asia to sign a memorandum on defense exchanges with Japan. Since then, the cooperative relationship, including port calls, has been progressing steadily based on the memorandum. Singapore and Japan have so far conducted 15 meetings on a regular basis between their defense authorities. Moreover, the two countries actively conduct high-level defense exchanges as Japan’s Minister of Defense attends the Shangri-La Dialogue organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) almost every year to explain Japan’s security policy. In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono met with Defense Minister Ng on the occasion of the 6th ADMM-Plus. Based on Vientiane Vision 2.0, the two ministers agreed to promote cooperation, including high-level exchanges and port calls by vessels and aircraft, while also exchanging opinions on regional situations, including those of North Korea and the South China Sea. In addition, in February 2020, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited Singapore and held a meeting with Defense Permanent Secretary Chiang to exchange views on the regional situation and on bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges.

As for the major service-to-service exchanges, a delegation led by the Colonel Koh, Assistant Chief of the General Staff (training) visited Japan in July 2019 and held the 12th JGSDF-Singapore Army Staff Talks in order to share the recognition to the future program on defense cooperation and exchanges between the GSDF and the Singapore Army. As for naval exchanges, the MSDF made four port calls to Singapore during 2019 alone on the way to and back from counter-piracy operations. In May 2019, Destroyers JS “Izumo” and JS “Murasame,” which were on the Indo-Pacific Deployment, called at Singapore during the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Exercise to join IMDEX Asia 2019, a maritime and defense exhibition, which was ongoing at the moment and held an onboard reception and goodwill training. In addition, the Chief of Staff, MSDF visited Singapore to speak at IMDEX Asia 2019 in conjunction with the call of these ships. In October 2019, the Chief of Staff, ASDF made a visit to Singapore, where he met with Singapore’s Air Force Commander Khong and exchanged views on service-to-service cooperation in defense and security. Additionally, MSDF vessels have made port calls in Singapore during international cooperation operations, such as United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and counter-piracy operations. Also, service-to-service exchanges have been actively conducted.

(4) The Philippines
Between Japan and the Philippines, a coastal state in the South China Sea and an ally of the United States, there are frequent mutual visits by naval vessels, working-level exchanges including Military-Military Consultation, and service-to-service exchanges along with high-level exchanges. At the Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting between then Minister of Defense Nakatani and then Secretary of National Defense Gazmin held in January 2015, the two Ministers signed a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges. This memorandum shows the intention of the two countries to conduct cooperation in non-traditional security areas, such as maritime security, in addition to defense ministerial meetings and vice-ministerial consultations on a regular basis, reciprocal visits between the SDF Chief of Staff, JS and the Chiefs of Staff of the each SDF Service, and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commander of each service, and participation in training and exercises.

At the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting in November 2015, Prime Minister Abe and then President Aquino reached a consensus in principle on the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which was signed in February 2016.

At the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting in September 2016, Prime Minister Abe and President Duterte agreed on the transfer of MSDF TC-90 training aircraft to the Philippines in order to enhance its capabilities in HA/DR, transportation, and maritime situational awareness. Two TC-90s were delivered in March 2017 and three TC-90s in March 2018, which completed the transfer of a total of five TC-90s to the Philippine Navy.

Moreover, at the Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting between then Defense Minister Onodera and Secretary of National Defense Lorenzana held on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018, Japan confirmed that it would grant GSDF’s decommissioned UH-1H parts and maintenance equipment to the Philippine Air Force. The delivery of parts began in March 2019, and was completed in September of the same year.
At the Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting in April 2019, then Defense Minister Iwaya and Secretary of National Defense Lorenzana welcomed the progress in cooperation, including the grant of TC-90s and UH-1H parts and maintenance equipment, and its contributions to the improvement of HA/DR and surveillance capabilities of the Philippines. They also confirmed the progress in Japan-Philippines defense cooperation, including port calls, in a broad range of fields and agreed that the two countries will further strengthen defense cooperation in the future.

High-level exchanges between Japan and the Philippines have also been deepening. Following his boarding on Destroyer JS “Izumo” in June 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte came aboard Destroyer JS “Kaga,” which made a port call at the Port of Subic during the Indo-Pacific

**VOICE**

**Enhancing the Ability of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Respond to Disasters**

Major OKUNISHI Yoshikazu, Commanding Officer of the Medical Service Unit, the 4th Logistics Support Regiment, GSDF (Kasuga City, Fukuoka Prefecture)

From June 30 to July 4, 2019, I lectured in a seminar of a capacity building program for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). At the seminar I exhibited and explained about equipment of the lifesaving systems held by GSDF. The lifesaving systems were deployed to GSDF across Japan, learning from the experiences after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, and have been used in the ensuing disaster relief activities. As the leader of the five dispatched members, I provided explanations on the activities and record of the Western Army’s disaster relief, while the rest of members demonstrated how to use a variety of equipment and conducted a rescue drill simulating a disaster site.

The seminar conducted in the MSDF Destroyer JS “Izumo,” stopping in the Philippines as part of Indo-Pacific Deployment 2019 (IPD19), was a valuable opportunity of training not only for AFP personnel but also for civilian officials of the government of the Philippines. Before leaving Japan, we repeated intensive rehearsals on explanation in a limited exhibition place and time, communication in English, in particular, and how to show the equipment effectively. We also tried to provide accurate explanations because the AFP plans to introduce similar equipment.

As a result, the seminar provided a very meaningful opportunity as the trainees expressed a lot of interest in the performance, intended usage and specific use situation, and we were also able to exchange opinions on disaster relief posture and lifesaving drills. In order to contribute to effective use of the lifesaving systems in the Philippines, a country vulnerable to many natural disasters, I am willing to take any opportunity to engage in education for units to which the equipment will be deployed.
Deployment in September 2018, to meet then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Ono and exchange opinions on the bilateral relationship. In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono met with Secretary of the National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana of the Philippines at the 6th ADMM-Plus. Minister Kono stated that Japan would like to promote cooperation such as port calls by vessels and aircraft, Japan-Philippines-U.S. trilateral cooperation including JSDF’s participation in the Philippines-U.S. bilateral exercises, personnel exchanges including high-level talks and defense equipment and technology cooperation based on the “Vientiane Vision 2.0.” In response, Secretary Lorenzana stated that the Philippines welcomes these measures. Both Ministers agreed to further enhance defense cooperation in broad fields including the cooperation mentioned above. In November 2019, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited the Philippines for vice-ministerial consultations with Undersecretary of National Defense Luna to exchange views on the regional situation and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges.

With regard to the major service-to-service cooperation and exchanges, in December 2019, the Chief of Staff, JS met with then Chief of Staff Clement, Armed Forces of the Philippines at the Ministry of Defense and reaffirmed the importance of promoting FOIP and defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. In October 2019, the GSDF Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade and others participated in the Philippines-U.S. bilateral exercise “KAMANDAG 19” to improve HA/DR capabilities during the deployment of the Japan Disaster Relief Team (JDR) and to strengthen U.S.-Japan and Japan-Philippines defense cooperation. In September 2019, Destroyer JS “Asagiri” conducted bilateral exercise with the Philippine Navy at the Port of Subic Bay and the surrounding sea and airspace in the Philippines to improve tactical skills and promote mutual understanding and trust. In October 2019, two P-3C patrol aircraft participated for the first time in the U.S.-Philippines bilateral exercise Sama Sama to strengthen cooperation between Japan, the U.S., and Philippine navies. In July 2019, the ASDF Air Support Command conducted overseas flight training in C-1 to improve the ability of operation personnel to carry out overseas missions at Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base in the Philippines, and also conducted unit-to-unit exchanges with the Philippine Air Force.

As for capability building, the MSDF held an HA/DR seminar in July 2019 on the occasion of its destroyer’s port call to the Philippines during the Indo-Pacific Deployment.

(5) Thailand

With Thailand, Japan has a long history of defense cooperation and exchanges based on the traditionally good relationship between the two countries, including the commencement of the dispatch of Defense Attachés and consultations between their defense authorities from early years. As for the acceptance of foreign students at the National Defense Academy, a Thai student became the first one to be accepted in 1958. Since then, Thailand has sent the largest cumulative number of students to the academy.

Since 2005, the MOD/SDF, has been participating in the multilateral exercise Cobra Gold cohosted by the United States and Thailand. In 2020, an exercise on rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas was conducted to enhance joint operation capacities during Cobra Gold 20.

In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono met with Prime Minister and Defense Minister Prayut on the occasion of the 6th ADMM-Plus. During the meeting, Defense Minister Kono stated that Japan would like to promote cooperation such as port calls by vessels and aircraft, JSDF’s participation in the multilateral exercise Cobra Gold, and holding staff talks. In response, Minister Purayuth stated that Thailand welcomes these measures. Both ministers agreed to further enhance defense cooperation in broad fields based on the Memorandum of Arrangement between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defence of the
Kingdom of Thailand on Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defense they had signed. From February to March 2020, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited Thailand to inspect Cobra Gold 20 and meet with the Director General of the Office of Policy and Planning of the Ministry of Defense to exchange views on the regional situation and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges.

As for recent service-to-service exchanges, in March 2020, the Chief of Staff, JS visited Thailand to see Cobra Gold 20. He also paid a courtesy call on Deputy Defense Minister Chaiichan and met with Chief of Defense Forces Pornpipat to share their understanding of the regional situation and the strengthening of bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. As for army exchanges, in August 2019, the 2nd Royal Thai Army – Japan Ground Self Defense Force Staff Working Group was held to make future exchanges between the armies more concrete.

As for capacity building programs, the ASDF has implemented seminars on aviation safety and international aviation law for Thailand since 2016. In March 2018, the GSDF conducted a seminar for the Royal Thai Army, which covered the characteristics of the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) Command, engineering missions, and other matters. In June 2018, the GSDF engineering unit supported the Royal Thai Army’s preparation for PKO through training on the maintenance and management of the water purification system, which the GSDF transferred to the UN at no charge when it withdrew from the UNMISS. In March 2019, the ASDF provided capacity building in the field of aviation safety.

(6) Cambodia

In 1992, Cambodia became the first country to which Japan sent an SDF unit for UN PKO. As indicated by Japan’s capacity building for Cambodia since 2013 and other programs, defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries have made steady progress. At the Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting in December 2013, the bilateral relationship was upgraded to a “strategic partnership.” After the summit, then Defense Minister Onodera signed the Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of National Defense of the Kingdom of Cambodia. In September 2017, then Defense Minister Onodera held a ministerial meeting with Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Tea Banh. They talked on the regional situation and gave high appreciation to progress in the Japan-Cambodia defense cooperation, including capacity building and service-to-service exchanges.

As for recent service-to-service exchanges, in February 2020, the Chief of Staff, GSDF visited Cambodia and paid a courtesy call on Prime Minister Hun Sen, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Tea Banh, and Commander-in-chief of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces Vong Pisen, and met with Commander of the Royal Cambodian Army Hun Manet to share their understanding of the regional situation and the promotion of bilateral defense cooperation and exchange.

The GSDF has worked to enhance bilateral cooperation through capacity building programs, including education programs on engineering activities (to foster land survey instructors) for the engineering unit of the Royal Cambodian Forces, which were held in July 2017, May 2018, and from June to July 2019. The graduation ceremony in July 2019 was attended by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs. In conjunction with his participation in the ceremony, the Vice-Minister paid a courtesy call on Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Tea Banh and met with Secretary of State for National Defense, Ministry of National Defense Neang Phat exchange views on the regional situation and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges.

(7) Myanmar

Japan has been promoting exchanges with Myanmar since Myanmar’s transition from military rule to democratic government in March 2011, including the first visit to the country by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense and the invitation of Myanmar to participate in multilateral conferences hosted by Japan. In November 2013, the two countries’ defense authorities held their first consultation in Myanmar’s capital of Naypyidaw. In November 2014, then Defense Minister Eto held a meeting with then Defense Minister Wai Lwin of Myanmar and they confirmed their intention to promote defense exchanges, while visiting Myanmar for the Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Roundtable.
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Under the Japan-Myanmar Military Officials Exchange Program sponsored by the Nippon Foundation since 2014, general officers in Myanmar have been invited to visit SDF facilities in Japan. In October 2019, Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces Min Aung Hlaing visited the Chief of Staff, JS for the first time to confirm the promotion of defense cooperation and exchanges between the SDF and the Myanmar Armed Forces under the FOIP initiative. In the same month, during his visit to Japan, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing paid a courtesy call on Prime Minister Abe. Prime Minister Abe expressed his wish for further development of cooperation based on the long history of friendship between the Myanmar Armed Forces and the SDF, and the commander called for the SDF’s cooperation for the modernization of the Myanmar Armed Forces. In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono held a meeting with Defense Minister Sein Win on the occasion of the 6th ADMM-Plus, and they agreed to further enhance defense cooperation in broad fields and exchanged views on the regional situation.

The ASDF supported the establishment of a weather services unit within the Myanmar Air Force through a seminar in the field of aviation meteorology, which was held in October 2018 and January and September 2019. In December 2018, Japan held a seminar on underwater medicine for the Myanmar Navy. In May 2018, Japan started to assist the establishment of a learning environment of the Japanese language for the Japanese Language Department of the Defense Services Academy of Myanmar.

Since 2014, Japan and Laos have served as co-chairs of the EWG on HA/DR of the ADMM-Plus meeting, while the relationship between the two countries’ defense authorities has made significant strides through cooperation under multilateral frameworks. In November 2016, then Defense Minister Inada became the first Japanese defense minister to visit Laos, exchanging views with Minister of National Defense Lieutenant General Chansamone regarding policies for further defense cooperation, such as high-level exchanges and capacity building, and agreeing with him to promote defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. The two countries also agreed on the signing of a memorandum on bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges between the defense authorities. In December 2018, then Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited the Lao Ministry of National Defense to meet Permanent Secretary of Defense Khamsy Vongkhamsoa. In this meeting, they agreed to work together for an early signing of the memorandum.

In October 2019, Deputy Defense Minister Yamamoto met with Deputy Defense Minister Onsi, who had been invited as a special speaker at the 11th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum. After the meeting, the Memorandum between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defense of the Laos on Defense Cooperation and Exchange was signed. The two vice ministers agreed that the two countries will promote defense cooperation in a wide range of fields, including HA/DR, based on the memorandum.

As for capacity building, the GSDF provided the engineering unit and medical unit of the Royal Lao Army with practical training on HA/DR in November 2018. These units were invited to Japan for the first time in October 2019. In addition to training at a disaster response command post, they received training at the GSDF Matsumoto Camp from GSDF personnel regarding the preparation of training plans for search and rescue and sanitation. Furthermore, in November 2019, GSDF personnel were dispatched to Laos to provide guidance to the Royal Lao Army on education and training in the areas of search and rescue and sanitation.

Japan signed the agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology with Malaysia in April 2018. In September 2018, then Minister of Defense Mohamad Sabu visited Japan and signed with then Minister of Defense Onodera in the education field, following the conclusion of the Agreement on Japan-Malaysia defense cooperation and exchanges. In the Defense Ministerial Meeting held after the signing, the two Ministers confirmed their intention to make defense cooperation more concrete in various fields including service-to-service exchanges based on the memorandum. Also in December 2019, Defense Minister Kono met with then Defense Minister Mohamad on the occasion of the 19th Doha Forum in Qatar. During the meeting, Defense Minister Kono stated that Japan would like to further advance defense cooperation and exchanges with Malaysia, based on the “Vientiane Vision 2.0” that Japan had announced in November of the same year. Then Minister Mohamad welcomed the updated Vientiane Vision. Both Ministers confirmed to move forward defense equipment and technology cooperation as well as personnel exchanges in the education field, following the conclusion of the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in April 2018. In February 2020, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs also visited Malaysia to pay a courtesy call on then Deputy Defense Minister Liew Chin Tong to exchange views on the regional situation and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges.

In October 2019, the Chief of Staff, ASDF made an official visit to Malaysia and met with the then Chief of Air Force Affendi to exchange views on the strengthening of the
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As for capacity building, an HA/DR seminar was held in May 2019 on the occasion of a port call of a destroyer to Malaysia during the Indo-Pacific Deployment.

**Brunei**

Regarding Japan’s relations with Brunei, during the Second ADMM-Plus meeting held in Brunei in August 2013, then Defense Minister Onodera held talks with then Brunei’s Minister of Energy Mohammad Yasmin Umar and exchanged views on the ADMM-Plus initiatives. In March 2020, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited Brunei and paid a courtesy call on Second Minister of Defence Halbi and met with Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defense Shahril for an exchange of views on the regional situation and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. As for recent service-to-service exchanges, in February 2019, the Chief of Staff, MSDF visited Brunei to meet then Commander of the Royal Brunei Navy Norazmi Pengiran Haji Muhammad. The two leaders agreed to further strengthen the navy component relationship through mutual visits of naval ships and other activities. In addition, in February 2020, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited Brunei to pay a courtesy call on Second Minister of Defence Halbi, and they agreed to further develop bilateral defense cooperation.

**Republic of Korea (ROK)**

(1) Significance of Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

Both Japan and the ROK confront wide-ranging complex security challenges, including response to the nuclear and missile issues of North Korea, response to large-scale natural disasters, counterterrorism measures, counter piracy measures, and maritime security.

On the other hand, issues between the defense authorities of Japan and ROK are affecting bilateral defense cooperation and exchange. Examples include the ROK’s response to the MSDF’s flags\(^5\) at an international fleet review ceremony hosted by the ROK in October 2018, the irradiation of a fire control radar at an MSDF aircraft by an ROK Navy destroyer in December 2018,\(^6\) and the ROK’s response to the Japan-ROK General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). The MOD/SDF will continue to call on the ROK side to appropriately deal with these matters.

(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

a. Overview

In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono held a meeting with Minister of National Defense Jeong Kyeong-doo on the occasion of the 6th ADMM-Plus. Defense Minister Kono stated that Japan-ROK bilateral relations as well as the trilateral relations between Japan, the ROK and the U.S. are extremely significant in the severe security environment surrounding Japan and the ROK although the defense relations between the two countries have been extremely sour because of various bilateral issues since 2018. The two Ministers agreed that the two defense authorities would continue their communication.

b. Japan-ROK GSOMIA

Based on the Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement Concerning the Nuclear and Missile Threats Posed by North Korea signed in December 2014, the defense authorities in Japan and the ROK have exchanged and shared classified information regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles via the United States. In light of the increasingly serious situation surrounding North Korea with its frequently repeated ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests, in November 2016, the GSOMIA was concluded between Japan and the ROK to further promote bilateral cooperation. This agreement serves as a framework to appropriately protect classified military information shared between the Japanese and ROK governments. In August 2019, the Government of the ROK notified the Government of Japan of its intention to terminate the GSOMIA in writing. However, in November 2019, the ROK government notified Japan about the

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\(^5\) As for MSDF’s ship flag, see the MOD website [https://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/net/shiritai/flag/index.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/net/shiritai/flag/index.html)

\(^6\) In December 2018, Gwanggaeto-daewarg, the Great class destroyer of the ROK Navy, directed a fire control-radar at a MSDF patrol aircraft conducting warning and surveillance activities off the coast of Noto Peninsula (within Japan’s exclusive economic zone). Taking the incident seriously, in January 2019, the MOD published its final statement, compiling objective facts, and has been urging the Korean side to take recurrence prevention measures. The SDF patrol aircraft was flying while keeping sufficient altitude and distance, and did not fly in a way that could have threatened the Korean navy vessel. The MOD will expend all possible means to monitor the situation and gather intelligence. For details, see the MOD website [https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/radar/index.html](https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/radar/index.html).
suspension of this notification. In response, Defense Minister Kono commented that Japan-U.S. and Japan-ROK bilateral cooperation and Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation are important amid the severe security environment in East Asia, and that he considered that the ROK government made its decision from a strategic perspective taking into account the current security situation in the region.

(3) Japan-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Relationship

Since Japan, the United States, and the ROK share common interests pertaining to the peace and stability of this region, it is important for the three countries to seize opportunities to promote close cooperation in addressing various security issues, including those regarding North Korea.

Japan, the United States, and the ROK have conducted a Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue. In June 2019, then Defense Minister Iwaya, ROK Minister of National Defense Jeong Kyeong-doo, and then U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan convened the Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting. The three Ministers recognized the international community’s shared goal of North Korea’s full compliance with its international obligations in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, which call for North Korea’s complete denuclearization in a verifiable and irreversible manner. They underscored commitment to cooperation and coordination with the international community for fully implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, including sustained international cooperation to deter, disrupt, and ultimately eliminate North Korea’s illicit ship-to-ship transfers. Regarding regional security issues, the Ministers reaffirmed that freedom of navigation and overflight must be ensured, and that all disputes should be resolved in a peaceful manner in accordance with the principles of international law. Based on this view, they shared the recognition of strengthening security cooperation between Japan, the United States and the ROK. At the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting held by Defense Minister Kono, ROK Minister of National Defense Jeong Kyeong-doo, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper on the occasion of the 6th ADMM-Plus in November 2019, the three ministers committed to further trilateral security cooperation, including information sharing, high-level policy consultation, and bilateral/multilateral exercises, based on the international community’s shared goal which calls for North Korea’s complete denuclearization as well as the abandonment of ballistic missiles in a verifiable and irreversible manner, North Korea’s full compliance with its international obligations in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, and the importance of a rules-based order.

At the working level, the three countries have coordinated with each other while closely sharing information through such opportunities as Director-General and Director level meetings, video conferences, and chief-of-staff level meetings based on the framework of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT). In May 2020, a plenary meeting of Director-Generals was held in the form of a video-teleconference. The representatives of the three countries engaged in consultation on the North Korean nuclear and missile threat, regional security, the coronavirus pandemic, and substantive ways to strengthen trilateral security cooperation.

As for service-to-service exchange, the Chief of Staff, JS visited the United States in October 2019 to participate in the Japan-U.S.-ROK chiefs of staff meeting. At this meeting, the Chief of Joint Staff, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Milley, and ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Park discussed trilateral defense cooperation from the viewpoint of promoting the peace and stability of Northeast Asia. Also, in July 2019, the Chief of Joint Staff and members of the GSDF Chemical School participated in Eastern Endeavour 19, an ROK-hosted Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) training exercise held in Busan. In addition to the MOD/SDF, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the National Police Agency, and the Japan Coast Guard participated in the training along with the relevant organizations of other

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7 The provision of the GSOMIA on termination of the agreement is as follows:

ARTICLE 21 ENTRY INTO FORCE, AMENDMENT, DURATION AND TERMINATION (excerpt)

3. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of one year and shall be automatically extended annually thereafter unless either Party notifies the other in writing through the diplomatic channel ninety days in advance of its intention to terminate the Agreement.
participating countries. The training included an exercise on operational procedures for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Through this exercise, the participants strengthened cooperation and deepened mutual understanding with the relevant organizations of the other participating countries.

The three countries need to enhance their security cooperation in various areas into the future, taking advantage of various available opportunities.

5 European Countries, Canada, and New Zealand

European countries, Canada, and New Zealand share universal values with Japan and play a central role in initiatives to address common challenges to global security, with a primary focus on non-traditional security areas, such as counter-terrorism and combating illicit ship-to-ship transfers, as well as international peace cooperation activities. In this regard, promoting defense cooperation and exchanges with these countries provides the foundations for Japan to become actively involved in dealing with these challenges and this is important for all of Japan, European countries, Canada, and New Zealand.

(1) The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom, being a major power that has influence not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world, has historically maintained close relations with Japan. On the security front, Japan shares the same strategic interests as the United Kingdom, as both countries are important allies of the United States. Given this relationship, it is extremely important for Japan to promote cooperation with the United Kingdom by working together on global issues, such as international peace cooperation activities, counter-terrorism and counter-piracy operations and by exchanging information on regional situations.

With regard to Japan’s relationship with the United Kingdom, the Memorandum on Defence Cooperation was signed in June 2012. Following this, Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology came into effect in July 2013 and the Japan-U.K. Information Security Agreement entered into force in January 2014, leading to the development of a foundation for defense equipment and technology cooperation as well as information sharing between the two countries. At the Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting in May 2014, prime ministers of both countries agreed to hold a Japan-U.K. “2+2” Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting and begin negotiations on the ACSA in order to enhance bilateral cooperation in the security field. In January 2017, the Japan-U.K. ACSA was signed. After the approval by Japan’s National Diet in April 2017, the ACSA entered into force in August. At the same time, relevant domestic laws were developed.

The effectuation of the Japan-U.K. ACSA enables the two countries to implement the mutual provision of supplies and services, such as water, food, fuel and transportation, between the SDF and U.K. Armed Forces through unified procedures in bilateral exercises and large-scale disaster relief operations, further facilitating and strengthening the Japan-U.K. strategic partnership. The Japan-U.K. Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, issued during the Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting in August 2017, stipulated that the two countries agreed to develop an action plan with specific measures relating to bilateral security cooperation between the relevant authorities. At the Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting in January 2019, the leaders reaffirmed the above Declaration and confirmed that the bilateral relationship had entered the next phase. At the third Japan-U.K. “2+2” Meeting in December 2017, the two countries issued a joint statement, which referred to bilateral exercises between the GSDF and U.K. Army, British naval ships’ deployment to the Indo-Pacific region and bilateral exercises with the SDF, and progress of the joint research on new air-to-air missiles. In addition, in November 2019, Defense Minister Kono held a telephone conversation with Defense Minister Wallace. The two ministers exchanged views on bilateral

8 The ACSA applies to the following activities: (1) bilateral/multilateral exercises; (2) UN PKO; (3) internationally coordinated peace and security operations; (4) humanitarian international relief operations; (5) operations to cope with large-scale disasters; (6) protection measures for or transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas for their evacuation from overseas; (7) communication and coordination or other routine activities; and (8) any other activity in which the provision of supplies and services is permitted under the laws and regulations of the respective countries.
defense cooperation and exchanges and the security situation surrounding the two countries. In addition, Defense Minister Kono explained the SDF’s intelligence gathering activities to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East. The security cooperation between the two countries has been steadily deepening.

As for service-to-service exchanges, from September to October 2019, the GSDF Central Band supported the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Military Band in participating in the Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo hosted by the United Kingdom and held in Australia, contributing to the improvement of the band’s performance and techniques, the strengthening of the relationship between U.K., Japanese, Australian, and PNG forces, and the enhancement of Japan’s credibility in the international community. In May 2019, the SDF supported U.K. Army’s pre-dispatch training on UNMISS, which led to the first ever exchange of experts in PKO between U.K. and Japanese armies. The GSDF and U.K. Army held the bilateral exercise “Vigilant Isles” from September to October 2019 to improve their tactical skills and bilateral coordination. In October 2019, the MSDF conducted goodwill training with the Royal Navy survey vessel HMS “Enterprise.” In November 2019, the Chief of Staff, MSDF visited the United States, and on board U.K. aircraft carrier “Queen Elizabeth,” he exchanged views with the Chief of Naval Operations Gilday and First Sea Lord Radakin on the deepening of trilateral cooperation for leading the international community and maintaining maritime order. Following this talk, they issued a joint statement. In January 2020, the Chief of Staff, ASDF made a visit to the United Kingdom and exchanged views with the U.K. Chief of the Air Staff and other officials.

(2) France

France is a major power that has influence not only in Europe and Africa, but also around the world. Having its overseas territories across the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, France is the only European country that maintains a constant military presence in the Indo-Pacific region. It also historically has had a close relationship with Japan and is positioned as Japan’s special partner.

The first Japan-France “2+2” Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting was held in Paris in January 2014, followed by the visit of then Minister of the Armed Forces Le Drian to Japan in July of the same year when the Statement of Intent to promote defense cooperation and exchanges was signed. From 2015 to 2018, four “2+2” meetings were held. At these meetings, Japan and France discussed issues including the following: international terrorism, maritime security, defense equipment and technology cooperation, ACSA, bilateral exercises, cooperation in the space domain, and collaboration in capacity building in developing countries.

Following these meetings, Japan and France signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in March 2015. In March 2017, the second meeting of the Japan-France Comprehensive Dialogue on Space was held. In the meeting, Japan and France signed the “technical arrangement concerning information sharing regarding the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) between the relevant authority in Japan and the Minister of Defense of the French Republic.” In July 2018, the Japan-France ACSA was signed. After the approval by Japan’s National Diet in May 2019, the ACSA entered into force in June of the same year.

At the fifth Japan-France “2+2” Meeting and the Defense Ministerial Meeting held in Brest, France, in January 2019, the two countries—both as maritime nations and Pacific nations—decided to establish the Japan-France Comprehensive Maritime Dialogue in order to promote specific cooperative measures, especially to materialize cooperation in the maritime field, for the purpose of maintaining and reinforcing FOIP. They also welcomed the commencement of the cooperative research on the Feasibility Study For Mine Countermeasure Technological Activities, and agreed to promote bilateral exercises involving French aircraft carrier “Charles de Gaulle,” deployed in the Indian Ocean, and to collaborate in capacity building programs for Southeast Asian countries and the Pacific Island countries. Japan and France also agreed to further strengthen bilateral cooperation in the cybersecurity and space fields through the Japan-France Bilateral Consultations on Cybersecurity and the Japan-France Comprehensive Dialogue on Space. Based on this initiative, the Japan-France-Australia-U.S. multilateral exercise “La Perouse” was conducted in the Indian Ocean in May 2019 with the aircraft carrier “Charles de Gaulle.” Furthermore, Japan highly appreciated France’s decision
to dispatch ships and aircraft in the first half of the year to patrol and monitor illegal maritime activities, including illicit ship-to-ship transfers. The two countries confirmed that they would continue their close cooperation. Defense Minister Kono met with Minister of the Armed Forces Parly at the 15th Manama Dialogue in Bahrain in November 2019 and at the Munich Security Conference held in Germany in February 2020. Both ministers welcomed that Japan-France defense cooperation is advancing, and they confirmed to closely work together for the potential “2+2” meeting to be held in Tokyo. Both ministers also shared views to promote concrete cooperation as partners to promote “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”

As for major service-to-service exchanges, the SDF has participated in the HA/DR exercises (“Equateur”) hosted by the French Armed Forces stationed in New Caledonia since 2014. In August 2018, an MSDF training squadron conducted goodwill training with French reprenishment oiler “Somme” in Brest. In September 2018, the Naval Chiefs of Staff of the two countries signed the Strategic Orientation agreeing to strengthen bilateral cooperation not only in the Pacific region, but also in the Indian Ocean. In addition, in August 2019, an MSDF training squadron and the French Navy held a goodwill exercise off the coast of French Polynesia. Furthermore, in June 2019, C-2 transport aircraft participated in the Paris Air Show for the first time. In January 2020, the Chief of Staff, ASDF made a visit to France and exchanged views with the Chief of Staff of the French Air Force. In May 2020, the two chiefs signed the Strategic Orientation and agreed to strengthen cooperation between two air forces.

(3) Canada

Between Japan and Canada, high-level exchanges, talks between defense authorities, and other exchanges have been conducted, with the Japan-Canada ACSA signed in April 2018, and entering into force in July 2019 after gaining approval by Japan’s National Diet in May 2019. At the fourth Japan-Canada “2+2” Foreign and Defense Vice-Ministerial meeting held in December 2018, both sides reaffirmed that they would promote further cooperation.

In June 2019, which marked the 90th anniversary of Japan-Canada diplomatic relations, then Defense Minister Iwaya held the first Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting in three years with Canadian Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan. It was the first official visit to Japan by Canadian Defence Minister in 13 years. At the meeting, the ministers welcomed the deepening of the two countries’ relationship, including the signing of the Japan-Canada ACSA and cooperation in warning and surveillance activities against illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea. They agreed that in particular, the MSDF and the Canadian Navy will take various opportunities to conduct bilateral exercises. They also agreed to work out the specifics of cooperation in the field of peacekeeping. The ministers also exchanged views on the regional situation, including issues related to the Korean Peninsula and the East and South China Seas. After the meeting, the ministers announced a joint statement that serves as a concrete guideline for the promotion of future defense cooperation. This was the first joint statement to be issued by the defense authorities of Japan and Canada. In February 2020, Defense Minister Kono met with Defence Minister Sajjan on the occasion of his attendance at the 56th Munich Security Conference. At the meeting, the Ministers welcomed the progress in bilateral defense cooperation in various fields, reviewed recent bilateral cooperation and exchanges, and agreed to foster cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.

As for major service-to-service exchanges, the Chief of Staff, GSDF made a visit to Canada for the first time in October 2019, where he met with the Commander of the Canadian Army Eye. In June 2019, the destroyers JS “Izumo,” JS “Murasame,” and JS “Akebono” conducted the bilateral exercise KADEX19-1 with the Canadian
Navy ships HMCS “Regina” and MV “Asterix” in the sea and airspace off the coast of Vietnam. In October 2019, the destroyers JS “Shimakaze” and JS “Chokai,” and the Canadian Navy ship HMCS “Ottawa,” conducted the bilateral exercise KAEDEX19-2 in the sea and airspace south of the Kanto region to improve tactical skills and strengthen cooperation. In February 2020, Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force Meinzinger visited Japan to meet with the Chief of Staff, ASDF and the Commander of the Air Defense Command. They agreed to strengthen cooperation between the air forces in light of the recent developments in the relationship between the Japanese and Canadian defense authorities.

(4) New Zealand

In relation to New Zealand, a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges was signed in August 2013. During a Summit Meeting in July 2014, the two countries agreed to conduct studies on an ACSA. In addition, at the Summit Meeting in September 2019, the two leaders shared the view that two countries will commence a joint study toward negotiations for an agreement on security information sharing. In June 2019, then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Suzuki visited New Zealand and paid a courtesy call to Defence Minister Ron Mark. They exchanged opinions on bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges and the defense policies of both countries. Concerning warning and surveillance activities against illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea, they agreed to continue to work together. In November 2019, Defence Minister Kono met with Defence Minister Mark on the occasion of the 6th ADMM-Plus. Defence Minister Kono expressed gratitude for New Zealand’s deployment of a patrol aircraft to collect evidence of North Korea’s “ship-to-ship” transfers, which is the second deployment by the country following on from a deployment in 2018. He added that he would like to continue to foster relations with New Zealand. The ministers welcomed active high-level exchanges between the two defense authorities. Also, they expressed their strong willingness in pursuing possibilities of bilateral cooperation on Pacific island countries. In addition, the ministers exchanged views on regional situation in Oceania, including Pacific island countries and New Zealand.

As for service-to-service exchanges, Chief of the New Zealand Army Boswell visited Japan in September 2019. In November 2019, Chief of Air Force Clark visited Japan. In December 2019, the three countries of Japan, the United States, and Australia held a multilateral HA/DR exercise “Christmas Drop” for the first time with the participation of New Zealand.

(5) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

When Prime Minister Abe visited Europe in May 2014, he held a meeting with then NATO Secretary General Rasmussen at NATO Headquarters and signed the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) (revised in May 2018). Based on the IPCP, SDF personnel were dispatched to NATO Headquarters for the first time in December 2014 as part of the Japan-NATO cooperation in the field of women, peace and security. Furthermore, the MOD/ SDF has participated in the annual meeting of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP) since 2015. In addition, from December 2019, an ASDF Lieutenant Colonel has been assigned to the NATO Headquarters Consultation, Command and Control Staff (NHQC3S) as staff responsible for managing information and communications for various NATO policies and projects. The MOD also sent a liaison officer to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in February 2017 and a liaison officer to the NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM) in June 2019. In July 2018, the Mission of Japan to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was established as an additional role of the Embassy of Japan in Belgium.

In the cyber field, since March 2019, the MOD official
has been dispatched to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). In December 2019, Japan participated for the first time in the NATO cyber defense exercise Cyber Coalition 2019 in Estonia. In February 2020, Defense Minister Kono held a meeting with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg at the 56th Munich Security Conference, where they welcomed the progress of cooperation between Japan and NATO, especially in the fields of cyber and maritime security, and exchanged views on regional security issues.

(6) Other European Countries
Japan and Germany signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in July 2017. In the same month, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited Germany for the first Japan-Germany defense vice-ministerial strategic dialogue, indicating progress in high-level and other bilateral exchanges.

In February 2019, Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel visited Japan for the Japan-Germany Summit Meeting. In this meeting, the two leaders welcomed that the negotiations to conclude an agreement on the security of information reached an agreement in principle, and affirmed that they would seize this opportunity to promote bilateral security and defense cooperation. In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono held a telephone conversation with Defence Minister Kramp-Karrenbauer to exchange views on bilateral defense exchanges and the security situation surrounding the two countries. He also explained the SDF’s information gathering activities to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East. In February 2020, Defense Minister Kono met Defence Minister Kramp-Karrenbauer at the 56th Munich Security Conference, where both ministers shared the view that they would promote concrete cooperation to realize the vision of a FOIP, and exchanged views on issues such as security situations in the Indo-Pacific region.

Japan and Italy have been promoting institutional development for facilitating defense cooperation and exchanges, including the entry into force of the Japan-Italy Information Security Agreement in June 2016 and the signing of the Agreement concerning the Transfer of the Defense Equipment and Technology in May 2017 that came into force in April 2019. In September 2018, then Minister of Defense Onodera visited Italy for a bilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting with the Italian Minister of Defence Elisabetta Trenta. In the meeting, the two ministers agreed to further strengthen bilateral coordination in maritime security. In addition, in January 2020, the Chief of Staff, ASDF made his first visit to Italy, exchanging views with the Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force and others on the regional situation and defense policy.

Spanish Defense Minister De Cospedal visited Japan in January 2018 for a Japan-Spain defense ministerial meeting, where the Japanese and Spanish ministers agreed to further enhance the relationship between the two countries’ defense authorities based on the memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges signed in November 2014.

The then Netherlands’ Minister of Defence Hennis-Plasschaert visited Japan in December 2016 for a Japan-Netherlands defense ministerial meeting, where the two ministers signed a memorandum regarding defense cooperation and exchanges. In September 2018, then Minister of Defense Onodera visited the Netherlands for the Japan-Netherlands Defense Ministerial Meeting with Deputy Prime Minister of the Netherlands Carola Schouten. In the meeting, the two ministers exchanged opinions on cooperation under the frameworks of the NATO and the European Union (EU). In addition, then Minister of Defense Onodera explained the situation of the illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea and stressed the importance of implementing strict sanctions on these illicit practices under the UN Security Council Resolutions. It was agreed that the Netherlands would work closely with Japan on this matter, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and the then chair of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea.

In September 2018, Estonian Minister of Defence Jüri Luik visited Japan for the bilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting. Based on what was discussed during Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Estonia in January 2018, Japan and Estonia agreed to deepen cooperation in cybersecurity through bilateral and multilateral efforts, which includes the dispatch of the Japanese MOD officials to the NATO CCDCOE.

Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defence Anatolii Petrenko visited Japan in October 2018. During this visit, a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges was signed and the Japan-Ukraine Security Meeting was held. In February 2020, Defense Minister Kono held the first defense ministerial meeting with Defence Minister Zahorodniuk at the 56th Munich Security Conference. Defense Minister Kono stated that Japan consistently respects Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and that Japan’s position is that it will not accept any attempt to change the status quo by coercion. Both ministers affirmed the importance of bilateral defense cooperation, and shared the view that they would materialize various cooperation based on the Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges that they signed in 2018. Both ministers exchanged views on issues such as security situations surrounding both countries.

In February 2019, then Finnish Minister of Defence Jussi Niinistö visited Japan. During this visit, a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges was signed and the
Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting was held. The two countries agreed to further deepen bilateral defense cooperation in various fields, building upon the recent development of bilateral defense exchanges.

With Denmark, Defense Minister Kono held a telephone conversation with Defense Minister Bramsen in October 2019, where they exchanged views on bilateral defense exchanges and the security situation surrounding both countries. In addition, Defense Minister Kono explained the SDF’s intelligence gathering activities to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East.

In February 2020, at the 56th Munich Security Conference, Minister of Defense Kono held talks with EU High Representative Borrell, where they welcomed that the cooperation is advancing especially in the field of maritime security, and shared the view that they would continue to promote concrete defense cooperation and exchanges. They exchanged views on issues such as security situations in the Indo-Pacific region.

6 China

(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China

A stable relation between Japan and China is an essential factor for the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. From broad and medium- to long-term perspectives, it is necessary for both countries to strive to build and enhance the “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests with China” in all areas, including security.

In the security field, in order to enhance mutual understanding and trust, the MOD/SDF will promote multi-layered dialogues and exchanges with China. In doing so, Japan will continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, comply with international norms of conduct, and improve transparency regarding military capability enhancement in the context of its rapidly increasing defense budget. Moreover, in order to avoid unexpected situations, Japan will utilize the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China in a manner that contributes to building a trusting relationship between the two countries.

(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchanges

Japan-China defense exchanges stagnated following the Japanese government’s acquisition of ownership of the three Senkaku Islands (Uotsurijima Island, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island) in September 2012, but have gradually resumed since the latter half of 2014.

In November 2015, Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting was held for the first time in four years and five months on the margins of the ADMM-Plus meeting between then Japanese Defense Minister Nakatani and then Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan. In addition, in June 2019, following the Defense Ministerial Meeting held during the previous year’s ADMM-Plus, then Defense Minister Iwaya and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe held a meeting during the Shangri-La Dialogue, where both ministers shared the recognition of the importance to realize the mutual visits between the Japanese Defense Minister and the Chinese Defense Minister as soon as possible. Based on this shared understanding, in December 2019, Defense Minister Kono visited China for the first time in 10 years as defense minister. At this meeting with Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, Defense Minister Kono conveyed his concerns about the activities of the Chinese military regarding the situation in the East China Sea, including the sea and airspace around the Senkaku Islands. Defense Minister Kono also strongly urged a positive response from the Chinese side. The ministers then welcomed the steady progress of exchanges for mutual understanding and trust between the defense authorities of Japan and China, agreeing to continue such efforts between the two countries. In March 2015, the 13th Japan-China Security Dialogue took place in Tokyo, with the two countries’ diplomatic and defense authorities participating. It was the first such meeting in four years. This Dialogue has been held almost every year since then. In addition, the Japanese and Chinese defense authorities have also participated in the Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs. The eleventh consultation was held in Hokkaido in May 2019.

As for service-to-service exchanges, in April 2019, Destroyer JS “Suzutsuki” visited China, as the first MSDF ship to do so in about seven and a half years, and participated in the International Fleet Review held by China to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy. In the same month, the Chief of Staff, MSDF, who visited China for the first time in about five and
a half years, attended a high-level symposium held on the sideline of the Fleet Review. On this occasion, the MSDF Chief of Staff conveyed the importance of free and open seas. Following this, in October 2019, the Chinese navy guided-missile destroyer “Taiyuan” became the first Chinese naval vessel to visit Japan in about 10 years, and conducted the third goodwill training with an SDF destroyer, which was the first such training in about eight years.

As for unit-to-unit exchanges, a delegation from the Eastern Theater Command, headed by the deputy commander, visited Japan in November 2018, followed by a delegation from the SDF, led by the Western Army commanding General, visiting the Eastern Theater Command and other areas in November 2019. In 2018, the Japan-China field-grade officer exchange program hosted by Japan’s Sasakawa Peace Foundation was held for the first time in six years. In April 2018 and September 2019, the Chinese delegation consisting of field-grade officers of the People’s Liberation Army visited Japan, in addition, the Japanese delegation consisting of field-grade officers of the SDF visited China in September 2018 and April 2019. The Japanese delegate paid courtesy calls to important persons and visited military units etc.

In efforts to build a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,” Japan and China must strive to promote confidential relations and mutual understanding through dialogue at various levels in various areas and must proactively step up concrete cooperation and exchange in non-traditional security areas, such as counter-piracy measures.

**VOICE**

*Voice of SDF Personnel Who Participated in the International Fleet Review to Commemorate the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy*

**Captain MOTOMURA Shingo, Escort Division 8 Commander, MSDF**

As Escort Division 8 Commander, I commanded Destroyer JS “Suzutsuki” and participated in the International Fleet Review during the FY2018 ocean training exercise (flight). The review was held by China to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy. This was a large-scale event reviewed by President Xi Jinping and with the participation of approximately 30 Chinese military vessels, including aircraft carrier “Liaoning,” and approximately 20 aircraft, as well as 18 military vessels from 13 countries. When participating in the fleet review, Destroyer JS “Suzutsuki” had an opportunity to call at Qingdao of Shandong. The opening of the destroyer to the public at the place was enormously popular, attracting many Qingdao citizens.

It is very meaningful that a destroyer of MSDF visited China for the first time in approximately seven-and-a-half years and participated for the first time in a fleet review held by the Chinese Navy. The fact that the maritime exchange between the MSDF and the Chinese Navy was resumed with the participation in the fleet review was very gratifying for me, as I had served as Defense Attache to China. In October 2019, guided missile destroyer “Taiyuan” of the Chinese Navy became the first Chinese military vessel to call at Japan in approximately 10 years, and goodwill training with a MSDF destroyer was implemented for the first time in approximately eight years. I think that continued Japan-China maritime exchange will lead to the promotion of mutual understanding and trust.
(3) Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China

At Japan-China Summit Meetings in January and April 2007, then Japanese Prime Minister Abe and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao agreed to develop a mechanism for communications, particularly maritime communications, between the two countries’ defense authorities. Based on the agreement, their defense authorities held the first Joint Working Group Meeting on the mechanism in April 2008 and accumulated talks. From the fourth Joint Working Group Meeting in January 2015, diplomatic authorities of both countries joined the negotiations.

After the eighth meeting of the Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs in December 2017 and the seventh Joint Working Group Meeting in April 2018, Japanese and Chinese defense authorities signed the memorandum on the mechanism in the presence of Japanese Prime Minister Abe and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang on the occasion of the Japan-China Summit Meeting in Tokyo in May 2018, and the operation of this mechanism commenced on June 8, 2018.

The “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China” has been developed (1) to promote mutual understanding and confidence between Japan and China and to enhance bilateral defense cooperation and exchange; (2) to avoid unexpected collisions; and (3) to prevent unforeseen circumstances in the sea and air from developing into military clashes or political or diplomatic issues. The mechanism’s main components include (1) annual and expert meetings between the two countries’ defense authorities; (2) a hotline between Japanese and Chinese defense authorities; and (3) on scene communication measures between vessels and aircraft of the SDF and the People’s Liberation Army.

Under the mechanism, the first annual and expert meetings were held between the defense authorities in December 2018, and the second annual and experts’ meetings were held in January 2020, to exchange views on the maritime security policies of the two countries, the operational status and improvement of the mechanism, as well as to coordinate the establishment of a hotline. At the Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting in December 2019, the ministers also confirmed that the mechanism has been operating appropriately since its inception and has played an important role in building trust between the defense authorities of Japan and China and avoiding contingencies in the field. The ministers also agreed to accelerate efforts to establish the hotline as soon as possible.

7 Russia

(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchange with Russia

Given that Russia is a key security player in the Indo-Pacific region and an important country neighboring Japan, it is very important for Japan to promote confidential relations with Russia through bilateral defense exchanges. As Japan-Russia relations have continuously been developing in a wide range of areas, the MOD/SDF has continuously conducted Japan-Russia “2+2” Meetings and various dialogues with Russian defense authorities according to the Memorandum on Japan-Russia Defense Exchanges signed in 1999 (revised in 2006), annual meetings based on the Japan-Russia Agreement on Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, and bilateral search and rescue exercises.

The Government of Japan deals with the relationships with Russia appropriately while emphasizing the solidarity of the G7 (Group of Seven), taking the Ukrainian situation and other factors into account. At the same time, it is important to maintain constant contacts with Russia, as one of Japan’s neighbors, at the working level to avoid unforeseen circumstances or unnecessary conflicts. The MOD considers these points in a comprehensive manner and advances defense exchanges with Russia accordingly.

(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchanges

At the Japan-Russia Summit Meeting in April 2013, the two leaders affirmed the importance of expanding
cooperation between Japan and Russia in the field of security and defense and agreed to set up the Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting, where the two countries’ defense and foreign ministers participate. At the first Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting in November 2013, the two countries agreed to conduct service-to-service unit exchanges between army branches and the mutual dispatch of exercise observers on a regular basis, and bilateral exercises of counter-piracy units of the MSDF and Russian Navy in the Gulf of Aden, as well as the regular Japan-Russia Cybersecurity Meeting. At the second Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting in March 2017, the two countries exchanged opinions regarding the regional situations among others. Concerning the activities of the Russian Armed Forces, the Japanese side protested against enhancing armaments, including the deployment of surface-to-ship missiles on the Northern Territories and the deployment of divisions on islands that may contain the Four Northern Islands. Japan expressed regret that these activities conflicted with Japan’s stance that the Northern Territory is an inherent part of the territory of Japan.

In July 2018, then Minister of Defense Onodera became the first Japanese Minister of Defense to pay a visit to Russia. He joined the Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting and the Defense Ministerial Meeting. In these meetings, Japan and Russia agreed on promoting bilateral defense exchanges, including a visit by the Chief of Staff, JS to Russia and mutual visits of naval ships, as well as on cooperation towards the denuclearization of North Korea, which has been a shared goal for the two countries.

In May 2019, the Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting and the fourth Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting were held in Tokyo. Regarding defense exchange, the Ministers agreed on the first participation by the GSDF Central Band in an international military music festival in Russia held in the summer of 2019. Regarding defense policy, the Japanese side explained that Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system is a purely defensive one and does not pose a threat to Russia.

As for service-to-service exchanges, following a visit to Russia by the Chief of Staff, GSDF in May 2019, from August to September of the same year, the GSDF band participated for the first time in the 12th Spasskaya Tower International Military Music Festival in Moscow, deepening mutual understanding and trust between JGSDF and Russian armies. In December 2019, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy Yevmenov was invited to Japan. This was the first visit to Japan by a commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy in 18 years. This promoted mutual understanding and confidence building between the two navies.

In January 2020, the SDF conducted its second bilateral counter-piracy exercise with Russian naval vessels in the Gulf of Aden.

Pacific Island countries are important countries that share the importance of a free, open, and sustainable maritime order based on the rule of law as maritime nations, as well as bear strong historical relationships with Japan. At the eighth Pacific Alliance Leaders Meeting (PALM8) held in 2018, Japan expressed its intention to strengthen its commitment to the stability and prosperity of the region. In addition, the NDPG published in the same year referred for the first time to Japan’s intention to promote cooperation and exchanges with Pacific Island countries. From January to February 2020, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited Fiji, PNG, and Tonga, three Pacific island countries with armed forces, for the first time as a political officer of the Ministry of Defense, and held talks with the defense ministers and other officials of each country. In all of these high-level talks, he exchanged views on a wide range of topics in defense cooperation and exchange, and confirmed their will for further promoting it in the future.

Since 2015, Japan has cooperated and strengthened the bilateral relationship with PNG with regard to establishing and training a military band through a capacity building program. After about three years and five months of training, the band gave an excellent performance of the tunes Port Moresby and Kimigayo on the occasion of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in front of the national leaders in November 2018. When the Chief of Staff, GSDF visited PNG for the first time in March 2019, Commander of the PNG Defence Force Gilbert Toropo expressed his appreciation for the capacity building Japan had provided. The two leaders shared the view that they continue to promote defense cooperation and exchanges in the future.

From September to October 2019, the SDF provided guidance on performance and techniques to the PNG Military Band, which participated in the Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo, a military music festival hosted by the United Kingdom and held in Australia.

In addition to these efforts, the MSDF and ASDF have strengthened Japan’s relationships with Pacific Island
countries by calling at ports and airports. Since 2015, the ASDF has conducted the multilateral humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise Christmas Drop in the Federated States of Micronesia. In the airdrop exercises, Japan has also dropped various donations to the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, and the Northern Mariana Islands. In October 2019, the ASDF U-4 transport aircraft and the JMSDF Training Squadron called at the Republic of Palau. The GSDF also took this opportunity to visit the Republic of Palau, and the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF officers participated in the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and Palau. Following this visit to the Republic of Palau, the U-4s made its first call to the Federated States of Micronesia, where they handed over donated wheelchairs. As part of the Pacific Partnership 2019 led by the United States Pacific Fleet, the MOD/SDF personnel were sent to the Marshall Islands to conduct cultural exchanges, including medical activities and musical performances.

Moreover, in November 2019, transport aircraft C-130H called at the Republic of the Marshall Islands International

**Voice**

**Voice of the First Official Trip to Pacific Island Countries by State Minister of Defense, One of the political officers of the MOD and Support Staff**

Defense Official HORIMOTO Kumiko, International Policy Division, Bureau of Defense Policy, Internal Bureau, MOD

Pacific Island countries are 14 countries located at the center of the South Pacific Ocean. Their importance has also been increasing from the strategic viewpoint. Three of them, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga have their own military forces. State Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited all three countries from January to February of 2020. This was the first visit to these countries by one of the political officers of the MOD and could send a clear message of our intent to strengthen the relationship with the defense authorities of the Pacific Island countries.

As a person in charge of promoting defense cooperation and exchange with Pacific Island countries, I engaged in preparation for the meeting with the ministers of defense held in the countries and planning of an entire program including inspection of troops. I also attended the State Minister and assisted him and served as his interpreter at the meetings. On the day of our visit to Fiji, the country was hit by a cyclone, but the Minister for Defence, National Security and Foreign Affairs Seruiratu swiftly arranged a change of venue to make the meeting possible.

I am delighted that through these visits we could build face-to-face relationships at a high level as the first step to promote further defense cooperation and exchange.

Meeting with the Minister for Defence, National Security, and Foreign Affairs of Fiji (The author is to the left, in the second row)

Defense Minister of Tonga and State Minister of Defense Yamamoto

Papua New Guinea military band and the Japanese Delegation (The author is at the left end of the front row)

**Video:** Joint HA/DR exercise Christmas Drop in the Federal States of Micronesia, Republic of Palau, and Commonwealth of Northern Marianas

**URL:** https://youtu.be/t-7o82vZHAs
Airport on the sidelines of an exercise in the United States. As an inter-agency cooperation project with the MOFA, the ASDF transported materials for dengue fever countermeasures (mosquito nets and repellents, etc.) at the request of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, in light of the epidemic in the region. In addition, in August 2019, Destroyer JS “Ise” and amphibious transport dock ship JS “Kunisaki” called at Port Moresby, and between August and September of the same year, MSDF training ship JS “Kashima” and escort ship JS “Inazuma” called at the port of Suva, Fiji and the port of Rabaul, PNG, to conduct various goodwill events.

Since peace and stability in the Middle East are extremely important for the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan, the MOD/SDF have been promoting high-level exchanges and unit-to-unit exchanges in order to build and strengthen cooperative relationships with countries in the region.

Japan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have promoted deeper bilateral defense exchanges. The two countries signed a memorandum on defense exchanges in May 2018, and held a meeting between defense authorities in December 2018. In addition, in June 2019, the Chief of Staff, JS made a visit to the UAE as the first Chief of Joint Staff of Japan, and paid a courtesy call to, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed. He also held a meeting with Lieutenant General Hamad Mohammed Thani Al Rumaithi, chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and agreed to promote defense cooperation and exchanges in a broad range of fields. In October 2019 and March 2020, Defense Minister Kono held a telephone conversation with Minister of State for Defense Affairs Bowardi, in which they exchanged views on bilateral defense exchanges and regional issues. The SDF sent a C-2 transport aircraft to the Dubai Air Show in November 2019. In January 2020, Prime Minister Abe visited the UAE and met Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed to exchange views and explain Japan’s efforts to ensure the safety of navigation of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East, gaining his support for such efforts.

Japan and Israel held the first politico-military dialogue in October 2018. This was held in accordance with the agreement reached during Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Israel in May 2018. In the first meeting, the leaders exchanged opinions on a wide range of topics, from regional situations to security issues. In November 2018, the fourth Dialogue on Cyber Issues between Japan and Israel was held. In addition, in June 2019, the Chief of Staff, JS visited Israel for the first time as a Chief of Joint Staff of Japan. In September 2019, the defense authorities signed Memorandum on Protection of Information for the Exchange of Classified Information on Defense Equipment and Technology between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defense of the State of Israel. Through these efforts, Japan and Israel have strengthened their relationship in the security field.

At the Japan-Iran Summit in December 2019, Prime Minister Abe gave a detailed explanation of Japan’s efforts to ensure the safety of the navigation of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East. In addition, in October 2019 and January 2020, Defense Minister Kono held the first defense ministerial telephone conversation with Defense and Logistics Minister Hatami, in which the two ministers exchanged views on the regional situation and other issues. During the January telephone conversation, Defense Minister Kono explained the SDF’s information gathering activities to ensure the safety of Japanese vessels in the Middle East.

Then State Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited Egypt in September 2017, marking the first visit by one of the political officers of the MOD. Moreover, in June 2019, the Chief of Staff, JS visited the country, and held a meeting with Lieutenant General Mahmoud Ibrahim Mahmoud Hegazy, Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces.

In March 2019, Minister Responsible for Defense Affairs Sayyid Badr visited Japan and met then Minister of Defense Iwaya and signed a memorandum on defense exchanges. In October 2019, Defense Minister Kono held a telephone conversation with Minister Responsible for Defense Affairs Badr. In December 2019, Defense Minister Kono visited Oman for the first time as a defense minister and met with Minister Responsible for Defense Affairs Badr. Both ministers confirmed to continue deepening defense cooperation and exchanges such as cooperation between the naval services under the FOIP vision. In January 2020, Prime Minister Abe visited Oman to exchange views with the new King Haitham and directly briefed him on Japan’s efforts to ensure the safety of navigation of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East, gaining his support for such efforts.

Japan and Qatar signed a memorandum on defense exchanges in February 2015. In May 2019, Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Attiyah visited Japan and the first defense ministers meeting was held between Minister Attiyah and then Defense Minister Iwaya. In October 2019, a telephone conversation was held between Defense Minister Kono and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defense Affairs Attiyah, where the two ministers exchanged views on bilateral defense exchanges. In December 2019, Defense Minister Kono attended the 19th Doha Forum hosted by Qatar for the first time as a defense minister and met with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
of State for Defense Affairs Attiyah. At the meeting, both Ministers welcomed that Japan-Qatar defense cooperation and exchanges are moving forward, and confirmed to continue deepening defense cooperation and exchanges in areas such as education and training.

Japan signed a memorandum on defense exchanges with Saudi Arabia in September 2016. In addition, in October and December 2019, telephone conversations were held between Defense Minister Kono and Crown Prince and Minister of Defense Mohammed. The two parties exchanged views on bilateral defense exchanges and regional developments. Defense Minister Kono also explained the SDF’s information gathering activities to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East. In January 2020, Prime Minister Abe visited Saudi Arabia to exchange views with King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed, and explained and gained their support for Japan’s efforts to ensure the safety of navigation of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East.

Japan’s then Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense signed a Statement of Intent to promote defense cooperation and exchanges with Turkey’s then Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defense Ümit Dündar in July 2012 during their talk. In June 2019, Commander of the Turkish Land Forces General Ümit Dündar visited Japan, held a meeting with the Chief of Staff, GSDF, and paid a courtesy call to State-Minister of Defense of Japan. In July 2019, Defense Minister Akar accompanied the president to Japan for the G20 and held talks with then Defense Minister Iwaya.

With Bahrain, Defense Minister Kono held a telephone conversation with the Commander in Chief of Bahrain Defense Force Khalifa to exchange views on bilateral defense exchange and the situation in the Middle East. In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono met with Commander Khalifa on the occasion of the 15th Manama Dialogue held in Bahrain. This was the first ministerial-level meeting between defense authorities of the two countries. At the meeting, both sides agreed to continue high-level exchanges as well as exchanges of mainly naval services.

Between Japan and Jordan, a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges was signed when Jordanian King Abdullah II visited Japan in October 2016. In November 2018, the King visited Japan and welcomed the steady progress concerning the defense authorities meetings and unit-to-unit exchanges during then Minister of Defense Iwaya’s courtesy visit to him and during his visit to the GSDF units of Camp Narashino. In addition, Defense Minister Kono, who visited Jordan for the first time as defense minister in December 2019, met with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lieutenant General Yousef Huneiti. During the meeting, Lt Gen Huneiti stated that bilateral defense exchanges are making progress such as the first politico-military dialogue being held for the first time in July 2019, and also stated that he would like to continue advancing cooperation in areas such as training and equipment. In response, Minister Kono stated that he would like to consider cooperation in the fields raised by Lt Gen Huneiti.

10 South Asian Countries

See Reference 42 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with South Asian Countries (Past Three Years))

(1) Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is an important country located at a key point on the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean. In recent years, Japan has proactively worked to strengthen bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges with Sri Lanka. In August 2018, then Defense Minister Onodera made the first visit to Sri Lanka as a Japanese Defense Minister. During this visit, the first-ever Defense Ministerial Meeting between the two countries was also held between then Defense Minister Onodera and then Sri Lankan State Minister of Defence Ruwan Wijewardene, in which they exchanged their opinions on maritime security and safety. The Sri Lankan State Minister of Defense also expressed the country’s hope to improve the capabilities of the Sri Lanka Armed Forces as a whole through capacity building of the three military services in the HA/DR field, for which then Defense Minister Onodera expressed his support. In July 2019, then State Minister of Defense Harada visited Sri Lanka for a meeting with then State Minister of Defence Wijewardene and paid a courtesy call on then President and Minister of Defence Sirisena to share their views on the need to further strengthen the partnership between the maritime states of Sri Lanka and Japan to promote FOIP.

As for service-to-service exchanges, the naval forces of the two countries agreed to hold the first staff consultations in February 2019, and to conduct the bilateral HA/DR exercise JA-LAN on an annual basis. In March 2019, a U-4 made a call at the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport to conduct
unit-to-unit exchanges with the Sri Lankan Air Force.

As for capacity building, in October 2019, six members of the Sri Lankan Air Force were invited to training in search and rescue provided by the ASDF air rescue unit. The invitees boarded the U-125A and UH-60J operated by the Naha Air Rescue Squadron and underwent a series of training such as the search, detection and rescue of search targets at sea.

(2) Pakistan
Located at the junction of South Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia, Pakistan is an important state for stability in the Indo-Pacific region, and it faces an important sea lane for Japan. Pakistan is a pro-Japanese country that has traditionally had a friendly relationship with Japan. Building on this relationship, the two countries have promoted defense cooperation and exchanges.

Since 2004, Japan and Pakistan have conducted Director-General level dialogues on defense policy on a biennial basis. However, in June 2019, the two countries held a Military-to-Military Talks for the second year in a row, in which they signed Memorandum on Japan-Pakistan Defense Cooperation and Exchange. In February 2019, Deputy Chief of Joint Staff visited Pakistan and held meetings with senior Pakistani military officials.

As for service-to-service exchanges, the MSDF participated in AMAN, a multinational exercise by Pakistan, while also conducting educational exchanges.

11 African countries

With Djibouti, the only country where an overseas SDF facility is located, the MOD/SDF has been cooperating in counter-piracy operations. The facility was used for transporting goods to the unit dispatched to the UNMISS. From October to December 2019, the facility was used as an accommodation for SDF instructors that attended a training program for Djibouti’s military engineers on the operation of heavy machinery, which was conducted as part of Japan’s disaster response capacity building for Djibouti. In December 2019, Defense Minister Kono visited Djibouti and held a meeting with Defense Minister Burhan. At the meeting, the two ministers confirmed that they would continue to strengthen cooperation between the defense authorities in order to deepen bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. Minister Kono also expressed his appreciation for the government’s support for the operation of the SDF’s facility in Djibouti, and explained the use of fixed-wing patrol aircraft of the SDF’s counter-piracy unit based in Djibouti for information gathering activities to ensure the safety of Japanese vessels in the Middle East.

Japan will work on the stable, long-term use of this facility for security cooperation in the Middle East and Africa.

12 Latin American Countries

In December 2016, Japan and Colombia signed a memorandum on defense exchanges.

From April to May 2018, then State Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited Brazil for talks with then Brazilian Defense Minister Silva e Luna. In addition, in July 2019, General Pujol made his first visit to Japan as Commander of the Brazilian Army and met with the Chief of Staff, GSDF. In the meeting, they agreed that deepening defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries is important for peace and stability in the international community.

With Jamaica, in December 2019, Prime Minister and Defense Minister Holness visited Japan and met with Defense Minister Kono.
Chapter 3
Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation

1 Multilateral Security Framework and Dialogue Initiatives

Multilateral framework initiatives, especially the ADMM-Plus and the ARF, have made steady progress and served as an important foundation for dialogue and cooperation and exchanges on the security of Asia Pacific. Japan puts importance on such multilateral frameworks and intends to strengthen cooperation and mutual confidence with countries in the region. Moreover, Japan hosts the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum and the Tokyo Defense Forum annually, which contribute to the multilateral defense cooperation.

Reference 44 (Record of Multinational Security Dialogues [Indo-Pacific Region; Past Three Years])
Reference 45 (Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the MOD)
Reference 46 (Other Multilateral Security Dialogues)

(1) Initiatives under the ADMM-Plus

The ASEAN member states hold the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), a ministerial level meeting among defense authorities in the ASEAN region, and the ADMM-Plus comprising the ASEAN member states and eight Dialogue Partner including Japan.

Minister of Defense Kono holding a meeting with the Defense Minister of Djibouti (December 2019)

The ADMM-Plus is the only meeting hosted by a government which allows defense ministers in the Asia Pacific region, including ASEAN member states to attend. Thus, the ADMM-Plus is highly significant from the perspective of promoting the development and deepening of regional security and defense cooperation. The MOD/SDF has been participating in and providing support for the meeting. There are (1) the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM)-Plus, (2) ADSOM-Plus Working Group (ADSOM-Plus WG), and (3) EWGs under the ministerial level ADMM-Plus.

In November 2019, Minister of Defense Kono attended the sixth ADMM-Plus held in Thailand. He conveyed Japan’s determination to make every effort to uphold and reinforce the international order based on the rule of law, in line with our vision for FOIP.

Minister Kono stated that Japan is determined to continue playing a constructive role, respecting ADMM-Plus, in order to support the resilience of the region. Also, he stated that Japan is strongly opposed to all unilateral attempts to change the status quo. In addition, he reiterated that Japan strongly expects that an effective and substantive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) to be concluded in accordance with international law. As to international security challenges, he reiterated that solidarity of the international society is indispensable to ensure the effectiveness of UN Security Council Resolutions, including countering “ship-to-ship transfers”. In addition, he stated our determination to continue playing our role by assuming a co-chair of the EWG.

11 The ARF, a forum aimed at improving the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region through dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues, has been held since 1994. The ARF currently comprises 26 countries and one organization as members and holds various inter-governmental meetings that are attended by both foreign affairs and defense officials to exchange opinions on the regional situation and the security area. The 26 countries are the 10 ASEAN member states (Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia (since 1995) and Myanmar (since 1996)), Japan, Australia, Canada, China and India (since 1996), New Zealand, PNG, the ROK, Russia, the United States and Mongolia (since 1996), North Korea (since 2000), Pakistan (since 2004), Timor-Leste (since 2005), Bangladesh (since 2006), and Sri Lanka (since 2007). The organization member is the EU.

12 The ADMM-Plus was founded in October 2010. Japan, the United States, Australia, the ROK, India, New Zealand, China and Russia participate in this meeting as Dialogue Partners.

13 Japan proactively contributed to the EWGs in 2018, participating in the EWG on HA/DR in February, April, July and September, in the EWG on PKO in April and November, in EWG on Humanitarian Mine Action in April and October, in the EWG on counter-terrorism in August, in the EWG on Cyber Security in May and November, in the EWG on Maritime Security in May and November, and in the EWG on Military Medicine in February and December.
on PKO with Viet Nam in the fourth cycle (2020-2023). The ADMM Plus adopted a joint statement on “Advancing Partnership for Sustainable Security”. In addition, various exercises were conducted as a culmination of the third cycle (2017-2019) of the EWG, which provides practical cooperation in seven areas. The MOD/SDF participated in the exercises in HA/DR, maritime security, defense medicine, and PKO.

**Fig. III-3-1-4 (Organizational Chart and Overview of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus [ADMM-Plus])**

(2) ARF

Regarding the ARF, in which mainly diplomatic authorities are engaged, concrete efforts have been made in recent years for specific initiatives in non-traditional security areas such as disaster relief, maritime security, and peacekeeping and peace building. The MOD/SDF has been making active contributions to this forum. At an Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM on MS) that has been held since 2009, for example, Japan has taken leadership in formulating a collection of best practices concerning assistance for capacity building in the field of maritime security. In the field of disaster relief, the MOD/SDF has dispatched SDF personnel and aircraft to ARF Disaster Relief Exercises (ARF-DiREx) conducted since 2009.

(3) Multilateral Security Dialogues Sponsored by the MOD/SDF

a. ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting and Vientiane Vision 2.0

Based on the proposal by Prime Minister Abe at the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit in December 2013, the first ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting took place in Bagan, Myanmar, in November 2014. This meeting, in which opinions were exchanged on cooperation in non-traditional security areas such as HA/DR and maritime security, was a breakthrough opportunity bringing defense ministers from Japan and the ASEAN member states together for the first time in the history of nearly 50 years of friendship and cooperation between Japan and ASEAN. This marked an important first step towards strengthening defense cooperation in the future.

In November 2019, at the 5th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in Thailand, Defense Minister Kono announced an updated version of Japan’s original initiative Vientiane Vision; “Vientiane Vision 2.0” with a view to accelerating the momentum of Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation. Ministers of ASEAN member states welcomed “Vientiane Vision 2.0” and expressed their expectations towards promotion of even more practical Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation in future under the updated vision.

The Vientiane Vision presents an overall picture of the priority areas of the future direction of ASEAN-wide defense cooperation in a transparent manner. Vientiane Vision 2.0 retains the basic framework of the initial Vision, including its objectives, direction, and means of cooperation, but introduces three new pillars: firstly, establishing three principles of Japan-ASEAN cooperation which are “heart-to-heart cooperation”, “tailored and lasting cooperation” and “equal and open cooperation”; secondly, introducing the concept of “resilience” to clarify the connection between our efforts and ASEAN’s centrality and unity; and thirdly, pursuing synergies between the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) announced by ASEAN in June 2018 and Japan’s FOIP.

In the field of HA/DR, since 2018, Japan has held the Japan-ASEAN Invitation Program on HA/DR. In February 2019, Japan held the second round of the invitation program, inviting participants from all ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat. In this program, a seminar on the Japanese large-scale disaster response guidelines and the first table-top exercise were conducted.

In the field of international law, in November 2018, Japan invited all ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat to the Japan-ASEAN Symposium on International Law titled “Regional Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and the Rule of Law.”

In the field of international aviation law and security in the air of aviation, the Professional Airmanship Program was

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15 Expert meetings have been established in the following seven areas: counter-terrorism, HA/DR, maritime security, defense medicine, peacekeeping, mine operations, and cybersecurity.

16 In addition to the Ministers’ meeting at the foreign minister level, the Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) and Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) are held each year, as well as meetings of the Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (IGG on CBM/POD) and the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC). Moreover, since the Ministers’ meeting in 2002, the ARF Defense Officials’ Dialogues (Dod) has been held ahead of the main meeting.

17 In 2011, Japan, Indonesia and New Zealand co-hosted the third ISM on MS in Tokyo. In 2017, Japan, the Philippines and the United States co-hosted the ninth one in Tokyo.
The only government-sponsored official meeting of the defense ministers in the Indo-Pacific region that includes countries outside the ASEAN region.

* Participating countries: 10 ASEAN member countries + 8 countries (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Russia, and the U.S.)

The Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs) established under the framework of the ADMM-Plus take practical actions, such as joint exercises, to address security issues in the Indo-Pacific region, which is a unique feature of the ADMM-Plus.

EWGs were established in seven fields. Each EWG is hosted jointly by one of the 10 ASEAN member countries and one of the additional 8 countries for a term of three years.

* Seven fields: (i) counter-terrorism, (ii) HA/DR, (iii) maritime security, (iv) military medicine, (v) peacekeeping, (vi) mine operations, and (vii) cyber security

EWGs respectively take practical actions such as sharing information, holding workshops and seminars, conducting joint training, and submitting recommendations and reports concerning respective areas.
Chapter 3

Security Cooperation

Section 5-2 (Initiatives to Support UN PKO, etc.)

Reference 47 (Vientiane Vision 2.0)

b. Japan–ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum

Since 2009, the MOD has annually held the Japan–ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum for the purpose of strengthening bilateral and multilateral relationships through the development of human networks between Japanese and ASEAN vice-ministerial level officials.

In October 2019, the 11th Japan–ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum was held in Tokyo, with the participation of vice ministers from all ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat, to exchange views on the following three themes: 1) Regional Security Situation; 2) Visions for the Indo-Pacific: Towards the Free and Open Regional Order; and 3) ASEAN’s Initiatives for Regional Defense Cooperation. Participants shared the recognition that ensuring the centrality and unity of ASEAN, which is the keystone of regional cooperation, is important to maintain free and open regional order which is the fundamental basis of peace and prosperity of the region in light of current regional trends of immense engagement of external states.

Through these initiatives, Japan has worked to promote capacity building, mutual understanding, and network building with participants from all ASEAN member states through seminars and training programs in various areas, including maritime security and HA/DR, while also fostering a shared recognition about international law, which has contributed to the stability of the Indo-Pacific region.

See Reference 47 (Vientiane Vision 2.0)

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The MOD has held the Asia-Pacific Defense Forum (Tokyo Defense Forum) every year since 1996 for senior officials in charge of defense policy (Director-General level officials and general-level officers) from the countries in the region to discuss defense policies of the participating countries and confidence-building measures in the field of defense.

In November 219, as an effort to strengthen relations with international students who had graduated from the National Defense Academy (NDA), a gathering was held for the first time with about 50 international students who had graduated from the main course of the NDA. Defense Minister Kono also joined this gathering.

Since 2002, Japan has invited people engaging in the field of security policy from Asia-Pacific countries to Japan as opinion leaders, in order to foster understanding of Japan’s security and defense policies and the situation of the SDF.

(4) Others

a. International Conferences Hosted by International Organizations

In July 2019, the Chief of Staff, GSDF participated in the UN PKO Chiefs of Defense Conference at UN Headquarters. The conference was attended by 403 people, including the chiefs of staff from 106 countries. At the conference, the GSDF Chief of Staff presented the results of the revision of the Military Engineer Unit Manual and Japan’s efforts to further contribute to the UN Triangular Partnership Project (UNTPP), which won the understanding of the chiefs of staff of the armed forces of all participating countries. The participants also shared an understanding of the challenges of UN peacekeeping operations and the efforts of each country for peacekeeping operations.

b. International Conferences Hosted by Private Organizations

International conferences on security include not only inter-governmental conferences but also meetings organized by private organizations in which various people, such as government officials, scholars, and journalists, participate to discuss medium- to long-term security issues. Major international conferences organized by private bodies include the IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue),18 IISS Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue),19 and the Munich Security Conference,20 one of the most prestigious

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18 This is a multilateral conference sponsored by the IISS, a private U.K. think tank, in which defense ministers from various countries participate with the objective of discussing defense-related issues and regional defense cooperation. It has been held in Singapore every year since 2002 and is known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, named after the hotel where it takes place.
19 An international conference hosted by the U.K. IISS, where foreign and defense authorities and other stakeholders mainly from Middle Eastern countries exchange views on security issues. It is held annually in Manama, Bahrain.
20 This is one of the most prestigious international security meetings organized by private bodies in Europe and the United States and has been held annually (usually in February) since 1962. Usual participants in the meeting include officials at the ministerial level from major European countries as well as top leaders, ministers, and lawmakers from countries in the world, and key executives of international organizations.
meetings on security in Europe and the United States. Defense Minister and MOD officials actively participate in these meetings, holding talks with defense ministers and other representatives from other countries, while making speeches at these meetings, in order to build trust and share mutual recognition with high-level officials and to send out positive messages.

In November 2019, Defense Minister Kono attended the 15th Manama Dialogue. This was the first time for a Japanese Defense Minister to participate in the event. At the meeting, he delivered a speech and held bilateral talks with the French Minister of the Armed Forces and ministerial-level officials from Jordan, Bahrain, and Yemen. In his speech at the 15th Manama Dialogue in November 2019, Defense Minister Kono stated that Japan has continuously contributed to peace and stability in the Middle East based on an understanding that an open and secure maritime order provides the basis for a stable and prosperous international community, and that the SDF is forging broader and closer ties with this Middle East through human contributions to maritime security in the region, participation in exercises, defense equipment cooperation, person-to-person links, and other initiatives. He also stated that Japan attaches importance to the freedom of navigation and the rule of law at sea, and that in order to ensure the safety of Japan-related ships and to secure the peace and stability of the Middle East region, Japan has started to consider how we can best utilize the assets of the SDF as our independent efforts to reinforce our information gathering.

In December 2019, Defense Minister Kono also attended the 19th Doha Forum organized by the Government of Qatar for the first time as a defense minister. He held bilateral meetings with the Ministers of Defense of Qatar and Malaysia and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Jordan, while also delivering a speech at the main meeting. In his speech on multilateral security cooperation, Defense Minister Kono expressed concern over the strengthening of North Korea’s military capabilities, including its nuclear and missile capabilities. He also stated that it is necessary to reinforce arms control and disarmament and the rule of law in the international community, and that Japan is working with other countries to promote FOIP through bilateral/multilateral exercises, capacity building, and defense equipment and technology cooperation based on the rule of law. He cited Vientiane Vision 2.0 as an example of Japan’s multilateral security cooperation efforts, and said that Japan would continue to promote multilateral security cooperation.

Minister of Defense Kono and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mogi attended the 56th Munich Security Conference in February 2020. On the occasion of the conference, Defense Minister Kono held the first defense ministerial meeting with Ukraine’s Defense Minister, as well as bilateral and other meetings with the defense ministers of Canada, France, and Germany, as well as with the High Representative of the EU and the Secretary General of NATO, where they exchanged views on defense cooperation and exchanges and regional situations.

c. Service-to-Service Exchange Initiatives

In August 2019, the Chief of Staff, JS attended the Chiefs of Defense Conference (CHOD) held by the United States Indo-Pacific Command. In this Conference, he shared with other countries his view on the importance of FOIP, while also
promoting an understanding of Japan’s and other countries’ defense policies and situations. In January 2020, the Chief of Joint Staff participated as a panelist at the multilateral forum Raisina Dialogue 2020 in India, together with the Deputy Commander of the Australian Defense Force, the Deputy Director General for International Relations and Strategy at the French Ministry of the Armed Forces, the First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff of the Royal Navy, the Chief of Naval of the Indian Navy, and the Chairman of the EU Military Committee, to convey the importance of Japan’s efforts to stabilize the international order for FOIP and of collaboration among nations that share values.

In July 2019, the Chief of Staff, GSDF cooperated and participated in the Megacities Conference organized by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army to discuss HA/DR in the event of a natural or man-made disaster in a megacity with the armed forces of other countries, as well as internal and external experts, to promote mutual understanding and strengthen cooperation. In September 2019, he participated in the Indo-Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (IPACC), where he shared his understanding of the importance of service-to-service cooperation for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, developed and strengthened relationships with chiefs of army staff and others through exchanging information and views, and promoted security cooperation.

In October 2019, the Chief of Staff, MSDF attended the Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS) hosted by the Italian Navy, promoting mutual understanding and trust, and communicating the MSDF’s efforts to the international community through information sharing and opinion exchange with the chiefs of naval staff of the G7 nations.

The Chief of Staff, ASDF attended the Air and Space Power Conference (ASPC) and the RIAT hosted by the Royal Air Force of the United Kingdom in July 2019. In November 2019, at the invitation of the UAE Air Force Chief of Staff, he participated in the Dubai Air Show hosted by the UAE. In March 2020, the ASDF Chief of Staff participated in the Air Power Conference hosted by Australia, where he exchanged views on a wide range of topics, including regional and international security issues.

2 Promoting Practical Multilateral Security Cooperation Initiatives

(1) Pacific Partnership

The Pacific Partnership (PP), which started in 2007, is an initiative in which naval vessels, primarily those from the U.S. Navy, visit countries in the Asia-Pacific region to provide medical care, conduct facility repair activities, and engage in cultural exchange to strengthen cooperation between countries participating in the initiative and facilitate international peace cooperation activities through cooperation with governments, military forces, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in those countries. Japan has dispatched SDF medical personnel and units under the Pacific Partnership since 2007. In 2019, Japan dispatched medical personnel to the Marshall Islands and Vietnam, in addition to sending its music band members to the Marshall Islands, for medical activities and cultural exchanges. Moreover, Japan also sent lecturers on women’s studies, peace, and security in Timor-Leste.

(2) Multilateral Exercises

a. Significance of Multilateral Exercises in the Indo-Pacific Region

In the Indo-Pacific region, the MOD/SDF has actively participated in multilateral training and exercises in non-traditional security fields, such as HA/DR and Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), in addition to traditional training conducted in preparation for combat situations. It is important to participate in such multilateral exercises so as not only to raise the skill level of the SDF, but also to create a cooperative platform with relevant countries. In light of this perspective, the MOD/SDF intends to continue to actively engage in such training.

b. Initiatives for Multilateral Exercises

The multilateral relationships have recently shifted from the phrase for building trust to the phrase for developing more concrete and practical cooperative relationships. Various multilateral training and exercises have been actively conducted as important initiatives to effectively help this shifting.
To improve the integrated operational capability, the SDF joined the multilateral exercise Cobra Gold from January to March 2020, which included training on rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas.

The GSDF has hosted the Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacific (MCAP) every year since 2002 as part of its multilateral cooperation initiatives, inviting officers from relevant countries.

The MSDF participated in the eighth multilateral exercise for submarine rescue drills in the Western Pacific submarine rescue exercise “Pacific Reach 2019” with 20 nations hosted by the Royal Australian Navy in the waters west of Perth, Commonwealth of Australia, from October to December 2019. In addition, from April to July 2019, three destroyers, including Destroyer JS “Izumo,” were dispatched for the Indo-Pacific Deployment. In this Deployment, in addition to the ADMM-Plus maritime security exercise, in which 11 countries participated, multilateral exercises such as the Japan-US-India-Philippines multilateral Exercise and the Japan-France-Australia-US quadrilateral Exercise La Perouse were conducted.

In December 2019, the ASDF participated in the multinational HA/DR exercise Christmas Drop in the Federal States of Micronesia, Republic of Palau, and Commonwealth of Northern Marianas and so on. New Zealand joined the exercise for the first time this round. Christmas Drop is now a quadrilateral exercise between Japan, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. In addition, in February 2020, the ASDF participated in a Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise and the U.S.-Japan-Australia joint HA/DR exercise Cope North.
Chapter 3

Security Cooperation

4 Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building

1 Objectives of Capacity Building

In today’s security environment, no country can maintain its peace and stability on its own. It is indispensable for the international community to unite to resolve global issues. The defense authorities of Southeast Asian and other countries have either requested the MOD to undertake capacity building, or expressed their expectations for such cooperation. In response to such expectations, the MOD/SDF started to provide capacity building in the security and defense areas in 2012.

Capacity building has the following objectives: (1) creating desirable security environment for Japan by supporting partner countries in the Indo-Pacific region to develop their own capacity in a sustainable manner, and enabling the recipient countries’ forces to undertake adequate roles in maintaining international peace and regional stability; (2) strengthening bilateral relationships with partner countries; (3) strengthening relationships with other donor countries, such as the United States and Australia; and (4) promoting Japan’s proactive and independent efforts to realizing regional peace and stability, and to gain trust in the MOD/SDF as well as and Japan.

The MOD/SDF will implement capacity building programs effectively by carefully coordinating with diplomatic policies and combining various means to maximize effects, while also tapping into the knowledge accumulated at the SDF.

2 Specific Activities

The MOD/SDF has provided capacity building in such areas as HA/DR, PKO, and maritime security to 15 countries and one organization in the Indo-Pacific region.

The MOD/SDF’s capacity building programs are aimed at improving the capabilities of recipient countries in a concrete and steady manner over a certain period of time. Some programs are carried out by dispatching MOD/SDF officials to the recipient country, by inviting recipient country’s officials to Japan, or by a combination of both. With the first method, SDF officials with technical knowledge are dispatched to the recipient country to help the recipient country’s forces and their related organizations through seminars, field training, and technical guidance. With the second method, the recipient country’s officials are invited to the MOD/SDF’s units and institutions to learn human resources development, education, and training that the MOD/SDF provides through seminars, field training, and observing the education and training programs.

In 2019, the number of capacity building programs conducted by means of dispatch was 126 (11 countries, 20 projects), and the number of those conducted by means of invitation was 75 (four countries, one organization and six projects). Under the dispatch programs for capacity building, the MOD/SDF has provided technical cooperation on engineering activities, such as road construction in Mongolia, and heavy equipment maintenance and surveying for the Harii Hamutuk training program sponsored by Australian forces in Timor-Leste. Japan has also provided guidance on techniques to PNG Military Band, which participated in the Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo in Australia, hosted by the United Kingdom. With regard to the project to support Mongolia in building capacity in the field of engineering, Defense Minister Enkhbold, who made the first Defense Minister’s visit to Japan in about five and a half years in December 2019, commented that the technical guidance provided by the SDF had enabled the Mongolian Armed Forces to construct roads, which had contributed significantly to the plan for dispatching facility units to UN peacekeeping operations. These projects have contributed to making specific and steady improvements in the capabilities of the recipient nations’ forces. Other programs that have thus far been conducted include a workshop on the disposal of underwater unexploded ordnance in Vietnam, and field training on aviation meteorology for the establishment of a weather services unit of the Myanmar Air Force, and field training on search and rescue and medical activities in Laos. In addition, the MOD/SDF held an HA/DR seminar in Indonesia to share its initiatives to increase various disaster response capabilities. In addition, as for invitation programs, the MOD/SDF conducted such programs as air rescue training for the Sri Lankan Air Force and the Third Japan-ASEAN HA/DR Invitation Program.

In addition, as part of capacity building for Africa, the
MOD/SDF implemented in 2018 a program for supporting the enhancement of disaster response capacity for Djibouti forces, including education on how to operate engineering equipment, such as hydraulic shovels, graders, and dozers, in order to strengthen the bilateral relationship.

3 Collaboration with Related Countries

In efforts to stabilize the regional security environment, collaboration with other donor countries is essential. In particular, collaboration with the United States, and Australia is considered a priority.

The joint statement of the Japan-U.S. “2+2” in April 2015 states that the two countries would strengthen their continued close coordination on cooperation including capacity building to realize peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. The two ministers agreed to promote defense cooperation with Southeast Asian countries.
Under a Japan-Australia personnel exchange program, the MOD has received four officials from the Australian Department of Defense to its International Policy Division’s Capacity Building Office four times since 2013. In exchange, the MOD has dispatched three officials to the Australian Department of Defense three times since 2015.

In November 2017, Japan and Australia held the first working group on capacity building.

Japan has also cooperated with the United States and Australia in providing capacity building to Timor-Leste. The SDF and the U.S. forces participated in the Harii Hamutuk Exercise sponsored by the Australian forces in Timor-Leste five times since October 2015, providing technical guidance on engineering for engineering units of the Timor-Leste forces.

It is important for Japan and other countries providing capacity building to conduct such cooperation effectively and efficiently by closely coordinating with and mutually complementing each other.

### Voice

**Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in Capacity Building for Lao People’s Army**

*Captain YOSHIDA Tatsuru,*

*Head of the 2nd Division, the 13th Infantry Regiment, GSDF (Matsumoto City, Nagano Prefecture)*

Capacity building for the Lao People’s Army started in 2016, with the aim of contributing to the enhancement of their disaster response capabilities. Since then, employing the GSDF’s technologies and skills in search and rescue and hygiene activities, the program has conducted education for commanding personnel of the Lao People’s Army and steadily built results. I, as the team leader, explained the disaster relief activities of the JSDF for 12 commanding personnel of the Lao People’s Army who were invited to Japan in October 2019, and I also provided them with education on planning disaster response training. In November of the same year, I was sent to Laos and provided guidance when the Lao People’s Army implemented training on search and rescue and first aid activities based on a plan prepared by the commanding personnel.

The participants from the Lao People’s Army participating in daily education and training showed a keen sense of responsibility and sincere attitude, which impressed us. They mastered a series of training management procedures including planning, implementation and evaluation of disaster response training.

The global intensification of disasters in recent years requires swift and sophisticated disaster response capability. Through this project, I felt that I was contributing to the enhancement of the disaster response capability of the Lao People’s Army and development of a friendly and trusting relationship between the two countries.
The NDPG states that for Japan, a maritime nation, strengthening the order of “Open and Stable Oceans” based on fundamental norms, such as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as ensuring safe maritime and air transport, is the foundation for its peace and prosperity, which is extremely important. From this viewpoint, the MOD/SDF will promote assistance that contributes to improving capabilities pertaining to the maritime security of coastal states in the Indo-Pacific region, such as India, Sri Lanka, and other South and Southeast Asian states. Moreover, Japan is promoting such activities as joint training and exercises, unit-to-unit exchanges, and active port visits on these occasions. Japan is also promoting activities such as anti-piracy efforts in cooperation with relevant countries and cooperation for strengthening the capabilities of the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).

Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security

(1) The Fundamental Idea of the Government

The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that as a maritime state, Japan will play a leading role, in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Sea,” which are upheld by maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law, ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with relevant international law, rather than by force.

The third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy was given Cabinet approval in May 2018. Taking a broad view of ocean policy from the perspective of security on the ocean, the Plan states that the government will act as one in undertaking “comprehensive maritime security.”

For this purpose, the government will undertake securing of the national interest in the territorial water of Japan and stable use of its important sea lanes.

Furthermore, the government will further strengthen its efforts toward enhancement of MDA that collects and summarizes a variety of maritime information from ships, aircraft, etc. in order to use the information for measures regarding the sea.

Concerning the COC, which China and ASEAN are continuing to discuss, Japan has expressed its position that the COC should conform with international law including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and not infringe on the legitimate rights and interests of all parties of the South China Sea.

(2) Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

The MOD/SDF is conducting counter-piracy operations to secure stable use of sea lanes and information gathering activities to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels in the Middle East. In the ADMM-Plus in November 2019, Defense Minister Kono stated his strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo and intimidation of other countries, urging for the demilitarization of the disputed terrain and the peaceful resolution of the conflict in accordance with the UNCLOS. Within the framework of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), the MSDF has been engaged in initiatives such as cooperation in the establishment of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).

Counter-Piracy Operations

1 Significance of Counter-Piracy Operations

Piracy is a grave threat to public safety and order on the seas. In particular, for Japan, which depends on maritime transportation to import most of the resources and food necessary for its survival and prosperity as a maritime nation, it is an important issue that cannot be ignored. The Japan Coast Guard (JCG), one of the law enforcement agencies in Japan, is primarily responsible for coping with piracy. However, in cases where it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the JCG to cope with piracy by itself, the SDF is to take action as well.

For Japan and the international community, the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden are extremely
important sea lanes, connecting Europe and the Middle East with East Asia. Successive UN Security Council resolutions were adopted, such as UN Security Council Resolution 1816, which was adopted in June 2008 in response to the frequent occurrence of and rapid increase in the piracy incidents with the purpose of acquiring ransoms by detaining hostages caused by pirates, who are armed with machine guns and rocket launchers. These resolutions have requested that various countries take actions, particularly the dispatch of warships and military aircraft, to deter piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

To date, approximately 30 countries, including the United States, have dispatched their warships to the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. As part of its counter-piracy initiatives, the EU has been conducting Operation Atalanta since December 2008, in addition to the counter-piracy operations conducted by the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) that was established in January 2009. Meanwhile, other countries have been dispatching their assets to the area.

As these initiatives by the international community have proved to be effective, the number of acts of piracy occurring in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has currently hovered at a low level. However, the assumed root causes of piracy such as terrorism and poverty in Somalia have still remained unsolved. In addition, considering the fact that Somalia’s capability to crack down on piracy is also still insufficient, if the international community reduces its counter-piracy efforts, the situation could be easily reversed. Therefore, there is no great change in the situation in which Japan must carry out its counter-piracy operations.

### Japanese Initiatives

#### (1) Legislation Concerning Counter-Piracy Operations

In March 2009, following the order for Maritime Security Operations for the purpose of protecting Japan-affiliated vessels from acts of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, two destroyers began providing direct escort to Japan-affiliated vessels, while P-3C patrol aircraft also commenced warning and surveillance operations in June of the same year.

Japan subsequently enacted the Anti-Piracy Measures Act in July of the same year. This act made it possible to protect the vessels of all nations from acts of piracy, regardless of their flag states. Moreover, it also enabled the use of weapons to a reasonable extent, if no other means were available, in order to halt vessels engaging in acts of piracy, such as approaching civilian vessels.

Furthermore, the Act on Special Measures concerning the Security of Japanese Flagged Vessels in Areas that Are Highly Susceptible to Acts of Piracy came into force on November 2013, which made it possible to have security guards on board a Japanese ship provided certain requirements are met, enabling them to carry small arms for the purpose of security operations.

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2. The Combined Maritime Force (CMF), the headquarters of which is located in Bahrain, announced the establishment of the CTF in January 2009 as a multilateral combined task force for counter-piracy operations.
3. The number of destroyers was changed to one from December 2016.
(2) Activities by the SDF

a. Dispatch of the Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) and Other Units

The SDF dispatches the DSPE, the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DAPE), and the Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DGPE) to carry out counter-piracy operations.

The DSPE strives to ensure the safety of ships navigating in the area in two different manners – direct escort of private vessels across the Gulf of Aden, and zone defense in allocated areas in the Gulf of Aden, by using destroyers (one destroyer dispatched). There are JCG officers aboard the destroyer.5

The DAPE conducts counter-piracy activities using the P-3C patrol aircraft (two aircraft dispatched). The unit conducts warning and surveillance operations in the flight zone that is determined in coordination with the CTF 151 Headquarters and confirms any suspicious boats. At the same time, the unit also provides information to the MSDF destroyers, the naval vessels of other countries and civilian vessels, responding by such means as confirming the safety of the surrounding area immediately, if requested. The information gathered by MSDF P-3Cs is constantly shared with other related organizations, and contributes significantly to deterring acts of piracy and disarming vessels suspected as pirate ships.

In order to improve the operational efficiency and effectiveness of the DAPE, the DGPE carries out activities such as maintenance of the facility set up in the northwest district of Djibouti International Airport.

In addition, the Airlift Squadron regularly operates ASDF transport aircraft to carry out air transport of materials required by the DAPE and the DGPE.

In late April, although COVID-19 had spread in Djibouti, in order to conduct regular inspection and maintenance of P-3C patrol aircraft in Japan, a substitute P-3C was dispatched after closely coordinating with related authorities and implementing thorough measures to prevent infection.

b. CTF 151 Deployed Unit at the Headquarters

In order to strengthen coordination with the units of other countries engaged in counter-piracy operations and enhance the effectiveness of the SDF’s counter-piracy operations, the MOD has dispatched SDF personnel to the CTF 151 Headquarters since August 2014. During the period from May to August 2015, the SDF also dispatched a CTF 151 commander for the first time, while between March and June 2017, March and June 2018, and February and June 2020, a CTF 151 commander as well as staff were also dispatched to the Headquarters.

c. Achievements

As of March 31, 2020, the DSPE has escorted 4,027 vessels. Under the protection of the SDF destroyers, not a single vessel has come to any harm from pirates and these vessels have all passed safely across the Gulf of Aden.

As of May 31, 2020, the DAPE has conducted the following activities: aircraft have flown 2,486 missions with their flying hours totaling 18,570 hours; and information was provided to vessels navigating the area and other countries engaging in counter-piracy operations on around 14,600 occasions. The activities conducted by the DAPE account for approximately 70 to 80% of the warning and surveillance operations carried out in the Gulf of Aden by the international community.

3 Praise for Japan’s Endeavors

The counter-piracy operations by the SDF have been highly praised by the international community. For example, national leaders and others have expressed their gratitude and the SDF has also been repeatedly well-received by the UN Security Council Resolution. Moreover, the MSDF destroyers, which are engaging in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, has received many messages from the captains and ship owners of the vessels that its units have escorted, expressing their gratitude that the ships were able to cross the Gulf of Aden with peace of mind and asking them to continue escorting ships there. Additionally, The Japanese Shipowners’ Association and other groups expressed appreciation for protection of Japan-related vessels and asked for continuation of efforts in fighting against piracy.
Fig. III-3-2-2  SDF’s Counter Piracy Operations (Image)

Outline of Counter Piracy Operations

- Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (approx. 200 personnel/one Destroyer)
  - Eight Coast Guard Officers aboard
- Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (approx. 60 personnel/two P-3C patrol aircraft)
- Deployment Support Group for Counter Enforcement (approx. 110 personnel)

Activities by other countries

- National Tasking
  (Japan, China, India, etc.)
- CTF151
  (Japan, ROK, Pakistan, etc.)
- EUNAVFOR
  (Spain, Italy, etc.)
- CTF151
  (Germany, Spain)

Note: The scale of deployed forces depends on the timing as the operations are carried out by all the participating countries in rotation.

Fig. III-3-2-3  Structure of the Deployed Forces

Commander, Self Defense Fleet

- Commander, Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement
  - 1 destroyer
  - Total approx. 200 personnel
  - Coast Guard Officers: 8 officials aboard
  - Special Boarding Unit personnel aboard
  - Equipped with 1 or 2 patrol helicopters, as well as 1 or 2 special boats

Commander, Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement

- Total approx. 60 personnel
- Squadron (2 P-3Cs)
- Support and logistics units

Commander, Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement

- Total approx. 110 personnel (about 30 maritime, about 80 ground)
- Operation units
- Guard units
- Military Police units

Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) Deployed Unit at the Headquarters

- Total of less than 20 personnel

In addition, Air Lift Squadron comprised of C-130H transport aircraft under the Air Support Commander will provide airborne transportation of materials, etc., when necessary.
Chapter 3

Security Cooperation

Training-Centered Initiatives

The MSDF not only endeavors to enhance its tactical skills through joint training with coastal states alongside sea lanes, but also strives to contribute to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, promote mutual understanding, and strengthen relationships of trust. In the Indo-Pacific Deployment which was implemented from April to July 2019, Destroyer JS “Izumo” and other deployed units conducted a total of eleven bilateral/multilateral and friendly drills, including the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Exercise and the Japan-France-Australia-US quadrilateral exercise La Perouse, while actively making port calls on the way to and back from counter-piracy operations.

Strengthening cooperation with coastal states of the Indo-Pacific region through the bilateral exercise and port calls contributes to the maintenance of maritime security, which has extremely high significance.

Cooperation in Maritime Security

The MOD/SDF has implemented capacity building in maritime security for Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka to help them enhance their MDA and other capabilities. Such program contributes to strengthening cooperation with partner countries that share common strategic interests with Japan.

The Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, which was approved by a Cabinet decision in May 2018, calls for strengthening cooperation related to maritime security with various countries through security dialogue and defense interaction among defense authorities at bilateral and multilateral levels with the aim of maintaining and advancing “free and open seas” supported by a maritime order defined by laws and rules. In response to this, the MOD has been working on cooperation for maritime security within regional security dialogue frameworks such as the ADMM-Plus and the ISM on MS.

See Reference 48 (Participation in Multilateral Exercise [Past Three Years])
Fig. III-3-2-4 (Visit to Ports and Airports by SDF [2019])
In the international community, there is a broadening and diversifying array of security challenges that cannot be dealt with by a single country alone. Rapid expansion in the use of space and cyber domains is poised to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security, which makes the establishment of international rules and norms a security agenda. The MOD/SDF will swiftly achieve superiority in space and cyber domains by strengthening coordination and cooperation with relevant countries through information sharing, consultation, exercise, and capacity building, while promoting measures concerning the development of international norms.

Cooperation in the Use of Space Domain

Regarding the use of the space domain, Japan will promote partnership and cooperation in various fields including SSA and mission assurance of the entire space system, through consultations and information sharing with relevant countries and active participation in multilateral exercises among others.

The MOD/SDF has taken part in the annual Space Situational Awareness (SSA) multinational tabletop exercise (Global Sentinel) and the Schriever Wargame, a multinational tabletop exercise on space security, hosted by the U.S. Forces and is working to share the recognition of threats in space among multiple countries and acquire knowledge related to cooperation regarding SSA and mission assurance of the space system.

The MOD/SDF is also working on cooperation with countries other than the United States. For example, the Japan-Australia Space Security Dialogue and Japan-U.S.-Australia Space Security Dialogue are held to exchange opinions on space policy. With France, based on the agreement to strengthen bilateral dialogue on space at the Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting in March 2015, the two countries decided to start the Japan-France Comprehensive Space Dialogue. At the 2nd Japan-France Comprehensive Space Dialogue in March 2017, in order to strengthen bilateral cooperation on SSA, the two countries signed a technical arrangement on information sharing pertaining to space situation awareness between the competent authority of Japan and the Minister of Defense of the Republic of France, and agreed to promote specific cooperation initiatives. With the EU, it was decided to start the Japan-EU Space Policy Dialogue at the Japan-EU Summit in May 2014, and four dialogue sessions have been held. At the Japan-India summit meeting in October 2018, the two countries decided to start space dialogue between the governments, and the MOD participated in the first meeting held in March 2019.

Cooperation in the Use of Cyber Domain

Regarding the use of the cyber domain, Japan will enhance its partnership and cooperation with relevant countries through measures such as sharing views on threat awareness, exchanging views on response to cyber attacks, and participating in multilateral exercises.

The MOD has held cyber dialogues with the respective defense authorities of Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, Estonia, and others to exchange views on threat awareness and relevant initiatives taken by each country. With NATO, the MOD carries out initiatives looking at possible future operational cooperation, such as establishing a cyber dialogue between defense authorities called the Japan-NATO Expert Staff Talks on Cyber Defense and in December 2019, officially participating for the first time in the cyber defense exercise Cyber Coalition 2019 hosted by NATO, in which Japan had participated as an observer. Furthermore, Japan has participated in the International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon) and has participated...
as an observer in a cyber defense exercise (Locked Shields), both organized by the CCDCOE based in Estonia. The MOD is further developing collaborative relationships with NATO in the cyber domain through the dispatch of personnel to the Centre since March 2019.

In addition, IT Forums have been held between the defense authorities of Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia to exchange views on initiatives in the information communications area including cybersecurity and current trends in technology. The MOD has been expanding the cooperation by implementing cybersecurity human resource development seminars for Vietnamese Forces as part of its capacity building in December 2017, March and August 2019, and January 2020.

Considering the fact that cyber attacks occur beyond national borders, it is important to continue to strengthen international cooperation in the cyber field through exchanges of views with defense authorities of other countries and relevant organizations such as the CCDCOE, and active participation in cyber defense exercises.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and missiles that can deliver them, as well as the proliferation of not only conventional arms but also goods and sensitive technologies of potential military use, pose a pressing challenge to the peace and stability of the international community. Moreover, many countries are working on the regulation of certain conventional weapons, considering the need to maintain a balance between humanitarian perspectives and defensive needs.

In order to deal with these issues, the international frameworks for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation have been developed under which Japan has played an active role.

Japan actively participates in international initiatives for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation in regard to WMDs, in the form of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as missiles that can deliver them, and associated technologies and materials.

Japan has contributed to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by offering its knowledge in the field of chemical protection since the negotiating stage and dispatching GSDF personnel who are experts on protection against chemical weapons to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which was established to continuously implement verification measures following the entry of the CWC into force. In addition, small quantities of the chemical substances under the regulation of the CWC are synthesized at the GSDF Chemical School (Saitama City), in order to conduct protection research. Thus, the school has undergone inspections 10 times in total since the establishment of the OPCW, in accordance with the CWC regulations.

Moreover, the whole of the Japanese Government is also working on projects aimed at disposing of abandoned chemical weapons in China, in accordance with the CWC. The MOD/SDF has seconded GSDF and other personnel to the Cabinet Office to handle this project, and since 2000, GSDF personnel with expertise in chemicals and ammunition have been dispatched to conduct excavation and recovery projects on a total of 19 occasions.

In addition, the MOD has been cooperating in endeavors aimed at increasing the effectiveness of regulations and decisions, by dispatching MOD officials to major meetings such as those of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), as well as international export control regimes in the form of the Australia Group (AG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). At the same time, SDF personnel were dispatched to training to foster surrogate inspectors provided by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

Reference 49 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations)
Japan has signed various conventions on the regulation of conventional weapons such as the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), based on humanitarian perspectives and security needs. In addition, Japan has signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention), which was adopted outside the framework of the CCW. With the entry of this Convention, the disposal of all cluster munitions possessed by the SDF was completed in February 2015.

The Ministry dispatches personnel to Group of Governmental Experts meetings related to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWs) and other events as necessary under the CCW framework. International discussions related to LAWs are under way on human-machine interaction in the use of weapons systems, issues pertaining to international humanitarian law, and other matters. Japan intends to continue its active involvement in the discussions, while also considering the standpoints of national security.

Furthermore, the MOD has actively cooperated in the initiatives of the international community that focus on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines by submitting annual reports that include data on Japan’s exceptional stocks to the Secretariat of the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines.

In addition, the MOD/SDF provides an annual report under the frameworks of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the UN Report on Military Expenditures and Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which aim to increase the transparency of the military preparedness and military expenditure. It also dispatches personnel as needed to governmental expert meetings and other meetings for reviewing and improving these systems. Since April 2018 the MOD/SDF has been sending a Senior Fellow of National Institute for Defense Studies as a member of the Group of Experts of the 1540 Committee established pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

Deeply concerned about the development of WMDs and missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, the United States announced its Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in May 2003, and sought the participation of other countries therein. Various initiatives are being undertaken based on PSI; PSI interdiction exercises aimed at improving the ability to thwart the proliferation of WMDs and related items and meetings to consider issues on policies and legislations.

Since the 3rd PSI Meeting in Paris (September 2003), the MOD/SDF has collaborated with relevant organizations and countries, dispatching MOD officials and SDF personnel to various meetings, as well as engaging in ongoing participation in these exercises since 2004.

The MOD/SDF has participated in PSI maritime interdiction exercises, hosted by Japan, thrice, working in partnership with relevant organizations such as the MOFA, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Finance and the Japan Coast Guard, and also participated in the PSI air interdiction exercise in July 2012, which Japan hosted for the first time. Japan organized Pacific Shield 18, a PSI maritime prevention exercise, in July 2018, to carry out training in
activities to prevent the spread of WNDs with Australia, New Zealand, the ROK, Singapore, and the United States.

Based on the proliferation cases in the areas surrounding Japan, and from the perspectives of preventing the proliferation of WMDs and improving the response capability of the SDF, the MOD/SDF strives to strengthen non-proliferation frameworks including PSI, as well as holding various relevant exercises and meetings and participating in the same kind of activities which other countries hold.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Exercise</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participation of the MOD/SDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 2012</td>
<td>PSI air interdiction exercise hosted by Japan</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Joint Staff, Ground Staff, Air Staff, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Northern Army, Central Readiness Force, GSDF Seventh Chemical Weapon Defense Unit and Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit, Internal Bureau (including two aircraft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2012</td>
<td>PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the ROK</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Joint Staff, Maritime Staff, Internal Bureau (including one ship and one aircraft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2013</td>
<td>PSI exercise co-hosted by the U.S. and UAE</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Dispatch of observer (Joint Staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2014</td>
<td>PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the United States</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Joint Staff (including one ship)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2015</td>
<td>PSI interdiction exercise hosted by New Zealand</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2016</td>
<td>PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Singapore</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2017</td>
<td>PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Australia</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Joint Staff, Ground Staff, Maritime Staff, Internal Bureau (including one aircraft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2018</td>
<td>PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Japan</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Joint Staff, Ground Defense Command, Self Defense Fleet, Eastern Army, Yokosuka Regional Unit, Chemical School, Internal Bureau (including two vessels, two aircraft and three vehicles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2019</td>
<td>PSI interdiction exercise hosted by ROK</td>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Joint Staff and Chemical School</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Fig. III-3-4-2 (Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction Exercise (Since FY2012))
The MOD/SDF has been proactively undertaking international peace cooperation activities working in tandem with diplomatic initiatives, including the use of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) for resolving the fundamental causes of conflicts, terrorism and other problems.

## Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities

### Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities

#### 1 Framework of International Peace Cooperation Activities and Background to Stipulating Such Activities as One of the Primary Missions of the SDF

The international peace cooperation activities undertaken by the MOD/SDF to date are as follows: (1) international peace cooperation assignments such as UN peacekeeping operations (the so-called UN PKO); (2) international disaster relief activities to respond to large-scale natural disasters overseas; (3) activities based on the former Special Measures Act on Humanitarian Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq; and (4) activities based on the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act, and the former Replenishment Support Special Measures Act. In 2007, international peace cooperation activities, which used to be regarded as supplementary activities, were upgraded to become one of the primary missions of the SDF, alongside the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order. In March 2016, the Legislation for Peace and Security was enforced, which allows cooperation and support operations in response to situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing based on general laws without establishing a special measures act.

#### 2 Continuous Initiatives to Promptly and Accurately Carry Out International Peace Cooperation Activities

To be a proactive contributor to world peace, it is important for the SDF to be fully prepared for any future operation. For this reason, all three branches of the SDF, namely the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, designate dispatch stand-by units, and the designated units are always ready to be deployed.

In September 2015, the UN launched the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) to enable the UN Headquarters to grasp the registered items of each country more specifically in order to ensure the flexibility and readiness of international peacekeeping activities. In light of this change, Japan registered engineering units and staff officers of mission headquarters in March 2016. Additionally, at the Defense Ministers’ Meeting on UN PKO held in November 2017, Japan announced that it would make arrangements for additional registration of fixed-wing aircraft for PCRS to enable air transport assistance for rapid PKO deployment.

Meanwhile, the SDF is enhancing information-gathering abilities and protection abilities, which are required for the SDF to be a proactive contributor to world peace.

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1 Affairs prescribed in Article 8 of the SDF Law (miscellaneous provision) or supplementary provisions
2 Missions defined in Article 3 of the SDF Law. The primary mission is to defend Japan. The secondary missions are the preservation of public order, activities in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan (in 2007), and international peace cooperation activities. In accordance with the entry into force of the Legislation for Peace and Security in 2016, “situations in areas surrounding Japan” was revised to “situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.”
units to carry out their missions while ensuring the safety of personnel and units in international peace cooperation activities, etc. In addition, in order to respond to various environments and prolonged missions, the SDF is improving its capabilities for transport, deployment, and information communication, as well as developing a structure of logistic and medical support for conducting smooth and continuous operations.

With regard to the education necessary for engaging in international peace cooperation activities, the GSDF International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit, which belongs to the Ground Component Command, provides training for GSDF personnel to be deployed to international peace cooperation activities, as well as supports their training. In addition, the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC) of the Joint Staff College offers not only basic education courses on international peace cooperation activities, but also specialized education to train personnel who can be appointed as contingent commanders of UN PKO missions and staff officers of mission headquarters. These specialized courses are conducted by using UN standard training materials and foreign instructors. Furthermore, since FY2014, the JPC has also provided education for personnel from foreign militaries and other Japanese ministries and agencies. This initiative represents the approach taken by the MOD/ SDF, which emphasizes the necessity of collaboration and cooperation with other related ministries and foreign countries, based on the current situation of more multi-dimensional and complicated international peace cooperation activities. The initiative aims to contribute to more effective international peace cooperation activities by enhancing collaboration in the field of education.

**3 Welfare and Mental Health Measures for Dispatched SDF Units**

The MOD/SDF has implemented various welfare and mental health support measures for dispatched SDF personnel and their families to reduce their anxiety. Depending on the characteristics of the duties of the dispatched unit, the MOD/ SDF provides dispatched SDF personnel with necessary measures as follows: (1) pre-dispatch training to acquire necessary knowledge on stress reduction; (2) mental health check before, during, and after the dispatch; (3) counseling on anxiety and worries provided by dispatched mental health care personnel; (4) dispatch of a mental health care team with specialized knowledge on dispatched SDF personnel from Japan consisting mainly of medical officers; (5) stress reduction training upon returning to Japan; and (6) ad hoc health checkup after returning to Japan.

**See Part IV, Chapter 1, Section 1-3 (Measures Aimed at Ensuring Effective Use of Human Resources)**

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**2 Initiatives to Support UN PKO, etc.**

As a means to promote peace and stability in conflict regions around the world, UN PKO have expanded their missions in recent years to include such duties as the Protection of Civilians (POC), the promotion of political processes, providing assistance in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) into society of former soldiers, Security Sector Reform (SSR), the rule of law, elections, human rights, and other fields, in addition to such traditional missions as ceasefire monitoring. To date, there are 13 UN PKO missions ongoing (as of the end of March 2020).

International organizations, such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), respective governments, and NGO conduct relief and restoration activities for the victims of conflicts and large-scale disasters from a humanitarian perspective and from the viewpoint of stabilizing affected countries.

Japan has been promoting international peace cooperation activities in various regions, including Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal, and South Sudan for more than 25 years, and the results of these activities have been highly praised both inside and outside of Japan.

In addition to continuous dispatch of staff officers to UNMISS, Japan is able to participate in Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security along with enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security. In April 2019, Japan started to dispatch staff officers to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). Japan will actively contribute to international peace cooperation activities through such activities as dispatch of personnel to mission headquarters and capacity building in Japan’s fields of expertise by using accumulated experience so far and working on human resource development.

**1 International Conferences Related to UN PKO**

In July 2019, the GSDF Chief of Staff participated in the UN PKO Chiefs of Defense Conference held in New York, the United States. At the conference, he shared the GSDF’s efforts as the chairman for the revision of the UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Engineer Unit Manual and
the dispatch of a delegation of instructors to the UNTPP, while also stating Japan’s strong determination to contribute to peace and stability in the international community through highly qualified capacity building programs and intellectual contributions, tapping into Japan’s strengths and experience in PKO.

2 Dispatch to the MFO

(1) Significance of Dispatch to the MFO

In August 1981, the MFO was established by the Protocol to the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty as an organization to undertake the tasks and responsibilities of the UN force and observer mission stipulated in the treaty.

Since 1982, when its activities started, by facilitating dialogue and confidence building between Egypt and Israel, the MFO has contributed to peace and stability in the Middle East, which is a foundation of peace and prosperity for Japan. With rising expectations of Japan’s role in the Middle East, Japan has provided financial assistance to the MFO since FY1988.

The MFO has expressed appreciation to Japan’s contribution this background, the MFO requested that Japan send staff officers to its headquarters. With a view to making proactive contributions to international peace efforts, the Cabinet decided on the implementation of international peace operations in the Sinai Peninsula on April 2, 2019, and dispatched two staff officers to the MFO as Japan’s first activity for the purpose.

(2) Activities by Staff Officers and Others

The two officers are engaging in liaison and coordination between governments of the two countries or other relevant organizations and the MFO as a Deputy Chief of Liaison and an Assistant Liaison Operation Officer at the MFO Headquarters, which is located in the south camp at Sharm El-Sheikh in the southern part of the Sinai Peninsula.

Additionally, in order to help the two officers dispatched to the MFO carry out activities smoothly and effectively, one liaison and coordination personnel is dispatched to Cairo city, Egypt, to liaise and coordinate with the relevant organizations in the dispatched country.

These activities express Japan’s commitment to more active involvement in the peace and stability of the Middle East. It is also expected to promote collaboration with the other countries dispatching officers, including the United States, and create new opportunities for human resource development.

3 UNMISS

(1) Significance of the Dispatch of Personnel to UNMISS

In July 2011 following South Sudan’s independence, with the objective of consolidating peace and security as well as helping establish necessary conditions for the development of South Sudan, the UNMISS was established. The Japanese Government was requested by the UN to cooperate with UNMISS, particularly through the dispatch of GSDF engineering units. The Cabinet approved the dispatch of two staff officers (logistics and database officers) to UNMISS in November 2011, and in December it decided to dispatch an SDF engineering unit, Coordination Center, and an additional staff officer (engineering officer). In addition, the Cabinet also approved the dispatch of one staff officer (air operations officer) in October 2014.

South Sudan shares borders with six countries and is positioned in a highly important location, connecting the African continent on all four points of the compass. The peace and stability of South Sudan is not only essential for the country itself; but also for the peace and stability in its neighboring countries, and by extension, Africa as a whole, as well as a crucial issue that should be dealt with by the international community. Based on the accumulated experience through past PKO, the MOD/SDF has contributed to the peace and stability of South Sudan by providing

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3 Acronym for the United Nations Triangular Partnership Project. A partnership for supporting the capability building of the personnel from UN PKO troop contributing countries through cooperation among the UN, UN PKO troop contributing countries, and third countries that possess technologies and equipment.
personnel-based cooperation in infrastructure development, on which the UN places great expectations.

See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 9-9 (Situation in South Sudan)

(2) Activities by Dispatched Engineering Units

Since the commencement of its engineering activities within UN facilities in Juba in March 2012, the dispatched engineering unit has steadily expanded its activities. The SDF has continued to dispatch over 300 personnel after the second unit took over in June of the same year, and carried out activities with great significance, such as repairing roads and constructing facilities for displaced people while ensuring the safety of the personnel.

The deployment of SDF engineering units marked a milestone of five years in January 2017 since the dispatch of the first engineering rotation. The major achievements include a total of approximately 260 km of road repair and a total of approximately 500,000 m² of development. Japan could move on to a new phase regarding engineering activities in Juba that the SDF was in charge of. Considering the above-mentioned issues in a comprehensive manner, on March 10, 2017, the Government of Japan came to the conclusion that the SDF engineering unit would withdraw from Juba around the end of May 2017. SDF personnel engaged in withdrawal work, then sequentially withdrew from South Sudan by the end of May 2017, and terminated the operations by the engineering unit in UNMISS.
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In response to a request from the UN to transfer items possessed by the dispatched engineering unit such as heavy machinery, vehicles, and residence-related containers, Japan transferred these items to UNMISS with no charge, intending to make Japan’s cooperation with UNMISS more effective. Prior to this transfer of items, the MOD, responding to a request from UNMISS, provided training on the operation and maintenance of heavy machinery to UNMISS personnel, so that UNMISS would be able to conduct engineering activities in a smooth manner using these heavy machinery and other equipment even after the withdrawal of the Japanese unit.

These dedicated activities by the dispatched engineering unit were highly appreciated and valued by the UN and South Sudan.

(3) Activities by Command Post Staff Officers and Others
Personnel dispatches to the UNMISS headquarters are continuing. Four GSDF members (logistics officer, intelligence officer, engineering officer, and air operations officer) currently carry out duties at the UNMISS headquarters. Specifically, the logistics officer procures and transports goods needed in UNMISS activities, the database officer collects and compiles information on security conditions, the engineering officer plans and proposes UNMISS engineering activities, and the air operations officer assists in operation of aircraft run by UNMISS.

Additionally, liaison staff members have been dispatched to the liaison office in the Embassy of Japan in South Sudan to support activities of the Japanese staff officers. These people help interactions between the South Sudan government and the International Peace Cooperation Corps in South Sudan with the aim of ensuring smooth and efficient cooperation with UNMISS. They will continue to contribute to activities as UNMISS members.

4 Dispatch of MOD Personnel to the UN Secretariat
The MOD/SDF dispatches personnel to the UN Secretariat for the purpose of actively contributing to the UN efforts to achieve international peace and for the purpose of utilizing experiences of dispatched personnel in Japan’s PKO activity. As of March 2020, one SDF personnel (working level) are involved in the formulation of UN PKO policies and plans at the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO). Since December 2002, including personnel currently dispatched, Japan has sent seven SDF members (one director level, six working level) to the UN DPO and two administrative officials (working level) to the UN Department of Operational Support (DOS).

5 Dispatch of Instructors to PKO Training Centers
To support PKO undertaken by African and other countries, the MOD/SDF has dispatched SDF personnel as instructors to PKO training centers in Africa and other countries that provide education and training for UN peacekeepers to contribute to peace and stability by enhancing the capacity of the centers.

Note: Double lines indicate a department/division in which Japanese personnel are placed.
Japan has so far earned unquestionable trust in the areas of engineering and transport that are essential for promoting smooth peacekeeping operations. To continue to support the rapid deployment of peacekeeping missions and implement high quality activities, Prime Minister Abe expressed Japan’s active support at the PKO Summit in September 2014, and it was embodied by the UNTPP.

The UNTPP was founded using funds from Japan as a project to support training for military engineers and the procurement of heavy equipment by the UN DOS. Japan has been dispatching SDF personnel to the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi, Kenya, as instructors since the trial training in September 2015. At the IPSTC, the SDF personnel efficiently provided training on facility and equipment operation for trainees from forces of African countries from June to October 2018 according to their level of heavy equipment operation skills. Two training sessions on the operation and maintenance of heavy equipment were provided for the Ugandan Army’s engineers from August to November 2019. This was the first training session held at the Uganda Rapid Deployment Capability Centre. From the start of the project to March 2020, a total of

VOICE

Lieutenant Colonel TOUDOU Kouji,
Vice Commandant, the 12th Engineer Group Headquarters
(Iwamizawa City, Hokkaido)

In 2019, I was appointed as a leader of an instructor team of the 2nd United Nations Project for RDEC (renamed UNTPP) and sent to the Republic of Uganda for about three months. This was the first training conducted in the Republic of Uganda. We taught military engineers of the republic how to operate construction machinery. We provided two six-week courses and trained 31 operators in total at intermediate level. They were a variety of students, from chief warrant officer to private, aged from 24 to 50, 30 men and one woman. As all the students very ardently worked on the training and made sincere efforts to improve their skills, we taught them to the best of our ability, which made the training very meaningful and fruitful for both the students and instructors. In a survey of students after the completion of courses, almost all answered, “The Japanese instructors are skillful and the way of teaching was easy to understand, and they treated students friendly and very well.” This was a moment when we forgot all difficulties in the past three months: “Not at all. Thank you!” Lastly, it was a great honor to contribute to this UN project. I wish to convey my hope, from Japan, that all the students will be successful in the future.

Video: SDF personnel engaged in RDEC (current UNTPP)
URL: https://youtu.be/TQLxPy4N63Y
164 GSDF officers have been dispatched to Africa to provide nine training sessions for a total of 277 members from eight African countries.

Considering that 30% or more of PKO personnel are from Asia, Japan decided to implement the project for the first time in Asia and the surrounding regions. The project provides training on heavy engineering equipment operation for engineering personnel. Trial training took place in Vietnam from November to December 2018 for 16 personnel from nine countries in Asia and the surrounding regions, including Vietnam and Indonesia. Following this, from November to December 2019 and from February to March 2020, the GSDF provided heavy equipment operation training for 40 personnel from five countries in Asia and the surrounding region, including Vietnam, Indonesia and Nepal.

In addition, the UN decided to extend the scope of support under this project to the field of sanitation, given that strengthening sanitation capacity to ensure the safety of deployed personnel has become an issue in UN peacekeeping operations. In response, the UN Field Medical Assistant Course (UNFMAC), which aims to train personnel who can provide first aid before medics or medical personnel provide specialized treatment in areas of PKO operations, was implemented in October 2019. In the course, eight instructors, including two GSDF officers, trained 29 personnel at the UN Regional Service Centre Entebbe in Uganda.

### Revision of the UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Engineer Unit Manual

In order to play a more leading role in international peace cooperation activities, the MOD/SDF served as the chair of the working group on the engineer unit manual since 2013 with the aim of supporting the development of UN Military Unit Manuals and contributed to the completion of the manual.

The UN asked Japan to serve as the chair of the working group again for revision of the manual. For the MOD/SDF, this is a meaningful opportunity to make contributions by using the experiences and capabilities acquired through the past PKO and other missions. Therefore the MOD/SDF decided to serve as the chair to handle the revision of the manual. The first expert meeting was held in Tokyo in December 2018. Since then, a total of four expert meetings have been held to complete the revision process, and the revised Military Engineer Unit Manual was submitted to the UN in July 2019.

The MOD/SDF will support for the dissemination of the manual.

### International Disaster Relief Activities

In recent years, the role of military affairs has become more diverse, and opportunities for military to use their capabilities in HA/DR are growing. To contribute to the advancement of international cooperation, the SDF has also engaged in international disaster relief activities proactively from the viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and improvement of the global security environment.

To this end, the SDF maintains its readiness to take any necessary action based on prepared disaster relief operation plans. In consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the SDF has been proactively conducting international disaster relief activities, which fully utilize its functions and capabilities, while taking into consideration specific relief requests by the governments of affected countries and disaster situations in these countries.

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4 With the aim of defining the capacity expected of PKO units and promoting understanding by the participating states, the UN has arranged manuals that prescribe the purpose, capacity and missions for each of ten fields: engineering, military police, aviation, maritime, riverine, signals, special forces, transport, logistics and Force Headquarters (FHQ) support.
Chapter 3
Security Cooperation

1 Outline of the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law

Since the enactment of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team (Japan Disaster Relief Team Law) in 1987, Japan has engaged in international disaster relief activities in response to requests from the governments of affected countries and international organizations. In 1992, the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law was partially amended, enabling the SDF to participate in international disaster relief activities and to transport its personnel and equipment for this purpose.

2 International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF and SDF’s Posture

Responding to specific relief requests by the governments of affected countries and the scale of disaster situations in these countries, the SDF’s capabilities in international disaster relief activities encompass (1) medical services, such as first-aid medical treatment and epidemic prevention; (2) transport of relief items, patients and personnel by helicopter and other means; and (3) water supply activities using water-purifying devices. In addition, the SDF uses transport aircraft and ships to carry disaster relief personnel and equipment to the affected area.

The Ground Component Command regional units of the GSDF and other relevant GSDF units maintain their readiness to ensure that they can carry out international disaster relief activities in an independent manner anytime when needed. The Self Defense Fleet of the MSDF and Air Support Command of the ASDF also constantly maintain their readiness to transport personnel and their supplies to disaster affected areas. Furthermore, in April 2015, the MOD/SDF also improved its readiness to be able to swiftly respond to a request for search activities using P-3C patrol aircraft.

3 International Disaster Relief Activities for Heavy Rains and Floods in the Republic of Djibouti

Heavy rains in the Republic of Djibouti between November 21 and 23, 2019, caused extensive flood damage.

At the request of the Government of the Republic of Djibouti, on November 26, Japan decided to carry out international disaster relief activities with some of the units dispatched for a counter-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

In addition to drainage using drainage pumps at elementary and junior high schools, emergency relief supplies provided by the Japanese government through JICA were transported to Djibouti.

On December 2, 2019, a termination order was issued by the Minister of Defense, ending international disaster relief activities. A total of approximately 230 personnel were dispatched to the site to drain approximately 1,950 tons of floodwater and transport approximately 4.3 tons of emergency relief supplies (tents, blankets, etc.).

4 International Disaster Relief Activities in Response to the Major Bush Fires in Australia

In response to a request from the Australian government to respond to the large-scale bush fires that had been continuing in Australia since September 2019, Japan decided on January 15, 2020, to have the SDF conduct international disaster relief activities, and dispatched two C-130H transport aircraft and about 70 ASDF personnel.

While stationed at Richmond Air Force Base from January 18, the members of the SDF transported personnel and supplies for firefighting and recovery efforts.

On February 7, a termination order was issued by the Minister of Defense, ending the 25-day operation of the international disaster relief activities. A total of

Video: International disaster relief activities for heavy rains and floods in the Republic of Djibouti
URL: https://youtu.be/kkWpSS5gf0
approximately 11 tons of goods (vehicles, firefighting equipment, etc.) and approximately 600 personnel were transported during this dispatch. The Australian ambassador to Japan visited the ASDF Komaki Air Base to greet the international disaster relief units upon their return. This mission was very meaningful also in deepening the Japan-Australia relationship.

**VOICE**

Voice of an SDF Personnel Engaged in International Disaster Relief Activities in Response to a Large-scale Bushfire in Australia

Colonel OTA Masashi, Flight Group Commander, 1st Tactical Airlift Wing, ASDF (Komaki City, Aichi Prefecture)

In January 2020, at the request of the government of Australia concerning the bushfire occurred in the country, I was ordered to carry out international disaster relief activities in the country. I visited the site as the commander of the air transport unit of the international disaster relief activities in Australia.

On the day when the order was issued, two C-130Hs departed ASDF Komaki Airbase. On our arrival at RAAF Base Richmond in Australia, we promptly established an operation system and started air transportation. In a low visibility condition due to the fire, we transported Australian military personnel to Kangaroo Island as our first mission, and continued transportation of firefighters who engaged in firefighting and restoration activities, military vehicles and firefighting equipment.

I made it a point to carry out prompt activities in response to the needs, which is important in a large-scale disaster, ensure operation across a broad area, and demonstrate our organizational capacity by exercising our capabilities cultivated through training at home and abroad. At the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake, Australia dispatched all their operable C-17 transport aircraft including ones engaged in overseas missions, excluding aircraft under maintenance. In order to repay Australia for the warm help, all team members did their best to accomplish the mission with all their hearts day and night, always thinking, “This is for the Australian people and restoration of the earth.”

Japan and Australia are special strategic partners combining the will and ability to contribute to the peace and stability of the region. I would be happy if this activity contributes to the deepening of the relationship of the two countries, which has been built at various levels.

Video: International Disaster Relief Activities in Response to the Major Bush fires in Australia
URL: https://youtu.be/wa8ihKN4oY
Core Elements Comprising Defense Capability, etc.

Chapter 1
Human Resource Base that Sustains the Defense Capability

Chapter 2
Measures on Defense Equipment and Technology

Chapter 3
Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities

Chapter 4
Elements that Sustain Defense Capability

Chapter 5
Interaction with Local Communities and Japanese Citizens
Chapter 1

Reinforcing Human Resource Base

The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) specifies that the core element of defense capability is Self-Defense Forces (SDF) personnel, and that securing human resources for SDF personnel and improving their ability and morale are essential to strengthening defense capability. This has become an imminent challenge in the face of shrinking and aging population with declining birth rates. Also in light of the sustainability and resilience of defense capability, the SDF needs to work even further to reinforce the human resource base that sustains the defense capability. SDF’s measures to reinforce the human resource base including those taken so far are explained below.

1 Recruitment and Employment

1 Recruitment

It is vital to secure highly qualified personnel for the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF to carry out various missions appropriately. Expectations from the public for the MOD/SDF have continued to rise. In Japan, however, due to the recent economic and employment upturn, as well as the advancement of declining birth rate and popularization of higher education, the environment surrounding the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel is severe. In such a situation, it is necessary for the MOD/SDF to recruit qualified human resources with a strong desire to join the SDF, by sufficiently explaining to them the missions, roles, duties, welfare programs, and privileges of the SDF.

For this reason, the MOD/SDF holds recruiting meetings at schools and also maintains Provincial Cooperation Offices in 50 locations throughout Japan to respond to the individual needs of applicants, with the understanding of educators and support from recruitment counselors. Moreover, local governments will carry out some of the administrative activities regarding the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel and candidates for uniformed SDF personnel, including announcing the recruitment period and promoting the SDF as a workplace, with the MOD bearing the requisite cost. At the same time, the MOD is strengthening collaboration with local governments to ensure necessary cooperation including information provision on recruitment targets, which is indispensable for smooth administrative activities regarding the recruitment.

2 Employment

(1) Uniformed SDF Personnel

Based on a voluntary system that respects individuals’ free will, uniformed SDF personnel are recruited under various categories. The upper age limit of general candidate for

Video : Advertisement for Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel
URL : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbxwcm_YCCo
enlistment (Upper) and candidates for uniformed SDF personnel was raised from “under 27” to “under 33” in 2018 in order to secure diverse human resources from a broader range, including people with work experience in private companies. A review of the examination for candidates for uniformed SDF personnel started in 2020 in order to ensure quality improvement of uniformed SDF personnel in fixed term system (candidate for uniformed SDF personnel) while at the same time securing human resources with diverse backgrounds and capabilities.

Personnel management of uniformed SDF personnel differs from that of general civilian government employees, due to the uniqueness of their duties and the need to maintain the SDF’s strength. With consideration given to the knowledge, experience, physical strength and other factors necessary for the duties of the respective ranks, the SDF has “Early Retirement System” where the majority of personnel retire in their mid-50s and “Fixed Term System” where one term is two or three years.

After employment, uniformed SDF personnel are assigned their branch of service and duties at units all around Japan, in accordance with their choice or aptitude, following basic education and training at respective training units or schools of respective SDF services.

(2) SDF Reserve Personnel, SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, and Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel

It is essential to secure the required number of uniformed SDF personnel promptly depending on situational changes in the event of a crisis. To secure the required number promptly and systematically, the MOD maintains the following three systems: the SDF Reserve Personnel system, the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel system, and the Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel system.

SDF Reserve Personnel become uniformed SDF personnel upon the issuance of a defense call-up order or other orders, and carry out logistical support and base guard duties. SDF Ready
### Overview of Appointment System for SDF Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>Admiral (MSDF), Second Lieutenant (GSDP, ASDP), Ensign (MSDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted (upper)</td>
<td>Sergeant Major (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF), Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer, Leading Seaman (MSDF), Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF), Staff Sergeant (ASDF), Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF), Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF), Enlisted (upper) (3 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted (lower)</td>
<td>Private First Class (GSDF), Airman First Class (ASDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF), Enlisted (lower) (3 years)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDF Reserve Personnel</th>
<th>SDF Ready Reserve Personnel</th>
<th>Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic concept</td>
<td>Open the issuance of a defense call-up order or other orders, serve as SDF Personnel</td>
<td>Serve as SDF Personnel in a pre-designated SDF unit, as part of the basic framework of defense capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligibility</td>
<td>Former SDF Personnel, Former SDF Reserve Personnel, Former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel</td>
<td>Former SDF Personnel, Former SDF Reserve Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Leading privates and lower SDF Reserve Personnel: 18 to under 50 years old</td>
<td>Leading privates and lower SDF Reserve Personnel: 18 to under 50 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment aspect</td>
<td>Employed by screening, based on application</td>
<td>Employed by screening, based on application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank designation</td>
<td>Former SDF Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle</td>
<td>Former SDF Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term of service</td>
<td>Three Years/One term</td>
<td>Three Years/One term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/Training</td>
<td>Utilizing their special skills</td>
<td>Utilizing their special skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion</td>
<td>Promoted by determination, based on service record of personnel who have fulfilled the service term (actual service term)</td>
<td>Promoted by determination, based on service record of personnel who have fulfilled the service term (actual service term)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits, allowances, and other terms</td>
<td>Training Call-up Allowance: ¥10,980/month, SDF Reserve Allowance: ¥4,000/month</td>
<td>Training Call-up Allowance: ¥10,400-14,200/day, SDF Reserve Allowance: ¥10,400-14,200/day, Continuous Service Incentive Allowance: ¥1,500/day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special activity for companies employing SDF Ready Reserve Personnel</td>
<td>Special activity for companies employing SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥4,250,000/month</td>
<td>Special activity for companies cooperating with training of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥800,000/month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call-up and other duties</td>
<td>Call-up: yearly, civil protection call-up: yearly, disaster call-up: training call-up</td>
<td>Call-up: yearly, civil protection call-up: yearly, disaster call-up: training call-up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes:
1. Staff candidates for the medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy faculties will be promoted to the position of First Lieutenant if they pass the national examinations in medicine and complete the prescribed education and training.
2. General candidate for enlistment (upper) refers to a candidate who has been enlisted with the premise that he/she will be promoted to a fixed-term position of “Enlisted (upper).” Until FY2008, there were two programs consisting of “Student candidates for enlistment (upper)” and “Enlisted (upper)” candidates. However, these two programs were reorganized and combined, and since FY2009, candidates have been appointed as “General candidates for enlistment (upper).”
3. As for the candidate for uniformed SDF personnel, in order to enhance the initial education of SDF personnel in fixed-term service, in July 2010, it was decided that their status during the first three months of their enlistment would be as non-SDF personnel, and they would engage exclusively in fundamental education and training as non-regular Ministry of Defense personnel.
4. GSDP High Technical School trains people to be SDF personnel who will be capable not only of operating and making full use of equipment in the GSDP but also of conducting missions in the international community. Starting from FY2011 appointments, the status of the school’s students was changed from SDF officer to “students,” which is a non-regular new status. New students receive a high school diploma at the conclusion of a student course (three years) through distance learning. From the FY2011 appointments, a new recommendation system was introduced in which those who are considered appropriate to be a GSDP High Technical School student are selected from among the candidates based on the recommendation of the principal of their junior high school etc., in addition to the conventional general examination.
5. A three-year program ended in FY2013. A new four-year program was established at the Division of Nursing, National Defense Medical College, in FY2014.
6. For Aviation Cadets, the Maritime Self-Defense Force selects from persons 18 or above and under 23 in age and the Air Defense Force 18 or above and under 21 in age.
7. For students on loans, the SDF lends school expenses (54,800 yen per month) to students who major in medicine, dentistry, or science and engineering at a university or a graduate school (excluding professional graduate schools) and have an intention to continue serving as SDF personnel after graduation (completion) by taking advantage of academic knowledge in their specialized fields.
Reserve Personnel become uniformed SDF personnel and are assigned to carry out their mission together with incumbent uniformed SDF personnel as part of frontline units following the issuance of a defense call-up order or other orders. Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel, some of whom are recruited among those with no prior experience as uniformed SDF personnel, are appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel after completing the necessary education and training.

As SDF Reserve Personnel and others work in their civilian jobs under normal circumstances, they need to adjust their work schedule to participate in periodic training exercises. Therefore, understanding and cooperation from the companies that employ these personnel are essential.

For this purpose, the MOD provides a special subsidy to the companies that employ SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and take necessary measures to allow such employees to attend training sessions for 30 days a year, by taking into consideration the burden on such companies. Also, in 2017, the MOD established a framework that allows the MOD/SDF to provide such information as the scheduled term of a training call-up and scheduled term during which SDF Reserve Personnel/SDF Ready Reserve Personnel are called up to perform actual operations and are appointed as uniformed SDF personnel, when requested by their employers. In 2018, the MOD established a system to provide a subsidy which aims to contribute to securing understanding and cooperation from the employers regarding the duties of SDF Reserve Personnel. Under the system, the employers are provided with a subsidy if
(1) SDF Reserve Personnel or SDF Ready Reserve Personnel respond to a defense operation call-up order, civil protection dispatch call-up order, or disaster relief call-up order, etc. or (2) if they have no choice but to leave their regular occupations due to injuries during their duties, etc. In addition, a special subsidy to the companies that cooperate with training of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel was established in 2020. The subsidy is paid to companies that employ people who, after being a Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel with no prior experience as uniformed SDF personnel, are appointed as SDF Ready Reserve Personnel after completing the necessary education and training, and that take necessary measures to allow such employees to attend training sessions.

SDF Ready Reserve Personnel were called up at the time of the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake, the 2018 July Heavy Rain, and the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake, while SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and SDF Reserve Personnel were called up at the time of the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis). They carried out their missions, including transportation of goods and water supply. In 2020, in a disaster relief mission to prevent infection of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) from spreading, SDF Reserve Personnel were called up and handled the situation.

The MOD has been implementing various measures to increase and enhance SDF Reserve Personnel and others because SDF Reserve Personnel are anticipated to be called up more often in response to earthquake and other disasters. Specifically, recruitment and appointment were expanded in 2018 to secure a wide variety of human resources from a broader range. The upper age limit for recruitment of leading privates and lower SDF Reserve Personnel was raised from “under 37” to “under 55” and the upper age limit for their continued appointment from “under 61” to “under 62.” An upper age limit is not set for persons with a license for a medical practitioner. Their continued appointment is approved when it is confirmed that they properly maintain their medical techniques and that there is no problem with their duties as SDF Reserve Personnel. The upper age limit for recruitment of leading privates and lower SDF Ready Reserve Personnel was raised from “under 32” to “under 50.” In 2019 a new system was established to appoint SDF Reserve Personnel without experience in the SDF as SDF Ready Reserve Personnel after certain education and training.

Also, the MOD promotes the use of SDF Reserve Personnel in a wide range of fields, such as the appointment of retired SDF pilots, who were reemployed in the private sector through the re-employment system, as SDF Reserve Personnel. (3) Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Other Civilian Personnel

There are approximately 21,000 civilian personnel — administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others — in addition to uniformed SDF personnel in the MOD/SDF. Civilian personnel are mainly recruited from those who have passed the Recruitment Examination for Comprehensive and General Service National Public Employees conducted by the National Personnel Authority (NPA), and those who have passed the Recruitment Examination for Ministry of Defense Specialists conducted by the MOD. After participating in the common training course, civilian personnel recruited in this process work in a wide range of fields.

Administrative officials are engaged in defense-related policy planning in the Internal Bureaus of the MOD and at the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA); analysis and evaluation at the Defense Intelligence Headquarters; and administrative works at the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout the country.

Technical and engineering officials are working in the Internal Bureaus of the MOD, the ATLA, the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout the country. They are engaged in constructing various defense facilities (headquarters, runways, magazines, etc.), carrying out research and development (R&D), efficient procurement, maintenance and improvement of a range of equipment, as well as providing mental health care for SDF personnel.

Instructors conduct advanced research on defense and provide high-quality education to SDF personnel at the National Institute for Defense Studies, the National Defense...
Academy, the National Defense Medical College, and other organizations.

In response to the “Directive for Organization and Allocation of Personnel Expense in FY2020 to Proceed with the Core Issue of the Cabinet Office” (decision by the Prime Minister on July 31, 2019), which listed “development of security arrangement while further improving the efficiency of defense force development” as one of the priority areas, the MOD has increased the number of defense officials in FY2020 in preparation for the implementation of NDPG and The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP).

### 2 Daily Education and Training

#### 1 Education of Uniformed SDF Personnel

Enhancing the ability of the individual uniformed SDF personnel who comprise SDF units is essential for the execution of the units’ duties. For this purpose, the respective SDF training units and schools provide opportunities for phased and systematic education according to rank and duties to nurture necessary qualities and instill knowledge and skills.

A considerable extent of human, temporal, and economic efforts such as securing instructors with special skills, and improving equipment and educational facilities, are necessary for providing education. In the event that personnel need to further improve their professional knowledge and skills, or that it is difficult for them to acquire such knowledge and skills within the SDF, the MOD/SDF commissions education to external institutions, including those abroad, as well as domestic companies and research institutes. Furthermore, based on the MTDP, in order to promote cross-domain joint operations, the MOD/SDF will strengthen joint education and standardize the curriculum, while at the same time improving the education infrastructure for the utilization of cutting-edge technology and expansion of recruitment including female SDF personnel.

#### 3 Measures Aimed at Ensuring Effective Use of Human Resources

##### 1 Effective Use of Human Resources

With regard to the personnel structure of the SDF, the authorized number of SDF personnel has been on a decline. On the other hand, there has been the need for more-skilled personnel and personnel with expertise in order to respond to the sophistication of equipment as well as the diversification and internationalization of SDF missions.

In light of such circumstances, while ensuring the robustness of the SDF, the NDPG and others plan to raise the mandatory early retirement age by one year during the period of the MTDP from 2020, and another one year during the period of the next MTDP in stages for each rank in order to ensure further utilization of older human resources who have rich knowledge, skills, and experience. The retirement age of personnel from the rank of Ichii (Captain (Ground Self-Defense Force [GSDF], Air Self-Defense Force [ASDF]/Lieutenant (Maritime Self-Defense Force [MSDF]) to Isso (Master Sergeant (GSDF, ASDF)/Petty Officer 1st Class (MSDF)) was raised in 2020. The SDF also continues to expand reenrollment after retirement (up to the age of 65) and further promotes utilization of the skills of retired SDF personnel in fields requiring high levels of expertise.

In addition, the SDF will promote manpower saving and automation by leveraging technological innovations such as artificial intelligence. In addition, in order to ensure an operating ratio with a limited number of personnel, the crew system was introduced in some MSDF vessels, where some crews take shifts to increase the number of operation days. The introduction of this crew system to new types of destroyers (FFM) is being considered.

![Fig. IV-1-1-4](https://example.com/figIV114.png) Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Mandatory Retirement Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General (GSDF), Vice Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF)</td>
<td>Sho</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), Major General (ASDF)</td>
<td>Shinsa</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel (GSDF, Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF))</td>
<td>Isso</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF), Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF)</td>
<td>Nisa</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Major (ASDF)</td>
<td>Sosha</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain (ASDF)</td>
<td>Ichii</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second Lieutenant (ASDF)</td>
<td>Sain</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer 2nd Class (GSDF), Warrant Officer (MSDF), Warrant Officer (ASDF)</td>
<td>Suna</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)</td>
<td>Sosha</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF)</td>
<td>Isso</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)</td>
<td>Niso</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Sosha</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leading Seaman (MSDF), Leading Seaman (ASDF)</td>
<td>Ichii</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Airman Second Class (ASDF)</td>
<td>Nii</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Airman Third Class (ASDF)</td>
<td>Noh</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF personnel who hold the rank of General (GSDF and ASDF) or Admiral (MSDF), and serve as Chief of Staff of Joint Staff Office, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, or ASDF Chief of Staff is 60.
2. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF personnel who hold positions such as physician, dentist, pharmacist, musician, railway police officer, or information analyst is 60.

**Source:** Reference 54 (Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel, etc.)
Voice of SDF Personnel Studying at Graduate Schools etc. at Home or Abroad

KINA Satoshi, First Lieutenant, Institute of Urban Innovation, Yokohama National University (Yokohama City, Kanagawa Prefecture)
After graduating from the JGSDF Officer Candidate School and then working in the SDF for several years, I applied for a graduate school trainee and entered Yokohama National University graduate school. After earning a master’s degree, I am now working on research concerning “rescue activities in the event of a Tokyo inland earthquake” in a doctoral course. At the moment, a dozen or so GSDF officers, including myself, are studying in graduate schools at home and abroad to cultivate the ability to think for problem solving, which is required from technical officers. After my study, I want to exercise my ability to identify and solve problems in R&D of defense equipment, for example.

Georgetown University, School of Foreign Services the United States)
Lieutenant Commander OKADA Wataru (currently belongs to JMSDF Staff College)
I have been studying foreign policy and international relations since September 2019 at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Services in Washington DC. The study is scheduled to run for two years. Teachers include active officials of the Department of State and the Department of Defense in addition to scholars. Students of diverse nationalities and social experiences are heatedly discussing all sorts of issues facing the international community, from human rights and development to military affairs, from multilateral viewpoints.

I will study hard in friendly rivalry with classmates who aspire to exert themselves for international peace at a government agency, United Nation’s organization, international NGO, etc. after graduation. After returning to Japan, I will contribute to Japan’s defense and stability of the international community.

Major NAGAYOSHI Takeshi, Student, Republic of Korea Joint Forces Military University
currently belongs to Operations Division, Operations and Intelligence Department, Air Staff Office)
In the one year since January 2019, I have completed an official course at the Joint Forces Military University of the Republic of Korea. The students of the course included 53 international students from 29 countries in addition to 303 Korean officers. I have been able to cultivate the knowledge and abilities necessary for a future commander and staff while communicating not only with Korean officers but also officers from other countries. At the time of graduation, I was the best student and wrote the best research paper among 14 students from foreign air forces and ASDF; and I received the Joint Forces Military University President Prize for the achievements. I would be happy if I could bridge the two countries by taking advantage of the bonds that I have built through my study at the university.
SDF’s Emergency Rations

The SDF is routinely stocking emergency rations in preparation for various contingencies. On the occasions of disaster relief operations and various exercises, SDF personnel consume the rations in order to take in nutrients necessary for maintaining and enhancing their physical fitness. The emergency rations are suitable for long-term storage of three years. They are stored at supply depots across Japan in the first year after procurement and at camps in the second year. They are consumed during exercises and on other occasions in the third year. The list of emergency rations includes 20 food items, such as “chikuzen-ni” (braised chicken and vegetables), pork roast chicken, “mabo tofu” (a spicy dish of tofu and minced meat). The items are well-balanced between Japanese, Chinese and Western foods in order to provide a sufficient variety to enable SDF personnel to consume the rations every day without losing appetite. While emergency rations currently procured are retort pouch foods, a set of which contains rice and side dishes as well as a spoon and a tray, those procured previously were canned foods. The procurement of canned foods, which were first adopted in 1954, has been discontinued because, thanks to technological advances, retort pouch foods currently available are as suitable for long-term storage as canned foods are. While emergency rations provided to units are usually consumed after being boiled using field cooking appliances, they can be consumed anywhere and at any time as they can also be warmed using heating agents. The list of rations is periodically changed. Items to be procured in the future, which will be selected from the viewpoints of increasing the nutrition volume and better meeting preferences, include pastas and buns.

Defensive Memorial Cordons, Defensive Meritorious Badges and Medals for Contribution to Unit Merits

As one of the important personnel measures for enhancing morale of SDF personnel and harmonizing units, Defensive Meritorious Badges and Medals for Contribution to Unit Merits are awarded to personnel who worked hard on their duties and who contributed to their unit with commendable achievements in carrying out their duties.

Recognized personnel may wear Defensive Meritorious Badges and Medals for Contribution to Unit Merits on their left chest at SDF ceremonies and other occasions.

In particular, wearing decorations and medals to mark honor and pride is customary in places for exchange with foreign military personnel. Therefore, these medals are useful for SDF personnel who work globally and engage in international exchanges.
Chapter 1
Human Resource Base that Sustains the Defense Capability

2 Improvement of Living and Work Environment and Treatment

To enable all SDF personnel to maintain high morale and continue to fully exercise their ability, the NDPG and the MTDP state that the MOD/SDF will improve living and work environment. Specifically, the SDF will steadily renew aged everyday life/workplace fixtures, secure the necessary quantities of everyday necessities in addition to accelerating the securing and reconstruction of the necessary barracks and housing, and proceed with measures against aging and earthquake proofing of facilities.

Because SDF personnel carry out their missions under a severe environment, the SDF will improve their treatment based on the special nature of their missions and work environment. Specifically, in order to ensure appropriate treatment in accordance with the risk and special nature of their missions and the characteristics of the area of the office, the SDF will make improvements to special work allowance, etc. and procure portable beds and better emergency rations to improve their ability to respond to disasters. To enable SDF personnel to fulfill their missions with high morale and pride, the MOD/SDF will improve their treatment through measures concerning honors and privileges, including the enhancement of the defensive meritorious badges to appropriately acknowledge their achievements.

In light of the severe recruitment environment, the Act on Remuneration, etc. of Ministry of Defense Personnel was revised in 2019 to raise salaries with a focus on starting pay.

3 Dealing with Retirement and Re-employment of SDF Personnel

In order to maintain the strength of the SDF, many uniformed SDF personnel retire in their mid-50s (personnel serving under the early retirement system) or in their 20s to mid-30s (uniformed SDF personnel serving under the fixed-term service system). Therefore, many of them need to find another job after retirement in order to secure their livelihoods.

Since supporting re-employment is the responsibility of the Japanese Government (the MOD) as the employer, and is crucial both for resolving any concerns that uniformed SDF personnel may have about their future as well as for securing qualified human resources, the MOD conducts support measures such as occupational training useful for their re-employment.

In addition, as the MOD does not have the authority to provide them with employment placement, the Foundation for the SDF Personnel Support Association provides free job consultation services for retired SDF personnel with permission from the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare and the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism.

Retired uniformed SDF personnel have excellent abilities in planning, leadership, faculty, cooperativeness, and responsibility gained through their work performance, education and training. Furthermore, they have various qualifications and licenses acquired through their duties and vocational training. Therefore, they are making positive contributions in a broad range of sectors, including manufacturing and service industries, as well as finance, insurance, real estate, and construction industries, in addition to the areas of disaster prevention and risk management at local governments.

Based on the NDPG and MTDP, the MOD/SDF will strive to further improve re-employment support by expanding vocational training subjects and support for step-by-step acquisition of qualifications before their retirement. The MOD also strives to further utilize retired SDF personnel while strengthening collaboration with local governments and related organizations from the perspective of utilizing the knowledge, skills, and experience of retired SDF personnel. Specifically, as of the end of March 2020, a total of 575 retired SDF personnel work as crisis management officers at local governments’ disaster prevention bureaus—46 prefectural bureaus have 102 of them in total, and 398 municipal bureaus have 473. As this strengthens collaboration with local governments and enhances the ability to deal with crisis management, including disaster prevention, the MOD/SDF will continue active support for the utilization of retired SDF personnel in local governments’ disaster prevention bureaus by further enhancing these efforts.

10 In 2020, special provisions are made for disaster dispatch allowances for employees engaged in disaster dispatch to prevent the spread of new coronavirus infections.
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### Re-employment support for uniformed SDF personnel serving under the fixed-term service system

- Re-employment support for uniformed SDF personnel retiring at an early age

- Major occupational training for re-employment

### Major occupational training for re-employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Training Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle operation</td>
<td>Large-sized, Regular-sized, Semi-medium-sized, Special (large-sized), Medium-sized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation of facility machines</td>
<td>Forklift, Boiler engineer, Heavy-duty vehicle, Crane, Vehicle for high-place work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunication technology</td>
<td>Electrician, Licensed electrician, Telecommunication worker, Special radio communication operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handling of dangerous materials</td>
<td>Hazardous material engineer, Person responsible for handling poisons and deleterious substances, Person responsible for manufacturing safety of high pressure gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor management practice, etc.</td>
<td>Security guard certification examination, Operation manager, Drone operator, Marine technician, Social and labor insurance consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information processing technique</td>
<td>Examination for basic computer skills, Microsoft Office Specialist, IT Passport, Fundamental information technology engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare</td>
<td>First-level training for nursing care workers, Mental health management, Care fitter, Housing environment coordinator for elderly and disabled people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal practice, etc.</td>
<td>Real estate transaction specialist, Administrative scrivener, Certified professional secretary examination, Registered customs specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Disaster prevention and crisis management education, Medical office work, Course for civil servant examination, Welding technician, Financial planner, Fire defense equipment officer, Health officer, Condominium manager, Official Business Skill Test in Book-keeping, Care clerk, Auto technician, Medical clerk, Chef, TOEIC, Dispensing fee calculation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Occupational training in about 150 topics, including those above, are conducted.

### Re-employment Support in FY2019

- Government service/association: 3.0%
- Agriculture and forestry/Fishery/Mining: 1.0%
- Wholesale and retail trade: 6.3%
- Construction: 8.0%
- Finance/Insurance/Real estate: 8.1%
- Manufacturing: 15.4%
- Transport/Communication/Telecom, radio, gas, oil, water: 18.6%
- Service: 39.2%

**Termination of term**

- Number of personnel who applied for re-employment support: 1,676
- Number of personnel who found a job: 1,669
- Percentage of personnel who found a job: 99.3%

**Early age retirement**

- Number of personnel who applied for re-employment support: 3,605
- Number of personnel who found a job: 3,579
- Percentage of personnel who found a job: 99.3%
Voice of a Re-employed SDF Personnel

Mr. ABE Asao, Licensed Pilot, Tokyo Bay Licensed Pilots’ Association

I am working as a maritime pilot at the Tokyo Bay Licensed Pilots’ Association. My job is to be on board and provide advice on the steering of large ships when they enter and leave ports in Tokyo Bay, including Port of Tokyo, Kawasaki, Yokohama and Chiba, to ensure safety of the ships and ports. The knowledge and experience I have developed in my SDF career are helpful in acquiring the national maritime pilot qualification and for my job performance as a licensed pilot. Working as a pilot is a rewarding job. I will further develop my knowledge and experience so that I can contribute to society.

Voice of a Re-employed SDF Personnel

Mr. KURIHARA Kazuto, Section 2, Production Division 1, Narita Laboratory, Dainichiseika Color & Chemicals Mfg. Co., Ltd.

After completing my four-year term of service at 3rd Anti-aircraft Company, GSDF Air Defense School Unit, I joined Dainichiseika Color & Chemicals Mfg. Co., Ltd. I was anxious about re-employment, but was able to successfully balance my job searching and SDF duties thanks to dedicated support from my re-employment supporter. After joining the company, I was assigned to Narita Laboratory, where I am producing colorant for plastics. My products are used for caps of shampoo and food bottles. I feel greatly satisfied with my work when I see such products sold in stores. We have many former SDF personnel in my workplace, and I am working happily and positively every day.

Voice of the Employer

Mr. FUNAKURA Kazuhisa, Chairman, Tokyo Bay Licensed Pilots’ Association

With about 170 licensed pilots, ours is the biggest pilots’ association in Japan and handles pilot operations over the entire Tokyo Bay. The job of licensed maritime pilots is to direct steering for captains of huge tankers, LNG ships, large container ships and other ships. With the enforcement of the amended Pilotage Act in 2007, not only former captains of ocean-going ships but also captains of coasting vessels and public ships may become licensed pilots. There are eight licensed pilots who are SDF veterans across the country, and one of them is working at our association. He tirelessly strives for safe and efficient navigation of ships taking advantage of his experience as a former ship captain.

Voice of the Employer

Mr. HAGIWARA Kunio, Manager of the General Affairs Department, Narita Laboratory, Dainichiseika Color & Chemicals Mfg. Co., Ltd.

Our company produces “colors,” including paints, colorant and print inks. Our laboratory produces colorants for plastic daily necessities, home appliances and automobiles. Over 100 out of the 230 employees are former SDF personnel, forming the core of the production department. (Almost 500 former SDF personnel are working in the whole company.) I am pleased to see that, in recent years, more former SDF personnel have a sense of responsibility and a cooperative nature in addition to patience and physical strength cultivated in the SDF. With a high retention rate, they will continue to be indispensable members of our company. Actually, I myself retired from SDF 35 years ago and have now become a general manager of our company.
Meanwhile, with regard to the re-employment of SDF personnel, new regulations about re-employment were introduced in October 2015, replacing the former prior approval system. As are the cases in other national government employees, the following three regulations were put in place in order to ensure the trust of the public regarding the fairness of official duties: (1) regulation on requesting re-employment of other personnel and retired personnel and requesting information; (2) regulation on seeking employment opportunities at companies in which retired personnel had a stake whilst in office; and (3) regulation on re-seeking employment opportunities at companies in which retired personnel and requesting information; (2) regulation on re-employment of other personnel and retired personnel; (3) regulation on re-employment of other personnel and retired personnel making requests. In order to ensure strict observation of these regulations, bodies comprised of academic experts with no history serving as SDF members (Defense Personnel Review Board’s Separate Meeting for Monitoring Reemployment and Cabinet Office’s Re-employment Surveillance Commission) monitor the situation, and any violation will be met with penalties. Additionally, for the purpose of appropriate implementation of unified management and disclosure of re-employment information by institutionalizing notification and announcement of such information by the Cabinet, it has been decided that information on the re-employment status of retired SDF personnel who were in managerial positions (equivalent to the position of Senior Coordinator in the MOD or higher) is to be published every fiscal year by the Cabinet. In response to the introduction of this system in FY2015, notifications of re-employment of the retired SDF personnel who were in managerial positions submitted during FY2018 were compiled, and a total of 231 cases were officially announced in September 2019.

5 Initiatives to Maintain Strong Discipline

The MOD/SDF has gained great expectations from the public and in order for the SDF to perform its maximum ability on duty, it is essential to achieve support and trust from the public. To this end, the SDF is required to always maintain strong discipline.

The MOD/SDF has so far strived to foster well-disciplined personnel by impressing in them an awareness of compliance with the law through setting up such campaign periods as the “MOD Anti-Drug Abuse Month,” “Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Week,” and “Self-Defense Personnel Harassment Prevention Week” and implemented various measures such as thorough instructions on service discipline.

Since 2019 the MOD/SDF has been working to prevent harassment by such means as mandatory education on harassment prevention for newly appointed directors of the ministry and other executives.

In addition, under the leadership of Minister of Defense Kono, in order to eradicate disciplinary violations such as assault, injury and power harassment, the standards for disciplinary action have been tightened since March 2020.

6 Initiatives to Prevent Suicide among SDF Personnel

SDF personnel suicides reached a record 101 in FY2005, and have subsequently increased and decreased, with 59 suicides in FY2019. The suicide of SDF members is truly a great tragedy for both the individuals themselves and their bereaved families. It also represents a great loss to the MOD/SDF in terms of the loss of capable personnel, and the MOD/SDF is taking ongoing measures to prevent suicides, including the following initiatives: (1) Expansion and enhancement of the counseling system (internal/external counselors, a 24-hour telephone counseling hotline, assignment of clinical psychotherapists at camps and bases, etc.); (2) Strengthening of education to raise awareness about mental health for commanders as well as enlisted personnel; and (3) Establishment of a campaign period for enhancing mental health care, close monitoring by commanders of the mental health condition of their subordinates whose working environment has been changed due to personnel transfers, etc., and distribution of various reference materials. In 2019 the

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11 Stipulated in Parts 2, 3 and 4 of Article 65 of the SDF Law
MOD/SDF promoted measures including the establishment of a counseling service by lawyers experienced in harassment cases in order to further improve the effectiveness of suicide prevention measures.

7 Commemorating Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty

Since the establishment of the National Police Reserve in 1950 and through its evolution via the National Safety Force and the Coastal Safety Force into the SDF today, SDF personnel have been striving to accomplish the noble mission of protecting the peace and independence of Japan. They have been devoting themselves unstintingly to training, day and night, to live up to the expectations and trust of Japanese citizens, regardless of danger, and with a strong sense of responsibility. During this time period, however, more than 1,900 personnel have lost their lives in the line of duty.

In the MOD/SDF, funeral ceremonies in order to express condolences are carried out by each unit to which the personnel who perished in the line of duty belonged. Moreover, in order to eternally recognize the achievements of the SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty, and to express deep honor and condolences, memorial ceremonies are carried out in various forms, such as the Memorial Service for members of the SDF personnel who lost their lives in the line of duty conducted with the participation of the Prime Minister. Achievements of 12 SDF members (4 GSDF, 4 MSDF, and 3 ASDF members, and one member of another organization) who lost their lives in the line of duty were recognized in a Memorial Service in FY2019.12

The Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty was constructed in 1962 in Ichigaya. In 1998, the Memorial Zone in its current form was completed by combining this monument with other monuments located in the same area. The MOD holds an annual memorial ceremony for SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty with the attendance of surviving family members, the Prime Minister, high-ranking officials of the MOD/SDF including the Minister of Defense, former Defense Ministers, and others. At the Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty in the Memorial Zone, there is an iron plate containing the names and other information of personnel who perished in the line of duty. When foreign dignitaries such as Defense Ministers visit the MOD, they make offerings of flowers, expressing their respect and condolences to personnel who perished in the line of duty. Memorial ceremonies are also held at individual SDF posts and bases.

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12 The Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty was constructed in 1962 in Ichigaya. In 1998, the Memorial Zone in its current form was completed by combining this monument with other monuments located in the same area. The MOD holds an annual memorial ceremony for SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty with the attendance of surviving family members, the Prime Minister, high-ranking officials of the MOD/SDF including the Minister of Defense, former Defense Ministers, and others. At the Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty in the Memorial Zone, there is an iron plate containing the names and other information of personnel who perished in the line of duty. When foreign dignitaries such as Defense Ministers visit the MOD, they make offerings of flowers, expressing their respect and condolences to personnel who perished in the line of duty. Memorial ceremonies are also held at individual SDF posts and bases.
Further Promotion of Work-Life Balance and Women’s Participation

The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, and both the number and the duration of situations requiring the MOD/SDF’s response are increasing. On the other hand, it is anticipated that a number of MOD staff, both male and female, will face time and commuting constraints for childcare, nursing care and other reasons due to big changes in social structure.

Amid such challenging circumstances, ensuring preparedness to consistently respond to various situations requires creating an environment that enables staff to be sound both mentally and physically, maintain high morale, and fully demonstrate their abilities. On the basis of this view, the MOD/SDF promotes initiatives to achieve work-life balance of its staff members.

Also, the MOD/SDF has been proactively encouraging the active participation of female personnel, and the number of female personnel is on the rise.

The MOD/SDF has been conducting a variety of initiatives in order to promote work-life balance and the further expansion of the recruitment and promotion of female personnel in a unified manner, such as formulating various plans1 that include three reforms: (1) working style reform; (2) reform to combine a successful career with childrearing and nursing care; and (3) reform for promoting active engagement of female personnel. In addition, the Committee to Promote Working Style Reform of the Internal Bureau Staff has been discussing and implementing initiatives to promote working style reform and reviewing the process of work under the leadership of the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense.

Working Style Reform

(1) Value and Mentality Reform
In order to implement working style reform, focus needs to be placed especially on reforming the values and mentality of staff in managerial positions regarding working style. Since FY2017, the MOD/SDF has been implementing educational initiatives, such as message given by the MOD/SDF leaders, seminars, and lecture meetings aimed at raising awareness concerning working style reform and the concept of work-life balance. With the increase of personnel facing time/commuting constraints for child/family care, the MOD/SDF is also promoting correction of long working hours and encouraging taking leave to ensure proper work-life balance so that every member can exert his/her full potential.

(2) Work Reform in the Workplace
It is important that initiatives for the promotion of work-life balance are implemented in a way which fits the individual workplaces, and that staff members themselves consider specific measures for improving their workplace environment. This approach will lead to developing effective initiatives and workplace climate. Based on this perspective, since 2016, the annual “Competition for initiatives to promote Working Style Reform at the Ministry of Defense” has been held during the campaign period for enhancing work-life balance, etc. The Minister of Defense and the State Minister of Defense honored particularly excellent initiatives, out of the applications received from various organizations and others, and used them to help achieve work reform at each workplace.

(3) Flexible Working Hours and Location
Realizing more flexible working hours and work locations is necessary in light of factors such as workload fluctuations and time constraints faced by individuals. For this reason, the MOD/SDF introduced the flextime system in 2016 and enabled its staff to choose Flexible Working Hours by dividing early/late shifts into multiple stages. In addition, telework, a work style that allows working at home, has started in the Internal Bureau of...

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the MOD in FY2017 and it has been expanded to other organizations such as individual Staff Offices, Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance, and South Kanto Defense Bureau. Other organizations that have not started telework are also working to make this work system available by FY2020.

### Reform to Combine a Successful Career with Childrearing and Nursing Care

In order for MOD/SDF staff, both male and female, to be successful in their careers while realizing work-life balance, it is necessary to establish a system that enables balancing work with childrearing/nursing care, and to ensure childcare services tailored to the irregular working patterns unique to the SDF.

#### (1) Development of an Environment that Enables Staff to Realize a Successful Career While Engaging in Childrearing and Nursing Care

The MOD/SDF has developed various schemes, which enable staff to balance work with childrearing/nursing care, such as ensuring substitute personnel for staff who take childcare leave and other leave. In particular, the ministry is encouraging its male staff to take childcare leave to promote their participation in family settings. Since FY2020, the ministry is strongly working to enable all male staff with a newborn child to take childcare leave or time off work for a total of one month or more. Also the target rate of childcare leave acquisition by male staff is set at 13% by FY2020.

The MOD/SDF is also developing an environment that enables staff to balance work life with their family life by distributing e-mail newsletters to help its staff to return to work smoothly after childcare leave and encouraging staff to use a “childcare form” to facilitate managers’ and the human resources department’s thorough and detailed planning.

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**VOICE**

*Voice of a Father Enjoying Child Rearing*

Major KAIGI Hajime,
Commander of the 4th Company, the 26th Infantry Regiment, GSDF (Asahikawa City, Hokkaido)

The SDF has a system in which both the mothers and fathers of a child can take child care leave until the child reaches the age of 3. In addition, male personnel can take paid leave up to 7 days before and after the delivery.

The Kaigi family was blessed with our second child in December 2018. Due to my wife’s job on this occasion, I was able to have the precious experience of devoting myself to child rearing for about two months from January to March 2019 by taking child care leave. I had some concerns because I did not take child care leave upon the birth of our first child and most of the child rearing tasks were done by my wife. However, I was able to successfully complete my child rearing mission during the period thanks to the understanding of my superior and coworkers and the guidance of my wife.

In FY2018, the rate of male SDF personnel taking child care leave was only about 3.5% and the rate of male national civil servants doing so was about 12%. The environment may not be friendly for males to take child care leave. However, the SDF will also change in response to the social trend in this regard. As a person who took child care leave, I will cooperate in developing an environment that is friendly for male SDF personnel to take child care leave and actively help coworkers who take child care leave.
understanding of the situation regarding childcare.

The MOD/SDF has a system to rehire SDF personnel who have previously resigned mid-career. It reassessed the system so that former SDF personnel who had resigned in their mid-career due to childrearing and nursing care could be reemployed from January 2017. The MOD/SDF started recruitment based on this system in January 2018.

(2) Ensuring Childcare Services

To allow SDF personnel who are rearing children to concentrate on their duties, it is important to ensure childcare services tailored to the irregular working patterns unique to the SDF. Since April 2007, the MOD/SDF has set up workplace nurseries at GSDF Camp Mishuku, GSDF Camp Kumamoto, GSDF Camp Makomanai, GSDF Asaka Camp housing district, MSDF Yokosuka Naval Base district, ASDF Iruma Air Base, Ichigaya district, where the MOD is located, and National Defense Medical College.

In addition, in the event of emergency operations such as disaster relief, the MOD promotes measures to provide temporary childcare in SDF camps and bases for children of SDF personnel who have no alternative but to attend to duties with their children.

3 Reform for Promoting the Careers of Female Personnel

For the further expansion of the recruitment and promotion of female personnel, the MOD/SDF has been making various efforts to advance the careers of motivated and qualified female personnel by setting up specific goals with regard to the recruitment and promotion of female personnel under the “Action Plan for Promoting the Active Participation of Female Employees and Work-Life Balance.” Moreover, the MOD formulated the “Initiative to Promote Active Engagement of Female SDF Personnel – Aiming for Attractive SDF that Adapts to the Times and Environment” (the “Initiative”) in April 2017 to specify its conceptual policy for promoting the active participation of female SDF personnel.

(1) Significance of Promoting Active Engagement of Female SDF Personnel and Personnel Management Policy

The “Initiative” outlines the significance of promoting the active participation of female personnel and the MOD/SDF personnel management policy. Specifically, with SDF duties becoming increasingly diverse and complex, SDF personnel are required, more than ever, to have multifaceted capabilities including higher levels of knowledge, decision-making ability, and skills.

In addition, under a severe recruitment environment due to the declining birthrate and continuing trend of higher education, it is anticipated that the number of SDF personnel with time and location restraints, including those involved in childcare, nursing care, and other responsibilities, will significantly increase.

In light of these changes, the SDF is required to evolve from a conventional organization with an emphasis on homogeneity among the members, into an organization that is capable of incorporating diverse human resources in a flexible manner.

At present, the largest human resource that the SDF has not been able to fully utilize is women, who account for half of the population targeted for recruitment. Promoting the active engagement of female SDF personnel has the following significance: (1) securing useful human resources; (2) utilizing diverse perspectives; and (3)
reflecting values of the nation. For this reason, the MOD/SDF has decided to open up a path for female personnel with motivation, ability, and aptitude to have opportunities to demonstrate their abilities in various fields, and aim for doubling the ratio of female SDF personnel.

In terms of employing and promoting female SDF personnel, the MOD/SDF sets out a personnel management policy to ensure equal opportunity between men and women and assign the right person to the right place based on the person’s motivation and ability/aptitude. In December 2019, a woman assumed the role of commanding officer of an Aegis destroyer for the first time, promoting active participation of female SDF personnel.

(2) Removal of the Assignment Restriction of Female SDF Personnel
The MOD/SDF has been reviewing the restriction of assignment of female personnel. With the removal of the restriction on female assignments in submarines in December 2018, assignment restriction against females was completely removed with the exception of the units where female personnel cannot be assigned for reasons of maternity protection (a part of the GSDF Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit [chemical] and Tunnel Company Units).

With the removal of the restriction on female assignments, in 2018, the first female submarine officer appeared. Training of female submarine personnel was started in January 2020. Furthermore, in March 2020, a female SDF personnel completed a basic parachute training course of the Airborne Training Unit and was assigned to the GSDF 1st Airborne Brigade.

(3) Expansion of the Recruitment of Female Personnel
a. Female SDF Personnel
As of the end of March 2020, the number of female SDF personnel is about 17,000 (about 7.4% of total SDF personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March 2010, about 5.2% of total SDF personnel), this is a rise of 2.2 percentage points, indicating that the ratio of female SDF personnel has been on the rise in recent years.

In order to increase the proportion of female SDF personnel among total SDF personnel to over 9% by FY2027, the MOD/SDF aims to ensure that women account for more than 10% of total newly employed SDF personnel in and after FY2017. Specifically, in order to increase the number of recruits through such measures as the elimination of the gender quota and the increase in the scheduled number of female recruits, the SDF will actively recruit women, promote their active participation, and improve education, living, and work environments for female SDF personnel.

In addition, with regard to promotion, MDO/SDF aims to increase the proportion of women among SDF personnel with a rank of field officer or higher to over 3.1%. As for the careers of the personnel anticipated to reach a rank of field officer or higher, emphasis is given on assigning them to a commander or assistant commander post at the rank of company officer, with the hope of allowing them to gain experience.

b. Female Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Others
As of the end of March 2020, the number of female civilian personnel—administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, and instructors, and others—is approximately 3,400 (about 25.2% of total civilian personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March 2010 when females made up 23% of the total civilian personnel), this is a rise of 2.2 percentage points, indicating that the ratio of female civilian personnel is on a rising trend in recent years.

With regard to recruitment, in line with the overall government target, the MOD has set up its goal of ensuring that women account for over 30% of recruits in and after FY2016. Regarding promotion, as a goal to be achieved by the end of FY2020, the proportion of women of the Division-Director level at local organizations and Assistant-Division-Director level at the ministry proper or equivalent would be approximately 5%, and the proportion of women of the Division-Director level at the ministry proper or equivalent is approximately 2%, and the proportion of women of the Unit-Chief level at the ministry proper or equivalent should be approximately 27%.
Active Participation of Female Personnel

Sergeant HASHIBA Reina, 1st Airborne Brigade Headquarter Company, GSDF (Funabashi City, Chiba Prefecture)

I completed the 319th basic parachute training course held by the Airborne Training Unit and was assigned to the 1st Airborne Brigade, which was my heart’s desire from my childhood.

For the promotion of a gender equal society, the limitation on the assignment of female SDF personnel was removed. I am happy that opportunities for women’s participation are expanded as well as grateful for a warm welcome by members of the 1st Airborne Brigade and enthusiastic coaching by instructors of the Airborne Training Unit.

Now I am standing at the start line as a paratrooper, I will enhance my spirit, skills, and physical strength, and devote myself to giving my all every day.

Lieutenant Commander TAKAKI Sayaka, Marine Staff Office (Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo)

The Ships and Weapons Division handles ship construction and maintenance. I am in charge of submarines and provide technical support, including checks of drawings and processes during construction, as well as trouble shooting.

I’m also a mother of two children. My superior, colleagues and family members are very sympathetic and helpful. For example, my husband is also SDF personnel and took child-care leave for half a year for each child. Thanks to his help, I was able to return to my workplace early. Also my husband takes care of our children when I am absent due to duty or an official trip.

My current goal is to work reasonably to create better ships. I will continue to value both family and work.

Captain SATO Saori, Special Airlift Group, ASDF (Chitose City, Hokkaido)

I work for the Special Airlift Group as a loadmaster officer (so-called cabin crew) of the B-777 government aircraft for overseas visits by dignitaries including the prime minister. Carrying dignitaries to their destinations safely and surely is an important task that plays a part in Japan’s diplomacy and thereby contributes to the peace and safety of the country. To this purpose, I undergo hard training on a daily basis so that I can provide safe and comfortable travel and ensure operation on schedule in cooperation with other crew members. Attending dignitaries puts me under a lot of pressure but smiles and words of appreciations from the passengers are my reward. I am working with pride and motivation in this job, which has been my dream since childhood.
Recruitment of women started in the general service area of the GSDF
Female GSDF personnel
Female MSDF personnel
Female ASDF personnel
Total number of female SDF personnel / Total number of SDF personnel

Note: As of the end of March 2020, the total number of female SDF personnel is 16,863 (approximately 7.4% of the total number of the SDF personnel)
Military technologies in recent years are showing remarkable advances. Against the backdrop of such technological advances, contemporary warfare increasingly features capabilities combined across all domains: not only land, sea and air but also new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. Aiming to improve overall military capability, states are seeking to gain superiority in technologies that undergird capabilities in these new domains. They endeavor to develop weapons that leverage cutting-edge, potentially game-changing technologies. They also engage in research of autonomous unmanned weapon systems equipped with artificial intelligence (AI). Further technological innovations in quantum technology including quantum computing and quantum cryptography and the information and communication technology (ICT) sector including the 5th generation mobile communication system (5G) will make it even more difficult to forecast future warfare.

While Japan is facing severe financial conditions, imports of foreign equipment are increasing due to their high-performance and the complex trends of defense equipment. On the other hand, Japan’s defense industry has been exposed to harsh conditions due to a downward trend in the number of procured equipment from domestic companies and other reasons.

Amid such a situation, it is essential to work on (1) reviewing equipment structure, (2) reinforcing technology base, (3) optimizing equipment procurement, (4) strengthening defense industrial base, and (5) promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation in order to ensure a necessary and sufficient defense capability in terms of both quality and quantity for the construction of a Multi-domain Defense Force.

### Section 1  
**Initiatives for Construction of Optimized Equipment Structure**

In order to acquire sufficient capabilities for cross-domain operations in view of the aging population with a declining birth rate and the severe fiscal situation, it is essential to further promote initiatives to optimize equipment structure. The Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDP) provides that the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will work on the following items to build an effective and optimized equipment structure from the perspective of joint operation.

1. **Enhancement of Joint Staff Functions**

In order to examine the current equipment structure of each SDF service and build an effective and optimized equipment structure from the perspective of joint operation, the MOD/SDF will study enhancement of the equipment structure at the Joint Staff, take necessary measures, and undertake the building of an equipment structure from the perspective of joint operation at an appropriate time during the MTDP period.

2. **Development of Product Families, Standardization of Specifications, Joint Procurement, etc.**

So far, based on a comprehensive perspective, the MOD has been striving to reduce expenses incurred in development, acquisition, and maintenance by the development of product families, standardization of equipment specifications, and joint procurement of equipment common to all SDF services. For the development of product families, for example, the MTDP plans to introduce vehicle families of next generation wheeled armored vehicles of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) that include personnel transport type, command communication type, and patient transportation type, and develop a radar with standardized specifications as a

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1 This refers to adding different variations to the functions and performance of equipment to enable them to respond to different operational demands, while standardizing their basic component parts.
successor to multiple types of radar, including coastal radar and low-altitude radar of the GSDF. For joint procurement of equipment common to SDF services, Type-11 short-range surface-to-air guided missiles of the GSDF and surface-to-air guided missiles for air base defense of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) share common specifications, potentially facilitating a reduction in unit prices through procurement in one contract. The MOD will examine specific effects from this effort.

3 Suspending Operation of Equipment of Lowered Priority

The MTDP plans to reduce the number of aircraft types, suspend the use of equipment of lowered priority, and review or terminate projects of low cost-effectiveness.

Specifically, 203mm self-propelled howitzer and other equipment whose priority is low in light of the security environment surrounding Japan will not be replaced. Biological Reconnaissance Vehicles and other equipment that are procured in a small number with low cost effectiveness will be decommissioned while maintaining the capabilities.

2 Initiatives to Make the Most of Limited Human Resources (Manpower Saving and Automation)

In view of the severe security environment surrounding Japan and the rapid development of the aging population with a declining birth rate, it is important to maximize defense capability by effectively utilizing the limited human resources to the utmost. Therefore, the current MTDP plans to actively work on manpower saving and automation of defense equipment.

1 Initiatives for Automation

The MTDP plans to actively promote initiatives towards automation through such means as the introduction of AI to data processing and decision making regarding unit operation, the procurement of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and R&D of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs).

Specifically, the MOD/SDF will actively promote the use of unmanned equipment, which includes the procurement of Global Hawk and Ship-Based UAVs of the MSDF, and consideration to introduce long-endurance UAVs to strengthen offshore surveillance capabilities on the vast Pacific side, while at the same time promoting AI utilization and related human resource development. In addition, the MOD/SDF plans to promote research on UUV with convertible mission modules and research on the detection of suspicious ships based on the analysis of data concerning an automatic identification system (AIS) using AI.

2 Initiatives for Manpower Saving

The MTDP plans to actively promote initiatives to save manpower through such means as streamlining in the design of new types of destroyers (FFM) and submarines and use of remote control for radar sites and other equipment. Other initiatives include the introduction of patrol vessels that can be operated by a smaller crew (about 30 members) through dedication to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
Reinforcing Technology Base

1 Necessity of Reinforcing Technology Base

As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe, it is necessary to ensure technological superiority by effectively utilizing Japan’s advanced technological strength in order to protect the lives and property of Japanese people in any situation. Particularly in recent years, with the rapid advances in technological innovation, it is forecast that we will see the operationalization of so-called game-changing technology that will completely transform combat aspects in the future, and the United States and other countries are proceeding hastily with research and development.

Thus, as a nation, strategically working on ways to ensure technological superiority and ensuring advanced technology base are important from the perspective of creating superior defense equipment and ensuring Japan’s security. Also, the strengthening of the technology base is a pressing issue. The state-of-the-art military technologies in each country are sensitive technologies that must not be easily shared with other countries. From the perspective of Japan, for the areas which should strategically maintain their domestic technology base, it is necessary to promote research and development domestically. In the cases of defense equipment and technology cooperation, such as equipment procurement and international joint development, it is important to maintain the leading role by owning important cutting-edge technology (key technology). This requires not only research and development by the MOD, but also the promotion of research and development by both the public and private sectors together.

2 Defense Technology Strategy and Related Documents

For the purpose of ensuring Japan’s technological superiority, inventing as well as delivering advanced equipment in an effective and efficient manner, and dealing with various policy issues pertaining to defense and civilian technologies, taking account of the National Security Strategy and the 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), the MOD formulated the Defense Technology Strategy in 2016, which presented the specific direction for various measures that should be addressed strategically. Based on this strategy, the MOD promotes various measures.

Fig. IV-2-2-1 Current Status of Research & Development Expenditure

Changes in Defense-Related Research & Development Expenditure of Major Countries

Changes in ratio of research & development expenditure to defense expenditure of major countries

Source: “OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators”

(Note) For the calculation of Defense-Related Research & Development Expenditure of Major Countries, the ratio of research & development expenditure to defense expenditure of major countries from the “OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators” data was used. However Chinese data was not published.
Outline of Defense Technology Strategy

(1) MOD Technology Policy Objectives
The following two objectives of the MOD technology policy are designed to strengthen the technical capabilities, which serve as the foundation of Japan’s defense capabilities, to make the foundation more robust:
(i) Ensuring technical superiority
(ii) Delivering superior defense equipment through effective and efficient research and development

(2) Specific Measures to be Promoted
The following three measures are promoted to achieve the objectives indicated in the previous paragraph.
(i) Grasping Technological Information
With regard to various scientific technologies that support defense technologies, the MOD grasps the current situation and trends both in and outside of Japan, including dual-use technology\(^2\) in the public and private sectors and cutting-edge scientific technology. In addition, the MOD develops and publishes the Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook (see Paragraph 2 below) to identify advanced technology fields, which have the potential to become game changers.
(ii) Development of Technologies
The MOD will promote research and development based on the “Research and Development Vision” (see Paragraph 3 below) that was formulated to promote medium- to long-term research and development. At the same time, the MOD also promotes research and development that serve as the foundation of defense force building and “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security,” which puts into perspective the identification and development of advanced technology expected to be used for technology exchange with relevant domestic/overseas agencies and for defense purposes, and technical research for application of the results to equipment, etc.
(iii) Protection of Technologies
The MOD implements technology control for proper technology transfer to prevent situations in which Japan’s technology leaks without the country’s intention, which would undermine the maintenance of peace and security in the international community or the ensuring of Japan’s technological superiority. The MOD also establishes intellectual property management taking into account the transfer of defense equipment and promotes the utilization of intellectual property.

Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook
The Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook presents an outlook of the technologies that can be applied to equipment expected to be established in roughly the next 20 years, and indicates technology fields that need to be developed in order to ensure Japan’s technological superiority. It is expected that making this Outlook public will facilitate the integration of superior civilian advanced technologies and the development of technologies outside of the MOD aimed at defense equipment applications. Review is now underway for taking a more strategic approach to important technologies, including technologies pertaining to new domains and other potentially game-changing technologies such as AI.

Research and Development (R&D) Vision
The “Research and Development (R&D) Vision” presents principles on R&D, technological challenges, and roadmaps on R&D of the technologies required for our future defense capability for the purpose of conducting advanced R&D systematically from a mid-to-long term viewpoint.

The MOD publishes R&D Vision, and shares them with the defense industry, with the aim of increasing predictability for relevant companies, promoting prior investment, and realizing more effective and efficient research and development by maximally exploiting the investment. So far, the MOD published the “R&D Vision on the Future Fighter Aircraft” in 2010 and the “R&D Vision on Future Unmanned Equipment: Focusing on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle” in 2016.

In August 2019, the MOD published the “Research and Development (R&D) Vision—Toward Realization of Multi-Domain Defense Force and Beyond” in order to contribute to the realization of Multi-Domain Defense Force and to achieve technological innovation necessary for further strengthening defense capability. The MOD will continue to promote research and development according to the roadmap of the R&D Vision while reviewing the R&D Vision, as well as establishing and publishing visions on new themes considering the direction of policy, operational needs, changes in technological trends and others.

\(^{2}\) Technology that can be used for both civilian and defense purposes
Technological progress is about to fundamentally change how security should be managed, and major states endeavor to develop weapons that leverage cutting-edge technologies. Against this backdrop, the MOD is promoting focused research in promising technical fields in order to ensure technological superiority in strategically important equipment and technology fields through focused investment in technologies in new domains, potentially game-changing cutting-edge technologies such as AI, and other important technologies. Specifically, for R&D of AI, the MOD included in the FY2020 budget the expense for research on radio image identification technology using AI. The MOD also has been making efforts to greatly shorten the research and development periods of Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile Intended for the Defense of Remote Islands, UUVs for long-term operation, standoff electronic warfare aircraft and other equipment through flexible and active use of new methods for stage-by-stage R&D of equipment, such as block approach and modularization. Research projects on new technologies, including UAVs and lasers, will include demonstrations that enable users to imagine how these technologies will be used. For equipment which is expected to need medium-term development, the ministry will develop a concrete image of future equipment by collecting and fully analyzing information on their technical feasibility from private companies and other parties at an early stage. Furthermore, the MOD efficiently and effectively conducts research on UUVs, etc. using dual-use technologies based on the “Basic Policy on the Relocation of Governmental Organizations” along with developing a new test and evaluation facility “Iwakuni Test Evaluation Facility (provisional name)” in Iwakuni City. The facility is also available for use by the civilian sector, including local institutions for higher education and research institutes.

In addition, based on the MTDP, the MOD is working to actively leverage potentially dual-use advanced commercial technologies through such efforts as technology exchange with relevant domestic and overseas entities, enhanced collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies, and use of the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” program. In this regard, the MOD/SDF will strengthen and expand cooperation with countries who are making large-scale investments in game-changing technologies, such as the U.S. and special strategic partner countries, and promote mutually complementary international joint R&D. The MOD/SDF is also conducting studies to reinforce its structure aimed at early discovery of innovative, emerging technologies and fostering thereof by utilizing and creating think tanks that survey and analyze the latest foreign and domestic technological trends.

For F-X to succeed the F-2 fighter aircraft, a development project starts in FY2020, and “F-X Development Division” was established in the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) in order to ensure efficient development. Furthermore, for improving technical reliability and reducing the development cost, the MOD is pursuing the best approach to realize Japan led development with international cooperation in sight.
The Japan-led development of F-X to succeed the ASDF’s F-2 fighter is scheduled to start in FY2020.

Over the years, Japan has built a fighter force structure comprising multiple types of fighter aircraft, as the MOD believes that deploying three types of fighter aircraft equipped with different combat systems makes it possible to effectively acquire and maintain air superiority. The MOD believes that it is necessary to ensure this structure into the future to acquire and maintain air superiority. While the F-2 is an important fighter that supports this fighter force structure, it is scheduled to start retiring around 2035. In order to maintain the structure by introducing the successor aircraft by that time, it is necessary to start developing F-X to succeed the F-2 now.

F-X will always have to exercise first-class capabilities against future threats. For the development of fighter aircraft with such capabilities, the MOD places priority on the following three objectives:
(i) Acquiring freedom of modification and upgrade when needed
(ii) Domestically accumulating in-depth technological knowledge and securing infrastructure for domestic maintenance and repairs with respect to aircraft systems and component systems.
(iii) Reducing development cost and risks associated with development delays.

In order to achieve these objectives, Japan has been holding dialogues with the United States and the United Kingdom, and it is scheduled to determine the basic framework, including partner countries, for international collaboration by the end of 2020.

Work processes associated with the development of F-X are wide-ranging, including a technical study on the aircraft systems, administrative work related to budget implementation, information security, management of intellectual property, and collaboration with foreign countries. To implement these processes efficiently, the “F-X Development Division” was established at the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency Commissioner’s Secretariat in April 2020, as a division dedicated to develop F-X in order to strengthen the organizational structure.

The development of F-X is an extremely large project compared to the MOD’s previous aircraft development projects. In order to make this grand project a success, the MOD will proceed with the development while making maximum use of technological and human resources possessed by domestic companies by further strengthening collaboration between the companies.

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4 One of the important policy meetings aimed at the planning and general coordination of comprehensive and basic science & technology innovation policies under the leadership of the Prime Minister and ministers in charge of Science & Technology policy, at a level higher than individual ministries.
5 The IT Strategy Headquarters, the Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters, the Headquarters for Healthcare Policy, the Space Development Strategy Headquarters, the Headquarters for Ocean Policy, and the Geospatial Information Utilization Promotion Committee in addition to the CSTI.
the Council for Integrated Innovation Strategy⁶ established for its promotion in order to further enhance collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies, national research and development agencies, industry, universities, and other parties. Furthermore, the MOD will further strengthen human exchange with research institutes, etc. in order to understand trends of civilian technologies for complementary and synergistic improvement of technological capabilities.

As international cooperative activities, the MOD will continue Japan-U.S. joint research and engineer exchanges, and continuously consider diverse possibilities through continued opinion exchange with other countries at various opportunities while closely observing their technology strategies, etc.

2 Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security and Its Utilization

In FY2015, the MOD launched a competitive research funding program called “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” to publicly seek and commission basic research on advanced civilian technologies, which are expected to contribute to future research and development in defense areas. A total of 74 research projects were awarded⁷ by FY2019, and this program was expanded in FY2017 in order to enable the awarding of larger-scale and longer-term research projects. The program will continue to run on a similar scale in FY2020 (total budget of about 9.5 billion yen).

In the basic research areas, free thinking of researchers leads to innovative and creative results. For this reason, it is necessary to assign maximum value to freedom of research when sponsoring research, so that, for example, researchers will be able to publish all of their research results to have a wide range of academic discussions. Hence, in this program, the MOD will neither restrict contractors’ publication of research results, nor designate research results as confidential, never providing any confidential data to researchers. In actuality, some research results have already been published through oral presentations, publications, etc.

Active utilization of advanced civilian technology through such programs is not only essential for securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of the Japanese people into the future, but is also beneficial for the development of Japan’s science, technology and innovation in non-defense areas as well, similar to how investment in innovative technology by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the United States facilitated advances in science and technology as a whole including civilian technology, such as the development of the Internet and GPS. From this perspective, the MOD intends to promote relevant measures and strives to raise awareness of this program that contributes to ensuring the freedom of study and its sound development.

Defense of Japan


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<tr>
<th>Research Title</th>
<th>Brief Summary</th>
<th>Representative Institution for the Project</th>
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<tr>
<td>Clarification of the mechanism for relaxing impact resistance using high-strength CNT as a base material and creation of super-impact resistant materials</td>
<td>This research aims to: scholarly elucidate the mechanism of relaxing impact resistance through calculation analysis of a destruction-buffering phenomenon, measurement analysis of a destruction phenomenon at an experimental nano level and synthesis of composite CNT materials; and create next-generation, carbon-based super-impact resistant materials.</td>
<td>University of Tsukuba</td>
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<tr>
<td>High throughput search for new solid-state lasers and characteristics by smart combinations of lattice engineering technology</td>
<td>This research aims to: establish a new R&amp;D model which enables enhancement of the efficiency of exploration and prototyping through use of calculation-based estimation, computational experimentation, and materials informatics to facilitate the search for laser materials and processes that are appropriate for use in specific wavelength bands.</td>
<td>S&amp;T, Inc., Ltd.</td>
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<td>Neurofeedback psychotherapy: new methods for learning and regulating latent brain dynamics</td>
<td>This research aims to: develop AI technology that estimates latent brain dynamics to infer human’s mental states and thereby achieve transferring skills from human to robots; clarify the relationship between external factors and latent brain dynamics underlying mental states and symptoms; furthermore, develop and optimize the neurofeedback method that controls the latent brain dynamics.</td>
<td>Advanced Telecommunications Research Institute International</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basic studies on development of a marine sound source monitoring system in coastal area</td>
<td>This research aims to: employ techniques to categorize a variety of sound sources under the sea on a real-time basis and technology for long-distance underwater communications; and thereby establish a method for making information on the distribution of sound sources obtained by multiple observations visible and drawing it on a real-time basis.</td>
<td>Japan Fisheries Science and Technology Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>Creation of highly-transparent and infrared reflectance members by controlling nanostructures</td>
<td>This research aims to: create resin with high durability and good reflectance performance; and establish nano-layering technology for enabling multiple resin to hundreds of nanometer thickness layers in a highly precise thickness control with original layered layout design, thereby realizing components reflecting infrared rays over a wide range of bandwidths while keeping glass-like transparency.</td>
<td>Toray Industries, Inc.</td>
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<td>Development of lightweight, non-volatile secondary batteries with high-energy density for ships</td>
<td>This research aims to: establish technology for extending the lifetime of secondary batteries by making use of nonvolatile substances at lower risk of leaching toxic substances outside of the batteries; and clarify the feasibility of the technology in applying it to energy storage systems which contribute to enhancing the performance and safety of ships.</td>
<td>Hitachi, Ltd.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basic research for enhancing the stability of small clock oscillators based on quantum interference</td>
<td>This research aims to: enhance the stability of palm-sized, small clock oscillators with less power consumption so that the performance is equivalent to that of the clock oscillators on board positioning satellites.</td>
<td>Micromachine Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detection of organophosphates by coordination polymers with extended pores</td>
<td>This research aims to find coordination polymers appropriate for detecting organophosphates. Spectral change of coordination polymers induced by exposure to organophosphates will be examined for three different spectroscopic methods. Each spectroscopic method will be validated as a new tool for detecting residual agricultural chemicals.</td>
<td>Osaka City University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Materials research on gradient index lens</td>
<td>This research focuses on germanium-silicon mixed-crystals whose refractive index distribution is controllable, which are expected to dramatically improve the degree of freedom in designing infrared lenses, and aims to reveal optical constants, e.g., refractive indices, in order to obtain basic optical properties of the optical crystals, and establish a new method for crystal growth that control the radial-direction indices.</td>
<td>Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (national research and development agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development of super environment resistant high strength oxide ceramic composite material</td>
<td>This research aims to: establish basic processes for mass production of continuous zirconia fibers and coating technology appropriate for continuous zirconia fibers; realize composites with excellent material properties; and clarify the potential for application to jet engines via evaluation of high-temperature properties in simulated actual environment.</td>
<td>National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)</td>
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<td>Basic research for the adhesion mechanism of insect legs and implementation of the mechanism to movable bodies</td>
<td>This research aims to: clarify the principle of insect legs that allow insects to walk on walls or in water and the structures of such legs, and thereby realize movable bodies capable of steadily moving on and staying at the surfaces of objects regardless of environmental changes.</td>
<td>National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research for situation-adaptive swarm control taking advantage of machine learning and physics-based swarm intelligence</td>
<td>This research aims to: establish a swarm control technology in which many agents are able to cooperatively and appropriately take action even if situations are changing from hour to hour, and conduct basic research for optimization to minimize the gap between a real environment and a simulation environment as well as for machine-learning technology.</td>
<td>Cluster Dynamics Inc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research for underwater optical wireless communication technology that achieves Bit product of 1 Gbps over 100m</td>
<td>This research aims to: measure impacts on communications caused by the characteristics of underwater light propagation, the fluctuation of seawater and other factors, and examine an underwater optical wireless communication system taking into consideration such influences, thereby demonstrating a long-distance, large-capacity underwater optical wireless communication system which is excellent in disturbance resistance and capable of providing stable communications for a longer time.</td>
<td>Trimatix Limited</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basic research for innovative underwater electricity transmission making use of self-excited bidirectional wireless power supply</td>
<td>This research aims to: clarify a principle of magnetic resonance systems in which an optimal magnetic condition is formed and wireless power supply is bidirectionally conducted at a highly efficient manner; and verify application of the principle to control of battery power sources.</td>
<td>Maxwell, Ltd.</td>
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<td>Clarification of a rotation mechanism of soft wheels that cells have and application of the mechanism to movable bodies</td>
<td>This research aims to: analyze rotation motions of a wheel-like structure in ameba cells, which was discovered recently; manufacture prototypes of soft robots imitating the structure and demonstrate them; thereby conducting basic research for imitation of living organisms having a soft, wheel-like structure.</td>
<td>Yamaguchi University</td>
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<td>Development of a system for assessing collision frequency targeting ship traffic flows in ship congested sea areas</td>
<td>This research aims to: establish a method for estimating the frequencies of multi-ship encounters by approximating ship traffic flows in ship-congested sea areas through a continuum approach and introducing computational grids into data on the target sea; and establish a system contributing to measures for forecasting frequencies of ship collisions and preventing ships from collision accidents.</td>
<td>National Institute of Maritime, Port and Aviation Technology (national research and development agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clarification of an impact-mitigation mechanism of the distalarity phenomenon by making use of ionic liquid</td>
<td>This research aims to: create transparent dilatant materials consisting of ionic liquid and particles whose inside structures are visible; clarify the principle of the distalarity phenomenon, in which liquid changes to solid if force is externally applied; and conduct basic research for realizing safe and secure shock absorbers by taking advantage of the outstanding environmental stability of ionic liquid.</td>
<td>National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basic research for surface modification of oxide semiconductor gas sensors</td>
<td>This research aims to: modify the surfaces of oxide semiconductor gas sensors; and thereby conduct basic research for adding new functions capable of detecting desired gases in a selective manner.</td>
<td>National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research on high-value added casting processes for Ni-based heat resistant superalloys</td>
<td>This study conducts basic research on a high-value added casting process that could provide an improved oxidation resistance, by examining a casting making use of platinum coated molds; and understanding the effect of interaction between coated materials and molten metal on the distribution of element concentration after casting.</td>
<td>National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)</td>
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<td>Basic research for nanostructured interacting surfaces of novel polymer coating film having ultra-low friction property</td>
<td>This research aims to conduct basic research for clarifying a mechanism that develops coefficients of specific ultra-low friction by: analyzing nanostructured surfaces of polymer films dispersed with an ultra-low volume of carbon fibers having novel carbon crystalline structures.</td>
<td>OSI Creos Corporation</td>
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1 Acquisition of Defense Equipment through Focused Project Management

As defense equipment is becoming more sophisticated and complex, its entire life cycle (concept study, research and development, mass production, deployment, operation and maintenance) cost has a tendency to increase in recent years. It has become extremely important to streamline acquisition throughout the life cycle of equipment and to establish a systematic management to realize the streamlining in order to efficiently acquire equipment of assured quality at appropriate cost in a required timeline as planned.

Therefore, since the establishment of ATLA in October 2015, the Department of Project Management in ATLA undertakes project management throughout the life cycle of equipment upon selecting important equipment, and promotes efforts to realize the optimized equipment acquisition.

Specifically, the MOD has selected 18 items for major programs designated for project management and 6 items for semi-major programs for project management as of the end of March 2020. The MOD designated Project Managers (PMs) dedicated to specific major programs. At the same time, the MOD established a systematic project management system by setting up the Integrated Project Team (IPT), which is composed of officials from relevant divisions within the MOD.

So far (as of the end of March 2020), for 23 items that have been selected for major and semi-major programs, the MOD has formulated the Acquisition Strategy and the Acquisition Plan (hereinafter referred to as “Acquisition Strategy, etc.”), which specify the basic matters necessary to systematically implement project management, such as the purpose of the acquisition program, acquisition policy, and life cycle cost. The Acquisition Strategy, etc. shows strategic plans to realize optimized acquisitions of equipment.

Furthermore, in principle, ATLA annually confirms the project implementation status with each SDF service, and endeavors to promote appropriate project management reflecting the latest situation by developing Analysis and Evaluation, which compile changes made in acquisition plans from the previous fiscal year, and thus reviews Acquisition Strategy. In August 2019, Analysis and Evaluation of the acquisition programs were implemented for 19 items for which the Acquisition Strategy, etc. had been developed.

2 Initiatives to Promote and Strengthen Project Management

(1) Past Initiatives
The following initiatives have been implemented to promote and strengthen project management.

a. Cost and Schedule Management Using WBS
For certain kinds of equipment produced in Japan, the MOD promotes the introduction of a management method to visualize the progress of work and cost generated by component (Work Breakdown Structure [WBS]) and endeavors to manage cost and schedule to detect the signs of cost increase and schedule delay early so that swift measures can be taken.

b. Method for More Accurate Cost Estimate
Life cycle cost and other costs have been estimated based on actual cost data of similar equipment developed or introduced in the past. However, as a larger amount of cost data is needed for a more accurate estimate, the MOD promotes the establishment of a cost database by collecting cost data and accumulating them into a database.

c. Accumulation and Development of Expertise through Strengthened Cooperation with Research and Educational Institutions, etc.
For further improving the management skills of PMs and enhancing human resources among those who engage in project management, the MOD strengthens collaboration with research and educational institutions on project management and provides opportunities to study project management methods from overseas and the private sector on a regular basis.
(2) Future Initiatives

In order to further promote effective and efficient equipment acquisition, the MOD needs to enhance the effectiveness and flexibility of project management throughout equipment life cycles. To this end, under the MTDP, the MOD/SDF will take new initiatives, including undertakings that contribute to cost reduction at mass production stage as a requirement at the development stage, incorporating successful examples in the civilian sector into the manufacture of defense equipment, and actively adopting the competitive bidding method and other contracting methods that contribute to the utilization of private sector knowledge and expertise, and tightening cost controls. In this regard, the MOD will expand the items subject to project management and strive to adjust the standards for the specifications and the review of project plans with consideration of life cycle costs. Furthermore, for more efficient acquisition, during the equipment selection phase, the MOD will implement thorough life cycle cost estimation, and analysis of alternatives, and secure binding obligations against company principals.

2 Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters

1 Reviewing Acquisition Systems

For the purpose of promoting acquisition reform, which is a prompt response to swiftly changing surroundings, the MOD has been holding meetings of the Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Committee since 2007, in addition to the Contractual Systems Study Groups held since 2010 to review acquisition systems. Since FY2016, a special research officer system\(^3\) has been adopted in order to surely bring the review results to fruition.

2 Long-Term Contracts, etc.

The production of defense equipment requires a significant amount of time. Therefore, if a certain amount is to be procured in bulk, a contract for more than five years is needed in many cases. With regard to defense equipment and services, economies of scale\(^4\) tend not to work mainly due to the following reasons: (1) the MOD is the only customer; and (2) companies that provide such defense equipment,
etc., are limited. In addition, it is difficult for companies to systematically move forward with their businesses with a high degree of predictability, which is peculiar to the defense industry.

For these reasons, the upper limit of acts that incur national debt prescribed in the Public Finance Act as within five years in principle was changed to within ten years for specific equipment through the enactment of the Long-term Contract Act.\(^5\) The introduction of this change regarding long-term contracts will make stable procurement possible, leading to the realization of the systematic improvement of defense capability. At the same time, for companies, given that the procurement amount will be assured, the systematic use of personnel and equipment, as well as cost reductions due to bulk orders, will be made possible.

In addition, by realizing longer-term multiple-year contracts utilizing the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) Act,\(^6\) the planned acquisition and execution of budgets is achieved through the standardization of investment amounts of the national expenditure, and certain benefits are obtained, such as cutting equipment procurement costs, by reducing risks for those taking orders and by promoting the entry of new suppliers. As projects using the PFI Act, the MOD launched the “project of development and operation of X-band satellite communications” in January 2013 and the “project of operation and management of private ships” in March 2016.

In addition, regarding procurement of certain equipment with which little competitiveness can be expected due to its characteristics, and companies that work on cost reduction using the MOD’s programs, the MOD promotes limited tendering contracts while ensuring transparency and fairness as well as clarifying and putting the subject into patterns, from the perspective of the implementation of smooth and efficient procurement, and the enhancement of the company’s predictability.

Specifically, as a new initiative, in acquiring new destroyers,\(^7\) the MOD has adopted a procurement method to acquire the new destroyers efficiently equipped with the necessary functions and to maintain and strengthen the construction technology base since February 2017. This is done by selecting a party that has made the best proposal with respect to the MOD’s requirements as a procurement counterparty, with the runner-up also involved in designing and building facilities as a subcontractor. The MOD concluded a proposal agreement in April 2017 and decided on a procurement counterparty and a subcontractor in August 2017.

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\(^5\) "Special Measures Law Concerning the Term of Expenditure Based on the Obligatory Assurance of National Subsidization for Specific Defense Procurement" (enacted in April 2015. An act for its partial revision to extend the effective period by five years was enacted in March 2019.)

\(^6\) Act on Promotion of Private Finance Initiative

\(^7\) New destroyers that combine improved multimission capabilities and compact hull
3 Decrease Procurement Cost and Improve Companies’ Incentives to Reduce Cost

With regard to the procurement of defense equipment, the cost is tending to increase because a large variety of equipment has no market price. Based on those characteristics, it is necessary to achieve both the reduction of procurement cost and improvement of companies’ incentives to reduce cost simultaneously. Thus, in June 2019 the MOD introduced an incentive contract system in which the public and private sectors jointly carry out the management of contract implementation to minimize contractual risks, and in which a certain percentage will be given back to the companies if cost reduction has been performed.

Since April 2020, a system to give an incentive for cost reduction has been in operation in order to fairly evaluate cost reduction efforts by companies.

2 Achieving Further Efficiency in the Acquisition of Defense Equipment

When acquiring defense equipment, the MOD aims to reduce development, acquisition, and maintenance expenses through the development of product families, standardization of equipment specifications, joint procurement of equipment common to multiple SDF services, etc., in addition to a review of the contract system. In the FY2020 budget, cost reduction is expected by the development of a multipurpose surveillance radar that combines the four types of radar owned by the GSDF.

In addition, the MOD has been facilitating the compilation of a database on the breakdown of procurement prices and actual price of major equipment in the past. The MOD expects this database to be utilized not only to verify the validity of procurement prices, but also to enhance the accuracy and efficiency of life cycle cost estimation for new equipment.

1 Effective and Efficient Maintenance and Replenishment

With regard to periodic maintenance of defense equipment, the MOD has been working to improve efficiency by extending the maintenance interval, after making sufficient efforts to ensure safety. In addition, the MOD has been working on the introduction of Performance Based Logistics (PBL) from the perspective of improving the equipment availability ratio and long-term cost reductions. In the FY2020 budget, the MOD pursues cost reduction and stable procurement through long-term contracts regarding repair of a certain quantity of fighter aircraft (F-15) components.

3 Efforts to Increase Fairness and Transparency

The MOD implements measures for making contracts more appropriate and strengthening checking functions to promote the enhancement of fairness and transparency in relation to the acquisition of equipment and materials.

As a part of the effort to “make public procurement more appropriate” across the whole government, the MOD continues to carry out the introduction and expansion of a comprehensive evaluation bidding system and make bidding procedures more efficient. In addition to these, based on reflection on the past, strengthening system investigation, reviewing penalties, ensuring the effectiveness of supervision and inspection, and other measures have steadily been carried out in order to prevent recurrence of such incidents as overcharging and falsified results of equipment testing by defense-related companies in 2012. Through these measures, the MOD strives to surely prevent recurrence of scandals, enhance fairness and transparency, and make contracts more appropriate.

In addition, ATLA carries out multilayered checks through both internal and external checking systems and check-and-balance within the organization – namely, ATLA further enhances internal inspections by the inspection and audit department, and through deliberations in the Defense Procurement Council, consisting of external experts, and defense inspection conducted by the Inspector General’s Office of Legal Complaints. Moreover, ATLA has also improved its education department and strives to enhance compliance awareness by providing thorough education pertaining to compliance for ATLA personnel.

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8 PBL is a contract method that involves payment of compensation according to the level of equipment performance achieved in terms of availability ratio and stable stock. It has achieved positive outcomes upon application to the maintenance and servicing of equipment in Western countries.

9 Unlike the automatic bid system, which focuses only on price, this is a system whereby the successful bidder is determined on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation that includes both the price and other elements. This method is adopted when it is appropriate to carry out such procedures as evaluating the technological elements.
FMS is a form of U.S. security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) etc. that may enable the U.S. allies and others to purchase defense equipment and services from the U.S. government. The characteristics of FMS include: (1) pricing is an estimate, (2) payments are made in advance in principle and balanced out after fulfillment, and (3) the delivery date is an estimate. This program allows Japan to procure equipment with a high level of confidentiality that cannot be generally purchased through Direct Commercial Sales and highly capable equipment. Therefore, FMS is critical to strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities.

Meanwhile, there are FMS-related challenges, such as delayed delivery and late case closures. As the FMS procurement amount is hovering at a high level in recent years, Japan and the U.S. governments have been actively working together to make improvements in these challenges. Specifically, the ATLA and Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) held Security Cooperation Consultative Meeting (SCCM) to discuss the challenges over FMS procurement, four times since 2016. At the 4th SCCM in January 2020, as for late delivery and late case closure, both agreed to monitor the status of delivery and case closure on each item, as well as to make best efforts for addressing and eliminating causes of late delivery and late case closure. Also, as for transparency in FMS pricing, both agreed that DSCA oversees related agencies to provide necessary cost information. In addition, Japan called for discussion to make delivery procedures efficient at the meeting, for FMS purchaser countries including Japan in 2019, and shares the points to be improved with the United States. The rationalization of FMS procurement is further promoted by setting up the Project Team for Promotion of Initiatives toward rationalization of FMS Procurement within the MOD in July 2019 in order to develop a framework to promote various efforts across the organization, and establishing ‘the Group for Coordination of FMS Procurement’ in the Procurement Planning Division of the ATLA in order to coordinate with the U.S. government in the United States in FY2020.
Strong industrial base is essential for ensuring the production and a high operation rate of high-performance equipment. For this purpose, the MOD established the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases in June 2014 to maintain and strengthen the base. Based on the NDPG, the ministry will make efforts towards making the defense industrial base more resilient, so that it can effectively respond to changing security environment. For example, since 2019, the MOD has arranged meetings to exchange views with the industry.

**Current Situation of Japan’s Defense Industrial Base**

The term “defense industrial base” refers to the human, physical, and technological bases that are essential for the production, operation, sustainment, and maintenance of defense equipment required for the MOD/SDF’s activities. In Japan, most of the base is covered by companies (the defense industry) that manufacture defense equipment and associated items. Therefore, a broad range of companies that possess special and advanced skills and facilities are involved in the defense production and technological bases. Meanwhile, the degree of defense demand dependence (the ratio of defense-related sales that account for all company sales) is approximately 5% on average, indicating that defense business is not the primary business in many companies.

Furthermore, unit costs and maintenance/sustainment costs tend to increase due to low-volume, high mix production and the sophistication and complication of defense equipment. For this reason, Japan’s defense industrial base faces issues, such as difficulties in maintaining and passing on skills and techniques, and withdrawal of some companies from defense business because work quantity is decreasing due to a decrease of procurement volume.

In addition, as the realignment of the Western defense industries and international joint development are making progress, Japan formulated the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in April 2014. However, improvement of international competitiveness has
become a challenge for Japan’s defense industry, because it has developed based on the production of defense equipment only for the SDF.

The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases

1 Context of Formulation of the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases, etc.

For the purpose of maintaining and strengthening Japan’s defense production and technological bases, which is an important and essential element supporting Japan’s defense capability, the “Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases” was formulated in June 2014. The Strategy responded to the National Security Strategy and the 2013 NDPG, replacing “Kokusankahoshin (guideline for domestic development/production).”

Overview of Defense Production and Technological Bases

(1) Significance of Formulation of the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases

“The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases” has made the following three points clear: (1) the context of the formulation of the strategy on defense production and technological bases and where this strategy stands; (2) characteristics of defense production and technological bases; and (3) changes in the environment surrounding defense production and technological bases.

(2) Goals and Significance of Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases

Through maintaining and strengthening defense production and technological bases, the MOD intends to (1) ensure sovereignty of security, (2) potentially contribute to increasing deterrence capability, and maintain and improve bargaining power, and (3) contribute to the sophistication of the domestic industry in Japan driven by cutting-edge technology.

(3) Basic Viewpoints for Promoting Measures

For the promotion of measures, the MOD takes into account the following basic viewpoints: (1) establishing long-term partnership between the private and public sectors; (2) strengthening international competitiveness; and (3) ensuring consistency with efficient and optimized acquisition of defense equipment.

(4) Defense Equipment Procurement Methods

With regard to defense equipment procurement, currently multiple methods, such as domestic development, international joint development and production, licensed domestic production, utilization of commercially produced goods, and imports, are adopted. These methods directly affect the defense production and technological bases. According to the characteristics of defense equipment, the MOD appropriately selects acquisition methods, including international joint development and production, which have become more agile and flexible due to the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.

(5) Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases

In order to maintain and strengthen defense production and technological bases, the MOD will promote the following measures with a focus on variation and efficiency, while considering Japan’s severe fiscal condition: (1) improvement in the contract system; (2) initiatives in research and development; (3) promotion of defense equipment and technology cooperation; (4) initiatives for defense industrial organizations including the building of robust production and technological bases through understanding actual situations of the supply chain; (5) strengthening of the MOD’s functions through the establishment of ATLA, etc.; and (6) collaboration with other relevant ministries and government agencies.

(6) Current Situation and Courses of Action for Each Defense Equipment Sector

With regard to the main defense equipment sectors (such as land equipment, supplies, etc., ships, aircraft, explosives, guided weapons, communications electronics and command control systems, unmanned equipment, space and cyber systems), the MOD will analyze the current situation of defense production and technological bases. At the same time
time, based on the priority matters for developing the SDF’s structure indicated in the 2013 NDPG, the MOD will present the future direction of the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases and the acquisition plan for each defense equipment sectors, and thereby, seek to increase predictability for companies.

## 3 Initiatives toward Strengthening of Defense Industrial Base

### 1 Past Initiatives

Based on the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases, the MOD has implemented various measures contributing to the maintenance and strengthening of the defense industrial base, such as improving the contract system, including the enactment of the Long-term Contract Act, and the establishment of ATLA, which integrated the organizations involved in the defense equipment procurement.

In addition, the following new measures are also taken in ATLA: (1) formulation of Defense Technology Strategy, etc. for ensuring the technological superiority, and implementation of the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” (see Section 2); (2) formulation of the Acquisition Strategic Plan for promoting project management, and improvement of contract systems (see Section 3); (3) grasping the supply chain in the defense industry and responses to risks in order to maintain and strengthen the defense industrial base (see Paragraph 2 below); and (4) participation of Japanese companies in the international F-35 program and defense equipment and technology cooperation involving joint research and development with other countries (see Section 5).

### 2 Initiatives Based on the NDPG

In order to strengthen Japan’s defense industrial base, which is essential to the production, operation, sustainment and maintenance of defense equipment, the MOD will work on the following initiatives based on the NDPG, etc., while considering the orientation of the defense production and technology strategy.

**1) Reforming the Existing Contract System towards Creating a Competitive Environment among Companies**

Japan’s defense industry is in a less competitive environment as there are many defense equipment items that only one company can produce. To address this issue, the MOD will review the existing contract system towards creation of a competitive environment among companies by actively evaluating initiatives and results which contribute to strengthening the competitiveness of the defense industry and cost reduction, as well as giving appropriate incentives based on the evaluation result.

**2) Strengthening Risk Management of Supply Chain for Defense Equipment**

The procurement of defense equipment involves not only prime companies that directly contract with the MOD but also supplier companies in a broad range of fields and sizes, which contract with the prime companies. The chains of these companies (supply chains) are the basis of Japan’s defense industry. However, these supply chains are confronted with risks, such as supply disruption due to withdrawing or bankruptcy of some manufacturing companies. In order to deal with the risks, the MOD is taking measures in order to maintain and strengthen the supply chains.

Past supply chain surveys revealed the presence of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) that have a high dependency rate on defense equipment. In the supply chain survey conducted by the end of FY2019, key suppliers holding irreplaceable technologies were identified. Additionally, vulnerabilities became apparent, such as a concentration of orders to a certain supplier.

Based on the survey results, the MOD will create a database of the results of the supply chain survey, and build a regular monitoring system for early identification of risks, such as supply disruption. Furthermore, the MOD will accurately deal with the vulnerabilities in the supply chain and strengthen the chain through initiatives such as identification of SMEs that have excellent technologies/products, advancement of the technology base in order to manage supply disruption and other risks, a study of measures to support enterprises regarding transfer of business and evaluation of the possibility of application of innovative technologies represented by 3D printer and AI to defense equipment.

**3) Further Industrial Participation of Japan’s Defense Industry in Sustainment and Maintenance of Imported Equipment, etc.**

Industrial participation in the sustainment and maintenance business of imported equipment is productive for the strengthening of Japan’s industrial base. For this purpose, it is important to pursue participation in the sustainment...
and maintenance of F-35A, Osprey, and other imported equipment and benefits for domestic companies through further promotion of joint R&D of high-capability equipment with the United States and other countries.7

(4) Promoting Appropriate Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

The government as a whole will work on necessary improvement in implementation of related rules for promoting appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment. At the same time, the MOD will strengthen intellectual property management, technology control and information security to prevent leakages of important technologies regarding defense equipment.

a. Initiatives for Necessary Operational Improvement

The MOD, in cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, will work on necessary improvement in implementation of related rules based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which are the operational standards for the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act. As a result, the MOD will enhance predictability for the defense industry and will promote appropriate and smooth equipment transfer.

Specifically, the ministry thinks it necessary to improve the implementation of relevant systems and procedures, which include rationalization of the handling of basic marketing information necessary for early business talks at international trade shows, etc.8 in order to ensure the smooth provision of such information.

b. Preventing Leakage of Key Technologies

(a) Intellectual Property Management

Through the application of more appropriate contract provisions regarding intellectual property, the MOD will accurately grasp intellectual property generated through R&D, etc. to promote the clarification of public or private belongings and prevention of leakages of key technologies to abroad. The ministry will also present options regarding the opening or closing of intellectual properties based on the characteristics of the technology and promotes appropriate management for each option.

(b) Technology Control

The MOD will strengthen technology control systems and functions for strengthening prevention measures of technology leakage such as ensuring prompt and proper assessment of technological sensitivity based on the importance and superiority of the technologies, which is needed in the examination of the propriety of overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology. Also, in order to prevent leakages of sensitive technologies, the MOD, in cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, promotes studies on reverse engineering countermeasure technologies, such as black box constitution.

(c) Strengthening Information Security

For Japan’s defense industry to participate in international businesses, it is necessary to respond to increasing threats of cyber attacks. With the aim of strengthening information security measures, the MOD will review the information security standard applicable to contractors handling the MOD’s information to be protected.9

In order to further encourage companies to consider entry into defense procurement business and facilitate their business with defense-related companies in Japan and abroad, it is important to improve the predictability of the necessary security measures for the companies. For this purpose, the MOD will develop an information security guidebook that comprehensively defines security measures that will normally be required for concluding a contract, which involves the handling of information to be secured, with the MOD in advance.

(5) Other Initiatives to Achieve Efficiency and Strength

Other than the above-mentioned initiatives, the MOD/SDF will undertake measures such as making the equipment manufacturing process efficient and thoroughly reducing cost and will strive to make Japan’s defense industry base efficient and resilient while foreseeing possible realignment and consolidation of businesses that may occur as a result of these measures.

3 Cooperation/Collaboration with the Industry

The maintenance and strengthening of Japan’s technological and industrial base are essential for production, operation and maintenance of defense equipment. For the effort of “Reinforcing Technology Base” and “Strengthening Defense Industrial Base” that are provided in NDPG and MTDP, cooperation between the MOD and the industry is indispensable.

In this context, in October 2019, Defense Minister

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7 SM-3 block IIA, jointly developed by Japan and the United States, is subject to FMS procurement, but Japanese companies have received contracts for manufacturing about half of the components, including those procured by the United States.
8 In October 2018, the Q&A section of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry website made it clear that information on the performance of goods and other matters that is used in early stage business talks and that does not include “specific information necessary for design, manufacture or use,” such as design information and production technique, is not subject to regulation under the Foreign Exchange Act. At the request of companies, the MOD is currently confirming the range of information included in data created by a company that may be disclosed to the public and handled as publicly known technology available to an unspecified large number of people.
9 Information subject to “Sensitive” or “For Official Use Only” in the MOD and information created using such information.
Kono and executives of the Japan Business Federation exchanged opinions on a wide range of themes, including international situations and defense policy in addition to defense equipment policy, and discussed the strengthening of public-private cooperation in general. In November of the same year, the commissioner of the ATLA had an opinion exchange with executives of the Japan Business Federation. From December onward, discussion on challenges and improvement measures regarding the defense industry and defense equipment policy has still continued at the working level.

The MOD will continue the initiatives for strengthening public-private cooperation, including opinion exchange with the industry at each of the minister level, the commissioner level and working level.
Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with other countries in order to contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of defense technological and industrial bases, as well as contributing to the promotion of our national security, peace and international cooperation. Japan will continue to realize effective defense equipment and technology cooperation through the strengthening of intelligence gathering such as the needs of its counterparts, cooperation including assistance for maintenance and repair of equipment, and strengthening of cooperative posture between the public and private sectors.

### Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

Based on the National Security Strategy formulated in December 2013, the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and its implementation guidelines were formulated in April 2014 as clear principles adapted to the new security environment. Under the principles, the MOD will contribute to peace and international cooperation more than ever, while actively promoting measures necessary for maintaining the peace and stability of the region and firmly defending Japan through active defense cooperation with the United States, which is Japan’s ally, and other countries. An appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology contributes to further active promotion of the maintenance of international peace and security. Such transfer also contributes to strengthening security and defense cooperation with Japan’s ally, the United States as well as other countries. Furthermore, it contributes to maintaining and enhancing Japan’s defense production and technological bases, thereby contributing to Japan’s enhancement of defense capability, given that international joint development and production projects have become the international mainstream.

#### Main Contents of the New Three Principles

1. Clarification of Cases Where Transfers Are Prohibited (the First Principle)

The cases where overseas transfers of defense equipment are prohibited are clarified as follows: (1) in the case of violating the obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded; (2) in the case of violating the obligations based on the Resolution of the United Nations Security Council; or (3) in the case of transferring to the countries in conflicts.

2. Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be Permitted As Well As Strict Examination and Information Disclosure (the Second Principle)

The cases where transfers may be permitted are limited to (1) cases that contribute to the active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, (2) cases that contribute to the security of Japan, or other cases. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and on the extent of the concerns that the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise for Japan’s security, whilst ensuring transparency. In addition, it has been decided that important cases would be deliberated at the National Security Council and along with this, information concerning the cases that were deliberated would be disclosed.

3. Ensuring Appropriate Control regarding Extra-Purpose Use or Transfer to Third Parties (the Third Principle)

Overseas transfers of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured, and the Government will in principle oblige the government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, in cases where it is judged appropriate for the active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, cases involving participation in the international systems for sharing parts, and cases where parts are delivered to a licensor, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of the control system at the destination.
Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

1 Joint Research and Development, etc.

Since 1992, Japan has implemented 23 joint research projects and one joint development project with the United States. At present, four joint research projects ((1) Comparison of Operational Jet Fuel and Noise Exposures, (2) Chemical Agent Detector-kit Colorimetric Reader, (3) High-Temperature Case Technologies, and (4) Next Generation Amphibious Technologies) are in implementation. In addition, with regard to the transfer of parts for Patriot PAC-2, software and parts, etc. for the Aegis System and F100 engine parts that are installed in F-15s and F-16s from Japan to the United States, Japan has affirmed since July 2014 that these overseas transfers fall under cases that may be permitted, based on deliberations at the National Security Council.

Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-2-2 (Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation) Reference 22 (Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects)

2 Production, Sustainment and Maintenance of Common Equipment between Japan and the United States

(1) Participation of Japanese Industry in the Production of the F-35A and the Establishment of Regional Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul and Upgrade (MRO&U) Capability

In December 2011, Japan selected the F-35A fighter aircraft as the next-generation fighter aircraft to be the successor to the F-4 fighter aircraft. At the same time, the Government decided to procure 42 aircraft from FY2012 onwards and to have Japanese industries participate in its production, aside from several completed aircraft, which will be imported. In light of this decision, the Japanese Government has been working to enable the involvement of Japanese industries in the manufacturing process in preparation for the acquisition of F-35A fighter aircraft from FY2013 onwards. So far the Japanese companies have participated in the Final Assembly and Check Out (FACO) for airframe and engines, and the manufacture of some engine parts (19 items), radar parts (7 items), and Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (EODAS)³ parts (3 items).

For the procurement of F-35A fighters in FY2019 and after, the MOD compared the unit price assuming the participation of domestic companies in the production with the import price of completed aircraft. Since the latter was lower, the Government decided to import completed F-35A fighters in order to promptly procure the necessary number while at the same time efficiently strengthening Japan’s defense capabilities under the severe fiscal circumstances. Later, however, as a result of cost reduction efforts by the manufacturers, including improvement in the manufacturing process and reduction of person-hours through work skill improvement, it was confirmed that the FACO by domestic companies would make the price lower than importing completed aircraft. For this reason, for the FY 2019 and FY2020 procurement, the MOD decided to procure F-35A fighters finally assembled and completed by domestic companies.⁴

The continuing participation of domestic companies in the manufacturing of F-35A fighters is meaningful in that it ensures operational and maintenance bases as well as the sustainment, development and advancement of fighter-related technology bases through working with cutting-edge fighter technologies and knowhow, which will eventually contribute to strengthening of the defense technological and industrial bases.

As global operation of F-35 fighter aircraft is anticipated, the U.S. Government plans to establish maintenance depot (regional MRO&U Capability) mainly for airframes and engines in the North America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific regions. In December 2014, with regard to regional MRO&U in the Asia-Pacific region for the F-35, the U.S. Government announced the following decisions: (1) Regional MRO&U Capability for airframes will be provided by Japan and Australia with both capabilities required not later than early 2018; (2) with regard to the regional MRO&U Capability for engines, initial capability will be provided by Australia by early 2018, with Japan providing additional capability at least 3-5 years later.⁵

Currently the MOD is preparing regional MRO&U capability for airframes to handle maintenance requirements beyond our field maintenance capability. In February 2019, the U.S. government announced the assignment of MRO&U capability for avionics components to Japan. These component MRO&U will begin activating in 2025, with

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2 In December 2018, the number of F-35A to be procured was changed from 42 to 147, of which 42 can be replaced by fighters that are capable of short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL).
3 EODAS, comprising six built-in cutting-edge infrared sensors per aircraft, realizes 360-degree spherical situational awareness, and enables missile detection and tracking.
4 In December 2019, for F-35A procurement in FY2019 and FY2020, it was decided to choose manufacturing arrangements involving domestic companies as it was confirmed to be more cost effective.
5 The regional MRO&U for airframes in Japan is scheduled to be located at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. (Komaki-minami factory in Aichi Prefecture).
6 The regional MRO&U for engines in Japan is scheduled to be located at IHI Corporation (Mizuho factory in Tokyo).
Establishing a maintenance depot for airframes, engines and others within Japan, and contributing to maintenance in the Asia-Pacific region are significant from the perspectives of securing the operational support system for F-35A fighter aircraft in Japan, maintaining the Japanese defense industrial base, strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and deepening equipment cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

(2) Initiatives towards the Establishment of a Common Maintenance Base of the Japan-U.S. Osprey

As the Planned Maintenance Interval (PMI) of the U.S. Marine Corps Ospreys deployed at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma was scheduled to commence roughly in 2017, the U.S. Navy carried out a public tender to select a maintenance company. Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd.\(^7\) was selected as the maintenance company for this purpose in October 2015. From February 2017, the PMI has been performed at GSDF Camp Kisarazu. Maintenance of the first aircraft was completed in March 2019 and the second in March 2020, and the aircraft were delivered to the U.S. Forces.

The MOD intends to establish a common maintenance base for both Japan’s and the United States’ Osprey by allowing the maintenance company to use the hangar at GSDF Camp Kisarazu for aircraft maintenance of the U.S. Marine Corps Osprey and also to implement the future aircraft maintenance of the GSDF Osprey at the same camp from the following perspectives: (1) smooth introduction of the GSDF Osprey (V-22);\(^9\)(2) smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements; and (3) enhanced efficiency in maintenance. The establishment of a common maintenance base at GSDF Camp Kisarazu would be extremely significant in that it will contribute to mitigating the burden on Okinawa as well as the “Strengthening of the basis to repair and maintain common equipment” stated in the new Guidelines.

3 Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

Defense equipment and technology cooperation with major European countries, which have competitive defense industries, will contribute to the strengthening of security and defense cooperation with these countries as well as the maintenance and strengthening of the defense industrial base in Japan. Therefore, Japan seeks to establish and deepen relationships with these countries.

(1) The United Kingdom

In July 2013, the Governments of Japan and the United Kingdom concluded a bilateral Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.\(^10\) In the same month, the two countries also started the Chemical and Biological Protection Technology Cooperative Research Project, marking the first time that Japan had engaged in such research with a country other than the United States. The Cooperative Research resulted in success in July 2017.


Furthermore, the two countries are exchanging information regarding the fighter (F-X) and the Future Combat Air System (FCAS)\(^11\) that are under study by Japan and the United Kingdom respectively, such as the Joint Preliminary Study on Potential Collaborative Opportunities for FCAS/Future Fighter, and exchanging views on the potential for future collaboration between the governments of Japan and the United Kingdom with industries also involved.

The meeting of the UK-Japan High-Level Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation Steering Panel was first held in July 2014, and it has been held regularly since then.

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\(^{7}\) The regional MRO&U for avionics components in Japan is planned to be developed by Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (Kamakura Works in Kanagawa Prefecture)

\(^{8}\) The company was renamed SUBARU Corporation on April 1, 2017.

\(^{9}\) GSDF will introduce 17 tilt-rotor aircraft (Osprey (V-22)) that can complement and strengthen the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in terms of cruising speed and range. As a temporary measure until completion of the maintenance facilities in Saga Airport, the aircraft will be temporarily deployed at Camp Kisarazu.

\(^{10}\) Official name: Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies Necessary to Implement Joint Research, Development and Production of Defence Equipment and Other Related Items

\(^{11}\) Generic name of the whole future fighter aircraft system in the United Kingdom
(2) France

Japan and France established committees on cooperation in the field of defense equipment and on export control respectively in January 2014, and signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in March 2015. Moreover, at the Fourth Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (“2+2”) held in January 2018, the two countries confirmed their intention to quickly start the cooperative research on the Feasibility Study for Mine Countermeasure Technological Activities and started the cooperative research in the following June.

In addition, in June 2017, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) P-1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft was displayed at the “Paris Air Show 2017,” and the ATLA set up an exhibition booth for P-1 aircraft for the first time at an international defense equipment exhibition. The MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft and the ASDF C-2 transport aircraft participated in the “Paris Air Show 2019” held in June 2019.

(3) Germany

Japan and Germany signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in July 2017.

Also, in April 2018, the MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft participated in the “Berlin Air Show 2018,” and the ATLA set up an exhibition booth related to P-1 aircraft.

(4) Italy

In May 2017, Japan and Italy signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. In January 2019, “Japan-Italy Defense Industry Forum” was held in Europe for the first time at an international defense equipment exhibition. The MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft and the ASDF C-2 transport aircraft participated in the “Paris Air Show 2019” held in June 2019.

(1) Australia

With Australia, the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology was signed in July 2014.

Meanwhile, at the Japan-Australia Defence Ministerial Meeting held in October 2014, it was agreed to seek multifaceted cooperation, including the following: (1) exploration of potential cooperation opportunities in the F-35 program; (2) acquisition reform dialogue with the Defence Material Organisation of Australia; (3) at the request of the Australian side, exploration of the possibility of Japanese cooperation in the Australian Future Submarine Program; (4) defense technology exchanges with the Defence Science and Technology Organization of Australia (in the field of marine hydrodynamics and exchanges among engineers and scientists); and (5) talks between defense industries in both countries. Subsequently, joint research on Marine Hydrodynamics started in December 2015 and ended in November 2019.

Japan demonstrated its technical strength through the participation of the ASDF C-2 transport aircraft in “Avalon International Airshow” held in Australia in February 2019.

The second meeting of the Japan-Australia Steering Committee for Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation was held in June 2019. At the meeting, the participants deepened discussions on measures for further promotion of defense equipment and technology cooperation between the countries in an effort to move ahead with the cooperation.

(2) India

Defense equipment and technology cooperation with India is considered an important field of cooperation based on the special strategic global partnership between Japan and India. At the Japan-India Summit Meeting in December 2015, the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of India concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology was signed.

To form the case of defense equipment and technology cooperation, including dual use technologies, the Joint

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16 Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of India concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
Working Group on Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation have been held five times so far. At the Japan-India Defence Ministerial Meeting held in September 2017, the ministers agreed to commence the discussions for research collaboration. In July 2018, the two countries launched the Cooperative Research on the Visual SLAM based GNSS Augmentation Technology for UGV

Progress has been made in discussions on defense equipment and technology cooperation between the two countries, including the second Japan-India Defence Industry Business Forum, which was held in February 2019.

(3) Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Countries

Between Japan and ASEAN member states, exchanges of views have taken place regarding defense equipment and technology cooperation in non-traditional security sectors, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and maritime security, through the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Meetings and other occasions. Participating countries have expressed their expectation for Japan’s cooperation in effectively dealing with these issues. In the “Vientiane Vision” announced by Japan at the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in November 2016, it is stated that Japan’s defense equipment and technology cooperation with ASEAN countries would be promoted with a focus on the following three points: (1) equipment and technology transfer, (2) human resources development, and (3) holding seminars on defense industries.

As a specific initiative with the Philippines, an official agreement was made on the transfer of MSDF’s TC-90 training aircraft to the Philippine Navy at the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting in September 2016. Based on the agreement, two TC-90s were delivered to the Philippine Navy in March 2017, followed by the delivery of the remaining three TC-90s in March 2018. TC-90 pilot training was conducted for pilots from the Philippine Navy at the MSDF Tokushima Air Base from November 2016 to March 2018. Since April 2017, maintenance and repair assistance by dispatched personnel from a Japanese maintenance company has been provided. Regarding the transfer, it was confirmed at the Japan-Philippines Defence Ministerial Meeting in June 2018 that parts and maintenance equipment of the UH-1H utility helicopters that became unnecessary for the GSDF would also be granted to the Philippine Air Force. After the signing of an arrangement between the defense officials involved in the transfer in November 2018, delivery of some components to the Philippines started in March 2019 and was completed in September 2019. These two transfers were cases of the application of the provision of the SDF Act enforced in June 2017 that enables the MOD to grant or transfer the equipment which is decommissioned by the SDF to the governments of developing states for a lower price than the current price (See Paragraph 3 below). Further, in January 2019, a framework was established for regular consultations of the Joint Working Group on Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation.

In November 2017, Japan and Thailand agreed to promote future defense equipment and technology cooperation, including early conclusion of the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.

Between Japan and Vietnam, the Terms of Reference (TOR) for regular consultations concerning defense equipment and technological cooperation was signed during the Japan-Vietnam Defense Vice-Ministerial Level Meeting in November 2016. Concerning the specific fields of cooperation, the Memorandum on the Orientation of Promotion of Defense Industry Cooperation was signed during the Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministers’ Meeting in May 2019. In addition, at the Japan-Vietnam Leaders’ Working Lunch held in July 2019, the leaders agreed on commencing official negotiations for the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.

Japan and Malaysia signed the Japan-Malaysia Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology in April 2018.

The MOD will continue to promote cooperation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as the maritime security area through these initiatives.

(4) Middle East

In November 2019, the ASDF C-2 transport aircraft participated in the “Dubai Air Show 2019” held in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The static display and the flight demonstration of C-2 transport aircraft were held and viewed by His Highness Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al
Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, and other high-level government officials.

Upon a request from His Majesty King Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in August 2019, Japan lent a retired GSDF type-61 main battle tank without charge to Jordan for display at the Royal Tank Museum. Meanwhile, the King offered to donate an armored vehicle developed in Jordan to the Japanese GSDF, which the GSDF received in the same month.

In October 2019, a ceremony for the lending and donation was held at the MOD. At the ceremony our Minister of Defense and Jordanian ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Japan delivered speeches, and signed and exchanged letters. In November 2019, our ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Jordan and the Director of the Jordan Royal Tank Museum unveiled the loaned type-61 main battle tank at the museum and a panel for its explanation was set up.

Israel and Japan signed a Memorandum on Protection of Information for the Exchange of Classified Information on Defense Equipment and Technology in September 2019 for appropriate protection of such classified information provided between Japanese and Israeli defense officials.

Surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment, it has become even more important for Japan that the nations which have a cooperative and friendly relationship with Japan in terms of security and defense have appropriate capabilities. It is also critical to develop a foundation that will serve as the basis for the international community to cooperate towards improving the security environment. Among these friendly nations, some have difficulties in acquiring an adequate level of defense equipment on their own because of their economic and fiscal situations. Some of these states are requesting to use SDF’s equipment which is no longer used. However, Article 9, paragraph (1) of the Public Finance Act stipulates that the Government must receive reasonable consideration when transferring or leasing any governmental properties including the SDF’s equipment to other countries. Therefore, a grant or a transfer for lower price than the current price is not allowed unless otherwise provided.

Under these circumstances, to respond to the needs of such friendly nations, a special provision to Article 9, paragraph (1) of the Public Finance Act was created in the SDF Act and put into force in June 2017. This provision enables the MOD to grant or transfer the SDF’s equipment which is no longer used to the governments of developing states for a lower price than the current price.

Even in the case of granting or transferring equipment for a lower price than the current price pursuant to this provision, whether or not to transfer such equipment, and to which government such equipment to be transferred, will be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and other regulations. In addition, an international agreement must be concluded between the Governments of Japan and the recipient countries to prevent extra-purpose use and third party transfer of the transferred equipment without the prior consent of Japan.

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20 Article 9, paragraph (1) of the Public Finance Act (Act No.34 of 1947) Govermental assets, unless otherwise provided, may not be exchanged and used as other means of payment, or transferred or leased without reasonable consideration.

21 As of April 2020, Japan has signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology with the following countries: the United States; the United Kingdom; Australia; India; the Philippines; France; Italy; Germany; and Malaysia. (See Reference 31 [Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements])
Adapting Defense Equipment for External Use

With regard to aircraft involving many technological bases shared between the defense and the civilian sectors, the MOD has been considering the civilian use of aircraft developed by the MOD from the perspective that taking measures to contribute to the revitalization of the civilian sector will contribute to maintaining and activating the industrial bases of Japanese aircraft, and by extension, to maintaining and strengthening the defense industrial base in Japan. In August 2010, the MOD compiled a set of guidelines for the development of a concrete system for the civilian use of aircraft, while in 2011, it also developed an application procedure for private companies interested in civilian use. So far, technical data related to the civilian use of the US-2 amphibian rescue aircraft and the F7-10 engine that are mounted on P-1 maritime patrol aircraft have been disclosed in response to requests from the implementing companies. In December 2016, the ATLA and IHI Corporation, a company manufacturing the F7-10 engine, signed a contract for the civilian use of the F7-10 engine for sales to the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) for the first time. The engine was delivered to JAXA in September 2019.

Considering that there have been inquiries about equipment other than aircraft not only from the private sector but also from foreign governments since the establishment of the Three Principles for the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, the term was changed from “Adapting Defense Equipment for Civilian Use” to “Adapting Defense Equipment for External Use,” and procedure rules were prepared in August 2018 towards project formulation in the future. In 2019, technical data, etc. for adapting defense equipment for external use concerning the automatic flight control computer processing unit for the improved SH-60K and Ship Landing Assist System for SH-60K were disclosed upon applications from companies.

Participation in International Defense Equipment Exhibitions

From the viewpoint of promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation, the ATLA has participated in international defense equipment exhibitions to introduce Japan’s defense equipment policies and advanced technology. These initiatives help foreign government officials better understand Japan’s equipment policies and technology, and contribute to building bases for the promotion of defense equipment and technology cooperation.

In November 2019, Japan participated in “Dubai Air Show 2019” in the UAE and held the static display and flight demonstration of C-2 transport aircraft, which Japan has developed. During the show, MOD/SDF personnel exchanged opinions with many government officials, including His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, as well as participants from private companies, which contributed to the promotion of defense equipment and technology cooperation.

In the domestic field, “Defence and Security Equipment International Exhibition and Conference: DSEI Japan 2019” was held in Makuhari Messe in November 2019. At the exhibition, the ATLA exhibited real products, models and panels to introduce equipment and technologies which other countries showed interest in: e.g. land equipment such as Type-16 mobile combat vehicles developed in Japan and equipment for PKO and disaster relief activities; small high-power engine technology; marine equipment related...
to minesweeping; prototypes developed by the ATLA; and systems related to fighter jets. Also, five Japanese SMEs showcased their products and technologies there.

Many domestic and overseas companies and government officials visited the ATLA booth during the show. The visitors and responsible MOD/SDF personnel vigorously exchanged opinions contributing to the promotion of defense equipment and technology cooperation.

6 Public-Private Collaboration for Appropriate Overseas Transfer of Defence Equipment

The Public-Private Defense Industry Forum is held with the purpose of promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation with partner countries as a joint effort between the public and private sectors. The aim of this forum is to deepen understanding of the relevant parties and facilitate concrete defense equipment and technology cooperation in the future through explanation of various systems surrounding the defense industry in Japan and each country as well as presentations by each company on their products and technology. Most recently, the forums were held with India in February 2019, and with the Philippines in October 2019.

In FY2020, the MOD will conduct feasibility studies of possible candidates for defense equipment and technology cooperation projects. The public and private sectors will work together on information gathering and dissemination toward the materialization of overseas equipment transfer.

7 Preventing Leakage of Key Technologies for Defense Equipment

In promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation internationally, the MOD will work to strengthen (1) intellectual property management, (2) technology control, and (3) information security in order to prevent leakage of key technologies for defense equipment.

See Section 4-3-2 (4) b of this Chapter (Preventing Leakage of Key Technologies)
Military Intelligence Collection

For formulating defense policy accurately in response to the changes in the situation and for operating defense capabilities effectively in dealing with various situations, it is necessary to grasp medium- to long-term military trends in the neighboring countries of Japan and to detect the indications of various situations promptly. To this end, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) always makes efforts to collect information swiftly and accurately by using various methods.

Examples of intelligence collection means used by the MOD/SDF include: (1) collecting, processing and analyzing military communications and signals emanating from electronic weapons in the air over Japan; (2) collecting, processing, and analyzing data from various imagery satellites (including Information Gathering Satellite (IGS)); (3) surveillance activities by ships, aircraft and other assets; (4) collecting and organizing a variety of open source information; (5) information exchanges with defense organizations of other nations; and (6) intelligence collection conducted by defense attachés and other officials.

As for defense attachés, the defense attaché assigned to Malaysia took additional responsibility for Brunei in October 2019, and the defense attaché assigned to Belgium additionally for the Mission of Japan to the European Union in February 2020. As of April 2020, 70 defense attachés are dispatched to 83 embassies and 6 missions and delegations (including 46 embassies, 1 mission and 1 delegation where defense attachés are actually stationed).

As of April 1, 2020 (70 defense attachés dispatched to 83 embassies and 6 missions and delegations of Japan; actually stationed at 46 embassies and 1 mission and 1 delegation)

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1 Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) of the Japanese government is operated by the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center. The MOD, along with other ministries and agencies, utilizes the imagery intelligence provided by the IGS.
Colonel KANEKO Hiroyuki, assigned to Iran

As the only SDF personnel residing in Iran, a distinctive country that has two armed forces (the regular force and the Revolutionary Guards) and that is a center of situations in the Middle East these days, I feel the security environment is constantly changing, which makes me feel the weight of responsibility. I also realize that a good relationship between Japan and Iran serves as an important foundation for my job as a defense attaché. Foreign military attachés in Iran have built a solid relationship in their groups. Daily interaction with these military officers, who take it for granted that they devote their lives for their countries in wartime, makes me mentally return to my starting point as a SDF personnel. For the remainder of my term, I continue to strive for the national interest while looking at myself.

Colonel DEGUCHI Arata, assigned to Kazakhstan

As a defense attaché to Kazakhstan, which is called a leader of Central Asia, I pay close attention to the military movements of Russia, China, Western and other countries in this region. While it has strong connections with Russia due to its historical background since the Russian Empire, Kazakhstan is driving for omnidirectional diplomacy and is also passionate about promoting defense cooperation with Japan. I feel greatly fulfilled with what I can do for the development of the Japan-Kazakhstan relationship. As Kazakhstan is an army country with a vast extent, it receives many army military attachés from various countries. Representing Japan when interacting with them is a valuable experience which could not be obtained through other opportunities.

Commander IGARASHI Naomi, assigned to Malaysia

Since March 2019, I have been working as the first ever defense attaché from JMSDF in Malaysia, a country situated at a geopolitically important position connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. In order to facilitate defense cooperation and collect information relevant to national defense, I coordinate and exchange opinions with the Malaysian Ministry of Defence, including the Malaysian Navy and think tanks, as well as military attachés from other countries on a daily basis. I feel deeply moved when I welcome JSDF vessels and aircraft without any mishap after complicated and wide-ranging coordination. In addition, as I realize a feeling of trust in Japan throughout Malaysia, I would like to make greater efforts to bring the two countries even closer in order to move such a good relationship one step forward.

Lieutenant Colonel OCHIAI Takashi, assigned to Morocco

In Rabat, I have been serving as a defense attaché at the Japanese Embassy in Morocco since July 2017. Morocco is a constitutional monarchy state that gained independence from France in 1956. Since its independence, the country has maintained a good relationship with Japan, and received many military attachés from around the world given its geographical characteristic as a military strategic chokepoint, situated at an entrance to the Mediterranean Sea.

The defense cooperation/exchange between Japan and Morocco is limited for the moment. Meanwhile, an SDF workshop for 66 generals and other staff members of the Moroccan armed forces has been realized for the first time in Japan in April 2019.

As a defense attaché at the Japanese Embassy in Morocco, I will continue to do my best for the development of the relationship between the two countries.
Under the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG), in order to provide timely and effective intelligence support to policy decision and SDF operations, the MOD/SDF will promote initiatives to comprehensively enhance intelligence capabilities at all stages of intelligence, including gathering, analyzing, sharing and securing of information.

Specifically, the MOD/SDF will strengthen information gathering and analysis capabilities so that the MOD/SDF will be fully capable of meeting various intelligence requirements including those related to new domains. This will be conducted by strengthening gathering postures for SIGINT and IMINT through establishing and enhancing capabilities of information collection facilities, utilizing IGS and commercial satellites, and diversifying means for information collection through new equipment such as long-endurance Unmanned Aircraft Vehicles (UAVs). Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will also strengthen the gathering posture of HUMINT through enhancing its defense attaché system, reinforce the gathering posture of OSINT and expand its cooperation with allied countries.

In this regard, the MOD/SDF will proactively utilize the latest information processing technology, promote all-source analysis by fusing a wide variety of information sources together, and successfully develop and connect systems that will promote information sharing.

In order to respond appropriately to increasingly diversified intelligence requirements, the MOD/SDF will promote the securing and training of highly capable personnel handling information collection and analysis. Moreover, the MOD/SDF will take steady measures in various directions including recruitment, education, training, and personnel allocation to strengthen comprehensive information collection and analysis capabilities.

With regard to information security, the MOD/SDF will coordinate with relevant offices to make every effort by such means as education in ensuring information sharing on a need-to-know basis, and in taking preventive measures against information leakage. Also, the MOD/SDF will strengthen counter-intelligence capability within the MOD/SDF by promoting collaboration with relevant organizations.

The Defense Intelligence Headquarters is the central intelligence agency of the MOD and the largest intelligence agency of Japan. It was established in 1997 in order to develop a framework for sophisticated and comprehensive information gathering and analysis in the increasingly complicated security environment following the cold war. The Headquarters collects SIGINT, IMINT, GEOINT, OSINT, etc. and analyzes international and military situations, and other matters related to Japan’s security.

The Defense Intelligence Headquarters is an organization consisting of Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) personnel, and administrative and technical officials (specialized in language, technology, administration or general office). SDF personnel use the knowledge based on their experience in their unit, whereas administrative/technical officials use their expert knowledge in language, technology, and other fields. They are working together for their mission.

Specifically, they conduct comprehensive analysis on international military situations that change day by day from diverse perspectives, including military, political and economic factors, based on information from every possible source, including SIGINT, IMINT, OSINT and opinion exchange with relevant parties.

Results of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters’ intelligence service are provided as analysis products to the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the National Security Secretariat established within the Cabinet Secretariat, the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, as well as GSDF, MSDF and ASDF units in a timely and appropriate manner to support policy decision and unit operation. The Defense Intelligence Headquarters also actively exchanges information with relevant ministries and agencies and foreign counterparts.
Training and exercise conducted by units in each service can be broadly divided into training for individual SDF personnel to improve the necessary proficiency for their respective fields, and training and exercise for units to enhance their systematic capabilities. Training for individuals is conducted one-on-one in stages based on the specialties and abilities of individual personnel. Training and exercise for units is conducted depending on the size of unit, from small to large; meanwhile, large-scale comprehensive training including coordination between units is also conducted.

In order to effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance its deterrence effectiveness, based on the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDP), SDF’s joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises are to be conducted in a tailored and visible way. While leveraging the lessons learned from these training and exercises, the SDF is conducting regular studies and reviews of its plans to address contingencies. The SDF also strives to further enhance amphibious operation capability by the implementation of joint training by the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) and Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) in collaboration with U.S. Marines. The SDF will strive to enhance the effectiveness of the swift and continuous deployment of units and strengthen their presence on a steady-state basis by organically coordinating such training and exercises that utilize training environments in Japan and abroad.

Also, seeking to respond to various situations with a whole-of-government approach, coordination with relevant agencies including the National Police Agency, Fire and Disaster Management Agency, and Japan Coast Guard will be reinforced. The SDF will also actively utilize the opportunities presented by the joint training and exercises of the SDF and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises as a way not only for developing and verifying plans for the actual SDF operations, but also for comprehensive issues including civil protection.

SDF training has been planned and conducted under conditions that are as close as possible to actual combat situations, yet many restrictions remain. Therefore, the SDF will conduct effective training and exercises by expanding the establishment and utilization of the training areas in Hokkaido and elsewhere in Japan based on the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG). For example, the GSDF newly organized a Support Group for Training Assessment in March 2020 and started operations related to regiment-level field counterattack exercise using a maneuvering ground in Hokkaido. Furthermore, the SDF will also facilitate expanded joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas with the SDF while accounting for relations with local communities. Furthermore, the SDF will facilitate the use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas, and the utilization of excellent training environments overseas, such as the U.S. and Australia, and introduce simulators actively.

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1 Training includes SDF Joint Exercises, Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercises, and Ballistic Missile Response Training, which are to prevent and repel direct threats to Japan. Other additional training includes International Peace Cooperation Exercises, which assume SDF’s international peace cooperation activities.
The Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF constantly strive as one for safety management, such as by implementing the highest level of safety measures and precautions during routine training.

Despite these efforts, in September 2019, during the maintenance of P-3C Patrol aircraft at MSDF Kanoya Air Base (Kagoshima Prefecture), an engine fell from the aircraft, and directly hit and killed one SDF personnel.

The MOD/SDF is thoroughly implementing measures to prevent another such accident and expending all possible means to ensure safety.

Any accident that can cause injury to the public, damage to its property, or the loss of life of SDF personnel, must be avoided at all costs. The MOD/SDF as a whole is making its utmost effort to prevent recurrence of such accidents by thoroughly investigating their causes and making sure each member has recognized the importance of safety management once again.
For the SDF to perform its mission, SDF personnel must remain in good health through appropriate health management. Also, it is important for the SDF to make continued efforts to enhance and strengthen its capabilities in military medicine for protecting the lives of the personnel engaging in a variety of services as much as possible.

Under the circumstances where the SDF’s missions are becoming more diverse and internationalized, it is important to appropriately and accurately carry out various medical activities, such as medical support in disaster relief and international peace keeping activities, and capacity building in the medical field.

The MOD/SDF, therefore, is enhancing and strengthening its medical capabilities so that they can appropriately respond to various emergency events and carry out its various missions in Japan and abroad.

### 1 Enhancing Seamless Medical Care and Evacuation Posture

#### 1 Enhancement of Medical Functions in Various Emergency Situations

In order to respond to various emergency situations, the MOD/SDF will enhance a seamless medical care and evacuation posture from the frontline to the final transport destination, while considering joint operation, in accordance with the MTDP.

Specifically, for the purpose of providing maximum protection for the lives of personnel injured on the frontline, the MOD/SDF will enhance medical functions for seamless implementation of a series of medical care and transportation starting from emergency life support by Frontline Medics and damage control surgery (DCS) at a medical base equipped with a field operation system to safe and speedy transportation to a SDF hospital that is the final destination for complete cure. Other measures necessary for the implementation of the above will be taken, including preparation of materials and equipment necessary for DCS, patient management after surgery, the whole body control of patients during transportation, and equipment for blood preservation.

On this occasion, MOD/JSDF decides to strengthen the organization of the Joint Staff for control and coordination concerning SDF medical operation on a daily basis.

#### 2 Enhancement of Medical Functions in the Southwestern Region

In the enhancement of seamless medical care and evacuation posture, in light of the geographical characteristics of Japan, with its vast sea area and large number of remote islands, the MTDP places a special focus on the enhancement of medical functions in the southwestern region. Specifically, the MOD/SDF will develop maintenance and evacuation guidelines for medical bases in the region and improve the medical equipment reserve system in main island of Okinawa and smaller islands.

### 2 SDF Hospitals Serving as Hub Hospitals with Enhanced Functions

The role of SDF hospitals is to admit and treat injured SDF personnel and other persons transported from their area of activity in various emergency situations, while in normal circumstances these hospitals provide medical care to SDF personnel and their families, etc. These hospitals also play the role of educational institutions that train medical personnel to maintain and enhance their skills.

In accordance with the NDPG and the MTDP, the MOD will continue to concentrate human and medical resources on the consolidation of SDF hospitals with increased performance levels to establish an efficient and high-quality medical care regime by improving their capacity as transfer

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1. "Frontline Medics" are, from among those who are certified as Licensed Practical Nurses (Refer to the Assistant Nurse stipulated in Article 6 of the Act on Public Health Nurses, Midwives, and Nurses [Act No. 203 of 1948]) and Emergency Life-Saving Technicians (refer to the Emergency Life-Saving Technician stipulated in Section 2, Article 2 of the Emergency Life-saving Technicians Act [Act No. 36 of 1991]), those who have completed the training curriculum approved by the council stipulated in Article 4 of the Directives Relating to Emergency Life-Saving Actions (MOD Directive No. 60 of 2016).

2. Hemostasis by pressing/placing gauze on damaged internal organs, suture, etc. and emergency operations to prevent contamination with intestinal tract contents. The purpose is to stabilize the patient’s condition to the level where transfer is possible.

3. Thoracotomy, laparotomy, craniotomy, and other operations to save life can be conducted.
hospitals with a certain level of medical care in response to infections, gunshot wounds, and other trauma and injury caused by NBC weapons in addition to general practice. SDF hospitals have been also advancing regional medical care. Some SDF hospitals are designated as secondary emergency medical institutions by local municipalities to accept emergency patients. SDF Central Hospital, in particular, responded to about 6,600 ambulances in 2019.

In response to the spread of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) infection, the MOD/SDF has been accepting COVID-19 patients at SDF hospitals and the National Defense Medical College Hospital (NDMC Hospital) since February 1, 2020. 430 COVID-19 patients in total (as of May 31) have been accepted by the SDF Central Hospital, SDF district hospitals in Sapporo, Yokosuka, Hanshin, Fukuoka and Kumamoto and the NDMC Hospital.

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The SDF Central Hospital and the NDMC Hospital are designated as medical institution for Category 1 Infectious Diseases and have been implementing training for response to infectious diseases. For example, the SDF Central Hospital implements training to accept infectious disease patients on a regular basis in preparation for the occurrence of Category 1 Infectious Diseases to establish cooperation with relevant institutions, which is necessary when such patients are identified. The training was useful in the activities to respond to the spread of the COVID-19 infection.

Using the lessons learned through the activities in response to the spread of the COVID-19 infection, the MOD/SDF will further strengthen its hygiene functions by implementing measures as follows in the first and second 2020 supplementary budgets: preparation of medical equipment including respirators and negative pressure equipment to accept infected patients, ambulances necessary for transportation of infected people, protective clothing necessary for handling COVID-19 and CT diagnosis vehicles and medical equipment that can be deployed to the field for pneumonia diagnosis.

In May 2019, SDF Central Hospital, with the participation of GSDF Eastern Army, GSDF Medical School, Japanese Red Cross Society, Japanese DMAT, Setagaya Medical Association and others, implemented a drill to accept a large number of injured people based on a scenario of a Tokyo Inland Earthquake. Through such drills, SDF Central Hospital strengthens collaboration with related organizations and improves its ability as a medical institution equivalent to a disaster base hospital. When CT scanners and other equipment of private hospitals in Koriyama City were covered with water due to the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis), SDF Fuji Hospital dispatched a vehicle with CT scanner for disaster relief at the request of Fukushima Governor for the period from October 18 to November 5, 2019, and supported treatment of 230 patients.

As disaster relief concerning community acquired infection of COVID-19, from May 2 to 14 the SDF Fuji Hospital sent a CT diagnosis vehicle to the cruise ship Costa Atlantica (with approximately 620 crews) where a mass infection occurred while the ship was moored to a pier in Nagasaki Prefecture. CT scan was conducted for 6 people.

3 Strengthening the Function of the NDMC

As the only educational institution of the MOD/SDF for the training of SDF personnel who are physicians (medical officers), SDF personnel who are public health and registered nurses (nursing officers) and technical officers, the NDMC plays the role to train and produce the primary medical staff for medical activities of the SDF as well as to maintain and improve their skills.

In this context, the NDPG and the MTDP state that the MOD/SDF will improve operations of the NDMC and enhance its research functions, and endeavor to secure high-quality talents.

Specifically, the MOD/SDF will strengthen the system for training of excellent medical and nursing officers, and improve the conditions for providing high-quality medical
care either equaling or surpassing other university hospitals. The MOD/SDF will also enhance research functions of the NDMC Research Institute and collaboration with medical care departments of the GSDF, MSDF, and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF). Through these initiatives, the MOD/SDF will further enhance the education/research conditions at the college.

The NDMC Research Institute started advanced research of defense medicine in FY2015 and has been conducting research contributing to SDF troop operation, which includes research on explosion trauma and damage caused by shock waves.

4 Enhancement of Education of Medical and Nursing Officers

While greater abilities are required of personnel engaged in medical care, such as medical officers, due to the diversification of missions, less than 90% of medical officer positions have been filled, although the rate has been improving year by year. Such low sufficiency is caused by medical officers leaving the SDF, one of the major reasons of which is the lack of opportunity to engage in medical training and practice. The MOD/SDF continues to implement various measures with various career options to prevent medical officers from leaving the SDF by enhancing clinical education after graduation from the NDMC and other institutions, promoting various initiatives for ensuring more opportunities for medical officers to engage in medical practice, helping them acquire and improve specialized knowledge and skills in areas such as infectious diseases and emergency medicine, as well as increasing their motivation for work. Through these measures, the MOD/SDF is working to improve the sufficiency of medical officers and maintain and improve their medical skills. In the MTDP, the MOD/SDF will continue efforts to improve the sufficiency of medical officers and further promote the appointment of SDF Reserve Personnel who are physicians to handle missions that are expected to increase.

Similar measures are taken for nursing officers to maintain and improve their knowledge/skills through practice at external hospitals, etc.

Moreover, medical personnel and medical staff, such as radiological technologists, clinical technologists, and emergency life-saving technicians, are educated and trained at SDF hospitals, schools and other relevant institutions so that the SDF can perform diverse missions and missions under special circumstances, including international peace cooperation activities and large-scale disasters.

5 Enhancement of Capabilities to Treat War Injury

In order to improve first aid capabilities on the frontline, and damage control surgeries and treatment while transferring the injured, the MOD/SDF has conducted research on relevant initiatives taken by the U.S. Forces and others, carried out reviews for appropriate and accurate life-saving activities, and enhancing education, training and research, including improvement of capabilities to treat combat injuries.

For the improvement of first aid capabilities on the frontline, since FY2017 the MOD has been providing specific education and training for SDF personnel who are certified as both Licensed Practical Nurses and Emergency Life-Saving Technicians to acquire necessary knowledge and skills, so that the SDF personnel with these qualifications will be able to provide specialized relief treatments on the spot to SDF personnel who are injured on the frontline, prior to their transfer to SDF hospitals and other medical facilities. SDF personnel who have completed this education and training curriculum have been designated as “Frontline Medics” and allocated to units. In FY2019 the SDF started education and training for Frontline Medics to maintain their knowledge and skills necessary for relief treatment.

In addition to medical care on the frontline, based on the MTDP, the SDF will enhance education and training tailored to the characteristics of the units and equipment of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, which include medical care on board ships or aircraft, while promoting development of a training system for medical care on aircraft and teaching materials for improvement of first aid capability. The SDF will also promote development of medical training infrastructure necessary for combat injury education and common to all SDFs.

Video: Life of NDMC Students
URL: https://youtu.be/dgZ8FQo_jq0

First aid treatment for those with symptoms such as airway obstruction and tension pneumothorax caused by injuries, and other treatments such as administration of analgesic for pain relief.
In light of the response to the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa in 2014, the MOD/SDF is accelerating training of human resources with expertise to contribute to overseas activities against infectious diseases that could be a global threat and to the development of a framework including the NDMC, while at the same time making various efforts to improve the capabilities to respond to infectious diseases. Specifically, the MOD/SDF is currently improving the necessary facility equipment at units, the NDMC Hospital and the SDF Central Hospital. The aims of this improvement are to provide personnel training for the enhancement of capabilities to deal with infectious diseases, improve equipment to transport infectious disease patients and develop readiness for offering medical treatment to patients affected by Category I infectious diseases which are classified as the most dangerous category among known infectious diseases. The SDF Central Hospital and the NDMC Hospital were designated as a medical institution for Category I infectious diseases in April 2017 and March 2019 respectively and have been working to improve capabilities to deal with infectious diseases.

SDF medical units engage in international cooperation including international disaster relief operations and capacity building assistance for foreign military forces. They have provided medical care in overseas disaster-struck areas and are actively assisting mostly the Asia-Pacific region with capacity building in such medical fields as underwater medicine, aeromedicine and disaster medicine, and conducting joint training.

For the future, the MOD/SDF will develop systems necessary for various international cooperation initiatives, which include the updating of mobile medical systems that are effective for overseas medical activities and dispatch of SDF personnel to the medical departments of international organizations, the U.S. Forces and others.
Various activities of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are hard to implement without the understanding and cooperation of each and every person and local governments. Therefore it is necessary to further deepen the trust between local communities and people, and the SDF.

Collaboration with Local Communities

The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) provides that, in recent years, activities, training and exercises of SDF and U.S. forces in Japan (USFJ) are becoming more diverse and defense equipment more sophisticated, and that, as a result, it is becoming all the more important to gain understanding among and secure cooperation from local governments and residents around defense facilities.

Therefore, the NDPG provides that the MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities regarding defense policies and activities, and that, upon fielding units and equipment of SDF or USFJ and conducting training and exercises, the MOD/SDF will make careful, detailed coordination to meet the desires and conditions of local communities, while sufficiently fulfilling accountability.

Supporting Civilian Life

The MOD/SDF conduct activities to support the lives of citizens in a range of fields, in response to requests from local governments and relevant organizations. Such activities contribute to further deepening the trust in the SDF, and provide SDF personnel with pride and confidence.

The GSDF handles the disposal of unexploded ordnance and other dangerous explosives found throughout Japan. In FY2019, there were 1,441 such cases (approx. 33 tons). In particular, cases handled in Okinawa Prefecture accounted for approx. 57% of the total cases. The MSDF clears and disposes of underwater mines and other dangerous explosives, but there was no such removal or disposal in FY2019.

The SDF not only tries to have interactions with local residents by doing things like opening its camps and bases to the public to the extent that they do not interfere with unit activities, but also provides transportation and other assistance at a variety of athletic events. In addition, it supports regional medical treatment efforts by providing general medical care at some SDF hospitals as well as conducting urgent transport for emergency patients from isolated islands. Furthermore, based on national and other policies, the MOD/SDF ensures opportunities for local small and medium sized enterprises to receive orders, while taking efficiency into account, by such measures as the promotion of separated/divided ordering and the securing of competition amongst companies within the same qualification and grade divisions.

Cooperation from Local Governments and Other Relevant Organizations for the SDF

(1) Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel and Cooperation with Re-employment Support

Amid the harsh recruitment and employment situation, the cooperation from local governments and relevant organizations is vital to secure highly qualified personnel and to support the re-employment of uniformed SDF personnel who retire at relatively young ages.

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2. For example, this is a method through which grouping of products, etc. takes place when putting up the order for general competitive bidding, and then a successful bidder for the groups is decided.
3. This means that out of the bidding participation eligibility categorized into grade A-D, there is competition between grade C or D only, which comprise mostly small and medium enterprises.
(2) Support for and Cooperation with SDF Activities

The SDF camps and bases maintain close relations with local communities, and therefore, various forms of support and cooperation from the local community are indispensable for the SDF to conduct its diverse activities, including education and training, and disaster relief. Moreover, units dispatched overseas for international peace cooperation operations and other duties receive support and cooperation from the relevant organizations for the procedures involved.

The MOD/SDF are further strengthening cooperation with relevant entities such as local governments, police and fire services in order to ensure immediate and sure activities by the SDF in various contingencies.

Regional Defense Bureaus established in eight locations nationwide make efforts to build cooperative relationships with their respective local communities, through collaboration with SDF units and Provincial Cooperation Offices. In FY2019 the bureaus provided local communities with explanations on a variety of training including Japan-U.S. joint training, development of SDF facilities on Mageshima, and plan to deploy Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) V-22 Ospreys at KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT.

Also, the bureaus conducted liaison and coordination with local governments in response to typhoon, heavy rain and other disasters. They also implemented measures to promote understanding of the defense policy in general by holding 16 seminars on defense issues and providing all prefectures and municipalities with explanations on the defense white paper, for example.

For this reason, the 101st Ordnance Disposal Unit in the GSDF Camp Naha goes into action day and night, sometimes more than five times a day. The unit removes fuses by hand and collects unexploded ordnance to make them safe, thereby contributing to the safety and security of people.

Ordnance disposal is a precarious mission, but ordnance disposal units across the country will continue to carry out their mission for residents.

Even today, more than 70 years after World War II, unexploded ordnance, mainly dropped before and during the war, are found across Japan from Hokkaido to Okinawa. Every time, the SDF disposes the ordnance at the request of the local authority.

In FY2019, the SDF disposed approximately 33 tons of ordnance in 1,441 operations. The number of ordnance found in Okinawa Prefecture is prominent: approximately 18 tons of ordnance of 529 operations were disposed in the fiscal year. They account for over one third of all ordnance found in Japan.

Defense facilities are diverse in their use, and often require large volumes of land. In addition, as of January 1, 2020, approx. 28% of the land area of the facilities and areas (for exclusive use) of the USFJ is jointly used by the SDF in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement,
with the purpose to enhance the diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises. Meanwhile, problems related to restricted establishment and operations of defense facilities have emerged due to the urbanization of areas around many of the defense facilities. Also, another problem is that frequent aircraft operations such as takeoffs and landings cause noise and other issues, impacting the living environment of local residential communities.

With that being said, defense facilities, as the foundation that supports the defense capabilities of Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, are indispensable for our country’s security. Therefore, in order for the facilities to exert their full function, it is necessary to maintain conditions for constant and stable utilization by ensuring harmony between the defense facilities and the surrounding areas as well as obtaining the understanding and cooperation of the local residents.

For that purpose, the MOD has taken measures to prevent, reduce or mitigate aircraft noise and other impacts caused by activities of the SDF or the U.S. Forces, or by the establishment/operation of airports and other defense facilities in the surrounding areas since 1974 based on the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities (Living Environment Improvement Act).

Taking into consideration the requests from the relevant local governments, the MOD partially revised the Living Environment Improvement Act in 2011, and conducted a review to enable the Specified Defense Facilities Environments Improvement Adjustment Grants to be applied to so-called soft projects, such as aid for medical expenses. In addition, the MOD added defense facilities to be eligible for these grants. Focused work is also underway to provide sound insulation at residences.

Regarding the Specified Defense Facilities Environments Improvement Adjustment Grants, the MOD has implemented initiatives such as the PDCA Cycle process since April 2014, aiming to increase the effectiveness of these grants.

In response to the requests by related local governments, the MOD continues to consider practical ways to achieve more effective and efficient measures to harmonize defense facilities and surrounding areas, in light of the severe fiscal situation.

Among the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, maintaining the presence of the USFJ and its readiness is vitally important for ensuring the security of Japan. For stable stationing of the USFJ, it is essential to obtain understanding and cooperation of the local governments and residents in the vicinities of U.S. bases. The MOD will work to share this recognition with the United States at various levels including the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting. The ministry will also constantly take various measures, including coordination for unit operation of the USFJ with the local governments and other parties, provision of subsidies pertaining to the USFJ realignment, prompt information provision to the local government in a case of incident or accidents, and exchange promotion between the USFJ and local residents.
(1) Coordination for Unit Operation of the USFJ with the Local Governments, etc.

The MOD is working to promote local understanding of the maintenance of USFJ facilities and unit operations through coordination, including prior explanation to the relevant local municipalities and residents at every occasion of USFJ realignment, training, unit deployment, new equipment deployment, etc.

(2) Subsidy, etc. to Promote the USFJ Realignment

During a period of time before and after the implementation of the USFJ realignment (10 years in principle), realignment subsidies will be granted to help to cover the expenses of projects which contribute to improving the convenience of the lives of residents in local municipalities affected by the realignment, and to stimulating the local industries. For that purpose, they will be granted in accordance with progress made in the steps of the realignment, after the Defense Minister designates the specified defense facilities and neighboring municipalities affected by the realignment. As of April 2020, 14 municipalities for nine defense facilities are eligible to receive the subsidies. In order to promote the realignment, additional measures are taken with budgetary provision.

(3) Ensuring Safety of Operations of the USFJ

Ensuring the safety of local residents is of prime importance in USFJ operations, and no accident or incident must occur. In the event of a crash, component fall/loss, precautionary landing on civilian airports, etc. of U.S. Forces aircraft, the MOD urges the United States to make exhaustive measures for safety management and recurrence prevention as well as prompt information provision. The ministry also requests measures such as suspension of flying according to the individual case. The MOD promptly provides the relevant local governments, etc. with explanation of the obtained information and takes measures to ensure prompt and appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the incident or accident.
The MOD not only listens to the results of accident investigation and recurrence prevention measures of the United States but also uses expert knowledge of the SDF to determine their reasonableness. Furthermore, in July 2019, another effort was made by revising the guidelines concerning aircraft accidents in order to further refine the applicable policies and procedures in case of an accident caused by U.S. military aircraft accidents outside of U.S. Forces facilities and areas in Japan.

Considering anxiety and concerns among local residents, Japan has been fully communicating its approach to the U.S. side including at the top and ministerial levels. The two countries closely cooperate to secure safe operation as the top priority. The MOD is also concerned about the increasing trend of accidents/incidents due to drinking caused by U.S. Forces military personnel and others and has requested the U.S. side on multiple occasions to reinforce official discipline and personnel education. The United States has also taken measures for its part, putting in place its guidelines for off-duty action (liberty policy), including measures such as alcohol restrictions at nighttime as well as curfews applying to U.S. Forces personnel ranked below a certain rank. Both the countries will continue cooperation to prevent recurrence of incidents related to drinking.

In addition, the Government of Japan prepared Crime Prevention Measures in Okinawa in June 2016 to deter crime in Okinawa Prefecture and ensure the safety and security of the people of Okinawa. Bolstering crime prevention patrol operations and establishing a safe and secure environment are the pillars of the Measures. The MOD is participating in the Okinawa Local Safety Patrol Corps established in the Okinawa General Bureau and will continue to cooperate with the relevant ministries and agencies to make it an effective crime-prevention effort.

(4) Promoting Exchange between the USFJ and Local Residents

The MOD holds a Japan-U.S. exchange program to deepen mutual understanding between Japan and the United States with the understanding and cooperation of the local governments and USFJ. Under the program, residents living near USFJ facilities and areas together with USFJ personnel enjoy sports, music and cultural exchanges.

The USFJ also has initiatives to deepen mutual understanding with people of the local communities, which include opening up of its bases (Friendship day) and information provision through websites and social media.

(5) Other Measures (Including Measures Pertaining to the SDF)

(1) Compensation for Fisheries

The MOD defines the confined water for training, etc. carried out by the SDF or the USFJ using water surface based on laws (Article 105-1 of the Self-Defense Forces Law or Article 1 of the Act to Restrict the Operation of Fishing Boats) or a contract and compensates for losses incurred from the restriction.

As an administrative measure to help people who suffered losses in their fishery operation due to the restriction or prohibition based on the provisions of the acts but cannot receive compensation under the provisions of the acts, the MOD provides relief money to people who satisfy certain requirements.

(2) Base Subsidy, etc.

The MOD provides cooperation by doing such things as providing various information also for the subsidy for municipalities where national defense facilities are located (“Base Subsidy”), and the Adjustment Grants for municipalities where defense facilities are located (“Adjustment Grants”), both of which are under the defense facilities-related subsidy system under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.

The base subsidy has been established considering that, among the facilities of the U.S. forces or the facilities used by the SDF, the land used for airports and maneuvering grounds covers a vast area that is a big part of the municipality area, which has a significant impact on municipal finance. The subsidy has a nature of substituting for fixed property tax and is granted to municipalities where national properties (land, building and structure) provided for use by the USFJ or the SDF are located.

The Adjustment Grants have been established because the Base Subsidy is not granted to municipalities where properties constructed or set up by the U.S. forces (“USFJ properties”) are located despite their exemption from fixed asset tax, and also considering the tax-fiscal impact of the municipal tax exemption for U.S. Force personnel and civilian employees. The grant is provided to municipalities where the U.S. Force property is located.

A sense of crisis regarding the sustainability of the global environment has been mounting internationally. In 2015 countries around the world advanced initiatives, such as the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at the United Nations and the Paris Agreement, which is an international framework concerning climate change. Marine plastic pollution and climate change were important topics at the G20 Summit held in Osaka in June 2019. Just before the
summit, the first Ministerial Meeting on Energy Transitions and Global Environment for Sustainable Growth was held with the attendance of relevant ministers of the participating countries. Japan also formulated the Fifth Basic Environment Plan at the cabinet in 2018 and has been working to realize a sustainable society. At the SDG Summit in September 2019, Prime Minister Abe expressed the intention to further accelerate initiatives in Japan and abroad by the next SDG Summit. In response to the acceleration of domestic and overseas initiatives, as a member of the government, the MOD also needs to contribute to solving environmental problems, while at the same time implementing measures with more focus on the coexistence of SDF/USFJ facilities and areas with surrounding areas.

(1) Efforts Related to the MOD/SDF Facilities

(1) Banning the Use of Plastic Bags

In order to take the initiative in the environmental measures of the government, the use of plastic bags was banned in Ichigaya District with the cooperation of shops, etc. on January 20, 2020. The MOD/SDF will ban the use of plastic bags also in other bases and camps where cooperation of shops is obtained to extend the ban across the country.

(2) Review of Electric Power Procurement

From the standpoint of the MOD/SDF, which has 250,000 members and operates facilities throughout the country, the problem of climate change is not an affair that concerns only other people. For procurement of electric power in FY2020, the MOD/SDF will review necessary electric power procurement in order to use renewable energy as much as possible after ensuring competitiveness, low price and stable supply, and plans to procure approx. 9,100 kWh electric power from renewable energy sources in the total of 151 facilities, etc. (on a contract basis) across the country.

(2) Efforts on the USFJ Facilities and Areas

(1) Efforts Related to Environmental Conservation

For activities of the U.S. Forces in USFJ facilities and areas, the USFJ developed Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS), which provides that generally the strictest regulation shall be adopted among environmental preservation regulations of Japan, the United States and international commitment. At the “2+2” Meeting in September 2000, based on the recognition that environmental conservation is important, the governments of both nations agreed to make it a common objective to ensure the health and safety of residents in the vicinity of USFJ facilities and areas, U.S. Forces personnel, their families and other such parties, and made the “Joint Statement of Environmental Principles.” To follow up on this announcement, Japan-U.S. consultations have been enhanced. The MOD has been working with relevant ministries and agencies to enhance cooperation for regular reviews of the JEGS compiled by the USFJ, exchange information on the environment, and deal with environmental pollution.

Furthermore, on September 28, 2015, the Governments of Japan and the United States signed and effectuated the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship relating to the USFJ, supplementary to the Status of U.S. Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the aim of strengthening environmental measures pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas. This supplementary agreement represents an international commitment with legal binding force and sets forth provisions concerning information sharing by the two countries, access to USFJ facilities and areas based on the report by the U.S. side at the time of an environmental accident and access to facilities and areas for investigation before their return.

In April 2020, in order to address an aqueous film-forming foam spill incident that occurred at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, access to MCAS Futenma pursuant to the Supplementary Agreement by the Government of Japan and the relevant local governments has been realized for the first time. The MOD will continue to cooperate closely with the relevant ministries, local governments, and the U.S. Government to address the concerns of local residents.

(2) Efforts to Save Utilities

In USFJ facilities and areas, efforts are made to save utilities, which include changes to energy-efficient heating/ventilation/air-conditioning equipment; installation of motion sensors for lights-out during absence; installation of solar panels; reduction of the period to use cooling/heating equipment and review of the preset temperature; and control of lighting and lights-out for night lighting, for example.

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8 JEGS is the environmental standard compiled by the USFJ. In order to ensure that USFJ activities and installations protect human health and the natural environment and, it stipulates matters such as the handling and storage methods of environmental pollutants within the facilities and areas.

9 Consisting of four items: (1) environmental governing standards, (2) information sharing and access, (3) response to environmental contamination, and (4) environmental consultation.
Participation in National Events

The SDF presents ceremonies including guards of honor, lining up and gun salutes to the Emperor, state guests and others at national events. A guard of honor to state guests from foreign countries at their welcome reception is essential for diplomatic procedure.

At the Sokuirei-Seiden-no-gi (Ceremony of the Enthronement of His Majesty the Emperor at the Seiden [State Hall]), the GSDF fired salutes in the Kita-no-maru area of the Outer Gardens of the Imperial Palace. At the celebration parade in November of the same year, the GSDF, Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), the National Defense Academy and National Defense Medical College conducted guards of honor, playing music and lining up. In addition to the members who were assigned to these duties, many other members participated in the event, including preparation for the implementation by the SDF.

Addressing Issues of perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS) and other organic fluorine compounds

PFOS, an organic fluorine compound, has a property of blending water and oil. In the past, PFOS was widely used for surface treatment agent in the semiconductor industry, aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) and other purposes. However, because it is hardly decomposed, and has a risk of negative effects through accumulation in the human body and environment, it was designated as a substance to be restricted by the POPs Convention (*1) in 2009 and the Chemical Substances Control Law (*2) in 2010. Further, last year, perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), another organic fluorine compound, became regulated under the POPs Convention. The regulation of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), which is a generic name of organic fluorine compounds, is also under international discussion.

In Japan, a high concentration of PFOS/PFOA is detected in various rivers across the country. In response to increasing public anxiety, the government as a whole is taking measures. Specifically, relevant ministries set provisional target values for tap water and water environments. The MOD formulated a plan to accelerate the replacement and disposal of AFFF containing PFOS in February this year with the aim of promoting understanding and ensuring trust of the local communities, which are essential for the stable operation of the SDF. The plan intends to complete disposal by the end of the next fiscal year for SDF facilities, and by the end of FY2023 for SDF vessels, in principle.

The United States Government is also studying the issue under numerous efforts, such as a report by a task force of the Department of Defense, which was issued in March this year. Under the initiative of Minister of Defense Kono and Secretary of Defense Esper, discussions at various levels are underway on Japan-U.S. cooperation, including actions concerning the U.S. Forces in Japan.

Under such circumstances, the occurrence of a large-scale aqueous film-forming foam spill incident at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma in April 2020 was deplorable. The MOD conducted cleaning and surveyed the status of contamination at nearby daycare centers and rivers outside the air station, and accessed MCAS Futenma under the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship for the first time upon an environmental accident. Access to MCAS Futenma was conducted five times in total to take samples of water and soil. In this manner, the MOD addressed the incident in collaboration with relevant ministries, local governments, and the U.S. Government. Based on all these initiatives in Japan and abroad, the MOD will continue efforts to eliminate the concerns of local residents over the issues concerning PFOS and other compounds in close coordination with relevant ministries, local governments, and the U.S. Government in order to dispel public anxiety.

*1 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
*2 Act on the Evaluation of Chemical Substances and Regulation of Their Manufacture, etc.
Activities for Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games

1 Cooperation by the SDF in Past Olympic Games and Performance of SDF Athletes (since the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games)

At the opening ceremony of the 18th Olympic Games held in Tokyo in 1964, Blue Impulse aircraft drew grand Olympic rings in the sky of Tokyo, the SDF band played the Olympic march and a fanfare, while students of the National Defense Academy held up the placards of the participating countries. Twenty-one SDF athletes participated in the games. Among them MIYAKE Yoshinobu won the first place in weight lifting and TSUBURAYA Kokichi became third in the marathon.

Since then, the SDF has participated in Olympic Games, with SDF athletes winning eight gold medals, four silver medals and eight bronze medals in total.

Video: Shukuga-Onretsu-no-gi (Imperial Procession by motorcar after the Enthronement Ceremony)
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AQYMP2kil8c
With the aim of strengthening efforts for the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games (hereafter referred to as “Tokyo 2020 Games”), the MOD/SDF Special Action Committee on the 2020 Tokyo Summer Olympics and Paralympics led by the Minister of Defense was set up in September 2013. At the first committee meeting, then Defense Minister Onodera explained the significance of the cooperation and participation of the MOD/SDF and stated that SDF personnel would make full efforts for Japan’s security and work for successful games with the spirit that all SDF members were participants.

At the 12th committee meeting in December 2019, it was decided that the MOD/SDF would take security measures, including warning and surveillance of the sky and sea area of Japan, including the area around the venues, relief provisions for victims in an event of a large-scale terrorist attack, and response to cyber attacks. Regarding cooperation with game operations, including ceremonies, the MOD/SDF had been conducting coordination with the Tokyo Organising Committee for the Olympic and Paralympic Games (Tokyo 2020) (hereafter referred to as “Tokyo Organising Committee”).

### After the Ceremony to Receive the Olympic Flame

**Lieutenant Colonel FUKUDA Tetsuo,** Commander, 11th Squadron, Flight Group, 4th Air Wing, ASDF (Higashi Matsushima City, Miyagi Prefecture)

On March 20, 2020, when the sacred flame of the Tokyo Olympic Games arrived at Matsushima Airbase, Miyagi Prefecture, Blue Impulse, an acrobatic flight team, drew five-colored rings in the sky above Tohoku. The strong wind that forced the Tohoku Shinkansen to suspend service blew away the Olympic symbol we drew, but the people of Tohoku who looked up at the sky could clearly see five rings. As the commander, I am proud that not only pilots but also maintenance crew and others who supported the flight worked together to do the perfect job at the moment when Matsushima Airbase attracted worldwide attention.

Because we could not miss any of the five-colored rings during the ceremony, it was necessary to prepare a stand-by aircraft and pilot for each color of smoke. We seriously trained pilots gathered from across the country so that all of them could ensure perfect performance.

The pilot who drew the yellow ring was from Yamada Town of Iwate Prefecture, which was badly affected by the tsunami of the Great East Japan Earthquake. With a determination to give a boost to the Olympic and Paralympic Games, a historic event that is a symbol of reconstruction, he flew in hopes that affected people would smile at the sight of the five rings.

The games have been postponed for one year. If I am given an opportunity to fly again, I will demonstrate the regained energy of Tohoku to the world and send the heartiest cheers from the sky so that athletes can exert all their strength.

**Squadron Commander Lieutenant Colonel FUKUDA**

**Prior training (photograph by KUROSAWA Eisuke)**

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**Video**: Five-colored rings drawn by Blue Impulse at the Olympic Flame Arrival Ceremony

**URL**: [https://twitter.com/ModJapan_jp/status/1240843368835371047?s=09](https://twitter.com/ModJapan_jp/status/1240843368835371047?s=09)
Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games on cooperation items (Olympic flame arrival ceremony, hoisting of national and other flags, medical services at the venue for shooting sports, marine rescue in sailing, control in and outside of venues, and operation of archery, shooting and modern pentathlon) and decided to implement the items at the official request of the organizing committee. In March 2020, the Tokyo 2020 Games was decided to be postponed and held in summer of 2021. The MOD/SDF will continue to cooperate with the organizing committee to prepare for the Games.

Other Initiatives

1 Response to Cases of Interference against SDF and U.S. Forces Aircraft by Laser Irradiation and Kite Flying

Cases of interference by laser irradiation and kite flying against the SDF and U.S. Forces aircraft in flight have been occurring frequently. These are extremely dangerous and malicious acts that may disrupt a pilot’s ability to operate aircraft and result in a catastrophe such as a crash. Therefore, the MOD disseminates information regarding the risks involved in these acts to local residents by putting up posters and requests their cooperation in reporting to the police while closely cooperating with relevant local governments. Additionally, the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Civil Aeronautics Act was revised in December 2016, making these interference acts subject to regulation as well as fines and other penalties.

2 Response to Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Mainly Drones Flying over Defense Facilities and Surrounding Airspace

In recent years there have been terror attacks overseas (including attempted ones) using small drones, including commercial drones, some of which are targeted at military facilities. Given such a situation, there is a concern that drone terror attacks on the SDF/USFJ facilities and areas can also happen in Japan, and if these facilities are endangered, the function as foundations to defend our nation can be seriously affected. To address such a concern, the Act on Prohibition of Flight of UASs around and over Key Facilities commonly known as the “Drone Act” was enforced on June 13, 2019, to prohibit small drones from flying over the SDF/USFJ facilities and areas designated by the Minister of Defense. Currently 27 SDF facilities where major SDF Headquarters, etc. are located are designated for the prohibition.

Reference 61 (a list of the defense-related facilities designated under the Drone Act)
Column The Drone Act

Based on the Drone Act, drone flights are prohibited over and within approximately 300 meters of the premises or areas of the SDF/USFJ facilities and areas that are designated by the Minister of Defense.

See Reference 61 (a list of the defense-related facilities designated under the Drone Act)

However, flights may be permitted when consent has been obtained from the administrator of the defense-related facilities or in other cases cited below (*): (See website)

- Flights over the designated defense-related facilities: When consent has been obtained from the administrators of the defense-related facilities.
- Flights over the surrounding areas within approximately 300 meters of the designated defense-related facilities: When consent has been obtained from those who own or occupy the areas, or when the flights are operated by the central or local governments for the purpose of performing public services.

Illegal flights of drones may be subject to the following measures:

- Measures to secure safety, including interfering against flights and destroying devices, may be implemented when an instruction for the discontinuation of the flights issued by police officers has not been followed.
- Offenders may be punished by imprisonment of up to one year, or a fine of up to 500,000 yen.

The advent of drones has made it possible for anyone to easily enjoy taking aerial video and photographs. However, contrary to their convenience, drones pose various potential risks, and in order to reduce the risks, various rules have been set. Before flying drones, the users should check on the regulations under the Drone Act in addition to the Civil Aeronautics Act.

Scan this to access the website of the MOD.
Public Relations Activities, Public Records and Archives Management, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities

Section 2

1 Various Public Relations Activities

As the activities of the MOD/SDF cannot be carried out without the understanding and support of the Japanese people, it is important to be proactive in undertaking easily comprehensible public relations activities and to gain the trust and cooperation of the public.

According to a “Public Opinion Survey on the Self-Defense Forces and Defense Issues” conducted by the Cabinet Office (in January 2018), public expectations and evaluations towards the SDF have been increasing as the scope of MOD/SDF activities has expanded both domestically and internationally. In light of this result, the MOD/SDF will continue to conduct a variety of PR activities, thereby striving to ensure better understanding of the current status of the MOD/SDF.

In addition, given that understanding and support from foreign countries are also of utmost importance for the SDF to conduct its missions successfully, it is essential that the MOD strengthens efforts to provide information to foreign countries about MOD/SDF initiatives, including about SDF activities abroad.


2 Events and PR Facilities

The MOD/SDF conducts activities to widely inform nationals of the current circumstances of the SDF. These activities include the GSDF Fuji Fire Power Exercise, cruises to experience MSDF vessels, and demonstration flights and boarding experiences on aircraft. In addition, at camps and bases throughout the country, events including equipment exhibitions and unit tours are held on occasions such as the anniversary of a unit’s foundation. In some instances, they also hold parades throughout the cities, with cooperation from the local communities. Furthermore, as part of the commemoration of the SDF anniversary, the SDF Marching Festival is held at Nippon Budokan arena every year. In 2019 the festival was held in Gymnasium 1 of the National Yoyogi Stadium due to renovation of Nippon Budokan, and approximately 38,500 visitors in total came.

Concerning annual reviews by the SDF, a troop review, a

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1 In addition to Facebook and other SNS accounts, the GSDF and MSDF opened an Instagram account in January and October 2017 respectively.
fleet review, and an air review are hosted in rotation by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF respectively. In 2019, the MSDF planned a fleet review of the MSDF in Sagami Bay but cancelled the review in order to expend all possible means for disaster relief activities in response to the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis) that hit Japan in October of the same year.

The MOD/SDF also actively opens PR facilities to the public. For instance, the number of visitors on the facility tour at the PR facilities in the MOD at Ichigaya district (Ichigayadai Tour) reached 460,000 as of the end of March 2020. Each SDF service also has a large-scale PR facility in addition to PR facilities and archives at the SDF camps and bases open to the public. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF provides cooperation for shooting films and TV programs.

### VOICE

**Essay Competition: Impressions upon Reading Defense of Japan 2019**

Following the publishing of Defense of Japan 2019, the MOD held an essay competition with the topic of impressions upon reading the book with the aim of having more citizens read the book to deepen their understanding of the country's defense while obtaining valuable opinions for the development of future issues involved in the preparation of Defense of Japan.

After careful examination, the examination board chaired by State Minister of Defense Yamamoto selected the work of Mr. MORINAKA Seiki for the highest award, three works for the award for excellence and three for the special award. The works were published on the MOD website.

Comment from Mr. MORINAKA Seiki (recipient of the highest award)

I learned of the essay competition with the topic of impressions upon reading Defense of Japan 2019 through a tweet by State Minister of Defense Yamamoto. I applied because I had been interested in the SDF and won the first award. I’m very happy because this is the first time for me to receive an award in a competition. My current dream is to become an ASDF fighter pilot. I think this award greatly encouraged my dream. I will keep this success in mind to stimulate my efforts.

Comment from State Minister of Defense Yamamoto

The first essay competition since the launch of Defense of Japan was held last year to motivate people to read the book, which is also referred to as a guide book on defense policy. Feedback far larger than expected was received. For the 2020 issue, too, we are looking forward to a large number of applications including your impressions, ideas for defense policy and observations that are useful for the next issue. Dear reader, it’s your turn to compete! The examiners at the MOD are waiting for you.
Essay Competition: Impressions upon Reading Defense of Japan 2020

Essay Competition: Impressions upon Reading Defense of Japan will be held just as last year. We are looking forward to receiving impressions upon reading the Defense of Japan from many people.

Entry requirements are as below. Please see the website of the Ministry of Defense, too.

1. Book for the essay competition
   Defense of Japan 2020

2. Application method
   (1) Postal application
   - Write only the text of your essay on up to 5 sheets of manuscript paper for 400 characters
   - Write the following on other paper (free style)
     - title of your essay
     - your address
     - your name with furigana
     - your occupation
     - your age
     - your phone number
     - E-mail address
   - Send the two items above to the following address
     Section in charge of Defense of Japan Essay Competition, Policy Planning and Evaluation Division,
     Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry of Defense
     5-1 Ichigaya Honmuracho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 162-8801
   (2) Application through the MOD website
   - Download the form and write the text of your essay (up to 2,000 characters).
   - Upload the text using the application form and send the text after entering necessary items.

3. Application deadline
   December 31 (Thu) 2020 (postmark deadline for postal applications)

4. Award
   Essays will be selected for the following awards and recognized during March 2021 at the Ministry of Defense
   - First Award
     Honorable certificate and extra prize (two tickets to both Fuji Fire Power Exercise and SDF Marching Festival)
   - Award for Excellence
     Honorable certificate and extra prize (two tickets to either Fuji Fire Power Exercise or SDF Marching Festival)

5. Notice
   (1) Application is limited to essays written in Japanese
   (2) Limited to unpublished original work written by an individual person; only one essay per person
   (3) Entries will not be returned for any reason.
   (4) Copyright of the winning essays belongs to the Ministry of Defense
   (5) The winning essays, winners’ names and recognition ceremony will be made public on the MOD website, etc.
undergraduate and graduate students as well as women and Enlistment Experience Programs for groups, companies and other organizations. These programs are intended to promote participants’ understanding of the SDF by offering opportunities to experience the daily life and training of the SDF, as well as to have direct contact with SDF personnel. In FY2019, approximately 120 people participated in SDF Life Experience Tours. From the private sector, the SDF received approximately 1,500 requests for Enlistment Experience Programs, and approximately 20,000 employees experienced SDF life.

2 Initiatives for Public Document Management and Information Disclosure

1 Necessity of Proper Management of Public Records and Archives and Proper Operation of the Information Disclosure System

Democracy, which is the most important system of the country, is founded on the principle that the public has access to accurate information, thereby making appropriate judgment and exercise of sovereignty. Administrative documents held by the government are of the utmost importance for the public’s access to accurate information. For this reason it is an important responsibility for the government, including the MOD/SDF, to manage information in an appropriate manner and appropriately respond to the public’s information disclosure requests.

2 Promotion of Proper Management of Public Records and Archives, and Proper Operation of the Information Disclosure System

The MOD/SDF takes it seriously that the issues over daily reports in South Sudan and Iraq brought about the public’s distrust in the MOD/SDF. The MOD/SDF is making full efforts to prevent recurrence based on the “Measures for Ensuring Appropriate Management of Public Records” (Adopted by the Ministerial Council on the Management of Administrative Documents and Related Matters on July 20, 2018), which compiles measures necessary for proper management of public records and archives by the entire government. The MOD/SDF is also working for proper management and response to requests for information disclosure by reforming the awareness of personnel and the organization culture, enhancing the checking framework, for example.

See Reference 63 (Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2019))

3 Initiatives for Policy Evaluation

1 Engagement in Policy Evaluation

The MOD has been conducting the evaluation of various policies based on its policy evaluation system. In FY2019, the MOD conducted policy evaluations of research and development (R&D) programs and projects concerning Special Taxation Measures as well as the major policies and programs of the NDPG and the MTDP.

2 Promotion of Evidence-Based Policy Making (EBPM)

The MOD is promoting EBPM by establishing a structure for promotion of EBPM within the ministry, including the establishment of a new position, “Director-General for Evidence-based Policymaking” in FY2018.

3 Initiatives for the Personal Data Protection System

In light of respecting individual rights in line with the Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs, the MOD takes measures to ensure the security of the personal information under its control, and discloses such information upon request.

4 Appropriate Operation of the Whistleblower Protection System

The MOD sets up a system to handle whistleblowing made by its officials, employees and outside workers, establishing internal and external contact desks to deal with whistleblowing and to protect whistleblowers.

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2 Information on the Summer Tour/Spring Tour for College Students, Ms. Parsley Tour (trial tour for women in their 20s); and One-Day Visit to SDF for Women, etc. is available on the MOD/SDF website.

3 Tours to experience the everyday life in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. They are implemented upon request from private companies and other organizations through the Provincial Cooperation Offices.
Reference
II. Fundamental Principle of National Security

I. Purpose

As Japan’s security environment becomes even more severe, Japan needs to identify its national interests from a long-term perspective, determine the course it should pursue in the international community, and adopt a whole-government approach for national security policies and measures in order to continue developing a prosperous and peaceful society.

In a world where globalization continues, Japan should play an even more proactive role as a major global player in the international community.

The Strategy, as fundamental policies pertaining to national security, presents guidelines for policies in areas related to national security.

With the National Security Council (NSC) serving as the control tower, as well as with strong political leadership, the Government of Japan will implement national security policies in a more strategic and structured manner through a whole-government approach.

When implementing policies in other areas, the Government of Japan will give due consideration to national security so that Japan can utilize its strengths, such as its diplomatic ability and defense capability, in a smooth and fully-functional way as a whole, based on the Strategy.

The Strategy will guide Japan’s national security policy over the next decade. Through the implementations and concrete policies, the NSC will regularly carry out systematic evaluation and upgrade the Strategy in a timely and appropriate manner.

II. Fundamental Principle of National Security

1. Principles Japan Upholds

Japan is a country with rich culture and tradition, and upholds universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law. Japan has been a wealth of highly educated human capital and high cultural standards, and is an economic power with strong economic capacity and high technological capabilities. Japan has achieved its development benefiting from an open international economic system. In addition, Japan as a maritime state has pursued “Open and Stable Seas.”

Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II, and has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

Japan has maintained its security, and contributed to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, by enhancing its alliance with the United States (U.S.), as well as by deepening cooperative relationships with other countries. Japan has also contributed to the realization of stability and prosperity in the international community through initiatives for supporting the economic growth of developing countries and for addressing global issues based on the principle of human security, as well as through trade and investment relations with other countries.

Complying with the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, Japan has been cooperating with the U.N. and other international organizations, and has actively contributed to their activities. Japan has also continuously participated in international peace cooperation activities. In addition, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan has consistently engaged in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, playing a leading role in international initiatives to realize “a world free of nuclear weapons.”

Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. This is the fundamental principle of national security that Japan should stand to hold.

2. Japan’s National Interests and National Security Objectives

National Interests

To maintain its sovereignty and independence; to defend its territorial integrity; to ensure the safety of life, person, and properties of its nationals, and to ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security and preserving its rich culture and tradition.

To achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic development, thereby consolidating its peace and security (to this end, it is essential that Japan strengthens the free trade regime and realizes an international environment that offers stability, transparency and predictability).

To maintain and protect international order based on rules and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law.

National Security Objectives

To strengthen the deterrence necessary for maintaining Japan’s peace and security and for ensuring its survival, thus deterring threats from directly reaching Japan; at the same time, if by any chance a threat should reach Japan, to defeat such threat and to minimize the damage.

To improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct threats to Japan, through strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside the Asia-Pacific region, and promoting practical security cooperation.

To improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable, and prosperous international community by strengthening the international order based on universal values and rules, and by playing a leading role in the settlement of disputes, through consistent diplomatic efforts and further personnel contributions.

III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan and National Security Challenges

1. Global Security Environment and Challenges

(1) Shift in the Balance of Power and Rapid Progress of Technological Innovation

The balance of power between nations is changing due to the rise of emerging countries (e.g., China and India). In particular, China is increasing its presence in the international community. The United States, which has the world’s largest power as a whole, has manifested its policy to shift its emphasis of national security and economic policy towards the Asia-Pacific region.

The rapid advancement of globalization and technological innovation has increased the relative influence of non-state actors, and the threat of terrorism and crimes committed by non-state actors is expanding.

(2) Threat of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Related Materials

The issue of the transfer, proliferation, and performance improvement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, such as ballistic missiles, the issue of nuclear and missile development by North Korea, and the nuclear issue of Iran remain major threats to Japan and the international community.

(3) Threat of International Terrorism

International terrorism has spread and become diverse in its forms due to the advancement of globalization.

Terrorist attacks against Japanese nationals and interests have actually taken place overseas. Japan and its people face the threat of international terrorism at both home and abroad.

(4) Risks to Global Commons

In recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access to global commons, such as the sea, outer space, and cyberspace, have been spreading and become more serious.

In the seas, in recent years, there have been an increasing number of cases of unilateral actions in an attempt to change the status quo by coercion with respect to natural resources and the security of respective states.

Due to these cases as well as piracy and other issues, there is a growing risk of the stability of sea lanes and freedom of navigation coming under threat.

There exist risks that could impede the continuous and stable use of outer space, including an increasing amount of space debris caused by satellite collisions amongst others.

Risks of cyber-attacks with the intent to disrupt critical infrastructure and obstruct military systems are becoming more serious.

(5) Challenges to Human Security

Global issues that cannot be dealt with by a single country—namely, poverty, widening inequality, global health challenges including infectious diseases, climate change and other environmental issues, food security, and humanitarian crises caused by civil wars and natural disasters—are emerging as critical and urgent issues of human security, threatening the very survival and dignity of individuals.

These challenges could have repercussions on peace and stability of the international community.

(6) The Global Economy and Its Risks

The risk of the expansion of an economic crisis from one country to the entire global economy is growing.

Signs of protectionism and reluctance towards the creation of new trade rules are becoming apparent.

The rise of resource nationalism in resource rich countries as well as an intensified competition for the acquisition of energy and mineral resources by emerging countries are observed.

2. Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region

(1) Characteristics of the Strategic Environment of the Asia-Pacific Region

The region has various political regimes and a host of countries with large-scale military forces including nuclear-weapon states. Yet a regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized.

(2) North Korea’s Military Buildup and Provocative Actions

North Korea has enhanced the capability of WMDs including nuclear weapons and that of ballistic missiles. At the same time, North Korea has repeatedly taken provocative military actions including the use of provocative rhetoric against Japan and other countries, thereby
increasing the tension in the region. The threat to the security of Japan and of other countries is being substantially aggravated.

- As Kim Jong-un proceeds to consolidate his regime, the domestic situation in North Korea needs to be closely monitored.
- North Korea’s abduction is a grave issue affecting Japan’s sovereignty as well as the lives and safety of Japanese nationals. It is an urgent issue for the Government of Japan to resolve under its responsibility.

(3) China’s Rapid Rise and Intensified Activities in Various Areas
- There is an expectation for China to share and comply with international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role for regional and global issues.
- China has been rapidly advancing its military capabilities in a wide range of areas without sufficient transparency.
- China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on their own assertions, which are incompatible with the existing order of international law, in the maritime and aerial domains, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea (e.g., intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands, establishment of its own “Air Defense Identification Zone”).
- The cross-strait relationship has deepened economically. Meanwhile, the military balance has been changing. Thus, the relationship contains both orientations towards stability and potential instability.

IV. Japan’s Strategic Approaches to National Security

1. Strengthening and Expanding Japan’s Capabilities and Roles
- To ensure national security, Japan needs to first and foremost strengthen its own capabilities and the foundation for exercising those capabilities. Japan must also steadily fulfill the role it should play and adapt its capabilities to respond to future developments.
- Enhancing Japan’s resilience in national security, through reinforcing its diplomatic and defense force, as well as bolstering its economic strengths and technological capabilities, contributes to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community at large.
- In order to overcome national security challenges and achieve national security objectives, as well as to proactively contribute to peace in cooperation with the international community, Japan needs to expand and deepen cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone. At the same time, Japan needs to make effective use of its diverse resources and promote comprehensive policies.

(1) Strengthening Diplomacy for Creating a Stable International Environment
- The key of national security is to create a stable and predictable international environment, and prevent the emergence of threats.
- It is necessary for Japan to realize an international order and security environment that are desirable for Japan, by playing an even more proactive role in achieving peace and stability of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.
- It is necessary to enhance diplomatic creativity and negotiating power to deepen the understanding of and garner support for Japan’s position in the international community.
- By highlighting Japan’s attractiveness, Japan needs to strengthen its soft power that would benefit the international community and more proactively to peace and international cooperation including the Three Principles of the Governing, Japan is required to contribute more proactively to peace and international cooperation including through utilizing defense equipment, and to improve its intelligence and open source intelligence.
- Japan will make even more proactive contributions to international organizations such as the U.N., including through increasing the number of Japanese staff in such institutions.

(2) Developing a Comprehensive Defense Architecture to Firmly Defend Japan
- Amid the severe security environment, Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective joint defense force, adapting to the change in strategic environment with consideration of its national power, and strive to ensure operations with flexibility and readiness based on joint operations.
- Japan will advance coordination within the government and with local governments and the private sector. In doing so, even in peacetime, Japan will maintain and improve a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters.
- In developing the structure of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF), which plays a central role in these efforts, Japan will enhance its defense structure for deterrence and response to various situations, prioritizing long-term functions from a joint and comprehensive perspective.
- With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence of the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will work closely with the U.S., and take appropriate measures through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people.

(3) Strengthening Efforts for the Protection of Japan’s Territorial Integrity
- Japan will enhance the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies responsible for territorial patrol activities and reinforce its maritime surveillance capabilities.
- Japan will strengthen coordination among relevant ministries and agencies to be able to respond seamlessly to a variety of unexpected situations.
- Japan will proactively engage in the protection, management, and development of remote islands near national borders, and from a national security viewpoint, review issues related to the use of land in areas such as remote islands near national borders and areas surrounding defense facilities.

(4) Ensuring Maritime Security
- As a maritime state, Japan will play a leading role, in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Seas,” which are upheld by maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law, ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with relevant international law, rather than by force.
- Japan will strengthen its maritime domain awareness capabilities in a comprehensive manner that involves the use of outer space, while paying attention to the establishment of international networks.
- Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan.

(5) Strengthening Cyber Security
- Japan as a whole will make concerted efforts to defend cyberspace and strengthen the response capability against cyber-attacks, so as to protect cyberspace from malicious activities; to ensure the free and safe use of cyberspace; and to guard Japan’s critical infrastructure against cyber-attacks, including those in which state involvement is suspected.
- Japan will constantly strengthen public-private partnership, and will comprehensively consider and take necessary measures with regard to expanding the pool of human resources in the security field, etc.
- Japan will take measures at both national and operational levels to enhance international cooperation, and will promote cyber defense cooperation.

(6) Strengthening Measures against International Terrorism
- Japan will first and foremost strengthen its domestic measures against international terrorism such as ensuring the security of nuclear facilities in Japan. In order to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals living abroad, Japan will strengthen such measures as collecting and analyzing intelligence on the situation of international terrorism.

(7) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities
- Japan will fundamentally strengthen its information-collecting capabilities from a diverse range of sources, including human intelligence and open source intelligence.
- Japan will enhance its intelligence analysis, consolidation, and sharing capabilities including by developing experts, and will promote all-source analysis that makes use of the array of information-gathering means at the Government’s disposal. Materials and intelligence will be provided to the NSC in a timely manner, and they will be appropriately utilized in policy formulation.

(8) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
- From the perspective of Japan’s role in “Constructive Participation to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to contribute more proactively to peace and international cooperation including through utilizing defense equipment, and to improve its intelligence and open source intelligence.
- Japan will fundamentally strengthen its defense and information-related capabilities including by developing experts, and will promote all-source analysis that makes use of the array of information-gathering means at the Government’s disposal. Materials and intelligence will be provided to the NSC in a timely manner, and they will be appropriately utilized in policy formulation.

(9) Ensuring the Stable Use of Outer Space and Promoting Its Use for Security Purposes
- Japan will engage itself in enhancing the functions of information-gathering satellites and in making effective use of satellites.
- Japan will also enhance a system for space situational awareness.
- Japan will promote the development and utilization of outer space in a manner that contributes to national security in the medium- to long-term, including the development of technologies.

(10) Strengthening Technological Capabilities
- Japan should encourage the further promotion of technologies, maintaining and enhancing the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies, thereby strengthening Japan’s technological capabilities.
- Japan will constantly grasp science and technology trends, and make effective use of technology in the area of security by combining the efforts of industries, academia, and the Government.
- Japan will proactively utilize its internationally outstanding
2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

- Japan and the U.S. have persistently strengthened and expanded their cooperation on a wide range of areas for peace, stability, and prosperity of not only the two countries themselves, but also the Asia-Pacific region and the broader international community.
- The U.S., based on its Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizing a rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, aspires to enhance its presence in the region and strengthen cooperation with its allies, including Japan and its partners.
- In order to ensure the security of Japan and to maintain and enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community, Japan must further elevate the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and realize a stronger Japan-U.S. Alliance.

(1) Further Strengthening of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas

- Japan will work with the U.S. to revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, through discussions on a variety of issues such as the concrete manner of defense cooperation and basic concepts of bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, while ensuring consistency with various policies in line with the Strategy.
- Japan will strive to enhance the deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance through working closely with the U.S. on operational cooperation and policy coordination on issues such as response to contingencies and the medium- to long-term strategy, and strengthening its security cooperation with the U.S. in such broad areas as BMD, maritime affairs, outer space, cyber space and largescale disaster response operations.

(2) Ensuring a Stable Presence of the U.S. Forces

- While taking measures such as Host Nation Support and increasing deterrence, Japan will steadily implement the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan in accordance with the existing bilateral agreements, in order to reduce the impact on people in host communities including Okinawa.

3. Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan’s Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community

To improve the security environment surrounding Japan, Japan will engage itself in building trust and cooperative relations with partners both within and outside the region through the following approaches.

- Japan will strengthen cooperative relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region with which it shares universal values and strategic interests.
  - ROK: Japan will strengthen the foundation for security cooperation.
  - Japan, the U.S., and the ROK will work together closely in addressing North Korean nuclear and missile issues.
  - Australia: Japan will further strengthen the strategic partnership by steadily sharing strategic recognition and advancing security cooperation.
  - ASEAN countries: Japan will further deepen and develop cooperative relations with the ASEAN countries in all sectors based on the traditional partnership lasting more than 40 years.
  - Japan will also provide further assistance to ASEAN efforts towards maintaining and strengthening its unity.
  - India: Japan will strengthen bilateral relations in a broad range of areas, including security cooperation, based on the bilateral Strategic Partnership.

- Japan will strive to construct a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests with China from a broad, as well as a medium- to long-term perspective. Japan will encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for the sake of regional peace, stability and prosperity, and Japan will respond firmly but in a calm manner to China’s recent attempts to change the status quo by coercion.

4. Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community

As a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will play an active role for the peace and stability of the international community.

(1) Strengthening Diplomacy at the United Nations

- Japan will further engage in active efforts by the U.N. for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security.
- Japan will continue to strive to achieve the U.N. Security Council reform, including through an expansion of both permanent and nonpermanent categories, with Japan becoming a permanent member of the Council.

(2) Strengthening the Rule of Law

- In order to establish the rule of law in the international community, Japan will participate proactively in international rule-making from the planning stage, so that Japan’s principles and positions are duly reflected.
- Japan will actively engage in realizing the rule of law relating to the sea, outer space and cyberspace, as well as in assistance for the development of legal systems.

(3) Leading International Efforts on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

- Japan will carry out vigorous efforts in pursuit of “a world free of nuclear weapons.”
- Japan will lead international efforts on disarmament and nonproliferation, including those towards the resolution of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development issues and Iran’s nuclear issues, in a manner consistent with the maintenance of the credibility of extended deterrence under the Japan-U.S. alliance.

(4) Promoting International Peace Cooperation

- Japan will further step up its cooperation with U.N. PKO and other international peace cooperation activities.
- Japan will actively strengthen the coordination between PKO and ODA projects, and make further strategic use of ODA and capacity building assistance.
- Japan will proactively train peacebuilding experts and PKO personnel in various countries in close consultation with countries or organizations concerned.

(5) Promoting International Cooperation against International Terrorism

- Japan will promote consultations and exchanges of views with other countries on the situation on international terrorism and international counter-terrorism cooperation, as well as reinforcement of the international legal framework.
- Japan will actively extend assistance to developing countries, etc.

5. Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues

Japan will endeavor to share universal values and reinforce an open international economic system, which form the basis of peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. At the same time, Japan will advance the following measures towards the resolution of development issues and global issues that could hinder peace and stability of the international community.

(1) Sharing Universal Values

- Through a partnership with countries with which Japan shares universal values, such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, Japan will conduct diplomacy that contributes to addressing global issues.
- Japan will actively utilize its ODA and other schemes in supporting democratization, the development of legal systems, and human rights.
- Japan will engage proactively in diplomatic issues on women.

(2) Responding to Global Development and Global Issues and Realizing Human Security

- It is necessary for Japan to strengthen its efforts to address development issues as part of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.
- Japan will strengthen efforts towards the achievement of the MDGs, and play a leading role in the formulation of the next international development goals.
- Japan will engage in further efforts in mainstreaming the concept of human security in the international community.

(3) Cooperating with Human Resource Development Efforts in Developing Countries

- Japan will promote economic partnership efforts, including through
the TPP, the Japan-EU EPA, a Japan-China-ROK FTA, and the RCEP. Through these efforts, Japan will strengthen the vigor and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

(5) Responding to Energy and Environmental Issues
- Japan will actively utilize diplomatic tools for efforts to achieve the stable supply of energy and other natural resources.
- In the area of climate change, Japan will implement a proactive strategy for countering global warming.

(6) Enhancing People-to-People Exchanges
- Japan will expand two-way youth exchanges.
- Japan will promote people-to-people exchanges through sport and culture.

6. Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding
- In order to fully ensure national security, it is vital to reinforce the domestic foundation for diplomatic power, defense force, and other capabilities to be effectively demonstrated.
- It is important to seek a deeper understanding of Japan’s security policies both at home and abroad to ensure national security.
(1) Maintaining and Enhancing Defense Production and Technological Bases
- Japan will endeavor to engage in effective and efficient acquisition of defense equipment, and will maintain and enhance its defense production and technological bases, including through strengthening international competitiveness.

(2) Boosting Communication Capabilities
- Japan recognizes the importance of Japan proactively and effectively communicating its national security policy to the world and its people, deepen the understanding among the people of Japan, and build cooperative relations with other countries.
- Within the Prime Minister’s Office serving as the control tower, Japan will enhance its public relations in an integrated and strategic manner through a government-wide approach. Fully utilizing various information technologies and diverse media, Japan will also strengthen its information dissemination in foreign languages.
- Japan will cooperate with educational institutions, key figures, and think tanks, and, in doing so, promote Japanese language education overseas and train personnel who are capable of contributing to strategic public relations efforts and other areas.
- By precisely and effectively communicating information on Japan’s position based on objective facts, Japan will be able to gain accurate understanding from the international public.

(3) Reinforcing the Social Base
- It is essential that each and every Japanese hopes to contribute to peace and stability in the region and the world, and to the improvement of the welfare of humanity, as well as that they perceive national security as a familiar and immediate issue for them, and have deep understanding of its importance and complexity.
- Japan will foster respect for other countries and their people as well as love for the country and region.
- Japan will advance measures that raise awareness with regard to security on such issues as territory and sovereignty, and that increase understanding of the activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Japan.

(4) Enhancing the Intellectual Base
- Japan will seek to enhance education on security-related subjects at institutions of higher education.
- Exchanges will be deepened between the Government and institutions of higher education, think tanks, etc.
- Japan will promote the fostering of private-sector experts and government officials.

Reference 2
NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY 2019 and beyond
(December 18, 2018)

I. NDGP’s Objective
Japan since the end of World War II has consistently pursued the path of a peace-loving nation. This has been accomplished by the persistent efforts of our forefathers under the principle of maintaining peace.

The most consequential responsibility of the Government of Japan is to maintain Japan’s peace and security, to ensure its survival and to defend to the end Japanese nationals’ life, person and property of its nationals and territorial land, waters and airspace. This is the foremost responsibility that Japan must fulfill as a sovereign nation. Carrying out this responsibility by exerting all of its own accord and initiative in the very heart of Japan’s national security. Japan’s defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of its security and the clear representation of the unwavering will and ability of Japan as a peace-loving nation. And maintaining Japan’s peace and security is an essential premise for its prosperity. At present, security environment surrounding Japan is changing at extremely high speeds. Changes in the balance of power in the international arena are accelerating and becoming more complex, and uncertainty over the existing order is increasing. In addition, rapid expansion in the use of new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is poised to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security, which has prioritized responses in traditional, physical domains, which are land, sea and air.

Even under these circumstances, Japan will vigorously march forward as a peace-loving nation. To do so, Japan, amid the dramatically changing security environment, needs to fundamentally strengthen its national defense architecture with which to protect, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, life, person and property of its nationals, territorial land, waters and airspace, and its sovereignty and independence, thereby expanding roles Japan can fulfill. Today, no country can preserve its security by itself alone. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance as well as security cooperation with other countries are critical to Japan’s national security, and this cannot be achieved without Japan's own efforts. The international community also expects Japan to play roles that are commensurate with its national power.

In strengthening its defense capability, Japan must squarely face the aforementioned realities of national security and ensure necessary and sufficient quality and quantity so as to build a truly effective defense capability that does not lie on a linear extension of the past. In particular, it has become essential that Japan achieve superiority in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. To build a new defense capability that combines strengths across all domains, Japan needs to engage in a transformation at a pace that is fundamentally different from the past, completely shedding the thinking that relies on traditional division among land, sea, and air. On the other hand, given the rapidly aging population with declining birthrates and severe fiscal situation, Japan cannot strengthen its defense capability without thorough rationalization that does not dwell on the past. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, together with Japan’s own defense architecture, continues to be the cornerstone of Japan’s national security. As stated above, Japan’s fulfillment of its foremost responsibility as a sovereign nation is the very way to fulfill its roles under the Japan-U.S. Alliance and further enhance the Alliance’s ability to deter and counter threats, and is a foundation upon which to strategically promote security cooperation in line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific.

Based on the foregoing thoughts, the Government, in line with “On National Security Strategy” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013, and hereinafter referred to as “National Security Strategy”), hereby sets forth “NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY 2019 and beyond” as the new guidelines regarding how Japan’s national defense ought to be to form the foundation of Japan’s future.

II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan
1. Characteristics of current security environment
In the international community, interdependency among countries further expands and deepens. On the other hand, thanks to further growth of national power of such countries as China, changes in the balance of power are accelerating and becoming more complex, thereby increasing uncertainty over the existing order. Against such a backdrop, prominently emerging are inter-state competitions across the political, economic and military realms, in which states seek to shape global and regional order to their advantage as well as to increase their influence.

These inter-state competitions occur on a continuous basis: In conducting inter-state competitions, states leverage various means such as undermining other country’s sovereignty using military and law-enforcement entities, and manipulating foreign country’s public opinion by exploiting social media. Also, the so-called gray-zone situations are becoming persistent over a long period of time, playing out as part of inter-state competitions. They may possibly further increase and expand.

Such gray-zone situations harbor the risk of rapidly developing into graver situations without showing clear indications. In addition, methods employed to alter the status quo, such as “hybrid warfare,” that intentionally blur the boundaries between the military and non-military realms are forcing affected actors to take complex measures not limited to military ones.

Driven by rapid technological innovation in information & communications and other fields, military technologies are showing remarkable advances. Against the backdrop of such technological advances, contemporary warfare increasingly features capabilities combined across all domains: not only land, sea and air but also new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. Aiming to improve overall military capability, states are seeking to gain superiority in technologies that underpin capabilities in new domains. Since space and cyber technologies are widely used for civilian purposes, if stable use of these domains is impeded, it may entail serious consequences for the safety of state and its citizens.

Due to advances in military technologies, a variety of new threats can now easily penetrate national borders. States endeavor to develop weapons that leverage cutting-edge, potentially game-changing technologies. They also engage in research of autonomous unmanned weapon systems equipped with artificial intelligence (AI). Further technological innovations heretofore are expected to make it difficult still to foresee future warfare.
In the international community, there is a broadening and diversifying array of security challenges that cannot be dealt with by a single country alone. With respect to space and cyber domains, establishing international rules and norms has been a security agenda. In maritime domains, there have been cases where a country has unilaterally claimed its entitlement or actions based on its own assertions that are incompatible with existing international order. These have generated undue infringement upon freedom in high seas. In addition, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and ballistic missiles as well as worsening international terrorism remain grave challenges for the international community.

Against such background, qualitatively and quantitatively superior military capabilities concentrate in Japan’s surroundings where clear trends are observed in further military build-up and increase in military activities.

2. Situations by country and region

While remaining to possess the world’s largest comprehensive national power, the United States, with inter-state competitions in a range of areas prominently emerging, has acknowledged that particularly important challenge is strategic competition with China and Russia who attempt to alter global and regional order.

To rebuild its military power, the United States is engaged in such efforts as maintaining military advantage in all domains through technological innovations, enhancing nuclear deterrent, and advancing missile defense capabilities. The United States upholds defense commitments to allies and partners and maintains forward force presence, while calling on them to share greater responsibility. The United States frames the Indo-Pacific as a priority region where it adopts a policy of strengthening alliances and partnerships.

Member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) including the United States are reviewing their strategies to deal with coercive attempts to alter the status quo as well as “hybrid warfare.” In view of changes in the security environment, NATO member states have been increasing their defense expenditures.

With an aim to build “world-class forces” by the mid-21st century, China has sustained high-level growth of defense expenditures with continued lack of transparency. China has engaged in broad, rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. In so doing, China attaches importance to ensuring superiority in new domains; it is rapidly advancing capabilities in cyber and electromagnetic domains with which to disrupt opponent’s command and control; and continues to enhance space domain capabilities through developing and experimenting anti-satellite weapons. China is also improving its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) and strategic lift capabilities and amphibious landing capabilities. Such capability enhancement serves to improve the so-called Anti-Access/Area Denial (“A2/AD”) capabilities — capabilities to deny access and deployment of foreign militaries to one’s surrounding areas and to disrupt their military operations therein—as well as to build capabilities with which to conduct military operations over greater distances. In addition, China is promoting civil-military integration policy in areas of national defense, science & technology and industry, and actively developing and acquiring cutting-edge technologies of potential military utility. Also, maritime law enforcement agencies and the military are improving their collaboration.

China engages in unilateral, coercive attempts to alter the status quo based on its own assertions that are incompatible with existing international order. In the East China Sea and other waters, China is expanding and intensifying its maritime activities at sea and in the air. Around the Senkaku Islands, an inherent part of Japanese territory, Chinese military vessels violate Japanese territorial waters despite Japan’s strong protests while Chinese naval ships continuously operate in waters around the Islands. China is also expanding its military activities in the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan. In particular, the Chinese military in recent years has frequently advanced to the Pacific, with its navigation routes and unit composition becoming more diverse. In the South China Sea, China has forcibly conducted large-scale, rapid reclamation of maritime features, which are being converted into military foothold. China in the South China Sea is also expanding and intensifying its maritime and air activities.

Such Chinese military and other developments, coupled with the lack of transparency surrounding its defense policy and military power, represent a serious security concern for the region including Japan and for the international community. Japan needs to continue to pay utmost attention to these developments. China is eagerly expected to play active roles in a more cooperative manner in the region and the international community.

North Korea in recent years has launched ballistic missiles at unprecedented frequency, rapidly improving its operational capabilities such as simultaneous launch and surprise attack. Given technological maturities obtained through a series of successful tests, North Korea is assessed as having developed successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads. Although North Korea expressed its intention for complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and high up in public its nuclear test, it has not carried out the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner: There has been no essential change in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities.

North Korea is assessed to possess large-scale cyber units as part of its asymmetric military capabilities, engaging in theft of military secrets and developing capabilities to attack critical infrastructure of foreign countries. North Korea also retains large-scale special operation forces.

Such military developments of North Korea pose grave and imminent threats to Japan’s security and significantly undermine peace and security of the region. Though United Nations Security Council resolutions, the international community also has made it clear that North Korea’s nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities constitute a clear threat to international peace and security.

Russia, in enhancing its military posture by continuing force modernization efforts with a focus on nuclear forces, is in sharp confrontation with Europe and the United States over issues including situation in Ukraine. Russia’s military activities and interventions in the Asian region, areas around the United States and the Middle East, as well as in the Far East including Japan’s Northern Territories. Close attention therefore needs to be paid to its developments.

3. Characteristics of Japan

Surrounded by sea on all sides and with long coastlines, Japan possesses numerous islands remote from the mainland and is blessed with vast Exclusive Economic Zones: spread widely therein are life, person and property of its nationals, territorial land, waters and airspace, as well as various resources, all of which Japan must defend to the end. For Japan, a maritime nation dependent on overseas trade for the bulk of energy resources and food supplies, fundamental to its peace and prosperity is to ensure the safety of maritime and air traffic by strengthening the order of “Open and Stable Oceans,” an order based on fundamental norms such as rule of law and freedom of navigation.

Japan is prone to natural disasters that exact heavy damage. Industry, population and information infrastructure concentrate in Japan’s urban areas, and a large number of critical facilities such as nuclear power plants are located in coastal areas.

In addition, Japan is undergoing population decline and ageing with dwindling birthrate at unprecedented pace. Severe fiscal conditions continue as well.

4. Summary

In light of the foregoing, while the probability of a large-scale military conflict is small, view of worst-case scenarios, which was of concern during the Cold War era, remains low, Japan’s security environment is becoming more testing and uncertain at a markedly faster speed than expected when the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) and hereinafter referred to as the “former Guidelines”) was formulated.

To prevent threats to Japan from materializing to menace life and peaceful livelihood of its nationals, it behooves Japan to take measures that are in line with these realities.

III. Japan’s Basic Defense Policy

In line with the National Security Strategy and from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” Japan has enhanced its diplomatic strength and defense capability. Japan has also expanded and deepened cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being a cornerstone. In so doing, Japan has also seen the Constitution has adhered to this basic precept of maintaining the exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses threat to other countries, ensured civilian control of the military, and observed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

Japan under these precepts will never ever change the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation. Based on this premise, Japan, even amid the realities of security environment it has hitherto never faced, must strive to preserve national interests identified in the National Security Strategy—decree to the end Japanese nationals’ life, person and property, territorial land, waters and airspace, and its sovereignty and independence. To that end, the Government will identify national defense objectives and the means to achieve them, and proactively and strategically promote measures with added variety.

National defense objectives are: first, to create, on a steady-state basis, security environment desirable for Japan by integrating and drawing on the strengths at the nation’s disposal; second, to deter threat from reaching Japan by making opponent realize that doing harm to Japan would be difficult and consequential; and finally, should threat reach Japan, to squarely counter the threat and minimize damage.

Japan will strengthen each of the means by which to successfully achieve these national defense objectives: Japan’s own architecture for national defense; the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and international security cooperation. These efforts, including achieving superiority in new domains, which are space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic domains, means that Japan can move swiftly and flexibly in order to deal with increasingly complex security environment that is changing at accelerating speeds.

In dealing with nuclear weapon threats, U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential: Japan will closely cooperate with the United States to maintain and enhance its credibility. To deal with the threat, Japan will also increase its own efforts including comprehensive air and missile defense as well as civil protection. At the same time, towards the long-term goal of bringing about a world free of nuclear weapons, Japan will
play an active and positive role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

1. Strengthening Japan’s own architecture for national defense

(1) Building comprehensive architecture for national defense

In order to address the realities of security environment that it has hitherto never faced and to securely achieve national defense objectives, Japan will build national defense architecture that in all phases integrates the strengths at the nation’s disposal; this structure enables not only Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Self-Defense Forces (SDF) efforts but also coherent, whole-of-government efforts; and enables cooperation with local governments and private entities. In particular, Japan will accelerate its efforts and cooperate in such fields as space, cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum, ocean, and science & technology, and also promote measures concerning the formulation of international norms in fields such as space and cyberspace.

Japan will further advance steady-state efforts such as strategic communications by systematically combining all available policy tools.

In order to address a range of situations including armed contingencies and “gray-zone” situations, Japan has been strengthening its posture under the principle of civilian control of the military. Japan further needs to seamlessly deal with various situations in a coherent, whole-of-government manner by way of swift and certain decision-making under even stronger political leadership, which will be assisted by enhanced support mechanism. In view of protecting the life, person and property of its nationals, Japan will continue to strengthen organization for disaster response and civil protection, and, in cooperation with local governments, work to secure evacuation facilities. Japan will build a posture fully prepared to evacuate Japanese nationals overseas during emergencies and ensure their safety. Japan will promote measures to protect infrastructure critical to people’s daily lives such as electricity and communication as well as to protect cyberspace.

In addition to making aforementioned efforts, in order to ensure the effectiveness of various policies and measures, Japan will, on a steady-state basis, devise and review relevant plans while systematizing them; also, expand the use of simulations and comprehensive training and exercises to improve the effectiveness of emergency response posture.

(2) Strengthening Japan’s defense capability

a. Significance and necessity of defense capability

Defense capability is the ultimate guarantee of Japan’s national security. Defense capability represents Japan’s will and ability to: deter threat from reaching Japan; and should threat reach Japan, eliminate the threat and, as a sovereign nation, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, defend to the end the lives and properties of its nationals, land and property as well as territorial land, waters and airspace.

At the same time, defense capability is essential for Japan to play on its initiative its roles in the Japan-U.S. Alliance at all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. Strengthening Japan’s defense capability to provide for national security is none other than strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Defense capability is essential also for advancing Japan’s efforts in security cooperation with other countries.

Defense capability is the most important strength for Japan in retaining self-sustained existence as a sovereign nation amid security environment it has never faced before. Japan must strengthen this capability on its own accord and initiative.

b. Truly effective defense capability – Multi-domain Defense Force

To be able to deter and counter qualitatively and quantitatively superior military threats in an increasingly testing security environment, it has become vitally important to adapt to warfare that combines capabilities in new and traditional domains—space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum—and traditional domains—land, sea and air.

Japan needs to develop, while qualitatively and quantitatively enhancing capabilities in individual domains, a defense capability that can execute cross-domain operations, which organically fuse capabilities in all domains to generate synergy and amplify the overall strength, so that even when inferiority exists in individual domains such inferiority will be overcome and national defense accomplished.

In order to ensure national defense in increasingly uncertain security environment, it is also important for Japan to be able to seamlessly conduct activities at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies. To date, Japan has endeavored to develop a defense capability that allows to engage in diverse activities in a swift and sustainable manner. In recent years, however, SDF has had to increase the scope and frequency of its steady-state activities such as maintaining presence, as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities: This is exacting a chronic burden on its personnel and equipment, generating a concern that SDF may not be able to maintain proficiency and the volume of its activities.

In space, cyber and electromagnetic domains during all phases

In space, cyber and electromagnetic domains, to prevent any actions that impede its activities, SDF will conduct on a steady-state basis persistent monitoring as well as collection and analysis of relevant information. In case of such event, SDF will promptly identify incidents and take such measures as damage limitation and recovery.

In case of armed attack against Japan, SDF will, on top of taking these actions, block and eliminate the attack by leveraging capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains.

In addition, in light of the society’s growing dependence on space and cyber, SDF will continuously enhance its efforts concerning these domains under appropriate partnership and shared responsibility with relevant organizations.

c. Large-scale disasters

In case of large-scale disasters, to protect the life, person, and property of Japanese nationals, SDF will swiftly transport and deploy requisite units to take all necessary measures for initial response, and, as required, maintain its posture for disaster response for a longer term. SDF will carefully address the needs of affected citizens and local governments, and engage in life saving, temporary repair and livelihood support in appropriate partnership and cooperation with relevant organizations, local governments and the private sector.

d. Collaboration with the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance

In all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, in line with the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” Japan will effectively conduct activities described in 2. by playing on its initiative its own roles in the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

1. Promotion of security cooperation

SDF will actively engage in efforts for enhanced security cooperation as stated in 3. In accordance with policies that are tailored to individual regions and countries, SDF will strategically promote defense cooperation and exchanges such as: joint training and exercises, cooperation in defense equipment and technologies, capacity building assistance, and service-to-service exchange.

2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, together with Japan’s own national defense architecture, constitute a cornerstone for Japan’s national security. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with
the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as its core, plays a significant role for peace, stability and prosperity of not only Japan but also the Indo-Pacific region and the international community.

As inter-state competitions prominently emerge, it has become all the more important for Japan to reinforce national security to further strengthen its relationship with the United States, with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests. The United States also views that cooperation with its allies has become more important.

While the Japan-U.S. Alliance has been reinforced through activities including those that were made possible by the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan needs to further enhance the Alliance through efforts under the “Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation” in order to achieve its national defense objective as security environment surrounding Japan becomes more testing and uncertain at remarkably fast speeds.

In further strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, it is an essential premise that Japan strengthen its own defensive capability on its own accord and initiative. Fulfilling this premise, Japan needs to press ahead with efforts such as: bolstering the ability of the Alliance to deter and counter threats; enhancing and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas; and steadily implementing measures concerning the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan.

(1) Strengthening ability of Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats
In all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies as well as during disasters, Japan will enhance information sharing with the United States, conduct effective and smooth bilateral coordination involving all relevant organizations and take all necessary measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security.

For these purposes, Japan will further deepen various operational cooperation and policy coordination with the United States. In particular, Japan will expand and deepen cooperation in: space and cyber domains; command, control and missile defense; bilateral training and exercises; bilateral ISR operations; and bilateral flexible deterrence options. Japan will also promote formulation and renewal of bilateral plans and deepen the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. In addition, Japan will even more actively conduct activities such as logistic support for U.S. force activities and protection of U.S. ships and aircraft.

(2) Strengthening and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas
In order to create a desirable security environment including maintaining and enhancing free and open maritime order, and with an eye on increasing Japanese and U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will conduct bilateral/multilateral capacity building assistance, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) and counter-piracy.

In order for Japan and the United States to be able to fully leverage their capabilities during bilateral activities, Japan will enhance and expand cooperation with the United States in such areas as equipment, technology, facility, and intelligence as well as information security.

In particular, Japan will promote standardization of defense equipment that contributes to Japan-U.S. bilateral activities, and sharing of various networks. In order to support sustainable U.S. force activities around Japan as well as to ensure high operational availability of SDF equipment, Japan will build capacity for in-country maintenance of U.S.-made equipment.

To further improve Japanese and U.S. capabilities, while facilitating common understanding of respective priorities in defense capability enhancement, promote measures such as effective acquisition of advanced U.S. equipment through optimized Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Japan-U.S. joint research and development.

With respect to SDF facilities and U.S force facilities and areas including training facilities and areas, Japan will promote cooperation on joint/shared use and efforts for improved resiliency.

(3) Steady implementation of measures concerning stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan
Japan will provide stable support for smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan through various measures including Host Nation Support (HNS). Japan will also steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan to mitigate impact on local communities while maintaining deterrence provided by U.S. forces.

Okinawa is located in areas critically important to Japan’s national security and U.S. force stationing in Okinawa greatly contributes to deter the Japan-U.S. Alliance provides: At the same time, facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Japan are highly concentrated in Okinawa. In light of this, Japan in recent years has been furthering its efforts to mitigate impact on Okinawa including returns of U.S. facilities and areas. Japan will continue to work to mitigate impact on Okinawa by steadily implementing such measures as realignment, consolidation and reduction of facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Okinawa including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma as well as the dispersion of impact on Okinawa.

3. Strengthening security cooperation
In line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific, Japan will strategically promote multilateral and multilayered security cooperation, taking into account characteristics and situation specific to each region and country. As part of such efforts, Japan will actively leverage its defense capability to work on defense cooperation and exchanges which include bilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, and interactions among military branches. Furthermore, Japan will global security challenges. In implementing these initiatives, Japan will position the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone and will work closely with the countries that share universal values and security interests, through full coordination with its diplomatic policy.

(1) Promoting defense cooperation and exchanges
With Australia, to further improve interoperability and by utilizing frameworks such as Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (FMC)/2+2, Japan will further promote bilateral training and exercises and defense equipment and technology cooperation, and advance cooperative activities such as bilaterally-aligned capacity building assistance to third parties. Japan will also strengthen cooperative relations under trilateral framework among Japan, Australia and the United States, which share universal values and strategic interests.

With India, in view of enhancing strategic partnership and by utilizing frameworks such as the “2+2,” Japan will promote bilateral training and exercises and defense equipment and technology cooperation in a broad range of areas including maritime security. Japan will also strengthen cooperation among Japan, India and the United States.

With Southeast Asian countries, Japan will continue to support efforts for enhancing the centrality and unity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is the key to regional cooperation, and promote practical bilateral and multilateral cooperation, including bilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and capacity building assistance.

With the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan will promote defense cooperation in a broad range of areas, and strive to establish frameworks for collaboration. Japan will also continue to strengthen trilateral cooperation among Japan, the ROK and the United States to maintain peace and stability in the region.

With the United Kingdom and France, to contribute to the stability of maritime order in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will, while leveraging such frameworks as the “2+2,” promote efforts including more practical bilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and bilateral collaboration on third-party engagement. Japan will strengthen cooperation with European countries as well as NATO and the European Union (EU).

With Canada and New Zealand, Japan will promote efforts including bilateral/multilateral training and exercises as well as bilateral collaboration on third-party engagement.

With China, in order to enhance multi-layered and trust, Japan will promote multi-layered dialogues and exchange. In so doing, Japan will continue to encourage China to play responsible and constructive roles for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, comply with international norms of conduct, and improve transparency regarding military capability enhancement. In order to avoid unexpected situations between the two countries, Japan will utilize the “Maritime and Aeronautical Communication Mechanism between the defense authorities of Japan and China” in a manner that contributes to building a trusting relationship between the two countries. Japan will calmly and firmly deal with Chinese activities at sea and in the air around Japan.

With Russia, in order to enhance multi-layered and trust, Japan will promote security dialogues with Russia including the “2+2,” high-level interactions and broad unit-to-unit exchanges, and deepen bilateral training and exercises.

With island nations of the Pacific Ocean, Japan will promote port and airport visits by SDF as well as exchanges and cooperation that utilize capabilities and characteristics of each service of SDF.

With countries in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa, in order to build and strengthen cooperative relations Japan will promote exchanges at all levels, including high level, and cooperation in such fields as capacity building assistance related to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

Regarding multilateral frameworks, Japan attaches importance to the Asia East Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that provide significant foundations for discussions, cooperation and exchanges related to security. Japan will also strengthen cooperation and mutual trust among the countries in the region.

(2) Responding to global issues
From the viewpoint of securing the freedom and security of navigation and flight, Japan will promote cooperation to contribute to the improvement of capabilities pertaining to the maritime security of coastal states in the Indo-Pacific region, which include South Asian countries such as India and Sri Lanka, as well as Southeast Asian countries. Moreover, Japan will promote such activities as bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, unit-to-unit exchanges and active port visits at these occasions. Japan will also conduct activities such as anti-piracy efforts in cooperation with relevant countries and cooperation for strengthening capabilities of the Maritime Domain.
Awakening (MDA).

Regarding the use of space domain, Japan will promote partnership and cooperation in various fields including the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and mission assurance of the entire space system, through consultations and information sharing with relevant countries and active participation in multilateral exercises among others. Regarding the use of cyber domain, Japan will enhance its partnership and cooperation with relevant countries through measures such as sharing views on threat awareness, exchanging views on response to cyber attacks, and participating in multinational exercises.

In cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations, Japan will promote non-proliferation efforts regarding: weapons of mass destruction and missiles which can serve as their delivery means; and goods and sensitive technologies of potential military use. Leveraging SDF’s knowledge and human resources, Japan will engage in various activities related to arms control and disarmament undertaken by the United Nations and other bodies, including the discussion on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS).

In line with the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan will actively promote international peace cooperation activities, while giving comprehensive consideration to such factors as purposes of mission, situation in host country, and political and economic relations between Japan and host country. While making good use of past experiences to develop human resources, Japan will actively contribute through such efforts as sending embedded personnel to mission headquarters and capacity building assistance in areas that Japan excels. Regarding SDF operation facility in the Republic of Djibouti, which is used for anti-piracy efforts, Japan will work towards stable, long-term use of the facility for regional security cooperation and other activities.

IV. Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability

1. Guiding thoughts

In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in security environment, Japan must strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. In view of aging population with declining birth rate and severe fiscal situation, it is essential that Japan use budget and personnel even more effectively.

In strengthening defense capability, Japan will enhance priority capability areas as early as possible, allocating resources flexibly and intensively without adhering to existing budget and human resource allocation, and undertake necessary fundamental reforms.

In taking these measures, SDF will further promote jointness of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces in all areas and, avoiding stove-piped approach, optimize their organizations and equipment. In particular, SDF will further promote jointness in a wide range of areas such as capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, comprehensive air and missile defense, damage recovery, transportation, maintenance, supply, security, education, medical service and research.

With respect to hedging against invasion scenarios such as amphibious landing employing large-scale ground forces, which were assumed primarily during the Cold War period, SDF will retain forces only enough to maintain and carry on the minimum necessary expertise and skills with which to adapt to changes in situation in the future, and work further to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization.

2. Priorities in strengthening capabilities necessary for cross-domain operations

1) Acquiring and strengthening capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains

In order to realize cross-domain operations, SDF will acquire and strengthen capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum by focusing resources and leveraging Japan’s superb science and technology. In doing so, SDF will strengthen and protect control, command, communications and information capabilities that effectively connect capabilities in all domains including the new ones.

a. Capabilities in space domain

Effective use of satellites for such purposes as information-gathering, communication and positioning is essential for realizing cross-domain operations. On the other hand, threats to the stable use of space are increasing.

SDF therefore will further improve various capabilities that leverage space domain including information-gathering, communication and positioning capabilities. SDF will also build a structure to conduct persistent ground- and space-based situation monitoring. To establish such a capability at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will also work to strengthen capabilities including mission assurance capability and capability to disrupt opponent’s command, control, communications and information.

b. Capabilities in cyber domain

Information and communications networks that leverage cyberspace are a foundation for SDF’s activities in various domains, and attack against them seriously disrupts organized activities of SDF. In order to prevent such attack, SDF will continue to strengthen capabilities for persistent monitoring of command and communications systems and networks as well as for damage limitation and recovery. In addition, SDF will fundamentally strengthen its cyber defense capability, including the counterattack during attack against Japan, opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack.

In so doing, SDF will significantly expand its human resources with specialized expertise and skills, and take into consideration its contributions to whole-of-government efforts.

2) Enhancing capabilities in traditional domains

SDF will enhance capabilities to effectively counter attacks by aircraft, ships and missiles during cross-domain operations in close combination with capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains.

a. Capabilities in maritime and air domains

In order to effectively deal with armed attack against Japan, it is extremely important for Japan to establish and maintain maritime and air superiority.

SDF will reinforce its posture for conducting persistent ISR at sea and in the air around Japan.

SDF will also strengthen surface and underwater operational capabilities including Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV). By taking measures such as developing a fighter force structure that features Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) fighter aircraft which bring operational flexibility, SDF will improve air operation capability particularly on the Pacific side of Japan, where number of air bases is limited despite its vast airspace. In so doing, as number of air bases that allow for take-off and landing of fighters is limited, Japan will take necessary measures to enable STOVL fighter aircraft to operate from existing SDF ships as required, in order to further improve flexibility in fighter operations while ensuring safety of SDF personnel.

b. Stand-off defense capability

As other countries make remarkable advances in early warning and control capabilities and the performance of various missiles, SDF needs to effectively intercept attack against Japan, while ensuring safety of its personnel.

SDF will acquire stand-off firepower and other requisite capabilities to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan including remote islands from the outside of their threat envelopes. In addition, in order to appropriately leverage advances in military technologies, Japan will swiftly and flexibly strengthen stand-off defense capability through measures such as comprehensive research and development of related technologies.

c. Comprehensive air and missile defense capability

Japan needs to effectively and efficiently counter increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats of ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft by optimum means and minimize damage.

SDF will establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces, those for missile defense as well as air defense equipment that each SDF service has separately used, thereby providing persistent nation-wide protection and also enhancing capability to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. SDF will also study ways to counter future airborne threats.

Based on basic role and mission sharing between Japan and the United States, in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole, Japan will continue to study a potential form of response capability to address the means for missile launch and related facilities and will take necessary measures.

d. Maneuver and deployment capability

In order to effectively deal with various situations such as attack on remote islands, SDF will continue to enhance cooperation with relevant agencies including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and with the United States and other relevant countries. SDF will also engage in organization building such as the construction of units specializing in space and dedicated career field, and develop human resources and accumulate knowledge and expertise in the space field.

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In so doing, SDF will significantly expand its human resources with specialized expertise and skills, and take into consideration its contributions to whole-of-government efforts.
SDF will take necessary measures for securing ammunition and fuel, ensuring maritime shipping lanes, and protecting important infrastructure. In particular, while cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, SDF will improve sustainability through safe and steady acquisition and stockpiling of ammunition and fuel. SDF will also improve resiliency in a multi-layered way through efforts including dispersion, recovery, and substitution of infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations. Further, SDF will work toward more effective and efficient equipment maintenance by reviewing existing maintenance methods, thereby ensuring high operational availability.

3. Priorities in strengthening core elements of defense capability
(1) Reinforcing human resource base
The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. Securing human resources for SDF personnel and improving their ability and morale are essential to strengthening defense capability. This has become an imminent challenge in the face of shrinking and aging population with declining birth rates. Also in light of sustainability and resilience of defense capability, SDF needs to work even further to reinforce human resource base that sustains SDF personnel.

MOD/SDF will promote efforts, including those addressed institutional aspects, in order to secure diverse, high-quality talents from a wider range of people. These efforts include: various recruitment measures such as cooperation with local governments and other entities; diversifying applicant pool including college graduates; expanding women’s participation; appropriate extension of SDF personnel’s mandatory retirement ages; leveraging hired SDF personnel as well as reserve personnel; and measures for raising fulfillment rates. MOD/SDF will also promote manpower saving and automation by leveraging technological innovations such as artificial intelligence.

To address all SDF personnel to maintain high morale and continue to fully exercise their ability, MOD/SDF will improve living and work environment and promote work style reforms at MOD/SDF to ensure proper work-life balance.

Through such efforts as enhancing joint education and research, MOD/ SDF will enrich education and research to improve SDF’s capabilities and foster its unity. MOD/SDF will enhance education for organization management skills. In addition, MOD/SDF will improve treatment through measures concerning honors and privileges, and allowance increase that reflects the special nature of SDF’s missions. MOD/SDF will also further improve re-employment support for SDF personnel in view of the fact that it is the raison d’être of an SDF personnel to maintain the livelihood of SDF personnel under the mandatory early retirement system.

(2) Reviewing equipment structure
MOD/SDF will examine the existing equipment structure from joint operation perspective and build an optimized equipment structure. In so doing, while giving due considerations to capabilities each SDF service requires for its operations, MOD/SDF will: develop equipment with multiple functional variants; optimize and standardize specifications of equipment; and jointly procure equipment commonly used across SDF services; reduce types of aircraft; suspend the use of equipment whose importance has decreased; and review or discontinue projects of low cost-effectiveness.

(3) Reinforcing technology base
As character of warfare changes dramatically due to advances in military technologies, it is becoming all the more important to reinforce technological base that has bearing on defense equipment through whole-of-government approach by leveraging Japan’s superb science and technology. MOD/SDF will make focused investments through selection and concentration in important technologies including artificial intelligence and other potentially game-changing technologies. MOD/SDF will also dramatically shorten research and development timelines by streamlining R&D processes and procedures. In doing so, MOD/SDF will encourage company’s prior investments and leverage its strength to full potential by actively using design proposal-based competition scheme and improving foreseeability through the formulation of R&D visions on capabilities required for Japan’s future national defense.

In addition, MOD/SDF will work to actively leverage potential dual-use, advanced commercial technologies through such efforts as: technology exchange with relevant domestic and overseas entities; enhanced collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies; and use of the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” program.

MOD/SDF will reinforce its structure aimed at early discovery of innovative technologies and fostering thereof by utilizing and creating think tanks that survey and analyze latest foreign and domestic technological trends.

(4) Optimizing equipment procurement
In order to secure necessary and sufficient quality and quantity of SDF equipment, MOD/SDF needs to acquire high-performance equipment at the most affordable prices possible. MOD/SDF also needs to do thorough cost management and reduction not only during budget development but also during budget implementation.

MOD/SDF will actively use systematic acquisition methods including long-term contracts which facilitate efficient procurement, and streamline equipment maintenance. MOD/SDF will facilitate competition among domestic and foreign companies to promote defense equipment development that eyes towards international joint development and production as well as overseas transfer. In order to efficiently procure U.S.-made high-performance equipment, MOD/SDF will promote rationalization of FMS procurement and work to align procurement timelines and specifications with U.S. forces and other parties. In taking these steps, MOD/SDF will further strengthen efforts on project management throughout the entire life cycle of defense equipment.

(5) Strengthening defense industrial base
Japan’s defense industry is an essential foundation for the production, operation, and maintenance of defense equipment. For the production of high-performance equipment and to ensure a high operational availability, it is necessary to make defense industrial base more resilient by overcoming challenges such as high costs due to low-volume, high-mix production and lack of international competitiveness, thereby enabling it to effectively adapt to changing security environment.

In addition to taking various measures concerning equipment structure, technological base, and equipment procurement, to create a competitive environment for companies, MOD/SDF will reform the existing contract system including affording incentives to companies. MOD/SDF will enhance supply-chain risk management and work to further expand Japanese defense industry’s participation in maintenance work of imported equipment. For whole-of-government efforts to promote appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which permits transfer of defense equipment in cases where the transfer contributes to Japan’s security, MOD/SDF will work to make necessary improvements and implement the Principles’ implementation. At the same time, MOD/SDF will strengthen intellectual property management, technology management and information security in order to prevent drain of important defense equipment-related technologies. Through the aforementioned measures, MOD/SDF will work to reduce equipment costs and improve industrial competitiveness, thereby striving to build resilient defense industrial base. MOD/SDF will also examine further measures to that end.

(6) Enhancing intelligence capabilities
MOD/SDF will enhance intelligence capabilities to provide timely, effective intelligence support to policy decision and SDF operations. MOD/SDF will strengthen capabilities for each to align with the livelihood of SDF personnel under the mandatory early retirement system.

In so doing, while giving due considerations to technological trends in information processing, MOD/SDF will strengthen capability and posture, including those related to new domains, for the collection of SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, OSINT and others. MOD/SDF will enhance collaboration with relevant domestic agencies including the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center which operates Information Gathering Satellites and with the ally as well as with other parties. MOD/SDF will work to hire, retain and train personnel for information collection and analysis and to acquire and control information-sharing systems. MOD/SDF will also establish more robust information security regime and strengthen counter-intelligence capability.

V. Organization of Self-Defense Forces
In order to realize cross-domain operations, SDF will strengthen joint operations as described in 1 and develop organization of each SDF service as described in sections from 2 to 4. Organic structure of major units and specific quantities of major equipment in the future are as shown in the Annex table.

1. Joint operation to realize cross-domain operations
(1) In order to further promote joint-ness of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF in all areas, SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff Office’s posture designed for effective SDF operations and for new domains, thereby enabling swift exercise of SDF’s capabilities. SDF will examine future framework for joint operation. SDF will also work to flexibly leverage personnel of each SDF service through such efforts as building posture for force protection and damage recovery with an eye on mutual cooperation among SDF services.

(2) SDF will maintain an ASDF unit that specializes in space domain missions, and strengthen its posture for joint operations in order to conduct persistent monitoring of situations in space, and to ensure superiority in use of space at all stages of armed conflict and promote defense equipment development such means as mission assurance and disruption of opponent’s command, control, communications and information.

(3) SDF will maintain a cyber-pace defense unit as an integrated unit in order to conduct persistent monitoring of SDF’s information and communications networks as well as to fundamentally strengthen cyber defense capability, including capability to disrupt, during attack against Japan, opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack.

(4) SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff Office’s posture in order to...
appropriately manage and coordinate, from joint operation perspective, the use of electromagnetic spectrum. SDF will strengthen each SDF service’s posture to enable SDF to collect and analyze information concerning electromagnetic domain and to neutralize radar, communications and other systems operated by opponent that intends to invade Japan.

In order to provide persistent nation-wide protection on a steady-state basis and to be able to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats: GSF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units and ballastic missile defense units; MSDF will maintain Aegis-equipped destroyers; ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units; and SDF will build comprehensive air and missile defense capability comprising these assets.

At all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will maintain a maritime transport unit as an integrated unit that allows SDF units to swiftly maneuver and deploy in joint operations.

2. Organization of GSDF

In order to be able to swiftly respond to various situations, GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades and an armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. GSDF will also maintain mobile operating units equipped with specialized functions, in order to effectively perform operations such as: various missions in cyber and electromagnetic domains; airborne operations; amphibious operations; special operations; air transportation; defense against NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) weapons; and security cooperation with foreign countries.

In view of the excellent training environment it offers, GSF will maintain half of rapidly deployable basic operational units in Hokkaido, on the premise that these units will deploy and move via joint transport capability.

GSDF will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats by taking measures including: persistent steady-state maneuvers such as coordinated activities between ships and Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade and other mobile operating units as well as their various training and exercises; stationing of units in remote islands hitherto without SDF presence; and establishing networks with MSDF and ASDF.

To be able to counter invasion of remote islands, GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units and hyper-velocity gliding projectile units for remote island defense.

With respect to basic operational units (divisions and brigades) other than the rapidly deployable ones referred to in (1), GSDF will review their organization and equipment with focus on tanks, howitzers and rockets. With respect to units under the direct command of regional armies, GSDF will also review their organization and equipment related to aerial firepower. GSDF will thoroughly implement rationalization and streamlining of these units and appropriately position them to meet conditions and characteristics of each region.

3. Organization of MSDF

In order to provide for defense in the waters around Japan and security of maritime traffic through effective prosecution of persistent ISR, antimissile operations and mine countermeasures, and to be able to effectively engage in security cooperation with other countries, MSDF will maintain reinforced destroyer units including destroyers with improved multi-mission capabilities, miniature frigate units and embarked patrol helicopter units. MSDF will organize surface units composed of these destroyer units and minesweeper units. In addition, MSDF will maintain patrol ship units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan.

With respect to the destroyers equipped with improved multi-mission capabilities, MSDF will introduce multi-crew shiftwork and promote collaboration with patrol ships equipped with high ISR capability, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture.

In order to effectively conduct steady-state, wide-area underwater ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, MSDF will maintain reinforced submarine units.

By introducing a test-bed submarine, MSDF will work to achieve greater efficiency in submarine operations and accelerate capability improvement, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture.

In order to effectively conduct steady-state, wide-area underwater ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units.

4. Organization of ASDF

ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of ground-based warning and control units and reinforced airborne warning units: ground-based warning and control units are capable of conducting persistent surveillance in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side; and airborne warning units are capable of conducting effective, sustained airborne warning, surveillance and control during “gray zone” and other situations with heightened tensions.

In order to be able to provide for air defense in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side with a comprehensive posture that brings together fighter aircraft and supporting functions, ASDF will maintain fighter aircraft units reinforced by high-performance fighter aircraft. In order to enable fighter aircraft units and airborne warning units to sustainably conduct various operations in wide areas, ASDF will maintain reinforced aerial refueling and transport units.

In order to be able to effectively carry out activities such as maneuver and deployment of ground forces and security cooperation with foreign countries, ASDF will maintain air transport units.

In order to be able to conduct information collection in areas relatively remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions, ASDF will maintain unmanned aerial vehicle units.

VI. Elements Supporting Defense Capability

For Japan’s defense capability to demonstrate its true value, SDF needs to constantly maintain and improve its capabilities and foster broad understanding by Japanese nationals.

1. Training and exercises

In order to maintain and improve its tactical skills, SDF will conduct more practical, effective and systematic training and exercises while, as necessary, work in partnership with relevant organizations, local governments and the private sector. In so doing, in order to conduct more practical training, SDF will: develop and utilize domestic training ranges such as those in Hokkaido as well as fine training environment overseas; facilitate joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas; facilitate use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas; and more actively introduce training simulators and others. SDF will also actively utilize training and exercises to constantly examine and review various plans for emergencies.

2. Medical Care

SDF needs to enhance its medical functions to keep SDF personnel’s vitality and enhance their ability to deal with various situations and even in a diverse range of missions at home and abroad. In order to protect the lives of SDF personnel to the maximal extent possible, MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture for medical care and onward transfer of patients, seamlessly covering the entire stretch between the frontline and final medical evacuation destinations. Taking into account conditions and characteristics of each region, SDF will focus on strengthening medical functions of SDF in Japan’s southwestern region. SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care regime through endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into medical hubs with enhanced functions. In order to secure medical personnel in operation units, SDF will: improve the management of the National Defense Medical College; enrich and enhance education and research such as improving medical care capabilities for war injury. In addition, SDF will improve requisite posture for various international cooperation including capacity building assistance.

3. Collaboration with local communities

Amid increasingly testing and uncertain security environment, activities, training and exercises of SDF and U.S. forces in Japan are becoming more diverse and defensive equipments are becoming more sophisticated. As a result, it is becoming all the more important to gain understanding among and secure cooperation from local governments and residents around defense facilities.

MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities regarding defense policies and activities. Upon fielding units and equipment of SDF or U.S. Forces in Japan and conducting training and exercises, MOD/SDF will make careful, detailed coordination to meet desires and conditions of local communities, while sufficiently fulfilling accountability. At the same time, MOD/SDF will continue to promote various impact alleviation measures including noise mitigation.

MOD/SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations including local governments, police and fire departments in order to enable SDF to swiftly and securely conduct its activities in response to various situations.

In certain regions, presence of SDF units makes substantial contributions to maintenance and revitalization of local communities. There are also cases where SDF’s emergency patient transport is supporting community medicine. In light of this, MOD/SDF will give due considerations to local conditions and characteristics upon reorganization of defense facilities in SDF garrisons and bases. At the same time, in administering garrisons and bases, MOD/SDF will give due considerations to their contributions to local economies.

4. Intellectual Base

In order to facilitate understanding of security and crisis management among the populace, MOD/SDF will effectively promote security-related education and research at educational institutions. Within MOD/SDF, in order to achieve at high levels both academic research and policy-support by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), MOD/SDF will facilitate NIDS’ collaboration with the policy-making sector. MOD/SDF will further enhance its defense research regime with NIDS playing central roles. In so doing, MOD/SDF will promote
systematic collaboration on education and research with other research and educational institutions within the Government, as well as with universities and think-tanks of excellence both at home and abroad.

**VII. Points of Attention**

1. Japan’s defense capability these Guidelines set forth envisions approximately 10 years. The National Security Council will conduct periodic, systematic evaluations throughout the course of implementation of various measures and programs. In order to build truly effective defense capability while firmly grasping changes in security environment, MOD/SDF will conduct verifications regarding capabilities required for Japan's defense in the future.

2. When major changes in situation are anticipated during evaluation and verification processes, these Guidelines will be amended as necessary after examining current security environment and others.

3. Considering increasingly severe fiscal conditions and importance of other budgets related to people’s daily life, MOD/SDF will work to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development to curb costs. MOD/SDF will work to ensure that defense capability can smoothly and fully perform its functions while harmonizing with other policies and measures of the Government.

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**Annex Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Units</th>
<th>Cyber Defense Units Maritime Transport Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized Number of Personnel</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active-Duty Personnel</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve-Ready Personnel</td>
<td>151,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Deployment Units</td>
<td>4,000</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground Self-Defense Force</th>
<th>Major Units</th>
<th>Rapid Deployment Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 rapid deployment divisions</td>
<td>4 rapid deployment brigades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 armored division</td>
<td>1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 brigades</td>
<td>1 helicopter brigade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Regional Deployment Units | 5 divisions |
| Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units | 5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maritime Self-Defense Force</th>
<th>Major Units</th>
<th>Surface Vessel Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>4 groups (8 divisions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer and minesweeper vessels</td>
<td>2 groups (13 divisions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine Units</td>
<td>6 divisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Aircraft Units</td>
<td>9 squadrons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Major Equipment | 54 |
| Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) | (6) |
| Submarines | 22 |
| Patrol Vessels | 12 |
| Combat Aircraft | Approx. 190 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Self-Defense Force</th>
<th>Major Units</th>
<th>Air Warning &amp; Control Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28 warning squadrons</td>
<td>1 AEW wing (3 squadrons)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter Aircraft Units</td>
<td>13 squadrons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Transport Units</td>
<td>2 squadrons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Control Units</td>
<td>3 squadrons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units</td>
<td>4 groups (24 fire squadrons)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space Domain Mission Units</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units</td>
<td>1 squadron</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Major Equipment | Approx. 370 |
| Combat Aircraft | Approx. 290 |
| Fighters | |
II. Reorganization of the Major SDF Units

1. In order to build a structure that is capable of realizing cross-domain operations including new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff’s posture designed for effective SDF operations and for new domains, thereby enabling swift and effective exercise of SDF’s capabilities irrespective of domain and for joint operations. SDF will take necessary measures after considering how to conduct the operation of organizations in which the functions in the future will be reorganized and integrated during the Cold War period. SDF will retain forces only enough to maintain and carry on the minimum necessary expertise and skills with which to adapt to changes in the situation in the future, by achieving efficiency and rationalization.

2. In order to strengthen operation capabilities in new domains, GSDF will establish 1 squadron of aerial refueling/transport units to enhance its aerial support capabilities including logistics support will be enhanced.

3. In order to provide for defense in the waters around Japan and security of U.S. forces in Japan. At all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will respond swiftly, and to deter and counter effectively and swiftly with various situations, GSDF will transform 1 division and 2 brigades respectively into 1 rapid deployment division and 2 rapid deployment brigades, which are equipped with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition to rapid deployment divisions and brigades, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade, which will be strengthened by the establishment of 1 amphibious rapid deployment regiment, will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats through conducting persistent, steady-state maneuver under the direct command of the respective regional armies. Furthermore, GSDF will take necessary measures to establish hyper-velocity gliding projectile (HVG) units for the defense of remote islands.

4. In order to provide for defense in the waters around Japan and security of U.S. forces in Japan. At all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will establish 1 group of maritime transportation unit as Joint Unit that will be responsible for the establishment of 1 amphibious rapid deployment regiment, will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats through conducting persistent, steady-state maneuver under the direct command of the respective regional armies. Furthermore, GSDF will take necessary measures to establish hyper-velocity gliding projectile (HVG) units for the defense of remote islands.

5. With respect to hedging against invasion scenarios such as amphibious landing employing large-scale ground forces, which were assumed primarily during the Cold War period, SDF will retain forces only enough to maintain and carry on the minimum necessary expertise and skills with which to adapt to changes in the situation in the future, by achieving efficiency and rationalization.

6. In order to build a structure that is capable of realizing cross-domain operations including new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff’s posture designed for effective SDF operations and for new domains, thereby enabling swift and effective exercise of SDF’s capabilities irrespective of domain and for joint operations. SDF will take necessary measures after considering how to conduct the operation of organizations in which the functions in the future will be reorganized and integrated during the Cold War period. SDF will retain forces only enough to maintain and carry on the minimum necessary expertise and skills with which to adapt to changes in the situation in the future, by achieving efficiency and rationalization.

7. In order to strengthen operation capabilities in new domains, GSDF will establish 1 squadron of cyber defense unit as joint unit in order to conduct persistent monitoring of situations in space, and to ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies.

8. In order to provide for defense in the waters around Japan and security of U.S. forces in Japan. At all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will respond swiftly, and to deter and counter effectively and swiftly with various situations, GSDF will transform 1 division and 2 brigades respectively into 1 rapid deployment division and 2 rapid deployment brigades, which are equipped with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition to rapid deployment divisions and brigades, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade, which will be strengthened by the establishment of 1 amphibious rapid deployment regiment, will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats through conducting persistent, steady-state maneuver under the direct command of the respective regional armies. Furthermore, GSDF will take necessary measures to establish hyper-velocity gliding projectile (HVG) units for the defense of remote islands.
Operations
(1) Acquiring and Strengthening Capabilities in Space, Cyber and Electromagnetic Domains

(A) Capabilities in Space Domain
In order to secure the stable use of space, SDF will build a structure to conduct persistent space monitoring under an appropriate role-sharing with related ministries and agencies by such means as establishing space domain mission units and establishing a space domain (SDO) system and will also newly introduce space-based optical telescopes and SSA laser ranging devices. In order to further improve various capabilities that leverage space domain information gathering, communication and positioning capabilities, SDF will continue to enhance information gathering capabilities through the use of various space satellites equipped with diverse sensors, and strengthen C4I capabilities by continuously developing a sophisticated X-Band satellite communications system. SDF will also strive to secure redundancy by such means as receiving multiple positioning satellite signals including those of Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) and utilizing information gathering satellites (IGS) and commercial satellites including micro ones. Additionally, in order to use these capabilities continuously, SDF will conduct necessary studies and research, and newly introduce training devices to study and train response to the vulnerabilities of Japanese satellites, and devices to grasp the state of electromagnetic interference against Japanese satellites. By this strengthening of the structure for grasping the situation, SDF will build the capability to disrupt C4I of opponents in collaboration with the electromagnetic domain.

In this regard, in addition to efforts to establish new job categories and enhance education dedicated to the space domain, SDF will actively leverage civilian technologies and promote to enhance cooperation including the development of human resources, with relevant agencies including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and with the U.S. and other relevant countries, given that cutting-edge technology and knowhow have been accumulated in these organizations.

(B) Capabilities in Cyber Domain
SDF aims to persistently ensure sufficient security against cyber attack by strengthening both the capability to disrupt and defend the use of cyberspace in the event of attack against Japan. With consideration to enhancing joint functions and efficient resource allocations, SDF will establish the necessary environment by such measures as expanding the structure of cyber defense squadron and other units, enhancing the resiliency of the C4 systems of SDF, strengthening capabilities of information gathering, research and analysis, and developing a practical training environment that can test SDF’s cyber defense capability.

In addition, SDF will strive to keep abreast of the latest information including cyber-related risks, counter measures and technological fights through cooperation with the private sector, and strategic talks, bilateral/multilateral exercises and other opportunities with the ally and other parties.

As the methods of cyber attack are becoming increasingly sophisticated and complicated, securing personnel with expertise on a continuing basis is essential. SDF plans to develop personnel with strong cyber security expertise, through efforts such as improving the in-house curriculum for specialized education, increasing learning opportunities at institutions of higher education at home and abroad, and conducting personnel management that cultivates expertise. In addition, SDF will strengthen the cyber defense capability by utilizing superior outside expertise.

In order to enable a comprehensive response through a whole-of-government approach in cyber domain, MOD/SDF seeks to enhance close coordination with relevant ministries and agencies, etc. by providing knowledge and MOD/SDF personnel on a steady-state basis, and enhance training and exercises.

(C) Capabilities in the Electromagnetic Domain
MOD/SDF will newly establish specialized sections in the internal bureau and the Joint Staff respectively in order to enhance the function to make policies pertaining to effective and efficient use of electromagnetic spectrum in MOD/SDF as well as to improve coordination with other ministries and agencies.

In order to enhance information gathering and analysis capabilities concerning electromagnetic spectrum and develop an information sharing posture, SDF will promote the procurement of radio wave information gathering aircraft and ground-based SIGINT sensor, the upgrade of the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) system, the connection of each SDF service’s systems including the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) and the improvement of each SDF service’s data links.

In order to neutralize the radar and communications of opponent attempting to invade Japan, SDF will proceed with the procurement of fighters (F-35A) and network electronic warfare devices in the upgrade of fighters (F-15) and utility aircraft (EP-3 and UP-3D). SDF will also swiftly proceed with studies and R&D aimed at the procurement of a new multi-function defense aircraft, high-output electronic warfare equipment, high-output microwave equipment and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) ammunition.

(2) Enhancing Capabilities in Traditional Domains

(A) Capabilities in the Ground and Air Domains

(i) Strengthening a Posture of Persistent ISR
In order to strengthen the posture to conduct persistent ISR in broad areas at sea and in the air around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side, and to detect any signs of significant development at an early stage, SDF will procure new type of destroyers with enhanced capabilities to respond to a wide range of missions (FFM), submarines, patrol vessels, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1), patrol helicopters (SH-60K (upgraded version)) and shipborne UAVs, conduct service-extension work on existing destroyers, new type of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) and patrol helicopters (SH-60J and SH-60K) and upgrade the capabilities of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1). In this respect, SDF will strengthen the posture of persistent ISR through increasing the number of the operating days by introducing rational shifts of multiple crews and coordination with patrol vessels to be newly introduced for the new type of destroyers (FFM), and through increasing the opportunities for operation of the submarine fleet on a steady-state basis by introducing the test submarine, which the type has been changed from existing submarines. In addition, SDF will maintain a fully-prepared ISR posture through procuring airborne early warning aircraft (E-2D) and a long-endurance UAV (Global Hawk), upgrading the capabilities of the existing airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), development of a new fixed-air defense radar, establishing 1 AEW wing as part of air warning and control units as stated in II4, preparing an operating base for mobile air defense radars on the islands on the Pacific side and strengthening over-the-horizon radar capabilities.

(ii) Obtaining and Maintaining Air Superiority
SDF will strive for the comprehensive enhancement of air defense capability in airspace around Japan including vast air space on the Pacific side.

SDF will proceed replacing fighters that are not suitable for modernization (F-15) by increasing the number of fighters (F-15J) and will newly introduce that are capable of short take-off and vertical landing (hereinafter referred to as “STOVL aircraft”) to enhance the flexibility of fighter operations, as the number of air bases that allow for conventional take-off and landing of fighters is limited.

In this regard, SDF will refurbish MSDF’s multi-function helicopter carrier destroyers (Izumo class) after studying operation of STOVL aircraft so that the operation where necessary will be possible such as response to air attacks in time of emergency, ISR, training and disaster response, in order to further improve flexibility in fighter operations while ensuring safety of SDF personnel and to improve air operation capability particularly on the Pacific side of Japan, where number of air bases is limited despite its vast airspace. These destroyers shall continue to engage as multi-function destroyers in a wide range of missions after refurbishment, such as the defense of Japan and the response to large-scale disasters. There will be no change in the existing Government opinion concerning equipment that cannot be possessed under the Constitution.

In addition, SDF will upgrade the capabilities of modernized fighter aircraft (F-15J) including the enhancement of electronic warfare capability by mounting stand-alone multi-functional pods and increasing the number of mounted missiles. Furthermore, SDF will upgrade the capabilities of fighter aircraft (F-2) including the enhancement of network function.

With regard to future fighter, SDF will procure new fighters that are capable of playing a central role in future networked warfare before the retirement of the fighter aircraft (F-2). MOD/SDF will promote necessary research and launch a Japan-led development project at an early
timing with the possibility of international collaboration in sight.

Along with continuing to procure middle-range surface-to-air guided missiles, SDF will continue to improve its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT systems by equipping them with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MIE) that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for ballistic missile defense (BMD). In addition, SDF will continue to procure aerial refueling/transport aircraft (KC-46A) and rescue helicopters (UH-60J).

(iii) Obtaining and Maintaining Maritime Superiority

In defense of the seas surrounding Japan and to ensure the security of maritime traffic by effectively conducting various activities including holding persistent ISR, anti-submarine operations and mine countermeasure operations, SDF will procure equipment such as a new type of destroyers (FFM), conduct service-extension activities on equipment such as existing destroyers, and enhance the capabilities of equipment such as fixed wing patrol aircraft (P-1) as stated in (i), and will procure minesweeping/transport helicopters (MCH-101). In addition, SDF will continue to procure Mine Sweeper Ocean (MSO) vessels and amphibious rescue aircraft (US-2), and will establish the structure for enhancing tactical development and education and training capabilities. Furthermore, SDF will continue to procure surface-to-ship guided missiles and will introduce new surface-to-shape guided missiles and air-to-shape guided missiles with further extended ranges. In addition, SDF will take necessary measures after considering the introduction of long-endurance UAVs to strengthen surveillance capabilities in the water including on the vast Pacific side. Moreover, SDF will strive to steadily enhance C4I capabilities and will deploy unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) and proceed with R&D aiming at further enhancement of capabilities to utilize them for oceanic observation and ISR.

(B) Stand-off Defense Capability

In order to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan while ensuring safety of SDF personnel, SDF will procure stand-off missiles (JSM, JASSM and LRASM), and will utilize them for oceanic observation and ISR. R&D aiming at further enhancement of capabilities to utilize them for oceanic observation and ISR.

(C) Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense Capability

In order to effectively and efficiently counter increasingly diverse and complex air threats including such as ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft by optimum means and minimize damage, SDF will establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces, those for missile defense as well as air defense equipment that each SDF service has separately used, thereby providing persistent mid-range-wide infrared sensors and will also study ways to counter future threats.

Based on basic role and mission sharing between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole, Japan will continue to study a potential form of response capability to address the means for missile launch and related facilities and will take necessary measures.

In preparation for an attack by guerrilla or special operations forces concurrent with a missile attack, SDF will continue to procure a variety of surveillance/response equipment, mobile combat vehicles, transport helicopters (CH-47JA) and UAVs in order to improve its ISR posture, and its ability to protect key facilities including nuclear power plants, and search and destroy infiltrating units, and also enhance the ability to respond effectively and efficiently by proceeding with the networking of its troops and strengthening information sharing. In sensitive locations such as areas where many nuclear power plants are located, SDF will conduct training with relevant agencies to confirm coordination procedures, and take necessary measures after considering the basis for deployment in areas neighboring nuclear power plants.

(D) Maneuver and Deployment Capability

In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation, transport operations for a wide variety of situations and improve effective deterrence and counter capabilities, SDF will take necessary measures after considering how to command and coordinate the transport capabilities of each SDF service unilaterally from a steady-state including the reinforcement of the transport coordination function of the Joint Staff.

SDF will continue to procure transport aircraft (C-2) and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) and introduce new utility helicopters, and will also promote relevant initiatives in order to obtain cooperation of related local governments and other entities in promptly deploying JSDF Ospreys (V-22). In developing such aerial transport capability, SDF will take necessary measures after considering the further enhancement of efficiency and effectiveness such as avoiding functional redundancies, clarifying the roles and assignments among the various means of transportation.

In order to strengthen the transport function to remote islands, SDF will newly introduce logistics support vessels (LSV) and landing craft utilities (LCU), and consider new vessels necessary to smoothly implement amphibious and other operations in the future. SDF will also continue to actively utilize ships for which the funds and know-how of the private sector have been utilized and consider further expansion in order to conduct large-scale transportation efficiently for coordination with the transport capabilities of SDF in light of the current situation in which they are being effectively in dispatches to disasters and transporting its troops.

SDF will equip mobile combat vehicles transportable by airlift to its units operable by the rapid deployment divisions/brigades) as stated in II-2, and will establish rapid deployment regiments that immediately respond to various situations. In addition to rapid deployment divisions and brigades, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade, which will be strengthened by the establishment of 1 amphibious rapid deployment regiment, will conduct persistent steady-state maneuver such as coordinated activities with ships as well as various training and exercises. SDF will also establish area security units in charge of initial responses on remote islands in the southwestern region, as well as conduct maneuver training for prompt deployment to remote islands.

(3) Strengthening Sustainability and Resiliency

(A) Securing Continuous Operations

In order to be able to operate units continuously at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will promote measures necessary for securing ammunition and fuel and protecting infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations.

With regard to securing ammunition, SDF will prioritize to procure anti-aircraft missiles that are necessary to secure air superiority, torpedoes that are necessary to secure maritime superiority, and will establish an infrastructural network for procuring from the outside of their threat envelopes and interceptor missiles for BMD while taking account of the needs of joint operations.

With regard to securing fuel, SDF will secure the effective emergency procurement and promote necessary measures
such as newly introduction of tankers from the perspective of stabilizing fuel supply during emergencies.

In order to minimize damage from various attacks and quickly recover functions, SDF will proceed with initiatives for equipment dispersion, recovery, and substitution of infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations while taking the perspective of protection from electromagnetic pulse attacks into consideration, and will construct a posture regarding patrol and damage recovery based on the perspective of mutual cooperation among each SDF service. In addition, SDF will also proceed with various measures to make it possible for SDF to immediately utilize private airports and ports in contingency situations.

With regard to strengthening logistics foundations, for the purpose of establishing readiness capabilities, SDF will store necessary ammunition and spare parts in locations most appropriate for operations and proceed with the establishment of the necessary facilities. SDF will also expand some arsenals and make it possible to have them used jointly by each SDF service and will study and take the measures necessary to optimize combat service support including logistics from the perspective of joint operations.

SDF will steadily construct and maintain necessary living quarters surrounding SDF camps and bases and will also proceed with measures for facilities regarding their deterioration and earthquake resistance. From the perspective of enabling a sustained response posture over the long term, various measures supporting families of military personnel will be promoted.

(B) Ensuring the Operational Availability of Equipment

In order to swiftly and effectively respond to various situations, MOD/SDF will ensure high operational availability of procured equipment by securing the necessary and sufficient funds for maintenance and retirement of the equipment, expanding the use of umbrella contract system, Performance Based Logistics (PBL), under which the price is to be determined according to realized performance regarding maintenance and modernization, sharing information on supply data between the public and private sectors, promoting the utilization of Additive Manufacturing (3D printers), which can form complex shapes with speed and precision and promoting the procurement of new primary and supporting components and parts from international manufacturers.

2. Priorities in Strengthening Core Elements of Defense Capability

(1) Reinforcing Human Resource Base

As equipment becomes more advanced and complex and missions become more varied and internationalized against the context of the rapidly shrinking and aging population with declining birth rate, MOD/SDF will strive to secure diverse, high-quality talents from a wider range of people and also promote initiatives on a priority basis. MOD/SDF will strive to secure diverse, high-quality talents from a wider range of people and also promote initiatives on a priority basis. In order to further increase the proportion of female SDF personnel to enhance the fulfillment of the ranks of SDF reserves, MOD/SDF will also strive to further improve re-employment support by such means as promoting the further utilization of retired SDF personnel who must show up at the workplace for emergency operation, while strengthening our collaboration with local governments and other entities.

(E) Enhancing Education

At each SDF service and the National Defense Academy of Japan (NDAJ), MOD/SDF will strive to enhance the content and organization of education and training, including the academic knowledge and international sensibilities necessary to nurture broad perspectives concerning security. In addition, MOD/SDF will take necessary measures after considering the need for further adequate education and research regarding joint operations is possible with the existing organizations, in order to enhance the capabilities and the unity of the SDF and promote cross-sectoral operations, and strive to strengthen education concerning the organizational management capabilities of MOD/SDF. In order to further promote mutual reinforcement between each SDF service, MOD/SDF will strive to standardize the curriculum and will utilize cutting-edge technology in order to promote effective and efficient education. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will strive to build up the network of students from overseas who graduated from NDAJ as a mean of support for strengthening defense cooperation and exchanges. In order to steadily implement education and training, MOD/SDF will take necessary measures after considering the procurement of new primary and supporting components and parts from international manufacturers.

(F) Improving Treatment of Personnel including Reserve Staff

In order to further increase the proportion of female SDF personnel, MOD/SDF will actively hire women, promote women’s participation and proceed with the establishment of the foundations for the education, living and work environment for female SDF personnel. In order to further utilize advanced-age human resources who have plenty of knowledge, skills and experience while keeping strength, MOD/SDF will raise the early retirement age for SDF personnel and utilize the personnel and the utilization by units of the skills of retired SDF personnel in SDF fields requiring high levels of expertise. MOD/SDF will also secure personnel for units that are responsible for fields that require high levels of expertise by effectively utilizing human resources in the private sector.

(C) Improving Living and Work Environment

As the duration of the activities of the units becomes longer in response to the severe security environment, MOD/SDF will strive to improve the living and work environment, so that all the troops can endure, and the mission of protecting life and peaceful livelihood of Japanese national will be able to fully exercise their capabilities and fulfill their missions with high morale, by such means as steadily providing a system for spouses to accompany the troops, providing a system for a temporary care for children of SDF personnel who must show up at the workplace for emergency operation, while strengthening our collaboration with local governments and other entities.

(D) Promotion of Work Style Reform

As the number of SDF personnel under time and mobility constraints because of child rearing and nursing care increases due to the consequence of major changes in the social structure, MOD/SDF will promote work style reform at MOD/SDF such as correcting long working hours and promoting the use of holidays in order to ensure proper work-life balance so that all SDF personnel will be able to fully exercise their ability and play prominent roles. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will proceed with initiatives such as establishing workplace nurseries, and will also promote measures supporting families of military personnel such as providing temporary care for children of SDF personnel who must show up at the workplace for emergency operation, while strengthening our collaboration with local governments and other entities.

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who are former reserve candidates as reserve ready personnel. Furthermore, in order to make it easier for SDF reserves to respond to training summons, MOD/SDF will undertake the strengthening of the foundations for education and training and the revision of the content of the training, and will implement measures to obtain the understanding and cooperation of the employers.

(2) Reviewing Equipment Structure
MOD/SDF will review the existing equipment structure and strengthen the functions of the Joint Staff in order to build an effective and rational equipment structure from a joint operation perspective. MOD/SDF will also develop equipment with multiple functional variants, optimize and standardize specifications of equipment, jointly procure equipment commonly used across SDF services, reduce types of aircraft, suspend the use of equipment whose importance has decreased, and review or discontinue projects of low cost-effectiveness.

In order to maximize defense capability by effectively utilizing the limited human resources to the utmost, MOD/SDF will actively promote initiatives towards automation through such means as the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) to data processing and decision makings regarding unit operation, the procurement of UAVs and R&D of unmanned surface vehicles (USV) and UUVs. MOD/SDF will also actively promote initiatives to save manpower through such means as streamlining in design of new types of destroyers (FFM) and submarines and use of remote control for other equipment.

(3) Reinforcing Technology Base
In order to ensure technological superiority in strategically important areas of equipment and technology by making focused investments in innovative technologies including artificial intelligence and other potentially game-changing technologies, MOD/SDF will revise Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook and newly formulate R&D visions on technologies that will be important for future joint operation, presenting the future direction of medium to long-term research and development from a strategic perspective.

In order to significantly shorten R&D timelines by streamlining its process, MOD/SDF will adopt new methods such as block approach and modularization for R&D of HVGP for the defense of remote islands, new surface-to-ship missiles for the defense of remote islands, UAVs and hypersonic weapons. MOD/SDF will also provide the capabilities to detect and eliminate threats promptly through analysis of alternatives by the technological demonstration at the initial stage of R&D.

MOD/SDF will work actively to leverage potentially dual-use, advanced commercial technologies through such efforts as technology exchange with relevant domestic and overseas entities; enhanced collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies; and the development of “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” program. In this regard, MOD/SDF will strengthen and expand cooperation with the countries who are making large-scale investments in game-changing technologies such as the U.S., and create mutually complementary international joint R&D. MOD/SDF will reinforce its structure aimed at early discovery of innovative, emerging technologies and fostering thereof by utilizing and creating think tanks that survey and analyze latest foreign and domestic technological trends.

(4) Optimizing Equipment Procurement
In order to provide timely and efficient intelligence support to policy decision and SDF operations, MOD/SDF will enhance the effectiveness and flexibility of project management throughout equipment lifecycles.

To this end, MOD/SDF will take various initiatives including undertakings that contribute to cost reduction at mass production stage as a requirement at development stage, incorporating successful cases in the civilian sector to the manufacture of defense equipment, actively adopting contracting methods such as the competitive bidding method that contribute to the utilization of private sector knowledge and expertise and tightening cost controls.

In this regard, MOD/SDF will expand the items subject to project management and strive to adjust the standards for the specifications and the revision of project plans with consideration of life cycle costs, and apply them.

Regarding the cost estimation of equipment without market prices, MOD/SDF will undertake more appropriate cost calculations by making the calculation of the processing costs required for the manufacture more precise and appropriate, and will also conduct the procurement of information systems at appropriate price levels. To implement these initiatives effectively, MOD/SDF will actively develop and allocate human resources by utilizing human resources with specialized expertise, skills and experiences in the private sector, and will also strive to construct the cost-data on component level of equipment based on the information compiled from the cost estimates/contract records.

MOD/SDF will actively use systematic acquisition methods including long-term contracts which facilitate efficient procurement, and streamline equipment sustainment and maintenance including the expansion of PBL, and other umbrella contracts. MOD/SDF will also facilitate the coordination among defense-related foreign companies regarding domestically procured equipment with low cost effectiveness by considering price reduction through imports and considering the deduction of unique specifications for domestic use. Furthermore, in light of the growing importance of the management of price, delivery time and other matters in procurement through Foreign Military Sales (hereinafter referred to as “FMS” procurement), MOD/SDF will collaborate closely with the U.S. Government and other organizations through Japan-U.S. consultations and promote initiatives towards the streamlining of FMS procurement, such as striving to acquire equipment in coordination with the United States in full consideration of life cycle costs, and specifications, and to manage the status of implementation in a timely and appropriate manner.

(5) Strengthening Defense Industrial Base
In order to strengthen the resilience of Japan’s defense industry base, which is an essential foundation for the production, operation, and maintenance of defense equipment, Government will actively take measures such as introducing the competition principle to Japan’s defense industry, which is in a poor competitive environment, incorporating the knowledge, expertise, and technology of the civilian sector, and strengthen the supply chains of equipment. As a part of these measures, MOD/SDF will also promote initiatives to comprehensively enhance intelligence support to policy decision and SDF operations, MOD/SDF will drastically strengthen information gathering system with the aim of creating a competitive environment, including the introduction of the enterprise evaluation system that assesses how much a contractor company tries to contribute to strengthening of defense industries (MOD/SDF) and encourage the spin-off from defense technology to civilian purposes and the spin-on from cutting-edge technologies in the civilian sector to the defense industry including R&D with innovative manufacturing technologies. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will strengthen risk management regarding the vulnerability of supply chains of equipment through research on the supply chains and also promote the participation of Japan’s defense industry in the sustainment and maintenance of imported equipment.

The government as a whole will promote appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which permits transfer of defense equipment in cases such as the transfer contributes to Japan’s security. In order to do so, based on progress and other elements in defense cooperation with our partners, the Government will make necessary improvements in implementation or related rules, promote public-private partnership in information gathering and dissemination, strengthen technology control and intellectual property management in order to prevent leakage of key defense equipment-related technologies on the occasion of overseas transfer and develop defense equipment with an eye on overseas transfer. MOD/SDF will also strengthen information security measures that will be necessary for Japan’s defense industry in participation in international businesses, and develop an information security guidebook for Japan’s defense industry. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will actively promote international R&D and commercial development with other countries utilizing Japan’s technological strengths.

In addition, MOD/SDF will undertake measures such as making the equipment manufacturing process and thorough cost reduction and will strive to make Japan’s defense industry base efficient and resilient while foreseeing possible realignment and consolidation of businesses that may occur as a result of these measures.

(6) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities
In order to provide timely and effective intelligence support to policy decision and SDF operations, MOD/SDF will promote initiatives to comprehensively enhance intelligence capabilities at all stages of intelligence capabilities, including gathering, analyzing, sharing and securing of information.

MOD/SDF will drastically strengthen information gathering and analysis capabilities so that MOD/SDF will be fully capable of meeting various intelligence requirements including those related to new domains. This will be conducted by strengthening gathering postures for SIGINT and IMINT through establishing and enhancing capabilities of information collection facilities, utilizing intelligence data from the space and airborne systems and satellites, and diversifying means for information collection through new equipment such as long-endurance UAVs. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will also strengthen the gathering postures for HUMINT through enhancing its defense attaché system, reinforce the gathering posture of OSINT and expand its cooperation with allied countries. In this regard, MOD/SDF will strive to achieve its even more effective and efficient posture by proactively utilizing the latest information processing technology, and will also promote
all-source analysis, which fuses a wide variety of information sources together. MOD/SDF will also strive to utilize information effectively by successfully developing and connecting systems that will promote information sharing. The MOD/SDF will respond appropriately to increasingly diversified intelligence requirements, MOD/SDF will promote securing and training of highly capable personnel handling information collection and analysis. Moreover, MOD/SDF will take steady measures in various directions including recruitment, training, and personnel allocation to strengthen comprehensive information collection and analysis capabilities.

With regard to information security, MOD/SDF will coordinate with relevant offices to make every effort by such means as education in ensuring information sharing on a need-to-know basis, and in taking preventative measures against information leakage. Also, MOD/SDF will strengthen countermeasures by enhancing information security within MOD/SDF by promoting collaboration with relevant organizations.

3. Large-Scale Disasters
In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as a Nankai Trough earthquake, or a special disaster such as a nuclear emergency, the SDF will respond to it immediately transporting and deploying sufficient numbers of SDF units based on a joint operational approach, and also will promote measures to strengthen the response posture including the deployment of drones for disasters, a helicopter satellite communication system (Helisat), lifesaving systems, and emergency power sources. With close coordination and cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, local governments and the private sector, the MOD will promote such measures as to establish contingency planning and to conduct training and exercises, and secure alternative capabilities when the basic capability of the SDF’s disaster and deployment operations is affected.

4. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance
(1) Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
In order to ensure Japan’s national security and to maintain and strengthen the U.S. commitment to Japan and the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will further strengthen Japan-U.S. defense cooperation under the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” while strengthening Japan’s own capabilities as a premise for these efforts. Japan will continue to promote cooperation in space and cyber domains, comprehensive air and missile defense, bilateral training and exercises and joint ISR activities. Japan will also further deepen Japan-U.S. close coordination and cooperation activities in various areas such as formulation and renewal of bilateral plans and the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. In order for Japan and the U.S. to be able to fully leverage their capabilities during bilateral activities, Japan will advance efforts for standardization of defense equipment that contributes to Japan-U.S. bilateral activities, sharing of various networks, building capacity for in-country maintenance of U.S. made equipment and initiatives for intelligence/information security. To efficiently improve Japanese and the U.S. capabilities, while facilitating common understanding of respective priorities in defense capability enhancement, promote measures such as effective acquisition of advanced U.S. equipment through optimized FMS procurement and Japan-U.S. joint R&D. Furthermore, Japan will promote cooperation on joint/shared use of SDF and U.S. force facilities, and efforts for improved resiliency.

(2) Steady Implementation of Measures Concerning Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan
In order to make the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan more smooth and effective, Japan will steadily secure Host Nation Support (HNS).

5. Strengthening Security Cooperation
In line with the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Japan will further promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges based on the understanding that realizing a security environment that is desirable for Japan is an extremely important and necessary undertaking that contributes to Japan’s defense itself and also relates to its basic fundamentals. In particular, in addition to high-level exchanges, policy dialogues and exchanges among military branches, in order to improve interoperability with relevant countries and to strengthen Japan’s presence, Japan will appropriately combine and strategically implement specific initiatives such as bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation and capacity building assistance, while taking characteristics and situation specific to each region and country into account.

Based on this significance of defense cooperation and exchanges, in order to further collaborate mutually and conduct specific and thorough initiatives, Japan will proceed with the improvement of operation procedures, development of organizational systems and review of systems, and will further reflect needs concerning defense cooperation and exchanges in SDF operations. Japan will also strive to collaborate with relevant ministries and agencies as well as with other countries, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, and strategically disseminate information on Japan’s initiatives. In this regard, Japan will focus on the following in particular.

(1) Holding bilateral/multilateral Training and Exercises
Japan will promote bilateral/multilateral training and exercises based on their significance as defense cooperation and exchanges. Through this, Japan will represent the will and ability to create a desirable security environment and will also seek to improve interoperability with relevant countries and strengthen cooperative measures with relevant countries.

(2) Equipment and Technology Cooperation
Japan will strengthen initiatives for equipment and technology cooperation including overseas transfer of defense equipment, and strive to enhance our partners’ military capabilities and maintain/strengthen medium and long-term relationships with those countries. In particular, Japan will effectively promote these initiatives by conducting activities such as training and exercises and capacity building assistance as necessary.

(3) Capacity Building Assistance
Japan will work with countries of the Indo-Pacific region to support advance capacity development efforts based on their voluntary ownership, so as to enable counterparts military organizations to contribute further towards international peace and regional stability, thus creating security environment that is desirable to Japan. In this regard, Japan will effectively utilize knowledge and expertise accumulated by SDF, coordinate thoroughly with diplomatic policy, and coordinate with partner countries such as the U.S. and Australia undertaking capacity building assistance so as to make maximum results by combing various measures efficiently.

(4) Maritime Security
Based on the understanding that open and stable seas are a foundation of the peace and prosperity of Japan, the Indo-Pacific region, and in line with the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Japan will promote initiatives such as bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, information sharing and visits by ships and aircraft as warranted by the occasion, with foreign countries that share the understanding of maritime security. Through these, Japan will show the will and ability to stabilize maritime order in an active and visible manner.

(5) International Peace Cooperation Activities
In line with the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan will actively promote international peace cooperation activities, while giving comprehensive consideration to such factors as purposes of mission, situation in host country, and political and economic relations between Japan and host country. In particular, Japan will actively promote activities such as dispatch of embedded personnel to mission headquarters, dissemination of United Nations (UN) military engineer unit manuals and capacity building assistance in Japan’s field of expertise by making good use of accumulated experiences. While Japan will also proceed with education and training that match missions conducted on the basis of the Legislation for Peace and Security, GSDF will take the necessary measures towards establishing an International Peace Cooperation Unit with high-level emergency response capabilities and high-level technology in areas such as facilities and the operation of UAVs by unifying the Ground Self-Defense Force and the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit. The Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center will expand its curriculum, and strengthen cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, foreign countries, and non-governmental organizations through efforts such as providing educational opportunities to not only SDF personnel, but also candidates from various backgrounds.

Regarding SDF operation facility in the Republic of Djibouti, which is used for anti-piracy efforts, Japan will work towards stable, long-term use of the facility for regional security cooperation and other activities.

(6) Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation
In cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations, Japan will promote non-proliferation efforts regarding: weapon and proliferation and non-proliferation which can serve as their delivery means; and goods and sensitive technologies of potential military use. Leveraging SDF’s knowledge and human resources, Japan will engage in various activities related to arms control and disarmament under the guidance of the UN and other bodies, including the discussion on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWs).

(1) Training and Exercises
To effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance its deterrence effectiveness, SDF’s joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises are to be conducted in a tailored and visible way while fully grasping the environment of the
surroundings of the training areas and making absolutely sure that safety is secured. Leveraging the lessons learned from these training and exercises, SDF will conduct regular studies and reviews of its plans to address contingencies. Along with these efforts, SDF will expand the establishment and utilization of the training areas in Hokkaido and elsewhere in Japan and conduct effective training and exercises. SDF will also facilitate to expand joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas with SDF while accounting for relations with local communities. Furthermore, SDF will facilitate the use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas and the utilization of excellent training environments overseas such as the U.S. and Australia, and introduce simulators actively. SDF will also strive to further enhance amphibious operation capability by the implementation of training by GSDF and MSDF in collaboration with U.S. Marines, SDF will strive to enhance the effectiveness of the swift and continuous deployment of units and strengthen their presence on a steady-state basis by organically coordinating such training and exercises that utilize training environments in Japan and abroad.

Seeking to respond to various situations with a whole-of-government approach, coordination with relevant agencies including police, firefighters, and the Japan Coast Guard will be reinforced. SDF will also actively utilize the opportunities presented by the joint training and exercises of SDF and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises as a way not only for considering and verifying plans for the actual operations of SDF, but also for actively considering and verifying comprehensive issues including civil protection.

(2) Medical Care
SDF will enhance its medical functions to keep SDF personnel’s vitality and enhance their ability to deal with various situations and engage in a diverse range of missions at home and abroad. In order to respond to various situations, SDF will strive to enhance the capacity to rapidly deploy medical bases and conduct Damage Control Surgery (DCS) to stabilize the symptoms of patients, and the capacity to manage patients being sent back as part of strengthening the system to seamlessly cover the entire stretch between the frontline and final medical evacuation destinations including the perspective of joint operations. In this regard, SDF will establish a system to jointly possess patient information from the frontline to final destinations. SDF will also strive to standardize medical supplies for the sake of interoperability and to stockpile necessary supplies. Furthermore, in order to transport patients safely, SDF will take necessary measures to introduce armored ambulances. Taking conditions and characteristics of each region into account, SDF will focus on strengthening medical functions of SDF in Japan’s southwestern region.

In order to conduct the control and coordination regarding medical operations of SDF on a steady-state basis, SDF will strive to strengthen the organization of the Joint Staff. SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care regime through further endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into medical hubs with enhanced functions. Furthermore, SDF will proceed to improve the management of the National Defense Medical College, enhance its research functions and strive to secure high-quality talents, as well as striving to enrich the clinical experience of medical-officers to better secure the number of medical officers, and promoting the appointment of SDF Reserve Personnel (physicians). In addition, MOD/SDF will proceed with the establishment of hygienic education and training foundations common to each SDF service that are necessary to improve medical care capabilities for enhancing its research functions and strive to secure high-quality researchers, as well as striving to enrich the clinical experience of medical-officers to better secure the number of medical officers, and promoting the appointment of SDF Reserve Personnel (physicians). In addition, MOD/SDF will proceed with the establishment of hygienic education and training foundations common to each SDF service that are necessary to improve medical care capabilities for combat injuries and the requisite posture for various international cooperation including capacity building assistance.

(3) Collaboration with Local Communities
MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities regarding defense policies and activities. Upon fielding units and equipment of SDF or U.S. Forces in Japan and conducting training and exercises, MOD/SDF will make careful, detailed coordination to meet desires and conditions of local communities, while sufficiently fulfilling accountability. At the same time, MOD/ SDF will continue to promote various impact alleviation measures including sound insulation projects at residences. MOD/SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations including local governments, police and fire departments in order to enable SDF to swiftly and securely conduct its activities in response to various situations.

In certain regions, presence of SDF units makes substantial contributions to maintenance and revitalization of local communities. There are cases where SDF’s emergency patient transport is supporting community medicine. In light of this, MOD/SDF will give due considerations to local conditions and characteristics upon reorganization of operation units as well as placement of SDF garnisons and bases. MOD/SDF will also promote various measures that contribute to the local community by such means as striving to secure opportunities for local small and medium enterprises to receive contract orders based on the contracting policy of the nation, etc., concerning small and medium enterprises while also being mindful of efficiency.

IV. Quantities of Major Procurement
The Annex Table shows details of the quantities of major procurement described in Section III.

V. Expenditures
1. The expenditure target for the implementation of the defense capability build-up described in this program amount to approximately ¥27,470 billion in FY 2018 prices.
2. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, substantive funds will be secured by means of thoroughly gaining greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development, suspending the use of equipment whose importance has decreased, reviewing or discontinuing projects of low cost-effectiveness, optimizing equipment procurement through cost management/ suppression and long-term contracts and securing other revenue. The annual defense budgets target for the implementation of this program is expected to be around approximately ¥25,500 billion over the next five years. In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan must strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. Moreover, to achieve rapid procurement of defense equipment, Japan must pursue flexible and swift project management, and the budgetary process for each fiscal year which will be conducted taking into account the economic and fiscal conditions among other budgets.
3. The amount of expenses based on contracts (material expenses) to be newly concluded to implement this program will be allocated within the ceiling of approximately ¥17,170 billion in FY 2018 prices (excluding the amount corresponding to payments outside of the program period for contracts that contribute to improving project efficiency such as the maintenance), and the future obligation shall be managed appropriately.
4. This program will be reviewed after three years as necessary, with consideration to such factors at home and abroad as the international security environment, trends in technological standards including information communication technology, and fiscal conditions.

VI. Other
While maintaining U.S. Forces deterrence, Japan will steadily implement specific measures stipulated in “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” and other SCC documents and SAGO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related programs to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa.

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## Annex Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>Mobile Combat Vehicles</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armored Vehicles</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Utility Helicopters</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles</td>
<td>3 companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles</td>
<td>5 companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land-based Aegis Systems (Aegis Ashore)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Howitzers</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Vessels</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Ships</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Tonnage)</td>
<td>(approx. 66,000t)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K/K (Upgraded Capability))</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ship-Borne Unmanned Aerial Vehicles</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minesweeping and Transport Helicopters (MCH-101)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Self-Defense Force</td>
<td>Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft (E-20)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fighters (F-35A)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fighter Upgrade (F-15)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft (KC-46A)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transport Aircraft (C-2)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles</td>
<td>4 groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(PAC-3 MSE)</td>
<td>(16 fire squadrons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Global Hawk)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Japan will basically pursue the establishment of 75 Patrol Helicopters and 20 Ship-borne UAVs at the completion of the "NDPG for FY 2019 and beyond", but those exact numbers will be considered during the period of the "MTDP (FY 2019 - FY 2023)."
2. 18 aircraft out of 45 aircraft of Fighters (F-35A) would have STOVLs.

### Reference 4  Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned

(As of March 31, 2020)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Recoilless Guns</th>
<th>Mortars</th>
<th>Field Artillery</th>
<th>Rocket Launchers, etc.</th>
<th>Anti-aircraft Machine Guns</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Armored Vehicles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approximate number owned</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Each type of gun, except those of tanks and armored vehicles, includes self-propelled guns.
### Reference 5  Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications

(As of March 31, 2020)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Use</th>
<th>Number Owned</th>
<th>Maximum Speed (knots)</th>
<th>Crew (number)</th>
<th>Full Length (m)</th>
<th>Full Width (m)</th>
<th>Engine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Fixed-wing</td>
<td>LR-2</td>
<td>Liaison and Reconnaissance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2 (8)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Turboprop, twin-engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>AH-1S</td>
<td>Anti-tank</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Turboshift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>Gh-60</td>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1 (3)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Turboshift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>Gh-1</td>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Turboshift, twin-engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>Uh-1</td>
<td>Utility</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>2 (11)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Turboshift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>CH-47J,UA</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>150/140</td>
<td>3 (55)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4/5</td>
<td>Turboshift, twin-engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>Gh-60J</td>
<td>Utility</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2 (12)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Turboshift, twin-engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>Ah-64D</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Turboshift, twin-engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>V-22</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>3 (24)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Turboshift, twin-engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed-wing</td>
<td>P-1</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Turbopfan, quadruple-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed-wing</td>
<td>P-3C</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Turboprop, quadruple-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>Sh-60J</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Turboshift, twin-engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>Sh-60K</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Turboshift, twin-engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>MCH-101</td>
<td>Minesweeping and transport</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Turboshift, triple engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADSF</td>
<td>Fixed-wing</td>
<td>F-15J/DJ</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>mach 2.5</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Turbopfan, twin-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed-wing</td>
<td>F-4EJ/EJ (improved)</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>mach 2.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Turbojet, twin-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed-wing</td>
<td>F-2A/B</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>mach 2</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Turbopfan, single-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>NF-4E/EJ</td>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>mach 2.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Turbojet, twin-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed-wing</td>
<td>C-1</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>mach 0.76</td>
<td>5 (60)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Turboshift, twin-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>C-2</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>mach 0.82</td>
<td>2~5 (116)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Turbopfan, twin-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed-wing</td>
<td>C-130H</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>6 (92)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Turboprop, quadruple-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>KC-767</td>
<td>Aerial refueling transport</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>mach 0.84</td>
<td>4~8 (260)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Turbopfan, twin-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>KC-130H</td>
<td>Aerial refueling transport</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>6 (92)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Turboprop, quadruple-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>E-2C</td>
<td>Early warning</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Turboshift, twin-engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>E-2D</td>
<td>Early warning</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Turboshift, twin-engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>E-767</td>
<td>Early warning and control</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Turbopfan, twin-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>CH-47J</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>5 (48)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Turboshift, twin-engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>Uh-60J</td>
<td>Rescue</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Turboshift, twin-engines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Parenthetical figures in the item “Crew” represents the number of people transported.
2. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2020.

### Reference 6  Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service

(As of March 31, 2020)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Destroyer</th>
<th>Submarine</th>
<th>Mine Warfare Ship</th>
<th>Patrol Combatant Craft</th>
<th>Amphibious Ship</th>
<th>Auxiliary Ship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number (vessels)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>GNP/GDP (Original Estimates) (A)</th>
<th>Annual Expenditures on General Account (B)</th>
<th>Growth Rate from Previous Year</th>
<th>General Annual Expenditures (C)</th>
<th>Growth Rate from Previous Year</th>
<th>Defense-Related Expenditures (D)</th>
<th>Growth Rate from Previous Year</th>
<th>Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to GNP/GDP (D/A)</th>
<th>Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to Annual Expenditures on General Account (D/B)</th>
<th>Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to General Annual Expenditures (D/C)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>75,590</td>
<td>9,915</td>
<td>△ 0.8</td>
<td>8,107</td>
<td>△ 2.8</td>
<td>1,349</td>
<td>△ 3.3</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>13.61</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>281,600</td>
<td>36,581</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>29,198</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>3,014</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>8.24</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,585,000</td>
<td>212,888</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>158,408</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>13,273</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>3,146,000</td>
<td>524,996</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>325,854</td>
<td>△ 0.0</td>
<td>31,371</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4,928,000</td>
<td>709,871</td>
<td>△ 2.9</td>
<td>421,417</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>47,236</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>6.65</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>4,838,000</td>
<td>924,116</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>540,780</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>46,625</td>
<td>△ 0.4</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>8.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>4,796,000</td>
<td>903,339</td>
<td>△ 2.2</td>
<td>512,450</td>
<td>△ 5.2</td>
<td>46,453</td>
<td>△ 0.4</td>
<td>0.969</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>9.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4,877,000</td>
<td>926,115</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>527,311</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>46,804</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.960</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>8.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>5,004,000</td>
<td>958,823</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>564,697</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>47,836</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.956</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>8.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>5,049,000</td>
<td>963,420</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>573,555</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>48,221</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.955</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>8.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>5,188,000</td>
<td>967,218</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>578,286</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>48,667</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>8.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>5,355,000</td>
<td>974,547</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>583,591</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>48,996</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.885</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>8.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>5,643,000</td>
<td>977,128</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>588,958</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>49,388</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.875</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>8.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>5,661,000</td>
<td>994,291(1,014,571)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>599,359(619,039)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>50,070</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.884</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>8.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>5,702,000</td>
<td>1,008,791(1,026,580)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>617,184(634,972)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>50,688</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.889</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>8.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The figures provided show GNP in and before FY1985, and GDP from FY1995 onward, in each case based on original estimates.
2. The upper figures for defense-related expenditures for FY2011 and thereafter exclude SACO-related expenses (10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, 2.8 billion yen in FY2016, 2.8 billion yen in FY2017, 5.1 billion yen in FY2018, 25.6 billion yen in FY2019, and 13.8 billion yen in FY2020), the U.S. Forces relocations-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) (102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 58.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, 142.6 billion yen in FY2015, 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, 201.1 billion yen in FY2017, 216.1 billion yen in FY2018, 167.9 billion yen in FY2019, and 179.9 billion yen in FY2020), expenses related to the introduction of new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015, 14.0 billion yen in FY2016, 21.6 billion yen in FY2017, 31.2 billion yen in FY2018, 6.2 billion yen in FY2019, and 0.03 billion yen in FY2020) as well as expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention, mitigation and building national resilience (50.8 billion yen in FY2019 and 50.8 billion yen in FY2020), while the lower figures include them.
3. Annual expenditure on general account and the lower figures in parentheses in the general annual expenditures column for FY2019 and thereafter include temporary/special measures.
### Reference 8 Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Initial Budget)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>FY 2016</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Composition Ratio</th>
<th>FY 2017</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Composition Ratio</th>
<th>FY 2018</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Composition Ratio</th>
<th>FY 2019</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Composition Ratio</th>
<th>FY 2020</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Composition Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel and provisions</td>
<td>21,473</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>21,662</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>21,850</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>21,831</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>21,426</td>
<td>40.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Materials</td>
<td>21,662</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>27,334</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>27,536</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>30,061</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>30,744</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment acquisition</td>
<td>7,609</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>8,408</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>8,191</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>8,329</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>8,544</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1,217</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1,283</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1,273</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facility improvement</td>
<td>1,461</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1,571</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1,752</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1,513</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>11,707</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>10,888</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>11,343</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>12,027</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>12,610</td>
<td>23.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Base countermeasures</td>
<td>4,509</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>4,529</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>4,449</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>4,470</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4,584</td>
<td>9.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>The cost for SACO-related projects</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>138</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses</td>
<td>1,766</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2,011</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2,161</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1,679</td>
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<td>1,799</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1,799</td>
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<tr>
<td>Introduction of government aircraft</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>National resilience-related expenses</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48,607</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>48,586</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>49,388</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50,072</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50,688</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50,541</td>
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<td>51,351</td>
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<td></td>
<td>51,911</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>52,574</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>53,133</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Personnel and food provisions expenses include personnel wage and food expenditures.
2. Equipment acquisition expenses include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships.
3. R&D expenses include those of equipment.
4. Facility improvement expenses include those of airfields and barracks.
5. Maintenance costs include those for housing, clothing and training.
6. Base countermeasures expenses include those for areas surrounding base countermeasures and burden by the USFJ.
7. Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.
8. The upper figures for Budgets and Composition Ratio exclude the cost for SACO-related expenses (2.8 billion yen in FY2016, 2.8 billion yen in FY2017, 5.1 billion yen in FY2018, 13.3 billion yen in FY2019, and 13.3 billion yen in FY2020), the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities; 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, 201.1 billion yen in FY2017, 161.1 billion yen in FY2018, 167.9 billion yen in FY2019, and 179.9 billion yen in FY2020), expenses related to the introduction of new government aircraft (14.6 billion yen in FY2016, 21.6 billion yen in FY2017, 31.2 billion yen in FY2018, 6.2 billion yen in FY2019, and 0.03 billion yen in FY2020), as well as expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention, mitigation and building national resilience (50.8 billion yen in FY2019 and 50.8 billion yen in FY2020), while the lower figures include them.
Reference 9 Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan (100 million yen)</td>
<td>48,667</td>
<td>48,996</td>
<td>49,388</td>
<td>50,070</td>
<td>50,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. (U.S. 1 million dollar)</td>
<td>565,370</td>
<td>568,896</td>
<td>600,683</td>
<td>653,666</td>
<td>689,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (100 million yuan)</td>
<td>9,544</td>
<td>10,444</td>
<td>11,070</td>
<td>11,889</td>
<td>12,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (100 million RUB)</td>
<td>37,753</td>
<td>28,523</td>
<td>28,270</td>
<td>29,974</td>
<td>32,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea (100 million won)</td>
<td>387,995</td>
<td>403,347</td>
<td>431,581</td>
<td>466,971</td>
<td>501,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia (1 million Australian dollar)</td>
<td>32,882</td>
<td>35,191</td>
<td>36,231</td>
<td>38,562</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K. (1 million GBP)</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>35,500</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>37,800</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (1 million euro)</td>
<td>39,689</td>
<td>40,841</td>
<td>42,741</td>
<td>44,354</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (1 million euro)</td>
<td>34,288</td>
<td>37,005</td>
<td>38,520</td>
<td>43,228</td>
<td>45,390</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others.
2. % represents a rate of growth over the previous year.
3. In Japan, the figures in the upper row exclude SAG-related expenditures (2.8 billion yen for FY2016, 2.8 billion yen for FY2017, 5.1 billion yen for FY2018, 25.6 billion yen for FY2019, and 13.6 billion yen for FY2020), the expenditures associated with the National Defense Agency (776.6 billion yen for FY2016, 2011.1 billion yen for FY2017, 216.1 billion yen for FY2018, 167.9 billion yen for FY2019, and 179.9 billion yen for FY2020), expenses related to the introduction of new government aircraft (14.0 billion yen for FY2016, 21.6 billion yen for FY2017, 31.2 billion yen for FY2018, 6.2 billion yen for FY2019, and 0.03 billion yen for FY2020), as well as expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention, mitigation and building national resilience (50.8 billion yen for FY2019 and 50.8 billion yen in FY2020), while the figures in the lower row are based on the initial budget and include them.
4. U.S. defense expenditures represent the annual budget for FY2020 and the figures for Japan are the figures for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention, mitigation and building national resilience (50.8 billion yen from FY2018 to FY2020) and the rate of growth over the previous year was calculated by comparing with the defense expenditure of the central government expenditure. The defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure for FY2017 was 1.0226 billion yen.
5. The figures for China are based on the initial budget in the Finance Budget Report to the National People's Congress (only the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure) was released; however, for FY2017, the figures are the defense expenditure of the central government expenditure as it was calculable. The rate of growth over the previous year was calculated by comparing with the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure. The rate of growth in the central ministry expenditure for FY2017 was 1.0226 billion yen.
7. The figures for the Republic of Korea are based on the initial budget released on its Ministry of National Defense website.
8. The figures for Australia are based on the initial budget in the Defense Budget Statement published by the Australian Department of Defence. The initial budget for FY2020 has not been released as of May 2020.
9. The figures for the United Kingdom are based on the initial budget in the budget message.
10. The figures for France are based on the initial budget in the ‘Defence Key Figures’ by the French Ministry for Armed Forces. The defense expenditure for FY2020 has not been released as of May 2020.
11. The figures for Germany are based on the initial budget released on its Federal Ministry of Defense website.

Reference 10 Conditions Required for Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces (Including Diet Approval) and Authority for the Use of Weapons Concerning Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Applicable Situations, etc.</th>
<th>Conditions Required for Operations</th>
<th>Main provisions for authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of defense (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 76)</td>
<td>(1) When there is a situation in which an armed attack against Japan from outside occurs or when it is considered that there is an imminent and clear danger of armed attack, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against these attacks. (2) When there is a situation in which an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, which in turn poses an imminent and clear danger of Japan’s survival to be threatened and fundamentally overturns people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against such a situation.</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by Prime Minister (2) Approval of the Diet required (prior approval required in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required</td>
<td>Use of force necessary to defend Japan, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of defense facilities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-2)</td>
<td>When there are areas in which the deployment of SDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensified and the order for defense operations (only for armed attack situations) is likely to be issued</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister)</td>
<td>Establishment of positions and defense facilities in the intended deployment area (use of weapons) SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming existing danger other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Applicable Situations, etc.</td>
<td>Conditions Required for Operations</td>
<td>Main provisions for authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures to be taken before a defense operation order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-3 and U.S. and Others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act)</td>
<td>When a defense operation order is expected under a tense situation (1) Authorized by Minister of Defense or person delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; Minister of Defense for services (2) Approval of the Diet: not required for supplies; required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) for services (3) Cabinet decision: not required for supplies; required (approval of the Prime Minister) for services</td>
<td>❚ Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on U.S. and others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act (Use of weapons) ❚ Provision of services as a related measure (Use of weapons) ❚ SDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies of themselves, those of the other SDFF personnel who are with them, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDFF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil protection dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-4)</td>
<td>When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: request of prefectural governors or Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief (Prime Minister)</td>
<td>❚ Measures concerning granting of asylum, emergency measures, traffic control, etc. pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Protection Law ❚ Partial application of the Policed Forces Law weapons (Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.) (all only when police officers are not present) ❚ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, etc.) (Use of weapons) ❚ Article 7 of the Policed Forces Law Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to SDFF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including assisted cast guard officers, are not present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public security operation by order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 79)</td>
<td>When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the law enforcement force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergencies</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by Prime Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: required (be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order’s issuance) (3) Cabinet decision: required</td>
<td>❚ Application of the Policed Forces Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, etc.) ❚ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ❚ Control over the Japan Coast Guard (Use of weapons) ❚ Article 7 of the Policed Forces Law Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDFF personnel under public security operations. ❚ SDFF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Policed Forces Law Execution Act, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other than the use of weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information gathering before public security operation order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 79-2)</td>
<td>When situations have intensified and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifles, machine guns, or other weapons are expected, and there is a special need to gather information</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: consultation between the Minister of Defense and the National Public Safety Commission</td>
<td>❚ Application of the Policed Forces Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, etc.) ❚ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) (Use of weapons) ❚ Article 7 of the Policed Forces Law Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDFF personnel under public security operations. ❚ SDFF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Policed Forces Law Execution Act, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other than the use of weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public security operation by request (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 81)</td>
<td>When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by Prime Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (4) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission</td>
<td>❚ Application of the Policed Forces Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, etc.) ❚ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) (Use of weapons) ❚ Article 7 of the Policed Forces Law Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDFF personnel under public security operations. ❚ SDFF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Policed Forces Law Execution Act, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other than the use of weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarding operation (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 81-2)</td>
<td>When special measures are deemed necessary to prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist attacks on SDFF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by Prime Minister (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (4) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense consults with the National Public Safety Commission after hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural governor</td>
<td>❚ Partial application of the Policed Forces Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, Entry (all only when police officers are not present), Prevention and Suppression of Crime) (Use of weapons) ❚ Article 7 of the Policed Forces Law Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDFF personnel under guarding operations. ❚ SDFF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Policed Forces Law Execution Act, use weapons in execution of their duties to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there is a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded and there is reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime security operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82)</td>
<td>When special measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by Minister of Defense (2) Approval of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister)</td>
<td>❚ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) (Use of weapons) ❚ Article 7 of the Policed Forces Law Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDFF personnel under maritime security operations. ❚ Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows stopping the progression of the vessel that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDFF personnel under maritime security operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
82-2 and Piracy Countermeasures

Rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82-3) When it is anticipated that ballistic missiles are flying toward Japan and the measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and properties in Japan's territory from the damage caused by the missiles

- Authorized by: Minister of Defense
- Approval of the Diet: not required (when the fact report required when measures taken)
- Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister)
- Additional requirements: for an urgent case, the order can be made in advance according to the emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister

- SDF-units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles flying headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.

Elimination of mines and other dangerous objects (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-2) When a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan's territorial airspace in violation of international law and/or the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations

- Authorized by: Minister of Defense
- Approval of the Diet: not required
- Cabinet decision: not required

- The action necessary to make intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (issuing warnings, guiding intruders away, use of weapons, etc.)

- Elimination and disposition of mines and other dangerous explosive objects found on the sea.

Emergency situations overseas (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-3) When special measures are deemed necessary to combat acts of piracy

- Authorized by: Minister of Defense
- Approval of the Diet: not required (to be reported to the Diet when the Prime Minister has approved the counterpiracy operation and when a mission has been completed)
- Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister)
- Additional requirements: Minister of Defense submits the response procedures to the Prime Minister

- Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.)

- Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under counter-piracy operations.

- If any party perpetrating acts of piracy, including approaching excessively close to a ship or trailing around a ship, continues their acts despite the counterpiracy measures of the other party, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of the ship in question, the use of weapons is permitted to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.

- Use of weapons

Transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4) When natural disasters, unrest, and other emergency situations overseas

- Authorized by: Minister of Defense
- Approval of the Diet: not required
- Cabinet decision: as necessary
- Additional requirements: when a request is made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to evacuate Japanese nationals whose lives and bodies are threatened

- SDF personnel engaged in duties related to rescue measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations when: (1) there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of Japanese nationals and others, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties stated above; (2) there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

- Use of weapons
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Applicable Situations, etc.</th>
<th>Conditions Required for Operations</th>
<th>Main provisions for authority</th>
<th>Use of weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logistics support and other activities</td>
<td>Situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or person who is a delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; Minister of Defense for services, search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations</td>
<td>(1) SDF personnel engaged in international humanitarian operations or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel, (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which were established within foreign territories and where SDF units and SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as the U.S. Forces personnel, when there are no other bases but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of SDF personnel and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Approval of the Diet: required (prior consent required with no exception)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister to implement response measures, for the draft basic plan and for the prescribed implementation guidelines pursuant to the basic plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation and support operations</td>
<td>Situations where the peace and security of the international community is threatened, where the international community is collectively addressing the situation to remove the threat in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations Charter, where Japan needs to make independent and proactive contributions to these activities as a member of the international community, and in the case where the International Community of the UN is adopted</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or person who is a delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; Minister of Defense for services, search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations</td>
<td>(1) SDF personnel engaged in international humanitarian operations or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel, (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which were established within foreign territories and where SDF units and SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as the U.S. Forces personnel, when there are no other bases but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of SDF personnel and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Approval of the Diet: required (prior consent required with no exception)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) SDF personnel engaged to conduct ship inspection operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister to implement response measures, for the draft basic plan and for the prescribed implementation guidelines pursuant to the basic plan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International disaster relief activities</td>
<td>In the case that a large-scale disaster has happened or is about to happen overseas, especially in developing countries/areas</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense</td>
<td>(1) SDF personnel engaged in duties in international peace cooperation operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, of International Peace Cooperation Corps, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel, (2) in the case where there are attacks against SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as personnel of foreign armed forces’ units, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Approval of the Diet: not required</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Cabinet decision: not required</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4) Additional requirements: request of the government of the disaster-stricken country to dispatch international disaster relief teams, and consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reference**

DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2020
Reference 11  History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan

1993  May 29: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that fell into the Sea of Japan
1995  Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense
1998  August 31: North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory
        The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the commencement of the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) for parts of the sea-based upper-tier system
1999  Started the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles
2002  Decision by the United States on the initial deployment of BMD
2003  The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started
2005  Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law (ballistic missile destruction measures)
        The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptors for BMD
2006  July 5: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, six of which fell into the Sea of Japan while the other exploded immediately after the launch
2007  The deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units started
        SM-3 launch tests by Aegis destroyers started
2009  March 27: First shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued
        April 5: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew over the Tohoku region and passed through to the Pacific Ocean
        April 7: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, which fell into the Sea of Japan
        July 4: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, which fell into the Sea of Japan
2012  March 30: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued
        April 13: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew a minute or longer, then separated into several parts and fell into the Yellow Sea
        December 7: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued
        December 12: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew over Okinawa Prefecture and passed through to the Pacific Ocean
2014  North Korea launched a total of 11 ballistic missiles in March, June, and July
2015  March 2: Two missiles were launched and flew approx. 500 km before landing in the Sea of Japan
2016  North Korea launched 23 ballistic missiles including what it claimed to be a “satellite” in a single year
        February 3: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued
        December 22: At the Nine Ministers’ Meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), it was decided that the ballistic missile defense enhanced-capability interceptor missile (SM-3 block IA) would progress to the joint production and deployment stage
2017  North Korea launched 17 ballistic missiles beginning in February
        June 22: Conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA at the sea
        December 19: NSC and the Cabinet meeting approved introducing two units of Aegis Ashore systems.
2018  January 31: The U.S. conducted a test shot of the SM-3 block IA
        June: 1: The MOD announced candidate sites for the deployment of two units of Aegis Ashore (GSDF Araya Maneuver Area in Akita Prefecture and Mutsumi Maneuver Area in Yamaguchi Prefecture).
        July 30: The MOD selected the components of Aegis Ashore (LMSSP).
        October 26: The United States conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA in waters.
        October 29: The MOD started surveys concerning the deployment of Aegis Ashore.
        December 11: The United States conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA.
2019  North Korea launched a total of 25 ballistic missiles and other objects since May
        May 27 and 28: The MOD explained results of surveys concerning the deployment of Aegis Ashore and results of study by the MOD to the governors of Akita and Yamaguchi Prefectures.
        December 17: The MOD provided the heads of the relevant local governments in Yamaguchi Prefecture with explanations anew on the results of the resurvey on deployment of Aegis Ashore.
2020  North Korea launched eight ballistic missiles in March
        June 15: The MOD announced suspension of Aegis Ashore deployment process

Reference 12  Participation of the MOD/SDF in Civil Protection Joint Training Exercises with Central and Local Government Bodies (2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Exercise</th>
<th>Training content (estimated)</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location (cumulative times)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simulation and Field exercise</td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents</td>
<td>July 11, 2019</td>
<td>Ishikawa Prefecture (7 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field exercise</td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives</td>
<td>February 3, 2020</td>
<td>Toyama Prefecture (13 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents</td>
<td>November 21, 2019</td>
<td>Yamagata Prefecture (4 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents</td>
<td>November 22, 2019</td>
<td>Gunma Prefecture (3 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident</td>
<td>December 18, 2019</td>
<td>Shizuoka Prefecture (6 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives</td>
<td>January 22, 2020</td>
<td>Mie Prefecture (3 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident</td>
<td>January 29, 2020</td>
<td>Shizuoka Prefecture (4 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents</td>
<td>August 1, 2019</td>
<td>Hyogo Prefecture (5 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review meetings</td>
<td>November 5, 2019</td>
<td>Shizuoka Prefecture (6 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident</td>
<td>November 20, 2019</td>
<td>Fukuoka Prefecture (6 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Review meetings</td>
<td>December 25, 2019</td>
<td>Shizuoka Prefecture (3 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulation exercise</td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents, and a barricade incident</td>
<td>January 16, 2020</td>
<td>Yamagata Prefecture (8 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident</td>
<td>January 17, 2020</td>
<td>Akita Prefecture (8 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives</td>
<td>January 21, 2020</td>
<td>Hokkaido Prefecture (4 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident</td>
<td>January 26, 2020</td>
<td>Fukuoka Prefecture (13 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents, and a barricade incident</td>
<td>January 31, 2020</td>
<td>Akita Prefecture (4 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident</td>
<td>February 4, 2020</td>
<td>Kagawa Prefecture (4 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulation exercise</td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident</td>
<td>February 6, 2020</td>
<td>Fukuoka Prefecture (7 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives, and chemical agents</td>
<td>February 7, 2020</td>
<td>Toyama Prefecture (5 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents</td>
<td>February 10, 2020</td>
<td>Mie Prefecture (3 times)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

        Implemented in 18 Prefectures in FY2008.
        Implemented in 14 Prefectures in FY2009.
        Implemented in 10 Prefectures in FY2010.
        Implemented in 12 Prefectures in FY2011.
        Implemented in 11 Prefectures in FY2012.
        Implemented in 12 Prefectures in FY2013.
        Implemented in 13 Prefectures in FY2014.
        Implemented in 15 Prefectures in FY2015.
        Implemented in 22 Prefectures in FY2016.
        Implemented in 24 Prefectures in FY2018.
Reference 13  
Efforts in Recent Years by the MOD on Cybersecurity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>April: Agreed in a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting to start a comprehensive dialogue on cybersecurity in order to strengthen the engagement of the governments as a whole. June: Cyber incident Mobile Assistance Team (CYMAT) established in the National Information Security Center (NISC). September: “Towards the Stable and Effective Utilization of Cyberspace by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces” formulated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>May: The First Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue was held in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting. July: The MOD and defense industry members deeply interested in cybersecurity established the Cyber Defense Council (CDC). August: Agreed at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting to consider a new framework for cooperation between the defense authorities from the perspective of further promoting Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in the cybersecurity area. October: Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) established between the Japanese and U.S. defense authorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reference 14  
Record of Disaster Relief (Past Five Years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Dispatches</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>30,035</td>
<td>33,123</td>
<td>841,200</td>
<td>23,838</td>
<td>81,950</td>
<td>22,665</td>
<td>957,000</td>
<td>211,000</td>
<td>43,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>5,170</td>
<td>5,824</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3,340</td>
<td>7,140</td>
<td>3,090</td>
<td>49,500</td>
<td>17,800</td>
<td>7,597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>2,618</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>707</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vessels</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Approx. 20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Kumamoto Earthquake, Northern Kyushu torrential rains, 2018 July Heavy Rain, 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Ibari Earthquake, 2018 Bosco Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai) and 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis) are excluded from the record of each fiscal year.

* The number of overall personnel includes maintenance, communication, command, standby/backup and other rear-service personnel in addition to personnel working in the field.

Reference 15  
Government’s Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Japan-Related Vessels in the Middle East

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 27, 2019)

Peace and stability in the Middle East are crucial to the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan. In addition, it is very important to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels (meaning Japanese-flag ships and foreign-flag ships that Japanese nationals are on board, as well as foreign-flag ships operated by Japanese shipping business operators or foreign-flag ships transporting Japanese cargoes that are important for stable economic activities of Japanese people; hereinafter the same) in the Middle East, which is the world’s major energy source.

In the Middle East, amidst rising tensions, there were incidents of attacks on ships. In June 2019, Japan-related vessels suffered damage. Under these circumstances, each country is reinforcing measures to ensure the safety of navigation in the region by utilizing ships and aircraft. Under the International Maritime Security Construct, the United States is carrying out activities utilizing ships, etc. together with such countries as the United Kingdom and Australia. France is participating in the initiative by European countries and has announced its intention to establish a command in the UAE. India is also carrying out activities using ships independently. In this manner, the international community is making all-out efforts to ensure safety, while gathering information for the safety of navigation by diverse means.

In this context, Japan has decided to make government-wide efforts and implement comprehensive measures in collaboration among relevant ministries and agencies with regard to the following points as Japan’s independent initiative to ensure peace and stability in the Middle East and the safety of Japan-related vessels: (1) further diplomatic efforts to ease tensions in the Middle East and stabilize the situation; (2) thorough implementation of navigation safety measures, including close information sharing with relevant industries; and (3) better utilization of the SDF’s ships and aircraft to strengthen information gathering posture. In light of the significance of these measures, Japan will take actions as follows based on the Cabinet decision.

1. Further diplomatic efforts

Japan has built good relations with countries involved in the stability of the Middle East, such as maintaining good relations with Iran for many years while being an ally of the United States. Taking advantage of these relations, Japan will make further diplomatic efforts, including reaching out to the countries concerned at various levels, to ease tensions and...
stabilize the situation in the Middle East. In addition, Japan will continue to seek cooperation from the coastal countries that play an important role in the safe navigation of vessels. As for SDF’s activities in the Middle East region, Japan has made efforts to gain the understanding of related countries in the region. Continued efforts will be made to gain the understanding of the countries concerned in the region regarding the SDF’s information gathering activities described in 3 below.

2. Thorough implementation of navigation safety measures

Japan will thoroughly implement its navigation safety measures, including meticulous information sharing with related industries. Specifically, a system of cooperation within the government and between the government and related industries will be established, which will also cover the sharing of information obtained through the SDF’s information gathering activities described in 3 below by related ministries and agencies. In addition, whenever information that suggests the existence of a risk to the safe navigation of vessels is obtained, the government will promptly share such information with related industries to call for vigilance in a timely manner, encouraging them to thoroughly implement navigation safety measures at their own initiative.

3. Information gathering activities by the SDF

Although there is no immediate need to implement protective measures for Japan-related vessels in the Middle East, given the rising tensions in the region, it is necessary to strengthen the information gathering system to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels. Therefore, Japan has decided to have the SDF conduct information gathering activities, considering the distance from Japan to the Middle East region, the SDF’s experience in operating in the region, and the importance of cooperation with units and organizations from other countries.

The SDF’s information gathering activities are part of the government’s navigation safety measures and are aimed at collecting information necessary to ensure the safety of Japan-related vessels. The activities are to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, paragraph (1), item (xviii) of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense (Act No. 164 of 1954), as they would need smooth decision-making and order issuance in relation to Maritime Security Operations as measures for unforeseen circumstances or other changes in the situation, which are provided in Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Law (Act No. 165 of 1954) described in (4) below.

Basic implementation policies are as follows. Details are to be provided in the Defense Minister’s order.

(1) Information to Be Gathered

The SDF’s information gathering activities will be conducted in the waters described in (3) below.

(2) Equipment

After necessary adjustments, one destroyer will be newly dispatched.

In addition, the SDF will also use fixed-wing patrol aircraft P-3C of the units currently engaged in the Counter-Piracy Operations, hereinafter referred to as “counter-piracy units”) under Article 7, paragraph (1) of the Acts of Piracy Countermeasures against Piracy (Act No. 55 of 2009, hereinafter referred to as the “Piracy Countermeasures Act”). Information gathering activities by the counter-piracy units will be carried out to an extent that does not interfere with the counter-piracy operations.

(3) Geographical Scope of Activities

The geographical scope of the information gathering activities by destroyers and fixed-wing patrol aircraft described in (2) consists of three waters of high seas: the Gulf of Oman, the northern Arabian Sea, and the Gulf of Aden to the east of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (including the exclusive economic zones of the coastal states). For resupply, destroyers will call at a port facing the three seas.

(4) Responding to Unforeseen Circumstances or Other Changes in the Situation

In the event of unforeseen circumstances or other changes in the situation, the relevant ministries and agencies will work together to understand the situation, share information closely and promptly with each other, and strengthen the government’s response. Then, if further measures by the SDF are deemed necessary in response to the situation in question, Maritime Security Operations will be ordered in accordance with Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. When issuing such an order, the MOD will make best efforts for prompt decision making.

The measures that can be taken in the course of Maritime Security Operations will be based on international laws, including the flag state principle, and will vary depending on the circumstances, such as whether the protected vessel is a Japanese or foreign-flagged vessel and the type of infringement.

(5) Ensuring the Safety of the SDF Units

In conducting information gathering activities, the SDF units take all possible measures to ensure their own safety, including the collection of sufficient information on the situation in the areas of operation, the installation of equipment necessary to ensure safety, and appropriate prior education and training.

(6) Cooperation among Relevant Ministries and Agencies

In order to ensure the effectiveness of information gathering activities and responses to changes in the situation including the rise of unforeseen circumstances, relevant ministries and agencies will work closely together to share understanding regarding such responses, improve response capabilities through training, and develop a system that allows for a prompt response to such situations.

(7) Cooperation with Other Countries

Although Japan does not participate in any specific framework related to the safety of navigation in the Middle East and the SDF’s information gathering activities are to be conducted at its own initiative, Japan will communicate and cooperate with other countries as necessary.

(8) Duration of the SDF’s Activities

The period during which the SDF should engage in the information gathering activities (including preparation and training periods) under the Cabinet decision is from December 27, 2019, to December 26, 2020. If it is deemed necessary to extend the SDF’s activities based on the Cabinet decision, another Cabinet decision or any changes to it will be made in that regard. If, prior to the expiration of the above period, the SDF’s activities are no longer deemed necessary in light of the necessity described in this paragraph, the SDF will terminate such activities at that point. If there is a noticeable change in the situation, the National Security Council will consider a response.

4. Report to the Diet

In view of the fact that matters pertaining to the SDF operations under the Piracy Countermeasures Act are reported to the Diet in accordance with Article 7, paragraph (3) of the Piracy Countermeasures Act, the Diet is to receive a report whenever a Cabinet decision or any changes to it is made and a report on the results of such activities upon termination.

Reference 16 United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (tentative translation)

Overview

On October 29, 2005, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, “U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Readiness for the Future.” In that document, the SCC members directed their respective staffs “to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006.” This work has been completed and is reflected in this document.

Finalization of Realignment Initiatives

The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan.

The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will finance their realignment associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities.

Key Implementation Details

1. Realignment on Okinawa

(a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)

The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a “V”-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.

In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.

Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.

Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.

Facility improvements for contingency use at ASDF bases at Nyutabara and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma capability will be necessary after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.

Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.

In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill.
2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability

- The USG does not intend to operate fighter aircraft from this facility.
- Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Group), 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters.
- The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukaeran, and Makinamoto Service Area.
- The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.
- Of the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide $6.09 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation of III MEF personnel estimated in U.S. FY2008 dollars at $3.18 billion in fiscal spending plus approximately $1 billion for a road.

(c)Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities

- Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.
- Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March 2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six candidate facilities will be examined:
  - Camp Kuwa: Total return.
  - Camp Zukaeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.
  - MCAS Futenma: Total return.
  - Makinamoto Service Area: Total return.
  - aha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging constructed at Urasoe).
  - Army POL Depot Kuwa Tank Farm No. 1: Total return.
- All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will occur before the return of designated facilities.
- While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be reevaluated.
- Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. Shared use and facility improvements will be possible from 2006.
- ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities.

(d)Relationships among Initiatives

- Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected.
- Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.
- The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on:
  1. (tangible progress toward completion of the FRF), and
  2. (Japan’s financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.

2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability

- U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed by U.S. FY2008. The headquarters of the GSDF Central Readiness Force subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan FY2012. SDF helicopters will have access to Kastner Heliport on Camp Zama.
- Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.
- In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented.
  - Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and underground rail (approximately 2ha). Affected housing units will be relocated to Sagamihara Housing Area.
- A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD (approximately 35ha) will be provided for local use when not required for contingency or training purposes.
- Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1ha) will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate.

3. Yokota Air Base and Airspace

- ASDP Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base in Japan FY2010. A bilateral master plan for base use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements.
- A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (B-JOCC), established at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required equipment and systems, respectively; while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of shared use equipment and systems.
- The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements.
  - Establish a program in Japan FY2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.
  - Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008; specific portions will be identified by October 2006.
  - Develop procedures in Japan FY2006 for temporary transfers of air traffic control responsibility to the Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.
  - Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related air space reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military (U.S. and Japanese) demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be completed in Japan FY2009.
- The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from commencement.
  - The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.
  - Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian- military dual-use.

4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni

- The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.
- Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to accommodate MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni, taking into account the continued requirement for U.S. operations from Atsugi.
- The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities. The aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-130 aircraft, necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya.
- U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam.
- Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulfill safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces, Japan SDF, and commercial aircraft (including those in neighboring airspace) through coordination by the Joint Committee. A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent fieldcarrier landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter.
- Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.

5. Missile Defense

- The sides will deploy additional capabilities and improve their respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will continue.
- The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as ASDF Shikoki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006.
III. Land Returns in Okinawa

6. Training Relocation

Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan FY2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan FY2006 can be developed.

Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities—Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni—will participate in relocated training conducted from the aforementioned SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Naha. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future.

The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.

Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training requirements.

In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1–5 aircraft for the duration of 1–7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6–12 aircraft for 8–14 days at a time.

At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained.

The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness.

(Attached conceptual diagram omitted)

Reference 17 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (Outline)

Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (Outline) (April 27, 2012)

Preamble

(1) The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee decided to adjust the plans outlined in the May 2006 Realignment Roadmap.

(2) Relocated training will not diminish the quality of the Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility.

(3) The Ministers affirmed that the new posture of the U.S. Marine Corps, coupled with the enhancement of Japan’s defense posture and promotion of bilateral dynamic defense cooperation, would strengthen the defense capabilities of the overall U.S.-Japan Alliance.

I. Unit Composition in Guam and Okinawa

(1) The United States will locate Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) in Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii and establish rotational deployment in Australia.

(2) Approximately 9,000 Marines will be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan.

(3) The end-state for the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa will be consistent with the levels in the Realignment Roadmap.

(4) There will be approximately 5,000 Marines in Guam.

(5) The preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation of Marines to Guam is $8.6 billion. Japan’s financial commitment will be the fiscal spending in the 2009 Guam International Agreement (up to $2.8 billion in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars). Other forms of financial support (investment or loan) will not be utilized.

Any contributions under the cooperation in 2. (2) below will be a part of the aforementioned commitment.

II. New Initiatives to Promote Regional Peace, Stability, and Prosperity

(1) The Ministers confirmed the importance of promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The government of Japan will take various measures, including strategic use of ODA (ex: providing coastal states with patrol boats).

(2) The two governments will consider cooperation for developing training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for shared use by the two countries, and will identify areas of cooperation by the end of 2012.

III. Land Returns in Okinawa

(i) Areas eligible for immediate return upon completion of procedures: Portions of Camp Zukeran (West Futemina Housing area and a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound), portions of Makiminato Service Area (north access road, area near Gate 5).

(ii) Areas eligible for return following relocation within Okinawa: Portions of Makiminato Service Area (including the preponderance of the storage area), portions of Camp Zukeran (Industrial Corridor, etc.), Camp Kusawa, Naha Port, Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kusawa Tank Farm No.1

(iii) Areas eligible for return following Marine Corps’ relocation to locations outside of Japan: Portions of Camp Zukeran, the remainder of Makiminato Service Area

(2) The two countries will jointly develop a consolidation plan for facilities and areas remaining in Okinawa by the end of 2012.

IV. Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and MCAS Futenma

(1) The Ministers recommitted that the existing relocation proposal is the only viable solution.

(2) The two countries will contribute mutually to refurbishment projects necessary to safely operate MCAS Futenma until the FRF is fully operational and to protect the environment.

For the full text of the Joint Statement, see the MOD website. (http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/release/2013/02100001.html)


I. Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines

In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under any circumstances, from peace-time to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize:

• seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses;
• synergy across the two governments’ national security policies;
• a whole-of-government Alliance approach;
• cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations;
• the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The two governments will continuously enhance the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Each government will maintain its individual defense posture based on national security policy. Japan will possess defense capability on the basis of the “National Security Strategy” and the “National Defense Program Guidelines.” The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combat-ready forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly.

The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“the Guidelines”) provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination, with a view to improving the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation. In this way, the Guidelines advance peace and security, deter conflict, secure the basis for economic prosperity, and promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

II. Basic Premises and Principles

The Guidelines, as well as actions and activities under the Guidelines, are and will be consistent with the following basic premises and principles:

A. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, will remain unchanged.

B. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and its provisions regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality of States, as well as other relevant international agreements.

C. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws, and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.

D. The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specific policies and measures.

III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies.

The two governments must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral security and defense cooperation. To
that end, the two governments will take advantage of all available channels to enhance information sharing and to ensure seamless and effective whole-of-government Alliance coordination that includes all relevant agencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning.

A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism

Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on the peace and security of Japan and the United States. In order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will establish the Alliance Coordination Mechanism. This mechanism will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also will contribute to timely information sharing as well as the development and maintenance of common situational awareness. To ensure effective coordination, the two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises.

The two governments will tailor to the situation the procedures for coordination as well as the exact composition of participating agencies within the Alliance Coordination Mechanism structure. As part of these procedures, contact information will be shared and maintained from peacetime.

B. Enhanced Operational Coordination

Enhanced bilateral operational coordination for flexible and responsive command and control is a core capability of critical importance to Japan and the United States. In this context, the two governments recognize the continued importance of colocating operational coordination functions to strengthen cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination from peacetime to contingencies, and to support international activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in close cooperation and coordination, will take action through their respective chains-of-command.

C. Bilateral Planning

The two governments will continue to develop and update bilateral plans to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated operations by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. To ensure the effectiveness of the plans and the ability to make flexible, timely, and appropriate responses, the two governments will exchange relevant information, including identifying operational and logistic support requirements and sources in advance, as appropriate.

The two governments will conduct bilateral planning in peacetime for contingencies relevant to Japan’s peace and security through an upgraded Bilateral Planning Mechanism, which includes relevant agencies of the respective governments. Bilateral plans will be developed with input from relevant agencies, as appropriate. The Security Consultative Committee (SCC) will continue to be responsible for presenting directions, validating the progress of the planning under the mechanism, and issuing directives as necessary. The SCC will be assisted by appropriate subordinate bodies.

Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments.

IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security

Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on Japan’s peace and security. In this increasingly complex security environment, the two governments will take measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners.

The two governments recognize that these measures need to be taken based on flexible, timely, and effective bilateral coordination tailored to each situation and that interagency coordination is essential for appropriate Alliance responses. Therefore, the two governments will utilize the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to:

• assess the situation;
• share information; and
• develop ways to implement the appropriate Alliance response, including flexible deterrence options, as well as actions aimed at de-escalation.

To support these bilateral efforts, the two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels on issues that could potentially affect Japan’s peace and security.

A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime

In order to ensure the maintenance of Japan’s peace and security, the two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, including through diplomatic efforts, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance to prepare for all possible situations. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to, the following:

1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

In order to identify at the earliest possible stage any indications of threats to Japan’s peace and security and to ensure a decisive advantage in intelligence gathering and analysis, the two governments will share and protect information and intelligence, while developing and maintaining common situational awareness. This will include enhancing coordination and cooperation among relevant agencies.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities based on the capabilities and availability of their respective assets. This will include conducting bilateral ISR activities in a mutually supportive manner to ensure persistent coverage of developments that could affect Japan’s peace and security.

2. Air and Missile Defense

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain and strengthen deterrence and their defense postures against ballistic missile launches and aerial incursions. The two governments will cooperate to expand early warning capabilities, interoperability, network coverage, and real-time information exchange and to pursue the comprehensive improvement of capabilities to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles. Moreover, the two governments will continue to coordinate closely in responding to provocative missile launches and other aerial activities.

3. Maritime Security

The two governments will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order based upon international law, including freedom of navigation. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, on various efforts such as maintaining and enhancing bilateral presence in the maritime domain through ISR and training and exercises, while further developing and enhancing shared maritime domain awareness including by coordinating with relevant agencies, as necessary.

4. Asset Protection

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual protection of each other’s assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in a cooperative manner, including during training and exercises.

5. Training and Exercises

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct effective bilateral and multilateral training and exercises both inside and outside of Japan in order to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. Timely and realistic training and exercises will enhance deterrence. To support these activities, the two governments will cooperate to ensure that training areas, facilities, and associated equipment are available, accessible, and modern.

6. Logistic Support

Japan and the United States are primarily responsible for providing logistic support for their respective forces in contingencies. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual logistic support where appropriate, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services, for such activities as set forth in the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) and its related arrangements.

7. Use of Facilities

In order to expand interoperability and improve flexibility and resiliency of the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, the two governments will enhance joint/shared use and cooperate in ensuring the security of facilities and areas. Recognizing the importance of being prepared for contingencies, the two governments also will cooperate in conducting site surveys on facilities including civilian airports and seaports, as appropriate.

B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan's Peace and Security

The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations cannot be defined geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’ respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation. Early recognition and adaptable, resolute decision-making on bilateral actions will contribute to deterrence and de-escalation of such situations.
In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to ensure the peace and security of Japan. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to, those listed below.

1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
   When Japanese and U.S. noncombatants need to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each government will be responsible for evacuating its own nationals, as well as dealing with the authorities of the affected area. As appropriate, the two governments will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out evacuations of Japanese or U.S. noncombatants. These evacuations will be carried out using each country’s capabilities such as transportation means and facilities in a mutually supplementary manner. The two governments may each consider extending evacuation assistance to third-country noncombatants.

   The two governments will conduct early-stage coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to carry out cooperation in fields such as the safety of evacuees, transportation means and facilities, customs, immigration and quarantine processing, safe havens, and medical services. The two governments will enhance coordination in noncombatant evacuation operations from peacetime, as appropriate, including by conducting training and exercises.

2. Maritime Security
   Taking into account their respective capabilities, the two governments will cooperate closely to enhance maritime security. Cooperative measures may include, but are not limited to, information sharing and inspection of ships based on a United Nations Security Council resolution or other basis under international law.

3. Measures to Deal with Refugees
   If a situation develops such that a flow of refugees into Japan becomes likely or actually begins, the two governments will cooperate to maintain Japan’s peace and security while handling refugees in a humane manner consistent with applicable obligations under international law. Primary responsibility for such refugee response lies with Japan. The United States will provide appropriate support upon a request from Japan.

4. Search and Rescue
   The two governments will cooperate and provide mutual support, as appropriate, in search and rescue operations. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will provide support to combat search and rescue operations by the United States, where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

5. Protection of Facilities and Areas
   The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces are responsible for protecting their own facilities and areas in cooperation with relevant authorities. Upon request from the United States, Japan will provide additional protection for facilities and areas in Japan in close cooperation and coordination with the United States Armed Forces.

6. Logistic Support
   The two governments will enhance mutual logistic support (which includes, but is not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services), as appropriate, to enable effective and efficient operations. This includes rapid validation and resourcing of operational and logistic support requirements. The Government of Japan will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies as well as private sector assets. The Government of Japan will provide logistic or other associated support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

7. Use of Facilities
   The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, temporary use of facilities, including civilian airports and seaports, in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas.

C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

   When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will take steps to deter the armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan.

   When an armed attack against Japan occurs, the two governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage and to deter any further attacks. The two governments will also take necessary measures including those listed earlier in Chapter IV.

1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated
   When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will intensify, through a comprehensive and robust whole-of-government approach, information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to deter the attack and to de-escalate the situation.

   The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will assume appropriate postures for bilateral operations, including the execution of necessary deployments. Japan will establish a posture to maintain the security of U.S. deployments. The preparations by the two governments may include, but would not be limited to: joint/shared use of facilities and areas; mutual logistic support, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transport, construction, engineering, and medical services; and reinforced protection of U.S. facilities and areas in Japan.

2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs
   a. Principles for Coordinated Actions
      If an armed attack against Japan occurs despite diplomatic efforts and deterrence, Japan and the United States will cooperate to repel promptly the attack and deter any further attacks to return peace and security to Japan. Such coordinated actions will contribute to the reestablishment of peace and security in the region.

      Japan will maintain primary responsibility for defending the citizens and territory of Japan and will take actions immediately to repel an armed attack against Japan as expeditiously as possible. The Self-Defense Forces will have the primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations in Japan and its surrounding waters and airspace, as well as its air and maritime approaches. The United States will coordinate closely with Japan and provide appropriate support. The United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces to defend Japan. The United States will take actions to shape the regional environment in a way that supports the defense of Japan and reestablishes peace and security.

      Recognizing that all instruments of national power will be required to defend Japan, the two governments respectively will employ a whole-of-government approach, utilizing their respective chains-of-command, to coordinate actions through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism.

      The United States will employ forward-deployed forces, including those stationed in Japan, and introduce reinforcements from elsewhere, as required. Japan will establish and maintain the basis required to facilitate these deployments.

      The two governments will take actions as appropriate to provide defense of each other’s forces and facilities in response to an armed attack against Japan.

b. Concept of Operations
   i. Operations to Defend Airspace
      The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan.

      The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, defense against attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles.

      The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations.

   ii. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks
      The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan.

      The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange real-time information for early detection of ballistic missile launches. When there is an indication of a ballistic missile attack, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain an effective posture to defend against ballistic missile attacks heading for Japan and to protect forces participating in ballistic missile defense operations.

      The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan.

      The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations.

   iii. Operations to Defend Maritime Areas
      The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of
communications.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, coastal defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, anti-air warfare, and air interdiction.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack.

The effectiveness of these activities will be enhanced through information sharing and other forms of cooperation among relevant agencies.

iv. Operations to Counter Ground Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against Islands. If the need arises, the Self-Defense Forces will conduct operations to retake an Island. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, operations to prevent and repel airborne and seaborne invasions, amphibious operations, and rapid deployment.

The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, also will have primary responsibility for defeating attacks by special operations forces or any other unconventional attacks in Japan, including those that involve infiltration.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations.

v. Cross-Domain Operations

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks. These operations will be designed to achieve effects across multiple domains simultaneously.

Examples of cooperation across domains include the actions described below:

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, as appropriate, will strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other’s ISR assets.

The United States Armed Forces may conduct operations involving the use of strike power, to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces. When the United States Armed Forces conduct such operations, the Self-Defense Forces may provide support, as necessary. These operations will be based on close bilateral coordination, as appropriate.

The two governments will cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains in accordance with bilateral cooperation set out in Chapter VI.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces’ special operations forces will cooperate during operations, as appropriate.

c. Operational Support Activities

The two governments will cooperate in the following activities in support of bilateral operations.

i. Communications and Electronics

The two governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will ensure effective communication between the two forces and maintain a common operational picture for bilateral operations under common situational awareness.

ii. Search and Rescue

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide mutual support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate.

iii. Logistic Support

When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will coordinate and provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability.

The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support.

iv. Use of Facilities

The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, additional facilities in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas.

v. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection

The Government of Japan will maintain primary responsibility for emergency responses to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents or attacks in Japan. The United States retains primary responsibility for maintaining and restoring the mission capability of the United States Armed Forces in Japan. At Japan’s request, the United States will support Japan in CBRN incident or attack prevention and response-related activities in an effort to ensure the protection of Japan, as appropriate.

D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan

When Japan and the United States each decide to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks. Bilateral responses will be coordinated through the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism.

Japan and the United States will cooperate as appropriate with other countries taking action in response to the armed attack.

The Self-Defense Forces will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to obtaining fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people.

Examples of cooperative operations are outlined below:

1. Asset Protection

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in asset protection, as appropriate. Such cooperation will include, but not be limited to, protection of assets that are engaged in operations such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations or Ballistic Missile Defense.

2. Search and Rescue

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate.

3. Maritime Operations

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in minesweeping, as appropriate.

4. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in intercepting ballistic missiles, as appropriate, in accordance with their respective capabilities. The two governments will exchange information to ensure early detection of ballistic missile launches.

5. Logistics Support

When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability.

The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support.
E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan
When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. Recognizing that immediate recovery from a large-scale disaster in Japan is essential for Japan’s peace and security and that such a disaster could affect the activities of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, the United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities. Such support may include search and rescue, transportation, supply, medical services, incident awareness and assessment, and other specialized capabilities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate.

To improve the effectiveness of the United States Armed Forces’ cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities in Japan, the two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. In addition, the United States Armed Forces also may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters.

V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security
In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. For well over half a century, both countries have worked together to deliver effective solutions to challenges in diverse regions of the world.

When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities for the peace and security of the region and beyond, the two governments, including the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below. This cooperation also will contribute to the peace and security of both countries.

A. Cooperation on International Activities
The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable.

The two governments may coordinate the activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, and also will pursue trilateral and multilateral cooperation in these activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will share information with each other and other partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below. This cooperation also will contribute to the peace and security of both countries.

B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation
The two governments will cooperate and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. In particular, the two governments will reinforce efforts and seek additional opportunities to cooperate with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations.

The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promoting cooperation and capacity building based upon international law and standards.

VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation
A. Cooperation on Space
Recognizing the security aspects of the space domain, the two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space.

As part of such efforts, the two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation. The two governments will provide mutual support, as appropriate, to establish and improve capabilities and will share information about actions and events that might affect the safety and stability of the space domain and impede its use. The two governments also will share information to address emerging threats against space systems and will pursue opportunities for cooperation in space-based equipment and technology that will strengthen capabilities and resiliency of the space systems, including hosted payloads.

To accomplish their missions effectively and efficiently, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate and to contribute to whole-of-government efforts in utilizing space in such areas as: early-warning; ISR; positioning, navigation, and timing; space situational awareness; meteorological observation; command, control, and communications, as appropriate; and ensuring the resiliency of relevant space systems that are critical for mission assurance. In cases where their space systems are threatened, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, in mitigating risk and preventing damage. If damage occurs, they will cooperate, as appropriate, in reconstituting relevant capabilities.

B. Cooperation on Cyberspace
To help ensure the safe and stable use of cyberspace, the two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and routine manner, as appropriate. The two governments also will share, as appropriate, information on the development of various capabilities in cyberspace, including the exchange of best practices on training and education. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions, including through information sharing with the private sector, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will:
• maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems;
• share expertise and conduct educational exchanges in cybersecurity;
• ensure resiliency of their respective networks and systems to achieve mission assurance;
• contribute to whole-of-government efforts to improve cybersecurity; and
• conduct bilateral exercises to ensure effective cooperation for cybersecurity in all situations from peacetime to contingencies.

In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, including those against...
The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation:

### A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

In order to enhance interoperability and to promote efficient acquisition and maintenance, the two governments will:

- cooperate in joint research, development, production, and test and evaluation of equipment and in mutual provision of components of common equipment and services;
- strengthen the basis of repair and maintain common equipment for mutual efficiency and readiness;
- facilitate reciprocal defense procurement to enhance efficient acquisition, interoperability, and defense equipment and technology cooperation;
- explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on defense equipment and technology.

### B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security

Recognizing the importance of intellectual cooperation concerning security and defense, the two governments will deepen exchanges of members of relevant organizations and strengthen communication between each side’s research and educational institutions. Such efforts will serve as the foundation for security and defense officials to share their knowledge and reinforce cooperation.

### VII. Bilateral Enterprise

The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation:

#### A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

In order to enhance interoperability and to promote efficient acquisition and maintenance, the two governments will:

- cooperate in joint research, development, production, and test and evaluation of equipment and in mutual provision of components of common equipment and services;
- strengthen the basis of repair and maintain common equipment for mutual efficiency and readiness;
- facilitate reciprocal defense procurement to enhance efficient acquisition, interoperability, and defense equipment and technology cooperation;
- explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on defense equipment and technology.

#### B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security

Recognizing the importance of intellectual cooperation concerning security and defense, the two governments will deepen exchanges of members of relevant organizations and strengthen communication between each side’s research and educational institutions. Such efforts will serve as the foundation for security and defense officials to share their knowledge and reinforce cooperation.

### VIII. Processes for Review

The SCC, assisted by an appropriate subordinate body, will regularly evaluate whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances. The two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan-U.S. Alliance relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time.

Reference 19  Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2017)
**Outline and Results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Agreed on the importance of establishing trust between defense leaders of Japan and the U.S. and working together to strengthen the Alliance.</td>
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<td>• Exchanged views on issues relating to North Korea. The Japanese side commented that now is the time to increase pressure on the regime and that Japan will take necessary measures to continue to coordinate with the U.S. Forces to fully respond to various contingencies.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Reaffirmed close communication and coordination between the two governments is vital in order to respond to issues relating to North Korea. Agreed on putting further pressure on North Korea and working on bolstering the defense capabilities to deter threats posed by North Korea.</td>
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<td>• In light of an increasingly severe security environment, shared their commitment to take initiatives to ensure the effectiveness of the Guidelines and to bolster the capabilities of the Alliance to deter and respond while both Japan and the U.S. work on improving their respective capabilities.</td>
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<td>• Shared information on the situation of and prospects for North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. The Japanese side commented that North Korean nuclear and missile development is posing an unprecedentedly serious and immediate threat to the security of this region including Japan, and called for thorough discussion to ensure the Alliance can take an orchestrated response to any situation. The U.S. side shared this view and reaffirmed its commitment to the security of Japan including a commitment to extended deterrence.</td>
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<td>• Given the increased level of North Korean ballistic missile threat, the two governments agreed on ensuring a reliable defense posture. Also confirmed working together for the introduction of new BMD assets including the Aegis Ashore. Agreed on bringing even closer coordination to the operation of Japanese and U.S. assets including Aegis-equipped ships.</td>
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<td>• Welcomed the high level of communication through telephone meetings on continued provocations by North Korea, and reaffirmed to continue to share information between Japan and the U.S.</td>
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<td>• Confirmed the importance of continuously pressuring North Korea in a visible way and the importance of close coordination between Japan and the U.S.</td>
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<td>• Reaffirmed the two governments’ intention to promote close cooperation between Japan, the U.S., and the Republic of Korea.</td>
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<td>• The U.S. side will keep a close watch on the situations in the Southeast Asia region while keeping a close watch on the situations in the South China Sea, and welcomed progress in multilateral security cooperation as well as dialogues in the region through the framework of ADF.</td>
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<td>• The Japanese side mentioned its intention to take initiatives to help ASEAN with capacity building based on the “Vientiane Vision.” Japan’s defense cooperation initiatives with ASEAN.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Confirmed that Japan and the U.S. will continue to cooperate closely to provide capacity building assistance to Southeast Asian partners.</td>
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<td>• The Japanese side requested the U.S. Forces to make efforts to operate safely as understanding from the local communities is vital in ensuring the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan.</td>
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<td>• The Ministers closely compared and adjusted the defense agencies’ understandings and policy on the way ahead including the meeting between leaders of United States and North Korea, regarding the issue of North Korea.</td>
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<td>• Agreed on the need to keep a close watch on North Korea, given no concrete initiatives by North Korea to give up nuclear development has been confirmed, despite the changes in the regime’s posture such as requesting for talks.</td>
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<td>• The Japanese side spoke about the necessity to put maximum pressure on North Korea in order to make it abandon its nuclear and missile development, and affirmed that the two governments will maintain pressure and sanctions on North Korea with the goal of having North Korea relinquish all weapons of mass destruction and all ballistic missile plans in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.</td>
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<td>• The U.S. side commend efforts by the MSDF to address the issue of illegal ship-to-ship transfers by North Korean vessels, and showed its commitment to continue these efforts with Japan and other partner nations.</td>
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<td>• Affirmed the importance of cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and the Republic of Korea and other nations through bilateral/multilateral training and exercise.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Agreed on the importance of continuing close information sharing to ensure the Alliance’s stance toward North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Welcomed progress in cooperation between Japan and the U.S. under Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines such as the SDF protecting and providing supplies and services to the U.S. Forces, and reaffirmed the further promotion of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation through the steady enforcement of the Legislation and the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Japanese side talked about moving forward on the review of the National Defense Program Guidelines towards the end of FY2018 and the set of studying for next Mid-Term Defense Program, and reaffirmed on sharing information between the ministers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 17, 2018</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Ministers exchanged opinions on regional challenges, and in light of China’s unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas, agreed that it is important for both countries to continue to closely watch on the situations in the East China Sea, to cooperate for the peace and stability, and to be continuously engaged in the South China Sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Ministers noted that China has enhanced its military capability and intensified its activities in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, and also agreed to reinforce the Alliance’s capacity to deter and respond through enhancement of defense capability based on the close cooperation of Japan and the U.S. for the peace and stability of the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of cooperating with the allied countries and various partners to assure the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and agreed that Japan and U.S. in Japan, U.S., and Australia proceed with coordination in the promotion of the basic principles such as rule of law, freedom of navigation, and in capacity building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 17, 2018</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Ministers exchanged views on the situation of and prospects for North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. The Japanese side commented that North Korean nuclear and missile development is posing an unprecedentedly serious and immediate threat to the security of this region including Japan, and called for thorough discussion to ensure the Alliance can take an orchestrated response to any situation. The U.S. side shared this view and reaffirmed its commitment to the security of Japan including a commitment to extended deterrence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Given the increased level of North Korean ballistic missile threat, the two governments agreed on ensuring a reliable defense posture. Also confirmed working together for the introduction of new BMD assets including the Aegis Ashore. Agreed on bringing even closer coordination to the operation of Japanese and U.S. assets including Aegis-equipped ships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Welcomed the high level of communication through telephone meetings on continued provocations by North Korea, and reaffirmed to continue to share information between Japan and the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 17, 2018</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 17, 2018</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Ministers confirmed that they will deepen cooperation on space capabilities, and shared the view on promoting cooperation for enhancing space situational awareness (SSA).

The Ministers shared the view on calling upon North Korea to resolve the Japanese abductions issue immediately.

The Ministers also reaffirmed that U.S. force stance in the region would remain robust, and shared the view on deepening consultation on ensuring deterrence and security in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Ministers shared the view that they will seek to achieve North Korea's abandonment of all of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. In addition, the Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will continue to work together in cooperation with other partner countries in fully implementing UN Security Council resolutions, including combating illicit ship-to-ship transfers.

Both sides affirmed the recent progress in the construction project of Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), and reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid its continued use. The Japanese side requested for cooperation with efforts to secure the understanding from the local communities, and to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.

The Ministers confirmed that U.S. Forces in ROK is a stabilizing force in the region, and that no change in U.S. Forces in ROK has been considered.

The Ministers confirmed to work together closely for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives and training relocation.

The Ministers also shared the understandings about the importance of the free and open Indo-Pacific, and confirmed the significance of cooperation between Japan and the United States to work together in cooperation with other partner countries in maintaining basic international principles such as rule of law, freedom of navigation and in implementing measures for peace and stability in the region.

The Ministers shared the view that the Japan-U.S. Alliance serves as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, and that Japan and the United States will work together to realize a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”

The Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will work together to realize a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”

The Ministers confirmed that U.S. Forces in ROK is a stabilizing force in the region, and that no change in U.S. Forces in ROK has been considered.
### Outline and Results

#### Jan. 10, 2019
Meeting with Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense / Washington, D.C.

**Participants:**
- Minister of Defense
- Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanaan

| The Ministers welcomed the successful holding of the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting and affirmed that the defense authorities of Japan and the United States will continue to closely cooperate with each other to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance. |
| The Ministers affirmed the importance of cooperation in maintaining the operational readiness of all North Korea's WMDs and ballistic missiles of all ranges. |
| The Ministers reaffirmed the significance of cooperation with various partners, including conducting bilateral/multilateral exercises and capacity building assistance to maintain and strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond. |
| The Ministers confirmed that the relocation to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. |

#### Jun. 4, 2019
Meeting between Minister of Defense Isawa and Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan / Tokyo

**Participants:**
- Minister of Defense Isawa
- Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan

| The two ministers affirmed that they will closely cooperate with each other in line with the policy confirmed at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting. |
| The Ministers reaffirmed that it is important to sustain the operational readiness of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and Japan and the U.S. continue to work together with the shared recognition that understanding and cooperation from the local communities is crucial for the maintenance of the operational readiness. |
| The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of full implementation of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions toward the abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction and all ranges of ballistic missiles by North Korea. |
| The Ministers reaffirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan's administration of the islands, and agreed to cooperate with each other for the peace and stability in the East China Sea. |

#### Aug. 7, 2019
Meeting between Minister of Defense Isawa and U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper / Tokyo

**Participants:**
- Minister of Defense Isawa
- U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper

| The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea's WMDs and ballistic missiles of all ranges. |
| The Ministers reaffirmed that it is important to maintain the operational readiness of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and Japan and the U.S. will continue to work together with shared understanding and cooperation from the local communities is crucial for the maintenance of the operational readiness. |
| The Ministers confirmed the importance of continuing to cooperate with other countries to counter illicit ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea. |
| The Ministers confirmed that the recent series of ballistic missile launches by North Korea are a serious threat to regional security. |

#### Nov. 8, 2019
Meeting between Minister of Defense Kono and U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper / Tokyo

**Participants:**
- Minister of Defense Kono
- U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper

| The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea's WMDs and ballistic missiles of all ranges. |
| The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of cooperation with various partners, including conducting bilateral/multilateral exercises and capacity building assistance to maintain and strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond. |
| The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea's WMDs and ballistic missiles of all ranges. |
| The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of continuing to cooperate with other countries to counter illicit ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea. |

#### Jan. 14, 2020
Meeting between Minister of Defense Kono and U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper / Tokyo

**Participants:**
- Minister of Defense Kono
- U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper

| The Ministers confirmed that the U.S.-ROK cooperation will be maintained. |
| The Ministers confirmed that they continue to closely work together for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives. |
| The Ministers also reaffirmed the importance of cooperation in maintaining the operational readiness on the local communities and the Ministers affirmed the importance to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces. |
| The Ministers affirmed that the relocation to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. |
| The Ministers reaffirmed that the relocation to Henoko-saki is the only solution to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces. |

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**Reference**

Defense of Japan 512
On April 19, 2019, the United States and Japan convened the Security Consultative Committee (U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee) in Washington, DC, with the participation of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan, Foreign Minister Taro Kono, and Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya. During the meeting, the Ministers affirmed their strong commitment to realize a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” a shared vision for a region in which all nations are sovereign, strong, and prosperous. They emphasized that U.S.-Japan cooperation in cyberspace and critical infrastructure is integral to their shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The Ministers highlighted the need for an increasingly networked structure of alliances and partnerships, anchored by the U.S.-Japan Alliance, to ensure resilient cooperation in this capacity. The Ministers also expressed concern about rapidly evolving technological advancement in new domains, including space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. The Ministers underscored their strong determination to achieve its completion as soon as possible.

In recognition of the depth and breadth of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, the Ministers agreed to release a fact sheet detailing additional areas of bilateral cooperation.

U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee 2019 Fact Sheet
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan, Foreign Minister Taro Kono, and Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya met in Washington, DC on April 19, 2019. Building upon their joint statement, the Ministers discussed the following shared priorities and initiatives through the timely and smooth deployment of Japan’s Aegis Ashore. The Ministers underscored their strong determination to achieve its completion as soon as possible.

Emphasizing the integral role of space in full spectrum cross-domain operations, the Ministers stressed the importance of deepening cooperation on space capabilities to strengthen mission assurance, interoperability, and operational cooperation. Both sides recognized the benefits of cooperation on space situational awareness (SSA) and highlighted Japan’s development of a Deep Space Radar and the opportunity to host U.S.-provided SSA payloads on Japan’s Quasi Zenith Satellite System planned for launch in 2023. The Ministers also underscored their interest in identifying ways to support alliance needs by leveraging emerging, innovative space concepts.

The Ministers determined to bolster capability and enhance their respective integrated defense for both air and missile threats, including through the timely and smooth deployment of Japan’s Aegis Ashore. The Ministers also shared concerns about the proliferation of intermediate-range missiles worldwide and committed to working together to address this growing threat.

To enhance interoperability, the Ministers reaffirmed the intent to promote the standardization of defense equipment, sharing of defense networks, and cooperation on emerging technologies. The Ministers welcomed progress on the SM-3 Block IIA and its anticipated shift to the production phase, as well as the expedited cooperative research process for amphibious operational technologies.

Cognizant of the fact that the Alliance’s technological advantage must be safeguarded from our adversaries at all times, the Ministers committed to strengthen and enhance information security practices across the whole of government to protect classified information, maintain technological superiority, and preserve our shared economic and defense advantages in the face of evolving threats to the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The Ministers emphasized the need for greater supply chain security, noting threats to the defense industrial base, national networks, and critical infrastructure required for mission assurance.
II. U.S. Forces in Japan

The Ministers reaffirmed the two Governments’ commitment to steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces in order to improve operational readiness and deterrence capabilities, while continuing efforts to mitigate the impact on local communities. The Ministers welcomed the progress on facility improvements of Nyutabaru Air Base and Tsuiki Air Base of the Air Self-Defense Force for contingency use of aircraft.

The Ministers welcomed the relocation of the carrier air wing squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni last year. The United States also expressed appreciation for the Government of Japan’s continued efforts to acquire Magashima for a new SDF facility. This facility will support operations such as large-scale disaster response as well as regular exercises and other activities, including as a permanent field carrier landing practice (FCLP) site for use by U.S. forces. The United States reiterated that a permanent FCLP facility will greatly contribute to the safe operation and training of U.S. forces. The Ministers expressed their intention to work closely in order to complete the development of the permanent facility at the earliest possible date.

The Ministers welcomed progress in the steady implementation of the Guam International Agreement, and the planned relocation of approximately 9,000 U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan. They reconfirmed the plan to begin the relocation to Guam in the first half of the 2020s.

The Ministers recognized the importance of aviation safety and addressing public concerns related to this issue. The Ministers committed to facilitate prompt exchanges of information, and to continue a regular bilateral dialogue regarding aviation safety. Both sides recognized the necessity of all training, including aviation training, to maintain the highest levels of readiness and capabilities for the Alliance.

The Ministers also reaffirmed that the two Governments would promote joint/shared use of the facilities of the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and U.S. Forces, in addition to operational training areas, to enhance interoperability, deterrence, and response capability, and to build a stronger relationship with local communities. The Ministers welcomed steady progress in both bilateral planning and cooperation on non-combatant evacuation operations.

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III. Working with Partners for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

The Ministers reiterated their support for ASEAN centrality and unity and their commitment to multilateral cooperation in Southeast Asia, including through joint training and exercises, capacity building, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and support for ASEAN-related architecture, including the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus. To support the autonomous and sustainable development of countries in the Mekong region, the Ministers committed to work closely in support of regional countries to address shared transboundary challenges, including transnational crime and trafficking, regional connectivity, energy security, and enhanced energy system integration.

The Ministers welcomed continued cooperation and high-level consultation among the United States, Japan, and Australia, including through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, and noted the importance of trilateral joint exercises and capacity building in Southeast Asian and Pacific island countries. The Ministers also noted with satisfaction the first Japan-U.S.-India trilateral summit meeting in 2018 and highlighted significant joint exercises, such as Malabar 2018 and Cope India 2018. Building upon these various trilateral efforts, the Ministers welcomed the regularization of quadrilateral engagement among Japan, the United States, Australia, and India. The Ministers also welcomed the increasing regional presence of the United Kingdom and France, and called for further cooperation in areas including activities in support of freedom of navigation, port calls, and countering illicit ship-to-ship transfers.

The Ministers called for full respect for freedoms of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, and reiterated the importance of activities that support those principles. The Ministers urged all parties to pursue demilitarization of disputed features in the SCS, resolve all maritime disputes peacefully without resorting to the threat or use of force, clarify their maritime claims in accordance with the international law of the sea as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, and fully respect legal and diplomatic processes.

The Ministers underscored the importance of the July 2016 Philippines- China Arbitral Tribunal’s Award for the two parties. The Ministers also emphasized the importance of a Code of Conduct in the SCS that is in full accordance with international law and upholds the right of navigation, port calls, and countering illicit ship-to-ship transfers.

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Reference 21

Record of Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2019

Joint Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.S.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S. bilateral joint exercise (command post exercise) (Keen Edge 2020)</td>
<td>Jan 24-31, 2020</td>
<td>Ichigaya District (Ministry of Defense), home stations of the units participating in the exercise, U.S. Yokota Air Base, and Hawaii (the United States)</td>
<td>GSDF Internal Bureau, each Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency, GSDF Ground Component Command, respective Regional Armees, GSDF Self-Defense Fleet, respective Regional Districts, GSDF Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S. joint air defense/misile-defense exercise</td>
<td>Feb 24-28, 2020</td>
<td>GSDF Camp Matsuura, Camp Shinko, Camp Aomori, Camp Iwaki, Camp Tainan, and Camp Alice; JSDF Yokosuka District, GSDF Minami, Yokota, Tsuiki, Kasuga, Myodahara and Natra Air Bases; and U.S. Yokosuka Naval Base</td>
<td>GSDF Joint Staff, Ground Component Command, Eastern Army, Middle Army, Western Army, GSDF Air Defense School, Self-Defense Fleet and Air Defense Command (U.S. Forces)</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Ground Self-Defense Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.S.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field training with U.S. Army in the United States (Aurora/Snow)</td>
<td>May 22-31, 2019</td>
<td>Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson and surrounding training area (Alaska), the United States</td>
<td>GSDF Major units of 1st Infantry Battalion, 1st Airborne Brigade</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 110 personnel</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 140 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field training with U.S. Forces in Australia (Talusman Sabre 19)</td>
<td>Jan 3-31, 2019</td>
<td>Shoalwater Bay Training Area (Queensland, Australia) and its surrounding area</td>
<td>GSDF Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, 1st Helicopter Brigade, GSDF Destroyer JS &quot;Kuruma,&quot; U.S. Marines and Navy</td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
<td>GSDF: Totaling approximately 330 personnel, JSDF: Totaling approximately 280 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parachute drop training from U.S. aircraft in Japan</td>
<td>Jul 16-17, 2019</td>
<td>Higashi Maneuver Area, ASDF Tsuiki Air Base and U.S. Yokota Air Base</td>
<td>GSDF 1st Airborne Brigade, Ground Component Command (U.S. Forces)</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 100 personnel</td>
<td>C-130J × 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S. joint Regional Army command post exercise (the United States) (RF-74)</td>
<td>Jul 17-30, 2019</td>
<td>Fort Shafter Army Base (Hawaii, the United States)</td>
<td>GSDF Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command, Eastern Army, Western Army, Training Evaluation Research and Development Command, etc. (U.S. Forces)</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 150 personnel</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 150 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field training with U.S. Army in the United States (Rainy Thunder)</td>
<td>Aug 20-29, 2019</td>
<td>Yokota Training Center (Washington, the United States)</td>
<td>GSDF One company of the 25th Infantry Regiment (U.S. Forces)</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 120 personnel</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 380 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field training with U.S. Army in Japan (Orient Shield 19)</td>
<td>Aug 26-29, 2019</td>
<td>Camp Kungun, Okinawa Maneuver Area, Vic-Camp Takuubara, Camp Amami, Naha Air Base, and Eielson Air Force Base</td>
<td>GSDF 1st Infantry Regiment, 4th Division, 3rd Anti-aircraft Artillery Brigade, Western Field Artillery Unit (U.S. Forces)</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 950 personnel</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 950 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parachute drop training from U.S. aircraft in Japan</td>
<td>Nov 12-13, 2019</td>
<td>Higashi Maneuver Area and ASDF Tsuiki Air Base</td>
<td>GSDF 1st Airborne Brigade, Ground Component Command (U.S. Forces)</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 120 personnel</td>
<td>C-130J × 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field training with U.S. Marines in Japan (Forest Light (MK))</td>
<td>Dec 1-13, 2019</td>
<td>Abeno Maneuver Area, Kokubudai Maneuver Area, Minoh Maneuver Area, Camp Imizu, and Camp Akino</td>
<td>GSDF Major units of 8th Infantry Regiment, 13th Division (U.S. Forces)</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 450 personnel</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 300 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S. joint Regional Army command post exercise (RF-77)</td>
<td>Dec 3-16, 2019</td>
<td>Camp Asaka, Camp Komur, Camp Courtyard, etc.</td>
<td>GSDF Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command, Eastern Army, Western Army, Training Evaluation Research and Development Command, Joint Staff, MSDF, ASDF, etc. (U.S. Forces)</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 5,000 personnel</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 1,600 personnel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Maritime Self-Defense Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.S.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field training with U.S. Army in the United States (Combat Training Center 20)</td>
<td>Jan. 2-Feb. 7, 2020</td>
<td>Fort Polk (Louisiana, the United States) (Joint Readiness Training Center)</td>
<td>J.SDF (Major units of 39th Infantry Regiment, 9th Division, U.S. Forces) 4-25 Brigade Combat Team, U.S. Army Alaska</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field training with U.S. Army in the United States (First Plot 2020)</td>
<td>Jan. 5-Feb. 27, 2020</td>
<td>Camp Pendleton (California, the United States), San Clemente Island, and their surrounding waters</td>
<td>J.SDF (Major units of 2nd Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, U.S. Forces) 1st Marine Expeditionary Unit (Hq.); 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit; Amphibious Squadron, 3rd Fleet, etc.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field training with U.S. Marines in Japan (Forest Light (HIY))</td>
<td>Jan. 19-30, 2020</td>
<td>Oyashio Maneuver Area, Kristinohi Maneuver Area and Aka Camp Takayubaru</td>
<td>J.SDF (12th Infantry Regiment, 8th Division; 6th Fighter Squadron, Western Army Aviation Group, etc. U.S. Forces) Major units of Brigade Landing Team, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field training with U.S. Marines in Japan (Northern Sierra)</td>
<td>Jan. 22-Feb. 8, 2020</td>
<td>Hokkaido-Oki Maneuver Area, Yoosuketsu Maneuver Area, Camp Ohleigh and MSDF Choshi Air Base</td>
<td>J.SDF (4th Infantry Regiment, 5th Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Air Tank Helicopter Unit, etc. U.S. Forces) 4th Marine Regiment, 3rd Division, 3rd Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment; Marine Aircraft Group 36, etc.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
#### Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Date of conclusion of intergovernmental agreement to implement joint research and development</th>
<th>Completion date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ducted rocket engine</td>
<td>Advanced steel technology, advanced hybrid propulsion technology using ceramic materials, eye-safe laser radar, ejection seat, advanced hybrid propulsion technology, shallow water acoustic technology, ballistic missile defense technology, low vulnerability gun propellant for field artillery, electronic device mounted on successor aircraft to P-3C, software radio, advanced hull material/structural technology, sea-based radar system, combat system for ship, palm-sized automated chemical agent detector, human effects of exposure to aircraft fuel and their engine exhaust, image gyro for airborne applications, hybrid electric drive, and High-Speed Multi-Hull Vessel Optimization</td>
<td></td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-3 Block IIA</td>
<td>Development of advanced missile interceptor</td>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td>March 2019 (moved to the joint produce/deployment stage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison of Operational Jet Fuel and Noise Exposures</td>
<td>Research on the combined effects of exposures to both jet fuel and noise on the risk of hearing loss for flight line personnel</td>
<td>November 2015</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Agent Detector-kit Colorimetric Reader</td>
<td>Research on automatically interpreting the colorimetric response of the Chemical Agent Detector-kit</td>
<td>February 2017</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Temperature Case Technologies</td>
<td>Research on rocket motor case made of high-temperature CFRP* (CFRP: Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic)</td>
<td>July 2018</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next Generation Amphibious Technologies</td>
<td>Research on the feasibility of the technology by simulations based on digital models of amphibious vehicles</td>
<td>May 2019</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release.
### Reference 23 Outline of 23 Issues

(As of April 1, 2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Area (ha)</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>U.S. Forces</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army POL Depots</strong></td>
<td>1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on December 31, 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Manabir, etc., for underground communication system (Noborikawa)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>Gun-Ten-Kyo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on September 30, 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20. Awase Meadows Golf Course</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on July 31, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Camp Zukeran</strong></td>
<td>3. Kuni-gami-son (Mt. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) district</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on March 31, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago-Kunigami line</td>
<td>(256)</td>
<td>Gun-Ten-Kyo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northern Training Area</strong></td>
<td>5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Hensko)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on March 31, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Camp Schwab</strong></td>
<td>6. In whole</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on March 31, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Makiminato Service Area</strong></td>
<td>7. In whole</td>
<td>Building</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on March 31, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sunabe Warehouse</strong></td>
<td>8. In whole</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on June 30, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yaedake Communication Site</strong></td>
<td>9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Motobu-cho)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on November 30, 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Onna Communication Site</strong></td>
<td>10. In whole</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on September 30, 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Eastern part</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kadena Air Base</strong></td>
<td>12. A part of southern area (Tobaru)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on January 31, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chibana Site</strong></td>
<td>13. In whole</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on December 31, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Camp Hansen</strong></td>
<td>14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on December 31, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City)</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on March 25, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kadena Ammunition Storage Area</strong></td>
<td>22. Eastern side of National Highway 58 (Kino-Hija), Southwestern corner (Yamatsuka Area)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on March 25, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on March 25, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22. Kurahama: site for waste incineration facilities</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on March 31, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22. Continuing use area for GSDF</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on October 31, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tori Communication Station</strong></td>
<td>16. Kadena bypass</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on March 31, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deputy Division Engineer Office</strong></td>
<td>17. In whole</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on September 30, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Camp Kuwae</strong></td>
<td>19. Southern side of the eastern part</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on December 31, 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18. Along Route 58</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MCAS Futenma</strong></td>
<td>21. Lands along eastern side (Nakabaru - Ginowan)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on July 31, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17 facilities, 21 issues</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17 facilities, 23 issues</td>
<td>1,021</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;Not yet returned after release agreement was concluded&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Camp Kuwae</strong></td>
<td>19. Northern side of Kuwae</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Change agreed on December 21, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kadena Ammunition Storage Area</strong></td>
<td>22. Old Higashiomi Ammunition Storage Area</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Release agreed on March 28, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 facilities, 2 issues</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,021</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. For the “Area” column, the value within parentheses is a portion of the value indicated immediately above.
2. A single circle in the “Classification” column expediently indicates that the scope of the case overlaps that of another issue.
3. The numbers in the “Scope” column were assigned only for the purpose of classifying 23 issues.
4. “SCC” in the “Classification” column indicates issues for which release was not achieved by June 1990 with respect to realignment, consolidation, and reduction plans of facilities and areas in Okinawa which were approved by the 15th and 16th Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meetings. “Gun-Ten-Kyo” indicates issues for which release was requested by the Council for promotion of de-ownership and utilization of military land and consultation of problems accompanying bases in Okinawa Prefecture chaired by Okinawa’s governor. “Governor” indicates issues for which then-Governor Nishime of Okinawa requested the U.S. government to release facilities and areas. “U.S. Forces” indicates issues in which the U.S. side declared to be returnable with respect to facilities and areas in Okinawa.
The SACO Final Report (tentative translation)

(December 2, 1996)

The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year.

The SCC, which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996.

The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report. Today, at the SCC, Minister Ieda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Merry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures introduced in this Final Report, if implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5.002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.

Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the yearlong SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary.

The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee.

The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject.

In accordance with the April 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa related issues at the same time.

Return Land:

— Futtenma Air Station — See attached.
— Northern Training Area

Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/9,852 acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions:

  - Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.
  - Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area.
— Aha Training Area

Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided.
— Gimbaru Training Area

Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
— Sobe Communication Site

Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
— Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield

Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated.
— Camp Kuwae

Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa.
— Senaha Communication Station

Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.
— Makiminato Service Area

Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area.
— Naha Port

Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 75ha/182 acres) and make necessary arrangements for its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha/87 acres).
— Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran)

Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.).

Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:

— Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104

Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese FY1997.
— Parachute drop training

Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.
— Conditioning hikes on public roads

Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.

Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:

— Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station

Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented.
— Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft

Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed.
— Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base

Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996.
— Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base

Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998.
— Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station

Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces.

Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:

— Accident reports

Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide accident reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996. In addition, as part of the U.S. forces’ good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notification of
appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces’ assets or facilities.

— Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements
Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.

— Visits to U.S. facilities and areas
Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

— Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles
Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on U.S. forces official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all non-tactical U.S. forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997.

— Supplemental automobile insurance
Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997.

— Payment for claims
Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:

• Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.

• A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by U.S. authorities.

— In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S. Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amounts.

— Quarantine procedures
Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

— Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen
Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. forces in the United States.

— Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee

The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report) (tentative translation)

1. Introduction

a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and its relocation. If the FIG determines that the facilities are to remain in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield’s critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF).

b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary.

c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.-Japan working group under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SCC on the status of its work.

2. Decisions of the SCC

a. Pursue construction of an SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station’s flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) — capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations.

b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions.

c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base.

d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities, which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available.

e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.

3. Guiding Principles

a. Futenma Air Station’s critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.

b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station’s operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway at SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing and new U.S. facilities.

c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other U.S. military facilities and housing.

d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations.

e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision.

f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation.

4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods

a. Studies have been conducted by a “Technical Support Group” comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a “Technical Advisory Group” comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible.

b. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules)—supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed.

c. Pontoon Type—platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater.

d. Semi-Submersible Type—platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.

5. The Next Steps

a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection.

b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility.

c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility.
1. Already returned facilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Facility (Project)</th>
<th>State of Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Training Area (Return of major portion)</td>
<td>• April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after seven HLZs are relocated, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• February 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on changes to the agreement of April 1999 (HLZs: from 7 HLZs to 6 HLZs, reduction of the scale of the site preparation from 75 m to 45 m in diameter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• December 2016: Major portion (approximately 4,010 ha) returned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aha Training Area (Return of total area)</td>
<td>• December 1998: Total return completed (release of joint use)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gimbaru Training Area (Return of total area)</td>
<td>• January 2008: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the helicopter landing zone (HLZ) is relocated to Kin-Blue Beach Training Area and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• July 2017: Total return completed (approximately 60 ha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sobe Communication Site (Return of total area)</td>
<td>• April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after communication systems including communication facilities such as antennas and others are relocated to Camp Hansen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• July 2016: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (Return of total area)</td>
<td>• October 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the Sobe Communication Site is relocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 191 ha) returned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senaha Communication Station (Return of most areas)</td>
<td>• March 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on return of most land after communication systems including the antenna facilities and others are relocated to Torii Communication Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• September 2009: Partially returned (approximately 61 ha excluding the microwave tower portion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• October 2008: The microwave tower portion consolidated into Torii Communication Station</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Facilities to be returned as the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Facility (Project)</th>
<th>State of Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MCAS Futenma (Return of total area)</td>
<td>* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• December 2015: Japan and the U.S. came to an agreement on partial early land return to be used for municipal roads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Already returned area]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• May 1997: Partially returned (approx. 473 m²)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• September 1997: Partially returned (approx. 62 m²)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Kuwae (Return of most areas)</td>
<td>* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• July 2017: Partially returned (approx. 45 m²)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• March 2018: Partially returned (approx. 4.5 ha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximinato Service Area (Return of partial area)</td>
<td>* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• December 2017: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on partial land return for the expansion of national highway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Already returned area]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• May 1997: Partially returned (approx. 38 ha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• September 2001: Partially returned (approx. 1 ha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• August 2013: Return of north access road (approx. 1 ha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• March 2018: Partially returned (approx. 3.3 ha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naha Port Facility (Return of total area)</td>
<td>* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Already returned area]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June 2000: Partially returned (approx. 1 ha)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Housing Consolidation Camp Zukeran

(Return of partial area: **Return of partial area)**

**Name of Facility (Project)** | **State of Progress**
--- | ---
Phase I: Golf Range Area | • April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others
• July 2002: Two high rises were furnished
• July 2006: An underpass was furnished
Phase II: Sada Area | • February 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others
• September 2005: Two high rises, 38 townhouses, and others were furnished
Phase III: Eastern Chatan Area | • March 2004: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others
• June 2008: 35 townhouses and others were furnished
Phase IV: Futenma and Upper Plaza Area | • March 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others
• February 2010: 24 townhouses constructed in Upper Plaza Area were furnished
• May 2006: Camp Zukeran was described as partial return in the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
• April 2013: It was written in the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa that the OHC plan will be reassessed under SACO, and that 910 family housing (including alternatives for housing that are to be removed in consolidated areas) will be built in addition to 56 housing already agreed to build based on the request for family housing after the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.

*Already returned area*

• March 1997: Partially returned (approx. 371m²)
• May 1997: Partially returned (approx. 598m²)
• June 1997: Partially returned (approx. 353m²)
• December 1997: Partially returned (approx. 0.3ha)
• March 1998: Partially returned (approx. 2ha)
• February 2000: Partially returned (approx. 3ha)
• December 2006: Partially returned (approx. 145m²)
• March 2015: Return of West Futenma Housing Area (approx. 51ha)
• March 2020: Partial return of the Facilities and Engineering Compound (approx. 11ha)

[Adjustment in training or operation]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point</th>
<th>State of Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relocation of Artillery Live-fire Training over Highway 104</td>
<td>• Relocated to five maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan in FY1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parachute Drop Training</td>
<td>• Relocation training conducted at Iejima Auxiliary Airfield since July 2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Implementation of initiatives to reduce noise]

1. Initiatives already taken

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point</th>
<th>State of Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Relocation of the U.S. Navy Ramp at Kadena Air Base | • June 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of rinse facility
• September 2008: Rinse Facility was furnished
• February 2009: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation of Navy Ramp
• October 2010: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of area forming and the construction of ramp and taxiway
• April 2011: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of the construction of parking and utility
• February 2013: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of the construction of type II maintenance hangar
• July 2013: Ramp, etc. were furnished
• July 2014: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of construction of hangars, etc.
• December 2016: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the furnishing of maintenance hangar, etc.
• January 2017: Relocation completed
• February 2020: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the implementation of demolition of part of the existing facilities |
| Installation of Noise Reduction Baffles at Kadena Air Base | • July 2000: Furnished |

2. Ongoing initiatives as the U.S. Forces realignment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point</th>
<th>State of Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transfer of KC-130 aircraft</td>
<td>* May 2006: United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation stated that the KC-130 squadron would be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and that the aircraft would regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSPO Kanoya Base and Guam.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month &amp; Year</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1996</td>
<td>Then Prime Minister Hashimoto and then U.S. Ambassador Mondale held a meeting, and the full return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) was announced. SACO Interim Report. → The airfield will be returned within five to seven years, following the completion of an adequate replacement facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1996</td>
<td>SACO Final Report → A maritime facility will be constructed off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa (one that can be dismantled).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1999</td>
<td>Then Governor of Okinawa announced that he had chosen the Henoko coast region of Nago City as a candidate for the facility relocation on condition that it would be for joint military-civilian use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1999</td>
<td>Then Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF. &quot;Government Policy on Relocation of MCAS Futenma” (Cabinet decision) → Construction in the Nago City Henoko coastal region in the water area of Camp Schwab.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2002</td>
<td>&quot;Basic Agreement Regarding the Use of Replacement Facilities” concluded between the Director General of Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. &quot;Basic Plan for Replacement Facilities for MCAS Futenma” was prepared. → Scale, construction methods, and specific construction site decided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2003</td>
<td>Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visited Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2004</td>
<td>A U.S. Forces helicopter crashed into a university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>&quot;2+2” Joint Statement → Agreement on a new plan (an L shape plan connecting the coastal area of Camp Schwab with the adjacent water area of Dura bay).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2006</td>
<td>&quot;Basic Agreement Regarding the Construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency, the Mayor of Nago, and the village mayor of Ginowan. → Agreement was reached by creating flight paths avoiding the surrounding region (the V shape plan).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2006</td>
<td>&quot;2+2” Joint Statement → Final adjustments made for the “U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” V shape plan approved → &quot;Basic Confirmation Regarding the Realignment of U.S. Military Forces in Okinawa” concluded between the Director General of Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. → &quot;GOI Efforts for USFJ Force Structure Realignment and Others” (Cabinet decision) → The cabinet decision of December 1999 was ablished.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2006</td>
<td>Establishment of &quot;the Council on Measures for Relocation of MCAS Futenma”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2007</td>
<td>The BA scoping document was sent to the governor, municipal mayors etc. of Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2009</td>
<td>Draft Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2009</td>
<td>Establishment of the Ministerial-Level Working Group on the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station. → Japan-U.S. summit meeting → Agreement on resolving the relocation of Futenma Air Station expeditiously through the working group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2009</td>
<td>Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies convened, Exploratory Committee for the Okinawa Bases Issue was established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2010</td>
<td>&quot;2+2” Joint Statement → Confirmed the intention to locate the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas → Cabinet approval of “immediate actions by the Government of Japan on items decided by the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee on May 28th, 2010”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2010</td>
<td>Futenma Replacement Facility Bilateral Experts Study Group Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>&quot;2+2” Joint Statement → Confirming the commitment that a replacement plan should be completed as early as possible after 2014, while deciding that the shape of the runway in the replaced facility should be V-shaped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2011- January 2012</td>
<td>The Environmental Impact Statement report was sent to the governor of Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2012</td>
<td>The Japan-U.S. Joint Statement was announced on the realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. → Official discussion was initiated to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2012</td>
<td>&quot;2+2” Joint Statement → The current plan to relocate the air base from Futenma to Henoko was reconfirmed to be the only viable solution. → Agreement reached to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2012</td>
<td>Revised Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>Application for approval of public water body reclamation was submitted to the governor of Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2013</td>
<td>Release of &quot;the consolidation plan of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa” → MCAS Futenma can be returned in FY2022 or later through relocation, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2013</td>
<td>&quot;2+2” Joint Statement → Recognition was reaffirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2013</td>
<td>Governor of Okinawa approved reclamation of the public water body related to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2014</td>
<td>Started the construction of replacement facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2015</td>
<td>&quot;2+2” Joint Statement → Reconfirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2015</td>
<td>• Governor of Okinawa revoked the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility project • The Okinawa Defense Bureau requested the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to review the governor of Okinawa’s revocation of the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility project, and requested the suspension of its execution • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism decided to suspend execution of the revocation of the landfill permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2015</td>
<td>• Reconfirmed that constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed an administrative suit seeking a retraction of revocation of the landfill permit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| March 2016   | • The government announced it would accept the court’s settlement recommendation • Landfill work was suspended • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued a correction instruction to Okinawa Prefecture over its revocation of the landfill permit • Okinawa Prefecture applied for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council of the correction instruction issued by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month &amp; Year</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| April 2016   | • Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting  
• Japan explained that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and that the Government decided to accept a court suggested settlement under the philosophy of "haste makes waste," and stated that it would like to realize the return of MCAS Futenma through the completion of the relocation to Henoko at the earliest possible time and will continue to make joint efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. The U.S. stated that its understands the court-suggested settlement on the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko as Prime Minister Abe's strategic decision, and said that the U.S. will continue its efforts through close cooperation. |
| June 2016    | • The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council notified the results of the review  
• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting  
→ Japan stated that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. stated that it fully understands the views of the Japanese Government and will continue to work closely with Japan. |
| July 2016    | • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed a suit seeking confirmation of the violation of law for the failure to act |
| September 2016| • Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting  
→ Japan stated that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. stated that it will continue to work closely with Japan. |
| December 2016| • Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting  
• The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Governor of Okinawa regarding the violation of law for the failure to act (finalized victory of the national government)  
• Governor of Okinawa retracted the revocation of the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project  
• Resumed the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project  
• Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting  
→ Japan explained that its position remains unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, that construction has resumed following the Supreme Court ruling, and that the Government will steadily move forward with the construction |
| February 2017| • Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting  
→ Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, and agreed to continue to work together closely  
→ Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting  
→ Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution |
| April 2017   | • Begun construction of the seawall, the main part of the public waters reclamation |
| July 2017    | Okinawa Prefectural Government filed a lawsuit against the central government arguing it is illegal to damage rock on the seabed without securing permission of the governor. |
| August 2017  | Joint statement of “2+2”  
→ The four ministers reaffirmed that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma. |
| March 2018   | • Naha District Court dismissed Okinawa Prefecture’s claim regarding a suit that demands for an injunctive order for actions that damage the reefs, etc. |
| April 2018   | • Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting  
→ Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution |
| August 2018  | • Okinawa Prefecture revoked (withdrew) the landfill permit for public waters. |
| October 2018 | • The Okinawa Defense Bureau requested the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to review Okinawa Prefecture’s withdrawal of the landfill permit for public waters, and requested the suspension of its execution.  
• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting  
→ Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution  
• The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism decided to suspend execution of the withdrawal of the landfill permit. |
| November 2018| • Governor of Okinawa objected to the decision by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to suspend execution, and applied for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council. |
| December 2018| • The Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court rejected an appeal by Okinawa Prefecture regarding a suit that demands for an injunctive order for actions that damage the reefs, etc.  
• Landfill work in Henoko side commenced |
| January 2019 | • Meeting between then Minister of Defense Iwaya and then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan  
→ Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution |
| February 2019| • Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit against the central government arguing it is illegal to damage rock on the seabed without securing permission of the governor.  
• Meeting between then Minister of Defense Iwaya and then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan  
→ Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution |
| March 2019   | • Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit against the central government arguing it is illegal to damage rock on the seabed without securing permission of the governor.  
• Okinawa Prefecture withdrew a petition for acceptance of final appeal with the Supreme Court regarding a suit that demands for an injunctive order for actions that damage the reefs, etc. (finalized victory of the central government).  
• Regarding the request for review by the Okinawa Defense Bureau, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism decided to revoke the withdrawal of the landfill permit by Okinawa Prefecture  
• Joint statement of “2+2”  
→ The four ministers welcomed the significant progress on the construction of the FIF and affirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution  
• Okinawa Prefecture withdrew its claim regarding the suit to revoke the decision to suspend execution of the withdrawal of the landfill permit.  
• Governor of Okinawa objected to the decision by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and applied for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council. |
| April 2019   | • Meeting between then Minister of Defense Iwaya and then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan  
→ The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will cooperate closely to make steady progress in implementing the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces.  
→ The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council dismissed the request for review by Governor of Okinawa. |
| July 2019    | • Governor of Okinawa objected to the dismissal by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council and filed a lawsuit to demand a revocation of the Government decision. |
| August 2019  | • Governor of Okinawa objected to the decision by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and filed a lawsuit to demand a revocation of the decision  
• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting  
→ Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution |
| October 2019 | • The Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court dismissed the claim regarding the suit to revoke the decision by Governor of Okinawa.  
• Governor of Okinawa filed a petition for acceptance of final appeal with the Supreme Court regarding the suit to revoke the decision by Governor of Okinawa. |
| January 2020 | • Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting  
→ Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution |
| March 2020   | • The Supreme Court dismissed the claim regarding the suit to revoke the decision by Governor of Okinawa. |
| April 2020   | • An application for change of landfill work related to the addition of the work to improve the soil foundation, etc., was submitted to Okinawa Prefecture. |
Reference 27  Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas Eligible for Immediate Return Upon Completion of Necessary Procedures</th>
<th>Returned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)</td>
<td>(March 31, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)</td>
<td>(August 31, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)</td>
<td>(March 31, 2019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)</td>
<td>(March 31, 2020)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Areas Eligible for Return Once the Replacement Facilities in Okinawa are Provided | 
| --- | --- | 
| Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester) | JFY2025 or later | 
| Lower Plaza Housing area, Comp Zukeran (Camp Foster) | JFY2024 or later | 
| A part of Kishaba Housing area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) | JFY2024 or later | 
| The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) | JFY2024 or later | 
| Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area | JFY2025 or later | 
| Naha Port | JFY2028 or later | 
| Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma | JFY2022 or later | 

| Areas Eligible for Return as USMC Forces Relocate from Okinawa to Locations Outside of Japan | 
| --- | --- | 
| Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) | — | 
| The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) | JFY2024 or later | 

Notes: 1. The Shirahi River area was returned at the same timing. 2. Part of the logistics support units in this area are scheduled to be relocated to locations outside of Japan. Efforts will be made to minimize the impact of the relocation on the approximate timing for return. However, the relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation. 3. Areas south of the Industrial Corridor (Camp Foster) can be returned at the same timing. 4. Plans for USMC relocation to locations outside of Japan have not yet been determined. The relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation.

Reference 28  Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 6, 2011</td>
<td>The U.S. Department of Defense announced that the CH-46 deployed at MCAS Futenma would be replaced with the MV-22 Osprey in the latter half of 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 13, 2012</td>
<td>Provided an explanation on the results of the Environmental Review, MV-22 pamphlet, etc. to Okinawa Prefecture, relevant local governments and other organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 29</td>
<td>Host Nation Notification and U.S. Department of Defense press release regarding the deployment of the MV-22 Osprey to Okinawa. Deployed a squadron in October 2012 (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in late July). Deployed an additional squadron in summer 2013. The results of the investigation of the crash accident were provided to the Government of Japan; the MV-22 Osprey did not conduct any flights in Japan until the safety of flight operations was reconfirmed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 23</td>
<td>Off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 19</td>
<td>Released the report &quot;MV-22 Osprey deployment in Okinawa&quot; (that safety was confirmed by the government). The Joint Committee agreed on matters related to the Osprey’s operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 6</td>
<td>Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 28, 2013</td>
<td>The Okinawa Citizens’ Council, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, and other organizations sent a statement to the Prime Minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 30</td>
<td>The MOD provided explanation to the relevant local governments and other organizations regarding the U.S. explanation on the deployment of the MV-22 squadron (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in summer 2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 30</td>
<td>The second squadron off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 25</td>
<td>Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 11, 2015</td>
<td>The U.S. Department of Defense announced that it would deploy the CV-22 Osprey at Yokota Air Base starting in the latter half of 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 13, 2016</td>
<td>Emergency landing of an MV-22 Osprey off the coast of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1, 2017</td>
<td>Planned maintenance interval of the MV-22 Osprey was commenced at Camp Kisarazu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 14</td>
<td>Informed relevant local governments and other organizations that the U.S. Department of Defense announced the postponement of the arrival of the CV-22 Osprey that were to be deployed at Yokota Air Base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 5</td>
<td>Accident of a MV-22 attached to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Force (Futenma) off the east coast of Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 3, 2018</td>
<td>U.S. Forces in Japan announced that five CV-22 Osprey would be deployed to Japan around summer of 2018, and that a total of ten Osprey would be deployed gradually over the next few years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 22, 2018</td>
<td>Informed relevant local governments and other organizations that the U.S. Forces in Japan announced that five CV-22 Osprey would be deployed at Yokota Air Base on October 1, 2018, and that a total of ten CV-22 would be deployed at Yokota Air Base gradually by around 2024.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1, 2018</td>
<td>Five CV-22 Osprey were deployed at Yokota Air Base.</td>
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Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan

1. Purpose

It is critically important to realize the realignment of the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ), in order to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in Japan and to mitigate the impact of defense facilities on surrounding residents by all of Japan. In this light, the purpose of this Act is to contribute to the smooth implementation of USFJ realignment by taking the following special measures, etc.

2. Special Measures, etc.

(1) Realignment grants for municipalities incurring greater impacts

- In connection with the realignment of USFJ, the national government designates defense facilities for which it is deemed that consideration must be paid to their increasing impacts on the stability of the lives of the residents in the surrounding areas. Realignment grants are awarded to municipalities in the area of such defense facilities, in order to cover the expenses of the projects that contribute to making the residents' lives more convenient and to developing industries, if the grants are considered necessary to help carry out the USFJ realignment smoothly and infallibly.

- The national government takes into consideration the extent that the stability of the lives of the residents impacted, and awards the realignment grants based on both the progress of the measures for achieving realignment and the length of time that has passed since the measures were first implemented.

(2) Public project special provisions for areas incurring particularly large impacts

- Designate areas that include municipalities incurring particularly large impacts as Special Area for Development concerning Realignment, and promote the development of these areas by establishing special provisions for cost sharing by local governments when developing roads, ports, and other infrastructure.

- Set up at the MOD the Council for Local Development concerning Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces comprised of relevant ministers, and at the Council's meetings discuss matters such as the designation of the Special Area for Development concerning Realignment and the establishment of the development plan for the area (Development Plan for Special Area for Development concerning Realignment).

(3) Measures for USFJ local employees

- Implement skills education and training that contribute to the continuous employment of USFJ local employees.

3. Expiration of the Law

This Act expires on March 31, 2027; provided, however, that the realignment grants will be awarded until March 31, 2032 at the latest based on the situation of the realignment.

Notes:

1. At the time of its enactment this Act was set to expire on March 31, 2017. However, the term of validity has been extended by 10 years to March 31, 2027 pursuant to the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017.

2. At the time of its enactment, this Act provided for the special measures, etc. under this Act in 2, (1) to (3) above, as well as for special provisions for the operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation for the implementation of investments and loans for family housing and infrastructure development related to USFJ relocation to the United States of America (Guam) for the promotion of said relocation. However, the said provision was abolished pursuant to the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017, after the 2+2 Joint Statement of April 2012 limited Japan’s financial commitment for the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam to direct cash contribution and it was confirmed that other forms of financial assistance (investments and loans) would not be utilized.
The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the “United States Government”), hereinafter referred to as the “Parties”;

Confirming that the United States armed forces in Japan (hereinafter referred to as the “United States armed forces”) under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the “Treaty”) and the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (hereinafter referred to as the “Status of Forces Agreement”), both signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, cooperate to strengthen the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East;

Bearing in mind the “Japan-United States Joint Statement on Reviewing Implementation Practices of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Related to U.S. Personnel with SOFA Status, Including the Civilian Component” announced by the Parties on July 5, 2016, and its recognition of the spirit of Alliance cooperation and the mutual commitment of Japan and the United States to strengthen the Alliance further and to enhance deterrence in a complex regional and global security environment;

Acknowledging the essential role of members of the Civilian Component defined in subparagraph (b) of Article I of the Status of Forces Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Civilian Component”) in fulfilling the United States’ obligations under the Treaty, as well as the importance of training and education processes for United States personnel with Status of Forces Agreement status;

Wishing to strengthen cooperation between the Parties by establishing a framework, including this Agreement which supplements the Status of Forces Agreement, with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian Component;

Affirming the continuing effectiveness of the Joint Committee provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Joint Committee”) as the means for consultation between the Parties on all matters requiring mutual consultation relating to the implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement; and

Convinced that enhanced cooperation with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian Component further contributes to achieving the objective of the Treaty and strengthening the Alliance;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1
The purpose of this Agreement is to enhance cooperation between the Parties with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian Component.

ARTICLE 2
The Parties shall establish a Working Group within the framework of the Joint Committee. Through the Working Group, the Parties shall retain the right to initiate consultations regarding implementation of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 3
The Parties shall continue to cooperate fully, through the framework of the Joint Committee, to clarify the scope of the Civilian Component, which plays an essential role in fulfilling the United States’ obligations under the Treaty.

1. The United States Government will designate members of the Civilian Component consistent with the categories of persons that the Parties shall direct the Joint Committee to develop.

2. The Parties also shall direct the Joint Committee to develop criteria that the United States Government will use in evaluating contractor employee positions for eligibility to receive designation as members of the Civilian Component. Such criteria are to be established so that those who are eligible to receive designation as members of the Civilian Component have skills or knowledge required for the accomplishment of mission requirements.

ARTICLE 4
Through the framework of the Joint Committee, the Parties also shall cooperate to strengthen mechanisms and procedures to ensure that persons ordinarily resident in Japan are excluded from being members of the Civilian Component.

ARTICLE 5
1. The Parties, through the framework of the Joint Committee, shall establish a procedure so that the Government of Japan is notified promptly of contractor employees who have been designated as members of the Civilian Component. The Parties shall consult in the Working Group upon the request of either Party regarding such notification.

2. Upon the development of criteria as directed in Article 3, the United States Government is to establish and maintain procedures for formalized, regular reviews of contractor employees who are designated as members of the Civilian Component to ensure that they are in fact eligible for such status.

3. The Parties, through the Working Group referred to in Article 2, shall establish procedures for regular reports regarding the Civilian Component. The United States Government is to provide such reports to the Government of Japan.

ARTICLE 6
If any dispute arises between the Parties relating to the implementation of this Agreement, the Parties shall settle it in accordance with the procedures for resolving matters set out in Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement.

ARTICLE 7
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature.

2. This Agreement shall remain in force as long as the Status of Forces Agreement remains in force.

3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2 of this Article, either Party may terminate this Agreement by giving one year’s written notice through diplomatic channels to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed the present Agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Tokyo in the Japanese and English languages, both texts being equally authentic, this sixteenth day of January 2017.
### Reference 31

#### Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements

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<tr>
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<td>Established the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America (exchange of notes) in November 1983</td>
<td>Signed in April 1996 and revised in September 1999</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Security Treaty</td>
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<td>Japan-India Joint Declaration on Security in October 2006</td>
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<td>Agreed to consider at Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting in July 2014</td>
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<td>Shared the view that two countries will commence a joint study toward negotiations for an agreement on security information sharing at Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting in September 2019</td>
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<td>Affirmed conclusion of an agreement in principle at Japan-Germany Summit Meeting in February 2013</td>
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Notes: Signed Memorandum with Singapore, Vietnam, Mongolia, Bahrain, Cambodia, Sweden, Spain, Qatar, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Colombia, the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Czech, Finland, Ukraine, Oman and Israel; signed statement of intent with Turkey.
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<th>United States</th>
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<th>Indonesia</th>
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Reference 33

Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (Past Three Years)

(Apr. 1, 2017 - Mar. 31, 2020)

High-level talks between heads of state and defense ministers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Participants</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jan. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (7th &quot;2+2&quot; Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
<td>Japan, Australia, and Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Minister of Defense of Japan</td>
<td>Japan and Australia (Chief of Staff)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Australia by Vice-Minister of Defense of Japan</td>
<td>Japan and Australia (Chief of Staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Air Force</td>
<td>Japan and Australia (Chief of Staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2017</td>
<td>Telephone Conversation between Japanese and Australian Defense Ministers</td>
<td>Japan and Australia (Chief of Staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-Australian Defense Ministerial Meeting (The Philippines 4th ADMM-Plus)</td>
<td>Japan and Australia (Chief of Staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Australian Prime Minister (summit meeting, meeting with Japanese Defense Minister)</td>
<td>Japan and Australia (Chief of Staff)</td>
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<td>Mar. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Japan and Australia (Chief of Staff)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep. 2018</td>
<td>Telephone Conversation between Japanese and Australian Defense Ministers</td>
<td>Japan and Australia (Chief of Staff)</td>
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<td>Visit to Australia by GSDF Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Japan and Australia (Chief of Staff)</td>
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<td>Japan-Australian Defense Ministerial Meeting (8th &quot;2+2&quot; Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
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<td>Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Navy</td>
<td>Japan and Australia (Chief of Staff)</td>
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<td>Japan-Australian Defense Ministerial Meeting</td>
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<td>Visit to Australia by MSDF Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff, JS</td>
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<td>Feb. 2019</td>
<td>Visit to Australia by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Yamada</td>
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<td>Jun. 2019</td>
<td>Japan-Australian Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore 18th Shangri-La Dialogue)</td>
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<td>Telephone Conversation between Japanese and Australian Defense Ministers</td>
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<td>Nov. 2019</td>
<td>☆:2019 Japan-Australia Defense Ministers Kono-Reynolds joint statement on advancing defense cooperation</td>
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<td>Telephone Conversation between Japanese and Australian Defense Ministers</td>
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Maritime Self-Defense Force

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<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Australia)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Australia</td>
<td>Oct. 13-21</td>
<td>Waters and airspace south of Kanto</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Yamagiri,” submarine</td>
<td>Two vessels F-1 × 1</td>
<td>Navy Frigates HMAS “Melbourne,” HMAS “Parramatta” (Air Force AP-3C × 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bilateral</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cruise training</td>
<td>Nov. 22, 2017</td>
<td>South China Sea</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Onami”</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Frigate HMAS “Melbourne”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep. 16-18</td>
<td>Waters north of Australia</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Sazanami”</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Frigate HMAS “Newcastle”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Australia</td>
<td>May 22-20, 2019</td>
<td>Waters south of Honshu through surrounding Guam</td>
<td>Destroyers JS “Ariake,” and JS “Asahi”</td>
<td>Two vessels</td>
<td>Frigates HMAS “Melbourne,” and HMAS “Parramatta”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bilateral</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Kanto through west of Kyushu via</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>surrounding Okinawa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Air Self-Defense Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Australia)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Australia</td>
<td>Sep. 11-10</td>
<td>Chitose Air Base, Misawa Air Base</td>
<td>Air Defense Command</td>
<td>F-15 × 10 F-2 × 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bilateral</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>and their surrounding airspace</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release.
## Reference 34

**Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (Past Three Years)**

(Apr. 1, 2017 - Mar. 31, 2020)

### Joint Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc (India)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with Indian Navy vessel</td>
<td>Sep. 27, 2018</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Kazuchi”</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Frigate INS “TGS”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with Indian Navy vessel</td>
<td>Nov. 17, 2018</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Kazuchi”</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Patrol vessel INS “SURYAA”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with Indian Navy vessel</td>
<td>Feb. 23, 2019</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Samidara”</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Frigate INS “THAKAO”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Ground Self-Defense Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc (India)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise with the Indian Army in India (Jarmila Guardian)</td>
<td>Oct. 27- Nov. 8, 2018</td>
<td>Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (Mizoram, India) and its surrounding area</td>
<td>Second Company, 52nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Battalion (one major unit of platoon)</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 30 personnel</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 30 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise with the Indian Army in India (Jarmila Guardian)</td>
<td>Oct. 15- Nov. 6, 2019</td>
<td>Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (Mizoram, India) and its surrounding area</td>
<td>7th Company, 34th Infantry Regiment, 1st Battalion</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 30 personnel</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 30 personnel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Maritime Self-Defense Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc (India)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goodwill exercise with the Indian Navy</td>
<td>Sep. 11, 2017</td>
<td>Waters west of India</td>
<td>Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Teruzuki,” Escort Division 6</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Patrol vessel INS “SURYAA”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-India bilateral exercise</td>
<td>Oct. 15, 2017</td>
<td>Waters west of Kyushu</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Koito”</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Frigate INS “Surupa,” Corvette INS “Kadmat”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-India bilateral exercise</td>
<td>Oct. 30, 2017</td>
<td>Waters west of India</td>
<td>Air Patrol Squadron 2</td>
<td>P-3C = 1</td>
<td>P-3C = 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy</td>
<td>Jan. 18, 2018</td>
<td>Mumbai Port (India) and its surrounding waters</td>
<td>28th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Koito,” Escort Division 2</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Frigate INS “TGS”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy</td>
<td>May 5, 2018</td>
<td>Waters and airspace west of Goa (India)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>P-1 = 1 or 2</td>
<td>Frigate INS “Tikika,” 1 submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy</td>
<td>May 13-14, 2016</td>
<td>Visakhapatnam Port (India) and its surrounding waters</td>
<td>28th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Koito,” Escort Division 7</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Destroyer INS “Rajgit,” submarine Several aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy</td>
<td>Oct. 7-15, 2016</td>
<td>Visakhapatnam Port (India) and its surrounding waters</td>
<td>Destroyers JS “Kaga,” and JS “Inazuma”</td>
<td>Two vessels</td>
<td>Missile Frigate INS “Sahyadri,” Corvette INS “Kirti,” and INS “Kadmat” Populair Support Ship INS “Shald” Submarine P-3C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy</td>
<td>Mar. 31, 2019</td>
<td>Andaman Sea</td>
<td>33rd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Agam”</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Patrol vessel INS “Kadmat”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy</td>
<td>Apr. 24, 2019</td>
<td>Waters and airspace off the coast of Goa (India)</td>
<td>5th Air Patrol Squadron</td>
<td>P-3C = 1</td>
<td>1 submarine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy</td>
<td>Apr. 28, 2019</td>
<td>Visakhapatnam Port (India) and its surrounding waters</td>
<td>32nd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Samirat,” Escort Division 4</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Destroyer INS “Rajgit”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-India bilateral exercise</td>
<td>May 23-24, 2016</td>
<td>Waters and airspace north of Sumatra (Andaman Sea)</td>
<td>Destroyers JS “tan,” and JS “Murasame”</td>
<td>Two vessels</td>
<td>Frigate INS “Sahyadri”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy</td>
<td>Dec. 23, 2019</td>
<td>Waters and airspace surrounding Mumbai Port (India)</td>
<td>34th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Sasamani”</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Frigate INS “Tikish,” submarine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**A.D.M.M.-Plus:**

- Visit to Japan by Chief of the Army Staff of Indian Army (Apr. 2017)
- Telephone Conversation between Japanese and Indian Defense Ministers (Nov. 2019)
- Visit to India by Chief of Staff, JS (participated in the Raisina Dialogue) (Dec. 2019)
- Visit to India by Chief of the Army Staff of Indian Army (Nov. 2019)
- Visit to India by Chief of Staff, JS (participated in the Raisina Dialogue) (Dec. 2019)
- Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff (Mar. 2018)

**Regular discussions between defense authorities:**

- Visit to Japan by Chief of the Army Staff of Indian Army (Apr. 2017)
- Visit to India by Chief of Staff, JS (participated in the Raisina Dialogue) (Dec. 2019)
- Visit to India by MSDF Chief of Staff (Jan. 2020)

**Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.:**

- Exchange between fighter pilots (JAF) (Apr. 2019)
- Exchange between the Indian Air Force and air defense-related units, etc. (JAF) (Sep. 2019)
- Japan-U.S.-India trilateral cooperation (Apr. 2018)


Air Self-Defense Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (India)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan-India bilateral exercise (Shinyuu Maitri 2018)</td>
<td>Dec. 1-8, 2018</td>
<td>Apa Air Force Station</td>
<td>3rd Tactical Air/Art Wing</td>
<td>C-2 × 1 Training approximately 20 personnel</td>
<td>C-17 = 1, Av-32 Transport Aircraft = 1, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-India bilateral exercise (Shinyuu Maitri 2019)</td>
<td>Oct. 15-25, 2019</td>
<td>Apa Singh Air Force Station, West Bengal, India</td>
<td>1st Tactical Air/Art Wing</td>
<td>C-130H × 1 Training approximately 20 personnel</td>
<td>C-130J, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release.

Reference 35 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN member states (Past Three Years) (Apr. 1, 2017 - Mar. 31, 2020)

(Indonesia)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Indonesia)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apr. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Vice-Defense Minister of Indonesia (Fukuoka (19th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Suzutsuki,” Escort Division 4</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Corvette KRI “Bung Tomo”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Maritime Self-Defense Force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Indonesia)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(Vietnam)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Vietnam)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(Maritime Self-Defense Force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Vietnam)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goodwill exercise with the Vietnam People’s Navy</td>
<td>Jan. 17, 2019</td>
<td>Off the coast of Cam Ranh</td>
<td>Destroyers JS “Quan,” and JS “Murasame”</td>
<td>Two vessels</td>
<td>Corvette HQ-381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Singapore)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Indonesia)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense</td>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Singapore by MSGF Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Indo-Pacific Deployment 2018 Destroyers JS “Izumo,” JS “Murasame,” and JS “Kaga,” Escort Flotilla 4</td>
<td>Three vessels</td>
<td>Patrol boat KRI “Kura”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Defense of Japan 532
### Maritime Self-Defense Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel etc. (Singapore)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goodwill exercise</td>
<td>May 23, 2017</td>
<td>Waters west of Manila</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Kurama,” Escort Division 6</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Frigate BRP “RAJAH HUMABON”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodwill exercise</td>
<td>Jun. 8, 2017</td>
<td>Waters around the Philippines</td>
<td>Destroyers JS “Izumo,” and JS “Suzukaze”</td>
<td>Two vessels</td>
<td>Frigate BRP “RAJAH HUMABON”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodwill exercise</td>
<td>Sep. 13-14, 2017</td>
<td>Waters and airspace around Palawan Island (the Philippines) (South China Sea and Sulu Sea)</td>
<td>Air Patrol Squadron 5, P-3C × 1</td>
<td>1 patrol vessel</td>
<td>1 patrol aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodwill exercise</td>
<td>Nov. 28, 2017</td>
<td>Waters around the Philippines</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Gumay”</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Corvette BRP “MIGUEL MALVAR”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodwill exercise</td>
<td>Feb. 4, 2018</td>
<td>Manila (the Philippines) and its surrounding waters and airspace</td>
<td>31st Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Akebono,” Escort Division 2</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Frigate BRP “RAJAH HUMABON”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise</td>
<td>May 8, 2018</td>
<td>Waters and airspace around Palawan Island (South China Sea and Sulu Sea)</td>
<td>Destroyers JS “Kaga,” JS “Inazuma,” and JS “Suzukaze”</td>
<td>Three vessels</td>
<td>C-90 × 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise</td>
<td>Sep. 7, 2018</td>
<td>Waters and airspace around Palawan Island (Sulu Sea)</td>
<td>31st Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Kaga,” Escort Division 1</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Phases: C-90, patrol craft BRP “Hestor Reinos” Phases: 2 Corvette BRP “Emilio Jacinto”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise</td>
<td>Jan. 27, 2019 (phase 1), Jan. 31, 2019 (phase 2)</td>
<td>Manila (the Philippines) and its surrounding waters and airspace</td>
<td>31st Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Saraburi,” Escort Division 4</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Submarine chaser BRP “Pedro Mirta” (laid down 2022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise</td>
<td>May 15, 2019</td>
<td>Waters and airspace east of Palawan Island</td>
<td>31st Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Izumo,” Escort Division 4</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Submarine chaser BRP “Piedemontese”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise</td>
<td>Sep. 28, 2019</td>
<td>Port of Subi (the Philippines) and its surrounding waters and airspace</td>
<td>31st Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Akebono”</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Corvette BRP “Emilio Jacinto”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Designation</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Participating Units</td>
<td>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</td>
<td>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Thailand)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodwill exercise with the Royal Thai Navy</td>
<td>Sep. 18, 2017</td>
<td>Waters west of Thailand</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Teruzuki,” Escort Division 6</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Frigate HTMS “CHAO PHRAYA”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodwill exercise with the Royal Thai Navy</td>
<td>Jan. 6, 2020</td>
<td>Phuket Port (Thailand) and its surrounding waters and airspace</td>
<td>34th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Tassanakorn”</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Patrol craft HTMS “Songkola” 5-7 Helicopter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| (Cambodia) | | | | | |
| High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense | | | | | |
| Sep. 2017 | Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice-Ministerial level) (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) | Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum) | Feb. 2020 | Visit to Cambodia by GSDF Chief of Staff (Meeting with Chief of Joint Staff) | Ministry of National Defense (Japan) |

| (Myanmar) | | | | | |
| High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense | | | | | |

| (Laos) | | | | | |
| High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense | | | | | |

| (Malaysia) | | | | | |
| High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense | | | | | |

| Unit-to-unit exchange, etc. | Mar. 2020 | Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs | Ministry of National Defense (Japan) |

| Unit-to-unit exchange, etc. | Mar. 2020 | Visit to Thailand by Chief of Staff | Ministry of National Defense (Japan) |

| Unit-to-unit exchange, etc. | Nov. 2019 | Visit to Japan by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs | Ministry of National Defense (Japan) |


### Maritime Self-Defense Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Brunei)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goodwill exercise</td>
<td>May 12, 2017</td>
<td>Waters around Penang</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Kirisame,” Escort Division 8</td>
<td>One vessel Small frigate KD “JUBAI”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with the Malaysia</td>
<td>Jan. 27, 2018</td>
<td>Port Klang (Malaysia) and its surrounding waters</td>
<td>30th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Amagiri,” Escort Division 2</td>
<td>One vessel Frigate KD “LEKU”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodwill exercise</td>
<td>Dec. 15, 2017</td>
<td>Sagamihara Bay</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Tenzan”</td>
<td>One vessel Destroyers JS “Kurama” and JS “Murasame”</td>
<td>Two vessels Frigate KD “LEKU” and KD “Porter”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Reference

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DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2020
Reference 37   Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries, Canada and New Zealand (Past Three Years)

(Apr. 1, 2017 - Mar. 31, 2020)

(United Kingdom)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (U.K.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field exercise with the U.K. Army in Japan (Aidant talks)</td>
<td>Sep. 30-Oct. 12, 2019</td>
<td>Fuji School, Kita Fuji Maneuver Area, Ojihara Maneuver Area</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Susuzumi,” Underway Replenishment Ship JS “Shiroi Rei”</td>
<td>Three vessels P-3C × 1, Frigate HMS “Sutherland”</td>
<td>Frigate HMS “Albion”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field exercise with the U.K. Army in Japan (Aidant talks)</td>
<td>Sep. 29-Oct. 24, 2019</td>
<td>Garelochhead Training Camp, Stone Camp and area around the Loch Ewe (the U.K.)</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Kaga,” and Js “Inazuma”</td>
<td>Two vessels Frigate HMS “Angil”</td>
<td>One vessel ([\text{British Armed Forces}])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others</td>
<td>Jun. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
<td>Jointly dispatched TIMS 1st Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Brigade</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 60 personnel</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 50 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others</td>
<td>Jun. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to France by State Minister of Defense (Paris Air Show)</td>
<td>Jointly dispatched TIMS 1st Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Brigade</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 60 personnel</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 50 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others</td>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Visit to France by Minister of Armed Forces (4th Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
<td>Jointly dispatched TIMS 1st Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Brigade</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 60 personnel</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 50 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others</td>
<td>Jan. 2019</td>
<td>Visit to France by Minister of Defense (5th Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
<td>Jointly dispatched TIMS 1st Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Brigade</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 60 personnel</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 50 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Designation</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Participating Units</td>
<td>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</td>
<td>Numbers of personnel, etc. (France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the French Navy</td>
<td>Jan. 27, 2020</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS &quot;Kanazawa&quot;</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Aircraft PUMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the French Navy</td>
<td>Feb. 21, 2020</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS &quot;Harauma&quot;</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Frigate FS &quot;FURINN&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the French Navy</td>
<td>Mar. 16, 2020</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Destroyer JS &quot;Harauma&quot;</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Amphibious Assault Ship FS &quot;Mishra&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maritime Self-Defense Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training Designation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others</td>
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<tr>
<td>High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Designation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise with the French Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise with the French Navy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Maritime Self-Defense Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Canada)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise with the Royal Canadian Navy (KAEDEX19-1)</td>
<td>Dec. 19, 2017</td>
<td>Waters south of Honshu</td>
<td>Destroyers JS “Setsuyu,” JS “Hyuga,” and JS “Showa”</td>
<td>Four vessels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Canada bilateral exercise (KAEDEX19-2)</td>
<td>Oct. 16-17, 2019</td>
<td>Waters and airspace south of Kuala Lumpur</td>
<td>Destroyers JS “Shimakaze,” and JS “Chokai”</td>
<td>Two vessels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(new Zealand)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Canada)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visit to New Zealand by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs</td>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>Japan-New Zealand Ministry of Defense Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit to New Zealand by Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Feb. 2019</td>
<td>Waters and airspace off the coast of Vietnam (South China Sea)</td>
<td>Destroyers JS “Uzuma,” JS “Murasame,” and JS “Kumano”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit to New Zealand by Japan-New Zealand Army Commander</td>
<td>Jun. 2019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(NATO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Canada)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visit to Japan by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation NATO</td>
<td>Jun. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-New Zealand Defence Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit to Japan by Secretary General of NATO (talks with Defense Minister)</td>
<td>Oct. 2017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit to NATO by Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Sep. 2017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit to NATO Allied Joint Force Command Naples by Minister of Defense</td>
<td>Jun. 2019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit to Germany by Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Meeting between Minister of Defense and NATO Secretary General (Germany (the 5th Munich Security Conference))</td>
<td>Sep. 2019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Germany)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Canada)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visit to Germany by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs (1st Japan-Germany Biannual Strategic Dialogue)</td>
<td>Jul. 2017</td>
<td>Berlin (International Aerospace Show)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technologies signed</td>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense (Munich Security Conference)</td>
<td>Apr. 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit to Germany by MSDF Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Feb. 2019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit to Germany by MSDF Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Feb. 2019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich Security Conference)</td>
<td>Aug. 2019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Italy)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Canada)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Italy (Defence Ministerial Meeting)</td>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology signed</td>
<td>Sep. 2017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document of exchange between National Institute of Defense Studies and Italian defense research and education organizations signed</td>
<td>Oct. 2017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit to Italy by Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy</td>
<td>Jul. 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit to Italy by Minister of Defense (Defence Ministerial Meeting)</td>
<td>Sep. 2019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Exchange/Meeting Details</td>
<td>Date(s)</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others</td>
<td>Jan. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Sweden by State Minister of Defense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others</td>
<td>Jun. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Deputy Minister of Defense of the Czech Republic (exchanged opinions with Commissioner of ATLA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian Republic</td>
<td>High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others</td>
<td>Feb. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Latvia by Chief of Staff, JS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(EU)</td>
<td>High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others</td>
<td>Feb. 2016</td>
<td>Meeting between Minister of Defense and EU High Representative (Germany (56th Munich Security Conference))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (EU)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the EU (German Navy) in the Gulf of Aden (Germany)</td>
<td>Dec. 1, 2017</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement Air Patrol Squadron 1</td>
<td>P-3C × 2</td>
<td>P-3C × 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint exercise with the EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) (Italy)</td>
<td>Jul. 11, 2018</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Modena,” Escort Division 5</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Frigate ITS “CARLO MARGOTTINI”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)</td>
<td>Aug. 29, 2018</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Modena,” Escort Division 5</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Landing platform dock SPS “CASTILLA”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)</td>
<td>Feb. 2, 2019</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Sanlúcar,” Escort Division 4</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Patro1 vessel ESPS “RELIAMPICO”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)</td>
<td>Mar. 24, 2019</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Sanlúcar,” Escort Division 4</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Frigate SPS “NATIVE”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)</td>
<td>Jan. 18, 2020</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Haraume”</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Frigate SPS “VICTORIA”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint counter-piracy exercise with the EU NAVFOR (Spain)</td>
<td>Feb. 7-8, 2020</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Haraume”</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
<td>Frigate SPS “VICTORIA”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release.
### Reference 38
#### Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (China)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-level talks between heads of defense and others</td>
<td>Oct. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (5th ADMM-Plus))</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Samidare”</td>
<td>1 unit vessel</td>
<td>Destroyer CNS “Taiyuan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-level talks between heads of defense and others</td>
<td>Jun. 2019</td>
<td>Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular discussions between defense authorities</td>
<td>Apr. 2018</td>
<td>15th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Foreign Affairs and Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting) (Tokyo)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular discussions between defense authorities</td>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>7th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China’s defense authorities (Beijing)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.</td>
<td>Dec. 2019</td>
<td>Visit to China by Minister of Defense (Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Hamagiri”</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Destroyer RFS “Admiral Vinogradov”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular discussions between defense authorities</td>
<td>Oct. 2018</td>
<td>1st Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism Annual and Experts Meeting</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Hamagiri”</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Destroyer RFS “Admiral Vinogradov”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-level talks between heads of defense and others</td>
<td>Nov. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff, Russian Army</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Hamagiri”</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Destroyer RFS “Admiral Vinogradov”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-level talks between heads of defense and others</td>
<td>Dec. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff, Russian Military</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Hamagiri”</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Destroyer RFS “Admiral Vinogradov”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-level talks between heads of defense and others</td>
<td>Oct. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Russia by Chief of Staff, JS</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Hamagiri”</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Destroyer RFS “Admiral Vinogradov”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release.

### Reference 39
#### Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Russia)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
<td>Nov. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff, Russian Army</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Hamagiri”</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Destroyer RFS “Admiral Vinogradov”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the Russian Navy</td>
<td>Nov. 10, 2016</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Hamagiri”</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Frigate RFS “YAROSLAV MUDRY”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the Russian Navy</td>
<td>Jul. 20-21, 2020</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Harusame”</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Frigate RFS “YAROSLAV MUDRY”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Russia bilateral search and rescue exercise</td>
<td>Nov. 25, 2017</td>
<td>Port of Vladivostok and waters around Vladivostok</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Hamagiri”</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Destroyer RFS “Admiral Vinogradov”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Russia bilateral search and rescue exercise</td>
<td>Jul. 10-15, 2019</td>
<td>Port of Vladivostok and waters around Vladivostok</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Hamagiri”</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Destroyer RFS “Admiral Vinogradov”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release.</td>
<td>Nov. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff, Russian Navy</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Hamagiri”</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Destroyer RFS “Admiral Vinogradov”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Designation</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Participating Units</td>
<td>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</td>
<td>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
<td>Jul. 5-10, 2018</td>
<td>Malochn Port and waters north of Wakhasa Bay</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Hamagiri”</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Destroyer RFS “Admiral Vinogradov”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Russia bilateral search and rescue exercise</td>
<td>Jul. 10-15, 2019</td>
<td>Port of Vladivostok and waters around Vladivostok</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Hamagiri”</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Destroyer RFS “Admiral Vinogradov”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release.

### Joint Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Russia)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the Russian Navy</td>
<td>Nov. 10, 2016</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Hamagiri”</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Frigate RFS “YAROSLAV MUDRY”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the Russian Navy</td>
<td>Jul. 20-21, 2020</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement Destroyer JS “Harusame”</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Frigate RFS “YAROSLAV MUDRY”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Russia bilateral search and rescue exercise</td>
<td>Nov. 25, 2017</td>
<td>Port of Vladivostok and waters around Vladivostok</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Hamagiri”</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Destroyer RFS “Admiral Vinogradov”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Russia bilateral search and rescue exercise</td>
<td>Jul. 5-10, 2018</td>
<td>Malochn Port and waters north of Wakhasa Bay</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Hamagiri”</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Destroyer RFS “Admiral Vinogradov”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Russia bilateral search and rescue exercise</td>
<td>Jul. 10-15, 2019</td>
<td>Port of Vladivostok and waters around Vladivostok</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Hamagiri”</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Destroyer RFS “Admiral Vinogradov”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release.
Reference 40  Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Pacific Island Countries (Past Three Years)

(Papua New Guinea)

High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others
Mar. 2019  Visit to Papua New Guinea by GSDF Chief of Staff
Feb. 2020  Visit to Papua New Guinea by State Minister of Defense

Reference 41  Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Countries in the Middle East (Past Three Years)

(UAE)

High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others
Nov. 2017  Visit to UAE by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Dubai Air and Space Show)
May 2018  Visit to Japan by UAE Minister of State for Defence Affairs (jagring ceremony for memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation and exchange, Vice-Ministerial Meeting)
Jun. 2018  Visit to UAE by Commissioner of ATLA
Oct. 2018  Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation
Nov. 2018  Visit to UAE by GSDF Chief of Staff (Dubai Air and Space Show)
May 2019  Japan-UAE Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation  Date  Location  Participating Units  Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)  Numbers of personnel, etc. (UAE)
Goodwill exercise with the United Arab Emirates Navy  Apr. 26, 2017  Persian Gulf  Destroyer JS “Kirisame”  One vessel  Patrol boat “MUBARAZ”

(Iran)

High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others
Oct. 2018  Visit to Japan by Minister Responsible for Defence Affairs of Oman
Jan. 2019  Visit to Oman by Minister of Defence (Defence Ministerial Meeting)

Joint Staff

Training Designation  Date  Location  Participating Units  Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)  Numbers of personnel, etc. (Oman)
Bilateral counter-piracy exercise with the Royal Navy of Oman  May 2, 2019  Gulf of Oman  Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement  Destroyer JS “Asagiri”  One vessel  Patrol ship SNV “AL MABRUKAH”

(Maritime Self-Defense Force)

Training Designation  Date  Location  Participating Units  Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)  Numbers of personnel, etc. (Oman)
Goodwill exercise with the Royal Navy of Oman  May 2, 2018  Waters around Duqm Port (Oman)  29th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement  Destroyer JS “Tanigami,” Escort Division 7  One vessel  Frigate SNV “AL MUKAZZAM”
Goodwill exercise with the Royal Navy of Oman  Sep. 1, 2019  Muscat Port (Oman) and its surrounding waters  33rd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement  Destroyer JS “Asagiri”  One vessel  Patrol/Bussey SNV “Al Seeb”
Goodwill exercise with the Royal Navy of Oman  Dec. 21, 2019  Waters and airspace around Duqm Port (Oman)  34th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement  Destroyer JS “Sazanami”  One vessel  Corvet SNV “Al Shamakh”

(UAE)

High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others
Oct. 2019  Visit to Japan by Chief of Joint Staff
Jul. 2018  Visit to Japan by Commissioner of ATLA
Nov. 2017  1st Japan-UAE Military-Military Consultation (Abu Dhabi)

Maritime Self-Defense Force

Training Designation  Date  Location  Participating Units  Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)  Numbers of personnel, etc. (Oman)
Goodwill exercise with the Royal Navy of Oman  Apr. 29, 2017  Persian Gulf (water around Damman)  Destroyer JS “Kirisame,” Escort Division 8  One vessel  Patrol boat HMS “SEIKOU”
(Qatar)

| High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others | May 2019 | Visit to Japan by Minister of State for Defense Affairs of Qatar
| Oct. 2019 | Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation
| Dec. 2019 | Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Meeting (Qatar 19th Doha Forum) |

Regular discussions between defense authorities


(Turkey)

| High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others | Jun. 2019 | Visit to Japan by Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defense of Turkey
| Jul. 2019 | Visit to Japan by Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Turkey |

Regular discussions between defense authorities

Nov. 2017 | 3rd Japan-Turkey Military-Military Consultation (Ankara) |

(Bahrain)

| High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others | May 2017 | Visit to Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
| Dec. 2017 | Visit to Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Manama Dialogue)
| Jun. 2018 | Visit to Bahrain by MSDF Chief of Staff
| Oct. 2018 | Telephone conversation between Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of Bahrain Defense Force
| Nov. 2019 | Meeting between Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of Bahrain Defense Force (Bahrain 15th Manama Dialogue) |

Regular discussions between defense authorities

Nov. 2017 | 2nd Japan-Jordan Military-Military Consultation (Manama) |

(Jordan)

| High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others | Dec. 2019 | Visit to Jordan by Minister of Defense (meeting with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-Lieutenant General Hasan Fouad)

Regular discussions between defense authorities

Oct. 2019 | Meeting between Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief of Bahrain Defense Force |

(Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release.

**Reference 42** Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with South Asian Countries (Past Three Years)

(Sri Lanka)

| High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others | Jul. 2017 | Visit to Sri Lanka by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
| Jul. 2019 | Visit to Sri Lanka by Sri Lankan State Minister of Defense
| Nov. 2019 | Visit to Sri Lanka by Chief of Staff |

Regular discussions between defense authorities

Aug. 2018 | Visit to Sri Lanka by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
| Jul. 2019 | Visit to Sri Lanka by State Minister of Defense |

Unit-to-unit exchanges, etc. | Mar. 2019 | Dispatch of ASDF U-4 to Sri Lanka (overseas flight training and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges) |

**Maritime Self-Defense Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Sri Lanka)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goodwill exercise with the Sri Lanka Navy</td>
<td>Dec. 22, 2017</td>
<td>Trincomalee Port (Sri Lanka) and its surrounding waters</td>
<td>29th Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Setagiri,” Escort Division 7</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodwill exercise with the Sri Lanka Navy</td>
<td>Aug. 5, 2018</td>
<td>Waters east of Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Air Patrol Squadron 2</td>
<td>P-3C × 1</td>
<td>One aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodwill exercise with the Sri Lanka Navy</td>
<td>Aug. 22, 2018</td>
<td>Trincomalee Port (Sri Lanka) and its surrounding waters</td>
<td>31st Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Kaga,” Escort Division 1</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise with the Sri Lanka Armed Forces</td>
<td>Jan. 27, 2019</td>
<td>Waters and airspace off the coast of Hambantota (Sri Lanka)</td>
<td>Air Patrol Squadron 2</td>
<td>P-3C × 2</td>
<td>Two Navy’s vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise with the Sri Lanka Navy</td>
<td>Jan. 21, 2020</td>
<td>Waters and airspace west of Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Air Patrol Squadron 2</td>
<td>P-3C × 2</td>
<td>Fast Missile Vessel SLNS “Saranamika”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Pakistan)

| Regular discussions between defense authorities | Apr. 2018 | 9th Japan-Pakistan Military-Military Consultation (Tokyo)
| Jun. 2019 | 10th Japan-Pakistan Military-Military Consultation (Islamabad) |

Regular discussions between defense authorities

May 2017 | Visit to ASDF units, etc. by Pakistan Air Force (Ichigaya, Hamamatsu) |

**Maritime Self-Defense Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating Units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Pakistan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise with the Pakistan Navy (Pro-AMAN)</td>
<td>Jan. 10, 2019</td>
<td>Karachi Port (Pakistan) and its surrounding waters and airspace</td>
<td>31st Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Kaga,” Escort Division 1</td>
<td>One vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise with the Pakistan Navy (Pro-AMAN)</td>
<td>Jan. 25, 2019</td>
<td>Waters and airspace off the coast of Karachi (Pakistan)</td>
<td>Air Patrol Squadron 2</td>
<td>P-3C × 2</td>
<td>Two vessels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release.
Reference 43  Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries (Past Three Years)

**Kazakhstan**
- High-level exchanges between heads of defense and other officials.  
  - Jul. 2017: Visit to Kazakhstan by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense  
  - Japan-Kazakhstan memorandum for defense exchange signed

**Brazil**
- High-level exchanges between heads of defense and other officials.  
  - Apr. 2018: Visit to Brazil by State Minister of Defense  
  - Jul. 2019: Visit to Japan by Brazilian Army Commander

**Mongolia**
- High-level exchanges between heads of defense and other officials.  
  - Dec. 2019: Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting

**Others**
- High-level exchanges between heads of defense and other officials.  
  - May 2017: Visit to Djibouti by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense  
  - Jul. 2017: Visit to Japan by Commander of the Chief of the Army of Chile  
  - Dec. 2017: Visit to Austria, Serbia Montenegro by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs

Maritime Self-Defense Force

**Goodwill exercise with the Maldives National Defence Force**
- Apr. 25, 2019: Port of Male (Maldives) and its surrounding waters  
  - 32nd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement  
  - Destroyer JS “Samidare,” Escort Division 4  
  - One vessel Maldivian Coast Guard ship “Huravee”

**Goodwill exercise with the Maldives National Defence Force**
- Jul. 22, 2019: Waters and Airspace east of Maldives  
  - Air Patrol Squadron 2  
  - P-3C × 1 Maldivian Coast Guard ship “Shaheed Ali”

Maritime Self-Defense Force

**Goodwill exercise with the Bangladesh Navy**
- Oct. 8, 2019: Chattogram (People’s Republic of Bangladesh) and its surrounding waters  
  - Minesweeper Tender JS “Takashima,” Minesweeper Division 3  
  - Two vessels Corvette BNS “Prottoy,” Patrol Craft BNS “Dhoby”

(Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release.

Reference 44  Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Indo-Pacific Region, Past Three Years)


**Dialogue**
- ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)
  - Ministerial Meeting
  - ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSIOM-Plus)
  - ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting Working Group (ADSIOM-Plus WG)
  - Experts’ Working Group (EWG)

**Date**

**Hosted by the private sector**
- ISSI Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)
- ISSI Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)

**Hosted by the Government**
- Doha Forum

**Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum**

**Forum for Defense Authorities in the Indo-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)**
- (May 2018, Mar. 2019)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Dialogue</th>
<th>Outline</th>
<th>Recent Situations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum</strong></td>
<td>Hosted by the Ministry of Defense since 2009. Vice-ministerial level officials from the defense authorities of ASEAN countries are invited to Japan to hold candid dialogues on regional security issues. The objective is to strengthen multilateral and bilateral relations by building close interpersonal relationships.</td>
<td>In October 2019, the MOD held the eleventh Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum in Tokyo, in which vice-ministerial level officials from all ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat participated to exchange their frank and constructive views on three themes: Regional Security Situation; Visions for the Indo-Pacific; Towards the Free and Open Regional Order; and ASEAN’s initiatives for Regional Defense Cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)</strong></td>
<td>Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 1996 with Director-General-level officials in charge of defense policy and defense exchanges, all of who are from the Asia-Pacific region, participating. The forum is designed to provide defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on ways to promote confidence building focusing on the defense field.</td>
<td>The 23rd Forum, held in March 2019, was attended by 37 countries (25 Asia-Pacific countries, France and the United Kingdom) as well as the ASEAN Secretariat, the EU and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The participants discussed a wide range of matters in the context of the themes of the Forum, “security issues in the Indo-Pacific region” and “changing security challenges and prospects.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GS Dialogue (GSD)</strong></td>
<td>Hosted by the GSDF for the first time in 2017, this dialogue provides a platform for the army and other services of like-minded countries that has close ties with the GSDF to exchange views on multilateral engagement in the Asia-Pacific region for the armies to actively contribute to regional peace and stability.</td>
<td>In February 2018, with the participation of five service branches from four countries to include the U.S. (including the Marines), Australia, the U.K. and France, group discussions under the theme of “Direction of defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region the army should aim for” and field trip to the GSDF Chemical School were carried out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST)</strong></td>
<td>Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, inviting officers in charge of logistics support from major countries in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on logistics system.</td>
<td>The 23rd Multi-beat Logistics Staff Talks (MLST) meeting was held in November 2019. The participants were working-level officers in charge of logistics sent from armies in 25 countries in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe. Views were exchanged under the theme “Logistic in Urban Disaster Response (including Measures for the Olympic Games).”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asia Pacific Naval College Seminar (APNCS)</strong></td>
<td>Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1998 with the participation of naval college staff from the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on the roles of naval forces with a view to encouraging school education/research and contributing to the promotion of defense exchange and mutual understanding between participating countries.</td>
<td>The 22nd seminar was held in February 2019 with the participation of navy military personnel from 18 countries, and personnel from Keio University, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), IBC Consulting &amp; Publishing Group, and Sasagawa Peace Foundation. Presentations by the participants and active opinion exchanges were conducted on the theme of “Cooperation among Navies in a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” In addition, unit and cultural study tours were also held to deepen the understanding of the MSDF as well as Japanese culture and history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Western Pacific Naval Symposium Short Term Exchange Program (WPNS STEP)</strong></td>
<td>Hosted by the MSDF, this program has been held annually since 2011, with the participation of junior naval officers from the WPNS countries. The program is designed to provide them with opportunities to deepen their understanding of Japan’s security environment, defense policy and buildup, and culture and history.</td>
<td>With the participation of naval officers and other personnel from 27 countries, the 9th WPNS STEP was held in October 2019. Presentations and exchange of candid views were carried out with regard to new initiatives by each navy and future equipment under the theme of “Cooperation among Navies in a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan Air Self-Defense Force Air Staff College Seminar</strong></td>
<td>Hosted by the JASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2015, providing participants related to air staff colleges mainly from the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on officers’ education. (From 1996 to 2014, this seminar was held as International Air Force Education Seminar.)</td>
<td>Air staff college personnel and researchers from five countries were invited in November 2019 to provide keynote speeches and presentations and to exchange their views on the theme of “How to Formulate Deterrent Strategies for Today.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Air Command and Staff Seminar</strong></td>
<td>Hosted by the JASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with the participation of students of air staff college students from the Asia-Pacific region. This program is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on security and roles of nations.</td>
<td>With the participation of air staff college students from 18 countries, the 19th seminar was held in October 2019. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Reflections Based on the Current Status and Challenges of Air Forces.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Seminar on Defense Science</strong></td>
<td>Hosted by the National Defense Academy since 1996, this seminar provides opportunities to discuss international affairs and security by inviting military academy representatives from the Asia-Pacific regions.</td>
<td>The 21st International Seminar on Defense Science was held in July 2016, inviting 10 countries. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Commitment to national cybersecurity by military academy and services in education and research.” This seminar ended in 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Cadets’ Conference</strong></td>
<td>Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this conference has been held annually since 1998 with the participation of cadets from each country. The conference is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on military in the 21st century.</td>
<td>In March 2019, the 22nd conference was held, and opinions were exchanged on the theme of “The Changing World and Consistent Belief.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Security Colloquium</strong></td>
<td>Hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, this seminar has been held annually since 1999 with officials at home and abroad knowledgeable about defense being invited. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities for advanced and professional reports and discussions on security issues in addition to enhancing public awareness of security issues.</td>
<td>In December 2019, this symposium was held as the 21st international symposium by inviting recognized researchers and practitioners from such countries as the United States, Russia, and Australia, as well as from Japan. Participants exchanged opinions under the theme of “Belt and Road Initiative and the Future of the International Order.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Forum on War History</strong></td>
<td>Hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with participation by military historians. The forum is designed to deepen the mutual understanding of its participants by making comparative studies of military history.</td>
<td>In September 2019, the 17th International Forum on War History was held by inviting recognized researchers and practitioners from such countries as the United States, and the United Kingdom, Australia, as well as from Japan. Participants exchanged opinions under the theme of “Unexpected Expansion of Conflicts.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASEAN Workshop</strong></td>
<td>Hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, this workshop-style group study session has been held annually since 2010 to discuss emerging security issues that the Asia-Pacific region faces in common. Since 2018, participating regions are limited to ASEAN countries.</td>
<td>In February 2020, researchers from the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand were invited, and they exchanged opinions under the theme of “US-China Strategic Competition.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Other Multilateral Security Dialogues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Multilateral Security Dialogue</th>
<th>Overview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus)</td>
<td>Started in October 2010. It is the only defense ministerial meeting in the Asia-Pacific region hosted by governments, including Japan, which provides opportunities to exchange views on issues related to regional security. It was decided in the 4th ADMM-Plus held in October 2017 that this meeting will take place annually instead of biennially.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting</td>
<td>First held in 2014. It is a platform for defense ministers of all of the ASEAN nations and Japan to discuss a wide spectrum of security-related issues, and to exchange views on concrete action plans to develop future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
<td>A forum that started in 1994, designed to improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region through political and security dialogue and cooperation. Currently 26 countries (10 ASEAN nations (Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia since 1995, Myanmar since 1996), Japan, Australia, Canada, China, India (since 1996), New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the ROK, Russia, the U.S., Mongolia (since 1998), North Korea (since 2000), Pakistan (since 2004), Timor-Leste (since 2005), Bangladesh (since 2006), Sri Lanka (since 2007), and 1 organization (EU) are members of the forum. Authorities in charge of diplomacy and defense meet through various government-to-government meetings to discuss the current regional situation and security area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Military Operations Research Symposium (AMORS)</td>
<td>AMORS is a forum held by Asia-Pacific countries on a rotational basis to exchange views on defense operations and research technology. Japan has participated in the forum since the second meeting in 1993.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul Defense Dialogue (SDD)</td>
<td>This event, hosted by the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK and participated in by the defense vice ministers of Asia-Pacific and Western countries, is a forum for exchanging opinions regarding regional security issues, including the issues of the Korean Peninsula. Japan has participated since the first meeting in 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doha Forum</td>
<td>Doha Forum is an international conference hosted by the Government of Qatar and participated in by ministers and government officials, intellectuals, and personnel from international organizations specialized in diplomacy, security, global issues, climate change, and emerging technologies, etc., and energy-related problems. Participants have unrestricted discussions. The Forum has been held every year since 2001, and the one in December 2019 was the 19th, in which Japan participated for the first time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD)</td>
<td>CHOD is an annual conference hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries on a rotational basis. Senior defense officials and others of Asia-Pacific countries meet to exchange views on security issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1998.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)</td>
<td>PASOLS is a seminar hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis mainly to exchange information on logistic-support activities. Japan’s participation in the seminar as an official member started in 1995 when the 24th session was held. The 47th Seminar was held with participation of nearly 30 countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raisina Dialogue</td>
<td>Raisina Dialogue is an international conference co-hosted by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, and the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) and participated in by Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers, Chiefs of Staff, etc, from over 100 countries worldwide. Participants discuss matters in diverse fields including the field of security. The IND has participated in the Dialogue since its third session in 2018 (1st: Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; 2nd: Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs; 3rd: Chief of Joint Staff and Special Advisor to the Prime Minister; 4th and 5th: Chief of Joint Staff).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)</td>
<td>PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every other year when PAMS is held. Army Chiefs of Asia-Pacific countries and others meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1999. The conference was held in Japan for the first time in 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Armies Management Seminars (PAMS)</td>
<td>PAMS is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about efficient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Asia-Pacific region can develop their ground troops. The IND has participated in PAMS since the 17th meeting in 1993. The 33rd seminar was held in Japan in 2009 at the same time as PACC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Army Land Forces Seminar</td>
<td>LANPAC is a symposium hosted by AUSA annually in Hawaii. Through panel discussions and consultations, high-level land force officials from the Indo-Pacific region exchange opinions on strategic issue in the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Amphibious Leaders Symposium (PALS)</td>
<td>This seminar was called “Chief of Army’s Exercise (CAEX)” until 2016. It is an exercise hosted by the Australian Army every other year. Senior officers of the Australian Army as well as the heads of land forces in the Asia-Pacific region and experts attend and exchange a wide range of views on issues facing the land forces in the region. The GSF participated in CAEX for the first time in 2012. In September 2014, the GSF Chief of Staff attended for the first time and delivered an address.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Meeting of the Association of U.S. Army (AUSA)</td>
<td>Hosted annually by AUSA in Washington, D.C., the Chief and Vice-Chief of Staff of the GSF participate in the meeting, exchange opinions among the General-class officers from the U.S. Army, and deliver speeches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Sea Power Symposium (ISS)</td>
<td>ISS is a symposium hosted by the United States every other year. Navy Chief of Staff of member countries and others meet to exchange views on common issues for their navies. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)</td>
<td>WPNS is a symposium hosted by a member country on a rotational basis every other year when ISS is not held. Senior navy officials and others of Western Pacific countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International MCM Seminar</td>
<td>This seminar is hosted by a WPNS member country on a rotational basis to exchange views on minesweeping in a year when minesweeping exercises are not conducted in the Western Pacific. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 2000. Japan’s MSDF hosted this seminar in Yokosuka in October 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Pacific Submarine Conference</td>
<td>Hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries in the Asia-Pacific region on a rotational basis to exchange views on issues centered around submarine rescue. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2001. The MSDF hosted the conference in October 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)</td>
<td>This symposium is held every two years hosted by a different participating country on a rotational basis. It is a platform for the Navy Chief of Staff from the Indian Ocean coastal countries to exchange their opinions concerning the maritime security of the Indian Ocean. Japan has participated since the third event in 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAN Sea Power Conference (SPC)</td>
<td>Held biennially as part of the Pacific International Maritime Exposition. As many navies send their Chief of Staff or Admirals to this conference, the conference serves as a platform for bilateral and multilateral exchange.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS)</td>
<td>Biennially hosted by the Italian Navy. Mostly attended by Chief of Staff of Navy from NATO nations who gather to exchange views on common naval challenges. Japan has participated since the 7th symposium in 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Maritime Security Symposium (IMSS)</td>
<td>Hosted by the Indonesian Navy every other year. Navy Chief of Staff from mostly Western Pacific nations exchange opinions on maritime security issues. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galle Dialogue</td>
<td>Hosted by the Sri Lankan Navy annually. Navy Chief of Staff from nations around the Indian Ocean exchange views on maritime security challenges. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Multilateral Security Dialogue</td>
<td>Overview</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS)</td>
<td>PACS is a conference hosted by the United States every other year with senior air force officials such as Air Chiefs and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1989.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space Symposium</td>
<td>Space Symposium is hosted by the United States every year with senior air force officials such as Air Chiefs and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the symposium since the 35th meeting in 2019.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACRIM Airpower Symposium</td>
<td>This symposium is held every year and hosted jointly by the U.S. and other participating countries on a rotational basis (it was held twice in 1996 and 1997). It is a platform for the Chiefs of Air Operations in the Pacific Rim to exchange their opinions. Japan has participated in this symposium since the first event held in 1995.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air and Space Power Conference</td>
<td>Air and Space Power Conference hosted by the Royal Air Force of the United Kingdom is held every year and Chiefs of Staff of Air Forces exchange views on issues in the aerospace held in line with themes set up for each year. Japan has participated in this conference eight times since its first participation in 2009 (also participated in the conference held in 2019).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Power Conference (APC)</td>
<td>APC is an international conference hosted by Australia every other year to exchange views on power. Japan has participated in this conference six times since 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Symposium</td>
<td>Air Force Symposium is hosted by the Philippine Air Force annually to exchange opinions under the themes concerning security. Japan has participated in this symposium four times since 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerospace Medicine Conference</td>
<td>Aerospace Medicine Conference is hosted by the Indian Air Force annually to exchange opinions concerning aerospace medicine. Japan participated in this conference for the first time in 2019.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubai International Air Chiefs Conference</td>
<td>Dubai International Air Chiefs Conference is hosted by the UAE Air Force biennially. Chiefs of Staff of Air Forces gather and exchange opinions on issues in line with themes set up for each year. Japan has participated in this conference four times since 2013 (also participated in the conference held in 2019).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombo Air Symposium</td>
<td>Colombo Air Symposium is hosted by the Sri Lankan Air Force annually to exchange opinions concerning air power and air strategy. Japan has participated in this symposium three times since 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Flight Training International Conference</td>
<td>Military Flight Training International Conference is hosted by the PLA Air Force biennially to exchange opinions concerning flight training, etc. Japan has participated in this conference twice since 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symposium hosted by the Air University's China Aerospace Studies Institute</td>
<td>The symposium is hosted by the Air University’s CASI to exchange opinions concerning China’s aerospace activities. Japan participated in the symposium for the first time in 2018. (The symposium was not held in 2019 due to circumstances on the U.S. side.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference (APIC)</td>
<td>Hosted in turn by the United States Pacific Command and participating countries, the Conference serves as a place for the exchange of opinions among intelligence chiefs and other officials from the defense ministries of countries in the Asia-Pacific region and other areas. Alongside exchanges of opinions on issues pertaining to regional security, the Conference is also aimed at contributing to the nurturing of relationships of trust between the respective countries, as well as at the sharing of information. It was hosted for the first time in February 2011 by the Department of Current and Crisis Intelligence, and was attended by 28 countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Heads of Defense Universities, Colleges and Institutions Meeting</td>
<td>Defense universities and other educational institutions from the ARF member countries take turns and hold a meeting once a year. The host plays the central role in making a decision on the themes with respect to global security issues in the Asia-Pacific region and the role of defense educational and research institutions, and the meeting takes place in the form of presentations and question-and-answer sessions based on certain themes. From Japan, National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending all of the meetings since the first meeting in 1997, and hosted the fifth meeting in Tokyo in 2001. In September 2018, the 22nd meeting was held in Tokyo for the first time in 17 years. Japan participated in the conference held in Singapore in November 2019.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Defense College Conference of Commandants (CoC)</td>
<td>CoC is an annual international conference hosted by the NATO Defense College, defense educational institutions from NATO member countries and NATO partner countries in turn. During the meeting, the heads of participating educational institutions exchange opinions from the perspective of improving advanced defense education, while at the same time the meeting focuses on the promotion of educational exchange among the heads of the educational institutions, NATO member countries, and the dialogue partners in the Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Mediterranean region. From Japan, National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending most of the conferences since FY2009 (no invitation in FY2013). Japan participated in the conference held in Italy in May 2019.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)</td>
<td>Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2002 with defense ministers and others of the Asia-Pacific region participating to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. From Japan, the Minister of Defense has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2002 (except for the 3rd and 11th conferences in 2004 and 2012; and the State Minister of Defence participated in the 11th conference).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASS Fullerton Forum</td>
<td>A Shangri-La meeting (preparation meeting) for the Shangri-La Dialogue hosted by the IASS. Defense authorities (director / vice chief level) of the countries that attend the Shangri-La Dialogue exchange opinions on regional security issues. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2013.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASS Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)</td>
<td>Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2004. Foreign and defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior official’s level for the first time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the State Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th, 12th and 13th conferences in 2010, 2016, and 2017. The Defense Minister participated in the 15th Conference for the first time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich Security Conference</td>
<td>The Conference was established in 1962. It is one of the most prestigious international conferences on security in Western countries. Foreign dignitaries such as Cabinet members, Diet/Parliament members, officers of defense authorities from Germany, which is the host country, NATO member countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, etc.), Russia, and central and eastern Europe countries attended. Japan participated for the first time in the 45th Conference in 2009, sending the Minister of Defense. The State Minister of Defense participated in the 52nd, 53rd, 54th and 55th Conferences in 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019. Defense Minister Kono participated in the 56th Conference in February 2020.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halifax International Security Forum</td>
<td>Hosted by Halifax International Security Forum with the support of the Canadian Department of National Defense, the Forum is attended by many government officials from the United States and Europe (including NATO Ministers and Defense Ministers from each EU country), who exchange opinions on security at the Forum. Japan has participated since the first Conference in 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)</td>
<td>Organized mainly by the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California, San Diego, this dialogue is designed for participants — private-sector researchers and government officials from member countries (China, North Korea, Japan, the ROK, Russia and the United States) — to freely exchange their views on security situations and confidence-building measures in the region. Japan has participated in the dialogue since the first meeting in 1993 (except in 2018).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Having contributed to the enhancement of ASEAN’s capabilities as a whole, especially in
III. Means: As part of a concerted whole of government effort, JMOD conducts practical cooperation by combining the following diverse mea-
II. Ways: On the basis of the above three principles, Japan aims to support ASEAN centrality, unity and resilience by taking the following
I. Ends: With a view to ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific that holds Southeast Asia as its hinge, the Japan Ministry of Defense aims to

As the hinge connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans, ASEAN is the key to regional cooperation.

Promoting further practical cooperation to support ASEAN’s resilience, and in turn, its centrality and unity

Redefining the Vientiane Vision in line with the concept of the “Indo-Pacific”

I. Three Principles for Japan’s Defense Cooperation with ASEAN
(1) Heart-to-heart Cooperation: Upholding ASEAN’s principles, valuing people-to-people connections and listening sincerely to partners’ needs
(2) Tailored and Lasting Cooperation: Pursuing sustainable outcomes through well-planned, transparent and ongoing engagement
(3) Equal and Open Cooperation: Pursuing wide-ranging international collaboration that supports ASEAN centrality, unity and resilience

I. Ends: With a view to ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific that holds Southeast Asia as its hinge, the Japan Ministry of Defense aims to

⇒ Pursuing further practical cooperation to support ASEAN’s resilience, and in turn, its centrality and unity

II. Ways: On the basis of the above three principles, Japan aims to support ASEAN centrality, unity and resilience by taking the following approaches with special emphasis on the three key areas of cooperation.

(i) Approaches based on the principles of ASEAN centrality and unity

⇒ With a view to upholding ASEAN centrality, Japan promotes international collaboration between ASEAN member states and countries outside ASEAN, with a central emphasis on ASEAN-led frameworks
⇒ With a view to upholding ASEAN unity, Japan promotes confidence-building and interoperability among ASEAN member states by enhancing connectivity and promoting shared norms and practices among defense authorities

(ii) Key areas of cooperation with a view to upholding ASEAN’s resilience

⇒ Ensuring the rule of law: Promoting the development and sharing of universal norms regarding the sea and air space
⇒ Strengthening maritime security: Promoting ASEAN’s efforts to enhance maritime domain awareness capabilities, and supporting individual states’ efforts to enhance their national security, and in turn, regional peace and stability
⇒ Assisting ASEAN’s organizational responses to regional challenges: Promoting ASEAN’s efforts to enhance its capacity to deal with natural disasters and non-traditional threats

III. Means: As part of a concerted whole of government effort, JMOD conducts practical cooperation by combining the following diverse mea-

(i) Promoting Shared Understanding of International Norms: Holding programs such as seminars with a view to share knowledge on international norms and practices
(ii) Defense Cooperation Program: Assisting ASEAN’s proactive efforts for enhancing its collective capabilities by sending JSDF personnel to Southeast Asia, and inviting ASEAN practitioners to Japan
(iii) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation: Transferring equipment and technology, developing human resources, holding seminars on defense industries, etc.
(iv) Joint Training and Exercises: Conducting bilateral and multilateral joint exercises, expanding forms of participation and inviting ASEAN observers to JSDF training
(v) Human Resource Development and Academic Exchanges: Reinforcing human networks among students and trainees, inviting opinion leaders to Japan, etc.
## Participation in Multilateral Exercise (Past Three Years)

### Joint Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participating countries</th>
<th>Participating SDF units</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</th>
<th>Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan-France-U.K.-U.S. Four-Country Training (Joint training in the United States in FY2017)</td>
<td>May 3-22, 2017</td>
<td>Waters and airspace around Japan; Guam (the U.S.) and its surrounding waters and airspace</td>
<td>France, the U.K., the U.S.</td>
<td>Joint Staff, Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Western Army, Signal Brigade, Central Transportation Management Command, Self-Defense Fleet, Yokosuka District, Landing Ship Jls “Kurmisaki”</td>
<td>1 vessel CH-47 × 1</td>
<td>Approximately 220 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Exercise hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Equateur 2017)</td>
<td>Sep. 4-15, 2017</td>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>France, Australia, Tonga, New Zealand, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the U.S., the U.K., and Japan</td>
<td>Joint Staff College</td>
<td>1 personnel</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise hosted by Australia (Pacific Shield 17)</td>
<td>Sep. 6-9, 2017</td>
<td>Australia (Cairns and its surrounding waters and airspace)</td>
<td>Australia, the U.S., New Zealand, the ROK, Singapore and others (20 countries in total, including observer countries)</td>
<td>Joint Staff (participating in table-top exercises) MSDF (participating in field training)</td>
<td>(Table-top exercises) 1 personnel (Field training) P-3C × 1, approximately 20 personnel</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 18</td>
<td>Jan. 21-Feb. 23, 2018</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Thailand, the U.S., Indonesia, Singapore, the ROK, Malaysia, India, China</td>
<td>Joint Staff, etc., GSDF, MSDF, ASDF</td>
<td>C-130H × 1</td>
<td>Approximately 150 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise hosted by Japan (Pacific Shield 18)</td>
<td>Jul. 24-26, 2018</td>
<td>Yokosuka Port; waters and airspace off the coast of Izu Peninsula</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia, New Zealand, the ROK, Singapore and others (19 observer countries)</td>
<td>Internal Bureau, Joint Staff, Ground Component Command, Eastern Army, GSDF Chemical School, Self-Defense Fleet, Yokosuka District</td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
<td>Approximately 280 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 19</td>
<td>Jan. 14-Feb. 23, 2019</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Thailand, the U.S., Indonesia, Singapore, the ROK, Malaysia, India, China</td>
<td>Joint Staff, etc., GSDF, MSDF, ASDF</td>
<td>C-130H × 1</td>
<td>Approximately 170 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMM-Plus Military Medicine Field Training Exercise (MEDEX-2019)</td>
<td>Mar. 8-18, 2019</td>
<td>Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh (India)</td>
<td>India, Myanmar, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, China, New Zealand, the ROK, Russia, the U.S.</td>
<td>Joint Staff, Western Army and GSDF Chemical School</td>
<td>Approximately 15 personnel</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI Exercise hosted by the ROK (Eastern Endeavor 19)</td>
<td>Jul. 10-11, 2019</td>
<td>Busan</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia, New Zealand, the ROK, Singapore and others (observer countries)</td>
<td>Joint Staff, GSDF Chemical School</td>
<td>3 personnel</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMM-Plus H/COR Exercise (staff training and communication training)</td>
<td>Jul. 30-Aug. 1, 2019</td>
<td>Staff training: Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur) Communication training: Ichigaya</td>
<td>Malaysia, the U.S., Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, the ROK, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam</td>
<td>Joint Staff, Defense Intelligence Headquarters</td>
<td>Approximately 5 personnel</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Exercise hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Equateur 2019)</td>
<td>Sep. 21-Oct. 5, 2019</td>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>France, Australia, Canada, Fiji, Indonesia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, the U.K., the U.S., Vanuatu</td>
<td>Joint Staff, Joint Staff College</td>
<td>3 personnel</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO cyber defense exercise (Cyber Coalition 2019)</td>
<td>Dec. 2-4, 2019</td>
<td>Estonia, Japan</td>
<td>NATO member countries, NATO partner countries, EU</td>
<td>Internal Bureau, Joint Staff, Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command</td>
<td>Approximately 20 personnel</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 20</td>
<td>Jan. 26-Mar. 9, 2020</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Thailand, the U.S., Indonesia, Singapore, the ROK, Malaysia, India, China</td>
<td>Joint Staff, etc., GSDF, MSDF, ASDF</td>
<td>C-130H × 1</td>
<td>Approximately 240 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Participating countries</td>
<td>Participating SDF units</td>
<td>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</td>
<td>Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australian Army-Hosted Shooting Convention</td>
<td>May 13-26, 2017</td>
<td>Puckapunyal training area (Victoria, Australia)</td>
<td>Australia, etc.</td>
<td>Fuji School, respective Regional Armies, Central Readiness Force</td>
<td>Approximately 20 personnel</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Training with U.S. and Australian Forces in Australia (Southern Jacksons)</td>
<td>May 17-28, 2017</td>
<td>Mount Bundy Training Area, etc. (Darwin, Australia)</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia</td>
<td>17th Infantry Regiment, 12th Brigade, Middle Army</td>
<td>Approximately 100 personnel</td>
<td>(Australian Army: Approximately 300 personnel, U.S. Army: Approximately 150 personnel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Exercise Khan Quest</td>
<td>Jul. 23-Aug. 5, 2017</td>
<td>Mongolia (Five Hills Training Area)</td>
<td>Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Canada, China, Colombia, Fiji, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, the ROK, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, the U.K., the U.S., Vietnam</td>
<td>Central Readiness Force, Joint Staff, etc.</td>
<td>46 personnel</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 1,000 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Army-Hosted Shooting Convention</td>
<td>Apr. 27-May 11, 2018</td>
<td>Puckapunyal training area (Victoria, Australia)</td>
<td>Australia, etc.</td>
<td>Ground Component Command, respective Regional Armies, Fuji School, etc.</td>
<td>Approximately 20 personnel</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Training with U.S. and Australian Forces in Australia (Southern Jacksons)</td>
<td>May 7-Jun. 8, 2018</td>
<td>Townsville Field Training Area (Queensland, Australia)</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia</td>
<td>2nd Infantry Regiment, 12th Brigade</td>
<td>Approximately 130 personnel</td>
<td>(Australian Army: Approximately 270 personnel, U.S. Army: Approximately 50 personnel, U.S. Marines: Approximately 180 personnel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Exercise Khan Quest</td>
<td>Jun. 14-28, 2018</td>
<td>Mongolia (Five Hills Training Area)</td>
<td>Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Cambodia, Canada, China, Czech, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kirgiz, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Qatar, the ROK, Singapore, Tajikistan, Turkey, Russia, the U.K., the U.S.</td>
<td>Ground Component Command</td>
<td>Approximately 40 personnel</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas deployment training (RIMPAC2018)</td>
<td>Jun. 15-Aug. 5, 2018</td>
<td>Hawaii, etc. (the U.S.)</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Columbia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, the ROK, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, the U.K., Vietnam (prospective participating countries at the time of release)</td>
<td>Ground Component Command; Western Field Artillery Unit; 5th Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment; 2nd Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade; International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit, etc.</td>
<td>Approximately 180 personnel</td>
<td>Approximately 780 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-Philippines joint exercise (KAMANDAG 18)</td>
<td>Sep. 8-Oct. 23, 2018</td>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>The U.S., the Philippines</td>
<td>Ground Component Command HQs, Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, Central Readiness Regiment</td>
<td>80 personnel</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Army-Hosted Shooting Convention</td>
<td>Mar. 23-Apr. 5, 2019</td>
<td>Puckapunyal training area (Victoria, Australia)</td>
<td>Australia, etc.</td>
<td>Ground Component Command, respective Regional Armies, Fuji School, etc.</td>
<td>Approximately 20 personnel</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Exercise Khan Quest</td>
<td>Jun. 14-28, 2019</td>
<td>Mongolia (Five Hills Training Area)</td>
<td>Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, China, El Salvador, Fiji, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Malaysia, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, Qatar, the ROK, Rwanda, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Togo, the U.K., Ukraine, Uruguay, the U.S., Vietnam, Zambia</td>
<td>Ground Component Command, etc.</td>
<td>Approximately 60 personnel</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Training Exercise ADMM-Plus Expert Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>Sep. 8-22, 2019</td>
<td>Indonesian National Armed Forces Peacekeeping Mission Center</td>
<td>10 ASEAN countries, the U.S., Australia, China, India, New Zealand, the ROK, Russia</td>
<td>Ground Component Command, etc.</td>
<td>Approximately 20 personnel</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-Philippines joint exercise (KAMANDAG 19)</td>
<td>Oct. 6-23, 2019</td>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>The U.S., the Philippines</td>
<td>Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, etc.</td>
<td>Approximately 80 personnel</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Participating countries</td>
<td>Participating SDF units</td>
<td>Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Training</td>
<td>Apr. 3-5, 2017</td>
<td>Waters west of Kyushu</td>
<td>The U.S., the ROK</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Sawagiri”</td>
<td>1 vessel P-3C × 1 (Japan)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Counter-Piracy Training</td>
<td>Apr. 20, 2017</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>The U.S., the U.K., the ROK</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Teruzuki,” Escort Division 6 Submarine Coastal</td>
<td>1 vessel P-3C × 1 (U.S.) Landing ship HMS “CARTER HALL” (U.K.) Frigate HMCS “MINING” (ROK) Guided-missile destroyer ROKS CHIO YOUNG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-Hosted International Maritime Exercise (command post exercise)</td>
<td>May 3-18, 2017</td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>The U.S., Bahrain</td>
<td>A few personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise</td>
<td>Jun. 5-16, 2017</td>
<td>Waters around Guam</td>
<td>The U.S., etc.</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel, training controller 5 personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Australia-Canada trilateral exercise</td>
<td>Jun. 9-10, 2017</td>
<td>Waters south of Shikoku</td>
<td>Japan, Canada, New Zealand</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Inazuma”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training</td>
<td>Sep. 12-19, 2017</td>
<td>Waters south of Honshu</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia</td>
<td>Destroyer Submarine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Training</td>
<td>Oct. 24-25, 2017</td>
<td>Waters around Japan</td>
<td>The U.S., the ROK</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Koishima,” and JS “Myoko” 2 vessels (U.S.) Several vessels (ROK) Several vessels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-India Trilateral Training</td>
<td>Nov. 3-6, 2017</td>
<td>Sea of Japan</td>
<td>The U.S., India</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Inazuma”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF training (Japan-U.S.-Canada trilateral training)</td>
<td>Nov. 10-26, 2017</td>
<td>Waters around Japan</td>
<td>The U.S., Canada</td>
<td>Approximately 25 vessels Approximately 60 aircraft (U.S.) Approximately 10 vessels (Canada) 1 vessel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Training</td>
<td>Dec. 15-12, 2017</td>
<td>Waters around Japan</td>
<td>The U.S., the ROK</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Chokai”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Naval Exercise hosted by the Indonesian Navy (KOMODO 2018)</td>
<td>Mat 5-9, 2018</td>
<td>Waters around Lombok (Indonesia)</td>
<td>Indonesia, the U.S., Australia, China, France, etc.</td>
<td>Landing Ship JS “Osumi,” Landing Ship Division 1 1 vessel Approximately 190 personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise</td>
<td>May 7-18, 2018</td>
<td>HMAS Creswell of the Royal Australian Navy</td>
<td>Australia, etc.</td>
<td>Diver 7 personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIMPAC 2018</td>
<td>Jun. 27-Aug. 2, 2018</td>
<td>Hawaiian Islands and its surrounding waters and airspace</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, the ROK, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, the U.K., Vietnam</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Ike” 1 vessel P-3C × 2 Approximately 460 personnel 47 vessels, 5 submarines, approximately 250 aircraft Approximately 25,000 or more personnel (total participating strength at the time of release)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine warfare training (Mutsu Bay) and minesweeping special training (Japan-U.S.-India trilateral exercise)</td>
<td>Jul. 18-30, 2018</td>
<td>Mutsu Bay</td>
<td>The U.S., India</td>
<td>Minesweeper Tender, Minesweeper Ocean, Minesweeper Coastal, Minesweeping Controller, diving tender 19 vessels MOH-191 × 3 P-3C × 3 P-1 × 1 (U.S.) 1 Minesweeper Ocean, MH-53E × 2, approximately 10 Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel (India) approximately 4 Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Exercise (Kakadu 2018)</td>
<td>Aug. 16-Oct. 10, 2018</td>
<td>Waters and airspace around Darwin (Australia)</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia, etc.</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Sazanami” Air Patrol Squadron 2 1 vessel P-3C × 1 Approximately 210 personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine warfare training (Hyuga-nada Sea) and minesweeping special training (Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise)</td>
<td>Nov. 18-28, 2018</td>
<td>Hyuga-nada Sea</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia</td>
<td>Minesweeper Tender, Minesweeper Ocean, Minesweeper Coastal, Minesweeping Controller 22 vessels MOH-101 × 2 or 3 (U.S.) 1 Minesweeper Ocean, MH-53E × 2, approximately 10 Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel (Australia) 2 Minesweeper Coastal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Participating countries</td>
<td>Participating SDF units</td>
<td>Numbers of personnel, etc. (Japan)</td>
<td>Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysian Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Exercise</td>
<td>Mar. 31, 2019</td>
<td>Langkawi (Malaysia) and its surrounding waters and airspace</td>
<td>Malaysia, etc.</td>
<td>Destroyer JS “Akiagi,” Escort Division 14</td>
<td>1 vessel Approximately 200 personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-France-Australia-U.S. Four-Country Exercise (La Perouse)</td>
<td>May 19-22, 2019</td>
<td>Waters and Airspace west of Sumatra (Indian Ocean)</td>
<td>France, Australia, the U.S.</td>
<td>Destroyers JS “Izumo,” and JS “Murasame”</td>
<td>2 vessels (Japan) P-8A, (EU) EA-18G</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine warfare training (Mutsu Bay) and minesweeping special training (Japan-U.S.-India trilateral exercise)</td>
<td>Jul. 18-30, 2019</td>
<td>Mutsu Bay</td>
<td>The U.S., India</td>
<td>Minuesweeper Tender, Minuesweeper Ocean, Minuesweeper Coastal, Minuesweeper Controller</td>
<td>18 vessels (U.S.) MCH-101 × 3, P-3C × 4, P-1 × 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-Hosted International Maritime Exercise</td>
<td>Oct. 28-Nov. 14, 2019</td>
<td>Waters around Bahrain</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia, countries in the Middle East, Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa and South America, etc.</td>
<td>Minuesweeper Tender JS “Bungo,” Minuesweeper Division 3, Minuesweeper Coastal JS “Takashima”</td>
<td>2 vessels (U.S.) Approximately 180 personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-Philippines joint exercise (MTA Sama Sama 2019)</td>
<td>Oct. 14-19, 2019</td>
<td>Waters and airspace east of Palawan Island</td>
<td>The U.S., the Philippines</td>
<td>Air Patrol Squadron 5</td>
<td>P-3C × 2 (The Philippines) C-90 × 1, 1 vessel, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise (Pacific Reach 2019)</td>
<td>Nov. 4-15, 2019</td>
<td>On-the-sea exercise: waters west of Perth</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia, the ROK, Singapore, Malaysia (approximately 20 observer countries)</td>
<td>Submarine Rescue Ship JS “Chiyoda”</td>
<td>1 vessel Approximately 150 personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDSF training (field training)(Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada multilateral training)</td>
<td>Nov. 4-21, 2019</td>
<td>Waters and airspace around Japan</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia, Canada</td>
<td>Submarine Tender JS “Chiyoda”</td>
<td>Approximately 20 vessels Approximately 40 aircraft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping special training (Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral training)</td>
<td>Nov. 18-28, 2019</td>
<td>Hyuga-nada Sea</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia</td>
<td>Minuesweeper Tender, Minuesweeper Ocean, Minuesweeper Coastal, Minuesweeper Controller,</td>
<td>17 vessels (U.S.) MCH-101 × 2 or 3 Approximately 1,000 personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2019 multilateral exercise for fixed-wing aircraft hosted by U.S. Navy (Sea Dragon 2020)</td>
<td>Jan. 20-31, 2020</td>
<td>Waters and airspace around Guam</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia, New Zealand, the ROK</td>
<td>51st Fighter Squadron</td>
<td>P-3C × 1 Approximately 30 personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise (Cope North 20)</td>
<td>Jan. 31-Mar. 6, 2020</td>
<td>Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.) and its surrounding waters and airspace</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia</td>
<td>71st Fighter Squadron</td>
<td>US-2 × 3 Approximately 30 personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Participating countries</td>
<td>Participating SDF units</td>
<td>Numbers of personnel, etc.</td>
<td>Numbers of personnel, etc. (partner country)</td>
</tr>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Flag training</td>
<td>Dec. 5-14, 2017</td>
<td>Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.)</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia, etc.</td>
<td>1st Tactical Air Lift Wing, Air Support Command</td>
<td>31 personnel</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral HA/DR exercise</td>
<td>Dec. 6-16, 2017</td>
<td>Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), Micronesia, Palau and Northern Mariana Islands, and their surrounding airspace</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia</td>
<td>1 aircraft</td>
<td>Approximately 25 personnel</td>
<td>(U.S.) C-130J × 3 (Australia) C-130J × 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Christmas Drop)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training</td>
<td>Feb. 4-11, 2018</td>
<td>Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), Micronesia, Palau and Northern Mariana Islands, Saipan, Tinian Island, Rota and Farallon de Medinilla Target Range, and their surrounding airspace</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia</td>
<td>8th Air Wing, 9th Air Wing, Air Rescue Wing, Airborne Early Warning Group, Air Defense Command</td>
<td>Approximately 20 aircraft</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 460 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Cope North Guam)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1st Tactical Air Lift Wing, Air Support Command</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral HA/DR exercise</td>
<td>Dec. 5-17, 2018</td>
<td>Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), Micronesia, Palau and Northern Mariana Islands, and their surrounding airspace</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia</td>
<td>1st Tactical Air Lift Wing, Air Support Command</td>
<td>Approximately 30 personnel</td>
<td>(U.S.) C-130J × 3 (Australia) C-130J × 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Christmas Drop)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training</td>
<td>Feb. 7-19, 2019</td>
<td>Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), Micronesia, Palau and Northern Mariana Islands, Saipan, Tinian Island, Rota and Farallon de Medinilla Target Range, and their surrounding airspace</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia</td>
<td>8th Air Wing, 9th Air Wing, Air Rescue Wing, Airborne Early Warning Group, Air Defense Command</td>
<td>Approximately 20 aircraft</td>
<td>Totaling approximately 450 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Cope North Guam)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1st Tactical Air Lift Wing, Air Support Command</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral HA/DR exercise</td>
<td>Dec. 4-16, 2019</td>
<td>Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), Micronesia, Palau and Northern Mariana Islands (the U.S.), Palau and Micronesia, and their surrounding airspace</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia, New Zealand</td>
<td>1st Tactical Air Lift Wing, Air Support Command</td>
<td>Approximately 30 personnel</td>
<td>(U.S.) C-130J × 3 (Australia) C-130J × 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Christmas Drop)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training</td>
<td>Jan. 31-Mar. 8, 2020</td>
<td>Andersen Air Force Base (Guam, the U.S.), Micronesia, Palau and Northern Mariana Islands, Tinian Island and Farallon de Medinilla Target Range, and their surrounding airspace</td>
<td>The U.S., Australia</td>
<td>8th Air Wing, 9th Air Wing, Air Rescue Wing, Airborne Early Warning Group, Air Defense Command</td>
<td>Approximately 450 personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1st Tactical Air Lift Wing, 3rd Tactical Air Lift Wing, Air Support Command</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Cope North 20)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note) The numbers of personnel, etc. are based on those at the time of release.
### Dispatch of Personnel to United Nations Agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Dispatch</th>
<th>Position in the Dispatched Organization</th>
<th>Dispatched Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 9, 1997 – Jun. 30, 2002</td>
<td>Inspectorate Division Director, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)</td>
<td>1 GSDF officer (Major General)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 11, 2005 – Jul. 10, 2009</td>
<td>Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)</td>
<td>1 GSDF officer (Major)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 9, 2009 – Jan. 8, 2013</td>
<td>Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)</td>
<td>1 GSDF officer (Major)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27, 2013 – Aug. 31, 2016</td>
<td>Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)</td>
<td>1 GSDF officer (Captain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 28, 2005 – Nov. 27, 2008</td>
<td>Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) (New York)</td>
<td>1 GSDF officer (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 18, 2013 – Sep. 17, 2016</td>
<td>Force Generation Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) (New York)</td>
<td>1 GSDF officer (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 1, 2015 – Nov. 30, 2017</td>
<td>Senior Military Liaison Officer, Africa I Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) (New York)</td>
<td>1 GSDF officer (Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 1 – Aug. 31, 2016</td>
<td>Strategic Support Service, Logistics Support Division, Department of Field Support, United Nations (New York)</td>
<td>1 GSDF officer (Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 29, 2016 – Mar. 1, 2017</td>
<td>Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peace Operations (UNDOF) (New York)</td>
<td>1 GSDF officer (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 11, 2017 – Aug. 27, 2018</td>
<td>Strategic Support Service, Logistics Division, Department of Operational Support, United Nations (New York)</td>
<td>1 administrative official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 1, 2018 – Oct. 10, 2019</td>
<td>Group of Experts, Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (New York)</td>
<td>1 instructor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. The OPCW Inspectorate Division Director served in office until July 2009 after his retirement from the SDF on August 1, 2007.
2. Dispatched as an official of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. Due to the organizational change on January 1, 2019, the name changed from “Department of Peacekeeping Operations” to “Department of Peace Operations.”
4. Due to the organizational change on January 1, 2019, the name changed from “Department of Field Support” to “Department of Operational Support.”

### Dispatch of Instructors and Others to PKO Centers, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Dispatch</th>
<th>Position in the Dispatched Organization</th>
<th>Dispatched Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 21 – 30, 2008</td>
<td>Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)</td>
<td>2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 22 – June 6, 2009</td>
<td>Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Major General)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 28 – September 5, 2009</td>
<td>Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali)</td>
<td>2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 10 – 17, 2010</td>
<td>Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 14 – 30, 2010</td>
<td>Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 15 – 20, 2011</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Shannon)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 31 – August 5, 2012</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 15 – 19, 2012</td>
<td>Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)</td>
<td>1 ASPF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 9 – 14, 2013</td>
<td>South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)</td>
<td>1 MSOF personnel (Captain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 28 – September 1, 2013</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 5 – 9, 2013</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 8 – 13, 2014</td>
<td>South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)</td>
<td>1 MSOF personnel (Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 23 – May 25, 2014</td>
<td>Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (EPPTC) (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 12, 2014</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya) (dispatched to give lecture in South Sudan)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 6 – 9, 2014</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)</td>
<td>1 MSOF personnel (Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2 – 23, 2014</td>
<td>Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (EPPTC) (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 19 – April 1, 2015</td>
<td>UN Peacekeeping Centre (India)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 4 – July 1, 2015</td>
<td>Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 5 – 20, 2015</td>
<td>South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)</td>
<td>1 MSOF personnel (Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 22 – November 7, 2015</td>
<td>Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 21 – April 1, 2016</td>
<td>UN Peacekeeping Centre (India)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 31 – June 17, 2016</td>
<td>Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 4 – 18, 2016</td>
<td>Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 6 – 19, 2017</td>
<td>Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2 – 18, 2017</td>
<td>Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1 – 15, 2017</td>
<td>Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 22 – 28, 2018</td>
<td>Indonesian National Defense Forces Peacekeeping Centre (Indonesia)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2 – 18, 2018</td>
<td>Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 3 – 15, 2019</td>
<td>Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 28 – Jul. 12, 2019</td>
<td>Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 9 – 22, 2019</td>
<td>Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 6 –15, 2020</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Institute (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Major)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. First dispatch of female SDF personnel.
2. In June 2015, the name changed from “International Peace Keeping Training Centre” to “Peace Support Training Centre.”
3. In October 2018, the name changed from “Peace Support Training Center” to “International Peace Support Training Institute.”
DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(2) International Peace Cooperation Activities</td>
<td>Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community</td>
<td>Contribution to promotion of international cooperation</td>
<td>Contribution to promoting the efforts by the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism</td>
<td>Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(3) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Dispatch</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Total Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Description of Principal Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| International Disaster Relief Activities in Honduras (Hurricane disaster) | Medical unit | Nov.-Dec. 1996 | 80 | 105 | - Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics  
- Transportation of equipment for medical units, etc. |
| Transportation of materials required for International Disaster Relief Activities in Iran (earthquake disaster) | Air transport unit | | 105 | | | - Join arrangements for the international disaster relief activities |
| International Disaster Relief Activities in India (earthquake disaster) | Maritime transport unit | Sep.-Nov. 1999 | 426 | 426 | - Marine transportation of materials required for international disaster relief activities (e.g., temporary dwellings) |
| International Disaster Relief Activities in India (earthquake disaster) | Material support unit | Feb. 2001 | 16 | 34 | - Delivery of aid materials and technical instruction on aid materials  
- Air transport of aid materials and support units, etc. |
| Transportation of materials required for International Disaster Relief Activities in Iran (earthquake disaster) | Air transport unit | Dec. 2003-Jan. 2004 | 31 | 31 | - Air transport of materials required for international disaster relief activities ( tents, etc.) |
| International Disaster Relief Activities in Thailand (earthquake/ tsunamis disaster) | Dispatched maritime unit | Dec. 2004-Jan. 2005 | 590 | 590 | - Search and rescue activities for the disaster struck victims  
- Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities |
| International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake disaster) | Joint liaison office | | 22 | | | - Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities  
- Air transport of aid materials  
- Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics  
- Marine transportation of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams  
- Marine transportation of aid materials  
- Air transport of aid materials |
| International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake disaster) | Maritime transport unit | Aug. 2005 | 346 | 346 | - Rescue of a Russian submarine |
| International Disaster Relief Activities in response to an earthquake in Pakistan, etc. (earthquake disaster) | Air support unit | Oct.-Nov. 2005 | 114 | 261 | - Air transport in connection with relief activities  
- Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams |
| International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake disaster) | Air transport unit | May-Jun. 2006 | 85 | | - Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics  
- Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams |

Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MEDF (in Cambodia and Timor-Leste) and the ASDSF (in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan).  
2. An advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part of the Rwandan refugee relief effort.
## International Disaster Relief Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Period of Dispatch</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Description of Principal Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint liaison office</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Medical support unit</strong></td>
<td>Oct. 2009</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint liaison office</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Medical support unit</strong></td>
<td>Jan.-Feb. 2010</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Coordination with relevant Malaysian organizations and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air transport unit</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Medical support unit</strong></td>
<td>Jan.-Feb. 2010</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>Air transportation of International Disaster Relief Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air transport unit</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Marine convoy</strong></td>
<td>Aug.-Nov. 2010</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Air transport of personnel engaged in international disaster relief activities and materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air transport unit</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Marine convoy</strong></td>
<td>Feb.-Mar. 2011</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Air transport equipment and materials required for medical treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint operations coordination center</strong></td>
<td>Nov.-Dec. 2013</td>
<td>Approx. 10</td>
<td>Joint arrangements for the International Disaster Relief Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Task Force</strong></td>
<td>Mar.-Apr. 2014</td>
<td>Approx. 10</td>
<td>Coordination with relevant Malaysian organizations and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local operation support center</strong></td>
<td>Apr.–May 2015</td>
<td>Approx. 110</td>
<td>Air transport of personnel and materials required for firefighting and relief activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local support coordination center</strong></td>
<td>Oct. 2018</td>
<td>Approx. 10</td>
<td>Coordination with relevant organizations of the Commonwealth of Australia and relevant countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Dispatch</th>
<th>Period of Dispatch</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Description of Principal Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
<td>Units carrying out replenishment support activities</td>
<td>Nov. 2001 - Nov. 2007</td>
<td>Materials supplies for foreign vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Forces in Japan, etc.</td>
<td>Units carrying out replenishment support activities</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Transportation of materials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Dispatch</th>
<th>Period of Dispatch</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Description of Principal Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
<td>Replenishment support unit</td>
<td>Jan. 2006 - Feb. 2010</td>
<td>Materials supplies for foreign vessels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### (6) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Dispatch</th>
<th>Period of Dispatch</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Total Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Description of Principal Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait, etc.</td>
<td>Evacuation operation unit</td>
<td>Jun. – Sep. 2006</td>
<td>Approx. 100</td>
<td>Operations required for evacuation of vehicles, equipment and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait, etc.</td>
<td>Maritime transport unit</td>
<td>Feb. - Apr. 2004</td>
<td>Approx. 330</td>
<td>Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipment required for the GSDF's activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait, etc.</td>
<td>Air transportation unit (1st 1st Air Unit)</td>
<td>Dec. 2006 - Feb. 2009</td>
<td>Approx. 310</td>
<td>Air transportation of materials for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (7) Counter-Piracy Operations (including dispatches as Maritime Security Operations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Dispatch</th>
<th>Period of Dispatch</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Total Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Description of Principal Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden: Maritime Force</td>
<td>Mar. 2009 - Dec. 2016</td>
<td>Approx. 400</td>
<td>Approx. 10,000</td>
<td>Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden: Air Unit (MSDF)</td>
<td>May 2009 - Feb. 2011</td>
<td>Approx. 100</td>
<td>Approx. 1,600</td>
<td>Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden and tasks related to general affairs, accounting, public relations, health, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden: Djibouti</td>
<td>Jul. 2014 - Jul. 2015</td>
<td>Approx. 70</td>
<td>Approx. 210</td>
<td>Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden: Djibouti</td>
<td>Jul. 2015 -</td>
<td>Approx. 60*</td>
<td>Approx. 1,200*</td>
<td>Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc. Conduct information gathering activities in the Gulf of Aden, especially in the airspace of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor where counter-piracy operations are carried out, and within the area of the high seas to the west of the northern Arabian sea since January 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden: Djibouti</td>
<td>Jul. 2014 -</td>
<td>Approx. 30</td>
<td>Approx. 390</td>
<td>Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct counter-piracy operations, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden: Bahrain, etc.</td>
<td>Jul. 2014 -</td>
<td>Under 20</td>
<td>Approx. 70</td>
<td>Communication and coordination with units of various countries participating in CTF151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden: Djibouti</td>
<td>Jul. 2012 - Jul. 2014</td>
<td>Approx. 3</td>
<td>Approx. 12</td>
<td>Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities necessary for Maritime Force and Air Unit to conduct counter-piracy operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden: Djibouti</td>
<td>May 2009 - Feb. 2011</td>
<td>Approx. 50</td>
<td>Approx. 970</td>
<td>Security of activity base and P-3C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden: Djibouti</td>
<td>Jul. 2014 -</td>
<td>Approx. 80</td>
<td>Approx. 1,040</td>
<td>Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities necessary for Air Unit to conduct counter-piracy operations, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (ii) Information Gathering Activities in the Middle East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Dispatch</th>
<th>Period of Dispatch</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Total Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Description of Principal Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gulf of Oman, the northern Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the east of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait: Maritime Force</td>
<td>Feb. 2020 -</td>
<td>Approx. 200</td>
<td>Approx. 200</td>
<td>Information gathering activities for ensuring the safety of Japan-related vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden: Djibouti</td>
<td>Jul. 2020 -</td>
<td>Approx. 60</td>
<td>Approx. 60</td>
<td>Conduct information gathering activities in the Gulf of Aden, especially in the airspace of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor where counter-piracy operations are carried out, and within the area of the high seas to the west of the northern Arabian sea since January 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Activities by the Air Unit are those by utilizing the counter-piracy unit. The number and the total number of personnel are included in the respective number, with an asterisk, of (7) Counter-Piracy Operations.

### Reference 52

**Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel and Changes in Them**

(As of March 31, 2020)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Staffing Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>150,777</td>
<td>139,060</td>
<td>91.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>45,356</td>
<td>42,850</td>
<td>91.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>46,923</td>
<td>42,828</td>
<td>91.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff etc.</td>
<td>4,098</td>
<td>3,704</td>
<td>90.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>247,154</td>
<td>227,442</td>
<td>92.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Non-Fixed-Term Personnel</th>
<th>Fixed-Term Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>Authorized: 46,039</td>
<td>Actual: 42,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>MSDF: 4,923</td>
<td>GSDF: 140,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted (upper)</td>
<td>GSDF: 137,071</td>
<td>JSDF: 21,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted (lower)</td>
<td>JSDF: 56,001</td>
<td>GSDF: 21,364</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Staffing Rate (%)**

- Authorized: 92.3%
- Actual: 97.0%
- GSDF: 97.8%
- JSDF: 77.0%

**Notes:**
1. Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value.
2. The number of authorized personnel is determined based on the budget.

Reference: 52
### Reference 53

**Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2019)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Number Applied</th>
<th>Number Recruited</th>
<th>Competition Ratios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Competition Ratios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of personnel</td>
<td>of personnel</td>
<td>Ratios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>candidates</td>
<td>candidates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer candidates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>1,874 (282)</td>
<td>205 (28)</td>
<td>9.1 (10.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>1,000 (162)</td>
<td>75 (9)</td>
<td>13.3 (18.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>1,130 (238)</td>
<td>68 (16)</td>
<td>16.6 (14.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,004 (682)</td>
<td>348 (53)</td>
<td>11.5 (12.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-commissioned officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Petty Officer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>91 (25)</td>
<td>12 (3)</td>
<td>7.6 (8.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>7 (0)</td>
<td>2 (0)</td>
<td>3.5 (---)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Sergeant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>811 (96)</td>
<td>79 (5)</td>
<td>10.3 (19.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>1,731 (195)</td>
<td>72 (4)</td>
<td>24.0 (48.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,542 (291)</td>
<td>151 (9)</td>
<td>16.8 (32.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Cadet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>15,822 (2,980)</td>
<td>4,067 (324)</td>
<td>3.9 (9.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>4,906 (977)</td>
<td>1,599 (227)</td>
<td>3.1 (4.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>7,582 (1,508)</td>
<td>981 (266)</td>
<td>7.7 (5.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28,310 (5,465)</td>
<td>6,647 (817)</td>
<td>4.3 (6.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniformed SDF personnel candidates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Phased)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>18,097 (3,434)</td>
<td>4,779 (1,167)</td>
<td>3.8 (2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>4,441 (932)</td>
<td>771 (131)</td>
<td>5.8 (7.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>6,306 (1,268)</td>
<td>1,809 (161)</td>
<td>3.5 (7.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28,844 (5,634)</td>
<td>7,359 (1,459)</td>
<td>3.9 (3.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense Academy Students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommended</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanity and social science</td>
<td>151 (44)</td>
<td>26 (5)</td>
<td>5.8 (8.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science and engineering</td>
<td>277 (50)</td>
<td>112 (16)</td>
<td>2.5 (3.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>428 (94)</td>
<td>138 (21)</td>
<td>3.1 (4.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective exam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanity and social science</td>
<td>130 (19)</td>
<td>14 (2)</td>
<td>9.3 (9.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science and engineering</td>
<td>172 (11)</td>
<td>41 (3)</td>
<td>4.2 (3.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>302 (30)</td>
<td>55 (5)</td>
<td>5.5 (6.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General exam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanity and social science</td>
<td>5,492 (2,276)</td>
<td>74 (15)</td>
<td>74.2 (151.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science and engineering</td>
<td>7,150 (1,378)</td>
<td>216 (14)</td>
<td>33.1 (98.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12,642 (3,654)</td>
<td>290 (29)</td>
<td>43.6 (126.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense Medical College students</td>
<td>5,809 (1,774)</td>
<td>81 (22)</td>
<td>71.6 (80.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense Medical College nursing students SDF regular personnel candidate and nursing school students</td>
<td>1,956 (1,520)</td>
<td>74 (69)</td>
<td>26.4 (22.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDF High Technical School Students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommended</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General exam</td>
<td>1,843</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,039</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. Figures in parentheses indicate numbers of females.
2. The number of authorized and actual personnel is as of the end of each fiscal year.
Reference 54  Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel, etc.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Service</th>
<th>Authorized Strength</th>
<th>Non-Authorized Strength</th>
<th>Regular Service</th>
<th>Authorized Strength</th>
<th>Non-Authorized Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Ministry of Defense  
Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (2)  
Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense (up to 3) |                       |                        | Administrative Officials, and others 27 |                       |                        |
| State Minister of Defense  
Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (2)  
Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense (up to 3) |                       |                        | Administrative Officials, and others 27 |                       |                        |
| Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (2) |                       |                        | Administrative Officials, and others 27 |                       |                        |
| Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense (up to 3) |                       |                        | Administrative Officials, and others 27 |                       |                        |
| Authorized Strength |                  |                        | Authorized Strength |                  |                        |
| Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense |                  |                        | Authorized Strength |                  |                        |
| Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense |                  |                        | Authorized Strength |                  |                        |
| Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs |                  |                        | Authorized Strength |                  |                        |
| Director, Director General, and others 708 |                  |                        | Authorized Strength |                  |                        |
| Administrative Officials, and others 20,165 |                  |                        | Authorized Strength |                  |                        |
| Uniformed SDF Personnel 247,154 |                  |                        | Authorized Strength |                  |                        |
| National Defense Medical College students |                  |                        | Authorized Strength |                  |                        |
| GSDF High Technical School students |                  |                        | Authorized Strength |                  |                        |
| Part-Time Officials |                  |                        | Authorized Strength |                  |                        |
| Authorized Strength |                  |                        | Authorized Strength |                  |                        |
| Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense |                  |                        | Authorized Strength |                  |                        |
| Reserve Personnel 47,900 |                  |                        | Authorized Strength |                  |                        |
| Ready Reserve Personnel 7,981 |                  |                        | Authorized Strength |                  |                        |
| Administrative Officials, and others 4,621 |                  |                        | Authorized Strength |                  |                        |
| National Defense Academy students |                  |                        | Authorized Strength |                  |                        |
| Part-Time Officials |                  |                        | Authorized Strength |                  |                        |

Notes: 1. Number of personnel refers to the numbers specified in the laws and regulations (as for uniformed SDF Personnel, the number is the authorized number specified in the laws and regulations)  
2. "Others" in the title includes Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense, Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense, and Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense

Reference 55  Main Measures for Re-employment Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Measures for re-employment support</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Measures for retiring uniformed SDF personnel</td>
<td>Occupational aptitude testing</td>
<td>Testing aimed to provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with guidance based on individual aptitudes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical training</td>
<td>Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement and eligible for qualifications (large-sized vehicle operation, forklift operation, electrician, boiler engineer, regular-sized vehicle operation, heavy-duty vehicle operation, crane operators, hazardous material engineer, first-level training for nursing care workers, semi-medium-sized vehicle, and business continuity specialist (new in FY2020), emergency manager (new in FY2020), etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster prevention and risk management training</td>
<td>Provide uniformed SDF officer retiring at an early age with technical knowledge on disaster prevention administration and the Civil Protection Plan (attending lectures in this area are a prerequisite for receiving the Cabinet Office’s Regional Disaster Prevention Manager license)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence courses</td>
<td>Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement and eligible for qualifications (hazardous materials engineer, electrician, financial planner, real estate transaction specialist, property administrator, fire defense equipment officer, certified administrative procedures legal specialist, labor and social security attorney, health manager, support to personnel who wish to go to university, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business management training</td>
<td>Support uniformed SDF personnel retiring at an early age to cultivate social adaptability, as well as provide necessary knowledge to lead a stable life after reemployment and retirement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career guidance</td>
<td>Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with knowhow to choose new occupation and right mindset toward reemployment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outsourcing career counseling, etc.</td>
<td>Outsource career counseling, etc. to external experts to meet the needs of each retiring uniformed SDF personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internship program</td>
<td>Implement internship programs for uniformed SDF personnel who plan to retire in order to prevent early retirement due to re-employment mismatches as well as to expand places of re-employment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures for internal support personnel</td>
<td>Training for support personnel</td>
<td>Training of labor administration, support activities, etc. to improve quality of support personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures for promotion outside of SDF</td>
<td>Support for publicity aimed at business owners</td>
<td>Publicizing to business owners, etc. the effectiveness of uniformed SDF personnel who plan to retire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inviting business owners on unit tours</td>
<td>Invite business owners to SDF units, etc. and provide them with tours, explanations of the re-employment support situation, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reference 56 		 Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government


(As of March 31, 2020 575 personnel)

Prefectural
Government

Government employment situation

Reference

Hokkaido

Hokkaido Prefectural Government (four persons), Sapporo City Government (two persons), Hakodate City Government (two persons), Asahikawa City Government, Muroran City Government, Kushiro City Government,
Obihiro City Government (two persons), Iwamizawa City Government (two persons), Rumoi City Government, Tomakomai City Government, Wakkanai City Government, Bibai City Government, Ashibetsu City Government
(two persons), Akabira City Government, Mombetsu City Government, Shibetsu City Government, Nayoro City Government, Chitose City Government (four persons), Takikawa City Government, Sunagawa City Government,
Noboribetsu City Government, Eniwa City Government (two persons), Date City Government, Kitahiroshima City Government (two persons), Hokuto City Government, Matsumae Town Office, Nanae Town Office, Shikabe
Office, Kamifurano Town Office, Nakafurano Town Office, Minamifurano Town Office, Toyotomi Town Office, Rebun Town Office, Bihoro Town Office, Engaru Town Office (two persons), Atsuma Town Office, Abira Town Office,
Shinhidaka Town Office, Otofuke Town Office (two persons), Memuro Town Office, Ashoro Town Office, Shibecha Town Office, Teshikaga Town Office

Aomori

Aomori Prefectural Government, Aomori City Government (five persons), Hirosaki City Government, Hachinohe City Government (three persons), Towada City Government, Misawa City Government, Ajigasawa Town Office,
Fukaura Town Office, Oirase Town Office

Iwate

Otsuchi Town Office, Yamada Town Office (two persons)

Miyagi


Akita

Akita Prefectural Government (two persons), Akita City Government, Odate City Government, Oga City Government, Yuzawa City Government (two persons), Yurihonjo City Government, Daisen City Government

Yamagata


Fukushima

Fukushima Prefectural Government, Fukushima City Government (two persons), Koriyama City Government, Iwaki City Government

Ibaraki

Omiya City Government, Kasumigaura City Government, Ami Town Office, Sakai Town Office (two persons)

Tochigi

Tochigi Prefectural Government, Utsunomiya City Government

Gunma

Gunma Prefectural Government (two persons), Numata City Government, Shibukawa City Government, Nakanojo Town Office

Saitama

Government, Ranzan Town Office

Chiba

Chiba Prefectural Government, Chiba City Government, Ichikawa City Government, Funabashi City Government, Tateyama City Government (two persons), Kisarazu City Government, Matsudo City Government (two persons),
Government,

Tokyo

Tokyo Metropolitan Government (nine persons), Shinagawa Ward Office (three persons), Ota Ward Office (two persons), Shibuya Ward Office (two persons), Toshima Ward Office, Arakawa Ward Office, Itabashi Ward Office (two
persons), Adachi Ward Office, Hino City Government, Mizuho Town Office

Kanagawa

Kanagawa Prefectural Government (three persons), Yokohama City Government (nine persons), Kawasaki City Government (two persons), Sagamihara City Government, Yokosuka City Government, Hiratsuka City Government,
Kamakura City Government, Fujisawa City Government (three persons), Odawara City Government, Chigasaki City Government, Zushi City Government, Miura City Government, Ebina City Government (three persons), Zama

Niigata


Toyama

Toyama Prefectural Government, Tonami City Government

Ishikawa

Ishikawa Prefectural Government, Wajima City Government, Nomi City Government

Fukui

Fukui Prefectural Government (three persons), Awara City Government

Yamanashi

Yamanashi Prefectural Government (three persons), Fujiyoshida City Government, Minami-Alps City Government, Minobu Town Office, Yamanakako Village Office, Fujikawaguchiko Town Office,

Nagano


Gifu


Shizuoka

Shizuoka Prefectural Government (six persons), Shizuoka City Government, Hamamatsu City Government, Atami City Government, Ito City Government, Shimada City Government, Gotenba City Government (two persons),

Aichi

Government (two persons), Yatomi City Government, Miyoshi City Government (two persons), Ama City Government, Nagakute City Government, Toyoyama Town Office, Oharu Town Office, Kanie Town Office, Tobishima Village
Office, Mihama Town Office, Taketoyo Town Office

Mie


Shiga

Shiga Prefectural Government, Kusatsu City Government, Konan City Government (two persons)

Kyoto

Kyoto Prefectural Government, Maizuru City Government, Joyo City Government, Yawata City Government (two persons), Kyotanabe City Government, Kizugawa City Government (two persons), Seika Town Office (three
persons)

Osaka

Osakasayama City Government, Toyono Town Office

Hyogo

Hyogo Prefectural Government, Kobe City Government (two persons), Himeji City Government, Akashi City Government, Nishiwaki City Government, Kawanishi City Government

Nara

Nara Prefectural Government (three persons), Nara City Government (four persons), Yamato Takada City Government, Gojo City Government (three persons), Gosho City Government, Ikoma City Government, Tawaramoto Town
Office

Wakayama

Wakayama Prefectural Government, Wakayama City Government, Hashimoto City Government, Shirahama Town Office

Tottori

Tottori Prefectural Government (two persons), Tottori City Government, Yonago City Government, Sakaiminato City Government, Yurihama Town Office, Nanbu Town Office

Shimane

Shimane Prefectural Government, Matsue City Government, Hamada City Government

Okayama

Okayama Prefectural Government, Kurashiki City Government, Asakuchi City Government, Nagi Town Office

Hiroshima

Hiroshima Prefectural Government (three persons), Hiroshima City Government, Kure City Government, Mihara City Government, Fuchu City Government, Miyoshi City Government, Higashihiroshima City Government,
Hatsukaichi City Government, Kaita Town Office

Yamaguchi

Town Office

Tokushima

Tokushima Prefectural Government (five persons), Anan City Government, Yoshinogawa City Government (two persons), Awa City Government, Miyoshi City Government

Kagawa


Ehime


Kochi

Kochi Prefectural Government, Kochi City Government, Konan City Government

Fukuoka

Fukuoka Prefectural Government, Kitakyushu City Government, Fukuoka City Government (two persons), Kurume City Government (two persons), Iizuka City Government (two persons), Chikugo City Government, Yukuhashi
City Government, Nakama City Government, Ogori City Government, Kasuga City Government, Onojo City Government (two persons), Munakata City Government (two persons), Dazaifu City Government, Asakura City
Government, Itoshima City Government, Nakagawa City Government, Kasuya Town Office, Tachiarai Town Office

Saga

Saga Prefectural Government (three persons), Karatsu City Government, Takeo City Government, Genkai Town Office

Nagasaki

Nagasaki Prefectural Government (five persons), Nagasaki City Government, Sasebo City Government (three persons), Shimabara City Government, Omura City Government, Matsuura City Government, Tsushima City
Government, Iki City Government, Saikai City Government, Unzen City Government

Kumamoto

City Government, Ozu Town Office, Yamato Town Office, Kuma Village Office

Oita

Oita Prefectural Government (two persons), Oita City Government, Beppu City Government, Kitsuki City Government, Hiji Town Office

Miyazaki

Miyazaki Prefectural Government (six persons), Miyazaki City Government, Miyakonojo City Government (three persons), Nobeoka City Government, Nichinan City Government, Kobayashi City Government (two persons),

Kagoshima

Kagoshima Prefectural Government (four persons), Kagoshima City Government, Izumi City Government, Tarumizu City Government, Satsuma-Sendai City Government, Soo City Government, Kirishima City Government (two
persons), Aira City Government, Toshima Village Office, Kinko Town Office, Minami Okuma Town Office

Okinawa

Tomigusuku City Government, Tarama Village Office

Notes: Provided by the Ministry of Defense as of March 31, 2020 (part-time personnel included).

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DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2020


The Government has made it its basic policy to deal with overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology in a careful manner in accordance with Prime Minister Eisaku Sato’s remarks at the Diet in 1967 (hereinafter referred to as “the Three Principles on Arms Exports”) and the collateral policy guideline by the Miki administration in 1976. These policy guidelines have played a certain role as Japan has been following the path of a peace-loving nation. On the other hand, these policy guidelines including the non-permission of arms exports to communist bloc countries have increasingly proved unsuitable for the current situation. Also, the Government has repeatedly taken exemption measures depending on the individual necessity of each case since arms exports to substantially all areas were not permitted, as a result of not promoting arms exports regardless of the destinations.

Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. At the same time, surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges, it has become essential for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world commensurate with its national capabilities. Against this backdrop, under the evolving security environment, Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and the world economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.

From the view point of achieving the fundamental principle of national security by implementing concrete policies, the Government, in accordance with the National Security Strategy adopted on December 17, 2013, decided to review the Government’s existing policy guidelines on overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology, and set out clear principles which fit the new security environment while giving due consideration to the roles that the existing policy guidelines have played so far and by consolidating the policy guidelines comprehensively with consideration on the past exemption measures.

An appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology contributes to further active promotion of the maintenance of international peace and security through timely and effective implementation of contribution to peace and international cooperation such as international peace cooperation, international disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, responses to international terrorism and piracy, and capacity building of developing countries (hereinafter referred to as “peace contribution and international cooperation”). Such transfer also contributes to strengthening security and defense cooperation with Japan’s ally, the United States as well as other countries. Furthermore, it contributes to maintaining and enhancing Japan’s defense production and technological bases, thereby contributing to Japan’s enhancement of defense capability, given that international joint development and production projects have become the international mainstream in order to improve the performance of defense equipment and to deal with their rising costs.

On the other hand, since the distribution of defense equipment and technology has significant security, social, economic and humanitarian impact on the international community, the need for each government to control the transfer of defense equipment and technology in a responsible manner while taking various factors into account is recognized. In light of the above, while maintaining its basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation, Japan will control the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology based on the following three principles. The overseas transfer of facilities related to arms production will continue to be treated in the same manner as defense equipment and technology.

1. Clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited
Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will not be permitted when:
1) the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded,
2) the transfer violates obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions,
3) the defense equipment and technology is destined for a country party to a conflict (a country against which the United Nations Security Council is taking measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack).

2. Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict examination and information disclosure
In cases not within 1. above, cases where transfers may be permitted will be limited to the following cases. Those cases will be examined strictly while ensuring transparency. More specifically, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted in such cases as the transfer contributes to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, or to Japan’s security from the viewpoint of—implementing international joint development and production projects with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including its ally, the U.S. (hereinafter referred to as “the ally and partners”), —enhancing security and defense cooperation with the ally and partners, as well as—supporting the activities of the Self-Defense Forces including the maintenance of its equipment and ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan’s security. Then the Government will make a comprehensive judgment in light of the existing guidelines of the international export control regime and based on the information available at the time of export examinations.

Significant cases that require especially careful consideration from the viewpoint of Japan’s security will be examined at the National Security Council (NSC). As for the cases that were deliberated at the NSC, the Government will disclose their information in accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 of 1999)

3. Ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-purpose use or transfer to third parties
In cases satisfying 2. above, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured. More concretely, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of control system at the destination in such cases as those where the transfer is judged to be appropriate for active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, when the transfer involves participation in an international system for sharing parts etc., and when the transfer involves delivery of parts etc. to a licensor.

Implementation guidelines for the policy described above will be decided by the NSC. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will implement the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Law No.228 of 1949) appropriately in accordance with the decision.

For the purpose of this policy, “defense equipment and technology” refers to “arms and military technologies”; “arms” refers to items listed in Section 1, Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet Order No.378 of 1949), and are to be used by military forces and directly employed in combat; and “military technologies” refers to technologies for the design, production or use of arms.

The Government will contribute actively to the peace and stability of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. Under such policy, it will play a proactive role in the area of controlling defense equipment and technology as well as sensitive dual-use goods and technologies to achieve the early entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty and further strengthen the international export control regimes.
The First Principle "The Cases Where Transfers Are Prohibited"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Specific example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Violation of obligations under treaties concluded and other international arrangements</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons Convention, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Arms Trade Treaty, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Violation of obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolutions</td>
<td>Security Council Resolution 1718 (nuclear issue of North Korea), etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Transfer to a nation which is party to a conflict</td>
<td>Countries which are the target of measures taken by the United Nations Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Second Principle "Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be Permitted"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Specific example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Cases that contribute to the active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation</td>
<td>Overseas transfers that contribute to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation only if the transfers have a positive meaning from the viewpoint of peace contribution and international cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Cases that contribute to the security of Japan</td>
<td>Overseas transfers that contribute to Japan’s security, only if the transfers have a positive meaning from the viewpoint of Japan’s security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) In cases where the influence is judged to be extremely limited from the perspective of the security of Japan</td>
<td>Overseas transfers that are necessary for supporting activities of the governmental agencies including the Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as “the SDF etc.”), which include the activities of foreign governments or private entities etc. related to the activities of the SDF etc., or for ensuring the security of Japanese nationals, and that are:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• temporary export of equipment, return of purchased equipment or provision of technical information related to the activities of the SDF etc., including replacements of items which need repairing with non-defective items;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• export of equipment for the protection or self-protection of public officials or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• export of equipment for the self-protection of Japanese nationals operating in dangerous areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Third Principle "Ensuring Appropriate Control"

In cases satisfying 2. above, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured.

Reference 58


Reference 59

Activities in Civic Life

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Details of Activities and Their Past Records</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disposal of Unexploded Bombs (Supplementary provisions of the Self-Defense Forces Law)</td>
<td>The GSDF disposes of such bombs at the request of municipal governments and others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Disposal operations in FY2019: a total of 1,441 disposal operations (average of approximately 28 operations per week), weighing approximately 33.0 tons in total; in particular, the amount of unexploded bombs that were disposed of in Okinawa Prefecture totaled approximately 18.0 tons, (accounting for about 37% of such bombs removed across the nation). (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible in regard to disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of Underwater Mines (Article 94-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law)</td>
<td>The MSDF undertakes minesweeping operations in waters designated as dangerous areas because underwater mines had been laid there during World War II, as well as removes and disposes of explosives after receiving reports from municipal governments and others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Minesweeping has been almost completed in the dangerous areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Disposal operations in FY2019: a total 0 units were disposed of, weighing approximately 0 tons in total. (If explosive hazardous materials are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Activities (Article 27 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 4-10 of Defense Ministry Establishment Law, and others)</td>
<td>Medical services are provided to the general public at the National Defense Medical College Hospital in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and some hospitals affiliated with the SDF (seven out of 16 such hospitals, including the SDF Central Hospital in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The National Defense Medical College Hospital serves as an advanced treatment hospital (provision of advanced medical treatment, etc.) and a medical facility providing tertiary emergency services (acceptance of emergency patients in critical condition).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• In the wake of a disaster, medical units belonging to major SDF units, acting on a request from municipal governments, provide traveling clinics, quarantines and so forth when a disaster occurs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The GSDF Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo), MSDF Underwater Medical Center (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), and ASDF Aviation Medicine Laboratory (Tachikawa City, Tokyo and Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture) undertake study on outdoor sanitation, underwater medicine, and aviation medicine, respectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The National Defense Medical College Research Institute (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture) undertakes study on disaster and emergency medicine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation in Supporting Athletic Meetings (Article 100-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, etc.)</td>
<td>At the request of concerned organizations, the SDF helps operations of the Olympics and Asian games in Japan as well as national sports meetings in the fields of ceremonies, communications, transportation, music performance, medical services, and emergency medical services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The SDF provides transportation and communication support to marathon events and ekiden road relays.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchanges with Local Communities</td>
<td>Sports facilities such as grounds, gyms and swimming pools at many of the SDF garrisons and bases are open to general citizens in response to requests from local communities. Participation in various events sponsored by general citizens and municipal governments or taking part as sports referees and instructors on an individual basis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table: Outline of Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Description of Measures</th>
<th>Examples of Covered Facilities and Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the United States Forces in Japan, etc.</td>
<td>Subsidies to finance disturbance prevention projects</td>
<td>Subsidies are granted to local governments’ projects to prevent or mitigate disturbance caused by frequent use of armored vehicles and other heavy vehicles, and frequent shooting, bombing, and use of other explosives by the SDF, etc.</td>
<td>- Canal, reservoirs, roads, river improvement, community reception facilities for television broadcast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subsidies to finance disturbance prevention projects</td>
<td>Subsidies are granted to local governments’ projects to prevent or mitigate significant noise caused by frequent take-off and landing of aircraft by the SDF, etc.</td>
<td>- Educational facilities such as elementary schools, junior high schools, and kindergartens, medical facilities such as hospitals and clinics, and welfare facilities such as healthcare centers, day-service centers for the elderly, and special nursing homes for the elderly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subsidies to finance soundproofing works for housing</td>
<td>Subsidies are granted for soundproofing works by homeowners, etc. in areas designated by the Defense Minister as areas where disturbance due to noise caused by frequent take-off and landing of aircraft by the SDF, etc. is serious.</td>
<td>- Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compensation for relocations</td>
<td>In areas designated by the Defense Minister as areas where disturbance due to noise caused by frequent take-off and landing of aircraft by the SDF, etc. is especially serious, compensation, etc. is provided for the loss ordinarily incurred by relocating buildings, etc. to other areas or by renovating them.</td>
<td>- Compensation for relocation buildings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improving green areas</td>
<td>Works such as the development of green zones are conducted on land in areas designated by the Defense Minister as areas necessary for preventing the occurrence of new disturbance due to noise caused by frequent take-off and landing of aircraft by the SDF, etc. and for improving the living environment in their vicinities.</td>
<td>- Land purchase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subsidies for developing facilities meant to stabilize people’s lives</td>
<td>In cases where installation or operations of a certain defense facility is found to disturb daily lives or business activities of the residents of the surrounding areas, subsidies are granted for local governments’ facility development projects to mitigate such disturbance.</td>
<td>- Roads, radio broadcast facilities, nursing homes for the elderly, fire departments, parks, waste disposal facilities, welfare centers for the elderly, public facilities for learning, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specified Defense Facilities Environ Improvement Adjustment Grants</td>
<td>In consideration of the level of the influence of the installation or operations of certain defense facilities on the living environment and regional development of the surrounding areas, grants are provided to municipalities affected by the specific defense facilities for their projects contributing to the development of public facilities, improvement of the living environment, or smooth implementation of regional development.</td>
<td>- Agricultural facilities, fishing facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Realignment grants</td>
<td>In consideration of the increase of influence of the realignment that the U.S. Forces in Japan may exert on residents’ stable daily lives, grants are provided for realizing the specified neighboring municipalities affected by the realignment for their projects contributing to the development of residents’ convenient lives and protection of the local industry when they are found necessary to promote smooth and steady realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan.</td>
<td>- Developing public facilities such as traffic facilities, recreation facilities, and social welfare facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grants for realignment-related training relocations</td>
<td>Considering that the influence of aircraft noise, etc. on residents’ stable daily lives may continue even after the provision of the realignment grants ends in areas around the realignment-related specified defense facilities where training relocations are conducted, grants are provided for projects contributing to the enhancement of residents’ convenient lives and protection of the local industry.</td>
<td>- Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance of school buildings, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project to develop specified areas affected by the realignment</td>
<td>With the aim of promoting smooth realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, grants are provided to municipalities affected by the realignment for their projects contributing to the enhancement of residents’ convenient lives and promotion of the local industry that they implement from a broader point of view.</td>
<td>- Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance of school buildings, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Realignment promotion project</td>
<td>Grants are provided for the development of facilities conducted by the specified neighboring municipalities affected by the realignment in light of the significance of promoting measures for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan and properly and promptly implementing the realignment.</td>
<td>- Facilities similar to those meant to stabilize people’s lives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Act on Improvement of Living Environments around Defense Facilities, etc.*

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### Reference 60

Outline of Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas

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### Reference 61

**Facility**

- Ishigaya building, Ministry of Defense
- Camp Sapporo
- Camp Sendai
- Camp Asaka
- Camp Iwami
- Camp Kengun
- Funakoshi building, Headquarters Yokosuka District
- Itsumi building, Headquarters Yokosuka District
- Area 1, Headquarters Maizuru District
- Headquarters Ominato District
- Headquarters Sasebo District
- Headquarters Kure Base
- Fuchu Air Base
- Camp Okada
- Camp Kasumimine
- Camp Tachikawa
- Camp Yao
- Camp Metabaru
- Camp Kengun
- Vice-Camp Takayubaru
- Hachinohe Air Base
- Tateshina Air Base
- Maizuru Air Base
- Kanoya Air Base
- Iruma Air Base
- Kasaig Air Base

**Location**

- 5-1 Honmura-cho, Ishigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo
- 10, Minamikanpo-jo, Chuzu-ku, Sapporo-shi, Hokkaido
- 1-1, Minaminemimata, Mita-ku, Sendai-shi, Miyagi
- Uozumikaken-cho, Nerima-ku, Tokyo
- 7-1-1, Midorigasaka, Ibaraki-ku, Hyogo
- 1-1, Higashimachi, Higashi-ku, Kumamoto-shi, Kumamoto
- 7-23, Funakoshi-cho, Yoshokusa-ku, Kanagawa
- Mutanchi, 1-chome, Nishi-Hemicho, Yokosuka-ku, Kanagawa
- 1190, Amabukashi, Maizuru-shi, Kyoto
- 4-1, Ominato-machi, Mutsu-shi, Aomori
- 18, Hirase-machi, Sasebo-shi, Nagasaki
- 8-1, Saiwai-cho, Kure-shi, Hiroshima
- 1-5-5, Sengen-cho, Fuchu-shi, Tokyo
- 161, Okadama-cho, Higashi-ku, Sapporo-shi, Hokkaido
- 1-1-5, Kasumimine-ku, Sendai-shi, Miyagi
- 5, Mitori-cho, Tachikawa-shi, Tokyo
- 1-81, Kuko, Yao-shi, Osaka
- 7, Taten, Yosinogari-cho, Kanzaki-gun, Saga
- 1812, Oyutsu, Masuki-machi, Kamimamakigumi-gun, Kumamoto
- Takada, Kasaigun, Kasai-shi, Aomori
- Mubanchi, Miyagi, Tateyama-shi, Chiba
- 731-20, Nagahama, Maizuru-shi, Kyoto
- 4-3, Subana, Wadaigami-cho, Komatsushima-shi, Tokushima
- 3-11-2, Nishiura, Kanoya-ku, Kagoshima
- 2-3, Iriya, Sayama-shi, Saitama
- 3-1-1, Hara-machi, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka
**Outline of the survey period:** January 11 - 21, 2018


### Table 1: Interest in the Self Defense Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Level</th>
<th>Eligible Number of People (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very interested</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat interested</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not interested</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: Impression toward the SDF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impression Level</th>
<th>Eligible Number of People (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good impression</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More of a positive impression</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad impression</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3: Defense capabilities of the SDF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability Level</th>
<th>Eligible Number of People (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should be increased</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current strength is sufficient</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should be decreased</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4: Evaluation of overseas activities by the SDF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity Level</th>
<th>Eligible Number of People (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly appreciated</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appreciate to a certain degree</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not appreciate very much</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not appreciate at all</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5: Efforts in international peace cooperation activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effort Level</th>
<th>Eligible Number of People (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should make more efforts in engaging proactively</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should maintain the current engagement level</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should reduce the amount of efforts in engaging from current level</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6: Role expected of the Self Defense Forces (multiple responses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Expected</th>
<th>Eligible Number of People (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disaster dispatches (relief activities, emergency patient transport, and other activities during disasters)</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting national security (national security in surrounding sea and airspace, response to attacks on islands, and others)</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining public order in Japan</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responding to ballistic missile attacks</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participating in international peace cooperation activities (such as United Nations PKO and international emergency relief activities)</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private-sector cooperation (civil engineering projects and National Sports Festival assistance, unexploded ordnance disposal, and others)</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rescuing Japanese people in other countries</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting defense cooperation and interaction (implementing meetings and discussions and joint training with defense agencies of other countries, defense equipment assistance, and others)</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing to stable use of cyberspace (response to cyberattacks and others)</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking actions to deal with piracy (initiatives to protect private-sector vessels from piracy offshore near Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden)</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperating with arms control and disarmament and non-proliferation efforts</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assisting capability building initiatives to improve capabilities of developing countries in national security and defense fields</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing to stable use of outer space</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing in particular</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Reference 63** Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2019)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Defense</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 18</td>
<td>Japanese naval vessels monitor Chinese aircraft near the Senkaku Islands</td>
<td>Japan-Philippines Summit (July 12)</td>
<td>Japan releases a defense white paper.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 20</td>
<td>Japan’s defense White Paper: 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Black Sea exercise conducted by Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May. 11</td>
<td>Japan-Philippines Summit (May 11)</td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. release its own INF policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May. 13</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>INF negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May. 16</td>
<td>Japan-Philippines Summit (May 16)</td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. release its own INF policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May. 20</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>INF negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May. 23</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>INF negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May. 26</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>INF negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May. 28</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun. 10</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
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<td>Jul. 27</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
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<td>Aug. 10</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
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<td>INF negotiations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 15</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 21</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
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<td>Aug. 23</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
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<td>INF negotiations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 27</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
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<td>INF negotiations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep. 10</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>INF negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 15</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>INF negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 20</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
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<td>INF negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 22</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
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<td>INF negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 28</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
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<td>INF negotiations.</td>
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<td>Oct. 10</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
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<td>Nov. 10</td>
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<td>Nov. 12</td>
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<td>Nov. 14</td>
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<td>Nov. 16</td>
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<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
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<td>Nov. 23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 25</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 23</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
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<td>INF negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 29</td>
<td>The defense White Paper 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>INF negotiations.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*-defense White Paper released*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Defense</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 28</td>
<td>Japan-Djibouti Defense Ministerial Meeting (Djibouti)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 27</td>
<td>Cabinet Decision on the Government’s Efforts to</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 21</td>
<td>Disaster relief to search for a fishing boat near</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 15</td>
<td>Meeting between Defense Minister Kono and the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 14</td>
<td>19th Doha Forum (Doha)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 20</td>
<td>Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
<td>Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
<td>Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bankok)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
<td>Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
<td>Announcement of “Vientiane Vision 2.0”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 29</td>
<td>Japan-India Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 16</td>
<td>Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 14</td>
<td>Disaster relief call-up orders for Ready Reserve Personnel and Reserve Personnel are issued (through November 18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 08</td>
<td>Japan-Djibouti Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation (Amman)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 24</td>
<td>Japan-Georgia Summit (Tokyo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 24</td>
<td>Japan-Albania Summit (Tokyo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 24</td>
<td>Japan-Armenia Summit (Tokyo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 23</td>
<td>Japan-Slovenia Summit (Tokyo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 23</td>
<td>Japan-Marshall Islands Summit (Tokyo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 22</td>
<td>Meeting between Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister of the People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 18</td>
<td>Japan-US Military Exercise (Bangkok)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 14</td>
<td>Russian Eastern Military District announces that it started a large military exercise in the Sakhalin and Primorsky regions involving up to 8,000 personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 13</td>
<td>A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” in the waters near the Paracel Islands (through September 21)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 10</td>
<td>North Korea launches two ballistic missiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 09</td>
<td>Local residents in the vicinity of a military facility near Arkhangelsk, northern Russia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep. 27</td>
<td>Second ASEAN-China joint maritime drill</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep. 20</td>
<td>A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 18</td>
<td>Japan-Australia Summit Telephone Conversation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 13</td>
<td>A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” in the waters near the Paracel Islands (September 20)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 12</td>
<td>North Korean launches two missiles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep. 11</td>
<td>Japan-Russia Summit (Vladivostok)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep. 04</td>
<td>Japan-Vietnam Summit (Bangkok)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep. 04</td>
<td>3rd RCEP Summit (Bangkok)</td>
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<td>Sep. 04</td>
<td>Japan-Philippines Summit (Bangkok)</td>
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<td>Sep. 04</td>
<td>Japan-India Summit (Bangkok)</td>
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<td>Sep. 04</td>
<td>Japan-Thailand Summit (Bangkok)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep. 03</td>
<td>ASEAN-related Summit Meetings (Bangkok) (through November 5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep. 01</td>
<td>Japan-Chile Summit Telephone Conversation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 29</td>
<td>Japanese-Singapore Summit (Singapore)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 27</td>
<td>Japanese-Singapore Summit (Singapore)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 26</td>
<td>Japan-Georgian Defense Ministerial Meeting (Kiev)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 24</td>
<td>Russian Eastern Military District announces that it started a large military exercise in the Sakhalin and Primorsky regions involving up to 8,000 personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 23</td>
<td>China finds a Japanese warship onMutable Reef, the Spratly Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 22</td>
<td>Japanese-Indonesian Defense Ministerial Meeting (Jakarta)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 22</td>
<td>Japan-Slovenia Summit (Tokyo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 22</td>
<td>Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Kuala Lumpur)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 21</td>
<td>Signing of the Memorandum between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defense of the Kingdom of Thailand on Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defense</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 21</td>
<td>Japan-Chile Defense Ministerial Meeting (Vina del Mar)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 20</td>
<td>Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 18</td>
<td>Japan-Korea Defense Ministerial Meeting (Seoul)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 13</td>
<td>Japan-Bhutan Defense Ministerial Meeting (Thimphu)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 12</td>
<td>Japan-Armenia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Yerevan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 11</td>
<td>Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 09</td>
<td>Japan-Laos State Defense Minister-Minister Meeting (Vientiane)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 08</td>
<td>Signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defense of the People’s Republic of China on Defense Cooperation (through November 18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 02</td>
<td>Russian Prime Minister Medvedev visits (Chughur Island)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 01</td>
<td>North Korea launches two ballistic missiles (probable)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>International</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Jan. 07 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation</td>
<td>Jan. 03 The U.S. military info Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 08 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever</td>
<td>Jan. 08 Iranian forces shot down a Ukrainian plane</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 09 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation</td>
<td>Jan. 09 Iran launches two ballistic missiles at Iraqi bases hosting U.S. troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 12 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation</td>
<td>Jan. 11 The Tanzanian presidential election is held, and incumbent President of the Democratic Front Party is re-elected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 13 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation</td>
<td>Jan. 15 Russian Prime Minister announces the resignation of the Cabinet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 15 International disaster relief activities in Australia</td>
<td>Jan. 20 Malaysia relaunches its first defense white paper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 16 Japan-India Disaster Ministerial Meeting</td>
<td>Jan. 21 A new Russian Cabinet is launched</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 18 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation</td>
<td>Jan. 27-28 Two Russian fighter-bombers fly within Japan’s air defense identification zone in the Sea of Okhotsk (Su-24 fighter-bombers are confirmed intruding for the first time)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 19 Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Video Conference</td>
<td>Jan. 27 The United States and the ROK announce the postponement of U.S.-ROK joint exercises to curb the spread of the novel coronavirus outbreak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 20 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation</td>
<td>Feb. 27 The United States and the ROK announce the postponement of U.S.-ROK joint exercises to curb the spread of the novel coronavirus outbreak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 01 Disaster relief in response to classical swine fever</td>
<td>Feb. 28 U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 02 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation</td>
<td>Mar. 02 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 10 Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation</td>
<td>Mar. 09 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 12 China’s northernmost nuclear submarine enters the East China Sea for the first time</td>
<td>Mar. 10 U.S. vessels conduct the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around the Paracel Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 13 Japan-India Disaster Ministerial Meeting</td>
<td>Mar. 16 Four Chinese vessels sail northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 15 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich)</td>
<td>Mar. 24 Four Chinese vessels sail southward from the Taiwan Strait to the East China Sea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 15 Japan-India Disaster Ministerial Meeting (Munich)</td>
<td>Mar. 27 Two Russian fighter-bombers fly within Japan’s air defense identification zone in the Sea of Okhotsk (Su-24 fighter-bombers are confirmed intruding for the first time)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 01 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich)</td>
<td>Mar. 29 Two Chinese aircraft pass the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 02 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich)</td>
<td>Apr. 10 A U.S. vessel sails through the Taiwan Strait</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 03 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich)</td>
<td>Apr. 10 The U.S. Space Command announces that Russia conducted a launch test of a ground-launched anti-satellite missile</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Mar. 04 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich)</td>
<td>Apr. 10 China announces establishment of the Tibet District and the Nantu District under the Sansha City of Hainan Province</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar. 14 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Munich)</td>
<td>Apr. 20 Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” sail southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean</td>
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<td>Apr. 10 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting</td>
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<td>Apr. 11 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting</td>
<td>Apr. 20 Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” sail southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean</td>
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<td>Apr. 12 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting</td>
<td>Apr. 20 Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” sail southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean</td>
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<td>Apr. 23 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting</td>
<td>Apr. 20 Six Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” sail southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean</td>
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<td>Apr. 23 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting</td>
<td>May 05 Standoff between Chinese and Indian forces along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) (border of Ladakh, India)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr. 24 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting</td>
<td>May 07 Standoff between Chinese and Indian forces along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) (border of Sikkim, India)</td>
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<td>Apr. 28 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting</td>
<td>May 29 Three Chinese vessels sail southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean</td>
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<td>May 02 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 03 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting</td>
<td>May 12 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting</td>
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<td>May 18 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting</td>
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<td>May 08 Japanese-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Conversation</td>
<td>May 19 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting</td>
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