National Security Strategy (NSS)

The NSS developed in December 2013 specifies, as Japan’s fundamental principle of national security, that Japan will contribute more proactively than ever before to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while committed to continuing the path as a peace-loving nation, and seeking its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region from the perspective of a “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.

Relationship among the NSS, the NDPG, the MTDP, and the fiscal year budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSS</th>
<th>Basic Policy on National Security, centered around diplomatic and defense policies (approx. 10-year time frame)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NDPG</td>
<td>Prescribes future defense force and target levels of defense force that Japan should achieve (approx. 10-year time frame)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTDP</td>
<td>Appropriate budget, develop specific projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual budget</td>
<td>Indicate limits of five-year total expenditures and quantity of major equipment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Advisory Panel on Security and Defense Capabilities

The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and Beyond (NDPG)

- The NDPG was approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet in December 2018.
- The NDPG establishes the posture of Japan’s defense forces and the level to achieve, envisioning approximately 10 years.

Security Environment Surrounding Japan

- Changes in the balance of power are accelerating and becoming more complex, thereby increasing uncertainty over the existing order.
- Rapid expansion in the use of the new domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is poised to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security, which has prioritized responses in the domains of land, sea and air. In addition, qualitatively and quantitatively superior military powers concentrate in Japan’s surroundings where clear trends are observed in increase in military activities.

Japan’s Basic Defense Policy

The following are set forth as national defense objectives:
- to create, on a steady-state basis, a security environment desirable for Japan by integrating and drawing on the strengths at the nation’s disposal;
- to deter threats from reaching Japan by making opponents realize that doing harm to Japan would be difficult and consequential; and
- should a threat reach Japan, to squarely counter the threat and minimize damage.

Under the basic precept of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, Japan will strengthen each of the means by which to successfully achieve these national defense objectives: Japan’s own architecture for national defense; the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and international security cooperation.

1 Strengthening Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense

- Under the recognition that defense capability is the most important strength for Japan in retaining self-sustained existence as a sovereign nation amid a security environment that it has never faced before, Japan will strengthen this capability on its own accord and initiative.
- As a truly effective defense capability, Japan will build a “Multi-Domain Defense Force.”

For details, see “Special Feature 1”
In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan will enhance priority capability areas as early as possible.

Strengthening Capabilities Necessary for Cross-Domain Operations

- Strengthening capabilities in the new domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum
- Strengthening capabilities in traditional domains, namely capabilities in maritime and air domains, stand-off defense capability, comprehensive air and missile defense capability, and maneuver and deployment capability
- Strengthening sustainability and resiliency by taking necessary measures for securing ammunition and fuel, ensuring maritime shipping lanes, and protecting important infrastructure

Strengthening Core Elements of Defense Capability

- Strengthening core elements of defense capability by reinforcing the human resource base, technology base, and defense industrial base, reviewing equipment structure, etc.

Joint Operation to Realize Cross-Domain Operations

- Maintaining units in space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic domains; strengthening other postures; building comprehensive air and missile defense capability; maintaining a maritime transport unit as an integrated unit

Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

- The GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units furnished with advanced mobility and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and mobile operating units equipped with specialized functions. The GSDF will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats by taking measures including persistent steady-state maneuvers.
- To be able to counter an invasion of remote islands, the GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units and hyper-velocity gliding projectile units for remote island defense.

Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)

- The MSDF will maintain reenforced destroyer units including a new type of destroyers (FFM), minesweeper units, and embarked patrol helicopter units, and will organize surface units. The MSDF will maintain patrol ship units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan.
- By introducing a test-bed submarine, the MSDF will work to achieve greater efficiency in submarine operations and accelerate capability improvement, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture.
- In order to conduct wide-area airborne ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, the MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units.

Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)

- The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of ground-based warning and control units and reinforced airborne warning units: ground-based warning and control units are capable of conducting persistent surveillance in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side; and airborne warning units are capable of conducting effective airborne warning, surveillance and control during “gray zone” and other situations with heightened tensions.
- The ASDF will maintain fighter aircraft units reinforced by high-performance fighter aircraft, and aerial refueling and transport units.
- The ASDF will maintain unmanned aerial vehicle units which enable it to conduct information collection in areas remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions.

Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

- Japan will press ahead with such efforts as bolstering the ability of the Alliance to deter and counter threats, enhancing and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas, and steadily implementing measures concerning the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan.

Strengthening Security Cooperation

- In line with the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, Japan will strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, taking into account the characteristics and situation specific to each region and country.
The MTDP sets forth the policy for the build-up of defense capability, the amount of major equipment to be procured, and the amount of expenditure for the five-year period from FY2019 to FY2023.

In order to build a structure that is capable of realizing cross-domain operations, the SDF will conduct reorganization of its major units.

The SDF will conduct programs to strengthen capabilities in both new and traditional domains.

The SDF will conduct programs to strengthen core elements of defense capabilities, including reinforcement of the human resource base.

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Training and Exercises: the SDF will conduct more practical, effective and systematic training and exercises while work in partnership with relevant organizations, local governments and the private sector.

Medical Care: The Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF will strengthen the posture for medical care and onward transfer of patients, seamlessly covering the entire stretch between the frontline and final medical evacuation destinations.

Collaboration with Local Communities: The MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities, and will make careful, detailed coordination to meet desires and conditions of local communities.

Intellectual Base: The MOD/SDF will promote security-related education at educational institutions. In order to achieve both academic research and policy-support by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), the MOD/SDF will facilitate the NIDS’ collaboration with the policy-making sector.

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In FY2019, which is the first fiscal year for implementing the NDPG and the MTDP, the MOD/SDF will steadily build up its defense capability as a truly effective defense capability towards building a Multi-domain Defense Force.

Main Projects of Build-up of Defense Capabilities in FY2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Main programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acquiring and strengthening capabilities in domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum</td>
<td>Acquisition of the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) System, Enhancement and strengthening of Cyber Defense Group, Enhancement of electronic warfare capabilities of fighter aircraft (F-15), Acquisition of the network electronic warfare system, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing capabilities in traditional domains</td>
<td>Construction of destroyers and submarines, Acquisition of fighter aircraft (F-35A), Upgrade of fighter aircraft (F-15), Research and studies for refurbishment of Izumo destroyers, Acquisition of stand-off missiles, Research on hyper-velocity gliding projectile intended for the defense of remote islands, Procurement of a land-based Aegis system (Aegis Ashore)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing sustainability and resiliency</td>
<td>Procurement of ammunition (anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes) necessary for ensuring air and maritime superiority, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priorities in strengthening core elements of defense capability</td>
<td>Promotion of measures for securing excellent personnel, encouraging women’s participation, and achieving a work-life balance, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcing human resource base</td>
<td>Promotion of research and development towards early practical use of equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcing technology base</td>
<td>Enhancement of the defense attaché system, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Elements Supporting Defense Capability

Chapter 4

Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019–FY2023; MTDP)

Reorganization of the Major SDF Units

Build-up of Defense Capability in FY2019

Chapter 4

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In April 2019, Japan decided to dispatch personnel to the MFO headquarters.

Training and Exercises Related to the Legislation for Peace and Security

Since the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security, the MOD/SDF has been conducting various training and exercises for new missions. The following training and exercises were conducted for approximately the past one year.

- Exercises on the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in multilateral exercise Khaan Quest 18 (June 2018, and June 2019)
- Joint training on rescue of Japanese nationals overseas (September and December 2018)
- Training on rescue of Japanese nationals overseas in multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 19 (January 2019)