The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG)\(^1\) states that the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, together with Japan’s own national defense architecture, constitute a cornerstone for Japan’s national security, and that the Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as its core, plays a significant role for peace, stability and prosperity of not only Japan but also the Indo-Pacific region and the international community.

The NDPG explains that, as inter-state competitions prominently emerge, it has become all the more important for Japan’s national security to further strengthen relationship with the United States, with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests, and that the United States also views that cooperation with its allies has become more important.

On that basis, the NDPG provides that, while the Japan-U.S. Alliance has been reinforced through activities including those that were made possible by the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan needs to further enhance the Alliance through efforts under the “Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation” in order to achieve its national defense objective as security environment surrounding Japan becomes more testing and uncertain at remarkably fast speeds.

At the same time, the NDPG provides that, in further strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, it is an essential premise that Japan strengthens its own defense capability on its own accord and initiative. Fulfilling this premise, Japan needs to press ahead with efforts such as: bolstering the ability of the Alliance to deter and counter threats; enhancing and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas; and steadily implementing measures concerning the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ).

This chapter explains activities related to the enhancement of the Japan-U.S. Alliance while taking account of the concept of the NDPG.

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\(^1\) See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 1, Footnote 7

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Outline of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

1. Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

1. Maintenance of Japan’s Peace and Security

In the current international community, a robust defense system capable of responding to every contingency, ranging from all types of armed attacks, including the use of nuclear weapons, to coercion or intimidation by military power, is necessary to secure the peace, security, and sovereignty of the nation.

However, it is difficult even for the United States to guarantee its security on its own. Much more than that, it would be difficult for Japan to ensure its national security solely through its unilateral efforts given its population, land, and economy. Moreover, such a strategy would not necessarily contribute to regional stability.

Consequently, Japan has maintained its peace and security, centered on the Security Arrangements with the
world’s dominant military power, the United States, with which it shares basic values such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a capitalist economy as well as an interest in maintaining the peace and security of the world, and has strong economic ties.

Specifically, Japan and the United States will take bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against Japan, based on Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and Japan will provide facilities and areas for the U.S. Forces, based on Article 6 of the treaty. If a nation plans to attack Japan, the attacker must be prepared to confront not only the defense capability of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), but also the overwhelming military strength of the United States, due to the U.S. obligation to defend Japan in the event of an armed attack. As a result, the opposing nation clearly recognizes that it will suffer grievously if it carries out an invasion, and such desires will be abandoned at the planning stage. In other words, this serves as deterrence against attacks.

Japan intends to create a seamless posture and secure its peace and security by effectively utilizing the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. military together with Japan’s own national defense architecture.

Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty states that contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East is the purpose of the use of facilities and areas by the USFJ. This provision is based on the recognition that the security of Japan is closely tied to the peace and security of the Far East region to which Japan belongs.

In the regions surrounding Japan, there are many states and the like with massive military power, including some states that retain nuclear weapons or continue nuclear development. In addition, uncertainty over the existing order is increasing due to changes in the balance of power. The so-called gray-zone situations harbor the risk of rapidly developing into graver situations without showing clear indications.

In such a security environment, the military presence of USFJ provides deterrence against unexpected contingencies caused by various security issues or destabilizing factors, not only protecting the interests of Japan and the United States but also providing a great sense of security to the nations in the region and thus fulfilling a role as public goods.

Also, the close bonds of cooperation based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements constitute the foundation of the United States’ commitment to the peace and stability of the region surrounding Japan. These arrangements, complemented by the alliances established between the United States and other countries in the region such as the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, and also by the friendly relations developed with other countries, play an indispensable role in maintaining the peace and stability of the region.

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, not only in defense but also in a wide range of areas, including politics, economy, and society.

The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with these security arrangements at its core, also forms the axis of Japan’s foreign policy. It contributes to Japan’s ability to implement positive efforts to maintain the peace and security of the international community, including the promotion of multinational security dialogue and cooperation, and cooperation with the United Nations.

Currently, we are confronted with global security challenges that are difficult for any single country to tackle alone, including risks concerning stable use of the seas, outer space and cyberspace, the acts of piracy, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and international terrorism, and it is important for countries to work together from peacetime. The strong bonds forged between Japan and the United States are also playing an important role in the efforts implemented by Japan to effectively respond to such challenges.

In particular, under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and the U.S. Forces are working together in peacetime in a variety of areas to strengthen their cooperation. This close coordination lays the foundation for various forms of global collaboration such as antipiracy, undertaken by the SDF and the U.S. Forces, and leads to enhancement of the operational effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

The peace and prosperity of the international community are closely linked to those of Japan. Accordingly, by advancing initiatives for resolving global issues in cooperation with the United States, which has remarkable operational capabilities, Japan will be able to further ensure its security and prosperity.
Since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960, Japan and the United States have built a robust alliance based on democratic ideals, respect for human rights, and the rule of law and common interests.

During the Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ensured the safety of Japan as a country of liberal democracy and contributed to the peace and stability in the region, including the formulation of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“Guidelines”) in 1978 with a focus on responses to an armed attack on Japan.

Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of Japan and the United States announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, reaffirming the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region following the Cold War. Upon the Declaration, the final report was compiled at the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) at the end of that year. As part of the promotion of cooperative relations presented in the Declaration, the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting) held in the following year (1997) approved the aforementioned 1997 Guidelines and expanded cooperation to responses in situations in areas surrounding Japan in light of changes in the security environment, such as the end of the Cold War.

In light of further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, following the “2+2” Meeting in December 2002, Japan and the United States held working-level and other consultations as a part of bilateral strategic dialogue on security from the perspective of how to make the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s capacity more effective to adapt to the changing times.

As a result of a number of these Japan-U.S. consultations, the direction of the Japan-U.S. Alliance was arranged in three stages. These stages are: confirmation of common strategic objectives to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region (first stage) in February 2005; announcement of the results of the examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage) in October 2005; and finalization of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, a program for implementing specific measures for the realignment of USFJ, (third stage) in May 2006.

Since the formulation of the 1997 Guidelines, various issues and destabilizing factors have emerged, and become more visible and aggravated in the security environment surrounding Japan; such as more active military activities of neighboring countries, new threats including international terrorist organizations and risks against the stable use of global commons such as oceans, outer space and cyberspace. In addition, the activities of the SDF have expanded to a global scale, as exemplified by anti-piracy activities, peacekeeping operations (PKO), and international disaster relief activities. As a result, it had become necessary for the manner of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation to be adapted to these changes in the security environment and the expansion of the SDF’s activities and missions.

Based on this background, both governments decided at the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013 to revise the 1997...
Guidelines until the end of 2014. The new Guidelines were approved at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2015 after a vigorous review between the two governments.

See Fig. III-2-1-1 (Major Milestones concerning Japan-U.S. Alliance)

3 Content of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

The Guidelines, which replace the 1997 Guidelines, update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize:

- seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses;
- synergy across the two governments’ national security policies;
- a whole-of-government Alliance approach;
- cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and
- the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The two governments will maintain their individual defense postures based on their national security policies. The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combat-ready forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly.

The Guidelines provide the general framework and

Part 3 Three Pillars of Japan’s Defense (Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense)

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policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination.

- The Guidelines promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

## 2 Basic Premises and Principles

The basic premises and principles maintain the approaches of the 1997 Guidelines as described below:

- The rights and obligations under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements will remain unchanged.
- All actions and activities undertaken under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law.
- All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.
- The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specific policies and measures.

### 3 Strengthened Coordination within the Alliance

#### (1) Establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism

In November 2015, the Japanese and U.S. Governments established the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) in order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response.

Based on the framework shown in Fig. III-2-1-3, this mechanism coordinates policy and operational aspects related to activities conducted by the SDF and the U.S. Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also contributes to timely information sharing as well as to the development and maintenance of common situational awareness.

The characteristics of the mechanism include that (1) it is the standing mechanism utilizable from peacetime; (2) it can be utilized for large-scale natural disasters in Japan as well as for cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and globally; and (3) it enables whole-of-government coordination while ensuring the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations. These characteristics enable the Japanese and U.S. Governments to respond appropriately and promptly when the need for coordination arises. For example, in the event of a large-scale natural disaster in Japan, it would require a diversity of coordination in the policy and operational aspects related to activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces. The utilization of this mechanism makes it possible to conduct close and appropriate coordination with the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations at various levels.

Since the establishment of the mechanism, Japan and the United States have been utilizing the mechanism to coordinate closely, including in response to the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake, the ballistic missile launches by North Korea, and Chinese activities in the waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands.

![Fig. III-2-1-3 (The Framework of Alliance Coordination Mechanism [ACM])](#)

#### (2) Enhanced Operational Coordination

Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. Governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the U.S. Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities.

#### (3) Establishment of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism

Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. Governments established the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM) in November 2015 for the purpose of implementing the development of bilateral plans in peacetime in line with the Guidelines in order to enable effective bilateral responses to contingencies relevant to Japan’s peace and security.

In the development of bilateral plans, this mechanism performs the functions of ensuring Ministerial-level directions and supervision and the involvement of relevant government ministries and agencies, as well as conducting coordination for various forms of Japan-U.S. cooperation conducive to the development of bilateral plans. The two governments will conduct bilateral planning through this mechanism.

![Fig. III-2-1-4 (The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism [BMP])](#)
### III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning.

#### A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism

In order to address issues seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, and will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the SDF and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. The two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises.

#### B. Enhanced Operational Coordination

The two governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities.

#### C. Bilateral Planning

In peacetime, the two governments will develop and update bilateral plans through the Bilateral Planning Mechanism. Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments.

### IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security

- The two governments will take measures to seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners.
- The two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism as appropriate, for assessment of the situation, sharing of information, as well as flexible deterrent options and actions aimed at de-escalation. The two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels.

#### A. Cooperative Measures during Peacetime

- The two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
- The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to: (1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; (2) Air and Missile Defense; (3) Maritime Security; (4) Asset Protection; (5) Training and Exercises; (6) Logistic Support; and (7) Use of Facilities.

#### B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security

- The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations cannot be defined geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’ respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation.
- In addition to continuing cooperative measures during peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to: (1) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations; (2) Maritime Security; (3) Measures to Deal with Refugees; (4) Search and Rescue; (5) Protection of Facilities and Areas; (6) Logistic Support; and (7) Use of Facilities.

#### C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

Bilateral actions remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation.

1. **When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated**

   - The two governments will take measures to deter an armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan.

2. **When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs**

   - **Principles for Coordinated Actions**
     - The two governments will take appropriate and coordinated actions to promptly repel the attack and deter any further attacks.
     - The SDF will have primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations, and the United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the SDF.
     - **Concept of Operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operations to Defend Airspace</th>
<th>Self-Defense Forces (SDF)</th>
<th>United States Armed Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan</td>
<td>Have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority</td>
<td>Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks</th>
<th>Self-Defense Forces (SDF)</th>
<th>United States Armed Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan</td>
<td>Have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan</td>
<td>Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operations to Defend Maritime Areas</th>
<th>Self-Defense Forces (SDF)</th>
<th>United States Armed Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication</td>
<td>Have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations</td>
<td>Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operations to Counter Ground Attacks</th>
<th>Self-Defense Forces (SDF)</th>
<th>United States Armed Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces</td>
<td>Have primary responsibility to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands, and have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority</td>
<td>Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security

The Guidelines identify the following operational support activities: (1) Communications and Electronics; (2) Search and Rescue; (3) Logistic Support; (4) Use of Facilities; and (5) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Protection.

B. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan

- When Japan and the United States decide to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under an armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks.
- The SDF will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people.
- Examples of cooperative operations are: (1) Asset Protection; (2) Search and Rescue; (3) Maritime Operations; (4) Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks; and (5) Logistics Support.
- Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan
- When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The SDF, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. The United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate.
- The two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. The United States Armed Forces may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters.

V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security

The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promote cooperation based upon international law and standards.

A. Cooperation on Space
- The two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space.
- The two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation.
- The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate in such areas as early-warning, ISR, positioning, navigation and timing, space situational awareness, meteorological observation, command, control, and communications.

B. Cooperation on Cyberspace
- The two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and appropriate manner. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the SDF and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions.
- The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will maintain posture to monitor their respective networks and systems, conduct educational exchanges, ensure the resiliency of their respective networks and systems, contribute to all Japanese and U.S. government efforts, and conduct bilateral exercises.
- In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.

VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation

The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation:

A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security
C. Educational and Research Exchanges

VIII. Processes for Review

Regular evaluations will be conducted on whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances, and the two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner if deemed necessary.
### The Framework of Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM)

**Joint Committee (JC)**
- **Japan Side**
  - Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Representative)
- **U.S. Side**
  - Deputy Commander of USFJ (Representative)

**Policy coordination on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement**

**Alliance Coordination Group (ACG)**
- **Japan Side**
  - Representatives from the Cabinet Secretariat (including the National Security Secretariat), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and other relevant ministries, departments, and agencies*
  - Representatives may participate as needed
- **U.S. Side**
  - Representatives from the National Security Council,* Department of State,* American Embassy in Japan, Office of the Secretary of Defense,* Joint Staff,* United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM)* U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), and other relevant ministries, departments, and agencies*
  - Representatives may participate as needed

- ○ Policy coordination on all matters requiring coordination in relation to activities of the SDF and U.S. Armed Forces
- ○ To ensure seamless responses, ACG will closely coordinate with JC.

**Bilateral Operations Coordination Center (BOCC)**
- **Japan Side**
  - Representatives from Joint Staff and Staff Offices of each SDF service
- **U.S. Side**
  - Representatives from USINDOPACOM and USFJ

**Component Coordination Centers (CCCs)**
- **Japan Side**
  - Representatives from each component of the SDF
- **U.S. Side**
  - Representatives from each component of the U.S. Armed Forces

- ○ CCCs will facilitate component-level bilateral coordination.
- ○ As appropriate, if either Japan or the U.S., or both, establish Joint Task Forces (JTFs), JTFs may further establish CCCs.

### The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM)

**Bilateral Planning Mechanism**

**Security Consultative Committee (SCC) “2+2”**
- Prime Minister
- President
- Foreign Minister
- Defense Minister
- State Secretary
- Defense Secretary

**Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)**
- Japan
  - DG: North American Affairs Bureau, MOFA, Defense Policy Bureau MOD, Joint Staff
- U.S.
  - Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense
  - U.S. Embassy JP, USFJ, JS, USINDOPACOM

**Bilateral Planning Committee (BPC)**
- Japan
  - Representatives of JSDF
- U.S.
  - Representatives of USINDOPACOM, USFJ

- ○ DG: North American Affairs Bureau, MOFA, Defense Policy Bureau MOD, Joint Staff
- ○ Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense
- ○ U.S. Embassy JP, USFJ, JS, USINDOPACOM

**Coordination among relevant ministries and agencies (RMAs) of both countries, explanation provided by RMAs, provision of additional information etc.**

**Command under the BPM**

**JSDF/USF chain of command**
4 Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

The Guidelines define that Japan and the United States will work on a variety of measures from peacetime, including ISR activities, air and missile defense, maritime security, training and exercises, asset protection, and logistics support, and cooperate in such activities as response to a large-scale disaster in Japan in order to seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security. The Guidelines also require both countries to cooperate in international activities and trilateral and multilateral cooperation for regional and global peace and security; to make cooperation on space and cyberspace; and to develop and enhance bilateral enterprise through defense equipment and technology cooperation as well as intelligence cooperation and information security for further improving the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation.

Many of these items are incorporated into the NDPG to “strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities” and to “strengthen and expand cooperation in a variety of areas.”

4 Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States

1 Various Policy Consultations

Japan and the United States have maintained close coordination at multiple levels, including the summit level and ministerial level, and have continually strengthened and expanded cooperative relations for the peace, stability and prosperity of not only the two countries but also the entire international community, including the Indo-Pacific region.

Close policy consultations on security are conducted through diplomatic channels as well as between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels in the Governments of Japan and the United States through meetings such as the Japan-United States SCC (“2+2” Meeting), the Security Subcommittee (SSC) and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC). As the framework for ministerial consultations among the top officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs of the two countries, the SCC (“2+2” Meeting) represents such policy consultations. The SCC functions as an important consultative panel to discuss issues related to Japan-U.S. cooperation in the area of security.

In addition, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) organizes Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meetings between the Japanese Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus on the defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation. Furthermore, the Japanese State Minister of Defense and the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense work together, and MOD officials, including the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and the Chiefs of Staff of the SDF, have working-level meetings when necessary and exchange information with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and others under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

The sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United States is undoubtedly conducive to the increased credibility of
the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and results in the further enhancement of close collaboration between the two countries. Therefore, the MOD is proactively engaging in these initiatives.

The two leaders praised the concrete cooperative projects in third countries to advance their shared vision to maintain and promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, and reaffirmed their strong determination to further enhance cooperation in wide-ranging areas in the Indo-Pacific region.

(2) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (October 19, 2018)
Defense Minister Iwaya and then Secretary Mattis took the opportunity of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) to hold the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting.

a. Free and Open Indo-Pacific
The Ministers, taking into account the then Minister of Defense Onodera’s visit to India and Sri Lanka in August 2018 and the U.S.-India 2+2 Dialogue held for the first time in September 2018, exchanged their views, shared the understandings about the importance of the free and open Indo-Pacific, and confirmed the significance of cooperation between Japan and the United States and with various partners.

From this point of view, the Ministers welcomed the development of the regional multilateral security cooperation and dialogue under the framework of the ADMM-Plus, and agreed to strengthen the cooperation with partner countries in maintaining basic international principles such as rule of law, freedom of navigation and in implementing measures for peace and stability such as capacity building assistance.
b. Regional Affairs
The Ministers, taking into account that China continues unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, confirmed that the two countries work together for the peace and stability of the East China Sea, and it is important for both countries to be engaged in the South China Sea.

The Ministers confirmed they continue to support full implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles of all ranges. As part of efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the UN Security Council resolutions, the Ministers additionally confirmed the importance of working with partner countries to counter illicit ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea, and welcomed the monitoring and surveillance activities taking place since September with the participation of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, and agreed that the two countries conduct the operation in cooperation with like-minded countries. The Ministers confirmed that U.S. Forces in ROK is a stabilizing force in the region, and that no change in U.S. Forces in ROK has been considered. The Ministers also agreed to work together to reinforce the deterrence and response capability including conducting Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises steadily as planned.

c. National Defense Program Guidelines, etc.
Defense Minister Iwaya explained the current status of the revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines and the formulation of the Mid-Term Defense Program for the next term, and the Ministers concurred to continue to closely exchange information.

The Ministers confirmed to work together to improve efficiency regarding Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Japan’s buying U.S.-made defense assets.

d. U.S. Forces in Japan
The Ministers reconfirmed that the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futemna to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid its continued use. The Ministers confirmed to work together closely for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives.

Defense Minister Iwaya requested for cooperation with efforts to secure the understanding from the local communities, and to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.

(3) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (November 30, 2018) (Security Field)
Prime Minister Abe held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with President Trump in the Argentine Republic, which he visited to attend the G20 Summit.

Prime Minister Abe and President Trump once again confirmed their recognition that under the robust relationship of trust between the two leaders, the Japan-U.S. Alliance is stronger than ever before, and shared the view that they will continue to strive to strengthen the Alliance.

The two leaders closely aligned their policies with regard to the issue of North Korea, and confirmed that Japan and the United States, as well as Japan, the United States, and the ROK, will continue to coordinate closely. In addition, the two leaders shared the recognition that the full implementation of UN Security Council resolutions continues to be necessary towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Furthermore, the two leaders confirmed that they will continue to cooperate closely to address illicit ship-to-ship transfers prohibited by the UN Security Council resolutions.

Prime Minister Abe explained his visit to China last month, and the two leaders shared the view that it is important for Japan and the United States to work closely together on encouraging China to play a constructive role.

(4) Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan (January 16, 2019)
Defense Minister Iwaya and then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan held a meeting at the U.S. Department of Defense.

a. Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
Both sides exchanged opinions based on the NDPG and the Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDP) formulated last December. Acting Secretary Shanahan supported the NDPG and the MTDP, and welcomed that Japan expressed its strong resolve to enhance its defense architecture and to play a larger role in accordance with the NDPG and the MTDP.

In regards to the current security environment, both sides shared views that competition among states is becoming more apparent. They also agreed that gaining technological superiority in new domains such as space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is increasingly important.

Both sides also confirmed that they will closely coordinate in their efforts to be made pursuant to Japan’s NDPG and MTDP, and the United States’ National Defense Strategy (NDS) respectively, as well as to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond following the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. With the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific in mind, they agreed to work together to shape a desirable security environment with Japan-U.S. alliance being the cornerstone of cooperation with other nations. Furthermore, both sides confirmed to strengthen and expand cooperation in wide range of fields including the
following:

○ Promote Japan-U.S. cooperation in the “new domains,” including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. The United States welcomed Japan’s first participation in the Schriever Wargame.

○ Closely coordinate in joint exercises and capacity building assistance, taking into account increasing both nations’ presence in the Indo-Pacific.

○ Welcome and even make progress in the two countries’ cooperation in the operational field following Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines (e.g. U.S. Forces asset protection mission conducted by the SDF, provision of supplies and services).

○ Make continued effort in streamlining FMS process, while welcoming the recent progress and improvements in issues related to FMS. Cooperate in ensuring cost transparency, improving late case closure, strengthening activities to realize and promote multi-year procurement.

○ Continue cooperation to realize Japan’s smooth and prompt introduction, including cost management of U.S.-made advanced defense equipment such as Aegis Ashore, E-2D and F-35.

○ Enhance cooperation in defense equipment and technology as well as promoting Japan-U.S. joint development and researches.

b. Regional Affairs

Both sides exchanged opinions on the recent developments on issues on North Korea, and confirmed they continue to support full implementation of the UNSC resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMDs and ballistic missiles of all ranges. Both sides agreed that Japan and the United States will continue working together with partner countries to counter North Korea’s illicit “ship-to-ship” transfers of refined petroleum products and other materials. Furthermore, both sides confirmed that deterrence through Japan-U.S. Alliance and U.S.-ROK Alliance is essential in maintaining the security of the region, and agreed that both countries will steadily implement Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises.

In regards to the East and South China Seas, both sides affirmed their position that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo by coercion, and that it is important to work together to make sure that Rule of Law and Freedom of Navigation are firmly established. Both sides also reaffirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands. Both sides confirmed that Japan and the United States work together for the peace and stability of the East China Sea.

c. U.S. Forces in Japan

Both sides affirmed the recent progress in the construction project of Futemna Replacement Facility (FRF), and reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futemna to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid its continued use. Defense Minister Iwaya requested for cooperation with efforts to mitigate impact on the local communities including Okinawa. Both sides confirmed to work together closely for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives and training relocation. Both sides also affirmed the importance to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.

(5) “2+2” Meeting (April 19, 2019)

On April 19, 2019, the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting was held in Washington, D.C. The meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Kono and Defense Minister Iwaya from the Japanese side and by Secretary of State Pompeo and then Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan from the U.S. side. The following is a summary of the meeting.

a. Overview

The Ministers exchanged candid views in light of an increasingly complex security environment and mainly confirmed the following three major points.

The Ministers shared the view that the Japan-U.S. Alliance serves as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, and that Japan and the United States will work together to realize a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” To this end, the Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will jointly increase their presence in the region, while collaborating with partners in the region through joint exercises, port calls, and other activities.

The Ministers welcomed the alignment of the strategic policy documents of both countries, including Japan’s NDPG. The Ministers shared the view that the two countries will strengthen cooperation for cross-domain operations, including capability enhancement in new domains, such as

Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (“2+2” Meeting) (April 2019)
space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum.

The Ministers shared the view that they will seek to achieve North Korea’s abandonment of all of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. In addition, the Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will continue to work together in cooperation with other partner countries in fully implementing UN Security Council resolutions, including combatting illicit ship-to-ship transfers. The Ministers also reaffirmed that U.S. force stance in the region would remain robust, and shared the view on deepening consultation on ensuring deterrence and security in the region. The Ministers also shared the view that they will continue to engage in close cooperation between Japan and the United States as well as among Japan, the United States, and the ROK. Furthermore, the Ministers shared the view on calling upon North Korea to resolve the Japanese abductions issue immediately.

b. Regional Security Environment

The Ministers exchanged candid views regarding the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region, and expressed serious concern about, and strong opposition to, unilateral coercive attempts to alter the status quo in the East China Sea (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS). The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to work together to safeguard the peace and stability of the ECS, and reaffirmed that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and that both nations oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands.

c. Strengthening Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation

(a) The Ministers highlighted the importance of cooperation for cross-domain operations. The Ministers confirmed that they will deepen cooperation on space capabilities, and shared the view on promoting cooperation for enhancing space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities through Japan’s development of a Deep Space Radar and hosting of U.S.-provided SSA payloads on Japan’s Quasi Zenith Satellite System. In addition, the Ministers shared the view on enhancing cooperation on cyber issues. They affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace and that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

(b) The Ministers confirmed that it is important to develop defense capabilities efficiently and effectively in order to enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The Ministers shared the view that the two countries will cooperate to introduce advanced weapon systems to Japan and to further streamline the FMS process.

(c) The Ministers affirmed the importance of information security, and shared the view on the need for greater supply chain security, noting threats to the defense industrial base, national networks, and critical infrastructure required for mission assurance.

(d) In order to improve Japan-U.S. Alliance readiness, the Ministers shared the view on further deepening operational cooperation, such as mutual asset protection, logistical support, and joint ISR operations.

d. U.S. Forces in Japan

The ministers shared the view that they will steadily implement the realignment of the USFJ, from the perspective of mitigating the impact on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In particular, the Ministers welcomed the significant progress on the construction of the FRF and reaffirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids its continued use. Foreign Minister Kono conveyed to the U.S. side that it is important to mitigate the impact on the local people, including making progress, one by one, on the issues surrounding the operation of U.S. forces and the SOFA, while steadily implementing the realignment of U.S. forces. Defense Minister Iwaya requested the U.S. side to minimize the impact of the operation of U.S. forces on local communities, including noise of transient aircraft. The two ministers also requested the U.S. side to prevent incidents and accidents.

(6) Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan (April 19, 2019)

Defense Minister Iwaya and then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan held a meeting at the U.S. Department of Defense.

a. General Statement

The Ministers welcomed the successful holding of the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting and affirmed that the defense authorities of Japan and the United States will continue to closely cooperate with each other to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

b. North Korea

The Ministers affirmed the importance of continuing to ensure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions toward complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction and all ranges of ballistic missiles by North Korea. The Ministers also agreed that Japan and the United States will continue to cooperate with like-minded countries in countering illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea. They affirmed the
importance of deterrence based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the U.S.-ROK Alliance and agreed to steadily conduct Japan-U.S. joint exercises.

c. Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

The Ministers agreed to promote Japan-U.S. cooperation for cross-domain operations and affirmed that the two countries will further promote cooperation in space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.

The Ministers affirmed that Japan and the United States will further streamline the foreign military sales process and agreed to strengthen defense equipment and technology cooperation by promoting Japan-U.S. joint research and development.

d. U.S. Forces in Japan

The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will cooperate closely to make steady progress in implementing the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces.

(7) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (April 26, 2019) (Security Field)

Prime Minister Abe held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with U.S. President Trump in Washington, D.C.

The two leaders affirmed that Japan and the United States will conduct careful policy coordination concerning the North Korea issue in light of the most recent developments related to North Korea, including the second U.S.-North Korea summit and the Russia-North Korea summit, and that close cooperation will be maintained between Japan and the United States and between Japan, the United States and the ROK toward full denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Prime Minister Abe once again expressed his appreciation to President Trump for having raised the abduction issue for the second time at the second U.S.-North Korea summit, and the two leaders affirmed that they will continue to closely cooperate with each other toward early resolution of the abduction issue. President Trump firmly pledged to continue to provide full support on this issue.

The two leaders welcomed the results of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2” Meeting) held on April 19 and agreed to continue to enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. They also reaffirmed that they will further strengthen cooperation toward realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific.

In addition, the two leaders welcomed economic development based on fair rules intended to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Prime Minister Abe stated that President Trump’s and the first lady’s visit to Japan as the first state guests after the enthronement of Prince Naruhito as emperor in May would symbolize the rock-solid bond of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and expressed his wish to internally and externally demonstrate through the visit that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is its strongest ever. In response, President Trump said he was looking forward to visiting Japan. The two leaders agreed to continue to strengthen the bilateral relationship through exchange of high-level officials.

(8) Meeting between Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga and Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan (May 9, 2019)

Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga held a meeting with then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan in the United States.

a. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga explained the current status of the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, where U.S. military facilities and areas are concentrated. In order to mitigate the impact on local communities while maintaining the deterrence capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the two officials affirmed that Japan and the United States will maintain close cooperation. In light of North Korea’s launch of projectiles on May 9, which followed the launch on May 4, the two secretaries affirmed that Japan and the United States will closely cooperate with each other at every level, including with respect to analysis and response.

b. The two secretaries exchanged opinions on the North Korea situation and agreed to ensure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga requested cooperation from the U.S. Government in resolving the abduction issue early, and the two secretaries affirmed that Japan and the United States will maintain close cooperation. In light of North Korea’s launch of projectiles on May 9, which followed the launch on May 4, the two secretaries affirmed that Japan and the United States will closely cooperate with each other toward realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific.

c. The two secretaries also affirmed that Japan and the United States will cooperate with each other toward realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific.

(9) Meeting between Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga and U.S. Vice President Pence (May 10, 2019)

Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga held a meeting with Vice President Pence at the White House during his visit to the United States.

a. The two secretaries exchanged opinions on the North Korea situation and agreed to ensure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga requested cooperation from the U.S. Government in resolving the abduction issue early, and the two secretaries affirmed that Japan and the United States will maintain close cooperation. In light of North Korea’s launch of projectiles on May 9, which followed the launch on May 4, the two secretaries affirmed that Japan and the United States will cooperate with each other toward realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific.
States will closely cooperate with each other at every level, including with respect to analysis and response.

b. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga described activities conducted by the Government of Japan with respect to the realignment of the USFJ in order to mitigate the impact on Okinawa and other local communities while maintaining the deterrence capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and the two secretaries affirmed that Japan and the United States will maintain cooperation.

c. The two secretaries affirmed that the Governments of Japan and the United States will closely cooperate with each other in order to internally and externally demonstrate that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is its strongest ever by making a success of President Trump’s visit to Japan as a state guest in late May following Prime Minister Abe’s successful visit to the United States in April. The two secretaries also affirmed that Japan and the United States will cooperate with each other toward realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific.

(10) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (May 27, 2019) (Security Field)

Prime Minister Abe held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with U.S. President Trump, who was paying a state visit to Japan.

a. Japan-U.S. Relations

Prime Minister Abe wholeheartedly welcomed the visit by President Trump and Mrs. Trump to Japan as the first State Guests. In response, President Trump stated that it was his honor to make the first State Call on Their Majesties the Emperor and Empress of Japan in the new era and expressed his gratitude for the welcome by the Japanese people.

The two leaders shared the view that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is stronger than ever before and is now the closest alliance in the world, thanks to the recent measures to strengthen the Alliance, including Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security as well as the strong personal relationship between the two leaders. The two leaders also confirmed their determination to continue to further strengthen the unwavering bond between Japan and the United States and to lead the peace and prosperity of the region and international community as true global partners in the new era.

b. North Korea

The two leaders closely coordinated their policies in light of the recent developments surrounding North Korea, spending adequate time. The two leaders reconfirmed that Japan and the United States completely share their position including the need to ensure the full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions.

Prime Minister Abe expressed his gratitude to President Trump for meeting once again with family members of the victims abducted by North Korea following the last meeting which took place during President Trump’s previous visit to Japan (November 2017). Prime Minister Abe expressed his determination to meet face to face with Chairman Kim Jong-Un towards the resolution of the abductions issue. Prime Minister Abe stated that he would like to meet with Chairman Kim Jong-Un without attaching any condition and talk candidly and frankly. In response, President Trump expressed his full support for Prime Minister Abe’s determination.

c. China

The two leaders affirmed the importance of continuing constructive dialogue with the Chinese government, including in the area of security and economy.

d. Regional Affairs

The two leaders discussed regional affairs, and reaffirmed the importance of U.S. presence in the region based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance, as well as of U.S. engagement and commitment in the region. Both leaders expressed concern regarding the current situation in the East and South China Sea, and that Japan and the United States would continue to coordinate together on this issue. The two leaders agreed to continue to strengthen and expand efforts to build a regional network between allies and friendly nations, including between and among Japan-U.S.-India, Japan-U.S.-Australia, as well as Japan-U.S.-Australia-India.

e. Free and Open Indo-Pacific

The two leaders welcomed the steady progress of cooperation between Japan and the United States towards the realization of a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” in sectors including energy, digital and infrastructure. The two leaders reaffirmed their intention to vigorously promote such cooperation towards the realization of this shared vision of Japan and the United States hand in hand.

f. Space

The two leaders confirmed that they would strengthen cooperation on the issue of space in areas including security, exploration, and industry. In addition, the two leaders shared the view to accelerate discussions on cooperation regarding moon exploration.

(11) Visit to Destroyer JS “Kaga” by Prime Minister & Mrs. Abe and President & Mrs. Trump (May 28, 2019)

Prime Minister Abe and Mrs. Akie Abe, together with President Trump and Mrs. Melania Trump, who were making a state visit to Japan, visited Destroyer JS “Kaga,” which was at anchor in the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)
Yokosuka District.³

Prime Minister Abe and President Trump gave remarks to encourage members of the Japan SDF and the USFJ. Leaders affirmed the ironclad bond of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and that they will cooperate closely to contribute to peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.

(12) Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan (June 4, 2019)

Defense Minister Iwaya and then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan held a meeting at the Ministry of Defense.

a. Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

Defense Minister Iwaya welcomed the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which has recently been released by the United States. Regarding activities to be conducted by Japan and the United States based on the two countries’ strategic documents, including those described in this report, the two ministers affirmed that they will closely cooperate with each other in line with the policy confirmed at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting.

The Ministers affirmed the need to deepen Japan-U.S. cooperation with a sense of urgency with respect to new domains, such as space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. They affirmed that they will promote Japan-U.S. cooperation for cross-domain operations, including in strengthening operational cooperation through improvement of interoperability and verifying the guidelines for bilateral cooperation through various exercises.

b. Free and Open Indo-Pacific

The Ministers once again shared the view on the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Defense Minister Iwaya expressed Japan’s hope to cooperate with the United States to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific as indicated in the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report of the United States. The Ministers affirmed the importance of cooperating with diverse partners.

c. Regional Situation, etc.

The Ministers discussed the regional situation and other matters in light of the discussions held at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue. Regarding North Korea in particular, they exchanged opinions in light of the recent situation surrounding the North Korea issue. They affirmed the importance of continuing to ensure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions toward the abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction and all ranges of ballistic missiles by North Korea in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and they also confirmed that Japan-U.S. and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation will be maintained.

d. U.S. Forces in Japan

Defense Minister Iwaya requested cooperation toward mitigating the impact on local communities, including Okinawa. The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue close cooperation to make steady progress in implementing the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces, including the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko. Defense Minister Iwaya requested the U.S. side to minimize the impact of the operation of the U.S. Forces on local communities, including noise of transient aircraft. The Ministers affirmed the importance of ensuring safe operation of the U.S. Forces.

(13) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (June 28, 2019) (Security Field)

Prime minister Abe held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with President Trump, who visited Japan to attend the G20 Osaka Summit.

The two leaders shared the view that the Japan-U.S.
Alliance is stronger than ever before, as evidenced by their frequent mutual visits in a short time, such as the visit by Prime Minister Abe to the United States in April, the visit by President Trump and Mrs. Trump to Japan as State Guests in May, and the revisit this time by President Trump to Japan. They also agreed to continue to further strengthen the unwavering Japan-U.S. Alliance.

In addition, the two leaders confirmed that they will continue close cooperation between Japan and the United States towards the resolution of issues surrounding North Korea, such as the abduction, nuclear, and missile issues. Moreover, the two leaders exchanged opinions on regional affairs, including the situation in the Middle East, and confirmed close cooperation between Japan and the United States.

(14) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (August 7, 2019)
Defense Minister Iwaya and U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper held a meeting at the Ministry of Defense.

a. Regional affairs
The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missiles of all ranges. The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue working together with partner countries to counter illicit ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea. Also, the Ministers confirmed the importance of the deterrent capability of regional U.S. Forces including U.S. Forces Korea.

The Ministers affirmed their position that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, and that it is important to work together to make sure that the rule of law and the freedom of navigation are firmly established. The Ministers reconfirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands, and agreed to cooperate with each other for the peace and stability in the East China Sea.

b. Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
The Ministers confirmed that they will closely coordinate in their efforts to be made based on the strategy documents of both countries and to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond. Also, they confirmed the significance of cooperation with various partners, including conducting joint exercises and capacity building assistance to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific with Japan-U.S. Alliance being the cornerstone. The Ministers confirmed to make continued effort in streamlining FMS process.

c. U.S. Forces in Japan
The Ministers confirmed that the relocation to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. Minister Iwaya requested for cooperation in the Government of Japan’s efforts to mitigate the impact on the local communities including Okinawa. The Ministers confirmed to work closely together for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives. Minister Iwaya also requested the U.S. Forces to minimize its operational impact on the local communities including noise of transient aircrafts and the Ministers affirmed the importance to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.