Current Trends in Security Environment

- Uncertainty over the existing order is increasing, and inter-state competition is becoming prominent across the political, economic and military realms.
  - Complex measures required due to “hybrid warfare”
  - Prolonged gray-zone situations
  - Technological progress exerting significant influence on security
  - Importance of domains, space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum
  - Game-changing technologies that could drastically change the conduct of future warfare (artificial intelligence (AI), hypersonic, and high-power energy technologies, etc.)

- Emergence of security challenges, which cannot be dealt with by a single country alone
  - Need to secure stable use of new domains: space and cyberspace; need to ensure security of maritime traffic; response to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs); and response to international terrorism
  - It is necessary to keep an eye on the COVID-19 infection, which is bringing about diverse impacts and restrictions to military activities of respective countries.

Security Environment Surrounding Japan

- Military powers with high quality and quantity are concentrated in Japan’s surroundings, where clear trends such as further military buildup and an increase in military activities are observed.
- A regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized in the Indo-Pacific region and longstanding issues increase in military activities are observed.
- Recent years have seen a continued tendency towards the prolongation of “gray zone” situations that are associated with territories, sovereignty and economic interests, and such situations may increase and expand in the future.

Regional Security Environment surrounding Japan etc.

Trends in Security and Defense Policies

- Based on the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released in February 2018, the United States modified a portion of its existing SLBM warheads into low-yield warheads. Additionally, the United States conducted test launches of its intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile and ballistic missile, which had been restricted by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. It also mentioned the necessity for arms control that includes China, which has been building medium-range missile capabilities outside the scope of the INF Treaty.
- The United States founded the Space Command as a Unified Combatant Command and then established the Space Force as the sixth branch of its military, within the Department of the Air Force (a new military service established for the first time in 70 years after the establishment of the Air Force).

Overview

- The United States recognizes strategic competition with revisionist powers, namely China and Russia, as the central challenge to U.S. security. Especially, the United States ranks China at the top of its list of priorities and places the greatest emphasis on the security of the Indo-Pacific region to strengthen deterrence against China.
  - Under the recognition that nuclear capabilities of North Korea, classified as “rogue regimes” in its strategic documents, constitute an extraordinary threat to the United States, it has maintained sanctions and continues to pursue denuclearization of North Korea, while maintaining strong military readiness of the U.S. forces including U.S. Forces Korea.
  - The United States prioritizes the allocation of military forces to the Indo-Pacific region and Europe while reducing forces in the Middle East and Africa. The United States, however, still needs to deal with security issues in the latter regions, which makes it difficult to describe that such transition of the U.S. force posture is smoothly progressing.
  - The United States has indicated that certain allies, which are pointed out as bearing a small burden, should bear it appropriately. It has requested NATO member states to swiftly achieve their national defense spending goals, and has required the Republic of Korea (ROK) to shoulder a bigger share of the costs associated with U.S. Forces Korea.
  - Amid rising tensions between Iran, the U.S. military killed the commander of the Guds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iraq. In response, Iran launched ballistic missiles towards Iraq bases where U.S. Forces were stationed.
  - Against growing tensions in the Middle East, the U.S. military reinforced its posture in the region. Additionally, the United States established the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) and conducted activities by naval vessels and other equipment, along with countries including the United Kingdom.

Major organizational chart of the DoD
### Activities in the Surrounding Sea Area and Airspace of Japan

- **China**
  - China has relentlessly continued unilateral attempts to change the status quo by coercion in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands, leading to a grave matter of concern.
  - The Chinese Navy and Air Force have in recent years expanded and intensified their activities in the surrounding sea areas and airspace of Japan, and there are cases involving the one-sided escalation of activities.
  - In order to change the status quo by coercion to create a fait accompli.

- **China's defense budget**
  - China's defense budget is increasing at a fast pace.
  - Approx. 4 times in 30 years.
  - Approx. 11 times in 30 years, and approx. 2.4 times in 10 years.

- **Changes in number of days on which Chinese government vessels intruded into the Japanese territorial waters**

- **Activities in Further Distant Seas**
  - China is steadily increasing its capabilities to conduct operations in more distant seas such as the Indian Ocean in recent years.
  - China has been promoting its "Belt and Road" Initiative, and China's support for the construction of port infrastructure in Indian Ocean countries as well as Pacific island countries could lead China to secure bases available for its military purpose. The Chinese military is possibly taking on the role of the shield behind the initiative by such means as the stabilization of areas via counter-piracy activities and the improvement of counter-terrorism capabilities in coastal states through joint exercises.

### China's Support for the Construction of Port Infrastructure in Indian Ocean Countries

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### Relationships with Countries and Regions

- There are various issues between the United States and China, such as trade issues, issues concerning the South China Sea, the Taiwan issue, the Hong Kong issue, and human rights issues regarding Uighur and Tibet.
- While the United States has been toughening its stance on China, China has maintained an uncompromising stance on its "core interests." Concerning trade and military issues, mutually keep themselves in check between the United States and China.
- While the United States has continued and reinforced its engagement in Taiwan, China has repeatedly expressed its strong protest against Taiwan's independence.
- Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen was reelected with the highest-ever number of votes and has reiterated her opposition to the "One country, Two Systems" principle, which China keeps in check.
- The Solomon Islands and Kiribati established diplomatic relations with China, and as a result, the number of countries having diplomatic relations with Taiwan declined to 15 from 22 in May 2016, when President Tsai took office.
- The overall military balance between China and Taiwan is shifting in favor of China, and the gap appears to be growing year by year. The United States continues sending arms (such as F-16 fighters) to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act.
- Moves to review projects have been seen among some countries cooperating in the "Belt and Road" Initiative, due to such factors as their deteriorating financial situation.
North Korea

Overview

- North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests so far, and is assessed to have already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads. In addition, North Korea repeatedly launches ballistic missiles in recent years at an unprecedented frequency, aiming to promote the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles and the enhancement of its operation capabilities. Such military trends in North Korea pose grave and imminent threats to Japan’s security.

- At the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting held in June 2018, Chairman Kim expressed his intention to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but the second U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in February 2019 ended without any agreement being reached between the two countries.

- At the December 2019 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP, Chairman Kim announced the intention to continue developing strategic weapons until the United States rolls back its hostile policy towards North Korea.

Current Status of the Nuclear Development

- Despite the technological maturity obtained through the past six nuclear tests, it is assessed that North Korea has already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads.

- In 2019, North Korea illicitly imported a volume of petroleum products far in excess of the cap set by UN Security Council resolutions.

- The possibility cannot be discounted that the sixth nuclear weapons test in September 2017 was of a hydrogen bomb.

- Given the technological maturity obtained through the past six nuclear tests, it is assessed that North Korea has already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads.

Current Status of the Missile Development

- Since 2016, North Korea has launched more than 70 ballistic missiles and others, and the following characteristics have been observed: (i) increase the firing range of ballistic missiles; (ii) enhance the accuracy, continuous fire capability, and operational capabilities necessary for saturation attacks; (iii) improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks; (iv) develop ballistic missiles that fly at low altitudes on irregular trajectories; and (v) diversify the forms of launches.

- In particular, North Korea has developed more advanced missile-related technologies in recent years. The three types of new short-range ballistic missiles that have been involved in a series of launches since May 2019 are distinctive in that they use solid fuel and fly at lower altitudes than conventional ballistic missiles. North Korea is thus believed to be trying to breach missile defense networks, and there are concerns that such advanced technologies will be applied to longer-range missiles.

- North Korea is relentlessly pursuing increasingly complex and diverse modes of attack and is steadily strengthening and improving its attack capabilities. These enhancements in its capabilities make early detection of the signs of a launch and the interception of the missiles more difficult, thereby posing new challenges for the information-gathering, early warning, and interception postures of relevant countries, including Japan.

Current Status of Ship-to-Ship Transfer, etc.

- North Korea is presumed to be evading the UN Security Council sanctions by conducting ship-to-ship transfers on the high seas and other techniques, and it is pointed out that in 2019, North Korea illicitly imported a volume of petroleum products far in excess of the cap set by UN Security Council resolutions.

Russia

Overview

- Russia is modernizing its military equipment, including strategic nuclear forces, and is stepping up military activities, so close scrutiny of developments in this regard will be required.

- Regarding conventional forces, Russia is developing fifth generation fighters and heavy unmanned combat aerial vehicles, and is also stepping up its activities in the realms of space and electromagnetic spectrum.

- In July 2019, two Russian Tu-95 long-range bombers carried out joint air patrol with two Chinese H-6 bombers from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea.

- In September 2019, Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu and, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission Zhang, signed a package of documents on military and military-technical cooperation.

- The authorities of both countries clearly denied that they would form a military alliance, but attention should be paid to future developments in light of recent advancement in their military cooperation.

Advancement in the Military Cooperation with China

- In July 2019, two Russian Tu-95 long-range bombers flew around Japan, and intruded into Japan’s territorial airspace twice when they flew northward over the Pacific Ocean. In July, one Russian A-50 early warning and control aircraft intruded into Japan’s airspace above the territorial waters of Takeshima Island. In February 2020, two Su-34 fighter-bombers deployed to the Far East were observed for the first time.

- In October 2019, the Eastern Military District announced that drills to repel landings by a hypothetical enemy assault force were to be held in the Sakhalin and Primorsky regions, involving up to 8,000 personnel, more than 3,000 units of tanks and military equipment, and up to 50 planes and helicopters.

- Even amid the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic within the forces, military activities have remained active.

Activities in Japan’s Northern Territories and the Vicinity of Japan

- Russia continues to station AFRE in the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan, and has recently been increasing the AFRE’s activities.

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Chapter 2
Middle East, North Africa, and Other Regions

Overview

- The Middle East is a major source of energy supply for the world and contains major routes for international commerce. Japan is also dependent on the region for approximately 90% of its crude oil imports. Peace and stability in the Middle East region is extremely important for the peace and prosperity of the international community, including Japan.
- On the other hand, the Middle East and Africa region has been experiencing constant conflicts and unrest throughout the 20th century. In recent years, tensions have risen due to the situation in the Gulf region and the Middle East peace process.
- In some countries that experienced the Arab Spring, which occurred at the beginning of 2011, civil wars and the activities of terrorist organizations are ongoing.

Situation in the Gulf Region

- Ongoing is the resumption of sanctions by the United States, Iran has implemented its measures to reduce compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by stages since May 2019. The United Kingdom, France and Germany referred the developments to the JCPOA Joint Commission under the JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism. In response, Iran suggested the possibility of considering withdrawal from the NPT, but stated that if Europe observes the agreement, it would return to compliance with the agreement.
- Since May 2019, the United States has expanded the number of U.S. troops deployed to the Middle East in response to Iran’s threats. On the other hand, since October 2019, there have been multiple attacks on U.S. military bases in Iraq and one American was victimized, which triggered military retaliation between the United States and Iran. However, both countries clearly showed their intent to avoid further escalation.
- Since May 2019, sporadic events affecting the navigation safety of civilian vessels have occurred in the waters of the Middle East. The United States and other countries including European countries promote efforts to safeguard maritime security in the region.
  - The United States advocated the Maritime Security Initiative and subsequently established the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), in which seven countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Botswana, participate, in addition to the United States.
  - Eight European countries, including France, Denmark, and the Netherlands, issued a statement to politically support the creation of a European-led maritime surveillance mission in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASH).
- Iran also presented a plan named HOPE (Hormuz Peace Endeavor) as an independent effort to maintain maritime security. In addition, Iran conducted the Maritime Safety Belt, the first bilateral military exercise with the Chinese and Russian navies in the Gulf of Oman and other areas.

Chapter 3
Trends Concerning New Domains and Relevant Challenges Facing the International Community

Military Science and Technology

- As civilian technologies have been rapidly developing, further technological innovation is expected to dramatically change battle scenes in the future.
- It has been pointed out that the rapid advancement has exerted a great impact on the military field, including the application for autonomous unmanned vehicles and the cyber domain, in addition to the improvement in data processing capacity.
- The United States indicates that China and Russia are developing advanced hypersonic weapons that challenge existing missile defense systems.
- High-power energy weapons, such as electromagnetic railguns, high-power laser weapons, and high-power microwaves, are being expected as a means to counter various airborne threats.

Space Domain

- Major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) functions.
- In outer space, various countries are promoting test flight in order to maintain their own peace and security. It has also been noted that China and Russia have been enhancing capabilities to impede the United States and its allies from using outer space.
- In order to respond to these threats, countries are restructuring space-related organizations within their forces.

Cyber Domain

- Information and communications technology (ICT) advancements are further increasing the dependence of military forces on information and communications networks. For this reason, cyber attacks are recognized as an asymmetrical means to impede the military activities of adversaries at low cost. Many foreign military forces are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace.
- It has been pointed out that China and Russia are bolstering the cyber capabilities of their military for the purpose of obstructing the network of adversaries’ military forces and destroying their infrastructure.
- Cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against information and communications networks of not only government organizations and military forces but also business corporations and academic organizations in various countries. Attacks attempting to steal critical technologies, secrets or personal information have also been confirmed.

Electromagnetic Domain

- Securing use of the electromagnetic spectrum is indispensable for the operation of communication equipment and radar systems. Major countries recognize electronic attacks for interrupting adversaries’ use of electromagnetic spectrum as an asymmetrical means to effectively hamper adversaries’ military performance, enhancing electronic warfare capabilities.
- China regularly conducts force-on-force exercises to effectively accomplish missions in complicated electromagnetic environments, thereby improving practical capabilities.
- It is reported that Russia used various electronic warfare systems in Eastern Ukraine and Syria to interrupt adversaries’ command and control traffic and radar systems, improving electronic warfare capabilities.

COVID-19 Infection

- The COVID-19 infection poses not only sanitary problems but also exerts influence broadly on society and economy of respective countries, revealing the vulnerability of supply chains and causing serious damage on local economies and concerns over prolonged economic sluggishness worldwide.
- Respective countries are utilizing their military forces’ sanitary capabilities and transportation capacity to deal with the infection domestically, and have also been contributing to the prevention of global spread of the infection. In the meantime, military training or bilateral/multilateral exercises have been suspended or postponed, and the infection has brought about diverse impacts and restrictions to military activities as well. If the spread of infection is further prolonged, this may exert various impacts on countries’ military capability.
- It is said that while actively providing medical goods and dispatching medical experts to countries where the infection is spreading, China has been making propaganda efforts in various manners, including the spread of disinformation, aiming growing social uncertainties and confusion due to the spread of infection.
- The COVID-19 pandemic may expose and intensify strategic competition among countries intending to create international and regional orders more preferable to themselves and to expand their influence. We need to closely watch such moves with great concern as security issues.
Japan's Security and Defense Policy

Chapter 2: Japan's Security and Defense Policy

Organizations Responsible for Japan's Security and Defense

Organizations of the MOD/SDF

To fulfill their mission of defending Japan, the MOD/SDF consists of various organizations, mainly the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as armed forces.

Location of Principal Units (for illustrative purposes) (As of March 31, 2019)

Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense

Chapter 3: Japan's Security and Defense Policy

National Security Strategy (NSS)

The NSS developed in December 2013 specifies, as Japan's fundamental principle of national security, that Japan will contribute more proactively than ever before to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while committed to continuing the path as a peace-loving nation, and seeking its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region from the perspective of a "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation.

Relationship among the NSS, the NDGP, and the fiscal year budget

The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and Beyond (NDGP)

- The NDGP was approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet in December 2018.
- The NDGP establishes the posture of Japan's defense forces and the level to achieve, envisioning approximately 10 years

Changes in NDGP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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| 1976 NDGP  | Basic ideas in 1976 NDGP: Maintaining a minimum defense force adequate to the self defense needs of the nation
| 1980 NDGP  | Basic ideas in 1980 NDGP: Maintaining a defense force capable of dealing with various contingencies
| 2000 NDGP  | Basic ideas in 2000 NDGP: Ensuring the capability to deal with the security environment of the century
| 2005 NDGP  | Basic ideas in 2005 NDGP: Ensuring the capability to deal with the security environment of the 21st century
| 2010 NDGP  | Basic ideas in 2010 NDGP: Ensuring the capability to deal with the security environment of the 21st century
| 2015 NDGP  | Basic ideas in 2015 NDGP: Ensuring the capability to deal with the security environment of the 21st century
| 2019 NDGP  | Basic ideas in 2019 NDGP: Ensuring the capability to deal with the security environment of the 21st century

The concept of Basic Defense Capability

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Under the basic precept of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, Japan will strengthen each of the means by which to successfully achieve these national defense objectives: Japan’s own architecture for national defense; the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and international security cooperation.

In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan will enhance priority capability areas as early as possible.

The following are set forth as national defense objectives:

Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability

- Strengthening Capabilities Necessary for Cross-Domain Operations
- Strengthening capabilities in the new domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum
- Strengthening capabilities in the traditional domains, such as capabilities in maritime and air domains, stand-off defense capability, comprehensive air and missile defense capability, and maneuver and deployment capability
- Strengthening sustainability and resiliency by promoting necessary measures for securing ammunition and fuel, ensuring maritime shipping lanes, and protecting important infrastructure.

Strengthening core elements comprising defense capability

Organization of Self-Defense Forces (SDF)

Joint Operation to Realize Cross-Domain Operations

The SDF will establish new units in the domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, strengthen its posture, build comprehensive air and missile defense capability, and maintain a maritime transport unit as an integrated unit.

Ground-Self Defense Force (GSDF)

The GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units furnished with advanced mobility and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and mobile operating units equipped with specialized functions. The GSDF will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats by taking measures including persistent steady-state maneuvers.

To be able to counter an invasion of remote islands, the GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units and hyper-velocity gliding projectile units for remote island defense.

Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)

The MSDF will maintain reinforced destroyer units including a new type of destroyers (FFM), minesweeper units, and embarked patrol helicopter units, and will organize surface units. The MSDF will establish patrol ship units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan.

In order to conduct underwater ISR and to engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, the MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units.

Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)

The ASDF will maintain ground-based warming and control units capable of conducting sustained surveillance in the airspace around Japan, and air warning and control units capable of conducting airborne warming, surveillance and control also during situations with heightened tensions, such as “gray-zone” situations.

The ASDF will maintain fighter aircraft units reinforced by high-performance fighter aircraft, and aerial refueling and transport units.

The ASDF will maintain unmanned aerial vehicle units which enable it to conduct information collection in areas remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions.

Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019–FY2023; MTDP)

- The MTDP sets forth the policy for the build-up of defense capability, and main projects for the five-year period from FY2019 to FY2023.
- In order to build a structure that is capable of realizing cross-domain operations, the SDF will conduct reorganization of its major units.
- The SDF will conduct programs to strengthen capabilities in both new and traditional domains.
- The SDF will conduct programs to strengthen core elements of defense capabilities, including reinforcement of the human resource base.

In FY2020, the second year of the NDPG and the MTDP, the MOD/SDF will steadily implement initiatives toward building a Multi-domain Defense Force based on the NDPG and the MTDP:

Main Projects of Build-up of Defense Capabilities in FY2020 (Priorities in strengthening capabilities necessary for cross-domain operations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capabilities that should be acquired and strengthened</th>
<th>Outline</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capabilities in space domain</strong></td>
<td>Development of satellites for Space Operations Squadron, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Procurement of SSA satellites (space-based optical telescopes)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Procurement of SSA satellite communication systems</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Capabilities in cyber domain</strong></td>
<td>Development of Cyber Defense Group, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Securing and development of cyber islands</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Enhanced and strengthening of U.S. and Japanese capabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Capabilities in electromagnetic domain</strong></td>
<td>Research and development of devices to neutralize the radar of opponents who intend to invade Japan, including development of standoff electronic warfare aircraft</td>
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<td>Strengthening of capabilities to minimize electronic jamming from opponents who intend to invade Japan through procurement of fighters (F-35AB) with superior electronic protection capability, etc.</td>
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<td>Enhancement of systems of electronic warfare units, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capabilities in Maritime and Air Domains</strong></td>
<td>Procurement of P-1 patrol aircraft (× 3), Procurement of SH-60K patrol helicopters (× 7)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Construction of the second generation of 20,000-ton tanker unit (cargo transport helicopter unit)</td>
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<td>Partial development of Destroyer JS “Izumo” ( batch II) for takeoff and landing by F-35B</td>
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<td>Establishment of ESG Satellites for Air Refueling and Transport</td>
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<td>Procurement of Type-20 5.56mm rifled (× 3,283)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Procurement of Type-19 155mm wheeled self-propelled howitzers (× 7), etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stand-off defense capability</strong></td>
<td>Procurement of stand-off missiles, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comprehensive air and missile defense capability</strong></td>
<td>Procurement of SM-1 Block IA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maneuver and deployment capability</strong></td>
<td>Modification to the Patriot system, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainability and resilience</strong></td>
<td>Procurement of Type-20 5.56mm rifled (× 3,283)</td>
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<td>Procurement of F-35B F-2A in Miwa Air Base</td>
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In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan must strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. To this end, in light of the NDPG and the MTDP, defense-related expenditures for FY2020 were increased by 61.8 billion yen from the previous fiscal year to 50.688 trillion yen (an increase of 1.2% from the previous year). Defense-related expenditures has increased for the eight consecutive years.

Change in Defense-Related Expenditures (Past 15 years; Original Budget Basis) (100 million yen)
Three Pillars of Japan’s Defense (Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense)

Chapter 3

Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense

Response from Peacetime to Grey Zone Situations

Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the Area Surrounding Japan

- The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) is engaged in persistent intelligence collection and warning and surveillance during peacetime over Japan’s territorial waters and airspace, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly.

- As part of its regular warning and surveillance activities in Japanese territorial waters, the SDF is carrying out information gathering on vessels suspected of violating the UN Security Council sanctions. During the period from 2018 to the end of March 2020, the SDF has observed 24 cases of seaborne rendezvous by (ship-to-ship transfer) North Korean vessels.

- In response to these illicit maritime activities, including ship-to-ship transfers by North Korean vessels, the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and France carried out early warning surveillance activities with aircraft using the U.S. Kadena Air Base in Japan. In addition, naval vessels of the U.S. Navy, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and France carried out enforcement of United Nations Security Council sanctions imposed against North Korea in sea areas surrounding Japan.

- In FY2019, ASDF aircraft scrambled 947 times, the third largest ever recorded. Breaking this figure down, ASDF aircraft scrambled 675 times in response to Chinese aircraft, and 268 times in response to Russian aircraft.

- In response to attacks on Japan including its remote islands, the SDF will quickly maneuver and deploy requisite units to block access and landing of invading forces while ensuring maritime and air superiority. Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, the SDF will block invading forces’ access and landing from outside their threat envelopes. Should any part of the territory be occupied, the SDF will retake it by employing all necessary measures.

- In order to strengthen its defense architecture in the southwestern region, a surface-to-air missile unit and a surface-to-ship guided missile unit were deployed to Miyako Island in March 2020. The GSDF will deploy an air security unit in charge of the initial response and other units also in Ishigaki Island.

- As part of measures to enhance the persistent ISR posture, the ASDF will establish Airborne Warning and Control Wing by upgrading the Airborne Early Warning Group in March 2020 and will establish a temporal unmanned aerial vehicle unit (tentative name) within FY2020.

- In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment of units, the MOD established a Tactical Airlift Wing that operates Osprey in March 2020.

Responses in Space Domain

- The MOD aims to establish SSA system by FY2022 to monitor and maintain an accurate picture of conditions in space. The MOD is also working to deploy radar to monitor threats to Japanese satellites, such as space debris, and its operating system.

- In preparation for full-scale SSA operation and introduction of defense equipment, the ASDF established Space Operations Squadron in May 2020.

Responses in Cyber Domain

- The MOD/SSF has taken comprehensive measures to ensure the safety of information and communication systems and respond to cyber attacks by a specialized unit, etc.

- The Cyber Defense Group will be further expanded by about 70 personnel to approximately 290 in FY2020.
The MOD/SDF will: enhance its ability to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic spectrum; strengthen information collection and analysis capabilities related to electromagnetic spectrum, and develop an information sharing posture; and strengthen capabilities to neutralize the radar and communications of opponents who intend to invade Japan.

In addition to the establishment of the GSDF Electronic Warfare Unit, in FY2020, the SDF will also proceed with development of standoff electronic warfare aircraft for jamming, and R&D aimed at the procurement of potentially game-changing technologies, such as high-power microwave devices and a high-energy laser system (HEL).

Response in Electromagnetic Domain

- In order to prevent the spread of COVID-19, the MOD/SDF gathered all their strength to carry out various activities. None of the SDF personnel engaged in the activities got infected (as of May 31, 2020.)
- In addition to activities in the cruise ship Diamond Princess, the MOD/SDF implemented disaster relief pertaining to rescue for prevention of the spread of COVID-19, disaster relief for reinforcement of border control against COVID-19, and education on infection protection for employees of the local governments.
- The SDF hospitals and the National Defense Medical College Hospital (NDMCH) have been accepting COVID-19 patients. A clinical trial of Avigan (favipiravir) tablets was also started.
- The MOD/SDF disclosed protective measures of “JSDF’s standards” in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19. At the same time, through the ministerial telephone conversations, the defense authorities shared information, lessons learned and knowledge obtained primarily while taking infection control measures.

Efforts of the MOD/SDF in response to the Spread of Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)

- The SDF works in collaboration with local governments, engaged in various activities such as the search and rescue of disaster victims and ships and aircraft in distress, and preventing epidemics. In FY2019, the SDF conducted 449 disaster relief operations, including the disaster relief in response to the flooding caused by heavy rain accompanying a front in August 2019 (Northern Kyushu Heavy Rain), the 2019 Ito Peninsula Typhoon (Typhoon Faxai) and the 2019 East Japan Typhoon (Typhoon Hagibis).
- At the beginning of a disaster, the SDF will maintain response readiness to any damage and need for activities while giving the first priority to life-saving activities. For livelihood support, the SDF will coordinate the division of roles, response policy, activity period, and other matters with relevant parties including the local governments and ministries concerned at the local response headquarters, etc.
- The SDF strengthened dissemination of information so that people can easily access the information related to support.

Response to Large-Scale Disasters

- Information Gathering Activities for Ensuring the Safety of Japan-related Vessels in the Middle East
  - In order to ensure peace and stability in the Middle East and the safety of Japan-related vessels, as a part of Japan’s independent initiative, the Cabinet decided to dispatch MSDF vessels for the purpose of gathering information and to utilize the existing counter-piracy unit.
  - On January 11, 2020, two P-3C (fixed-wing patrol aircraft) left Japan to replace the counter-piracy unit and began information gathering activities on the 20th. Destroyer JS “Takanami” left port on February 2 and began information gathering activities in the field on February 26. On May 10, 2020, Destroyer JS “Kirisame” left Japan to replace “Takanami.”

Policy Consultation between Japan and the United States

- Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting
  - At the meeting held in New York on September 25, 2019, the leaders reaffirmed the recognition that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is stronger than ever before, and shared the view on continuing to further strengthen the unwavering Japan-U.S. Alliance.
- Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting
  - At the meeting held in Washington D.C. on January 14, 2020, Minister of Defense Kono explained the cabinet decision made in December 2019, which is to send the SDF to the Middle East, and Japan and the United States have confirmed the following points:
    - The Ministers confirmed that we have to avoid further escalation of the situation in the Middle East;
    - The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missiles of all ranges;
    - The Ministers confirmed that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, and work together to make sure that the rule of law and the freedom of navigation are firmly established;
    - The Ministers confirmed that they continue to closely work together to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond, and to materialize the aligned strategies of both countries;
    - The Ministers reaffirmed that they cooperate with various partners, including conducting joint exercises and capacity building to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific with Japan-U.S. Alliance being the cornerstone;
    - The Ministers confirmed to work closely together for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives, including the acquisition of Mageshima, a candidate site for a permanent FCLP facility.
- The Ministers reaffirmed that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma, and:
- The Ministers reaffirmed that Japan and the United States continue to work together with the shared recognition that understanding and cooperation from the local communities is crucial for the maintenance of operational readiness of the USFJ.

Strengthening Ability of Japan-U.S. Alliance to Deter and Counter Threats

In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security, Japan and the United States are advancing cooperation in various fields, including “Cooperation in Space and Cyber Domains,” “Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense,” “Bilateral Training and Exercises,” “ISR Activities,” “Maritime Security,” “Logistics Support,” and “Cooperation in Response to a Large-Scale Disaster in Japan.”

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which marked the 60th anniversary in 2020, together with Japan’s own national defense architecture, constitute a cornerstone for Japan’s national security.

The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as its core, plays a significant role for peace, stability and prosperity of not only Japan but also the Indo-Pacific region and the international community.

The Guidelines manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peace-time to contingencies.

Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as its core, plays a significant role for peace, stability and prosperity of not only Japan but also the Indo-Pacific region and the international community.
Three Pillars of Japan’s Defense (Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense)

Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas

In order to create a desirable security environment including maintaining and enhancing free and open maritime order, and with an eye on increasing Japanese and U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan and the United States are conducting bilateral activities in such areas as “Maritime Security,” “Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief,” and “Triilateral and Multilateral Training and Exercises,” and promoting cooperation in the areas of “Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation” and “Joint/Shared Use.”

Steady Implementation of Measures Concerning the USFJ

The presence of USFJ provides deterrence, while on the other hand, given the impacts of the stationing of the USFJ on the living environment of the local residents, it is necessary to make efforts appropriate for the actual situation of each area in order to mitigate the impacts.

Stationing of the USFJ

It is necessary to maintain the presence of the USFJ and its readiness to make rapid and agile responses in case of emergency in Japan and its surrounding areas even in peacetime, so that Japan-U.S. Alliance based on Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements provides enough for the deterrence contributing to the peace and stability of the defense of Japan and the region.

Therefore, Japan accepts the stationing of the U.S. Forces based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and it is a cornerstone of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

Stationing of the US Forces in Okinawa

Approximately 70% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 6% of the land area of the prefecture and approximately 14% of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, it is necessary to make utmost efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, while also considering the above-mentioned security standpoints.

Regarding distribution of functions offered by MCAS Futenma, the development of facilities is being promoted to transfer the function of accepting transient aircraft to Naha and Naha Air Base.

Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

The Indo-Pacific region is the center of the world vitality, and home to more than half the world’s population. It is important to establish this region as a free and open global commons to secure peace and prosperity in the region as a whole. In order to promote a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” the MOD/SDF will strengthen defense cooperation and exchanges with countries in the region.

1. Australia: In November 2019, a Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting was held. The Ministers agreed to deepen and expand bilateral defense cooperation.

2. India: In September 2019, a Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting was held. In November of the same year, a Defense Ministerial Meeting and the first Japan-India 2+2 Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting were held. The Ministers reiterated their commitment to advance bilateral security cooperation.

3. ASEAN: In November 2019, at the ASEAN-Japan Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting, Vientiane Vision 2.0, an updated version of Vientiane Vision, was announced. Meetings with the defense ministers of each Act country were held.

4. ROK: In November 2019, the ROK government announced the suspension of the notification to terminate the Japan-ROK GSOMIA. In response, Defense Minister commented that Japan-U.S. and Japan-ROK bilateral cooperation and Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation are important amid the severe security environment in East Asia, and that he considered that the ROK government made its decision from a strategic perspective taking into account the current security situation in the region.

5. European countries, Canada, and New Zealand: Meetings with the defense ministers of European countries and New Zealand were held on the occasion of the AOMM-Plus in November 2019, and meetings with the defense ministers of European countries and Canada were held at the Munich Security Conference in February 2020. In October 2019, the Chief of Staff, GSDF visited Canada for the first time.

6. China: In October 2019, the Chinese vessel visited Japan for the first time in about 10 years. In December of the same year, Defense Minister visited China for the first time in 10 years and held a meeting with China’s Defense Minister.

7. Russia: In August and September 2019, the ROK Navy participated for the first time in the Spasskaya Tower International Military Music Festival in Moscow. In November of the same year, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy visited Japan for the first time in 18 years.

8. Pacific Island Countries: From January to February 2020, State Minister of Defense visited Fiji, PNG, and Tonga for the first time as a political officer of the Ministry of Defense.

9. Middle Eastern Countries: Defense Minister attended the Manama Dialogue held in November and the Doha Forum in December 2019 for the first time as a Japanese Defense Minister. In addition, the Minister visited Jordan and Oman for the first time and held defense ministerial meetings. He also had telephone conversations with defense ministers of various other countries in the Middle East.

Efforts under the Vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”

The MOD/SDF will create a desirable security environment for Japan by promoting multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation.

Strategic Promotion of Multi-Faceted and Multi-Layered Defense Cooperation

Three Pillars of Japan’s Defense

(i) Promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, and freedom of trade
(ii) Pursuit of economic prosperity (improving connectivity, etc.)
(iii) Commitment to peace and stability

Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

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Since 2012, the MOD/SDF has provided capacity building in such areas as HA/DR, Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation.

Regarding cooperation in the use of cyber domain, the MOD has held cyber dialogues with the respective defense authorities of the United States, in addition to strengthening cooperation with coastal states of the Indo-Pacific region through specific initiatives.

In September to October 2019, Japan has provided guidance on techniques to ensure maritime security for cybersecurity personnel of the People’s Army of Vietnam. Japan has contributed to the enhancement of multilateral cooperation in the region by holding seminars for cybersecurity personnel of the People’s Army of Vietnam.

Ensuring Maritime Security

For Japan, a maritime nation, strengthening the order based on fundamental norms, such as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, is the foundation for its peace and prosperity, which is extremely important.

The SDF has been dispatching the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement, the Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement, and the Deployment Support Group since 2009 in order to protect vessels from acts of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

In addition, Japan has provided training on the operation of heavy equipment to the UN DOS. Japan has been dispatching a total of 164 GSDF personnel to Africa to provide nine training sessions for a total of 277 members from eight African countries.

Support to the UN Triangular Partnership Project (UNTPP)

The UNTPP was founded using funds from Japan as a project to support training for military engineers and the procurement of heavy equipment by the UN 205. Japan has been dispatching a total of 164 GSDF personnel to Africa to provide nine training sessions for a total of 277 members from eight African countries.

In addition, given that strengthening sanitation capacity to ensure the safety of deployed personnel has become an issue in UN peacekeeping operations, medical training was implemented in October 2019.

International Disaster Relief Activities

To contribute to the advancement of international cooperation, the SDF has engaged in international disaster relief activities proactively from the viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and improvement of the global security environment.

In recent years, international disaster relief activities were carried out from November to December 2019 in response to the heavy rains and floods in the republic of Djibouti and from January to February 2020 in response to the major bush fires in Australia.
Part IV

Core Elements Comprising Defense Capability, etc.

Chapter 1

Human Resource Base that Sustains the Defense Capability

Reinforcing Human Resource Base

The NDPG specifies that the core element of defense capability is SDF personnel, and that securing human resources for SDF personnel and improving their ability and morale are essential to strengthening defense capability. This has become an imminent challenge in the face of shrinking and aging population with declining birth rates. Also in light of the sustainability and resilience of defense capability, the SDF needs to work even further to reinforce the human resource base that sustains the defense capability.

Effective Use of Human Resources

The NDPG and others plan to raise the mandatory early retirement age by one year during the period of the MTDP from 2020, and another one year during the period of the next MTDP in stages for each rank. The retirement age of personnel from the rank of Ichizki (Captain (GSDF, ASDF)/Lieutenant (MSDF)) to Isso (Master Sergeant (GSDF, ASDF)/Petty Officer 1st Class (MSDF)) was raised in 2020. In addition, in order to ensure an operating ratio with a limited number of personnel, the crew system was introduced in some MSDF vessels, where some crews take shifts to increase the number of operation days. The introduction of this crew system to new types of destroyers (FFM) is being considered.

Improvement of Living and Work Environment and Treatment

The SDF will steadily renew everyday life/workplace fixtures, secure the necessary numbers of everyday necessities in addition to accelerating the securing and reconstruction of the necessary barracks and housing, and proceed with measures against aging and earthquake proofing of facilities. In addition, the SDF will improve their treatment based on the special nature of their mission and work environment. Specifically, in order to ensure appropriate treatment in accordance with the risk and special nature of their missions and the characteristics of the area of the office, the SDF will make improvements to special work allowance, etc. and procure portable beds and better emergency rations to improve their ability to respond to disasters.

Further Promotion of Work-Life Balance and Women’s Participation

Working Style Reform

The MOD/SDF is promoting correction of long working hours and encouraging taking leave to ensure proper work-life balance so that every member can exert his/her full potential.

Women’s Participation

In terms of employing and promoting female SDF personnel, the MOD/SDF sets out a personnel management policy to ensure equal opportunity between men and women and assign the right person to the right place based on the person’s motivation and ability/aptitude. In December 2018, a woman assumed the role of commanding officer of an Aegis destroyer for the first time, promoting active participation of female SDF personnel. In addition, the MOD/SDF has been reviewing the restriction of assignment of female personnel. With the removal of the restriction on female assignments in submarines in December 2018, assignment restriction against females was completely removed with the exception of the units where female personnel cannot be assigned for reasons of maternity protection (a part of the GSDF Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit (chemical) and Tunnel Company Units).

Chapter 2

Measures on Defense Equipment and Technology

Reinforcing Technology Base

- Review of the Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook is now underway in order to ensure Japan’s technological superiority in the strategically important equipment and technology field, including technologies pertaining to new domains and other potentially game-changing important technologies.
- As far development of the fighter (F-X), improving technological reliability and reducing the development cost, the MOD is pursuing the best approach to realize Japan led development with international cooperation in sight.

Optimizing Equipment Procurement

- The MOD has been promoting effective and efficient equipment acquisition by selecting 18 items for major programs designated for project management. At the same time, the MOD strives to cut equipment procurement costs by making bulk orders utilizing long-term contracts.
- To enhance the level of performance management, the MOD makes every effort. The specific efforts include constant monitoring of goods and service deliveries from both sides, facilitating the internal management system concerning the execution process of FMS procurement, and strengthening cooperation with the U.S. government through close Japan-U.S. consultations.

Strengthening Defense Industrial Base

- In order to strengthen Japan’s defense industrial base, the MOD identifies four lines of effort: (1) reforming the existing contract system towards creating a competitive environment among defense companies; (2) strengthening risk management of supply chain for defense equipment; (3) further participation of Japan’s defense industry in sustainment and maintenance of imported equipment, etc.; and (4) promoting appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.

Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

- Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with other countries in order to contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of technological and industrial bases, as well as contributing to the promotion of our national security, peace and international cooperation.
  - Transfer of parts and maintenance equipment of the UH-1H utility helicopters to the Philippines started in March 2019, and was completed in September 2019.
  - From the viewpoint of promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation, the ATLA has participated in international defense equipment exhibitions. Moreover, the Public-Private Defense Industry Forum was held with the Philippines and other countries.

"Defence and Security Equipment International Exhibition and Conference: DSEI Japan 2019" held in Makuhari Messe (November 2019)

Captain Otani was appointed as the first female commanding officer of an Aegis destroyer (December 2018)
Chapter 3

Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities

Examples of intelligence collection means used by the MOD/SDF include: (1) collecting, processing and analyzing military communications and signals emanating from electronic weapons in the air over Japan; (2) collecting, processing, and analyzing data from various imagery satellites (including Information Gathering Satellite); (3) surveillance activities by ships, aircraft and other assets; (4) collecting and organizing a variety of open source information; (5) information exchanges with defense organizations of other nations; and (6) intelligence collection conducted by defense attaches and other official.