On the Publication of Defense of Japan 2018

Minister of Defense  Itsunori Onodera

The Ministry of Defense (MOD) / the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) is constantly committed to crisis management and takes on the noble mission of defending Japan’s independence, peace, and security and securing the lives and property of the Japanese people.

Looking at the security environment surrounding Japan, North Korea, repeatedly carried out nuclear tests and launched ballistic missiles through last year, and begun to engage in dialogue this year. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the reality that North Korea still continues to possess and deploy several hundred Nodong missiles capable of reaching almost every part of Japan. In addressing the North Korean nuclear and missile issue, it is essential for the international community to remain united, following results at the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting held in June 2018, toward the realization of the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. Japan needs to carefully monitor specific actions by North Korea.

China’s recent activities, including its rapid military modernization and enhancement of operational capabilities, its unilateral escalation of actions in areas around Japan, and with the lack of transparency in the military build-up, present a strong security concern for the region including Japan and the international community. In addition, Russia continues frequent activities around Japan. Furthermore, global security issues, including challenges emerging in new domains such as outer space and cyberspace, are broadening and diversifying.

Given these circumstances, the MOD/SDF must strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities and expand its role in order to fulfill our mission. For this purpose, we are currently reviewing the National Defense Program Guidelines and examining the next Medium-Term Defense Program to complete them by the end of this year under the instruction from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Concerning this process, we will identify what defense capabilities are truly needed to protect the people, rather than simply extending the existing capabilities.
It is also necessary to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Since I was appointed as Defense Minister last year, I have been in close consultation with U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis and pursued close cooperation between Japan and the United States. Our two countries have closely coordinated our understanding and policies and taken united actions in responding to North Korea issues. We are striving to further reinforce the bonds of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Alliance. At the same time, initiatives to mitigate the impact of the bases on the local residents in Okinawa and other areas are important and we continue to listen sincerely to the local residents’ voices and make further efforts.

Japan must also continue to promote security cooperation with other countries. In recent years, we have steadily expanded a variety of cooperation, including bilateral/multilateral training, joint development of equipment, and capacity building assistance, with many other countries that share fundamental values and security interests. Japan intends to robustly promote strategic international defense cooperation as part of further commitment to peace and stability in the region and the international community from the standpoint of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.

While the MOD/SDF is steadily implementing a variety of measures in this way, individuals of the SDF, who diligently work day and night, despite the dangers, with abundant motivation and a strong sense of responsibility in difficult environments, such as posts on remote islands, radar sites, and on-board ships away from home, are obviously the ones who are carrying out these measures.

This year’s Defense White Paper explains the measures taken by the MOD/SDF in detail and the opening feature introduces the front-line SDF members, who assiduously and seriously carry out their duties as part of 24-hour, 365-day operations. By this, we aim to promote a wider understanding of how steady implementation of these measures and daily efforts of the SDF members contribute to the peaceful lives and securing of the Japanese people.

The MOD/SDF must gain support and trust of the Japanese people in order to fully exert our capabilities and fulfill our mission. It is sincerely regretted that issues related to document management and information disclosure have significantly affected the trust of the Japanese people in the MOD/SDF in the past two years. The MOD/SDF continues to vigorously strive to prevent the recurrence so that such issues never happen again.

Finally, we hope that many people will take the Defense White Paper in hand and deepen their understanding of the MOD/SDF and think about the SDF members who are carrying out their missions in various locations to protect our peaceful lives even at this moment.
## Defense Chronology

The past year’s major events relating to the defense of Japan are explained with photos and commentaries for a clearer understanding.

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   Ballistic Missile Defense
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2. **Working**  
   Duties carried out 24 hours a day, 365 days a year
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3. **Preparation**  
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Please help fill out a questionnaire on Defense of Japan!

The Ministry of Defense wants to hear your views on Defense of Japan 2018.
Please fill out the questionnaire on the Defense of Japan website.
We will use this to further improve future editions of Defense of Japan.

Defense of Japan 2018 questionnaire:
Events related to North Korea’s nuclear and missile development

Since 2016, North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests and launched as many as 40 ballistic missiles. These military activities by North Korea pose an unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security and significantly undermine the peace and security of the region and international community.

July 2017
Landed in Japan’s EEZ in the Sea of Japan

August 2017
Flew over Japan and landed in the Pacific Ocean

September 2017
Flew over Japan and landed in the Pacific Ocean

November 2017
Landed in Japan’s EEZ in the Sea of Japan

* EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone

Collaboration with related countries

Japan-China-Republic of Korea Summit Meeting
(May 9, 2018; Cabinet Public Relations Office)

Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting
(June 7, 2018; Cabinet Public Relations Office)
While appreciating the significance of another clear promise by Chairman Kim Jong-un in a written document to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the joint declaration from the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting in June 2018, it is important to closely monitor specific actions by North Korea to eliminate nuclear and missile capabilities.

Taking into consideration the fact that North Korea possesses and deploys several hundred Nodong missiles capable of reaching almost every part of Japan as well as advancements in the development and operational capabilities of nuclear weapons and missiles through repeated nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches to date, there is no change in our basic recognition concerning the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles.

Picture of suspected illegal “ship-to-ship transfer” of goods by a North Korean-related vessel (confirmed multiple times since January 2018)

Current status of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development

**Nuclear development**

- Possibility that the September 2017 nuclear test was a hydrogen bomb test
- Possibility of having achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and developed nuclear warheads

**Ballistic missile development**

- Deployment of several hundred ballistic missiles capable of reaching Japan
- Possessing and enhancing capabilities for a surprise ballistic missile attack
Further expansion of operational areas of China’s sea and air power

China’s sea and air power is expanding its operational areas surrounding Japan, including the area around Senkaku Islands.

China’s recent activities surrounding Japan (for illustrative purposes):

- **Bomber advances all the way to the area off the Kii Peninsula (August 2017)**
- **Frequent advancements into the Pacific Ocean passing between Okinawa and Miyako Island**
- **Underwater submarine and destroyer’s intrusions into the contiguous zone off the Senkaku Islands (January 2018)**
- **The PLA Navy and Air Force’s activities in the East China Sea**
- **Chinese Air Force fighters’ advancements into the Sea of Japan (December 2017)**
- **China-Russia joint exercise “Joint Sea 2017”**
- **Carrier-based fighter (presumed) flights in the Pacific Ocean (April 2018)**
- **First advancement of Chinese Air Force fighters into the Sea of Japan (December 2017)**
- **Navigation by the Chinese Navy aircraft carrier “Liaoning” in waters near Okinawa (April 2018)**

The number of Japan’s press releases on China’s military aircraft’s flights through the strait between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Times</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>2014</td>
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<td>2016</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Military activities by Russia are generally becoming more active

Russia tends to increase its military activities in areas around Japan, including the Northern Territories.

Deployment of surface-to-ship missiles in the Northern Territories (for illustrative purposes)

Announcement of deployment of coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles to Etorofu Island and Kunashiri Island (November 2016)

Surface-to-ship missile Bastion

Civilian airport designated as joint use with military (January 2018)

New Su-35 fighter redeployed on Etorofu Island (March 2018)

Trends in the number of scrambles against Russian planes (past 10 years)
Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Close cooperation at Summit and Minister levels

Japan and the United States have closely coordinated their understanding and policies, and worked in close cooperation by repeatedly holding Summit Meetings, “2+2” meetings, Defense Ministerial Meetings, etc. about regional situations including the North Korea issues and East and South China Seas.

Main Japan-U.S. consultations and other contacts over the past year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2017</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
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<td>Summit/Ministerial meeting</td>
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<td>Telephone talks Summits</td>
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<td>Defense Ministers</td>
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</table>

Strengthening cooperation through Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises

The Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces strive to enhance bilateral exercises between Japan and the United States on a regular basis. These bilateral exercises aim to bolster Japan-U.S. cooperation. Demonstration of this bond improves deterrence and response capabilities for the overall Japan-U.S. alliance, thereby showing Japan’s robust capabilities to promote regional stability.

Main Japan-U.S. consultations and other contacts over the past year

* Prepared using materials released by the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2018</th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
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</tbody>
</table>


Active promotion of security cooperation

Security challenges in today’s international community cannot be resolved just by a single country on its own and require cooperation with other countries. Promotion of defense cooperation and exchanges with other countries is highly important in building face-to-face relationships to deal with various security issues in the region and international community in cooperation with each other.

Track record of high-level interactions (June 2017 to June 2018)
The ability of countries to handle natural disasters and maritime problems on their own should substantially contribute to the improvement of the global security environment. Capacity building assistance is an initiative that aims to improve the capabilities of partner countries. The Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces are engaging in cooperation programs to build such capabilities utilizing the abilities that they possess.

Recent programs of capacity building assistance (April 2017 to May 2018)

* Includes collaborative projects with other countries providing assistance
What is a ballistic missile?
A ballistic missile is a missile propelled by a rocket engine. It can strike against long-distance targets. The following chart shows the general ranges.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-1,000 km</td>
<td>Short range ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000-3,000 km</td>
<td>Medium range ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000-5,500 km</td>
<td>Intermediate range ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,500 km and up</td>
<td>Inter-continental ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The Maritime Self-Defense Force currently has six Aegis-equipped destroyers, five of which possess ballistic missile defense capabilities (as of the end of June 2018); it is scheduled to expand this capability to a sixth destroyer within this year.
The Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces are constantly gathering information and conducting surveillance in order to resolutely protect the lives of Japanese people and defend Japan’s territorial land, waters and airspace from the threat of ballistic missiles. Currently, Japan utilizes multi-tier defense via an automatic warning and control system (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment; JADGE) that effectively coordinates 1) upper-tier interception by Aegis-equipped destroyers and 2) lower-tier interception by Patriot PAC-3 to deal with ballistic missiles that fly toward Japan.

2 Detection, identification, and tracking by warning and control radar

3 Coordinated by JADGE (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment)

JADGE is a core system for the command and control as well as communication functions. It centrally processes the information regarding aircraft captured by radars installed nationwide, and it provides fighters with instructions required for scrambling against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace and air defense combat operations. In addition, it controls Patriot and radar, etc. in responses to ballistic missiles.

4 Refer here for the latest information on Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces initiatives related to ballistic missile defense (Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Force website)
Preparation from Peacetime

Maintaining surveillance and response capabilities

The Self-Defense Forces members work vigorously 24 hours a day and 365 days a year throughout the country to protect Japan against the threat of ballistic missiles.

Voice

Destroyer Myoko,
Maritime Self-Defense Force
Lieutenant Masanori Matsuo
I work hard for the mission of surveillance and training with sufficient alertness day and night in order to protect Japan from ballistic missile threats.

Voice

Destroyer Myoko,
Maritime Self-Defense Force
Petty Officer Second Class
Kenichi Iwamiya
I am in charge of maintenance of radar that detects ballistic missiles. I put my fullest efforts into maintaining an ideal state at all times.

Voice

42nd Air Warning Group,
Air Self-Defense Force,
Staff Sergeant Kengo Matsumoto
I take pride in working on the frontline, being vigilant against foreign aircraft and ballistic missiles approaching Japan.

Voice

5th Air Defense Missile Group,
Air Self-Defense Force,
Staff Sergeant Kazuya Iwakiri
I work as a maintenance crew member of a PAC-3 unit, which is considered the “last defense against ballistic missiles.” I’m honored to contribute to protecting our citizens.

Deployment of main ballistic missile defense-related troops nationwide (image)
Nationwide PAC-3 maneuver deployment training

The Self-Defense Force has been steadily implementing PAC-3 maneuver deployment training nationwide since June 2017. (The training has been conducted in 20 locations through the end of June 2018.)

VOICE

2nd Air Defense Missile Group
Air Self-Defense Force
First Lieutenant
Akinori Onori (left side in the photo)

I am committed to conducting missions and training as a BMD goalkeeper. PAC-3 is all set for the defense of Japan.

Enhancement of ballistic missile defense capabilities

Resolutely securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of the people of the country is the most important responsibility for the government. The current circumstance indicates that the enhancement of Japan’s defense capability against ballistic missiles is an urgent issue, considering the fact that North Korea still holds a number of various types of ballistic missiles, which cover Japan within their range. Amid such a situation, the installation of Aegis Ashore missile defense systems will drastically improve Japan’s defense capability for ensuring the seamless security of the country on a 24 hours a day and 365 days a year basis.

“New Shield” in ballistic missile defense: Aegis Ashore

What is Aegis Ashore?
Aegis Ashore is a ground-based interception system for ballistic missiles flying in space outside of the Earth’s atmosphere (mid-course stage). It is a piece of equipment with parts other than the ship hull of an Aegis-equipped destroyer on the ground in a fixed position.

Refer to Section III, Chapter 1, Sub-section 2 (Effective deterrence and response) for details.
Surveillance in the Sea of Japan

46th Air Warning Group, Air Self-Defense Force

VOICE
46th Air Warning Group, Air Self-Defense Force
Staff Sergeant Takeshi Suzue

I work with pride at a key site protecting airspace on the Sea of Japan side in extreme cold and am involved in surveillance activities that take place 24 hours a day.

Sado Island’s Air Self-Defense Force radar site

Surveillance in the East China Sea

Self-Defense Fleet, Maritime Self-Defense Force

VOICE
Destroyer Abukuma, Maritime Self-Defense Force
Leading Seaman Raika Maruyama

My job is conducting surveillance with my own eyes. I carry out my duties on the front line even on rainy and windy days.

Picture of an activity that is strongly suspected to be a so-called “ship-to-ship transfer” involving a North-Korean-flagged vessel, which is prohibited by UN Security Council resolutions, observed by Destroyer Umigiri in international waters in the East China Sea (May 2018)

Tanker of unknown nationality

North Korean tanker
The Self-Defense Forces constantly monitors waters and airspace around Japan with 24 hours a day operations to respond rapidly and seamlessly to various situations.

**Surveillance in the area around Hokkaido**

*301st Coast Observation Unit, Ground Self-Defense Force* ....... 4

*Rebun Island Ground Self-Defense Force Vice-Camp*

**VOICE**

301st Coast Observation Unit, Ground Self-Defense Force
Master Sergeant
Makoto Ashizaki

I carry out surveillance of ships passing through the La Perouse (Soya) Strait with high alertness as part of operations that take place 24 hours a day and 365 days a year.

*Surveillance in waters and airspace around Japan*  
Constant surveillance activities

The Self-Defense Forces constantly monitors waters and airspace around Japan with 24 hours a day operations to respond rapidly and seamlessly to various situations.

- Surveillance facility located on a hill
- Post on the western side of Yonaguni Island
Measures against airspace violations
60 years of promoting peace in the skies

The Air Self-Defense Force detects and identifies aircraft flying in areas around Japan’s airspace. When the ASDF finds an aircraft that might violate Japan’s airspace, fighters and other aircraft embark on an emergency scramble to confirm the subject aircraft and monitor the situation. If the aircraft violates Japan’s airspace, the ASDF issues a warning to leave. Japan began measures against airspace violations in 1958 and has conducted a total of 27,144 scrambles so far as of the end of FY2017.

Trend in the number of scrambles from FY 1958 to FY 2017

* Refer to Section III, Chapter 1, Sub-section 2 for “Number of scrambles since the Cold War period and breakdown”

VOICE

304th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 9th Air Wing, Air Self-Defense Force
First Lieutenant Shohei Taguchi

When I was a child, I admired my father, who was a F-15 pilot, so I aimed to become a fighter pilot. Our mission is becoming more complex in the southwestern area with an increase in the number of scrambles and diversification of target aircraft. I train every day to be capable of handling any situation.
Disaster Relief
Prompt and appropriate responses to large-scale disasters, etc.

The Self-Defense Forces collaborates and cooperates with local governments etc. when natural disasters and other disasters occur. We work on various activities, such as search and rescue for afflicted people and vessels/aircraft in distress, flood prevention, medical care, infectious disease control, water supply, and transportation of people and goods.

Response to natural disasters

While keenly feeling the danger of torrential rain disasters, I advanced through blocked roads to isolated areas along with local firefighters and carried numerous afflicted people to safety.

163rd Engineer Equipment Unit, 5th Engineer Brigade, Ground Self-Defense Force
Staff Sergeant Hideyuki Sasakawa

While keenly feeling the danger of torrential rain disasters, I advanced through blocked roads to isolated areas along with local firefighters and carried numerous afflicted people to safety.

Writer involved in coordination at the local site for rescue activities (center of the picture)

Search and rescue activities by Ground Self-Defense Force (Jul-Aug 2017)

Infectious disease prevention measures by Ground Self-Defense Force (January 2018)

Nighttime snow removal activities by Ground Self-Defense Force (February 2018)

Search and rescue activities by Ground Self-Defense Force (April 2018)

Search and rescue activities by Maritime Self-Defense Force (July 2018)
Transport of emergency patients, processing of unexploded shells, and other activities to protect the lives and safe living of Japanese people

The Self-Defense Forces handles emergency transport of emergency patients from outlying islands and other areas. Depending on the circumstances, we provide wide-area medical transport via the Aero-Medical Evacuation Squadron to transport seriously ill patients using Air Self-Defense Force C-130H transport planes (401 emergency transports took place in fiscal 2017).

Emergency patient transport and other activities

Emergency patient being transported by 15th Helicopter Unit, Ground Self-Defense Force

Aero-Medical Evacuation Squadron, Air Self-Defense Force during wide-area medical transport

71st Air Corps, Maritime Self-Defense Force on sea rescue activities

VOICE

71st Air Corps, Maritime Self-Defense Force
Airborne Rescue Personnel, Petty Officer Second Class Teppei Maeda

Only rescue flight boats, which are capable of landing on the ever-changing sea surface, can save lives on the sea at distant rescue locations. I work with pride on my mission that only we can perform.

Processing of unexploded shells and other activities

The Self-Defense Forces removes and processes unexploded shells, mines, and other devices (1,611 cases of unexploded shells and 15,500 mines and other explosive objects handled in fiscal 2017).

Members of the 101st Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit, Ground Self-Defense Force processing unexploded shells

Members of the Okinawa Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit, Maritime Self-Defense Force preparing for disposal of explosive dangerous materials
Training and exercises for various situations
Enhancement of effective deterrence and response capabilities

Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises and Self-Defense Forces joint exercises are conducted in a visible manner in order to respond to various situations effectively and enhance deterrence capability. Various plans are continuously reviewed and updated in light of lessons learned from these training activities and exercises.

Japan-U.S. bilateral training


Joint exercises by Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces

Joint exercise on the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas at Air Self-Defense Force Iruma Air Base (Saitama Prefecture) (December 2017)

Remote island joint disaster prevention exercise in Okinawa Prefecture (September 2017) (doctor helicopter having transported injured people by air onto the sea-based Ise Destroyer)

Joint exercises with local public entities

Japanese citizen protection training in Nagasaki Prefecture (November 2017)

Voice

Nagasaki Prefecture Crisis Management Section, Councilor Koji Aoki (second person from the right in the photo) (in charge of protecting Japanese citizens)

I directly support the Governor in matters related to protecting Japanese citizens and other crisis management, including disaster prevention and ballistic missile response, utilizing my experience and knowledge as a commander and staff in the Ground Self-Defense Force.
The Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces are continuously implementing measures to build highly effective and comprehensive defense capabilities.

1. Strengthening defense presence in the southwest area

- **Enhancement of remote island defense**
  - Deploying Self-Defense Force in blank areas
  - Reorganization into units capable of responding promptly to a crisis or other event
  - Reorganizing units into rapid deployment division/brigade capable of quick deployment by transport aircraft and other equipment

- **Reinforcement of air defense**
  - Strengthening air defense operations with additional fighters and deployment of airborne early warning aircraft

- **Preparation for remote island defense**
  - Establishing an amphibious operation specialized unit to defend remote islands

- **Establishment of capabilities for quick transportation of troops to further locations**
  - Acquiring aircraft and other equipment to transport a larger number of personnel and supplies to further locations quickly

---

Yonaguni Island (Okinawa)
- Establishing a coast observation unit on Yonaguni Island (Japan’s westernmost point)

Naha (Okinawa)
- Establishing Southwestern Air Defense Force
  - Strengthening the fighter unit (from about 20 aircraft to roughly 40 aircraft)
  - Establishing airborne early warning aircraft unit

Senkaku Islands
- Acquisition of aircraft and other equipment to transport a larger number of personnel and supplies to further locations quickly
### Preparation for remote island defense

**Ainoura (Nagasaki)**

Establishing the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade

### Establishment of new unit to support quick response in a crisis or other event

**Kita Kumamoto, Kumamoto** 8th Division

Zentsuji, Kagawa 14th Brigade

Reorganizing units into rapid deployment division/brigade capable of quick deployment by transport aircraft and other equipment

### Establishment of capabilities for quick transportation of troops to further locations

- Procuring V-22 Ospreys with improved speed, traveling distance, and other features compared to existing helicopters
- Procuring C-2 transport aircraft with improved traveling distance and loading capabilities

### Enhancement of remote island defense

**Amami Island (Kagoshima), Miyako Island, and Ishigaki Island (Okinawa)**

- Security unit
- Surface-to-ship missile unit
- Medium-distance surface-to-air missile unit
2 Procuring new equipment

Stand-off missiles capable of attacking invading force from locations outside of adversary’s threat envelope
- Missiles capable of attacking invading force to Japan from locations where their attacks are unreachable (stand-off) and secure personnel of the Self-Defense Forces

F-35A cutting-edge fighter that possesses better stealth capabilities and high-performance sensors
- Robust stealth capability to evade opponent’s radar
- Equipped with high-performance sensors
- Possible to discover and attack opponents without being discovered (deployments started at the Misawa Air Base (Aomori Prefecture) in January 2018)

E-2D new airborne early warning aircraft (flying radar) with superior precise detection capability of further targets
- Airborne early warning aircraft are equipped with a circular radar device on the plane which are able to discover opponents quickly. They are also called “flying radar.”
- E-2D are able to detect further targets than existing airborne early warning aircraft

Constructing compact new destroyers that are able to handle a variety of duties and high-performance submarines
- Constructing new destroyers that are able to handle a variety of duties and submarines with higher performance
- Future goals for the number of destroyers and submarines
  - Current volume Future volume
  - Destroyers 47 vessels → 54 vessels
  - Submarines 18 vessels → 22 vessels

* Refer to page 228 in the main text for details on stand-off missiles
3 Most significant reforms since the establishment of the Ground Self-Defense Force

Establishment of Ground Component Command as the “command center for action”

The GSDF established the Ground Component Command (GCC) for the purpose of carrying out swift and flexible nationwide operation of its units under the joint operation.

Unit operation following establishment of the Ground Component Command

- Defense Minister
- Chief of Staff
- Ground Component Command
- Self-Defense Fleet
- Air Defense Command
- Northern Army
- North Eastern Army
- Eastern Army
- Middle Army
- Western Army

* Ground Component Command commands GSDF units when integrated operation is necessary.

VOICE

Creation of Ground Component Command

A new unit (Ground Component Command) has been formed as an organization to handle the integrated operation of Ground Self-Defense Force units nationwide. This should enable quicker and more flexible nationwide operation of Ground Self-Defense Force units and facilitate efficient and effective collaboration with the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, the U.S. military, and others. I intend to engage in my duties to defend Japan’s peace and security and bring reassurance and security to the Japanese people within a framework of civilian control.

First commander of the Ground Component Command

General Shigeru Kobayashi (right side in the photo)

Establishment of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade as a “key tool in the defense of remote islands”

The Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade is a new unit equipped with amphibious vehicles and other related equipment, possessing amphibious tactical capabilities to protect remote islands.

- Self-Defense Force personnel reaching land in an amphibious vehicle
- Amphibious vehicle being loaded onto a Maritime Self-Defense Force transport ship
Overview

The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute.

Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region

1. In the area surrounding Japan, there is a concentration of nations with large-scale military capabilities, and a regional cooperation framework on security has not yet to be fully institutionalized, leading to the existence of uncertainty and unclarity, including the persistence of territorial disputes and unification issues.

2. Meanwhile, there has been a tendency towards an increase in and prolongation of so-called “gray-zone” situations; that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty, and economic interests.

3. There has also been a noticeable trend among neighboring countries to modernize and reinforce their military capabilities and to intensify their military activities. The security challenges and destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacific region are characterized below:
   - North Korea’s military development such as nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development represents an unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat.
   - The unilateral escalation of China’s military activities poses a strong security concern for the region including Japan and international community.
   - Russia has tendency to intensify its military activities, including in areas surrounding Japan, and this trend needs to paid due attention.

4. Territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of which are inherent parts of the territory of Japan, remain unresolved.

Recent Security Related Issues around Japan

Global Security Environment

- Emerging global security challenges include regional conflicts growing in complexity, international terrorism becoming more serious, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and securing the stable use of new domains such as maritime space, cyberspace, and outer space.
The Trump Administration’s Security Policy


2 Within these documents, the Trump Administration cites the following three types of main challengers competing with the United States and states the main security concern of the United States is not terrorism, but rather long-term strategic competition with China and Russia.
   - China and Russia: Revisionist powers
   - Iran and North Korea: Rogue states
   - Jihadist terrorists: Transnational threat organizations

3 Given this recognition, the United States emphasizes maintaining military superiority, its commitments to the Indo-Pacific Region, and strengthening relations with allies.

Nuclear Strategy and Missile Defense Policy

1 In terms of nuclear posture, in the near term the United States will modify a small number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option, and in the long term, pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles.

2 As for the country’s missile defense posture, the United States plans to reinforce both mainland defense and regional defense as well as work on the development of cutting edge technologies, in order to respond the threat of not only ballistic missiles, but also cruise missiles and other weapons systems.

Indo-Pacific Strategy

1 The United States champions a vision of promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific in the Indo-Pacific Region.

2 This vision calls for the following U.S. policies:
   - North Korea’s nuclear and missile development: while maintaining negotiations with North Korea on denuclearization, keep sanctions until denuclearization becomes apparent, and continue to maintain presence of the United States Forces Korea.
   - China’s maritime advances: remain involved in the free and lawful use of the seas through the Freedom of Navigation Operations, while not tolerating unilateral changes in the status quo.
North Korea

Since 2016, North Korea has willfully conducted three nuclear tests and launched as many as 40 ballistic missiles. These military trends in North Korea pose an unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security, and significantly damage the peace and security of the region and the international community.

In the joint declaration at the first-ever U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting in June 2018, North Korea gave a commitment to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and confirmed that it plans to continue the negotiations between the two sides. It is highly significant that Chairman Kim Jong-un reiterated his intention for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and made a clear promise to do so in a written document.

It is important to closely monitor specific actions by North Korea to eliminate nuclear and missile capabilities.

Taking into consideration the fact that North Korea appears to possess and deploy several hundred Nodong missiles capable of reaching almost every part of Japan as well as advancements in the development and operational capabilities of nuclear weapons and missiles through repeated nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches to date, there is no change in our basic recognition concerning the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles.

North Korea willfully conducted its sixth nuclear test in September 2017. The yield of the weapon is estimated at around 160kt, making it the largest yielding test to date. It is difficult to deny the possibility that it was a hydrogen bomb test.

Considering the technological maturity estimated to have been achieved through these six nuclear tests, it is possible that North Korea has already achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and has developed nuclear warheads so that nuclear weapons can be loaded into ballistic missiles.

As for whether North Korea has demonstrated warhead reentry technologies, while detailed analysis is necessary, North Korea can be accumulating related technologies through its repeated missile launches.

North Korea is suspected to have several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and already a substantial stockpile of such agents. North Korea is also thought to have some infrastructure for the production of biological weapons. The possibility cannot be denied that North Korea is able to load biological and/or chemical weapons on ballistic missiles.

Development of WMD and Ballistic Missiles

1 North Korea willfully conducted its sixth nuclear test in September 2017. The yield of the weapon is estimated at around 160kt, making it the largest yielding test to date. It is difficult to deny the possibility that it was a hydrogen bomb test.

2 Considering the technological maturity estimated to have been achieved through these six nuclear tests, it is possible that North Korea has already achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and has developed nuclear warheads so that nuclear weapons can be loaded into ballistic missiles.

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4 North Korea is suspected to have several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and already a substantial stockpile of such agents. North Korea is also thought to have some infrastructure for the production of biological weapons. The possibility cannot be denied that North Korea is able to load biological and/or chemical weapons on ballistic missiles.
In terms of ballistic missiles, North Korea appears to be aiming to (1) advance long-range ballistic missiles’ technological reliability, (2) enhance the accuracy and operational capabilities necessary for saturation attacks, (3) improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks, and (4) diversify the forms of launches.

If North Korea advances further in development of ballistic missiles and other activities and overconfidently and wrongly believes that it has obtained strategic deterrence against the United States, there is possibility of increased and more serious military provocations in the region and could lead to circumstances that raise strong concerns for Japan.
Underpinned by high level of increases in defense budget, China is considered to reinforce its military capabilities broadly and rapidly with a focus on nuclear and missile force, as well as its Navy and Air Force. As part of this China has been strengthening its so-called A2/AD capabilities.

Besides this type of strengthening military capabilities from past years, China is pursuing new types of practical operational capabilities, such as those of electronic and cyber warfare, in recent years.

Considering Xi Jinping’s further consolidation of authoritative power as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, China’s military modernization to improve practical operational capabilities can be accelerated more strongly in the future.

China aims to realize fundamental modernization of its military forces, namely the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), by 2035 and transform the PLA into one of the world’s top militaries by the middle of the 21st century, intending to rapidly enhance its military capabilities in accordance with its increasing national strength.

China’s sea and air power is expanding its operational areas, including the area around Senkaku Islands, undertaking further activities which are seemingly based on its own claim regarding the islands.

China is considered to attempt to routinize its naval ships’ navigation in waters close to Japan and its presumable sea and air power’s training activities which accompany entry into the Pacific Ocean. At the same time, the quality of its activities is showing continuous improvement, including a pursuit of developing practical joint operational capability.

Sufficient attention should be paid to issues regarding China’s offshore platforms.
China’s attempts to change the status quo by coercion

China, over maritime issues where its interests conflict with others’ continues to act in a way which can be considered assertive, such as attempts at changing the status quo by coercion.

China has pressed ahead with rapid and large-scale land reclamation on seven features in the Spratly Islands, installing military facilities such as artillery batteries, and transforming these features into military installations. Furthermore, China is promoting militarization of the Paracel Islands too, as bomber takeoff and landing exercises are pointed out to be implemented, for example. China’s military activities in South China Sea are expanding, and the expansion itself is to change the status quo by coercion and to promote the changed status as an accomplished fact.

The United States is conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations in the waters such as South China Sea to cope with over-claiming of maritime interests, including one by China.

However, China is exhibiting interest in initiatives to avoid and prevent unexpected contingency in the sea and airspace. For example, in May 2018, Japan and China officially agreed to implement “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan-China.”

Nevertheless, China’s rapid modernization of the PLA, enhancement of operational capabilities, and unilateral escalation of activities in areas close to Japan, without sufficient transparency, are generating strong security concerns in the region and international community, including Japan.

It is probable that the PLA plays a backing role in Belt and Road Initiative through its activities such as sea lane protection. In addition, development of infrastructure under the initiative can lead to further expansion of the PLA’s activities in the area such as the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.

An image of the PLA’s recent activities in the sea and airspace around Japan
Russia

1. President Putin, who has called for Russia to become a strong and influential nation, was re-elected in March 2018. With regards to Russia’s future, he emphasized to further bolster its defense capability, while stating his commitment to pursue constructive relations with other countries without the intention of starting an arms race.

2. With regards to Europe, Russia is negative about the expansion of NATO, and has deployed three divisions near the border with Ukraine etc, and conducted the large-scale training exercise Zapad-2017 in September last year.

3. As for Syria, Russia announced naval and air bases in Syria will continue to operate on a permanent basis. Attention will continue to be paid to Russia’s moves to expand its influence in the Middle East.

4. In the Far East, Russia has been developing its newest class of frigate (Steregushchiy class) and fighter jets (Su-35 and Su-34). In 2018, Russia also plans on holding a large-scale military exercise called Vostok-2018.

5. Russia announced deployment of surface-to-ship missiles in the Northern Territories (Etorofu and Kunashiri islands), and it is also intensifying activities in Etorofu island, including designation of a civilian airport to both civilian and military use and deployment of fighters.

6. Russia tends to increase its military activities, including in areas near Japan, and it is necessary to closely observe this trend.

Trends in Regional Conflicts and International Terrorism

1. ISIL has lost nearly all of the territory it once controlled as a result of military operations by the U.S.-led coalition and local forces. However, ISIL-affiliated groups continue to actively carry out terrorist attacks in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

2. The threat for terrorism is spreading globally, including “homegrown” terrorism perpetrated by individuals or groups who are inspired by extremist ideologies and foreign terrorist fighters returning to their countries of origin after fighting for ISIL.

3. It is essential for Japan to once again address the threat of international terrorism head-on in light of ISIL’s repeated reference to Japanese people as targets of attack and the attack in Dhaka (Bangladesh) in 2016.

4. In the Syrian theater, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France concluded that the Assad regime used chemical weapons and carried out attacks on Syria’s chemical weapon facilities. Related countries and various forces remain in conflict, as seen in strong criticism of this action by Russia, a key supporter of the Assad regime. There is still no end in sight to military clashes in Syria.
Outer Space

1. Major countries are making efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C4ISR* functions. (*The term “C4ISR” stands for command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.)

2. Countries are rapidly developing capabilities in outer space for securing their own military superiority in outer space. It is pointed out that China and Russia have been developing anti-satellite weapons such as killer satellites.

3. It is pointed out that China could threaten U.S. information superiority in outer space in the future.

Cyberspace

1. As military dependence on information communication networks grows further, cyber attacks are regarded as an asymmetrical strategy capable of exploiting the weaknesses of an adversary’s forces. Many foreign militaries develop their capability to execute cyber attacks.

2. It has been pointed out that China and Russia are reinforcing their military’s cyber attack capabilities in order to disrupt networked units and destroy infrastructure.

3. Cyber attacks are frequently carried out against information and communications networks of government organizations and military forces of various countries. It is suggested that government organizations of countries such as China, Russia, and North Korea are involved in those attacks.
The National Security Strategy

● The National Security Strategy (NSS) developed in December 2013 sets forth Japan’s fundamental principle of national security, which is that Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken as a peace-loving nation, and contribute even more proactively to security peace, stability, and prosperity in the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region as a proactive contributor to peace based on the principle of international cooperation.

The National Defense Program Guidelines

The current National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), developed in December 2013 being based on the NSS, emphasize the following:

**Effective Means of Deterrence and Response to Various Situations**
1. Ensuring the security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan
2. Respond to an attack on remote islands
3. Response to ballistic missile attacks
4. Responses in outer space and cyberspace
5. Responses to major disasters

**Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environment**
1. Holding training and exercises
2. Promoting defense cooperation and exchange
3. Promoting capacity building assistance
4. Ensuring maritime security
5. Implementing international peace cooperation activities
6. Cooperating with efforts to promote arms-control, disarmament, and nonproliferation

The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP)(FY2014-FY2018) developed in December 2013 based on the NDPG specifies the review of major units, major projects concerned with the capability of the SDF, the maintenance scale of main equipment, and required expenses.

Review of the National Defense Program Guidelines, etc.

1. As 2018 marks the final fiscal year for the current MTDP, a new NDPG is also be discussed towards the end of 2018.
2. This is based on the necessity to identify what defense capabilities are truly needed to protect the people, rather than simply extending existing capabilities, looking squarely at the reality of the increasingly severe security environment.
3. Concerning this process, it is essential to secure necessary and sufficient defense capabilities qualitatively and quantitatively. Given that it is especially vital to utilize capabilities in new domains such as space and cyberspace, it would be no longer inadequate to consider problems in the conventional domains - i.e., land, sea, and air, and it is necessary to develop capabilities in these areas.
Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2018

Japan will steadily build up its defense capability through programs that include the following in FY2018, which is the final fiscal year for the current NDPG and the current MTDP.

Major Programs for Building up Defense Capability in FY2018

- **Aegis Ashore**
  - Begin introduction of Aegis Ashore, a land-based Aegis system (conducting basic design and geological and other surveys).

- **Standoff missile (JSM) (image)**
  - Deploy a missile that can be launched from a significant standoff range (outside the target’s threat range).

- **FY2018 FFM (3,900t class) (image)**
  - Construct a new type of frigates more compact and with improved multi-task capability.

- **Research on element technologies of a HVGP (Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile) intended for the defense of remote islands (image)**
  - Conduct research on element technologies of a HVGP intended for the defense of remote islands, which can glide at high velocity and attack a target in order to enable island-to-island firing.

- **Research on element technologies of a new anti-ship missile intended for the defense of remote islands (image)**
  - Conduct research on element technologies of a new anti-ship missile intended for the defense of remote islands in order to improve the range and survivability of existing anti-ship missiles.

- **SM-3 Block IIA**
  - Acquire SM-3 Block IIA missiles, which have the necessary performance for ballistic missiles that travel in a lofted trajectory and for extension of defense range.

Defense-Related Expenditures

- In FY2018, in order to strengthen the posture for protecting the life and property of the Japanese people as well as Japan’s territorial land, sea, and airspace in light of the increasingly severe security environment, Japan has increased defense-related expenditures following on from FY2017 (increased 0.8% from the previous year to 4.9388 trillion yen).

Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures Over the Past 15 Years

(Note: The figures above do not include SACO-related expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) and expenses for the introduction of new government aircraft. Including these expenses, total defense-related expenditures were as follows: ¥4,902.6 billion in FY2004, ¥4,856.0 billion in FY2005, ¥4,913.6 billion in FY2006, ¥4,801.3 billion in FY2007, ¥4,779.8 billion in FY2008, ¥4,774.1 billion in FY2009, ¥4,790.3 billion in FY2010, ¥4,775.2 billion in FY2011, ¥4,713.8 billion in FY2012, ¥4,753.8 billion in FY2013, ¥4,884.8 billion in FY2014, ¥4,980.1 billion in FY2015, ¥5,054.1 billion in FY2016, ¥5,125.1 billion in FY2017, and ¥5,191.1 billion in FY2018.)
Establishment of the Legislation for Peace and Security, and SDF Activities Following the Enactment

The Legislation for Peace and Security, consisting of the Act for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security and the International Peace Support Act, was passed and enacted in September 2015 and entered into force in March 2016.

Framework for the Activities of the Self-Defense Forces after the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security

- The following provides an overview of the framework for the government’s response to various situations as laid out in the Legislation for Peace and Security, including new potential situations, as well as the main activities of the SDF.

Main activities of the SDF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Types of SDF Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed attack situations and survival-threatening situations</td>
<td>Defense operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation that will have an important influence</td>
<td>Support activities (including logistic support), search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining public order and responding to infringements that do not amount to an armed attack</td>
<td>Public security operations, maritime security operations, antipiracy activities, interception measures for ballistic missiles, measures against airspace invasions, rescue and transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, provisions for the protection of weapons and other equipment of the U.S. Armed Forces, provision of supplies and services to the U.S Armed Forces, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to peace and stability of the international community</td>
<td>Respond to situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing (cooperation and support operations, search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations), The international Peace Cooperation Assignments (UN PKO and internationally coordinated operations for peace and security), International disaster relief operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Implementation of Training Pertaining to the Legislation for Peace and Security

- After the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security, the MOD/SDF has conducted a range of training sessions that pertained to new duties. The main sessions conducted over the past year are as follows:
  - Training in protecting American warships in accordance with the stipulation on the protection of weapons and other equipment of the U.S. and other countries armed forces. (July, 2017)
  - Training in conducting UN Peacekeeping Operations as part of Khaan Quest 17, a multilateral joint exercise (July-August, 2017)
  - Joint training concerning rescue of Japanese nationals overseas (September-October, December, 2017)
  - Joint training concerning rescue of Japanese nationals overseas as part of Cobra Gold 18, a multilateral joint exercise (January-February, 2018)

Protection of Weapons, etc. of U.S. and Other Armed Forces

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

1. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, which is centered on bilateral security arrangements, functions as a “public good” that contributes to the stability and prosperity not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.

2. As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe and the United States meanwhile maintains and strengthens its engagement and presence in the Asia-Pacific region, it has become more important than ever to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the security of Japan.

Core Efforts to Strengthen the Alliance

Main Initiatives to Strengthen the Alliance

1. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (April 2015) set forth policy concerning initiatives such as “seamlessly ensuring Japan’s peace and security,” “cooperation for regional and global peace and security” and “space and cyberspace cooperation.”

2. In accordance with the guidelines, both countries will continue to conduct more joint training and exercises, joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, and jointly utilize both countries’ facilities and areas of operation for these activities.

Policy Discussions between Japan and the U.S.

U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2 meeting)

- During U.S.-Japan "2+2" talks held in Washington DC on August 17, 2017, the two countries reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthening their alliance and to the alliance continuing as a foundation for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting

- Discussions at Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meetings to date have focused mainly on the following areas:
  - Close Japan-U.S. cooperation towards North Korea’s complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment of any capability of launching any type of weapon of mass destruction or ballistic missile of any range
  - Continued scrutiny of conditions in the East China Sea and Japan-U.S. cooperation on ensuring peace and stability in this region
  - Defense cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and Southeast Asian nations to address conditions in the South China Sea
  - Cooperation in ensuring the safe operations of U.S. Armed Forces and efforts to promote understanding in local regions, including Okinawa
  - Continued Cooperation for making improvements in challenges regarding FMS (Foreign Military Sales)
In order for the U.S.-Japan Alliance to function sufficiently as a deterrent that contributes to the defense of Japan and peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, it is necessary to have a USFJ presence and to be prepared to respond to emergencies with speed and agility.

For this purpose, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan allows the stationing of USFJ, which is a core part of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

Approximately 70% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 14% of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, it is necessary to continue to make utmost efforts to mitigate the impact.

A number of steps have been taken to mitigate the impact on Okinawa while maintaining security in the region, including releasing of land areas south of the Kadena Air Base, reducing troop numbers in Okinawa and relocating to Guam, and training relocation of tilt-rotor/rotary-wing aircraft such as U.S. Marine Corps’ MV-22 Osprey aircraft.

The relocation of MCAS Futenma is the only solution to eliminate its danger as quickly as possible while simultaneously maintaining the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. Forces. Thus, the Government of Japan is making all-out efforts to realize the relocation.

The following progress has been made involving the return of USFJ land:

- March 2015: West Futenma Housing Area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) (about 51 ha) was returned. This land was returned to the owner in March 2018 after soil pollution surveys, etc.
- December 2016: The return of approximately 4,000 ha, a major portion of the Northern Training Area, was achieved, the largest of its kind since the reversion of Okinawa to the mainland. This land was returned to the owner in December 2017 after soil pollution surveys, etc.
- July 2017: A portion of MCAS Futenma (about 4 ha along Ginowan City road 11) was returned
- March 2018: A portion of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (about 3 ha of land to expand Route 58) was returned

In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing measures to consolidate facilities and areas of USFJ and to proceed with the realignment of USFJ. Such measures are aimed at securing the stable presence of the U.S. Forces while maintaining its deterrence capabilities and trying to mitigate the impact on local communities. The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni began in August 2017 and was completed in March 2018.

Ensuring the safety of local residents is of prime importance in USFJ operations. The two countries cooperate with a prime focus on ensuring the safety so that accidents or incidents will not occur.
Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

Effective Deterrence and Response

In order to respond to a variety of contingencies in a timely and appropriate manner, and to ensure the protection of the lives and property of the people as well as territorial land, water and airspace, it is necessary to make efforts to deter the occurrence of a variety of contingencies before they happen by building a comprehensive defense system. If a contingency does occur, it is required to respond seamlessly to the situations as they unfold. The MOD/SDF take the following initiatives.

Ensuring Security of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan

- The SDF persistently engages in warning and surveillance activities in the water and airspace surrounding Japan during peacetime so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly. Information gathered through these activities are shared with other relevant government agencies.

Suspicion Illegal Transfer of Goods at Sea (Ship-to-ship Transfer) by North Korea-related Vessels

1. As part of its warning and surveillance activities in the water surrounding Japan, the SDF gathers information on vessels suspected of violating the UN Security Council resolutions.

2. Up to the end of June 2018, the SDF has confirmed and made public 9 activities that were highly likely to be illegal transfers of goods at sea (so-called “ship-to-ship transfer”) by North Korea-related vessels.

3. In order to conduct warning and surveillance by aircraft and such against illegal activities at sea including “ship-to-ship” transfer, Australian and Canadian patrol aircraft were deployed to Japan for about a month from the end of April in 2018. British Royal Navy’s frigate HMS Sutherland engaged in information gathering operations in the high seas surrounding Japan in early May.

Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace

1. The ASDF detects and identifies aircraft flying in the airspace surrounding Japan using warning and control radars as well as early-warning and control aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft heading to Japan’s territorial airspace are detected, fighters and other aircraft scramble to approach them in order to confirm the situation and monitor them as necessary.

2. In 2017, the ASDF scrambled 904 times. Among these, 500 were against Chinese aircraft, and 390 were against Russian aircraft.

Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War
In order to respond to attacks on remote islands, it is important to position units and so forth in accordance with the security environment, and also to detect signs at an early stage through Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) conducted by the SDF as well as obtaining and securing maritime and air superiority. Initiatives taken by the MOD/SDF include the following.

Enhanced Defense Posture in the Southwestern Region

1. GSDF: Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade was newly established in March 2018. (Security units will be positioned on Amami Oshima, Miyako Island, and Ishigaki Island.)
2. MSDF: Acquired equipment including fixed wing patrol aircraft P-1 and SH-60K rotary wing patrol helicopters.

Securing Capabilities for Swift and Large-scale Transportation and Deployment

Enhanced rapid deployment capabilities through the improvement of transport LST and the introduction of V-22 Ospreys and C-2 transport aircraft.

Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

1. Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is based on an effective multi-tier defense system with upper tier interception with Aegis-equipped destroyers and lower tier with Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE).
2. In order to defend Japan, at all times, it is necessary to drastically improve ballistic missile defense capabilities. Therefore, the National Security Council and the Cabinet approved in December 2017 the introduction of two land-based Aegis System (Aegis Ashore) to be operated by the GSDF.
3. The introduction of Aegis Ashore will reinforce upper tier interception Aegis-equipped destroyers.

Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD (image)
There is a growing threat against the stable use of outer space such as the rapid increase of space debris.

The MOD/SDF launched an X-band defense communications satellite called Kirameki-2 in January 2017, and another one named Kirameki-1 in April 2018, to be used for the information communications of extremely important command and control in unit operations.

With regard to cybersecurity, the number of cases recognized as threats to Japanese governmental organizations in FY2016 reached approximately 7,110,000, and these threats have become increasingly serious.

In order to appropriately deal with cyber attacks, the MOD has increased the number of personnel in the SDF units responsible for responding to cyber attacks approximately from 350 to 430.

When natural disasters occur, the SDF works in collaboration with local governments, engaging in various activities such as the search and rescue of disaster victims or missing ships or aircraft, offering medical treatments and preventing epidemics. There were 501 disaster-related dispatches in 2017.

The SDF stands ready to dispatch its units swiftly. Specifically, the SDF maintains operational readiness by which the GSDF designates units including a helicopter unit, the MSDF designates vessels such as transport ships, and the ASDF designates airlift units. In addition, the SDF strengthens its joint operational capability through exercises in and outside Japan.

With cooperation from relevant government organizations, the MOD/SDF has held training with participation of local governments, etc. In addition, the MOD/SDF also actively participates and cooperates in civil protection training implemented by local governments.
The MOD/SDF will enhance bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, and will more actively promote United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UN PKO), counter-piracy operations, international peace cooperation activities, and other relevant missions to address global security issues.

### Initiatives under the Multilateral Security Framework and Dialogues

1. Initiatives under the multilateral framework such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)-Plus and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which is a security cooperation framework in the Asia-Pacific region, have made steady progress and serve as an important foundation for cooperation and exchanges in the areas of security and defense.

2. Japan has contributed to the enhancement of multilateral cooperation in the region, for example, by annually holding the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum and the Tokyo Defense Forum.

### Capacity Building Assistance

1. Through the capacity building assistance program launched in 2012, Japan has provided assistance in various areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, PKO, maritime security, and international law to 14 countries and 1 organization mainly in the Asia-Pacific region.

2. Between January and March, and October and December 2017, Japan provided assistance programs for the Djiboutian Armed Forces to help strengthen its disaster response capability, including training on the operation of facilities and equipment.

### Multilateral Joint Training

- In the Asia-Pacific region, the MOD/SDF actively participates in multinational training in non-traditional security fields, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), in addition to conventional training conduct in preparation for combat situations.

### Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries

1. As for defense cooperation and exchanges, Japan will continue its effort to alleviate any conditions of confrontation and tension, as well as fostering a collaborative and cooperative atmosphere through bilateral dialogues and exchanges.

2. In addition, recognizing the increasing need for international cooperation, Japan has recently enhanced bilateral defense relationships from traditional exchanges to deeper cooperation in a phased manner by appropriately combining various means including joint exercises and capacity building assistance, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and establishing institutional frameworks such as the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA).
Ensuring Maritime Security

For Japan, a maritime state, strengthening order on the seas based on fundamental rules, such as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as ensuring safe maritime transport, is the foundation for peace and prosperity, which is extremely important.

In cooperation with the relevant countries, the MOD/SDF engages in counter-piracy operations and promotes various initiatives including assistance for capacity building in this field for those coastal states alongside the sea lanes, and makes the most of various opportunities to enhance joint training and exercises in waters other than those in the immediate vicinity of Japan.

For counter-piracy operations, the SDF surface force and air force have participated in the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) and conducted its missions in cooperation with other countries. Furthermore, the SDF dispatched a CTF 151 commander from March to June 2018.

Efforts for International Peace Cooperation Activities

The MOD/SDF is proactively undertaking international peace cooperation activities working in tandem with diplomatic initiatives, including the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for resolving the fundamental causes of conflicts, terrorism, and other problems.

International Conferences etc. with regard to UN Peacekeeping Operations

The MOD hosted the Tokyo preparatory meeting for the UN Peacekeeping Defense Ministerial Meeting in August 2017.

At the UN Peacekeeping Defense Ministerial Meeting held in Canada in November 2017, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto announced that Japan would further contribute to the “UN Project for African Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities” and take initiatives to increase the number of female PKO personnel.

United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)

Japan continues to dispatch SDF personnel to UNMISS Headquarters although the SDF engineering unit was withdrawn at the end of May 2017.

Japan will continue to contribute to activities as UNMISS members.

Dispatch of MOD personnel to UN Secretariat

The uniformed SDF personnel are dispatched to PKO centers overseas as instructors, and administrative officials as well as the uniformed SDF personnel are dispatched to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN Department of Field Support.

GSDF personnel have been dispatched as instructors to the UN Project for African Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities. So far, until last year the dispatched GSDF personnel here provided 6 training sessions on the operation of heavy equipment for about 170 personnel participants from 8 countries in Africa.
Human Foundation and Organization that Supports the Defense Force, and Active Participation of Female Personnel

Establishing a New Benefit to Ensure Understanding and Cooperation for Duties of SDF Reserve Personnel and Others.
- A new system was introduced in FY 2018 in order to gain understanding and cooperation from the companies that employ SDF Reserve Personnel or SDF Ready Reserve Personnel for their duties. In the new system, a special benefit is provided to the companies in case the employed SDF Reserve Personnel or SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: 1) responds to orders such as defense operation, civil protection or disaster relief dispatch orders; 2) must miss their civilian jobs due to injuries sustained while on duty.

Safety Management Initiatives
- Any incident that can cause injury to the public, damage to its property, or the loss of life of SDF personnel, must be avoided at all costs. The MOD/SDF makes a united and full effort to prevent the same incidents from happening again by conducting a thorough investigation as to the cause of incidents and ensuring each SDF personnel is committed to safety management.

Working Style Reform
- The MOD/SDF is going forward with working style reform to promote work-life balance through initiatives such as holding “Competition for initiatives to promote Working Style Reform at the Ministry of Defense” in 2017, and also taking full effect of telework in the Internal Bureau of the MOD head office.

Reform to Realize a Successful Career with Childrearing and Nursing Care.
1. A workplace nursery was newly opened at Ichigaya district where the MOD is located in April and within National Defense Medical College in October 2017.
2. As for the re-employment of SDF personnel who left the SDF mid-career, the system was reassessed in January 2017 to welcome back personnel who retired mid-career due to childrearing and nursing. Their re-employment began in January 2018.

Establishment of High-quality Medical Care System
- Establish an efficient and high-quality medical care system through measures such as improving operation of the National Defense Medical College Hospital, etc., as well as promoting consolidation, upgrade, etc. of SDF hospitals.

Secure and Train Personnel, Enhance Capabilities
- More emphasis will be placed on securing and training medical officers and nurses, etc. Further, strengthen the first aid capabilities on the frontline as well as the abilities to respond to infectious diseases.
Measures on Defense Equipment and Technology

Promotion of Research and Development for Ensuring Technological Superiority

1. The MOD formulated the Defense Technology Strategy in August 2016, which presents a specific direction for various measures that should be implemented strategically. This aims to ensure Japan’s technological superiority, develop advanced equipment in an effective and efficient manner, and deal with various policy issues pertaining to defense and civilian technologies.

2. Additionally, the MOD formulated the Medium-to Long-term Defense Technology Outlook for future technologies expected to be established in the next 20 years and the Research and Development Vision that presents the concept of future equipment and the R&D roadmaps. The MOD promotes a variety of measures based on these documents.

3. 33 proposals have been selected by the end of JFY 2017 in the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” (funding program), which aims to discover inventive and promising research at research organizations and corporations.

Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

- Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with other countries in order to contribute to the national security of Japan, the promotion of peace and international cooperation, and the maintenance and enhancement of defense production and technological bases. The most recent initiatives include the following:
  - Five MSDF TC-90 training aircraft were granted to the Philippine Navy.
  - Japan decided to grant the GSDF UH-1H spare parts and maintenance equipment to the Philippine Air Force.
  - The MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft was displayed and gave the first demonstration flight at ILA Berlin 2018.
  - Bilateral Defense Industry Forum began (with the participation of Indonesia, India, Vietnam and Australia in FY2017).
  - The MOD has been carrying out technology cooperation with the U.K. and started the very first cooperative research with France.

Interaction with Local Communities and Japanese Citizens

Collaboration with Local Communities

- The MOD/SDF conducts a variety of cooperation activities such as the disposal of unexploded ordnance and mines to support civilian life. Such activities further deepen the trust between local communities/people and the SDF, as well as significantly contribute to the maintenance and vitalization of local communities.

Various Public Relations Activities

- The MOD/SDF widely publicizes current circumstances of the SDF both at home and abroad through various information communication platforms including Social Networking System (SNS) and events such as the SDF Marching Festival, a troop review, a fleet review, and an air review.

Initiatives for Information Disclosure and Management of Public Documents

- In light of the issue of the daily reports related to the PKO in South Sudan and the daily reports in Iraq, the MOD/SDF is committed to regaining trust of the public by thoroughly implementing measures pertaining to information disclosure and management of public documents to prevent similar incidents.
A North Korean tanker that is strongly suspected of engaging in the act of ship-to-ship cargo transfer, which is prohibited by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (June 2018)
The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute. While nations with large military forces are concentrated in this region, a regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized. Opaque and uncertain factors such as territorial disputes and reunification issues remain. There has been also a tendency towards an increase in and prolongation of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty, and maritime economic interests. In addition, there has been a noticeable trend among neighboring countries to modernize and reinforce their military capabilities and to intensify their military activities. In this regard, security challenges and destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacific region including the area surrounding Japan are becoming more serious.

In particular, North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests including the biggest by far since 2016. It also launched 40 ballistic missiles including those that flew over Japan and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. North Korea’s military development such as its nuclear and missile development constitute unprecedented, serious and imminent threats to the security of Japan.

Russia has been modernizing its forces including its nuclear capability not only in the Europe region but in the periphery of Japan. It has increased its military activities such as enhancement of military deployment in the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands and close attention needs to be paid to its development.

In addition, emerging global security challenges include regional conflicts growing in complexity, international terrorism becoming more serious, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and securing the stable use of new domains such as maritime, outer space and cyber space.

The security challenges and destabilizing factors in the international community which has these characteristics are complex, diverse, and wide-ranging, and it is becoming ever more difficult for a single country to deal with them on its own. In this context, it is increasingly important for countries which share interests in regional and global stability to cooperate and actively respond to security challenges. Cross-cutting government efforts are also critical to overcome these challenges.

**Section 1 Asia Pacific Security Environment**

The Asia-Pacific is a unique region with a concentration of large-scale military forces. Recently, the shift in the global balance of power stemming from the increase in power of China and other nations is also having an influence in the region. Under this situation, countries in the region have made efforts to enhance and strengthen
specific and practical intra-regional coordination and collaboration with a particular focus on non-traditional security fields such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Opportunities for bilateral defense exchanges between countries in the region have increased in recent years. Multilateral security dialogues, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus), conferences hosted by nongovernmental institutions with the participation of relevant defense ministers, and bilateral and multilateral joint exercises are held. Promoting and developing such multilayered approaches among countries is also important to ensure stability in the region.

Also, views on security and perceptions of threats are different by country. Therefore, a regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized, and longstanding issues of territorial rights and reunification continue to remain in the region.

In the Korean Peninsula, the Korean people have been divided for more than half a century, and the faceoff continues between the military forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea. There are issues concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea. Furthermore, with regard to Japan, territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of which are inherent parts of the territory of Japan, remain unresolved. On top of this, recent years have seen a continued tendency towards the prolongation of “gray-zone” situations, raising concerns that they may develop into more serious situations in the absence of a clear path towards the resolution of the situations.

In North Korea, it is deemed that following the change of regime that made Chairman of the State Affairs Commission Kim Jong-un the leader of the country, the regime continues to strengthen and tighten its grip to make Chairman Kim Jong-un the sole leader. North Korea is military-focused and deploys a massive military force. It is also furthering its development and operational capabilities of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and it maintains a large-scale special operations force. Through these activities, North Korea is believed to continue to maintain and strengthen asymmetrical military capabilities. In particular, it is regarded that North Korea has further advanced its entire ballistic missile program, including new type ballistic missiles, through technological verification conducted by launching a series of ballistic missiles. Recently, North Korea has not only engaged in research and development of ballistic missiles, but has also intensified activities to increase their operational capabilities, including surprise attack. North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in defiance of calls of restraint from the international community. As for the sixth nuclear test conducted in September 2017, the possibility can’t be denied that it was a hydrogen bomb test as it was estimated to have been about a 160-kiloton yield. Considering the technological maturity reached through the past six nuclear tests, it is possible that North Korea has successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons for warheads and enabled them to be equipped on ballistic missiles. With the passage of time, there will likely be a growing risk that North Korea would deploy ballistic missiles mounted with a nuclear warhead that have ranges covering Japan. North Korea has repeated provocative rhetoric and behavior against related countries including Japan. In 2013, North Korea emphasized that Japan is within the range of its missiles, referring to specific Japanese cities, and in March 2017, North Korea announced that it had launched four ballistic missiles as part of the exercise for striking the bases of the U.S. military forces in Japan. North Korea has repeatedly shown its intention to attack Japan using nuclear weapons as seen in the recent statement of “using nuclear weapon to sink Japan” released by Korean Central Television. Such North Korean military trends, coupled with its provocative words and actions such as threats to missile attack against Japan, constitute a serious and imminent threat to the security not only of Japan but also of the entire region and the international community. North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals, a grave issue concerning the sovereignty of Japan and the lives and security of the Japanese people, is yet to be resolved. A solution will require concrete actions by North Korea.

Today, China has significant influence in the international community. Accordingly, there continues to be strong expectations on China to recognize its responsibility in the international community, accept and comply with international norms, and play an active role in a more cooperative manner in regional and global issues. In the meantime, China has been trying to establish unique international order, has been continuously increasing its defense budget at a high level, and has been rapidly reinforcing its military capabilities in a wide range of areas, without sufficient transparency.

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1 Asymmetrical military capabilities, in this context, refer to means of attack different from those of an opponent with superior conventional military capabilities. Such measures are exploited to compensate for disadvantages in conventional weapons and troops. Examples include WMDs, ballistic missiles, terrorism, and cyber-attacks.
In particular, China is believed to be making efforts to strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities to prevent military activities by other countries in the region, denying access and deployment of foreign militaries to its surrounding areas (“Anti-Access/Area-Denial” [“A2/AD”] capabilities), and recently, rapidly materializing large-scale military reforms designed to build its joint operations structure with actual combat in mind. In addition, China is rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities both in quality and quantity in the maritime and aerial domains in the region, including in the East and South China Seas. In particular, China has continued to take assertive actions with regard to issues of conflicts of interest in the maritime domain, as exemplified by its attempts to change the status quo by coercion, and has signaled its position to realize its unilateral assertions without making any compromises.

As for the seas and airspace around Japan, Chinese government ships have routinely and repeatedly intruded into Japan’s territorial waters, and Chinese naval vessels and air forces has further expanded its operations in areas including the waters surrounding and airspace over the Senkaku Islands. In June 2016, a Jiangkai I-class frigate became the first Chinese naval combatant vessel to enter the contiguous zone off the Senkaku Islands and in January 2018, a Shang-class submarine navigating underwater and a Jiangkai II-class frigate each entered the same contiguous zone. This marked the first confirmed case in which a submerged submarine entered into the contiguous zone off the Senkaku Islands. These activities by the Chinese Navy represent an attempt to change the status quo unilaterally using force and escalate the situation one-sidedly. Moreover, they pose a serious concern to Japan. In addition, China has engaged in dangerous activities that could cause unintended consequences, such as its naval vessel’s direction of fire control radar at a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) destroyer, the flight of fighters abnormally close to SDF aircraft, and its announcement of establishing the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)” based on its own assertion, thereby infringing the freedom of overflight.

In the South China Sea, China has continued large-scale and rapid reclamation of multiple features based on China’s unique assertions which are incompatible with the existing international order. The verdict handed down by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in July 2016 with regard to the case involving China and the Philippines rejected the rights claimed by China in the sea included in the “Nine-Dash Line,” including “historic rights” used as the basis for the “Nine-Dash Line,” and found that China’s activities including land reclamation are illegal. However, China has made it clear that it does not intend to follow this decision. Even today, China is developing, in addition to military facilities such as artillery, various infrastructures that can be used for military purposes including runways, ports, hangars, and radar installations among others, moving ahead with making these features military outposts. In addition, in July and August 2016 after the verdict, Chinese Air Force H-6K bombers conducted “combat patrol flight” in the airspace near Scarborough Shoal, and China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that these flights would be “regularized” in the future. This shows that China’s military is expanding activities in the seas and airspace of the South China Sea.

These Chinese activities represent serious security concerns of the region encompassing Japan, and of the international community, and need to be watched out for with intense interest. China is urged to further increase transparency regarding its military and enhance its compliance with international norms. It is a key task to further strengthen mutual understanding and trust by promoting dialogue and exchanges with China, and make further progress on measures to build trust, such as measures to avoid and prevent unintended consequences in the maritime domain.

In Russia, President Vladimir Putin, who has been seeking the revival of Russia as a strong and influential power, achieved reelection to his fourth term in March 2018. It is deemed that Russia has promoted the strengthening of the readiness of its Armed Forces and the development and acquisition of new equipment, while continuing to give priority to its nuclear force.

Even as expenditure cuts are thus made in a wide range of areas, Russia has striven to secure defense spending and has continued to modernize its Armed Forces. Recently, Russia has intensified its military activities not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but also in the Arctic, the Europe.
region, the periphery of the United States, and the Middle East, and has been expanding the area of activities.

Specifically, from the perspective of Europe and the United States, Russia is believed to be changing the status quo using force by engaging in so-called “hybrid warfare” in Ukraine which Russia regards as a part of its sphere of influence. This is recognized as not only a strong concern for European countries, but also a global issue that could potentially engulf the entire international community including Asia. Russia is also appearing to be expanding its influence internationally, including through its involvement in the Syria Civil War as a supporter of the Assad regime.

In the Far East, the Russian Armed Forces have conducted large-scale exercises. Russia has unveiled the deployment of coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles in the Northern Territories and has referred to a plan to deploy a division to the Northern Territories or the Chishima Islands, and thus continued attention needs to be paid to Russian military development in the Far East, including the Four Northern Islands.

As seen above, in the Asia-Pacific region, where the security environment has increasingly grown severe, the presence of the U.S. Forces remains extremely important in order to achieve regional stability. Accordingly, Japan and other countries, such as Australia and the ROK, have established bilateral alliances and partnerships with the United States, and allow the stationing and rotational deployment of the U.S. Forces in their territories. In regard to the responses to the unilateral changes in the status quo by force or coercion based on unique assertions, it is important for the international community centered around countries in the region to make concerted efforts to protect the existing international order based on law.

While various explanations have been offered for so-called “hybrid warfare,” in this white paper, the term is used to mean “aggression conducted by methods that are difficult to identify definitively as an ‘armed attack’ based on its outward appearance, involving a combination of non-military means, such as sabotage and information manipulation, and military means which are utilized covertly.”
Major Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region (Approximate Strength)

**Russian Far East**
- 980,000 troops (267)
- 15,000 marines (3)
- 750 vessels - 1,787,000 tons
- 2,850 aircraft

**North Korea**
- 1,100,000 troops (33)
- 780 vessels - 111,000 tons
- 550 aircraft

**Japan**
- 140,000 troops (15)
- 135 vessels - 488,000 tons
- 400 aircraft

**U.S. Forces in Japan**
- 21,000 troops (1)
- 150 aircraft

**U.S. 7th Fleet**
- 30 vessels - 400,000 tons
- 50 (carrier-based) aircraft

**Taiwan**
- 130,000 troops (15)
- 10,000 marines (3)
- 390 vessels - 205,000 tons
- 500 aircraft

**ROK (Republic of Korea)**
- 490,000 troops (54)
- 29,000 marines (3)
- 240 vessels - 215,000 tons
- 640 aircraft

**Notes:**
2. Figures for Japan indicate the strength of each SDF as of the end of 2017; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of ASDF aircraft (excluding transport aircraft and MSDF aircraft (fixed-wing aircraft only).
3. Figures for the U.S. ground forces in Japan and the ROK are those of the Army and Marine Corps personnel combined.
4. Combat aircraft include Navy and Marine aircraft.
5. Figures in parentheses show the total number of central units, such as divisions and brigades. That of North Korea shows only divisions. That of Taiwan includes military police as well.
6. The number of U.S. 7th Fleet vessels and aircraft indicates those which are forward-deployed in Japan and Guam.
7. Figures of combat aircraft of the U.S. Forces, Japan and the U.S. 7th Fleet include only fighters.

**Legend**
- Ground forces (200,000 troops)
- Naval vessels (200,000 tons)
- Combat aircraft (500 aircraft)
Global Security Environment

The current global security environment has two aspects. Firstly, the United States, which remains the world’s most powerful nation, is thought to play an ongoing role in ensuring global peace and security. Meanwhile, due to change in the power balance caused by further advancement of China, India and other countries, and the relative change of the United States influence, the international community is becoming increasingly multi-polarized.

Secondly, globalization and rapidly advanced technological innovation have further expanded and deepened mutual dependence among countries. As a result, a conflict or other security issue in a country or region is likely to soon grow into a destabilizing factor that could affect the entire international community. In relation to this, the rapid spread of information communication networks, such as the Internet and social media that serve as a major factor behind globalization, has greatly expanded the ability of non-state actors to disseminate and mobilize their views and claims; and in the process increased their influence over nations and the international community. Examples include the explosive propagation or spread of individual criticism of nations or international terrorist groups disseminating their extremist views, leading in some cases to worldwide circulation.1

Given this situation, emerging global security challenges include regional conflicts growing in complexity, international terrorism becoming more serious, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and securing the stable use of new domains such as maritime space, outer space, and cyber space.

(1) Regional Conflict and International Terrorism
There are underlying differences in the nature of conflicts occurring around the world. In the case of prolonged conflicts, it is believed there is a rising possibility that human rights violations, refugees, starvation, and poverty occurring as a result of conflict will affect a much broader area than the countries involved. Furthermore, climate change and competition to secure resources and energy could become more tangible, and cause regional disputes. They could become new factors that affect the global security environment.

Amidst this backdrop, in the Middle East and Africa, there are many examples where geographic blind spots without government control in vulnerable nations with unstable political situations and weak governance capabilities have become a hotbed for the activities of international terrorist organizations.2

Terrorist organizations are carrying out activities across national borders while obtaining personnel, weapons and financial resources by taking advantage of vulnerable border controls. Also, in European and North American countries, there is growing concern over the threat of terrorism posed by persons who sympathize with extremist thoughts propagated by international terrorist organizations or by persons returning to their home country after fighting in conflict zones. The extremist organization ISIL has repeatedly cited that Japanese nationals are a target of its terrorist attacks. Taking into account that Japanese nationals died in the terrorist attack on a restaurant in Dhaka, Bangladesh that occurred in July 2016, the threat of international terrorism must be considered a problem facing Japan, too.

In this manner, there is a growing risk that the impact of regional conflict and threat of terrorism will spread as a factor of instability affecting the entire international community, not just a single country or single region. It is important for the international community to review approaches to international frameworks and its involvement based on the character of each and to seek out appropriate responses. As for regional conflicts, the mission of UN peacekeeping operations has expanded to a wide range of fields including civilian and policing activities: supervision of disarmament, security force reforms, election and government monitoring, and humanitarian assistance for refugee repatriation. In particular, there is growing importance placed on missions for protecting civilians and women and for peace building. Additionally, there are examples in which multinational forces and regional institutions authorized by the UN Security Council are working to prevent conflict, maintain peace and build peace.

1 Controlling such actions is becoming more difficult even for authoritarian states with strong control of their people and for the international community working to contain the activities of terrorist organizations. As a result, even authoritarian states have been forced to give more consideration than normal toward public opinion with regard to domestic governance and the management of national politics. Also, for the international community, problems that should be resolved become more complicated, making it even more difficult to address them.

2 As noted above, the weakening of government structures can create a hotbed for the activities of international terrorist organizations and also make it more difficult to combat risks posed by the explosive spread and propagation of large-scale disasters or infectious disease.
In terms of international counterterrorism, there is growing importance for international cooperation due to the spread of activities by terrorist organizations across international borders. At present, in addition to the use of military means, the entire international community is working to block sources of financing for terrorist organizations and taking initiatives to prevent the international transfer of terrorists.

(2) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The proliferation of WMDs, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and of ballistic missiles that serve as the means of delivery of WMDs is still viewed as a significant threat to the international community, including East Asia. As for chemical weapons, the Malaysian police announced that VX, a chemical whose production and use is banned under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), was detected from the body of Kim Jong-nam following his assassination that occurred in Malaysia in February 2017. Additionally, U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May made a statement which says it is clear that Novichok, a Russian-made military nerve agent, was used. It is very likely that Russia is responsible for the attack, with regard to the attack on a former Russian intelligence agent that occurred in the United Kingdom in February 2017. Concerning the situation in Syria, in April 2017 the United States determined that the Assad regime used chemical weapons in an attack on a region controlled by anti-government forces in the south of Idlib Governorate in northwest Syria, and in response launched a missile strike on Shayrat Airbase, the base of the planes used in the Assad regime’s attack and which is believed to be housing chemical weapons. Furthermore, in April 2018 the United States, United Kingdom and France determined that the Assad regime used chemical weapons against civilians once again in Eastern Ghouta on the outskirts of Syria’s capital of Damascus, and in response they launched a missile strike on three chemical weapons-related facilities, demonstrating resolve to stop the use and proliferation of chemical weapons.

In addition, there are continuing concerns about the acquisition and use of WMDs by non-state actors, such as international terrorist organizations. In this regard, the international community continues to pursue efforts to counter terrorism activities that utilize nuclear materials and other radioactive substances.

(3) Maritime Domain
With regard to the maritime domain, which has been regarded as a foundation for supporting international trade, piracy acts have taken place in various parts of the world, and there have been cases where countries unilaterally assert their rights and take actions based on their own assertion that is inconsistent with the existing international order, thereby unduly infringing the freedom of navigation on the high seas and of overflight. China’s continued militarization such as large scale and rapid land reclamation in the South China Sea, and developing batteries and other military facilities and various kinds of infrastructure that can be used for military purposes constitutes acts that unilaterally change the status quo and further advances its efforts to create a fait accompli. In response to these situations, the international community has been taking various measures such as continuing to conduct antipiracy operations in relevant waters including off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, collaborating to protect the existing international order based on law including a free and open maritime order, and implementing initiatives designed to avoid and prevent unintended consequences in the maritime domain and airspace.

(4) Cyberspace and Outer Space
Recently, securing the stable use of new domains such as outer space and cyberspace, in addition to the conventional domains of the ground, sea and air, has become an important challenge for the security of the international community. The further advancement of military science and technology along with significant advancements in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) has increased the dependence of social infrastructure and military activities on outer space and cyberspace. On the other hand, the development of anti-satellite weapons by countries and the diversification of cyber attacks with suspected government involvement have exacerbated the risks to the stable use of outer space and cyberspace. In recent years, countries are moving ahead with specific efforts aimed at reinforcing a nation’s ability to combat cyber attacks, including private sector companies, and acquiring the capabilities to monitor threats to space assets such as satellites. There are also moves seen in the international community to promote the rule of law in outer space and cyberspace by establishing certain codes of conduct.

(5) Technology
Rapid advancements in technological innovation are now spreading into military fields. Major powers such as the United States, China and Russia are believed to be focusing on research and development of precision guided technologies, unmanned technologies, artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, and stealth technologies,
among others. Such progress in military science and technology relies heavily on the development of civilian technologies. It is believed that the development and international transfer of civilian technologies will have a major impact on improvements in the military capabilities of each country. Meanwhile, countries without advanced technologies and non-state actors appear set to develop and acquire means for asymmetrical attack such as WMDs and cyber capabilities, along with obtaining through illicit means the technologies of developed countries. Such trends in the development of military technologies are believed to have a significant impact on the military strategies of each country and the power balance between countries.

As seen above, the international community today faces complex, diverse, and broad security challenges and destabilizing factors. Along with deterrence and handling of armed conflicts, the roles of military forces in responding to these challenges are becoming so diverse that they include a broad spectrum of activities from conflict prevention to reconstruction assistance, and military forces are now playing such important roles more frequently. Meanwhile, for military forces to play their roles, comprehensive responses are required that combine military capacity with other capacities such as diplomacy, law enforcement and justice, intelligence, and the economy.
It has been pointed out that the Trump administration, which was inaugurated in January 2017, has significantly changed the patterns of U.S. involvement in the world amidst the formation of a new security environment, including a shift in the global balance of power, attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in Ukraine and the South China Sea, the development and improved operational capability of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles which have become an unprecedentedly serious and urgent threat, and the intensification of the activities of international terrorist organizations. On the other hand, it can be considered that while the United States is focusing on global competition, the United States has been continuing to play a role for world peace and stability with its comprehensive national power, the largest in the world, based on its belief that the values and influence of the United States, bolstered by its power, would make the world freer, safer, and more prosperous.

The Trump administration, under the “America First” vision for governance, has set forth a policy for rebuilding the U.S. Forces and placing importance on allies under the banner of peace through strength. In addition, in less than a year since the inauguration, the Trump administration unveiled its policies on security and national defense by publishing the National Security Strategy (NSS), followed by the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National Posture Review (NPR).

Regarding regional security, the United States has clarified its stance that it will emphasize the security of the Indo-Pacific region. In particular, under the recognition that North Korea’s nuclear capacity is an urgent, unpredictable threat to the United States and its allies, it has maintained sanctions and continues its efforts to pursue the complete denuclearization of North Korea. In addition, taking into account China’s current movements in the South China Sea, the United States has expressed its stance that it will continue “Freedom of Navigation Operations,” and during his November 2017 trip to Asia, President Trump emphasized the importance of freedom of navigation when he revealed the vision for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (see 1-3 of this Section).

The United States has also been dealing with security issues outside of the Indo-Pacific region. In response to the offensive from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other organizations in Iraq and Syria since 2014, the United States, since August 2014, has led
Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), a military operation against ISIL that includes airstrikes. In addition, following its assessment that the Assad administration of Syria had used chemical weapons in April 2018, together with the United Kingdom and France, the United States carried out missile strikes against Syria’s chemical weapons-related facilities, and clarified its stance of developing powerful deterrence against the production, proliferation, and use of weapons of mass destruction. In August 2017, the United States announced its strategy on Afghanistan and South Asia which made clear its continuous involvement with Afghanistan, and in September 2017, Defense Secretary Mattis disclosed that reinforcements of over 3,000 U.S. military personnel would be sent to Afghanistan. In light of Russian actions concerning Ukraine, in order to strengthen involvement in NATO security and deterrence, the investment for the European Deterrence Initiative is being increased from US$4.8 billion in the previous fiscal year to US$6.5 billion in the FY2019 Department of Defense budget request. On the other hand, in its security policies, the United States considers that certain allies which are pointed out as bearing only a small burden of cost and enjoying security guaranteed by the United States should shoulder their fair share of responsibility. Under such a perception, the United States has requested NATO member states to swiftly meet their commitments to increase their national defense spending to 2% of GDP.

One year has passed since the inauguration of the Trump administration, and amidst the indicated direction of security and defense policies in strategies such as the NSS, specific security and defense policy trends advanced under the aforementioned strategy will draw attention. In addition, it should also be noted how the changing situations in the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East and the EU, as well as the November 2018 mid-term election, will affect the U.S. security and defense policies.

1 Perception about security environment

The National Military Strategy (NMS) released in July 2015 during the former Obama administration explicitly cites Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea as “revisionist states” that are attempting to revise key aspects of the international order and are acting in a manner that threatens U.S. national security interests. It also mentions that violent extremist organizations such as ISIL are becoming imminent threats.

On the other hand, the NSS released in December 2017 indicates that changes in a regional balance of power can have global consequences and threaten U.S. interests. It mentions the three main sets of challengers against the United States and its allies and partners, which are the “revisionist powers” of China and Russia, the “rogue states” of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, including jihadist terrorist groups. Of these, China and Russia are said to challenge American power, influence, and interests and attempt to erode American safety and prosperity, while North Korea and Iran destabilize regions and threaten the United States and its allies.

In addition, the NDS published in January 2018 points out that the primary concern in U.S. security is not terrorism but rather long-term strategic competition with China and Russia. It also mentions that China and Russia are undermining the free and open international order constructed by the United States and its allies, and it is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model.

Furthermore, regarding the military actions carried out in Syria in April 2018, President Trump stated that establishing strong deterrence against the production, proliferation, and use of chemical weapons is an important interest for the national security of the United States.

In consideration of this recognition, the United States deems as security threats nations and organizations that attempt to undermine the interests of itself and its allies and threaten the international order. While the Trump administration has fundamentally accepted the threat perception of the previous Obama administration, it is addressing threats posed by China and Russia with particular emphasis as priority issues and appears to be continuing a policy of dealing with threats posed by North Korea, Iran, radical terrorist groups, and production, proliferation, and use of weapons of mass destruction.
The NSS developed by President Trump is rooted in the America First policy and realism in which power plays a central role in international politics, and stresses the need to rethink the policies of the past 20 years that were based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in the international community would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. Moreover, the NSS sets up a strategic policy to protect four vital interests in this competitive world: 1. Protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life, 2. Promote American prosperity, 3. Preserve peace through strength, and 4. Advance American influence.

Furthermore, in addition to rebuilding the U.S. military to the strongest armed forces and strengthening capabilities in many areas including space and cyberspace, the United States is also striving to leverage the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. Moreover, while recognizing that allies and partners are a great strength of the United States and close cooperation is necessary, the United States has demanded that its allies and partners demonstrate the will to confront shared threats and contribute the capabilities. It is also pointed out that although the United States is responding to the growing political, economic, and military competition throughout the world, by ensuring American military power is second to none and fully integrating with its allies all instruments of power, the United States will seek areas of cooperation with competitors from a position of strength.

The NDS drawn up by Secretary of Defense Mattis based on the NSS considers the long-term competitions with China and Russia as the principal priorities of the Department of Defense because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity and the potential for the threats to increase. Moreover, to expand the competitive space, the following three lines of effort are raised: 1. Building a more lethal Joint Force, 2. Strengthening alliances and attracting new partners, 3. Reforming the Department of Defense for greater performance and affordability.

Among these, 1. Building military power prioritizes preparedness for war and in order to defeat aggression by a major power and deter opportunistic aggression elsewhere, it advances building flexible theater postures and force deployment that have mobility, resilience, and modernize key capabilities such as nuclear forces, space and cyberspace, C4ISR, missile defense, advanced autonomous systems, etc. Further, although indicating its commitment to deter aggression, it also demonstrates the stance that dynamic military force employment, military posture, and operations must introduce unpredictability to adversary decision-makers. For 2. Strengthening alliances, the following three matters are emphasized: i. Uphold a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability, ii. Expand regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning, and iii. Deepen interoperability. On the other hand, there are expectations that allies and partners contribute an equitable share to mutually beneficial collective security, including effective investment in modernizing their defense capabilities.

While the Trump administration has stopped using the key phrase “rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region” set forth by the Obama administration, it has shown a stance of placing importance on the region through the United States’ commitment to the region and strengthening its presence since the inauguration of the administration. In particular, under the policy to continue sustaining maximum pressure on North Korea, which is continuing its nuclear and ballistic missile development, the Trump

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5 At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting on February 4, 2017, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis who was visiting Japan at the very early timing of just two weeks after the inauguration of the new Trump administration, emphasized that the Asia-Pacific region remains a top priority for the United States and that the United States would strengthen its commitment by maintaining the presence of the U.S. Forces in the region. Also, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2017, he stated that the Asia-Pacific region is positioned as a priority region and that the United States would strengthen alliances, empower regional countries, and strengthen the U.S. Forces capabilities in the region. He also stated 60% of all U.S. naval warships, 55% of the army, and about two thirds of the Fleet Marine Forces were assigned to the Pacific Command area of responsibility, and soon 60% of overseas tactical aviation assets would be assigned to the theater.
administration is exhibiting its recognition that a military option plays an important role in backing up diplomatic efforts, and also is clearly showing its readiness to respond with overwhelming power in retaliation to any attack by North Korea.

To show military presence against North Korea, following on from the deployment in the Sea of Japan of two carrier strike groups, the Carl Vinson Strike Group and the USS Ronald Reagan Strike Group in June 2017, three carrier strike groups, the USS Ronald Reagan, USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS Nimitz strike groups were deployed in the Sea of Japan in November 2017. The nuclear submarines USS Tucson and USS Michigan also made port calls in the ROK in October 2017. In addition, during the joint U.S.-ROK regularly-held aviation exercise Vigilant Ace in December 2017, F-22 and F-35 aircraft participated for the first time ever in the exercise. Furthermore, between May and December 2017, B-1B strategic bombers flew over the Korean Peninsula every month. In addition, following the deployment of 62 launchers of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system by the U.S. Forces in the ROK in April 2017, in September 2017 four launchers were added and a total of six sites commenced operation.

In March 2018, responding to North Korea’s statement of intent for denuclearization and other developments, President Trump indicated his forward-looking intent to hold a U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting, which resulted in the holding of the first-ever historic summit on June 12, 2018. Both leaders clearly indicated willingness for jointly making efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and based on the reaffirmed commitment expressed by Chairman Kim toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, both leaders confirmed that follow-on negotiations would continue. Responding to this discussion, on June 18 and 22, 2018, the U.S. Department of Defense announced the suspension of all planning for the U.S.-ROK command and control exercise Ulchi-Freedom Guardian scheduled for August, and two the Korean Marine Exchange Program training exercises scheduled to occur in the following three months. Regarding this point, at the joint press conference following the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting held on June 29, Secretary of Defense Mattis stated that the decision was taken to create space for their diplomats to negotiate strongly, and increasing the prospects for a peaceful solution on the Korean Peninsula, and that the United States maintains a strong, collaborative defensive stance to ensure its diplomats continue to negotiate from a position of unquestioned strength. On the other hand, the United States showed a clear stance that it would maintain sanctions until North Korea took concrete, verifiable measures for ending its nuclear development, and that it would keep the U.S. Forces in the ROK. (See 1-5 of Section 2.)

During his November 2017 trip to Asia, in consonance with Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,” President Trump expressed his intention to emphasize compliance with principles such as respecting the rule of law and freedom of navigation, and that he would promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region, as well as strengthen alliances in the region.

In relation to this, the NSS emphasizes that China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region and reorder the region in its favor, as well as having mounted a rapid military modernization campaign to limit U.S. access to the region and to provide itself a freer hand there. Moreover, as part of its Indo-Pacific region strategy, while reinforcing its commitment to freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with international law, the United States will seek to increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India and develop a strong defense networks with its allies and partners. In the same way, the NDS points out that China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage and is seeking regional hegemony. It emphasizes that a free and open Indo-Pacific provides prosperity and security, and that the United States will strengthen its alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains.

Furthermore, regarding China’s maritime expansion, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2017, Secretary of Defense Mattis stated that the scope and effect of China’s

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6 A ballistic missile defense system that intercepts short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the terminal phase from the ground. It tracks and intercepts targets at high altitude in the upper atmosphere or beyond the atmosphere. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2 for ballistic missile defense systems.

7 The Korean Marine Exchange Program (KMEP) is an annually-held joint exercise between the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa and the ROK Marine Corps. 19 exercises were planned under the KMEP in 2018, and 11 exercises had been carried out as of June 22, 2018.
construction activities in the South China Sea differ from those in other countries in several key ways, including the nature of its militarization, China’s disregard for international law, its contempt for other nations’ interests, and its efforts to dismiss non-adversarial resolution of issues; and that the United States cannot and will not accept unilateral coercive changes to the status quo. Moreover, while committing to protecting the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea, and the ability of all countries to exercise those rights in the strategically important East and South China Sea, the United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, and demonstrate resolve through operational presence in the South China Sea and beyond. It is reported that in May, July, August, and October 2017, as well as January, March, and May 2018, the U.S. Forces conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations within 12 nautical miles of the islands and reefs in the South China Sea that are claimed by China. Also, in May 2018, the U.S. Department of Defense stated that China had deployed anti-ship missiles and surface-to-air missiles to the features in the Spratly Islands, and pointed out that the placement of these weapon system was only military use. As an initial response to China’s continued militarization of areas in the South China Sea, the United States disinvited the Chinese navy to the multilateral Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in 2018.

Based on such a perception of China and regional strategy, it can be considered that the United States is advancing efforts rooted in the concept of free and open Indo-Pacific region.

In addition, as part of its activities around strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, in January 2017, the U.S. Forces deployed Marine Corps specification F-35B fighters to MCAS Iwakuni. In October 2017, 12 Air Force specified F-35A fighters were deployed at Kadena Air Force Base for the first time ever in the Asia-Pacific region. Also, in January 2018, nuclear-capable B-2 bombers and B-52 bombers were deployed to Guam, and in place of the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard, the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp that is capable of carrying F-35B fighters arrived in Sasebo. Furthermore, in March 2018 the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson made the first port call by a U.S. aircraft carrier in over 40 years in Vietnam.

4 Innovation Initiatives in the National Defense Field

In November 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Hagel announced the Defense Innovation Initiative (DII) that aimed to achieve military superiority through innovation, and stated the expectation that this would develop into the Third Offset Strategy. Also, in 2015 as a part of DII, then-Secretary of Defense Carter established Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) in Silicon Valley to be a bridge between the Department of Defense and civilian groups, in order to introduce innovative civilian technologies into military fields.

The Trump administration stopped using the names DII and Third Offset Strategy, but in August 2017 Secretary of Defense Mattis visited DIUx and IT companies and discussed utilization methods of new technologies for the Department of Defense. To the accompanying press corps, he stated that Department of Defense innovation initiatives are a matter of maximum priority and pointed out the importance of DIUx. Also, the NSS outlines a policy that the United States must harness innovative technologies that are being developed outside of the traditional defense industrial base. The NDS also states that the Department of Defense needs innovation to surpass revisionist powers, and calls for extensive investment in military application of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, including rapid application of commercial breakthroughs, to gain competitive military advantages. In view of these circumstances, it can be considered that the United States will continue to place emphasis on innovation in the national defense field.

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8 It is regarded that the Trump administration implemented the following Freedom of Navigation Operations: within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef of the Spratly Islands by the destroyer USS Dewey in May 2017, within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island of the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Stethem in July 2017, within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef of the Spratly Islands by the destroyer USS John S. McCain in August 2017, surrounding the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Stethem in July 2017, within 12 nautical miles of Scarborough Shoal by the destroyer USS Hopper in January 2018, within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef by the destroyer USS Mustin in March 2018, within 12 nautical miles of the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Higgins and the cruiser USS Antietam in May 2018.

The Obama administration implemented the following Freedom of Navigation Operations: within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef of the Spratly Islands by the destroyer USS Lassen in October 2015, within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island of the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Curtis Wilbur in January 2016, within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef of the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS William P. Lawrence in May 2016, and surrounding the Paracel Islands by the destroyer USS Decatur in October 2016.

9 The United States’ Third Offset Strategy is based on the concept of offsetting the capacity of the adversary by acquiring asymmetrical means that differ from the capacity of the adversary. There were two previous offset strategies as follows: (1) the nuclear deterrent of the 1950s; and (2) precision-guided missiles and stealth aircraft technologies of the 1970s.
The NPR released in February 2018 stated that, although the United States had reduced the role and number of nuclear weapons based on the aspiration that if the United States took the lead in reducing nuclear arms, other states would follow, the global threat conditions have worsened markedly since the most recent NPR released in 2010 and there now exist unprecedented threats and uncertainty, as China and Russia have expanded their nuclear forces and North Korea continues its pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Given these circumstances, the following were raised as the roles of U.S. nuclear forces: 1. Deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear attacks, 2. Assurance of allies and partners, 3. Achievement of U.S. objectives if deterrence fails, and 4. Capacity to hedge against an uncertain future.

Also, while the United States would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners, the NPR clearly states that extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks against the United States and its allies, and a “no first use” policy is not justified today. It also indicates that the United States remains the policy to retain some ambiguity regarding the precise circumstances that might lead to a U.S. nuclear response. Furthermore, it also revealed that the United States would apply a tailored approach to deter across a spectrum of adversaries, threats and contexts, and in addition to that, it would ensure effective deterrence by enhancing the flexibility and range of its nuclear capabilities through nuclear modernization and the development and deployment of new capabilities. Specifically, in addition to sustaining and replacing the nuclear triad, as new capabilities, in the near-term, the United States would modify a small number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option, and in the longer term, pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), leveraging existing technologies, as well as incorporate nuclear capability onto the forward-deployable, nuclear-capable F-35 as a replacement for the current aging dual-capable aircraft (DCA). Also, the United States has shown its commitment to extended deterrence for its allies and, if necessary, maintaining the forward-deployed capability with DCA and nuclear weapons in regions outside Europe, including Northeast Asia.

On the other hand, there has not yet been an official announcement on the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) that President Trump had directed to be formulated alongside the NPR. Regarding this, in March 2018, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy John Rood testified in Congress regarding missile defense that while the review work was still being advanced, the new review would be decided on as the Missile Defense Review (MDR) based on the existing threats of missile strikes by cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles, other than ballistic missiles. Moreover, in order to deal with threats to the U.S. mainland by rogue nation missiles, he set forth strengthening the mainland’s missile defense through additional deployment of 20 ground-based interceptor missiles, strengthening the capability of ground-based interceptor missiles by Redesigned Kill Vehicles (RKV), and deployment of new missile tracking and identification sensors in Alaska, Hawaii, and the Pacific. Regarding missile defense in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific region, he mentioned strengthening readiness through additional deployment of Patriot missiles, THAAD, and SM-3. Also, together with ensuring the missile defense capabilities of allies and partners, he also indicated a policy to strengthen cooperation for improving interoperability with the U.S. missile defense system. Furthermore, regarding advanced technologies, he stressed commitment in such areas as improving identification capability of missile defense system sensors, boost phase missile interception lasers, new sensors deployed in space, and Multi-Object Kill Vehicles (MOKV).
As the budget deficit of the U.S. Government is deepening in recent years, the Budget Control Act enacted in August 2011 stipulated a significant cut in government spending by FY2021. Also, in March 2013, the sequestration of government spending including defense expenditure was started based on the provisions of the Budget Control Act. However, after this, sequestration was eased for the budgets from FY2014-FY2017 due to the bipartisan acts passed twice. Furthermore, amid the Trump administration’s policy to end the sequestration of defense spending in order to rebuild the U.S. military, the Bipartisan Budget Act was passed in February 2018, and a defense budget framework was approved that drastically raised the limit set by the sequestration for FY2018 and 2019.

In these circumstances, the defense budget request in the Budget Blueprint submitted to Congress in February 2018 allocated US$617.0 billion for the base budget, representing about a 7% increase over the previous year. For the overseas contingency operations budget, a total of US$69.0 billion would be appropriated per the request, including budget escalation in the OIR and the European Deterrence Initiative. Also, the goals for military end strength and procurement were represented in the FY2019 budget request, such as securing 1,338,100 personnel, adding 24,100 more troops to the services’ end strength, and procuring 135 upgraded M-1 tanks (56 tanks in the previous year), 10 battleships (8 in the previous year), and 77 F-35 fighters (70 in the previous year). In addition, regarding ballistic missile defense, additional deployment of 20 ground-based interceptor missiles in Alaska, other than 40 missiles in Alaska and 4 missiles in California, are to be completed by the end of 2023, in light of the threat of the ICBMs posed by North Korea and Iran.

In January 2018, Secretary of Defense Mattis pointed out that the U.S. military competitive edge has eroded in every domain of warfare and that the defense expenditure cap was causing a negative effect. He stated that there was a need for a stable, predictable budget, and that while both capability and capacity are important for building the military, currently, building the capacity is being emphasized. For this, the Trump administration can be considered to be pursuing ensuring a sufficient and stable defense budget, emphasizing keeping a force of sufficient size in the short-term, and aiming for budgetary measures to expand capability in the mid- and long-term.

In January 2012, the Department of Defense announced that the specific national defense annual expenditure reduction based on the enacted act would amount to roughly US$487 billion over the 10 year period between FY2012 and FY2021 (roughly US$259 billion during the five year period between FY2013 and FY2017).

Through the passing of the 2013 Non-Partisan Budget Act, the national defense budget limit was lowered by US$22 billion and US$9 billion in FY2014 and FY2015 respectively. Through the passing of the 2015 Non-Partisan Budget Act, the national defense budget limit was raised to US$25 billion and US$15 billion in FY2016 and FY2017 respectively.

Through the passing of the 2018 Non-Partisan Budget Act, the national defense budget limit was raised to US$80 billion and US$85 billion in FY2018 and FY2019 respectively.

An increase of about US$35 billion from the FY2018 enacted budget level.

The total sum of the FY2019 national defense budget request was roughly US$716.0 billion, including defense-related budget requests from other departments of roughly US$30 billion (such as the Department of Energy’s nuclear-related programs) and the roughly US$686 billion of Department of Defense budget request.
The operation of the U.S. Forces is not controlled by the individual branches of the broader armed forces, rather it is operated under the command of the Unified Combatant Commands, composed of forces from multiple branches of the armed forces. The Unified Combatant Commands consist of three commands with functional responsibilities and six commands with regional responsibilities. Of these, Secretary of Defense Mattis announced that the name of the Pacific Command would be changed to the Indo-Pacific Command in May 2018.

The U.S. ground forces have about 470,000 Army soldiers and about 180,000 Marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among other countries. Along with a shift from the Obama administration’s policy reducing soldiers to a policy of increasing them, in order to deter enemies and achieve battle victories when necessary, the Army has been making efforts to maintain the world’s leading ground force capability through necessary investment in ensuring readiness. The Marine Corps aims to acquire forces capable of responding to any threat as a “middleweight force,” bridging the seam between smaller special operations forces and larger heavy conventional forces.

The U.S. maritime forces have about 940 vessels (including about 70 submarines) totaling about 6.36 million tons. The 6th Fleet is responsible for the East Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and Africa; the 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the northwest Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet in the eastern Pacific; the 4th Fleet in South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the 7th Fleet in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

The U.S. air forces have roughly 3,570 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the ROK.

In regard to strategic offensive weapons including nuclear force, the United States under the former Obama administration proceeded with its reduction based on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that came into force in February 2011. In February 2018, it announced that its deployed strategic warheads stood at 1,350, while its deployed delivery platforms stood at 652. The United States is studying the concept of a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), as an effort contributing to the nation’s new ability to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons.

Moreover, in addressing the increasing threats in cyberspace, the U.S. Cyber Command was founded in order to oversee operations in cyberspace. The U.S. Cyber Command achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in May 2010 and commended full capability in November in the same year. Furthermore, in May 2018, the Cyber Command, which was previously a subunified command under U.S. Strategic Command, was elevated to a unified combatant command.

Also, in June 2018, President Trump instructed the Department of Defense to immediately start the necessary processes to establish the Space Force as the sixth branch of the Armed Forces.
Fig. I-2-1-3

U.S. Forces Deployment Status and the Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region

European Region
- Army: approx. 26,000 personnel
- Navy: approx. 8,000 personnel
- Air Force: approx. 25,000 personnel
- Marines: approx. 4,000 personnel
- Total: approx. 66,000 personnel
  (Total in 1987: approx. 354,000 personnel)

Asia-Pacific Region
- Army: approx. 35,000 personnel
- Navy: approx. 22,000 personnel
- Air Force: approx. 27,000 personnel
- Marines: approx. 26,000 personnel
- Total: approx. 110,000 personnel
  (Total in 1987: approx. 184,000 personnel)

Notes: 1. Source: Documents published by the U.S. DoD (as of the end of 2017), etc.
2. The number of personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam.

In June 2017, Secretary of Defense Mattis stated that 60% of Navy vessels, 55% of the Army, and approximately 2/3 of the Fleet Marine Force are deployed in the area for which the Pacific Command is responsible and that 60% of overseas tactical air assets will be deployed there.
The United States, a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by placing the Indo-Pacific Command, a combatant command integrating the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps in the region. The Indo-Pacific Command is a geographic combatant command which is responsible for the largest geographical area, and its subordinate unified commands include U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea. In order to broaden the perspective of the U.S. Forces and promote better understanding of the U.S. Forces from allies, the Indo-Pacific Command headquarters accept personnel from allies in the region. Under this scheme, personnel from Canada and Australia are currently serving in the Indo-Pacific Command as deputy director level officials.

The Indo-Pacific Command consists of the U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, and U.S. Pacific Air Forces, which are all headquartered in Hawaii.

The Army Pacific’s subordinate commands include the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, the 8th U.S. Army in the ROK, which is the Army component of the U.S. Forces in the ROK, and the U.S. Army Alaska. Additionally, the Army Pacific assigns approximately 2,600 personnel to commands in Japan, such as I Corps (Forward) and the Head quarters, U.S. Army Japan Command. The U.S. Pacific Fleet consists of the 7th Fleet, which is responsible for the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, responsible for the East Pacific and Bering Sea. The U.S. Pacific Fleet in total controls about 200 vessels. The 7th Fleet mainly consists of a carrier strike group with main stationing locations in Japan and Guam. Their mission is to defend territorial lands, people, sea lines of communication, and the critical national interests of the United States and its allies. An aircraft carrier, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers and destroyers among others are assigned to the 7th Fleet.

The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force each in the U.S. mainland and Japan. Of this force, about 18,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which are equipped with F/A-18 fighters and other aircraft, in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the Western Pacific. The U.S. Pacific Air Force has three air forces, of which three air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters and C-130 transport aircraft) are deployed to the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and two air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters) to the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK.

Fig. I-2-1-3 (U.S. Forces Development Status and the Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region)
On the Korean Peninsula, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two—north and south—for more than half a century. Even today, the ROK and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.6 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

Peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula under such security environment is an extremely important challenge not only to Japan but also to the entire region of East Asia.

Fig. I-2-2-1 (Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total armed forces</th>
<th>ROK</th>
<th>U.S. Forces in Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground troops</td>
<td>Approx. 1.28 million personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 625,000 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>Approx. 1.1 million personnel</td>
<td>Approx. 490,000 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval vessels</td>
<td>Approx. 780; 111,000 tons</td>
<td>Approx. 240; 215,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>Approx. 3,500</td>
<td>M-48, K-1, T-80 etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>Approx. 3,500</td>
<td>M-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>Approx. 2,510</td>
<td>Approx. 30,000 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>Approx. 12</td>
<td>F-4 x 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd and 4th generation fighter aircraft</td>
<td>F-16 x 60</td>
<td>F-16 x 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Approx. 25.25 million</td>
<td>Approx. 51.18 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term of service</td>
<td>Men: 12 years</td>
<td>Army: 21 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women: 7 years</td>
<td>Navy: 23 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Air Force: 24 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data from “The Military Balance 2018,” etc. Data for the troop strength of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) from U.S. DoD information (December 2017).
North Korea has been advocating the building of a strong socialist state in all areas—ideology, politics, military affairs, and economy, and it adopts “military-first (Songun) politics” to realize this goal. “Military-first (Songun) politics” has been defined as a basic form of socialist politics that leads the great undertaking of socialism to victory by giving priority to the military forces in all activities under the principle of military first, and strengthening and relying on the actors in the revolution with the North Korean People’s Army (KPA) acting as the central and main force. In fact, leader Kim Jong-un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, who is in a position to control the military, noted the importance of military power: “It is necessary to uphold the military-first revolutionary path as the constant strategic path, and strengthen the might of the military power in all of its dimensions.” He also regularly visits military organizations. In this light, it is conceivable that the Chairman will continue to attach importance to and rely on the military forces.

Although North Korea has been facing serious economic difficulties and has depended on the international community for food and other resources, it seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. North Korea deploys most of its military forces along the DMZ. According to the official announcement at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2018, the proportion of the defense budget in the FY2017 national budget was 15.9%. However, it is believed that this represents only a fraction of the real defense expenditures.

Furthermore, North Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities by continuing to promote the development of WMDs and ballistic missiles and the enhancement of its operation capabilities, including conducting six nuclear tests so far and repeatedly launching as many as 40 ballistic missiles since 2016, and by maintaining and strengthening large-scale special operations forces. In addition, North Korea repeatedly uses provocative rhetoric and behavior against relevant countries, including Japan.

Such military trends in North Korea pose an unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan and seriously undermine the peace and security of the region and the international community.

Needless to say, North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated. At the same time, sufficient attention needs to be paid to the development and deployment of ballistic missiles, the military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, and the proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles by North Korea.

### General Situation

North Korea has been advocating the building of a strong socialist state in all areas—ideology, politics, military affairs, and economy, and it adopts “military-first (Songun) politics” to realize this goal. “Military-first (Songun) politics” has been defined as a basic form of socialist politics that leads the great undertaking of socialism to victory by giving priority to the military forces in all activities under the principle of military first, and strengthening and relying on the actors in the revolution with the North Korean People’s Army (KPA) acting as the central and main force.

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### Ballistic missiles

A ballistic missile is a rocket engine-propelled missile that flies on a parabolic trajectory. It is capable of attacking distant targets. Ballistic missiles are generally categorized according to the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM)</td>
<td>Under approx. 1,000 km or less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)</td>
<td>Approx. 1,000 km – Under approx. 3,000 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)</td>
<td>Approx. 3,000 km – Under approx. 5,500 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)</td>
<td>Approx. 5,500 km or more</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ballistic missiles launched from submarines are collectively referred to as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), while a ballistic missile that has a precision guidance system on its warhead necessary to attack aircraft carriers and other vessels is called an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM).

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1. North Korea used to insist that it would open the door to a “powerful and prosperous nation (Kangseong Daeguk)” in 2012, which marked the 100th anniversary of the birth of the late President Kim Il-sung. Recently, however, North Korea has been using mainly the expression, “powerful and prosperous country (Kangseong Kukka).”
3. At the Supreme People’s Assembly in June 2016, the National Defense Commission was renamed the State Affairs Commission, presided over by Chairman Kim Jong-un. For consistency purposes “Chairman of the State Affairs Commission” is used for the title of Kim Jong-un in this white paper.
5. In particular, from March to April 2013, North Korea underscored that it would exercise its right to preemptive nuclear attack against the United States and other countries, and that the strike zone of its ballistic missiles included Japan, naming specific cities. For example, it has stated that “not only Yokosuka, Misawa, Okinawa, and Guam but also the U.S. mainland are within our range” (March 31, 2013, Rodong Sinmun), “none of Japan’s territories shall be spared from being the target of our retaliatory attack (listing the names of Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Nagoya, and Kyoto in this context)” (April 10, 2013, Rodong Sinmun, etc.). More recently, the North Korean Central Broadcasting Station stated on September 13, 2017, that “the Japanese archipelago will be sunk into the sea by a nuclear bomb,” and the October 9 edition of the Rodong Sinmun stated that, “If the flames of war break out on the Korean Peninsula, Japan can never be safe. Everything in Japan that is mobilized for war will be pulverized to pieces, to say nothing of the bases in Japan for U.S. Invasion.”
Partly because North Korea maintains its extremely closed regime, it is difficult to accurately capture the details and intentions of its behavior. However, it is necessary for Japan to pay utmost attention to them.

Commentary

View of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles

North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests and launched 40 ballistic missiles since 2016. During 2017, it carried out a nuclear test with an estimated yield roughly 10 times the scale of the Hiroshima-type atomic bomb, launched a new intercontinental-range ballistic missile into Japan’s EEZ, and launched two ballistic missiles that flew over Japan. These military developments by North Korea pose an unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security and undermine peace and security of the region and the international community.

Kim Jong-un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, expressed interest in North-South dialogue in his New Year’s address given on January 1, 2018. This was followed by a summit meeting between the Republic of Korea and North Korea in April 2018 at which Chairman Kim Jong-un expressed his intention to work toward denuclearization. Furthermore, at the United States-North Korea summit meeting held in June 2018, North Korea has made clear its intention to work toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and confirmed that negotiations would continue with the United States. It is significant that Chairman Kim Jong-un has made another clear promise in a written document to work toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

It is important to carefully assess specific actions by North Korea to dismantle nuclear and missile capabilities. At the same time, taking into consideration the fact that North Korea possesses and deploys several hundred Nodong missiles capable of reaching almost every part of Japan as well as advancements in the development and operational capabilities of nuclear weapons and missiles through repeated nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches to date, etc., there is no change in our basic recognition concerning the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles.

The Ministry of Defense and Self Defense Forces continue to do their utmost in gathering intelligence, monitoring the situation, and implementing other activities to be ready for any circumstances, while also collaborating closely with the United States and Republic of Korea, in order to carry out the responsibility of protecting the lives and peaceful existence of the Japanese population.
Military Posture

(1) General Situation

North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines (extensive training for all soldiers, modernizing all military forces, arming the entire population, and fortifying the entire country).\(^6\) North Korea’s military forces are comprised mainly of ground forces, with a total troop strength of roughly 1.28 million. While North Korea’s military forces are believed to have been maintaining and enhancing their capabilities and operational readiness, most of its equipment is outdated. Meanwhile, North Korea has forces such as largescale special operations force that can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence gathering and sabotage, to guerrilla warfare. Moreover, North Korea seems to have many underground military-related installations across its territory.

(2) Military Capabilities

The North Korean Army comprises about 1.10 million personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them are believed to be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army is infantry, but the army also maintains armored forces including at least 3,500 tanks and artillery. North Korea is believed to regularly deploy long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240 mm multiple rocket launchers and 170 mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities and bases in the northern part of the ROK including the capital city of Seoul. Despite limited resources, it is deemed that North Korea continues to selectively reinforce its conventional forces and improve its equipment, such as main battle tanks and multiple rocket launchers.\(^7\)

The Navy has about 780 ships with a total displacement of approximately 111,000 t and is chiefly comprised of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile craft. Also, it has about 20 of the former model Romeo-class submarines, about 70 midget submarines, and about 140 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and transportation of the special operations forces. The Air Force has approximately 550 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union. However, some fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29 fighters and Su-25 attack aircraft are also included. North Korea has a large number of outdated An-2 transport aircraft as well, which are believed to be used for transportation of special operations forces. In addition, North Korea has so-called asymmetric military capabilities, namely, special operations force whose size is estimated at 100,000 personnel.\(^8\) In recent years, North Korea is seen to be placing importance on and strengthening its cyber forces.\(^9\)

WMD and Ballistic Missiles

While North Korea continues to maintain largescale military capabilities, its conventional forces are considerably inferior to those of the ROK and the U.S. Forces Korea. This is the result of a variety of factors, including decreases in military assistance from the former Soviet Union due to the collapse of the Cold War regime, limitations placed on North Korea’s national defense spending due to its economic stagnation, and the rapid modernization of the ROK’s defense capabilities. It is thus speculated that North Korea is focusing its efforts on WMD and ballistic missile reinforcements in order to compensate for this shortfall.

North Korea’s development of WMDs and missiles is considered to have made further strides through going ahead with the sixth nuclear test and repeating ballistic missile launches. Coupled with its provocative rhetoric

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6 The Four Military Guidelines were adopted at the fifth plenary meeting of the fourth KWP Central Committee in 1962.

7 According to “The Military Balance 2014,” North Korea is replacing Soviet-made T-54 and T-55 tanks with the Ch’omma-ho that North Korea independently produced based on the T-62. Furthermore, the Defense White Paper 2014 that the ROK Ministry of National Defense released in January 2015 refers to North Korea’s development of a new 300 mm multiple rocket launcher, as well as the significant increase in the number of tanks, armored cars, and multiple rocket launchers in North Korea’s possession. North Korea allegedly fired several rounds from the 300 mm multiple rocket launcher on three instances in March 2016 and launched a new short-range surface-to-air missile in April 2016. In addition, North Korea announced that it had successfully conducted test launches of a new type of surface-to-air missiles and a new type of surface-to-ship cruise missiles on May 28 and June 9, 2017, respectively.

8 It has been said that North Korea possessed two types of special operations forces: one under the military forces and the other under the KWP. However, it has been reported that these organizations were consolidated in 2009 and the Reconnaissance General Bureau was established under the auspices of the military forces. The existence of the bureau was officially confirmed in March 2013 when Korean Central Broadcasting Station reported General Kim Yong-chol as the Director of the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Moreover, James Thurman, then Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, stated, “North Korea possesses the world’s largest special operations force of over 60,000” in his speech at the Association of U.S. Army in October 2012. Additionally, the ROK Defense White Paper 2016 notes, “Special operation forces are currently estimated at approximately 200,000 strong.”

9 The U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of February 2016 notes, “North Korea probably remains capable and willing to launch disruptive or destructive cyber attacks to support its political objectives.” The annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (2015) submitted to Congress by the U.S. DoD in February 2016 states, “North Korea probably views OCD (offensive cyber operations) as an appealing platform from which to collect intelligence and cause disruption in South Korea and other adversaries including the United States.” According to the ROK’s Defense White Paper 2016, North Korea has trained approximately 6,800 cyber warfare personnel and carries out various forms of cyber warfare provocations. Regarding North Korean cyber attacks, see Chapter 3, Section 5.
and behavior, such as suggesting a missile attack on Japan, North Korea’s development of WMDs and missiles poses an unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan and seriously undermine the peace and security of the region and the international community. Additionally, such development poses a serious challenge to the entire international community with regard to the non-proliferation of weapons, including WMDs.

On the other hand, at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP held on April 20, 2018, decisions were made to discontinue “nuclear test and inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire,” and to dismantle the northern nuclear test ground. In the subsequent inter-Korean summit meeting held on April 27, North Korea expressed its intention to work towards denuclearization. Then, on May 24, international press representatives were invited to witness the destruction of the northern nuclear test ground. Looking to the future, it will be necessary to continue to carefully monitor moves by North Korea, including what kind of concrete actions it will take towards realizing the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and all ballistic missiles in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

(1) Nuclear Weapons

a. The Current Status of the Nuclear Weapons Program

Details of the current status of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are largely unclear, partly because North Korea remains an extremely closed regime. In light of the unclear status of past nuclear developments, and considering North Korea has already conducted six nuclear tests including the nuclear test in September 2017, it is conceivable that North Korea has made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program. With regard to plutonium, a fissile material that can be used for nuclear weapons, North Korea has suggested its production and extraction on several instances. Moreover, in June 2009, North Korea announced that it would weaponize all of its newly extracted plutonium. In April 2013, North Korea announced its policy to readjust and restart all nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, including the nuclear reactor, the disablement of which was agreed upon at the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks in September 2007. In November 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) opined that while lack of inspection makes it impossible to determine conclusively, multiple activities were observed from satellite imagery suggesting that the nuclear reactor was restarted. Furthermore, in September 2015, North Korea stated that all nuclear facilities in Yongbyon including the nuclear reactor and the uranium enrichment plant were readjusted and started normal operation. Because the restarting of the reactor could lead to the production and extraction of plutonium by North Korea, such developments are causes of great concern.

As for highly enriched uranium that can also be used for nuclear weapons, in 2002 the United States announced that North Korea acknowledged the existence of a uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons. Later in June 2009, North Korea declared the commencement of uranium enrichment. Furthermore, in November 2010, North Korea disclosed its uranium enrichment facility to American nuclear specialists and later announced that it was operating a uranium enrichment plant equipped with thousands of centrifuges. The expansion of this uranium enrichment plant has been suggested in August 2013; in this regard, North Korea could have increased its enrichment capabilities. The series of North Korean behaviors related to uranium enrichment indicate the possibility of the development of nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium in addition to plutonium.

With regard to the development of nuclear weapons, North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in October
2006, May 2009, February 2013, January 2016, September 2016, and September 2017. It is highly likely that North Korea has made strides in its nuclear weapons program, collecting the necessary data through these nuclear tests.

It is believed that North Korea seeks to miniaturize nuclear weapons and develop them into warheads that can be mounted on ballistic missiles, as part of its nuclear weapons program. On September 3, 2017, it was announced that Chairman Kim Jong-un had visited North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Institute and had seen a hydrogen bomb capable of being loaded into an ICBM, in addition to which, following North Korea’s sixth nuclear test that was forced through on the same day, North Korea announced that it “successfully carried out a test of H-bomb for ICBM.” In general, miniaturizing a nuclear weapon small enough to be mounted on a ballistic missile requires a considerably high degree of technological capacity. However, considering, for example, that the United States, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s, as well as the technological maturity that is estimated to have been reached through North Korea’s previous six nuclear tests, it is possible that North Korea has achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and has developed nuclear warheads.

Furthermore, the yield of the sixth nuclear weapons test in 2017 was estimated to be the largest ever, with a maximum yield of approximately 160kt. Given the size of the estimated yield, the possibility cannot be discounted that the test was of a hydrogen bomb. Although North Korea asserted that the fourth nuclear test conducted in January 2016 was a hydrogen bomb test, given that the estimated yield was 6-7kt, it is doubtful that a general hydrogen bomb test was conducted at that time. In any case, it is believed that with the passage of time, there would be a greater risk of North Korea deploying a ballistic missile mounted with a nuclear warhead that includes Japan in its range.

In this regard, related developments need to be monitored carefully. North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, considered in conjunction with North Korean efforts to enhance ballistic missile capabilities, including extending the range of ballistic missiles that could become the delivery vehicles of WMDs, poses an unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan, and seriously undermine peace and security of the region and international community. Therefore, it can never be tolerated.

b. Background of the Nuclear Program

As regards the objective of North Korea’s nuclear development, North Korea is deemed to be developing nuclear weapons as an indispensable deterrent for maintaining the existing regime in light of the following: North Korea’s ultimate goal is allegedly the maintenance of the existing regime; North Korea considers that it needs its own nuclear deterrence to counter the nuclear threat of the United States and is in no position at least in the short-term to overturn its inferiority in conventional

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15 On October 27, 2006, as a result of the independently collected information and its analysis as well as Japan’s own careful examination of the U.S. and DK analyses, the Japanese Government arrived at the judgment that the probability of North Korea conducting a nuclear test was extremely high.

16 The Japanese Government believes that North Korea conducted a nuclear test on this day, given that North Korea announced on May 25, 2009, via the Korean Central News Agency, that it had successfully conducted an underground nuclear test, and in light of the Japan Meteorological Agency’s detection of seismic waves with a waveform that were unlikely those of a natural earthquake.

17 On February 12, 2013, at around 11:59 am, the Japan Meteorological Agency detected seismic waves with an epicenter located in the vicinity of North Korea, which had waveforms that were unlikely those of a natural earthquake. On the same day, North Korea announced via the Korean Central News Agency that it successfully conducted a nuclear test. On this basis, the Government of Japan verified the facts in coordination with other relevant parties, including the United States and the ROK. Based on a comprehensive consideration of the aforementioned information, the Japanese Government determined that North Korea conducted a nuclear test. North Korea announced that it “succeeded in the third underground nuclear test,” “the test was conducted in a safe and perfect way on a high level with the use of a smaller and light A-bomb, unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power,” “physically demonstrating the good performance of the DPRK’s nuclear deterrence that has become diversified.”

18 On January 6, 2016, at around 10:30 am, the Japan Meteorological Agency detected seismic waves with an epicenter located in the vicinity of North Korea, which had waveforms that were unlikely those of a natural earthquake. On the same day, North Korea announced via the Korean Central News Agency that it successfully conducted a hydrogen bomb test. Based on a comprehensive consideration of this and other information, the Japanese Government determined that North Korea conducted a nuclear test.

19 On September 9, 2016, at approximately 9:30 a.m., the Japan Meteorological Agency detected seismic waves with an epicenter located in the vicinity of North Korea, which had waveforms that were unlikely those of a natural earthquake. Based on a comprehensive consideration of all the information including this, the Government believes that North Korea conducted a nuclear test.

20 At around 12:31 p.m. on September 3, 2017, the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) detected seismic waves with an epicenter located in the vicinity of North Korea, which had waveforms that were unlikely those of a natural earthquake. Based on comprehensive considerations, including the information from the JMA, the Government determined that the earthquake occurred as a result of a nuclear test by North Korea.

21 On September 3, 2017, in a report on a visit by Chairman Kim Jong-un to North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Institute, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced that North Korea is able to conduct an “ultra-powerful electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack over a wide area.”

22 Over ten years have already passed since North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006. Furthermore, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests to date. This timetable for technology development and the number of tests are reaching levels that are by no means inadequate, even when compared to the processes of developing technologies to miniaturize and lighten nuclear weapons in the United States, former Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China. The ROK’s Defense White Paper 2016 assesses that “North Korea’s ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons seems to have reached a considerable level.”

23 In regard to North Korea’s nuclear test on January 6, 2016, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” (February 2016) states, “Although we are continuing to evaluate this event, the low yield of the test is not consistent with a successful test of a thermonuclear device.” Furthermore, in January 2016, the ROK National Intelligence Service reportedly briefed the National Assembly that because the power and seismic waves of the fourth nuclear test do not match up to those of the previous three nuclear tests, the test was unlikely a hydrogen bomb test.


25 For example, a statement issued by the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on March 14, 2014 alleges that the United States threatens and intimidates North Korea with nuclear strikes, and that North Korea has come to possess nuclear deterrence out of necessity in order to protect the autonomy of its nation and people.
forces vis-à-vis the United States and the ROK. North Korea asserts that the Iraqi and Libyan regimes collapsed and that Syria was attacked by U.S. Forces in April 2017 due to their lack of nuclear deterrence, and North Korea reiterates nuclear weapons will never be traded away at negotiations.

In fact, North Korea has repeatedly claimed to the international community that it was a “nuclear weapons state.” In March 2013, North Korea adopted the “new strategic line” (so-called “Byungjin line”) policy of simultaneous economic and nuclear development, alleging that even if it does not increase defense spending, it would be able to concentrate on its economic development and on improving the people’s livelihood as long as nuclear deterrence is robust, and thereby increases the effectiveness of its war deterrent and defense force. At the Seventh KWP Congress and also in the “New Year’s Address” of January 2018, it made clear that it would remain steadfast to this policy. At the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP in April 2018, in addition to declaring the “Byungjin line” was successfully carried out, North Korea declared that among other things, it had determined to “concentrate all efforts on building a powerful socialist economy and markedly improving the standard of people’s living through the mobilization of all human and material resources of the country.”

With regard to the issue of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, six rounds of the Six-Party Talks have been held since August 2003, aimed at taking peaceful measures to achieve the verifiable denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. At the sixth round of the Talks in September 2007, the parties reached an agreement, which included completion of the disablement of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and “a complete and correct declaration of all (North Korea’s) nuclear programs” by the end of the year. However, the implementation of the agreement has not been completed, and the Six-Party Talks has been suspended since December 2008. At the first-ever U.S.-North Korea summit meeting held on June 12, 2018, Chairman Kim Jong-un made clear his intention to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and confirmed that negotiations would continue with the United States. Based on the outcomes of the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting it is now necessary to work closely with the United States and the ROK and cooperate with the international community, including China and Russia, to elicit concrete actions from North Korea towards the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

(2) Biological and Chemical Weapons

North Korea is an extremely closed regime. In addition, most materials, equipment, and technology used for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for both military and civilian uses, which in turn facilitates camouflage. For these reasons, details of the status of North Korea’s biological and chemical weapons development and arsenals are unclear. However, with regard to chemical weapons, North Korea is suspected to have several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and already a substantial stockpile of such agents. North Korea is also thought to have some infrastructure for the production of biological weapons. Possession of sarin, VX, mustard and other chemical weapons, and of anthrax, smallpox, pest and other biological agents that could be used as biological weapons have been pointed out. The possibility cannot be denied that North Korea is able to load biological and/or chemical weapons on warheads.

(3) Ballistic Missiles

As is the case with WMDs, many of the details of North Korea’s ballistic missiles are unknown, partly owing to the country’s extremely closed regime. It appears, however, that North Korea gives high priority to the development of ballistic missiles out of political and

26 For example, a comment in the Rodong Sinmun dated December 2, 2013 contends that the situation in Iraq and Libya teaches an acute lesson that countries under the constant threat of U.S. preemptive nuclear attack have no choice but to become a victim of U.S. state terrorism, unless the countries have powerful deterrence capability. In addition, the “Statement by the Spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” dated April 8, 2017 states with regard to the U.S. attack on Syria two days earlier on April 6 as follows: “Swagging as a superpower, the US has been picking only on countries without nuclear weapons and the Trump administration is no exception.”

27 North Korea announced in 2005 that it manufactured nuclear weapons, and declared itself a “nuclear weapons state” in 2012 in its revised constitution. In April 2013, after conducting its third nuclear test in February, North Korea adopted the Law on Consolidating the Position of Self-Defensive Nuclear Weapons State. During the Seventh KWP Congress held in May 2016, KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un delivered a report on the work of the KWP Central Committee, setting out that North Korea was a “nuclear weapons state,” and stating, “We will consistently take hold on the strategic line of simultaneously pushing forward the economic construction and the building of nuclear force and boost self-defensive nuclear force both in quality and quantity.”

28 For example, the ROK Defense White Paper 2016 points out that, following the commencement of production in the 1980s, it is estimated that North Korea has a stock of 2,500–5,000 of various chemical weapons stored. It also notes that North Korea likely has the capability to produce a variety of biological weapons including anthrax, smallpox, and pest. Moreover, the U.S. DoD’s “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” of February 2016 points out that, “North Korea probably could employ CW [chemical weapons] agents by modifying a variety of conventional munitions, including artillery and ballistic missiles.” North Korea ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987 but has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

29 In principle, the ballistic missile defense system is also used to handle ballistic missiles carrying biological or chemical weapons. With regard to the damage on the ground in the case where a ballistic missile carrying a biological or chemical weapon is destroyed by a Patriot missile PAC-3, etc., there is no single answer to the question since the damage varies according to the various conditions such as the type, performance, intercepted altitude and speed of the ballistic missile, and the weather. However, in general terms, the biological or chemical weapon will likely be neutralized by the heat, etc. at the time of the destruction of the ballistic missile, and even if it retains its potency it will disperse during the freefall stage. Thus, it is believed that the ballistic missile will be unable to demonstrate its prescribed effectiveness.
are the following. 

**Fig. I-2-2-2 (Ballistic Missiles developed/Possessed by North Korea)**

**Fig. I-2-2-3 (Image released by North Korea picturing the launch of a ballistic missile with ICBM range (estimated) (November 2017))**

**Fig. I-2-2-4 (Ballistic Missile Launches by North Korea to Date)**

### a. Types of Ballistic Missiles Possessed or Developed by North Korea

(a) **Toksa**

Toksa is a short-range ballistic missile with a range estimated to be approximately 120 km. It is mounted on a Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL). It is deemed that Toksa is the first ballistic missile possessed or developed by North Korea which adopts a solid fuel propellant.  

(b) **Scud**

The Scud is a liquid fuel propellant single-stage ballistic missile and is transported and operated on a TEL. Scud B and Scud C, a variant of Scud B with extended range, are short-range ballistic missiles with ranges estimated to be about 300 km and 500 km, respectively. It is believed that North Korea has manufactured and deployed them, and has exported them to the Middle East and other countries.

The Scud ER (Extended Range) is a ballistic missile that has an extended range due to the extension of the Scud’s body as well as the reduction in weight of the warhead, among other factors. The range of a Scud ER is estimated to reach approximately 1,000 km, and it appears that a part of Japan falls within this range.

In addition, North Korea is developing a ballistic missile that appears to be an improvement of the Scud missile. This ballistic missile was launched on May 29, 2017, and is presumed to have flown approximately 400 km and fallen into Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). A day after the launch, North Korea announced that it had successfully conducted a test launch of a newly developed ballistic rocket incorporating a precision navigation guidance system. In addition, while the images released by North Korea show that the ballistic missile was launched from a continuous track TEL and had what appears to be small wings on its warhead, i.e., characteristics different from those of existing Scud missiles, the shape other than the warhead and length are similar to existing Scud missiles. Another similarity is that it can be confirmed that the missile has straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel-propelled engine. It has also been noted that this ballistic missile is equipped with a maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MaRV).  

Given that North Korea announced that Chairman Kim Jong-un

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30 North Korea admitted that it is exporting ballistic missiles to earn foreign currency. (Comment by the Korean Central News Agency on June 16, 1998, and statement made by a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson on December 13, 2002) At the same time, it is pointed out that North Korea’s ballistic missile exports have been set back by increasing pressure from the international community.

31 According to “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia” (accessed in April 2018) North Korea possesses 700 to 1,000 ballistic missiles in total, 45% of which are presumed to be Scud-class, 45% Nodong-class, and the remaining 10% other intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles.

32 In March 2007, then U.S. Forces Korea Commander Burwell B. Bell testified before the House Armed Services Committee that, “North Korea is developing a new solid propellant short-range ballistic missile. Recently, in March 2006, North Korea successfully test-fired the missile. Once operational, the missile can be deployed more flexibly and rapidly than the existing system and North Korea will be able to launch the missile in a much shorter preparation period.”

33 "Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” published by DoD in May 2018.

34 It is generally said that small wings on the warhead have the functions of stabilizing aerodynamics, navigating during flight, and enhancing precision.

35 For example, according to “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia” (accessed in April 2018), the launch on May 29, 2017, was presumed to have been the first launch of a short-range ballistic missile based on a Scud missile, equipped with a maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MaRV), suggesting that North Korea has made advances in its precision guidance systems.
Fig. I-2-2-2 Ballistic Missiles developed Possessed by North Korea

| Toksa | Scud B, C, ER, Modified | Rodong Modified | Musudan | SLBM | SLBM modified for ground launch | IRBM-class | ICBM-class | New type, ICBM-class | Taepodong-2 variant | KN-08/KN-14 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Range | approx. 120 km | Approx. 300 km/ Approx. 500 km/ Approx. 1,000 km/ Under analysis | Approx. 1,300 km/ Approx. 1,500 km | Approx. 2,500–4,000 km | 1,000 km or more | 1,000 km or more | Approx. 5,000 km | 5,500 km or more | 10,000 km or more | 10,000 km or more* | 5,500 km or more (ICBM reportedly) |
| Fuel | Solid | Liquid | Liquid | Liquid | Solid | Solid | Liquid | Liquid | Liquid | Liquid | Liquid |
| Operation platform | TEL | TEL | TEL | submarine | TEL | TEL | TEL | TEL | launch site | TEL |

* Based on warhead weight, etc.

Fig. I-2-2-3 Image released by North Korea picturing the launch of a ballistic missile with ICBM range (estimated) (November 2017)

Note 1: The figure above shows a rough image of the distance each missile can reach from Pyongyang for the sake of convenience.

Note 2: Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea.
### Ballistic Missile Launches by North Korea to Date

#### 2015 and earlier

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Presumed type of missile</th>
<th>Number of launches</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Flight distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993/5/29</td>
<td>Nodong (possible)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Approx. 500 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/8/31</td>
<td>Taepodong-1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Taepodong Area</td>
<td>Approx. 1,600 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/7/5</td>
<td>Scud and Nodong</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kittaeryŏng Area</td>
<td>Approx. 400 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/7/5</td>
<td>Taepodong-2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Taepodong Area</td>
<td>Unknown, presumed to have failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/4/5</td>
<td>Taepodong-2 or variant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Taepodong Area</td>
<td>3,000 km or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/7/4</td>
<td>Scud or Nodong</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kittaeryŏng Area</td>
<td>Maximum approx. 450 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/4/13</td>
<td>Taepodong-2 or variant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tongch’ang-ri Area</td>
<td>Unknown, presumed to have failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/12/12</td>
<td>Taepodong-2 variant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tongch’ang-ri Area</td>
<td>Approx. 2,600 km (second stage landfall)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/3/3</td>
<td>Scud</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Near Wonsan</td>
<td>Approx. 500 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/3/26</td>
<td>Nodong</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Near Sukchon</td>
<td>Approx. 650 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/6/29</td>
<td>Scud</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Near Wonsan</td>
<td>Approx. 500 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/7/9</td>
<td>Scud</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Approx. 100 km south of Pyongyang</td>
<td>Approx. 500 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/7/13</td>
<td>Scud</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Near Kaesong</td>
<td>Approx. 500 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/7/26</td>
<td>Scud</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Approx. 100 km west of Haeju</td>
<td>Approx. 500 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015/3/2</td>
<td>Scud</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Near Nampo</td>
<td>Approx. 500 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/2/7</td>
<td>Taepodong-2 variant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tongch’ang-ri</td>
<td>Approx. 2,500 km (second stage landfall)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/3/10</td>
<td>Scud</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Near Nampo</td>
<td>Approx. 500 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/3/18</td>
<td>Nodong</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Sukchon</td>
<td>Approx. 800 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/4/15</td>
<td>Musudan (indicated)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>East coast area</td>
<td>Unknown, presumed to have failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/4/23</td>
<td>SLBM “Pukkuksong”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Off the coast of Sinpo</td>
<td>Approx. 30 km (ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/4/28</td>
<td>Musudan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Wonsan</td>
<td>Unknown, presumed to have failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/5/31</td>
<td>Musudan (possible)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wonsan</td>
<td>Unknown, presumed to have failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/6/22</td>
<td>Musudan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Wonsan</td>
<td>First: Approx. 100 km (maximum); Second: Approx. 400 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/7/9</td>
<td>SLBM “Pukkuksong”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Off the coast of Sinpo</td>
<td>A few kilometers (ROK media reports)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/7/19</td>
<td>Scud and Nodong</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Near Hwangju</td>
<td>First: Approx. 400 km; Third: Approx. 500 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/8/3</td>
<td>Nodong</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Near Unonyul</td>
<td>Approx. 1,000 km (the first exploded right after launch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/8/24</td>
<td>SLBM “Pukkuksong”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Oear Sinpo</td>
<td>Approx. 500 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/9/5</td>
<td>Scud ER</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Near Hwangju</td>
<td>Approx. 1,000 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/10/15</td>
<td>Musudan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Kusong</td>
<td>Unknown, presumed to have failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/10/20</td>
<td>Musudan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Kusong</td>
<td>Unknown, presumed to have failed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Presumed type of missile</th>
<th>Number of launches</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Flight distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017/2/12</td>
<td>Ground-launched ballistic missile modified from SLBM “Pukkuksong-2”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Kusong</td>
<td>Approx. 500 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/3/6</td>
<td>Scud ER</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Near Tongch’ang-ri</td>
<td>Approx. 1,000 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/3/22</td>
<td>Under analysis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Wonsan</td>
<td>Exploded within seconds of launch, presumed to have failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/4/5</td>
<td>Under analysis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Sinpo</td>
<td>Approx. 60 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/4/16</td>
<td>Under analysis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Sinpo</td>
<td>Exploded right after launch, presumed to have failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/4/29</td>
<td>Under analysis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Pulchhang</td>
<td>Felli inland approx. 50 km away, presumed to have failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/5/14</td>
<td>IRBM-class ballistic missile “Hwasong-12”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Kusong</td>
<td>Approx. 800 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/5/21</td>
<td>Ground-launched ballistic missile modified from SLBM “Pukkuksong-2”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Pulchhang</td>
<td>Approx. 500 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/5/29</td>
<td>Ballistic missile modified from Scud missile</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Wonsan</td>
<td>Approx. 400 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/7/4</td>
<td>Intercontinental-range ballistic missile “Hwasong-14”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Kusong</td>
<td>Approx. 900 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/7/28</td>
<td>Intercontinental-range ballistic missile “Hwasong-14”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Mupyong-ri</td>
<td>Approximately 1,000 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/8/29</td>
<td>IRBM-class ballistic missile “Hwasong-12”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Sunan</td>
<td>Approximately 2,700 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/9/15</td>
<td>IRBM-class ballistic missile “Hwasong-12”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Sunan</td>
<td>Approximately 3,700 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017/11/29</td>
<td>New type of Intercontinental-range ballistic missile “Hwasong-15”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Pyongsong</td>
<td>Approximately 1,000 km</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*North Korean names in parentheses*
had ordered the development of ballistic missiles capable of precision attacks on enemy ships and other individual targets, the intent appears to be to enhance the accuracy of ballistic missile attacks.

(c) Nodong

The Nodong is a liquid fuel propelled single-stage ballistic missile and is transported and operated on a TEL. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300 km, reaching almost all of Japan.

Although the details of Nodong’s performance have not been confirmed, Nodong may not have the accuracy to carry out precise strikes on specific target installations, as this ballistic missile is likely based on Scud technology. However, it has been suggested that North Korea is working to increase the Nodong’s accuracy. In this regard, it had been suggested that there is a type of Nodong aimed at enhancing accuracy by improving the shape of the warhead (whose range is deemed to reach approximately 1,500 km through the weight reduction of the warhead). Against this backdrop, the launch of this type of ballistic missile was confirmed for the first time in the images published by North Korea a day after the launch of one Scud and two Nodong missiles on July 19, 2016. Thus, it is necessary to continue to pay attention to related developments.

(d) Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)

It has been suggested that North Korea is developing an SLBM and a new submarine which is designed to carry the SLBM (referred to by North Korea as “Pukguksong”). Since it announced in May 2015 through its media that it conducted a successful test launch of an SLBM, it has made public SLBM launches on four occasions. Judging from the images and footage that it has made public so far, North Korea may have succeeded in operating the “cold launch system,” in which the missile is ignited after it is ejected into the air. Moreover, in the launches in April and August 2016, it appears, based on observations such as the shape of the flame coming out of the missile and the color of the smoke, that the militarily superior solid fuel propellant system was adopted.

A ballistic missile presumed to be an SLBM has been confirmed in flight in the direction of Japan, launched from the vicinity of Sinpo, on the east coast of North Korea, on August 24, 2016. The SLBM flew approximately 500 km. Considering that this was its first SLBM to fly approximately 500 km, the possibility cannot be denied that North Korea had striven to solve the problems through the preceding launches and achieved certain technological progress. Furthermore, it is predicted that the ballistic missile presumed to be the SLBM that was launched at this time flew on a somewhat higher than nominal trajectory. If it were launched on a nominal trajectory the firing range is expected to surpass 1,000 km. It is also thought that North Korea’s SLBM launches are conducted from a Gorae-class submarine (displacement 1,500 t). North Korea is believed to have one such submarine. It is also pointed out that North Korea seeks to develop a larger submarine to launch SLBMs.

It is deemed that through developing the SLBM...
and a new submarine to carry it, North Korea intends to diversify its ballistic missile attack capabilities and improve survivability.

(e) Ballistic missile modified from the SLBM

North Korea launched a ballistic missile on both February 12 and May 21, 2017, both of which appeared to be a modified version of the SLBM for ground launch (referred to by North Korea as “Pukguksong-2”). This ballistic missile is estimated to have flown approximately 500 km on both occasions, on somewhat higher trajectories than nominal. If it were launched on a nominal trajectory, the firing range is expected to surpass 1,000 km. A day after the launch on February 12, North Korea named the ballistic missile that was launched “Pukguksong-2” and announced that it was developed as a ground-to-ground ballistic missile based on the results of the August 2016 SLBM launch. It also announced a day after the launch on May 21, 2017 that it had again successfully conducted the test launch of the Pukguksong-2 and that Chairman Kim Jong-un had authorized its “operational deployment.” Moreover, the launch by a “cold launch system,” in which the missile is ignited after it is ejected into the air from a continuous track TEL, and the characteristic radial exhausts of solid fuel propellant engines, can be confirmed from each of the images that North Korea released. It has the characteristics of appearing to be using “cold launch system” and solid fuel propellant engines in common with the SLBM. Given that North Korea has made references to its deployment for operational deployment, there is a possibility that North Korea will newly deploy a solid fuel propellant engine that includes Japan within its firing range.

(f) Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)

To date North Korea has launched three liquid fuel-propelled IRBMs (referred to by North Korea as “Hwasong-12”). This ballistic missile was launched on May 14, 2017 and is presumed to have reached a height of over 2,000 km and flew a distance of approximately 800 km for about 30 minutes. Based on this flight pattern, it is presumed that the ballistic missile was launched on a lofted trajectory. Had it been launched on a nominal trajectory, the maximum firing range is expected to be close to approximately 5,000 km. In addition, the straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine can be confirmed from the images released by North Korea a day after the launch, suggesting that the ballistic missile uses liquid fuel. On August 29 and September 15, 2017 single missiles of this class were launched and flew over Japan’s territory in the vicinity of the Oshima Peninsula and Cape Erimo. The ballistic missile launched on August 29 flew at an altitude of approximately 550 km over Japanese territory, and is presumed to have flown a total distance of 2,700 km. The ballistic missile launched on September 15 is presumed to have flown over Japanese territory at an altitude of between 700 and 800 km, flying for a total distance of approximately 3,700 km. These launches were the first cases of North Korea launching what it calls ballistic missiles that flew over Japan’s territory.

In view of their flight paths, these missiles appear to demonstrate a certain level of function as an IRBM. Also, the fact that missiles that overflew Japan were launched in succession in a short time period would suggest that North Korea is steadily improving its ballistic missile capabilities. Furthermore, although at the time of launches in May and August 2017 the missiles were confirmed to have been launched after being separated from the wheel-drive TEL, at the time of the September launch the missile was confirmed to have been launched while still attached to the wheel-drive TEL. Considering this point, together with North Korea’s claims at the time of the launch that it was for the purposes of “confirming practical operational procedures” and “realize the potential of the
“Hwasong-12” there is a possibility that North Korea is improving its practical operational capabilities.

In 2016 North Korea conducted repeated launches of an IRBM that is presumed to be the Musudan, but although the missile launched in June flew for a certain distance on a lofted trajectory, the fact that there were two successive launch failures in October would suggest that there may still be obstacles remaining towards the operationalization of the Musudan and that North Korea may be concentrating on the development and operationalization of the “Hwasong-12” as an IRBM instead.

(g) Intercontinental-range ballistic missile
(Launched on July 4 and 28, 2017)
To date North Korea has launched two intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (referred to by North Korea as “Hwasong-14”). One such ballistic missile was launched on July 4, 2017, reaching a height well over 2,500 km, and is estimated to have flown approximately 40 minutes. It flew approximately 900 km and is estimated to have fallen into Japan’s EEZ. Another missile that was launched on July 28 reached a height of well over 3,500 km, and is estimated to have flown approximately 45 minutes, covering a distance of approximately 1,000 km before falling into Japan’s EEZ. From this flight pattern it is presumed that the two ballistic missiles were launched on a lofted trajectory. If they were to have been launched on a normal trajectory it is estimated that they would have a maximum range of at least 5,500 km. On July 4, the day of the launch, North Korea made an “important announcement,” announcing that it had successfully conducted a test launch of a new type of ICBM. Furthermore, on the day following the July 28 launch, North Korea announced that the “nuclear bomb detonation device” had functioned normally, emphasizing that the safety of the warhead in an atmospheric reentry environment had been made maintained. This suggests that North Korea is aiming to operationalize long-range ballistic missiles.

Based on images released by North Korea, the ballistic missiles launched on July 4 and 28 have the following in common with the IRBM launched on May 14: (1) the engine system consists of one main engine and four auxiliary engines, (2) the shape of the lower part of the propulsion system is conical, and (3) the straight-line flame of liquid-propulsion systems can be confirmed. Based on these facts and the respective ranges that can be estimated for the missiles, the possibility can be deduced that the intercontinental-range ballistic missiles that were launched on July 4 and 28 were developed on the basis of the new-type IRBM that had been launched on May 14.

Also based on images published by North Korea, it can be confirmed that the ballistic missiles that were launched on July 4 and 28 had been mounted on the wheeled eight-axle TEL similar to KN-08/14 (see (j) below). However, it can be confirmed from the images at the time of the launches that they were launched from simplified launch pads, not TELs. Furthermore, the images suggest that the missile was of two-stage construction.

(h) New type of intercontinental-range ballistic missile
(Launched on November 29, 2017)
On November 29, 2017, North Korea launched a single missile that is presumed to have been a new type of intercontinental-range ballistic missile (referred to by North Korea as “Hwasong-15”) different to the missiles described in (g) above. The missile reached a height of well over 4,000 km, and is estimated to have flown approximately 53 minutes, covering a distance of approximately 1,000 km before falling into Japan’s EEZ. From this flight pattern it is presumed that the missile was launched on a lofted trajectory. On the day of the launch, North Korea made an “government statement,” declaring that it had successfully conducted a test launch of the “Hwasong-15,” a newly developed type of ICBM with the capability to strike all areas of the U.S. mainland, and asserting that it had now completed development of its

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40 With a range of between 2,500 and 4,000 km, it has been suggested that all parts of Japan and Guam may fall within the Musudan’s firing range. Similar to its Scud and Nodong counterparts, it is liquid fuel-propelled and is loaded onto a TEL to transport and operate. It has been noted that Musudan is a revamped version of the Russian SLBM SS-N-6 that North Korea acquired in the early 1990s.

41 In addition to this announcement, the announcement that North Korea had succeeded in its first hydrogen bomb test (January 6, 2016) and the announcement that it had succeeded in the launch of the earth observation satellite Kwangmyongsong-4 (February 7, 2016) have been issued as “important announcements.”
Commentary  

North Korea’s ICBM development situation

North Korea launched an intercontinental-range ballistic missile twice in July 2017 and once in November 2017 and asserted that “all of the mainland United States is within range for nuclear attack” in the New Year’s address given in January 2018.

Generally, realization of an ICBM as a weapon requires (1) a range of at least 5,500km, (2) miniaturization of nuclear weapon and acquisition of nuclear warhead, and (3) atmospheric reentry technology.

Regarding range (1), the intercontinental-range ballistic missile launched twice in July 2018 (referred to by North Korea as Hwasong-14) appears to have a range of at least 5,500km based on the flight distance, altitude, and other points. Additionally, the new intercontinental-range ballistic missile (referred to by North Korea as Hwasong-15) launched in November 2018 might exceed 10,000km depending on the warhead weight and other aspects.

Regarding development of miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquisition of nuclear warhead (2), North Korea might have reached this level in light of the more than 10 years elapsed since conducting the first nuclear test in 2006 and the technological maturity estimated to have been reached through a total of six nuclear tests.

Regarding atmospheric reentry technology (3), heat protection technology that prevents deformation, destruction, and other damage to the nuclear warhead on reentry into the atmosphere after the ballistic missile has been launched and leaves the atmosphere is particularly important. While North Korea has repeatedly claimed to have verified this technology, it is still necessary to carefully analyze whether North Korea has actually verified this technology.

North Korea is deemed to accumulate related technologies through repeated launches of ballistic missiles. Given this reality, it is necessary to establish even further readiness in order to protect the lives and property of the Japanese people and defend Japan’s territories, seas, and airspace.

If North Korea made further progress in the development of ballistic missiles and demonstrated the atmospheric reentry technology, etc., could unilaterally gain recognition of having strategic deterrence against the United States. Overconfidence or misperception of this deterrence by North Korea might lead to increased and more serious military provocations in the region. Japan thinks this situation could warrant substantial concern.

Some observers suggest that North Korea could obtain the ability to attack the United States with a nuclear-armed ballistic missile within a few months. The Japanese government needs to carefully monitor North Korea’s nuclear and missile development situation.

The following points would suggest that this missile is a new type of intercontinental-range ballistic missile, different from the two intercontinental-range ballistic missiles launched in July 2017: (1) its flight distance and altitude, (2) the fact that North Korea announced the successful test launch of a new type of ICBM, the “Hwasong-15,” (3) the fact that the missile was deployed on a previously unseen nine-axle wheel-drive TEL, and (4) that the nose of the warhead was more rounded than previous missiles. In addition, according to images released by North Korea, the missile was of a two-stage design, and it can be confirmed that it was removed from the TEL prior to launch and that its straight-line exhausts are characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine.

Furthermore, based on the flight altitude, distance flown and released images, it can be assumed that this missile could have a range in excess of 10,000 km, depending on the weight of the warhead deployed, etc., thus renewing concerns over the increasing ranges of North Korea’s ballistic missiles.

In addition, although the wheel-drive TELs possessed by North Korea are thought to be modified versions of Russian and Chinese TELs, given that North Korea has claimed to have developed its own TEL, future developments will continue to be monitored.
(g) Taepodong-1 and 2
Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2 are long-range ballistic missiles launched from fixed launch pads. Taepodong-1 is assumed to be a two-stage, liquid fuel propellant ballistic missile with a Nodong used as its first stage and a Scud as its second stage. It is estimated to have a range of at least approximately 1,500 km. Taepodong-1 was launched from the Taepodong district on North Korea’s northeastern coastline in 1998, and it is presumed that part of it flew over Japan and fell in to the Sanriku offshore waters. Taepodong-1 may have been a transitory product for the development of Taepodong-2.

Taepodong-2 is believed to be a missile which uses in its first stage, four engines, each of which is developed based on the technologies of Nodong, and the same type of engine in its second stage. Its range is estimated to be approximately 6,000 km for the two-stage type, while the range of its three-stage variant can be more than approximately 10,000 km assuming that the weight of the warhead is not over approximately 1 t. Taepodong-2 missiles and its variants have been launched a total of five times so far.

Most recently, in February 2016, North Korea conducted a launch of a missile disguised as a “satellite” from the Tongch’ang-ri district in the northwest coastline of North Korea using a Taepodong-2 variant, a type similar to that of the previous ballistic missile launch in December 2012, after notifying international organizations. It is assessed that North Korea’s long-range ballistic missiles’ technological reliability had been advanced by this launch because it is estimated that (1) it successfully launched two similar types of ballistic missiles in a row; (2) the missile flew in almost the same way as the last launch; and (3) it put an object into orbit around the Earth.

Accordingly, it is believed that these test launches of long-range ballistic missiles can contribute to the development of shorter-range missiles in such ways as increasing the range and payload capability and improving the circular error probability (CEP). Also, related technology such as the separation technology of multi-stage propelling devices and the technology of posture control and thrust modulation of long-range ballistic missiles can be applied to other middle-range and long-range ballistic missiles that North Korea is newly developing. Therefore, the launch may lead not only to the improvement of other types of its ballistic missiles including Nodong but also to the advancement of North Korea’s entire ballistic missile program including the development of new ballistic missiles and diversification of attack measure.

North Korea continues to claim that it will keep conducting “satellite launches” and will develop and launch more capable satellite launch vehicles. It is possible that North Korea will further develop its long-range ballistic missiles by repeating similar launches under the name of “satellite” launches, in order to carry out further technical tests to operationalize its long-range ballistic missiles. It has been suggested that North Korea is carrying out modification for upsizing its launch tower in Tongch’ang-ri district. While the missile launched in February 2016 was similar in size to the Taepodong-2 variant launched in December 2012, North Korea may launch larger long-range ballistic missiles in the future. Furthermore, as launches from fixed launch pads are vulnerable to external attacks, North Korea may seek resiliency and survivability through building underground or silo launch facilities and launching from TELs.

(j) KN-08/KN-14
The details of the new missile “KN-08” which was showcased at the military parade in April 2012 and July...
2013 are unknown. However, the missile is believed to be an ICBM. At the military parade in October 2015, a new missile thought of as the “KN-08” was showcased with a different-shaped warhead from the previous version. The U.S. DoD reportedly calls the new missile, considered a variant of the “KN-08,” the “KN-14.” Whereas the Taepodong-2 is launched from a fixed launch pad, the “KN-08” and “KN-14” are carried by a TEL, making it difficult to detect signs of their launch in advance, and is likely intended to increase survivability.

b. Trends in Recent Ballistic Missile Launches

North Korea has repeatedly launched various types of ballistic missiles. In particular, since 2016 it has conducted as many as 40 ballistic missile launches, including launches of what appear to be new types of missiles.

As for trends in North Korea’s ballistic missile launches, firstly, it appears that the country seeks to increase the firing range of ballistic missiles. In February 2016, it launched a long-range ballistic missile (a Taepodong-2 variant) which was disguised as a “satellite,” and in the same year repeatedly launched the Musudan, considered to have Guam in its range. As for the IRBM that was launched in 2017, it is expected to reach a maximum firing range of approximately 5,000 km. Furthermore, in July intercontinental-range ballistic missiles were launched, followed by another intercontinental-range ballistic missile launch in November, which is considered to have been a new type of missile that could have a range in excess of 10,000 km, depending on the weight of the warhead deployed, etc. Although it is considered necessary for the operationalization of long-range ballistic missiles to further verify technology for protecting the re-entry vehicle from the ultrahigh temperature that is generated during the atmospheric re-entry of the warhead part, North Korea announced in March 2016 that it had successfully conducted a “mock ballistic missile atmospheric re-entry environment test” and announced that it had demonstrated atmospheric reentry technology for warheads on the July 4 launch. In addition, with announcements such as the one in November 2017 on the day of the launch of what is believed to have been a new type of intercontinental-range ballistic missile, claiming that it had re-verified warhead reliability in a reentry environment, North Korea is displaying an intention to seek to secure and enhance technology aimed at the operationalization of long-range ballistic missiles. This has become a serious concern for relevant countries including Japan.

Secondly, North Korea may be aiming to enhance the accuracy and operation capabilities necessary for saturation attacks with regard to ballistic missiles already deployed. As for the Scud and Nodong, which are already deployed, launches had been confirmed when Kim Jong-il was the Chairman of the National Defense Commission. Since 2014, they have been launched eastward from unprecedented locations in western North Korea, cutting across the Korean Peninsula, in the early morning and late hours of the night using TELs, often in multiple numbers. This indicates that North Korea is capable of launching Scuds and Nodongs from any place and at any time, from which it is deemed that it has increased confidence in the performance and reliability of its ballistic missiles.

As for Scuds and Nodongs, since 2016, there have been launches where it is presumed that warheads fell in Japan’s EEZ, posing a major threat to Japan’s security. The ballistic missile launched on August 3, 2016 that appears to be a Nodong flew approximately 1,000 km, with its warhead predicted to have fallen into the Japanese EEZ for the first time. The three ballistic missiles launched on September 5 of the same year, apparently Scud ERs, were launched simultaneously and are all estimated to have fallen in more or less the same place in Japan’s EEZ after flying approximately 1,000 km. Moreover, the four ballistic missiles, apparently Scud ERs, launched on March 6, 2017 were launched simultaneously, three of which are predicted to have fallen within Japan’s EEZ and the other near the EEZ, after flying approximately 1,000 km. It is possible that through these launches, North Korea is demonstrating an intention to conduct large-scale saturation attacks with regard to ballistic missiles already deployed.

44 The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of February 2015 notes that, “(North Korea) has publicly displayed its KN-08 road-mobile ICBM twice. We assess that North Korea has already taken initial steps towards fielding this system, although the system has not been flight-tested.”

45 Jane’s Defence Weekly dated October 13, 2015 notes that the “KN-08” showcased at the military parade on October 10, 2015 had a larger third stage than the earlier version, and therefore, could have an extended range. It also suggests that low quality ablative materials cannot withstand high temperatures during re-entry, and thus, a blunter shape warhead may have been developed to reduce speed to protect the warhead.

46 North Korea is thought to have started developing longer-range ballistic missiles by the 1990s, including Nodong.

47 KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un’s January 2017 New Year’s Address announced that the test launch of an ICBM had entered the final stage of preparation. In North Korea, a New Year’s Address by President Kim Il-sung had been given every year on January 1 up to 1994. Since the death of the president, from 1995 to 2012, a New Year’s Joint Editorial by the KWP bulletin Rodong Sinmun, the Korean People’s Army bulletin J Jason Isominning, and the Kimilsung Youth League bulletin Youth Vanguard had been published in its place.

48 According to images released by North Korea, the aim of the test appears to be to conduct a test that simulates the high temperature that occurs during the atmospheric re-entry of the warhead by firing the engine of the ballistic missile at the test object installed on a fixed platform. Generally, it is difficult to recreate the circumstances of the atmospheric re-entry of the warhead by the emission from the engine alone. It is necessary to conduct technology verification by flight tests to conduct an accurate demonstration including the impact of the airflow, etc.

49 Further analysis is necessary to determine whether North Korea was able to demonstrate the warhead protection technology during atmospheric re-entry necessary for the operationalization of long-range ballistic missiles by the July 4, 2017 launch.

50 North Korea announced the implementation of the ground test for a “new type of large-output generator (engine) for ICBMs” in April 2016, the implementation of the ground test for a new type of large-output generator (engine) for satellite-launch rocket launchers in September 2016, and the ground test for a new type of “large-output engine” in March 2017.
Korea’s intentions are not only research and development of ballistic missiles but also the enhancement of their operational capabilities. Since Chairman Kim Jong-un has repeatedly instructed the military troops to reject formality and conduct practical training, it can be considered that these instructions underpin the launches of ballistic missiles that have already been deployed.

North Korea also has claimed that a new type of ballistic missile which appears to have been modified from the Scud missile launched on May 29, 2017 is a “ballistic missile that incorporates a precision navigation guidance system,” and it has also been noted that this missile is equipped with a maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MaRV). It is deemed that North Korea is aiming to enhance the accuracy of attack by upgrading ballistic missiles that have already been deployed.

Thirdly, North Korea appears to be seeking to improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks by enhancing secrecy and instantaneousness to make it difficult to detect signs of a launch. Using a TEL or submarine, a ballistic missile can be launched from any point, making it difficult to detect signs of a launch in advance. North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles from TELs and SLBMs. In addition, the SLBMs repeatedly launched in 2016 and the ballistic missile presumed to be modified from the SLBM as a ground-launched type and launched on February 12 and May 21, 2017 appear to use solid fuel. It is thus possible that North Korea is proceeding with the development of solid-fueled ballistic missiles. Generally solid fuel-propelled ballistic missiles are pre-loaded with solid fuel, and therefore, they can be launched instantly and the signs of their launch are more difficult to detect. Furthermore, they can be reloaded more quickly, and they are relatively easier to store and handle in comparison to liquid fuel-propelled missiles. In this respect, they are considered to be superior militarily. From these factors, North Korea is deemed to be aiming to enhance its surprise attack capabilities.

Fourthly, North Korea may be attempting to diversify the forms of launches. It has been confirmed that at the June 22, 2016 Musudan launch and the May 14, July 4, July 28, and November 29, 2017 launches of the ballistic missile, so-called lofted trajectories, in which missiles are launched at higher angles than nominal to high altitudes, were utilized. Generally, when a launch is made on a lofted trajectory, interception is considered to be more difficult.

Should North Korea make further progress in the development of ballistic missiles, including the verification of reentry technologies, it may come to have a one-sided understanding that it has secured strategic deterrence against the United States. Should North Korea have such a false sense of confidence and recognition regarding its deterrence, this could lead to increases and the escalation of military provocations by North Korea in the region and could create situations that are deeply worrying also for Japan.

c. Future Outlook for Ballistic Missile Development

In his “New Year’s Address” in January 2018, Chairman Kim Jong-un declared the historic accomplishment of perfecting the national nuclear forces, and called for “mass-production of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles, the power and reliability of which have already been proved to the full, to give a spur to the efforts for deploying them for action.” North Korea’s development of long-range ballistic missiles has also been covered in other publications, including the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of the United States announced in February 2018, in which it was noted that “North Korea may now be only months away from the capability to strike the United States with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.”

However, at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP in April 2018, Chairman Kim Jong-un announced the suspension of ICBM test launches. Then, at the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in June, he clearly expressed the intention to work towards denuclearization. Given these developments it will be necessary to continue to carefully monitor trends in North Korea’s ballistic missile development program.

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51 In addition, in images released together with reports by North Korean media about the visit of Chairman Kim Jong-un to the Chemical Material Institute of the Academy of Defense Science, a panel could be seen featuring the name “Pukguksong-3,” which, in view of the name “Pukguksong,” has led some people to speculate that North Korea is developing a new type of solid fuel-propelled ballistic missile.
(1) Developments Related to the Kim Jong-un Regime

After the demise of Chairman of the National Defense Commission Kim Jong-il in 2011, Kim Jong-un became the de facto head of the military, party, and the state by assuming the position of Supreme Commander of the KPA, First Secretary of the KWP, and First Chairman of the National Defense Commission by April 2012. The framework of the Kim Jong-un regime was laid out in a short period of time. Since the transition to the new regime, there has been a number of announcements of party-related meetings and decisions, and in May 2016, the Seventh KWP Congress was held for the first time since the last Congress in October 1980, 36 years earlier. These developments suggest that the state is run under the leadership of the party. Meanwhile, Chairman Kim Jong-un underscores the importance of military strength and makes frequent visits to military organizations. In this light, the Chairman is anticipated to continue to attach importance to military strength.

Following the change in regime, Chairman Kim Jong-un has conducted frequent personnel reshuffles, including reshuffles of the top three military posts of the Director of the General Political Bureau, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Minister of the People’s Armed Forces. In turn, individuals whom Chairman Kim Jong-un selected were assigned to the key party, military, and cabinet posts. In addition, in December 2013, Jang Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission and Chairman Kim Jong-un’s uncle, was executed for “plotting to overthrow the state.” It is believed that through such measures, the Chairman endeavors to strengthen and consolidate a monolithic leadership system.52 In 2014, the North Korean media stopped reporting the activities of Kim Kyong-hui, Secretary of the KWP and Kim Jong-un’s aunt. Meanwhile, the North Korean media began to report the activities of Chairman Kim Jong-un’s younger sister, Kim Yo-jong, as a senior member of the KWP.53 These developments suggest that a generational change in the leadership may be taking place among the Kim dynasty.

At the KWP Congress held in May 2016, Kim Jong-un was named to the new post of KWP Chairman. In his report on the work of the KWP Central Committee, the Chairman set out that North Korea was a “nuclear weapons state,” and said the country would consistently uphold the “Byungjin line” policy of economic development and the building of nuclear force as well as further boost its self-defensive nuclear force both in quality and quantity. In this manner, the Chairman demonstrated, both to those in and outside of the country, North Korea’s readiness to continue with its nuclear and missile development. Prior to the Congress, North Korea conducted provocations at unprecedented frequency and content, including the launch of ballistic missiles.

The holding of the KWP Congress may be an indication that North Korea has shifted into high gear by establishing the state-run governance system centered on the party and led by KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un, in terms of its organization, personnel, among other dimensions, both in name and in substance.54 At the Supreme People’s Assembly session convened in June 2016, it was decided that the National Defense Commission would be turned into the State Affairs Commission, and KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un was named Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, the new “highest position” of the “state” replacing First Chairman of the National Defense Commission. These changes are also likely to be manifestations of the governance system moving into full

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52 Following the execution of Jang Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission, the North Korean media repeatedly calls for the strengthening of the “monolithic leadership system” and “single-minded unity.” For example, an editorial in the Rodong Sinmun dated January 10, 2014 urged the people to stay cautious even of trivial phenomena and elements which erode North Korea’s single-minded unity. In May 2015, it was suggested that Hyon Yong-chol, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, may have been executed on charges of treason. The ROK National Intelligence Service reportedly briefed the National Assembly that the Minister was executed in late April 2015. In July 2015, the North Korean media introduced Pak Yong-sik, previous Deputy Director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army, with the title, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces. Additionally, since February 21, 2016, the North Korean media has introduced Ri Myong-su, previous Minister of People’s Security, as Chief of General Staff Department instead of Ri Yong-gil. Ri Yong-gil was announced as an alternate member of the KWP Politburo at the KWP Congress in May 2016.

53 According to the Korean Central Broadcasting Station, Kim Yo-jong was elected a member of the KWP Central Committee at the KWP Congress held in May 2016. The media has also shown her supporting KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un on the podium during the celebration parade following the KWP Congress. In addition, at the Second Plenum of the Seventh KWP Congress in October 2017, Kim Yo-jong was elected as an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.

54 Elections for members and alternate members of the KWP central leadership agencies (e.g., KWP Central Committee and KWP Politburo) were held during the KWP Congress. Pak Pong-ju, Premier, and Choe Ryong-hae, KWP Secretary, were newly elected as KWP Politburo Standing Committee members to form a five-member Standing Committee including: Kim Jong-un, KWP Chairman; Kim Yong-nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly; and Hwang Pyong-so, Director of the General Political Bureau. All five members of the KWP Politburo Standing Committee are not genuine military personnel. Furthermore, the ranks of military personnel have fallen within the KWP Politburo, and Premier Pak Pong-ju has been added as a member of the KWP Central Military Commission. It is pointed out that these aspects show that a KWP-led governance system is shifting into high gear.
(2) Economic Conditions

In the economic domain, North Korea has been facing chronic stagnation and energy and food shortages in recent years due to the vulnerability of its socialist planned economy and diminishing economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War. Especially for food, it is deemed that North Korea is still forced to rely on food assistance from overseas. Following North Korea’s various provocations including the nuclear test in January 2016 and launch of a ballistic missile disguised as a “satellite” in February 2016, the ROK decided to completely suspend operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which makes up over 99% of inter-Korean trade. Furthermore, the strengthening of sanctions by countries including Japan and the United States, and the sanctions of the related UN Security Council resolutions in response to the implementation of nuclear tests and missile launches by North Korea can be assumed to have had a certain effect, when considered together with the severe economic situation of North Korea. Accordingly, if China, North Korea’s largest trading partner, and other relevant countries continue to rigorously implement sanctions an even more severe economic situation could beset North Korea.

To tackle a host of economic difficulties, North Korea has made attempts at limited improvement measures and some changes to its economic management systems, and promotes the establishment of economic development zones and the enlargement of the discretion of plants and other entities over production and sales plans. Furthermore, at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP in April 2018, in addition to declaring the “Byungjin line” was successfully carried out, North Korea declared that among other things, it had determined to “concentrate all efforts on building a powerful socialist economy and markedly improving the standard of people’s living through the mobilization of all human and material resources of the country.” These all suggest that North Korea is placing importance on rebuilding its economy. Nonetheless, North Korea is unlikely to carry out any structural reforms that could lead to the destabilization of its current ruling system, and thus, various challenges confront the fundamental improvement of its current economic situation.

In addition, the possibility has been noted that North Korea could be evading the UNSC sanctions by engaging in smuggling operations, and since the beginning of 2018, MSDF assets patrol aircraft including have confirmed numerous cases in which North Korean-flagged tankers have drawn alongside foreign tankers in international waters. After comprehensive analysis, the Government of Japan has determined that there is a strong possibility that these vessels have been conducting ship-to-ship transfers in the high seas, which is forbidden under the terms of UNSC resolutions. See Fig. 1-2-2-5 (Sanctions against North Korea based on UN Security Council Resolutions)

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55. After the Supreme People’s Assembly session in June 2016, the media introduced the “Minister of the People’s Armed Forces,” who is considered equivalent to the minister of defense, as the “Minister (Secretary) of the People’s Armed Forces,” raising the possibility that the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces has been reorganized into the Ministry (Department) of the People’s Armed Forces.

56. In June 2017, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) designated North Korea as a country requiring external assistance for food.

57. For example, North Korea conducted a so-called currency revaluation (decreasing the denomination of its currency) at the end of 2009. The currency revaluation is said to have led to economic disorder, such as price escalation due to shortfall of supply, which in turn increased social unrest.

58. During the plenary meeting of the KWP Central Committee on March 31, 2013, KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un instructed the establishment of economic development zones in each province. Pursuant to these instructions, the Economic Development Zone Law was enacted in May of that year. To date, 21 economic development zones have been established.

59. While the details of the policy are not necessarily clear, it is understood that in the industrial sector, entities would be able to independently make production decisions and conduct sales outside the scope of the national plan, as well as determine employee remuneration and benefits based on the situation of the entities. In the agriculture sector, an autonomous business system would be introduced at the household level. It has been said that 1,000 pyeong (1 pyeong = approx. 3.3 m²) of land would be allocated per person, with 40% of the agricultural products going to the state and 60% going to individuals.

60. For details of these cases and information about Japan’s response, please refer to Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2.
5 Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with the United States

The U.S. Trump administration announced that it would deal with North Korea’s nuclear and missile issue based on the concept of “all options are on the table,” and increased its presence in this region by means such as three carrier strike groups, including a Ronald Reagan carrier strike group conducting joint training in the Western Pacific Ocean in November 2017. In addition, in the Joint Statement by then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense James Mattis, and Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats released in April, 2017, it was declared that the U.S. policy towards North Korea aims to pressure North Korea into dismantling its nuclear, ballistic missile, and proliferation programs by tightening economic sanctions and pursuing diplomatic measures with its allies and regional partners. In August 2017, then-Secretary of State Tillerson and Defense Secretary Mattis issued a joint statement, in which they reiterated that the United States would apply pressure towards achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and that an immediate cessation of nuclear and missile tests would be required in order for the United States to enter into negotiations with North Korea.

In response, North Korea repeated its previous assertions that developing its own nuclear deterrent capability was necessary in order to respond to the nuclear threat posed by the United States, and continued to engage in provocative rhetoric and behavior. In addition, North Korea reacted sharply to such actions as U.S.-ROK combined exercises, alleging that such activities were a manifestation of the “hostile policy” of the U.S. towards North Korea and repeatedly voicing strong criticism against the ROK, including a statement in October that if the United States would apply pressure towards achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and that an immediate cessation of nuclear and missile tests would be required in order for the United States to enter into negotiations with North Korea.

On June 12 the historic first-ever U.S.-North Korea summit meeting was held and both sides confirmed that they would join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Chairman Kim Jong-un made clear his intention to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and confirmed that negotiations would continue with the United States. Furthermore, in a press conference following the summit meeting, President Trump stated that North Korea had agreed to destroy a missile engine testing site. Based on the outcomes of the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting it is now necessary to work closely with the United States and the ROK and cooperate with the international community, including China and Russia, to elicit concrete actions from North Korea towards the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

(2) Relations with the Republic of Korea

The administration of President Moon Jae-in inaugurated in May 2017 has expressed its position on North Korea that, while putting emphasis on inter-Korean relations through dialogue, it also indicated a stance of responding resolutely through sanctions and pressure to provocations by North Korea. In fact, based on the policy of responding resolutely to provocations, in December 2017 the Moon administration announced a new set of ROK sanctions against North Korea. North Korea also continued to engage in repeated provocative rhetoric and behavior against the ROK, including a statement in October that if war were to break out on the Korean Peninsula, the entire ROK would be reduced to ashes. These events caused inter-Korean tensions to rise.

On the other hand, in his “New Year’s Address” in January 2018, Chairman Kim Jong-un indicated North Korea’s desire to participate in the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games and demonstrated a willingness to improve inter-Korean relations. Following this, on January 9, a North-South High Level Officials’ Meeting was held, and through frequent inter-Korean consultations thereafter preparations were made for North Korea to participate in the Winter Olympic Games. During the Games, Kim Yo-jong visited the ROK, which was followed

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61 For example, on August 8, 2017, a spokesperson for the KPA Strategic Rocket Forces announced that North Korea was carefully examining the operational plan for making an enveloping fire in the areas around Guam with its “medium- to long-range strategic ballistic rocket Hwasong-12.” In addition, in a statement by the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission on September 22, Chairman Kim Jong-un noted that he was “giving serious consideration to exercising the highest level of hardline countermeasures in history.”

62 On this point, Rodong Sinmun dated March 24, 2017 states that “our Strategic Forces have also routinized ballistic rocket launch exercises” in response to the U.S.-ROK joint exercise.

63 According to an announcement by the ROK, in the meeting North Korea agreed to hold an inter-Korean summit meeting at the end of April and establish a hotline between the two leaders. In addition, it was reported by the ROK that North Korea had indicated that it would have no reason to keep nuclear weapons if the military threat to the North was eliminated and its security guaranteed, that it was prepared to engage in dialogue with the United States towards denuclearization and with a view to normalizing relations, and that while dialogue is ongoing it would not resume provocations such as nuclear or missile tests. North Korea was also reported as expressing understanding for the regular U.S.-ROK joint military exercises.
by a meeting in March between a delegation headed by a special envoy from the ROK and Chairman Kim Jong-un, which served to facilitate preparations for the inter-Korean summit meeting. The inter-Korean summit meeting was held on April 27, resulting in the issuance of the Panmunjom Declaration, which confirmed among other matters that the two countries agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain, and confirmed the common goal of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. In addition, in a second inter-Korean summit meeting held on May 26, Chairman Kim Jong-un reiterated his desire for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Panmunjom Declaration also notes that the two countries will aim to declare an end to the Korean War\(^{64}\) and that President Moon Jae-in had agreed to visit Pyongyang in the autumn of 2018. Future developments in inter-Korean relations will be closely watched.

(3) Relations with China

The China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which was concluded in 1961, is still in force.\(^{65}\) In addition, China is currently North Korea’s biggest trade partner. In 2016, trade volume between China and North Korea was very large, accounting for approximately 90% of North Korea’s total trade (excluding trade between North Korea and the ROK),\(^{66}\) suggesting North Korea’s dependence on China.

With regard to the situation in North Korea and its nuclear issue, China has expressed support for

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\(^{64}\) The Korean War began in June 1950 and in July 1953 an armistice agreement was concluded. In the Panmunjom Declaration, the two countries announced that they would engage in consultations with a view to declaring an end to the War by the end of this year, which is the 65th anniversary of the Armistice, and turning the armistice into a peace treaty.

\(^{65}\) It includes a provision that if either of the signatories (China and North Korea) is attacked and enters into a state of war, the other would make every effort to immediately provide military and other assistance.

\(^{66}\) According to an announcement by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA).
denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and solving problems through dialogue and consultations. While it has endorsed the series of UNSC Resolutions, which strengthen sanctions on North Korea.\textsuperscript{67} It has also stated that sanctions alone will be unable to achieve a fundamental solution to the nuclear issue and that a solution should be found through dialogue and consultations. On this point China has repeatedly referred to “dual suspension,” by which it means that North Korea should temporarily suspend nuclear and missile test activities and that the United States and the ROK should temporarily suspend joint military exercises.

China is a vital political and economic partner for North Korea and maintains a degree of influence on the country. Although it has been noted that China-North Korea relations had deteriorated due to North Korea’s repeated nuclear and ballistic missile tests, in March 2018 the first-ever China-North Korea summit meeting under the leadership of Chairman Kim Jong-un was held,\textsuperscript{68} in which the two leaders agreed to further develop bilateral relations and also for President Xi Jinping to make a visit to North Korea. Chairman Kim Jong-un made another visit to China in May and held a second meeting with President Xi, in which it is reported that issues such as the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula were discussed. Chairman Kim Jong-un made a third visit to China in June, and is believed to have explained the outcomes of the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting to President Xi and engaged in an exchange of opinions. On the other hand, North Korea does not necessarily adopt actions which are in line with the position of China over nuclear and ballistic missile issues. Furthermore, China has opposed the implementation of excessive sanctions on North Korea that could lead to destabilizing the Korean Peninsula. Given such circumstances, North Korea-China relations and China’s influence on North Korea require continued attention.

(4) Relations with Russia
Concerning North Korea’s nuclear issue, Russia, along with China, has expressed support for the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Following the sixth nuclear test conducted by North Korea in September 2017, Russia condemned North Korea’s nuclear test for violating UNSC Resolutions, but also stated that measures that would escalate tensions should be avoided. Nonetheless, Russia approved UNSC Resolution 2375, which was adopted in September 2017. Furthermore, although Russia endorsed UNSC Resolution 2397, adopted in December 2017, it emphasized that pressure on North Korea should make way for dialogue and negotiations.

Following the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in June, Russia has continued to demonstrate an active stance in supporting political and diplomatic processes in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula and has called on relevant countries to give consideration to consultations in a multilateral format.

(5) Relations with Other Countries
Since 1999, North Korea has made efforts to establish relations with a series of West European countries and others, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with European countries\textsuperscript{69} and participation in the ARF ministerial meetings. Meanwhile, it has been reported that North Korea has cooperative relationships with countries such as Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Cuba in military affairs including arms trade and military technology transfer.

In recent years, North Korea is deemed to be strengthening its relations with African countries, with North Korean senior officials paying visits to African countries.\textsuperscript{70} The underlying purposes for enhancing relations with these countries include the usual objective of deepening political and economic cooperation. In addition, it appears that North Korea hopes to acquire foreign currency by expanding its arms trade and military

\textsuperscript{67} On January 5, 2018, the Ministry of Commerce of China announced that based on UNSC Resolution 2397, China would implement measures from January 6, including restrictions on export of crude oil to North Korea and restrictions on export of refined petroleum products.

\textsuperscript{68} According to a statement released by China, in the China-North Korea summit meeting Chairman Kim Jong-un stated that the issue of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula could be realized if the ROK and the United States would take phased measures in step with North Korea in order to realize peace and reconciliation. This visit to China was the first overseas visit made by Chairman Kim Jong-un since assuming the leadership of North Korea.

\textsuperscript{69} For example, the United Kingdom and Germany established diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2000 and 2001, respectively.

\textsuperscript{70} For example, in May 2016, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly Kim Yong-nam attended the inauguration ceremony of the President of Equatorial Guinea. He held talks with the President, as well as with the leaders of the Republic of Chad, the Gabonese Republic, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the Republic of Guinea, and the Republic of Mali who were attending the inauguration ceremony.
cooperation with African countries – activities which are becoming increasingly difficult due to sanctions based on UN Security Council resolutions and political turmoil in the Middle East.

It is actually the case that transactions that violate the terms of UNSC Resolutions have been observed, and the possibility that North Korea’s illegal activities could provide a funding source for nuclear and ballistic missile development is a cause for concern. At the same time, however, following the adoption of the series of UNSC Resolutions in 2017, various countries in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia are reviewing their diplomatic and economic relations with North Korea.

In February 2017, a North Korean man was murdered in Malaysia and the Malaysian Government later confirmed that the man was Kim Jong-nam. The Malaysia police also announced that VX, whose production and use are banned by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention), was detected from his body.

The final report of the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts assisting the North Korea Sanctions Committee released in March 2018 makes references to the export of weapons and related military equipment to Eritrea, the export of surface-to-air missiles to Mozambique, and the repair and renewal of surface-to-air missile systems and air defense radar in Tanzania.

In May 2017, the Moon Jae-in administration was inaugurated in the ROK. With regard to its North Korea policy, while on the one hand the administration announced that it would put emphasis on improving inter-Korean relations through dialogue, it also indicated a stance of responding resolutely through sanctions and pressure to provocations by North Korea. How the North Korea policy of the Moon administration will impact inter-Korean relations will continue to require close attention.

The U.S. Forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the ceasefire of the Korean War. The ROK has established very close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. Forces Korea have been playing an important role in securing peace and stability of the region such as playing a vital role in deterring the outbreak of large-scale armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

The ROK has a defensive weakness, namely, its capital Seoul, which has a population of approximately 10 million, is situated close to the DMZ. The ROK has set the National Defense Objective as follows: “to protect the country from external military threats and invasions, to support peaceful unification, and to contribute to regional stability and world peace.” As one of the “external military threats,” the ROK, in its Defense White Paper, used to designate North Korea as the “main enemy.” However, the ROK presently uses the expression, “the North Korean regime and its armed forces...will remain as our enemies.”

The ROK has continued to undertake reforms of its national defense. In recent years, in August 2012, in light of the sinking of the ROK patrol boat and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010, the Defense Reform Basic Plan (2012-2030) was released by the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK, which included enhancing deterrence capabilities against North Korea and making the military even more efficient.

In March 2014, the Defense Reform Basic Plan (2014-
2030) was unveiled, which included in its scope the long-term development of defense capabilities in order to respond to potential threats after the unification of the Korean Peninsula while securing response capabilities against the threat from North Korea. In February 2017, it announced the Defense Reform Basic Plan (2014-2030) (rev.1), which, while maintaining the objectives and underlying tone of Defense Reform Basic Plan (2014-2030), emphasizes having readiness capability for simultaneous local provocations and all-out war, while giving top priority to bolstering the organization and military power for responding to nuclear, missile and other asymmetrical threats from North Korea.

### 3 Military Posture of the ROK

The ROK’s military capacity is as follows. The ground forces consist of 22 army divisions and 2 marine divisions, totaling 520,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of 240 vessels with a total displacement of approximately 215,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy combined) consist of approximately 640 combat aircraft.

The ROK has been modernizing its military forces—not only its Army but also its Navy and Air Force—in order to establish an omnidirectional defense posture to deal with future potential threats, not least threats from North Korea. The Navy has been introducing submarines, large transport ships, and domestically built destroyers. The Air Force is currently promoting a program for the installation of the F-35A as a next-generation fighter with stealth property.

In November 2017, the ROK Government announced a revision of its missile guidelines, which stipulate the range of ballistic missiles it possesses; the revision included the elimination of warhead weight limit restrictions on ballistic missiles, in order to enhance the deterrence against military provocation by North Korea. Furthermore, to address North Korean nuclear and missile threats, in addition to expanding the missile capabilities of the ROK Forces, the ROK is engaging in efforts to build a Korean-type three-axis system, comprised of the following elements: a system known as “Kill Chain” to conduct swift preemptive strikes using missiles and other assets, the indigenous missile defense system (Korea Air and Missile Defense [KAMD]), and the Korea Massive Punishment & Retaliation (KMPR) concept.

In recent years, the ROK has actively promoted equipment export, which reached approximately US$3.2 billion on a contract value basis in 2015. Since 2006, the amount has increased by nearly 13-fold in 11 years. It is reported that export items have diversified to include communication electronics, aircraft, and naval vessels.

Defense spending in FY2018 (regular budget) increased by about 7.0% from the previous fiscal year to nearly KRW 43,158,1 trillion, marking the 19th consecutive year of increases since 2000.

### 4 U.S.-ROK Alliance and U.S. Forces Korea

The United States and the ROK have taken various steps to deepen the U.S.-ROK Alliance in recent years.

While regularly confirming the strengthening of the U.S.-ROK Alliance at the summit level, as specific undertakings, the two countries signed the U.S.-ROK Counter-Provocation Plan for dealing with North Korea’s
proclamations in March 2013, and approved the Tailored Deterrence Strategy, designed to enhance deterrence against North Korean nuclear and other WMD threats, at the 45th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October of the same year. At the 46th SCM in October 2014, the two countries agreed on “Concepts and Principles of ROK-U.S. Alliance Comprehensive Counter-missile Operations (4D Operational Concept)” to tackle North Korean ballistic missile threats. At the 47th SCM in November 2015, the implementation guidance on the 4D Operational Concept was approved. Additionally, after North Korea went ahead with its nuclear test in January 2016, the United States and the ROK began formal talks regarding deployment of THAAD to U.S. Forces Korea in February 2016 and officially decided in July to deploy them. At the end of April 2017 part of the THAAD system was deployed to the designated site for operations and in September four additional launching pads were deployed, concluding the temporary deployment of THAAD. In addition, in a U.S.-ROK summit meeting also held in September, the enhanced deployment of U.S. strategic assets in and around the ROK on a rotational basis was agreed. Furthermore, it was reported that in the regular U.S.-ROK joint military exercise conducted in April 2018, around 300,000 ROK Forces personnel and around 23,700 U.S. Forces personnel participated, as well as amphibious assault ships and F-35B fighters. In June the U.S. Department of Defense announced that the U.S.-ROK joint military exercise “Freedom Guardian” planned for August had been suspended, along with two U.S.-ROK Marine Exchange Program training exercises scheduled to occur within the next three months.

At the same time, the two countries have worked to deal with such issues as the transition of OPCON to the ROK and the realignment of U.S. Forces Korea. For the transition of OPCON to the ROK, the roadmap for the transfer “Strategic Alliance 2015” was established in October 2010. Aiming to complete the transition by December 1, 2015, the two countries have reviewed the approach of transitioning from the existing combined defense arrangement of the U.S. and ROK Forces, to a new joint defense arrangement led by the ROK Forces and supported by the U.S. Forces. Nevertheless, based on the increasing seriousness of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, the two sides decided at the 46th SCM to re-postpone the transition of OPCON, and to adopt a conditions-based approach, i.e., implementing the transition when conditions such as the ROK Forces’ enhanced capabilities are met. The three-axis system, which is deemed to be the central challenge for enhancing

83 The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff has announced that the plan contains consultative procedures as well as robust and thorough response methodologies for the United States and the ROK to take joint responses in the event of a North Korean provocation. However, the details of the plan have not been made public.

84 According to the Joint Communiqué of the 45th ROK-U.S. SCM, this strategy establishes a strategic framework for tailoring deterrence against key North Korean threat scenarios across armistice and wartime, and strengthens the partnership between the United States and the ROK to maximize their deterrent effects. However, the details have not been made public.

85 According to the Joint Communiqué of the 46th SCM, the “Concepts and Principles” are designed to detect, defend, disrupt, and destroy missile threats, including nuclear and biochemical warheads. However, the details have not been made public. Furthermore, according to the “Strategic Digest 2015” of the U.S. Forces in the ROK, the “Concepts and Principles” apply from peacetime to war, and will guide operational decision-making, planning, exercises, capability development, and acquisitions.

86 A ballistic missile defense system designed to intercept short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase from the ground. It captures and intercepts targets at high altitudes outside of the atmosphere or in the upper atmosphere. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2 regarding the ballistic missile defense system.

87 The United States and the ROK have had the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to operate the U.S.-ROK combined defense system to deter wars on the Korean Peninsula and to perform effective combined operations in the case of a contingency. Under the U.S.-ROK combined defense system, OPCON over the ROK Forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, who concurrently serves as the Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in a contingency.
the capabilities of the ROK Forces, is scheduled for completion in the early 2020s. At the 49th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October 2017, it was decided that the United States and the ROK would jointly supplement the conditions-based OPCON transfer plan by the time of the next meeting. Future developments will continue to be monitored.

With regard to the realignment of the U.S. Forces Korea, an agreement had been reached in 2003 on the relocation of the U.S. Forces’ Yongsan Garrison located in the center of Seoul to the Pyeontaek area, south of Seoul, and on the relocation of the U.S. Forces stationed north of the Han River to the south of the river.

Subsequently, however, the agreement has been partially revised, due to various factors, including: the relocation to the Pyeontaek area being delayed due to logistical reasons such as increases in relocation costs; in relation to the postponement of the transition of OPCON, it has been necessary for some U.S. Forces personnel to remain at Yongsan Garrison; and it was decided that the counter-fires forces of U.S. Forces Korea would remain in their location north of the Han River to counter the threat of North Korea’s long-range rocket artillery. In July 2017 the U.S. Eighth Army headquarters relocated to the Pyeontaek area, and in June 2018 the headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea and United Nations Command also relocated to the same area. The realignment of U.S. Forces Korea could have a significant impact on U.S. and ROK defense postures on the Korean Peninsula, and as such it will be necessary to follow future developments closely.

(1) Relations with China
China and the ROK have made continuous efforts to strengthen their relations. Meanwhile, outstanding issues have emerged between China and the ROK.

The “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” (ADIZ) issued by China in November 2013 overlapped in some areas with the ROK’s ADIZ. Furthermore, it included the airspace above the sea areas surrounding the reef, Ieodo (Chinese name: Suyan Rock), regarding which China and the ROK have conflicting claims to the jurisdictional authority over the exclusive economic zone. Against this backdrop, the ROK Government announced the expansion of its own ADIZ in December 2013 and enforced it from the same month. In addition, China has protested that the deployment of THAAD to U.S. Forces Korea would undermine China’s strategic security interests. On this point, in October 2017 the governments of China and the ROK announced that they had agreed to utilize military channels to reach a mutual understanding relating to China’s concerns about THAAD. In December 2017 President Moon Jae-in made his first visit to China since his inauguration and the two leaders agreed to establish a hotline and continue to maintain close communication, as well as vitalizing high-level strategic dialogue.

(2) Relations with Russia
Military exchanges have been under way between the ROK and Russia in recent years, including exchanges among high-ranking military officials. The two countries have also agreed on cooperation in the areas of military technology, defense industry, and military supplies. In 2008, they agreed to upgrade the bilateral relations to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” In March 2012, the two countries held the first ROK-Russia defense strategic dialogue and agreed to regularize the dialogue. In November 2013, President Vladimir Putin visited the ROK, and a joint statement was issued in which the two sides agreed to strengthen dialogue in the areas of politics and security.

On the other hand, Russia opposes the deployment of THAAD by U.S. Forces Korea for the reason that it is part of the U.S. missile defense network and harms the strategic stability of the region.

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The United States intends to consolidate and relocate the bases of the U.S. Forces Korea which are scattered across the ROK, in order to ensure stable stationing conditions for U.S. Forces Korea and a balanced development of ROK land. The agreement between the United States and the ROK includes: (1) an agreement to conduct the relocation to south of the Han River in two stages (June 2003); and (2) the withdrawal of 12,500 of the nearly 37,500 personnel out of the ROK (October 2004). The United States has thus been transforming its posture in accordance with these agreements. However, at the U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in April 2008, the two countries agreed to maintain the current 28,500 as the appropriate troop level. Since then, the two countries have continued to affirm that maintaining this troop level would be appropriate.
China, the world’s most populous country, has a vast landmass surrounded by a long borderline shared with 14 countries as well as a long coastline. China is also a nation with various races, religions, and languages. China, with a long history, has been shaping and maintaining a distinct culture and civilization. China’s pride in its unique history and semi-colonial experience in and after the 19th century are driving its desire for a strong nation and fueling its nationalism.

In recent years, China has increased its presence in the international community. For example, China takes a proactive stance towards efforts in non-traditional security areas, making personnel and financial contributions to UN PKOs and sending its ships continuously for counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, China has participated proactively in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. These activities have been highly appreciated by the international community. There continues to be high expectations for China to recognize its responsibility in the international community, accept and comply with international norms, and play an active role in a more cooperative manner on regional and global issues.

China faces various problems domestically including human rights issues. The spread of bribery and corruption among the central and local leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has become a significant political problem. Furthermore, China’s rapid economic growth has brought with it emerging problems such as regional disparities between urban-rural and coastal inland regions, the issue of the tax system that facilitates these disparities, wealth gaps among urban residents, inflation, environmental pollution, and lack of agricultural and industrial water. More recently, China has tended to slowdown in its economic growth. In the future, China is also expected to face issues associated with the rapid aging of the population, including pension and other issues related to the social security system. The Chinese Government has been tightening its control over society as these potentially destabilizing factors to the government administration expand and diversify. However, it is suggested that controlling activities of the masses becomes increasingly difficult with the spread of the Internet, coupled with other factors. Additionally, China confronts issues concerning ethnic minorities in the country, with their staging protests and carrying out campaigns in pursuit of separation and independence in the Tibet Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and elsewhere. In the meantime, since 2014, China enacted laws that covers not only security from external threats, but also includes culture and society as a part of security. Those laws include the Anti-Spy Law in November 2014, a new National Security Law in July 2015, an Anti-Terrorism Law in January 2016 to strengthen state control, a strengthened Law on Management of Domestic Activities of Overseas Non-governmental Organizations in January 2017, and the National Intelligence Law in June 2017 to strengthen domestic espionage prevention mechanisms under its “holistic view of national security.”

The “anti-corruption” movement following the launch of the Xi Jinping leadership has made inroads under the policy of cracking down on both “tigers” and “flies,” with severe charges of corruption on people including prominent leaders of the Party and military, such as Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang.

1 According to an announcement by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the full year of 2017 was 6.9% compared to the previous year. The figure exceeded the target of “around 6.5%” set by the Chinese government, but remained low, similar to the previous year 2016 when the growth rate marked 6.7%.
former CPC Politburo member Sun Zhengcai, former CMC Vice Chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, and former CMC members Zhang Yang and Fang Fenghui. In his remarks at the 19th National Congress of the CPC in October 2017, General Secretary Xi spoke about “strict governance over the Party,” stating that “corruption is the greatest threat our Party faces” as well as suggesting that he will continue to crack down on corruption within the Party and the military. Through these developments, the Party has demonstrated its intention and made unprecedented efforts in recent years to further bolster the power foundations of General Secretary Xi in the CPC. For example, it was decided at the 19th National Congress to incorporate the “thoughts,” namely the political philosophy, under the name of General Secretary Xi Jinping into the Party constitution as a guideline. This was the first time since Chairman Mao Zedong that a leader had their name in a guideline before retirement. Moreover, at the first plenary session of the 13th National People’s Congress held in March 2018, a resolution was adopted to revise the constitution and abolish term limits for China’s presidents, which indicates that Xi Jinping is further consolidating power as president. Impacts on the military of these actions and future relevant developments are to be watched for.

2 Military Affairs

1 General Situation

For over the past 25 years, China has sustained large increases in its defense budget, and has broadly and rapidly reinforced its military forces, mainly its nuclear and missile forces as well as its Navy and Air Force. Along with such efforts, it is understood that China is strengthening its so-called “A2/AD” capabilities.

In addition to traditional strengthening of military capabilities, over the past few years, in particular, China has been trying to develop a new form of practical operational capabilities. The military reforms with a goal of creating a practical military, have been steadily and rapidly making progress since its beginning at the end of December 2015. Among them, China emphasizes information warfare to securely obtain information superiority as one of its asymmetric military capabilities. China is considered to be rapidly developing its capabilities in electronic warfare and cyberspace with the aim of confusing enemy command systems in conflict situations. In addition, China is working to improve joint operational capabilities, enhance capabilities for distant power projection, conduct practical training, cultivate and acquire personnel for operations of informatized forces, improve the foundation of its domestic defense industry, and ensure law-based governance on the military.

The Chinese military leadership has emphasized to continue to improve the Chinese military’s operational capabilities, exhibiting the results of its recent 5-year activities such as the “struggle” against the Senkaku Island, which is an inherent territory of Japan, the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ),” and its Navy and Air Force’s “regular patrols.” Although it is not necessarily clear what specific activities these examples indicate, there is a high probability that it is not only planning to make such activities routine, but also further expand and intensify them both qualitatively and quantitatively, given that the Chinese military is rapidly expanding and intensifying activities in the areas surrounding Japan, such as the East China Sea and western Pacific Ocean. The policy stated at the 19th National Congress in October 2017 to speed up by 15 years the achievement of the third stage of the “three-stage development strategy” was declared in the past, can be considered a decision based on development exceeding China’s own assumptions on the pace of the modernization of the military and military activities. It is possible that military modernization efforts to strengthen the practical operational capabilities of the military will be further accelerated, considering General Secretary Xi
Jinping’s strengthening of his power foundation within the CPC and further strengthening of his authority as the head of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of Communist Party of China.

China, particularly over maritime issues where its interests conflict with others, continues to act in an assertive manner based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing international order, including attempts to change the status quo by coercion, where there is a potential danger to lead to unexpected situations. Additionally, as for the acts to change the status quo by coercion, China remains poised to fulfill its unilateral demands without compromise, including making steady efforts to turn its acts into faits accompli.

At the same time, China recently has also shown interest in efforts to avoid and prevent unexpected contingencies in sea areas and in airspace.

Considering these situations, there is a strong concern, in international society including Japan, over the issues including the rapid modernization of the military capabilities and improvement of the operational capabilities as well as the following China’s unilateral escalation of activities surrounding Japan, together with the lack of transparency in its military and security affairs. Accordingly, it is necessary to pay close attention to the issues.

# Defense Policies

China regards that the buildup of strong defense capabilities and powerful military forces constitutes a strategic mission to modernize the state, and that it ensures the security of the state under “peaceful development.” China considers the main goal and mission of national defense policies as: to adapt to the new changes in security environment; to accomplish the strategic guideline of active defense to realize the CCP’s goal of building a strong military; to accelerate the modernization of national defense and the military forces; to firmly protect its national sovereignty, security, and interests as a result of development; and to provide strong assurances for realizing the “Chinese dream” of the great revival of the peoples of China. China contends that these defense policies are defensive in nature. Furthermore, China seems to emphasize not only physical means but also non-physical means in military affairs and warfare. It has incorporated the concept of “Three Warfares” — “Media Warfare,” “Psychological Warfare,” and “Legal Warfare” — into the tasks of the political work of the military. In addition, China has set forth a policy of close coordination of military struggle with political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legal endeavors.

China has employed a policy to ensure to establish the “system of modern military power with Chinese characteristics,” aiming at informatizing the military based on its military strategy to follow the development trend of the military all over the world observed in the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Iraq War and so on, and to win informatized local wars. Dealing with a Taiwan contingency is believed to be a top priority in China’s efforts to strengthen the military forces; more specifically, improving its capabilities to hinder the independence of Taiwan and foreign military support for it. Furthermore, in recent years, China is working actively to acquire capabilities for missions other than dealing with a Taiwan contingency, and is steadily enhancing operational capabilities in more distant waters.

As for future indicators of the modernization of the military, in his remarks to the 19th National Congress in October 2017, General Secretary Xi Jinping proclaimed the goals of seeing that mechanization is basically achieved, IT application has come a long way and strategic capabilities have seen a big improvement by the

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3 For example, regarding the so-called “nine-dash line” asserted by China in the South China Sea, “historic rights” claimed by China were rejected by the Philippines-China arbitration (July 2016). Also, in recent years, China continues to use its own interpretations, such as those of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It has been noted that China is developing arguments that attempt to restrict reportedly military activities of other countries in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). For instance, the Chinese government announced in a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 2003 to add Media, Psychological, and Legal Warfares to the PLA’s mission. They are collectively referred to as the “Three Warfares.” U.S. DoD explains these warfares as follows: (1) Media Warfare is aiming at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build public and international support for China’s military actions and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing policies perceived to be adverse to China’s interests; (2) Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through psychological operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military and supporting civilian personnel; and (3) Legal Warfare uses international and domestic laws to gain international support and manage possible repercussions of China’s military actions.

4 The strategic concept of active defense is seen as the essence of the CCP’s military strategic concept. It upholds the principles of defense, self-defense, and “post-emptive strike” (suppress the adversary after it attacks), and maintains that “We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.”

5 See the defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015).
year 2020, that by 2035 the modernization of its national defense and its forces is basically completed, and that by the mid-21st century the people’s armed forces have been fully transformed into world-class forces. These goals are said to be ahead of the target of the third stage of the “Three Stage Development Strategy,” namely the basic modernization of the national defense and the forces by the middle of the 21st century, and it appears that on further acceleration of military power is to be seen as China’s power grows.

3 Military Transparency

China has not disclosed specific information such as possession of weapons, procurement goals and past procurements, organization and locations of major units, records of main military operations and exercises, and a detailed breakdown of its national defense budget. Moreover, China has neither set out a clear and specific future vision of its military strengthening, nor ensured adequate transparency of its decision-making process in relation to military and security affairs.

China has released defense white papers including “China’s National Defense” nearly every two years since 1998. China also conducts numerous dialogues with national defense authorities of other countries. A spokesperson at the Chinese Ministry of National Defense has been giving monthly press conferences since April 2011. In November 2013, the position of spokesperson was newly established at seven departments, including the Navy and Air Force. Such moves can be perceived on the one hand as efforts that contribute to the improvement of the transparency of military forces, but on the other hand as efforts to strengthen “Media Warfare.”

However, China has not provided a detailed breakdown of its national defense spending. Moreover, in China’s defense white papers released after 2013, the contents have included limited topics. The papers has made no reference to national defense spending that was described in previous defense white papers, and the overall description has decreased. In this respect, as transparency is declining, China has not yet achieved the levels of transparency expected of a responsible nation in the international community.

Incidents have been occurring that incite concerns over China’s military decision-making and actions, including Chinese explanations different from the actual facts. For example, details have yet to be disclosed regarding the causes of the Chinese nuclear-powered submarine’s submerged navigation in Japan’s territorial waters in November 2004 although it constitutes a breach of international law. Furthermore, with respect to the incidents such as that of a Chinese naval vessel directing its firecontrol radar at an MSDF destroyer in January 2013, both the Chinese Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave explanations which were inconsistent with the facts; in this case they have denied the use of the radar itself. With regard to the incident in which Chinese fighters flew abnormally close to MSDF and ASDF aircraft (May and June 2014), the Chinese Ministry of National Defense gave explanations that were contrary to the truth; it claimed that Japanese aircraft “entered the airspace for the Chinese drills without reporting to China and conducted dangerous acts.” Particularly in 2016, China repeatedly made claims that are contrary to the fact. In the case where SDF aircraft scrambled against Chinese aircraft, China claimed that the SDF aircraft “conducted interference at close distance and shot IR flares, endangering the safety of the Chinese aircraft and its crew.” The submerged transit of a Chinese Navy submarine through Japan’s contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands was confirmed in January 2018, but China did not acknowledge this. In recent years, amid the significant changes in the environment surrounding the China’s military, including advances in military specialization and diversification of missions associated with military strengthening, some see that relations between the CCP leadership and the PLA have become increasingly complex. Others opine that the military’s influential power on foreign policy decisions has been changing. Attention is to be paid to such situations also in terms of crisis management.

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6 See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4 for examples of dialogue with Japan.
7 The seven departments are: then PLA General Political Department; then PLA General Logistics Department; then PLA General Armaments Department; PLA Navy; PLA Air Force; then PLA Second Artillery Corps; and People’s Armed Police.
8 The defense white papers “China’s National Defense in 2008” and “China’s National Defense in 2010” provided a breakdown of personnel expenses, training and maintenance costs, and equipment costs for the active force, reserve force, and militia, limited to the FY2007 and FY2009 defense budget expenditures, respectively, but has not offered an explanation of them recently.
9 For example, on December 10, 2016, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced, “When Chinese Air Force aircraft mobilized for regular blue water training in the Western Pacific and passed through the Miyako Strait (sic) airspace, the Japanese SDF mobilized two F-15 fighters and conducted interference against the Chinese aircraft at close distance and shot IR flares, endangering the safety of the Chinese aircraft and its crew.” On October 28 of the same year, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense made a similar announcement. See Part 2-6 (3) of this section.
10 When asked about the submarine’s transit at a regular press conference held by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 16 2018, the spokesperson replied, “I do not have information about the circumstances of submarines.”
Chinese false explanations are also evident in China’s coercive, as well as rapid and large-scale development on features in the South China Sea. At the press conference after the U.S.-China Summit Meeting in September 2015, President Xi Jinping stated, “China does not have any intention to pursue militarization” in the South China Sea, but has been advancing militarization.

As China’s influence in the international community has risen politically, economically, and militarily, other countries are closely following China’s moves. In order to allay their concerns over China, it is becoming more important for China to explain its military activities according to the facts and improve the transparency of its national defense policy and military capabilities. It is strongly hoped that China will increase transparency concerning its military affairs by such efforts as disclosing specific and accurate information on its defense policies and military capabilities.

China announced that its national defense budget for FY2018 was approximately 1,107 billion yuan. This initial budget amount represented a growth of approximately 8.3% (approximately 84.4 billion yuan) compared to the initial budget amount for the previous fiscal year. China’s announced national defense budget has increased at a rapid pace every year since FY1989.

The nominal size of China’s announced national defense budget has grown approximately 51-fold in the 30 years since FY1989 and approximately 2.7-fold in the 10 years since FY2008. China positions the buildup of defense capabilities as important a task as economic development. It is believed that China continues to invest resources in the improvement of its defense capabilities in tandem with its economic development. Attention is to be paid to how the slowdown in China’s economic growth affects China’s national defense budget.

In addition, it must be noted that the amount of the defense budget announced by China is considered to be only a part of its actual military expenditures. For example, it is believed that the announced defense budget does not include foreign equipment procurement costs and research and development (R&D) expenses.

China’s military forces are composed of the PLA, the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP), and the militia. It is provided that these bodies be instructed and commanded by the Central Military Commission (CMC). The PLA is defined as a people’s force created and led by the CCP, comprising the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Rocket Force, etc.

(1) Military Reform

China is currently carrying out reforms of the PLA which are seen as the largest in the country’s history.

In November 2015, President Xi unveiled China’s official position on a specific direction of the military reforms for the first time, announcing that the military reforms would be carried out by 2020, which would include: establishment of “theaters” and a command structure for joint operations as well as reduction of troops by 300,000 personnel.

Military reforms have rapidly taken shape in recent years. By the end of 2016 from what are called the “neck up” reforms, namely the center of the military level.
up, are reported to be basically complete. Specifically, they abolished the PLA’s seven Military Regions and created five new theaters responsible for command of operations, namely, the Eastern Theater, Southern Theater, Western Theater, Northern Theater, and Central Theater. In addition, they also formed the PLA Army (PLAA) Headquarters, Rocket Force (PLARF), Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), and Joint Logistics Support Force. Moreover, the four general departments that were the headquarters for the entire PLA were replaced by 15 functional sections under the CMC, including the Joint Staff Department, Political Work Department, Logistic Support Department, and Equipment Development Department. Since 2017, military reforms have been making steady progress with the start of what are called full-scale “neck down” military reforms, namely the field level. For example, the expansion of the organization of the Navy Marine Corps, whose mission include amphibious landing operations, the unification of PAP leadership and command system under the CMC, the reorganization from 18 Group Armies to 13, and reform of military schools was confirmed after 2017. In March 2018, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that a reduction of 300,000 personnel had been basically completed.

It is considered that these series of reforms are designed to build military forces that can fight and win wars by improving their joint operational capabilities and strengthening the military’s readiness, including the development of military capabilities and organizational

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18 Shenyang Military Region, Beijing Military Region, Jinan Military Region, Nanjing Military Region, Guangzhou Military Region, Chengdu Military Region, and Lanzhou Military Region.
19 The PLA was considered a large organization of the Army, and therefore, a headquarters of the Army as a service did not exist. The ongoing reforms have given the Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force the same status as the Army.
20 The establishment of PLARF is seen as a de facto elevation of the Second Artillery Force.
21 PLASSF is identified as a new force for maintaining national security. Reportedly it is in charge of cyber, outer space, and electronic warfare capabilities.
22 The Joint Logistics Support Force is considered to be the first Chinese command dedicated to joint logistics support for the armed forces.
management from peacetime. In addition, it has been noted that the reorganization of the headquarters is a means of tackling corruption at the center of the military by strengthening the direct leadership of the CMC and its Chairman and decentralizing the leading organs. The total number of members of the CMC has continued to be reduced in recent years, with seven newly elected members at the 19th National Congress in October 2017, including President Xi. Since it has been noted that many people who have deep connections to President Xi were appointed, it is thought that President Xi’s command of the CMC, and thus the PLA, is to be further strengthened.

While China is expected to continue these reforms, there are views that dissatisfaction is growing within the military because of the rapid military reforms. Attention is to be paid to the progress of the reforms as well as their outcomes, including their effects on the security of Japan and the rest of the region.

(2) Nuclear and Missile Forces

China has made independent efforts to develop nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile forces since the mid-1950’s, seemingly with a view to ensure deterrence, supplementing its conventional forces, and maintain its voice in the international community. It is regarded that China’s nuclear strategy is to deter a nuclear attack on its territory by maintaining a nuclear force structure able to conduct retaliatory nuclear attacks on a small number of targets such as cities in the adversary’s country, should China be subject to nuclear attack. The PLA Rocket Force was newly established with equal status as the Army, Navy, and Air Force as part of the ongoing military reforms, suggesting that China will continue to attach importance to its nuclear and ballistic missile forces.

China possesses various types and ranges of ballistic missiles: ICBM; SLBM; IRBM/medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM); and short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). The update of China’s ballistic missile forces from a liquid propellant system to a solid propellant system is improving their survivability and readiness. Moreover, it is believed that China is working to increase performance by extending ranges, improving accuracy, employing maneuverable warheads and multiple ones, and by other means.

China’s main ICBM strategic nuclear asset had been the fixed-site liquid-propellant DF-5 missile. However, it has been suggested that China has in recent years deployed the DF-31, which is a mobile-type ICBM with a solid propellant system mounted onto a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), as well as the DF-31A, a model of the DF-31 with extended range, and that China will increase the number of DF-31A in particular. China is also viewed as developing a new ICBM known as DF-41. With regard to SLBM, it is considered that Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to carry the JL-2, whose range is deemed to be approximately 8,000 km, are currently operational. If the Jin-class SSBNs begin nuclear deterrence patrols, it is believed that China’s strategic nuclear capabilities will improve significantly. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that China is also developing an extended-range SLBM, also called JL-3, and a new SSBN to carry it.

As for the IRBM/MRBM covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan, China has the mobile solid-propellant DF-21 and DF-26, which can be transported and operated on a TEL. These are capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. China possesses ballistic missiles carrying conventional warheads with high targeting accuracy based on the DF-21, and deploys the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) carrying conventional warheads, which could be used to attack ships at sea including aircraft carrier. The DF-26, which has a range including Guam, is considered a “second-generation ASBM” developed on the basis of...
the DF-21D, and it was announced in April 2018 that it had “formally joined the order of battle.” In addition to IRBM/MRBM, China possesses the DH-10 (CJ-10), a cruise missile with a range of at least 1,500 km, as well as the H-6, a bomber that is capable of carrying this cruise missile. It is deemed that these missiles will complement ballistic missile forces, covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan. China is likely operating these ASBMs and long-range cruise missiles to strengthen its “A2/AD” capabilities. Concerning SRBM, China possesses a large number of solid-propellant DF-16, DF-15, and DF-11, and they are believed to be deployed facing Taiwan. It is believed that their ranges also cover a part of the Southwestern Islands including the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands, which are inherent territories of Japan.

Furthermore, in order to acquire strike capability that will be able to penetrate layered missile defenses, China is considered to be rapidly developing the hypersonic vehicle WU-14, which is launched by a ballistic missile. Moreover, it has also been pointed out that progress is being made on the development of the DF-17 missile capable of carrying hypersonic weapons.

These weapons are said to travel at ultra-high speed and be difficult to intercept by a missile.

China announced that it conducted tests on midcourse missile interception technology in January 2010, January 2013, July 2014 and February 2018. Attention is to be paid to China’s future trends in ballistic missile defense.

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33 China reportedly conducted flight tests of its WU-14 in January, August, and December 2014, June, August, and November 2015, and April 2016 (total: 7 times). Some reports refer to it as DF-ZF.
34 DF-17 flight tests were reported to have been conducted on November 1 and 15, 2017.
35 In addition to these four tests, China claims that the test conducted in July 2014 was another missile interception technology test. However, it is pointed out that this was actually an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) test. (See Chapter 3, Section 4-2-4.)
(3) Ground Forces

China has the third largest ground forces in the world, next to India, with approximately 980 thousand personnel. Since 1985, China has continuously sought to modernize its military by curtailing the number of personnel and streamlining organizations and systems through reforms, including those currently under way, in order to improve the capability while pursuing the downsize, multifunctionality, and modularization of military units. Specifically, it is believed to be improving mobility using measures such as switching from the past regional-defense model to a full mobile model, and working to motorize and mechanize its infantry. China is also believed to be strengthening its airborne troops (belonging to the Air Force), amphibious forces, special operations forces, and helicopter units. China is undertaking efforts to build a command system for improving its joint operational capabilities and operational efficiency, and is carrying out reforms to improve its logistical support capabilities.

China has annually conducted mobile exercises that cut across multiple regions such as Stride, Firepower, and Sharp Sword. They are aiming at verifying and improving the capabilities necessary to deploy army troops to remote areas, such as long-distance mobility capabilities of the army, and logistical support capabilities that include mobilizing militias and public transportation. Furthermore, the Army and Air Force reportedly took part in the joint exercise, Southern Land 2017, and since 2014, have conducted combined military branch and service exercises under Joint Action. These suggest that China intends to improve its joint operational capabilities as well.

(4) Naval Forces

The naval forces consist of three fleets: North Sea Fleet; East Sea Fleet; and South Sea Fleet. The Chinese Navy has approximately 750 ships (including approximately 70 submarines), with a total displacement of approximately 1.79 million tons. China’s naval forces are rapidly modernizing, and the Chinese Navy promotes the mass production of its indigenous Yuan-class submarines with superior quietness, as well as surface combatant ships with improved air defense and anti-ship attack capabilities. The Navy is also developing Renhai-class destroyers, the largest in the Navy, indicated to be equipped with vertical launch systems (VLSs) capable of launching the latest YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missile. It has also been noted that its submarines are being developed to be capable
### Deployment and Strength of the People’s Liberation Army

**China**

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<th>Category</th>
<th>Approx. 2 million troops</th>
<th>Approx. 0.98 million troops</th>
<th>Type-99/A, Type-98/A, Type-96/A, Type-88A/B and others</th>
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<tr>
<td>Group troops</td>
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<td>Approx. 1.39 million</td>
<td>M-60A, M-48A/H and others</td>
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<td>Tanks, etc.</td>
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<td>Approx. 1,200 vehicles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warships</td>
<td>Approx. 750 vessels</td>
<td>Approx. 390 vessels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers,</td>
<td>Approx. 80 vessels</td>
<td>Approx. 20 vessels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>destroyers, and frigates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>Approx. 70 vessels</td>
<td>4 vessels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>Approx. 15,000 troops</td>
<td>Approx. 10,000 troops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>Approx. 2,850 aircraft</td>
<td>Approx. 500 aircraft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern fighters aircraft</td>
<td>J-10 x 370</td>
<td>Mirage 2000 x 55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Su-27/J-11 x 329</td>
<td>F-16 x 144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Su-30 x 97</td>
<td>Ching-kuo x 128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Su-35 x 14</td>
<td>Fourth-generation fighters (total): 327</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J-15 x 20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J-16 x 16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J-20 x 6 (under tests)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Fourth-/fifth-generation fighters (total): 852)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Approx. 1.39 billion</td>
<td>Approx. 24 million</td>
<td>1 year*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term of service</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For those born in 1994 or later, the term is 4 months

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**Notes:**
1. ● Theater headquarters  □ Theater Army organization
2. Theater boundaries have not been officially announced. The above map is prepared based on U.S. DoD reports, media reports, etc.
of carrying anti-surface cruise missiles. In addition, the Navy is increasing the number of large landing ships and supply ships. In September 2017, a supply ship was commissioned with a mission to supply the aircraft carrier group.

With regard to aircraft carriers, following the commissioning of the first aircraft carrier Liaoning in September 2012, it appears that China is continuing to train carrier-based aircraft pilots using domestic J-15 carrier-based fighters and conducting takeoff and landing tests mainly in the Bohai and Yellow Seas. In December 2016, the Liaoning participated in its first comprehensive live action, live fire exercise in the Bohai Sea with other vessels, including live firing by carrier-based fighters. Furthermore, later in the same month, it was confirmed that the carrier advanced, together with multiple vessels, to the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea. It was announced that the “Liaoning” advanced to the Pacific Ocean and conducted opposing trainings including carrier-based fighters after its participation in a naval review in the South China Sea from March to April 2018. These activities are believed to indicate a further expansion of the distant deployment capability of the Chinese Navy. In April 2017, a launching ceremony was held for an indigenous aircraft carrier with “a conventional power-generating facility and a displacement of 50,000 tons” and “a ski-jump takeoff style.” The carrier conducted initial sea trials before its commissioning in May 2018. Furthermore, China is reportedly building its second indigenous aircraft carrier, and it is suggested that this carrier is possibly equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system.

In view of these developments concerning the naval forces, China appears to be steadily building up capabilities for conducting operations in more distant waters in addition to near sea defense.

It is pointed out that, among the militia, whose status is China’s armed force other than the military the so-called maritime militia is playing the role of the advance guard for supporting China’s maritime interests. The maritime militia is said to operate in the South China Sea, etc., and consist of fishermen and residents of isolated islands. However, the details of the maritime militia have not been revealed. Given the China’s emphasis on the necessity of “fully exerting the overall power of the military, police and militia” on the seas, attention is to be paid to these asymmetrical forces, too.

(5) Air Forces

The Chinese Navy and Air force have approximately 2,850 combat capable aircraft in total. As for the fourth generation fighters, China has imported from Russia the Su-27 fighter and the Su-30 fighter having anti-surface and anti-ship attack capabilities. In November 2015, China reportedly signed an agreement with a Russian state-run military company to purchase 24 Su-35 fighters, considered the newest fourth generation fighter, and has received the delivery of total 14 fighters by December 2017. China is also developing its own domestic modern
fighters. China also has started the mass production of the J-11B fighter, which is allegedly a copy of the Su-27 fighter, and the domestic J-10 fighter. China’s domestic J-16 fighter, thought to be a copy of Russia’s Su-30 fighter, has started test flights at operational units. China’s domestic J-15 carrier-based fighter thought to be modeled on Russia’s Su-33 carrier-based fighter is carried on the aircraft carrier Liaoning. Additionally, China is considered to have started deploying the J-20 fighter, said to be a next-generation fighter, to operational units, and is also developing the J-31 fighter.

China is also continuing the modernization of its bombers said to have ground attack capabilities, and the Chinese Air Force has increased the number of H-6K bombers that are considered to be able to operate anti-surface cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. The Chinese Air Force is also developing a new strategic bomber called the H-20.

China is also making continuous efforts to improve capabilities which are essential for operations of modern air forces by introducing the H-6U tanker and KJ-500
and KJ-2000 Airborne Early Warning and Control System. Furthermore, in July 2016, China started the deployment of the indigenously developed Y-20 large cargo aircraft in order to enhance its transportation capability. China is also rapidly developing a variety of domestic unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), including those capable of long-duration flights at high altitude for reconnaissance and other purposes (high-altitude long endurance [HALE]) and those capable of carrying missiles and other weapons for attack purposes. Some of these are deployed and are actively exported. In fact, it is suggested that the Chinese Air Force has created an unmanned aerial vehicle unit with an attack role. In addition to the frequent use of UAVs for reconnaissance and other purposes in its surrounding sea areas and airspace, domestically, it is noted that China is working to improve “Swarm” technology to operate a large number of low-cost UAVs.

Judging from the modernization of the Air Force, it is believed that China is not only improving its air defense capabilities for its national territory, but also making steady efforts to build up capabilities for air superiority and anti-surface and anti-ship attacks in further distant areas and for long-range transportation.

(6) Information operations capabilities

Information gathering and command and communication in the military sector, which are vital for swift and efficient exercise of military strength, increasingly rely on satellites and computer networks. As such, China seems to recognize the importance of taking an information mastery in wartime, when it must protect its own information systems and networks while neutralizing those of its adversaries at the same time. China is considered to be emphasizing information operational capabilities for these operations. In fact, China stated that “outer space and cyber space have become new commanding heights (capture point) in strategic competition among all parties,” and established the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) at the end of 2015 with a mission pointed out to be responsible for outer space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare.

China is said to have developed its space program in the shortest time in the world. In December 2016, China published the white paper China’s Space Activities, which emphasizes the peaceful use of outer space but does not deny its use for military purposes. In addition, it has been pointed out that administrative organizations and state-owned enterprises involved in the use of space in China have close ties with the Chinese military, and in fact, it is considered that China is planning to improve its military capabilities in space. Examples of projects being advanced by China include the launch of the positioning satellites called “BeiDou,” also known as the Chinese version GPS, to develop global satellite positioning system by 2020. Another example is an Earth observation satellite that is suggested to possibly have a role as a military reconnaissance satellite. Moreover, China is thought to be developing weapons including laser weapons, anti-satellite weapons and anti-satellites satellites, in order to restrict and interfere with the use of space-based assets by adversaries in wartime. China has

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46 The AG-600, which China is developing indigenously with the first flight in January 2018, will be the largest amphibious aircraft in the world. Although it is claimed that it will be used for civilian purposes such as natural resource research, the possibility of its conversion to military use has been pointed out. It has also been reported that China and Ukraine signed an agreement for consultations concerning the large transport aircraft An-225 for export to and production in China.

47 UAVs being developed by China include the HALE UAV “Xianglong” (Soar Dragon), considered the “Chinese Global Hawk,” the BZK-005, a UAV that can be used for multiple purposes, such as reconnaissance, communications relay, and signals intelligence; the GJ-1 “Wingloong” attack UAV; and the CH-4 “Caihong.”

48 State-owned enterprise China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) announced in November 2017 that it demonstrated “Swarm” technology using 119 UAVs, breaking the U.S. record. It is said that the use of “Swarm” technology with low-cost UAVs makes attacks on aircraft carriers and fighters possible.

49 The defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015) identifies “building air space capabilities and conducting offensive and defensive operations" as a strategy for enhancing the military capabilities of the Air Force.

50 While the definition of information operations differs depending on the country, the definition of “actions using comprehensive electronic war, computer and network operations, psychological operations, and other means to attack an enemy’s behavior or counter attack with resistance” has been used internally by the Chinese military.

51 “China’s Space Activities 2016” states the objective of space exploration as utilizing outer space for peaceful purposes to promote human civilization and social progress and provide benefits to all humankind. At the same time, it also includes references to the demands of national security.

52 The Worldwide Threat Assessment (May 2017) by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence pointed out that China is continuing to improve its military and intelligence capabilities in space.

53 The Worldwide Threat Assessment (May 2017) by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence pointed out that “its [China’s] ground-launched ASAT missiles might be nearing operational service within the PLA.”
Modernization of China’s sea and air military capabilities (update ship volume in the diagram)

China is rapidly modernizing military capabilities with fast-growing national defense budgets. Modernization of maritime military capabilities aims to establish the ability to conduct operations in more distant waters. Specifically, China continues to reinforce new naval vessels and new submarines. The Liaoning, China’s first aircraft carrier, went on its first excursion in the Pacific Ocean in December 2016, and the first home-built aircraft carrier launched in April 2017 and conducted its first sea trial in May 2018 and will reportedly begin service within the next 2-3 years. In modernization of air force capabilities, China hopes to improve air defense for the mainland and establish an ability to engage in combat at greater distances. Specifically, it has increased 4th-generation fighters and has announced the start of deployment for the J-20, a next-generation fighter plane, in operational forces. China is also developing, producing, and deploying a wide range of military planes, including fighters, bombers, AWACS, and cargo aircraft. While China explains that its advances do not pose a threat to any country, its rapid modernization of military capabilities is taking place without a detailed future image or clarification of necessity and this is a security concern for the region including Japan and the international community as a whole.

Naval Forces

Air Forces

announced that it will “improve capabilities in support of the awareness of the state of cyberspace, cyber defenses, national cyberspace warfare.” Indeed, major military training since 2008 has been noted to always contain elements such as cyber strategy, including both attack and defense. Recent training has reportedly been successful in interfere with the command and communication system of the adversary force. It is said that not only Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft frequently flying near Japan, but also some of upgraded J-15 fighters and H-6 bombers have electronic warfare capabilities. Furthermore, some have speculated that China is reinforcing its “A2/AD” capabilities by using cyber attacks to destroy adversary’s networks in the entire region.
Concerning the PLA, there is a view that by turning exception into normality through uniform peacetime and wartime force deployment and exceeding traditional activity spaces, China intends to and will make further development.

Joint Operation Capabilities at the 19th Party's National Congress in October 2017, China is thought to continue joint operation capabilities at the 19th Party’s National Congress in October 2017, China is thought to continue to prioritize the development of joint operations systems, and enhancing joint operation capabilities at the 19th Party’s National Congress in October 2017, China is thought to continue to prioritize the development of joint operations systems and will make further development.

As General Secretary Xi Jinping spoke about creating “strong and effective command institutions in theaters for joint operations” and enhancing joint operation capabilities at the 19th Party’s National Congress in October 2017, China is thought to continue to prioritize the development of joint operations systems and will make further development.

In recent years, China has been conducting exercises with the aim of developing joint operations systems, such as the three services’ joint exercise (July 2017) in the Eastern Theater, and the military parade with the 90th anniversary of the PLA consisting of theater-based structure with a strong emphasis on the practical military. These exercises are believed to be geared toward building the forces of each military branch for joint operations and implementing joint operations based on the theater command.

Waters and Airspace Activities

(1) General Situation

Recently, China is believed to be aiming to build up capabilities to conduct operations in more distant waters and airspace. Accordingly, China has rapidly expanded its waters and airspace activities using its sea and air powers both in qualitative and quantitative ways. Specifically in the sea and airspace areas surrounding Japan, Chinese naval vessels, and navy and air force aircraft have been observed conducting training and information gathering activities, as well as naval vessels heading for distant waters such as Indian Ocean. A large number of Chinese government ships that belong to maritime law enforcement agencies and their aircraft have been observed engaging in monitoring activities for the protection of its maritime rights and interests. These activities include:
intermittent intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters by Chinese government vessels; intrusions into Japan’s airspace; and dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences, including a Chinese vessel’s direction of a fire-control radar at an MSDF destroyer, the flight of Chinese military fighter jets abnormally close to an SDF aircraft, and activities that could infringe upon the freedom of overflight over the high seas, such as the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).” China is urged to act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law.

(2) Situation of Activities in Japan’s Surrounding Waters and Airspace

Chinese Navy vessels and Air Force and Navy aviation have recently escalated their activities in the surrounding sea areas and airspace of Japan. For instance, they are conducting activities based on unilateral claim on the Senkaku Islands, and are expanding their areas of operations including the area surrounding the Senkakus. These raise a great concern to Japan. The number of scrambles by the ASDF against Chinese aircraft has kept high, reaching a new high in FY2016. The Chinese military leadership has emphasized to continue to improve the Chinese military’s operational capabilities, exhibiting the results of its recent 5-year activities such as the “struggle” against the Senkaku Island, which is an inherent territory of Japan, the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ),” and its Navy and Air Force’s “regular patrols.” At the same time, it appears that China continues to improve the quality of its activities, and efforts can be seen to build joint operation capabilities to develop a practical military.

a. Military Activities in the East China Sea (including the areas around the Senkaku Islands)

Chinese naval vessels have been conducting operations in the East China Sea continuously and actively. Stating its own position regarding the Senkaku Islands, China alleges that patrols by Chinese naval vessels in the sea areas under its jurisdiction are completely justifiable and lawful. Chinese naval vessels have recently tended to expand the sea area of their regular activities to the south, and are continuously operating in the area near Japan’s Senkaku Islands. In June 2016, a Jiangkai I-class frigate of the Chinese Navy entered Japan’s contiguous zone off around the Senkaku Islands. This was the first time a Chinese Navy combatant vessel entered Japan’s contiguous zone around the Senkaku Island. Furthermore, in January 2018, a Shang-class submarine and a Jiangkai II-class frigate passed into the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands. This was the first time a submerged Chinese submarine was identified and announced as transiting through these contiguous waters off the Senkaku.

In recent years, Chinese Navy intelligence gathering vessels (AGIs) have also been found conducting multiple

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55 In FY2016, the number of times that ASDF aircraft scrambled against Chinese aircraft hit a record of 851 times.
56 For example, a China Military Online article (October 21, 2015) reported that in recent years, the average number of days in a year that all major combatants in the East Sea Fleet of the Chinese Navy conducted operations exceeded 150 days.
57 In June 2018, a Japan Coast Guard patrol ship confirmed that the Chinese Navy Anwei-class hospital ship navigated the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands.
activities. A Chinese Navy Dongdiao-class AGI repeatedly navigated back and forth outside of the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands in November 2015. In June 2016, the same type of AGI sailed in Japan’s territorial waters near Kuchinoerabu Island and Yakushima Island, and then sailed within Japan’s contiguous zone north of Kitadaito Island. Subsequently, the vessel repeatedly conducted east-west passages outside the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands. This was the first navigation in Japanese territorial waters by a Chinese Navy vessel in approximately 12 years.\(^{58}\)

China’s air forces are also actively conducting activities in the East China Sea on a routine basis. Their activities include warning and surveillance, Combat Air Patrols (CAP), and training. The area of the activities of PLA aircraft has tended to expand eastward and southward in recent years. As a result of this incremental expansion, PLA aircraft have recently been confirmed conducting activities actively in airspace closer to the main island of Okinawa and the rest of the Southwestern Islands. The intent of the expanded activities of PLA aircraft may be to operate the “East China Sea ADIZ.”\(^{59}\)

In May and June 2014, incidents occurred where two PLA Su-27 fighters came abnormally close to MSDF and ASDF aircraft that were conducting normal warning and surveillance activities in the East China Sea. In July 2017, two PLA J-10 fighters reportedly intercepted a U.S. Air Force EP-3 electronic reconnaissance aircraft.\(^{60}\) And in April 2018, an unmanned aerial vehicle presumed to be a Chinese BZK-005 unmanned reconnaissance vehicle was confirmed to have flown over the East China Sea.

Regarding Japan’s airspace over and around the Senkaku Islands, territorial airspace intrusion by a fixed-wing aircraft of the State Oceanic Association (SOA) in December 2012 marked the first such instance by a Chinese aircraft. Subsequently, fixed-wing aircraft of the SOA were frequently observed flying near the airspace up through March 2014.\(^{61}\) Recently, it has been confirmed that the scope of the activities of PLA aircraft near the Senkaku Islands has tended to expand in the southward direction. In June 2016, ASDF fighters scrambled against PLA aircraft that flew southward closer to the Senkaku Islands. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense

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\(^{58}\) In November 2004, a Chinese nuclear submarine conducted “submerged passage through the territorial sea of another country” in Japanese territorial waters in violation of international law.

\(^{59}\) In November 2016, a spokesperson of the PLA Air Force stated that the PLA Air Force had been continuously conducting patrols of the “East China Sea ADIZ” for the past three years. See Chapter 3, Section 3-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East China Sea and South China Sea).

\(^{60}\) See Chapter 3, Section 3-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East China Sea and South China Sea).

\(^{61}\) For example, on March 7, 2011, a Chinese Z-9 helicopter believed to belong to the SOA flew as close as approximately 70 m and as low as approximately 40 m above water around the Japanese destroyer Samidare, which was patrolling the waters in the central area of the East China Sea. On April 12, 2012, a Y-12 aircraft believed to belong to the SOA flew as close as approximately 50 m and as low as approximately 50 m above water around the destroyer Asayuki.
released an official announcement stating that SDF aircraft conducted provocations against PLA aircraft. However, SDF aircraft conduct scrambles in accordance with international law and the SDF Law, and it is never true that SDF aircraft conducted provocations against PLA aircraft. Chinese announcements concerning the Japanese response have been one-sided, and it is extremely regrettable that the Chinese side is unilaterally making explanations contrary to the fact, as doing so undermines the Japan-China relationship.

b. Advancements into the Pacific Ocean

Chinese Navy combatant vessels continue to transit the waters near Japan to advance into the Pacific Ocean and return to base with high frequency. The advancement routes are multiplying. Chinese naval vessels have transited the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, and have been found passing through the Osumi Strait, sea area between Yonaguni Island and Nakanokami Island near Iriomote Island, the sea area between Amamioshima Island and Yokoatejima Island, Tsugaru Strait, and Soya Strait. By diversifying routes in this manner, China appears to be aiming to enhance its deployment capabilities to the open ocean, and considering remarks from high-ranking government officials, it is thought that China is planning to make deployments to the Pacific Ocean sailing through waters near Japan regular activities. Furthermore, considering the nature of the activities it is conducting in distant areas, China is presumably aiming to enhance operation execution capabilities on the open ocean. In December 2016, the aircraft carrier Liaoning navigated the East China Sea together with other vessels and passed the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to advance to the Western Pacific for the first time. On that occasion, a surveillance helicopter took off from a Jiangkai II-class frigate accompanying the carrier and flew in airspace approximately 10 to 30 km southeast of the territorial airspace over Miyako Island. In April 2018, the aircraft carrier Liaoning and a number of vessels participated in a naval review and training in the South China Sea, and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that they passed through the Bashi Channel and conducted confrontation exercises that included carrier-based fighters. At that time, the MSDF conducting warning and surveillance confirmed aircraft presumed to be carrier-based fighters taking off and landing, and it was the first time what are presumed to be carrier-based fighters were confirmed flying over the Pacific Ocean. The activities are worthy of attention as an indicators of the enhancement of the capabilities of China’s naval forces, including aircraft carriers, and enhancement of its force projection capabilities to distant areas. With a Chinese Navy Shang-class submarine passing submerged from the Pacific Ocean toward the East China Sea from Japan’s contiguous zone northeast of Miyako Island in January 2018, it is thought that submarines also conducted some activities in the western Pacific. In addition, in July 2017, a Chinese Navy Dongdiao-class AGI sailed through Japan’s territorial waters southwest of Matsumae-kojima Island in Matsumae, Hokkaido, and subsequently sailed eastward through Tsugaru Strait and advanced to the Pacific Ocean.

Regarding the advancement of air forces into the Pacific Ocean, the advancement of a Chinese Navy Y-8 early warning aircraft into the Pacific Ocean, passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, was confirmed for the first time in July 2013. The advancement of Air Force aircraft into the Pacific was also confirmed in 2015. In 2017, advances into the Pacific Ocean via this airspace became more active, especially after July, with flights totaling 18 passages over the course of a year. This is a significant increase in the number of times Chinese combat vessels have been active in the waters around the Southwestern Islands, Soya Strait and Tsugaru Strait since 2008 is: 3 times (2008), 2 times (2009), 4 times (2010), 5 times (2011), 13 times (2012), 21 times (2013), 14 times (2014), 12 times (2015), 15 times (2016), 12 times (2017), and 4 times (as of the end of May 2018).

In March 2017, when Japan announced the transit of Chinese naval vessels between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, a Chinese Ministry of National Defense spokesperson said, “Japan needs to get used to the fact that we will pass through many more times in the future.” In 2017, Chinese military aircraft passed between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island once in March, 3 times in July, 5 times in August, 3 times in November, and 6 times in December for a total of 18 times.

Regarding the scramble by ASDF fighters against PLA aircraft that flew southward towards the Senkaku Islands on June 17, 2016, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense released the following announcement: “Chinese fighter jets were approached by two Japanese F-15 fighter jets in high speed. They conducted provocations and used fire-control radars against us. The PLA responded decisively and took measures such as tactical maneuver. Consequently, the Japanese fighter jets flew away after firing infrared jamming shells.”

The number of times Chinese Navy combatant vessels have been active in the waters around the Southwestern Islands, Soya Strait and Tsugaru Strait since 2008 is: 3 times (2008), 2 times (2009), 4 times (2010), 5 times (2011), 13 times (2012), 21 times (2013), 14 times (2014), 12 times (2015), 15 times (2016), 12 times (2017), and 4 times (as of the end of May 2018).

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64 In March 2017, when Japan announced the transit of Chinese naval vessels between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, a Chinese Ministry of National Defense spokesperson said, “Japan needs to get used to the fact that we will pass through many more times in the future.”

65 In 2017, Chinese military aircraft passed between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island once in March, 3 times in July, 5 times in August, 3 times in November, and 6 times in December for a total of 18 times.
from the five flights confirmed in 2016. The types of aircraft passing through the airspace are also increasing in variety year by year. The newest H-6K bombers and Su-30 fighters were confirmed by 2016 and the first Y-8 EW aircraft in July 2016 were confirmed by sight that at least one of the H-6K bombers that flew in September 2016 carried objects in the form of missiles. Flight patterns have also been changing. In November 2016, H-6K bombers and other aircraft were confirmed to have flown from the south of the Sakishima Islands to the East China Sea, passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, and made frequent flights toward the Bashi Channel from the East China Sea via between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island. Upon the flight in December 2017 being confirmed, a spokesperson of the PLA Air Force stated that the aircraft were “cruising around an island (Taiwan).” In August 2017, H-6K bombers advanced to airspace off the Kii Peninsula after advancing to the Pacific Ocean via passage between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island. Through the conduct of frequent long-distance flights of bombers and other aircraft, and the advanced flight paths and composition of military units, China is thought to be demonstrating its presence around Japan and so on, and planning further enhancements to more practical operational capabilities. With regard to SDF aircraft, SDF aircraft conducted scrambles against PLA aircraft advancing into the Pacific Ocean in October and December 2016, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense made false announcements that SDF aircraft shot IR flares, endangering the safety of the Chinese aircraft. However, there is absolutely no truth to these announcements; SDF aircraft conducted scrambles in accordance with international law and the SDF Law.

Additionally, activities considered to be planned to improve the capability to carry out joint sea and air operation execution capabilities, such as activities like air to-ship attack drills when entering the Pacific Ocean, have also been seen in recent years, and continued attention has to be paid for related trends. 

### c. Activities in the Sea of Japan

It is thought that the Chinese Navy has had vessels deployed in the Sea of Japan for training and other occasions in the past, and air units have also started activities in the area recently. “Confrontation exercises” in the Sea of Japan by Chinese Navy forces were announced for the first time in August 2016, during which time three aircraft participated in the exercise, including two H-6 bombers that passed through the Tsushima Strait into the Sea of Japan. In January 2017, naval vessels and aircraft were said to have carried out joint confrontation exercises in the same area, in which eight aircraft, including six H-6 bombers passed through the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan.

The Chinese Air Force flew through the Tsushima Strait for the first time in December 2017 to advance to the Sea of Japan. This passage included the simultaneous transit of the latest H-6K bomber and Su-30 fighter, and were the first Chinese fighter aircraft to advance into the Sea of Japan. In addition, the Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft that entered the Sea of Japan in February 2018 flew through the Western Channel (the strait between Tsushima in Nagasaki Prefecture and the Korean Peninsula) of the Tsushima Strait, and was the first time for a flight through the channel. The activities of the Chinese military in the Sea of Japan are considered to continue to expand and be intensified further.

#### (3) Activities of Chinese Government Vessels Especially Around the Senkaku Islands

In December 2008, China Maritime Surveillance vessels hovered and drifted inside Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. These are not permitted under international law. Since then, China Maritime Surveillance and China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command vessels have intensified their activities in the aforementioned territorial waters. Such activities have been intensified greatly after September 2012, when the Japanese Government acquired property rights to and ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsuri Island, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island). Since October 2013, Chinese government vessels have repeatedly intruded into these territorial waters, and the form of the intrusions have become more reinforced.

China is seen to be steadily strengthening an operational posture intended to use Chinese government

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66 Since 2013, air forces have passed between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to advance to the Pacific Ocean 5 times (2013), 5 times (2014), 6 times (2015), and 5 times (2016).
67 The Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2015) states that the H-6K bomber’s ability to carry the DH-10 (CJ-10) land attack cruise missile, which allows for more long-distance attacks, allows China to target as far as the second island chain including Guam.
68 See footnote 9 of this section.
69 For example, in December 2017, when H-6 bombers advanced into the western Pacific Ocean, naval vessels reportedly conducted anti-aircraft and anti-missile training in the same area. It is possible that the training between the bombers and naval vessels was to improve joint anti-ship attack abilities.
70 The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that the Chinese military aircraft carried out “unusual reconnaissance activities” within South Korea’s ADIZ.
71 In December 2017, a PLA Air Force spokesperson stated after the Air Force entered the Sea of Japan for the first time, “The Sea of Japan is not Japan’s sea.”
72 While with some exceptions, Chinese government vessels often intrude into Japan’s territorial waters two to three times a month from around 10 a.m. for about two hours. The number of vessels had been two to three until August 2016. Since then, four vessels often intrude into territorial waters in a group.
vessels to intrude into Japan’s territorial waters. For example, since December 2015, Chinese government vessels carrying weapons that appear to be cannons have begun to repeatedly intrude into Japan’s territorial waters. Additionally, government vessels deployed to seas near the Senkaku Islands are increasingly larger in size, with at least one of the government vessels intruding into Japan’s territorial waters being a 3,000 t or larger-class vessel since August 2014. Since February 2015, three 3,000 t or larger-class government vessels have been confirmed entering Japan’s territorial waters simultaneously multiple times. China is also presumed to operate two of the world’s largest 10,000 t-class patrol vessels.74

It appears that the operation capabilities of Chinese government vessels in the sea areas around Japan are also improving. In early August 2016, approximately 200-300 fishing boats advanced to the contiguous zone off the Senkaku Islands. At that time, a maximum of 15 Chinese government vessels navigated the contiguous zone simultaneously, and later for five days a large number of Chinese government vessels and fishing boats repeatedly intruded into territorial waters. It was confirmed that the government vessels that advanced into those waters included many armed vessels.74 This case appears to indicate that China has the capability to simultaneously inject a large number of government vessels including armed vessels in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands.

These activities of Chinese government vessels in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands are an attempt to unilaterally change the status quo by force. Japan finds China’s actions which escalate the situation totally unacceptable.

In May 2017, it was confirmed that an object that appeared to be a small drone was flying above a Chinese government vessel intruding into Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. This flight also represents a unilateral escalation of the situation and constitutes an invasion of territorial airspace.

Besides the waters around the Senkaku Islands, Chinese government vessels were confirmed to have passed through the territorial waters of Japan around Tsushima (Nagasaki Prefecture), Okinoshima Island

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73 “China Coast Guard 2901” and “China Coast Guard 3901” are also reportedly conducting test navigation. These government vessels allegedly carry a 76 mm cannon.

74 Since then, from mid-August, confirmed cases have not included the intrusion of government vessels into territorial waters following Chinese fishing boats. The frequency of intrusions into territorial waters, etc. has returned to about the same level as before early August.
(Fukuoka Prefecture) and the Tsugaru Strait in July 2017. The same vessels were also confirmed to have sailed in Japan's territorial waters from Sata Cape to the Kusagakiguntou Islands (both in Kagoshima Prefecture) in August that year.

Retired Navy vessels are believed to have been handed over to the China Coast Guard,\(^\text{75}\) that was formally launched in July 2013. It was reported that the Navy and the China Coast Guard conducted a coordinated drill. It appears that the Navy is supporting maritime law enforcement agencies on both the operations and equipment fronts. In July 2018, the Chinese Coast Guard was incorporated into the People’s Armed Police (PAP) under the leadership and command of the Central Military Commission. The way of the military and the Coast Guard cooperation in the future is worthy of attention.

(4) Situation of Activities in the South China Sea

China has also been intensifying its activities in the South China Sea, including waters around the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, over which territorial disputes exist with neighbors, including some ASEAN member states.

Since 2014, on seven features in the Spratly Islands, China has pressed ahead with large-scale and rapid land reclamation works.\(^\text{76}\) The Philippines-China arbitration award issued in July 2016 denied the rights claimed by China in the waters surrounded by the “nine-dash line” including the “historic rights” as the basis of the “nine-dash line” claimed by China, and determined the illegality of China’s activities such as land reclamation. However, China has made it clear that it would not comply with the award and is currently continuing to develop military facilities, such as batteries, and various kinds of infrastructure that can be used for military purposes including runways, ports, hangars, and radar facilities. It can be said that China is advancing the militarization of the features.\(^\text{78}\) During the 19th National Congress in October 2017, General Secretary Xi Jinping reported the progress of the land reclamation work in the South China Sea as one of the accomplishments of economic development.

In Fiery Cross Reef, a large harbor capable of receiving surface combatants is being constructed. In January 2016, China declared completion of a 3,000 m-long runway which fighters and bombers can take off from and land on, and aircraft test flights were conducted willfully against the protests from countries in the area.\(^\text{79}\) In April 2016, a Navy patrol aircraft flying over the South China Sea landed at Fiery Cross Reef to evacuate emergency patients. At Subi and Mischief Reefs, in July of the same year, China conducted aircraft test fights willfully for two straight days on a runway where large aircraft can take off and land.\(^\text{80}\) In January 2018, two Y-7 transport aircraft were reported over Mischief Reef, and Y-8 special mission aircraft were confirmed over Suig Reef later in April that year. It has been noted that batteries capable of being equipped with anti-aircraft guns, missile shelters, underground facilities which are pointed out to be ammunition storages, are being built on these features. It has also been noted that the construction of this infrastructure has been completed. Additionally, in April 2018, it was reported that anti-ship cruise missiles and anti-surface cruise missiles were deployed in each feature as part of a military training, and that radar jamming

\(^{75}\) It has been suggested that three Jiangwei I-class frigates belonging to the Chinese Navy were repaired to be handed over to the China Coast Guard. Similarly, it has been suggested that two Luda-class destroyers will be handed over from the Chinese Navy to the China Coast Guard.

\(^{76}\) The seven features are: Johnson South Reef; Cuarteron Reef; Gaven Reefs; Hughes Reef; Fiery Cross Reef; Mischief Reef; and Subi Reef.

\(^{77}\) The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (June 2017) notes that China added over 3,200 acres of land in the Spratly Islands by late 2015 and completed the land reclamation.

\(^{78}\) The international community has repeatedly suggested that China is militarizing its activities in the South China Sea. For example, in October 2017, Harry B. Harris Jr., Commander, U.S. Pacific Command stated, “We also want Beijing to do more to stop provocative actions in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, where the Chinese are building up combat power and positional advantage in an attempt to assert de facto sovereignty over disputed maritime features ... where they are fundamentally altering the physical and political landscape by creating and militarizing man-made islands...where they are using its military and economic power to erode the rules-based international order.”

\(^{79}\) China is believed to have conducted three test flights at Fiery Cross Reef on January 2, 3, and 6 of 2016. In response, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam expressed strong opposition on January 2, and the Philippines protested in writing on January 8.

\(^{80}\) On July 14, 2016, the spokesperson of the Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested that it was an infringement on Vietnamese sovereignty.
systems were deployed on Mischief Reef. On the other four features, it is pointed out that the construction of facilities, such as harbors, helipads, and radars, is making progress and that what appears to be large anti-aircraft guns and close in weapon systems (CIWS) may have already been deployed. If these features are used for full-scale military purposes, it could significantly change the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.

In the Paracel Islands, China has similarly carried out land reclamations and promoted their use for military purposes. China has extended the runway on Woody Island since 2013. In October 2015 and October 2017, China was reported to deploy J-11 and other fighters, and in February 2016 and January 2017, the existence of equipment likely to be surface-to-air missiles was confirmed. It has been noted that the takeoff and landing training of the H-6K bombers in the South China Sea announced by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense in May 2018 was carried out on Woody Island. In recent years, Chinese vessels have allegedly been conducting what are likely to be survey activities in the Scarborough Shoal, where a standoff took place between Chinese and Philippine government ships in April 2012. It is pointed out that new land reclamations in the shoal might be started in the future, and that if China conducts land reclamations and installs radar facilities, runways, and other infrastructure in the Scarborough Shoal, it could possibly increase its ability to track the situation and ultimately enhance its capabilities in all areas of the South China Sea. Attention must continue to be paid to the situation going forward.

The activities of the PLA in sea areas and airspace are expanding as well. In March 2009 and December 2013, Chinese naval vessels and other vessels approached and intercepted a U.S. Navy vessel navigating in the South China Sea. In May 2016, February 2017 and May 2017, a PLA fighter allegedly flew close to U.S. Forces aircraft, etc. In July and August 2016, after the Philippines-China arbitration award was rendered, a PLA Air Force H-6K bomber conducted “combat air patrol” in the airspace in the periphery of the Scarborough Shoal. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that this patrol would “become normal.” In September of the same year, the China-Russia joint exercise Joint Sea 2016 was conducted for the first time in the South China Sea. A field training exercise by naval vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” and a naval review ceremony, regarded as the largest since the founding of China, was conducted in the same area from the end of March until April 2018. It is also reported that Chinese government vessels fired warning shots at fishing boats of neighboring countries, and that Chinese naval vessels are active in some waters of the South China Sea at all times. In this manner, it appears that China seeks to expand its military presence and enhance its military operation capabilities in the South China Sea.

Such activities by China unilaterally change the status quo and further advance its efforts to create a fait accompli. Japan is deeply concerned about these activities, and the concern is shared with the international community, including the United States. In response to the growing international concerns over the development on the features, China asserts that a number of ASEAN member states including the Philippines and Vietnam are illegitimately occupying features of the Spratly Islands and carrying out large-scale construction work to build fixed facilities such as airstrips. However, China’s development work on the features is of a scale incomparable to the activities carried out by other countries and is being conducted at a rapid pace.

In any case, the issues over the South China Sea are of concern to the entire international community due to their direct implications for peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Countries concerned including China are urged to refrain from unilateral actions that...
heighten tension and act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law.

See Fig. I-2-3-6 (China’s development on the features of the Spratly islands)
Chapter 2, Section 6 (Southeast Asia);
Chapter 3, Section 3 (Maritime Trends)

(5) The State of Activities in the Indian Ocean and other seas

The Chinese Navy is thought to be shifting its naval forces towards “offshore waters defense and open seas protection,” and is steadily increasing its capabilities to conduct operations in more distant seas such as the Indian Ocean in recent years. For example, since December 2008, Chinese Navy vessels sail in the Indian Ocean to the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden to take part in international counter-piracy efforts. Activities of Chinese Navy submarines are also beginning to be confirmed continuously in the Indian Ocean. In 2014, a Song-class submarine reportedly called at a port in Colombo, Sri Lanka, twice in the same year. This marked the first time that a Chinese submarine entered a port overseas. It is reported that in May 2015 and May 2016, a Yuan-class submarine and a Shang-class submarine respectively called at a port in Karachi, Pakistan, and in January and September of 2017, a Song-class submarine and Yuan-class submarine called at a port in Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. Besides the Indian Ocean, in September 2015, five Chinese vessels reportedly sailed in the high seas in the Bering Sea and sailed in U.S. territorial waters near the Aleutian Islands.

Additionally, China has been remarkably trying to secure overseas bases such as harbors, which would help

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88 According to the United States, the coastal state in this case, the Chinese vessels’ navigation did not violate international law.
support its operations in far seas. For example, in August 2017, China began construction of “security facilities” for logistics support of the Chinese military in Djibouti, a strategic point in East Africa facing the Gulf of Aden. In recent years, China has been promoting its “Belt and Road Initiative” whose main purpose is establishing an economic zone centered on the Eurasian continent, with the Chinese military possibly taking on the role of the shield behind the concept through the defense of sea lanes. Furthermore, while it is thought that the concept includes a strategic intention to expand its influence in the region, it is possible that the construction of infrastructure based on the same concept will further promote the activities of the PLA in the Indian Ocean, Pacific ocean and elsewhere. For example, by supporting the construction of port infrastructure in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and other Indian Ocean countries, it is possible that China attempts to secure ports to call, strengthen the defense of sea lanes, and further improve the operation execution capabilities of the PLA Navy in the Indian Ocean.

(6) Objectives of Water and Airspace Activities
Taking into consideration such factors as the development of Chinese naval and air forces, activities in sea areas and airspace, statements in defense white papers, China’s geographical location and globalizing economy, the water and airspace activities of the Chinese Navy, Air Force and other organizations are considered to have the following objectives.

The first is to intercept operations by adversaries in waters and airspace as far as possible from China in order to defend its territory, territorial waters and territorial airspace. Behind this objective is an increase in effectiveness of long-range attacks due to recent progress in science and technology.

The second is to develop military capabilities to deter and prevent Taiwan’s independence. China maintains that it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the unification of China. To ensure that they can prevent foreign intervention into Taiwan, which is surrounded by the sea in all directions, China needs to enhance its military operational capabilities at sea and airspace.

The third is to weaken the control of other countries and to strengthen the claim through various surveillance activities and use of force, at sea and in airspace surrounding the island to which China claims territorial sovereignty.

The fourth is to acquire, maintain, and protect its rights and interests. China is engaged in oil and gas drilling as well as building facilities and surveying in the East and South China Seas. It has been confirmed that in addition to the existing 4 platforms, China is building 12 new offshore platforms on the Chinese side of the Japan-China median line of the East China Sea since June 2013. In late June 2016, the installment of an anti-surface vessel radar and a surveillance camera was confirmed on one of the platforms. Attention is to be paid to developments of the platforms by China, including the purpose of such equipment. Japan has repeatedly lodged protests against such unilateral development by China and demanded the termination of such work.

The fifth is to defend its sea lanes of communications.

**KEY WORD**

*Belt and Road* Initiative
A concept for an economic sphere proposed by President Xi Jinping. The “Silk Road Economic Belt” (“One Belt”) and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (“One Road”) were announced in September and October 2013, respectively. Since then, the two concepts are collectively referred to as the “Belt and Road” Initiative.

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89 China is collaborating on port development projects and other programs with local governments at such ports as Gwadar Port in Pakistan, Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, and Chittagong Port in Bangladesh.

90 On November 1, 2016, Foreign Minister Kishida (at that time) revealed that new gas field drilling was taking place in that sea area and stated that “it is extremely regrettable that [China] is continuing with acts towards unilateral development.”

91 With regard to resource development in the East China Sea, in September 2010, China unilaterally announced postponement of the negotiation to conclude an international agreement with Japan for implementing the so-called “June 2008 Agreement.” While the negotiation has not been resumed yet, it is pointed out that China is highly likely carrying out gas production in the Kashi gas field (Tianwanli in Chinese) and elsewhere. Meanwhile, China’s SOA announced that the “Haixiangxiyou 981” oil rig succeeded in its first drilling in the South China Sea in May 2012.
In the background is the fact that its sea lanes, including its oil transportation routes from the Middle East, are essential for the globalizing Chinese economy. The areas of its sea lanes which the Chinese Navy deems it should defend depend on such factors as the international situation at the time. However, given the recent strengthening of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, it is believed that they have been developing a capacity to defend areas past China’s near seas to more distant seas.

Given these objectives and recent trends in China’s water and airspace activities, it is believed that China plans to further expand the sphere of its water and airspace activities, and further intensify its operations in waters surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, the South China Sea and the airspaces over these sea areas, and the Indian Ocean.

Meanwhile, in recent years, China has shown interest in taking steps to avoid and prevent unexpected situations at sea areas and airspace. For example, in April 2014, China, together with other countries such as Japan and the United States, agreed to the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which sets forth the standards of behavior in the case that the naval vessels or aircraft of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) member states have unexpected encounters. Also, in May 2018, Japan and China signed a formal agreement to start implementation of the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between the Defence Authorities of Japan-China to prevent accidental clashes between SDF and PLA vessels and aircraft.  

### International Military Activities

In recent years, the PLA has been emphasizing nontraditional security missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster rescue, and counterpiracy. In order to carry out these missions, it has actively dispatched its units overseas. It is believed that in the background of the PLA’s stance on international military activities is the expansion of China’s national interests beyond its national borders, which in turn increased its necessity to protect and promote its national interests overseas, as well as China’s intent to raise its stature by demonstrating its will to fulfil its responsibilities to the international community.

China vows to consistently support and actively participate in UN PKOs. According to the Ministry of National Defense of China, it has sent more than 35,000 military personnel to them. According to the United Nations, as of the end of May 2018, China has a total of 2,514 troops engaged in UN peacekeeping activities, including United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). China has also contributed civilian police and military observers, and has dramatically increased its budget allocation for peacekeeping. In addition, in September 2017, China announced that it registered approximately 8,000 troops in the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS).

In this manner, China has actively made personnel...
and financial contributions and has a growing presence in UN PKO. It is deemed that underlying China’s proactive attitude towards UN PKOs is China’s wish to strengthen its relations with the regions where PKOs are conducted, particularly with African nations, by way of these activities.

Moreover, China has been actively participating in counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. In view of the deteriorating situation in Libya, China carried out an evacuation operation of Chinese nationals from Libya from February to March 2011 for the first time. In this operation, China dispatched a Navy vessel and Air Force transportation aircraft to Libya. Moreover, From March to April 2015, based on the worsening situation in Yemen, the Chinese Navy’s counter-piracy forces docked at the ports of Aden, Al Hudaydah, and elsewhere for the evacuation of Chinese nationals and foreign nationals, including one Japanese national, living in Yemen. In May 2017, when Sri Lanka was hit by flooding and landslides, the Chinese Navy carried out disaster relief activities, such as providing material support and medical rescue activities, while it was on a long-range cruise. China’s humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities have received international praise. It has been pointed out, however, that through such activities, China aims to build a pacifist and humanitarian image of its military forces and demonstrate, both domestically and internationally, its intent to place priority on military operations other than war. It is also suggested that China hopes to test its ability to promptly project its military power to distant locations.

### Education and Training

In recent years, the PLA has conducted practical exercises including large-scale ones such as joint exercises led by theaters, joint exercises of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, confrontation exercises, landing exercises, and exercises that cut across military regions and theaters, as well as night-time exercises and joint exercises with other countries in order to strengthen its operational capabilities. The goal of “being able to fight and winning battles” was repeatedly mentioned in statements by President Xi. This is construed as evidence that the military is promoting implementation of more practical exercises. The new military training regulations in effect since January 2018 referred to the implementation of joint and full-spectrum operational capabilities based on network information systems, in addition to the implementation of practical training as a rule.

In the education spectrum, the PLA aims to train soldiers who have the ability to implement joint operations. In 2003, it launched a human resource strategy project to develop human resources capable of directing joint and informatized operations, and of building informatized armed forces. It was reported in 2017 that the PLA National Defense University began training to develop human resources capable of directing joint operations. On the other hand, in recent years, a variety of issues have been raised in relation to benefits, including remuneration, the personnel development system, and the treatment of veterans.95

China outlined the promotion of “rule of law” at the fourth plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee in 2014, and is proceeding to develop various related laws, and it is thought that the military will also be required to implement the “rule of law.” One specific action is Chairman of the CMC Xi Jinping’s comment at the 90th anniversary commemorating the formation of the PLA held in August 2017 that the “military be controlled by law.” Additionally, in October of the same year, Miao Hua, Director of the Political Work Department, and Zhang Shengmin, Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, were selected as members of the 19th Central Military Committee, the supreme decision-making body in the military.

China has been developing wartime mobilizations systems in order to effectively utilize private resources in case of emergencies, including wars. In 2010, China enforced the National Defense Mobilization Law, which is the basic law for wartime mobilization into effect. In fact, while it appears that military weapons have recently been transported by commandeered civilian vessels,96 such a development is thought to be in line with the fusion of military and civilian personnel currently being promoted, and it is possible that this will be actively implemented going forward.

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95 See footnote 26 in this section.
9 National Defense Industry Sector

While China imports highly sophisticated military equipment and parts that it cannot produce domestically from other countries such as Russia, China is believed to place emphasis on their indigenous production. In recent years, reform in the Chinese defense industry has progressed. Under the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, a department of the State Council, China has formed 12 group corporations to develop and produce nuclear weapons, missiles, rockets, aircraft, vessels, and other conventional weapons. In doing so, China promotes, in particular, two-way technological exchanges where military technologies are utilized for developing the national economy, and, in turn, civilian technologies are absorbed for a buildup of national defense. As a result, specifically, the technologies of the defense industry have contributed to the development of civilian space exploration, the aviation industry, and the shipbuilding industry.

In recent years, the “military-civil fusion” strategy, which is said to have been upgraded to the national strategy, is also being promoted in the field of defense technology. Furthermore, China encourages and supports international cooperation and competition in dual-use industries. China is thus thought to have interest in absorbing foreign technologies through dual-use industries. By proactively introducing advanced technologies from overseas in this way, the modernization of the PLA can be further advanced.

3 Relations with Other Countries

1 General Situation

China, particularly over maritime issues where its interests conflict with others’, continues to act in an assertive manner based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing international order, including attempting to change the status quo by coercion. China remains poised to fulfill its unilateral demands without compromise, which has included making steady efforts to turn its acts into faits accomplis. It has advocated building a “community of shared future for mankind” and, while referring to promoting the building of a “New Model of Major Country Relations” based on mutual respect, equitable justice, cooperation, and “win-win,” it has been noted that China has tried to influence political decisions in other countries through efforts such as putting pressure on foreign educational institutions and winning over politicians. There have also been movements toward creating their own international order, including the construction of a China-led multilateral mechanism. On the other hand, China recognizes that a peaceful and stable international environment is necessary for maintaining sustainable economic development and enhancing China’s overall national power. Based on such recognition, in its relationships with other countries, China proactively carries out military exchanges including reciprocal visits by senior military officials and joint military exercises. In recent years, China has been engaged in dynamic military exchanges not only with major powers such as the United States and Russia and with its neighboring countries including Southeast Asian countries, but also with countries in Africa and Latin America. At the same time, the objectives of China’s promotion of military exchanges are thought to include alleviating other countries’ concerns regarding China by strengthening its relations with these countries, creating a favorable security environment for China, enhancing China’s influence in the international community, securing stable supplies of natural resources and energy, and building foreign bases. China is believed to consider military exchanges as a strategic means to safeguard its national interests, and as such, to position military

97 As a specific example, in the field of engine development and manufacturing for military and civilian aircraft, where the progress of proprietary development is limited, when a state-owned enterprise specializing in engines was established in August 2017, President Xi Jinping emphasized the “close fusion of military and civil development.”
98 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (June 2017) states that China uses various means including cyber theft in order to acquire foreign military and dual-use technology.
99 The General Secretary Xi, at a Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs in June 2018, underlined “thought on socialism with Chinese characteristic for a new era,” specifically, the enforcement of the building of “a community with a shared future for mankind” and the progress of “Belt and Road Initiative,” the development of global partnerships and leading the reform of global governance systems.
100 In submitting an amendment to national security legislation to the Parliament of Australia in December 2017, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull said in his speech, “Media reports have said that the Chinese Communist Party has been working to covertly interfere with our media, our universities and even the decisions of elected representatives right here in this building.”
101 China seeks to implement its own initiatives in the security realm; at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), China criticized military alliances and proposed “the security of Asia by the people of Asia.” In the international finance domain as well, China plays a leading role in establishment of the New Development Bank (BRICS Development Bank) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
exchanges as an element in China’s overall diplomatic strategy. Moreover, China has set forth the “Belt and Road” Initiative as its foreign policy. In the international finance domain, China plays a leading role in the establishment of the New Development Bank (BRICS Development Bank) and AIIB.

2 Relations with Taiwan

See 4-1 of this section (Relations with China)

3 Relations with the United States

There are various issues between the United States and China, such as human rights in China, the Taiwan issue, and trade issues. However, since a stable U.S.-China relationship is essential for China to develop its economy, it is believed that China will continue to aspire to maintain stable relations with the United States. China is trying to further develop relations with the United States through mutual respect and “win-win” cooperation, respecting its “core interests and major concerns.”

The United States has made frequent statements on the necessity of cooperation between the United States and China on issues such as North Korea since the start of the Trump administration. At the same time, it also called on China to uphold international rules and norms on global issues, including maritime security and international trade. Furthermore, the United States regards China as a “revisionist state” trying to shape the world along its own authoritarian model, and has indicated it recognizes that China is pursuing regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific in the near future through the modernization of its military and other efforts, and sees the re-emergence of a Pacific in the near future through the modernization of its militaries have engaged in annual humanitarian and mutual port visits. For example, the U.S. and Chinese observers to U.S. military exercises, and joint drills have been conducted between the Chinese and U.S. navies on mutual port visits. For example, the U.S. and Chinese militaries have engaged in annual humanitarian and disaster relief exercises since November 2013. After the inauguration of the Trump administration, both countries frequently mentioned the importance of bilateral military exchanges, and several new dialogue frameworks were launched. In April 2017, it was decided at the U.S.-China Summit Meeting that the U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue would be established as part of the new U.S.-China Comprehensive Dialogue, and the first meeting was held in Washington, D.C. in June of the same year. Also in 2017, the U.S.-China Joint Staff Dialogue Mechanism was established and the first dialogue was held in November of the same year. There were instances in the past, when the DoD notified China of the same year. This was confirmed in a document between the Japanese and U.S. leaders for the first time in February 2017, in the joint statement from the first Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting since the inauguration of the Trump administration, which explicitly referred to the application of Article 5 of the Treaty to the Senkaku Islands. The same interpretation is reiterated in the “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” published in June 2017 by the U.S. DoD. China has shown strong protest to these views. With regard to the issues over the South China Sea, the United States is concerned about such dimensions as obstruction to the freedom of navigation in sea lanes, restrictions on the activities of U.S. Forces, and the worsening security situation in the entire region. The United States has requested China to comply with international norms, and has repeatedly criticized China’s unilateral and assertive actions. And the United States also implements the Freedom of Navigation Operation in the South China Sea to counteract excessive claims to maritime interests by other countries such as China. In May 2018, DoD announced that they disinvited China to RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Exercise) that is held every year because of “China’s continued militarization of islands in the South China Sea.”

On the other hand, a hotline between the defense departments of the two countries was set up in April 2008. In November 2014 and September 2015, the United States and China announced that they agreed on confidence-building measures aimed at reducing the risk of unintended encounters. China has also dispatched observers to U.S. military exercises, and joint drills have been conducted between the Chinese and U.S. navies on mutual port visits. For example, the U.S. and Chinese militaries have engaged in annual humanitarian and disaster relief exercises since November 2013. After the inauguration of the Trump administration, both countries frequently mentioned the importance of bilateral military exchanges, and several new dialogue frameworks were launched. In April 2017, it was decided at the U.S.-China Summit Meeting that the U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue would be established as part of the new U.S.-China Comprehensive Dialogue, and the first meeting was held in Washington, D.C. in June of the same year. Also in 2017, the U.S.-China Joint Staff Dialogue Mechanism was established and the first dialogue was held in November of the same year. There were instances in the past, when the DoD notified

102 Then Vice President Xi Jinping first used “New Model of Major-Country Relations” in talks with then President Obama when during his visit to the United States in 2012. China explains that the concept is based on: (1) no conflict, no-confrontation; (2) mutual respect; and (3) win-win cooperation. However, when President Xi Jinping made no mention of it when he met with U.S. President Donald Trump in April and November of 2017.


104 See Section 3, footnote 85.

105 See Section 2-1-1 for the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” conducted by the U.S. in the South China Sea.

106 Chinese naval vessels participated in the same exercise conducted in 2014 and 2016.

107 It was reported that consultations were held on the issue of North Korea, the South China Sea, U.S.-China military exchanges, among other matters.
Congress of the sale of weapons to Taiwan in October 2008 and January 2010, where China notified the United States to cancel the major military exchanges with them. However, when notice was given in December 2015 and July 2017, although China vigorously protested, it made no remarks about canceling military exchanges. In 2017, it made no mention of any measures against the United States, and took a more restrained approach than in the past. Although both China and the United States have their differences, progress in military exchanges seems to be relatively stable.

## 4 Relations with Russia

Ever since the China-Soviet confrontation ended in 1989, China and Russia have placed importance on their bilateral relationship. They have emphasized the deepening of their “strategic partnership” since its establishment in the mid-1990s. In 2001, the China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation was concluded. In 2004, the long-standing issue of border demarcation between the two countries came to a settlement. The two countries have a common view on promoting the multipolarization of the world and the establishment of a new international order, and have further deepened their relations.

On the military front, since the 1990s, China has purchased modern weapons from Russia, including fighters, destroyers, and submarines. Russia is currently the largest supplier of weapons to China. Meanwhile, their trade amounts are said to be declining in recent years due to the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China, however, it is suggested that China has shown strong interest in continuing to import Russia’s advanced equipment. For example, in November 2015, China reportedly signed an agreement to purchase 24 of the newest fourth generation Su-35 fighters, and received 14 aircraft at the end of 2017. It was also reported that an agreement was reached regarding the purchase of the S-400 surface-to-air missile system in 2014, with delivery of the missiles beginning in 2018. At the same time, it is pointed out that Russia, which shares a land border with China, has a policy of not supplying sophisticated weapons to China that would cause a threat to Russia and of differentiating the performance of the weapons it exports. It is also suggested that Russia has concerns about competing with China in arms exports.

China and Ukraine have deep ties in the field of arms procurement, as indicated by China’s purchase of the Ukrainian unfinished Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier “Varyag,” which was the basis of the aircraft carrier “Liaoning.” In this regard, attention will also be paid to the relationship with Ukraine.

Military exchanges between China and Russia take place in such forms as routine mutual visits by senior military officers and joint exercises. For example, the two countries have held the large-scale joint military exercise of navy “Joint Sea” every year since 2012, and held it in the Sea of Japan and, for the first time, the Baltic Sea and Sea of Okhotsk in 2017. From 2016, the two countries started “Aerospace Security,” a joint missile defense computer-simulated exercise. These exchanges will likely enable China to not only deepen mutual understanding and confidence-building between their militaries, but also learn about the operation methods of Russian-made weapons and the operational doctrine of the Russian Armed Forces. Furthermore, China holds the joint counter-terrorism exercise “Peace Mission” China and Russia or among the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member countries including China and Russia.

## 5 Relations with Other Countries

### (1) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries

As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia, reciprocal top-level visits and other activities continue to be carried out actively. In 2017, the heads of seven

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108 Regarding the military field, this treaty mentions military confidence building or strengthening of mutual troop reductions in border areas, military cooperation such as military technical cooperation, and holding discussions in the event that there is awareness of any threat to peace.

109 According to SIPRI, Russia accounts for 65% of China’s arms imports from 2013 to 2017.

110 It is suggested that China is plagiarizing, copying, and reverse-engineering military science technologies, including redesigning its own J-11B fighter based on the Russian-made Su-27 fighter. Feeling strong discontent and casting doubts over China, it is suggested that Russia is cautious about supplying state-of-the-art equipment to China, such as the Su-35 fighter and the S-400 surface-to-air missile. For example, Russia has allegedly requested that the agreement regarding the supply of Su-35 fighters requires the payment of a vast amount of compensation if China copies and produces the fighter. It has also been noted that Russia may supply only the S-400 missiles with relatively short ranges.

111 China and Ukraine agreed on the export and joint production of four Zul'ib-class air-cushioned landing craft for China in 2009, of which two were delivered to China between 2013 and 2014. In 2011, the two countries entered into a contract for the sale of three L-78 aerial refueling tankers. It was reported in 2016 that they signed an agreement to hold consultations concerning the export and production in China of the massive cargo aircraft An-225.

112 Joint Sea was held in April 2012, July 2013, May 2014, May and August 2015, and September 2016 in the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan off the coast of Vladivostok, northern East China Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Peter the Great Gulf, and the South China Sea, respectively.

113 The Peace Mission exercise was held among China and Russia in August 2005, July 2009, and July to August 2013, and among the SCO member countries including China and Russia in August 2007, September 2010, June 2012, August 2014, and September 2016.
ASEAN member countries visited China on the occasion of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in May 2017 that included State Counsellor and Foreign Minister Aung San Suu Kyi of Myanmar, President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, and President Joko Widodo of Indonesia. President Xi Jinping also visited Vietnam in November later that same year. China is also actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN Plus One (China), ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China, the ROK) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In November 2017, Premier Li Keqiang attended multilateral meetings in Philippines including the ASEAN Plus One Summit. Furthermore, China has developed bilateral relations through infrastructure development support, etc. under the “Belt and Road” Initiative.

On the military front, China has made efforts toward military confidence building, such as goodwill visits of Southeast Asian countries between April and October 2017 by the Chinese naval fleet. In September 2017, a submarine identified to be a Yuan-class submarine also visited Malaysia. These efforts can also be considered to have the objective of securing bases for the activities of the PLA Navy in the distant sea areas of the Indian Ocean.

Some ASEAN countries are likely to have concerns about China’s advance into the South China Sea, but in 2017, any conflicts between China and these countries over territorial rights in the South China Sea have not surfaced. The Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings against China regarding their disputes over the South China Sea, including Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In July 2016, a final arbitration was made where most of the content of the allegations were accepted. However, since China provides the Philippines with substantial economic support, the Philippines is said to have refrained from referring to the ruling. The statement at the 31st ASEAN Summit in November 2017, when the Philippines held the chair, mentioned improved relations between China and ASEAN, and did not express any concerns about the situation in the South China Sea. This was the first time those concerns went unmentioned since the Chairman’s statement at the ASEAN summit in May 2014. At the same time, in July 2017 and March 2018, the Vietnamese government reportedly made foreign companies engaged in oil drilling in the South China Sea with the permission of the Vietnamese government cancel the drilling under the pressure from China. This is regarded as an example of China flexing its muscles with its unilateral demands. Moreover, it is reported that in December 2017 the then candidate for commander of Indonesia’s army referred to the “rise of China as a superpower” as one of the threats to Indonesia’s security. These issues will be points to watch for in future developments of China-ASEAN relations.

(2) Relations with Central Asian Countries

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in the western part of China, is situated next to Central Asia. It shares borders with the three countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. It has ethnic minorities settled in the areas straddling borders, and there are lively exchanges between the people of those countries. Therefore, China is deeply concerned about the political stability and security situations, such as terrorism by Islamic extremists in Central Asian states. Such concerns of China appear to be reflected in China’s engagement in SCO, which was established in June 2001. Moreover, China is strongly interested in the abundant energy and natural resources of Central Asia, with a view to diversify its supply source and procurement methods of these resources. China promotes cooperation in the energy field with Central Asian countries, such as the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines between China and Central Asian nations.

(3) Relations with South Asian Countries

China has traditionally maintained a particularly close relationship with Pakistan, and mutual visits by their leaders take place frequently. Their cooperation in the military sector, including exporting weapons and transferring military technology, is also considered to be deepening. As the importance of sea lanes increases for

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114 The Chairman’s statement at the ASEAN Summit held in April 2018, expressed the concerns of leaders of some ASEAN countries about the land reclamation activities, etc. in the South China Sea, although no names were mentioned.

115 See Chapter 2, Section 6-4.

116 It had been pointed out that over the last several years China had been dispatching maritime law enforcement vessels appearing to belong to the Chinese Coast Guard around Scarborough Shoal to interfere with Philippine fishing boats approaching the Shoal. According to CSIS/AMTI, it was confirmed that Philippine fishing boats were operating around Scarborough Shoal after the Philippines-China Summit Meeting in October 2016. In November of the same year, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “the matter of Philippine fishermen conducting fishing was dealt with appropriately based on friendship.”
China, it is believed that the importance of Pakistan is rising for China, partly because of the geopolitical features of Pakistan which faces the Indian Ocean. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a development plan for power facilities and transportation infrastructure in the region stretching from the Port of Gwadar, where China is assisting construction, to Kashgar in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, is a flagship project of Belt and Load Initiative, and progress of the project is expected to increase China’s influence in Pakistan.

China and India have undemarcated border areas, and in January 2018, an Indian newspaper reported an incident of the Chinese military “crossing the border.” Additionally, even in the Doklam Plateau where Bhutan has close relations to China and India both of which ownership of the highlands, a standoff occurred between the two countries that lasted from June to August 2017. On the other hand, China has recently striven to improve its relationship with India, while also paying consideration to maintaining balance with Pakistan. And because China identifies the relationship with India as a strategic partnership, the leaders of the two countries actively conduct mutual visits. As a background to progress the relations with India, there seems to be an emphasis on economic growth of the two countries, and a response to closer US-India relations.

In recent years, China has also been deepening its relations with Sri Lanka. Initially after taking office, President Maithripala Sirisena, who had campaigned to shift from a diplomacy oriented towards China to a diplomacy oriented towards all countries and won the election in January 2015, suspended the Colombo Port City development projects financed by China. However, he subsequently announced their resumption in January 2016, and new development projects with China are also showing progress. In July 2017, an agreement was reached to lend interests to Chinese enterprises at the Port of Hambantota, which is being constructed with Chinese loans. It has also been noted that India, traditionally closer to Sri Lanka, is concerned about these developments. Additionally, China is deepening its relations with Bangladesh, such as by developing the harbor in Chittagong where a naval base is located and exporting arms.

With regard to military exchanges, China has conducted a variety of joint exercises with Pakistan and India since 2003, including joint naval search and rescue exercises and counter-terrorism exercises.

(4) Relations with EU Countries
For China, the European Union (EU) countries are now as an important partner as Japan and the United States, especially in the economic field. China, through diplomatic opportunities, strongly requests EU countries to lift their arms embargo against China which has been imposed since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.

Regarding information technology, avionics, and AIP systems for submarines and other areas, EU member countries possess more advanced technologies than China or Russia which exports weapons to China. Therefore, if the EU arms embargo on China were lifted, the weapons and military technologies of EU countries would transfer to China and would be utilized as a bargaining chip to gain the edge in weapons transactions with Russia. Although it was explicitly stated in the EU’s strategy against China, which was adopted for the first time in 10 years in July 2016 that the position concerning the arms embargo against China remained unchanged and continuous attention will need to be paid to future discussions within the EU.

(5) Relations with Middle East and African Countries, Pacific Islands, and Central and South American Countries
China has been enhancing its relations with Middle

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117 China identifies CPEC, a ground transport route that starts from the port of Gwadar in Pakistan and announced that China would invest US$46 billion in CPEC.
118 They include the Kashmir region and the state of Arunachal Pradesh.
119 At the meeting with Prime Minister Mohdi of India in September 2017, President Xi Jinping is reported to have stated that China and India have an opportunity to develop together and must adhere to the basic judgment that they will not pose a threat to each other. Including these talks, President Xi has visited with Prime Minister Modi three times between September 2017 and June 2018.
120 According to SIPRI, Bangladesh accounts for 19% of China’s arms exports from 2013 to 2017, which is the second largest share.
121 For example, in November 2010, then Chinese President Hu Jintao visited France, and on this occasion, China and France announced a joint statement that included text supporting the lifting of the arms embargoes against China. It is deemed that some EU countries have positive opinions about the lifting of their arms embargoes against China.

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Arms embargo against China
EU countries announced the suspension of arms sales to China as a measure against the suppression of human rights in China during the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. However, the actual embargoed items are ultimately left to the interpretation of the individual member countries. China continues to seek the lifting of the arms embargo against China, and there are movements towards reconsideration within the EU.
Eastern and African nations in the economic realm, including providing active assistance for their infrastructure development and investment in their resource and energy development, and has been further expanding its influence in the region. In recent years, not only interactions among state leaders and senior military officials but also arms exports and exchanges between military forces are actively conducted. Underlying these movements could be China’s aim to ensure a stable supply of energy and natural resources and to secure overseas bases in the future. China has actively dispatched personnel to UN PKOs in Africa. In December 2016, São Tomé and Príncipe severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan, followed by Burkina Faso in May 2018, while re-establishing relations with China.

As regards China-Australia relations, a Chinese company’s agreement with the Northern Territory Government of Australia to lease Darwin Port raised debates over security. China has also been boosting its relations with the Pacific islands. It has been developing oil, natural gas, and cobalt mines in Papua New Guinea and has signed an agreement on military cooperation with the country. Though proactive and continuous economic assistance has also been implemented in other islands, Australia and other countries have also expressed their concerns over China’s infrastructure projects.

Furthermore, military exchanges are being promoted with Fiji and Tonga.

China has striven to further deepen its relations with Central and South American countries. Chinese senior military officials have continuously visited countries, such as Argentina and Brazil. Since 2015, China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) held the ministerial meeting. In June 2017, Panama severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan, followed by the Dominican Republic and previously stated in May 2018, while establishing relations with China.

### 6 International Transfer of Weapons

The total of China’s arms exports have surpassed the total of imports since 2013. China has expanded provision of weapons such as small arms, tanks, aircrafts, and Unmanned Aircraft Vehicles (UAVs) to developing countries in Asia, Africa, and other areas. Specifically, it is reported that the main recipients are Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, while weapons are also being exported to African countries such as Algeria, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Ghana, and Kenya, to Central and South American countries including Venezuela, and to Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq and Iran. Some experts claim that China transfers weapons in order to strengthen its strategic relationships with allies, enhance its influence in the international community, and secure energy and natural resources. China does not participate in some of the frameworks of international arms export control, and some observers point out that there is proliferation of missile-related technology.

Attention will be paid to whether China will increase the transparency of international weapons transfer in response to the concerns of the international community.

### 4 Military Capabilities of Taiwan

#### 1 Relations with China

China upholds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China, and that the Taiwan issue is therefore a domestic issue. The country maintains that the “one-China” principle is the underlying premise and foundation for discussions between China and Taiwan. China also claims that it would never abandon its efforts for peaceful unification, and expresses that it would take up policies and measures to solve issues of Taiwanese people’s interest and to protect their due authority. Meanwhile, China is strongly opposed to any foreign intervention in the unification of China as well as any move towards the independence of Taiwan, and on this basis, China has repeatedly stated that it has not renounced the use of force. “The Anti-Secession Law,” enacted in March 2005, clearly lays out the nonrenunciation of the use of force by China.

Tsai Ing-wen (Democratic Progressive Party) won...
a landslide victory over Zhu Lilun (Kuomintang) in the presidential election in January 2016, and the Tsai administration was inaugurated on May of the same year. President Tsai has not outlined a clear stance regarding the “1992 Consensus,” which positions China as the political foundation of cross-Strait relations and which exemplifies the “One China” policy. Furthermore, President Tsai has upheld the “maintenance of dialogue and communication of intent” and the “maintenance of the promotion of the peaceful and stable development of cross-Strait relations.” Furthermore, President Tsai has upheld the “maintenance of dialogue and communication of intent” and the “maintenance of the promotion of the peaceful and stable development of cross-Strait relations” since taking office, though comments, “we cannot return to past tensions but also cannot succumb to pressure.”

Under the former administration of Ma Ying-jeou (Kuomintang) that championed policies to maintain the status quo over independence, the relationship between Taiwan and China developed mainly in the economic field. While they managed to hold the first summit meeting after the two countries split, following the inauguration of the Tsai administration, China announced that it has already suspended exchanges with Taiwan. Also, before and after the inauguration of President Tsai, Taiwanese delegates were refused attendance to or had their invitations ignored to meetings held by international organizations. In December 2016, São Tomé and Príncipe severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan, followed by Panama doing so in June 2017 and the Dominican Republic and Burkina Faso in May 2018, while they established relations with China. Taiwan is strongly protesting, citing these actions as “Chinese acts that shrink the international space of Taiwan.” In addition, China announced in January 2018 that it would begin operation of new commercial flight routes near the Taiwan Strait without prior consultation with Taiwan.

Under these circumstances, China’s General Secretary Xi Jinping stated at the 19th National Congress in October 2017 that China was “ready to share the development opportunities on the mainland with our Taiwan compatriots,” while emphasizing that the “one-China principle” is the political foundation of cross-Strait relations. In February 2018, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Chinese State Council announced 31 preferential treatment measures including enrollment in schools and support of employment from Taiwan. Even after China announced its suspension of cross-Strait exchanges with Taiwan, President Tsai called for dialogue with China. At the reception marking the 30th anniversary of cross-Strait exchanges, President Tsai, looking for a way to open up relations between the two countries, stated that “governance has entered a new stage” and “the present presents an opportunity for change,” just as the 19th National Congress had wrapped up. As President Xi enters his second term, China’s attitude toward Taiwanese policy and the future of cross-Strait relations will be issues to watch.

Both countries have put forth their own assertions regarding the Senkaku Islands, but Taiwan has a negative attitude toward cooperation with China.

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126 On May 2016, President Tsai stated in her inaugural address: “In 1992, the two institutions representing each side across the Strait (SEF & ARATS), through communication and negotiations, arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings. It was done in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences. I respect this historical fact.”

127 In her inauguration address on May 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen stated that she would “work to maintain current mechanisms concerning dialogue and communication of intent” and that “the two sides should maintain the peaceful and stable development of cross-Strait relations on the existing political foundations.”

128 President Xi Jinping and then President of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou, held the first summit after the China-Taiwan split in November 2015. Both sides reaffirmed “One China” and agreed to establish a cross-Strait hotline.

129 In June 2016, a Taiwan Affairs Office of the Chinese State Council spokesperson announced that the exchange mechanism had already been suspended.

130 Recently, in May 2016, in addition to an invitation letter to the World Health Organization (WHO) annual meeting not being delivered, the director of Taiwan’s Ministry of Environmental Protection was also said to have been refused entry to the 23rd annual Conference of the Parties to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 23). Taiwan claims that these are due to Chinese demands and urgings. According to an announcement by Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after a request from China, Nigeria forcibly closed Taiwan’s mission in July 2017, and the governments of Ecuador, Bahrain, Papua New Guinea, Jordan and other countries asked Taiwan to remove “Republic of China” and “Taiwan” from the name of its missions and replace it with “Taipei.”

131 Taiwan currently has diplomatic relations with 18 countries.

132 In January 2015, Taiwan protested China’s announcement that it had set four new flight routes close to the Taiwan Strait saying that it was overcrowding the airspace. Following that, China and Taiwan agreed to negotiate some of the flight routes, but when both parties were about to agree to preliminary talks on the pros and cons of operating the other routes in January 2018, China began operation of the four routes without any prior consultation with Taiwan.

133 Taiwanese vessels intruded Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands three times in 2012. Taiwan’s foreign minister issued a statement on the Senkaku Islands in February 2013 titled “Our Position on Not Cooperating with Mainland China.”
2 Military Capabilities of Taiwan

Under President Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan has put forth a national defense development plan of “resolute defense, multiple deterrence” “Cultivate a Professional Military,” and “Strengthen information, communications, and electronic warfare capabilities.” In December 2017, Taiwan published its first national defense report under the Tsai administration. The report changed the existing force concept from “victory on beach areas,” to “preservation of warfighting capability, pursuing decisive victory in the littoral area, and annihilating the enemy in the beach area,” and made its first mention of military cooperation with the United States and insisted that their cooperation made a progress both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Taiwan, for improving the expertise of its military personnel and other purposes, aims to reduce the total forces from 215,000 personnel at the end of 2014 to 170,000-190,000 by 2019, while transforming its armed forces consisting of drafted personnel and volunteers into all-volunteer forces.

With regard to Taiwan’s military power, at present, ground forces, including the Navy Marine Corps, have a total of approximately 140,000 personnel. It is believed that approximately 1.66 million reserve personnel of the air, naval, and ground forces would be available in case of war. Regarding naval capabilities, in addition to Kiddclass destroyers which were imported from the United States, Taiwan possesses relatively modern frigates and other vessels. Regarding air capabilities, Taiwan possesses F-16 A/B fighters, Mirage 2000 fighters, Ching-kuo fighters, and other assets.

3 Military Balance between China and Taiwan

While China has continued to increase its defense budget by a significant margin, Taiwan’s defense budget has remained mostly unchanged for nearly 20 years. China’s official military budget in 2017 was roughly 15 times the amount Taiwan spent. In the “Nation Defense Report 2017,” Taiwan acknowledged rapid growth in China’s military capabilities along with significant advances in military reforms, integrated operations, weapons development, and overseas base construction and pointed out “threat is growing to to Taiwan.” It also mentions that Chinese military fighters and destroyers routinely circle Taiwan and exhibit the country’s military capabilities to Taiwan.

While the PLA proceeds to enhance its missile, naval, and air forces, the Taiwan’s military still struggles to modernize its equipment. The U.S. DoD has notified Congress of possible arms sales to Taiwan based on the Taiwan Relations Act. Taiwan has announced that it will continue to purchase advanced weapons.

At the same time, Taiwan is also making progress in developing its own equipment. In the first Quadrennial Defense Review (2017QDR) released under the Tsai administration in March 2017, the review emphasized progress, such as in the development of its defense industry, particularly with the domestic production of weapons and equipment. For example, in June 2016, the Taiwan Navy announced a policy to switch over major

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134 According to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that the Ministry of Defense of Taiwan released on March 2017, “resolute defense... protect the homeland” and “achieving multi-domain deterrence, comprehensive strategy” are listed in the military strategy. In July 2017, the Taiwanese Army added a new Information, Communications and Electronic Force Command to its general staff aimed at improving cyber warfare capabilities.

135 Originally, the Ministry of Defense had aimed to transition to all-volunteer forces by the end of 2014, but in September 2013 announced that this would be postponed until the end of 2016. Later, in October 2017, Minister of National Defense of Taiwan announced the policy that “a draft would not be conducted in 2018 and beyond.”

136 In November 2016, the Taiwan Air Force announced the policy that “a draft would not be conducted in 2018 and beyond.”

137 This figure was obtained by comparing China’s announced FY2016 defense budget of approximately 1,044,397 billion yuan and Taiwan’s announced FY2015 defense budget of approximately 319.3 billion Taiwan dollars by converting them into U.S. dollars using the exchange rate for FY2015 released by the Central Bank of Taiwan (US$1 = 6.7588 yuan = 30.439 Taiwan dollars). China’s actual defense budget is reportedly larger than the amount announced, and therefore, the actual difference in the defense budgets of China and Taiwan could be greater.

138 At a press conference in December 2017, President Tsai Ing-wen showed caution toward China, saying that Chinese military aircraft were becoming more active around Taiwan.

139 On June 29, 2017, (Eastern Standard Time in the United States), the Trump administration announced to Congress that it would sell approximately $1.4 billion (about ¥157 billion) in weapons, including interceptor missiles, to Taiwan. This was the first time for the Trump administration to sell weapons to Taiwan. However, it is reported that this does not include the F-35 and other high-performance weapons.

140 It is said that Taiwan has sought the sale of F-16C/D fighters and conventional submarines from the United States but they have not been achieved. “Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025” published by CSIS on January 2016, “Taiwan has stopped requesting F-16C/Ds and probably hopes that the United States will eventually make available F-35s, perhaps in a decade.”
ships including submarines, to an indigenous shipbuilding program. In April 2018, it was reported that the U.S. government granted permission to U.S. companies to negotiate with Taiwan on the construction of submarines.

The military capabilities of China and Taiwan are generally characterized as follows:
1) Regarding ground forces, while China possesses an overwhelming number of troops, their capability of landing and invading the island of Taiwan is limited at this point in time. However in recent years, China has been steadily improving its landing and invasion capabilities, such as building large landing ships.
2) Regarding naval and air forces, China, which overwhelms Taiwan in terms of quantity, has also been rapidly strengthening its naval and air forces in recent years in terms of quality, where Taiwan had superiority over China.
3) Regarding missile attack capabilities, Taiwan has been strengthening its ballistic missile defense, including upgrading PAC-2 to PAC-3 and newly inducting PAC-3. China possesses numerous short-range ballistic missiles and other assets with ranges covering Taiwan. Taiwan is deemed to have few effective countermeasures.

Comparison of military capabilities should be made based not only on the performance and quality of the military capability and equipments, but also on various factors such as the purpose and aspects of the assumed military operations, the operational status, the skill level of the personnel, and the logistics. Nevertheless, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is shifting in favor of China, and the gap appears to be growing year by year. Going forward, attention is to be paid to trends such as the strengthening of Chinese and Taiwanese forces, the sale of weapons to Taiwan by the United States, and Taiwan’s development of its own main military equipment.
President Vladimir Putin, who has been seeking the revival of Russia as a strong and influential power, successfully achieved reelection to his fourth term in March 2018. In his inaugural address in May of that same year, President Putin stated that Russia is a strong, active and influential participant in international life, and that the country’s security and defense capability are reliably assured. He also stated that quality of life, wellbeing, security and health were his main goals, and that Russia has risen like a phoenix a number of times throughout history and would achieve a breakthrough again.

At the annual presidential address to the Federal Assembly of Russia in March of that same year, held prior to the presidential election, President Putin said, “Russia ranks among the world’s leading nations with a powerful foreign economic and defense potential.” After it became certain he would win reelection, President Putin also called for the further strengthening of Russia’s defense capabilities, while on the other hand, also making remarks to the effect that Russia has no intention of starting an arms race, and that Russia seeks constructive relations with other countries.1

At that same presidential address, President Putin talked about modernizing Russia’s military equipment, including its strategic nuclear forces, and emphasized that Russia would be developing new nuclear weapons as a measure in response to the deployment of missile defense systems by the United States domestically and abroad. President Putin also expressed the recognition that Russia’s military power helped maintain strategic parity in the world, and made remarks to the effect that Russia is prepared to negotiate toward construction of a new system for international security and sustainable development of civilization.

President Putin once remarked, “The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the 20th century,” and he has been working to unify and strengthen the sphere of the former Soviet Union through such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015.

With regard to the situation in Ukraine, ever since the efforts to implement ceasefire agreements (Minsk Agreements)2 in the destabilized region of eastern Ukraine following the illegal “annexation” of Crimea by Russia, there have been no major developments in particular. The West has alleged that Russia attempted to change the status quo by force by engaging in “hybrid warfare,” and it is increasing its sense of caution toward Russia.3

In addition, Russia has been conducting military intervention in Syria since September 2015. Russia has indicated that it has the ability to continually and swiftly deploy military assets in remote areas while acquiring bases in Syria. At the same time, it is thought that Russia considers the intervention as an opportunity to test and demonstrate its equipment. In December 2016, Syrian government troops seized Aleppo, which is a

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1 President Putin made this statement at a meeting that he invited other presidential candidates to after it seemed certain that he would win the election (March 2018).

2 The Minsk Protocol of September 2014 consists of the following items: (1) ensure the immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons; (2) ensure monitoring and verification by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of the regime of non-use of weapons; (3) enact the Law of Ukraine “With respect to the temporary status of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions” (“Law on Special Status); (4) ensure monitoring on the Ukrainian-Russian state border and verification by the OSCE, together with the creation of a security area in the border regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation; (5) immediately release all hostages and unlawfully detained persons; (6) prohibit the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions; (7) conduct an inclusive national dialogue; (8) adopt measures aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in Donbas; (9) ensure the holding of early local elections in Donetsk and Lugansk regions; (10) remove unlawful military formations, military hardware, as well as militants and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine; (11) adopt a program for the economic revival of Donbass and the recovery of economic activity in the region; and (12) provide personal security guarantees for the participants of the consultations.

Then, the Minsk Memorandum was signed in September 2014, and the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreement was signed on February 2015. These are collectively called the Minsk Agreements.

3 See Chapter 2, Section 4, footnote 2. Due to the complex nature of hybrid warfare that combines economic, intelligence operation, and diplomatic aspects, some suggest that the rising threat of hybrid warfare will drive closer cooperation between NATO, which is a military alliance, and the EU, which is reinforcing its security and defence initiatives.
strategic location in Syria, and at the end of the month a ceasefire agreement entered into force between the Assad Government and opposition forces led by Russia and Turkey. Since January 2017, Russia has been increasing its presence in the Middle East, including the hosting of Syrian peace talks brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran, while continuing the fight against ISIL and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) (formerly known as Al-Nusra Front). Furthermore, Russia concluded an agreement with the Government of Syria for its continued use of bases in Syria in the future. Focus of attention will be the extent to which Russia will expand its influence in the Middle East including Syria.

While Russia faces severe economic conditions, forecasts indicate that following the recovery in oil prices, a major export product, the country will maintain positive economic growth in 2018.4 Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine is believed to have cooperated on the maintenance of Russia’s ICBMs. It is said that the suspension of Ukraine’s technical support following the deterioration of the bilateral relation could impair the operations of Russian equipment that rely highly on Ukraine.

Against the backdrop of foreign policy factors, including the Ukrainian crisis and the military intervention in Syria, Russia set out its objectives and strategic priorities of domestic and foreign policies in the “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation” revised in December 2015.

The National Security Strategy construes that Russia has an increasingly greater role in a multipolarizing world. The Strategy perceives increased activity of NATO and expansion of its member states as threats to national security, and expresses its vigilance against the U.S. deployment of missile defense (MD) systems to Europe and the Asia-Pacific region for undermining global and regional stability.

In the defense domain, the Strategy commits to giving continued priority to the role fulfilled by Russia’s military force, and to ensuring strategic deterrence and preventing military conflict by maintaining a sufficient level of nuclear deterrent capability and the RAF.

Under these circumstances, attention is being paid on how President Putin, while maintaining his power base, will deal with Russia’s diplomatic isolation from Europe and the United States, and economic situation, as well as promote economic structural reforms and modernization of Russia’s military forces, and its effort to expand international influence. Furthermore, although attention was focused on the improvement of Russia-U.S. relations immediately after the inauguration of the Trump administration, stance toward Russia in the United States remains severe and the outlook is unclear.

4 The IMF predicted that Russia’s GDP growth rate for 2017 would be 1.8% but would decrease to 1.6% in 2018.
Russia will maintain a sufficient level of nuclear deterrent capability and reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to an event where nuclear or other WMDs are used against it or its allies, or under circumstances wherein conventional weapons are used against it and where the survival of the country itself is imperiled.

Furthermore, defending Russian interests in the Arctic was newly added as one of the military’s tasks in peacetime.

As for Russia’s defense budget, the executed FY2017 budget registered a year-on-year decrease of around 25% compared to the amount spent in the previous year, while the amounts executed for FY2011-FY2016 showed year-on-year double-digit growth. Although Russia faced a difficult fiscal situation in 2015 and 2016, including declines in economic growth, it is said that the country has worked to secure a budget for national defense in order to achieve the goals of the State Armaments Program (GPV: Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya) by 2020 and other targets. However, having used up the reserve fund set aside for fiscal replenishment, it is expected that in 2018, as it was the case in 2017, Russia’s national defense budget will continue to be allocated based on the amount of economic growth achieved.

Russia has implemented full-scale military reform since 1997 by presenting the three pillars of reform: downsizing; modernization; and professionalization.

Moreover, based on the policy statement, “Future Outlook of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” that was approved by then President Dmitry Medvedev in September 2008, Russia is advancing measures including troop reductions, structural reform (from the division-based command structure to a brigade-based one), strengthening of combat readiness, and modernization of the RAF such as the development and introduction of new equipment.

Regarding the downsizing of the military forces, it was decided that RAF would have a strength of one million personnel as of 2016. Since December 2010, Russia reorganized its six military districts into four military districts (Western, Southern, Central and Eastern Districts). On this basis, Russia established a joint strategic command in each military district and is carrying out integrated operations of its entire military forces, such as the ground force, naval force, and air force under the control of the Military District Commander. In December 2014, the Northern Joint Strategic Command in charge of the Arctic became operational.

Regarding the modernization of the military forces, Russia is working to increase its percentage of new equipment up to 70%, and it announced in December 2017 that it had increased said proportion to approximately 60%. Within the State Armaments Program (GPV: Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya) 2018-2027 that appears to have been approved by President Putin, it is said that Russia will continue to invest 19 trillion rubles over ten years to update equipment and an additional 1 trillion rubles to develop infrastructure needed for the deployment of that equipment. It is expected that Russia will continue modernization efforts in the future.

Regarding the professionalization of the military...
forces, in order to make the combat readiness of the permanent readiness units effective, Russia promotes the introduction of a contract service system (for noncommissioned officers and soldiers) which selects personnel who would serve under contracts from the conscripted military personnel. In 2015, the number of contract servicemen exceeded the number of conscripted personnel for the first time, and in the future the percentage of contract servicemen is set to increase further.

In the context of the gradual increase in difficulties in securing the defense budget due to the recent severe economic situation, attention will be paid to the trends related to Russian efforts to improve the capacity of conventional forces and maintain the strategic deterrence capability provided by nuclear weapons.

### 3 Military Posture and Trends

Russia’s military forces are comprised of forces such as the RAF, the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), and the Federal National Guard Service of the Russian Federation. The RAF consists of three services and two independent forces: Land Forces; Navy; Aerospace Forces; Strategic Missile Forces; and Airborne Forces.

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**Nuclear Forces**

Russia emphasizes its nuclear forces to secure its global position, to strike a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States and to supplement its inferiority in conventional forces. It is thus believed that Russia is making efforts to maintain readiness of its nuclear forces unit.

Russia still possesses ICBMs, SLBMs, and long range bombers (Tu-95 Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks) comparable to the United States in scale.

Russia is obligated to reduce strategic nuclear arms pursuant to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty concluded with the United States. Russia is working on accelerating the development and introduction of new weapons under the policy to prioritize the modernization of nuclear forces based on its GPV.

In March 2011, Russia started the deployment of RS24, which is considered a multi-warhead version of the “Topol-M” ICBM. Since December 2012, three Borey-class Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) vessels, which carry the new-type SLBM “Bulava,” were commissioned. There are plans to deploy four such vessels each to the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet in the future.

In October 2017, firing training took place using an ICBM “Topol” from Plesetsk Cosmodrome as well as SLBMs from a SSBN in the Okhotsk Sea and a SSBN from the Barents Sea. Cruise missile firing training also took place using long-range bombers. President Putin, at the Expanded Meeting of the Defense Ministry Board held in December 2017, noted that the share of modern weapons in Russia’s nuclear triad had reached nearly 80%, and stated that Russia would increase that percentage to 90% by 2021. He also stated that Russia could overcome both existing and future missile defense systems.

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**Borey-class submarine**

<Specifications, performance>
- Water displacement: 19,711 tons
- Maximum speed: 25 knots (approximately 46 km/h)
- Main armament: SLBM Bulava (maximum firing range 8,300 km)
- Torpedoes

<Description>
Russian Navy’s new type of strategic nuclear-powered submarine carrying ballistic missiles, the first ship being commissioned in 2012. It can carry 16 SLBMs. It has been deployed with the Pacific Fleet since 2015.

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10 Reasons behind the promotion of the contract service system may include a decrease in the population suitable for military service and the shortening of the conscription period (since January 2008, the conscription period has been shortened to 12 months). At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2010, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu stated that personnel strength adequacy was around 93% and contracted soldiers totaled approximately 384,000.

11 In April 2010, Russia and the United States signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), and the treaty came into force in February 2011. Each side is obligated to reduce deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and their deployed delivery platforms to 700 within seven years after the entry into force of the treaty. The United States announced that as of February 2018, Russia had 1,350 deployed strategic warheads and 562 deployed delivery platforms, while Russia announced that as of February 2018, it had 1,444 deployed strategic warheads and 527 deployed delivery platforms.

12 In addition, it is believed that Russia is developing a new heavy ICBM “Sarmat” (RS-26) that can destroy robust ICBM launch sites and be equipped with many warheads, a light-weight mobile solid-fuel ICBM “Rubezh” (RS-26) as well as new warheads aimed at enhancing the capability to penetrate MD.
As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia scrapped ground-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 km by 1991 in accordance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with the United States, and removed tactical nuclear weapons from naval vessels and stored them onshore in the following year. Russia, however, still possesses a broad array of other nuclear forces. In the midst of this, in December 2017, the U.S. Department of State concluded that Russia had deployed...
Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) in violation of the INF Treaty, and that the U.S. Department of Defense had begun review of military concepts and options including ground-launched intermediate-range missiles. On the other hand, Russia has criticized the U.S. as well, saying that it is in effect in violation of the INF treaty, calling the Aegis Ashore system a potential platform for the launch of Tomahawk missiles. Different assertions about the treaty still exist between Russia and the U.S.

Russia is considered to be developing and procuring conventional forces in accordance with its GPV. Close attention will need to be paid to Russia’s development, procurement, and deployment of new equipment, such as the “PAK FA” (Su-57)\(^\text{13}\) currently under development as the so-called “fifth generation fighter” and the T-14 Armata.

**Key Word**

**Fifth generation fighter**

While there are no clear standards for demarcating fighter generations, it is pointed out that a fifth generation fighter has more advanced capabilities than those of previous generations by combining the latest technologies, such as various types of electronic equipment and stealth.

**Commentary Modernization of Russia's nuclear forces**

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (announced in December 2014) asserts that Russia retains the right to strike with nuclear weapons not only if nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction are used but also in the case of an invasion involving conventional weapons that threatens the country’s survival. In this way, Russia is placing priority on modernization of nuclear capabilities from the standpoint of a nuclear equilibrium with the US and supplementation of weaknesses in conventional forces.

Strategic nuclear force initiatives are promoting multiple warheads, increased nuclear output, and other improvements, including the new Yars intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for mobile and silo use and deployment of new Borei-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines equipped with new Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). In non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, Russia is moving forward with deployments of the new Iskander short-range ballistic missile (land-to-land) that can carry conventional or nuclear warheads and the Kalibr cruise (ship-to-land) missile.

Additionally, Russia has stated that it is pursuing nuclear capabilities to destroy the missile defense system being installed by the US domestically and abroad on the basis that it undermines the balance of nuclear forces with the United States. At the State of the Union Address given in March 2018, President Putin introduced a variety of new weapons, including the Sarmat large silo-type ICBM, a nuclear-powered cruise missile, a nuclear-powered unmanned submarine weapon, the Kinzhal hypersonic missile for fighter planes, and the Avangard strategic missile with winged aircraft in the warhead.

Japan needs to continue to closely monitor activities by the Russian military, including modernization of nuclear forces and developments, including in light of Russia’s deployments of nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles and strategic bombers in the Far East region.

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\(^\text{13}\) According to various reports, Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation President Yuri Slyusar stated in January 2015 that test versions of Russia’s fifth generation PAK-FA (“Prospective Aviation Complex of Frontline Aviation”) fighter jet had started to be handed over to the Russian Air Force. However, he also indicated that mass production is scheduled for 2020.
tank, in addition to the introduction of the Su-35 fighter and the surface-to-surface missile system “Iskander.”

Along with carrying out a range of exercises, since February 2013, the RAF have been conducting surprise inspections designed to validate the combat readiness of the military districts, etc. for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. These inspections are contributing to the improvement of long-distance mobilization capability of the RAF. Furthermore, outside of Russia, the RAF have been deploying vessels mainly formed of the Black Sea Fleet to the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, from October 2017 to January of the following year, Steregushchyi-class frigates belonging to the Baltic Fleet navigated the long distance from the North Atlantic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean. A plan is underway to construct or rebuild 10 airfields in the Arctic, and in August and October 2017, a flotilla mainly comprising Northern Fleet Udaloy-class destroyers took part in a landing drill while navigating the long distance from Severomorsk on the Kola peninsula to the Novosibirsk islands. The RAF has been intensifying its activities in the Arctic, which include not only such deployment and exercises of naval vessels and resumption of military facility operation, but also strategic nuclear deterrence patrols by SSBN and patrol flights by long-range bombers.

In addition, in April 2017, Russian Tu-95 long-range bombers flew as far as the coast off Alaska, and in December that year, Tu-95 bombers also visited Biak Airport in Indonesia. In addition, in January 2018, Tu-160 long-range bombers flew to the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea, and the North Sea.

The RAF has thus intensified activities not only in the Asia-Pacific, but also in the Arctic, Europe, areas near the U.S., and the Middle East. In particular, Russia’s vessels and aircraft tend to expand their area of activity.

As for the future of RAF, there are uncertain elements which may be influenced by Russia’s future economic and social development and trends in Russia’s diplomatic relations with European and other countries; therefore, it is necessary to keep our attention on future developments.

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14 A new tank fitted with an unmanned turret that was unveiled for the first time during the Victory Day Parade on May 9, 2015. In addition to this tank, Russia is currently developing a family of crawler and wheeled infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled howitzers, and so on. A contract for 100 tanks was concluded in 2016, with the delivery of the tanks scheduled to occur in 2020.

15 As it proceeds with its military reform, Russia has conducted large-scale exercises for verification and other purposes in recent years. Among these, Zapad 2017 was held in September 2017 as a command and staff exercise held in a round-robin format involving all military districts. Taking part in this exercise were around 12,700 troops, 70 aircraft and helicopters, and 250 tanks. The purpose of this exercise is believed to be enhancing the mutual operating capabilities of each joint strategic command and the coordination of advanced command and control systems. (Exercises from the previous four years included: Vostok 2014 [East Military District], Tsentr 2015 [Central Military District], Kavkaz 2016 [South Military District], and Zapad 2016 [West Military District].)

16 Surprise inspections were conducted at the Central and Southern Military Districts in February 2013, Southern Military District in March 2013, Western Military District in May 2013, Eastern and Central Military Districts in July 2013, strategic nuclear units in October 2013, and Western and Central Military Districts from February to March 2014. In September 2014, a surprise inspection of the Eastern Military District was conducted, which transitioned to the Vostok 2014 large-scale exercise.

17 At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that the surprise inspections held five times a year on average would enable the commanders of every military district and military service as well as staff to mobilize long distances and execute tasks in unknown regions.

18 Russia’s naval fleet in the Mediterranean which is said to have completed its formation on June 1, 2013, is considered a permanent operational force.

19 Among the military installations being developed in the Arctic, it is believed that the bases under construction on Alexandra Island in the Franz Josef Land and Kotelny Island in the Novosibirsk Islands will house 150 and 250 personnel each and have enough supplies to continue operations without assistance for a period of 18 months. In addition, the Northern Fleet has conducted long distance navigation to the Novosibirsk Islands every year since 2012.

20 It is deemed that the RAF intends to maintain and enhance their combat readiness, as well as use diversification approach towards the West and other countries in connection with the situation in Ukraine, and expand Russia’s influence.
1 General Situation

Russia newly established the Eastern Military District and the Eastern Joint Strategic Command in 2010. Land Forces, the Pacific Fleet, and the Air Force and Air Defense Units have been placed under the Military District Commander, who conducts unified operation of these services.

The current presence of the RAF in the Far East region is significantly smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear forces, still remains in the region. Russian armed forces in the vicinity of Japan are generally increasing activity, including the trend related to deployment of new units and military facility development.

Given that the RAF set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear units and dealing with conflicts through the intertheater mobility of its round-the-clock readiness units, it is necessary to keep our attention on the positioning and trends of the RAF in the Far East region while also keeping in mind the trends of units in other regions.

(1) Nuclear Forces

As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, three Delta III-class SSBNs and two Borey-class SSBNs equipped with SLBMs are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk, and approximately 30 Tu-95 long-range bombers are deployed in Ukrainka. Russia is prioritizing the reinforcement of its maritime strategic deterrence posture which had been greatly scaled-down compared to the former Soviet Union, and as part of these efforts, it plans on deploying four Borey-class SSBNs to the Pacific Fleet by 2020.

(2) Ground Forces

As part of its military reforms, Russia is thought to be reorganizing the command structure from a division-based to a brigade-based one, while also shifting all of its combat forces into permanent readiness units. The Eastern Military District now consists of eleven brigades and one division with approximately 80,000 personnel in total as well as a marine brigade equipped with amphibious operations capability. The Eastern Military District has introduced new equipment, such as the “Iskander” surface-to-surface missile system, “Bal” and “Bastion” surface-to-ship missiles, and the “S-400” surface-to-air missile system.

(3) Naval Forces

The Pacific Fleet is stationed or deployed at its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The fleet is comprised of approximately 260 ships with a total displacement in the region of approximately 640,000 tons, including approximately 20 major surface ships and approximately 20 submarines (approximately 15 of which are nuclear powered submarines) with a total displacement of approximately 320,000 tons. Additionally, it plans on deploying four multipurpose Steregushchy-class frigates.

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Stereogushchy-class frigates

<Specifications, performance>
Full load displacement: 2,235 tons
Speed: 26 knots
Main armament: Anti-ship missiles (with a maximum range of 130 km (or 260 km for the improved version)), ship-to-air missiles (maximum firing range 60 km)
On-board aircraft: One helicopter (Ka-27)

<Description>
The Russian Navy’s new type of frigate, the first of which was commissioned in 2007. The Russian Ministry of Defense is scheduled to deploy Sovershennyy (fourth ship), Gromkiy (seventh ship), Aldar Tsydenzhapov (11th ship), and Rezkiy (12th ship) to the Pacific Fleet.

Tu-95 long-range bomber

<Specifications, performance>
Speed: 924 km
Maximum radius of action: 6,398 km
Main armament: Air-to-surface cruise missiles (maximum firing range 4,500 km)

<Description>
Produced between 1956 and 1994, the final version is currently under refurbishment for modernization. Capable of carrying eight air-to-surface cruise missiles (conventional or nuclear warhead).
In March 2016, Russia's Ministry of Defence announced that it planned to deploy surface-to-ship missiles “Bastion” and “Bal” to the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands before the end of the 2016 year. In November 2016, Russia announced that it deployed coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles to Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. After then President Medvedev visited Kunashiri Island for the first time as head of state in November 2010, Russian ministers and others have made repeated visits to the Northern Territories. Between July and September 2015, Prime Minister Medvedev and six minister-level dignitaries also visited Etorofu Island, among other areas. Also, Russia is proceeding with the development of military facilities in the Northern Territories. In November 2016, Russia announced that it deployed coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles to Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. Although in February 2017, Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu stated at a meeting

2 Russian Forces in Japan’s Northern Territories

Since 1978 during the former Soviet Union era, Russia has redeployed ground troops on Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan. While the Russian troop strength is thought to be far less than that at peak times, one division is still stationed in Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands. Furthermore, tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and anti-air missiles are deployed. After then President Medvedev visited Kunashiri Island for the first time as head of state in November 2010, Russian ministers and others have made repeated visits to the Northern Territories. Between July and September 2015, Prime Minister Medvedev and six minister-level dignitaries also visited Etorofu Island, among other areas. Also, Russia is proceeding with the development of military facilities in the Northern Territories. In November 2016, Russia announced that it deployed coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles to Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands.

In the Eastern Military District, Russia deploys approximately 400 combat aircraft from its Air Force and Navy combined. Existing models are being modernized and new models, such as the Su-35 fighters and the Su-34 fighter-bombers, are being introduced to improve their capabilities.

Surface-to-ship missile Bastion

- **Specifications**, **performance**
  - Maximum firing range: 300 km

Surface-to-ship missile with the objective of coastal defense, etc., it has been deployed to the Pacific Fleet since 2014.

Anti-air Missile S-400

- **Specifications**, **performance**
  - Maximum firing range: 250 km (anti-aircraft), 60 km (anti-ballistic missile)
  - Maximum height: 27 km

This missile has the capability to intercept ballistic missiles and act as an air-defense missile. It was deployed in the Eastern District in 2012. It has been pointed out that a missile with a maximum range of 400 km also exists (the 40N6).

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21 According to Military Balance 2018, in addition to 34 Su-35 fighters, 24 Su-34 fighter-bombers have been deployed to the Eastern Military District (11th Army of Air and Air Defence Force).

22 The 18th Machine Gun and Artillery Division, which is comprised of two regiments, is one of the few division units making up the RAF since most divisions were transformed into brigades due to military reform, and is stationed on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. The Division aims to prevent landings, and participated in surprise inspections conducted in the Eastern Military District and elsewhere in July 2013. The number of Russian military personnel stationed in this region in 1991 was approximately 9,500. At the Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting held in 1997, then Russian Defence Minister Igor Rodionov revealed that the troops stationed in the Northern Territories had been reduced to 3,500 personnel by 1995. In July 2005, when then Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov visited the Northern Territories, he declared that Russia would neither increase nor decrease the troops stationed on the four islands, clarifying Russia’s intention to maintain the status quo. In February 2011, a senior official of the General Staff was said to have stated that troops on the Northern Territories would be maintained at around 3,500 personnel in the process of reorganizing divisions into brigades. In May 2014, Commander Sergey Sukovkin of the Eastern Military District announced the buildup of military facilities on the Northern Territories. In August 2014, Russia opened a new airport in Etorofu Island. Through such measures, Russia has stepped up its activities in the Northern Territories under de facto occupation.

23 After the visit, Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island were visited by then First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov in December 2010, by then Regional Development Minister Viktor Basargin in January 2011, then Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov in May 2011. Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev visited Kunashiri Island and Shikotan Island of the Habomai Islands in September 2011. In addition, in January 2011, then Deputy Minister of Defence Dmitry Bulgakov, and in February 2011, then Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov visited Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island and inspected the units stationed there. Furthermore, Prime Minister Medvedev and three ministers visited Kunashiri Island in July 2012. In July 2015, Minister of Healthcare Veronika Skvortsova visited Kunashiri Island and Shikotan Island, and in August 2015, Prime Minister Medvedev, Deputy Prime Minister and Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District Yury Trutnev, Minister for the Development of Russian Far East Galukhin, and Minister of Education and Science Dmitry Livanyov visited Etorofu Island. In September 2015, Minister of Agriculture Alexander Tkachev visited Etorofu Island, and Minister of Transport Maxim Sokolov visited Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island.

24 At a meeting held at the Ministry of Defence of Russia in December 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that a total of 392 buildings and facilities are actively being built in the military facility areas on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. Subsequently, at a meeting held at the Ministry of Defence in January 2016, the Minister noted that completing infrastructure construction in the areas was one of the priorities for 2016.

25 In March 2016, Russia’s Ministry of Defence announced that it planned to deploy surface-to-surface missiles “Bastion” and “Bal” to the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands before the end of the year. In November 2016, Boyevaya Vakhta, a newsletter published by the Pacific Fleet, mentioned that a “Bastion” coastal missile unit is being rotated to Etorofu Island and a “Bal” coastal missile unit to Kunashiri Island using an artillery squadron.
of the State Duma (lower house) that the deployment of a division to the Northern Territories or the Chishima Islands would be completed before the end of the year, details such as location of the deployment and the type of service are unknown. In January 2018, a government decree was issued to allow for joint military and civilian use of the new airport built in 2014 in Etorofu Island besides Tennei military airfield. Concerning military exercises and trainings, in February 2018, over 2,000 military personnel participated in an anti-terrorism exercise in the Northern Territories and the Chishima Islands, and it was announced in March of that same year that a new Su-35 fighters jet would be redeployed to Etorofu Island from its home base as part of a training exercise.

As described above, Russia continues to station RAF in the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan, and has recently been increasing the RAF’s activities in the territories under de facto occupation. Some point out that such developments reflect the Russian people’s heightened awareness of territorial integrity due to the Ukrainian crisis, as well as the rising military importance of the Northern Territories adjacent to the Sea of Okhotsk, an operating area of SSBN.

During the Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) held in March 2017, Japan expressed it was regrettable that Russia had deployed surface-to-ship missiles in the Northern Territories and that Russia may deploy a new division to the islands including the Four Northern Islands. Closer attention must be paid to Russian military movements in the Far East, including the Northern Territories.

3 Operations in the Vicinity of Japan

In the vicinity of Japan, the RAF has been generally increasing its activities, including exercises and drills which are believed to be conducted for objectives such as verifying the results of the military reform.

In September 2014, the strategic command and staff exercise Vostok 2014, considered the largest and the most important of the RAF exercises and drills conducted that year, was carried out in the Eastern Military District. Over 155,000 personnel, over 4,000 combat vehicles, approximately 80 vessels, and approximately 630 aircraft participated in the exercise. It is regarded that its purpose was to verify the combat readiness and mobilization postures of the units in the Far East strategic front, including the Arctic. The exercise included units from not only the Eastern Military District, but also the Western and Central Military Districts. The various units conducted long-distance maneuvers covering a distance of 12,000 km at most. For Vostok 2018, which will be held in Siberia and the Arctic sometime in August and September 2018, there are plans for participation of units not only in the Eastern Military District, but also the Central Military District and the Northern Fleet.

The number of exercises carried out by the Russian Land Forces in the areas adjacent to Japan has decreased from the peak. However, its activities are generally increasing.

With regard to naval vessels, their activities are generally increasing in recent years. For example, various exercises and long distance voyages have been carried out by Pacific Fleet vessels, along with assigned missions involving operations in Syria and patrols by nuclear-powered submarines. In September 2011, 24 naval vessels including a Slava-class guided missile cruiser passed through the Soya Strait in succession. This was the first time since the end of the Cold War that such a major transit of this strait by Russian naval vessels was confirmed. In recent years, ten or more Russian naval vessels have passed through the Soya Strait one to three times a year. Additionally, survey activities have taken place on Matsuwa Island located roughly in the middle of the Chishima Islands, with the objective of studying the feasibility of deploying Pacific Fleet’s forces there.

26 In Soviet Military Power 1989, the U.S. DoD refers to “Bastion” as the activity area of SSBN to be protected by land, sea, and air assets while utilizing topography in the territorial waters of the former Soviet Union. It was assumed that in the Pacific region, the former Soviet Union had set up a “Bastion” mainly in Okhotsk Sea. Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy stated that regular long-term patrols of SSBN, which were greatly curtailed since the former Soviet Union, would be restarted in 2012.

27 The large-scale exercise Vostok 2014 was conducted over a vast area extending from the Arctic to the coastal area. In the Kamchatka Peninsula, ALCM launches were carried out from long-range bombers, as well as launches of SLCMs from Oscar II-class nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGN). In Wrangel Island in the Arctic, night-time parachute landings and survival drills were conducted. In the Sakhalin, the Naval Infantry conducted landing drills as well as drills to prevent the landings of opposing forces. In the coastal and inland areas, drills including the launches of short-range ballistic missiles and GLCMs using the “iskander” surface-to-surface missile system, as well as drills that made use of private infrastructure, such as takeoff and landing drills of the Su-25 attack aircraft using roads for motor vehicles were conducted.

28 The number of cases of the Russian naval fleet passing through the three international straits (Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima) of Japan that have been identified and released in FY2017 is as follows: 12 cases in the Soya Strait (18 in FY2016, 22 in FY2015, 10 in FY2014); 1 case in the Tsugaru Strait (1 in FY2016, 0 in FY2015, 1 in FY2014); and 3 cases in the Tsushima Strait (7 in FY2016, 4 in FY2015, 8 in FY2014).

29 Some of the 24 naval vessels participated in the exercise conducted in the eastern part of the Kamchatka Peninsula and other places.
in the future, and it is said that a new runway has been completed on that island as well. There are also reports that bases will be constructed on Matsuwa Island as well as Paramushir Island, located in the north of Chishima Islands, and that there are plans to deploy Bal and Bastion surface-to-air missiles there. Attention must be paid to movement towards the construction of a coastal defense system covering the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands.

Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of the patrol activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia has been increasing flights by long-range bombers. Also, there were flights of Tu-95 long-range bombers refueled in mid-flight and supported by A-50 early warning aircraft and Su-27 fighters as well as flights of Tu-160.

Russian aircraft were particularly active in FY2014 during the height of tensions in Ukraine, and in April the same year when eastern Ukraine began to destabilize, unusual flights took place with Tu-95 long-range bombers conducting flights around Japan on four occasions in one month. On two of these occasions, a total of six Tu-95 flew on the same day.

Russian aircraft activities continue to be active, as shown by the higher number of scrambles against Russian aircraft compared to the previous year, and the flights by Tu-95 long-range bombers around Japan in August 2017.

Based on its National Security Strategy, Russia engages in open, rational, and pragmatic diplomacy to protect its national interests. It aims to pursue multidirectional diplomacy by ruling out futile confrontation and acquiring as many partners as possible around the world.
For this reason, Russia has been working on deepening its economic partnerships with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).\textsuperscript{35}

Furthermore, Russia aspires to deepen its relations with the Asia-Pacific countries, seen as drivers of the global economy,\textsuperscript{36} and in recent years, has attached importance to China and India as countries with which to strengthen bilateral relations. Meanwhile, Russian efforts to strengthen its cooperative relations with the West are still facing challenges after the Ukrainian crisis. However, with regard to the Syrian situation, Russia is exploring the possibility of cooperation with other countries towards stabilizing Syria and countering international terrorist organizations, including ISIL.

Attention will be paid to how Russia would balance its posture of economic-centered and benefit-focused foreign policy with Russia’s politics and diplomacy including security, and develop its relations with other countries.

2 Relations with Asian Countries

Russia recognizes that the significance of the Asia-Pacific region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy, and considers it strategically important to strengthen its status in the region from the viewpoint of socioeconomic development in Siberia and the Far East,\textsuperscript{37} and security.\textsuperscript{38} In the executive order concerning foreign policy issued in May 2012, President Putin upheld his policy to participate in the integration process of the Asia-Pacific region in order to accelerate socioeconomic development in the East Siberia and Far East regions, and stated that Russia would make efforts to develop relationships with Japan, the ROK, and other countries, along with China,\textsuperscript{39} India, and Vietnam. To achieve strategic stability and equal strategic partnerships, Russia places particular emphasis on developing a comprehensive partnership relationship and strategic cooperative relationship with China as a key factor in maintaining global and regional stability, and also intends to assign an important role for the privileged strategic partnership with India.\textsuperscript{40}

Under this policy, Russia has participated in various frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{41} Since 2015, the Eastern Economic Forum has been held in Vladivostok for accelerating the economic development of Eastern Russia and expanding international cooperation with the Asia-Pacific region.

Russia continues to advance close military cooperation with China. Export agreements on new armaments such as the S-400 surface-to-air missile and Su-35 fighter jets were concluded in 2015, and since 2012, China and Russia have been conducting joint naval exercise “Joint Sea.” Russia also continues broad military cooperation with India. Export agreements were concluded in 2016 for new armaments such as the S-400 surface-to-air missiles and Grigorovich-class frigates, and both countries have been conducting joint development of the fifth generation fighter and the “BrahMos” supersonic cruise missile. Additionally, both Russia and India continue to conduct the joint exercise “INDRA” involving the armies and navies of both countries.\textsuperscript{42} Regarding the relationship with Japan, Russia states that it will develop mutually beneficial cooperation and is intensifying its approach in many fields including politics, economy and security.

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\textsuperscript{35} In October 2011, eight CIS countries (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Moldova, and Armenia) signed the CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement.

\textsuperscript{36} Press conference by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov following the Russia-China-India foreign ministers’ meeting (April 2016).

\textsuperscript{37} Russia is currently developing resources in Siberia and Sakhalin.

\textsuperscript{38} The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (released in November 2016). In his campaign platform paper on foreign policy published in February 2012, then Prime Minister Putin expressed his recognition that the importance of the entire Asia-Pacific region was rising.

\textsuperscript{39} See Chapter 2, Section 3-3 for the relationship with China.

\textsuperscript{40} The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (December 2015) states that, “The Russian Federation will develop its comprehensive partnership relationship and strategic cooperative relationship with the People’s Republic of China as a key factor for maintaining global and regional stability. The Russian Federation will assign an important role to the privileged strategic partnership with the Republic of India.”

\textsuperscript{41} Russia has participated in regional frameworks, such as the APEC, the APF, the SCO, and the East Asia Summit (EAS; since 2011).

\textsuperscript{42} Aside from this cooperation, it has been reported that in March 2015, India requested Russia to lease another Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine in addition to the one already on lease.
3 Situation in Ukraine

As antagonism between Ukraine and Russia has continued since 2014, Ukraine has shifted away from non-alignment policy that Ukraine once held and is pursuing efforts to join NATO. In March 2018, President Poroshenko stated that Ukraine would participate in a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). Sporadic clashes between Ukrainian troops and separatist armed forces continue in the eastern part of the country, with over 10,000 people reported to have died since April 2014. Furthermore, the political processes set out in the Minsk agreements seem to have stalled, including the holding of local elections and allowing more autonomy in the areas controlled by separatists. The unstable situation in eastern Ukraine and the Russian “annexation” of Crimea have taken on aspects of being entrenched. A proposal has been put forth to establish a United Nations mission with peacekeeping force in eastern Ukraine. Russia asserts that this force should only work along the contact line, while the United States and others argue that the forces work within the entire occupied territory, including along national border between Ukraine and Russia. Developments related to this issue will be paid attention in the future.

4 Situation in Syria

Since September 2015, while acquiring Tartus Naval Base and Khmeimim Air Base as bases of its operations in Syria, the Russian military has conducted aerial bombing using fighter-bombers and long-range bombers as well as fired cruise missiles from surface vessels and submarines deployed to the Caspian Sea and Mediterranean. Russia’s Ministry of Defence announced in November 2016 that the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov deployed to the eastern part of the Mediterranean launched aircraft and conducted airstrikes on land-based targets for the first time in Russia’s naval history. These aircraft from the aircraft carrier are reported to have flown 420 sorties over a two-month period, bombing a total of 1,252 terrorist facilities. It has been pointed out, though, that most of these sorties were flown from Khmeimim Air Base since the aircraft was moved from the aircraft carrier to the Air Base soon after the airstrike began. It is therefore open to question whether this should be assessed as the operational capability of the aircraft carrier.

In December 2016, Syrian government troops gained control of strategically located Aleppo, where fighting has continued involving Syrian government troops, opposition forces, Kurdistan troops, and ISIL fighters. At the end of the same month, a nationwide ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia and Turkey took effect between the Assad administration and opposition forces. While Russia has continued to fight ISIL and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS; formerly the “al-Nusra Front”) since January 2017, it has also held Syrian peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan together with Syria and Iran. Russia has been increasing its presence in the Middle East by promoting initiatives that aim for political resolutions in the future, such as the establishment of a ceasefire monitoring organization and de-escalation areas.

In December 2017, President Putin visited a base in Syria, where he announced that the fight against terrorism in the country had been largely resolved, that Russia would continue to operate two permanent bases within Syria, and that he had decided that most of the Russian forces in Syria would be redeployed back to Russia. It is expected that Russia will prioritize a process towards political resolution while reducing its military campaign in Syria. Attention will continue to be paid to movement

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43 The NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a NATO program to offer advice and support to countries wishing to join NATO. However, participation in a MAP does not mean that the country will decide to participate in NATO in the future.

44 In December 2017, at an Expanded Meeting of the Defense Ministry Board, it was announced that since the start of its military operation in Syria, Russian air units have launched approximately 34,000 strikes, damaging or eliminating approximately 8,000 armored vehicles, 718 weapons and ammunition production facilities, and 60,318 combatants.
to enhance the influence of Russia in the Middle East, including Syria.

The objectives of Russian military intervention may include: (1) to sustain the Assad administration which is friendly to Russia; (2) to defend Russian interests including its military bases in Syria; (3) to address the threat of international terrorist organizations including ISIL; and (4) to secure influence in the Middle East. Thus far, Russia seems to have contributed to the recovery of the Assad administration’s areas of control and protecting Russian interests. Additionally, the use of cruise missiles and strategic bombers in the attacks has demonstrated Russia’s long-range precision strike capabilities. Considering the significant influence of Russia’s military intervention on the course of the Assad administration, coupled with the expanding partnerships between Russia and surrounding countries such as Turkey and Iran, Russia’s influence on future stability in Syria and on the political settlement process cannot be neglected.

Russia positions the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the CIS as the top foreign policy priority. Russia considers that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS, and deploys its troops in Ukraine (Crimea), Moldova (Transnistria), Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia), which withdrew from the CIS in August 2009. Through the conclusion of an alliance and strategic partnership treaty with Abkhazia in November 2014, the conclusion of an alliance with South Ossetia in 2015, and other efforts, Russia has been working to ensure its military influence.

Due to increasing activities by Islamic armed insurgents in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia has been pursuing military cooperation primarily on counterterrorism measures in the region, and organized the Collective Rapid Deployment Force in May 2001 within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Furthermore, in June 2009, a permanent joint rapid reaction force was established to strengthen the functions of the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force.

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45 In August 2008, following the conflict with Georgia, then President Medvedev indicated that one of the five principles of Russia’s foreign policy was that there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests.

46 In Transnistria, located on the eastern side of the Dniester River, ethnic Russian residents declared separation and independence from Moldova in 1990, but it was never recognized as such by the international community. Following the “annexation” of Crimea into Russia, in March 2014 the “Parliament” of Transnistria urged Russia to also incorporate the region. Moreover, during a telephone conference between President Putin and then President Barack Obama in March 2014, President Putin pointed out that Transnistria was experiencing a blockade. A Russian unit of approximately 1,500 troops is currently stationed in Transnistria.

47 After the conflict with Russia in August 2008, Georgia withdrew from the CIS in August 2009, but Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Georgian territory and continues to have troops stationed in the regions. In the parliamentary election in October 2012 “Georgian Dream,” an opposition alliance with a campaign promise of improving Georgia’s international community. Following the “annexation” of Crimea into Russia, in March 2014 the “Parliament” of Transnistria urged Russia to also incorporate the region. Moreover, during a telephone conference between President Putin and then President Barack Obama in March 2014, President Putin pointed out that Transnistria was experiencing a blockade. A Russian unit of approximately 1,500 troops is currently stationed in Transnistria.

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49 While some CIS countries continue to prioritize their relations with Russia, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan, others attempt to maintain a distance from Russia. In addition to Georgia which has already withdrawn from CIS and Ukraine which is announcing plans to withdrawal, countries such as Azerbaijan and Moldova have taken mostly pro-Western policies to reduce their security and economic dependence on Russia. In September 2012, Kyrgyzstan and Russia agreed on a 15-year extension of the period of the use of Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan, which otherwise would end in 2017. In October 2012, Tajikistan and Russia agreed to extend the lease of the base of Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division in Tajikistan until 2042. In December 2013, Su-27 fighters of the Russian naval force were deployed in Belarus for the first time.

50 In May 1992, leaders of six countries (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) signed the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. In 1993, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus joined the treaty, which came into effect in April 1994. However, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the treaty in 1999 without renewing it. In May 2002, CST was reorganized into the CSTO. Uzbekistan returned to CST in August 2006 but gave notice to suspend its participation in CSTO in June 2012, effectively withdrawing from the organization.

51 Learning from the fact that CSTO could not sufficiently respond to the request by Kyrgyzstan for the peace-keeping activities at the time of the ethnic conflict in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, CSTO has been discussing improvement in the efficiency of its crisis response system. The CSTO Summit Meeting in December 2011 warned against the foreign forces’ stationing in a member state by requiring the consent of all member states when any member state builds a base of a third country. CSTO joint exercises, Vzaimodeistvie (cooperative operation), has been implemented every year since 2009.
In addition, out of concern that the worsening security in Afghanistan could lead to the destabilization of Central Asia, Russia and Central Asian countries support Afghanistan while considering measures to strengthen the security of the Afghan border.52

6 Relations with the United States

President Putin has striven to deepen cooperative relations with the United States in the economic domain, while opposing the United States on any action Russia considers as “a U.S. attempt to encroach on Russia’s strategic interests.”

Russia strongly opposed the deployment plan of the MD system in Europe by the United States, stating that it would have a negative impact on Russia’s nuclear deterrent capabilities. Following the start of operations of a U.S. MD system in Romania in May 2016, President Putin noted that the deployment of MD systems in Europe was continuing despite the end of the threat posed by Iranian nuclear weapons and missiles, and stated that Russia would do everything necessary to maintain strategic military force parity.

Russia feels that the deployment of the U.S. MD system in Europe and the Asia-Pacific undermines global and regional security. While expressing its concerns over the U.S. MD system, Russia is also seeking the enhancement of its strategic nuclear forces, including missiles that can reliably breakthrough MD systems.

However, following Russia’s actions in connection with the situation in Ukraine, the United States announced suspension of the military exchanges with Russia in March 2014.53 In addition, the United States dispatched a missile destroyer to the Black Sea and provided non-lethal weapons to the Ukrainian Government.54 In March 2018, the U.S. Department of State approved the sale of anti-tank missiles to Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized this move, stating that it would not help to bring an end to the conflict in Ukraine.

In regard to the situation in Syria, there were some positive developments, including the recognition of the importance of U.S.-Russia cooperation to eliminate ISIL, a U.N.-led political resolution to the conflict, and provisional safe zones as shown in a joint statement released at the U.S.-Russia Summit Meeting held in November 2017. However, antagonism between the two countries is ongoing, with both the U.S. and Russia criticizing each other over the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in April 2017, and also the missile strikes against Syria by the U.S., the U.K., and France in April 2018. At the U.S.-Russia summit meeting held in July 2018, disarmament issues as well as international affairs including North Korea and Syria were discussed with the recognition to improve the deteriorated U.S.-Russia relations; however, its outlook on improvement remains unclear.

7 Relations with Europe and NATO

Through the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia has worked with NATO as an equal partner in the areas of common interest, such as by participating in certain decision-making processes. However, following the Ukrainian crisis, NATO and European countries suspended their practical cooperation with Russia, including that in the military domain, except for the NRC’s ambassador-level meetings.55 Additionally, NATO and European countries have maintained a severe diplomatic stance towards Russia while working together with the Ukrainian Government.

At the NRC summit held in Lisbon in November 2010 prior to the suspension of working level cooperation, Russia and NATO would work towards building a true and modernized strategic partnership. They have continued searching for possibilities of dialogue and cooperation in
fields such as MD, Afghanistan, cooperation on counter-terrorism, and anti-piracy measures. With regard to MD cooperation, no progress was made on Russia-NATO relations. For example, the talks at the meeting of NRC defense ministers held in June 2011 highlighted the difference in position between NATO advocating MD cooperation in which only information and data would be exchanged under the two independent systems of NATO and Russia, and Russia aiming at “sector MD” in which both sides operate integrally by setting zones for each country’s responsibility under a unified MD system of NATO and Russia.

Meanwhile, there remains an unsolved issue between Russia and NATO regarding the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement.56

Furthermore, the Ukrainian crisis has represented existing threat to NATO’s eastern border for the first time since the Cold War. Consequently, some of NATO’s member states in Eastern Europe and the Baltic harbor national security concerns. For this and other reasons, NATO continues to take steps to ensure the effectiveness of its collective defense.57

Russia revealed that it has deployed two army divisions near the border with Ukraine, and one army division near its border with Belarus, and Russia conducted the strategic command and staff exercise Zapad 2017 in its Western Military District and Belarus in September 2017.58 That exercise was brought up at the NATO-Russia Council meeting held in October of that same year, where it was pointed out that the number of actually participating soldiers and the area used for the exercise were larger than indicated in the announcement made by Russia prior to the exercise. However, there were no invasions into other countries by Russia, and no Russian units stayed in Belarus following the exercise, which were points of concern.

Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept announced in November 2016 states that containment policies of the United States and its allies undermine regional and global stability, and Russia would maintain its negative perspective towards NATO expansion.

8 Exportation of Arms

Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry and to make economic profit, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country’s export value has been increasing in recent years.59 In January 2007, the Russian Government granted the exclusive authority to export arms to the Rosoboron Export State Corporation as part of its ongoing initiatives to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards its military industry as an integral part of the nation’s military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft

56 At the 1999 Istanbul summit of the OSCE, an agreement was reached on changing the troop ceilings set formerly by blocks to those set by country and territory and on complying with the current CFE Treaty until the adapted CFE Treaty comes into effect. Russia was dissatisfied with the fact that despite its ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty, NATO member states refused to ratify the Treaty on the grounds that the RAF were not withdrawing from Georgia and Moldova. Therefore, in December 2007, Russia suspended the implementation of the CFE Treaty and halted inspections based on this treaty. Presently, only four countries have ratified the adapted CFE Treaty—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—and it has not yet come into effect. In addition, Russia has proposed dissolving the existing security framework that has NATO at its center and creating a new European security treaty that would provide new fundamental principles for security in Europe and the Atlantic region.

57 See Chapter 2, Section 8 for more about NATO’s initiatives.

58 Russia’s strategic command and staff exercises are held under the command of its joint strategic commands. Management of the military exercises are handled by each military district each year in a round robin format. In 2017, Zapad 2017 was held in the Western Military District and Belarus. According to a Russian Defense Ministry announcement, approximately 12,700 personnel, 10 ships, 70 aircraft and helicopters, and 250 tanks participated in this exercise.

59 According to SIPRI, Russian arms exports between 2013 and 2017 increased by 7% compared to that of the period between 2008 and 2012. Russia has the second largest share of arms exports in the world (22%) after the United States.
companies such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev.

Russia exports equipment such as fighters and vessels to countries including India, China, Algeria, ASEAN member states, and Venezuela.\textsuperscript{60} Russia concluded an agreement with China to sell new Su-35 fighters and the S-400 surface-to-air missile system. Deliveries of the Su-35 fighters\textsuperscript{61} have already begun at the end of 2016, and plans call for a total of 24 of these aircraft to be delivered to China by 2018. It has been pointed out that this deal was made possible because the interests of China and Russia coincided: while China promotes indigenous weapons production, it still needs Russian technology for state-of-the-art equipment, whereas Russia aims to avoid diplomatic isolation caused by the Ukrainian crisis and to gain economic profit through arms exports.\textsuperscript{62}
1 **General Situation**

Australia maintains a special strategic partnership with Japan and shares universal values, such as strategic interests, respect for freedom and human rights, and democracy. It is allied with the United States, as are Japan and the ROK.

In Australia, in September 2015, Malcolm Turnbull was elected to lead the ruling Liberal Party. As a result, the Turnbull administration from the conservative coalition was formed. In July 2016, both the upper and lower houses were dissolved simultaneously for the first time in 29 years. Turnbull continues to be prime minister of a conservative coalition that controls the lower house.

The former Abbott administration criticized the defense spending cuts of the previous Labor Party administration, and signaled its intention to actively make investments which are deemed necessary for building a stronger defense force. This policy has continued under the Turnbull administration.

The Defence White Paper released in February 2016 presents the government’s future plan and measures for national defense. It was previously published in 1976 (Fraser Liberal Party administration), 1987 (Hawke Labor Party administration), 1994 (Keating Labor Party administration), 2000 (Howard Liberal Party administration), 2009 (Rudd Labor Party administration), 2013 (Gillard Labor Party administration), and 2016 (Turnbull Liberal Party administration) a total of seven times.

The Australian Government launched its first National Security Strategy (the Strategy) in January 2013. The Strategy provides a blueprint for national security over the next decade, presenting the recognition that responding to the economic and strategic changes in the Asia-Pacific region is vital to the national security of Australia. The Strategy defines four objectives for the country’s national security: (1) to ensure a safe and resilient population; (2) to protect and strengthen Australia’s sovereignty; (3) to secure Australia’s assets, infrastructure and institutions; and (4) to promote a favorable international environment. On this basis, the Strategy outlines the following priorities for the next five years: (1) enhanced engagement in the Asia-Pacific region; (2) integrated cyber policy and operations; and (3) effective partnerships.

The Defense White Paper released in February 2016 presents an outlook of Australia’s security environment over the next two decades. It then outlines the direction of Australia’s defense strategy for dealing with this environment, and the development of the defense force pursuant to this strategy.

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1 In this election, the conservative coalition comprised of the Liberal, National, and other parties won a majority 76 out of the 150 lower house seats, resulting in Prime Minister Turnbull continuing on as leader, although the coalition lost a large number of seats from its initial total of 89. In the upper house, the coalition aimed to capture seats from minority parties through election reform but failed to obtain a majority, and may continue to encounter difficulties with government administration going forward. Actually, the Turnbull coalition briefly fell into the minority in the Australian parliament in November 2017 following a resignation by a parliament member due to a dual-citizenship issue. However, currently, Turnbull’s coalition holds a narrow majority.

2 This strategy is based on the National Security Statement, announced in December 2008, which articulated Australia’s national security agenda and set in motion reforms to strengthen the National Security Community. The national security strategy is scheduled to be revised every five years.

3 Specifically, this includes: 1) deepening the Australia-U.S. Alliance; 2) enhancing bilateral cooperation with influential regional countries such as China, Indonesia, Japan, the ROK, and India; and 3) promoting the superiority and effectiveness of multilateral forums.

4 The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) integrates the capabilities of Australia’s Department of Defence, Attorney-General’s Department, and Federal Police and the cyber-related personnel of the Australian Crime Commission.

5 This includes sharing information securely and quickly with domestic and international partners and strengthening information sharing between government and business.

6 The Defence White Paper of Australia presents the government’s future plan and measures for national defense. It was previously published in 1976 (Fraser Liberal Party administration), 1987 (Hawke Labor Party administration), 1994 (Keating Labor Party administration), 2000 (Howard Liberal Party administration), 2009 (Rudd Labor Party administration), 2013 (Gillard Labor Party administration), and 2016 (Turnbull Liberal Party administration) a total of seven times.
Specifically, the white paper maintains that while there is little prospect of a military attack on Australian territory in the period to 2035,7 Australia will face new complexities and challenges. Based on this understanding, three strategic defense interests are identified, namely: a secure, resilient Australia (including the security of sea lanes); a secure nearer region; and a stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order. Additionally, three strategic defense objectives are given, which are: (1) Deter, deny, and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia and its national interests; (2) Make military contributions to support the security of maritime Southeast Asia and support the governments of South Pacific countries to build and strengthen their security; and (3) Contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order. To maintain the ADF’s high level of capability needed to achieve these objectives, the Government will make important investments. In addition to increasing the troop strength by approximately 4,400 personnel,9 Australia will acquire high performance equipment, including 12 new submarines, 3 air warfare destroyers (Aegis vessels), 72 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, and 7 MQ4C unmanned patrol aircraft. Simultaneously, Australia will seek to strengthen ISR capabilities, electronic warfare capabilities, and cyber security capabilities, as well as strengthen the functions of its bases in northern Australia and elsewhere. To support these programs by funding, the white paper also presents the concrete target of increasing defense funding to reach 2% of GDP by 2020.

In addition, with North Korea continuing to make repeated, provocative actions unlike any seen in the past, Prime Minister Turnbull announced in October 2017 that Australia would be equipping nine of the future frigates of the Royal Australian Navy with a missile defense system (the Aegis system) that can intercept long-range ballistic missiles, stating, “A number of states, notably of course, North Korea, are developing missiles with advanced range and speed. We must have the capability to meet and defeat them.”10

3 Relations with Other Countries

In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia subscribes to the view that Australia’s security and prosperity are directly linked to the development of the nearer region, the Indo-Pacific region, and the global strategic environment. Based on this view, Australia will build and maintain international security relationships to achieve its strategic defense objectives. In particular, Australia will aim to mature and deepen practical engagement with partners across the Indo-Pacific region, including Indonesia, Japan, the ROK, New Zealand, India, and China, while continuing to give the highest priority to its alliance with the United States. On November 2017, Australia published the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, Australia’s first such white paper in 14 years. This document too, emphasized this policy.11

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7 The white paper identifies six factors that will shape the security environment of Australia over the next two decades: (1) the roles of the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region and the relationship between them; (2) challenges to the stability of the rules-based global order; (3) the threat of terrorism to Australians at home and abroad; (4) state fragility caused by uneven economic growth, crime, social, environmental and governance challenges, and climate change; (5) the pace of military modernization and the development of more capable regional military forces; and (6) the emergence of new complex, non-geographic threats (e.g., cyber threats). With regard to (5), the white paper notes that in the Indo-Pacific region, half of the world’s submarines and at least half of the world’s advanced combat aircraft will be operating and more countries may acquire ballistic missile technology.

8 According to the white paper, over the next decade, the number of active duty ADF personnel would be increased to approximately 62,400 personnel from the current approximately 58,000 personnel. If this is realized, the ADF would return to its largest size since 1993.

9 The Defence White Paper refers to the submarines to be acquired as “regionally superior submarines.” It explains that Australia would select the submarine classification by the end of 2016, and that the first submarine would begin entering service in the early 2030s. Japan, Germany, and France participated in the submarine Competitive Evaluation Process. In April 2016, the Australian Government announced that the French company DCNS was chosen as the partner for building the submarines. In August 2016, it was found that confidential DCNS documents on its submarine order for the Indian Navy had leaked, resulting in rising calls in Australia for a review of the deal. Prime Minister Turnbull emphasized that the submarines being built for Australia are a different type than the one leaked, refuting the need for a review.

10 Following statements made by Foreign Minister Bishop in April 2017 to the effect that “the United States Administration did say that all options are on the table” and suggesting that Australia supports this. In regard to North Korea, a spokesperson for the North Korean Foreign Ministry repeated the threat of nuclear attack against Australia, saying, “If Australia persists in following the US moves to isolate and stifle North Korea … this will be a suicidal act of coming within the range of the nuclear strike of the strategic force of North Korea.”

11 The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper recognizes that it is in the national interest of China to increase its influence, and concludes that there are instances in which Chinese influence is indeed greater than U.S. influence in parts of the Indo-Pacific. Beyond that, it points out that Australia will expand strategic relations with democratic states that share similar aspirations with Australia, while also ensuring the deepening of the Australia-U.S. Alliance. The White Paper also emphasizes that Australia will strengthen relationships, keeping in mind the “quad” states (Japan-U.S.-India-Australia) with the aim of ensuring stability and growth from Asia to Africa in particular.
Relations with the United States

In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that its alliance with the United States pursuant to the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (ANZUS)\(^{12}\) is based on shared values and will continue to be the centerpiece of Australia’s defense policy. Australia notes that the United States, which remains the pre-eminent global military power over the next two decades, will continue to be its most important strategic partner, and the active presence of the United States will continue to underpin the stability of the region. It is stated that Australia thus welcomes and supports the critical role of the United States in ensuring stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Since 1985, the two countries have been regularly convening the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) to discuss major diplomatic and security issues. On the operational front, the two countries have made efforts to increase interoperability through joint exercises, including Exercise Talisman Saber.\(^{13}\) Since April 2012, the U.S. Marine Corps have conducted rotational deployments to northern Australia.\(^{14}\) On the equipment front, the two countries have been simplifying the export procedures associated with equipment deals pursuant to the Australia-U.S. Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty that entered into force in May 2013. In addition, the two countries are considering the joint development of the F-35 JSF and missile defense cooperation.\(^{15}\) Furthermore, bilateral cooperation is being advanced in areas such as ISR, space,\(^{16}\) and cyber.\(^{17}\) In August 2014, the two sides signed the Force Posture Agreement which provides a legal framework for the rotational deployment of the U.S. Marine Corps. From October 2014, the ADF has been participating in the combat mission of the U.S.-led operation against ISIL. In July 2015, the two countries conducted a training in which B-52 strategic bombers of the U.S. Forces were flown from the U.S. mainland to drop bombs on an air weapons range in Australia and then returned to the United States.\(^{18}\) Under the Turnbull administration, at the 30th AUSMIN in October 2015, the two sides signed a joint statement on defense cooperation to serve as a guideline for future defense cooperation, and reaffirmed their strong bilateral cooperation. In October 2016, cost-sharing negotiations for the Force Posture Initiatives were concluded in principle.

AUSMIN was held in June 2017 where they decided to further expand defense and security cooperation. As a result, the detailed progress of these efforts will be a focus of attention in the future.

Relations with China

In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that its relationship with China is crucial in different ways from its relationship with the United States, and that it welcomes China’s continued economic growth and the opportunities this is bringing for Australia and other countries in the Indo-Pacific. It goes on to say Australia is committed to continuing the development of Australia’s defense relations with China, and working to enhance mutual understanding, facilitate transparency, and build trust.

Based on such a policy, Australia and China continuously hold dialogues among their defense

\(^{12}\) A trilateral security treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. Since 1986, the United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand due to its adoption of a non-nuclear policy. The treaty is thus effective only between Australia and the United States and between Australia and New Zealand.

\(^{13}\) Exercise Talisman Saber, started in 2005, is a biennial combined U.S.-Australia training designed to improve combat readiness and interoperability. About 33,000 U.S. Forces and ADF personnel participated in the exercise held from June to July 2017.

\(^{14}\) By way of the Force Posture Initiatives of November 2011, the United States and Australia announced that the U.S. Marine Corps would conduct rotational deployments approximately every six months to Darwin and northern Australia. Accordingly, approximately 200 U.S. Marines were deployed in 2012 and 2013, 1,150 Marines in 2014 and 2015, approximately 1,250 Marines in 2016 and 2017, and approximately 1,600 Marines in 2018. The Defence White Paper 2016 sets out that the size would be increased to approximately 2,500 Marines by 2020. In addition, under this same initiative, access to Australian military facilities and areas in northern Australia by U.S. Air Force aircraft was set to be expanded, together with opportunities for joint exercises and training. Accordingly, in February 2017, 12 F-22 fighter aircraft were deployed to Australia.

\(^{15}\) While Australia considers that the threat of an ICBM attack on Australia is low, it deems there is a possible threat of an attack on Australian territory by a long-range or submarine-launched ballistic missile or cruise missile, as well as attack on the deployed ADF by a short-range ballistic missile or cruise missile. To counter such threats, Australia and the United States have launched a working group to study options that could contribute to missile defense in the region.

\(^{16}\) Since signing the Space Situational Awareness Partnership in November 2010, Australia and the United States have promoted space cooperation, including the relocation of the U.S. C-band ground-based radar system and the Space Surveillance Telescope to Australia.

\(^{17}\) At the AUSMIN in September 2011, the two nations signed a joint statement on cyberspace and confirmed that, mindful of their longstanding defense relationship and the ANZUS Treaty, the two would consult together and determine appropriate options to address threats in the event of a cyber attack that threatens the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of either Australia or the United States.

\(^{18}\) The statement envisions that greater competition for resources and territorial disputes will increase the possibility of miscalculation and the potential for conflict in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, and states that the two countries would further deepen their defense relationship to deal with this. Specifically, the statement sets forth: deeper interoperability; strengthened policy and intelligence cooperation; increased collaboration in science and technology; capability development, and defense industry engagement; and coordinated multilateral engagement.
expresses particular concern with the unprecedented pace and scale of China’s land reclamation activities in the South China Sea. Furthermore, the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper contains statements to the effect that China is challenging the position of the United States in the Indo-Pacific, the most important region for Australia.

In October 2015, the Government of the Northern Territory leased to a Chinese company the rights to operate the commercial wharfs of the Darwin Port, also utilized by ADF and U.S. Force vessels. After it became clear that the Australian federal government did not lodge objections, saying there were no security concerns, people expressed uneasiness within and outside of Australia. Later, deals involving Chinese companies seeking to acquire Australian facilities continued to emerge. In January 2017, the federal government of Australia announced the establishment of a dedicated center within the Attorney General’s Department, which will identify facilities requiring surveillance and carefully manage the risks for advising related institutions in order to block the sale of important infrastructure related to national security, including specific ports and harbor facilities, to companies from other countries.

With China’s perceived influence on Australia growing larger, in December of that year, Prime Minister Turnbull submitted a bill to the Australian Parliament meant to prevent interference in domestic affairs by foreign actors. That bill was passed into law in June 2018.

3 Relations with India

In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that it welcomes India’s increasingly active role in the Indo-Pacific region, and that it sees India as a key security  

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19 In July 2014, Fan Changlong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, visited Australia, and held talks with then Prime Minister Abbott, then Minister for Defence David Johnston, and others. The two sides agreed to hold a U.S.-China-Australia trilateral joint exercise. In addition, Australia and China have regularly convened a Defence Strategic Dialogue since 1997. At the 20th Dialogue held in August 2017, Australian officials, including Vice Admiral Raymond James Griggs of the Royal Australian Navy and Rebecca Skinner, Deputy Secretary of Strategic Policy and Intelligence of the Department of Defence, held talks with Major General Shao Yuanming, deputy chief of the Joint Staff of the PLA.

20 In January 2016, three PLA Navy vessels visited Brisbane, Australia to take part in navigation training together with RAN vessels. In August 2017, following on the previous year, KOWARI 2017, the fourth survival training among the United States, China, and Australia, was conducted in northern Australia, with ten personnel participating from each country. In September 2017, Exercise Pandaroo designed to build teamwork, friendship, and trust between the Australian and Chinese forces was carried out in southeastern Australia, with ten personnel participating from each country.

21 In response to China’s announcement of the “East China Sea ADIZ” in November 2013, Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop issued a statement saying Australia has made clear its opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions to change the status quo in the East China Sea.

22 In addition, opposition parties and think tanks raised concerns over the fact that this Chinese company is thought to have close ties with the Communist Party of China and the PLA, and over the fact that the U.S. Forces that utilize Darwin Port were not consulted in advance. According to press reports, then President Barack Obama requested Prime Minister Turnbull to provide advance notice. Additionally, the Chinese company in question is currently expressing interest in a port near Adelaide where future submarines are slated to be built, raising further concerns.

23 The Government of Australia has struck down the acquisition of a farming company, S. Kidman & Co., which owns land equivalent to about 1% of Australia’s landmass and the acquisition of major power company Ausgrid by Chinese companies due to reasons of national security.

24 The newly established Critical Infrastructure Centre is viewed as supporting the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) which screens individual projects and advises the Government.

25 The law requires the registration of the representatives of foreign governments or foreign companies doing lobbying activities in the Australian parliament, and imposes imprisonment in the event that someone does make calls to action or influence the policymaking process without registering.

26 According to Australian media reporting, it is clear that China has meddled in domestic affairs through large-scale political contributions and bribes from at least five Chinese people.
partner. Australia notes that it aims to further mature its defense relationship with India in support of their shared strategic interests.

The Australia-India relationship was elevated to a strategic partnership in November 2009, and the two countries have regularly conducted strategic dialogues, mutual visits by senior military officers, interactions among military services, and mutual dispatches of students to military educational organizations. More recently, in November 2014, Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi visited Australia, marking the first visit to Australia by an Indian Prime Minister in 28 years. The two leaders agreed to extend defense cooperation to cover research, development, and industry engagement, to hold regular meetings at the level of Defense Minister and conduct regular maritime exercises, and to convene talks between each of their military services. Accordingly, in June 2015, two Indian Navy vessels made a goodwill visit to Australia, and in September 2015, the first bilateral joint naval exercise AUSINDEX 15 was conducted off the east coast of India. Mutual exchanges between the two countries are steadily progressing, including the holding of AUSINDEX 17 off the west coast of Australia in June 2017.

In Exercise Bersama Shield held in April 2016, more than 200 personnel, vessels including a submarine, and patrol aircraft of the ADF participated. In October 2016, Exercise Bersama Lima was held. See Chapter 2, Section 6, Footnote 5.

In November 2013, it was reported that an Australian intelligence agency wiretapped the telephone calls of Indonesia’s previous President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Mrs. Yudhoyono, ministers, and others. The Indonesian Government lodged strong protests, including summoning the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia and demanding an apology to the Australian Government. The Government also announced the suspension of military exchanges and intelligence cooperation with Australia. In April 2015, two Australians were executed in Indonesia for helping to smuggle drugs, and the case of wiretapping of the Indonesian President and others by Australia’s intelligence agency, and the issue of the execution of Australian nationals in Indonesia. Consequently, cooperative relations in the security and defense fields stalled intermittently between the two countries. Subsequently, in the second half of 2015, mutual visits by ministers and higher-level officials resumed, including the visit to Indonesia by Prime Minister Turnbull. The Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) was held in November 2016, and the bilateral relationship is seeing further improvements.

With Singapore and Malaysia, Australia carries out regular joint combined exercises in the South China Sea and other areas under the framework of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. Australia considers that Singapore is its most advanced defense partner, and that they share Australia’s interest in a secure maritime trading environment. Defense cooperation is also deepening, including the signing of a memorandum of understanding concerning military training and training area development in Australia under the comprehensive strategic partnership in October 2016. As regards Malaysia, Australia stations the ADF in Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) Base Butterworth, and contributes to maintaining regional security and stability through patrol activities in the South China Sea and the northern Indian Ocean.

Australia plays a leading role in assisting Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and the South Pacific countries in fields such as security maintenance, coping with natural

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27 From Australia, three RAN vessels including a submarine and one patrol aircraft participated. From India, three Indian Navy vessels and one patrol aircraft participated.
28 The Lombok Treaty is a security cooperation framework that espouses wide-ranging cooperation in the defense field. It entered into force in February 2008. The Defense Cooperation Arrangement covers strengthened cooperation in counter-terrorism and maritime security.
29 In November 2013, it was reported that an Australian intelligence agency wiretapped the telephone calls of Indonesia’s previous President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Mrs. Yudhoyono, ministers, and others. The Indonesian Government lodged strong protests, including summoning the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia and demanding an apology to the Australian Government. The Government also announced the suspension of military exchanges and intelligence cooperation with Australia. In April 2015, two Australians were executed in Indonesia for helping to smuggle drugs, and the Australian Government strongly protested to Indonesia.
30 See Chapter 2, Section 6, Footnote 5.
31 In Exercise Bersama Shield held in April 2016, more than 200 personnel, vessels including a submarine, and patrol aircraft of the ADF participated. In October 2016, Exercise Bersama Lima was held in Malaysia, Singapore and South China Sea in which approximately 400 personnel, vessels, and patrol aircraft of the ADF participated.
32 See Chapter 3, Section 3, Footnote 17.
disasters, and maritime patrol. In particular, in the field of maritime patrol, Australia still regularly deploys ADF assets to the South Pacific to assist with patrol activities. In addition, in June 2014, Australia unveiled a plan to replace the 22 patrol vessels it provided to these countries in the past. In May 2018, Australia announced its largest ever aid package for Pacific Island countries of AUS$1.3 billion, with the intent of further strengthening relations.

With New Zealand, Australia has an alliance pursuant to the ANZUS Treaty. The two countries hold regular meetings by their leaders and defense ministers, and have maintained close cooperative relations in the security and defense fields through joint exercises and joint activities in the region.

Chapter 2, Section 6 (Security and Defense Policies of Countries in South East Asia)

5 Overseas Activities

In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia identifies the following strategic defense objective: to contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order. In line with this objective, as of late June 2018, about 2,404 of Australia’s approximately 57,800 force strength are deployed and are conducting operations overseas.

In Iraq, to support the airstrikes conducted by the U.S. Forces against ISIL in northern Iraq, Australia began air-dropping humanitarian supplies in August 2014 and participating in combat missions such as airstrikes from October 2014. In addition, Australia has been advising and assisting, as well as providing capacity building assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces on the military front since May 2015. Since August 2014, in addition to about 780 personnel (of which, approximately 400 personnel are engaged in assistance in the United Arab Emirates), Australia has dispatched six F/A-18 fighter/attack aircraft, one E-7A early warning and control aircraft, and one KC-30A refueling aircraft, among other assets, for activities in Iraq. Following the Declaration of victory over ISIL by the Prime Minister of Iraq in December 2017, that same month, Australia announced that it would be halting air strikes.

In Afghanistan, since October 2001, approximately 1,550 ADF personnel on average have engaged annually in reconstruction assistance activities and the training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). With the completion of ISAF’s activities in the end of 2014, about 300 ADF personnel now train, advise, and assist NATO-led Afghan forces. In July 2016, Australia announced that it would extend its support in the region until 2020 in order to solidify the progress that has been made in Afghanistan to date.

33 Australia has extended proactive assistance for the political and social stability of Timor-Leste since 1999, when the momentum for independence heightened in Timor-Leste. The ADF led the International Stabilization Force (ISF) since 2006, and with the stabilization of the security situation in Timor-Leste, the withdrawal of the ADF was completed in March 2013. In the Solomon Islands, the ADF extended assistance for their stabilization since July 2003 through the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The ADF withdrew from the country in August 2013, when the military activities of RAMSI were completed.

34 According to “Military Balance (2018),” the breakdown by service is as follows: approx. 29,000 Army personnel; approx. 14,400 Navy personnel; and approx. 14,400 Air Force personnel.

35 Accordingly, the Australian Government withdrew six F/A-18 fighter jets back to Australia on January 2018. However, the E-7A early warning and control aircraft and refueling aircraft remain stationed in the Middle East.
Southeast Asia occupies a strategic position for traffic, linking the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. It is an important region for Japan which relies on maritime transport for many of the supplies needed for economic activities and the lives of the Japanese people. The countries in Southeast Asia are making efforts to achieve political stability and steady economic growth, and lately have realized overall economic development to varying degrees. Such economic development has deepened interdependence within the region and with countries outside the region. In late 2015, the establishment of the ASEAN Community was declared as an outcome of the strides made in ASEAN cooperation towards its integration.

Meanwhile, this region still has destabilizing factors, including the territorial disputes over the South China Sea, ethnic minority issues, separatist and independence movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Moreover, there are incidents such as piracy by which the safe passage of ships is obstructed. Furthermore, there is a concern about increases in terrorism in the region as the activities of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the Middle East slow down. In May 2017, an Islamist extremist group pledging loyalty to ISIL took over a town in the Philippines, and Malaysian and Indonesian nationals are said to have joined this organization. In order to cope with these issues, the countries in Southeast Asia are working to build military forces for national defense and maintenance of domestic public security, as well as for addressing new security issues such as terrorism and piracy. Recently, against the backdrop of economic development, the countries have been modernizing their military forces, mainly their naval and air forces, as well as strengthening their maritime law enforcement capacities.

Figure I-2-6-1 (Comparison of Forces Strength and Defense Budget between Southeast Asia and Japan/China/ROK 2017)

Indonesia

Indonesia is a country of importance in Southeast Asia with the world’s largest Muslim population, vast land and territorial waters, and strategic importance for maritime traffic. Although Indonesia does not confront any immediate external military threats, it faces internal concerns, including the activities of Islamic extremists, such as supporters of ISIL and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and secession and independence movements in Papua Province.

Under the banner of the maritime nation concept, President Joko Widodo who took office in October 2014 strives to revive maritime culture, address territorial disputes through maritime diplomacy, and strengthen maritime defense capabilities.

As part of its military force reform, Indonesia aims to meet the requirements for minimum defense capabilities—what it calls “Minimum Essential Force (MEF).” However, Indonesia has indicated that its maritime defense capabilities, in particular, are still very much inadequate. According to the “nine-dash line” claimed by China overlaps with its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the vicinity of the Natuna Islands, and in July 2017, Indonesia announced that it was changing the name of the northern part of its EEZ in the South China Sea to the “North Natuna Sea.” Indonesia emphasizes cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries, and adopts an independent and active foreign policy. With the United States, it is strengthening its cooperative relationship in such fields as military education and training and

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1 In July 2015, prior to his retirement, then Commander of the National Armed Forces of Indonesia Moeldoko said that Indonesia had achieved 34% of its MEF goals.
2 It is believed that on December 15, 2015, Minister of Defense Ryamizard Ryacudu unveiled a plan to deploy a fighter squadron and small vessels to the Natuna Islands as well as increase the number of troops stationed there from the current 800 to around 2,000, including the special operations force of the Air Force, for the purpose of “being prepared for a range of threats such as illegal operations and illicit intrusion.” Furthermore, in June 2016, Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Luhut announced a concept to build a submarine base on the Natuna Islands.
military equipment procurement, and is carrying out joint training, including “Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT)” and the “Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT)” exercises. With China, president Joko visited China in March 2015, and affirmed with President Xi Jinping that they would deepen bilateral relations under the framework of comprehensive strategic partnership.

Indonesia is carrying out bilateral coordinated patrols and maritime training exercises with India. Moreover, in May 2018, President Joko and Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Modi, signed the Defence Cooperation Agreement.

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3 A general term that refers to a series of bilateral exercises that the United States conducts with Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Timor-Leste.
4 A general term that refers to counter-terrorism joint exercises that the United States conducts with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
Malaysia

Malaysia, which is located at the center of Southeast Asia, considers itself to have common strategic interests with its neighboring countries. Although Malaysia does not acknowledge any imminent external threats at present, it believes that its forces should maintain a level of readiness for dealing with all military threats, and therefore, places importance on “Independence,” “Total Defence,” “Commitment to the Rule of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA),” “Cooperation to the UN for World Peace,” “Measures against Terrorism,” and “Defence Diplomacy” in its defense policy. On the other hand, in connection with the recent continued anchoring of Chinese government vessels around the South Luconia Shoal over which Malaysia claims sovereignty, Malaysia has announced that its Navy and maritime law enforcement agencies would conduct around-the-clock monitoring, and that Malaysia would defend its sovereignty. Along with these strengthening its maritime defense posture, Malaysia also has striven to bolster its defense posture in eastern Malaysia, constructing a new naval base in April 2017 in Bintulu close to the James Shoal and the South Luconia Shoal.

Malaysia and the United States hold joint exercises such as CARAT and SEACAT, and promote military cooperation including capacity-building in the maritime security field.

Despite competing claims over the sovereignty of the South China Sea and other matters, Malaysia and China have strong ties, especially their economic relationship, and mutual visits by dignitaries take place frequently. In November 2016, Prime Minister Najib visited China and reached an agreement on economic cooperation and the purchase of naval vessels.

Furthermore, in November 2015, when the Commander of the Chinese Navy visited Malaysia, it is said that the two countries agreed on making use of the Port of Kota Kinabalu for port calls by Chinese Navy vessels. In January 2017, a Chinese submarine made a port call at the Kota Kinabalu naval base for the very first time, and a second port call was made by a Chinese submarine in September of that same year.

3 Myanmar

Myanmar shares borders with China and India, which are steering the changing balance of power in the international community, and is located on the border of South Asia and Southeast Asia. In light of these factors, Myanmar is noted for its strategic significance. In Myanmar, the armed forces had control over the government following the collapse of the socialist regime in 1988. However, with an economic slowdown caused by the economic sanctions imposed by the West against the military government, coupled with isolation from the international community, transition to civilian rule based on the road map to democracy was completed. Later, in the general elections in November 2015, the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by President Aung San Suu Kyi secured a victory, and in March 2016 the new Htin Kyaw administration was started. Having relatives who are foreign nationals, Aung San Suu Kyi is unable to become president under the provisions of the constitution. Therefore, she was appointed Foreign Minister and to the newly created post of State Counsellor, and in these roles she is exercising leadership in the administration.

Since the previous Thein Sein administration, the Government of Myanmar has actively taken steps towards democratization, including the release of political prisoners and ceasefire agreements with ethnic minorities. The international community has shown some level of appreciation for these steps, with the West, part of fiscal reconsolidation efforts. This has resulted in the announcement of the cancellation of a long-range railway construction project, which had started with Chinese cooperation in August 2017. The administration has shown a stance of seeking renegotiations with the Chinese Government on projects supported by China that were actively advanced by the previous Najib administration.

As for North Korea, following the murder of Kim Jong-nam at Kuala Lumpur International Airport in February 2017, relations between the two countries have deteriorated. However, Prime Minister Mahathir showed his willingness to “establish a good relation” with North Korea and said that Malaysia will reopen its embassy in Pyongyang, which the previous administration had considered to permanently close.

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5 Entered into force in 1971. This agreement states that Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom will discuss what response should be adopted in the event of aggression towards or the threat of an attack on Malaysia or Singapore. The five countries carry out various exercises based on these arrangements.

6 Consists of seven steps: reconvening of the National Assembly; stepwise implementation of processes necessary for democratization; drafting a new constitution; a national referendum on the constitution; general election; convening of the House of Representatives; and the establishment of a new government.

7 About 30% of Myanmar’s population is ethnic minorities, some of which demand secession or greater autonomy for their regions. In the 1980s, the Government of Myanmar implemented oppressive policies involving human rights violations such as forced labor and forced migration, which led to armed conflicts with armed groups of ethnic minorities.
including the United States successively easing economic sanctions on Myanmar.

With regard to the efforts for a ceasefire agreement with ethnic minorities, peace consultations with ethnic military groups started from 2011. The Government signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with eight armed ethnic minority groups in October 2015 and with two more parties in February 2018 respectively. Furthermore, in August 2016, the inaugural 21st Century Panglong Union Peace Conference was held for peace and reconciliation. This was followed by the second Peace Conference in May 2017, and the third Peace Conference in July 2018.

On the other hand, concerns are increasing in the international community related to the situation in western Rakhine State. Following attacks on police posts by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in August 2017, over 600,000 mostly Muslim refugees fled into neighboring Bangladesh over the course of two months since Myanmar military and other security forces launched large-scale operations. The international community has expressed concern over this incident on the grounds that there were mass killings and violations of human rights. With regard to this issue, Myanmar does not recognize that the Muslims living in northern Rakhine State, so-called the Rohingya people, as its citizens, and thus, their legal status as stateless people complicates the issue.

In terms of foreign policy, Myanmar continues to uphold a policy of neutrality and non-alignment, while for its national defense policy, continues to emphasize the three national causes of Non-disintegration of the Union, Non-disintegration of National Solidarity, and Perpetuation of Sovereignty, as well as resolutely repelling foreign invasions and interference in domestic matters.

With regard to individual foreign relations, China is thought to be an important partner to Myanmar since its period of military rule. With economic support from China, a gas pipeline and a port, among other infrastructure, are being built. On the military front, China is regarded as a major supplier of equipment. In August 2016, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi visited China, where she announced the promotion of a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. Furthermore, Myanmar has maintained a cooperative relationship with Russia in the military field, including during the military regime, and Russia has been a destination for students from Myanmar and a supplier of major defense equipment. As for India, since the transition to civilian rule, Myanmar has deepened cooperative relations in the fields of the economy and military, which has developed into defense cooperation and exchanges such as the hosting of various seminars and friendly visits to Myanmar by Indian naval vessels.

Cooperative relations with North Korea, including weapons trades, were maintained under Myanmar’s military regime. Following the transition to democracy, although Myanmar denies that it has military ties to North Korea, there are sometimes still reports suggesting doubt about the relationship between the military and North Korea.
on the Bangsamoro and the partial decommissioning of MILF forces and weapons.\textsuperscript{9} On the other hand, military clashes have occurred between the government army and National Police, and armed forces opposing the peace talks.\textsuperscript{10} It is deemed that time will be required to achieve practical peace.

In May 2017, security forces clashed with the Maute group, an Islamic extremist organization that pledges allegiance to ISIL, which had occupied the city of Marawi by taking hostages. The enduring battle resulted in fatalities and injuries, causing public safety in the city to deteriorate. As a result, martial law was declared in Mindanao. The military operations resulted in the killing of core members and fighters of the Maute group, leading President Duterte to declare liberation of Marawi City from terrorists in October of that same year. On the other hand, the declaration of martial law was extended until the end of 2018, to quell the continuing rebellion in the region.

ASG, an Islamic extremist group, has orchestrated a number of kidnappings for ransom in the Sulu Sea and Celebes Sea. Given this situation, in June 2017, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia announced that they had launched a trilateral maritime patrol in the region of the Sulu sea. Air patrols were also started by each country in October of that year.

The Philippines, with a historically close relationship with the United States, has maintained a cooperative relationship with the United States under their mutual defense treaty and military assistance agreement, even after the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces in 1992.\textsuperscript{11} The two countries are conducting joint exercises including the large-scale military exercise Balikatan.

In March 2016, the two countries agreed on five locations for carrying out defense cooperation under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)\textsuperscript{12} they signed in April 2014 for strengthening their cooperation on such areas as the capacity enhancement of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and disaster relief.\textsuperscript{13} It is expected that concrete steps will be taken, including the development of facilities in the Philippines for the rotational deployment of the U.S. Forces in accordance with the EDCA.

The Philippines and China have competing claims over the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. Seeking a settlement under international law, in January 2013, the Philippines launched arbitral tribunal proceedings pursuant to UNCLOS against China. In July 2016, a final award was rendered accepting nearly all of the Philippines’ submissions. The Government of the Philippines released a statement that it welcomed the award by the arbitral tribunal and strongly affirms its respect for the decision. Also, President Duterte stated in his State of the Nation Address held in the same month that the Philippines would strongly affirm and uphold the award handed down for the arbitration case between the Philippines and China. However, when President Duterte visited China in October 2016, a joint statement was announced that included infrastructure investment, drug

\textsuperscript{9} In October 2012, the Framework Agreement for the realization of a final agreement on the Mindanao peace process was signed. In January 2014, the Government of the Philippines and MILF signed the Annex on Normalization. The goal of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro signed in March 2014 was to launch an autonomous government in 2016 after formulating the Bangsamoro Basic Law, holding a referendum in order to demarcate a jurisdictional domain, abolishing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and establishing the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA).

\textsuperscript{10} In January 2015, in Mindanao, an exchange of fire occurred between the Philippine National Police that were mobilized to arrest JI suspects, and the MILF and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). This incident reportedly left casualties on both sides.

\textsuperscript{11} In 1947, a military base agreement was concluded that allows the U.S. Forces to use Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station for 99 years. A military assistance agreement was also concluded in 1947, followed by the mutual defense treaty in 1951. With the revision of the 1966 military base agreement, the time limit for the stationing of U.S. military bases in the Philippines was set for 1991. Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station were returned in 1991 and 1992, respectively. Subsequently, the two countries concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1996, establishing the legal status of U.S. Forces personnel visiting for joint military exercises in the Philippines.

\textsuperscript{12} The EDCA is designed to enable the U.S. Forces to utilize and develop facilities in the Philippines, preposition equipment, among other activities. It was agreed that the bases in the Philippines to be utilized by the U.S. Forces would be decided through consultations after the EDCA was concluded and would be stated in an annex to the agreement. After the signing in 2014, the consultations regarding the annex had been suspended as litigation procedures were instituted in the Philippines on the grounds that the EDCA was unconstitutional. However, the Supreme Court of the Philippines handed down a ruling in January 2016 that the EDCA is indeed constitutional.

\textsuperscript{13} At the 2+2 talks held on January 12, 2016 (EST), the ministers welcomed the decision that the EDCA was constitutional, and reaffirmed their commitment to continue strengthening their alliance in terms of ensuring both countries’ mutual defense and security as well as jointly contributing to regional peace, stability, and economic prosperity. On March 17–18, 2016 (EST), a strategic dialogue among foreign and defense authorities was held in Washington, D.C. The two sides agreed on the following five EDCA Agreed Locations: Antonio Bautista Air Base; Basa Air Base; Fort Magsaysay; Lumbia Air Base; and Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base.
enforcement cooperation, coastal security cooperation and military cooperation but did not make reference to the tribunal’s award in the case involving the Philippines and China. Also, in May 2017, President Duterte toured a PLA Navy vessel that made its first port call at the port in Davao, where the president grew up, and announced an agreement concerning joint military exercises with the PLA. In this regard, attention will be paid to developments in the future.

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Singapore

Given its limited land area, population, and resources, Singapore’s existence and development depend on the peace and stability of the region in a globalized economy. Singapore gives high priority to national defense, with defense spending accounting for about one-fifth of its national budget.

Singapore identifies deterrence and diplomacy as twin pillars of its national defense policy. Because it is a very small country, Singapore’s armed forces make use of the training facilities of other countries, including the United States and Australia, while continually dispatching military personnel to take part in training exercises overseas.

Singapore emphasizes the importance of cooperative relations with ASEAN and the FPDA, and has concluded defense cooperation agreements with countries within and outside the region. With the aim of contributing to peace and stability in the region, Singapore supports U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific and permits it to use military facilities in Singapore. In 2013, U.S. littoral combat ships (LCSs) began their rotational deployments. In December 2015, the P-8 patrol aircraft of the U.S. Forces were deployed to Singapore for around one week for the first time. The two countries have committed to continuing to carry out similar deployments routinely. In addition, Singapore conducted joint exercises with the United States, such as CARAT and SEACAT.

As for China, in May 2015, the two countries conducted their first bilateral naval joint exercise China-Singapore Cooperation 2015. Active mutual visits by dignitaries have also taken place, with President Xi Jinping visiting Singapore in November 2015, and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong visiting China in September 2017.

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Thailand

Thailand’s defense policy includes: strengthening defense cooperation through ASEAN, international organizations, and other entities; defense that makes comprehensive use of political, economic, and other national strengths; and effective defense aimed at increasing the readiness of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) and developing the defense industry. Attacks and bombing incidents by Islamic extremists seeking secession and independence have become a frequent occurrence in southern Thailand. The Government identifies the swift restoration of peace and security of the lives and property of the people in southern Thailand as an urgent task. In addition, undemarcated border issues exist between Thailand and neighboring countries including Myanmar and Cambodia. The submission of an amnesty bill intended to pave the way for the pardon and return of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra by ruling parties to the National Assembly in 2013 exacerbated domestic disorder. In May 2014, then Commander-in-Chief Prayuth Chan-o-Cha of the Royal Thai Army issued a declaration of martial law nationwide, and then seized power via the National Council for Peace and Order, which mostly comprises the Thai military. Currently, under the administration led by former Commander-in-Chief Prayuth, who was selected as interim Prime Minister, the Government is aiming to hold general elections and transition to a new administration under a new constitution in order to facilitate a transition to civilian rule. The new constitution was promulgated and entered into force in April 2017. Next general election is expected to be held in 2019.

Under its flexible omni-directional diplomatic policy, Thailand pursues cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries and coordination with major countries, including Japan, the United States, and China. Since the conclusion of the Military Assistance Agreement in 1950, Thailand and its ally, the United States, have maintained a cooperative relationship. They have conducted the lateral joint exercise Cobra Gold since 1982, as well as

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14 See this Section, Footnote 5.
15 Based on an agreement reached in April 2013. In October 2016, LCS USS Coronado arrived in Singapore for the third rotational deployment.
16 In December 2015, Minister of Defence Ng Eng Hen of Singapore visited the United States. The two sides signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, and concurred that in accordance with this Agreement, they would strengthen their defense cooperation in the five areas of military, policy, strategy, technology, and the non-traditional security area of piracy and terrorism.
the CARAT and SEACAT joint exercises.\(^\text{18}\)

Thailand and China have also promoted military exchanges, conducting joint exercises such as Blue Strike among their marines and Falcon Strike among their air forces.\(^\text{19}\)

Vietnam perceives that it confronts diverse and complex security challenges. It considers that the issues in the South China Sea have serious impacts on the maritime activities of Vietnam, and non-traditional threats, such as piracy and terrorism, are matters of concern.

During the Cold War era, the former Soviet Union provided the most significant assistance to Vietnam. Until 2002, Russia had a naval base in Cam Ranh Bay. After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Vietnam rapidly expanded its diplomatic relations with other countries, including establishing diplomatic ties with the United States. At present, Vietnam pursues an omnidirectional diplomatic policy and seeks to actively participate in international and regional cooperation in order to build friendly relations with all countries. In March 2016, an international port opened in the key strategic position of Cam Ranh Bay, and since then a number of navy vessels from not only Japan but also the United States and China have made calls to the new port.

In January 2016, the Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) was held after five years since the previous Congress.\(^\text{20}\) The Congress decided that Nguyen Phu Trong would remain CPV General Secretary, among other decisions, and a new leadership was established. General Secretary Trong in his second term identified that his focal missions for the next five years would include the following: enhance party building; carry out political reform; accelerate national modernization; and maintain the country’s independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity.

Vietnam and the United States have strengthened their military relations in recent years. This has taken such forms as joint exercises with the U.S. Navy and port calls by U.S. Navy vessels in Vietnam. In 2017, mutual visits were conducted by the leaders of both countries, and an agreement was reached on the deepening of defense cooperation. March 2018 marked the first port call by a U.S. aircraft carrier to Vietnam since the end of the Vietnam war.

Vietnam and Russia continue to strengthen cooperation in the area of national defense. In March 2013, Minister of Defence Sergey Shoygu visited Vietnam, and the two sides agreed to jointly construct vessel replenishment facilities along Cam Ranh Bay. In 2014, Russian IL-78 aerial refueling tankers landed at Cam Ranh International Airport for the first time for the refueling flights for Russia’s Tu-95MS strategic bombers.\(^\text{21}\)

As these examples demonstrate, the two countries have been carrying out new military cooperation. In recent years, the two countries have also promoted cooperation in the energy sector, such as nuclear power generation. Vietnam is mostly on Russia for its defense equipment.

Vietnam and China, under their comprehensive strategic cooperation partnership relations, proactively conduct exchanges among their senior government officials. However, the two countries have competing claims concerning issues such as sovereignty over the South China Sea. In November 2015, President Xi Jinping visited Vietnam, and the two sides agreed that differences in opinion regarding maritime issues would be dealt with appropriately. They also signed a joint statement noting that the two countries would refrain from actions that further complicate the issue. Furthermore, in January 2017, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Trong visited China, where the bilateral agreements of past summit meetings, including the basic principles concerning the South China Sea finalized in 2010, were reaffirmed and it was agreed that they would advance cooperation aimed at joint development.

Vietnam and India have been deepening their cooperative relationship in a broad range of areas, including security and economy. In the area of defense cooperation, it is noted that the Indian Armed Forces support the training of Vietnam’s Navy submarine personnel and Air Force pilots, and Indian Navy vessels make friendly visits to Vietnam. Furthermore, when then

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18 In May 2014, following the coup d’état in Thailand, the United States announced it would suspend joint exercises and freeze military assistance. However, the lateral joint exercise Cobra Gold was held in February 2015, and the bilateral joint exercise CARAT was held in August 2015.

19 From November 12 to 30, 2015, the first joint exercise between Chinese and Thai air forces, Falcon Strike-2015, was held at the Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base in Thailand. From China, six J-11B fighters participated, and from Thailand, five JAS-39 Gripen fighters participated. In addition, in the air show of the closing ceremony of the exercise, from China, seven J-10 fighters of the August 1st Aerobatics Team participated, and from Thailand, two F-16 fighters participated.

20 President Truong Tan Sang, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, Minister of National Defence Phuong Quang Thanh, among others were not reelected and retired from office. In April 2016, President Tran Dai Quang, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Minister of National Defence Ngo Xuan Lich, and others were appointed at the Vietnamese National Assembly.

21 In March 2015, it was reported that U.S. DoD authorities, while stating the relevant facts, requested Vietnam to prevent the recurrence of this activity. In addition, a senior official of the U.S. Pacific Command allegedly stated that the Russian military aircraft that received refueling from the aerial refueling tankers arriving from the Cam Ranh base conducted provocative flights. In January 2015, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that Russian aerial refueling tankers (IL-78) used Cam Ranh Bay in 2014, enabling the refueling of strategic fighters.
Minister of National Defense Phung Quang Thanh visited India in May 2015, the two sides signed the Joint Vision Statement on Defence Cooperation for the period 2015-2020. In September 2016, Prime Minister Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit Vietnam in 15 years. During the visit an agreement was reached on raising the status of the bilateral relationship to comprehensive strategic partnership, while an announcement was made concerning a loan of US$500 million for deepening defense cooperation. Cooperation in the area of energy between India and Vietnam is also deepening, with a joint development program for oil and natural gas in the South China Sea.

Based on IISS’s “The Military Balance” and other sources.

In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have increased their defense spending against the backdrop of economic development and other reasons, and are modernizing their military forces focusing on inducting equipment such as submarines and fighters including fourth-generation modern fighters. The underlying factors noted are increases in defense spending, the relationship between Southeast Asian countries in the sense that they react to neighboring states’ development of military capabilities, response to the expansion of China’s influence, and the inadequate role of regional security organizations to nurture relationships of trust. Many Southeast Asian countries procure much of their defense equipment from a wide range of countries. As such, there are perceived difficulties in achieving consistent operations and maintenance in the respective countries.

Indonesia has introduced a total of 16 Russian Su-27 fighters and Su-30 fighters by 2013. In 2011, an agreement was reached regarding the U.S. provision of 24 F-16 fighters, and these have been successively delivered since July 2014. In addition, in August 2017, Indonesia announced plans for an additional procurement of 11 Su-35 fighters from Russia. With the ROK, Indonesia concluded an agreement in December 2011 to purchase three ROK-made 209-class submarines, and one was delivered on August 2017. The two countries also discussed joint development of the 4.5 generation KF-X/IF-X fighter, and they concluded an agreement which sets forth the details of their cost sharing and bilateral cooperation in January 2016. In addition, Indonesia is domestically building two frigates based on the Dutch Sigma-class Frigate 10514 vessel. The first of these vessels was delivered in January 2017, and the second was delivered January 2018.

As of 2009, Malaysia had purchased 18 Su-30 fighter jets from Russia. In addition, that same year, Malaysia introduced two Scorpène-class submarines (jointly developed by France and Spain) as its first submarines. In November 2014, Malaysia reportedly concluded an agreement to purchase six corvettes from the ROK. Malaysia announced a plan to build six indigenous littoral combat ships (LCSs). The first of these vessels was launched in August 2017. Furthermore, in November 2016, Malaysia concluded an agreement with China to purchase four littoral mission ships (LMS).

The Philippines has taken steps in recent years to modernize its defense equipment against the backdrop of conflicts over territorial rights in the South China Sea.

After the F-5 fighters were decommissioned in 2005, the Philippines did not have any fighters for some length of time. However, between November 2015 and May 2017, the Philippines successively introduced 12 FA-50PH light fighters purchased from the ROK.

As for naval forces, the Philippines received three Hamilton-class frigates from the United States by 2016. The Philippines introduced two Indonesian-made landing dock vessels by 2017.

Singapore is actively striving to modernize its forces. It introduced 24 U.S.-made F-15 fighters by 2012 and also participates in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program.

As for naval forces, Singapore introduced two Archerclass (Västergötland-class) submarines from Sweden by 2012. Also, in December 2013, Singapore concluded an agreement to purchase two German 218SG-class submarines (with plans to introduce them from 2021). With regard to Singapore’s current plans to build eight indigenous patrol vessels, the first such vessel came into service in May 2017, and the country aims to have all vessels in operation by 2020.

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22 The statement was agreed upon in May 2015, when Minister of National Defense Phung Quang Thanh of Vietnam visited India and held talks with Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar. While the content of the Joint Vision Statement has not been disclosed, it is said to cover the period 2015-2020, with maritime security cooperation constituting the main pillar. On the same day, the two sides also signed an MOU on strengthening the cooperation between their coast guards.

23 Based on IISS’s “The Military Balance” and other sources.
As for Thailand, in July 2014, the country established the Submarine Squadron Headquarters, and started evaluation work to procure submarines. In April 2017, the Royal Thai Navy drew up a plan to purchase three Yuan-class submarines from China over the next 11 years, and the Thai Cabinet approved the purchase of one vessel.  

With regard to frigates, in September 2012, the Cabinet approved a plan to introduce two frigates, and concluded an agreement to purchase an ROK-made frigate as the first one. In addition, by 2013, Thailand has introduced 12 Swedish-made JAS-39 Gripen fighters.

By January 2017, Vietnam successively introduced six Russian-made Kilo-class submarines. By February 2018, Vietnam started the operation of four Russian-made Gepard-class frigates. As for its air force capabilities, Vietnam started to successively introduce Russian-made Su-30 fighters in 2004, and to date, the total number of delivered Su-30 fighters came to 36.

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**4 Trends concerning Sovereignty and Other Issues over the South China Sea**

**1 Background**

In the South China Sea, ASEAN countries and China have competing claims to such areas as the Spratly Islands, and the Paracel Islands. China is pursuing unilateral, large-scale, and rapid land reclamation and the building of facilities. The international community is expressing deep concern over the unilateral changes in the status quo and China’s creation of a fait accompli.

Since the enactment of the Act on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the People’s Republic of China in 1992, which stated that the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands are territories of China, the country has only strengthened moves intended to emphasize its territorial claims. For example, China attached a map of the “nine-dash line” to a verbal note addressed to the UN in 2009, in which it made claims to the parts of the South China Sea that purportedly came under China’s “sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction.” Furthermore, in 2012, China announced the establishment of Sansha City in Hainan Province, which claims to have jurisdiction over the islands of the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, and their surrounding waters. In November 2013, Hainan Province amended its regulation on the implementation of China’s fishing law, stipulating that foreign fishing vessels that wish to carry out fishing activities in waters under the jurisdiction of Hainan Province must obtain permission from the relevant departments under China’s State Council. In January 2016, China set out a maritime policy for the next five years beginning from 2016, which stated that China would build a “Spratly Islands ecosystem protection zone.”

On the other hand, ASEAN countries as well have been bolstering their claims to territory in the South China Sea. In March 2009, the Philippines passed the so-called Archipelagic Baselines Law, stating that the Philippines has sovereignty over part of the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal pursuant to UNCLOS. In May 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia jointly requested to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) an extension of the continental shelf of the sea area that includes part of the Spratly Islands. In June 2012, Vietnam adopted the Maritime Law (effective January 2013) that asserts its sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands.

Some of the countries concerned in the South China Sea have reportedly resorted to the use of force on the opposing country’s vessels, including seizing vessels and firing warning shots, and the concerned countries have mutually lodged protests against these actions.

Between Vietnam and China, in May 2014, China’s unilateral commencement of oil drilling in waters near the Paracel Islands triggered confrontations between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels. In July 2015, a Vietnamese fishing vessel was rammed by a Chinese...
vessel and sunk near the Paracel Islands. In May 2016, a high-speed Chinese vessel followed a Vietnamese fishing boat and intimidated it with its guns near Quarteron Reef in the Spratly Islands. Furthermore, in January of the same year, a dispute occurred over oil resource development in which Vietnam, alleging that China’s oil drilling rig “Haiyang Shiyou 981” conducted activities in an area north of the Paracel Islands where Vietnam and China have overlapping claims to the continental shelf, requested China to suspend its operations and withdraw the rig.

Between China and the Philippines, in November 2015, a Chinese vessel allegedly appeared several kilometers off the coast of Thitu Island of the Spratly Islands, an island occupied by the Philippines, and anchored there for approximately ten days. In April 2017, Secretary of National Defense Lorenzana indicated his intention to protest to China through diplomatic channels concerning an incident that occurred in March 2017 in waters near the Spratly Islands when China Coast Guard vessels fired warning shots across the bows of Filipino fishing vessels. Furthermore, the Secretary landed on Thitu Island, effectively controlled by the Philippines, in a military aircraft where he stated his intention to push forward with repairs of the runway.

Between Malaysia and China, in March of that year, in an incident occurred in which it is said that China Coast Guard vessels and around 100 Chinese fishing boats together made an incursion into the area around the Luconia Shoals within Malaysia’s EEZ.

Between Vietnam and Taiwan as well, in January 2016, a Vietnamese fishing vessel operating near the Spratly Islands reportedly collided with a Taiwanese coast guard vessel.

Some of the countries concerned in the South China Sea conduct land reclamations and build facilities on the features they respectively occupy, including the Spratly Islands. However, under these circumstances, since 2014, China has pushed forward with rapid and large-scale land reclamations activities and continued to install military facilities such as batteries, as well as develop various types of infrastructure that can be used for military purposes, including runways, hangars, harbors and radar, continuing to make the features military bases.

Some countries with claims on territory in the South China Sea are making efforts to resolve the issue peacefully in accordance with international law. In January 2013, the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings pursuant to UNCLOS for the dispute over China’s assertions and actions in the South China Sea, and in July 2016, an arbitral tribunal rendered a final ruling in which it ruled in favor of nearly all of the Philippines’ submissions. In response, China issued a statement noting that the ruling was invalid and had no binding force and that China opposed and refused to accept it. Pursuant to UNCLOS provisions, the award of the arbitral tribunal is final and is legally binding on the parties to the dispute, and therefore, it is necessary that the parties adhere to the award.

As for ASEAN, the issues surrounding the South China Sea have been discussed repeatedly at ASEAN-related meetings and other fora, with a view to achieving their peaceful resolution. A Chairman’s Statement from an ASEAN Summit in May 2014 repeated concerns over the situation in the South China Sea. Following that, the Chairman’s Statement from the November 2017 ASEAN Summit did not express such concerns, but instead drew attention to the recognition that Chinese and ASEAN relations were improving. However, within the Chairman’s Statement from the ASEAN Summit held in April 2018, yet again concerns were expressed by a portion of the leaders about land reclamation activity in the South China Sea.

Also, in 2002, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea (DOC)\textsuperscript{34} aimed at peacefully resolving the issues over the South China Sea. Official talks are now ongoing for establishing the Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC), which goes into further detail than the DOC and is deemed to have legal binding force. Following the adoption of the COC framework at the ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in August 2017, the start of the negotiations on the COC was formally announced at the 20th ASEAN-China Summit in November of the same year. Although the progress being made in discussions should be appreciated, care must be taken to ensure that COC does not invalidate the decision of the arbitral tribunal between the Philippines and China, or is not used as a pretext for excluding the involvement of countries outside the region.

The issues surrounding the South China Sea are a matter of concern for the whole international community, and are directly related to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. As such, attention will continue to be paid to trends in the countries concerned, as well as the direction of dialogues aimed at the resolution of the issues.

The ASEAN Community established on December 31, 2015 is comprised of three pillars, namely, cooperation by the ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. The first of these, the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), adopts the principle of building on what has been constructed over the years in the field of political and security cooperation through ASEAN’s initiatives, and of aiming to ensure a peaceful life in a democratic and harmonious environment. The APSC Blueprint 2025 identifies the four characteristics of (1) aiming to become a rules-based, people-oriented, people-centered community; (2) aiming to become a peaceful, secure, and stable region; (3) aiming for dynamic and outward-looking ASEAN centrality; and (4) aiming for strengthened ASEAN institutional capacity and presence.

ASEAN member states also utilize ASEAN as the multilateral security framework of the region that it has been over the years. ASEAN holds mechanisms such as the ARF and ADMM, which provide opportunities for dialogue on security issues. Furthermore, ASEAN has made efforts to improve the security environment in the region and promote mutual trust, for example, by holding the ASEAN Militaries’ Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table-Top Exercise (AHR). In addition, ASEAN attaches importance to expanding its relations with countries outside of the region. It holds the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus), a platform that adds eight non-ASEAN countries including Japan to ADMM, and holds HA/DR exercises. Moving forward, ASEAN member states are expected to further develop such initiatives as dialogues, HA/DR exercises, and expansion of relations with non-ASEAN countries, in accordance with the principle and concepts of APSC.

\textsuperscript{34} The DOC includes commitments to resolve territorial and other disputes by peaceful means, and to reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct would further promote peace and stability in the region and work towards the attainment of this objective, based on the principles of international law.
Section 7 South Asia

1 India

1 General Situation

With a population of more than 1.2 billion on its vast land, India is the world’s largest democratic country. It has achieved steady economic growth in recent years, and has significant influence in the South Asian region. Also, it is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, which is of strategic and geopolitical importance in terms of sea lines of communication, connecting the Asia-Pacific region with the Middle East and Europe.

India shares borders with many countries, and has non-demarcated border issues with China and Pakistan. India has multiple ethnic groups, religions, cultures, and languages, and there are concerns about the activities of ultra-leftists and secession and independence movements, as well as the movements of Islamic extremists stationed across the India-Pakistan border.

On the diplomatic front, the Modi administration that was inaugurated in May 2014 has maintained the neighborhood first policy, which emphasizes strengthening relations with South Asian countries, while expanding the focus of strengthening India’s external relations to the Asia-Pacific region, in accordance with the “Act East” policy. In addition, the administration has carried out proactive foreign policy, placing priority also on India’s relations with the United States, Russia, Europe, among other areas. In the defense domain, maintaining preparedness at its land borders and addressing the threat of terrorism remain major concerns. At the same time, the administration has also recently attached importance to ensuring maritime security, especially in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, the administration has made efforts aimed at modernizing its military by expanding foreign companies’ direct investment in India’s defense industry under the “Make in India” initiative and promoting the domestic production of equipment through enhancing technological cooperation with other countries. Moreover, the administration has deepened collaboration with other countries to strengthen maritime security cooperation.

2 Military Affairs

India’s security environment is directly linked to its neighboring countries and the regions of West Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the Indian Ocean; and India recognizes that strategic-economic factors impose upon them an increasingly larger responsibility. In view of the multifaceted security concerns and the global dimensions of the challenges, India has strengthened cooperative relations with other countries and has long been actively participating in UN PKOs. In order to respond rapidly and effectively to diversified security issues, the Government and defense forces remain fully prepared to tackle all challenges.

Based on the nuclear doctrine of 2003, India adheres to the following policies: minimum nuclear deterrence, the no-first-use nuclear policy, no use against non-nuclear weapon nations, and maintaining the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests that it announced immediately after the nuclear test in 1998. India promotes the development and deployment of various ballistic missiles. India conducted the sixth test launch of “Agni 5” in June 2018 and reportedly started developing “Agni 6,” which is alleged to have a range of up to 10,000 km. It is deemed that the country aspires to extend the ranges of ballistic missiles and make other performance improvements. In regard to cruise missiles, India jointly develops “BrahMos” with Russia and deploys them. India

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1 The country has a Muslim population exceeding 100 million, although the majority of the country’s population is Hindu.
2 It is regarded that based on the progress of the “Look East” policy intended to strengthen India’s relations with ASEAN, the “Act East” policy which advocates a more practical approach has been adopted since the inauguration of the Modi administration.
is also developing a ballistic missile defense system.\(^3\)

In recent years, India has been injecting efforts into modernizing its naval and air forces in particular. As a part of these efforts, it is expanding procurement of equipment from foreign countries as well as joint development with them, and has emerged as the world’s largest arms importer.\(^4\)

With respect to its naval capabilities, India decommissioned one aging British-built aircraft carrier INS Viraat in March 2017. India introduced the Russian-built conventional powered aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya in November 2013, and is also building one indigenous conventional powered aircraft carrier INS Vikrant.\(^5\)

With regard to submarines, India acquired one Russian-built Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine INS Chakra in April 2012 under a lease arrangement. It reportedly placed into service its first indigenous ballistic missile and nuclear submarine INS Arihant in August 2016. Furthermore, in 2009, India concluded an agreement with the United States to purchase eight P-8I patrol aircraft. India has so far deployed all eight aircraft to a base in southern India facing the Bay of Bengal, and in July 2016 it concluded a purchase agreement for an additional four P-8I patrol aircraft.

With respect to its air force capabilities, India is refurbishing its existing fighter aircraft. Moreover, it signed an agreement to purchase 36 Rafale fighter aircraft from France in September 2016 as part of India’s plan to induct medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA).\(^6\)

With Russia, India has concluded an agreement in December 2012 to purchase 42 additional Su-30 fighters. India has also been deepening military technological cooperation with Russia, including the joint development of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft based on the PAK FA being developed by Russia. With the United States, India has concluded an agreement in 2010 to purchase ten C-17 transport aircraft and has inducted all of these aircraft by 2014.

In addition to aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, India undertakes the development and indigenous production of tanks and light combat aircraft. However, delays in their development present challenges for India’s domestic production of equipment.

3  Relations with Other Countries

I

(1) Relations with Pakistan

India and Pakistan have disputes over the sovereignty of Kashmir,\(^7\) and have had three armed conflicts of significant scope. The territorial dispute over Kashmir has long been in contention between India and Pakistan.

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3  Regarding missiles that India possessed, the following have been indicated: “Prithvi II”: a mobile, single-stage liquid-fueled ballistic missile with a range of about 250–350 km “Agni 1”: a mobile, single-stage solid-fueled ballistic missile with a range of about 700–1,250 km “Agni 2”: a mobile, two-stage solid-fueled ballistic missile with a range of about 2,000–3,500 km “Agni 3”: a mobile, two-stage solid-fueled ballistic missile with a range of about 3,000–5,000 km “Agni 4”: a mobile, two-stage solid-fueled ballistic missile with a range of about 4,000 km “Agni 5”: a mobile, three-stage solid-fueled ballistic missile with a range of about 5,000–8,000 km “Agni 6”: a three-stage solid/liquid-fueled ballistic missile with a range of about 8,000–10,000 km “BrahMos”: a solid/Ramjet supersonic cruise missile with a range of about 300–500 km

Ballistic missile defense system: India is developing a two-stage intercept system consisting of a missile for high altitude interception (PAD) up to 80 km in altitude and a missile for low altitude interception (AAD) up to 30 km in altitude

4  According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

5  The indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant is 262.5 m long, has a standard displacement of 40,642 t, and is scheduled to be commissioned in 2018.

6  Since 2007, India has been implementing a project to induct 126 MMRCA. In 2012, India announced that it selected the French Rafale aircraft. In April 2015, during his visit to France, Prime Minister Modi expressed India’s intention to swiftly purchase 36 Rafale aircraft. It is believed that a purchase agreement was signed in September 2016 and discussions are still ongoing regarding the model of the remaining 90 aircraft.

7  India asserts the accession of Kashmir to India, based on the Instrument of Accession document by which the ruler of Kashmir acceded to India at the time of Pakistan’s independence, and contends that this matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations on the basis of the 1972 Simla Agreement (an agreement on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the withdrawal of their military forces that was reached following a summit meeting held in Simla in northern India). On the other hand, Pakistan declares that this should be decided through a referendum, in line with a 1948 UN resolution. The two countries have taken a significantly different fundamental stance towards the resolution of the dispute.

See  Fig. I-2-7-1 (Military Forces of India and Pakistan (approximate))
with dialogues repeatedly resuming and suspending.\(^8\)

More recently, then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan was invited to Prime Minister Modi’s swearing-in ceremony in May 2014. In December 2015, on his return from visiting Afghanistan, Prime Minister Modi made a surprise informal visit to Pakistan. In this regard, both countries have demonstrated readiness to improve their relations. Meanwhile, it remains uncertain whether bilateral dialogues would be sustained, with the postponement of their vice foreign ministerial meeting in both August 2014 and January 2016.\(^9\) Armed clashes between the two militaries have repeatedly taken place in the Kashmir region. The large-scale armed clashes in October 2014 reportedly killed and injured civilians. Furthermore, in January 2016, armed forces intruded into an Indian Air Force base adjacent to the Kashmir area, killing and wounding security personnel and others, and also in September 2016, armed insurgents attacked an Indian military base on the Indian side of Kashmir, reportedly killing and injuring a number of troops. In the same month, the Indian Army announced that India’s military crossed the Kashmir Line of Control to carry out a localized attack on a terrorist camp located on the Pakistani side. In this manner, the Kashmir issue remains a concern for both countries.

(2) Relations with the United States

India is actively striving to strengthen bilateral relations with the United States. The United States is also promoting engagement with India in line with the expansion of the relationship derived from the economic growth of India. The two countries conduct joint exercises, such as Malabar,\(^10\) on a regular basis. In addition, in recent years, the United States has become one of India’s major equipment procurement destinations.\(^11\)

At the Summit Meeting in January 2015, two leaders agreed that they would expand technology cooperation to include co-development and co-production of equipment. The leaders also affirmed that they would deepen cooperation in the field of maritime security, and agreed that cooperation between their navies would be expanded, including upgrading their bilateral naval exercise Malabar. Furthermore, at the Defense Ministerial Meeting in December 2015, the two sides held talks on strengthening various defense cooperation, and confirmed the progress made in the technology cooperation consultations related to aircraft carriers and jet engines conducted by their joint working group. In such ways, their cooperation in the field of security has expanded. In addition, when Prime Minister Modi visited the United States in June 2016, the United States recognized that India is a “Major Defense Partner.” In August 2016, in a joint statement of the U.S. and Indian defense ministers, the United States agreed to elevate defense trade and technology sharing with India to a level commensurate with its closest allies and partners. Also, a memorandum was signed concerning logistics support cooperation.

In June 2017, Prime Minister Modi visited the United States. At his first summit meeting with President Trump, the two sides agreed to continue to strengthen their strategic partnership. In the area of security, they underscored the importance of Malabar, and furthermore, the United States proposed the sale of unmanned aerial systems.

(3) Relations with China

See Chapter 2, Section 3-3-5 ((3) Relations with South Asian Countries)

(4) Relations with Russia

See Chapter 2, Section 4-5-2 (Relations with Asian Countries)
Pakistan is believed to have started its nuclear program in the 1970s and conducted its first nuclear test near the Chagai District of the Balochistan Province in 1998. In 2004, it came to light that nuclear-related technologies, including uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. Khan and other scientists, who had led the nuclear program in Pakistan.

Regarding missiles that Pakistan possessed, the following have been indicated:

- "Nasr" (Hatf 9): a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 70 km
- "Ghaznavi" (Hatf 3): a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 290 km
- "Shaheen 1" (Hatf 4): a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 750 km
- "Ghauri" (Hatf 5): a mobile, single-stage liquid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 1,300-1,800 km
- "Shaheen 3" (Hatf 6): a mobile, two-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 2,750 km
- "Ababeel": a new ballistic missile with a range of about 2,200 km
- "Raad" (Hatf 8): a cruise missile with a range of about 350 km
- "Babur" (Hatf 7): a supersonic cruise missile with a range of about 750 km

Pakistan has been actively proceeding with the development of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and has conducted a number of test launches in recent years. In 2015, Pakistan conducted two test launches of the ballistic missile “Shaheen 3” in March and December, and a test launch from an aircraft of the cruise missile “Raad” in January 2016. Pakistan also conducted its first test launch of the ballistic missile “Ababeel,” which is capable of delivering multiple warheads, using Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology, in January 2017. Same as the previous year, it conducted another test fire of submarine launched cruise missile “Babur” in March 2018. It is deemed that Pakistan is steadily increasing military capabilities of its missiles.

Pakistan is the world’s ninth largest importer of weapons, and it is pointed out that 70% of its weapons are imported from China. Pakistan purchased four Sword-class frigates from China, while at the same time it has engaged in the joint development of the JF-17 fighter aircraft with China and has inducted 69 aircraft through indigenous production. Pakistan is also considered to have recently conducted negotiations with China to newly purchase four frigates and eight submarines. Although Pakistan introduced 18 F-16C/D fighter jets received from the United States by 2011, due to the recent degradation of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship, it has been pointed out that weapon imports into Pakistan seem to be on the decline.
(1) Relations with India

(2) Relations with the United States

Besides supporting the activities of the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan cooperates with the war on terror by launching mop-up operations against Islamic extremists in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. Recognizing the efforts of Pakistan, the United States designated it as a “major non-NATO ally” in 2004.

The two countries conducted strategic dialogues from 2010, and the United States provided Pakistan with military support. However, these were suspended after U.S.-Pakistan relations deteriorated as a consequence of the then Osama Bin Laden mop-up operation conducted by the U.S. Forces in the territory of Pakistan in May 2011. In October 2013, dialogue was resumed after summit meetings were held between then President Obama and then Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan, and in January 2014, Pakistan and the United States held their first strategic dialogue in three years.

Meanwhile, Pakistan urges the United States to immediately end its drone attacks on Islamic extremists in Pakistani territory, and the Pakistan Government has protested repeatedly.16

The United States, on the other hand, has condemned Pakistan for allowing Islamic extremists in Afghanistan to have safe havens, which pose threats to the United States. In August 2017, “No partnership can survive a country’s harboring of militants and terrorists who target U.S. Service members,” President Trump said. That same month, the government announced the suspension of $255 million in Foreign Military Assistance to Pakistan. Following this, in January 2018, it also announced the suspension of security assistance to Pakistan. These measures will not be lifted until the Pakistani Government takes decisive action against terrorist groups, including the Afghan Taliban. Attention will be paid to further action by the two countries moving forward.

(3) Relations with China

16 In November 2011, NATO forces conducted airstrikes on border posts in Pakistan, causing casualties to Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan strongly condemned this action and retaliated by closing the ground supply route for ISAF. Additionally, it is reported that at an all-party conference organized by the leaders of the ruling and opposition parties in September 2013, the Government adopted a resolution asserting that the U.S. drone attacks were a clear violation of international law.
With the end of the Cold War, many European countries now recognize the need to address diverse security challenges, such as outbreaks of regional conflict within and around Europe, the rise of terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, and an increasing number of cyberspace threats. At the same time, these countries had recognized that the threat of large-scale invasion by other countries had disappeared. Nevertheless, since the heightening of tensions in Ukraine in February 2014, there is a growing need to revisit existing strategies and plan new concepts in order to deal with Russia’s changes to the status quo with force in the background and “hybrid warfare.”

With regard to international terrorism, the incidents of terrorism occurring within European nations, including the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015 and the terror attacks in Brussels in March 2016, has made counter-terrorism efforts an urgent task. In addition, the number of refugees and migrants crossing into Europe since 2015 has soared due to turmoil in the Middle East, including the prolonged civil war in Syria. Although there has been a downward trend in the number recently, ensuring border security remains a challenge.

To respond to such challenges and situations, Europe has sought to further strengthen and expand multilateral frameworks, such as NATO and the EU. At the same time, it is working to contribute to the security and stability of the international community by proactively participating in activities outside the European region. Moreover, steps are taken at the national level by reviewing security and defense strategies, reforming national defense systems, and strengthening bilateral and multilateral defense and security cooperation.

Further, in light of changes in the security environment, the downward trend of defense expenditure, and the drastically expanding gap of defense expenditure between the United States and other member states, in 2014 NATO member states agreed on the goal to allocate 2% or more of their GDP to national defense spending until 2024. On this goal, at the NATO Summit held in May 2017, President Trump strongly urged countries that had not yet done so to increase their national defense spending by more than 2% of their GDP. Also, at a press conference held after the NATO Summit of July 2018, he said he believed their national defense spending should rise to 4% of their GDP.
The Strategic Concept is an official document defining the objectives, characteristics, and basic national security responsibilities of NATO. The document has so far been formulated seven times (1949, 1952, 1957, 1968, 1991, 1999, and 2010).

NATO has conducted air policing on a rotational basis since 2004. The missions involved patrolling the skies of a single country with four aircraft, but since the crisis in Ukraine, the missions were enhanced, shifting to patrolling the skies of four countries with 16 aircraft. In September 2015, the missions were reduced to patrols above two countries with eight aircraft. Similar air policing by NATO has been conducted over Slovenia, Iceland, Albania, and Bulgaria in addition to the three Baltic nations.

RAP was approved as one of the concrete efforts of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). CFI is intended to provide a framework for conducting joint exercises and drills among member states. Furthermore, it is designed to strengthen joint drills among member states and with partner countries, enhance interoperability, and make use of advanced technology.

2 Enhancement of Multinational Security Frameworks

1 NATO

Founded for the core task of collective defense among member states, NATO has expanded the scope of its activities to conflict prevention and crisis management since the end of the Cold War.

In the NATO Summit held in Lisbon in November 2010, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept for the first time in 11 years to propose a guideline for the next decade for the creation of a more efficient and flexible alliance. The document cites major threats such as proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles, terrorism, conflict or instability beyond NATO borders, and cyber-attacks, and prescribes three core tasks as follows: (1) collective defense in accordance with Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, the basic treaty of NATO; (2) crisis management including conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction assistance; and (3) cooperative security including active contribution to arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

Following Russia’s “hybrid warfare” over Ukraine as well as the frequent “unusual fights” of Russian Armed Force aircraft over the European front, including three Baltic states, NATO and member states reaffirmed the threat posed by Russia. In April 2014, they suspended practical cooperation with Russia and took other steps, including expanding its Baltic air policing mission, which had taken place from 2004 when the three Baltic nations joined NATO.

Additionally, at the NATO Summit held in Wales in September 2014, leaders adopted a joint declaration demanding Russia to retract its “annexation” of Crimea and adopted the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) for enhancing existing readiness forces. This plan was created in order to deal with the influence of Russia and threats from the Middle East and North Africa. Based on this plan, NATO has continued to maintain its presence in eastern allies, while steps have been taken to significantly improve the readiness of the existing multinational

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NATO Response Force (NRF) and create the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) that can be mobilized within two to three days. Furthermore, the declaration adopted at the NATO Summit held in Warsaw in July 2016 cited Russia’s aggressive actions and terrorism by ISIL as threats. At the meeting, a decision was reached to deploy four battalions to the three Baltic nations and Poland on a rotational basis. Specifically, at the defense ministers meeting held in October 2016, it was decided that the battalions would be multinational in nature with more than 20 countries participating, including the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada, which would be leading the battalions, and became fully operational in 2017. Member states view Russia in varying ways due to differences in their geographic distance from Russia and other factors. While measures are being taken to counter Russia’s influence, member states are also maintaining opportunities for dialogue with Russia.

The declaration adopted at the NATO Summit in Brussels in July 2018 cited as follows: (1) establishment of the Joint Force Command Norfolk in the United States, the headquarters aimed at strengthening defense of Atlantic Ocean sea lanes that link the United States and Europe, (2) establishment of the Joint Support and Enabling Command in Ulm, Germany, the headquarters aimed at expediting transport of troops and equipment within or outside Europe (3) arrangement of the Readiness Initiative called the “Four Thirties” by 2020 to maintain a situation in which 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 combat vessels can be ready to use within 30 days or less.

In the Mediterranean, a permanent maritime force has been deployed to the Aegean Sea since February 2016 due to the influx of illegal immigrants transiting the Mediterranean. This force monitors the influx of illegal immigrants and shares information with Turkey, Greece, and other countries. Also, in November 2016, Operation Active Endeavor, focused on collective defense held since 2001, was succeeded by Operation Sea Guardian, focused on crisis management, resulting in a wider array of missions including counter-terrorism and capacity-building assistance, among others.

Since August 2003, NATO had been leading ISAF in Afghanistan. Its mission was completed in December 2014. In place of this mission, since January 2015, NATO has been leading the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), whose primary tasks are to provide training, advice, and assistance to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). At the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting held in November 2017, it was decided to strengthen support in Afghanistan, including reinforcements of 3,000 personnel, and the number of essential personnel in Afghanistan expanded to 16,000 personnel.

Besides Afghanistan, NATO is also carrying out missions in Kosovo, Somalia, and other countries. Since October 2008, NATO had dispatched ships from the permanent maritime forces to the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean to take part in Operation Ocean Shield to combat piracy, but these activities ended in December 2016.

With regard to ISIL, NATO has taken the stance of emphasizing prevention over intervention. In addition, in the fight against ISIL, the Wales Summit Declaration of September 2014 strongly condemned ISIL’s violent acts and affirmed that NATO would activate its collective defense if any member state were attacked by ISIL. Furthermore, the Warsaw Summit Communiqué of July 2016 set forth the decision to dispatch early warning and control forces to fight against ISIL, with surveillance and reconnaissance missions taking place since October 2016.

9 The NRF consists of 40,000 personnel, and the VJTF is a multinational force consisting of approximately 20,000 personnel from the NRF (including 5,000 land force personnel).
10 For example, France held talks with President Putin of Russia following the terror attacks in November 2015, and the two sides agreed to exchange intelligence between their military forces. The United Kingdom, in its strategy document SDSR2015, states that the issues of Ukraine would significantly change the rules-based international order, while it also states that the country would seek ways to cooperate with Russia on the issues of ISIL topping the list. Germany, too, has stated the need for deterrence and dialogue with Russia in its white paper on national defense published in July 2016. Additionally, in April 2016, NATO held the dialogue framework of the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels for the first time in almost two years, which was followed by meetings in July and December 2016, March, July, and October 2017, and again in May in 2018.
11 In Kosovo, NATO has carried out its mission within the framework of the Kosovo International Security Force since 1996. Today, NATO provides recommendations, training, and capacity-building assistance to the Kosovo Security Force. In Somalia, NATO takes part in transport operations and dispatches expert personnel to tactical divisions as support for the AU Somalia Mission.
12 The EU, although it has a property of non-binding multilateral cooperation, introduced the CFSP, which covers all areas of foreign and security policy based on the Treaty of Maastricht, which took effect in 1993. In June 1999, the European Council decided to implement the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to offer peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance activities in conflict areas, as a part of the CFSP framework. The Treaty of Lisbon, made effective in 2009, renamed the ESDP to CSDP and clearly positioned it as an integral part of the CFSP.
in approximately 10 years. This document calls for initiatives towards enhancing the EU’s internal and external resilience against threats to order in Eastern Europe, and the threat of terrorism or other events in the Middle East and Africa, in accordance with the principles of rules-based order and democracy. In November 2016, an agreement was reached on the execution of this strategy, with priority given to responding to conflict and crises outside of the EU, capacity building of partners, and protecting EU citizens from terrorism and other threats. It also required assigning priority to necessary capabilities and deepening relations among member states. In the same month, the European Commission released an action plan for reinforcing defense cooperation in Europe, including the establishment of the European Defence Fund. In addition, in December 2017 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was launched as a defense cooperation framework participated by 25 countries among the member countries. Under this framework, the participating countries finance joint projects including joint development of equipment and infrastructure that will contribute to developing readiness. It is expected that the framework would strengthen the EU’s defense, so its future movements will be the subject of attention.

In response to the crisis in Ukraine, the EU has condemned the military measures of Russia and implemented economic sanctions against Russia. In addition, to support the economic and political reforms in Ukraine, the EU continues its engagement in non-military affairs, including the provision of large-scale financial assistance to Ukraine.

To deal with the threat of ISIL, the EU extends funds to carry out humanitarian assistance for Syria and Iraq. Additionally, the EU works with countries in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa to provide capacity-building assistance in counter-terrorism measures, among other activities. In November 2015, in accordance with a request from France after the terror attacks in Paris, the EU, for the first time, activated the “mutual assistance clause” stipulating a mutual defense obligation, and EU member states expressed their support to France.

In May 2015, the EU started Operation Sophia conducted by European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFORMed) due to the surge of refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea into Europe. The first phase focusing on the monitoring of smuggling and human trafficking networks was completed in October 2015. The operation has entered the second phase involving the search, seizure, and diversion on the high seas of vessels suspected of being used for smuggling and human trafficking. Furthermore, at the Foreign Affairs Council meeting held in June 2016, agreement was reached to add two tasks to Operation Sophia: training of the Libyan Navy Coast Guard; and providing support for implementing the UN arms embargo on the high seas. Also, in October 2016, the European Border and Coast Guard was established, with its own equipment and at least 1,500 personnel ready at any time for emergency deployment in order to crack down on the inflow of refugees and immigrants.

In June 2016, the United Kingdom conducted a national referendum to decide whether or not the country should leave the EU. Following the victory of the pro-Brexit camp, the United Kingdom gave official notice in March 2017 to the EU of its intention to exit the EU. In December 2017, the EU and the United Kingdom reached a basic agreement on the terms of the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU, and the negotiations moved into the “second phase,” including trade negotiations. In March 2018, the EU and the United Kingdom tentatively agreed on the introduction of a “transition period” of about one year and nine months to avoid an upheaval because of the economic environment following the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU.

In 2003, the EU led peacekeeping operations for the first time in Macedonia by using NATO’s equipment and capabilities. Since then, it has been actively committed to the operations in crisis management and maintenance of peace and order by, for example, sending troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of the

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13 The EU takes measures, such as capital regulations and ban on exports of equipment and dual use goods, along with asset freezes and travel bans, and extends its expiry date every six months.
14 Article 42, Paragraph 7 of the Treaty on European Union provides for a mutual defense obligation, where if a EU member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.
15 On November 17, 2015 after the terror attacks, then Minister for Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian of France requested the application of the “mutual assistance clause” at the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting. The application was agreed upon unanimously. Based on the application of the clause, France requested other EU member states to: (1) contribute to counter-ISIL operations in Iraq and Syria; and (2) help reduce the military burden of France by contributing to France’s counter-terrorism operations in Mali, Central Africa, and other areas. Nevertheless, the extent of cooperation has remained relatively small, except for that from the United Kingdom and Germany.
16 These are called Petersberg tasks. They consist of: (1) humanitarian assistance and rescue mission; (2) peacekeeping mission; and (3) combat mission in crisis management, including peacemaking.
Congo, Chad, Mali, and Central Africa. For example, in January 2014, the EU decided to dispatch security forces to Central Africa, where the situation had been of constant tumult. The forces commenced operations in April 2014 and completed its mission by March 2015. In the same month, the EU launched the European Union’s Military Advisory Mission (EUMAM) to support preparations for security sector reform in Central Africa. Since July 2016, the European Union’s Training Mission (EUTM) has succeeded the mission, which continues to modernize military forces in Central Africa. Also, the EU has been conducting Operation Atalanta, the first maritime mission to combat piracy off the Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden since December 2008. Under this mission, vessels and aircraft dispatched from each country protect ships in the area and conduct surveillance in these waters.\(^\text{17}\)

To tackle piracy in this area, the EU has undertaken “European Union Training Mission-Somalia” and “European Union Maritime Security Capacity Building Mission in Somalia,” in addition to Operation Atalanta. Based on a comprehensive approach, the EU not only implements piracy countermeasures, but is also working to develop and strengthen its coastal policing and judicial system capabilities.

The SDSR2010 committed to decreasing defense spending by 8% by FY2014, including at least 4.3 billion pounds in non-front line savings, excluding spending for operations such as in Afghanistan. The SDSR2010 decided to decrease, by 2015, Royal Navy personnel by 5,000, Army personnel by 7,000, and Royal Air Force personnel by 5,000, along with reduction of the holdings of main battle tanks by 40%. In the Army realignment plan “Army 2020” released later in July 2013, the United Kingdom was to reduce the Army’s active military personnel from 102,000 to 82,000 by 2020, while increasing reservists from 15,000 to 30,000 by 2018.\(^\text{18}\)

Advancements have been seen in cooperation between NATO and the EU. At the NATO Summit held in July 2016, a joint declaration was released citing fields which NATO and the EU should prioritize cooperation, and at the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting and the EU Council meeting in December 2016, 42 recommendations in seven fields were adopted for implementing the joint declaration. At the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting in December 2017, 32 cooperation items in three fields were added. Based on these recommendations, NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian and the EU’s Operation Sophia are now mutually collaborating in the Mediterranean, and NATO and the EU are also advancing cooperation in fields of responding to hybrid threats, cybersecurity, and capacity development.
cuts and explicitly proposes to increase the defense force in order to develop capacities to address the entire list of expanded threats. The NSS-SDSR2015 lays out that the United Kingdom would continue to be a key player in the international community, and promote procurement of equipment and formation of units with high readiness and mobility, in view of dealing with threats such as terrorism and cyber security. In December 2017, the aircraft carrier Queen Elizabeth was put into commission.

Since September 2014, the United Kingdom has conducted airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq. In addition, it carries out ISR activities using unmanned aerial vehicles, provides education and training to forces engaged in ground warfare such as the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga, a military organization of the Kurdistan Regional Government, as well as extends humanitarian assistance to refugees. Furthermore, following the terror attacks in Paris, the United Kingdom decided in December 2015 to extend the scope of the airstrikes from Iraq to Syria, and commenced airstrikes in Syria on the day after the Parliament gave its approval.

With regard to the Asia-Pacific region, the NSS-SDSR2015 presents the view that the region offers significant economic opportunities for the United Kingdom, and has considerable influence on the future integrity and credibility of the rules-based international order. It then expresses commitment to attaching importance to working with the United Kingdom’s security partners including Japan. In particular, it considers Japan as the United Kingdom’s closest security partner in Asia. In the National Security Capability Review (NSCR) issued in March 2018 as well, Japan and the ROK are considered to be strong partners for security, prosperity, and working on global issues. Based on this view, in this region, the United Kingdom conducts Operation Patwin, a natural disaster assistance mission to the Philippines, participates in the multilateral joint exercise RIMPAC, and conducts goodwill trainings with Japan. In addition, in February 2018, the Rt Hon Gavin Williamson, Secretary of State for Defense of the United Kingdom clearly referenced that the British Royal Navy Frigate HMS Sutherland would be sailing through the South China Sea and making it clear that the Royal Navy has a right to do that. In early May 2018, in order to contribute to international efforts to monitor prohibited trading at sea by North Korea, the HMS Sutherland conducted information gathering activities regarding ships suspected of conducting “ship-to-ship transfers” in the waters surrounding Japan. Further, in April 2018, the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom announced that the Royal Navy’s landing ship HMS Albion, along with the Royal Navy frigate HMS Argyll in the latter half of 2018, would be dispatched to the Asia-Pacific region. The deployment of these three ships means that the Royal Navy would have an almost unbroken presence in the Asia-Pacific region throughout 2018.

In March 2017, the United Kingdom officially informed the EU of its intention to leave the union. While the United Kingdom will continue to be a NATO member state, some have noted that the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU would reduce the EU’s military capacity by around one-fourth. Therefore, attention will be given to various trends, including the EU’s security initiatives and relations with NATO.

France

Since the end of the Cold War, France has focused on maintaining independence of its defense policies, while having led initiatives to enhance the defense structure and capability in Europe. It has worked on the development of its military capacity by streamlining and integrating military bases, dealing with operational requirements to strengthen its defense capability, as well as enhancing its intelligence capabilities and modernizing equipment required in the future.

The Defence and National Security Strategic Review announced by the Macron administration in October 2017 states that the threats that France faces, including domestic terrorism, the refugee issue, and the Ukraine crisis, are diversifying, increasing in complexity, and rapidly becoming more violent, and amidst the increasingly multipolar international system, competition is intensifying among major military powers.

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19 The “NSS-SDSR2015” will maintain the size of the Armed Forces personnel and increase the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force by 700 personnel combined. It also decided to build two aircraft carriers, introduce nine new maritime patrol aircraft, and maintain a fleet of four strategic nuclear submarines. Underpinned by a stable economy, the NSS-SDSR2015 is to maintain defense expenditure amounting to 2% of GDP which is the NATO’s target and to further increase defense spending, especially equipment procurement spending.

20 The NSS-SDSR2015 is to add two Typhoon squadrons, establish a F-35 squadron capable of operating from new aircraft carriers, create two strike brigades of up to 5,000 personnel, and have a system that can deploy an expeditionary force of around 50,000 personnel overseas by 2025.

21 Since 2014 and as of February 2018, the United Kingdom has conducted over 1,600 aerial bombings, held training for over 60,000 Iraq military soldiers, and dispatched over 1,400 United Kingdom military personnel.

22 From October to November 2016, Typhoon fighters visited Japan to take part in Japan-U.K. joint exercises. See Part 1, Chapter 3, Section 3-4 regarding the maritime security strategy of the United Kingdom. In April 2018, the British Navy frigate HMS Sutherland conducted a joint exercise with JMSDF, including JS DD SUZUNAMI.
and the danger of escalation is growing. Under these conditions, France will continue to fulfill its duties within NATO including for collective defense and contributing to security, and will take a leading role in efforts to strengthen the EU’s defense. In addition, in the Military Planning Law for 2019-2025 announced in February 2018, a total of approximately 300 billion euros will be allocated for defense expenditure by 2025, and there was confirmation of President Macron’s commitment to the goal of allocating 2% of France’s GDP to its defense budget by 2025.

France has been conducting airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq since September 2014 and in Syria since September 2015. Following the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015, France declared a state of emergency domestically, and decided to deploy 10,000 military personnel to maintain domestic security and suspend troop reductions. Outside of France, the country enhanced its airstrikes against ISIL in Syria and deployed mobile units including the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore, France has continued to provide education and training to the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga, as well as humanitarian assistance for refugees.

Since France has territories in the Indo-Pacific region, it places importance on its commitment to the region. The Strategic Review issued in October 2017 points out the potential for a threat to benefits, such as the freedom of navigation, due to the worsening strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific region, and clearly states that France will maintain its stance of protecting its sovereignty of its overseas prefectures and territories in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. Further, France has indicated its policy to continue strengthening its worldwide partnership network, from Africa to the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region. In May 2018, during his visit to Australia, President Macron stated that the Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis is absolutely key for the Indian-Pacific region. In addition, in February 2018, France had the Floréal class frigate Vendémiaire make a port call in Japan and conduct joint exercises with the MSDF, and has proactively organized the multilateral exercises Exercise Croix du Sud and Equateur in the South Pacific.

3 Germany

While Germany has been implementing a large-scale reduction of its military personnel since the end of the Cold War, it has been gradually expanding the dispatch of its federal forces overseas. At the same time, Germany has advanced the reform of its armed forces to enable them to execute multiple responsibilities encompassing conflict prevention and risk management in the context of multilateral organizations, including NATO, the EU, and the UN. However, following a worsening in the security environment, in May 2016 Germany changed policy and announced that it would increase military personnel by around 7,000 by 2023.

The country’s defense white paper released in July 2016 for the first time in about 10 years explains that Germany’s security environment has grown more complex and unstable, causing gradually rising uncertainty, citing specific threats such as international terrorism, cyber-attacks, interstate conflict, and the influx of refugees and immigrants. The white paper also states that Germany would continue to emphasize multilateral cooperation and cross-government approaches, while striving to realize rules-based international order. Furthermore, with regard to the number of military personnel, the white paper notes that although an upper limit was in place following the end of the Cold War and Germany has continually worked to reduce personnel, it would shift to a policy with no upper limit and perform regular reviews of its military force plan to adjust the number of personnel flexibly.

In Iraq, Germany has thus far provided education and training to the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga, supplied equipment and ammunition, extended financial

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23 As of January 2018, France has mobilized 1,100 personnel, 10 Rafale fighters, 1 frigate, among other assets.

24 Germany decreased its military personnel strength which was once more than 500,000 at the time of its reunification to 250,000 by 2010. In 2016, personnel were cut further back to 177,000. However, since July 1994, when the Federal Constitutional Court judged that dispatching the federal forces to international missions under multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations and NATO was constitutional, Germany has gradually expanded dispatch of its federal forces to participate in various international operations, including security maintenance and reconstruction activities in the Balkan Peninsula and Afghanistan, and anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.
assistance for humanitarian assistance, as well as conducted training of Kurdish troops in Germany. In December 2015, following the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015, the Cabinet approved plans to provide logistics support to the Coalition that is conducting counter-ISIL military operations. This expanded German engagement in counter-ISIL military operations, albeit the commitment is limited to logistics support missions, such as reconnaissance and aerial refueling.25

With regard to the Asia-Pacific region, Germany considers it to be important from the standpoint of its large population and economic strength, and expresses the view that the region plays a central role in international politics, while on the other hand, the region faces issues such as being home to two-thirds of the world’s poor. Germany’s military engagement in the region is limited to disaster relief missions and goodwill visits, and does not include joint training.

The decision was made on the following commitment during the 12-month period from early January to end of December 2016: (1) dispatch the frigate Augsburg to escort the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle; (2) deploy Tornado fighters (up to six fighters) and aerial refueling aircraft to Incirlik Air Base in Turkey; and (3) deploy up to 1,200 personnel to areas of ISIL’s operations in Syria, their airspace, the eastern Mediterranean Sea, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea to collect intelligence using reconnaissance satellites and share this intelligence with relevant countries. This decision also added the dispatch of personnel to NATO’s AWACS (airborne warning and control system) unit to the mission. Furthermore, Germany strives to reduce the operational burden of France by increasing the number of German personnel participating in the UN PKO in Mali (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali [MINUSMA]) and training personnel in Iraq.

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In a global security environment, there is a growing risk that unrest or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately develop into a destabilizing factor that could affect the entire international community.

The conflicts occurring in recent years in various parts of the world are not necessarily of the same nature. In addition to an array of problems, which is at the root of conflicts, including ethnicity, religion, territory, and resources, the impacts of climate change and other global issues have also been suggested as causes of conflicts.1

There are also cases where the political turmoil accompanying regime change leads to conflicts between ethnic groups, religious sects, or political factions that can become prolonged against a background of public dissatisfaction over economic and social disparities and/or high unemployment rates. The human rights violations, refugees, hunger, poverty, and other consequences of conflicts can have impacts on not only the parties of the conflicts but also a wider area. States with weak governance are also finding it difficult to tackle risks such as the explosive outbreak and spread of infectious diseases.

Furthermore, in the Middle East and Africa, there are prominent cases where power vacuums in some states with political instability and weak governance have become hotbeds of the activities of international terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIL. These organizations are leveraging inadequate border controls to expand and step up their operations across national borders while securing the personnel, weapons, and drugs that serve as a source of funding. There also exists organizations that have the ability to carry out terrorist acts in places far from their bases, continuing to pose imminent security challenges to the international community.

Furthermore, in developed countries, such as the United States and European countries, there has been an increasing number of cases of young people who are inspired by the extreme ideology spread by international terrorist organizations against the backdrop of dissatisfaction over estrangement from society, discrimination, poverty, and disparities, resulting in joining the international terrorist organizations as fighters or conducting “homegrown” terrorism activities in their home countries.

Regarding Japan, during the terrorist incident regarding the murder of Japanese nationals in Syria in early 2015, ISIL explicitly announced that Japanese nationals would be the targets of terrorist attacks. ISIL also issued a statement claiming responsibility for the murder of Japanese in Bangladesh in October of the same year, and later referred to the incident in its official

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1 The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released by the U.S. Department of Defense in March 2014 regards climate change as one of key factors that will shape the future security environment. It claims that climate change may accelerate instability and conflict by causing water scarcity, sharp increases in food costs, and other effects.
### List of Peacekeeping Operations

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</tbody>
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Note: According to the United Nations (as of the end of May 2018).
bulletin when it listed Japanese nationals as their targets. Bearing in mind the terror attack at a restaurant in Dhaka, Bangladesh in July 2016, we Japanese must face up to the threat of international terrorism as our own problem.\(^2\)

It has become increasingly important that the international community should examine the shape of tailored international frameworks and involvement measures, and seek out appropriate responses to these complicated and diverse destabilizing factors.

Amid these situations, in recent years, mandates of the UN PKO\(^3\) have come to include a wide range of areas, including not only traditional roles like the monitoring of a ceasefire or military withdrawal but also activities by civilians and police such as the monitoring of disarmament, security sector reform, the monitoring of elections and administrative activities, and humanitarian assistance (e.g., return of refugees to their homeland). This also suggest that the importance of the roles related to the protection of civilians and peace-building, in particular, has been growing.

In September 2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2178 on the issue of foreign terrorist fighters. The resolution requested member states to make exits from their countries for the protection of civilians and peace-building, in particular, has been growing.

The seventh issue of the ISIL propaganda magazine *Dabiq* published in February 2015 included descriptions of the murder of two Japanese nationals in Syria and renewed a call for terror attacks on Japanese nationals and interests. Furthermore, the 11th issue (published in September 2015) called for terror attacks on Japanese diplomatic missions in Bosnia, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The 12th issue (published in November 2015) described the murder of a Japanese national in Bangladesh and warned again that Japanese nationals and Japanese interests would be the targets of terror attacks.

As of the end of April 2018, 14 UN PKOs were operating globally, including about 89,905 military and police personnel and about 15,000 civilian personnel (as of the end of August 2017) from 124 countries. Out of these UN PKOs, there were 10 operations in the Middle East and Africa. (See Fig. I-3-1-1)

In addition to the UN PKO framework, multinational forces and regional organizations authorized by the UN Security Council have engaged in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. In Africa, regional organizations such as the African Union (AU)\(^4\) undertake their activities based on UN Security Council resolutions, and their activities are sometimes handed over to UN PKOs later. The international community also offers recommendations and training assistance and supplies equipment, from a long-term perspective, prompting African nations self-help efforts to enhance local government organizations and improve the capabilities of their military and security organizations.

Concerning international counterterrorism measures, the proliferation of the threat of terrorism has gained momentum while its perpetrators are increasingly diversified, making it even more difficult to prevent terrorist attacks. For this reason, international cooperation on counterterrorism measures has become even more important. Currently, the international community as a whole is taking various steps, including military means as well as measures to cut off the funding sources for terrorist organizations and prevent the international movement of terrorists.\(^5\)

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\(^4\) The world’s largest regional organization comprised of 55 countries and regions in Africa. It was established in July 2002 by reorganizing the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (established in May 1963). Its objectives include achieving the integration and solidarity of African nations and people, accelerating political, economic, and social integration of Africa, and promoting peace, security, and stability in Africa. In January 2017, the AU General Assembly approved the accession of Morocco, the only non-member in Africa.

\(^5\) In September 2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2178 on the issue of foreign terrorist fighters. The resolution requested member states to make exits from their countries for the purpose of executing acts of terrorism punishable under domestic laws. The resolution also includes measures obligating member states to prevent entry or transit through their territories of any individual about whom that state has credible information that demonstrates reasonable grounds for believing that the individual is attempting to enter or transit through its territory for the purpose of participating in acts of terrorism. In addition, at the G7 Summit held in Germany in June 2015, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to effectively implement the established international framework for the freezing of terrorists’ assets.

\(^6\) The term means “successor” in Arabic. After Prophet Muhammad died, the term has been used to refer to those who led the Islamic community. Since then, a number of the heads of hereditary dynasties, including the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, utilized this title.
and other elements of cyberspace under a sophisticated public relations strategy to issue propaganda for the organization, recruit fighters and call for terrorist acts. As a result, they appear to have gained many supporters, and it has been noted that more than 40,000 foreign fighters actually travelled to Iraq and Syria.

As for obtaining weapons and ammunition, ISIL is believed to engage in looting in addition to utilizing illegal trafficking networks. In particular, when they invaded northern Iraq in the first half of 2014, they managed to pillage a variety of equipment from the Iraqi military facilities that they occupied. Furthermore, it has been noted that ISIL has also begun producing and modifying weapons. It has been pointed out that they are manufacturing IEDs from chemicals obtained through legal channels and using them in suicide bombings. It has also been confirmed that they are using tactics such as modifying small commercial drones so that they can carry hand grenades and the like and attacking enemy vehicles by dropping bombs loaded on them. Regarding the use of drones, it has been noted that ISIL attempted to expand the damage by using camera-equipped drones to skillfully guide suicide-attack vehicles. It is believed that ISIL is using these new tactics in recent fighting.

(2) Progress in Military Operations against ISIL and the Current Situations of ISIL

In response to the expansion of ISIL’s reach since January 2014, the Coalition forces led by the United States have been conducting air strikes in Iraq and Syria since August and September of the same year respectively. The coalition forces have also engaged in education and training of local forces, supply of weapons, and rescue of hostages by the special forces.

In Iraq, the Iraqi Security Forces (including paramilitary troops and the police, in addition to Iraqi government forces) and the Peshmerga, the military organ of the KRG, cooperated with the Coalition to recapture key cities in Iraq including Kirkuk, Ramadi, and Fallujah. In particular, in July 2017, the Iraqi Security Forces recaptured Mosul which is important as the symbol of the expansion of ISIL’s influence. Subsequently, the ISIL strongholds remaining in northern and western Iraq such as Tal Afar, Hawija, Al-Qaim and Rawa were also recaptured, and the Iraqi Government announced in December 2017 that all Iraqi territory had been liberated from ISIL.

In Syria, meanwhile, in addition to air strikes by the Coalition, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), composed mainly of local Kurd and Arab forces, have conducted operations against ISIL in northern Syria with support from the United States and others. As the result, in October 2017, they recaptured Raqqa, the putative capital of “Islamic State,” and also conquered Syria’s largest oil field, situated in Deir Ezzor in eastern Syria.

Russia launched its military operation in Syria in September 2015 with the purpose of the survival of the Assad administration and protection of Russian bases in Syria. It carried out air strikes and launched cruise missiles from the sea, dropped precision satellite-guided bombs from strategic bombers, and temporarily deployed the aircraft career Admiral Kuznetsov to conduct air strikes. With this support from Russia, the Assad administration conquered ISIL strongholds,

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7 It has been noted regarding the IEDs that ISIL used between July 2014 and February 2016 that parts and components manufactured and/or exported by approximately 50 firms in 20 countries fell into the hands of ISIL, who used them within a year after it acquired them.
8 ISIL has published videos in which it attacks tanks and the like with explosives dropped from drones. It has been noted that the purpose is to destroy some vehicles and force them out of the frontlines through such attacks.
9 It has been noted that ISIL has been amplifying the effect of its attacks by using drones to find targets from the air and providing instructions to suicide bombers at the ready on the ground and instructing optimal paths for them.
10 As of August 2017, the Coalition had conducted 13,331 and 11,235 air raids in Iraq and Syria respectively.
11 The Peshmerga remained stationed in Kirkuk after recapturing it from ISIL and effectively controlled it. However, when the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) implemented a referendum on independence in September 2017, the Iraqi Government dispatched security forces and subdued the city the following month.
12 After the recapture, new problems have emerged, including confrontation between Shiites and Sunnis.
13 Tartus is the only Russian naval base facing the Mediterranean Sea in Syria, reportedly having a dockyard that can provide fuel and food to and repair military ships.
14 Regarding the series of military activities by Russia, it has been noted that they have been displaying their military capabilities and to demonstrate those capabilities through operations, while others have noted that the target of the military operations is not ISIL but the opposition forces confronting the Assad administration.
mainly in southern and eastern Syria such as Palmyra and Deir Ezzor. In December 2017, Russia declared that Syria’s entire territory had been liberated from ISIL and announced that it would pull out some of its troops deployed in Syria while maintaining its bases there.

It is believed that the number of ISIL fighters and ISIL revenue have declined significantly as a result of the progress in these operations against ISIL. At the same time, it is believed that approximately 3,000 ISIL fighters remain in hiding, mainly near the Iraq-Syria border, who are conducting terrorist acts against security forces and citizens in Baghdad and Damascus, respective capitals of Iraq and Syria, and elsewhere in both countries. In other words, the threat of ISIL in Iraq and Syria has not been eliminated completely. It is important for the international community to continue to engage towards the stability of the two states in order to prevent ISIL forces from expanding again.

(3) Dispersion beyond Iraq and Syria

After ISIL declared the establishment of the “Islamic State,” multiple “provinces” have been established outside of Iraq and Syria as the “Islamic State” territories (see figure), and these “provinces” have been conducting terrorist acts in each place. On the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, an organization claiming to be the Islamic State-Sinai Province has been conducting a series of terrorist acts against the military and police as well as Christians. In Afghanistan, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province has conducted sporadic terrorist acts in its capital Kabul and elsewhere. Terrorist attacks claimed by ISIL “provinces” have also been confirmed in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya and elsewhere. It is believed that the threat of terrorist

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15 In a December 2017 tweet, the spokesperson for the Coalition expressed the understanding that the number of ISIL’s foreign fighters remaining in Iraq and Syria was under 3,000.
16 For example, suicide bombing and shooting attacks aimed at police vehicles occurred in September 2017 on the Sinai Peninsula, for which ISIL-Sinai Province claimed responsibility.
17 For example, three suicide bombing attacks occurred in December 2017 at a Shiite cultural facility in Kabul, for which ISIL-Khorasan Province claimed responsibility.
acts by such organizations will continue in the future.

Furthermore, organizations claiming to be ISIL in countries where no “provinces” have been established exist and have conducted terrorist attacks targeting security forces and citizens. Particularly in the Philippines, in May 2017, an Abu Sayyaf Group (ASF) faction and the Maute group pledging allegiance to ISIL occupied part of the city of Marawi on the island of Mindanao. The Philippine Government declared martial law and launched military operations, and the fighting continued for around five months. In October of the same year, the Philippine Government took control of Marawi and declared an end of the fighting. However, the search for individuals connected to the organizations supporting ISIL continues and security has yet to be firmly established. Elsewhere, there is concern that the threat posed by ISIL is permeating Southeast Asia with the existence of organizations supporting ISIL in Indonesia for one.\(^1\)\(^8\)

(4) Foreign Fighters

Many foreign fighters flowed into Iraq and Syria with the rise of ISIL since 2014. However, as the strength of ISIL ebbed, it is believed that that number of foreign fighters travelling to Iraq and Syria is declining.\(^1\)\(^9\)

Meanwhile, a major concern has been raised that foreign fighters acquiring combat training and combat experience in Iraq and Syria would return to their countries and conduct terrorist attacks there. It is believed that at least 5,600 foreign fighters had returned from Iraq and Syria to their home countries by October 2017.\(^2\)\(^0\)

Amid such circumstances, it has been pointed out that the terrorists who carried out the simultaneous attacks in Paris in November 2015 included ones who mingled with refugees and immigrants in entering Europe.\(^2\)\(^1\)

Like the terrorist act that occurred in Belgium in August of the same year, there is also the possibility that ISIL has made foreign fighters return to their home countries where they are ordered to conduct terrorist attacks.\(^2\)\(^2\) The international community is required to continue to take various initiatives going forward in order to prevent such terrorist acts by foreign fighters.

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**Commentary**

**Diffusion of the ISIL threat**

While ISIL, which rapidly emerged in Iraq and Syria from 2014, has considerably lost influence in these countries recently, related organizations operating in the Middle East, Africa, and other regions continue to actively engage in terrorist efforts and there are also organizations in Southeast Asia that claim allegiance to ISIL.

Furthermore, ISIL continues to encourage terrorism in areas outside of Iraq and Syria with propaganda over the Internet and other efforts. Individuals and groups inspired by ISIL’s thinking have recently conducted terrorist attacks in Western countries. ISIL supporters in various regions worldwide might carry out terrorist attacks considering encouragement by ISIL in its journals and other materials to target large-scale outdoor gathering and other venues with large numbers of people using vehicles, knives, and other readily available means. More than 5,600 fighters with battle experience in Iraq and Syria have returned to their home countries, and it is thought that these fighters returned to 33 countries. Terrorist threats have been diffused worldwide via returning fighters.

The international community hence needs to closely cooperate and promptly implement effective countermeasures of the ongoing threat of terrorism by ISIL-related organizations and ISIL supporters in various regions around the world.

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\(^1\)\(^8\) In Indonesia, a series of bombing and shooting attacks occurred in Jakarta in January 2016, and an organization supporting ISIL claimed responsibility. It is also believed that Indonesians and Malaysians participated in an organization supporting ISIL in the fighting in the city of Marawi.

\(^1\)\(^9\) In an October 2017 press conference, the spokesperson for the Coalition expressed the understanding that there were virtually no foreign fighters flowing into Iraq and Syria at the time.

\(^2\)\(^0\) According to the Soufan Center, the number of foreign fighters returning to their home countries are approximately 800 in Tunisia, 760 in Saudi Arabia, 425 in the United Kingdom, approximately 300 in Germany, 271 in France, and so on.

\(^2\)\(^1\) Since the series of terror attacks in Paris, the French forces deployed 10,000 troops in France to guard domestic transportation systems, tourist spots, and the like. Although the number of troops was reduced to 7,000, they continue security activities domestically and otherwise engage in protecting the public.

\(^2\)\(^2\) The perpetrator is reported to have received military training in Syria in May 2015, then instructed by ISIL to return to Europe to conduct the terrorist act.
2 Trends in Al Qaeda-related International Terrorist Organizations

(1) Al Qaeda

With regard to Al Qaeda, which is believed to have directed the 9/11 attacks in 2001, it is believed to have been weakened as the group’s previous leader Osama Bin Laden as well as many executives were killed in U.S. operations. However, it is considered that it continues its activities as a core organization such as issuing instructions and recommendations to its affiliates in North Africa and the Middle East. In addition, its current leader Zawahiri has repeatedly issued statements calling for terrorist acts against the West. The possibility of Al Qaeda attacks has not disappeared.

(2) Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a Sunni extremist organization based in Yemen, is mainly active in south Yemen, continuing their fight against the Yemeni security forces and the opposition insurgent group Houthis. The United States has continued air strikes using UAVs and killed many AQAP leaders. However, AQAP has taken advantage of the instability in Yemen to maintain a certain level of force there. It also spreads extreme ideology utilizing propaganda videos and magazines.

(3) Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a Sunni extremist organization based in Algeria and also active in Mali, Tunisia, and Libya has mainly conducted terrorist attacks and kidnapping against Algerian security forces and Europeans and U.S. nationals. Although the strength of AQIM has declined due to the French-led military intervention that started in 2013, the group is still continuing its terror attacks in Algeria and Mali, while organizations under the AQIM umbrella are instigating terrorist attacks in states such as Burkina Faso and Mali.

3 Trends of Other International Terrorist Organizations

(1) Taliban

The Taliban is an organization based in Afghanistan with the objective of establishing a state governed by Sharia law. Its forces were diminished significantly for a while by the mop-up operations launched by the United States following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. However, with the end of the mission of the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in December 2014, the Taliban has been stepping up its offensive again and expanding the control areas within Afghanistan. It also continues suicide attacks and shootings as well as rocket attacks targeting the government and foreigners.

The Taliban held its first peace talks with the Afghan Government in July 2015. However, it has hardened its confrontational posture since then and has not shown a willingness to take part in peace talks even after a new supreme leader was appointed in May 2016.
(2) Boko Haram

In Nigeria, Boko Haram, a Sunni extremist organization, has repeatedly carried out terror attacks targeting mainly citizens. It is believed that its influence is declining due to the mop-up operations that the Nigerian military is mounting together with neighboring countries. However, it continues its activities, mainly in northeast Nigeria, and a suicide bomb attack that is believed to have been conducted by Boko Haram occurred at a mosque in the northeast in January 2018.

4 The Threat of “Home-grown” Terrorism

As Al Qaeda and ISIL call for terrorism attacks around the world, “home-grown” terrorism, in which residents are inspired by the extremism espoused by these organizations and conduct terrorist attacks at home, continues to be a threat.

In recent years, “lone-wolf” terrorism, planned and committed by individuals or small groups who do not have any official relations with international terrorist organizations but have become influenced in some way, have occurred. The terrorist act in November 2017 when a truck ran through a bicycle path in New York is considered a “lone-wolf” terrorist act. ISIL and Al Qaeda have been using propaganda magazines and other means to introduce specific methods for terrorist acts to supporters who want to conduct such “lone-wolf” terrorist acts. For example, ISIL gives detailed examples of specific methods and targets for terrorist acts using knives and vehicles in its magazine Rumiyah. Al Qaeda also has used its magazine to publish how to make a bomb using material close at hand. “Lone-wolf” terrorism is also seen as a threat to the international community because it is difficult to detect signs in advance and prevent it.

More recently, terrorist acts have been confirmed that are conducted in an organized manner by fighters sent in by terrorist organizations or by local individuals or organizations under instructions from terrorist organizations. These incidents indicate that the forms of terrorist acts are becoming diversified and that the capacity of terrorist organizations to execute operations is improving, raising concern that the threat of terrorism is growing.

3 Current Situation of Regional Conflicts and the International Response (mainly in the Middle East and Africa)

1 Situation in Syria

The violent clashes in Syria since March 2011 pits four parties, the Syrian government forces, opposition forces, Islamic extremist forces, and Kurdish forces against each other. However, government forces have gained the upper hand overall, as they recaptured Aleppo, which was once a stronghold of rebel forces, in December 2016 with support from Russia.

Against this backdrop, UN Security Council Resolution 2254 adopted in December 2015 established a road map for the peace process, and peace talks have been taking place since January 2016 between the government and opposition forces under UN auspices. However, fighting did not abate on either side and there was no progress to be seen in the initiative towards peace.

Under these circumstances, peace talks sponsored by Russia, Turkey, and Iran began in Astana, Kazakhstan in January 2017. In the fourth meeting held in May of the same year, an agreement was reached on the creation of “safe zones” in four locations within Syria where fighting and air strikes would be forbidden while Russia, Turkey, and Iran would dispatch troops to Syria to monitor the ceasefire. Later, in January 2018, the Syrian National Dialogue Congress was held in Sochi, Russia, where it was agreed to establish a constitutional committee towards the enactment of a new constitution. However, the main opposition forces and Kurdish forces did not participate in the congress. It will draw attention whether talks towards the enactment of a new constitution will make progress.

In this manner, various efforts towards peace and stability are being made. However, large-scale clashes occurred in what are supposed to be “safe zones” in Idlib province in northern Syria and in Eastern Ghouta on the outskirts of the capital Damascus. Particularly in Eastern Ghouta, Syrian forces intensified their offensive with support from Russian forces, resulting in many
casualties among citizens.

Under these circumstances, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France determined that the Assad administration had used chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta and showed the determination not to allow the proliferation and use of chemical weapons, conducting missile attacks on Syrian facilities related to chemical weapons in April 2018. Russia and Iran, who support the Assad administration, are pushing back at the attack by the three states.

Furthermore, as the influence of ISIL wanes in Syria, a confrontation over the status of Kurds is emerging. The Kurds exhibited movement towards the expansion of autonomy such as the unilateral announcement in March 2016 led by Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Kurdish political party, to introduce a federative system in northern Syria, and implementation of their own local elections in September 2017 and the like. Turkey, which deems PYD to be a terrorist organization, invaded Afrin in northeastern Syria in January 2018 and announced in March of the same year that it had taken control of the city center of Afrin.

In this manner, the military clashes between the forces within Syria still do not show signs of ending, and peace talks are also stalling. Further initiatives from the international community towards the stabilization of Syria is required.

The Situation Surrounding Middle East Peace

Since the foundation of Israel in 1948, there have been four wars between Israel and Arab countries. The 1993 Oslo Agreement was signed between Israel and Palestine and a peace process made temporary progress but has fallen short of achieving peace. In the Palestinian territories, the moderate Fatah, which governs the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the Islamic fundamentalist Hamas, which effectively controls the Gaza district, are in conflict, splitting the area.

In September 2017, Hamas announced its intent to accept the administrative control of the Gaza Strip by Fatah. In October of the same year, direct consultations were held through the mediation of Egypt, in which the two parties agreed on the handover of administrative authority by December. However, subsequent negotiations encountered difficulties, while the Trump administration announced on December 6 of the same year that the United States would recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. After that, the security situation deteriorated temporarily as demonstrations and other protest activities took place day after day in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and people were injured or killed in clashes with the Israeli security forces. Tensions rose as rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip at Israeli territory and as a response to that, Israel intercepted rockets fired from the Gaza Strip and conducted air strikes on the Gaza Strip. In May 2018, immediately after the relocation of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, protest activities in the Palestinian Autonomous Area were activated again, which resulted in many casualties particularly in the Gaza Strip. Future movements in the Middle East peace process including engagement by the United States and the future direction of negotiations towards the transfer of administrative authority over the Gaza Strip bears watching.

Situation in Yemen

In Yemen, anti-government protests occurred from February 2011 and international pressure led to a transition from then President Ali Abdullah Saleh to new President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi through election. Meanwhile, the confrontation between the government and the opposition insurgent group Houthis, based in northern Yemen, intensified. In September 2011, the Houthis occupied the capital Sana and President Hadi evacuated to the city of Aden in the south.

Later, as the Houthis invaded the city of Aden,
President Hadi sought assistance from Arab countries. In response, in March 2015, coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia began air strikes against the Houthis.

A series of peace talks intermediated by the United Nations took place between April and August of the same year, but a final peace agreement has yet to be reached. 33 Military operations by Saudi-led coalition forces against the Houthis and the launching ballistic missiles into Saudi Arabia and other attacks by the Houthis continue. 34 The coalition launched operations to recapture Houthis-controlled Hodeidah, Yemen’s second-largest port city, and announced that they had occupied the airport there. Meanwhile, regarding the ballistic missile attacks by the Houthis, which have mainly targeted the Saudi south, the Houthis have announced that they have launched ballistic missiles at Riyadh, the Saudi capital, since November 2017. In response, Saudi Arabia is claiming that it has intercepted the ballistic missiles launched by the Houthis. The United States and Saudi Arabia also claim that the missiles launched at Riyadh were provided by Iran.

Under these circumstances, in December 2017, former President Saleh, who had joined forces with the Houthis to fight against the Saudi-led coalition forces, extended an offer for a ceasefire and talks with the Saudi-led coalition forces. The Houthis rejected this and killed the former president. Meanwhile, inside the government-aligned forces, the Southern Transitional Council, which seeks independence for south Yemen, clashed with the Hadi administration and overran a military base and government buildings in Aden. These situations have added further confusions in Yemen.

4 Situation in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the U.S. Forces launched mop-up operations against the Taliban and other groups in November 2001. Furthermore, the security duties by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) among other efforts have reportedly been reducing the Taliban’s assault capabilities to a certain degree. However, around the time that ISAF withdrew in December 2014 after completing its mission and the NATO-led “Resolute Support Mission (RSM)” started to train, advise and assist the ANDSF as its core mission, the Taliban intensified their offensive resulting in security deterioration. Meanwhile, the ANDSF faces challenges with logistics, morale, air capabilities, and troop-commander leadership, and the Taliban is expanding its own areas of control in Afghanistan amidst these circumstances. According to a report released by the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in October 2017, the areas controlled by or under the influence of the Afghan Government was approximately 57% of Afghan territory, the lowest since December 2015, when the survey started.

Furthermore, in addition to the Taliban, ISIL has established “Khorasan Province” in eastern Afghanistan and expanded its activities. Suicide bomb attacks and rocket attacks that the Taliban and ISIL are believed to be involved have occurred one after another around the country. When U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis visited Afghanistan in September 2017, several rockets hit Kabul International Airport and the surrounding area, and both the Taliban and ISIL claimed responsibility. In January 2018, a suicide bomb attack occurred in the center of Kabul killing more than a hundred people with the Taliban claiming responsibility while ISIL attacked an NGO office in Jalalabad in the east in the same month. Instability continues in the security situation nationwide. In June 2018, Afghanistan and the Taliban both announced a ceasefire unilaterally. However, the Taliban abandoned the ceasefire after three days and reopened its attacks. It is unclear whether the security situation may stabilize.

The first peace talks between the Afghan Government and the Taliban were held in May 2015 but has not been resumed since after the subsequent change in the supreme

33 The first round of peace talks under the mediation by the UN took place in Geneva. Both the Yemeni Government and anti-government forces participated in the talks and had indirect consultations but fell short of reaching any final agreement. In Switzerland in December 2015, the Yemeni Government and anti-government forces held the second round of peace talks, realizing their first direct negotiations. Although a ceasefire was put into force before the second round, repeated ceasefire violations occurred, leading the second round to be suspended without any major achievement.

34 In June 2015, the Houthis and Yemeni forces units supporting former President Saleh red a Scud missile at Khans Musaib in southern Saudi Arabia. Saudi forces red two Patriot missiles to intercept the Scud and identified and destroyed the Scud launching site in southern Saada governorate. Since then, multiple similar incidents have occurred. It has been suggested that the Yemeni Scud missile was purchased from North Korea and that Yemeni forces units supporting the Houthis were involved with its ring.
leadership. Although the Afghan Government called out to the Taliban for dialogue, the Taliban has been silent on peace talks, and there are yet to be prospects for reopening the talks.

5 Situation in Libya

In Libya, following the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, elections for a General National Congress were held in July 2012, establishing a congress consisting mainly of Islamists. In June 2014, elections for a Council of Representatives were held to establish a new congress to replace the General National Congress. However, since secularists became the majority, the confrontation between Islamic and secular groups intensified, and consequently, Libya became fragmented between east and west with two assemblies existing in parallel – the Islamic groups’ General National Congress based in the capital city of Tripoli and the secular groups’ Council of Representatives based in Tobruk in eastern Libya. In December 2015, the UN mediated a political agreement for Libya and a national consensus government was established in March 2016. However, as Islamic groups took control of the new government, secular groups turned their back and refused to join the national consensus government. As a result, Libya remains divided between the East and the West. In addition, militias supporting the east and west respectively continue sporadic military clashes. Under these circumstances, there are no prospects for establishing domestic governance and security yet.

In addition, ISIL, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations are gaining ground in these unstable circumstances and clashing with militias around the country. ISIL in particular is believed to be divided into small groups and in hiding, mainly in the desert regions in southern Libya. In October 2017, car bomb attacks targeting the militias occurred for which ISIL claimed responsibility. Further terrorist acts will likely occur in the future.

6 Situation in Egypt

In Egypt, where then-President Mubarak, who had been serving as the president for approximately three decades, resigned in 2011, and then-President Mursi, who had been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, was inaugurated. However, in June 2013, large-scale protests of the people occurred amidst the poor economic situation and the deterioration of security. The military intervened in response and dismissed the president. In May 2014, former Defense Minister Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi was inaugurated as president. In the three years since its inauguration, the el-Sisi administration undertook economic reforms including a shift to a floating exchange rate system and the abolition of subsidies. However, enhancing domestic security measures is still a major challenge. In November 2017, an armed group assaulted a mosque in the northern Sinai Peninsula leaving more than 300 people dead. Countermeasures against terrorism are urgently required.

President el-Sisi was reelected in presidential election held in March 2018 with approximately 97% of the votes. In the election, a former prime minister, a former parliament member, and former military chief of staff who were seen as strong candidates declined one after another to run or were detained by the authorities, leaving only one opponent for the president. Approximately 41% voted, a figure lower than in the previous election.

7 Situation in South Sudan

(1) Political Turmoil

The North-South civil war that had continued since 1983 between the Sudanese Government consisting mainly of Arab Muslims in the north and the anti-government group consisting mainly of African Christians in the south came to an end in 2005 with the entry into force of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) brokered by neighboring countries, the United States, and others. In July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan was separated and gained independence from the Republic of the Sudan as the
result of the referendum held in January 2011 according to the provisions of the CPA. On the same day, the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was established as the result of the independence.\(^37\) Salva Kiir Mayardit, a Dinka, became president while Riek Machar, a Nuer, became vice president. However, political turmoil continued even after the independence.

The political conflict between the pro-Kiir faction (mainstream) and the pro-Machar faction (anti-mainstream group)\(^38\) was brought to the surface after President Kiir had dismissed Vice President Machar and all the other cabinet ministers in July 2013. Following this, in December of the same year, clashes that broke out between the government and the pro-Machar faction in the capital city of Juba and violent acts targeting specific ethnic groups spread to different areas of the country in a short span of time, resulting in a large number of casualties, refugees, and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

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### (2) Beginning of Peace Building

With the establishment of UNMISS in July 2011, the “Intergovernmental Authority on Development” (IGAD)\(^39\) assisted by the UN and the AU initiated efforts to start dialogues among South Sudanese leaders and enable their reconciliation. In January 2014, the IGAD helped the government and the pro-Machar faction to sign an agreement on ceasing hostile activities in South Sudan.

Having partly boosted by these initiatives, in August 2015, the government, the pro-Machar faction and others reached the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS), including the establishment of a transitional government. In response to the agreement, the UN Security Council also added support for the implementation of the agreement to the UNMISS mandate. Later, efforts to implement the agreement were made, and on April 29, 2016, Transitional Government of National Unity was established in which Mr. Kiir and Mr. Machar were the president and the first vice-president respectively.

### (3) Recent Trends

In July, 2016, a shooting occurred in Juba between the security forces of President Kiir and First Vice President Machar. Following this, Machar left Juba and fled the country, and President Kiir dismissed Machar from the office.

Given this harsh situation, the international community has joined forces for peace and stability. The nation-building process for South Sudan is now entering a new stage.

In August 2016, the UN Security Council created the Regional Protection Force (RPF)\(^40\) for the purpose of maintaining security in Juba and surrounding areas. In April 2017, an advance party of Bangladesh’s construction engineering company arrived in South Sudan as the first unit of the RPF.

More troops continue to be dispatched. In December of the same year, the first High-Level Revitalization Forum\(^41\) was held under the leadership of IGAD, where cessation of hostilities was agreed between the government, the pro-Machar faction and others.

In December 2016, the South Sudanese Government announced the initiation of the national dialogue\(^42\) in order to promote national reconciliation and advance the progress of consensus. In May 2017, a swearing-in ceremony of the national dialogue steering committee.

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\(^{37}\) The initial mandate period was one year, with UNMISS comprised of up to 7,000 military personnel and up to 900 police personnel. UNMISS was designed to fulfill the roles of: (1) supporting peace consolidation and thereby fostering long-term state building and economic development; (2) supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution and protection of civilians; and (3) supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish the rule of law, and to strengthen the security and justice sectors.

\(^{38}\) From here on, the anti-mainstream faction formed around Machar is referred to as the pro-Machar faction.

\(^{39}\) IGAD was established in 1996. Its members are the eight East African nations of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Eritrea, and South Sudan.

\(^{40}\) According to UN Security Council Resolutions 2304 and 2406, the Regional Protection Force (RPF) is responsible for providing a stable environment for Juba and neighboring areas, and also in other areas in South Sudan, as necessary. The RPF is authorized to use all necessary means to achieve the following three mandates: (1) facilitation of conditions for safe and free movement both in and outside of Juba; (2) Protection of the airport and key facilities; (3) Engaging to any actor that is credibly found to be preparing attacks on UN protection-of-civilians sites or civilians, etc.

\(^{41}\) It was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, bringing together the various factions in South Sudan, to revitalize the 2015 Agreement on The Resolution of The Conflict.

\(^{42}\) An initiative that the government started in order to promote national reconciliation through consultations on the causes of domestic clashes and ways to resolve them.
was held to launch the national dialogue. Since then, some progress in the initiatives towards domestic stability, including the commencement of grass-roots level dialogues nationwide, has been confirmed. In June 2018, President Kiir, former First Vice President Machar and others signed “Khartoum Declaration of Agreement on South Sudan,” under which a permanent ceasefire came into force. However, the details of the political system and security arrangements have not been specifically determined, so the situation bears watching.

Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2.1 (United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan)

8 Situation in Somalia

(1) Establishment of an Integrated Government
Somalia has been in a state of anarchy since its government collapsed in 1991. It continues to face a serious humanitarian crisis to this day as a large number of refugees are generated. After 14 years, in 2005, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was inaugurated through the intermediation of the neighboring countries. In 2012, when the period for provisional governance by TFG ended, a new cabinet was inaugurated, and a unified government was established for the first time in 21 years. In February 2017, a presidential election was held, in which Mohamed Abdullah Mohamed Farmajo, a former prime minister in the TFG defeated then-incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to become president. President Farmajo is currently rebuilding the Somali National Armed Forces with support from other countries.

(2) The Rise of Al-Shabaab and the Piracy Issue
Somalia faces two issues, terrorism and piracy. Al-Shabaab, a Sunni extremist organization based in the central south, has repeatedly conducted terrorist attacks against the government and other targets. In 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established with the approval of the UN Security Council to stabilize the situation.

In August 2014, AMISOM, jointly with the Somali National Armed Forces, launched “Operation Indian Ocean” and successfully recaptured some of the cities in the central south which had served as the bases of Al-Shabaab. In the following month, Al-Shabaab’s leader was killed by the attacks of the U.S. Forces.

Al-Shabaab has been weakened to some degree as a result of these operations, but it still exists as a threat. It frequently stages attacks against the bases of Somali and AMISOM forces and terrorist attacks within Somalia and in AMISOM member countries. It has been pointed out that ISIL fighters have been flowing into Somalia in recent years. In these circumstances, counterterrorism operations by U.S. forces have been intensified since March 2017, when President Trump approved the intensification of the operations in certain areas by U.S. forces deployed in Somalia.

Additionally, in Somalia, especially in the north eastern part, there are believed to be outposts of pirates who are active off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The international community implements a series of initiatives to enhance the security capabilities of Somalia based on the perception that instability of Somalia triggers piracy issues. The international community has continued to implement initiatives off the coast of Somalia, which have contributed to steadily low level of the reported number of pirates attacks.

Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2.1 (Counter-piracy Initiatives)

9 Situation in Mali

(1) Anti-government Insurgents
In Mali, an anti-government Tuareg insurgent group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), raised a rebellion in January 2012. Other groups, including “Ansar Dine,” an Islamic extremist group joined the rebellion. The MNLA conquered some northern cities and declared the independence of the northern region in April 2012. Subsequently, Islamic extremist groups, including Ansar Dine that expelled the MNLA, “Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa” (MUJAO), and “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM), started to govern the northern region based on the Sharia law, aggravating the humanitarian and security situations in northern Mali.

Sources:
44 In May 2017, the United Kingdom hosted the “London Somalia Conference,” where cooperation by the international community towards strengthening Somali National Armed Forces was confirmed.
45 Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia supply most of the troops. Security Council Resolution 2372 (August 2017) determined that the troops would be reduced from 22,126 members to 21,626 by December 31, 2017 and further reduced to 20,626 by October 31, 2018.
46 In October 2017, a terrorist attack using Vehicle-Borne IEDs (VIED) occurred in Mogadishu, killing more than 500 people.
47 In November 2017, U.S. forces conducted air strikes in Somalia targeting ISIL.
48 The Tuareg Tribe is a nomadic ethnic minority in the Sahara Desert. It is pointed out that the tribe has been in conflict with the Government of Mali seeking for autonomy in northern Mali.
49 In March 2017, these forces merged to “Jama Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM, literally, protector of Islam and Muslims).”
(2) Initiatives to Build Peace

In response to this situation, in December 2012, the UN Security Council approved the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), whose tasks included revitalizing the capabilities of Malian troops and security organizations and supporting the Malian authorities. The Malian provisional government recaptured major cities in the northern part of the country, assisted by the sending of troops by France and the deployment of AFISMA. In April 2013, the UN Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), whose tasks included the stabilization of densely-populated areas and support for the reconstruction of national functions throughout Mali. In July 2013, MINUSMA, which had its authority delegated by AFISMA, became operational. With the support of MINUSMA, a presidential election was held in a peaceful manner, and a new government was established in September of the same year.

In May and June 2015, the Mali Government signed the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation with the armed groups “Platform” and “Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA)” respectively. In February 2017, the Mali Government and the armed groups began joint patrols based on the Agreement. However, little progress has been seen on the execution of the Agreement and there is concern over the delay in its implementation. Thus, in September of the same year, a UN Security Council resolution was adopted for the first time to impose sanctions on individuals and others who obstruct progress on the Agreement.

The UN Security Council decided in June 2016 to increase the strength of MINUSMA by approximately 2,500 members and adopted a resolution in June 2017 to give the political support of the UN Security Council to the deployment of the G5 Sahel Joint Force consisting of up to 5,000 members. In addition, in December of the same year, the UN Security Council requested the Secretary-General to provide specified support for the G5 Sahel Force through MINUSMA in support of initiatives to counter terrorism by the countries in the region. At the same time, 42 MINUSMA personnel died as the result of terrorist attacks and other causes in 2017 alone. The unstable security situation continues and there is a need for further progress in the peace process.

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50 AFISMA receives troops from member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), including Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, and Nigeria.
51 In June 2013, the provisional government and MNLA reached an agreement on such issues as allowing the northern area to participate in the presidential election and approving the dispatch of Malian troops to northern cities.
52 The Joint Force consists of the following five countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.
53 This is the largest number of annual deaths for any mission in UN Peacekeeping Operations in 2017.
The transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), such as nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, and ballistic missiles that deliver such weapons, have been recognized as a significant threat since the end of the Cold War. In particular, there still remain strong concerns that non-state actors, including terrorists, against which traditional deterrence works less effectively, could acquire and use WMDs.

### Nuclear Weapons

During the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 raised awareness of the danger of a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that took effect in 1970 prohibited countries other than those that exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device in or before 1966 from having nuclear weapons, and provided that arms control and disarmament of nuclear forces would be pursued through two-way negotiations.

The NPT is currently signed by 191 countries and regions. While some countries that had previously possessed nuclear weapons became signatories of this treaty as non-nuclear weapon states by abandoning these weapons, India, Israel, and Pakistan still refuse to accede to this treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. There are other countries that have declared the development and possession of nuclear weapons, such as North Korea, which announced that it conducted nuclear tests in October 2006, May 2009, February 2013, January 2016, September 2016, and September 2017.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released by the Trump administration in February 2018 states that the United States “remains committed to its efforts in support of the ultimate global elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.” It also confirms that NPT is a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and that the United States continues to abide by its obligations under the NPT and will work to strengthen the NPT regime.

Additionally, regarding the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty which was signed by the presidents of the United States and Russia in April 2010, and took effect in February 2011, the Trump administration expressed its intention to continue to implement this Treaty. Similarly, the United Kingdom also stated in the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) in October 2010 that the country would decrease the number of its nuclear warheads, and the NSS-SDSR 2015 released in November 2015 confirmed that there is no change in this policy to reduce the number of nuclear warheads.

In the area of “nuclear security” which addresses terrorist activities that utilize nuclear and other radioactive materials, the Nuclear Security Summit that commenced at the proposal of then President Obama has been held on four occasions. The fourth Nuclear Security Summit that was held in Washington, D.C. in March-April 2016 adopted a Communiqué, which shared the recognition that the threat of nuclear terrorism remains an imminent challenge to the international community, and which outlined the need for continuous efforts to prevent nuclear materials from getting into the hands of non-state actors even after the summit. The Trump administration has indicated it will promote cooperation with allies, partners and international institutions to combat nuclear terrorism.

The Trump administration indicates concerns in the 2018 NPR that Russia is improving its delivery capabilities, including ground-launched cruise missiles in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. It also criticizes Russia for rebuffing United

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1. The United States, the then Soviet Union (now Russia), the United Kingdom, France, and China. France and China acceded to the NPT in 1992.
2. Article 6 of the NPT sets out the obligation of signatory countries to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith.
3. As of June 2018
4. South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus
5. After North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 1993, it pledged that it would remain a contracting state to the NPT. However, North Korea again declared its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. In the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks adopted in September 2005, North Korea pledged to return to the NPT at an early date. Nonetheless, North Korea subsequently announced the implementation of six nuclear tests. North Korea’s nuclear tests constitute a major challenge to the NPT.
6. The treaty stipulates that both countries would reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and the number of deployed delivery vehicles to 700 by seven years following the treaty’s entry into force. The United States reported that it had 1,350 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 652 deployed delivery vehicles, while Russia reported that it had 1,444 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 527 deployed delivery vehicles. These numbers are as of February 5, 2018.
7. At the Nuclear Security Summit, it was confirmed that the IAEA would play a central role in international nuclear security initiatives. Accordingly, the IAEA hosted the International Conference on Nuclear Security in Vienna, Austria in December 2016, which was attended by more than 2,000 people from 130 countries and 17 international organizations and groups.
States’ efforts to follow New START with another round of negotiated reductions.\(^8\)

Meanwhile, China is deemed to have increased its inventory of nuclear warheads as well as developed and deployed their means of delivery,\(^9\) and thereby, continued to enhance the capability of its nuclear forces. It has been pointed out that initiatives for reducing nuclear weapons involving China will be needed in the future.

### 2 Biological and Chemical Weapons

Biological and chemical weapons are easy to manufacture at relatively low cost and are easy to disguise as most materials, equipment, and technology needed to manufacture these weapons can be used for both military and civilian purposes. For example, water purification equipment used to desalinate sea water can be exploited to extract bacteria for the production of biological weapons, and sodium cyanide used for the process of metal coating can be abused for the production of chemical weapons.\(^10\)

Biological and chemical weapons are attractive to states and non-state actors, such as terrorists, seeking asymmetric means of attack.\(^11\)

Biological weapons have the following characteristics: (1) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive; (2) there is usually an incubation period of a few days between exposure and onset; (3) their use is hard to detect; (4) even the threat of use can create great psychological effects; and (5) they can cause mass casualties and injuries depending on the circumstances of use and the type of weapon.\(^12\)

As has been pointed out, advancements in life science could be misused or abused for the development of biological weapons. In view of these concerns, in November 2009, the United States established guidelines\(^13\) on responding to the proliferation of biological weapons and their use by terrorists. The guidelines set out that the United States would take measures to ensure the thorough management of pathogens and toxins.\(^14\)

As for chemical weapons, Iraq repeatedly used mustard gas, tabun, and sarin in the Iran-Iraq War. In the late 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons to suppress Iraqi Kurds.\(^15\) It is believed that other chemical weapons\(^16\) that were used included VX, a highly toxic nerve agent, and easy-to-manage binary rounds.\(^17\) In August 2013, sarin was used in the suburbs of Damascus, Syria, where Syrian troops clashed with anti-government groups.\(^18\) The Syrian Government denied using chemical weapons, but entered into the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in line with an agreement between the United States and Russia. Subsequently, international efforts were undertaken for the overseas transfer of chemical agents and other measures based on the decisions made by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)\(^19\) and a UN Security Council resolution.\(^20\) In August 2014, the operation to destroy Syria’s sarin, VX gas, and other chemical weapons on the U.S. Navy transport vessel Cape Ray was completed.\(^21\)

In August 2015, in order to identify users of chemical weapons in Syrian civil war, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution that establishes a Joint Investigative Mechanism of the UN and OPCW, and investigations under this mechanism have been carried out. In November 2016, the term of this investigative mechanism was

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\(^8\) With regard to negotiations for reducing the number of nuclear weapons, in December 2017 Russian Foreign Ministry Director of Nonproliferation and Arms Control Mikhail Ulyanov indicated his intent to discuss with the United States the possibility of extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty by five years and stated Russia’s position that all countries with nuclear weapons, not just the United States and Russia, should participate in future treaties on reducing or restricting nuclear weapons.

\(^9\) See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-2 for China’s ballistic missile development

\(^10\) The export of related dual-use items and technologies that can be used to develop and produce these biological and chemical weapons is controlled by the domestic laws of member states, including Japan, pursuant to an agreement of the Australia Group, a framework for international export control.

\(^11\) They refer to means of attack to strike an adversary’s vulnerable points and are not conventional means. They include WMDs, ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, and cyber attacks

\(^12\) Then Japan Defense Agency, “Basic Concept for Dealing with Biological Weapons” (January 2002).

\(^13\) In November 2009, the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats was released. It presents guidelines on responding to the proliferation of biological weapons and their use by terrorists. In the State of the Union Address in January 2010, then President Obama said that the United States was launching a new initiative to respond promptly and effectively to bioterrorism and infectious diseases.

\(^14\) U.S. Executive Order (July 2, 2010).

\(^15\) Mustard gas is a slow-acting blister agent. Tabun and sarin are fast-acting nerve agents

\(^16\) In particular, it has been reported that a chemical weapons attack against a Kurdish village in 1988 killed several thousand people at once.

\(^17\) A weapon in which two types of relatively harmless chemicals that serve as ingredients for a chemical agent are contained separately within the weapon. It was devised so that the impact of the firing of the weapon or other action mixes the chemical materials in the warhead, causing a chemical reaction and thereby synthesis of the chemical agent. Binary rounds are easier to store and handle than weapons containing chemical agents from the outset.

\(^18\) Iraq joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in February 2009


\(^20\) (The 33rd and 34th) meeting of the Executive Council of OPCW.

\(^21\) UN Security Council Resolution 2118.

\(^22\) According to OPCW, 600 tons of Category 1 extremely toxic chemical materials, including sarin and VX gas, were disposed of (August 19, 2014, Statement by the OPCW Director-General). In January 2016, OPCW reported that destruction of all of the chemical weapons reported by the Syrian Government was completed.
extended for one more year, and efforts have continued to be made to ensure that chemical weapons would not be used ever again by identifying those responsible for the use of chemical weapons. This joint investigation mechanism has specified persons responsible for six incidents of chemical weapons use in Syria. It has been reported that four of these are attributed to the Syrian Army, while the remaining two incidents were initiated by ISIL. 23, 24

In particular, the report published in October 2017 finds that the Syrian government was responsible for the use of sarin once again in Khan Sheikhun, Syria in April 2017. This investigative mechanism ended its activities after the UN Security Council failed to adopt a resolution to renew its mandate.

Meanwhile, even after this, there continues to be incidents where chemical weapons were used in Syria, as suspicions have been pointed out that chemical weapons were used in Eastern Ghouta in April 2018. 25 In the same month, the United States, United Kingdom and France launched missile strikes on chemical weapons related facilities in Syria after they determined the Assad regime had used chemical weapons. 26

North Korea is an example of a country that is still presumed to possess these chemical weapons and which has not entered into the CWC. In addition, the Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995, as well as incidents of bacillus anthracis being contained in mail items in the United States in 2001 and that of ricin being contained in a mail item in February 2004, showed that the threat of the use of WMDs by terrorists is real and that these weapons could cause serious damage if used in cities. Furthermore, the Malaysian police announced that a VX nerve agent whose production and use are banned by the CWC was found on the body of Kim Jong-nam who was assassinated in February 2017.

The United Kingdom criticized Russia over its highly likely involvement in the use of Novichok, a military-grade chemical weapon developed by Russia, in the attack on a former Russian intelligence agent that occurred in the United Kingdom in March 2018. As punishment, countries including European countries and the United States expelled Russian diplomats.

3 Ballistic Missiles and other missiles

Ballistic missiles enable the projection of heavy payloads over long distances and can be used as a means of delivering WMDs, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Once launched, ballistic missiles follow an orbital flight trajectory and fall at a steep angle at high speed. As such, effectively countering them requires a highly accurate interceptor missile system.

The deployment of ballistic missiles in a region where armed conflict is under way runs the risk of intensifying or expanding the conflict. Additionally, it has the risk of further heightening tension in a region where military confrontation is ongoing, leading to the destabilization of that region. Furthermore, ballistic missiles are used as a means of attacking from a distance or threatening another country that has superior conventional forces.

In recent years, along with the threat of ballistic missiles, analysts have pointed to the threat of cruise missiles as a weapon which is comparatively easy for terrorists and other non-state actors to acquire and which has the potential for proliferation. 27 Because cruise missiles are cheaper to produce compared to ballistic missiles and are easy to maintain and train with, many countries either produce or modify cruise missiles. At the same time, it is said that cruise missiles have a higher degree of target accuracy and that they are difficult to detect while in flight. 28 Moreover, because they are smaller than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be concealed on a ship to secretly approach a target, and present a serious threat if they carry WMDs in their warheads. 29

23 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1 for ISIL.
24 In a report by the joint investigation mechanism (JIM) involving the UN and OPCW, it was determined that the Syrian Government used chlorine gas in Talmenes (April 2014), in Samim (March 2015), and in Qmenas (March 2015), and also used sarin in Khan Sheikhun (April 2017). The report also found that ISIL used mustard gas in Marea (August 2015) and in Um Ram (September 2016). The U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of February 2016 referred to ISIL’s contribution to this incident, and assessed that non-state actors are using chemicals in warfare in Syria.
25 The draft Security Council resolution to establish a UN independent investigative mechanism for identifying users of chemical weapons, proposed by the United States on April 10, 2018, was vetoed by Russia.
26 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1-3 for general information about the Syria situation, including military actions taken by the United States, United Kingdom and France.
27 In the July 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon, it is believed that Hezbollah used a cruise missile to attack an Israeli naval vessel. Israel announced in March 2011 that it had uncovered six anti-ship cruise missiles among other items on cargo ships subject to inspection.
28 United States Congressional Research Service, “Cruise Missile Proliferation” (July 8, 2005)
29 The United States is concerned that the development and deployment of ballistic and cruise missiles by countries including China and Iran could pose a threat to U.S. forward-deployed forces.
Even weapons that were purchased or developed for self-defense purposes could easily be exported or transferred once domestic manufacturing becomes successful. For example, certain states that do not heed political risks have transferred WMDs and related technologies to other states that cannot afford to invest resources in conventional forces and attempt to offset this with WMDs. Some of these states that seek WMDs do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk, and furthermore, due to their weak governance, terrorist organizations are active in their countries. Therefore, it is conceivable that in general, the possibility of actual use of WMDs would increase.

Moreover, since it is uncertain whether such states can effectively manage the related technology and materials, there is a concern that chemical or nuclear substances will be transferred or smuggled out from these states with high likelihood. For example, there is a danger that even terrorists who do not possess related technologies would use a dirty bomb\(^{30}\) as a means of terrorist attack so long as they gain access to radioactive materials. Nations across the world share concerns regarding the acquisition and use of WMDs by terrorists and other non-state actors.\(^{31}\)

The proliferation of WMDs and other related technologies has been noted in numerous instances. For example, in February 2004, it came to light that nuclear-related technologies, mainly uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists in Pakistan. It has also been suggested that North Korea supported Syria’s secret nuclear activities.\(^{32}\)

Furthermore, there has been significant transfer and proliferation of ballistic missiles that serve as the means of delivery of WMDs. The former Soviet Union and other countries exported Scud-Bs to many countries and regions, including Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan. China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable number of countries now possess ballistic missiles. In addition, Pakistan’s Ghauri and Iran’s Shahab-3 missiles are believed to be based on North Korea’s Nodong missiles. Further still, it has been suggested that North Korea conducted ballistic missile-related trade with Syria and Myanmar.\(^{33}\)

North Korea has made rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches. It is believed that an underlying factor of this fact was North Korea’s imports of various materials and technologies from outside the country. It is also noted that North Korea transfers and proliferates ballistic missile airframes and related technologies, and that it promotes the further development of missiles using funds procured by such transfer and proliferation.\(^{34}\) Some also point out that North Korea conducts ballistic missile tests at its export destination and make use of its results.

The international community’s uncompromising and decisive stance against the transfer and proliferation of WMDs and other technologies has put significant pressure on countries engaged in related activities, leading some of them to accept inspections by international organizations or abandon their WMD and other programs altogether.\(^{35}\) Meanwhile, it is pointed out that, in recent years, states of proliferation concern have sustained their proliferation activities by averting international monitoring, through illicitly exporting WMDs and other technologies overseas by falsifying documentation, diversifying transport routes, and utilizing multiple front companies and intermediaries. Additionally, intangible transfer of

\(^{30}\) Dirty bombs are intended to cause radioactive contamination by spreading radioactive materials.

\(^{31}\) Based on these concerns, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004, which sets forth the decision that all UN member states would refrain from providing support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use WMDs and their means of delivery, as well as adopt and enforce laws that are appropriate and effective for prohibiting these activities. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism also entered into force in July 2007.

\(^{32}\) DM “Worldwide Threat Assessment” from January 2014 states, “North Korea’s assistance to Syria in the construction of a nuclear reactor (destroyed in 2007) illustrates the reach of the North’s proliferation activities.” The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report of May 2011 states that the destroyed reactor was very likely a nuclear reactor that Syria should have declared to the IAEA.

\(^{33}\) The March 2018 report of the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee points out the activities of North Korean ballistic missile technicians in Syria and the transfer to Syria of special files used at chemical weapons manufacturing facilities. It also discusses North Korea’s ongoing military relationship with Myanmar, including ballistic missile systems.

\(^{34}\) In addition, concerning the proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles by North Korea, the “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of January 2014 pointed out that “North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria’s construction of a nuclear reactor, destroyed in 2007, illustrate the reach of its proliferation activities.” Moreover, in the report entitled “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” which was published by the U.S. DoD in March 2014, it was pointed out that North Korea uses various techniques to circumvent measures taken by each country on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions, including sending cargo through multiple front companies and intermediaries.

\(^{35}\) Extensive behind-the-scenes negotiations began in March 2003 among Libya, the United States and the United Kingdom. In December 2003, Libya agreed to dismantle all of its WMDs and to accept inspections by an international organization. Later, in August 2006, Libya ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol. Meanwhile, after the military campaign against Libya by a multinational force, in March 2011, North Korea denounced the military attacks against Libya, saying that attacking after disarmament was an “armed invasion.”
technology has arisen as a cause for concern. Namely, states of proliferation concern have obtained advanced technologies which could be adapted for the development and manufacturing of WMDs and other technologies via their nationals—researchers and students who have been dispatched to leading companies and academic institutions in developed countries.36

The nuclear issues of Iran are a serious challenge to the international non-proliferation regime. In 2002, it was revealed that Iran, without notifying the IAEA, had been engaged for a long time in uranium enrichment and other activities potentially leading to the development of nuclear weapons. Since 2003, Iran has continued with its uranium enrichment activities despite resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board and the UN Security Council urging Iran to stop its uranium enrichment and other activities.

However, with Hassan Rouhani winning the presidential election in Iran in June 2013, the discussions with the E3+3 (U.K., France, Germany, U.S., China, and Russia) were advanced, resulting in the announcement of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) towards the comprehensive resolution of nuclear issues in November 2013. The execution of the first step measures of the JPOA commenced in January 2014.37

On April 2, 2015, consultations held in Lausanne, Switzerland resulted in an agreement regarding the key parameters of the final agreement. On July 14, 2015, the final agreement concerning the nuclear issues of Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was announced in Vienna. Following this, on July 20, 2015, UN Security Council Resolution 2231 approving the JCPOA was adopted. In the agreement, it was decided that Iran would reduce its enriched uranium stockpile and number of centrifuges, ban the production of weapons grade plutonium, and accept IAEA inspections, among other measures, in exchange for ending the sanctions of previous UN Security Council resolutions and the U.S. and EU’s nuclear-related sanctions.38

The JCPOA reached its adoption date on October 18, 2015, 90 days after the Security Council resolution was adopted. On January 16, 2016, the IAEA released a report confirming Iran’s completion of the necessary preparatory steps to start the implementation of the JCPOA. Accordingly, the United States suspended its nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. In addition, the EU terminated some of its sanctions, and the sanctions imposed by previous UN Security Council resolutions concerning the nuclear issues of Iran ended, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Subsequently, the IAEA has repeatedly confirmed that Iran is complying with the agreement. However in May 2018 President Trump stated that with the current agreement, Iran can still be on the verge of a nuclear breakout in a short period of time even if Iran fully complies with the agreement, and also the agreement fails to address Iran’s development of ballistic missiles. He then announced that the United States will withdraw from the agreement and start work aimed at re-imposing sanctions. President Trump has said he will work with allies to find a real, comprehensive and lasting solution to Iran’s nuclear threat. Thus, the future moves of the United States will be closely monitored.

36 The February 2016 report of the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council DPRK Sanctions Committee states that over the past 20 years since 1996, North Korea has dispatched more than 30 engineers to the Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific, which receives technical support from the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs. These engineers participate in research programs concerning topics such as satellite communications, space science and atmospheric chemistry, and satellite navigation systems. The report notes that such know-how regarding space science and satellite systems contributes to improving North Korea’s ballistic missile technology.

37 First step measures include the limited relaxation of sanctions by the E3+3, provided that for six months, Iran: (1) retains half of its existing uranium enriched to approximately 20% as oxide and dilutes the remaining half to less than 5%; (2) does not enrich uranium over 5%; (3) does not advance activities at uranium enrichment facilities and heavy water reactors; (4) accepts enhanced monitoring by the IAEA.

38 The major nuclear-related restrictions on Iran in the JCPOA include the following: with regard to uranium enrichment, limiting the number of centrifuges for uranium enrichment to 5,060 or less, keeping the level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%, and restricting Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile to 300 kg; and with regard to plutonium production, redesigning and rebuilding the Arak heavy water reactor to not produce weapons grade plutonium and shipping spent fuel out of Iran, and not engaging in reprocessing spent fuel including R&D and not constructing reprocessing facilities. According to then U.S. Secretary of State Kerry, with this agreement Iran’s breakout time (the time it takes to manufacture nuclear fuel for a single nuclear weapon) will be extended from 90 days or less before the JCPOA to a year or more. Furthermore, the JCPOA is an agreement pertaining to nuclear issues and does not suspend or lift sanctions related to international terrorism, missiles, human rights, among other issues. In response, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, in his address to the UN General Assembly in October 2015, strongly criticized the Iranian nuclear agreement for making war more likely. In the United States, while the Republican Party that makes up the majority of Congress had been opposed to the agreement, the motion of disapproval was not supported by two-thirds majority vote of both the House of Representatives and the Senate necessary to override the President’s veto. Thus, the disapproval of the agreement was avoided.
Maritime security is of critical importance to Japan, a maritime nation surrounded by sea. For example, Japan relies on sea transport to import energy resources. Accordingly, ensuring secure sea lanes is vital for the survival of the nation. Securing the stable use of one of the global commons, the “maritime domain,” is a key security issue for the international community. In recent years, maritime trends in the countries concerned are drawing attention, including their compliance with relevant international norms.

1. Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East and South China Seas

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides for the principles of freedom of navigation in the high seas and freedom of overflight. Nevertheless, in the waters and airspace in the periphery of Japan, especially the East and South China Seas, it has become increasingly common for countries to unilaterally assert their rights or take actions, based on their unique assertions which are incompatible with the existing international order. This has caused situations of undue infringement upon such principles.

Numerous cases of acts which go against the principles of freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight have been recently seen in the East China Sea. For example, there was the case in January 2013, when a Chinese naval vessel directed its fire-control radar at an MSDF destroyer navigating on the high seas (30th), and another case in which a Chinese naval vessel is suspected to have directed its fire-control radar at a helicopter carried onboard an MSDF destroyer (19th). The directing of a fire-control radar is generally an act carried out prior to using firearms, and directing it at an opponent is a dangerous act that may have unintended consequences.

On November 23, 2013, the Chinese Government declared “the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)” including the Senkaku Islands as if they were a part of China’s “territory.” China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that it would enforce rules set on any aircraft flying in the ADIZ and that the PLA would take “defensive emergency measures” if aircraft does not follow the instructed procedures. Japan is deeply concerned about such measures, which are profoundly dangerous acts that unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea, escalating the situation, and that may cause unintended consequences in the East China Sea. Furthermore, the measures unduly infringe the freedom of overflight. Japan is demanding China to revoke any measures that could go against the principle of freedom of overflight. The United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, and the EU, too, have expressed concern about China’s establishment of such zone. Increased activities by Chinese military aircraft have been confirmed in recent years in the airspace close to the various southwestern islands of Japan, including the main island of Okinawa, and the expansion of these activities may be an attempt to enforce “the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).” Moreover, in May and June of 2014, fighters of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China flew abnormally close to aircraft of the MSDF and Japan Air Self-Defense Force, which were flying over the East China Sea.

Such actions have also been seen frequently in the South China Sea. Chinese naval vessels have obstructed the navigation of U.S. naval vessels and Chinese aircraft have also obstructed the flight of U.S. military aircraft. In December 2016, an unmanned underwater vehicle belonging to the U.S. Navy was momentarily seized in the South China Sea by a vessel of the PLA Navy. These
cases are dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences.

Additionally, China has gone ahead with land reclamation on seven features on a massive and rapid scale on the Spratly Islands since 2014. In July 2016, the rights asserted by China in the sea area enclosed by the “nine-dash line,” including “historical rights” as the basis of the “nine dash line” were denied in the arbitration award between the Philippines and China, and the illegality of China’s reclamation activities was acknowledged. However, China has clearly stated its intention not to comply with the award, and continues militarization of the features by developing batteries and other military facilities and various infrastructure that can be used for military purposes, such as runways, harbors, hangars and radar facilities. Moreover, in July and August 2016 after the arbitration award between the Philippines and China was rendered, an H-6 bomber of the PLAAF conducted combat air patrols in the airspace around Scarborough Shoal, with China’s Ministry of National Defense announcing that it would conduct these patrols regularly from now on. This shows the PLA has been intensifying its operation in the South China Sea. Under these circumstances, a further increase in China’s aerial presence in the area could lead to the establishment of a “South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” in the future.

Furthermore, Chinese government vessels have obstructed fishing and other vessels of countries approaching the features, etc. by ring warning shots and water cannons at the vessels. Claimants as well as the international community including the United States have repeatedly said they are deeply concerned about China’s unilateral changes of the status quo, further advancement of efforts to create a fait accompli, and assertive and dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences.

Despite these numerous acts that could pose risks to securing the stable use of oceans and airspace, in recent years progress has been made on efforts to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies. First, at the Japan-China Summit Meeting held on May 9, 2018, Japan and China agreed to establish a “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between Japan-China Defense Authorities” with the aim of avoiding unintended confrontations between the naval vessels and aircraft of the SDF and PLA. As for multi-national initiatives, in April 2014, navies of participating countries of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), including Japan, the United States, and China, reached agreement on the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). CUES sets forth a code of conduct such as procedures and communication method to ensure safety for unexpected encounters by vessels or aircraft of the navies of each country. In November 2014, the United States and China agreed on measures pertaining to mutual notification of military activities, together with rules of behavior to avert collisions in waters and airspace in accordance with CUES and other frameworks. In September 2015, the two countries announced an agreement concerning an additional annex stipulating rules of behavior to avert air encounters. Between ASEAN and China, official discussions have been held between on the establishment of the Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC).

It is strongly hoped that these initiatives designed to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies will supplement the existing international order, and that the countries concerned, including China, refrain from unilateral actions that heighten tension and act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law.

Moreover, to ensure the effectiveness of the UN Security Council Resolution regarding the North Korea issue, the international community has been cooperating in the bolstering of measures to prevent the evasion of sanctions by North Korea, including ship-to-ship transfers of goods (the offshore transfer of goods from or to ships registered to North Korea), which has been prohibited by the UN Security Council Resolution.7

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6 This code is not legally binding and does not supersede the annexes of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and other international treaties.
7 See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 3 (China); Chapter 2, Section 6 (Southeast Asia)
8 The Arctic Region is the area north of the latitude line of 66 degrees 33 minutes north latitude. There are eight countries in the Arctic Region – the five countries that border the Arctic Ocean and Finland, Sweden, and Iceland that do not border it. In 1996, the Arctic Council was established, which aims to promote cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic states, with the involvement of the indigenous communities and other inhabitants on common Arctic issues (e.g., sustainable development and environmental protection).
proactively promoting efforts to secure their interests in resource development and use of the sea route. From the perspective of security, the Arctic Ocean has traditionally been used for the deployment of strategic nuclear forces and as their transit route. With the decrease in sea ice in recent years, ships have been able to navigate for a longer period of time and more extensively than before. It is therefore considered that the region could be used for deploying maritime forces or maneuvering military forces in the future, increasing its strategic importance.

In this situation, there are unresolved issues among the Arctic states over the demarcation of maritime boundaries based on UNCLOS and extension of the continental shelf. Some of these Arctic states including Russia are promoting efforts to deploy new military capabilities for the purpose of securing their interests and defending their territories.

In the Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy revised in December 2015, Russia continues to maintain that it would secure its interests in resource development and use of the sea route. Russia has been actively involved with the Arctic, underpinned by Russia’s possession of the largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) among the coastal states, the potential abundance of resources in the waters of the Arctic Ocean, the geographic and security importance of the Northern Sea Route located off the coast of Russia, and Russia’s military superiority ensured by the deployment of military forces directly facing the Arctic Ocean.9

In the Arctic Strategy released by the U.S. DoD in 2013, the United States expresses its desire for the Arctic to become a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is protected, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges. In December 2016, then U.S. President Obama decided to ban new drilling for oil and natural gas in a majority of U.S. territorial waters in the Arctic to protect marine resources, showing a negative stance towards resource development. However, the U.S. President Trump signed an executive order repealing this decision of then U.S. President Obama in April 2017.10

Aside from coastal states in the Arctic Ocean, 13 countries including Japan and China have observer status in the Arctic Council. Notably, China has shown active involvement in the Arctic Ocean, deploying the polar research vessel Xue Long to the Arctic Ocean for eight times since 1999.11 In January 2018, they published a white paper titled “China’s Arctic Policy ” in which they claimed to be one of the geographically closest states to the Arctic Circle with rights pertaining to the development of resources. They also announced their intention to build a “Polar Silk Road.” In September 2015, it was reported for the first time that five Chinese naval vessels sailed in the Bering Sea between the Arctic Ocean and the Pacific and sailed in the U.S. territorial waters near the Aleutian Islands. Focus will be on whether or not such activities would have any relation to the PLA Navy’s future advancements into the Arctic Ocean.

### 3.3 Maritime Security Efforts of Countries

With regard to oceans, not only for economic development but also for the national security of each country, it has become even more important to promote appropriate rulemaking and to make concerted efforts by the international community to address risks and ensure freedom of navigation while respecting such rules. “Open and Stable Seas” constitute the basis for peace and prosperity of the international community as a whole. In this regard, each state has been tackling on its own or with others various issues including piracy, unidentified vessels, illegal dumping, contraband, human smuggling, maritime disasters, and the removal of hazardous substances, for maintaining the stability of sea lanes of communication.

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9 Russia is said to have a fleet of around 40 icebreakers, while an additional three nuclear-powered icebreakers and two multipurpose icebreaker patrol ships are currently under construction. See Chapter 2, Section 4 (Russia) regarding the Northern Joint Strategic Command in charge of the Arctic, the deployment and training of the Northern Fleet vessels, the development of military facilities, strategic patrols by strategic nuclear submarines, and patrol flights by long-range bombers.

10 As regards activities of other coastal nations, Canada states that the Arctic is a priority region under its policies in Canada’s Northern Strategy (released in 2009), and similar to the United States, in December 2016 Canada announced a moratorium on the development of oil and natural gas in its territorial waters in the Arctic Ocean. Denmark and Norway have also developed the Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020 (released in 2011) and the Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy (released in 2006), respectively, which outline their stances of attaching importance to the Arctic, including the perspective of security.

11 In 2012, Xue Long became the first polar research vessel to sail across the Arctic Ocean. In 2013, a cargo vessel Yong Sheng became the first Chinese commercial ship to cross the Arctic Ocean. Canadian scientists took part in Xue Long’s voyage to the Arctic Ocean in 2017, and they succeeded for the first time in trial navigation of the Arctic Northwest Passage (along the north coast of Canada). Currently, China is believed to be building its second polar research vessel.
United States

Regarding China’s maritime advances, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis declared at the Shangri-La Dialog, held in June 2017, that the United States cannot and will not accept unilateral coercive changes to the status quo due to the scope and scale of China’s construction activities in the South China Sea, which differ from those of other countries in several key ways. They include the nature of its militarization, China’s disregard for international law, its contempt for other nations’ interests, and its efforts to dismiss non-adversarial resolution of the issues. In stating this, he also stated that the U.S. remains committed to protecting the rights, freedom and lawful uses of the sea, and the ability of countries to exercise those rights in the strategically important East and South China Seas. Moreover, he stated that the U.S. will continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, and demonstrate resolve through operational presence in the South China Sea and beyond. In May, July, August and October of 2017, and January, March and May of 2018, it has been reported that the U.S. military actually conducted Freedom of Navigation operations, navigating vessels in surrounding waters and within 12 nautical miles of maritime features in the South China Sea claimed by China. Japan supports these Freedom of Navigation operations conducted in the South China Sea by the United States, and believes in the importance of cooperation within the international community to protect the free, open and peaceful seas.

The United States deems that its safety and economic security depend upon the secure use of the world’s oceans, and that the United States has a vital interest in maritime security. Based on this recognition, the United States leads the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) to counter piracy and advance maritime safety, including tackling terrorism in waters surrounding the Middle East and Africa, such as the Gulf of Aden, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. In waters surrounding Central America, the United States conducts operations to counter illicit trafficking, primarily drug trafficking with European and Western Hemisphere countries. The United States thus dispatches vessels to the various sea areas of the world and takes actions to combat piracy, organized crime, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

NATO, which identifies acts of terrorism as a threat to its member countries, has conducted Operation Active Endeavour as a maritime initiative since October 2001 following the terrorist attacks in the United States of the same year. Regarding this operation, a decision was made to transition to Operation Sea Guardian, whose mission is crisis management, and a wide range of operations has been carried out since November 2016, including counter-terrorism and capacity building assistance, among others, while collaborating with Operation Sophia of the European Union (EU).

To deal with the pending issue of the large influx of refugees and migrants, NATO decided to deploy the Standing NATO Maritime Groups, which is multinational, integrated force made up of vessels from member countries that provide offshore deterrence for member countries through routine exercises and maintenance of rapid deployment capabilities, to the Aegean Sea in February 2016, and notify Greek and Turkish authorities as well as the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU of information regarding refugee boats.

In response to the threat of piracy, NATO was deploying vessels of the Standing NATO Maritime Groups to off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. NATO was carrying out Operation Ocean Shield since August 2009, and it engaged in counter-piracy activities by vessels as well as helped countries build up their capacities to counter piracy if requested. NATO ended these activities in December 2016. With many of its member states facing the ocean, the EU has high maritime traffic and economic activity in the sea, and since December 2008, it has conducted the counter-piracy operation known as Operation Atalanta in this area, which became the EU’s first maritime mission. This operation aims to monitor the waters around the area and

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12 The Freedom of Navigation Operations are operational activities conducted by the U.S. Forces for countering excessive claims over maritime interests asserted by coastal states to protect the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all states under international law. It is deemed that the Operations have been conducted on an ongoing basis since 1979.

13 CMF is a multinational force, which operates to promote maritime security, stability, and prosperity, under the U.S. Central Command. Forces from 32 countries participate in CMF, and the CMF Commander concurrently serves as the Commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. CMF is comprised of three combined task forces: Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), which is tasked with maritime security operations; Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) with counter-piracy operations; and Combined Task Force 152 (CTF-152) with maritime security operations in the Persian Gulf. The Japan Self-Defense Forces deploy units to CTF-151.

14 European and Western Hemisphere countries, including the United States, conduct Operation Martillo to combat illicit trafficking, including the trafficking of narcotics, precursor chemicals, bulk cash, and weapons, as well as organized crime along the sea areas surrounding Central America.
escort ships using naval vessels and aircraft dispatched from various countries, and it has been decided that these operations will continue until the end of 2018.

3 United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is an island nation surrounded by sea, and has a heritage of engaging actively in maritime activities, including maritime trade. Furthermore, the United Kingdom has many overseas territories and has an EEZ which extends about 25 times the U.K. terrestrial extent. Due to these factors, the United Kingdom proactively contributes to NATO-and EU-led multinational forces and the U.S. led CMF in order to ensure the maritime security of the sea areas surrounding the United Kingdom, including its overseas territories, and by extension, the seas of its neighboring countries. Specifically, the headquarters of Operation Atalanta, the EU-led counter-piracy operation is located at the Northwood Maritime Command Headquarters in the U.K. In addition, the U.K. navy engages in initiatives to maintain a presence in the Asia-Pacific region, in order to ensure freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.15

4 France

France, with its many overseas territories, possesses one of the largest EEZs in the world. The strategic review announced in October 2017, pointed out the possibility of the benefits of freedom of navigation being threatened as the result of deterioration in the strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific region, and simultaneously clarified the country’s intention to continue protecting its overseas sovereignty and overseas territories in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. As such, France has deployed forces in French Polynesia and New Caledonia, including the deployment of frigates and patrol boats. Moreover, the Floréal-class frigate, Vendémiaire, made a port call in Japan in February 2018 to hold joint exercises with the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF). France has also been hosting multilateral exercises such as Croix du Sud and Equateur in the South Pacific.16

5 Australia

Australia’s Defence White Paper unveiled in 2016 considers the security of sea lanes as a strategic defense interest, along with the security and resilience of Australia. Especially as Australia depends on maritime trade with Southeast Asia and maritime trade transiting Southeast Asia, Australia sees a need to ensure the security of trade routes in the country’s proximate waters and in Southeast Asia.

Based on this policy, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has a outpost in Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) Base Butterworth and conducts patrol and surveillance activities called “Operation Gateway” using patrol aircraft in the North Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.17 The ADF also engages in expanding naval cooperation with India, providing patrol vessels to South Pacific countries,18 and conducting coastal patrols by mobilizing ADF assets.

In relation to China, there were reports of Australian patrol aircraft operating in the area around the South China Sea being subjected to PLA aircraft interference on a regular basis. Moreover, there were reports in April 2018 of three Australian naval vessels heading toward Vietnam being provoked by the PLA Navy. In response to this, the Ministry of National Defense of The People’s Republic of China stated that the “reports were not true,” while Australian Prime Minister Turnbull declared that Australia will exert and practice its right of freedom of navigation throughout the world’s oceans, including South China Sea.

6 China

China relies on sea transport for over 90% of its trade cargo.19 Accordingly, ensuring the security of China’s sea lanes constitutes a critical part of the “basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development,”20 one of China’s “core interests.”

With regard to counter-piracy activities, as a member of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP),21 China shares information and participates

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15 See Chapter 2, Section 8-3-1
16 See Chapter 2, Section 8-3-2 for more information about French ships calling on ports and France’s involvement in exercises. As for humanitarian assistance activities, France carried out activities in the Philippines, Vanuatu, and Fiji following the damaging typhoons and cyclones that struck these countries in November 2013, March 2015, and February 2016.
17 In December 2015, the Australian Department of Defence admitted that as part of these activities, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) aircraft conducted patrol activities in the South China Sea from November to December. This was preceded by BBC’s release of the content of the radio communications that allegedly took place between RAAF aircraft and the PLA Navy, claiming that Australia was carrying out “freedom of navigation” flights in the South China Sea.
18 See chapter 2, Section 5-3-4
19 According to the website of the Central People’s Government of China, over 90% of China’s export and import cargo, such as crude oil, iron ore, food, and container, are transported by sea.
20 Then State Councillor Dai Bingguo, “China will unswervingly follow path of peaceful development” (December 7, 2010, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China website)
21 As of June 2018, the contracting parties to ReCAAP are the following 20 countries: Australia; Bangladesh; Brunei; Cambodia; China; Denmark; India; Japan; the ROK; Laos; Myanmar; the Netherlands; Norway; the Philippines; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Thailand; United Kingdom; United States; and Vietnam.
in cooperative arrangements related to piracy in Southeast Asia. Since December 2008, China has deployed naval vessels to off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden and has been involved in international efforts to repress piracy. Through such activities, China has contributed to ensuring maritime security. Commitment to ensuring the security of its sea lanes is also considered to be connected to the PLA Navy’s objective of building up capacity for continuous operations in more distant waters. In this respect, since August 2017, China has begun operating a security base for providing support for the activities of the PLA in Djibouti, a strategic key point in East Africa facing the Gulf of Aden, where the PLA Navy’s vessels involved in counter-piracy activities return to. The objective of these overseas bases, including ports, is believed to be to build up China’s capacity for continuous operations in more distant waters.

Meanwhile, in the South China Sea, China and ASEAN member states have conflicting assertions over the sovereignty of such areas as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. In recent years, the countries concerned, including China, have stepped up their activities to assert their sovereignty. Developments associated with the freedom of navigation in the sea have been subject to increasing international concern.

7 Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is located at the crossroads of traffic, linking the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. This region, however, has maritime security issues, including disputes over the sovereignty of the South China Sea and piracy.

In 2002, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) aimed at peacefully settling the issues over the South China Sea. Currently, official consultations have been held with a view to establishing the COC, which is deemed to contain more specific content than the DOC and to be legally binding.

Furthermore, there have been developments related to settling issues through arbitral proceedings set out in UNCLOS. In January 2013, the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings pursuant to UNCLOS for the dispute between the Philippines and China over its assertions and actions in the South China Sea. In July 2016, a final award was rendered in which nearly all of the Philippines’ submissions were ruled in favor of the Philippines. This award will be final and legally binding on both parties. Moreover, Vietnam, another claimant, has requested the tribunal to take into consideration Vietnam’s assertions over the South China Sea. In this regard, there has been a trend among some countries concerned to work towards a peaceful solution of the issue in accordance with international law.

With regard to counter-piracy measures, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand conduct the Malacca Strait Patrols. Efforts have also been under way to share information related to piracy and build a cooperation arrangement in accordance with ReCAAP. Additionally, in recent years, the cases of abduction for ransom has been confirmed in the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea. In order to respond to this, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines began sea patrols in the area in June 2017, and air patrols in October of the same year.

22 The Malacca Strait Patrols are comprised of: the Malacca Strait Sea Patrols which commenced in 2004; aircraft patrol activities which commenced in 2005; and information sharing activities which commenced in 2006.
Nearly 60 years have passed since a satellite was launched into outer space for the first time in the history of mankind. In recent years, technology leveraging outer space has been applied to various areas. No state is allowed to own outer space, and it is freely available to all nations. Major countries thus make proactive efforts to use outer space. For example, observation satellites such as meteorological satellites are used to observe weather as well as land and waters; communication and broadcasting satellites are used for the Internet and broadcasting; and positioning satellites are used to navigate aircraft and ships. These satellites have widely prevailed in social, economic, scientific, and other areas as essential infrastructure for the public and private sectors.

In the security field, military forces in major countries are actively involved in outer space activities and utilize a variety of satellites. There is no concept of national borders in outer space, meaning that the utilization of satellites enables the observation of, communication at, and positioning on any area on Earth. Thus, major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C4ISR functions. Such satellites include imagery reconnaissance satellites reconnoitering military facilities and targets, early warning satellites that detect the launch of ballistic missiles, satellites gathering radio wave information for military communications, communication satellites for military communication, and positioning satellites for navigating naval vessels and aircraft and enhancing the precision of weapons systems.

In outer space, the various countries are also rapidly developing their capabilities to ensure their military superiority. As various countries launch military satellites, China conducted a test to destroy its aging satellite with a ground-launched missile. The resulting space debris spread across the satellite’s orbit, and came to be seen as a threat against space assets such as satellites owned by countries. Furthermore, countries including China and Russia are thought to be also developing anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) that do not directly hit and destroy a satellite by a missile, thus creating less space debris.

For example, it has been noted that ASATs under development include an ASAT that brings a “killer satellite” to maneuver itself close to target and utilize a robot arm to capture it to disable its functions. In this area, China has carried out experiments in outer space in which they have mobilized satellites close to other satellites to simulate the movements of a killer satellite. It has been noted that Russia too, has launched killer satellites. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that both China and Russia are developing ASATs that disable the functions of the target satellite by using a jammer to interfere with communications between the target satellite and the ground station.

As the above illustrates, the risk to the stable use of outer space has become one of the critical security challenges for countries, thus it has become necessary to deal with this risk effectively in an effort to ensure stability in the use of outer space.

Against this backdrop, the existing framework such as the Outer Space Treaty (The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) that prescribes the exploration and use of outer space, do not have provisions on prohibiting the destruction of space objects and refraining from actions triggering space debris. International efforts have been under way recently for the creation of the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities and the guidelines for “Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space...
Activities. Moreover, countries are working on the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) by monitoring the solar activity with a potential impact on satellites and electronic equipment on Earth, and threats caused by meteors reaching Earth, in addition to threats posed by anti-satellite weapons and space debris to space assets. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-6 (Responses in Space)

2 Trends in the Use of Space by Countries for Security Objectives

1 United States

The United States launched its first satellite, Explorer 1, in January 1958, following the satellite launches by the former Soviet Union. The country has since then proceeded with a variety of space activities in fields including military, science, and resource exploration, such as launching the world’s first reconnaissance satellite and landing on the Moon. Today, the United States is the world’s leading space power. The U.S. Forces clearly recognize the importance of outer space for their actions, and in this regard, actively utilize outer space for security purposes. In June 2010, the United States released the National Space Policy that presents the country’s basic guidelines for space policy.7

The National Security Strategy (NSS) revealed in December 2017 points out that many countries are said to have purchased satellites to back up their strategic military activities, and some countries even pursuing a variety of ASATs on the basis of belief that the capability to attack assets in outer space will give them asymmetrical advantages. But having noted that, the United States indicated that unlimited access to and freedom in activities in outer space were vital interests of the United States, and that the long-term goals in outer space were given consideration by the newly established National Space Council (NSpC) in an effort to develop strategies. The National Space Strategy was announced in March 2018, which demonstrated its recognition that their adversaries had turned space into a warfighting domain, and that the United States would seek to deter, counter, and defeat threats in the space domain that are hostile to the national interest of the United States and its allies. Based on these strategic guidelines, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has set the goal of maintaining and strengthening U.S. space superiority for security purposes, recognizing that the United States needs to prepare for the possibility of conflict extending into outer space.

From an organizational perspective, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is responsible for non-military space development in the United States, while the U.S. DoD works on space development from national security perspective, and the Joint Force Space Component Command under the control of the U.S. Strategic Command oversees the activities in space from a military perspective.

Major satellites used for military purposes include satellites for imagery reconnaissance, early warning, electronic / signals intelligence, communication, and global positioning, and their operations are wide-ranging.

2 Russia

Russia’s space activities have been continuing since the former Soviet Union era. The former Soviet Union successively launched multiple satellites after it launched the first satellite in the history of mankind, Sputnik 1, in October 1957, and had the largest number of launched satellites in the world until the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The satellites included many military satellites, and progress was made in the use of space for military purposes by the U.S. and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War era. Russia’s space activities have declined since the former Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. However, the country has recently started to expand its activities once again.

Regarding the country’s trends in security, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, approved in December 2015, states that the U.S. deployment of weapons into outer space constitutes one of the factors undermining global and regional stability. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, a document

In 2007, the chairperson of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS) proposed to discuss “the long-term sustainability of outer space activities” in relation to civil space activities, for the purpose of defining risk reduction for long-term sustainable activities and equal access to outer space. Based on this proposal, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of UN COPUOS set up a working group, which carries out discussions every year for establishing the guidelines. In June 2016, an agreement was reached on a part of the guidelines that included details on the promotion of gathering and sharing of data information on space debris monitoring. Negotiations are currently being continued with the aim of arriving at an overall agreement within 2018.

In December 2017, a signing ceremony was held for the Space Policy Directive 1, which was the first policy on space to be announced after President Trump’s inauguration. In his speech, he mentioned the relationship between space and its military use, and noted the importance of the U.S. space policy, indicating new developments within the U.S. government.
created in April 2014 to specifically define the principles of the National Security Strategy in the military field, mentions the development and maintenance of a group of orbiting spacecraft to support Russia’s military activities in space as being one of the main missions.

From an organizational perspective, the Roscosmos State Corporation for Space Activities is in charge of space activities related to Russia’s scientific and economic areas, while the Russian Ministry of Defence is involved in space activities for security purposes. The Russian Aerospace Forces conducts actual space activities for military purposes, manages facilities for launching satellites, among other activities.

Major satellites launched by Russia are satellites for imagery reconnaissance, early warning, radio wave information gathering, communication, positioning, and others, all of which are presumed to be used for security purposes. Currently, Russia is developing a new Angara carrier launch vehicle, along with building a new launch site in Vostochny in the Far East.

Regarding European outer space activities, France succeeded in launching its own satellite for the first time in 1965, following the former Soviet Union and the United States, and the United Kingdom succeeded in launching its own satellite for the first time in 1971. Italy and Germany used launch vehicles developed by the United States to own satellites in December 1964 and July 1965, respectively. Meanwhile, the European Space Agency (ESA) Convention signed in May 1975 established the ESA, which launched a satellite in 1979.

In Europe, the EU, the ESA, and European countries are promoting their own unique space activities and are cooperating with each other to implement space activities. The ESA signed a “framework agreement” with the EU in May 2004 to prescribe that they will coordinate on proceeding with space development and hold regular minister-level council meetings. The joint council meeting held by the ESA and the EU in May 2007 approved the “European Space Policy.” This “European Space Policy” mentions improving synergy effects between space activities for civil and defense purposes, and the importance of implementing space activities based on coordinated efforts among member states and ensuring an internationally competitive space industry. The Policy identifies security as one of its areas of priority.

It is thought that in the future, “Galileo,” a satellite positioning system planned by the EU and the ESA, “Copernicus,” an Earth observation program, and the Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS), a reconnaissance satellite project implemented by the European Defence Agency (EDA), will be utilized for security in Europe.

China began working on space development in the 1950s, and in April 1970, the country launched its first satellite “Dong Fang Hong I,” mounted on the transportation launch vehicle “Long March 1,” using technology enhanced through its missile development.

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8 According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Aerospace Forces were created by merging the Air Force and the Aerospace Defence Forces, and started performing its tasks in August 2015. The tasks of the Aerospace Forces include: (1) providing focused combat command to the air force; (2) conducting aerial and missile defense; (3) launching and controlling satellites; (4) warning about missile attack; and (5) monitoring outer space.

9 In July 2014, the first launch of “Angara-1.2PP” was conducted successfully. In December 2014, “Angara-A5” successfully put a dummy satellite into orbit for the first time. The Angara launch vehicle is considered as the first large launch vehicle that Russia developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is expected that the vehicle will be launching commercial as well as military satellites.

10 The new launch site is being built to replace the Russian-leased Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, and Russia aims to have the site fully operational by 2020.

11 The ESA was established in May 1975 based on the ESA Convention targeting to establish a single European space organization focusing on the peaceful use of space research, technology, and application areas. The organization was formally established in October 1980.

12 In September 2000, the European Commission (EC) and the ESA created the European Strategy for Space that committed to pursuing Europe’s coherent and effective space activities. The strategy envisioned that the EC would make political and strategic decisions on space policies and that ESA would function as the implementing organization. For the satellite positioning system “Galileo” currently in operation and the environmental and security monitoring program “Copernicus,” the EU and ESA are complementing each other in carrying these projects forward, with the former mainly taking charge of the policy dimension and the latter the technical dimension.

13 The EC released the European Strategy for Space in October 2016.

14 In December 2016, initial services were launched with 18 satellites. Galileo is set to offer the services in conjunction with GPS because of the insufficient number of satellites. The system is expected to be fully operational by 2020 when all 30 satellites are in place.

15 New observation satellites called “Sentinels” are being launched to collect imagery necessary for conducting Earth observations. Sentinels are classified according to their purpose into: 1) all-weather satellite that takes images of land and ocean; 2) all-weather satellite capable of high-resolution land monitoring to provide imagery of vegetation, inland waterways, and coastal areas; and 3) satellite measuring land- and sea-surface temperature and topography. Six Sentinels are said to be in orbit as of January 2016.

16 The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established in 2004 to improve Europe’s defense capabilities for crisis management purposes and to execute and maintain security and defense policies.

17 The MUSIS was started by Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, and Spain. The organization was joined later by Poland in December 2010. This is a joint project succeeding such projects as “Helios 2” (a French military reconnaissance satellite), “Pleiades” (a French Earth imaging satellite used for military and civilian purposes), “SAR-Lupe” (a German group of military radar satellites), “COSMO-SkyMed” (an Italian constellation of Earth observation satellites), and “Ingenio” (a Spanish optical satellite).

18 The number of cargo rocket launches in 2016 was 22 in the United States, 22 in China, 17 in Russia, 11 in Europe, 7 in India, 4 in Japan, and 1 in Israel. In terms of the number of rocket launches, China overtook Russia for the first time to equal the U.S. Moreover, the number of rocket launches in 2017 were 29 in the U.S., 19 in Russia, 18 in China, 11 in Europe (France), 7 in Japan, and 5 in India.
China has thus far conducted activities such as manned space flight and lunar rover launches. It is speculated that China’s space development is intended to enhance national prestige and develop space resources.

With regard to the organizational setup, the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the State Council, oversees industries related to space, nuclear technology, aviation, ships, and weapons. The China National Space Administration enforces the administrative control of the space area for civil and commercial purposes and represents the Chinese Government externally.

China’s defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015) states that outer space is a commanding height in strategic competition among all nations. Meanwhile, China asserts that its activities in outer space constitute “peaceful use of outer space,” and underscores that China is “opposed [to] the weaponization of and arms race in outer space, and [will take] an active part in international space cooperation.” China also commits to “[keeping] abreast of the dynamics of outer space, deal with security threats and challenges in that domain, and secure its space assets.” In addition, “China’s Space Activities in 2016,” China’s white paper on space activities released in December 2016, presents a vision to “build China into a space power” and for “the realization of the Chinese Dream.” It also presents a schedule of launches up to 2020, and emphasizes international cooperation and the peaceful use of space. On the other hand, the white paper also notes that China will satisfy its needs for security, which does not deny the country’s military use of space.

China is indeed actively using space for information collection, communications, and positioning for military purposes. While the details of the tasks and organization of the Strategic Support Force, established in January 2016, have not been revealed, it is pointed out as being in charge of outer space, cyber, and electronic warfare. Also, in addition to the continuation of the launch of Long March series cargo rockets, China has announced the plan for developing a cargo rocket capable of carrying extra heavy payloads. Carrier launch vehicles are developed and manufactured by Chinese state-owned enterprises, which are thought to be also developing and manufacturing ballistic missiles. It is expected that China will pursue space development through close collaboration between the public sector, military, and private sector. Moreover, it is regarded that China is focusing also on the development of satellite ground stations and opened China’s first satellite data receiving station outside of China, near Kiruna in Sweden in December 2016. Furthermore, the country has launched a manned space program with the aim of constructing its own space station. The first unmanned cargo spacecraft, Tianzhou 1, was launched in April 2017 from Wenchang Space Launch Center on the carrier rocket, Long March-7 Y2. After that, Tianzhou 1 succeeded in being docked with Tiangong-2, a space laboratory. Other than that, the Hainan Sheng Institute of Remote Sensing is planning to launch a series of 10 satellites between 2019 and 2021.

Also, China is considered to have become one of the space powers through investments, research and development.

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19 In addition to lunar exploration, it also cites the launch of worldwide services for the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, Mars exploration, asteroid exploration, and Jupiter exploration.
20 In August 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum science satellite called Micius that will be carrying out a proof-of-concept mission for quantum communication between space and a ground station.
21 By December 2012, the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System officially started its services covering most of the Asia-Pacific region. It is reported that the BeiDou system has already started to be mounted on navy vessels, government vessels belonging to maritime law enforcement agencies, fishing boats, among other vessels. BeiDou offers not only positioning services but also interactive short message features. It is suggested that these features make it possible to centrally capture and share, in real-time, the position and other data related to vessels of other countries that Chinese navy vessels have detected, and improve information gathering capabilities on the ocean and other areas.
22 In September 2015, China succeeded in its first launch of Long March-6 (for launching small satellites) and Long March-11 (cold-fuel propellant, for instantaneous launching of small satellites). China also succeeded in launching Long March-7 for launching “Shenzhou” manned spacecraft in June 2016 and Long March-5 (for launching large satellites) in November 2016. On the other hand, the launch of their Long March 5 rocket in July 2017 ended in failure. It also announced plans to launch Long March-9 (for launching ultra-large satellites), which aims to achieve capability to launch 100-ton payload into low orbit, by around 2030.
23 It is noted that this receiving station located in the Arctic Circle offers many security advantages, such as ease of receiving data obtained by Earth observation satellites in sun-synchronous orbits (including photo reconnaissance satellites).
24 The National Medium and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development published by the State Council of China in February 2006 positions space station construction, lunar exploration and high-resolution Earth observation systems as specific critical projects in the aerospace area.
India’s space development promotes space programs aimed at social and economic development in line with the five-year national plan. The country’s 12th Five-Year Plan focuses on non-military projects including communication, positioning, Earth observation (e.g., disaster monitoring, resource exploration, and weather observation), transportation systems, space science, and spinoff promotions.

The Space Commission (SC) determines the country’s space policy under the leadership of the Prime Minister and assumes responsibility for securing space development budgets and implementing space development programs. The Space Agency, managed by the SC, oversees the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), which implements space development policy following the country’s space policy, develops and launches vehicles, and develops and manufactures satellites.

In April 2016, India operated a positioning satellite that can position itself around India as well as launched an Earth observation satellite, which are supposedly used also for security purposes. In February 2017, India successfully launched a satellite launch vehicle loaded with 104 satellites, marking the largest number ever carried on a single rocket in the world. In the future, the country plans to implement planetary explorations and conduct manned space flight.

### 6 Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea (ROK) is considered to have started full-scale space development from the latter half of the 1990s. The ROK carries out space activities based on the three key plans it established in November 2013, namely: the “Mid- and Long-Term Plan for Space Development (2014–2040),” which plans to move up the first launch of launch vehicles manufactured by the ROK to June 2020; the “Space Technology Industrialization Strategy,” which prompts the private sector to lead space development; and the “Revision of the Korean Rocket Development Plan,” which outlines the use of ROK-made launch vehicles and the ROK’s own development of planetary and space exploration satellites and high orbit satellites.

On the organizational front, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute leads research and development as an implementation agency. Furthermore, the Korea Agency for Defense Development is engaged in the development and use of various satellites.

Major satellites used by the country include imagery reconnaissance and communication satellites. The ROK relies on other countries to launch its satellites.

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26 The February 2015 “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence notes that in July 2014, China tested an anti-satellite missile not involving the destruction of a satellite. In addition, it states that China has satellite jamming capabilities and is making progress on an anti-satellite system.
27 According to the “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” published by the U.S. DoD in June 2017, China continues to develop directed-energy weapons, electronic countermeasure systems (jammers), and a variety of capabilities including capability to counter satellite, designed to limit or block the use of space assets by adversaries during a crisis or conflict.
28 The 12th Five-Year Plan covers the period between April 2012 and March 2017. The 13th Five-Year Plan has yet to be announced.
29 In April 2016, India succeeded in the test launch of a large launch vehicle carrying an unmanned capsule.
30 All 104 satellites were launched and placed into polar orbit at the same time. They comprised India’s roughly 700 kg Cartosat-2D Earth observation satellite and 103 small satellites weighing less than about 10 kg each (1 each from Israel, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UAE, 2 from India, and 96 from the United States).
31 In December 2014, the ISRO succeeded in the test launch of a large launch vehicle carrying an unmanned capsule.
32 In January 2013, for the first time on its third attempt, the ROK successfully launched the space launch vehicle “Naro (KSLV-1)” that was developed based on the first stage of the Russian Angara rocket.
33 The ROK had planned to launch a test space rocket in December 2017, but has postponed this launch until October 2018 due to technical issues.
34 The Mid- and Long-Term Basic Plan for Space Development (1996–2019) released in 1996 is considered to be the ROK’s first space plan.
Owing to the advancement of information and communications technology (ICT) in recent years, information and communications networks such as the Internet have become essential components across all facets of life. Meanwhile, cyber attacks against critical infrastructures, namely, information and communications networks, have the potential to seriously impact the lives of individuals.

Types of cyber attacks include functional disruption, data falsification and data theft caused by unauthorized access to information and communications networks or through the transmission of viruses via e-mail, functional impairment of the networks through simultaneous transmission of large quantities of data, as well as attacks intending to shut down or take over a system belonging to critical infrastructure, such as power systems. Also, Internet-related technologies are constantly evolving, with cyber attacks becoming more and more advanced and sophisticated by the day.

For military forces, information and communication capability form the foundation of command and control, which extend from central command to ground-level forces. In this regard, ICT advancements are further enhancing the dependence of units on information and communications networks. Furthermore, military forces rely on various critical infrastructures, including electricity, to execute their missions. Accordingly, cyber attacks against such critical infrastructures could become a major impediment to their missions. For this reason, cyber attacks are regarded as an asymmetrical strategy capable of mitigating the strengths of adversaries by exploiting the weaknesses of an adversary’s forces. It is believed that many foreign military forces are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace. It has been pointed out that China and Russia in particular are bolstering the cyber attacking capabilities of their militaries for the purpose of obstructing the networking of military forces and destroying infrastructure. In addition, actors (including non-state actors) attempting to cause harm to nations, etc. are likely to have realized that attacking through cyberspace is often easier than attacking directly using physical means. Moreover, it is said that the information and communications networks of countries are being compromised for the purpose of gathering intelligence. As more confidential information becoming to be stored in cyberspace, cyber espionage through cyber attacks is causing more serious damage.

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1 The targets of cyber attacks are wide-ranging. Beginning with large targets, they range from global-level targets, including interstate targets, as well as nations and government institutions, local communities, business communities and infrastructures, companies, and individuals. As such, it is said that measures to counter cyber attacks need to be optimal relative to the size of the target.
2 In the Japanese MoD’s "Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace" of September 2012, cyber attacks are characterized as follows: (1) diversity: cyber attacks involve diverse actors, methods, objectives, and context; (2) anonymity: actors can easily conceal and disguise their identity; (3) stealth: some cyber attacks are difficult to identify and can take place without causing any realization of damage; (4) offensive dominance: attack tools are easy to acquire depending on the tool, and it is difficult to completely eliminate software vulnerabilities; and (5) the difficulties of deterrence: retaliatory strikes and defensive measures have minimal deterrence effect.
3 According to the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (March 2018).
4 According to the "Cybersecurity National Action Plan" unveiled by then U.S. President Obama in February 2016.
5 According to the annual report presented to Congress by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget based on the Federal Information Security Management Act, the number of cybersecurity incidents reported to federal offices in FY2017 in the U.S. was 35,277. Moreover, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of February 2018 names Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea as being the main countries that pose the greatest cyber threat to the U.S. It also indicates that (1) Russia is continuing its spying on critical infrastructure of the U.S. as well as that of its allies, while also targeting the U.S., NATO and allies in trying to obtain information on U.S. policies, (2) China is continuing its engagement in cyber espionage while also enhancing its cyber attack capabilities to address its priority issues in national security, (3) Iran is continuing infiltration efforts in countries allied to the U.S and the West for the purpose of espionage and in preparing for future cyber attacks, and (4) North Korea is engaging in cyber activities to acquire funds, gather information and launch attacks against the ROK and the U.S. See Part 1, Chapter 3, Section 1 regarding ISIL’s use of cyberspace.
6 “APT 1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units;” released in February 2013 by Mandiant, a U.S. information security company, concludes that the most active cyber attack group targeting the United States and other countries is Unit 61398 under then Third Department of the PLA General Staff Department. The report also states that then Third Department of the General Staff Department, which constituted the cyber unit, had 130,000 personnel.
intelligence agencies, security agencies, private hacker groups, and companies. According to the defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015), China will expedite the development of a cyber force and enhance its cyber capabilities. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that cyber warfare units have been formed under the Strategic Support Force that was created as part of China’s military reforms in late December 2015. In June 2015, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) became a target of a cyber attack in which, as it later came to light, personal information of about 22 million people including U.S. federal employees and U.S. Forces personnel were stolen. While Chinese involvement in this attack has been suggested, China denies its involvement and explains that it was a “crime” involving Chinese hackers.

Moreover, it was pointed out that in April 2017, two groups of hackers associated with Chinese governmental organizations carried out cyber attacks on the government, military and defense companies of the ROK. It has been pointed out that China is using cyber attacks to obtain sensitive information concerning critical infrastructure, national security decision-making processes, and plans of military tactics of other countries.

Russia’s involvement has been pointed out in the cyber attack that caused a large-scale power outage in Ukraine in December 2015. As for the cyber attack caused by ransomware in many countries centered in Ukraine in June 2017, both the U.S. and U.K. governments announced in February 2018 that it was initiated by the Russian military.

Government has also criticized Russian intelligence agencies for carrying out cyber attacks to affect the outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. In March 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it indicted four hackers, including two officers of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), for computer hacking in order to steal information from at least 500 million user accounts of a major U.S. Internet company. It is believed that the Russian military, intelligence and security agencies, and other organizations engage in cyber attacks. Furthermore, it is clear that the Russian military has its own cyber command. This cyber command is believed to be responsible for conducting offensive cyber activities, including inserting malware into command and control systems of adversaries. It has been indicated that such Russian activities reflect objectives including intelligence gathering to support Russian decision-making, operations to support military and political objectives, and continuing preparation of the cyberspace environment for future contingencies.

It was reported in May 2017 that the ROK Ministry of National Defense had concluded that the September 2016 cyber attack on the internal network of the ROK Armed Forces was conducted by an entity which was believed to be a North Korean hacker group. Moreover, it has been pointed out that documents containing military secrets were stolen as the result of this cyber attack. In the Wannacry Malware cyber attack in May 2017, the malware encrypted and rendered unusable hundreds of thousands of computers in hospitals, schools, businesses in over 150 countries. Regarding this incident, the United States announced that it has publicly attributed the cyber attack to North Korea in December of that same year.

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7. The Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2016) notes that China carries out cyber espionage led by the Ministry of State Security and military organizations as well as cyber espionage led by China’s many non-state actors targeting the United States. These actors include hackers contracted by the government, civilian “patriotic hackers,” and criminal organizations.

8. The defense white paper notes that, “Cyberspace has become a new pillar of economic and social development, and a new domain of national security.” “As international strategic competition in cyberspace has been turning increasingly fiercer, quite a few countries are developing their cyber military forces,” and China “is one of the major victims of hacker attacks.”

9. Since September 2015, China has publicized a series of its decisions on military reforms, and in January 2016, announced the establishment of the Strategic Support Force and other units. While the details of the Force’s tasks and organization have not been revealed, it is suggested that it is in charge of outer space, cyber, and electronic warfare.

10. See the Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2015). In addition to this attack, the report states that a U.S. airline company was attacked by the same method used in the attack against the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM).


13. In February 2016, the New York Times reported that there were doubts about the involvement of the Russian military with which Ukraine is in a standoff over the annexation of Crimea and other matters.

14. According to the joint statement issued in October 2016 by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the director of National Intelligence of the United States, and the joint report issued in December of the same year by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the FBI concerning Russian cyber attacks on the U.S., as well as the U.S. intelligence community report on Russia’s cyber attacks on the U.S. presidential election released in June 2017. Moreover, during the 2017 presidential campaign in France, Macron, known as a hardliner on Russia, was reportedly a target of a cyber attack, as well as a widespread fake news story about having hidden assets in a tax haven. After being appointed president, in a joint press conference of the French and Russian presidents, Macron criticized Russian media outlets by name, referring to them as organs of fying propaganda.

15. The incident occurred in 2014. Other than that, there was another cyber attack on this Internet company in 2013, resulting in leaking of information on 3 billion people.

16. According to a statement made by Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu during a briefing for lower house members in February 2017. According to this statement, the Russian military has a cyber command. Minister Shoigu emphasized that the command was “for opposing political propaganda activities” since there was an information war taking place between Russia and the West, indicating the purpose of the command was for defense. Also, it is pointed out that the number of Russia’s cyber troops comes to approximately 1,000.

17. According to then U.S. Director of National Intelligence Clapper’s written testimony on “Worldwide Cyber Threats” at the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in September 2015.


19. According to the digital ROK National Defense Report in May 2017. Furthermore, the report revealed that IP addresses (Internet addresses) used in the attacks were traced back to the Shenyang region of China, known to have been used by existing North Korean hackers.

20. According to a press release by Homeland Security Adviser Bossert of the United States. Moreover, according to JPCERT/CC, over 2,000 devices in 600 locations are said to have been infected.
It has been pointed out that this cyber attack succeeded in collecting 140,000 dollars in Bitcoins. In addition, according to the ROK National Intelligence Service, North Korea has repeatedly hacked the ROK exchanges for the purpose of stealing cryptocurrency, and it has succeeded in acquiring the equivalent of several dozen billion won (several billion yen). These cyber attacks were believed to be for raising money.

It has been pointed out that North Korean government institutions are involved in such cyber attacks, and as a national project, the North Korea is training hackers for cyber attacks.

Meanwhile, in Japan, the Japan Pension Service was hacked in May 2015, which led to the theft of the personal information of pension recipients and policyholders.

Other than this incident, there are many reports about cyber attacks on governmental agencies and businesses in defense and aerospace industries, allegedly conducted by state-sponsored hacker groups. In addition, supply chain risks, including products embedded with deliberately and fraudulently altered programs, and the existence of advanced malware designed to attack industrial control systems are cause for concern.

Cyber attacks exploiting insecure IoT devices, including the massive cyber attack by the Mirai malware in 2016, are becoming conspicuous, and this kind of threat is expected to grow in the future. Cyber attacks on telecommunication networks of a government and military forces, or on critical infrastructure could have a serious effect on the security of states, and it has been pointed out that state-sponsored cyber attacks have been on the rise in recent years. Given this situation, there is a need for continuous monitoring of trends in the threats in cyberspace.

### 3 Initiatives against Cyber Attacks

Given these growing threats in cyberspace, various initiatives are under way at the whole of government level and the ministry level, including defense ministries.

A number of issues have been raised that need to be dealt with to enable an effective response to be taken to cyber attacks, which have become a new security challenge in recent years. For instance, it is regarded that the international community has diverging views concerning the fundamental matters of cyberspace, including how international law applies. It is suggested that countries have clashing claims, with the United States, Europe, and Japan calling for maintaining a free cyberspace, while Russia, China, and most emerging countries call for strengthening national control of cyberspace. Against this backdrop, there has been a movement to promote the rule of law in cyberspace in the international community.

The Fifth UN Group of Governmental Experts failed to submit a conclusive report, however, discussions are being held on the establishment of international rules within the framework of global conferences on cyberspace.

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21 In November 2013, ROK media outlets reported that the ROK National Intelligence Service made revelations about North Korean cyber warfare capabilities in the national audit of the Information Committee of the National Assembly, and that Kim Jong-un, First Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party of North Korea, stated that, “Cyber attacks are omnipotent swords with their power paralleled with nuclear power and missiles.” In the U.S. Department of Defense’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” introduced in Congress in February 2016, it is stated that North Korea has an offensive cyber operations capability. The 2016 Defense White Paper published by the ROK in January 2017 notes that North Korea has concentrated on boosting its cyber units to nearly 7,000 personnel.

22 For example, “NK Intellectual Solidarity,” a North Korean defector association in the ROK, held a seminar entitled “Emergency seminar on cyber terrorism by North Korea 2011” in June 2011, and presented material entitled “North Korea’s cyber terrorism capabilities,” explaining that North Korean organizations conducting cyber attacks were supported by government agencies employing superior human resources from all over the country, giving them special training to develop their cyber attack capabilities.

23 In October 2012, the U.S. House Information Special Committee published an investigation report, entitled “Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE.” The report advised that products manufactured by Huawei Technologies and Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment (ZTE) (major Chinese communications equipment manufacturers) should not be used, due to their threats to national security based on strong concerns over China’s cyber attack capabilities and intentions targeting critical U.S. infrastructure, as well as opaque relations between Chinese major IT companies and the central government, the Chinese Communist Party, and the PLA augmenting supply chain risks. A similar move has been taken by other countries, including France, Australia, Canada, India, and Taiwan. Some countries, including the United Kingdom and the ROK, have issued warnings.


25 In “North Korean Actors Spear Phish U.S. Electric Companies” published in October 2017 by FireEye, the U.S. cybersecurity company, multiple U.S. electric companies are said to have been attacked through spear phishing emails from cyber threat actors likely affiliated with the North Korean government, in September 2017.

26 Generally, the trends at the governmental level are thought to include the following: (1) organizations related to cybersecurity that are spread over multiple departments and agencies are being integrated, and their operational units are being centralized; (2) policy and research units are being enhanced by establishing specialized posts, creating new research divisions and enhancing such functions; (3) the roles of intelligence agencies in responding to cyber attacks are being expanded; and (4) more emphasis is being given to international cooperation. At the level of the defense ministry, various measures have been taken, such as establishing a new agency to supervise cyberspace military operations and positioning the effort to deal with cyber attacks as an important strategic objective.

27 These countries have called for the free flow of information and multi-stakeholder approach including business and civil society as well as governments.

28 Global conferences on cyberspace have been held since being proposed by the then U.K. Foreign Secretary Hague in 2011, and the series of conferences has been called the “London Process.” The conferences have been attended by the governments, international organizations, groups from the private sector, NGOs, etc., of over 100 countries, and comprehensive discussions are held on various issues regarding cyberspace. They are high-level, large-scale global conferences, and the most recent one was held in November 2017.
In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for protecting Federal government networks and critical infrastructure against cyber attacks, and the Department’s Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&CC) works to protect the networks of government agencies. According to the National Security Strategy announced by the United States in December 2017, many countries regard cyber capabilities as being a measure to influence other countries, and cyber attacks have become a crucial aspect of modern-day warfare. As such, the United States intends to deter, defend, and if necessary, defeat other countries with cyber capabilities. To ensure this, the United States came up with a strategic policy to streamline integration of the U.S. government’s authorities and procedures to (1) improve its capabilities in identifying cyber attacks and responding quickly to them, (2) improve cyber measures for protecting the assets, critical infrastructure, information, etc., of the U.S. government, and boosting expertise, and (3) enable the launching of cyber operations against adversaries when necessary. In January 2018, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) announced the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which props up the National Security Strategy. It described a policy of investments in cyber defense, resilience, and the continued integration of cyber capabilities into the full spectrum of military operations. Moreover, the DoD Cyber Strategy released in April 2015 under the Obama administration states that the DoD has set out the following three primary missions in cyberspace: (1) defend DoD networks, systems, and information; (2) defend the United States and its interests against cyber attacks of significant consequence; and (3) provide integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations. Additionally, the DoD states that the aforementioned cyber capabilities include cyber operations to disrupt an adversary’s military-related systems. U.S. Cyber Command’s mission is to “direct, synchronize, and coordinate cyberspace planning and operations.” The Command consists of the Cyber Protection Teams that manages the cyber forces of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and operates and defends the information infrastructure of the DoD, the National Mission Teams that support U.S. defense against national-level threats, and the Combat Mission Teams that supports the operations conducted by unified combatant commands on the cyber front (these three Teams are collectively referred to as the Cyber Mission Force). U.S. Cyber Command, which had been a subunified command under U.S. Strategic Command, was elevated to a unified combatant command in May 2018, allowing the Cybercom commander to report directly to the U.S. Secretary of Defense as is the case with other unified combatant commanders.

The United States deems that China continues to conduct cyber-enabled theft targeting a broad set of U.S. interests ranging from information related to national security, to sensitive economic information and U.S. intellectual property. In September 2015, then U.S. President Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed at their summit meeting that the two countries will not conduct cyberespionage of intellectual property. Then in November 2017, President Trump and President Xi Jinping agreed to continue upholding the terms of the agreement at the summit meeting in 2015. Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that cyber espionage by China continues unimpeded as before.

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29 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced a cybersecurity strategy in May 2018. More than 20 billion devices are expected to become connected to the Internet by 2020, and this is also said to increase the risks.

30 The DoD Cyber Strategy states that Russia and China have acquired advanced cyber capabilities and strategies. It goes on to say that Russian activities are carried out stealthily and their intentions are difficult to discern. The Strategy notes that China steals intellectual property to benefit Chinese companies. Furthermore, it states that while Iran and North Korea have less developed cyber capabilities, they have displayed an overt level of hostile intent towards the United States and U.S. interests.

31 In order to execute these missions in cyberspace, the DoD presents the following five strategic goals: (1) Build and maintain ready forces and capabilities to conduct cyberspace operations; (2) Defend the DoD information network, secure DoD data, and mitigate risks to DoD missions; (3) Establish arrangements to defend the United States and its interests from cyber attacks of significant consequence through collaboration with relevant departments and companies; (4) Use cyber options to control conflict; and (5) Build close cooperative relations with allies and partners.

32 According to a statement made in April 2015 by the commander of U.S. Cyber Command to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, and other sources, the three forces are made up of several teams, and dozens of them are currently operating. Employing the National Guard and reserve units, the Cyber Mission Force is set to have 133 teams (National Mission Teams [13 teams], Cyber Protection Teams [96 teams], Combat Mission Teams [27 teams], Support Teams [25 teams]) and 6,200 personnel by September 2018.

33 In announcing the elevation of U.S. Cyber Command to a combatant command, the U.S. DoD has stated that the domain of cyberspace is just as important for military operations as land, sea and air, and that operational capabilities in cyberspace are indispensable for military success. They indicated that the future issues will be the bolstering of cyber weapons, cyber defense, and the scale and capabilities of cyber personnel.

34 During the summit meeting, then President Obama allegedly expressed deep concerns over China’s cyber attacks and stated that the United States would exercise all possible tools, hinting at the application of economic sanctions. Meanwhile, the two sides agreed that they would hold U.S.-China ministerial dialogues on fighting cybercrime. Moreover, Australia has agreed for both countries not to engage in cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property at the high-level security dialog with China in April 2017.

The NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Policy on Cyber Defence, and its action plan, which were adopted in June 2011: (1) clarify the political and operational mechanisms of NATO’s response to cyber attacks; (2) clarify that NATO would provide assistance to member states to develop their cyber defense, and provide assistance to member states if they are subject to cyber attacks; and (3) set out principles on cooperation with partners. Furthermore, at the NATO Summit in September 2014, agreement was reached that NATO’s collective defense applies to cyber attacks against member states.

As for its organization, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) provides political oversight on policies and operations concerned with NATO’s cyber defense. In addition, the Emerging Security Challenges Division formulates policy and action plans concerning cyber defense. Furthermore, in November 2017, an agreement was reached on creation of a new Cyber Operations Center to help integrate cyber into NATO planning and operations.36 Furthermore, NATO has conducted cyber defense training exercises annually since 2008 to heighten the defense capabilities of its servers. In addition, NATO has expanded cooperation with EU in the fields of cybersecurity and cyber defense.37

In 2008, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) was authorized to serve as NATO’s cyber defense-related research and training institution,38 and was established in Estonia’s capital of Tallinn. CCD COE carries out research on the relationship between cyber activities and international law, and created the “Tallinn Manual.”39 In February 2017, “Tallinn Manual 2.0” was published as the second edition of the previous manual based on a review of broad discussion points, from peacetime legal regimes, such as laws on state responsibility, human rights, aviation, space, and maritime affairs, to contingency legal regimes, such as the use of force and laws on armed conflict.

The United Kingdom, in its “NSS- SDSR2015" released in November 2015, committed to investing £1.9 billion over the next five years in increasing its cyber defense capabilities to strengthen the functions for identifying and analyzing cyberspace threats. In November 2016, the country announced a new “Cyber Security Strategy” that presented a vision for the United Kingdom, which is to be secure and resilient to cyber threats, prosperous and confident in the digital world. To achieve this vision, the Strategy requires the United Kingdom to possess the means to effectively “defend” from cyber threats, to “deter” through having the means for offensive cyber action, and to “develop” cutting-edge technologies.

In terms of the Government’s overall cybersecurity policy, the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA) has been set up to present strategic policies and to coordinate cybersecurity planning for the overall government. In October 2016, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) was newly established under the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to promote public-private partnerships for responses to national cyber incidents.

In its first “National Security Strategy” published in January 2013, Australia positions integrated cyber policies and operations as one of the top national security priorities. In April 2016, a new “Cyber Security Strategy” through 2020 was released, which provides that Australia will ensure the safety of the people, that private companies will participate in cybersecurity, and that threat information will be shared.

In terms of organization, the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) that brings cybersecurity capabilities from across the government into a single location was established in November 2014 to respond to major cybersecurity issues related to government

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37 In July 2016, NATO and the EU signed a Joint Declaration with the aim of expanding cooperation in dealing with new issues, such as those in terrorism, refugees and immigrants, including the cybersecurity issues. They have been strengthening cooperation, for example, by exchanging information on cyber defense.
38 In June 2013, the NATO Defense Ministers’ Meeting placed cyber attacks at the top of the agenda for the first time. They agreed to establish an emergency response team and to implement a cyber defense mechanism on a full scale by October 2013.
39 The “Tallinn Manual” and the “Tallinn Manual 2.0” are both considered independent outputs of the members that participated in the project (Professor Michael N. Schmitt of the U.S. Naval War College served as project leader; members included professionals, scholars on international law, and experts in cyber technology in the West and other areas), and not the official view of NATO.
agencies and critical infrastructures. In July 2015, the ACSC issued its first report on cybersecurity, which contended that the number, type, and sophistication of cyber threats to Australia are all increasing. Moreover, cyber forces were established within the military in July 2017 to strengthen the Department of Defence’s cyber capabilities and systems.

5 Republic of Korea

The ROK formulated the “National Cyber Security Master Plan” in August 2011, which clarifies the supervisory functions of the National Intelligence Service in responding to cyber attacks. It places particular emphasis on strengthening the following five areas: prevention, detection, response, systems, and security base. In the national defense sector, the Cyber Measures Technology Team was established by the Ministry of National Defense to respond to cyber and hacking threats. It also created the “National Cybersecurity Crisis Response Manual” that stipulates rapid response procedures to cybersecurity crises after drawing up the “National Cyber Security Strategy.” In 2015, the Joint Chiefs of Staff centralized the cyber attack tactical system mainly around the Joint Chiefs of Staff by newly establishing the Cyber Tactics Department, assigning control authority concerning cyber tactics to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and publishing a field manual on “joint cyber tactics.”

40 The ACSC, comprised of staff from the Australian Crime Commission, the Australian Federal Computer Emergency Response Team, and the Defence Intelligence Organisation, analyzes cyber threats and responds incidents in both private and public sector.
41 According to the report, malicious actors in cyberspace targeting Australia are: (1) foreign government-sponsored adversaries; (2) serious and organized criminals; and (3) groups motivated by certain issues and individuals with personal grievances.
42 According to Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy announced in October 2017, the country’s offensive cyber capability in support of military operations will be deployed through the Australian Signals Directorate in cooperation with the Australian Defence Force.
43 Under the Director of the National Intelligence Service, the National Cybersecurity Strategy Council has been established to deliberate on important issues, including establishing and improving a national cybersecurity structure, coordinating related policies and roles among institutions, and deliberating measures and policies related to presidential orders.
44 In February 2014, the ROK Ministry of National Defense reportedly briefed the National Assembly that it planned to develop cyber weapons for attacking other countries.
Recent developments in science and technology, as represented by the dramatic advancement of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), has impacted a variety of areas, triggering significant and revolutionary changes in many areas such as economy, society, and lifestyle.

The military sphere is no exception. Developed countries, including the United States, consider that transformations driven by advances in ICT can dramatically improve combat and other capabilities, and therefore, continue to pursue a variety of ICT research and policies.

For example, if information on enemy forces collected by using information-gathering systems, including reconnaissance satellites and unmanned aircraft, is shared on a network, command and control can be exercised immediately, even from remote headquarters, and offensive power can be directed swiftly, precisely, and flexibly against targets.

Additionally, new ICT technology has been developed in recent years. For instance, in August 2016, China launched a satellite called “Mozi” to perform the world’s first quantum cryptographic communications\(^1\) testing. Then in January 2017, it was said that they succeeded in using Mozi for long-distance quantum cryptographic communication between China and Australia. Going forward, new technologies such as quantum cryptography communications could potentially be applied to the military field in various countries in the future.

Furthermore, there is the possibility that a revolution in military logistics will occur due to the 3D printing technology, for example by allowing the procurement of parts that does not rely on inventory. For instance, in August 2017, the U.S. Navy announced that they carried out a demonstration experiment on mobile 3D printer equipment capable of manufacturing replacement parts\(^2\) in forward-deployed regions.

Major countries with sophisticated and modernized military forces, place emphasis on improving the destructive capabilities of weapons, precision guidance technology, information-related technology including C4ISR, unmanned technology (e.g., drones),\(^3\) artificial intelligence (AI) and big data analysis,\(^4\) and hypersonic technology\(^5\) to be able to carry out more precise and effective attacks. Recently, reports have been published of successful tests of railguns\(^6\) and high energy laser weapons\(^7\) that are expected to provide effective repower compared to existing weapons, such as artillery, in terms of their cost per ring, range, precision, promptness, and other aspects. Furthermore, there have been reports about the development of high speed strike weapons (HSSW) that can strike even long-range targets with conventional weapons, quickly and with pinpoint accuracy.\(^8\)

Recent research of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has pointed out a variety of advanced research and development in small unmanned aircraft

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1. Quantum cryptographic communication is a method of communication that relies on quantum cryptographic technology, an encryption technology that makes use of quantum properties, and it is said that third parties cannot decode it.
2. Associated equipment that includes 3D printers is stored in a container, allowing some parts to be manufactured immediately and on the spot.
3. Drones for military use such as unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), and unmanned maritime vehicle (UMV) have been developed (UMVs may be classified into unmanned surface vehicle (USV) and unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV)). It is suggested that these drones could shift from human-operated types to fully autonomous types, as known as Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). Furthermore, within the framework of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), discussions are taking place on the operation of systems that automatically kill enemies without human judgment from the perspectives of their characteristics, human intervention and international law.
4. For example, in the United States, DARPA and the Air Force are engaged in joint research and development of the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC), aiming to apply the technology to hypersonic missiles, etc. in the future. HAWC uses the technology of scramjet engine, which enables hypersonic flight by taking in air at hypersonic speed and burning it without reducing the speed to below the speed of sound. Furthermore, Russia is developing Zinc, an anti-ship hypersonic cruise missile, which has been attracting attention for its performance and naval vessel it will be deployed on.
5. A railgun is a weapon that shoots bullets by using the magnetic field generated from electric energy instead of gunpowder. The U.S. Forces are developing a railgun with a range of about 370 km, or about ten times that of the existing 5-inch (127 mm) ammunition. A single railgun shot reportedly costs 1/20th to 1/60th the price of a missile.
6. The U.S. Forces are developing laser weapons to strengthen low-altitude air defense capabilities against small ships and drones, and firing tests have been carried out. It is considered that these high energy laser weapons systems will be miniaturized, with a possibility for placing the weapons on light mobility vehicles. In addition, tests have been conducted on integrating the high energy liquid laser area defense system (HELLADS) with the ground-based laser weapons system, since 2017. Tests have also been carried out to bring down unmanned aircraft by using lasers in efforts to put the technology to practical use.
7. Said to fly at lower orbital altitudes than ballistic missiles with the aim of greatly reducing the time required for conventional weapons attack.
capable of airborne launch, recovery, and reuse, unmanned vessels to detect submarines, long-range anti-ship missiles available under electronic warfare environment, spacecraft capable of rapidly launching satellites and space monitoring telescopes capable of discovering even small objects.

Recent advances in military science and technology are also largely attributed to the advancement of civil technology. In recent years, as the capabilities of existing equipment are improved and new equipment is developed, dual-use technology has been leveraged frequently.

In general, it is expected that countries which have difficulty possessing advanced technologies and non-state actors including terrorist organizations will carry out research and development on weapons and other equipment that will enable them to gain superiority in fighting against countries with state-of-the-art technology, and illegitimately obtain technology through ICT or other means. For instance, ISIL seemed to have started using unmanned aircraft for both reconnoitering and attacking, therefore research and development of technology for countering these threats is also recognized as an important challenge in the future.

### 2 Trends Concerning Defense Production and Technological Bases

Recently, Western countries in particular have continued to face difficulties when they try to increase defense budgets significantly. On the other hand, the sophistication of military science and technology and the greater complexity of equipment have escalated development and production costs and have raised unit prices for equipment procurement. Under these circumstances, many countries are taking on a variety of initiatives in order to maintain and enhance their national defense production and technological bases.

Western countries have set a target to increase competitiveness through realignment of their defense industry, based on the aforementioned situation related to national defense budgets. The United States has experienced repeated mergers and integrations among domestic corporations, while Europe has experienced cross-border mergers and integrations of the defense industry, especially in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy.

In response to the escalation of development and production costs, Western countries are promoting joint development and production and technological cooperation related to equipment among their allies and partners. This move aims for (1) splitting development and production costs, (2) expanding demands in all countries participating in joint development and production, (3) mutual complement of technologies, and (4) raising domestic technology levels by obtaining the latest technology.

For example, the joint development and production of the F-35 fighter jet led by the United States is the largest joint program. At present, there is anticipated demand for around 3,200 aircraft. This project will have impacts on the defense production and technological bases of the countries involved, through the operation, sustainment and maintenance stages of the aircraft.

Additionally, there is an increasing number of cases where governments are providing funding for national defense-related research and development conducted by the private sector. In the United States, for example, approximately US$3.17 billion in research and development funding was requested for FY 2018 to DARPA whose mission is to make investments in breakthrough technologies that will contribute to national security. The defense authorities have long provided substantial funding for the research conducted by companies and universities. The EU has also promoted a gradual process on the framework to fund research related to defense technology, against the backdrop of the consistent decline in national defense research expenditure.
by member states over the past 10 years. In 2017, the EU commenced Preparatory Action on Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) - related research in which it will provide €90 million over three years to more than 12 national defense research programs, with the European Defense Agency as the implementing body of this framework.

Countries have exported equipment overseas since the Cold War era, and even today, many countries are taking measures to promote exports.

Exports of equipment to the Asia-Pacific region have increased in recent years. This has been underpinned by economic growth in the region as well as the growing influence of China, the existence of territorial disputes, and responses to the enhancement of military buildup in neighboring countries. Countries such as China and the ROK have expanded exports of affordable equipment due to the development of the infrastructure required for production of equipment with the past imports of equipment and the improvement of capabilities in science and technology.

Importing countries adopt offset policies in order to keep a good balance between improving defense capabilities through imports and developing domestic defense production and technological bases, including setting requirements that domestic companies would be involved in parts manufacturing as a condition for procurement of equipment and services from abroad.

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**Fig. I-3-6-1** Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional Arms Export (2013-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Global shares in defense equipment export (%), 2013–2017</th>
<th>Comparison with 2008–2012 export values (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 United States</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>+25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Russia</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 France</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>+27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Germany</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 China</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>+38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 United Kingdom</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>+37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Spain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Israel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Italy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Netherlands</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. I-3-6-2** Trends in Import Value of Major Conventional Arms in the Asia-Pacific Region (2013-2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Import values ($ as billion), 2013–2017</th>
<th>Comparison with 2008–2012 import values (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 India</td>
<td>18.048</td>
<td>+24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 China</td>
<td>5.786</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Australia</td>
<td>5.559</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Pakistan</td>
<td>4.147</td>
<td>-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Indonesia</td>
<td>4.014</td>
<td>+192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Viet Nam</td>
<td>3.990</td>
<td>+81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Republic of Korea</td>
<td>3.239</td>
<td>-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Taiwan</td>
<td>2.847</td>
<td>+260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Bangladesh</td>
<td>2.239</td>
<td>+540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Singapore</td>
<td>2.150</td>
<td>-60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Created based on “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.” The top 10 countries by export value between 2013–2017 are listed (decimals are rounded).

16 The EU has launched a funding program called “Horizon 2020” for research and innovation to which it has committed 80 billion Euros over the seven-year period from 2014 to 2020. However, the provision of funds is limited to research for civilian or dual-use technology. In the United Kingdom, the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) has a budget of £6 million in FY2017 and regularly solicits conceptual demonstration research topics in order to fund research with a novel, high risk and high potential earning rate to develop capabilities for U.K. defense and security.

17 The definition of offset in defense trade encompasses a range of industrial and commercial benefits such as co-production, licensed production, subcontracting, technology transfer, purchasing, and credit assistance, technology transfer, assistance in purchase and payment, to “Offsets in Defense Trade Version Twenty-First Study” by the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security.
Part II

Japan’s Security and Defense Policy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Chapter 1
Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security and Defense

Chapter 2
About the National Defense Program Guidelines

Chapter 3
Development of Legislation for Peace and Security and the SDF Activities since Legislation’s Enforcement

Chapter 4
Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
Section 1 Measures to Ensure Japan’s Security

The independent state of a nation must be protected in order for it to determine its own direction in politics, economy, and society, as well as maintaining its culture, tradition, and sense of values. In addition, peace and security are essential for the people to live with a sense of safety and for Japan to continue to prosper. However, peace, safety, and independence cannot be secured by simply wishing for them. The essence of national security can be found in creating an international environment that is stable and predictable, while preventing the emergence of threats before they occur, through diplomacy. Nevertheless, the reality of the current international community suggests that it is not necessarily possible to prevent invasions from the outside by employing only nonmilitary means such as diplomatic efforts, and in the event that the nation were to be invaded it would not be able to remove such a threat. Defense capabilities are the nation’s ultimate guarantee of security, expressing its will and capacity to eliminate foreign invasions, and they cannot be replaced by any other means.

For this reason, Japan is striving to develop appropriate defense capabilities to protect the life and properties of its nationals and to defend the territorial land, sea, and airspace of Japan. At the same time, it is strengthening the Japan–U.S. Alliance with the United States, which shares basic values and interests with Japan. This underlines that the peace and security of Japan is ensured through developing seamless defense measures by coupling Japan’s own defense capabilities with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

Moreover, from the perspective of improving the security environment surrounding Japan and preventing the emergence of threats to Japan, the importance of the role played by defense capabilities is increasing in cooperative efforts as a member of the

Upon recognizing the role of defense capabilities, Japan aims to ensure national security as well as bringing peace and safety to the Asia-Pacific region, and eventually to the entire world through making its utmost efforts in a variety of fields.
Section 2 Constitution and the Basis of Defense Policy

1 Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense

Since the end of World War II, Japan made a decision not to repeat the ravages of war and has worked hard to build a peace-loving nation. The Japanese people desire lasting peace, and the principle of pacifism is enshrined in the Constitution, Article 9 of which prescribes the renunciation of war, the prohibition of war potential, and the denial of the right of belligerency of the state. Of course, since Japan is an independent nation, these provisions do not deny Japan’s inherent right of self-defense as a sovereign state. Thus, the Japanese Government interprets this as a constitutional right to possess the minimum armed forces needed to exercise that right. Therefore, Japan, under the Constitution, maintains the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as an armed organization, holding its exclusively defense-oriented policy as its basic strategy of defense, and continues to keep it equipped and ready for operations.

2 The Government’s View on Article 9 of the Constitution

1 Permitted Self-Defense Capability

Under the Constitution, Japan is permitted to possess the required minimum self-defense capability. The specific limit is subject to change according to the prevailing international situation, the level of military technologies, and various other factors, and it is discussed and decided through annual budget and other deliberations by the Diet on behalf of the people. Whether such capability constitutes a “war potential” that is prohibited by Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution must be considered within the context of Japan’s overall military strength. Therefore, whether the SDF should be allowed to possess certain armaments depends on whether such possession would cause its total military strength to exceed the constitutional limit. The possession of armaments deemed to be offensive weapons designed to be used only for the mass destruction of another country is not permissible under any circumstance as it would, by definition, exceed the minimum necessary level. For example, the SDF is not allowed to possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), long-range strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers.

2 Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution

In the past, the Government had interpreted Article 9 of the Constitution to mean that armed force could be used to exercise the right of self-defense only when the following three conditions were met: (1) When there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan; (2) When there are no appropriate means to deal with such aggression other than by resorting to the right of self-defense; and (3) When the use of armed force is confined to be the minimum necessary level. However, it has been concluded in the Cabinet’s decision made on July 1, 2014, “Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People,” that “the use of force” should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense when the following “three new conditions” are met: (1) When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness; (2) When there is no appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people; (3) Use of force to the minimum extent necessary. The following is the interpretation of the measures for self-defense permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution defined in the abovementioned Cabinet decision.

The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit “use of force” in international relations in all forms. However, when considered in light of “the right (of the people) to live in peace” as recognized in the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution which stipulates, “their (all the people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” shall be the supreme consideration in
governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of self-defense necessary to maintain its peace and security and to ensure its survival. Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful situations where the people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence, “use of force” to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted. This is the basis, or the so-called basic logic, of the view consistently expressed by the government to date with regard to “use of force” exceptionally permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution, and clearly shown in the document “Relationship between the Right of Collective Self-Defense and the Constitution” submitted by the Government to the Committee on Audit of the House of Councillors on October 14, 1972. This basic logic must be maintained under Article 9 of the Constitution.

To date, the Government has considered that “use of force” under this basic logic is permitted only when an “armed attack” against Japan occurs. However, in light of the situation in which the security environment surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed and continuously evolving by shifts in the global power balance, the rapid progress of technological innovation, and threats such as weapons of mass destruction, etc., in the future, even an armed attack occurring against a foreign country could actually threaten Japan’s survival, depending on its purpose, scale and manner, etc.

Japan, as a matter of course, will make the utmost diplomatic efforts, should a dispute occur, for its peaceful settlement and take all necessary responses in accordance with the existing domestic laws and regulations developed based upon the constitutional interpretation to date. It is still required, however, to make all necessary preparations in order to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people.

Under such recognition and as a result of careful examination in light of the current security environment, it has been concluded that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date.

As a matter of course, Japan’s “use of force” must be carried out while observing international law. At the same time, a legal basis in international law and constitutional interpretation need to be understood separately. In certain situations, the aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution is, under international law, based on the right of collective self-defense. The Government has reached a conclusion that although this “use of force” includes those which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted under the Constitution, only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words, for defending Japan.

### Geographic Boundaries within which the Right of Self-Defense may be Exercised

The use of the minimum necessary force to defend Japan under the right of self-defense is not necessarily confined to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory, territorial waters, and airspace. However, it is difficult to give a general definition of the actual extent to which it may be used, as this would vary with the situation.

Nevertheless, the Government interprets that, as a general rule, the Constitution does not permit armed troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas deployment of troops would exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level of self-defense.

### Right of Belligerency

Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution prescribe that “the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” However, the “right of belligerency” does not mean the right to engage in battle; rather, it is a general term for various rights that a belligerent nation has under international law, including the authority to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force and to occupy enemy territory. On the other hand, Japan may of course use the minimum level of force necessary to defend itself. For example, if Japan inflicts casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force in exercising its right of self-defense, this is conceptually distinguished from the exercise of the right of belligerency, even though those actions do not appear to be different. Occupation of enemy territory, however, would exceed the minimum necessary level of self-defense and is not permissible.
Under the Constitution, Japan has efficiently built a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military, observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

**1  Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy**

The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, that the extent of the use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense. The policy including these matters refers to the posture of a passive defense strategy in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution.

**2  Not Becoming a Military Power**

There is no established definition for the concept of a military power. For Japan, however, not becoming a military power that could threaten other countries means that Japan will not possess and maintain a military capability strong enough to pose a threat to other countries, beyond the minimum necessary for self-defense.

**3  Non-Nuclear Principles**

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles refers to those of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not allowing them to be brought into Japan. Japan adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a fixed line of national policy. Japan is also prohibited from manufacturing and possessing nuclear weapons under the Atomic Energy Basic Law. In addition, Japan ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and as a non-nuclear weapons state, has an obligation not to manufacture and acquire nuclear weapons.

Civilian control refers to the priority of politics to the military in a democratic state or democratic political control of military strength. Japan has, by giving serious reflection to the regrettable state of affairs that happened until the end of World War II, adopted the following strict civilian control system that is entirely different from the one under the former Constitution. Civilian control aims to ensure that the SDF is maintained and operated in accordance with the will of the people.

The Diet, which represents Japanese nationals, makes legislative and budgetary decisions on such matters as the allotted number of the SDF personnel and main organizations of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) / the SDF. It also issues approval for defense operations of the SDF. The function of national defense, as a general administrative function, entirely falls under the executive power of the Cabinet. The Constitution requires that the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State who constitute the Cabinet be civilians. The Prime Minister, on behalf of the whole Cabinet, holds the authority of supreme command and supervision of the SDF. The Minister of Defense, who is exclusively in charge of national defense, exercises general control and supervision over the SDF duties. In addition, the National Security Council of Japan under the Cabinet deliberates important matters on national security.

At the MOD, the Minister of Defense is responsible for issues concerning national defense, and as the head of the MOD also controls and manages the SDF. The Minister of Defense is assisted in policy planning and political affairs by the State Minister of Defense, the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) and the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense.

In addition, the Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense provide the Minister of Defense with advice on important issues under the jurisdiction of the MOD based on their expertise and experience. The Defense Council consisting of political appointees, civilian officials and uniformed SDF personnel of the MOD deliberates on basic principles concerning administrative affairs under the Ministry’s jurisdiction.

Through these ways, the MOD aims to further
enhance the operation of the civilian control system.

As mentioned above, the civilian control system is well established. However, in order to ensure that the system achieves good results, it is necessary to continue making practical efforts in both political and administrative aspects, along with a deep interest in national defense taken by the people.
As the security environment surrounding Japan grows increasingly severe, Japan faces mounting security challenges it needs to address. Under such circumstances, it is necessary to carry forward the policies pertaining to national security from a strategic perspective under strong political leadership with the Prime Minister at its core. For this reason, the National Security Council was established in the Cabinet in December 2013 to provide a platform to discuss important matters with regard to Japan’s security. Since its establishment, the Council has met 179 times (as of the end of June 2018) and has been serving as a control tower for foreign and defense policies. The National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) are also deliberated and approved in this National Security Council.

The National Security Secretariat established within the Cabinet Secretariat provides constant support to the National Security Council as its secretariat. The Secretariat is also tasked with planning and designing, and overall coordination of basic guidelines and important matters with regard to foreign and defense policies pertaining to national security. Administrative organs that are deeply involved in policies support the Secretariat with both personnel and information. The Secretariat has many civilians and uniformed personnel of the MOD with concurrent posts, who are engaged in the planning and designing of policies, as well as the utilization of respective specialized knowledge. In addition, information such as global military trends are shared in a timely manner.

The enhanced ability to plan and design national security policies has led to systematic alignment of Japan’s national security, and to providing a direction for policies with regard to new security challenges. Furthermore, individual defense policies are formulated and efforts to expedite decision-making are made based on the basic guidelines discussed at the National Security Council, and this is contributing significantly to improved planning and execution of policies within the MOD.

![A scene from a National Security Council meeting held upon North Korea’s launch of ballistic missile (Photo courtesy of the Cabinet Secretariat Public Relations Office)](image_url)
Japan’s National Security Policy Framework

The NSS approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet in December of 2013 represents Japan’s first ever basic policy on national security with a focus on diplomatic affairs and defense policy. The NSS defines approaches that Japan should follow based on a long-term view of its national interests. It replaces the Basic Policy on National Defense, which had served as the basis for Japan’s defense policies theretofore.

The NDPG, which was established based on the NSS, defines basic policies for Japan’s future defense, the role of its defense capabilities, and objectives for specific SDF equipment. The NDPG was formulated with a medium-to-long-term outlook because the acquisition of defense equipment and the establishment of troop operational systems cannot be accomplished overnight and requires many years of planning. The NSS and NDPG are mainly designed for the next decade or so.

The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) specifies a maximum budget and the amount of mainstay defense equipment to be acquired over the subsequent five-year period in order to achieve the defense capability targets defined in the NDPG. The fiscal year budget is drawn on the MTDP substantiated as projects, and the necessary expenses for each fiscal year will be appropriated based on relevant situations.

To date, the NDPG has contained mention of nationwide basic security policies focusing on defense policy to a certain extent. The NSS carries it with great meaning as the definitive statement of the Government’s basic policy on national security, with a focus on diplomatic affairs and defense policy.

Outline of the National Security Strategy:
Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the Principle of International Cooperation

Japan is committed to continuing the path it has followed to date as a peace-loving nation and, as a major player in international politics and business, it also seeks its own security as well as peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region from its stance as a Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the principle of international cooperation. Japan will contribute more proactively than ever before to the peace, security and prosperity of the international community.

In achieving the aforementioned fundamental principle of national security, the NSS stipulates national interests and goals, and presents a strategic approach that needs to be employed.

KEY WORD

Proactive Contribution to Peace

A fundamental principle of national security introduced in the NSS, which refers to Japan’s commitment to contribute to ensuring international peace, stability and prosperity even more proactively and in a manner proportional to Japan’s national power.
Since it was first developed in 1976, the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) has been established five times. The current National Defense Program Guidelines FY2014 and beyond was introduced in 2013. The NDPG is a “grand design” to ensure peace and security of Japan, which establishes the posture of Japan’s defense forces and the level to achieve based on the security environment and the changes in military situation surrounding Japan. Therefore, the NDPG must squarely face the reality of security environment all the time and set forth the defense forces which are truly needed to protect the Japanese people.

The NDPG is the first of its kind to be developed based on the National Security Strategy (NSS), and it calls for the building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force as the cornerstone for the protection of Japan’s peace and security.

### Changes of the Views regarding Defense Capability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Basic ideas</th>
<th>Background</th>
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<tr>
<td>1976 NDPG</td>
<td>- The concept of Basic Defense Capability&lt;br&gt;- Maintain a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation preventing a power vacuum that destabilizes the region, rather than coping with a direct military threat to Japan</td>
<td>- Defeate and Cold War coexisting in global community&lt;br&gt;- Balanced relationship among the United States, China, and the Soviet Union in the vicinity of Japan&lt;br&gt;- Need to show the target of defense force buildup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 NDPG</td>
<td>- Basically follow the concept of Basic Defense Capability&lt;br&gt;- “Dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters” and “contributing to building a more stable security environment” added to the roles of defense capability, joining the existing role of “defense of the nation”</td>
<td>- The end of Cold War&lt;br&gt;- International situation with unpredictability and uncertainty&lt;br&gt;- National expectations to international contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 NDPG</td>
<td>- Capability to work independently and proactively on implementing international peace cooperation activities, as well as dealing effectively with new threats and diverse contingencies&lt;br&gt;- Succeeding the effective parts of the concept of basic defense capability</td>
<td>- New threats such as international terrorism and ballistic missile attacks&lt;br&gt;- Direct connection between world peace and Japan’s peace&lt;br&gt;- Necessarily to convert the policy from putting weight on deterrence to handling the situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 NDPG</td>
<td>- Build up of a Dynamic Defense Force (Not bound by the concept of Basic Defense Capability )&lt;br&gt;- Facilitating effective deterrence of and responses to various contingencies, and making it possible to proactively conduct activities to further stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security environment in a dynamic manner</td>
<td>- Change in global power balance&lt;br&gt;- Complex military situation surrounding Japan&lt;br&gt;- Diversification of the military role in global society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 NDPG</td>
<td>- Build up of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force</td>
<td>- Security situation surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe&lt;br&gt;- U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region&lt;br&gt;- Lessons learned from the Self-Defense Forces experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake</td>
</tr>
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1. Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet in December 2013
security in light of Japan’s geographical characteristics under the new security environment.

Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the number and the duration of situations, including so-called “gray-zone” situations (see Part 1, Chapter 1, Section 1), which require the Self Defense Forces (SDF)’s commitment are both increasing.

Among these situations, the qualitative and quantitative capabilities of the defense force underpinning the SDF activities were not necessarily sufficient. The NDPG, being fully mindful of these needs, calls for the enhancement of deterrence and response capability by pursuing further joint operations, improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct activities, as well as developing defense capabilities adequate both in quality and quantity that underpin various activities. To this end, Japan has conducted capability assessments based on joint operations in relation to the SDF’s total functions and capabilities, in order to identify the functions and capabilities that should be comprehensively prioritized. The NDPG carries great significance as it has made it possible to adapt to an ever-changing security environment surrounding Japan, and realize a more prioritized and efficient defense capability build-up, based on the results of these capability assessments. Additionally, it requires the build-up of the most effective operational posture, by further strengthening a wide-ranging logistics support foundation.

The NDPG discusses new trends in the global security environment and the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. With regard to the new trends in the global security environment, it mentions: 1) expanded and deepened interdependence among countries; 2) increase in the number of gray-zone situations; 3) change in the power balance; 4) undue infringement upon freedom of the high seas; and 5) securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace. With regard to the trends in the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, it lists general situations, including that Japan faces security vulnerabilities such as frequent natural disasters, concentration of population, and a large number of nuclear power plants in coastal areas.

Japan’s Security and Defense Policy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance

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2 The NDPG discusses that Japan’s geographical characteristics make it a maritime state, therefore, securing the safety of maritime and air traffic constitutes the basis of peace and prosperity. It also states that Japan faces security vulnerabilities such as frequent natural disasters, concentration of population, and a large number of nuclear power plants in coastal areas.

3 The NDPG describes new trends in the global security environment and the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. With regard to the new trends in the global security environment, it mentions: 1) expanded and deepened interdependence among countries; 2) increase in the number of gray-zone situations; 3) change in the power balance; 4) undue infringement upon freedom of the high seas; and 5) securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace. With regard to the trends in the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, it lists general situations, including that gray-zone situations tend to linger and could develop into more serious situations. In addition, the NDPG discusses military trends in North Korea, China, Russia and the United States.

4 Specifically, the NDPG calls for the strengthening of various fields as the basic foundation for the SDF in areas such as training and exercise, operational infrastructure, personnel and education, medical care, defense production, technological bases, efficient acquisition of equipment, research and development, collaboration with local communities, communication capabilities, intellectual base, and the promotion of reform of the Ministry of Defense (MOD).
3 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s national security. Also, the Japan-U.S. Alliance functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity not only of Japan, but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. From this perspective, Japan will place emphasis on: strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; strengthening and expanding of cooperation in a broad range of fields; and steady implementation of measures relating to the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan.

4 Active Promotion of Security Cooperation

(1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region

Japan will promote a variety of cooperative initiatives in a multi-layered manner to ease the atmosphere of confrontation and the sense of curiosity towards one another in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, with regard to the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia and India, Japan will make efforts to improve cooperation and interoperability. Japan will also endeavor to promote dialogue and exchanges with China and Russia.

Additionally, with regard to capacity building assistance, Japan will promote and carry it out in full coordination with diplomatic policy initiatives, including Official Development Assistance (ODA), and Japan will expand the range of countries receiving support as well as its scope.

Furthermore, in multilateral security cooperation and dialogue, Japan, in cooperation with the United States and Australia, will proactively contribute to building cooperative relationships in the region, and Japan will actively participate in multilateral joint training and exercises.

(2) Cooperation with the International Community

It is very difficult for a single country to respond to global security challenges on its own. Moreover, as the roles of military forces have diversified, such forces play an important role in building peace and promoting confidence-building. Therefore, Japan will continue and strengthen various initiatives concerning arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and capacity building assistance on a regular basis in cooperation with the international community. Specifically, Japan will strengthen its cooperation with the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), along with the United Kingdom, France and other European countries. Furthermore, Japan will actively promote various international peace cooperation activities in a multi-layered manner, and in particular, will continue to actively conduct activities utilizing the SDF’s capabilities.

3 Future Defense Force Japan Should Achieve

1 Roles of the Defense Forces

(1) Effective Deterrent of and Response to Various Situations

Japan will achieve intelligence superiority through persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities in an extensive surrounding area to detect any signs of development at an early stage. Through such activities, Japan will clearly express its resolve not to tolerate any change of the status quo by force, thereby preventing various situations from occurring.

At the same time, Japan will swiftly and seamlessly respond to situations from an early stage, including gray-zone situations, and establish the necessary posture to continuously address a protracted situation. Moreover, Japan will implement an effective response tailored to each situation, even in cases when multiple events occur in a consecutive or concurrent manner.

In particular, the following points will be emphasized: (1) ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan; (2) response to an attack on remote islands; (3) response to ballistic missile attacks; (4) responses in outer space and cyberspace; and (5) responses to major disasters.

(2) Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environment

Through persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan, and the timely and appropriate implementation of training, exercises, and various other activities, Japan will ensure the stability of the security environment in
the region. Moreover, by working in partnership with its allies and partners, Japan will promote multi-tiered initiatives, including bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchange, joint training and exercises, and capacity building assistance.

In order to respond appropriately to global security issues, Japan will strengthen various initiatives focused on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as actively promote international peace cooperation activities, anti-piracy initiatives and capacity building assistance. Japan will attach importance to the following in particular: (1) holding training and exercises; (2) promoting defense cooperation and exchange; (3) promoting capacity building assistance; (4) ensuring maritime security; (5) implementing international peace cooperation activities; and (6) cooperating with efforts to promote arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

## Priorities in Strengthening Architecture of the SDF

### (1) Basic Approach

Based on the results of the capability assessments conducted based on the standpoint of joint operations in relation to various potential contingencies, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime superiority and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response in various situations, including defense posture buildup in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities with a consideration to establishing a wide-ranging logistics support foundation.

At the same time, in terms of preparation for an invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will possess the minimum necessary level of expertise and skills, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization.

### (2) Functions and Capabilities to be Emphasized

The SDF will selectively strengthen the following functions and capabilities in particular, paying attention to enhance joint functions with interoperability with the U.S. Forces.

![Fig. II-2-1-2 (Functions and Capabilities to be Emphasized and Their Content)](image-url)
Architecture of Each Service of the Self-Defense Forces

(1) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

In order to respond swiftly to an attack on remote islands and various other situations, the GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades, and an armored division). In addition, the GSDF will maintain mobile operating units capable of effectively performing amphibious and other operations. The GSDF will maintain half of these rapidly deployable basic operational units in Hokkaido, given its excellent training environment.

The GSDF will implement rationalization and streamlining with a particular focus on tanks/howitzers and rockets, and review the organization and equipment of units.

The number of GSDF personnel will be maintained at around 159,000, which was the same level as at the end of FY2013, in order to ensure sufficient personnel availability to respond to major disasters or other situations.

(2) Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)

The MSDF will increase the number of destroyers to 54 (14 escort divisions) by using new destroyers that offer improved response capabilities for various missions and have more compact designs, and will maintain ship-based patrol helicopter units in order to secure the defense of surrounding waters and ensure the safety of maritime traffic. Furthermore, two Destroyers equipped with the Aegis Weapon System will be added, bringing the fleet to eight.

Furthermore, in order to effectively carry out regular information gathering, and warning and surveillance activities, as well as patrolling of surrounding waters and defense operations, the MSDF will maintain an augmented submarine fleet and patrol aircraft units.

(3) Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)

The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units in order to provide persistent ISR in most air space over Japan and the surrounding areas. By consolidating warning and control operations at air defense command centers, the ASDF will gradually change warning groups into warning squadrons as well as establish one new squadron in the air warning unit.

As for Fighter Units, the 13th squadron will be newly established, and Air Reconnaissance Unit will be abolished. In addition, one squadron will be added to the Aerial Refueling/Transport Unit, making it a two-squadron architecture.

Furthermore, the ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units providing multi-layered defense for Japan against ballistic missile attacks, together with the Aegis destroyers, as well as protecting key areas in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units of the GSDF.

The NDPG sets out the form of Japan’s defense capabilities over the next decade or so. The National Security Council will conduct regular, systematic review over the course of implementation of the various measures and programs. In addition, smooth, swift and accurate transition to the future defense capabilities will be facilitated through validations based on joint operational capability assessment. When major changes in the situation are anticipated during the review and verification process, necessary examination considering the security environment at that time will be implemented and these guidelines will be revised adequately. In light of the increasingly severe fiscal conditions, Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in the defense capability buildup while ensuring harmony with other national initiatives.
The security environment surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly severe at a pace much faster than when the current NDPG was set forth. As exemplified by North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, China’s military build-up lacking transparency as well as forceful and unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Sea, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and escalating terrorism throughout the world, the international community today faces broad and diverse security challenges. Of all these challenges, new areas of activities such as cyberspace and outer space require particular attention. With that being said, Japan’s security policy rests on our own effort, and it is required of Japan to boost its defense capabilities and try to expand its roles.

Prime Minister Abe announced in his Policy Address...
to the 196th Session of the Diet in January 2018 that the Government would, while maintaining the exclusively defense-oriented policy as given, revise the NDPG. In the background is the imperative to identify defense capabilities that are truly needed to protect the Japanese people, and in doing so, the Government must squarely face the harsh reality in Japan’s surroundings rather than simply extending the existing capabilities.

As the current Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) ends in FY2018, the Government is reviewing the NDPG targeting to revise it by the end of December 2018.

In reviewing the current NDPG, it is critical to secure necessary and sufficient “quality” and “quantity” of defense capability. Given that the utilization of new domains, such as cyberspace and outer space is especially vital, the conventional method of categorization, namely land, sea, and airspace is no longer relevant, and Japan must fully commit itself to improve capabilities in these new areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fig. II-2-1-4 Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Training and Exercises</td>
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<td>Operations Infrastructure</td>
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<td>Medicine</td>
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<td>Defense Production and Technological Bases</td>
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<td>Efficient Acquisition of Equipment</td>
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<td>Research and Development (R&amp;D)</td>
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<td>Collaboration with Local Communities</td>
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<td>Boosting Communication Capabilities</td>
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<td>Enhancing the Intellectual Base</td>
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<td>Promoting Reform of the MOD</td>
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</table>
Section 2 Outline of the Medium Term Defense Program

1 Program Guidelines

Based on the NDPG, the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) (MTDP) states that an appropriate defense buildup is to be achieved under the following six basic program guidelines.

In reinforcing the structure of the SDF, Japan will prioritize the improvement of the 9 functions and capabilities which the NDPG specifies as those that should be emphasized, and aim to build highly effective integrated defense forces in an efficient manner.

2 Authorized Number of SDF Personnel and Quantities of Major Procurement

The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the end of FY2018 will be approximately 159,000, with approximately 151,000 being SDF Regular Personnel, and approximately 8,000 being Ready Reserve Personnel.

The authorized number of SDF personnel of the MSDF and ASDF through FY2018 will be approximately at the same levels as at the end of FY2013.

The Annex Table shows details of the quantities of...
major procurement. Japan aims to develop the defense forces described in the Annex Table of the NDPG over a 10-year time frame.

### Expenditures

The expenditures required to implement the defense force developments described in this program amount to approximately 24,670 billion yen in FY2013 prices. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, approximately 700 billion yen will be secured by means of further streamlining and rationalization through efforts such as equipment procurement reform. The annual defense budgets for the implementation of this program will be allocated within a limit of approximately 23,970 billion yen over the next five years.
### Section 3 Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2018

Japan will steadily build up its defense capability during FY2018, which is the final fiscal year under the MTDP based on the NDPG, to establish a dynamic joint defense force.

In doing so, Japan will place particular emphasis on the following measures: ensuring security of sea...
and airspace surrounding Japan; response to attacks on remote islands; response to ballistic missile attacks, while also focusing on ensuring technological superiority, and the maintenance and enhancement of defense production and technological bases to steadily build-up defense capabilities for a dynamic joint defense force.

Furthermore, considering the increasingly severe situation in Japan’s public finance, Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiencies and streamlining through efforts such as longer-term contracts, while harmonizing these efforts with other measures taken by the Government.

In light of the outcome of the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting held in June 2018, Japan believes it is important for the international community to stay united and make efforts to ensure the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges by North Korea, and we must watch North Korea’s future concrete actions closely. It is no surprise that the MOD, whose responsibility is to protect the lives and property of the nationals, needs to be fully ready to be able to respond to any contingencies or situations. The MOD will continue to carry forward various programs, including the initiative to introduce Aegis Ashore, which is allocated in the FY2018 budget.

**Commentary**

**Deployment of stand-off missiles**

Japan introduces stand-off missiles to effectively defend our country ensuring the safety of Self Defense Forces (SDF) personnel and in light of the increasingly severe national security environment.

Given significant expansion of radar coverage and anti-aircraft missile range due to significant advances in military technologies in various countries, SDF jets are currently compelled to respond within the range of these threats. Deployment of stand-off missiles enables SDF to respond from outside the range. As a result, SDF will be able to respond to invading forces while protecting the safety of SDF personnel.

Stand-off missile, which is vital to Japan’s defense while protecting the safety of SDF personnel, is necessary to take out hostile forces when Japan is armed-attacked by the forces and is minimum necessary equipment for self defense.
Defense-related expenditures include expenses for improving defense capabilities and maintaining and managing the SDF, as well as expenses necessary for the implementation of measures against neighborhood affairs in the vicinity of defense facilities. Defense-related expenditures have been on a hike for 6 years in a row since FY2014, including the duration of the current MTDP under which defense expenditures are set to increase by 0.8% in real average over the course of five years.

In comparison with the previous fiscal year, defense-related expenditures for FY2018 were increased by 39.2 billion yen to 4.9388 trillion yen. When including expenses related to Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) and expense for the introduction of new government aircraft, defense-related expenditures were increased by 66 billion yen from the previous fiscal year to 5.1911 trillion yen.

Additionally, the supplementary budget for FY2018 contains an appropriation of 234.5 billion yen as necessary expenses for securing stable operations of the SDF, which includes responding to ballistic missile attacks.

### Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures

Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into “personnel and food provision expenses,” which covers items such as wages and meals for SDF personnel, and “material expenses,” which finance the repair and maintenance of equipment, the purchase of fuel, the education and training of SDF personnel and the procurement of equipment and the others. Material expenses are further classified into “obligatory outlay expenses,” which are paid based on contracts concluded in previous fiscal years, and “general material expenses,” which are paid under current-year contracts. Material expenses are also referred to as “program expenses,” and since general material expenses include repair costs for equipment, education and training expenses for personal,
and the purchase of fuel, they are referred to also as “activity expenses.” The MOD terms this classification method as “classification by expenses.”

Personnel and food provision expenses as well as obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory expenses, account for 80% of the total defense-related budget. The remaining 20% of the budget includes spending for repairing equipment and for implementing measures to alleviate the impact on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan. As such, a high percentage

![Fig. II-2-4-2 Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures Over the Past 15 Years](image)

Note: The figures above do not include SACO-related expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) and expenses for the introduction of new government aircraft. Including these expenses, total defense-related expenditures were as follows: ¥4,902.6 billion in FY2004, ¥4,856.0 billion yen in FY2005, ¥4,813.6 billion in FY2006, ¥4,801.3 billion in FY2007, ¥4,779.8 billion in FY2008, ¥4,774.1 billion in FY2009, ¥4,790.3 billion in FY2010, ¥4,775.2 billion in FY2011, ¥4,713.8 billion in FY2012, ¥4,753.8 billion in FY2013, ¥4,884.8 billion in FY2014, ¥4,980.1 billion in FY2015, ¥5,054.1 billion in FY2016, ¥5,125.1 billion in FY2017, and ¥5,191.1 billion in FY2018.

![Fig. II-2-4-3 Relationship between Annual Expenditure and Future Obligation Concerning New Contracts](image)
of the budget is allocated for maintenance purposes. For this reason, the breakdown of the defense-related expenditures cannot be easily altered in a significant manner on a single-year basis.

Personnel and food provision expenses were increased by 18.7 billion yen from the previous fiscal year, while obligatory outlay expenses for the year increased by 22.6 billion yen. General material expenses decreased by 2.1 billion yen from the previous fiscal year.\(^2\)

In addition to the annual budget expenditure, the amount of future obligations concerning new contracts also indicates payments for the following year and beyond (the amount of future obligation arising in the applicable fiscal year). In the build-up of defense capabilities, it is common to take multiple years from contract to delivery or completion, in areas such as the procurement of vessels, aircraft, and other primary equipment, as well as the construction of buildings such as aircraft hangars and barracks. Consequently, for such items, a procedure is undertaken whereby a multi-year contract is arranged, and it is promised in advance at the time of the contract that payments will be made in the following fiscal year and beyond (within five years, in principle). The sum of money to be paid in the following fiscal year and beyond, based on such a multi-year contract, is called the “future obligation.” The amount of future obligation concerning new contracts arising in FY2018 increased from the previous fiscal year by 23.8 billion yen (1.2%).

Furthermore, if looked at on a contract basis,\(^3\) which shows the scale of operations, there is an increase from the previous fiscal year of 21.7 billion yen (0.7%).

### 3. Initiatives for Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement

In light of the increasingly severe fiscal conditions, the MTDP specifies securing approximately 700 billion yen based on a policy to achieve further streamlining and rationalization in the defense capability buildup.

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2. The comparison with the previous year is concerning expenditure excluding the SACO-related expenses and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) (216.1 billion yen), and expense for the introduction of new government aircraft (31.2 billion yen).

3. The sum total of general material expenses and future obligation concerning new contracts, which shows the amount of the material expenses (program expenses) that are to be contracted in the applicable fiscal year and to be paid in the same fiscal year and beyond. The amount is 2.9887 trillion yen in FY2018.
For this purpose, the MOD is currently carrying out reviews to achieve efficiency, and has sought a reduction of approximately 573 billion yen from FY2014 to FY2017 through the following measures: 1) utilize long-term contracts (Part III, Chapter 4, Section 3); 2) review maintenance methods; 3) use of civilian goods and review of specifications; 4) bulk purchase of equipment; 5) scrutiny of the prime cost. Furthermore, approximately 197 billion yen of cost reduction is expected in the FY2018 budget. Concrete initiatives introduced in the FY2018 budget are as follows.

- A reduction of approximately 5 billion yen by making an over five-years long-term contract of Performance Based Logistics (PBL) (Part III, Chap.) for maintenance equipment of the F110 engine (fighter (F-2)).
- A reduction of approximately 68.5 billion yen through a review of maintenance methods including extending regular maintenance intervals for the engine of F7-10 (fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1)).
- A reduction of approximately 16.6 billion yen by pursuing cost savings through the use of civilian goods and review of specifications of equipment such as the maintenance of the tactical network control system (TNCS).
- A reduction of approximately 37.1 yen through bulk procurement of equipment in a single fiscal year that could lead to a reduction in expenses.
- A reduction of approximately 70.1 billion yen through initiatives such as scrutinizing the unit cost and related expenses of major equipment, etc.

Monolithic understanding of the defense expenditures of each country is not possible in view of differences in the socioeconomic and budgetary systems. There is not an internationally unified definition of defense expenditures, and breakdowns of defense expenditures are unclear in some countries where such data is publicly disclosed.

Furthermore, in comparing the defense expenditures of each country, though there exists the method of converting their defense expenditures into dollar amounts at respective currency rates, their dollar-based defense...
expenses calculated in this way do not necessarily reflect the precise value based on each country’s price levels. Therefore, the results of converting Japan’s defense-related expenditures and those of other countries officially published by each government into dollar amounts, using the purchasing power parity of each country reported by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), are shown in Fig. II-2-4-6 (The Defense Budgets of Major Countries).

Fig. II-2-4-7 Changes in Defense Budgets in Surrounding Countries Over the Past Ten Years

Notes: 1. Created based on the defense budgets published by each country.
2. These are numerical values obtained by simple calculation of the ratio between the defense budgets each year, with the FY2008 value as 1 (times) (rounded to two decimal places).
3. The definition and breakdown of the defense budgets of each country are not necessarily clear. As we must take into account various factors such as price levels of each country, it is very difficult to draw a comparison of defense budgets among countries.

In addition, Fig. II-2-4-7 (Changes in Defense Budgets in Surrounding Countries Over the Past Ten Years) shows the changes in defense expenditures of Japan’s neighboring countries over the past ten years.
The security environment surrounding Japan is increasingly severe, and we are now in an era where threats could easily spread beyond national borders, and no country can maintain its own security only by itself any longer.

Against this background, it is first and foremost important to advance vibrant diplomacy in order to maintain peace and security of Japan, and ensure its survival, as well as to secure its people’s lives. However, at the same time, it is also necessary to prepare for the worst-case scenario.

Specifically, it is essential to avoid armed conflicts beforehand and prevent threats from reaching Japan by appropriately developing, maintaining and operating Japan’s own defense capability, strengthening mutual cooperation with the United States which is Japan’s ally, and other partner countries, and in particular, further elevating the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the peace and stability of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region.

On that basis, in order to resolutely secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situation and contribute even more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community under the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, it is necessary to develop domestic legislation that enables seamless responses.

In May 2014, following a report submitted by the Advisory Panel on the Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security and in accordance with the basic orientation for the way that further deliberations would take place as presented by Prime Minister Abe, discussions were held in the ruling parties and studies were also conducted by the Government.

Following this, in July 2014, a Cabinet Decision was made on “Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People,” which set forth the basic policy for the development of legislation that enables seamless responses to any situations.

Reference 16 (Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect Its People)

Following the aforementioned Cabinet Decision, a legislation drafting team was launched under the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Secretariat. In addition, the Ministry of Defense established “The Study Committee on the Development of Security Legislation” with the Minister of Defense as its Chairman, and conducted the deliberations towards the development of security legislation. The deliberations in the Government were conducted based on the discussions at a total of 25 meetings in the ruling parties, and, on May 14, 2015, the Government made Cabinet Decisions on two bills, the Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security and the International Peace Support Bill. The two bills were then submitted to the 189th ordinary session of the Diet on May 15, 2015.

These two bills enable seamless responses to any situations, from the protection of assets including weapons of units of the U.S. Forces and armed forces of foreign countries during peacetime, support activities to armed forces of foreign countries, etc., in situations...
that have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security and situations that the international community is collectively addressing for peace and security (to be discussed later), to the limited use of the right of collective self-defense as a measure for self-defense to the minimum extent necessary to defend Japan when the “Three New Conditions” are satisfied.

Following the longest extension of a Diet session in the postwar, the longest Diet debate of security-related bills in the postwar period was conducted, constituting about 116 hours of debate in the House of Representatives and about 100 hours of debate in the House of Councillors, totaling about 216 hours. As a result, the two bills were passed at a plenary session of the House of Councillors and enacted on September 19, 2015, upon formation of a broad consensus, with approval of not only the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan and Komeito but also the three opposition parties of the then Assembly to Energize Japan, the then Party for Future Generations and the then New Renaissance Party (altogether five parties out of the ten political parties).

Just before the passage, these five parties reached the “Agreement Concerning the Legislation for Peace and Security” (the “Five-Party Agreement”), which include matters that should be taken into consideration in judging the applicability of the Three New Conditions related to the recognition of a “survival-threatening situation,” and committed them to obtaining a conclusion on the shape of a Diet organization for the constant surveillance and post—verification of SDF activities based on the Legislation for Peace and Security, and the strengthening of the Diet’s involvement. The Government also made a Cabinet Decision to the effect that the Government will respect the Five-Party Agreement and handle these matters appropriately. The Legislation for Peace and Security was put into force on March 29, 2016.

With the security environment surrounding Japan becoming increasingly severe, the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security has a historical significance. The legislation, which enables the SDF to provide protection and logistic support to U.S. naval vessels engaged in ballistic missile defense, helps strengthen the deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole, thereby further ensuring the peace and security of Japan through making more proactive contributions to the peace and stability of the region and the international community. The Legislation has been highly appraised around the world. This fact clearly shows that the Legislation contributes to the peace and stability of the region and the international community.

![Fig. II-3-1-1](structure_of_legislation_for_peace_and_security.png)

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4 See Chapter 1, Section 2
5 The Legislation for Peace and Security has been drawing understanding and support not only from Japan’s ally, the U.S., but also from Australia, countries of the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, the Middle East, South America, as well as ASEAN, the EU and the United Nations.
Commentary

Enhanced deterrent through peace and security legislation

Peace and security legislation implemented two years ago improved content that enables broader cooperating with the United States and other related countries than previously, such as expanding the scope of activities for which supplies and services can be provided to US troops operating in the same theater as Self Defense Forces.

In 2017, Japan delivered supplies and services to US troops collecting intelligence and provided protection to forces from other countries collaborating with Self Defense Force troops in activities that benefit Japan’s defense. These activities reinforced the Japan-US alliance and bolstered Japan’s deterrence. The peace and security legislation hence has clearly brought increased certainty to Japan’s national security. The government intends to continue to put utmost efforts into protecting the lives and peaceful existence of the Japanese people.

Commentary

The Relationship between the Legislation for Peace and Security and the Constitution

The “use of force” is permitted under the Constitution

- When an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness;
- When there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people; and
- Use of force is limited to the minimum extent necessary, only when the Three New Conditions above are satisfied. Even for the “use of force” permitted under the Three New Conditions, the basic logic of the constitutional interpretation presented in the Governmental view of 1972 (below) has not changed:

- The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit the “use of force” in international relations in all forms. However, when considered in light of “the right (of all peoples of the world) to live in peace” as recognized in the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution which stipulates, “their (all of the people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” shall be the supreme consideration in governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of self-defense necessary to maintain its peace and security and to ensure its survival.
- Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful situations where the people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence, the “use of force” to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted.

Furthermore, the “use of force” permitted under the Three New Conditions remains within the scope of the Supreme Court decision on the Sunagawa Case. The Supreme Court decision states that

- “it must be pointed out that it is natural for Japan, in the exercise of powers inherent in a state, to take measures for self-defense that may be necessary to maintain its peace and security, and to ensure its survival.”

In other words, the decision can be interpreted as recognizing that Japan should be able to take “measures for self-defense” to maintain its peace and security and ensure its survival after stating that Japan has the right to self-defense, without making a distinction between the right to individual self-defense and the right to collective self-defense.

As the Legislation for Peace and Security, which reflects the Three New Conditions described above in just proportion, maintains the basic logic of the constitutional interpretation hitherto presented by the Government and remains within the scope of the Sunagawa Case decision by the Supreme Court, the only institution endowed with the power to finally determine the constitutional interpretation, it is consistent with the Constitution.
This section gives an outline of a full picture of the framework for the Government’s responses to various contingencies as well as the main operations of the SDF including the new activities the SDF can now engage in after the streamlining of the Legislation for Peace and Security.¹

### Responses to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations

The Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and a Survival-Threatening Situation² specifies items that should be stipulated as basic principles and basic policies (the Basic Response Plan) regarding responses to Armed Attack Situation and Anticipated Armed Attack Situation, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations as well as the responsibilities of national and local governments in the event of an armed attack.

Previously, the aforementioned legislation stipulated responses to Armed Attack Situations, etc. However, considering the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan, a “Survival-Threatening Situation” was newly added to the situations to which Japan is to respond as an armed attack since even if it occurs against a foreign country it could threaten Japan’s survival as well, depending on its purpose, scale and manner. Following this, the SDF Law was also amended to define responses to such a situation as one of the SDF’s primary duties as unavoidable self-defense measures for Japan’s defense along with some other changes.

#### (1) Basic Response Plan etc.

In situations such as an Armed Attack Situation, etc., or a Survival-Threatening Situation, the Government is required to adopt the Basic Response Plan, which includes the following items, and ask for approval by the Diet. In addition, once the Basic Response Plan is adopted, a temporary Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) is to be established within the Cabinet, to implement these measures.

1. The following items concerning situations that need to be dealt with:
   a. Sequence of the event the situation, the confirmation of occurrence of an Armed Attack Situation, etc., or a Survival-Threatening Situation, and the facts that support this confirmation
   b. When the situation is confirmed as an Armed Attack Situation, etc., or a Survival-Threatening Situation,

## KEY WORD

### Armed Attack Situation and Anticipated Armed Attack Situation

- An armed attack situation means a situation where an armed attack against Japan from outside has occurred or an imminent and clear danger of the armed attack against Japan is acknowledged.
- An anticipated armed attack situation means a situation where an armed attack has yet to occur, but circumstances are growing increasingly strained and an armed attack is anticipated.

(These situations are referred to as “Armed Attack Situation, etc.” collectively.)

## KEY WORD

### Survival-Threatening Situation

A Survival-Threatening Situation means a situation where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, which in turn poses a clear risk of threatening Japan’s survival and of overturning people’s rights to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness fundamentally.

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¹ In addition to the ones explained in this section, see Reference 18 for the other conditions in which inflicting injury on a person is permitted.
² Following the addition of a Survival-Threatening Situation, the title of the Act was revised from the “Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc.” to the “Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and a Survival-Threatening Situation.”
the reason why there are no other appropriate means available to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, and the use of force is necessary to respond to the situation

(2) An overall plan to respond to the Armed Attack Situations, etc., or a Survival-Threatening Situation

(3) Important matters related to the response measures

(2) Diet Approval

In principle, the prior Diet approval is required to issue a Defense Operation order to the SDF to respond to an Armed Attack Situation or a Survival-Threatening Situation.

(3) Response Measures

In responding to Armed Attack Situations, etc., or Survival-Threatening Situations during the period for which the Basic Response Plan is valid, the designated government institutions, local governments and designated public institutions are to implement the required measures based on legal provisions during the period between the formulation and termination of the Basic Response Plan. See the reference below for the measures to be implemented.

(4) Responsibilities of the National and Local Governments

See the reference below for the responsibilities of the national and local Governments, etc. as defined in the Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and a Survival-Threatening Situation.

(5) Authority of the Prime Minister for Response Measures

Following the adoption of the Basic Response Plan, the Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) will be established within the Cabinet, which consists of the Prime Minister and other Ministers of States. The Prime Minister is to be appointed as the Chief, and some of the Ministers of States and to be appointed as the Deputy Chief.

If the Prime Minister recognizes that there are
obstacles to protecting the lives, bodies or properties of the people, or to eliminating an armed attack, and particularly when necessary response measures under comprehensive coordination are not implemented, the Prime Minister may instruct the head of the local government concerned and other relevant persons to implement the necessary response measures.

In circumstances where the necessary response measures are not implemented or if there are obstacles to protecting the lives, bodies or properties of the people or to eliminating an armed attack, and emergency responses are required in light of the situations, the Prime Minister may implement the response measures that the local governments or designated public institutions have failed to implement, or may have the Ministry of State responsible for operations relating to the relevant countermeasures implement these measures after notifying the relevant heads of local government or other relevant individuals.


In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the UN, the Government shall immediately report the measures it has taken to terminate armed attacks on Japan to the UN Security Council.

(7) Revisions to Other Relevant Legislation

a. Act Related to the Actions of the U.S. Forces and Others

Before the revision, the U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Act specified measures, etc., to be taken to ensure smooth and efficient operation of the U.S. Forces necessary to terminate an armed attack in Armed Attack Situations, etc., based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In addition to support for the U.S. Forces responding to Armed Attack Situations, etc., support operations for the armed forces of foreign countries other than the United States in Armed Attack Situations, etc., as well as support operations for the U.S. Forces and the armed
forces of other foreign countries in Survival-Threatening Situations were added in the revision. 

b. Maritime Transportation Restriction Act

The previous Maritime Transportation Restriction Act had provided procedures for stopped ship inspections and taking ship measures conducted by the MSDF to control maritime transportation of weapons, ammunition and military personnel, etc., to armed forces, etc., of foreign countries making armed attacks against Japan in Armed Attack Situations. The revision Act added the provisions to control maritime transportation in Survival-Threatening Situations. Furthermore, the waters in which the MSDF can take these measures. According to the revised law the MSDF can control maritime transportation in Japan’s territorial waters, territorial waters of foreign countries (only when their consent is obtained) and the high seas, although it was previously restricted to Japan’s territorial waters and the high seas surrounding Japan.

c. Prisoners of War Act

The Prisoners of War Act previously specified items necessary for the detention, internment and other forms of treatment of prisoners of war, etc., in Armed Attack Situations in order to ensure the appropriate practice of the International Humanitarian Law regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, etc. The provisions were added for the application of the Prisoners of War Act in Survival-Threatening Situations as well.

d. Act Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities

To ensure the appropriate and rapid operations of the SDF and the U.S. Forces and measures vital to the protection of the people, the Act Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities provides for procedures to be taken for comprehensive coordination of the use of specific public facilities (ports, airports, roads, waters, air zones and radio waves) in Armed Attack Situations, etc. The operations of the armed forces of foreign countries other than the U.S. Forces in Armed Attack Situations, etc., were added to the scope of coordination of the use of specific public facilities.

The Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations provides for appropriate and rapid response measures to be implemented in emergency situations other than an Armed Attack Situation and Survival-Threatening Situations in order for the Government to ensure the peace and independence of the country, and to maintain the security of the country and its people.

(1) Positioning as the Mission of the SDF

The primary duty of the SDF had been to “defend Japan against direct or indirect aggression.” Now since the purpose of the SDF’s operation in Survival-Threatening Situations stemming from an armed attack on a foreign country is also to defend Japan as well, the revised legislation stipulates this is one of the SDF’s primary duties.

(2) Defense Operation

Although an Armed Attack Situation, had been the only situation in which a Defense Operation order may be issued, the revised legislation newly added Survival-Threatening Situations to this category. Following this revision, the Prime Minister can now issue a Defense Operation order to the whole or part of the SDF when it is deemed necessary for the defense of Japan in Armed Attack Situations and Survival-Threatening Situations. As it had been before the law revision, prior Diet approval is required for a Defense Operation order in principle. The SDF under Defense Operation duty is allowed to exercise the use of force only when the “New Three Conditions” are satisfied.

(3) Others

Among the provisions setting forth a variety of authorities and special measures, etc., necessary for SDF operations
on a Defense Operation order, those whose purpose is entirely to respond to direct armed attack on physical damage against Japan are not to be applied to Survival-Threatening Situations.\(^9\)

### Civil Protection

#### (1) Outline of the Civil Protection Act and the Civil Protection Dispatches

The Civil Protection Act\(^10\) stipulates the responsibilities of the national and local governments as well as measures for evacuation, relief, and response to armed attack-induced disasters in order to protect the lives, bodies and property of the people and to minimize influence on its livelihood in the case of Armed Attack Situations, etc., or emergency response situations.

If the Minister of Defense finds it unavoidable after receiving a request from prefectural governors,\(^11\) or receives a request from the Task Force Chief, upon approval by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense can issue civil Protection Dispatch Order to the SDF units, etc. to civil protection dispatch to conduct civil protection measures or emergency response protection measures (including assisting the evacuation of residents, providing relief to the evacuees and immediate restoration).

![Fig. II-3-2-4 Mechanism of Civil Protection Dispatches](image)

### (2) Relationship between Survival-Threatening Situations and Civil Protection Measures

The Civil Protection Act, stipulates necessary measures, including issuance of warnings and measures for the evacuation and relief of residents from the perspective of protection of the people and their livelihood from a direct attack against Japan and physical damage. A situation in which the rules of Survival Threatening Situations are applicable and warning issuance and evacuation and relief of residents are required is nothing less than a situation where an armed attack against Japan is anticipated or imminent. In such a case, it is recognized as Armed Attack Situations, etc., and necessary measures are to be implemented under the Civil Protection Act.\(^12\)

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9. The examples of application in Survival-Threatening Situations include the organization of special units, and the defense call-up of SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Reserve Personnel, etc., while the examples of non-application, which mean the examples of application only in Armed Attack Situations, etc., in other words, include measures for the construction of defense facilities, the authority to maintain public order, emergency passage, appropriation of supplies, and orders to perform duties, etc.

10. The official title of the act is the Act Concerning the Measures for Protection of the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc.

11. The Prime Minister assumes the position of the Director of the Crisis Management Headquarters, but these positions are regulated as separate entities.

12. In the case that an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival is not regarded as an armed attack situation, etc., a series of measures are to be implemented to ensure the stability of the people’s livelihood, including a stable supply of daily necessities, based on a variety of existing laws and regulations, taking thorough response measures to protect people’s livelihood without invoking the Civil Protection Act.
Previously, the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan had stipulated rear area support,13 rear area search and rescue operations14 and ship inspection operations (those set forth in the Ship Inspection Operations Law) conducted by Japan as measures to respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security in areas surrounding Japan. In accordance with the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan, the law revision deleted “in areas surrounding Japan” from “situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security in areas surrounding Japan” and changed the name of situations from “situations in areas surrounding Japan” to “situations that will have an important influence,”15 and also extended the scope of militaries that the SDF can support and add new types of response measures as follows.

1 Militaries that the SDF supports

On top of the existing “U.S. Armed Forces engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,” the revised law added “armied forces of other foreign countries engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the UN Charter” and “other similar organizations” on the armed forces, etc., responding to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, which the SDF is allowed to support.

2 Response Measures to Situations that will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security

The revised law sets out measures to respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security as (1) logistics support activities, (2) search and rescue activities, (3) ship inspection operations, and (4) other measures necessary to respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, and added “lodging, storage, use of facilities and training services” as the types of goods and services provided by the SDF in (1) logistics support activities, on top of the “supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, communications, airport and seaport services, and base services” previously. While the provision of weapons is not included, as before, the revised law allows the “provision of ammunition” and “refueling and maintenance of aircraft ready to take off for combat operations.”

The revised law made it possible to implement response measures in foreign territories, but only when the foreign country concerned consents.

3 Measures to Avoid Integration with the Use of Force

The revised law sets forth the following measures in order to avoid integration with the use of force by a foreign country and also to ensure the safety of SDF personnel:

- The SDF does not conduct activities in “the scene where a combat is actually taking place.” Regarding search and rescue operations, however, when stranded personnel have been located and rescue operations have commenced, the SDF units are allowed to continue search and rescue activities as long as the safety of these units is ensured.
- The commanding officers, etc., of the SDF units order the temporary suspension of activities, etc., if combat operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity.
- The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing activities, and if it is deemed difficult to implement operations smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, the Minister must promptly change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the activities being implemented there.

KEY WORD

Situations that will have an important influence

Situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, including situations that, if left unattended, could result in a direct armed attack on Japan.
4 Diet Approval

As before the law revision, prior diet approval is required, in principle, and ex-post facto approval is also allowed in emergency.

5 Authority for the Use of Weapons

When engaged in logistics support activities or search and rescue activities in the event of a situation that will have an important influence on Japan, SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons if necessary in order to protect oneself or other SDF members who are at the same scene, or those under the supervision of oneself (so-called “the use of weapons of self-preservation type”). In addition, SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons jointly with members of the armed forces or other organizations of foreign countries in order to protect the lives and bodies of those stationed at the camps (however, inflicting injury on a person is permitted only in the cases of legitimate self-defense and aversion of clear and present danger in “the use of weapons of self-preservation type”).

6 Ship Inspection Operations

(1) Outline
Ship inspection operations mean operations to inspect and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others) and to request, if necessary, a change of sea route, or destination port or place, for the purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures concerning trade or other economic activities to which Japan is a party, conducted based on the UN Security Council resolutions or with the consent of the flag state.

(2) Authority for the Use of Weapons
The so-called “the use of weapons of self-preservation type” is permitted.
of duties of SDF personnel, permitting them the use of weapons. In addition, partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law allows SDF personnel to exercise authority such as requesting nearby persons or ships to cooperate or boarding on other ships for inspection. The use of weapons is also permitted in order to stop a ship when certain conditions are met.

3 Counter-Piracy Operations

(1) Outline

When there is a special need to respond to acts of piracy, the Minister of Defense may order SDF units to conduct operations at sea against such acts upon approval by the Prime Minister. In order to obtain approval, the Minister of Defense shall create a response guideline and submit it to the Prime Minister.

(2) Authority for the Use of Weapons

SDF personnel may use weapons in executing duties under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act. When there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of a ship perpetrating acts of piracy, including approaching excessively close to a non-military ship, the use of weapons is permitted to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.

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21 Article 16, 17-1, 18, and Article 20-2 of the Japan Coast Guard Law.
4 Destruction Measures Against Ballistic Missiles

In case ballistic missiles or other objects launched at Japan as an armed attack against Japan or a Survival-Threatening Situation, and the New Three Conditions are simultaneously met, the SDF would cope with the situation by a Defense Operation order. On the other hand, if ballistic missiles are flying towards Japan, but the situation cannot be acknowledged as an armed attack, the Minister of Defense can take the following measures:

1. When it is anticipated that ballistic missiles or other objects are flying towards Japan and it is deemed necessary to take measures to protect lives and properties in Japan’s territory if they fall to the ground, upon approval by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense may order the SDF units to take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles in airspace over Japan’s territory or high seas once they have actually been launched towards Japan.

2. Also, besides the case of (1), the Minister of Defense may not have enough time to get approval by the Prime Minister when the situation unfolds rapidly such as the cases when there was no warning prior to the launch. In preparation for such case, the Minister of Defense may create an emergency response guideline and get approval by the Prime Minister in peacetime. Based on this emergency response guideline, the Minister of Defense can order the SDF units to take measures to destroy ballistic missiles or other objects in the airspace over Japan’s territory or high seas in advance for a certain period of time once they have actually been launched towards Japan.

5 Measures Against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace

The Minister of Defense may order SDF units to take necessary measures to make intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, use of weapons, etc.) when a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan’s territorial airspace in violation of international law, the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations.

22 Ballistic missiles or other objects except aircraft that are believed to cause grave damage to human lives or property when they fall to the ground.

23 Although there is no clear provision regarding the use of weapons, it is interpreted to be included in the “necessary measures.”
Previously, operations to protect Japanese nationals, etc. overseas in emergency situations were limited to transporting to safe places those who need protection of their lives or bodies, and rescue of Japanese nationals, etc. overseas involving the use of weapons was not allowed even in cases of terrorist attacks. In light of these circumstances, the newly established provisions enable the units of the SDF to take “rescue” that go beyond transportation and include guarding and rescue of Japanese nationals, etc. overseas whose lives or bodies could be harmed in emergency situations when the following requirements are satisfied:

(1) Procedures
Upon a request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and after subsequent consultations between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Defense issues an order following approval by the Prime Minister.

(2) Requirements for Implementation
When all of the following conditions are satisfied, the rescue measures may be implemented:

a. It needs to be confirmed that in the areas where the rescue measures are taken, the competent authorities of the country concerned are maintaining public safety and order at the time, and no act of combat will be conducted;

b. The country concerned\(^{24}\) consents to the SDF taking the rescue measures (including the use of weapons); and

c. It is expected that coordination and cooperation can be ensured between the units of the SDF and the competent authority of the country concerned in order to carry out the rescue measures as smoothly and safely as possible in response to anticipated dangers.

(3) Authority for the Use of Weapons
In carrying out their duties to implement the rescue measures, SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary, depending on the situation when there are adequate grounds to recognize the compelling need to use weapons to protect the lives and bodies of Japanese nationals and others or themselves, or to eliminate actions that obstruct their duties (including the permission to resort to the so-called “use of weapons in defense of the mission mandate.”\(^{25}\) However, causing harm to people is permitted only in cases of legitimate self-defense or evasion of clear and present danger.).

See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-9 (Response to Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas and Others)

### Protection of Weapons and Other Equipment of the Units of the U.S. Forces and the Armed Forces of Other Foreign Countries

The newly added provisions, Article 95-2 of the SDF Law, enable SDF personnel to protect the weapons and other equipment of the units of the United States Forces and the armed forces of other foreign countries that are in cooperation with the SDF and are currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan. In December 2016, the National Security Council approved “The Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law,” which sets out the basic principles of the article and the Cabinet’s involvement in the operationalization of the article, etc.

(1) Coverage
Weapons, etc. of the units of the United States Forces, armed forces of other foreign countries and other similar organizations, that are, in cooperation with the SDF and are, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises but excluding activities in the scene where the combat activities are actually being conducted).

(2) Procedures, etc.
When a request is made by the United States Forces, etc., and only when the Minister of Defense deems it necessary, SDF personnel provide asset protection.

(3) Authority for the Use of Weapons
In protecting weapons and other equipment described in (1) above as part of their duties, SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are adequate grounds to recognize the need to use weapons to protect persons, weapons, and other equipment (however, causing harm to people is permitted only in cases of legitimate self-protection or evasion from present danger).

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\(^{24}\) It includes an organization, if any, that administers the said country in accordance with a resolution of the General Assembly or the Security Council of the UN.

\(^{25}\) While the so-called “right to use weapons of self-preservation type” permits the use of weapons only for the protection of oneself and others (oneself, SDF members who are at the same scene as oneself, or those under the supervision of oneself), the so-called “right to use weapons in defense of the mission mandate” allows the use of weapons beyond self-preservation, for example, to protect the lives and bodies, etc., of other people or to repel obstructions of the performance of duties of SDF personnel.
Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3-3 (Commencement of the Enforcement of the Protection of Weapons and Other Equipment of the Units of the U.S. Forces and the Armed Forces of Other Foreign Countries [SDF Law Article 95-2])

Expansion of the Provision of Supplies and Services to the U.S. Forces

Regarding the provision of supplies or services to the United States Armed Forces, the scope of the U.S. Forces and the scope of supplies covered were expanded as follows with the revised legislation:

1. **Scope of the U.S. Forces Covered**
   a. The scope extended to the United States Armed Forces that are on field sites along with the units of the SDF carrying out the following actions or activities and engaged in activities similar to those of the SDF units:
      - Guarding of facilities and areas of bases, etc. of U.S. Forces Japan
      - Counter-piracy operations
      - Operations necessary to take measures to destroy ballistic missiles, etc.
   b. The scope extended to the U.S. Forces participating in multilateral exercises of three or more countries, including Japan and the United States, in addition to the U.S. Forces participating in Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises
   c. The scope extended to the U.S. Forces that are in field sites along with SDF units temporarily staying at facilities of the U.S. Forces for day-to-day operations, in addition to the U.S. Forces temporarily staying at SDF facilities

2. **Scope of Supplies to be Provided**
   Added ammunition (weapons remain excluded)

Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3-4 (Conclusion of the New Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA))

Disaster Relief Dispatches and Others

1. **Disaster Relief Dispatches**
   In principle, Disaster Relief Dispatch is conducted as follows: prefectural governors or other officials ask the Minister of Defense, or an officer designated by the Minister, to dispatch the SDF units, etc., in the event of a natural disaster; the Minister or the designated officer will dispatch the units if it is deemed necessary for the SDF to respond to the disaster.

   This procedure is based on the idea that prefectural governors and other officials should grasp the overall conditions of the disaster and their own disaster relief capabilities first, and then decide whether to make a request for the SDF disaster relief dispatch.

   - Removal and disposal of mines or other explosive hazardous objects
   - Protection measures for Japanese nationals, etc. in emergency situations in foreign countries
   - Activities to gather information by ships or aircraft about the movements of the armed forces of foreign countries and other information that contributes to the defense of Japan

2. **Earthquake Prevention Dispatch and Nuclear Disaster Relief Dispatch**
   When a warning declaration is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes or a declaration of a nuclear emergency situation is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, the Minister of Defense is authorized to order dispatching units upon a request of the Director of the Seismic Disaster Warning Headquarters or the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister).

   - The Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard, the Director General of the Regional Coast Guard Headquarters, and the Director of the Airport Administrative Office may request a disaster relief dispatch.
   - With regard to disaster relief dispatch, earthquake prevention dispatch, and nuclear disaster relief dispatch, (1) SDF personnel ordered for the dispatch may take measures (Article 4 of the Police Duties Execution Law) such as evacuation based on Article 94 of the SDF Law (Authority in Disaster Relief Dispatch, etc.); (2) SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be called up for service in the event of disaster relief dispatch, and SDF Ready Personnel in the event of earthquake prevention dispatch or nuclear disaster relief dispatch; and (3) special units may be temporarily formed as necessary

   The Prime Minister issues an earthquake alert with the endorsement of the Cabinet in the event that an earthquake prediction was reported by the Director-General of the Japan Meteorological Agency and when it is deemed necessary to urgently implement emergency earthquake disaster prevention measures.
5 Framework for Contributing to the Peace and Stability of the International Community

Response to Situations Threatening the International Peace and Security that the International Community is Collectively Addressing

The International Peace Support Act was newly enacted in the recent legal revision in order to ensure peace and security of the international community, enabling Japan to conduct cooperation and support operations for the armed forces of foreign countries engaged in operations for international peace and security in situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing. Previously, the Japanese Government has enacted special measures laws, such as the Act on Special Measures against terrorism / Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, and the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, in order to conduct operations such as at-sea replenishment activities in the Indian Ocean, and humanitarian and reconstruction support activities in Iraq. However, from the perspective of enabling seamless responses to any situation, rather than developing new legislation in response to every emergence of a specific need in the future, the International Peace Support Law, enacted as general law, enables Japan to conduct support operations more expeditiously and effectively for the military forces of foreign countries operating for international peace and security, making it possible to proactively contribute to international peace and security on Japan’s own initiative.

Situations Threatening the International Peace and Security that the International Community is Collectively Addressing

These refer to situations that threaten peace and security of the international community, and the international community is collectively addressing the situations in accordance with the objectives of the UN Charter to remove the threat; Japan, as a member of the international community, needs to independently and proactively contribute to these activities.
(1) Requirements
The requirement for Japan to offer cooperation and support to the operations of foreign armed forces is the issuance of one of the following UN resolutions (by the General Assembly or the Security Council).

a. Resolutions that decide, call upon, recommend or authorize the country, which is subject to Japan’s support operations to respond to situations that threaten the peace and security of the international community.

b. Other than (a), resolutions that regard the situations as a threat to peace or a breach of peace and call on UN member states to respond to the situations concerned.

(2) Response Measures
The following response measures can be implemented in situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing.

a. Cooperation and support activities
Supplies and services to armed forces of foreign countries (supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport services, base services, lodging, storage, use of facilities, training services and construction) are to be provided.

While the provision of weapons is not included as in the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security, the revised law now allows the “provision of ammunition” and “refueling and maintenance of aircraft ready to take off for combat operations.”

b. Search and rescue activities

c. Ship inspection operations (those set forth in the Ship Inspection Operations Law)
Ship inspection operations were only permitted to be performed in situations in areas surrounding Japan. However, in light of the increased cases of maritime inspection as countermeasures against global threat such as the transnational transfer of weapons of mass destruction and weapons for international terrorism organizations in the international community since 2000, which is when the Ship Inspection Operations Act was enacted, the SDF can carry out ship inspection operations in situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing as defined in the International Peace Act.

(3) Measures to Avoid Integration with the Use of Force
The following measures are set forth in order to avoid integration with the use of force by a foreign country and also to ensure the safety of SDF personnel:

- Japan does not implement support activities in the scene where a combat is actually taking place. However, when the personnel having been stranded have already been found and rescue operations have commenced, the SDF units are allowed to continue search and rescue activities concerning them as long as the safety of these units is ensured.
- The commanding officers of the SDF units, etc., order a temporary suspension of support activities if combat operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity.
- The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing activities, and if it is deemed difficult to implement operations smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, must promptly change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the activities being implemented there.

(4) Diet Approval
Prior Diet approval required without exception, and each house of the Diet has an obligation to make efforts towards decisions within 7 days (excluding any period when the Diet is in recess). In addition, re-approval is required in the case of a lapse of more than two years since the commencement of the response measures.

(5) Authority for the Use of Weapons
SDF personnel engaged in cooperation support activities or search and rescue activities in a situation threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing are permitted the so-called “right to use weapons of self-preservation type.” In addition, SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons with members of the armed forces and other organizations of foreign countries in order to protect the lives and bodies of those stationed in the camps.

2 International Peace Cooperation Activities
The International Peace Cooperation Act, enacted in 1992, set forth a framework to operate appropriately and quickly in the following three operation categories namely UN PKOs, International Humanitarian Relief Operations, and International Election Observation Operations, and urged...
the Japanese government to take measures to provide contributions in kind for those operations, thereby enabling Japan to actively contribute to international peace efforts centering upon the UN. The law also stipulates a set of basic guidelines, or the so-called “Five Principles for PKO Participation” for Japan’s participation in these activities.

At the time of the enactment of the Act, it was assumed that Japan was to cooperate with the ceasefire monitoring in conventional conflicts between states within the framework of UN PKOs under the control of the UN. However, the nature of conflicts that the international community faces has transformed into intra-state conflicts or a combination of inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Therefore, support for the nation building of state parties to conflict and the creation of a safe environment necessary to achieve this end have become important tasks in international peace cooperation activities. Furthermore, there is a wide range of international peace cooperation activities that have come to be implemented outside of the UN frameworks.31

Given the diversification and qualitative change of the international peace cooperation activities, through the recent legal revision, Japan, in order to contribute further to peace and stability of international community under the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, has expanded the scope of tasks that can be implemented in UN PKOs and reviewed the authority to use weapons, and also introduced new provisions to allow for active participation in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, safety-ensuring, and other non-UN-led operations (“Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security”).

(1) Requirements for Participation

a. UN Peace Keeping Operations

While maintaining the framework of the Five Principles for Participation, the new law stipulates that the consent of acceptance of countries to which the areas where these operations are conducted belong needs to be stably maintained throughout the period of the operations if the SDF conducts so-called “safety-ensuring” operations or so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations.

b. Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security

Besides the existing three types of operations (UN PKOs, International Humanitarian Relief Operations, and International Election Observation Operations), Japan is now able to participate in Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security, when any of the following conditions is satisfied, in addition to the fulfillment of the Five Principles for Participation.

1. Based on resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council, or the Economic and Social Council of the UN

2. At the requests of any of the following international organizations:
   - The UN
   - Organs established by the UN General Assembly or Specialized Agencies, Funds and Programmes of the UN such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or otherwise specified by a Cabinet Order
   - Regional organizations, as prescribed in Article 52 of the UN Charter or organs established by multilateral treaties, acknowledged as having the actual achievements or expertise pertaining to the activities of Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security such as the European Union or otherwise specified by a Cabinet Order

3. At the requests of the countries to which the areas where those operations are to be conducted belong (limited to only those cases that are supported by any of the principal organs of the UN as prescribed in Article 7 (1) of the UN Charter).

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31 These activities include the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), implemented at the request of the European Union, and the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), implemented at the request of the countries to which the area where those operations are to be conducted belongs with the support of the UN Secretary-General.
(2) Description of Tasks

In addition to ceasefire monitoring and humanitarian relief operations for afflicted persons, the following tasks have been added and expanded to tasks in UN PKOs, etc.

- Addition of monitoring, stationing, patrol, inspections at checkpoints and security escort for the protection of safety of specified areas including prevention and suppression of injury or harm against lives, bodies and property of local population, afflicted persons and other populations requiring protection (so-called “safety-ensuring” operations)
- Addition of protection of lives and bodies of individuals engaging in international peace cooperation operations or providing support for those operations, in response to urgent requests when unexpected dangers to lives or bodies of such individuals related to operations occur or are imminent (so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations)
- Expansion of tasks such as provision of advice or guidance related to works for the purpose of assisting in establishing or re-establishing organizations of the Government relating to national defense or other organizations
- Expansion of tasks conducted at organizations for supervision and coordination of tasks to include planning, drafting, coordination or collection and updating of information in Headquarters Office or coordination offices conducting UN PKOs and Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security, for the implementation of tasks (of mission headquarters’ operations)

(3) Authority to Use Weapons

a. Expansion of the Authority to Use Weapons for Self-preservation (Joint Protection of Camps)

Camps of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs), etc., are the bases where personnel of participating countries spend their time when not conducting operations outside camps, and the last bastion, so to speak, to secure the safety of lives and bodies of those inside. Thus, in the case of unexpected situations, such as attacks against camps, it is essential for SDF personnel stationed in the camps are allowed as the use of weapons for self-preservation according to the revised legislation.32

b. The Authority to Use Weapons in the So-Called “Kaketsuke-Keigo” Operations

In carrying out so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations, uniformed SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons to the extent judged reasonably necessary according to the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives or bodies of themselves or individuals related to operations that they intend to protect (however, inflicting injury on a person is permitted only in the cases of legitimate self-defense or aversion of clear and present danger).

c. The Authority to Use Weapons for So-Called “Safety-Ensuring” Operations

In carrying out so-called “safety-ensuring” operations, uniformed SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons within the limits judged reasonably necessary according to the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives, bodies or properties of themselves or other individuals, or to eliminate obstructive behavior for their duties (however, inflicting injury on a person is permitted only in the cases of legitimate self-defense or aversion of clear and present danger).

(4) Diet Approval

Diet approval is necessary prior to the commencement of so-called “safety-ensuring” operations, in addition to ceasefire monitoring, in principle (ex-post facto approval is permitted when the Diet is in recess or the House of Representatives is dissolved).

(5) Ensuring the Safety of SDF Personnel

The provision for ensuring the safety of the personnel of the International Peace Cooperation Corps was added, while the measures for ensuring the safety of the personnel were incorporated into the matters to be stipulated in the Implementation Procedures.

(6) Other Key Points of Amendment

- Dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel to the UN (dispatch of Force Commanders of UN PKOs)

The Act was amended to make it possible to dispatch uniformed SDF personnel and have them engage in the tasks of the UN and those concerning overall management of tasks implemented by units of the

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32 The authority to use weapons for self-preservation is allowed in view of the existence of particular circumstances, whereby armed personnel, who protect camps which are the last bastions of safety, are in the relationship of mutually dependent upon each other in dealing with situations.
SDF, etc., or units of armed forces of foreign states participating in UN PKOs, at the request of the UN, with the consent of the Prime Minister.\(^\text{33}\)

- Provision of supplies and services to the Armed Forces of the United States, etc., for their operations to cope with large-scale disaster\(^\text{34}\)

The revision of the International Peace Cooperation Act in June 2017 added the Armed Forces of the U.K. to the scope as well.

The MOD/SDF participated in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) following the major earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010, but was unable to provide supplies and services to the U.S. Forces engaged in disaster relief operations in Haiti outside the framework of UN PKOs, due to the absence of necessary domestic legislation.

The dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel is limited to cases where the consent of the countries hosting the UN PKOs for which the dispatched uniformed SDF personnel will conduct operations and are located in the area together with the units of the SDF, etc., and is undertaking operations to cope with large-scale disasters, so far as it does not hinder the performance of International Peace Cooperation Assignments, etc., of the SDF.\(^\text{35}\)

### 3 International Disaster Relief Operations

When large-scale disasters occur in regions overseas, especially in less-developed regions, and the governments of the affected countries or international organizations request assistance, the Minister of Foreign Affairs shall consult with the chief of relevant administrative agencies including the Ministry of Defense as well as the National Public Safety Commission regarding the details of such request if dispatch is deemed appropriate.

Following such consultation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may consult with the Minister of Defense to ask for cooperation with regard to operations of SDF units if there is a special need.

The Minister of Defense can order units of the SDF to carry out rescue and medical activities as well as transportation of personnel and supplies based on the consultation above.\(^\text{36}\)

### 6 Other Amendments in the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security

#### 1 Revision of the Act for the Establishment of the National Security Council

Responses to a Survival-Threatening Situation and responses to situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing were added as the items for deliberation, and items for deliberation regarding “situations in areas surrounding Japan” were changed to items for deliberation regarding “situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.” Furthermore, the following items (all items are related to the stable maintenance of the consent of acceptance of hosting countries) were specified as the items that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Council must consult with the Minister of Defense before the dispatch of SDF personnel.

**Commentary**

**Risk of Being Dragged into a War**

The “use of force” permitted as a measure for self-defense under Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan must meet the very strict requirements of the Three New Conditions. They are extremely stringent requirements not seen anywhere else in the world and serve as a clear constitutional restraint. Furthermore, when the Minister of Defense issues a defense operation order to actually conduct the “use of force,” the Government must seek Diet approval in advance, in principle. As such, since the SDF conducts its activities in compliance with the Constitution and laws enacted by the Diet, it will never be the case that the “use of force” by the SDF expands endlessly, resulting in Japan being dragged against its intention into a war of another country.

In addition, under the Legislation for Peace and Security, the Japan-U.S. Alliance will function more for Japan’s peace and security. By sending this message out to the world, Japan’s capability to prevent a conflict from occurring, in other words its deterrence capability, will be further enhanced, and the risk of Japan coming under an attack will be further reduced. Furthermore, it will enable Japan to cooperate further with the international community for the maintenance of peace and development of the region and the world, making the world more peaceful.

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\(^{33}\) The dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel is limited to cases where the consent of the countries hosting the UN PKOs for which the dispatched uniformed SDF personnel will conduct operations and of state parties to the conflict regarding the implementation of the UN PKO (when the state parties to the conflict are nonexistent, the consent of the countries where the UN PKOs are to be conducted) is deemed to be stably maintained throughout the duration of the dispatch and where circumstances that lead to the suspension of the dispatch are deemed unlikely to occur.

\(^{34}\) The MOD/SDF participated in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) following the major earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010, but was unable to provide supplies and services to the U.S. Forces engaged in disaster relief operations in Haiti outside the framework of UN PKOs, due to the absence of necessary domestic legislation.

\(^{35}\) The revision of the International Peace Cooperation Act in June 2017 added the Armed Forces of the U.K. to the scope as well.

\(^{36}\) The revision of the National Security Council Consultation Act in March 2017 specified that the National Security Council must consult with the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Foreign Affairs before the dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel.
The Ministry of Defense and Self Defense Forces are national administrative entities and obviously require a legal basis in carrying out their respective duties. The Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense defines the administrative scope of the Ministry of Defense, and Article 5 of the Act states that the Self Defense Forces Act determines the duties, actions, and authority of the Self Defense Forces. The Self Defense Forces Act hence provides a list (similar to an index) of what the Self Defense Forces are allowed to do in accordance with specified procedures to address various situations.

Article 3 in the Self Defense Forces Act divides the duties of the Self Defense Forces into main duties (item 1 of the same article) and secondary duties (items 1 and 2 of the same article). Defense actions to defend Japan correspond to main duties, and only the Self Defense Forces carry out these duties.

Secondary duties consist of “duties for maintaining public order as necessary” (secondary duties under item 1) and duties defined by other laws “to an extent that does not interfere with performance of the main duties” (secondary duties under item 2). The former includes public order actions that police entities cannot handle alone, maritime guarding actions, measures to destroy ballistic missiles and other weapons, and measures to deal with airspace intrusions. The latter covers actions conducted in response to important impact situations (logistical assistance), international peacekeeping activities (international peacekeeping tasks and international emergency assistance), and activities related to international peace joint action situations (cooperative assistance, etc.). These main and secondary duties are jointly known as “inherent duties.”

Activities handled by the Self Defense Forces on the basis that it is appropriate to utilize skills, experience, and organizational functions cultivated by the Self Defense Forces over many years are known as “additional duties” (separate from inherent duties). These include transportation for national guests, education and training consignments, and cooperation with athletic events.

Since the duties of the SDF overseas are to be expanded under the latest legal revisions, it is necessary to more adequately ensure the discipline and control of the activities of the SDF overseas.

For this reason, provisions were established for the punishment of those who commit crimes overseas such as the following: (1) Colluded defiance of superiors’ official orders and unlawful command of units, and (2) defiance of and disobedience to superiors’ orders by those given defense operation orders.
Section 3 The Situation of the Self-Defense Forces after the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security

1 Promotion of Various Preparations for New Missions Based on the Legislation for Peace and Security

Since the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security on March 29, 2016, the MOD/SDF has undertaken various preparations for a variety of new missions based on the Legislation for Peace and Security, such as activities to raise awareness of legal systems and intra-unit rules that were established, education of SDF personnel, as well as development of educational materials necessary for the actual training of various units and the nurturing of instructors. In August 2016, as these preparations were all but completed, each unit of the SDF sets out to implement necessary training in connection with the Legislation for Peace and Security. Between Japan and the United States, and other bilateral and multilateral joint training, Japan started to conduct necessary training related to the Legislation for Peace and Security after coordinating with the countries concerned.

2 Implementation of Training

In July 2017, the SDF conducted the first exercise related to the protection of U.S. vessels based on SDF Act Article 95-2 with the intention to enhance the relationship with the U.S. Navy. In the same year from July to August, the SDF took part in multilateral exercise, Khaan Quest 2017, to elevate various capabilities through conducting UN PKO-related exercise based on International Peace Cooperation Act.

VOICE

Participation in Training (Overseas) of Rescue of Japanese Nationals Overseas in FY2017 (domestic)

Central Readiness Regiment (Utsunomiya City, Tochigi), S3, Lieutenant Colonel, Masachiyo Hirose

Rescue of Japanese Nationals Overseas require close collaboration with related agencies, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of protecting overseas Japanese people as a main duty and combined units from Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces. I participated in rescue training that brings together related parties as a staff officer for the destination dispatch team with responsibility for all activities in the dispatch country.

The training begins from the point after which team members have already deployed at an overseas location. A Ground Self Defense Forces vehicle handles ground transportation of Japanese people and others temporarily assembled at the temporary assembly site (Soumagahara Camp, Gunma Prefecture) to the assembly location airport (Iruma Base, Saitama Prefecture). Boarding procedures, such as confirming identities and carry-on baggage checks, are conducted at the airport. The Japanese people and others are then escorted onto the Air Self Defense Forces’ transport plane (C-130H) and Ground Self Defense Forces’ transport helicopter (CH-47JA) for evacuation outside the country.

The training exercise, which consists of securing the safety of Japanese people and others jointly with the Foreign Ministry and responding to continuously changing circumstances, provided an opportunity to come into contact with the enthusiastic efforts of Foreign Ministry personnel who are working for the same purpose of safely rescuing and transporting Japanese people and others, clarified the mutual capabilities and strengths of the Foreign Ministry and Self Defense Forces, and reinforced the importance of close collaboration.

I hope to continue improving my capabilities to carry out this duty through enhancement of my proficiency in regular regiment training in order to be ready to implement the mission of immediately acting to rescue Japanese people and others at any time and deeper mutual understanding and closer cooperation with the Foreign Ministry and other agencies achieved through joint exercises.
Between September and October in Djibouti, and in Japan in December 2017, the SDF conducted a training on rescue of Japanese nationals overseas provided in SDF Act Article 84-3 to improve its joint operation capabilities and to strengthen cooperation with the relevant organizations.

Furthermore, between January and February 2018, the SDF participated in a multilateral joint exercise (Cobra Gold 18). In the command point exercise, the SDF conducted training related to cooperation and support operations under the International Peace Support Act as well as training for rescue of Japanese nationals overseas to improve its joint operation capabilities.

Moreover, in June 2018, the SDF took part in the multilateral joint exercise “Khaan Quest 18” and improved various capabilities through conducting training related to the “joint protection of camps” and so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” as well as “safety-ensuring operations” based on the International Peace Cooperation Act.

**2 Assignment of New Mission for the South Sudan PKO**

**1 Background**

Japan deployed engineering units to the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) from January 2012 to the end of May 2017. Following the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security, after a comprehensive consideration in light of the local situation and the training for the new additional mission, the Government decided to assign the duty of so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” starting with the 11th Engineering Unit to be deployed to UNMISS, as well as the duty of joint protection of camps. Following the approval obtained at the 9-Minister Meeting of the National Security Council, the Cabinet approved the revision of the Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for UNMISS on November 15, 2016.

**2 Fundamental Concept regarding the Assignment of New Duties**

In making the Cabinet Decision above, the Government indicated its basic concept regarding the so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” and joint protection of camps. The outline of the basic concept is as follows:

(1) Premise

The maintenance of security in South Sudan is, in principle, the responsibility of the South Sudan public security authorities and the South Sudan government forces, complemented by troops of UNMISS. This responsibility should be exclusively borne by the infantry unit of UNMISS. What Japan deploys to South Sudan is the SDF engineering unit, and thus the maintenance of security there is not the duty of the unit.

(2) So-Called “Kaketsuke-Keigo”

“Kaketsuke-keigo” is to be conducted in very limited situations, such as when those engaged in NGO activities, etc. are attacked in locations close to the SDF engineering unit and there are no UN units or others around to take prompt actions. It is conducted in response to urgent requests as a quick and temporary measure, within the abilities of the unit in light of the humanitarian and urgent nature of such measures. In the past, when SDF units were dispatched to Timor-Leste and then Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Japanese nationals facing contingent circumstances in those countries asked for protection by SDF units. On those occasions, the SDF units, while they were not adequately trained for such protection operations and their duties and authorities under law were limited, made every effort to protect Japanese nationals within the limits of their means, rushing to the scene and transporting them to safe locations.

“Kaketsuke-keigo” is a mission entailing risks. As long as Japanese nationals overseas have the possibility of facing contingent situations, however, the Government believes that (1) the official assignment of the solid duty of “kaketsuke-keigo” and the necessary authority and (2) the establishment of a steady structure with adequate training beforehand, are conducive to not only contributing to the safety of Japanese nationals overseas but also to reducing risks to the SDF units.

Since SDF units have only self-protection capabilities, “kaketsuke-keigo” represents only responses that are feasible within their capabilities.

The military personnel of other countries usually possess self-protection capabilities. Even then, if they are in a crisis situation that they cannot handle by themselves, it is basically...
In view of the track record of past activities, the area of activities in South Sudan is limited to “Juba and its surrounding area” starting with the 11th Engineering Unit deployed in that country. The implementation of “kaketsuke-keigo” is also limited to within this area of activities.

(3) Joint Protection of Camps
In the field of UN PKOs, etc., it is usual practice for personnel of multiple countries to cooperate in their activities. In South Sudan as well, the SDF unit and units of Rwanda and some other countries share one camp as their base of activities.

Even if such a camp is attacked by an armed group, the SDF unit previously could not respond to the situation in cooperation with other units and could not participate in coordination with the United States and also engaged in the work to develop necessary rules and regulations in order to ensure appropriate operation of the system for the protection of weapons, etc., of the units of the U.S. Forces and the armed forces of other foreign countries (SDF Law Article 95-2). Upon completion of these works, in December 2016, at the National Security Council the Government decided on the Implementation Guidelines concerning Article 95-2 of the SDF Law, and started applying the article to the U.S. Forces operations. This operationalization helps to further strengthen coordinated surveillance between the SDF and the U.S. Forces and also to further enhance deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

(1) Basic Principles of Implementing Article 95-2
a. Purpose of Article 95-2
This Article is to enable SDF personnel to carry out very passive and limited use of weapons to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment (“the weapons, etc.”) of units of the U.S. Forces, armed forces of other countries or other similar organizations (“the U.S. Forces, etc.”), that are concurrently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises but excluding activities conducted in places where combat activities are actually occurring) in cooperation with the SDF, from infringements which do not amount to an armed attack, because the weapons, etc. can be regarded as an important material means which constitute the defense capability of Japan.

Through the provision of Paragraph 1 of the Article that “excluding activities conducted in places where combat activities are actually occurring,” it is ensured that asset protection is not to be, nor to be legally regarded as being integrated (“ittaika”) with the use of force of the U.S. Forces, etc. and that the SDF personnel never respond to any combat activities by the use of weapons pursuant to the Article. The SDF personnel thus never conduct use of force and this prevents the situation from evolving into combat activities as a result of the use of weapons under the provision of the Article.
This use of weapons does not fall under “use of force” which is banned in Article 9 of the Constitution.

b. Activities that Contribute to the Defense of Japan

“Activities that contribute to the defense of Japan” in the Article may include mainly the following ones, while the Government of Japan is to examine each activity on a case-by-case basis: (1) ISR activities including ballistic missile alert; (2) transportation and replenishment activities in “situations that will have an important influence”; and (3) joint exercises to enhance capabilities required for defending Japan.

c. Judgment on Whether or Not to Conduct Asset Protection

When the Minister of Defense receives a request from the U.S. Forces, etc., the Minister subjectively should judge whether the activities conducted by the units of the U.S. Forces, etc. in cooperation with the SDF are “activities that contribute to the defense of Japan” and whether asset protection by the SDF personnel is necessary, by considering the objective and content of the activities, capability of the unit, types of weapons, etc. of the unit and surrounding circumstances including possibility of combat activity as well as the impacts on performance of the SDF’s regular operations.

(2) Involvement of the Cabinet

Requests from the U.S. Forces, etc. based on Paragraph 2 of the Article should be deliberated in the National Security Council (NSC) before the Minister of Defense judges on conducting asset protection if the Minister receives requests in the following cases. However, in case there is no time for dealing with an urgent request by the U.S. Forces, etc., the Minister should promptly report to the NSC regarding provision of asset protection. (1) The U.S. Forces, etc. makes a request for the first time after the operationalization of asset protection. (2) The request is made for asset protection in the territory of a third country.

(3) Disclosure of Information

In the implementation of Article 95-2, if an unusual event occurs in conducting asset protection operation, the Government promptly discloses such an event, and releases a basic plan that specifies matters concerning the implementation of asset protection operations in a situation that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. The Government also strives for appropriate disclosure of information in light of the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Act No. 42 of 1999).

3 Track Record of Asset Protection Operations

In 2017, during a joint exercises to improve the capabilities necessary to defend Japan, the SDF conducted asset protection operations for US military vessels and aircraft once individually in 2017.

4 Conclusion of the New Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)

In September, 2016, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and U.S. Ambassador to Japan signed the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). ACSA was approved by the Diet and took effect in 2017.

The ACSA was prepared as a new agreement to replace the previous Japan-U.S. ACSA to enable the application of existing settlement procedures to the provision of supplies and services from the SDF to the U.S. Forces that become possible under the newly enacted Legislation for Peace and Security. The new ACSA enables the smooth and expeditious provision of a broad range of supplies and services between the SDF and the U.S. Forces, thereby raising the levels of specific on-site cooperation between them.

Japan also signed ACSA with the U.K and Australia other than the United States in light of the Legislation for Peace and Security, etc., which obtained Diet approval along with the Japan-U.S. ACSA and took effect in the same year.
Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s security. The Japan-U.S. Alliance centered on bilateral security arrangements functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity, not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.

As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe, it has become more important than ever to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the security of Japan with the United States that maintains and strengthens its engagement and presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

The military presence of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) not only contributes to the defense of Japan, but also functions as deterrence and response capabilities to address contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region, and serves as a core element of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

In this manner, the stationing of USFJ based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty not only contributes to the interests of Japan but also to the interests of the United States, which has an interest in this region.

On the other hand, since the stationing of USFJ impacts the living environment of local residents, efforts that correspond to the actual situation of each region must be made to mitigate the impact on regions such as Okinawa.

**Section 1 Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements**

In the current international community, a robust defense system capable of responding to every contingency, ranging from all types of armed attacks including the use of nuclear weapons to coercion or intimidation by military power, is necessary to secure the peace, security, and sovereignty of the nation.

However, it is difficult even for the United States to guarantee its security on its own. Much more than that, it would be difficult for Japan to ensure its national security solely through its unilateral efforts given its population, land, and economy. Moreover, such a strategy would not necessarily contribute to regional stability.

Consequently, Japan has maintained its peace and security, centered on the Security Arrangements with the world’s dominant military power, the United States, with which it shares basic values such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a capitalist economy as well as an interest in maintaining the peace and security of the world, and has strong economic ties.

Specifically, Japan and the United States will take bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against Japan, based on Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and Japan will provide facilities and areas for the U.S. Forces, based on Article 6 of the treaty. If a nation plans to attack Japan, the attacker must be prepared to confront not only the defense capability of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), but also the overwhelming military
strength of the United States, due to the U.S. obligation to defend Japan in the event of an armed attack. As a result, the opposing nation clearly recognizes that it will suffer grievously if it carries out an invasion, and such desires will be abandoned at the planning stage. In other words, this serves as deterrence against attacks.

Japan intends to create a seamless posture and secure its peace and security by effectively utilizing the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. military as well as maintaining its own adequate defense capability.

2. Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding Japan

Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty states that contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East is the purpose of the use of facilities and areas by USFJ. This provision is based on the recognition that the security of Japan is closely tied to the peace and security of the Far East region to which Japan belongs.

In the regions surrounding Japan, there are many states and the like with massive military power, including some states that retain nuclear weapons or continue nuclear development. In addition to issues or tension caused by changes in the balance of power, situations that we call “gray zones” over sovereignty of the territory or vested interests are likely to arise, and this risks further aggravation of the situation.

In such a security environment, the military presence of USFJ provides deterrence against unexpected contingencies caused by various security issues or destabilizing factors, not only protecting the interests of Japan and the United States but also providing a great sense of security to the nations in the region and thus fulfilling a role as public goods.

Also, the close bonds of cooperation based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements constitute the foundation of the United States’ commitment to the peace and stability of the region surrounding Japan. These arrangements, complemented by the alliances established between the United States and other countries in the region such as the Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines and also by the friendly relations developed with other countries, play an indispensable role in maintaining the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

3. Further Stabilization of the International Security Environment

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, not only in defense but also in a wide range of areas, including politics, economy, and society.

The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with these security arrangements at its core, also forms the axis of Japan’s foreign policy. It contributes to Japan’s ability to implement positive efforts to maintain the peace and security of the international community, including promotion of multinational security dialogue and cooperation, and cooperation with the United Nations.

Currently, we are confronted with global security challenges that are extremely difficult for any single country to tackle alone, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorism, and acts of piracy, as well as new risks concerning stable use of the seas, outer space and cyberspace, and it is important for countries to work together from peacetime. The strong bonds forged between Japan and the United States are also playing an important role in the efforts implemented by Japan to effectively respond to such challenges.

In particular, under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and the U.S. Forces are working together in peacetime in a variety of areas to strengthen their cooperation. This close coordination lays the foundation for various forms of global collaboration such as antipiracy, undertaken by the SDF and the U.S. Forces, and leads to enhancement of the operational effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

The peace and prosperity of the international community are closely linked to those of Japan. Accordingly, by cooperating with the United States, Japan is able to advance measures to further stabilize the global security environment. This in turn is enhancing the security and prosperity of Japan.
Since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960, Japan and the United States have built a robust alliance based on democratic ideals, respect for human rights, the rule of law and common interests. During the Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ensured the safety of Japan as a country with a liberal ideology and also contributed to the peace and stability in the region, including the formulation of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“Guidelines”) in 1978 with a focus on responses to an armed attack on Japan.

Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of Japan and the United States announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, reaffirming the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region following the Cold War. Upon the Declaration, the final report was compiled at the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) at the end of that year. As part of the promotion of cooperative relations presented in the Declaration, the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting) held in the following year (1997) approved the aforementioned 1997 Guidelines1 and expanded cooperation to responses in situations in areas surrounding Japan in light of changes in the security environment, such as the end of the Cold War.

In light of further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, following the “2+2” Meeting in December 2002, Japan and the United States held working-level and other consultations as part of bilateral strategic dialogue on security from the perspective of how to make the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s capacity more effective to adapt to the changing times. As a result of a number of these Japan-U.S. consultations, the direction of the Japan-U.S. Alliance was arranged in three stages. These stages are: confirmation of common strategic objectives to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region (first stage) in February 2005; the announcement of the results of the examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage) in October 2005; and the formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, a program for implementing specific measures for the realignment of USFJ, (third stage) in May 2006.

Japan and the United States at the “2+2” Meeting in May 2007 reconfirmed and updated their common strategic objectives. In February 2009, the two countries signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam (the Guam International Agreement), which entered into force in May 2009.

At the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011, the two countries reviewed and revalidated their common strategic objectives set forth in the Joint Statements of the previous “2+2” Meetings, including maintenance of maritime security domain by defending the principle of freedom of navigation and maintenance of bilateral cooperation with respect to protection of and access to outer space and cyberspace, and discussed a diverse range of areas, including an expansion of information sharing and joint ISR activities.

In the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, Japan and the United States announced that they decided to adjust the plans outlined in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (Realignment Roadmap) of May 2006, considering significant progress on the realignment of the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan since the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 as well as the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.

Since the formulation of the 1997 Guidelines, the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, and as the activities and responsibilities of the SDF have expanded, it had become necessary for the nature of the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation to adapt to those changes. Against

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1 The 1997 Guidelines define the roles of Japan and the United States, and the cooperation of the two countries under three categories: (1) under normal circumstances, (2) in response to an armed attack against Japan, and (3) in situations in areas surrounding Japan. They also stipulated that they would review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner.
that background, based on the Japan-U.S. SCC or “2+2” Meeting in October 2013 to draft recommended changes to the 1997 Guidelines by the end of 2014, as a result of extensive work to revise them on the part of both countries, new Guidelines were approved in April 2015 in the “2+2” Meeting held at the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War.

See Fig. II-4-2-1 (Major Milestones concerning Japan – U.S. Alliance) Reference 26 (Joint Statement (tentative translation) (February 10, 2017))

Overview of the Revision of the 1997 Guidelines

It is necessary for both Japan and the United States to discuss and decide the roles each will fulfill in case of an armed attack against Japan or other situation in advance, with a view to responding rapidly to such an event.

The Guidelines and the various policies for ensuring their effectiveness provide a framework pertaining to role-sharing between Japan and the United States. Based on that framework and the changing security environment surrounding Japan, both Japan and the United States have continuously studied bilateral cooperation plans for the two countries, held consultations on them, and worked on the revision of the Guidelines to adapt to the current situations.

Background to the Revision of the Guidelines

Since the formulation of the 1997 Guidelines, various issues and destabilizing factors have emerged, and become more visible and aggravated in the security environment surrounding Japan; such as more active military activities of neighboring countries, new threats including international terrorist organizations and risks against the stable use of global commons such as oceans, outer space and cyberspace. In addition, the activities of the SDF have expanded to a global scale, as exemplified by anti-piracy activities, PKO, and international disaster relief activities.

As a result, it had become necessary for the manner of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation to be adapted to these changes in the security environment and the expansion of the SDF’s activities and missions.

Against the backdrop of these changes in the security environment, Prime Minister Abe directed then Minister of Defense Onodera at the end of 2012 to work on the revision of the Guidelines and other matters. In addition, at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in February 2013, Prime Minister Abe stated to then U.S. President Obama
that, “in response to the changing security environment, Japan would like to start reviewing the Guidelines through discussions on the two countries’ views of the roles, missions and capabilities (RMC).”

Against the background described above, at the Japan-U.S. SCC or “2+2” Meeting in October 2013, the Ministers directed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to draft recommended changes to the 1997 Guidelines, and this task was to be completed by the end of 2014.

The Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting at that time identified several objectives for the revision of the 1997 Guidelines, including ensuring the Alliance’s capacity to respond to an armed attack against Japan, as a core aspect of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation; expanding the scope of cooperation, to reflect the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, encompassing such areas as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy; evaluating the concepts that guide bilateral defense cooperation in contingencies to ensure effective, efficient, and seamless Alliance response in a dynamic security environment that includes challenges in emerging strategic domains such as space and cyberspace; and exploring additional ways in which we can strengthen the Alliance in the future to meet shared objectives.

Based on the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013 and in line with approaches indicated in the 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of the United States, Japan and the United States conducted extensive work on the revision of the 1997 Guidelines.

In October 2014, based on the agreement reached at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting held in July 2014, the two governments announced “The Interim Report on the Revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.” In addition, in December 2014, the SCC (“2+2” Meeting), recognizing the significance of ensuring consistency between the revision of the Guidelines and Japan’s legislative process, decided to further deepen the discussions to work towards finalizing the revision of the Guidelines during the first half of 2015, taking into account the progress of Japan’s legislative process.

The Japan-U.S. SCC approved the new Guidelines recommended by the SDC at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2015, thereby accomplishing the objective of revising the Guidelines as outlined by the Ministers in October 2013.

## Content of the Guidelines

The Guidelines, which replace the 1997 Guidelines, update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies.

### (1) Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines

The Guidelines newly specified the matters to be emphasized in security and defense cooperation. The objectives of the new Guidelines are retained in line with the approach of the 1997 Guidelines.

- In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize:
  - seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses;
  - synergy across the two governments’ national security policies;
  - a whole-of-government Alliance approach;
  - cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and
  - the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

- The two governments will maintain their individual defense postures based on their national security policies. The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combat-ready forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly.

- The Guidelines provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination.

- The Guidelines promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

### (2) Basic Premises and Principles

The basic premises and principles maintain the approaches of the 1997 Guidelines as described below:

- The rights and obligations under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements will remain unchanged.
- All actions and activities undertaken under the
Strengthened Alliance

Outline of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

See the main text for I. “Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines” and II. “Basic Premises and Principles.”

III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning.

A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism

The two governments will take measures to seamlessly and effectively address situations that affect Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response. These measures will include, but not be limited to: (1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; (2) Air and Missile Defense; (3) Maritime Security; (4) Asset Protection; (5) Training and Exercises; (6) Logistic Support; and (7) Use of Facilities.

B. Enhanced Operational Coordination

The two governments recognize the importance of utilizing coordinated operational coordination functions. The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities.

C. Bilateral Planning

In peacetime, the two governments will develop and update bilateral plans through the Bilateral Planning Mechanism. Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments.

IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security

A. Cooperative Measures during Peacetime

The two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security

The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to: (1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; (2) Air and Missile Defense; (3) Maritime Security; (4) Asset Protection; (5) Training and Exercises; (6) Logistic Support; and (7) Use of Facilities.

C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

Bilateral actions remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation.

1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated

The two governments will take measures to deter an armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan.

2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs

The two governments will take appropriate and coordinated actions to promptly repel the attack and deter any further attacks. The SDF will have primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations, and the United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the SDF.

Concept of Operations

Self-Defense Forces (SDF) United States Armed Forces

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>SDF Description</th>
<th>U.S. Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operations to Defend Airspace</td>
<td>Conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan</td>
<td>Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks</td>
<td>Conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan</td>
<td>Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations to Defend Maritime Areas</td>
<td>Conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication</td>
<td>Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations to Counter Ground Attacks</td>
<td>Conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces</td>
<td>Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Have primary responsibility to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands, and have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority</td>
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<td>Item</td>
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<td><strong>IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security</strong></td>
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<td><strong>VIII. Processes for Review</strong></td>
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<tr>
<th>Cross-Domain Operations</th>
<th>Self-Defense Forces (SDF)</th>
<th>United States Armed Forces</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>In cooperation with relevant agencies, strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other's ISR assets</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Space / cyberspace</td>
<td>Cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special operations</td>
<td>Special operations forces cooperate during operations, as appropriate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike operations</td>
<td>May provide support, as necessary, for the strike operations of the United States Armed Forces</td>
<td>Involve the use of strike power, to support and supplement SDF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Operational Support Activities
  - The Guidelines identify the following operational support activities: (1) Communications and Electronics; (2) Search and Rescue; (3) Logistic Support; (4) Use of Facilities; and (5) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Protection.
- A. Cooperation in International Activities
  - The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the SDF and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable.
  - Common areas for cooperation will include: (1) Peacekeeping Operations; (2) International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief; (3) Maritime Security; (4) Partner Capacity Building; (5) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations; (6) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; (7) Training and Exercises; and (8) Logistics support.
- B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation
  - The two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. The United States Armed Forces may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters.
- C. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan
  - In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
  - When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities, the two governments will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below.
- A. Cooperation on Space
  - The two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space.
  - The two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation.
  - The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate in such areas as early-warning, ISR, positioning, navigation and timing, space situational awareness, meteorological observation, command, control, and communications.
  - The two governments will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promote cooperation based upon international law and standards.
- B. Cooperation on Cyberspace
  - The two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and appropriate manner. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the SDF and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions.
  - The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will maintain posture to monitor their respective networks and systems, conduct educational exchanges, ensure the resiliency of their respective networks and systems, contribute to all Japanese and U.S. government efforts, and conduct bilateral exercises.
  - In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.
- C. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
  - The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation:
      - A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
      - B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security
      - C. Educational and Research Exchanges
- D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan
  - When Japan and the United States decide to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under an armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks.
  - The SDF will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people.
  - The United States will conduct appropriate operations to respond to situations where Japan has come under an armed attack, to protect its people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people.
- E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan
  - When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The SDF, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. The United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate.
  - The United States will maintain and strengthen the partnership with Japan and its regional partners to respond to large-scale disasters.
- F. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in the United States
  - The two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. The United States Armed Forces may participate in disaster related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters.
- G. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in a Third Country
  - The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the SDF and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions.
  - The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will maintain posture to monitor their respective networks and systems, conduct educational exchanges, ensure the resiliency of their respective networks and systems, contribute to all Japanese and U.S. government efforts, and conduct bilateral exercises.
  - In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.
- H. Cooperation in Response to an Armed Attack against a Third Country
  - When a third country is attacked, and Japan has not come under an armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks.
  - The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate in such areas as early-warning, ISR, positioning, navigation and timing, space situational awareness, meteorological observation, command, control, and communications.
Guidelines will be consistent with international law.

- All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.
- The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specific policies and measures.

3 Major Initiatives for Strengthening the Alliance

The Guidelines define that the two countries will work on a variety of measures, including ISR activities, air and missile defense, maritime security, and bilateral training and exercises, and cooperate in response to a large-scale disaster in Japan in order to “seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security.” The Guidelines also require both countries to work on “Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security,” through cooperation in international activities and trilateral and multilateral cooperation; to cooperate for Space and Cyberspace Cooperation which are emerging as new strategic domains; and to develop and enhance “Bilateral Enterprise” through defense equipment and technology cooperation for further improving the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation. Many of these items are incorporated into the NDPG to “strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities” and to “strengthen and expand cooperation in a variety of areas.”

1 Strengthened Coordination within the Alliance

(1) Establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism

In November 2015, the Japanese and U.S. Governments established the ACM in order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response.

Based on the framework shown in Fig. II-4-2-4, this mechanism coordinates policy and operational aspects related to activities conducted by the SDF and the U.S. Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also contributes to timely information sharing as well as to the development and maintenance of common situational awareness.

The characteristics of the mechanism include that (1) it is the standing mechanism utilizable from peacetime; (2) it can be utilized for large-scale natural disasters in Japan as well as for cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and globally; and (3) it enables whole-of-government coordination while ensuring the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations. These characteristics enable the Japanese and U.S. Governments to respond appropriately and promptly when the need for coordination arises. For example, in the event of a large-scale natural disaster in Japan, it would require a diversity of coordination in the policy and operational aspects related to activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces. The utilization of this mechanism makes it possible to conduct close and appropriate coordination with the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations at various levels.

Since the establishment of the mechanism, Japan and the United States have been utilizing the mechanism to coordinate closely, including in response to the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake, the ballistic missile launches by North Korea, and Chinese activities in the waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands.

(2) Enhanced Operational Coordination

Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. Governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the U.S. Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities.

(3) Establishment of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism

Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. Governments established the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM) in November 2015 for the purpose
of implementing the development of bilateral plans in peacetime in line with the Guidelines in order to enable effective bilateral responses to contingencies relevant to Japan’s peace and security.

In the development of bilateral plans, this mechanism performs the functions of ensuring Ministerial-level directions and supervision and the involvement of relevant government ministries and agencies, as well as conducting coordination for various forms of Japan-U.S. cooperation conducive to the development of bilateral plans. The two governments will conduct bilateral planning through this mechanism.

(1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Activities

With regard to bilateral ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) activities, from the perspective that it is important to implement ISR activities in a broad Asia-Pacific region in cooperation between Japan and the United States to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the activities of both countries, the two countries set up the Defense ISR Working Group in February 2013 consisting of director-level defense officials from Japan and the United States, which is further deepening the cooperation between the two countries.

The expansion of these ISR activities will function as deterrence capabilities, and will also ensure information superiority over other nations and enable the establishment of a seamless cooperation structure in all phases from peacetime to contingencies.

(2) Missile Defense

Regarding the response to ballistic missiles, Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities have been enhanced by sharing operation information and establishing response procedures. For the repeated ballistic missile launches by North Korea, Japan and the United States have conducted coordinated responses utilizing the ACM. Also, in the systems and technology field, the cooperative development of a new ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptor with enhanced capabilities (SM-3 Block IIA) is steadily in progress.
(3) Maritime Security

The Guidelines allow Japan and the United States to develop and enhance the system for sharing maritime surveillance information from peacetime and to cooperate where appropriate for the maintenance and enhancement of the presence of Japan and the United States through ISR as well as training and exercises. The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the U.S. Navy plan to maintain and enhance both countries’ presence in the Western Pacific through multiple joint training and exercises.

(4) Bilateral Training and Exercises

Bilateral training in peacetime not only contribute greatly to maintaining and enhancing the Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities by improving interoperability through the deepening of mutual understanding of tactics and other aspects and the enhancement of mutual communication, but also are useful in improving tactical skills on each side. In particular, the knowledge and techniques that the Japanese side can learn from the U.S. Forces, which have vast experience in actual fighting, are invaluable and greatly contribute to improving SDF capabilities.

In addition, conducting bilateral training at effective times, places, and scales demonstrates the unified commitment and capabilities of Japan and the United States, which has a deterrent effect. In light of these perspectives, the MOD/SDF is continuing its initiatives to enrich the contents of bilateral training and exercises.

Bilateral training have been expanded not only within Japan but also to the United States by dispatching SDF units there. Ongoing efforts are being made to enhance...
interoperability and Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities at the military service and unit levels, including the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army command post exercises, special anti-submarine exercises, and Japan-U.S. Bilateral Fighter combat training.

Since FY1985, mostly on an annual basis, command post exercises and field training exercises have been conducted alternately as the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise. From January to February 2018, command post exercises were conducted at the Ministry of Defense in Ichigaya.

Also, in May and June 2017 Japanese and U.S. vessels, including the destroyer JS Izumo conducted bilateral maritime exercise in the South China Sea. Furthermore, as bilateral exercises in the waters and airspace around Japan, the MSDF conducted cruising exercises with U.S. Navy vessels including the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan that extended from the waters around Okinawa to the Bashi Channel from September to October 2017. In November the same year, the MSDF conducted bilateral exercise in the Sea of Japan with a strike force comprising three aircraft carriers the USS Ronald Reagan, the USS Nimitz, and the USS Theodore Roosevelt and other vessels of the U.S. Navy for the first time. In conjunction with this, the MSDF conducted Japan-U.S. bilateral cruising exercise with the strike force from October to November 2017 in the waters and air of the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea and around Okinawa, and the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) conducted tactical exercises with F/A-18, carrier-based fighters from the aircraft carriers USS Ronald Reagan and USS Nimitz.

Also in March 2018, the MSDF conducted bilateral
exercises with the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and other vessels of the U.S. Navy in the waters and air from the northern part of the South China Sea to the area around Okinawa. The ASDF also conducted multiple training with U.S. Air Force B-1B, B-52 and U.S. Marine F-35B in the airspace around western Kyushu and around Okinawa.

The Japan-U.S. bilateral training were conducted with the aim of enhancing the tactical skills of the SDF and bolstering collaboration with the U.S. Forces. It is believed that bolstering Japan-U.S. collaboration and demonstrating bilateral ties as an outcome of implementing these Japan-U.S. bilateral training have the effect of further enhancing the deterrence and response capabilities of the overall Japan-U.S. Alliance and demonstrating Japan’s determination and high capacity towards stabilizing the region in an increasingly severe security environment for Japan.

In recent years, USFJ have also participated in disaster drills organized by local governments, thereby deepening cooperation with relevant institutions and local governments.

![](ASDF_personnel_attending_a_meeting_for_a_Japan-U.S._joint_training_(Red_Flag_Alaska)).jpg)

(5) Logistics Support
Japan-U.S. cooperation is also being steadily promoted through logistics support based on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement\(^2\) (ACSA) signed in 1996 and revised in 1999 and 2004, as a result of increased opportunities for cooperation between the two countries. The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and to initiatives for international peace taken under the leadership of the United Nations. Its scope of application includes various occasions such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, disaster relief activities, UN peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief activities, situations in areas surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations. If either the SDF or the U.S. Forces request the other party to provide supplies or services, the Agreement, in principle, allows the requested party to do so.\(^3\) In addition, at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2015, the two countries confirmed that they would expeditiously work on the negotiations on the ACSA to operationalize the mutual logistics cooperation envisioned by the new Guidelines. Subsequently, following the passage of the Legislation for Peace and Security in September 2015, the new Japan-U.S. ACSA was signed in September 2016, ratified by the Diet on April 14, 2017, and entered into force on April 25. This has enabled the same framework as the existing Japan-U.S. ACSA, such as settlement procedures, to be applied to the provision of supplies and services that had become possible under the Legislation for Peace and Security, so that by December 2017 food and fuel has been provided to U.S. Forces engaged in information collection and other activities.


\(^3\) The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food, water, billeting; transportation (including airlift); petroleum, oils, and lubricants; clothing; communications; medical services; base support; storage; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance; airport and seaport services; and ammunition (only in armed attack situations and anticipated situations) (Provision of weapons is not included).

(6) Joint/Shared Use
The expansion of joint/shared use of facilities and areas increases bases for the SDF’s activities such as maneuver areas, ports, and airfields, which in turn enhances the diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises and expands the scope and raises the frequency of such activities as ISR. The SDF has only a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, including Naha Air Base, and most of them are located in urban areas, which results in operational limitations. The joint/shared use of facilities and areas of USFJ in Okinawa will greatly improve the SDF’s training environment in Okinawa, and facilitate implementation of joint training and exercises and increased interoperability between the...
SDF and the U.S. Forces. It will also improve readiness and contribute to ensuring the safety of local people in the case of a disaster.

Thus, while taking into account the SDF defense posture in the regions, including the Southwestern Islands, and relations with local communities, Japan and the United States are proactively engaged in consultations, and specific initiatives are steadily progressing. For example, the GSDF has been using Camp Hansen since March 2008 for exercises. Moreover, the relocation of the ASDF Air Defense Command to Yokota in April 2012 and the relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters to Zama in March 2013 were carried out. In addition, in December 2013 and between June and July 2014, the MSDF conducted the training on the sea and training utilizing facilities in Guam and its surrounding area in cooperation with the U.S. Navy. The development of training ranges in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands (Tinian Island, Pagan Island, etc.) for shared use by the SDF and the U.S. Forces is under consideration.

In the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, the SDF and the U.S. Forces demonstrated their high-level joint response capabilities based on the strong ties they had developed. The success of the joint response between the U.S. Forces and the SDF through Operation Tomodachi was the result of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises over many years, and will lead to the Alliance being deepened further in the future. Operation Tomodachi involved the deployment of a large-scale force at its peak, including troops of approximately 16,000 personnel, around 15 ships, and around 140 aircraft, resulting in relief activities that were unprecedented in scale and contributing greatly to Japan’s restoration and reconstruction. Not only those affected but numerous Japanese at large were filled with a deepened sense of appreciation and trust for USFJ.

On the other hand, some issues have emerged, such as clarifying the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan and the United States in the event of a disaster within Japan, as well as stipulating more concrete joint guidelines to facilitate greater participation by the U.S.
Forces in disaster prevention drills, and examining mechanisms for the sharing of information and more effective coordination mechanism.

In light of these issues, the December 2013 Response Plan for a Massive Earthquake in the Nankai Trough listed the Japan-U.S. Joint Response Plan, and the two countries conducted a bilateral joint comprehensive disaster prevention training in Kochi Prefecture in February 2014 based on the scenario of an earthquake occurring in the Nankai Trough. USFJ also participated in the Wakayama Prefecture Tsunami Disaster Readiness Practical Training (October 2014) and Michinoku ALERT 2014 (November 2014), a disaster relief exercise by the GSDF Northeastern Army. In this manner, the SDF and USFJ have been enhancing their cooperation for disaster readiness.

In response to the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016, Japan-U.S. cooperation was manifested in the form of the transportation of daily necessities by the Osprey (MV-22) of the U.S. Marine Corps and the transportation of SDF personnel by C-130 transport aircraft. The ACM was utilized on that occasion, including the Japan-U.S. Joint Coordination Office locally established by the joint task force organized for the earthquake response.

(2) Trilateral and Multilateral Training and Exercises

The Guidelines enable Japan and the United States to promote and enhance trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. Thus, the SDF is participating in trilateral (e.g., Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan-U.S.-India, and Japan-U.S.-ROK) and multilateral training, in addition to bilateral training and exercises between Japan and the United States.

5 Space and Cyberspace Cooperation

(1) Cooperation on Space

With regard to cooperation on space, based on the agreement at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in November 2009 to promote cooperation in the area of space security as part of initiatives to deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the two countries have periodically been working together to discuss how they should cooperate in the future, such as the holding of the 1st Japan-U.S. Space Security Dialogue in September 2010 with the participation of relevant ministries and agencies.

Furthermore, the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in April 2012 decided to deepen the space-based partnership for civil and security purposes and to create a whole-of-government comprehensive dialogue on space, enabling relevant ministries and agencies to hold the 1st whole-of-government Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space in March 2013. The two countries have been sharing information on their respective space policies and discussing plans for future cooperation on a regular basis.

Moreover, based on the instructions given by the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting of April 2015, the two countries established the Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) to further promote the cooperation among bilateral defense authorities in the area of space. The SCWG has held four meetings in total since its establishment in October 2015 (the most recent...
meeting was in February 2018). Going forward, Japan and the United States will leverage this working group to deepen discussions in a wide variety of areas, including (1) promoting space policy dialogue, (2) reinforcing information sharing, (3) working together to develop and secure experts, and (4) continued participation to tabletop exercises.

(2) Cooperation on Cyberspace
Concerning cooperation on cyberspace, the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) was established in October 2013 as a framework between the MOD and the Department of Defense (DoD) to discuss a broad range of professional and concrete issues, including the sharing of information at the policy level, human resources development, and technical cooperation.

The Guidelines released in April 2015 and the CDPWG Joint Statement published in May 2015 cited the prompt and appropriate development of an information sharing structure and the protection of the critical infrastructure upon which the SDF and the U.S. Forces depend to accomplish their missions as examples of cooperation between the Japanese and U.S. Governments. In addition, as part of cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. Forces, the securing of the resiliency of their respective networks and systems and the implementation of educational exchanges and bilateral exercises were also cited. Japan and the United States will further accelerate bilateral cyber defense cooperation in line with the direction presented by the Guidelines and the CDPWG Joint Statement.

6 Initiatives to Further Improve the Effectiveness of Bilateral Cooperation

(1) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
Japan proactively promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology while bearing in mind the maintenance of the technological and production bases and the mutual cooperation principle based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.

In view of the progress in technology cooperation between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States regardless of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and related guidelines. In 1983, Japan established the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America. In 2006, the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America was established to replace the foregoing Exchange of Notes. Under these frameworks, Japan decided to provide the United States with 20 items of arms and military technologies, including military technologies related to joint technological research on BMD. Japan and the United States consult with each other at forums such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&T) and conduct cooperative research and development regarding the specific projects agreed upon at these forums.

At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in June 2016, the Ministers signed a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Memorandum of Understanding (RDP MOU). The MOU promotes measures concerning the procurement of equipment by Japanese and U.S. defense authorities based on reciprocity (providing information necessary to submit bids to businesses of the other country, protecting submitted corporate information, waiving restrictions on participation by businesses of the other country, etc.).

Part III, Chapter 4, Section 4-2 (Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) explains initiatives for the common maintenance infrastructure for the 24 MV-22 Ospreys deployed by the U.S. Marine Corps at MCAS Futenma and the Osprey planned to be deployed by the GSDF7 as well as initiatives for the onsite maintenance locations (regional depots) in the Asia-Pacific region for F-35 fighter aircraft.

(2) Education and Research Exchange
The Guidelines recognize the importance of intellectual cooperation relating to security and defense, and the two governments will deepen exchanges between members of relevant organizations, and strengthen communication between each side’s research and educational institutions. To this end, the MOD/SDF has been working on education and research exchanges by accepting students from abroad and holding Japan-U.S.
bilateral or multilateral seminars that include the United States so that security and defense personnel can share knowledge and enhance cooperation.

Chapter 4
Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2018

4 Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States

Various Policy Consultations
Japan and the United States have maintained close coordination at multiple levels, including the summit level and ministerial level, and have continually strengthened and expanded cooperative relations for the peace, stability and prosperity of not only the two countries but also the entire international community, including the Asia-Pacific region.

Close policy consultations on security are conducted through diplomatic channels as well as between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels in the Governments of Japan and the United States through meetings such as the Japan-United States SCC (“2+2” Meeting), the Security Subcommittee (SSC) and the SDC. As the framework for ministerial consultations among the top officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs of the two countries, the SCC (“2+2” Meeting) represents such policy consultations. The SCC functions as an important consultative panel to discuss issues related to Japan-U.S. cooperation in the area of security.

In addition, the MOD organizes Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meetings between the Japanese Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus on the defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation. Furthermore, the Japanese State Minister of Defense and the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense work together, and MOD officials, including the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and the Chiefs of Staff of the SDF, have working-level meetings when necessary and exchange information with the U.S. DoD and others under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

The sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United States is undoubtedly conducive to the increased credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and results in the further enhancement of close collaboration between

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consultative Forum</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Consultative Committee (SSC) (“2+2” Meeting)</td>
<td>Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense</td>
<td>Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of the relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to related to Japan-U.S. cooperation in the area of security.</td>
<td>Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960, in accordance with Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Subcommittee (SSC)</td>
<td>Participants are not specified</td>
<td>Exchange of views on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States</td>
<td>Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)</td>
<td>Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of the Bureau of Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense; Representative from Joint Staff</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Representative from: the U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ, Joint Staff, PACOM</td>
<td>Study and consideration of consultative measures to Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S. Joint Committee</td>
<td>Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of the Bureau of Local Cooperation, Ministry of Defense; and others</td>
<td>Deputy Commander of USFJ, Minister at the U.S. Embassy, and others</td>
<td>Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command before December 26, 1990.
2. Meetings are held from time to time between working-level officials of the two Governments, such as officials corresponding in rank to vice-minister or assistant secretary.
3. A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy-Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996.
the two countries. Therefore, the MOD is proactively engaging in these initiatives.

Reference 24 (Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since FY2015))
Fig. II-4-2-6 (Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues)

2 “2+2” Meeting (August 17, 2017)

The “2+2” Meeting was held in Washington DC on August 17, 2017. Foreign Minister Kono and Defense Minister Onodera attended from the Japanese side, and then U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson and Secretary of U.S. Defense Mattis attended from the U.S. side.

The following is a summary of the “2+2” Meeting and Joint Statement.

a. Overview

○ Amidst an increasingly severe security in the Asia-Pacific region, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and reconfirmed that the Alliance continues to be the cornerstone of the regional peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

b. Regional Strategic Environment

○ The Ministers concurred that North Korea’s nuclear and missiles development is completely unacceptable, and that it is necessary to apply more pressure on North Korea, including the strict and full implementation of the newly adopted United Nations Security Council resolution. In addition, while maintaining Japan-U.S. and Japan-U.S.-Republic of Korea cooperation closely, that the Ministers urge China and Russia to play a greater role, as well as to continue taking concrete measures to reinforce the defense posture of the Alliance and enhance its capabilities in order to deter the threat of North Korea.

○ Regarding the situation in the South China Sea, the Ministers agreed that Japan and the U.S. would continue to cooperate for the peace and stability of the East China Sea, reaffirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku islands, and that they oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands.

○ The Ministers confirmed the significance of continued engagement of Japan and the United States including through respective activities to support freedom of navigation.

c. Strengthening Security and Defense Cooperation

○ The Ministers shared the view to develop measures to further enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In particular, they proposed practical measures and actions to further strengthen the Alliance, including through reviewing the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States to ensure seamless Alliance responses across a full spectrum of situations.

• Japan expressed the intent to expand its role in the Alliance and augment its defense capabilities, in anticipation of its next planning period for it Mid-Term Defense Program.

• The United States committed to deploying its most advanced capabilities to Japan.

• In order to expedite work already underway in this regard, the Ministers gave the following guidance to their stance. (1) Accelerate implementation of the Guidelines and pursue additional types of cooperation under Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security. (2) Explore new and expanded activities in various areas such as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), training and exercises, research and development, capacity building, and joint/shared use of facilities.

○ The Ministers reaffirmed the two governments’ commitment to the implementation of the 2015 Guidelines.

• The Ministers welcomed to operationalize mutual asset protection and to bring into force the new Japan-U.S. ACSA.

• The Ministers reaffirmed the critical role of the U.S.’ extended deterrence that is essential to ensuring the security of Japan as well as the peace and stability of the Asia-pacific region.

• The Ministers affirmed to enhance and accelerate of cooperation in such areas as bilateral planning, air and missile defenses, Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), cooperation on defense equipment and technology cooperation, intelligence cooperation and information security.

• Aiming to enhance cooperation in outer space and cyberspace, and deepen discussions towards cooperation.
d. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation

The Ministers highlighted efforts to advance trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation with other partners in the region, notably ROK, Australia, India and Southeast Asian countries.

The Ministers emphasized to expand Japan-U.S.-Korea trilateral exercises (missile warnings, anti-submarine warfare, and maritime interdiction operation exercises), and enhance information-sharing. They affirmed the intention to further enhance capacity building programs and defense equipment and technology transfers to the Southeast Asian countries. They confirmed the commitment to launch a whole-of-government dialogue on maritime security capacity building.

e. The U.S. Force Presence in Japan

The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to implementing the existing arrangements to maintain a robust U.S. Force presence in Japan, while maintaining deterrent capability of U.S. Force and mitigating their impact on local communities, and enhancing from local communities for the presence and operations of USFJ.

• The Ministers reaffirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma. They underscored their strong determination to achieve relocation of facilities to Henokosaki and the return of MCAS Futenma as soon as possible.

• The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to steadily implement the existing realignment plan (Consolidation Plan, relocation of marine corps stationed in Okinawa to Guam, field carrier landing practice, relocation of training of tilt-rotor aircraft/rotary wing aircraft, etc.).

Host Nation Support (HNS)
The Ministers reaffirmed the overall level of HNS, and the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) funding.

Other issues
The Ministers reaffirmed promotion of joint/shared use. They welcomed supplementary arrangements of the Status of Forces Agreement regarding the environmental stewardship and the civilian component, and they stressed the importance of steadily implementing these arrangements.

Reference 25 (Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (2+2) Joint Statement (provisional translation) (August 17, 2017)

3 Recent Major Policy Consultations

(1) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (August 17, 2017)
Minister of Defense Onodera and Secretary of Defense Mattis took the opportunity of Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting to hold the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting.

a. General Statement
The Ministers agreed on the importance to establish a trust relationship between Japan-U.S. defense authorities, and agreed to cooperate to strengthen Japan-U.S. alliance.

b. Response to the North Korea Issue
The Ministers exchanged their views about pressing issues of North Korea, and stated that it is time to increase the pressure and also noted that they will take necessary measures in cooperation with U.S. Forces to respond to every situation.

Regarding the response to issues of North Korea, the Ministers confirmed that close coordination between Japan and the U.S. is indispensable and agreed to work on further increasing the pressure on North Korea and improvement of the defense posture and capability.

c. Enhancement of the Deterrence and Response Capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
In light of increasingly severe security environment, the Ministers agreed to proceed with initiatives to ensure effectiveness of the Guidelines and to further enhance the deterrence and response capability of Japan-U.S. alliance, while advancing an effort to improve capabilities of both Japan and the U.S.

(2) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (September 21, 2017)
Prime Minister Abe visited New York to attend the United Nations General Assembly, and held Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with President Trump.

The two leaders discussed the situation concerning North Korea. They once again shared the view that a series of provocative actions including North Korea’s ballistic missile launch on August 29 as well as on September 15 and its nuclear test on September 3 constitute an unprecedented, grave and imminent threat to the international community including Japan and the United States. They confirmed that the U.S. commitment to defend Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, is unwavering, and that Japan and the United States are 100% together.

The two leaders welcomed the recent adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2375. They affirmed the importance of continued cooperation between Japan and the United States, trilateral cooperation.
between Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea, as well as to urge relevant countries including China and Russia to secure the full implementation of the resolution and to further work on maximizing the pressure against North Korea.

(3) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (October 23, 2017)

Minister Onodera and Secretary Mattis took the opportunity of ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM plus) to hold the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting from 12:45 (LT) for about 65 minutes. An overview is as follows.

a. Response to issues of North Korea

The Ministers shared information on the situation and outlook of nuclear and missile development by North Korea. Minister Onodera described the situation where threats of North Korea to security of the region including Japan have become unprecedentedly major and imminent. Based on that fact, Minister Onodera stated the necessity of a proper discussion with Secretary Mattis to take close measures to any situation as an alliance. Secretary Mattis expressed the similar view and renewed strong determination on defense of Japan including commitment for extended deterrence.

In light of increasing threat of ballistic missile by North Korea, the Ministers agreed to ensure the best defense posture, confirmed cooperation on introduction of new BMD assets focusing on Aegis Ashore, and agreed to promote closer cooperation on operational side between assets of Japan and the U.S. assets including Aegis ship.

The ministers welcomed that they are keeping a high level of communication through telephone calls on the occasion of repeated provocative acts by North Korea, and confirmed that they will keep working closely together in information sharing. Also, they confirmed that they will continue to exert pressure on North Korea in a tangible way, and reiterated the importance of coordinating closely on future measures between Japan and the United States.

In addition, the Ministers reaffirmed to advance close trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States, and Republic of Korea.

b. Regional Situations

The Ministers agreed that they will continuously keep paying attention to the situation of the East China Sea and both Japan and the United States will cooperate for its peace and stability.

Also, the Ministers confirmed the importance of commitment to South-East Asia in light of the situation including the South China Sea, and welcomed development of multilateral security cooperation and dialogue in the region under the framework of ADMM plus. Minister Onodera stated that Japan will proceed with the effort to improve capability of ASEAN based on the guidelines for Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation, “the Vientiane Vision.” The Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will cooperate to promote defense cooperation including capacity building assistance with South-East Asian countries.

In addition, as for the accident of CH-53E, Secretary Mattis showed recognition on the importance of flight safety, and Minister Onodera conveyed to Secretary Mattis that it is vital to win the support of local communities to ensure stable stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan and asked to operate safely.

(4) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (November 6, 2017)

Prime Minister Abe held a working lunch and Summit Meeting with U.S. President Trump when he visited Japan, and held discussions on the bilateral security situation, including North Korea, the regional situation, and Okinawa.

a. North Korea

❖ Introduction

The two leaders confirmed that both countries are 100% together on the issue of North Korea, and that the U.S. commitment to the region is unwavering, backed by the U.S. presence based on the robust Japan-U.S. Alliance. President Trump also reconfirmed the ironclad U.S. commitment to Japan’s defense through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional.

❖ Reinforcing Pressure to North Korea

The two leaders shared the view that now is not the time for dialogue, that maximum pressure must be applied to North Korea, and the recognition that North Korea will not see a bright future unless it changes its course of actions toward denuclearization.

Prime Minister Abe announced that Japan intends to take additional measures, which President Trump welcomed in response.

The two leaders welcomed deepened coordination among Japan, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK), and reaffirmed to further foster coordination among three countries.

Both leaders reaffirmed that the full implementation of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea is imperative and confirmed that they intend to encourage related countries including China and Russia, including through direct engagement with their counterparts, so that the international community as a whole maximizes pressure on North Korea.
b. Regional / Global Affairs

❍ Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy
The two leaders confirmed that a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law is a cornerstone for peace and prosperity of the international community and called on all states to respect freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the seas, and reiterated that both countries intend to continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows.

The two leaders stressed the importance of the Indo-Pacific region, which is the core of the vitality of the world with its vast population and economic dynamism.

In addition, both leaders affirmed that Japan and the United States will work together to promote peace and prosperity in the region by developing the Indo-Pacific as free and open and directed relevant ministers and institutions to flesh out detailed cooperation, in particular, in the following areas:

1. Promotion and establishment of fundamental values (rule of law, freedom of navigation, etc.)
2. Pursuit of economic prosperity (improvement of connectivity, etc.)
3. Commitment for peace and stability (capacity building on maritime law enforcement, etc.)

Both leaders reiterated that they will cooperate with any country that shares this vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

❍ East China Sea and South China Sea
The two leaders expressed concern about the situation in the East and South China Seas and they reaffirmed their opposition to unilateral coercive actions that could alter the status quo and increase tensions.

They reiterated that maritime disputes should be settled peacefully in accordance with international law.

Taking note of the progress of discussion of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC), they emphasized the importance of demilitarization of the disputed features in the South China Sea.

❍ China
The two leaders welcome China’s positive contribution to regional and global peace and prosperity, and stressed the importance for Japan and the U.S. to continue constructive dialogue with China.

c. Japan-U.S. Relations
The two leaders shared the view that they intend to continue to work toward enhancing the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance amid an increasingly severe security environment in the region.

Along with appreciating the achievements made at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (Japan-U.S. “2+2”) held in August 2017, they directed relevant ministers to continue to follow up with these achievements.

The two leaders reaffirmed the commitment to the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan in accordance with previous affirmations, maintaining operational and deterrent capability of U.S. forces in Japan. Both leaders reconfirmed that the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Henokosaki is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma and called for the steady implementation of the construction plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), noting the adverse impact of further delays on the ability to provide for peace and security. Prime Minister Abe stated that it is essential to be responsive to local communities’ concerns regarding incidents, accidents and other issues. Both leaders reaffirmed the importance of engaging local communities about the purpose of training and of allaying concerns about safety.

(5) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (April 17 and 18, 2018) (Security Field)
Prime Minister Abe held Japan-U.S. Summit Meetings with U.S. President Trump three times.

a. North Korea
The two leaders reaffirmed the close coordination between the two countries with respect to the actions to be taken on the issue of North Korea including the upcoming U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting, and expressed their intention for Japan and the US to remain fully aligned on all areas of talks with North Korea. They also confirmed the importance of Japan-U.S.-ROK close trilateral coordination.

Both leaders shared the recognition that maximum pressure campaign to North Korea under the close cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and ROK and in coordination with the international community including China, has recently driven North Korea to seek dialogue. The two leaders also commended the efforts by the ROK Government up to this point.

The two leaders noted that concrete measures toward denuclearization hadn’t been announced yet by North Korea, and shared the view that they needed to continue careful analysis of its intention.

Nonetheless, both leaders affirmed that they would maintain maximum pressure against North Korea. As the US maintains the policy of “all options are on the table,” Prime Minister Abe reaffirmed his support for this President Trump’s principled position. Moreover, both leaders shared the recognition that North Korea must not be given any reward for merely engaging with other countries, and that the international community should uphold this policy.
Both leaders reaffirmed that they are committed to achieving the denuclearization of North Korea. They also reaffirmed that North Korea needs to abandon all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. The two leaders shared the recognition that specific actions need to be taken by North Korea to realize these goals.

Prime Minister Abe requested President Trump to raise the abductions issue during the upcoming U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting, and President Trump assured that he will bring up the matter in his meeting with Kim Jong-un and urge North Korea to promptly resolve its abduction of Japanese citizens, referring to the strong impression he received when he met the families of the abductees during his visit to Japan last November. Both leaders agreed to work towards the early resolution of the abductions issue.

Both leaders shared the importance of addressing North Korea’s sanctions evasion and full implementation of the pertinent United Nations Security Council Resolutions by the international community under close cooperation with international partners including ROK. In this context, President Trump commended Japan’s effort to counter illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea related vessels, and expressed that the U.S., with other multilateral partners, would continue efforts on this issue in coordination with Japan.

Both leaders shared the expectation that the situation will improve following the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting, etc. They also shared the recognition that North Korea is situated in a truly fortunate location, adjoining the growth region of Asia and the Pacific, and it has an industrious labor force as well as natural resources. Both leaders also shared the view that if it were to make use of those, there could be a path towards North Korea dramatically growing its economy and improving public welfare, and reaffirmed that is where North Korea’s bright future lies.

b. Japan-U.S. Alliance

Against the backdrop of the current situation regarding North Korea, President Trump reaffirmed unwavering commitment of the U.S. to Japan’s defense through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional.

Both leaders reaffirmed that they would further promote the Japan-U.S. security cooperation through steady implementation of Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.

Both leaders expressed their intention to work together to mitigate impact of the U.S. forces on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining operational and deterrent capability of the U.S. forces, Japan. The leaders reaffirmed that the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to the Camp Schwab/Henoko area and in adjacent waters is the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and as such called for the steady implementation of the construction plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) to ensure the Alliance’s ability to provide for peace and security in the region. Both leaders also shared a continued commitment to safety operations.

The two leaders shared concern regarding the situation in the East and South China Seas, and reaffirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to coordinate together on this issue. The two leaders also reaffirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covers the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and that they oppose any unilateral action that seeks to change the status quo.

Prime Minister Abe conveyed President Trump that it is important for Japan to continue introducing sophisticated equipment including U.S.-made defense equipment in strengthening Japan’s defense capability and responding to the severe security environment. President Trump welcomed Prime Minister Abe’s remarks.

c. Others

Both leaders welcomed progress in discussions between Japan and the United States, toward achievement of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and agreed that they would further advance concrete cooperation in areas that follow international standards including development of high quality infrastructure.

Both leaders also discussed China, and agreed on the importance of urging China to make further contributions to the peace, security, and prosperity of the region and the international community.

(6) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (April 20, 2018)

Minister of Onodera and Secretary of Defense Mattis held the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting at the U.S. Department of Defense.

a. North Korea

The Ministers closely compared and adjusted the defense agencies’ understandings and policy on the way ahead, including the meeting between leaders of United States and North Korea, regarding the issue of North Korea. Despite that North Korea’s attitude is changing and they are showing their willingness to talk, the Ministers noted that no concrete measures by North Korea towards denuclearization has been seen and agreed to keep close watch on North Koreas’ actions. Minister Onodera
stated the necessity of maintaining maximum pressure against North Korea to make them abandon all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs, and the Ministers confirmed that they will continue exerting pressure and sanctions, under the common principle of realizing abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.

In light of illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods, Secretary Mattis applauded measures implemented by Maritime Self Defense Forces, and noted the U.S. willingness to continue pursuing such activities in coordination with Japan and other various partners. In addition, the Ministers reaffirmed to advance close trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea as well as multinational cooperation through conducting joint exercises.

The Ministers agreed that they will continue to maintain close communication to take concerted action as an alliance in response to any situations.

b. Enhancing the Alliance Capability to Deter and Respond
The Ministers welcomed the Japan-U.S. cooperation in new areas implemented under Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines for Japan U.S. Defense Cooperation such as protection mission against U.S. Forces’ assets and provision of goods and services to U.S. Forces by Self Defense Forces, and the Ministers reaffirmed to make further improvement of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation through steady implementation of Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.

In light of the build-up of Japan’s future defense capability, Minister Onodera explained that Japan is in the process to review the National Defense Program Guidelines and to develop the next Mid-Term Defense Program towards the end of this year, and the Ministers agreed to continue to work closely and exchange information. Minister Onodera also stated that, in order to address the severe security environment, it is essential for the strengthening of Japan’s defense capability that Japan continues to introduce high-performance defense equipment including U.S. made assets. The Ministers affirmed that both countries will make efforts to realize Japan’s smooth and timely procurement of U.S. made assets, including Aegis Ashore, by making improvements in challenges regarding Foreign Military Sales.

c. U.S. Forces in Japan, Okinawa
Minister Onodera requested continued efforts to ensure safe operation of U.S. Forces, including U.S. military aircrafts in Okinawa and the CV-22 expected to be deployed in Yokota Air Base this year. Secretary Mattis expressed his recognition that it is important to ensure safe operations. Furthermore, Minister Onodera requested cooperation in efforts to mitigate the impact on local communities, such as those in Okinawa, and the Ministers agreed to work together in obtaining understanding of local communities.

(7) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting (May 29, 2018)
Minister of Defense Onodera and Secretary of Defense Mattis held the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in Hawaii.

a. North Korea
The Ministers, taking into account the recent situations regarding the issue of North Korea, closely compared and adjusted the defense agencies’ understandings and policy on future response against North Korea issues. Minister Onodera expressed his view that the meeting between the leaders of U.S. and North Korea should be an opportunity to advance outstanding issues of concern such as nuclear, missile and abductions issues. The Ministers confirmed that they will continue exerting pressure and sanctions, under the common principle of realizing abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction including chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles of all ranges in complete, verifiable and irreversible way.

In light of illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods, the Ministers welcomed measures implemented by Japan in coordination with partner countries including United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and agreed that they will continue to take actions with the voluntary countries, and reaffirmed the importance of the deterrent capability of regional U.S. Forces including U.S. Forces Korea.

Secretary Mattis expressed U.S. renewed commitment to Japanese defense. The Ministers agreed that they will continue to maintain close communication to take concerted action as an alliance in response to any situations.

b. Regional State of Affairs, etc.
The Ministers exchanged opinions on regional challenges, and in light of China’s unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force, agreed that it is important for both countries to continue to closely watch on the situations in the East China Sea, to cooperate for the peace and stability, and to be continuously engaged in the South China Sea. The Ministers noted that China has enforced its military capability and intensified its activities in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, and also agreed to reinforce the Alliance capability to deter and respond through enhancement of defense capability based on the close cooperation of Japan and U.S. for the peace and stability of the region.
c. Free and Open Indo-Pacific
The Ministers reconfi rmed the importance of cooperating with the allied countries and various partners to assure the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and agreed that Japan and U.S. or Japan, U.S., and Australia proceed with coordination in the promotion of the basic principles such as rule of law, freedom of navigation, and in capacity building.

d. U.S. Forces in Japan
Minister Onodera requested efforts to ensure safe operations of U.S. Forces and cooperation in efforts to obtain consent from local communities including those in Okinawa.

(8) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (June 7, 2018)
( Security Field)
Prime Minister Abe and U.S. President Trump held Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in Washington, DC.

The two leaders closely coordinated the future policy with regard to the issue on North Korea, including responses to the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting that was scheduled for June 12, and shared the view that Japan and the United States, as well as Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), would coordinate closely to ensure that the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting would be a historic meeting marking progress on the issues of concern, including the abductions, nuclear, and missile issues.

The two leaders confirmed that following the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting, Japan and the United States, as well as Japan, the United States, and the ROK, will promptly share information and coordinate policy.

(9) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting (June 29, 2018)
Minister of Defense Onodera and Secretary of Defense Mattis held the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting at the Ministry of Defense.

a. North Korea
The Ministers, taking into account the recent situations regarding the issue of North Korea, closely compared and adjusted the defense agencies’ understandings and policy on future response against North Korea issues. The Ministers agreed that, complying with the UNSCRs, they will work together to realize CVID of all of its WMD including biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles of all ranges in coordination with the international community, and confirmed that Japan and U.S. continue to counter illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea in coordination with their partner countries.

Secretary Mattis explained the suspension of U.S.-ROK combined military exercises, and the Ministers reaffirmed that neither withdrawal nor reduction of the USFK has been considered, and reconfi rmed the importance of the deterrent capability of regional U.S. Forces including U.S. Forces Korea. Secretary Mattis expressed renewed U.S. commitments to defend Japan, and the Ministers agreed to proceed with the reinforcement of the alliance’s deterrence and response capability including conducting Japan-U.S. joint exercises steadily, as planned. The Ministers agreed that they will continue to maintain a close channel of communication to take concerted actions as an alliance in response to every situation.

b. Regional Affairs
The Ministers exchanged their views based on Secretary Mattis’s visit to China, the Ministers reconfi rmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands, and agreed to continue to closely watch on the situations in the East China Sea, and to cooperate with each other for the peace and stability.

The Ministers also confi rmed the importance to collaborate towards consolidating basic principles such as rule of law and freedom of navigation.

c. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
The Ministers welcomed the progress and improvements being made in challenges regarding Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and the Ministers also confirmed the U.S. will continue to work to help Japan achieve effi cient procurement.

d. U.S. Forces in Japan
The Ministers agreed to closely work towards the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, and Minister Onodera’s requested to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.
Section 3 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan

Measures such as realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan are extremely important in mitigating the impact on local communities, such as those in Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrent capability of the U.S. Forces. The MOD will advance the U.S. Forces realignment and other initiatives while making continuous efforts to gain the understanding and cooperation of local communities hosting USFJ facilities and areas.

1 Significance of the Presence of the U.S. Forces in Japan

As the security environment surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly severe, for the Japan-U.S. Alliance, which is based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, to adequately function as a deterrence that contributes to Japan’s defense as well as the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, it is necessary to secure the presence of the U.S. military in Japan and to maintain a posture in Japan and the surrounding areas from peacetime that enables USFJ to respond swiftly and expeditiously to emergencies.

For this purpose, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan allows the stationing of USFJ, which is a core part of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

Further, the realization of a stable U.S. military presence is necessary for a swift Japan-U.S. joint response based on Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in the event of an armed attack on Japan. Additionally, the actions of USFJ in the defense of Japan will be assisted by the timely reinforcement of other U.S. Forces, and USFJ will serve as the basis of such support.

In order for USFJ to carry out the abovementioned role, it is essential that all the services of the U.S. Forces, including those in Japan, are functionally integrated. For instance, when responding to armed aggression against Japan in cooperation with the SDF, the U.S. Forces primarily serve the role of “spear” through its offensive power. When the U.S. Forces function as an offensive power, it can be expected that the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps stationed in Japan work in an integrated manner to fully exert their functions.

In addition, while Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty stipulates the obligation of the United States to defend Japan, Article 6 allows the United States to use facilities and areas in Japan for maintaining the security of Japan and international peace and security in the Far East, and overall Japan-U.S. obligations are kept in balance.

2 Measures to Ensure the Smooth Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan

The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) stipulates matters pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas and the status of USFJ, including furnishing of facilities and areas for use by the U.S. Forces (USFJ facilities and areas), and satisfying the labor requirements of USFJ.

(1) Furnishing of JSDJ Facilities and Areas
Japan furnishes USFJ facilities and areas for the U.S. Forces under the provisions of the SOFA, in accordance with agreements reached through the Joint Committee between the Governments of Japan and the United States.

The Government of Japan has entered into agreements and concluded lease contracts with owners of private and public lands on which USFJ facilities and areas exist in order to ensure the stable use of these facilities and areas. However, should the Government be unable to obtain the approval of landowners, it will acquire title under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, while compensating the landowners for any loss they may have suffered in the process.

(2) Satisfying labor Requirements of USFJ
USFJ require manpower (labor) to maintain its forces, and the SOFA stipulates that the requirements of USFJ shall be satisfied with the assistance of the Government of Japan.

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3 The term “title” means a legal cause that justifies a certain act.
As of the end of FY2017, 25,803 USFJ local employees (hereinafter referred to as the “employees”) at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan, working as office workers at headquarters, engineers at maintenance/supply facilities, members of security guards and fire departments on base, and sales staff at welfare/recreational facilities. They perform functions essential for the smooth operations of USFJ, and support its activities.

The Government of Japan hires these employees in accordance with the provisions of the SOFA. The MOD supports the stationing of USFJ by performing administrative work for personnel management, payment of wages, health care, and welfare, etc.

Host Nation Support (HNS) plays an important role to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Due to soaring prices and wages in Japan since the mid-1970s, and changes in the international economic situation, the Government of Japan began to bear labor costs such as welfare costs in FY1978. Then in FY1979, Japan began to bear costs for the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP).

Furthermore, as labor costs soared due to changes in economic conditions that affected both countries, the employment stability of the employees was adversely influenced, and there was even concern that it would affect the activities of USFJ. Therefore, in 1987, the Governments of Japan and the United States concluded an agreement that sets forth special measures regarding Article 24 of the SOFA (the Special Measures Agreement) as exceptional, limited and provisional measures under the cost principle in the SOFA.

Based on this agreement, the Government of Japan

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**3 Costs Associated with the U.S. Forces Stationed in Japan**

Various costs associated with USFJ include the costs of stationing USFJ, costs for implementing the stipulations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report for mitigating the impact on the people of Okinawa, as well as costs for implementing measures that will contribute to mitigating the impact on local communities associated with the initiatives for the realignment of the U.S. Forces.

**Fig. II-4-3-1 U.S. Forces Japan-related Costs (Budget for FY2018)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Category</th>
<th>MOD-Related Budget (¥307.1 billion)</th>
<th>SACO-related costs (¥5.1 billion)</th>
<th>Realignment-related costs (¥216.1 billion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ</td>
<td>¥196.8 billion (1)</td>
<td>Projects for land returns ¥2.6 billion</td>
<td>Relocation of the U.S. Marines in Okinawa to Guam ¥59.0 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities Improvement Program</td>
<td>¥20.6 billion</td>
<td>Projects for training improvement ¥0.4 billion</td>
<td>Projects for realignment in Okinawa ¥87.9 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor costs (welfare costs, etc.)</td>
<td>¥20.6 billion</td>
<td>Projects for noise reduction ¥0.8 billion</td>
<td>Projects for contingency use ¥0.2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent for facilities</td>
<td>¥100.2 billion</td>
<td>Projects for the relocation of Carrier Air Wing</td>
<td>Projects for training relocation Local task force-related cost ¥70 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relocation, etc</td>
<td>¥4.3 billion</td>
<td>Projects for realignment initiatives</td>
<td>Projects for facilitating realignment initiatives ¥4.1 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other costs (compensation for fisheries, etc.)</td>
<td>¥28.5 billion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Burden from the Special Measures Agreement (¥158.8 billion)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Category</th>
<th>Cost Sharing (¥196.8 billion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total: ₹182.0 billion (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. Training relocation costs under the Special Measures Agreement extend either into the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ or the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs.
2. The SACO-related costs refer to the cost for implementing the contents of the SACO Final Report to reduce the impact on people in Okinawa, while the realignment-related costs refer to the cost relating to a step to contribute to reducing the impact on local communities as part of the realignment initiatives. Since the cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ is Japan’s voluntary effort to bear some costs in light of the importance of ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, its nature is different from the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs, and is categorized separately.
3. The estimated costs of government-owned land provided for use as USFJ facilities.
4. Numbers may not add up due to rounding.

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started to bear labor costs of eight categories such as the adjustment allowance (currently replaced by the regional allowance). As the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was revised later on, the costs borne by the Government of Japan expanded to cover labor costs for base pay, etc., and utilities costs from FY1991. The financial responsibility of the Japanese Government was further expanded to cover training relocation costs from FY1996.

The Government of Japan has been reviewing HNS while paying full attention to its tight fiscal conditions, and as a result, HNS has been on a steady decline after peaking out in the FY1999 budget on an expenditure basis.

5 Current Special Measures Agreement

As the former SMA was effective up until March 2016, the current SMA was intended to “open discussions pertaining to future arrangements for an appropriate level for sharing the costs of U.S. Forces stationed in Japan” based on the “2+2” agreement of April 2015. Following this agreement, Japan and the United States held consultations on a new SMA, and in December 2015, the Governments of Japan and the United States reached agreement as follows: Subsequently, after the new SMA was signed in January 2016 and approval by the Diet, the new agreement took effect in April of the same year.

The key points of the new SMA are as follows:

1. Effective period: Five years (from FY2016 through FY2020).
2. Cost sharing: Japan shall bear all or part of the labor costs, utilities costs, and the costs incurred in training relocation.

Labor costs

The upper limit of the number of workers at welfare, recreation, and morale facilities to be funded by Japan will be reduced from 4,408 to 3,893, while the upper limit of the number of workers engaged in activities such as maintenance of assets and administrative works to be funded by Japan, will be increased from 18,217 to 19,285. As a result, the upper limit of the number of workers to be funded by Japan will be increased from the current 22,625 to 23,178. These adjustments will be phased in over the new SMA period from FY2016 to FY2020.

Utilities costs

Over the new SMA period, the share of utilities costs to be borne by Japan for each fiscal year is reduced from the current 72% to 61%, with the upper limit for utilities costs to be funded by Japan set at approximately 24.9 billion yen.

Costs for Facilities Improvement Program

The amount of costs for the FIP will not fall below 20.6 billion yen in each fiscal year during the new SMA period. For the period of the previous SMA, any amount of reductions in the labor costs and the utilities costs was to be appropriated for an increase in costs for the FIP. But such appropriation will not be made during the new SMA period.

(3) Scale of Host Nation Support

The amount of HNS in FY2020, the final fiscal year of the new SMA period, will be approximately 189.9 billion yen, with the average amount for each fiscal year during the same period coming to approximately 189.3 billion yen (any change in wages based on recommendations by the National Personnel Authority will be reflected appropriately in labor costs for each fiscal year).

(4) Cost-saving efforts: It is clearly stipulated that the United States will make further efforts to economize the above-mentioned expenditures.

6 USFJ Facilities and Areas and the Local Communities

The social conditions surrounding USFJ facilities and areas have changed significantly, including, for example, through urbanization over the past several decades. For USFJ facilities and areas to fully exert their capabilities and be genuinely accepted by the Japanese people, it is vital to reduce the impact of the facilities and areas as much as possible and secure the understanding and cooperation of the local communities in light of such changes. Japan’s national land is narrow with limited plains, and there are many cases where USFJ facilities and areas are located close to urban and business areas. In such areas, factors including the existence of those facilities and areas, and the takeoffs and landings of the U.S. Forces aircraft have considerable impact on the residents’ living environment and local development. It is therefore necessary to make efforts to mitigate the impact in a way that is responsive to the circumstances of each area.

2 Deployment of New U.S. Forces Assets (F-35B) to Japan

As a fifth generation fighter, the F-35 has high stealth performance and powerful fire control capabilities. It has three variants: F-35A, the normal takeoff and landing variant; F-35B, the short takeoff and vertical landing variant; and F-35C, the aircraft carrier variant.

It was confirmed in the Japan-U.S. “2+2” joint
announcement in October 2013 that the deployment of the F-35B fighter to Japan would begin in 2017 as its first forward deployment outside of the United States. In January 2017, 10 F-35B fighters arrived in Iwakuni Air Base to replace F/A-18 fighters. In November, the AV8B fighters were replaced by six F-35B fighters.

As the security environment surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly severe, the Government of Japan believes that the deployment of the F-35B, the most up-to-date and high-performance fighter, to Japan is a manifestation of the iron-clad commitment of the United States to the Japan-U.S. Alliance, strengthens the deterrent of the Alliance, and contributes to the security of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region.

### 3 Progress of the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan

As for the realignment of USFJ, “the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (Roadmap) was set forth in May 2006. Subsequently, the Governments of Japan and the United States have conducted full-fledged bilateral discussions concerning coordination of the plan for the realignment, in view of factors including the following: 1) The necessity of implementing measures to promptly and steadily enable the visible mitigation of the impact on Okinawa; 2) The necessity of coordinating strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region and the realignment package, which was set out in the U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance released in January 2012; and 3) The fact that a reduction in the cost associated with the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps to Guam has been demanded by the U.S. Congress. The achievements thereof have been announced as part of the Joint Statements of the “2+2” Meeting and through other means.

1. **Achievements at the “2+2” Meeting (April 27, 2012)**

The 2006 Roadmap stated that, among the III Marine Expeditionary Force stationed in Okinawa, the main focus of the relocation to Guam would be the command elements, but the United States decided to alter the composition of the units. As a result, the U.S. Government decided to deploy the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)—consisting of command, ground, aviation and logistics support elements—in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, as well as in Australia as a rotational unit. In addition, the Governments of Japan and the United States decided to delink both the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land returns south of Kadena Air Base from the progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF).

2. **Achievements at the “2+2” Meeting (August 17, 2017)**

The two Governments agree that, “in view of maintaining a robust U.S. Force presence in Japan, the Governments of Japan and the United States reaffirmed their commitments to implement the existing arrangements for the realignment of USFJ. These arrangements aim to maintain operational and deterrence capability in an increasingly severe security environment, while also mitigating the impact on local communities and enhancing support from local communities for the presence and operations of USFJ.”

### 4 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa

In comparison to areas such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, and Guam, Okinawa is located closer to potential conflict areas that could affect Japan’s peace and security, including the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, but at the
same time has the advantage of having a certain distance from these areas that would not heighten military tension there unnecessarily. In addition, Okinawa, comprising a large number of small islands, is located roughly in the center of the Southwestern Islands having a total length of some 1,200 km and close to key sea lanes for Japan, which depends on marine transportation for over 99% of its overall international trade. Furthermore, its location is extremely important from the perspective of security, as Okinawa serves as a strategically important target for neighboring countries in both making access to the Pacific from the continent and rejecting access from the Pacific.
to the continent. Thus, the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa—including the U.S. Marine Corps, which is in charge of first response for a variety of contingencies and capable of high mobility and rapid response, and also has readiness for wide-ranging missions—with the above-mentioned geographical characteristics, further ensures the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, strengthens deterrence, and contributes greatly not only to the security of Japan but also to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

On the other hand, Okinawa has many USFJ facilities and areas such as airbases, exercise fields and logistics facilities. As of January 1, 2017, approximately 70.6% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 8% of the land area of the prefecture.
and 14% of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, it is necessary to make utmost efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, while also considering the above-mentioned security standpoints.

**Fig. II-4-3-3 (The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Significance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa)**

**Geographical Advantage of Okinawa**
- Okinawa is located roughly in the center of the Southwestern Islands and also close to key sea lanes (*1) for Japan, and thus its location is extremely important from the perspective of Japan’s security.
- Okinawa is located at a distance that makes it possible to expeditiously send units to potential conflict areas and at the same time has sufficient distance so as not to heighten military tension unnecessarily and is not overly close in terms of protecting units.
- In the eyes of neighboring countries, Okinawa’s location is strategically important in both enabling access to the Pacific from the continent and rejecting access from the Pacific to the continent.

*1 Japan is dependent upon marine transportation for at least 99% of the total volume of its trade.

**The Significance & Roles of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa**
It is essential to maintain defense capabilities for the area of the Southwestern Islands in the main island of Okinawa, which is important as a strategic location for Japan for the security of Japan. The stationing of the U.S. Marine Corps (*2), which is capable of rapid response and high mobility and also has readiness for a wide variety of missions ranging from armed conflicts to natural disasters, in Okinawa, which features such geographical advantages plays an important role in ensuring not only the security of Japan but also the peace and safety of East Asia.

*2 The Marine Corps constantly utilizes all combat elements (land, sea and air) during its drills and deployments, so it is suited to providing a rapid response in the event of any kind of situation.

**Initiatives for Realignment, Consolidation, and Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa**

When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas covering approximately 278 km² for exclusive use by the U.S. Forces under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. However, their concentration in Okinawa has led to strong calls for their realignment, consolidation and reduction on the grounds that they seriously affect the lives of people in Okinawa Prefecture.

Both countries have continued their initiatives to realign, consolidate, and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, centering on those subject to the strong local requests, and, in relation to the so-called 23 issues, it was agreed in 1990 that both sides would proceed with the required adjustments and procedures for the return of land. Moreover, it was agreed in 1995 that initiatives would also be made to resolve the so-called Three Okinawa Issues, including the return of Naha Port (Naha City).

Subsequently, in response to an unfortunate incident that occurred in 1995, as well as the refusal of the then Governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal documents under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, the Government of Japan decided to devote even greater initiatives towards realignment, consolidation, and reduction, believing that the impact should be shared by the whole nation. In order to hold consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, the Government of Japan established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture, and SACO between Japan and the United States, and the so-called SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996.

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*5 The Three Okinawa Issues refer to the return of Naha Port, the return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, and the relocation of artillery live fire training over Highway 104. The relocation (distribution and implementation) of artillery live fire training over Highway 104 in FY2018 is planned for East Fuji Maneuver Area, Yausubetsu Maneuver Area, North Fuji Maneuver Area and Ohjitbara Maneuver Area.
Outline of SACO Final Report

The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land, the adjustment of training and operational procedures, the implementation of noise abatement initiatives, and the improvement of operational procedures regarding the SOFA, and also refers to the related facilities and areas covered. The land to be returned based on the SACO Final Report represents approximately 21% (about 50 km²) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa at that time, exceeding the amount of land returned during the period between the reversion of Okinawa and the implementation of the SACO Final Report, which is roughly 43 km².

Return of a Major Portion of the Northern Training Area

(1) Achievement of Majority Return

On December 22, 2016, the return of approximately 4,000 ha, a major portion of the Northern Training Area located in the villages of Kunigami and Higashi, was achieved based on the SACO Final Report.

The returned land accounts for approximately 20% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) in Okinawa. The return is the largest one since the reversion of Okinawa to the mainland, and had been an issue for 20 years since the SACO Final Report in 1996.

Given the requests for an early return of the land from the local villages of Kunigami and Higashi, the Government of Japan exerted its full efforts to achieve the earliest possible return as a way of contributing to the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa.

On the day before the return, Prime Minister Abe and then U.S. Ambassador Kennedy made a Japan-U.S. Joint Announcement. On the day of the return, a ceremony was held in Okinawa, which was attended by many officials including Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga, then Defense Minister Inada, then U.S. Ambassador Kennedy, and Kunigami Village Mayor Miyagi and Higashi Village Mayor Iju.

Based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Use of the Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Previously Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces, the MOD took measures to remove obstacles (such as soil contamination survey, etc.) so that the landowners, etc. can use returned lands effectively and appropriately, and transferred the land to the landowners on December 25, 2017.

(2) Construction Work for the Relocation of Helipads

The condition for returning the Northern Training Area was to relocate seven helipads to be returned in the area to a preexisting training area. In this regard, the Government
of Japan reached an agreement with the U.S. side to make considerations for the natural environment and to relocate not all but six helipads, which is the minimum necessary, and has steadily made progress with the construction work.

Some protesters impeded the expeditious execution of the construction work for the relocation of the helipads, through repeated obstruction such as parking cars and setting up tents in front of the entrance of the Northern Training Area. Thus, not only the Okinawa Defense Bureau but also the MOD headquarters and other regional defense bureaus dispatched personnel to support the relocation construction work.

Despite such efforts, the continuous obstruction made it difficult to bring in material and equipment by land, leading to a decision to transport them by helicopter. However, some of the equipment was too heavy for civilian helicopters to transport. For this reason, the Ground Self-Defense Force’s CH-47JA helicopter was used for their transportation in September 2016. In such ways, utmost efforts were made towards the achievement of the early return. As a result, the relocation of the helipads was completed in December 2016.

4 History and Progress of the U.S. Forces Realignment in Okinawa

Along with the initiatives set forth in the roadmap related to the realignment of the U.S. Forces, measures were implemented to alleviate the impact on the local communities while maintaining the deterrence capabilities.

(1) Relocation and Return of MCAS Futenma

The Government of Japan believes that it is imperative not to allow MCAS Futenma to remain indefinitely at its current location, which is in the vicinity of houses and schools in the center of Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture. This is a fundamental idea shared between the Government of Japan and the people of Okinawa.

As for the relocation of MCAS Futenma, the Government of Japan has not changed its stance that the current plan to construct the FRF at the Camp Schwab Henokosaki area (Nago City) and adjacent waters is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma.

The Government of Japan plans to make further efforts to achieve the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma as early as possible and to mitigate the impact on Okinawa in a speedy manner. The return of MCAS Futenma is expected to eliminate danger in the area and to contribute to the further growth of Okinawa, including Ginowan City, through the reuse of the area (approximately 481 ha with a land area 100 times larger than Tokyo Dome).

a. Relocation of MCAS Futenma and Mitigation of the Impact on Okinawa

The relocation of MCAS Futenma holds more significance than merely moving the facility from one location to another. Rather, it also contributes greatly to mitigating the impact on Okinawa. As such, the Government will work as one to implement this initiative.

(a) Distribution of Functions Offered by MCAS Futenma

MCAS Futenma fulfills the following functions relating to the aviation capabilities of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa: (1) Operation of the Osprey and other aircraft; (2) Operation of air refueling aircraft; and (3) Accepting a large number of transient aircraft in contingencies. Of these three functions, only (1) “operation of the Osprey and other aircraft” will be relocated to Camp Schwab. As for (2) “operation of air refueling aircraft,” all 15 KC-130 air refueling aircraft were relocated to MCAS Iwakuni (in Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture) in August 2014.

This marked the completion of a task that has remained unresolved for 18 years since the SACO Final Report in 1996, enabling a vast majority of fixed-wing aircraft located in MCAS Futenma to be moved outside Okinawa Prefecture. This move also led to the relocation of approximately 870 USFJ personnel, civilian employees, and dependents.

Moreover, the function of (3) “accepting a large number of transient aircraft in contingencies” will also be transferred to Tsuiki Air Base and Nyutabaru Air Base.

(b) Landfill Area

The area required for the land reclamation to build the FRF is approximately 160 ha, less than one-third of the approximately 481 ha of MCAS Futenma, and the new facility will be equipped with a significantly shorter runway at approximately 1,200 m (approximately 1,800 m including the overruns) compared to the current runway length of 2,740 m at MCAS Futenma.

(c) Flight Routes

Two runways will be constructed in a V-shape, which enables the flight path for both takeoff and landing to be located over the sea, in line with the requests of the local community. In MCAS Futenma, flight paths used daily for training and other purposes are located over residential areas, whereas flight paths in the FRF will be changed to over the sea, thereby reducing noise and risks.

For example, while more than 10,000 households...
are located in areas requiring housing noise insulation near MCAS Futenma, there will be zero households requiring such insulation around the FRF. This means that the noise levels experienced by all households will comply with the environment criteria applied to exclusive housing areas. In the case that an aircraft encounters any contingency, safety on the ground can be ensured by diverting the aircraft offshore.

b. The Necessity of Constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility within Okinawa Prefecture

The U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa consists of air, ground, logistics, and command elements. The interaction of those elements is indispensable for U.S. Marine Corps operations characterized by great mobility and readiness, so it has been determined that the FRF needs to be located within Okinawa Prefecture so that rotary-wing aircraft stationed at MCAS Futenma will be located near the elements with which they train, operate, or otherwise work on a regular basis.

c. Background Concerning the Futenma Replacement Facility

Considering the occurrence of the U.S. Forces helicopter crash in Ginowan City in August 2004, bilateral discussions on the realignment have been made towards realizing the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma at the earliest possible date in order to resolve the concern of the residents living in the vicinity.

In the SCC (“2+2”) document compiled in October 2005, the initiative to “locate the FRF in an ‘L’-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay” was approved. However, since this L-shape meant that U.S. military aircraft would fly over settlements in Nago City and Ginoza Village, a request was submitted to avoid flights over these settlements. In light of this, based on negotiation and agreement with the local municipalities including Nago City, it was decided to stipulate in the Roadmap that the FRF be located in a V-shape configuration that “combines Henokosaki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays.” With regard to construction of this replacement facility, “a Memorandum of Basic Understanding” was exchanged between the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Inamine and the then Minister of State for Defense Nukaga in May 2006.

After the change of government in September 2009, the Exploratory Committee for Okinawa Base Issues was established. After reviews conducted by the Committee, both governments, at the “2+2” Meeting held in May 2010, confirmed the intention to locate the FRF in the Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and the adjacent waters, and also agreed to take concrete measures to mitigate the impact on Okinawa.

Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in June 2011, it was decided that the runway would take a “V” shape, and the Ministers confirmed their commitment to complete the relocation project at the earliest possible date after 2014 in order to avoid the indefinite use of MCAS Futenma and to remove the risks as early as possible.

During the deliberation process which led to these conclusions, first of all, it was determined that, from a security perspective, the deterrence of the U.S. Forces, including that of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa that is located in a crucial area for the security of Japan, cannot be lessened while there remains instability and uncertainty in the security environment in East Asia. Furthermore, concern was expressed that the functions of the U.S. Marine Corps such as mobility and readiness would be weakened if the helicopter units stationed at MCAS Futenma were to be detached from the other Marine units stationed in Okinawa and moved abroad or out of the prefecture. Therefore, it was concluded that the FRF had to be located within Okinawa Prefecture.

At the “2+2” Meetings in October 2013 and April 2015, which followed the “2+2” Meeting of April 2012, and the joint statement issued at the first Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting during the Trump administration in February 2017, the Governments of Japan and the United States also confirmed that the plan to construct the FRF at Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma.

d. Completion of Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures

After the MOD sent the environmental impact assessment scoping document in 2007 to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and other parties, the MOD worked on revising the document based on the opinions provided by the governor. Finally, the MOD completed the environmental impact assessment procedures by sending the revised assessment document to related parties including the governor in December 2012, while making the assessment document available for public review. Throughout these procedures, the MOD received a total of 1,561 opinions from the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture on six occasions, made all the required revisions, and reflected them in the content of the environmental assessment. In this way, the MOD had taken steps to comply with relevant laws, asked opinions and ideas from Okinawa.
Prefecture over a sufficient period of time, and reflected them in the assessment.

**e. Promotion of the Futenma Replacement facility Construction Project**

The Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau submitted the land-fill permit request on public waters to Okinawa Prefecture in March 2013, and then Governor of Okinawa Nakaima approved this in December 2013. However, Governor of Okinawa Onaga revoked the land-fill permit by then Governor of Okinawa Nakaima in October 2015, leading to the filing of three suits over the revocation of the land-fill permit between the Government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture.

Under these circumstances, the court came up with a settlement recommendation, and the Government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture reached a court-mediated settlement agreement in March 2016. In the settlement, the Government of Japan and Okinawa mutually affirmed that after the final judicial ruling is handed down by the Supreme Court, they would abide by the ruling and take steps in line with the spirit of the text of the ruling and the reasons conducive to the text, and continue to take responses in good faith by cooperating with each other in accordance with the purpose of the ruling.  

Pursuant to the provisions of the settlement agreement, the Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau immediately suspended the land-fill work while the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued an instruction for correction based on the Local Autonomy Act to current Governor Onaga to repeal the revocation of the land-fill permit. Subsequently, in December 2016, after examination by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council and deliberation by the Fukuoka High Court Naha Branch, the Supreme Court set forth the decision that the revocation of the land-fill permit by Governor Onaga was illegal.

In the judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that then Governor Nakaima’s decision was not illegal. The court stated that no circumstances could be found indicating that then Governor Nakaima’s decision that the landfill was in compliance with the condition in Article 4 (1) (i) of the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface, “that it is appropriate and reasonable as the use of national land,” had no foundation in fact, or clearly lacked reasoning under socially accepted conventions. The reasons given by the court include: (1) the area of the replacement facilities and the landfill area will be significantly reduced from the area of the MCAS Futenma facilities, and (2) aircraft flying over residential areas can be avoided by the land-fill in the

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6 (1) The suit, filed by the Government of Japan as plaintiff based on Article 245-8 of the Local Autonomy Act, seeking a court ruling instructing a retraction of the revocation of the land-fill permit by current Governor Onaga (the so-called subrogation suit); (2) the suit, filed by Okinawa Prefecture based on Article 251-5 of the Local Autonomy Act, seeking to invalidate the decision to suspend the validity of the revocation of the land-fill permit (the decision to suspend execution) by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism as the illegal “involvement of the state”; and (3) the suit, filed by Okinawa Prefecture based on Article 3 of the Administrative Case Litigation Act, seeking to invalidate the decision to suspend execution by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism.
coastal area that puts the runway extension out to the sea, and the replacement facilities will be installed using part of Camp Schwab, which is already provided to the U.S. Forces.

Moreover, regarding whether the construction of replacement facilities takes environmental protection and other considerations into adequate account, the Supreme Court, finding that construction methods, environmental protection measures and countermeasures that can conceivably be taken at this point in time have been taken and that there is sufficient consideration for disaster prevention, determined that it cannot be said that then Governor Nakaima’s decision was illegal. The court did not find that there was anything particularly unreasonable in then Governor Nakaima’s decision-making process and the content of the decision that the construction met the condition of Article 4 (1) (ii) of the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface, “the land-fill gives sufficient consideration to the protection of the environment and prevention of disasters.”

Following this Supreme Court ruling, on December 26, Governor Onaga retracted the revocation of the landfill permit and the Okinawa Defense Bureau resumed the replacement facilities construction project the following day. On April 25, 2017, it started the construction of the seawall, the main part of the public waters reclamation. On July 24 of the same year, Okinawa Prefecture filed suit in the Naha District Court, requesting that this seawall construction not be allowed to damage the reefs on the seafloor, etc., without permission from the Governor of Okinawa based on the laws of Okinawa Prefecture. Subsequently, that Court dismissed Okinawa Prefecture’s claim on March 31, 2018, and on July 23, Okinawa Prefecture objected to that decision, and filed an appeal with the Fukuoka High Court Naha Branch.

The Government of Japan views that both the national government and Okinawa Prefecture will cooperate with each other and act in good faith, according to the purpose of the ruling of the Supreme Court and the settlement to which the two parties agreed. The Government intends to go forward with the project, while being fully mindful of the safety of the work and taking the natural environment and the living environment of the residents into utmost consideration based on the relevant laws and regulations.

(2) Force Reduction and Relocation to Guam

Since the Roadmap was announced in May 2006, the Governments of Japan and the United States held a series of consultations on the reduction of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.

a. Timing and Size of Relocation

The 2006 Roadmap stated that approximately 8,000 personnel of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) and approximately 9,000 dependents will be relocated from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, but the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 and other agreements set the timing of the relocation for the earliest possible date after 2014.

Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April 2012, the Governments of Japan and the United States decided to delink both the relocation of III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land return south of Kadena Air Base from the progress on the FFRF and the United States reviewed the composition of the units and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam. As a result, Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is to be stationed and deployed in Guam, Japan, and Hawaii, approximately 9,000 personnel are to be relocated to locations outside of Japan (about 4,000 of whom are to be relocated to Guam), the authorized strength of the U.S. Marine Corps forces in Guam is to be approximately 5,000 personnel, and the end-state for the presence of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa is to be consistent with the level of approximately 10,000 personnel envisioned in the Roadmap.

Accordingly, the “2+2” Meeting held in October 2013 agreed that, under the relocation plan described at the 2012 “2+2” Meeting, the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam is to begin in the first half of the 2020s. The plan is expected to promote the implementation of the consolidation plan for facilities and areas in Okinawa of April 2013.

b. Costs of the Relocation

Under the Roadmap, the two sides reached an agreement that, of the estimated US$10.27 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs, Japan would provide US$6.09 billion, including US$2.8 billion in direct cash contribution, while the United States would fund the remaining US$4.18 billion. In February 2009, the Japanese Government and the U.S. Government signed “the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III MEF Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam” (the Guam International Agreement). The Agreement legally guarantees and ensures actions taken by Japan and the United States, such as Japan’s long-term funding for projects to which Japan provides direct cash contributions. As part of measures based on this Agreement, the Japanese Government has been providing cash contributions to the U.S. Government in relation
to the projects for which Japan has provided financial support since FY2009.\(^7\)

Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April 2012, the unit composition and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam were revised and it was agreed that the preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation was US$8.6 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2012 dollars). With regard to Japan’s financial commitment, it was reaffirmed that it was to be the direct cash contribution of up to US$2.8 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars) as stipulated in Article 1 of the Guam International Agreement.\(^8\) It was also confirmed that Japan’s equity investment and loans for family housing projects and infrastructure projects would not be utilized. Moreover, it was stipulated that any funds that had already been provided to the U.S. Government under the Guam International Agreement would be counted as part of the Japanese contribution. Furthermore, as a new initiative, a portion of the direct cash contribution of US$2.8 billion mentioned above would be used to develop training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as shared use facilities for Japan and the United States. In addition, it was agreed that the remaining costs and any additional costs would be borne by the United States, and that the two governments were to complete a bilateral cost breakdown.

At the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013, a Protocol Amending the Guam International Agreement was signed to add the stipulations concerning the development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the use of these training areas by the SDF. The limit on Japanese cash contributions remains unchanged at US$2.8 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars). Both countries also completed the process of creating a detailed breakdown of required costs. Furthermore, the National Defense Authorization Act for U.S. Fiscal Year 2015 was enacted in December 2014, which lifted the freeze on the use of funds for the relocation to Guam imposed by the U.S. Congress in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012.

c. Completion of Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures

As for the environmental impact assessment for Guam, the required procedures were conducted to reflect the revisions to the project made by the adjustments to the plan for realignment, and the assessment was completed in August 2015.

Furthermore, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Joint Military Training Environmental Impact Statement (CJMT-EIS), is now being implemented.

\(\text{d. Progress of the Guam Relocation Project}\)

While the environmental impact assessment for Guam was being conducted, the Government of the United States implemented infrastructure development projects at the Andersen Air Force Base and the Apra area of the Naval Base Guam as projects unaffected by the assessment. The U.S. Government is currently implementing relocation construction work in all project areas, following the lifting of the freeze on the Guam relocation funds pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act and the completion of the environmental impact assessment for Guam.

\(\text{Fig. II-4-3-7 (Progress of the Guam Relocation Project)}\)

\(\text{(3) Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air base}\)

The Roadmap stated that following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base. However, at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, it was decided to delink the progress on the FRF from both the relocation of the III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land returns south of Kadena.

In addition, with regard to the land to be returned, it was agreed to conduct consultations focusing on three categories, namely (1) land eligible for immediate return; (2) land eligible for return once the relocation of functions is completed; and (3) land eligible for return after the relocation abroad.

Since the change of administration at the end of 2012, Japan and the United States have continued consultation under the basic policy of the Abe administration to dedicate all its strength to mitigate the impact of the U.S. Forces on Okinawa communities. Japan strongly requested an early return of land areas south of Kadena, including Makimino Service Area (Camp Kinser) in Urasoe City of which Okinawa has particularly made a strong request for the return. As a result, both countries announced the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (Consolidation Plan) in April 2013, which stipulated the return schedule, including the specific years of return.

The return of all land according to the plan will enable the return of approximately 70% (approximately 1,048 ha, the equivalent of 220 Tokyo Domes) of USFJ facilities and areas located in densely populated areas in the central and

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\(^7\) As for projects for which Japan provides financial support, cash contributions of approximately 124.2 billion yen have been provided to the U.S. side using the budgets from FY2009 to FY2016.

\(^8\) In line with this, the special provisions for the operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (investment and loan) that had been prescribed by the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan were abolished by an act revising part of that act that was enacted on March 31, 2017.
In the consolidation plan, both sides confirmed that they would implement the plan as early as possible. The Government of Japan will continue to work with all its strength so that land areas south of Kadena would be returned at the earliest possible date.

Furthermore, following the announcement of the consolidation plan, consultations have been held since April 2013, involving Ginowan City, Ginowan City Military Land Owners Association, Okinawa Prefecture, Okinawa Defense Bureau, and Okinawa General Bureau in a bid to contribute to the promotion of the effective and appropriate use of West Futenma Housing Area within Camp Zukeran, and the MOD has also been providing necessary cooperation.

Efforts have been made to enable the early return of land areas, including the land areas that are to be returned as soon as required procedures are completed (shown in red in Fig. II-4-3-8), since the announcement of the consolidation plan in April 2013. These efforts resulted in the realization of the return of the north entrance of Makiminato Service Area (approximately 1 ha) in August 2013 and West Futenma Housing Area within Camp Zukeran (approximately 51 ha) at the end of March 2015. Furthermore, such measures as relocation to Kadena Ammunition Storage Area and Torii Communication Station have been implemented to advance the land return. Additionally, in December 2015, Japan and the U.S. agreed to such measures as the early return of partial land at MCAS Futenma for a municipal road, and the early return of partial land at Makiminato Service Area for the purpose of widening National Road to relieve southern parts of the main island of Okinawa.

In addition to the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Okinawa Office) and the Cabinet Office also participate in the consultations as observer.
The Japanese and U.S. governments have been continuously promoting realignment, consolidation and reduction of U.S. military facilities and areas in Okinawa prefecture since the return of Okinawa to Japan for the purpose of mitigating the impact of military bases on Okinawan residents while maintaining Japan’s deterrence capabilities. The two governments accelerated progress in recent years and there are a number of examples of land utilization after returns that contribute to local vitalization.

Based on the SACO final report, roughly 4,000 ha of the Northern Training Area, a majority of this facility and the largest return of land since the repatriation of Okinawa, was returned to landowners after a period of just over 70 years from the end of the war in December 2017. Effective use of the returned land is expected since it became part of the Yanbaru National Park, and a goal is to register the land as a World Natural Heritage site.

Additionally, the West Futenma Housing Area on Camp Zukeran returned in March 2015 under the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa was transferred to landowners in March 2018 after obstacle removal work such as soil pollution surveys for utilization of the land. Plans for this land include use for the Okinawa Health Medical Center, including transfer of the University of the Ryukyus’ Medical Department and Hospital.

Japan and the United States agreed to the following actions as partial acceleration of the Consolidation Plan in December 2015 – 1) joint use of a portion of land at Camp Zukeran in order to construct a road that connects Route 58 to the former West Futenma Housing Area, 2) return of a portion of land at MCAS Futenma, and 3) return of a portion of land at Makiminato Service Area.

This agreement resulted initially in the return of approximately 4 ha of land at MCAS Futenma in July 2017. While the return came more than 30 years after it was requested by local communities, it is likely to alleviate traffic congestion in the surrounding area and improve the local living environment through advances in municipal road development suspended for over a quarter century.

The next step was the return of approximately 3 ha of land at Makiminato Service Area adjacent to Route 58 in March 2018. While Route 58, which runs alongside Makiminato Service Area, experienced the prefecture’s worst traffic congestion at more than 70,000 cars a day, it is expected that the completion of the land return will help alleviate traffic congestion through use of this land to widen the road from six lanes to eight lanes.

Japanese and U.S. people involved gathered for a ceremony commemorating the above-mentioned return of a portion of land at Makiminato Service Area and transfer of the West Futenma Housing Area on May 20, 2018, including Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga, Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs Fukui, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto, Vice Governor of Okinawa Jahana, Ginowan Mayor Sakima, Urasoe Mayor Matsumoto, and Deputy Commander of the U.S. Forces in Japan. It was confirmed that this land return and transfer will lead to realization of effective and appropriate land use.

The Japanese and U.S. governments intend to continue promoting local vitalization through utilization of returned land sites and advancement of Okinawa as a whole by moving forward with such land returns especially in highly populated areas south of Kadena Air Base.
traffic congestion, and at the end of July 2017, partial land at MCAS Futenma (approximately 4 ha) were returned to the landowners, and at the end of March 2018, partial land at Makiminato Service Area (approximately 3 ha) were returned to the landowners and West Futenma Housing Area within Camp Zukeran (approximately 51 ha) was transferred to the landowners.

All-out initiatives are being continuously made to steadily implement the return of land areas south of Kadena Air Base under the consolidation plan and mitigate the impact on Okinawa as early as possible, and also to realize the respective returns of land in the shortest possible time for more visible mitigation of the impact on Okinawa.

Reference 31 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena)

Fig. II-4-3-8 (Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base)

5 Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces in Japan

(1) U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey Deployment in Okinawa

The Osprey is an aircraft that combines the vertical takeoff/landing and hovering functions of rotary-wing aircraft on the one hand and the speed and range of fixed-wing aircraft on the other. As the primary air unit of the U.S. Marine Corps, the MV-22 that has been developed for the U.S. Marine Corps plays an important role in engaging in a broad range of activities, including transportation of personnel and goods.

The U.S. Marine Corps was replacing aged rotary-wing aircrafts (CH-46) with MV-22s, which have superior basic performance. In September 2013, all the 24 CH-46s deployed at MCAS Futenma were replaced by MV-22s.

The MV-22 is a highly capable aircraft compared with the CH-46; it can fly faster, can carry more payload, and has a longer range. Its deployment to Okinawa will strengthen the deterrence of USFJ as a whole and greatly contribute to the peace and stability of the region.
(2) CV-22 Osprey Deployment by U.S. Air Force to Yokota Air Base

In May 2015, the Government of the United States announced that CV-22 aircraft, tailored to meet the requirements of the U.S. Air Force, would be deployed to Yokota Air Base (which encompasses Fussa City, Tachikawa City, Akishima City, Musashi Murayama City, Hamura City and Mizuho Town of Tokyo Prefecture), with the first three aircraft to be deployed in the latter half of 2017 for completion of the deployment of a total of 10 aircraft by 2021. However, the Government of the United States announced in March 2017 that it would delay the arrival of the CV-22s to the U.S. fiscal year 2020.

In April 2018, the Government of the United States announced 5 aircraft were scheduled to be deployed around the summer of 2018 to address regional security concerns in the Pacific region, adjusting the previously announced timeline in 2017. The total of 10 aircraft are expected to be deployed in stages over the next several years.

The CV-22 aircraft to be deployed to Yokota Air Base will handle tasks for transporting personnel and supplies for Special Operation Forces of the U.S. Forces to deal with crises and emergencies in the Asia-Pacific region, including humanitarian assistance and natural disasters.

As Japan faces an increasingly tougher security environment, the deployment of high-performance CV-22 from the perspective of the U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region and enhancing the readiness posture of the United States will enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and contribute to the defense of Japan and the stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

The Government of Japan will continue to take responses in a careful and sincere manner in order to obtain the understanding and cooperation of local communities.

(3) Safety of the Osprey

Prior to the deployment of the MV-22s to MCAS Futenma in 2012, the Government of Japan conducted its own confirmation of the aircraft’s safety by establishing an analysis and assessment team composed of experts from inside and outside the Government and aircraft pilots, etc., In addition, when our country itself decided to introduce Ospreys (V-22s) in 2014, the Government reconfirmed the safety of the aircraft by collecting and analyzing all kinds of technical information.

Regarding recent accidents involving the MV-22, there has been no change in the recognition of the Government of Japan that there is no problem with the safety of the MV-22 aircraft, as the U.S. side has not given any explanation that there is any structural problem with the aircraft. For example, the cause of the MV-22 mishap off the coast of Okinawa in December 2016 was pilot error during the mishap pilot’s attempts to conduct aerial refueling training under challenging weather conditions.

Additionally, the CV-22 has the same propulsion system with the MV-22 and the structure of both aircraft is basically in common; therefore, the Government of Japan considers the safety of both aircraft to be at the same level.

In any event, the Government of Japan considers that ensuring safety is of prime importance in operations of the U.S. Forces, and on various occasions, including the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting in August 2017, Minister of Defense Onodera requested Secretary of Defense Mattis and other high-ranking officials to give consideration to local communities and ensure safety. The Government of Japan will continue to ask for the maximum consideration for safety.

(4) Usability of Osprey Deployed by the U.S. Forces in Case of Disaster

In the aftermath of the devastating typhoon that hit the central part of the Philippines in November 2013, 14 MV22 aircraft, deployed in Okinawa, were dispatched for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities to support Operation Damayan. The MV-22s were deployed promptly to affected areas that were difficult to access, and transported several hundred isolated victims and about six tons of relief materials in a day. In April 2014, the MV-22, deployed in Okinawa, was dispatched for search and rescue activities in the wake of an accidental sinking of a passenger ship off the coast of Jindo in the Republic of Korea. Furthermore, in response to the large earthquake that hit Nepal in April 2015, four MV-22s deployed in Okinawa were dispatched to the country to transport personnel and supplies.

In Japan, when the Kumamoto Earthquake occurred in 2016, MV-22s were dispatched to deliver daily necessities to the disaster stricken areas.

In this manner, the MV-22 is capable of conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities immediately and over a large range when large-scale disasters occur because of its high performance and multi-functionality. It has also been used for disaster prevention drills since 2014. In September 2016, two MV22s participated in the comprehensive disaster prevention drills of Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture and conducted delivery drills for isolated islands.

Like the MV-22, the CV-22 can conduct humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief activities, including search and rescue missions, both immediately and over a large range, in the case of a large-scale disaster. As such, it is expected that the superior capabilities of the Osprey deployed by the U.S. Forces can be showcased in a variety of operations in the future as well.

Fig. II-4-3-9 (Usability of Osprey Aircraft)

Today, a number of USFJ facilities and areas still remain in Okinawa because of the U.S. occupation of Okinawa and the slower progress of return of USFJ facilities and areas compared to other areas of Japan even after the occupation ended. In order to mitigate the concentrated impact on Okinawa, the Government of Japan has been implementing initiatives towards the realization of the
SACO Final Report and the Roadmap. The MOD is committed to further mitigating the impact on Okinawa through the Okinawa Policy Council, its subcommittee and other means, while listening to the opinions of the local residents.10

At the Okinawa Policy Council Meeting in December 2013, then Governor of Okinawa Nakaima presented several requests, including cessation of the operation of MCAS Futenma within five years and its early return, the re-deployment of about twelve MV-22s to bases outside of Okinawa, and the total return of Makiminato Service Area within seven years.

The Japanese Government as a whole is addressing the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa by establishing the Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa, consisting of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of State for Okinawa, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the Governor of Okinawa and the Mayor of Ginowan. The MOD also created the Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa headed by the State Minister of Defense in January 2014 to continually work on the reduction of the impact on Okinawa.

The Consultation between the Central Government and Okinawa Prefecture, consisting of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of State for Okinawa, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the Governor of Okinawa and the Mayor of Ginowan, was established with the purpose of holding consultations on measures for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa and measures for Okinawa’s development. In the three meetings that have been held since January 2016, discussion took place on issues such as the relocation of MCAS Futenma and the suspension of its operation within five years and the return of more than half of the Northern Training Area.

The Consultation between the Central Government and Okinawa Prefecture, consisting of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of State for Okinawa, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the Governor of Okinawa and the Mayor of Ginowan, was established with the purpose of holding consultations on measures for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa and measures for Okinawa’s development. In the three meetings that have been held since January 2016, discussion took place on issues such as the relocation of MCAS Futenma and the suspension of its operation within five years and the return of more than half of the Northern Training Area.

For the return of lands in Okinawa provided for use by the USFJ (“USFJ Land”), the Act on Special Measures Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Use of the Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Previously Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces stipulates various measures concerning the USFJ Land agreed to be returned. The MOD mainly conducts the following initiatives, and will continue its initiatives to promote the effective and appropriate use of returned lands by coordinating and cooperating with related ministries, the prefectural government and local municipalities. The MOD:

1. conducts mediation in relation to access for surveys, etc., to be implemented by the prefectural government and local municipalities on the USFJ Land which are agreed to be returned;
2. conducts measures applying to all the returned lands to remove obstacles for use such as soil contamination and unexploded ordnance, not only those caused by the activities of the stationed forces, before handing over the land to the owners and
3. provides financial benefits to alleviate the impact on the owners of the returned lands and to promote use of the land.

In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing measures to secure the stable presence of the U.S. Forces by maintaining its deterrence and trying to mitigate the impact on local communities.

Due to the strong desire from local public bodies and other organizations, the Japanese and U.S. Governments, after bilateral consultations, agreed on the return of six facilities and areas in Yokohama City and on the construction of housing units for dependents of members of the U.S. Forces in the Yokohama area of the “Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex.” Of the area of approximately 419 ha to be returned, approximately 375 ha consisting of four facilities and areas, including Kami Seya Communication Station, have to date been returned.
Current Situation Regarding the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan as Stipulated in the Roadmap

(1) Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and Control capability

To have enhanced mobility and readiness as well as to enable joint missions, the headquarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) at Camp Zama (Sagamihara City and Zama City in Kanagawa Prefecture) was reorganized into the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward) in December 2007 and the reorganization took place at the end of September 2008.

With the aim of strengthening coordination with the reorganized USARJ headquarters so as to enable rapid responses to various contingencies, the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters (then) was relocated from GSDF Camp Asaka (Asaka City, Wako City and Niiza City in Saitama Prefecture and Nerima Ward, Tokyo) to Camp Zama, where the headquarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) are located, at the end of FY2012. In addition, with the establishment of the Ground Component Command at the end of FY2017, the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters was abolished and a Japan-U.S. Joint Headquarters that assumes a coordinating role between Japan and the United States was established in the headquarters of the Ground Component Command.

In addition, for more effective and efficient use of Camp Zama and the Sagami General Depot (SGD), measures were taken for the partial return of respective facilities and areas. In February 2016, the partial release of land (approximately 5.4 ha) at Camp Zama was realized and Zama General Hospital was established on the returned site in April 2016. In addition, in December 2015, the shared use of a portion of land at SGD (approximately 35 ha) with Sagamihara City was realized. In other areas, the realignment projects associated with the improvement of U.S. Army Japan command and control capability have been undertaken as shown in Fig. II-4-3-11.
Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2018

Chapter 4

Fleet. The U.S. Navy affirms that it will continue to

Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers do not need to replenish their fuel and they are able to maintain the high speeds necessary for the operation of aircraft, giving them excellent combat and operational

The BJOCC functions to contribute to providing a joint response for Japan’s defense. To that end, it works to enhance information sharing, close coordination, and interoperability between the Japanese

region as well as regional peace and stability. The U.S.

role in ensuring maritime security in the Asia-Pacific

Air Base would be studied, and a Liaison Conference

was agreed that the joint civilian-military use of Yokota

Air Base would be relocated from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to

is located at the center of an urban district, the noise of
carrier jets taking off and landing in particular had been a

problem for a long time. It was necessary to resolve such

problems as soon as possible in order to stably maintain

the operations of aircraft carriers.

Thus, after the completion of the runway relocation

project at MCAS Iwakuni (Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi

Prefecture), which made aircraft operations possible with

less impact on the living environment of the surrounding

communities, it was decided that CVW-5 squadrons

would be relocated from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to

MCAS Iwakuni. The relocation began in August 2017

and completed in March 2018.13

As the security environment in the Asia-Pacific

region grows increasingly severe, while this relocation

allows the long-term forward deployment of a U.S. aircraft
carrier and carrier-based aircraft, ensuring deterrence, it

also alleviates issues regarding the noise to a significant

extent. This would not have been possible without the

understanding of residents of Yamaguchi Prefecture and

Iwakuni City.

In order to mitigate impacts of the increased

operations at MCAS Iwakuni due to the relocation,

the related measures listed in Fig. II-4-3-13 are to be

taken. As a result, the noise problems are expected to

be mitigated from the current situation, with the area

requiring residential noise-abatement work, or the so-
called first category area, decreasing from approximately

1,600 ha to approximately 650 ha.

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11 The BJOCC functions to contribute to providing a joint response for Japan’s defense. To that end, it works to enhance information sharing, close coordination, and interoperability between the Japanese and U.S. headquarters.

12 Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers do not need to replenish their fuel and they are able to maintain the high speeds necessary for the operation of aircraft, giving them excellent combat and operational capabilities.

13 A project to relocate the runway of MCAS Iwakuni by approximately 1,000 m to the east (offshore), in response to the requests from Iwakuni City, etc. The new runway commenced its operations in May 2010. The project was completed at the end of FY2010.
b. Field-Carrier Landing Practice

The 2006 Roadmap prescribes that a bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent FCLP facility is to be established with the goal of selecting a permanent site at the earliest possible date. At the “2+2” Meeting of June 2011, it was confirmed that the Government of Japan will explain to local authorities that Mageshima is considered to be the candidate site for a new SDF facility. This SDF facility would be used to support operations in response to a variety of situations including large-scale disasters as well as regular exercises and other activities, including use by the U.S. Forces as a permanent site for FCLP. In addition, the 2005 SCC document confirmed that the U.S. Forces will continue to conduct FCLP at Iwo-To in accordance with existing temporary arrangements until a permanent FCLP training facility is identified.

c. Resumption of Civil Aviation Operations at MCAS Iwakuni

Considering that the local public entities, etc., including Iwakuni City is located in the eastern part of Yamaguchi Prefecture facing the Seto Inland Sea and has various regional characteristics and resources, including magnificent mountains, clear streams, a beautiful sea, and historical and cultural resources.

One of such unique features is the presence of MCAS Iwakuni jointly used by the U.S. Marines and Maritime Self-Defense Force. In accordance with the Realignment Roadmap bilaterally agreed in May 2006, 15 KC-130 air refueling aircraft relocated from MCAS Futenma in Okinawa. In addition, approximately 60 U.S. Navy carrier-based aircraft relocated from NAF Atsugi in Kanagawa Prefecture at the end of March 2018. As a result, approximately 120 U.S. military aircraft as well as the U.S. Navy Unit now station at MCAS Iwakuni.

The City’s comprehensive plan formulated in December 2014 calls for “co-existence with the base.” It outlines measures to mitigate various impacts attributed to the base, such as aircraft noise and incidents/accidents. At the same time, it outlines measures for community development, taking advantage of the adjacency to the base, in the fields of education, disaster prevention, tourism, industrial development, and Japan-U.S. exchanges.

We expect to promote exchanges through sports and cultural events at the Atagoyama Sports Facility (baseball field, athletic stadium, cultural interaction center, etc.) developed by the Ministry of Defense as carrier-based aircraft were relocated.

About 3,800 people (military personnel, civilian personnel, and their dependents) moved from NAF Atsugi along with the relocation, and the total number of people is more than 10,000 (including those already here). Iwakuni City seeks to deepen the mutual understanding and friendship between Japan and the U.S. through various opportunities, while maintaining a good relationship between U.S. personnel and local residents as “good neighbors.”

Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport, which uses the runway of the U.S. military base, opened in December 2012. The Okinawa route was established in March 2016 in addition to the Haneda route. The boarding rate since its opening has been 68.0% (as of end of April 2018), which exceeds the expectation and stays high.

Iwakuni has evolved together with the base and has been cooperative for the stable operations of the base.

It is true that we have faced various challenges as a city hosting the base, but I believe that our efforts contribute to maintenance of the USFJ deterrence capabilities, Japan’s national defense/security policy, and mitigation of the impact on Okinawa. Iwakuni City will continue to carry out its duty to realize the long-term development of the city as well as to maintain local residents’ peace and security.

Iwakuni Mayor Mr. Fukuda (center) on a tour of Atagoyama Sports Facility with U.S. Ambassador to Japan Hagerty

Completion of the relocation of carrier-based aircraft on March 30, 2018 (EA-18G in the photo)
Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City, had been working together to request the resumption of civil aviation operations, it was agreed in the Roadmap that “portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.” Based on this agreement, Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport was opened in December 2012, resuming regular flights of civil aviation aircraft for the first time in 48 years.

(5) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

Japan and the United States are set to continue close coordination on BMD as the two countries improve their respective BMD capabilities. In June 2006, an AN/TPY-2 radar (so-called “X-Band Radar”) system was deployed to the U.S. Shariki Communication Site (Tsugaru City, Aomori Prefecture).14 Also in October 2006, U.S. Army Patriot PAC-3 units (Patriot Advanced Capability) were deployed to Kadena Air Base (Kadena Town, Okinawa City and Chatan Town in Okinawa Prefecture) and Kadena Ammunition Storage Area (Yomitan Village, Okinawa City, Kadena Town, Onna Village and Uruma City in Okinawa Prefecture). In December 2014, the second TPY-2 radar in Japan was deployed to the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site (Kyotango City in Kyoto Prefecture).

In addition, the United States deployed Aegis destroyers with BMD capabilities to Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (Yokosuka City in Kanagawa Prefecture) in October 2015 and March 2016. Another Aegis destroyer with BMD capabilities, USS Milius, was also added to the fleet in May 2018. [P]

(6) Training Relocation

a. Aviation Training Relocation (ATR)

Based on the decision that U.S. aircraft from three USFJ facilities and areas—Kadena, Misawa (Misawa City and Tohoku Town in Aomori Prefecture) and MCAS Iwakuni—would participate for the time being in bilateral training with ASDF at ASDF facilities, training relocation has been underway since 2007. The MOD has been improving its infrastructure, as required, for the training relocation.15

In January 2011, at the Joint Committee, based on the achievements at the “2+2” Meeting in 2010, both governments agreed to include Guam as a new training relocation site and to expand the scale of training. Moreover, at the Joint Committee in October 2011, they agreed on details for training sites. After that, training was relocated to Guam and other locations for the first time, leading to a series of training conducted at relocation sites.

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14 The radar was deployed to ASDF Shariki Sub Base (in Aomori Prefecture) in June 2006, but was thereafter transferred to the neighboring U.S. Shariki Communication Site.

15 USFJ aircraft conduct bilateral exercises at ASDF facilities in order to improve interoperability and reduce the impact of training activities on the areas surrounding USFJ air bases.
Furthermore, in March 2014, both governments at the Joint Committee agreed to add air-to-ground training using the Misawa Air-to-Ground Range (Misawa City and Rokkasho Village in Aomori Prefecture). This agreement resulted in air-to-ground training using the Misawa Air-to-Ground Range in June 2014.

The training relocation contributes to enhancing interoperability between the two countries, and also to relocating part of air-to-ground training conducted by using Kadena Air Base. Thus, this training relocation will help noise abatement around Kadena Air Base, thereby contributing to the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa.

In addition to assisting USFJ, the MOD/SDF is conducting efforts to ensure the safety and security of the local community, such as the establishment of a liaison office, facilitating communication with related government agencies, and response to requirements from the local community. These efforts have been contributing to successful training relocation.

b. Relocation of Training for MV-22, etc.

Having decided in the “2+2” joint statement of October 3, 2013 to reduce the MV-22’s amount of time located and training in Okinawa and to utilize opportunities to participate in various operations in mainland Japan and across the region in order to increase training outside of Okinawa Prefecture, including mainland Japan, while maintaining the deterrent of the Alliance, the Governments of Japan and the United States have been moving forward with the implementation of training, etc. for the MV-22 at MCAS Futenma outside of Okinawa Prefecture.

On September 1, 2016, it was agreed at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee to relocate the training activities of Tilt-Rotar / Rotary wing aircraft, such as the AH-1 and CH53, and the MV-22 that are currently stationed at MCAS Futenma out of Okinawa Prefecture at Japan’s expense in order to further promote training outside of Okinawa and mitigate the impact of training activities on Okinawa.

Three training relocation programs were scheduled for FY2017. The training was held in Hokkaido in August 2017, in Kumamoto Prefecture in December, and in Miyagi Prefecture between February and March 2018 as Japan-U.S. joint training (field training between the GSDF and the U.S. Marine Corps).

The MV-22’s amount of time located and training in Okinawa will continue to be reduced by relocating exercises participated by the MV-22 to places such as mainland Japan and Guam, and the Government will continue to promote initiatives that contribute to further mitigating the impact on Okinawa.

6 Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan

In order to smoothly implement the realignment of USFJ based on the Roadmap, the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan (USFJ Realignment Special Measures Act) was enacted in August 2007. Realignment grants, Special Subsidy Rates for Public Projects, etc. and other systems were established based on the law.

During a period of time before and after the implementation of realignment (10 years in principle), realignment grants will be awarded to help cover the expenses of projects which contribute to increasing the convenience of the lives of residents of local municipalities affected by the realignment, and to stimulate local industries. To this end, they will be awarded in accordance with progress made in the steps of U.S. Forces realignment, after the Defense Minister designates the specified defense facilities and neighboring municipalities affected by realignment. As of April 2018, 9 defense facilities in 15 municipalities are eligible to receive the grant.

In addition, under the U.S. Forces realignment, some USFJ facilities and areas will be returned, and the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa will be relocated to Guam. Since these developments may affect the employment of USFJ local employees, the Government of Japan will take measures to include education and skills training, which is to help retain their employment.

The Realignment Special Measures Act was supposed to cease to be effective as of March 31, 2017. However, since there remain realignment projects that require implementation, an act revising part of the Act including a ten-year extension of the time limit of the Act to March 31, 2027 was enacted.

See Reference 33 (Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan)

16 Approximately 6.7 billion yen in the FY2018 budget.
17 Under the Realignment Special Measures Act, changes in the composition of units of those naval vessels that conduct operations integrally with U.S. air wings subject to realignment (replacement of the aircraft carrier at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka with a nuclear aircraft carrier) will be treated in the same way as the realignment of USFJ.
18 The specific scope of projects includes 14 projects identified by Article 2 of the enforcement ordinance of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan, including education, sports, and cultural projects.
At the “2+2” Meeting in September 2000, based on the recognition that environmental conservation is important, the governments of both nations agreed to make it a common objective to ensure the health and safety of residents in the vicinity of USFJ facilities and areas, U.S. Forces personnel, their families and other such parties, and made the “Joint Statement of Environmental Principles.” To follow up on this announcement, Japan-U.S. consultations have been enhanced. Specifically, the MOD has been working with relevant ministries and agencies to enhance cooperation for regular reviews of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS), exchange information on the environment, and deal with environmental pollution.

Additionally, at the “2+2” Meeting in May 2010, Japan and the United States discussed the possibility of taking a “Green Alliance” approach and studied the adoption of renewable energy for the U.S. Forces facilities and areas under development in Japan.

Furthermore, the Governments of Japan and the United States engaged in discussions aimed at the creation of a framework for increased initiatives in managing the environment associated with USFJ facilities and areas. The Government of Japan then commenced negotiations with the United States on an agreement that supplements the SOFA on an environmental front, and they reached substantive accord in October 2014, before signing and effectuating the supplementary agreement in September 2015. This supplemental agreement represents an international commitment with legal binding force and sets forth provisions concerning environmental standards and access to USFJ facilities and areas.

This supplemental agreement is part of a more comprehensive framework for recognizing the significance of environmental protection. This agreement is the first one to be created to supplement the SOFA since the SOFA entered into force and has a historical significance that differs in nature from conventional improvements in the operations of the SOFA.

Ensuring the safety of local residents is of prime importance in USFJ operations, and an accident or incident must not occur. Both Japan and the U.S. cooperate with a prime focus on ensuring the safety.

Despite such circumstances, a CH-53E helicopter assigned to MCAS Futenma made an emergency landing at Higashi Village in Kunigami District and burned into flames in October 2017, and a window of another CH-53E assigned to MCAS Futenma fell onto the playground of Futenma Daini Elementary School in December 2017. Then in 2018, an F-16 fighter assigned to Misawa Air Base jettisoned fuel tanks in Lake Ogawara in February, and there have been precautionary and emergency landings on civilian airports, etc.

Regarding these accidents and incidents, Japan has clearly conveyed its position to the U.S. side and requested preventive measures to avoid reoccurrence especially at summit and ministerial levels, in light of anxieties and concerns of local communities.

Causes of these accidents and incidents may vary depending on the case, but the Government of Japan has determined the rationality of results of investigations and preventive measures on the U.S. side through not only hearing explanations from the U.S. side but also confirming with SDF expertise. Additionally, the MOD has strongly requested the U.S. side to provide information regarding the accidents and incidents, and taken appropriate steps, including explaining to the local authorities in a timely manner, when the relevant information was provided by the U.S. side.

The Government of Japan has been taking measures for the improvement of the living environment in regions surrounding USFJ facilities and areas. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications also provides municipalities with base grants, which have alternate features in terms of municipal tax on real estate.

Moreover, in the vicinity of USFJ facilities and areas, incidents and accidents caused by U.S. Forces personnel and others have affected local areas and their residents, so the Government of Japan has requested USFJ to take effective measures for the prevention of recurrence, such
as educating military personnel and others, and enforcing strict discipline among them. The Government of Japan is cooperating with USFJ in these prevention measures; at the same time it has taken measures for prompt and appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the incidents and accidents.

The United States has also taken measures for its part, putting in place its guidelines for off-duty action (liberty policy), including measures such as nighttime alcohol restrictions as well as curfews applying to U.S. Forces personnel ranked below a certain rank.

Following the case which occurred in Okinawa in April 2016 where a member of the U.S. Forces civilian component became a suspect of murder, the Governments of Japan and the United States engaged in discussions to develop effective prevention measures, and released the Japan-United States Joint Statement in July 2016 on clarifying the scope of the civilian component, among other matters.21

The Governments of Japan and the United States conducted intensive discussions to establish a legally binding document based on the joint statement, and in January 2017 signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America on Cooperation with regard to Implementation Practices Relating to the Civilian Component of United States Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, which immediately went into force. This supplementary agreement supplements and clarifies the content of the “civilian component” prescribed by the SOFA and it is the second such supplementary agreement, following the Supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship, which was concluded in 2015. It is hoped that the recurrence of incidents and accidents by the civilian component of USFJ will be prevented by further promoting cooperation...

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21 The Joint Statement focuses on such areas as clarifying the scope of the civilian component and enhancing training and orientation processes for all U.S. personnel with SOFA status.
between Japan and the United States and further 

strengthening management of the civilian component 
of USFJ through the steady implementation of this 
supplementary agreement.

In light of the aforementioned joint statement, 

training materials to deepen understanding about the 
history and culture unique to Okinawa, designed for 
all military personnel, the civilian component and their 
families newly arriving in Okinawa, were revised taking 
into account the views of Okinawa Prefecture and others. 
In November 2016, the relevant local governments 
observed the actual training using the materials.

In March 2017, the U.S. Forces in Okinawa invited 
journalists to Camp Foster and showed them the training 
for new arrivals using the materials. 

Reference 34 (Agreement between the Government of Japan 
and the Government of the United States of America on 
Cooperation with Regard to Implementation Practices Relating 
to the Civilian Component of the United States Armed Forces in 
Japan, Supplementary to the Agreement under Article VI of the 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and 
the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas 
and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan)

Meanwhile, the Government of Japan prepared 
Crime Prevention Measures in Okinawa in June 2016 
under the understanding that in order to never allow a 
recurrence of similar tragic incidents, it is necessary 
for the Government to promptly promote measures to 
deter crime and ensure the safety and security of the 
people of Okinawa. The pillars of the Measures consist 
of bolstering crime prevention patrol operations and 
the establishment of a safe and secure environment. 
The MOD is participating in the Okinawa Local Safety 
Patrol Corps established in the Okinawa General Bureau 
and will continue to cooperate with relevant ministries 
and agencies to ensure the implementation of effective 
measures. 

Part III, Chapter 5, Section 1-4 (Measures to Promote Harmony 
between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas)
Joint Exercises conducted by the ASDF, the U.S. Air Force, and the U.S. Marine Corps in the airspace surrounding Kyushu (September 2017)

Part III

Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

Chapter 1
Organizations Responsible for the Defense of Japan, and Effective Deterrence and Handling

Chapter 2
Active Promotion of Security Cooperation

Chapter 3
Human Foundation and Organization that Supports the Defense Force, and Active Participation of Female SDF Personnel

Chapter 4
Measures on Defense Equipment and Technology

Chapter 5
Interaction with Local Communities and Japanese Citizens
Section 1
Organization of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)

1 Organization of the MOD/SDF

To fulfill their mission of defending Japan, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) consists of various organizations, mainly the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as armed forces.

2 Systems to Support the Minister of Defense

The Minister of Defense is responsible for issues related to the defense of Japan as the head of the MOD, and is in overall charge of the SDF duties in accordance with the provisions of the SDF Law. The Minister is supported by the State Minister of Defense, the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) and the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense. There are also the Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense, who advise the Minister of Defense, and the Defense Council, which deliberates on basic principles concerning administrative affairs under the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, there are the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, who organizes and supervises the administrative affairs of each bureau and organization to support the Minister of Defense, and the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, who is responsible for the overall coordination of duties such as those related to international affairs.

Moreover, the Internal Bureaus of the MOD, Joint Staff, Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Air Staff Office, and the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) as an external bureau have been established in the MOD. The Internal Bureaus of the MOD are responsible for basic policy relating to the duties of the SDF. The Director-General of the Ministry’s Secretariat and the Directors-General of each Bureau within the Internal Bureaus shall, along with the Commissioner of ATLA who is in charge of defense equipment administration, support the Minister of Defense in accordance with their respective responsibilities, by providing the Minister of Defense assistance from a policy perspective – namely, to ensure that the affairs under the jurisdiction of the MOD are properly carried out in accordance with laws and regulations in order to accomplish the mission of the MOD. The Joint Staff is a staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning the operation of the SDF. The Chief of Joint Staff provides centralized support for the operations of the SDF for the Minister of Defense from a military expert’s perspective. The Ground Staff, Maritime Staff and Air Staff are the staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning their respective services except operations of the SDF, with the Chiefs of Staff for the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) acting as the top ranking expert advisers to the Minister of Defense regarding these services. In this manner, the MOD has ensured that the support for the Minister from a policy perspective and the support for the Minister from a military expert’s perspective shall be provided in a well-balanced manner like the two wheels of a vehicle, so to speak, in order for the Minister of Defense to appropriately make decisions. This existing concept regarding the support system for the Minister of Defense has been made even more explicit by Article 12 of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Act, which has been amended to stipulate that the support for the Minister of Defense provided by the Director-General of the Minister’s Secretariat and the Directors-General of each Bureau as well as the Commissioner of ATLA shall be conducted in cooperation with the support for the Minister by each Chief of Staff, since 2015, when the

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1 The MOD and the SDF form a single organization for national defense. Whereas the term “Ministry of Defense” refers to the administrative aspects of the organization, which manages and operates the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, the term “SDF” refers to the operational aspects of the organizations whose mission is the defense of Japan.
Act was amended for the establishment of ATLA and the reorganization of Joint Staff, etc., as part of an initiative for the MOD reform.²

### 3 Base of Defense Administration in Regional Areas

The MOD has Regional Defense Bureaus in eight locations across the country (Sapporo City, Sendai City, Saitama City, Yokohama City, Osaka City, Hiroshima City, Fukuoka City, and Kadena Town) as its local branch bureaus in charge of comprehensive defense administration.

In addition to implementing measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting bases and inspecting equipment, Regional Defense Bureaus carry out various activities to obtain the understanding and cooperation of both local public entities and local residents towards the MOD/SDF activities.

#### 2 Joint Operations System of the Self-Defense Forces

In order to rapidly and effectively fulfill the duties of the SDF, the MOD/SDF has adopted the joint operations system in which the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF are operated integrally. The MOD/SDF is also making efforts to strengthen the foundation of the joint operations such as communication, education and

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² The Government has made remarks regarding civilian control and the role of the civilian officials in the Internal Bureaus during the Diet deliberations on the Amendment Act, stating: “Civilian control means the priority of politics to the military in democratic countries. Civilian control in our country consists of control by the Diet, control by the Cabinet (including the National Security Council), and control within the MOD. Control within the MOD means that the Minister of Defense, a civilian, manages, operates, and controls the SDF. In addition to support from political appointees such as the State Minister of Defense and Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense, support from civilian officials in the Internal Bureaus also plays an important role in aiding the exercise of civilian control by the Minister of Defense. The role of civilian officials in the Internal Bureaus in civilian control is to support the Minister of Defense, and there is no relationship in which civilian officials of the Internal Bureaus issue commands to units.”
training, as well as to enhance the functions of the Joint Staff in light of the current security environment.

### 1 Outline of Joint Operations System

#### (1) Role of the Chief of Staff

a. The Chief of Joint Staff develops a joint operations concept for SDF operations, and centrally supports the MOD on SDF operations from a military expert’s perspective.

b. The Minister’s commands concerning the operations of the SDF shall be delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff and orders concerning operations of the SDF shall be executed by the Chief of Joint Staff. In doing this, the Minister’s commands and orders shall be delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff not only in cases where a joint task force is organized, but also in cases where a single SDF unit is employed to respond.

#### (2) Relationship between Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, and Other Chief of Staff

The Joint Staff undertakes functions relating to the operations of the SDF, while the Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Offices undertake functions for unit maintenance, such as personnel affairs, building-up defense capability, and education and training.

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3 This applies to the case in which a special unit is organized to carry out a specific duty, or the required troops are placed partly under the authority of a commander outside of their usual command structure based on Article 22, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the SDF Law, and refers to units, which are made up of more than two units of the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF.
2 Strengthening integrated Operational Functions

In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making relating to the operations of the SDF and to make the process swifter, in October 2015, the Bureau of Operational Policy was abolished and some of this Bureau’s functions such as the planning and drafting of laws and regulations relating to unit operations were transferred to the Bureau of Defense Policy in order to unite affairs concerning actual operations of the units into the Joint Staff. This change has made the Joint Staff assume work that the Internal Bureaus had previously conducted, such as external explanations including remarks at the Diet and communication and coordination with related ministries and governmental agencies. Regarding this work, therefore, the Administrative Vice Chief of Joint Staff, a Vice-Chief of Joint Staff level post for civilian officials, and the Joint Staff Councilor, a post for civilian officials at the level of a division director and department director general have been established to conduct external coordination duties, etc., taking advantage of the expertise of civilian officials concerning actual operations of the units.

3 Central Organization Reform of the Ministry of Defense

1 Background and Direction of the MOD Reform

The MOD reform started in response to the frequent incidence of scandals within the MOD/SDF, and the “Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense,” which was held at the Prime minister’s office in 2007, put together the report containing measures against the incidence of scandals and central organization reform. Based on the report, the establishment of the Defense Council under law, the abolition of the post of the Director of Defense and the establishment of the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense (presently the Special Adviser to the Minister of Defense) were implemented on the basis of the report in order to strengthen support for the Minister of Defense and to ensure civilian control thoroughly in 2009.

Following this, in the “Direction of the MOD Reform” arranged in August 2013 at the “Committee for
the Deliberations on the MOD Reform,” established in the MOD in the same year, it was determined that the full-fledged reform based on following four main points would be undertaken: (1) mutual posting of civilian officials and uniformed personnel; (2) total optimization of the building-up of defense capability and the strengthening of equipment acquisition functions; (3) strengthening of integrated operational functions, and (4) strengthening of policymaking functions and public relations capability.

2 Specific Initiatives on the Reform of the Ministry of Defense

In accordance with the “Direction of the MOD Reform,” the MOD has fostered a greater sense of unity by promoting mutual posting of civilian officials and uniformed personnel. In October 2015, in addition to the previously mentioned reorganization at the Joint Staff, a large-scale reorganization was implemented, which included the establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) by bringing together and consolidating the departments of the MOD that had been related to procurement in order to accurately respond to the extending equipment administration.

By conducting duties at these new organizations, the MOD/SDF needs to ensure that this reform will be firmly established, while assisting the Minister of Defense both from a policy perspective of the Internal Bureaus and from a military expert’s perspective of the each Staff Office, with each of them playing the role as the two wheels of a vehicle.

3 Main Initiatives in FY2018

A certain level of achievement has been realized regarding the reorganization of the MOD central organization based on the “Direction of the MOD Reform.” Meanwhile, the MOD has implemented the following initiatives, considering the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan and the increasing need to advance various measures more effectively and efficiently.

• Enhancement of policy making function by establishing the position of the Director-General for Evidence-based Policymaking

For the building and strengthening of the function that plays the central role of promoting the Evidence-Based Policy Making (EBPM), the position of Director-General for Evidence-based Policymaking responsible for the overall coordination of the initiatives concerning the promotion of the EBPM, such as conducting high-level and flexible adjustment of complex policy issues across various agencies within the MOD, has been established.

• Enhancement of the function of the Joint Staff Councilor

Considering the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the position of the Joint Staff Councilor has been upgraded from one councilor to two councilors, and one of whom is called the Principal Joint Staff Councilor, in order to enhance and strengthen functions at the Joint Staff of external briefings and the communication and coordination with relevant departments and divisions inside and outside the MOD.
Section 2 Effective Deterrence and Response

In order to respond to a variety of contingencies in a timely and appropriate manner, and to assure the protection of the lives and property of the people as well as territorial land, water and airspace, it is necessary to make efforts to deter the occurrence of a variety of contingencies before they happen by building a comprehensive defense architecture. If a contingency does occur, it is required to respond seamlessly to the situations as they unfold. Therefore, it is important to ensure information superiority\(^1\) through continuous surveillance over a wide region around Japan during peacetime. If a contingency does arise, ensuring maritime superiority\(^2\) and air superiority\(^3\) in our sea and airspace in a timely manner is important to respond effectively and minimize the damage.

**Reference 17 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 18 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units)**

**1 Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan**

Japan is comprised of a little over 6,800 islands, and is surrounded by wide sea space, which includes the sixth largest\(^4\) territorial waters (including inland waters) and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world. The SDF is engaged in persistent intelligence collection and warning and surveillance during peacetime over Japan’s territorial waters and airspace, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace.

**1 Warning and Surveillance in Waters and Airspace Surrounding Japan**

**(1) Basic Concept**
The SDF persistently engages in warning and surveillance activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan during peacetime so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly.

**(2) Response by the MOD/SDF**
The MSDF patrols the areas such as the waters surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea from peacetime, using patrol aircraft and other aircraft. The ASDF uses radar sites at 28 locations nationwide, and early warning and control aircraft amongst others, to carry out warning and surveillance activities over Japan and its surrounding airspace. These activities of the MSDF and ASDF are done 24 hours a day. Warning and surveillance activities in major channels are also conducted 24 hours a day by MSDF guard posts, GSDF coastal surveillance units, and other assets.\(^5\) Furthermore, warning and surveillance activities are carried out with the flexible use of destroyers, aircraft, and so on as required. The information obtained through such surveillance activities is shared with the relevant ministries and agencies, including the Japan Coast Guard, in order to strengthen coordination.

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1. To have an advantage over the opponent in terms of quickly and correctly identifying, collecting, processing, and conveying information.
2. Maritime superiority refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force at sea and can carry out maritime operations without suffering substantial damages by the opposing force.
3. Air superiority refers to the condition in which one side can carry out airborne operations without suffering a significant level of obstruction by the opposing force.
4. Excluding overseas territories. The EEZ is the eighth largest in the world if overseas territories are included.
5. Article 4(1)(18) of the Act for Establishment of the MOD (Investigation and research required for the performance of duties within jurisdiction) provides the legal basis for early warning surveillance activities by the Self Defense Forces.
Thus, the SDF maintains a defense and security posture so that it can respond quickly to various contingencies in areas surrounding Japan. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF are working to share the information collected by this type of early warning surveillance activities and to reinforce our cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies.

To show an example of the events that were reported from SDF’s surveillance, following September 2012 when the Government of Japan acquired property rights to and ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsuri Island, Minamikojima Island, and Kitakojima Island), Chinese government vessels have carried out intermittent intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands. In June 2016, a Chinese Navy combatant vessel entered Japan’s contiguous zone to the north of the Senkaku Islands for the first time. Chinese Navy vessels continue their activities in the sea areas surrounding Japan, and six vessels including the Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier “Liaoning” passed through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, and entered the western Pacific in December 2016. This was the first time that the entry of this aircraft carrier into the Pacific Ocean was confirmed.

In July 2017, a Chinese naval intelligence collection ship entered Japanese territorial waters southwest of Kojima (Matsumae, Hokkaido) passing east through the Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean for the first time. In January 2018, the JSDF confirmed that a Chinese submarine and warship had been navigating through the Japanese contiguous waters of the Senkaku Islands at the same time (more about the submarine below). Furthermore, in April, in waters some 350 km south of Yonaguni Island, a number of (presumed) fighter jets were observed taking off from the aircraft carrier Liaoning for the first time.

It has been pointed out that North Korea is attempting to evade United Nations Security Council sanctions through smuggling. As part of its regular warning and surveillance activities in Japanese territorial waters, the Self Defense Force is carrying out information gathering on vessels suspected of violating the UN Security Council sanctions. In 2018, Self Defense Force patrol aircraft have confirmed nine observations of seaborne rendezvous between North Korean tankers and foreign-flagged tankers in the East China Sea to the end of June. The information was shared with relevant agencies and ministries. In a comprehensive judgment across the government, the vessels concerned are strongly suspected of engaging in transshipment of cargo with the North Korean vessels, which is prohibited by UN Security Council resolution. Japan reported this to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea, shared the information with relevant countries, sent letters of intent to the relevant countries regarding the tankers concerned and made public announcements on the subject.

In response to these illicit maritime activities including transshipments with North Korean vessels prohibited under the UN Security Council resolution, the United States and other concerned countries are carrying out early warning surveillance activities using aircraft based at the United States Kadena Air Base in Japan. Australian and Canadian aircraft made patrol flights over a one-month period starting in late April. In the same month, the United Kingdom also announced that it would contribute to the international operation to monitor illicit transactions in North Korean waters and in early May, the naval frigate HMS Sutherland conducted an information gathering operation in the international waters around Japan. The Ministry of Defense and the Self Defense Force intend to continue their close cooperation with concerned countries to ensure compliance with the UN Security Council resolution.

6 Since December 26, 2015, Chinese government vessels equipped with weapons, which appear to be machine guns, have intruded into the territorial waters of Japan.
7 Activity associated with the passage of Chinese naval vessels through the Ryukyu Islands between Okinawa Hondo and Miyakojima Islands was confirmed seven times in 2017.
8 Specifically, P-3C patrol planes of MSDF Air Patrol Squadron 1 observed rendezvous in the East China Sea on January 20, 2018 between North Korean tanker Rye Song Gang 1 and Dominican Republic-flagged tanker Yoko, on February 13 between North Korean tanker Rye Song Gang 1 and Belize-flagged tanker Wan Heng 11, on February 16 between North Korean tanker Yu Jong 2and a small vessel of unknown origin, on February 24 between North Korean tanker Chon Ma San and Maldives-flagged tanker Xin Yuan 18, on May 19 between North Korean tanker Ji Song 6 and a small vessel of unknown origin, on May 24 between North Korean tanker Sam Jong 2 and a vessel of unknown origin, on June 21 between North Korean tanker Yu Poyng 5 and a small vessel of unknown origin, and the next day between North Korean tanker Yu Poyng 5 and a small vessel of unknown origin, believed to be the same boat, and on June 29 between North Korean tanker An San 1 and a small vessel of unknown origin.
9 The initiative of the Japanese government to counter this type of transshipment was lauded by President Donald Trump at the U.S.-Japan summit meeting and by Secretary of Defense James Mattis at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in April 2018.
(2) Response by the MOD/SDF

The ASDF detects and identifies aircraft flying in airspace surrounding Japan using warning and control radars as well as early-warning and control aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft heading to Japan’s territorial airspace is conducted as an act to exercise the right of policing intended to maintain public order. Unlike measures taken on land or at sea, this measure can be taken only by the SDF. Therefore, the ASDF is primarily responsible for conducting the actions based on Article 84 of the SDF Law.
airspace are detected, fighters and other aircraft scramble to approach them in order to confirm the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. Furthermore, in the event that this suspicious aircraft has actually intruded into territorial airspace, a warning to leave the airspace would be issued, among other responses.

In FY2016, ASDF aircraft scrambled 904 times, which was a decrease by 264 times compared with the previous fiscal year. However, this is the 6th highest number of times since 1958 when scrambles commenced and the number continues to be kept relatively high.

Breaking this figure down, planes were scrambled 500 times in response to Chinese aircraft. This is 351 fewer incidents than the previous year, which was a record, but it is clear that Chinese aircraft continue to be highly active, as this is the third highest figure since the number of scrambles by country or territory was first made public in 2001.

A distinctive example arose in May 2017 when a drone caused an airspace violation as it flew above a Chinese naval vessel entering Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands. In August last year, six Chinese military bombers were observed in an unprecedented flight from the East China Sea over Okinawa Hondo and Miyakojima Islands northeast across the Pacific to an area off the Kii Peninsula before returning. Then in December, five aircraft including two fighter jets flew over the Tsushima Strait and entered the Japan Sea airspace. This was the first time that a Chinese fighter has been confirmed entering the Japan Sea airspace. Then in April 2018, a (presumed) unmanned Chinese aircraft flew across the East China Sea.

With these kinds of acts, China is expanding the scope of activities of its air force and escalating its actions inside Japanese airspace. It is a troubling situation.

Planes were scrambled 390 times in response to Russian aircraft, an increase of 89 events compared to the year before. Russian aircraft remain active, including unusual long-distance flights by two bombers through Japanese airspace in August 2017 and February 2018.

Even after the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” by China in November 2013, the MOD/SDF has implemented warning and surveillance activities as before in the East China Sea, including the zone in question, and has continued to take all initiatives necessary to engage in warning and surveillance in both the sea and airspace around Japan. The MOD/SDF also engages in strict airspace anti-intrusion measures in accordance with international law and the SDF Law.
3 Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan’s Territorial Waters

(1) Basic Concept

With respect to foreign submarines navigating underwater in Japan’s territorial waters, an order for maritime security operations will be issued. The submarine will be requested to navigate on the surface of the water and show its flag, in accordance with international law, and in the event that the submarine does not comply with the request, the SDF will request it to leave Japanese territorial waters.

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10 The term “territorial waters” also includes inland waters.
Response by the MOD/SDF

The MSDF is maintaining and enhancing capabilities for: expressing its intention not to permit any navigation that violates international law; and responding in shallow water areas by detecting, identifying, and tracking foreign submarines navigating under the territorial waters of Japan. In November 2004, the MSDF observed a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigating under Japanese territorial waters around the Sakishima Islands. In response to this incident, the MSDF issued an order for maritime security operations, and continued to track the submarine with MSDF vessels until it entered the high seas.

Maritime Self-Defense Force P-3C patrol aircraft and others also confirmed observation of submerged submarines navigating through the Japanese contiguous zones in May 2013 in waters south of Kumejima Island, in March 2014 off the east coast of Miyakojima Island and in February 2016 in waters southeast of Tsushima Island. Further, in January 2018, a submerged submarine was spotted by Maritime SDF assets including a destroyer moving through Japanese contiguous zones of the Senkaku Islands. The submarine was then observed surfacing in international waters of the East China Sea flying the Chinese flag. This was the first time that a Chinese naval submarine has been observed operating in the Japanese contiguous zones of the Senkaku Islands. Although international law does not forbid foreign submarines navigating underwater in the contiguous zone of coastal states, Japan maintains a posture to appropriately deal with such activities.

Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels

Basic Concept

The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to suspicious armed special operations vessels (unidentified vessels). However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued and the situation will be handled by the SDF in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.

Response by the MOD/SDF

In light of the lessons learned from the cases of an unidentified vessel off the Noto Peninsula in 1999, an unidentified vessel in the sea southwest of Kyushu in 2001, and other similar incidents, the MOD/SDF have...
been making various efforts.

In particular, the MSDF has been taking the following steps: (1) deployment of Patrol Guided Missile Boats; (2) establishment of the MSDF Special Boarding Unit; (3) equipment of destroyers with machine guns; (4) furnishing forcible maritime interdiction equipment (flat-nose shells); (5) improving the sufficiency ratio of military vessel personnel; and (6) enhancing equipment for the Vessel Boarding Inspection Team.

Furthermore, based on the “Manual on Joint Strategies concerning Unidentified Vessels” jointly prepared by the then Japan Defense Agency and the Japan Coast Guard in 1999, the MSDF also makes an effort to strengthen cooperation between these two organizations, conducting activities such as joint exercises periodically.

If signs of attack are detected in advance, troops will be deployed and concentrated in an area expected to be invaded ahead of the deployment of enemy units, and, through the joint operation involving all the SDF forces (the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF), deter and remove enemy attacks. If there is an invasion of the islands, the enemy will be brought under control by ground fire from aircraft and vessels, and then tactical operations will be implemented to regain the islands by the landing of troops.

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11 A special unit of the MSDF was newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance, and disarm suspicious vessels in the event of vessel boarding inspections under maritime security operations.

12 A non-bursting shell launched from the 76-mm gun equipped on destroyer, the flat front nose of which keeps it from bouncing.
SDF forces and other initiatives. Furthermore, a precise response will also be taken to attacks using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and other weapons.

See Fig. III-1-2-6 (Conceptual Image of Defending Japan's Offshore Islands)

2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

For defense posture buildup in the southwestern region, the ASDF established the 9th Air Wing in January 2016 and newly formed the Southwestern Air Defense Force in July 2017. The GSDF, in addition to the Yonaguni coast observation unit formed in March 2016 and other newly-formed units, established the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade with full-fledged amphibious operation capabilities in March 2018. Moreover, the GSDF will deploy some units including an area security unit in charge of the initial responses in Amami Oshima, Miyako Island, and Ishigaki Island.

In addition, the MSDF will acquire P-1 fixed wing patrol aircraft, SH-60K rotary wing patrol helicopters, and other equipment. Through these initiatives, the MOD/SDF will continue persistent ISR operations, and develop an immediate response posture in the case of contingencies.

Also, in order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment of units, initiatives are underway to enhance rapid deployment capabilities through: the improvement of Osumi class LST (Landing Ship, Tank); a review of the role of multipurpose vessels; and the introduction of V-22 Ospreys and C-2 transport aircraft.

In particular, for the operation of V-22 Ospreys, the MOD determined that the KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT was the best airfield to be used as the deployment site for V-22 Ospreys due to positional relationships with relevant units in joint operations, the length of the runway, and the geographic environment that can reduce burdens borne by the local community. The MOD/SDF hopes to gain understanding from the local community through providing in-depth explanations.

Moreover, in addition to the acquisition of six fighter aircraft (F-35A), one aerial refuelling and transport aircraft (KC-46A) and four tilt-rotor aircraft (V-22) to serve in responding to attacks on remote islands, the FY2018 budget includes funds for research into the technologies required for high-speed glide bombs and

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13 At the KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT, the ramp, aircraft hangars, etc., are to be developed on the west side of the airport. Approximately 70 aircraft, consisting of 17 newly acquired V-22 Ospreys and approximately 50 helicopters transferred from Camp Metabaru are expected to be deployed.
new anti-ship missiles to defend remote islands.

Meanwhile, various types of training to increase the capacity for amphibious operations are being undertaken. The MOD and SDF carried out the joint amphibious exercise Dawn Blitz 17 with U.S. Marines in the United States from October to November 2017, the joint exercises (field training) in November 2017 and the joint amphibious exercise Iron Fist 18 with U.S. Marines in the United States from January to February 2018. And in May 2018, the first exercises of the newly formed Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade were conducted with the MSDF. Practical exercises were conducted outside SDF bases in waters off the west coast of Kyushu and Tanegashima Island.

![GSDF personnel getting off an amphibious vehicle and deploying during Iron Fist 18 (January 2018)](image)

### 3 Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Japan began developing the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in FY2004 to be fully prepared for the response against ballistic missile attacks. Necessary amendments were subsequently made to the SDF Law in July 2005, and in December of the same year, the then-Security Council and Cabinet decided to begin Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor. To date, Japan has steadily built up its own defense system against ballistic missile attacks, by such means as installing ballistic missile defense capability to the Aegis-equipped destroyers and deploying the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3).

In case ballistic missiles or other objects are launched against Japan as an armed attack, it will be dealt with by issuing a defense operation order for armed attack situations. On the other hand, when such situation is not yet acknowledged as an armed attack, Japan will take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles.

As a response against ballistic missiles or other objects, the Joint Task Force-BMD is formed, with the Commander of the Air Defense Command serving as its Commander, and various postures for effective defense are to be taken under a unified command through JADGE. Furthermore, the GSDF will play a leading role in dealing with damage caused by the impact of a fallen ballistic missile.

#### 1 Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense

**(1) Basic Concept**

Currently, Japan’s BMD is an effective multi-layered defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis-equipped destroyers and the lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE).

The upcoming introduction of the land-based Aegis system, Aegis Ashore, will enable our forces to intercept missiles in the upper tier not just from Aegis destroyers but from land (see below for more details on the introduction of Aegis Ashore).

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#### (2) Response by the MOD/SDF

Since 2016, North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests and 40 ballistic missile launches. These military actions by North Korea are a severe and imminent threat to the safety of Japan. Meanwhile, we believe that the clear commitment made by Chairman Kim Jong-un at the historic North Korea-United States summit held in June 2018 to fully denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, and
repeated in writing, is highly significant. We must now carefully monitor the concrete actions of North Korea toward the elimination of nuclear weapons and missiles. North Korea probably possesses and has deployed hundreds of Nodong missiles, which have almost all of Japan within their range. Based on the progress of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development gained through successive nuclear tests and ballistic missile firings and improved operational capability, our fundamental stance on the threat posed by North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles is unchanged.

Considering such a situation, the MOD/SDF, whose mission is to protect the lives and assets of the people, are not changing their intent to do everything necessary to be sure that it is able to respond to any situation or state of affairs, and continue to conduct the necessary intelligence collection, warning and surveillance activities, and other necessary activities while closely cooperating with the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Further cooperation with the U.S. Government including the U.S. Forces in Japan is essential for efficient and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related measures including constant real-time sharing of BMD operational and relevant information, and the expansion of BMD cooperation have been agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting).

Furthermore, Japan has closely cooperated with the United States in responding to ballistic missiles, by means such as receiving Shared Early Warning (SEW) from the U.S. Forces, and sharing intelligence gathered by assets including transportable BMD radar (TPY-2 radar) and Aegis-equipped destroyers deployed in Japan by the U.S. Forces.

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17 Information on the area and time of launch, the projected area and time, where and when objects fall relating to ballistic missiles launched in the direction of Japan, which is analyzed and conveyed to the SDF by the U.S. Forces in a short period of time after the launch. (The SDF started to receive the information since April 1996.)
Maintenance, enhancement and validation of Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities have been actively conducted through training and other activities. Since 2010, BMD exercise has been held between the MSDF and the U.S. Navy, connecting their ships and other equipment via a network and conducting a simulation of response to ballistic missiles, to improve tactical capabilities and strengthen bilateral coordination. In February 2018, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force took part in this exercise as a joint Japan-U.S. air defense/missile defense exercise with the goal of improving strategic and tactical skills and strengthening cooperation.

Beyond Japan-U.S. cooperation, there is also a need to bolster cooperation between the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea. In October and again in December 2017, trilateral ballistic missile information-sharing exercises were held in waters off Japan with the objective of strengthening coordination.

With respect to the handling of finely detailed information related to ballistic missiles, the passage of the Specially Designated Secrets Act in December 2014 (Law no. 108, 2013) has established the basis for protection of highly confidential information related to national security. This has promoted increased sharing of information not just within the government but with the United States and other relevant countries.

In addition, the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)\(^{18}\) entered into effect on November, 2016. As GSOMIA serves as a framework for protecting various confidential information including information regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat shared between Japan and the ROK, which will be required for practical and effective responses to various situations, further strengthening of the Japan-U.S.-ROK relationship will be expected.

The SDF engages in various training on a daily basis to improve its capability to counter ballistic missiles. It has been conducting PAC-3 maneuver deployment training nationwide sequentially from June 2017 in an effort to strengthen the SDF’s capability to counter ballistic missiles and generate a sense of safety and security among the public. It had conducted 20 training sessions as of the end of June 2018 including deployments to U.S. Forces Japan’s facilities.

**Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2-1 (North Korea); Chapter 2, Section 1-4-2 (Japan-Republic of Korea Defense Cooperation and Exchanges); Reference 35 (History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan)**

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(3) **Strengthening of the BMD System**

In light of the severe security environment, the MOD/SDF have been taking necessary measures for improving its capabilities for responding to ballistic missile attacks based on the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-term Defense Program. For example, of the six MSDF Aegis-equipped destroyers, the MOD is currently refurbishing two without BMD capabilities, Atago and Ashigara, to give them BMD capabilities and this refurbishment of Atago was already completed in December 2017. The MOD also decided to acquire additional two Aegis-equipped destroyers with BMD capabilities using the FY2015 and FY2016 budgets. These projects will increase the number of Aegis-equipped destroyers with BMD capabilities from the present five (including refurbished Atago) to eight by FY2020.

Meanwhile, Japan and the United States are jointly developing advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block IIA), which will be the successor of SM-3 Block IA to be mounted on Aegis-equipped destroyers, and promoting the project to its deployment, in order to deal with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missile attacks.

At the National Security Council 9-Minister Meeting in December 2016, a decision was made to transition to joint production and the deployment phase. Following the FY2017 budget, the expenses to acquire SM-3 Block IIA were budgeted in the FY2018. Acquisition and deployment of SM-3 Block IIA are planned to be implemented in FY2021.

In comparison with the previous SM-3 Block IA, SM-3 Block IIA will have not only extended interceptable altitude and coverage of protection, but also have enhanced defeating capability and simultaneous engagement capability. In addition, it is expected that the interception capabilities of SM-3 Block IIA will be enhanced against ballistic missiles equipped with interception avoidance measures such as a decoy and ballistic missiles launched with an intention to avoid being intercepted by taking a higher than nominal trajectory (lofted trajectory)\(^{19}\).

There will be eight Aegis-equipped destroyers with BMD capabilities, and SM-3 Block IIA will also be deployed. It is planned that there will be a strengthened protection system by around FY2021.

With regard to Patriot PAC-3, necessary expenses have been appropriated in the supplementary budget for FY2017, which continued from the supplementary

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\(^{18}\) The official name is the “Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Korea on the Protection of Classified Military Information,” which was signed by Yasumasa Nagamine, Ambassador of Japan to the ROK, and Han Min-goo, then-Minister of National Defense of the ROK, in Seoul, ROK, on November 23, 2016.

\(^{19}\) By taking a higher trajectory than minimum energy trajectories (trajectories that enable efficient flying of a missile and maximize its range), it takes a shorter range than the maximum range, but the falling speed of the missile becomes faster.
budget of the previous year, to enable the acquisition of the enhanced capability type, PAC-3 (MSE) (Missile Segment Enhancement). Introduction of PAC-3 MSE will realize the extension of interception altitude from about 10 km to 20-30 km, meaning that the coverage of protection (area) will expand more than twice compared with the current PAC-3.

With North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles posing an unprecedentedly severe and imminent threat to the safety of Japan, the country must work to drastically upgrade its ballistic missile defense capabilities in order to ensure constant and sustained protection. At meetings of the National Security Council and Cabinet in December 2017, a decision was made to purchase two Aegis Ashore units, to be retained by the Ground Self Defense Force. The aim is to improve the capability for multi-layered defense of Japan against ballistic missile attacks in addition to existing Aegis-equipped destroyers and Patriot batteries.20

The cost of obtaining all information from the United States related to acquisition of Aegis Ashore, improvement of ballistic missile response capability of the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE),21 conversion to FPS-7 fixed warning and control radars and addition of a BMD function22 is allocated in the FY2017 supplementary budget, while the cost of geological survey and preliminary design work required for the deployment of Aegis Ashore and development of next-generation warning and control radar with detection and tracking functionality for ballistic missile attacks23 is allocated in the FY2018 budget.

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20 The costs required to introduce the Aegis Ashore land-based defense system in 2017 and 2018 are to be covered within the scope of the total MTDP budget.
21 Upgrade to enhance capability against loittled trajectory attacks, attacks with little chance of advance detection and attacks by multiple ballistic missiles launched simultaneously.
22 Acquired FPS-7 fixed warning and control radar for deployment at Wakkakai, Hokkaido. Allocated infrastructure costs required for deployment of FPS-7 at Wakkakai, Hokkaido and Unishima Island, Nagasaki Prefecture.
23 Development of next-generation warning and control radar with detection and tracking functionality to deal with future airborne threats and ballistic missile attacks, advanced survivability and economic efficiency.
Aegis Ashore is a land-based missile defense system (Aegis system) that consists of radar, a command communication system, an interceptor missile launcher, and other equipment, which essentially constitutes the BMD part of an Aegis-equipped destroyer for BMD, and is capable of intercepting ballistic missiles flying in the exosphere from the ground.

As North Korea still holds multiple and various types of ballistic missiles that include Japan within its firing range, this makes it an imminent challenge for Japan to improve its BMD capability. The deployment of Aegis Ashore would fundamentally boost Japan’s capabilities to protect itself seamlessly 24 hours a day and 365 days a year.

Generally speaking, it takes a long time to acquire new defense equipment. This does not change even in the event of an emergency. Securing the lives and the peaceful livelihood of the Japanese people is the most important duty of the Government, and the MOD considers it a matter of course to be prepared fully so that Japan can respond to any contingencies. Furthermore, the working environment for crew onboard Aegis-equipped destroyer is extremely severe. These ships must make port calls for maintenance and replenishment, creating gaps in defense posture. This means frequent long-term deployments for the crew to eliminate those undesired intervals. This burden on personnel is anticipated to be lifted significantly once Aegis Ashore is deployed. Moreover, Aegis-equipped destroyer would be able to go back to their core duty of ensuring maritime security, and strengthening Japan’s deterrence capability as a whole.

GSDF Araya Maneuver Area in Akita Prefecture and Mutsumi Maneuver Area in Yamaguchi Prefecture have been selected as possible areas for the deployment of two Aegis Ashore sites after studies within the MOD. In light of this, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Fukuda and Ono visited Akita and Yamaguchi prefectures on June 1, 2018. Defense Minister Onodera also visited both prefectures on June 22 and gave a briefing on the necessity of the deployment. Not only will the MOD conduct a thorough investigation and implement measures so that the deployment will not affect the livelihood of people in the communities, but it will also continue to give sincere and detailed briefings with the hope that doing so will resolve any questions and anxiety the communities may have.

Missile Defense of the United States and Japan—U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation

(1) Missile Defense of the United States

The United States is developing a multi-tier missile defense system that combines defense systems suited for each of the following phases of the ballistic missile flight path to provide a mutually complementary response: (1) the boost phase, (2) the mid-course phase, and (3) the terminal phase. Japan and the United States have developed close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense, and a part of the missile defense system of the United States has been deployed in our country in a step-by-step manner.

(2) Japan-U.S. BMD Technology Cooperation, etc.

The Government commenced a Japan-U.S. cooperative research project on a sea-based upper-tier system in FY1999. As the result showed good prospects for resolving initial technical challenges, in December 2005, the then-Security Council and the Cabinet decided to start Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor by using the results of the project as a technical basis. The joint development started in June 2006 with a view to expanding the coverage of protection and dealing with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missiles attacks.

In February and June 2017, Japan and the United States conducted tests of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor in waters off Hawaii. Analysis of the test data confirmed that it meets all performance requirements.

Currently, as part of development work, the United States is carrying out validation of the data connection between the Aegis system and the SM-3 Block IIA, and between radars. Japan continues to cooperate as required.

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24 Specifically, a TPY-2 radar (so-called “X-band radar”) for BMD has been deployed at the U.S. Shikoku Communication Site in 2006, and BMD-capable Aegis ships have been forward deployed in Japan and surrounding areas. In October 2006, Patriot PAC-3 units were deployed in Okinawa Prefecture, and in October 2007, a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) was deployed in Aomori Prefecture. Furthermore, the 2nd TPY-2 radar was deployed at the U.S. Kygami Communication Site in December 2014.

25 With regard to the Japan-U.S. cooperative development, it is necessary to export BMD related arms from Japan to the United States. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s statement issued in December 2004, it was determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply to the BMD system and related matters under the condition that strict controls are maintained. Based on these circumstances, it was decided that the prior consent of Japan could be given to the third party transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA under certain conditions. This decision was formally announced in the Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting) in June 2011.

The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (Three Principles) received Cabinet approval in April 2014. However, with regard to exceptional measures instigated before the Three Principles were decided, overseas transfers will continue to be organized in the guidelines for the principles as allowable under the Three Principles.
In Japan where most of the towns and cities are highly urbanized, even small-scale infiltrations and attacks can pose a serious threat against the country’s peace and security. These cases refer to various mode and forms including illegal activities by infiltrated foreign armed agents\textsuperscript{26} etc., and sabotage carried out by foreign guerillas or special forces, which can be deemed as an armed attack against Japan.

### 1 Basic Concept

In the stage where the actual situation of intruders and the details of the ongoing case are not clear, the police primarily respond to the situation, while the MOD/SDF will collect relevant information and reinforce the security of the SDF facilities. When the situation is clearer and can be dealt with by the general police force, various forms of assistance such as transportation of police officers and provision of equipment to the police force will be carried out. If the case cannot be dealt with by the general police force, then public security operations by the SDF will be implemented. Furthermore, if it has been confirmed that an armed attack is being carried out against Japan, the SDF will respond under a defense operation order.

### 2 Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

Typical forms of attacks by guerillas or special forces include the destruction of critical private infrastructure and other facilities, attacks against people, and assassinations of dignitaries.

In dealing with attacks by guerillas or special forces, the MOD/SDF responds with a particular emphasis on the establishment of a relevant information gathering posture, warning and surveillance to prevent invasions in coastal areas, protection of key facilities, and search and destroy of invading guerillas or special forces. Efforts will be made for early detection of attacks and indications through warning and surveillance, and, as required, the
SDF units will be deployed to protect key facilities such as nuclear power plants and necessary posture for protection will be established at an early stage. Based on this, in the event of an infiltration of our territory by guerrillas or special operations forces, they will be searched for and detected by reconnaissance units, aviation units and others and combat units will be promptly deployed to besiege and capture or to destroy them.

**3 Response to Armed Agents**

**(1) Basic Concept**

While the police assumes primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF will respond in accordance with situational developments. When this happens, the SDF cooperates with the police force. Accordingly, with regard to public security operations of the SDF, the Basic Agreement concerning cooperation procedures between the SDF and the police, as well as local agreements between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces, have been concluded.

**See** Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-3-1, (Public Security Operations)

**(2) The MOD/SDF Initiatives**

The GSDF continues to conduct exercises nationwide with the police of each prefecture and has been strengthening such collaboration by, for example, conducting field exercises at nuclear power plants throughout the country since 2012. Furthermore, joint exercises in dealing with suspicious vessels are also continuously conducted between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard.

**4 Response to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons**

In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the danger of NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) weapon proliferation, which can cause indiscriminate mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area, and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment and materials, to terrorists and countries under suspicion of proliferating such weapons. The sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995 is one of the examples of an incident in which these weapons were used.

**(1) Basic Concept**

In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a way that corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will conduct defense operations to repel the armed attack and rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of the use of NBC weapons in a way that does not correspond to an armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the armed group and rescue victims in cooperation with related agencies.

Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the chemical protection units of the GSDF and medical units of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF will cooperate with relevant organizations in information gathering concerning the extent of the damage, decontamination activities, transportation of the sick and injured, and medical activities through disaster relief and civil protection dispatches.

**(2) The MOD/SDF Initiatives**

The MOD/SDF possesses and maintains the GSDF Central Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit and the Countermeasure Medical Unit as well as increasing the number of chemical and medical protection unit personnel, in order to improve the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Also,
the GSDF has designated personnel to take initial action in the event of extraordinary disasters in order to allow operations to begin within approximately one hour. The MSDF and the ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases.

5 ■ Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security

1 ■ Basic Approach by the Government

Based on the National Security Strategy (NSS), Japan will play a leading role in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Seas,” and will take necessary measures to address various threats in sea lanes of communication, including counter-piracy operations, ensuring safe maritime transport and promoting cooperation with other countries by promoting necessary cooperation related to maritime security. In addition, it is stated in NSS that Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities.

The new Basic Plan on Ocean Policy was given Cabinet approval in May 2018 after a review of the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy that was given Cabinet approval in 2013. Taking a broad view of ocean policy from the perspective of security on the ocean, the Plan states that the government will act as one in undertaking “comprehensive maritime security” and promote a “free and open Indo-Pacific Strategy” in collaboration and cooperation with related countries.

2 ■ Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

In order to maintain the order of “Open and Stable Seas” and to ensure the safety of maritime transport, the MOD/SDF promotes various kinds of initiatives such as implementing counter-piracy activities, providing capacity building assistance to coastal countries, and enhancing joint training using a variety of opportunities.

6 ■ Responses in Space

Utilization of satellites enables the remote sensing of, communication at, and positioning on any area on Earth. Thus, countries around the world actively use outer space and make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites such as imagery satellites, communication satellites, and positioning satellites to enhance information gathering capabilities as well as command and control, and information and communications capabilities. Under such circumstances, for Japan whose defense force is built in line with the basic principles of exclusively defense oriented policy, the use of space, which does not belong to any territories of any nations and is not constrained by such factors as the surface of the terrain, is extremely important when: collecting information to detect indications of various incidents in advance and strengthening the surveillance activities in its surrounding seas and airspace; and ensuring means of communication by the SDF in their international peace cooperation activities and other activities.

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31 In addition to “Comprehensive Maritime Security,” given recent changes in the oceanic environment, basic principles are being established for key policies on oceans with respect to 1) promoting the industrial use of the oceans, 2) sustaining and preserving the oceanic environment, 3) improving scientific knowledge, 4) deepening polar policies, 5) international collaboration and cooperation and 6) promoting the fostering of human resources for oceanic profession and the understanding of citizens.

32 In April 2016, the Office of National Space Policy was reorganized into the National Space Policy Secretariat.

33 Cabinet decision on April 1, 2016
and strengthening of space industry and scientific/technological bases. Amid rising dependence on space systems and increasing threats and risks in space, “mission assurance” initiatives are underway to ensure stable space operations including detection and avoidance of threats and risks, increased survivability of the systems themselves and early recovery of functionality.

Responding to Japan’s progress in development and use of outer space, the Diet approved two laws—the Act on Ensuring Appropriate Handling of Satellite Remote Sensing Data (Remote Sensing Data Act) and Act on Launch of Artificial Satellites and Launch Vehicles and Control of Artificial Satellites (Space Activities Act) in November 2016, and Remote Sensing Data Act and part of Space Activities Act went into effect in November 2017.

The Space Activities Act stipulates matters necessary to secure public safety and provide prompt protection of the victims from damages in Japan’s space development and use, such as a permission system for launching, obligation for compensation, and government compensation. The government began accepting applications for permission after the enforcement of part of the Act. In addition, the Remote Sensing Data Act established (1) a license pertaining to use of satellite remote sensing instruments, (2) a certification of persons handling satellite remote sensing data and (3) a system that enables the Prime Minister to issue an order to a satellite remote sensing data holder to prohibit provision of data under certain occasions.

2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF

The use of space is extremely important for the MOD/SDF to conduct a range of tasks effectively and efficiently. Thus, it is critically important for the MOD/SDF to be able to continuously utilize space capabilities even in contingencies. In order to do so, NDPG stipulates the MOD/SDF to strengthen information gathering, C2 (command & control) and satellite communication capabilities by using multiple types of satellites with various sensors and by enhancing the survivability of satellites through such initiatives as Space Situational Awareness (SSA). In implementing these initiatives, the MOD/SDF will form partnerships with relevant institutions and organizations both in Japan and the United States. As part of this initiative, the MOD is advancing deliberations toward Japan’s inaugural participation in the Schriever Wargame, a multinational tabletop exercise hosted by the US Air Force Space Command. This is meaningful for Japan in terms of enhancing collaboration with partner countries and drafting the national space policy in the future.

Reflecting the formulation of the National Security
Strategy (NSS) and the NDPG, the MOD revised the “Basic Policy Relating to the Development and Use of Space” in August 2014. Also, from the perspective of further promoting cooperation in the space field between the defense authorities of Japan and the United States, the two countries established the “Japan-US Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG)” in April 2015 and so far held four meetings. The SCWG continues to promote consideration in broader fields such as: (1) promotion of policy-related consultation regarding space, (2) closer information sharing, (3) cooperation for nurturing and securing experts, and (4) continued participation to tabletop exercises.

Furthermore, the MOD/SDF launched an X-band defense communications satellite called Kirameki-2 in January 2017 and Kirameki-1 in April 2018, owned and operated by the MOD for the first time, to be used for the information communications of extremely important command and control in unit operations. Going forward, in light of the future increase in required communication, the MOD will conduct steady development of Kirameki-3 to realize integrated communications as well as high-speed and large capacity communications, thereby aiming for the early realization of a three-satellite system with all of the three X-band defense communications satellites.

3 Development of the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) System

When using outer space, it is necessary to ensure its stable use. However, there has been a rapid increase in the volume of space debris in outer space, raising the risk of significant damage to satellite functions caused by collision between debris and satellite. In addition, it is speculated that the development and verification test of a killer satellite, which approaches the target artificial satellite to disturb, attack, and capture it, is underway, increasing the threat to the stable use of outer space. That is why the MOD, based on the Basic Plan on Space Policy and through cooperation with relevant domestic institutions such as the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and the U.S., aims to establish Space Situational Awareness (SSA) by 2022 to monitor and maintain an accurate picture of conditions in space. It is also working to deploy a radar and operating system to monitor threats to Japanese satellites such as space debris. For this to happen, the government agencies and ministries concerned need to work together to build an effective operating system. On this point, JAXA is devising a plan to deploy radar able to monitor low orbit satellites (at altitudes of up to 1,000 km) and a ground-based optical telescope to monitor geostationary orbit satellites.
(at altitudes of around 36,000km). Combined with the radar of the MOD that will principally be dedicated to the function of geostationary orbit monitoring, Japan is planning an effective SSA program.

As the project to establish the system gets underway, the preparation of the new radar and operating system will build on the knowledge acquired by the ASDF in establishing defense capabilities. A new unit to operate the system is also being considered.

To establish SSA, it will be vital to continuously exchange views and share information with foreign allies, and to carry out discussions about the nature of future cooperation. The MOD has taken part in the annual SSA multinational tabletop exercise hosted by the U.S. Strategic Command since 2016 with the purpose of acquiring knowledge related to the operation of SSA as well as of strengthening cooperation with the United States. Such initiatives to upgrade our SSA capability also contribute to the strengthening of deterrence against new threats in space.

**7 Response to Cyber Attacks**

Information and communications technology has developed and been rapidly and widely adopted. As a result, it is now an essential infrastructure for socioeconomic activities. On the other hand, there is a possibility that people’s life and economic activities will be severely affected if the computer systems or networks fail. The same is true of both the MOD/SDF. If the critical functions of the SDF are intercepted by a cyber attack, there is a possibility that problems that threaten the core of Japan’s defense may arise.

**1 The Whole-of-Government Approach and Other Initiatives**

With regard to cyber attacks, the number of cases recognized as threats to Japanese governmental organizations and agencies in FY2016 reached approximately 7,110,000, and these threats have become increasingly serious.

In order to deal with the increasing threat to cyber security, in November 2014, the Cyber Security Basic Act was enacted. The Act aims to contribute to the security of Japan by clarifying the basic principles of Japan’s cyber security measures and the responsibilities of local governments, as well as by comprehensively and effectively promoting the measures regarding cyber security. In response to this, in January 2015, the Cyber Security Strategic Headquarters was established in the Cabinet and the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cyber Security (NISC) was established in the Cabinet Secretariat. The NISC is responsible for planning and promotion of cyber security-related policies and serves as the control tower in taking measures and responding to significant cyber security incidents in government organizations and agencies, as well as critical infrastructures.

Furthermore, in September 2015, the Cyber Security Strategy was formulated for the comprehensive and effective promotion of measures pertaining to cyber security, with the aims: to create and develop free, fair and safe cyber space; to enhance the vitality of the economy and society and realize their sustainable development; to realize society in which citizens can live safely and with peace of mind; to contribute to peace and stability of the international community as well as the security of Japan.

**2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF**

(1) Contribution to the Whole-of-Government Approach

Along with the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MOD, as one of the five government agencies that cooperate particularly closely with the NISC, participates in cyber attack response training and personnel exchanges, and provides information about cyber attacks, etc. to the cross-sector initiatives led by the NISC as well as sending personnel to the Cyber incident Mobile Assistant Team (CYMAT).

The MOD is considering applying the knowledge and experience of the SDF to penetration tests of the IT systems of government ministries and agencies conducted by NISC.

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35 With the enactment of the Cyber Security Basic Act in January 2015, the National Information Security Center (NISC) was reorganized as the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC). The NISC is responsible for the planning and promotion of cybersecurity-related policies and serves as the control tower in taking measures and responding to significant cybersecurity incidents in government organizations and agencies, as well as critical infrastructures.
Chapter 1
Organizations Responsible for the Defense of Japan, and Effective Deterrence and Handling of Problems

DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2018

Part Ⅲ  Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

Chapter 1
Organizations Responsible for the Defense of Japan, and Effective Deterrence and Handling

Fig. III-1-2-13 MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks

2) Responses by special units to cyber attacks
- 24-hour monitoring of networks and information systems as well as advanced measures against cyber attacks (virus analysis) by the Cyber Defense Group (Joint Staff), System Protection Unit (GSDF), Communication Security Group (MSDF), and Computer Security Evaluation Squadron (ASDF)

3) Development of a response posture to cyber attacks
- Establishment of security measures criteria of information systems
- Establishment of security measures with which MOD/SDF staff should comply
- Development of response posture at the time of cyber attack occurrence
- Establishment of the Cyber Policy Review Committee

6) Coordination with other organizations and agencies
- Information sharing with the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity, the U.S. Armed Forces, and other relevant nations

5) Development of human resources
- For the purpose of human resources development, implementing studying abroad programs at organizations affiliated with Carnegie Mellon University and studying programs at graduate schools in Japan, as well as education at professional courses at the SDF
- For the purpose of fostering security awareness, offering education at workplaces and professional education at the National Defense Academy

4) Research of cutting-edge technology
- Research on technology to develop the cyber training environment

3) Cooperation with the United States
Since comprehensive defense cooperation, including joint response, between Japan and its ally the United States is vital, the two countries set up the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) as a framework between the defense authorities of Japan and the United States. Under this framework, meetings have been held five times to discuss the following topics: (1) promotion of policy discussions regarding cyber issues, (2) closer sharing of information, (3) promotion of joint exercises incorporating response to cyber attacks, and (4) matters such as cooperation for training and maintaining experts. Moreover, in May 2015, the two countries announced a joint statement on the specific future direction of the cooperation.

In addition, Japan’s cooperation with the United States is to be further strengthened by such means as participation in the “Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue,” a...
whole-of-government approach by both nations, holding of the “Japan-U.S. IT Forum,” a framework between the defense authorities since 2002, and dispatching liaison officers to the U.S. Army’s cyber educational institution.

(4) Cooperation with Other Countries etc.

Japan has held cyber dialogues with the respective defense authorities of Australia, the United Kingdom, Estonia, and others to exchange views on threat awareness and relevant initiatives taken by each country. With NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), Japan carries out initiatives looking at possible future operational cooperation, such as establishing a cyber dialogue between defense authorities called the Japan-NATO Expert Staff Talks on Cyber Defense and participating in the cyber defense exercise (Cyber Coalition) hosted by NATO as an observer. Furthermore, Japan has participated in the International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon), and as an observer in a cyber defense exercise (Locked Shields) organized by the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) based in Estonia. As Japan received approval to join the CCDCOE in January 2018, the MOD is further developing collaborative relationships in the cyber area through the dispatch of personnel to the Centre.

In addition, the IT Forum has been held between the defense authorities of Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia to exchange views on initiatives in the information communications area including cybersecurity and current trends in technology.

Considering the fact that cyber attacks occur beyond national borders, it is important to continue to strengthen international cooperation in the cyber field through exchanges of views with defense authorities of other countries and relevant organizations such as the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), and active participation in cyber defense exercises.

In Japan, in July 2013, the “Cyber Defense Council” (CDC) was set up, and its core members consist of around ten companies in the defense industry with a strong interest in cyber security. Efforts are being made to improve capabilities to deal with cyber attacks by the MOD/SDF, and the defense industry, through joint exercise and other initiatives.

When disasters such as natural disasters occur, the SDF works in collaboration with local governments, engaged in various activities such as the search and rescue of disaster victims or ships or aircraft in distress, controlling floods, offering medical treatment, preventing epidemics, supplying water, and transporting personnel and goods.

8 Response to Large-Scale Disasters

1 Basic Principles

In the event of a major disaster, all possible measures will be taken to rapidly transport and deploy the SDF units required and if necessary, to sustain the mobilization for a long period. Not only will the SDF units respond to the
needs of affected residents and local authorities through care, proper collaboration and cooperation, but they will also be engaged with institutions concerned, local authorities and the private sector to save lives, achieve urgent rehabilitation and provide livelihood support.

The SDF has put in place arrangements for an initial response to ensure that disaster relief operations are conducted promptly. This is called “FAST-Force.”

(1) Response to Natural Disasters

a. Disaster Relief for Heavy Rain Disaster Caused by Typhoon No. 10

(1) On July 5, 2017, road flooding, landslide and other damages occurred due to heavy rain, cutting off roads and isolating individuals in Toho Village, Asakura-gun, Fukuoka Prefecture and many places in Hita City, Oita Prefecture. On the same day, the SDF, responding to disaster relief requests from the Governors of Fukuoka and Oita Prefectures, carried out rescue operations for isolated individuals, searches for missing people, elimination of road obstacles, transportation of personnel and goods, water supply assistance, meal providing assistance, and bathing assistance, which continued until August 20 in Fukuoka Prefecture and July 13 in Oita Prefecture. The total scale of this disaster relief was approximately 81,950 personnel, 7,140 vehicles, and 169 aircraft.

b. Disaster Relief in Response to Bird Flu Outbreak

In January 2018, the occurrence of highly pathogenic avian influenza was confirmed at poultry farms in Sanuki City, Kagawai Prefecture, and many places in Hita City, Oita Prefecture. On the same day, the SDF, responding to disaster relief requests from the Governors of Fukuoka and Oita Prefectures, carried out rescue operations for isolated individuals, searches for missing people, elimination of road obstacles, transportation of personnel and goods, water supply assistance, meal providing assistance, and bathing assistance, which continued until August 20 in Fukuoka Prefecture and July 13 in Oita Prefecture. The total scale of this disaster relief was approximately 81,950 personnel, 7,140 vehicles, and 169 aircraft.

c. Disaster Relief in Response to Forest Fire

In January 2018, a number of people were injured by falling rocks at a ski resort in Kusatsu, Agatsuma District due to the eruption of Mt. Kusatsu-Shirane. The SDF received a request from the Governor of Gunma for disaster relief and conducted a lifesaving mission. The mission was composed of dispatches of around 280 personnel, around 75 vehicles and nine aircraft.

d. Disaster Relief in Response to Volcanic Eruption

In January 2018, water supply failures have occurred in Sado, Niigata Prefecture, Uwajima, Ishikawa Prefecture, Oda, Shimane Prefecture and Miyako, Okinawa Prefecture, due to water pipe breakage, etc. In response to disaster relief requests from the governors of the prefectures affected, the SDF provided relief supplies of water. These missions engaged around 765 personnel, some 450 vehicles including water tank trailers, and supplied approximately 349 tons of water in total.

e. Disaster Relief in Response to Water Supply Relief

Since January 2018, water supply failures have occurred in Sado, Niigata Prefecture, Uwajima, Ishikawa Prefecture, Oda, Shimane Prefecture and Miyako, Okinawa Prefecture, due to water pipe breakage, etc. In response to disaster relief requests from the governors of these prefectures, the SDF carried out euthanization of poultries. Approximately 410 personnel and 75 vehicles from SDF were dispatched to cope with this situation.

c. Disaster Relief in Response to Forest Fire

Over the period from June 2017 to the end of May 2018, local authorities conducted firefighting operations against fighting forest fires in Iwate Prefecture, Gunma Prefecture, Tokyo, Nagano Prefecture (twice), Yamanashi Prefecture, Hyogo Prefecture, Shimane Prefecture, Oita Prefecture and Miyazaki Prefecture but were unable to settle the situation despite their efforts. Based on requests issued by the governors of these prefectures, the SDF contributed to aerial firefighting and other resources. SDF dispatches were conducted 10 times in total, including a total of some 110 personnel, around 37 vehicles and some 110 aircraft. Approximately 1,778 tons of water was applied on 414 occasions.

e. Disaster Relief in Response to Water Supply Relief

Since January 2018, water supply failures have occurred in Sado, Niigata Prefecture, Uwajima, Ishikawa Prefecture, Oda, Shimane Prefecture and Miyako, Okinawa Prefecture, due to water pipe breakage, etc. In response to disaster relief requests from the governors of the prefectures affected, the SDF provided relief supplies of water. These missions engaged around 765 personnel, some 450 vehicles including water tank trailers, and supplied approximately 349 tons of water in total.
f. Disaster Relief in Response to Heavy Snow
In February 2018, Awara City, Echizen City and Eiheiji Town, Yoshida District in Fukui Prefecture were hit by a blizzard that caused a large number of vehicles to be stranded on roads. In response to a disaster relief request from the Governor of Fukui Prefecture, a lifesaving and snow-clearing mission was conducted. Some 4,960 personnel were dispatched along with some 820 vehicles, rescuing some 1,190 trapped vehicles, providing 6,750 meals, clearing around 31.8 km of road and supplying some 15,320 liters of fuel.

g. Disaster Relief to Save Lives after Landslide
In April 2018, Yabakei-cho in Nakatsu City, Oita Prefecture was struck by a landslide. Houses were buried in mud and residents were missing, feared dead. In response to a disaster relief request from the Governor of Oita Prefecture, a lifesaving mission was dispatched. Some 3,250 personnel were deployed, along with some 845 vehicles and two aircraft.

h. Disaster Relief for Northern Osaka Prefecture Earthquake
In June 2018, an earthquake (magnitude 6.1) hit northern Osaka Prefecture, resulting in water supply interruptions in Suita, Mino, Takatsuki and Ibaraki, Osaka Prefecture. In response to a disaster relief request from the Governor of Osaka Prefecture, relief water supply and showering facilities were provided. The mission involved some 1,145 personnel, around 280 water trailers and 12 aircraft.

i. Disaster Relief in Response to July 2018 Flooding Disaster
In July 2018, record levels of rain fell across a wide swath of Japan from east to west, causing rivers to breach their banks and multiple large scale flooding and landslide events. In response to disaster relief requests from the governors of Kyoto Prefecture, Hyogo Prefecture, Okayama Prefecture, Hiroshima Prefecture, Yamaguchi Prefecture, Kochi Prefecture, Ehime Prefecture and Fukuoka Prefecture, around 300 liaison officers were sent to coordinate closely with local governments in up to 74 locations to save lives, rescuing stranded residents, supplying water, providing bathing facilities, distributing goods, preventing water intrusion and clearing roads. In the wake of the flooding disaster, in order to take all possible measures for disaster relief operations, SDF Ready Reserve Personnel were called up for the third time following the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake with approximately 300 SDF Ready Reserve Personnel engaging in daily support of survivors at its peak. This mission involved approximately 31,500 personnel, 25 boats and 38 aircraft. In total, 2,265 people were rescued, 3,035 tons of water were supplied and 13,008 people were provided with bathing facilities (as of July 11, 2018).

(2) Transportation of Emergency Patients
The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with insufficient medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients). In FY2017, out of a total of 501 cases of disaster relief, 401 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients, with dispatches to remote islands such as the Southwestern Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures), the Ogasawara Islands (Tokyo), and remote islands of Nagasaki Prefecture representing the majority of such cases.

In addition, the SDF carries out sea rescues upon requests by the Japan Coast Guard on such occasions as transport of emergency patients from vessels navigating areas of ocean far from the mainland where the aircraft of other organizations are unable to respond, due to reasons including a short flight range; emergencies of vessels due to incidents such as fire, flooding or capsizing.

Furthermore, the SDF conducts wide-area medical transport operations for serious-case patients, by the ASDF transport aircraft C-130H utilizing its mobile
Rescue activities for people isolated in Fukuoka Prefecture

5th Engineer Brigade, 9th Engineer Group (Construction) (Ogori, Fukuoka),
9th Engineer Group (Construction) Commander, Colonel Shinya Yamamoto

Our 9th Engineer Group (Construction) handles disaster relief in Asakura City and Toho Village in Fukuoka Prefecture. This area is located on the Chikugo River, which is known for its extensive water volume, and has Mount Sangun in the background. While it is rich in natural beauty, water damage has often occurred.

A heavy rainfall and flood warning had been issued for the area because of concentrated rain from the morning hours on July 5, 2017 (Wednesday). The Governor of Fukuoka Prefecture submitted a disaster relief request to the 4th Division Commander at about 7 pm. I proceeded to Haki Branch Office of Asakura City with police guidance and dispatched a company to rescue people at Matsumoto Elementary School and other isolated facilities following coordination with local personnel.

In Toho Village, meanwhile, lack of road access prevented the liaison team from arriving at the Toho Village Office. Without any related information, I led the main body of the group in advancing to the area. We cleared the road using the group’s own construction equipment while moving forward and arrived at Toho Village Office early in the morning on July 6 (Thursday).

Our first action was saving the lives of people trapped in homes destroyed by debris flow in the Iwaya area. I still remember my exuberance in hearing the report of having saved parents and children trapped in debris with the guidance of employees at Toho Village Office. Throughout this disaster relief, I was alongside the village mayor, reviewing requests and sending orders to the various units based on damage information.

We achieved our mission thanks to a spirit of putting victims first and conducting activities in an integrated manner with local public officials, police officers, and firefighters. I am hoping for a prompt recovery by the area.

Disaster relief for heavy snowfall in Fukui Prefecture

14th Infantry Regiment (Kanazawa, Ishikawa),
Heavy Mortar Company Firing Officer, First Lieutenant Jun Mihara

I participated in disaster relief related to heavy snowfall in northern Fukui Prefecture as a team leader.

I provided instructions on dispatch preparations for the dispatch request and immediately proceeded to the area with team members after receiving the request. Amid steady snowfall totaling about 50 cm a day, we manually removed snow from around each vehicle with shovels throughout the night so that snow removal trucks could operate.

Despite these difficult conditions, we successfully carried out our mission utilizing physical and mental resilience and company cohesion cultivated in our daily training.

I personally reinforced my sense of the importance of physical and mental preparations, daily training, and cohesiveness with team members in responding immediately to and completing various duties. I intend to continue working together with other team members in our missions in order to fulfill the expectations of local residents.
medical units in certain occasions.

Furthermore, in FY2017, the SDF carried out 66 dispatches of firefighting support, with 55 cases responding to fire in the areas near SDF facilities.

(3) The MOD/SDF Response to Nuclear Disaster
In order to respond to nuclear disasters, the MOD/SDF has formulated “The SDF Nuclear Disaster Response Plan.” The SDF also participates in general nuclear disaster prevention drills jointly implemented by the government, local governments, and nuclear operators, to confirm the effectiveness of municipal governments’ evacuation plan and to strengthen cooperation with relevant agencies in a nuclear disaster emergency. Moreover, since October 2014, SDF personnel (5 personnel as of April 1, 2018) were transferred (on temporary assignment) to a section in charge of nuclear disaster prevention within the Cabinet Office as part of an effort to enhance the effectiveness of nuclear disaster response capabilities.

(4) Formulating Plans for Responding to Various Disasters
Formulating Plans for Responding to Various Disasters in the event of the occurrence of various disasters, the MOD/SDF will take all possible measures such as swift transportation and deployment of sufficiently sized units in their initial response. By establishing a rotating staffing posture based on a joint operational approach, the MOD/SDF will ensure that it is able to sustain a well-prepared condition for a long-term response. In doing so, the MOD/SDF will fully take into account the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake and other disasters.

The MOD/SDF is in the process of formulating various contingency plans for responses to large-scale earthquakes, which are under consideration at the Central Disaster Management Council, based on the Ministry of Defense Disaster Prevention Plan to respond to such earthquakes.

(5) Exercises Involving the SDF
In order to respond to large-scale and various other disasters in a speedy and appropriate manner, the SDF carries out various disaster prevention drills, and also actively participates in disaster prevention drills organized by the Japanese Government or local governments and is seeking to ensure cooperation with various ministries and agencies, and local governments.

- **Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR)**
  From June to July 2016, the SDF conducted a command post exercise and a tabletop exercise in preparation for the predicted Nankai Trough earthquake to enhance the SDF’s earthquake response capability.

- **Tomodachi Rescue Exercise (TREX) Joint Disaster Response Exercise with U.S. Forces**
  In November 2017, joint exercises were held with U.S. Forces stationed in Japan in the scenario of a Nankai Trench earthquake. The purpose of the exercise was to maintain and enhance earthquake disaster handling capabilities in collaboration between the SDF and U.S. forces and to strengthen cooperation with relevant local authorities.

- **Remote Island Disaster Relief Exercise (RIDEX)**
  In September 2017, the SDF participated in a general disaster prevention training planned and organized by Okinawa Prefecture and conducted a field training exercise to deal with sudden large-scale disasters in a remote island to maintain as well as enhance the SDF’s ability to respond to disasters in remote islands and strengthen collaboration with relevant local authorities.

- **Other**
  The SDF worked to enhance their earthquake response capability, for example, by conducting the Nankai Rescue 29, an exercise in preparation for the predicted earthquake.
along the Nankai trough implemented by the GSDF Middle Army in June 2017, and “Big Rescue Azuma 2017,” an exercise in preparation for the same predicted earthquake implemented by the GSDF Eastern Army in the same month.

They also took part in the Ministry of Defense Disaster Management Headquarters drill, drills held by the Government Disaster Management Headquarters on Disaster Prevention Day, and more.\(^\text{37}\)

\(\text{(6) Collaboration with Local Governments and Other Relevant Organizations}\)

It is important for the SDF to strengthen collaboration with local governments and other relevant organizations under normal circumstances for the purpose of conducting disaster relief operations smoothly. For this reason, the SDF implements various measures including: (1) Establishment of the post of Liaison Officer for Civil Protection and Disaster Management (administrative official) at the SDF Provincial Cooperation Offices; (2) Temporary assignment of SDF officers to the department in charge of disaster prevention at the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, and (3) Recommendation of retired SDF personnel with knowledge in disaster prevention in accordance with requests from local governments. As of the end of March 2018, as many as 432 retired SDF personnel are working in disaster prevention and other sections in 291 local governments in 45 prefectures throughout the country. Such cooperation in human resources is a very effective way of strengthening collaboration between the MOD/SDF and local governments, and its efficacy was confirmed through the experiences of the Great East Japan Earthquake and other disasters. In particular, each GSDF regional Army establishes a forum for interaction with senior directors for crisis management and other officials from local governments and share information and exchange opinions to strengthen collaboration with those local governments.

\(\text{Reference 65 (Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government)}\)

\(\text{9 Response to Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.}\)

In the event of natural disasters, insurgencies, and other emergencies overseas, the Minister of Defense can order SDF units to rescue or transport Japanese nationals and other people overseas upon request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to guard, rescue or transport Japanese nationals overseas, etc. and upon subsequent consultations with the Minister, on the basis of Article 84-3 (rescue Japanese nationals overseas, etc.) or Article 84-4 (transport of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.) of the SDF Law. For prompt and, appropriate implementation of these activities regarding Japanese nationals overseas, the SDF is prepared to dispatch its units swiftly. Specifically, the SDF maintains operational readiness, with the GSDF designating a helicopter unit and leading transport unit personnel, the MSDF designating vessels such as transport ships (including ship-based aircraft), and the ASDF designating airlift units and personnel for dispatch.

Since the rescue and transport of Japanese nationals overseas require close coordination among the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, exercises for this operation are carried out constantly. From September to October 2017, the exercise for the transport of Japanese nationals overseas was conducted in Djibouti with the aim of enhancing overseas deployment and activity capabilities and strengthening cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. Forces. Furthermore, in December 2017, the SDF carried out an exercise in Japan for the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas to practice the whole process of the

\(\text{See Reference 65 (Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government)}\)

ASDF personnel carrying out confirmation tasks during training for the rescue Japanese nationals overseas (Thailand) (February 2018)

\(\text{37 In addition, the following drills were conducted and participated in, in 2017: 1) government tabletop drills, 2) the Nuclear Energy Disaster Prevention Drill, 3) the large tsunami disaster prevention drill, 4) the drill for medical treatment activities following a large-scale earthquake, 5) a drill related to the Comprehensive Disaster Prevention Drill of Nine Prefectural and City Governments, 6) a drill related to the joint disaster drill among the Kinki prefectures, 7) a drill related to the Nankai Trough Massive Earthquake Countermeasure Tokai Block Council Joint Disaster Simulation Drill, 8) a drill related to the Nankai Trough Massive Earthquake Countermeasure Kyushu Block Council Joint Disaster Simulation Drill, and 9) comprehensive disaster prevention drills conducted by local governments or other bodies.}\)
actions and coordination with related organizations for the rescue in order to enhance integrated operational capabilities and strengthen coordination with related organizations. In January and February 2018, the MOD/SDF also took the opportunity of the annual multilateral joint exercise “Cobra Gold” taking place in Thailand to conduct an exercise for the series of activities to protect Japanese nationals overseas in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Embassy in Thailand. The staff of the embassy and their family members participated in the exercise as well the collaboration between the MOD/SDF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was strengthened through this exercise.

The MOD/SDF have conducted the transportation of Japanese nationals in four cases. Responding to the kidnapping of foreigners and Japanese in Iraq, 10 Japanese evacuated to Kuwait by an ASDF C-130H plane in April 2004. In January 2013, a government aircraft was deployed to bring seven Japanese nationals and the remains of a further nine nationals back to Japan following the kidnapping in Algeria.

With respect to the terrorist attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh, which occurred in July 2016, the bodies of Japanese victims (seven nationals), their families, and other involved parties were transported to Japan. In relation to the deterioration of the situation in South Sudan in July of the same year, the ASDF transport aircraft C-130H transported four embassy staff from Juba to Djibouti.

**10 ■ Readiness against Invasion**

The NDPG states that only the necessary level of readiness against land invasions involving the mobilization of large ground forces, which was expected primarily during the Cold War, will be retained.

In the event of a military attack on Japan, the SDF will respond with defensive mobilization. Their operations are categorized into (1) operations for aerial air defense operations, (2) defense operations protecting waters around Japan, (3) operations protecting the land, and (4) operations ensuring security in maritime communication, based on the characteristic of their purposes. In executing these operations, the U.S. Forces will assist the operations implemented by the SDF and deploy operations to complement the capabilities of the SDF, including the use of striking power, in line with the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.

**1 Air Defense Operations**

Based on the geographic features of Japan, in that it is surrounded by the sea, and the features of modern wars, it is expected that Japan will be repeatedly hit by rapid and surprise aerial attacks by aircraft and missiles in the case where a full-scale invasion against Japan occurs. Operations for aerial defense can be categorized into comprehensive aerial defense mainly conducted by the GSDF, MSDF or ASDF for their bases or troops. Comprehensive aerial defense aims to deal with enemy aerial attacks at the farthest point from our territory, prohibiting enemies from gaining air superiority and preventing harm to the people and the sovereign territory of Japan. At the same time, efforts will be made to inflict significant damage on the enemy thus making the continuation of their aerial attack difficult.

**2 Defense Operations Protecting Waters Surrounding Japan**

If an armed attack is carried out against Japan, which is an island country, aerial attacks are expected to be combined with attacks against our ships and territory by enemy destroyers. In addition, transport vessels could be deployed to enable massive enemy ground forces to invade our territory. Our defense operations protecting the waters surrounding Japan are composed of measures at sea, measures in waters around our coasts, measures in major straits, and aerial defense above waters around Japan. We need to protect the waters around our country by combining these multiple operations, blocking the invasion of our enemies, and attacking and depleting their combat capabilities.
Fig. III-1-2-16 Example of Air Defense Operations

Flow of air defense operations

1. Detect
2. Identify
3. Intercept
4. Destroy

Notes:
1. Aircraft with airborne warning and control functions in waters distant from its national land and with alternative control capabilities for defense ground environments.
2. Keeping armed fighters on an airborne alert so that they can immediately respond to approaches by enemy aircraft.

Fig. III-1-2-17 Example of the Strategy for Defending Sea Areas Surrounding Japan

Fixed-wing patrol aircraft

Response in the main channel

Airborne warning and control system

Anti-air warfare

Fighters

Enemy aircraft

Enemy-surface vessels

Angle-equipped destroyer

Anti-surface warfare

Patrol helicopter

Fixed-wing patrol aircraft

Response in the waters

Mine deployment warfare

Surface-to-ship missile

Minesweeper

Anti-mine warfare

Response in coastal waters

Anti-submarine warfare

Submarine

Anti-surface warfare

Mine deployment warfare

Part II Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

Chapter 1 Organizations Responsible for the Defense of Japan, and Effective Deterrence and Handling
In order to invade the islands of Japan, invading countries are expected to gain sea and air superiority, followed by the landing of ground troops from the sea and airborne troops from the air.

For invading ground and airborne troops, it tends to be difficult to exert systematic combat capabilities while they are moving on their vessels or aircraft or right before or after they land in our territory. As we protect our land, we need to make best use of this weakness to deal with our enemies between coastal and sea areas or at landing points as much as possible and attack them at an early stage.

Japan depends upon other countries for the supply of much of its resources and food, making maritime transportation routes the lifeblood for securing the foundation of our existence and prosperity. Furthermore, if our country comes under armed attack, etc., maritime transportation routes will be the foundation to maintain continuous warfare capabilities and enable the U.S. Forces to come and assist in the defense of Japan.

In operations to ensure the safety of our maritime transportation, the SDF combines various operations such as anti-sea, anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-mine operations to patrol, defend SDF ships, and protect straits and ports, as well as setting up sea lanes to directly defend Japanese ships, etc. Aerial defense (anti-air operations) for Japanese ships on maritime transportation routes is conducted by destroyers, and support from fighter jets and other aircraft is provided as required.

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40 The act of systematically monitoring a specific area with the purpose of gathering information and intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force.

41 Relatively safe marine areas defined to enable the transportation of ships. The locations and width of sea lanes change depending on the situation of a specific threat.
11 Initiatives Related to the Protection of Civilians

1 Basic Policy on the Protection of Civilians and the Role of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

In March 2005, based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Act, the government established the Basic Guidelines for the Protection of the People. It anticipates four types of armed attack: 1) a land invasion, 2) an attack by guerrillas or special forces, 3) a ballistic missile attack, 4) an air attack and points to consider in taking measures to protect civilians depending on the type of attack.

The MOD/SDF, based on the Civil Protection Act and the Basic Guidelines, have developed a Civil Protection Plan of the MOD and the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency. This plan stipulates that in a situation where Japan is under attack, the SDF would make utmost efforts to fulfill its basic task of repelling the attack. It also states that, within the scope of no hindrance to the task, the SDF would do as much as possible to protect civilians through support on evacuation and disaster relief.

2 Initiatives by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to Facilitate Measures for Civilian Protection

(1) Civilian Protection Training

For sound and expeditious implementation of measures to protect civilians, it is important to conduct training on a regular basis to ensure effective and efficient collaboration with concerned ministries, agencies and local governments. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF hold exercises in cooperation with concerned bodies.

As an example, in November 2017, the central government (the Cabinet Office and the Fire and Disaster Management Agency) and local governments (Nagasaki Prefecture and Unzen City) held a civilian protection exercise in Unzen, Nagasaki Prefecture with the scenario of a ballistic missile launch and landing, one of the anticipated types of armed attack. The GSDF and MSDF as well as Provincial Cooperation Office Nagasaki JSDF participated in the training.

(2) Ongoing Collaboration with Local Governments

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF are establishing liaison departments in Regional Armies and Provincial Cooperation Offices to ensure ongoing and close collaboration with local governments and other bodies. Civilian protection councils are also being established in local governments for comprehensive implementation of measures to protect civilians. Representatives of each branch of the SDF and Regional Defense Bureau officials have been appointed to the councils.

Moreover, local governments are recruiting retired SDF officers to serve as crisis managers. For example, they act as coordinators with the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, as well as developing and implementing joint action plans and exercises.

12 Response to Other Events

1 Military Intelligence Collection

For formulating defense policy accurately in response to the changes in the situation and for operating defense capabilities effectively in dealing with various contingencies, it is necessary to grasp mid- to long-term military trends in the neighboring countries of Japan and to detect the indications of those situations at an early stage. To this end, the MOD/SDF always makes efforts to collect information swiftly and accurately by using various methods.

Some examples of intelligence collection methods used by the MOD/SDF include: (1) collecting, processing and analyzing signals emanating from military communications and electronic weapons in the air over Japanese territory; (2) collecting, interpreting, and analyzing data from various imagery satellites (including Information Gathering Satellite); (3) warning and surveillance activities by ships, aircraft and other vehicles; (4) collecting and organizing a variety of open source information; (5) information exchanges with defense organizations of other nations; and (6) intelligence collection conducted by defense attachés.
and other officials.

As the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, strengthening intelligence capabilities is considered to be an increasingly important issue. For this reason, the MOD is currently promoting comprehensive enhancement of its intelligence capabilities at all stages, including collecting, analyzing, sharing, and securing intelligence. Specifically, the MOD will move forward with the high-level use of geospatial data such as visualization of situations by fusing various information, securing highly competent analysts by such means as integrating and strengthening educational curricula, and enhancing the dispatch posture of defense attachés.

In light of the changing situation in Europe, the dispatch of defense attachés to Finland, which was suspended in 2014, was resumed in February 2018. In March, additional officers were dispatched to the Philippines and Viet Nam, countries located on sea lanes vital to Japan. By the end of 2018, a new dispatch is planned for Chile in view of the importance of collecting strategic information in Pacific Rim countries. Additional attachés are also anticipated to be dispatched to Malaysia, a country located on key sea lanes and with which Japan is increasingly engaged across a range of fields from military exchange to capacity building support, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and to Belgium, where NATO and the EU are headquartered, in view of the importance of ensuring continued robust collaboration, cooperation and mutual security arrangements with Europe.

Fig. III-1-2-19 (Dispatched Defense Attachés)

### Initiative against Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attacks

Electromagnetic pulse attacks place an extreme burden on electronics by generating instantaneous powerful electromagnetic waves through nuclear explosions and other means leading to their malfunctioning or destruction. This type of attack would impact not just the defense field but Japanese people’s lives in general. Led by the Cabinet Secretariat, the MOD, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and others are deliberating the necessary cross-governmental countermeasures.

The MOD and the SDF will advance the multiplication of the communications network required for information sharing among the services, and conduct research on the protection of components against EMP attacks. The FY2018 budget includes funding for research on a component of EMP warhead and EMP protection technology.

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<td><strong>Fig. III-1-2-19</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dispatch destination</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Jointly administered country</strong></td>
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<td><strong>As of April 1, 2018 (67 defense attachés dispatched to 45 embassies and 2 delegations of Japan)</strong></td>
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</table>
In situations where the need and potential for international cooperation in the security and defense areas are increasing unprecedentedly, the MOD/SDF is required to actively contribute to ensuring the security of Japan, the peace and stability of the region and the peace, stability, and prosperity of the entire international community from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. Specifically, the MOD/SDF plans to enhance bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, and more actively promote the United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO), counter-piracy operations, international peace cooperation activities, and other relevant missions as avenues to address global security issues.

### Section 1 向战略国际防务合作

#### 1 Significance and Evolution of Security Cooperation and Dialogue, and Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

The peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region are closely linked to the security of Japan and growing more important for the international community amid global balance of power changes. While nations with large-scale military power concentrate in the region, any framework for regional security cooperation has not been sufficiently institutionalized. As national political, economic and social systems differ widely in the region, visions of security vary from country to country. Furthermore, there have been an increasing number of unilateral actions attempting to change the status quo by coercion without paying respect to existing international law. The issues involving the South China Sea, in particular, cause concerns over the maintenance of the rule of law at sea, freedom of navigation and overflight, and the stability of the Southeast Asian region. Thus, responses to these issues have become an important challenge to ensure the regional stability.

Under such circumstances, strategic international cooperation to promote bilateral and multilateral security cooperation and exchanges more effectively in consideration of the international situation and security challenges has been growingly required for building confidence between the relevant countries and establishing a foundation for their cooperation to resolve regional security issues.

Regarding the form of defense cooperation and exchanges, Japan has long strived to alleviate any conditions of confrontation and tension and foster a collaborative and cooperative atmosphere by building face-to-face relationships through bilateral dialogues and exchanges. In addition, recognizing the increasing need for international cooperation, Japan has recently enhanced bilateral defense relationships from traditional exchanges to deeper cooperation in a phased manner by appropriately combining various means including joint exercises and capacity building assistance, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and the development of institutional frameworks such as the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA).

In addition, multilateral regional security cooperation and dialogue are in the process of evolving from those that focus on dialogue to cooperation that seeks to build regional order. It is important to promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges in a multi-layered, practical manner for improving the regional and global security environment.

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1 On December 16, 2015, at the Meeting of the Ministry of Defense and SDF Senior Personnel, Prime Minister Abe said: “I would like you to advance strategic international defense cooperation, boldly and without being caught up in existing ideas. By doing this, I would like you to play a part in the strategic foreign and security policies that I develop by taking a panoramic perspective of the globe.”

See Reference 40 (Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years)); Reference 42 (Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2016)) Fig. III-2-1-1 (Major Achievements in High-Level Exchanges (June 2017-June 2018)) Fig. III-2-1-2 (Security Dialogues and Defense Exchanges)
Multilateral framework initiatives such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)-Plus and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a security cooperation framework in the Asia-Pacific region, have made steady progress and serve as an important foundation for cooperation and exchange in the areas of security and defense. Japan has contributed to the enhancement of multilateral cooperation in the region by holding the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum and the Tokyo Defense Forum annually.

2 Multilateral Security Framework and Dialogue Initiatives

The ASEAN countries hold the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), a ministerial level meeting between defense authorities in the ASEAN region, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) comprising the ASEAN members and eight non-ASEAN countries including Japan.

The ADMM-Plus is the only official meeting of the defense ministers in the Asia-Pacific region including the countries outside the ASEAN region. Thus, the ADMM-Plus is highly significant from the perspective of encouraging the development and deepening of security and defense cooperation in the region. The MOD/SDF has been participating in and providing support for the meeting. Established under the ministerial meeting in

2 The ARF, a forum aimed at improving the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region through dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues, has been held since 1994. The ARF currently comprises 26 countries and one organization as members and holds various inter-governmental meetings that are attended by both foreign affairs and defense officials to exchange opinions on the regional situation and the security area. The 26 countries are the 10 ASEAN members (Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia (since 1995) and Myanmar (since 1996)), Japan, Australia, Canada, China and India (since 1996), New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia, the United States and Mongolia (since 1998), North Korea (since 2000), Pakistan (since 2004), Timor-Leste (since 2005), Bangladesh (since 2008), and Sri Lanka (since 2007). The organization member is the European Union (EU).

3 It was founded in October 2010. As the non-ASEAN countries, Japan, the United States, Australia, the ROK, India, New Zealand, China and Russia participate in this meeting.

See Reference 40 (Record of Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years); Reference 41 (Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements); Reference 42 (Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2017)); Reference 43 (Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense); Reference 44 (Other Multilateral Security Dialogues)
### Security Dialogues and Defense Exchanges

<table>
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<th>Classification</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>Major initiatives</th>
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</table>
| **Exchange between Defense Ministers and high-level officials** | Improving and reinforcing mutual trust and cooperation through frank exchanges of views on regional situations and national defense policies that are important common interests to both sides, as well as enhancing the following defense exchanges. | - Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan’s Defense Minister and Defense Ministers from other countries  
- Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan’s State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, Chief of Joint Staff, Officers at the GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Chief level |
| **Regular consultation between defense officials** | Paving the way for high-level dialogues and exchanges through continuous and direct exchanges of views between national defense policy-makers, and contributing to the enhancement of mutual trust and cooperation between related countries. | - Consultations between Director-General-level officials, Deputy Director-General-level officials, and their counterparts  
- Dialogue between Japan’s Joint Staff, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, and their counterparts in foreign countries |
| **Exchange between units** | Contributing to the improvement and enhancement of mutual trust and cooperation between related countries through bilateral exercises and events for exchanges. | - Personnel exchanges  
- Mutual visits to vessels of training squadrons and aircraft, and bilateral exercises for search and rescue operations |
| **Exchange of students** | In addition to the original educational purposes, deepening the understanding of other countries’ defense policies and the situation of their defense units, as well as building mutual trust through the promotion of relatively long-term personnel exchange and establishing human networks. | - Mutual acceptance of students  
- National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan National Defense Academy, GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Staff College, Joint Staff College  
- Dispatch of students to overseas military-related organizations |
| **Research exchanges** | Deepening mutual understanding between researchers of both countries through frank exchange of opinions for the maintenance and promotion of defense exchanges. | - Research exchanges between Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies and military-related research organizations in other countries |
| **Security dialogue** | Deepening mutual understanding on the recognition of situations and on security policy among related countries as well as exchanging views and discussing on a wide range of multilateral issues. | - Dialogues at the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)  
- Experts’ Working Groups (Maritime security, Military medicine, Counter-terrorism, Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, Peacekeeping operations, Humanitarian Mine Action, Cyber security  
- Multilateral dialogues sponsored by the Ministry of Defense Japan  
- Japan-ASEAN Defence Vice-Ministerial Forum  
- Tokyo Defense Forum  
- Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacific (MCAP)  
- International Symposium on Security Affairs  
- Multinational Dialogues held by Defense Authorities  
- Asia-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference (CHOD)  
- Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)  
- Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNs)  
- The Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS)  
- Chief of Army’s Exercise (CAEX)  
- Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference (APICC)  
- Multilateral dialogues sponsored by private sectors  
- IASS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)  
- Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)  
- Munich Security Conference  
- Halifax International Security Forum  
- The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)  
- The Fullerton Forum |
| **Multilateral exercises and seminars** | Improving skills and contributing to enhancement of mutual trust and cooperation through multilateral exercises and seminars. | - Personnel exchanges  
- Multilateral exercises and seminars related to disaster relief, minesweeping, and submarine rescue operations |

*In October 2017, Defense Minister Onodera participated in the fourth ADMM-Plus, emphasizing that the international community should be united to exert maximum pressure on North Korea to change its policy to dismantle all nuclear and ballistic missile problems, noting that Japan was implementing joint drills with the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea and other activities contributing to free and open seas.*

The joint declaration released by the ADMM, which was held before the ADMM-Plus, included the promotion of procedures for the Standard Operating procedure (SOP) on the Multi-National Cooperation Centre (MNCC) to be adopted as part of an ASEAN’s SOP. MNCCs aim at maximizing the effectiveness of activities of assisting states’ militaries, and SOP on MNCC was prepared by the EWG on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, in which Japan and Laos served as co-chairs from 2014 to 2017.

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4 Japan has proactively contributed to the EWGs in 2017, participating in the EWG on Humanitarian and Disaster Relief in May and September in the EWG on PKO in May and October, in the EWG on Humanitarian Mine Action in May and October, in the EWG on Cyber Security in July and November, in the EWG on Maritime Security in November, and in the EWG on Military Medicine in December.
Regarding the ARF, in which mainly by diplomatic authorities are engaged, concrete efforts\(^5\) have been made in recent years for specific initiatives in non-traditional security areas such as disaster relief, maritime security, and peacekeeping and peace building. The MOD/SDF has been making active contributions to this forum. At an Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM on MS) that has been held since 2009,\(^6\) for example, Japan has taken leadership in formulating a collection of best practices concerning support for capacity building in the field of maritime security. In the field of disaster relief, the MOD/SDF has dispatched SDF personnel and aircraft to ARF Disaster Relief Exercises (ARF-DiREx) conducted since 2009.

\(^5\) In addition to the Ministers’ meeting at the foreign minister level, the Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) and Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) are held each year, as well as meetings of the Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG on CBM/PD) and the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC). Moreover, since the Ministers’ meeting in 2002, the ARF Defense Officials’ Dialogues (DOD) has been held ahead of the main meeting.

\(^6\) In 2011, Japan, Indonesia and New Zealand co-hosted the third ISM on MS in Tokyo. In 2017, Japan, the Philippines and the United States co-hosted the ninth one in Tokyo.
Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting that took place on the sidelines of the fourth ADMM-Plus meeting in October 2017, Japan and ASEAN shared the recognition that Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation has become even more important as regional security has become diverse and complex. ASEAN welcomed and supported the “Vientiane Vision,” and Japan and ASEAN agreed to further promote Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation based on the vision.

The “Vientiane Vision” is the first of its kind to present an overall picture of the priority areas of the future direction of ASEAN-wide defense cooperation in a transparent manner. Specifically, the vision that urges that cooperation contributing to capacity building in each ASEAN country and the entire ASEAN give priority to three points: (1) Consolidating the order based on the principles of international law; (2) Promoting maritime security; and (3) Coping with increasingly diversifying and complex security issues.

Based on the vision, Japan has promoted practical defense cooperation with ASEAN by combining diverse measures including: (1) promotion of international law to share understanding and experience regarding international law, (2) capacity building assistance, (3) defense equipment and technology cooperation, (4) joint training and exercises, and (5) human resource development and academic exchange. In June 2017, as the first Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation programs, Japan implemented the Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program\(^7\) on Destroyers Izumo and Sazanami combining on-board training and seminars on maritime security, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief (HA/DR) and the Japan-ASEAN Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR) Observation Program, inviting participants from all ASEAN countries and the ASEAN Secretariat. In August and September 2017, Japan conducted a program which included a briefing at the Cabinet Office, a visit to the sight of the joint disaster prevention drills by the nine municipalities in the Kanto region,\(^8\) and a tour in disaster prevention facilities in Tokyo for ASEAN embassy officials in Tokyo. In February 2018, Japan invited ASEAN countries to an observer program for the Japan-U.S.-Australia Cope North Guam 2018 HA/DR Exercise in Guam. In the same month, Japan conducted the Japan-ASEAN Invitation Program on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, inviting participants from all ASEAN countries and the ASEAN Secretariat to promote capacity building, mutual understanding,
the development of human networks through seminars on Japan’s responses to experiences with large-scale disasters, and visits to SDF units.

(2) Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum

Since 2009, the MOD has annually held the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum for the purpose of strengthening bilateral and multilateral relationships through the development of human networks between Japanese and ASEAN vice-ministerial level officials.

In September 2017, the MOD held the ninth Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum in Fukuoka, in which vice-ministerial level officials from all ASEAN countries and the ASEAN Secretariat participated to exchange their views on three themes: (1) ASEAN at its 50th Anniversary: Achievements and Further Enhancement of Unity, (2) Regional Security Situations, and (3) The “Vientiane Vision”: Current Status and Prospects. The Japanese and ASEAN participants recognized various regional common issues such as the situation of the Korean Peninsula and the situation in the East and South China Sea, and agreed that it is important for Japan and ASEAN to respond to these challenges in the closest cooperation.

(3) Tokyo Defense Forum, etc.

The MOD has held the Asia-Pacific Defense Forum (Tokyo Defense Forum) every year since 1996 for senior officials in charge of defense policy (Director-General level officials and general-level officers) from the countries in the region to discuss defense policies of the participating countries and confidence-building measures in the field of defense.

The 22nd Asia-Pacific Defense Forum was held in March 2018 with the participation of 26 Asia-Pacific countries, the United Kingdom, France, the ASEAN Secretariat, the European Union (EU), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for a broad range of discussions on (1) “Situation of the Korean Peninsula,” (2) “Responses to Various Crises,” and (3) “Promotion of Mutual Confidence between Defense Authorities: Communication and Transparency.”

In addition, since 2001, the MOD has invited to Japan key figures who are primarily involved in security policy from countries in the Asia-Pacific region, with the objective of promoting their understanding of Japan’s security and defense policy as well as the current status of the SDF.

(1) International Conferences Hosted by International Organizations

State Minister of Defense Yamamoto attended the United Nations Peacekeeping Defense Ministerial conference held in Vancouver in November 2017 and delivered a speech as representative of Japan that co-sponsored the conference. In the speech, he noted that Japan would make further contributions to the United Nations Project for African Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities and promote initiatives to increase women participants in UN PKO forces.

(2) International Conferences Hosted by Private Organizations

International conferences on security include not only inter-governmental conferences but also meetings organized by private organizations in which various people such as government officials, scholars, and journalists participate to discuss medium- to long-term security issues. Major international conferences organized by private bodies include the Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) hosted by International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Munich Security Conference, one of the most prestigious meetings on security in Europe and the United States.

Japan’s Foreign Minister Kono and State Minister of Defense Yamamoto attended the 54th Munich Security Conference held in February 2018. In addition to dozens of ministers such as foreign and defense ministers from the U.S., the U.K., France, and Russia, heads of more than 10 international organizations participated in the conference to discuss security in Europe, cyber security, nuclear security and other topics.

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9 This is a multilateral conference sponsored by the IISS, a private British think tank, in which defense ministers from various countries participate with the objective of discussing defense-related issues and regional defense cooperation. It has been held in Singapore every year since 2002 and is known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, named after the hotel where it takes place.

10 This is one of the most prestigious international security meetings organized by private bodies in Europe and the United States and has been held annually (usually in February) since 1962. Usual participants in the meeting include officials at the ministerial level from major European countries as well as top leaders, ministers, and lawmakers from countries in the world, and key executives of international organizations.
At the 17th Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018, Defense Minister Onodera delivered a speech at the second plenary session on “De-escalating the North Korean Crisis,” introducing Japan’s efforts to resolve the issue of North Korea as well as expressing Japan’s determination in working towards long-term stability and development at the Indo-Pacific region. The Minister also held bilateral and trilateral meetings with participants from other countries, exchanging opinions on the regional situations including the ones in North Korea, East and South China Sea and defense cooperation among others, and confirming the measures for strengthening future cooperation with those countries.

(3) Service-to-Service Exchange Initiatives

In October 2017, the Chief of Joint Staff participated in a Japan-U.S.-ROK chief of defense conference, agreeing with his counterparts to continue cooperation in addressing common security issues to enhance regional peace and stability.

The GSDF Chief of Staff participated in the 10th Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC) sponsored by the U.S. Army and the ROK Army in September 2017. Through the conference, the GSDF Chief of Staff held talks with his counterparts in other Pacific countries to enhance confidential relations at high levels. At Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK talks, particularly, the GSDF Chief of Staff confirmed the need for enhancing cooperation between Japanese and ROK army branches to secure regional peace and stability.

The MSDF Chief of Staff attended the Regional Seapower Symposium sponsored by the Italian Navy in October 2017. Along with the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations and the First Sea Lord of the British Royal Navy, the MSDF Chief of Staff publicized the importance of cooperation through capacity-building support and Japan’s maritime security initiatives. As naval chiefs from the Group of Seven industrialized countries joined the symposium, the MSDF Chief of Staff held talks with his counterparts from other countries to discuss and share the recognition of what the naval branch should do to maintain maritime order based on the rule of law.

The ASDF Chief of Staff attended the Air Power Conference and the Royal International Air Tattoo air show sponsored by the British Royal Navy at the invitation of the British Chief of Air Staff, attempting to enhance bilateral air force relationship through talks on regional situations, defense cooperation and exchanges, and other topics. In September 2017, the ASDF Chief of Staff visited Hawaii to attend the Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium. At the symposium, the ASDF Chief of Staff held a meeting with his U.S., Australian and Philippine counterparts to deepen mutual understanding and enhance confidential relationship. The ASDF Chief of Staff also participated in the Singapore Air Show in February 2018 and the Air Power Conference, a symposium sponsored by the Australian Air Force, in March 2018, holding talks with his counterparts from other participating countries to enhance bilateral relations.

3 Promoting Capacity Building Assistance and Other Practical Multilateral Security Cooperation Initiatives

The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe. As any country cannot maintain its peace and stability on its own, it is indispensable for the international community to unite to resolve global issues. Under such a circumstance, capacity building assistance especially in the security and defense-related areas is increasingly becoming important. For this reason, defense authorities of Southeast Asian and other countries request the MOD to provide capacity building assistance and express expectation for cooperation at various opportunities such as international conferences and bilateral meetings. The MOD/SDF is working to further strengthen and deepen defense cooperation and exchanges by combining capacity building assistance and other diverse practical means.

1 Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building Assistance

(1) Objectives of Implementing Capacity Building Assistance

Providing assistance for capacity building has the following objectives: (1) enabling recipient countries to contribute to improving the global security environment; (2) strengthening bilateral relationships with recipient countries; (3) strengthening the relationships with other donor countries such as the United States and Australia; and (4) promoting Japan’s efforts to work proactively and independently to realize regional peace and stability to gain trust in the MOD/SDF and Japan as a whole. Capacity building assistance initiatives also facilitate the improvement of SDF capabilities.
(2) Specific Activities
Japan launched capacity building assistance programs in 2012 to provide assistance in various areas such as HA/DR, peacekeeping operations, maritime security, and international law to 15 countries and one organization mainly in the Asia-Pacific region.

MOD/SDF capacity building assistance activities include the dispatch of MOD/SDF officials to foreign countries for long- to short-term programs. Long-term dispatches include lectures and practical training for large-scale systematic human resources development. Short-term dispatches include seminar lectures by SDF personnel with relevant knowledge. In addition, the MOD/SDF invites foreign officials to Japan to observe and experience SDF education and training operations.

Under long-term dispatch programs, the MOD/SDF has provided technical assistance regarding engineering activities such as road construction in Mongolia, which builds on previous assistance, engineering assistance for the Harii Hamutuk training program sponsored by Australian forces in Timor-Leste, and support for a military band from January to March 2018 in Papua New Guinea, which is serving as the chair of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 2018.

Short-term dispatch programs included human resource development seminars on air rescue, aviation medicine and cyber security areas in Vietnam, land survey in Cambodia, seminars and practical trainings for HA/DR and aviation meteorology areas in Myanmar, support for the military band in Papua New Guinea, HA/DR in Malaysia, and in Laos, and seminars for search and rescue in Sri Lanka.

Under the invitation program, the MOD/SDF implemented training of Philippine personnel for ship maintenance, training of Papua New Guinea personnel for a military band, training of Uzbekistani personnel for military medicine, and training of personnel from all ASEAN countries and the ASEAN Secretariat for the HA/DR area.

From January to March and from October to December in 2017, the MOD/SDF implemented a program for supporting the enhancement of disaster response capacity for Djibouti forces, including education on how to operate engineering equipment such as hydraulic shovels, graders, and dozers, in order to strengthen the bilateral relationship.

(3) Cooperation with Partner Countries
In efforts to stabilize the regional security environment, Japan’s cooperation with other donor countries is essential. In particular, Japan’s capacity building cooperation with the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom is considered a priority.

The joint statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in April 2015 states that the two countries would strengthen their continued close coordination on cooperation including capacity building assistance to realize peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. Furthermore, at a Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in October 2017, Defense Minister Onodera expressed that Japan would proceed with capacity building initiatives for ASEAN based on the Vientiane Vision. The two ministers then agreed to promote defense cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, including capacity building assistance.

Under a Japan-Australia personnel exchange program, the MOD has accepted an official from the Australian Department of Defense to its International Policy Division’s Capacity Building Office each for three periods: from July to September 2013, from February
2015 to August 2016, and from August 2016 to June 2018. In exchange, the MOD dispatched an official to the Australian Department of Defense each for three periods: three months from July 2015, one year from August 2016, and an ongoing period from April 2016.

In November 2017, Japan and Australia held the first working group on capacity building assistance. Japan has also cooperated with the United States and Australia in capacity building assistance to Timor-Leste. The SDF and the U.S. forces participated in the Harii Hamutuk capacity building assistance program sponsored by the Australian forces in Timor-Leste in October in 2015, 2016 and 2017, providing technical guidance on engineering including construction for engineering units of the Timor-Leste forces.

In the joint statement issued for the third Japan-UK Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting in December 2017, Japan and the United Kingdom welcomed progress of coordination of capacity building in developing countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and Africa, and shared the view to use a coordination mechanism for future joint capacity building in strategic priorities such as maritime security and safety, counter-terrorism, cyber security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, promotion of quality infrastructure, gender equality, and demining.

It is important for Japan and other countries providing capacity building assistance to conduct such assistance effectively and efficiently by closely coordinating with and mutually complementing each other.

2 Pacific Partnership

The Pacific Partnership (PP), which started in 2007, is an initiative in which naval vessels, primarily those from the U.S. Navy, visit countries in the Asia-Pacific region to provide medical care, conduct facility repair activities, and engage in cultural exchange to strengthen cooperation between countries participating in the initiative and facilitate international peace cooperation activities through cooperation with governments, military forces, international organizations, and NGOs in those countries.

### Past Capacity Building Assistance Activities

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**Note:**
- : Japan’s own projects.
- : Projects implemented in cooperation with other countries providing assistance, Green letters: ASEAN member states
Security (WPS) international engagement conference in Indonesia. It also sent the Osumi transport ship and medical personnel to Vietnam for search and rescue training and cultural exchange.

3 Multilateral Joint Training

(1) Significance of Multilateral Joint Training in the Asia-Pacific Region

In the Asia-Pacific region, the MOD/SDF has actively participated in multilateral joint training in non-traditional security fields, such as HA/DR and Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), in addition to traditional training conducted in preparation for combat situations. It is important to participate in such multilateral training so as not only to raise the skill level of the SDF, but also to create a cooperative platform with relevant countries. In light of this perspective, the MOD/SDF intends to continue to actively engage in such training.

See Reference 46 (Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years))

(2) Initiatives for Multilateral Joint Exercises

a. Participation in and Hosting of Multilateral Joint Exercises


In June 2017, the MSDF implemented the first Pacific Guardian multilateral joint exercise with the Canadian and New Zealand navies in waters south of Japan’s Shikoku Island. In July 2017, the MSDF implemented the Japan-U.S.-India Malabar 2017 exercise in waters east of India, sponsoring the annual trilateral naval drill for the first time. In November 2017, the MSDF conducted a joint exercise with the U.S. and Indian navies in the Sea of Japan.

In December 2017, the ASDF took part in the Christmas Drop Japan-U.S.-Australia joint humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise in the Federal States of Micronesia.

VOICE

Working as an Australian Department of Defence Exchange Official in the Japan Ministry of Defence

Daniel Golding, Exchange Official, Capacity Building Assistance Office, International Policy Division

Since August 2016, I have been working as the Australian Department of Defence Exchange Official within International Policy Division in the Japan Ministry of Defense. I have been contributing to the planning and implementation of the JMOD’s regional capacity building programs and engagement with security partners such as the United States and Australia. For example, I implemented a new capacity building program to assist ASEAN member states improve their humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) capability. I also took part in coordinating the Australian Prime Minister’s visit to JGSDF Narashino Training Area and I joined the Prime Minister’s office call with Defense Minister Onodera in January 2018. I greatly appreciate the opportunities provided through this exchange program to contribute to the continued enhancement of the Japan-Australia Special Strategic Partnership and to work with and learn from my JMOD and JSDF colleagues.

Briefing participants of the Japan-ASEAN Invitation Program on HA/DR (February 2018)
b. Multilateral Tabletop Exercises, etc.
In September 2017, the SDF participated in Exercise Equateur 2017, a multilateral exercise led by French Armed forces stationed on New Caledonia, implementing a multilateral command post exercise for island disaster relief operations.

The GSDF has hosted the Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacific (MCAP) every year since 2002 as part of its multilateral cooperation, inviting officers from relevant countries. In November 2017, participants from 11 countries and the United Nations World Food Program reviewed the past MCAP results to share knowledge about humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and conducted training for the Japan-U.S. Tomodachi Rescue Exercise (TREX) for disaster prevention.

4 Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In promoting cooperation and exchanges in the area of security, it is necessary to strengthen them based on a combination of the most optimal means while taking into account the situations of cooperation partner countries and their relationship with Japan. Therefore, not only comprehensive efforts within multilateral frameworks but also bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges are important.

1 Japan-Australia Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia
Australia is a “Special Strategic Partner” for Japan in the Asia-Pacific region as both Japan and Australia are allied with the United States and share not only universal values but also strategic stakes and interests. In recent years, particularly, Japan and Australia as responsible countries in the Asia-Pacific region are strengthening mutual cooperation focused on areas such as HA/DR activities and cooperation in capacity building assistance.

Defense cooperation between Japan and Australia started with cooperation in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The two countries have built up cooperation since then through the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, and various international disaster relief operations. When the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred in March 2011, the Australian Defense Force (ADF) dispatched three out of its four transport aircraft to Japan to engage in a disaster relief mission. Cooperation between the two countries has deepened and is becoming more practical.

In the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), for example, Japan accepted two ADF officers dispatched to engage in UNMISS operations from January to May 2017 into the Japanese camp.

Against the background of the deepening defense cooperation between Japan and Australia, the two countries in March 2007 announced the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, Japan’s first such joint declaration focusing on security with a country other than the United States. Japan and Australia have also developed the foundation for cooperation such as the Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), the Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement, and the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.

Regarding the Japan-Australia ACSA, a new agreement for expanding the situations in which the provision of goods and services is possible was signed by the two countries in January 2017, followed by the establishment of relevant laws and regulations. The new agreement was concluded in light of the expansion of cases in which the SDF and the ADF conduct operations together due to the further advances in their defense cooperation and exchanges, and the development of the Legislation for Peace and Security in Japan. The agreement was approved by the National Diet in April 2017 and put into force in September 2017. Relevant domestic laws were developed then.

Japan will continue deepening its cooperative relationship with Australia, a “Special Strategic Partner” that has both intention and ability to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region jointly with Japan.

(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In October 2017, Defense Minister Onodera held a defense ministerial meeting with Australian Defense Minister Payne on the occasion of the Fourth ADMM-Plus meeting. The two ministers then agreed that Japan and Australia would closely cooperate in deterring provocative actions by North Korea and enhance cooperation with relevant countries in regard to the South China Sea situation through capacity building assistance and joint exercises while securing their regional presence along with the United States. They also agreed to further develop Japan-Australia defense cooperation and continue coordination on a bilateral agreement to reciprocally improve procedures to facilitate the two countries’ joint actions.

At a Japan-Australia Summit Meeting in January 2018, the two countries’ top leaders ordered their respective defense ministers to pursue deeper and wider bilateral defense cooperation including further cooperation regarding exercises, operations, capacity building, the exchange of visits between maritime/ground/air force units, defense equipment, and science and technology.

Regarding bilateral service-to-service cooperation and exchanges, the MSDF dispatched P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft to the Townsville Base in September 2017 to participate in Exercise Pacific Protector 2017 that Australia hosted under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In the same month, Air Marshal Gavin Davies, Chief of Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force, visited Japan and agreed with the ASDF Chief of Staff to form a sister squadron relationship between the two countries’ aerial refueling and transport squadrons. In October 2017, the MSDF conducted the Japan-Australia Trident joint exercise with the Australian Navy. In the same month, an Australian Air Force C-130J transport squadron visited Japan for interaction with its ASDF counterpart squadron. In November 2017, C-2 transport aircraft of the ASDF called at Australia’s Richmond Air Force Base for a service-to-service exchange. Through such service-to-service cooperation and exchanges, the two countries have tried to further promote mutual understanding and confidential relations.

(3) Cooperative Relationship between Japan, the United States, and Australia

Japan and Australia are both allied with the United States and share universal values. They cooperate closely to resolve various challenges the Asia-Pacific region and the international community are facing. In order to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of such cooperation, it is important Japan and Australia to proactively promote trilateral cooperation with the United States, whose presence is indispensable for regional peace and stability.

The Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF), a Director General-level meeting among the three countries of Japan, the United States, and Australia, has met nine times since April 2007.

At an SDCF meeting held in October 2016, the three countries’ defense authorities signed a Trilateral Information Sharing Agreement to expedite their sharing of classified information for cooperative activities regarding joint exercises and operations among the three
countries. They plan to utilize this agreement to further deepen their collaboration.

On the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018, Defense Minister Onodera held a Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis and Australian Defense Minister Payne. The three ministers agreed on the importance of maintaining free and open maritime order. They also agreed to draft a strategic action agenda that would provide a long-term vision for trilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. With regard to the regional situation, the ministers agreed to remain united to support for the diplomatic efforts to achieve complete, verifiable and irreversible disarmament of its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missile programs. They welcomed sustained international cooperation to deter, disrupt, and ultimately eliminate illicit activities, such as illegal ship-to-ship transfers. In addition, they confirmed that they would continue to share concerns about the ongoing situation in South China Sea situation, and underscored the shared commitment to upholding lawful uses of sea, including the South China Sea.

Japan, the United States and Australia have also carried out joint exercises by service branch. In May 2018, for example, the GSDF participated in the Southern Jackaroo joint exercise with the U.S. and Australian forces in Australia.

In September 2017, the MSDF implemented a Japan-U.S.-Australia joint exercise (an anti-submarine warfare drill) with two submarines, each from the United States and Australia in waters south of Japan’s Honshu Island. In June 2017, the three countries and Canada conducted a joint cruising exercise in the South China Sea.

The ASDF participated in the Christmas Drop Japan-U.S.-Australia joint humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise in the Federal States of Micronesia. In February 2018, the ASDF cohosted a Japan-U.S.-Australia joint exercise and a trilateral humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise (Exercise Corp North Guam 2018) in Guam. Through these various training and exercise opportunities among Japan, the United States and Australia, Japan continues efforts to improve mutual understanding and interoperability.

Commentary

Operation Christmas Drop

Training names are often attached to joint training with other countries. The names are fundamentally based on the training purpose and content. As the name suggests, the “Operation Christmas Drop” (official name: Japan-U.S.-Australia joint training for humanitarian assistance and disaster rescue in the Federated States of Micronesia and other countries) is a training for dropping supplies around Christmas (in December). Supplies (daily goods, etc.) dropped in the training are given to people living in the Federated States of Micronesia as assistance. These goods are donations mainly gathered by the U.S. Air Force and the philanthropic organizations in the U.S. Good providers and training participants package the items together ahead of the drop. Participating aircraft from the various countries are named “Santa No. ???” during the training period and embark toward the destination. Additionally, the aircraft fly at a low altitude of about 100m for the actual drop and this lets training participants see people waiting for the goods waving from the ground. The drop hence feels like more than a simple provision of goods and truly a mission to “deliver gifts.”

Unlike training conducted at training grounds, the Operation Christmas Drop requires a decision on the drop point based on local circumstances through watching resident movements on genuine outlying islands. It is a valuable opportunity that provides training very similar to actual mission conditions. The “Santa” mission also raises the motivation of members and contributes to significant training results.
Chapter 2
Active Promotion of Security Cooperation

Part 2 Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

2 Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

(1) Significance of Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

While Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have difficult bilateral issues, it is important for them to advance their relations in future oriented manner.

Both Japan and the ROK confront wide-ranging complex security challenges including not only the nuclear and missile issue of North Korea, but also counter-terrorism measures, peacekeeping operations, responses to large-scale natural disasters, counter-piracy measures, and maritime security. In order to effectively address such security challenges, the two countries should carry out not just exchanges for increasing mutual understanding and confidence building but also more broad-ranging concrete defense cooperation.

(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

a. Overview

Since 2015, Japan’s defense cooperation and exchanges with the ROK have been implemented at various levels including ministerial and other high levels and unit levels.

In dealing with North Korea’s nuclear and missile issue, particularly, Japan should strengthen cooperation with the ROK in the security and defense areas. Following North Korea’s ballistic missile launches in July and September 2017, Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial teleconferences were carried out swiftly on July 6 and September 6. The Japanese and ROK Defense Ministers then agreed that the two countries should be united to address the North Korean nuclear and missile issue. In this respect, they gave high ratings to past Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation and agreed to continue close cooperation.

In October 2017, Defense Minister Onodera held talks with ROK Minister of National Defense Song Young Moo on the occasion of the Fourth ADMM-Plus meeting. They reaffirmed that Japan and the ROK would continue to closely cooperate in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear and missile issue. As for bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, they agreed to steadily implement specific cooperation and exchange measures such as personnel exchanges and the exchange of ship and aircraft visits to advance cooperation. Based on the minister-level agreement, an MSDF training squadron made a port call to Pyeongtaek in October 2017 before an ROK naval training squadron visited Yokosuka in December 2017. Including such exchange of visits, Japan-ROK defense cooperation and exchanges have steadily been accumulated. On the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018, Defense Ministers Onodera and Song met again and welcomed positive moves toward the comprehensive resolution of pending issues involving North Korea. They also confirmed that their countries would cooperate with the international community including the United States in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions to lead North Korea to take further concrete actions. The ministers welcomed steady Japan-ROK defense cooperation and exchanges and agreed to promote bilateral cooperation in a wide range of areas to enhance the foundation for bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges.

b. Japan-ROK General Security of Military Information Agreement

Based on the Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement Concerning the Nuclear and Missile Threats Posed by North Korea signed in December 2014, the defense authorities in Japan and the ROK have exchanged and shared confidential information regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles via the United States. In light of the increasingly serious situation surrounding North Korea with its frequently repeated ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests, Japan and the ROK concluded the General Security of Military Information Agreement in November 2016 to further promote bilateral cooperation. This agreement will serve as a framework to appropriately protect classified information shared between the Japanese and ROK Governments and is expected to promote smoother and swifter information exchanges between the two governments.

See Reference 48 (Recent Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and Exchanges (Past Three Years))

(3) Japan-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Relationship

Since Japan, the United States, and the ROK share common interests pertaining to the peace and stability of this region, it is important for the three countries to seize opportunities to promote close cooperation in addressing various security issues including those regarding North Korea.

Japan, the United States, and the ROK have conducted a Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue. In response to growing North Korean threats, however, Defense Minister Onodera held a Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis and ROK Minister of National Defense Song on the occasion of the Fourth ADMM-Plus meeting in October 2017 to share their recognition. On the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018, Defense Minister Onodera had another Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting with U.S. Defense Minister...
Secretary Mattis and ROK Minister of National Defense Song, where they agreed to support diplomatic efforts for the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and continue enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. They also welcomed sustained international cooperation to deter, disrupt and ultimately eliminate illicit activities such as illegal ship-to-ship transfers.

At the working level, the three countries have coordinated with each other while closely sharing information through such opportunities as Director-General and Director level meetings, video conferences, and chief-of-staff level meetings based on the framework of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT). For example, they implemented a Director-General level DTT video teleconference in response to North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile tests from July 2017. They then reaffirmed that they should continuously enhance their security cooperation and coordination to deter and respond to North Korean threats and agreed to cooperate with other countries in continuing to exert pressure on North Korea to take concrete actions to terminate the nuclear and ballistic missile program.

At the chief of staff level, the Chief of Joint Staff participated in Japan-U.S.-ROK meetings in October 2017 and May 2018, agreeing with his U.S. and ROK counterparts to continue further cooperation on common security issues to enhance regional peace and stability.

The Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperative relationship has been transforming into a more substantive relationship. For example, the three countries conducted ballistic missile information sharing exercises in waters around Japan in October and December 2017. Using various opportunities, Japan, the United States and the ROK are required to enhance their security cooperation in various areas in the future.

(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India

India is growing more influential against a backdrop of the world’s second largest population, its high economic growth and latent economic power. Located in the center of sea lanes that connect Japan with the Middle East and Africa, India is an extremely important country geopolitically for Japan. Furthermore, Japan and India share universal values as well as common interests in the peace, stability, and prosperity of Asia and the world and have established the “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.” In this context, Japan and India have also been strengthening their relations in the area of security in recent years.

Defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and India have steadily deepened since October 2008 when the two countries signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India. Meetings and consultations at various levels such as the ministerial and Chief of Staff levels, as well as service-to-service exchanges including bilateral and multilateral exercises, have been regularly conducted. Moreover, the two countries signed the Memorandum on Japan-India Defense Cooperation and Exchanges in September 2014 and saw the conclusion of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of India concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology as well as the General Security of Military Information Agreement in December 2015, further solidifying the institutional basis of Japan-India defense cooperation and exchanges. These agreements have strengthened the relationship between the two partners that are capable of dealing with regional and global issues, as well as the foundation of this partnership.

(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

At the Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting in September 2017, the two ministers reaffirmed the evolution and expansion of bilateral defense cooperation and agreed to pursue opportunities for the promotion of Japan-India cooperation and exchanges by deepening and advancing the Japan-U.S.-India exercise Malabar and by building on bilateral exchanges in a wide range of areas including observer participation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercises. As for the ground service branch, the ministers agreed to proactively conduct exchanges in the areas of peacekeeping operations, counter-terrorism, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in which the two countries have strong interests. Regarding the air service branch, they reaffirmed their intentions to pursue further cooperation and exchange opportunities through the bilateral exchange of aircraft visits.

Recent service-to-service exchanges included the first participation by the Chief of Staff Joint Staff in the Raisina Dialogue, a multilateral forum held in India in January 2018. In March 2018, the Chief of Staff Joint Staff visited India for talks with Admiral Sunil Lamba, Chairman of the Chief of Staff Committee of India. They then agreed on the need for deepening Japan-India defense exchanges.

Japan and India have proactively conducted service-to-service exchanges through exercises and training.
Since July 2017, for example, the MSDF and the Indian Navy conducted seven joint exercises including those involving patrol aircraft. In December 2017, ASDF helicopter crew members visited an Air Force Squadrons in India.

Opportunities for Japan-U.S.-India trilateral exercises have also increased. For example, the MSDF implemented the Malabar 2017 exercise with the U.S. and Indian navies in eastern waters of India in July 2017, hosting the first annual trilateral naval drill. In November 2017, a Japan-U.S.-India joint naval exercise took place in the Sea of Japan.

See Reference 49 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (Past Three Years))

**4 Japan-China Defense Exchanges and Cooperation**

**(1) Significance of Defense Exchanges and Cooperation with China**

A stable relation between Japan and China is an essential factor for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. From broad and medium- to long-term perspectives, it is necessary for both countries to strive to build and enhance the “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests with China” in all areas, including security. In the security area, Japan continues to encourage China to play a responsible, constructive role for the sake of regional peace, stability and prosperity, to comply with international norms of behavior, and to improve transparency with regard to its advancing military capabilities in the context of its rapidly increasing defense budget. As part of such efforts, Japan
continues defense exchanges to improve the transparency of Chinese military and security policies and promote measures such as the development of a framework to avert or prevent unexpected incidents.

(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchanges

Japan-China defense exchanges stagnated following the Japanese government’s acquisition of ownership of the three Senkaku Islands (Uotsuri Island, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island) in September 2012, but have gradually resumed since the latter half of 2014.

In November 2015, Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting was held for the first time in four years and five months on the margins of the ADMM-Plus meeting. Then Japanese Defense Minister Nakatani and Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan held a frank exchange of views regarding various issues between the two countries and shared the recognition that it would be important for Japan and China to develop their defense exchanges. On the occasion of the ADMM-Plus meeting in October 2017, Defense Minister Onodera exchanged opinions with then Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wan Quan as well.

In March 2015, the 13th Japan-China Security Dialogue took place in Tokyo, with the two countries’ diplomatic and defense authorities participating. It was the first such meeting in four years. The 14th one came in Beijing in November 2016 and the 15th in Tokyo in October 2017.

Japanese and Chinese defense authorities have also participated in the Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs. The latest meetings of the consultation included the seventh one in Fukuoka in June 2017, the eighth one in Shanghai in December 2017 and the ninth one in Sendai in April 2018.

In February 2018, Japan’s Sasakawa Peace Foundation and China’s Ministry of National Defense agreed to resume the Japan-China field-grade officer exchange program for the first time in six years. In April 2018, a Chinese delegation led by Major General Ci Guowei, Deputy Chief of the Office for International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of National Defense, paid a courtesy call on Defense Minister Onodera.

In efforts to build a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,” Japan and China must strive to promote confidential relations and mutual understanding through dialogue at various levels in various areas and must proactively step up concrete cooperation in non-traditional security areas, such as counter-piracy measures.

(3) “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China”

At Japan-China Summit Meetings in January and April 2007, then Japanese Prime Minister Abe and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao agreed to develop a mechanism for communications, particularly maritime communications, between the two countries’ defense authorities. Based on the agreement, their defense authorities held the first Joint Working Group Meeting on the mechanism in April 2008 and accumulated talks. At the third Joint Working Group Meeting in June 2012, they agreed on the basic objectives and composition of the mechanism.

From the fourth Joint Working Group Meeting in January 2015, diplomatic authorities of both countries joined the negotiations.

After the eighth meeting of the Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs in December 2017 and the seventh Joint Working Group Meeting in April 2018, Japanese and Chinese defense authorities signed the memorandum on the mechanism in the presence of Japanese Prime Minister Abe and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang on the occasion of the Japan-China Summit Meeting in Tokyo in May 2018, and the operation of this mechanism commenced on June 8, 2018.

The “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China” has been developed (1) to promote mutual understanding and confidence between Japan and China and to enhance bilateral defense cooperation, (2) to avoid unexpected collision, and (3) to prevent unforeseen circumstances in the sea and air from developing into military clashes or political or diplomatic issues. The mechanism’s main components include (1) annual and expert meetings between the two countries’ defense authorities, (2) a hotline between Japanese and Chinese defense authorities, and (3) on scene communication measures between vessels and aircrafts of the SDF and the People’s Liberation Army.

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13 Memorandum on the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Japanese Ministry of Defense and the Chinese Ministry of Defense

Defense of Japan 362
The signing of the memorandum after a decade of negotiations is an important step for promoting mutual understanding and confidence between Japan and China and very significant for avoiding unexpected collision. It is important for the mechanism to be operated in a manner to contribute to building confidential relations between Japanese and Chinese defense authorities.

See Reference 50 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years))

5 Japan-Russia Defense Exchanges and Cooperation

(1) Significance of Defense Exchanges and Cooperation with Russia

Given that Russia is a key security player in the Asia-Pacific region and an important country neighboring Japan, it is very important for Japan to promote confidential relations with Russia through bilateral defense exchanges. As Japan-Russia relations have continuously been developing in a wide range of areas, the MOD/SDF has continuously conducted various dialogues with Russian defense authorities according to the Memorandum on Japan-Russia Defense Exchanges signed in 1999 (revised in 2006), annual meetings based on the Japan-Russia Agreement on Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, and joint search and rescue exercises.

The Government of Japan deals with the relationships with Russia appropriately while emphasizing the solidarity of the G7 (Group of Seven), taking the Ukrainian situation and other factors into account. At the same time, it is important to maintain constant contacts with Russia, as one of Japan’s neighbors, at the working level to avoid unforeseen circumstances or unnecessary conflicts. The MOD considers these points in a comprehensive manner and advances defense exchanges with Russia accordingly.

(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchanges

At the Japan-Russia Summit Meeting in April 2013, the two leaders affirmed the importance of expanding cooperation between Japan and Russia in the field of security and defense and agreed to set up the Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting, where the two countries’ defense and foreign ministers participate. At the first Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting in November 2013, the two countries agreed to conduct ground service unit exchanges and the mutual dispatch of exercise observers on a regular basis, and joint exercises of counter-piracy units of the MSDF and Russian Navy in the Gulf of Aden, as well as the regular Japan-Russia Cyber Security Meeting.

At the Japan-Russia Summit Meeting in December 2016, the two leaders welcomed dialogues between the national security councils of both countries as well as defense exchanges and agreed to continue these dialogues and exchanges going forward.

At the second Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting in March 2017, the two countries exchanged opinions regarding the regional situations among others, and agreed to continue conducting defense exchanges such as working-level meetings, unit-to-unit exchanges, and search and rescue exercises. The Japanese side protested against the activities of the Russian Armed Forces to enhance armaments in the Far East, including the deployment of surface-to-ship missiles on the Northern Territories and the deployment of divisions on islands that may contain the Four Northern Islands, expressing that these activities conflicted with Japan’s stance that the Northern territory is an inherent part of the territory of Japan and were regrettable.

In part of recent major Japan-Russia military exchanges, Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, visited Japan and met with the SDF Chief of Joint Staff in December 2017. They exchanged opinions on matters of interest to the two countries regarding security and agreed on the need for Japan-Russia defense exchanges. In November 2017, Oleg Salyukov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, visited Japan for talks with the GSDF Chief of Staff, to build their confidential relations.

As for exercises and drills, the MSDF and the Russian Navy conducted a search and rescue exercise in waters off Vladivostok in November 2017.

See Reference 51 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years))

14 Official title: Japan-Russia Agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea beyond territorial waters and the air space above them
ASEAN member states continue to experience rapid economic growth and are garnering international attention for their potential as a growth center that is open to the world. Such ASEAN member states and Japan have been traditional partners with a history of exchanges and a close economic relationship over the past nearly 50 years.

ASEAN member states, located in geopolitically important areas occupying strategic points on Japanese sea lanes, are also playing an important role in ensuring the peace and prosperity of Japan as well as the entire region. Therefore, it is important for Japan to strengthen cooperation in the security and defense areas and enhance confidential relations with ASEAN member states.

Based on this principle, Japan and ASEAN member states have been working to foster trust and deepen mutual understanding through high-level and working-level exchanges and promoting effective cooperation such as capacity building cooperation, joint exercises, and defense equipment and technology cooperation. In addition to these bilateral cooperation efforts, Japan has strengthened cooperation under multilateral frameworks such as the ADMM-Plus and ARF. At the second ASEAN-Japan Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting in Laos in November 2016, Defense Minister Inada announced the “Vientiane Vision” as a guideline for the Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation going forward. The vision provided an overall picture of the priority areas of the future direction of ASEAN-wide defense cooperation in a transparent manner for the first time and was welcomed by all ASEAN member states.

From the viewpoint of actively promoting such bilateral and multilateral cooperation and stabilizing the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, Japan strives to strengthen defense cooperation and exchanges with ASEAN member states.

(1) Indonesia
Indonesia conducts active defense cooperation and exchanges with Japan. During the Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting in March 2015, Prime Minister Abe and President Joko agreed to strengthen their Strategic Partnership underpinned by sea and democracy and reaffirmed their intention to hold a Japan-Indonesia “2+2” Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting. At the first “2+2” Meeting held in Tokyo in December of the same year, the two countries agreed to start negotiations on an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technology, actively participate in a multilateral naval exercise (Komodo 2016), and further advance capacity building assistance. The Joint Statement of a Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting in January 2017 confirmed the importance of continuing dialogues between their foreign and defense authorities at various levels, including the regular Japan-Indonesia “2+2” Meeting and foreign and defense authorities’ meetings, in order to further promote close cooperation in the security and defense fields. Similarly, at the working level, exchanges at various levels have been carried out, including consultations between the diplomatic and defense authorities of both countries, consultations between the respective defense authorities, and various educational and academic exchanges.

Furthermore, Japan and Indonesia have also been cooperating through capacity building assistance in oceanography, international maritime law, and international aviation law, and conducted the second seminar on international maritime law for the Ministry of Defense of Indonesia and the Indonesian Navy in March 2018.

(2) Vietnam
With Vietnam, which is a coastal country facing the South China Sea with a population of approximately 90 million, Japan has developed cooperation and exchanges between their defense authorities. At the Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting held in March 2014, the two leaders agreed to elevate the relationship between the two countries to an “Extensive Strategic Partnership.” At the Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting in May 2018, both countries confirmed that they would strengthen cooperation in the security and defense areas.

At the Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting in April 2018, Defense Minister Onodera and Defense Minister of Vietnam Lich signed the “Joint Vision Statement on Japan-Vietnam Defense Cooperation,” which serves as a guideline of future Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation and exchanges. In the meeting, concerning the regional situation, both ministers called for self-restraint on militarization and other unilateral actions to change the status quo made in the South China Sea, and agreed on the importance of the peaceful conflict resolutions based on international law and the conclusion of an effective Code Of Conduct in the South China Sea at an early time. At the Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial
Meeting held on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018, both ministers agreed to promote defense cooperation and exchanges in specific areas such as U.N. peacekeeping operations and capacity building assistance and shared the recognition of the South China Sea situation. In service-to-service exchanges between Japan and Vietnam, the GSDF Chief of Staff held talks with Chief of General Staff Giang and other senior Vietnamese military officers in Vietnam in January 2018, and they agreed to cooperate in Vietnam’s participation in the U.N. peacekeeping operations. In April 2016, an MSDF vessel visited the Cam Ranh Bay International Port. In April 2017 the MSDF destroyers Izumo and Sazanami participating in the multilateral exercise “Pacific Partnership 2017” called at the Cam Ranh Bay International Port for medical and facility repairing activities deepening bilateral defense exchanges. In December 2017, an ASDF U-4 utility support aircraft flew to the Da Nang International Airport for an unit exchange. In April 2018, Le Huy Vinh, Commander of Air Defense and Air Force, Vietnam, visited Japan and held talks with the ASDF Chief of Staff. They agreed to enhance the Japan-Vietnam Service-to-Service relationship.

As for capacity building assistance program to Vietnam, the ASDF implemented programs on air rescue in June 2017, on aviation medicine in November 2017, and on cybersecurity in December 2017.

It remains vital that Japan and Vietnam strengthen their relationship in order to achieve more concrete, practical cooperation, based on the memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges.

(3) Singapore

In December 2009, Singapore became the first country in Southeast Asia to sign a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges with Japan. Since then, cooperative relationship is progressing steadily based on the memorandum. Singapore and Japan have so far conducted 15 regular meetings between their defense authorities. Moreover, the two countries actively conduct high-level defense exchanges as Japan’s Minister of Defense attends the Shangri-La Dialogue organized by the IISS almost every year to explain Japan’s security policy. In May 2018, Defense Minister of Singapore Ng Eng Hen visited Japan for a Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting, where defense ministers of both countries exchanged opinions on bilateral and Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation and the regional situation covering the South China Sea. In June 2018 when Defense Minister of Japan Onodera visited Singapore to attend the Shangri-La Dialogue, he paid a courtesy call on Singaporean Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean and exchanged opinions on the North Korean issue, as well as bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges.

As for recent major service-to-service exchanges, Melvyn Ong, then Chief of the Singaporean Army, visited Japan and held talks with the GSDF Chief of Staff in October 2017, reaffirming that each ground service would work to strengthen their relationship. In November 2017, ASDF C-2 transport aircraft visited the Paya Lebar Air Base in Singapore for unit-to-unit exchange. In February 2018, the ASDF Chief of Staff attended the Singapore Air Show and exchanged opinions with his foreign counterparts.

Additionally, MSDF vessels have made port calls in Singapore during international cooperation operations such as UN peacekeeping operations and counter-piracy activities. Also, service-to-service exchanges have been actively conducted.

(4) The Philippines

Between Japan and the Philippines, mutual visits by naval vessels, working-level exchanges including consultations between their defense authorities, and service-to-service exchanges have been frequently conducted along with high-level exchanges. At the Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting held in January 2015, the two ministers signed a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges. This memorandum shows the intention of the two countries to conduct cooperation in non-traditional security areas such as maritime security, in addition to defense ministerial meetings and vice-ministerial consultations on a regular basis, reciprocal visits between the SDF Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the each SDF Service, and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commander of each service, and participation in training and exercises. At the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting in November 2015, the two leaders of both countries reached a consensus in principle on the agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology, which was signed in February 2016.

At the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting in September 2016, Prime Minister Abe and President Duterte agreed on the transfer of MSDF TC-90 training aircraft to the Philippines in order to enhance its capabilities in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, transportation, and maritime situational awareness. At the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting in January 2017, the two countries agreed that they would promote defense cooperation in various fields such as capacity building.
assistance, defense equipment cooperation, and training and exercises.

At the Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting in October 2017, after the transfer of two MSDF TC-90 training aircraft to the Philippine Navy, Defense Minister Onodera announced to Defense Minister of Philippines Lorenzana that the transfer of TC-90 would be changed from lease to grant. In March 2018, the remaining three TC-90 aircraft were transferred to the Philippine Navy at Naval Base Heracleo Alano, Sangley Point, Cavite City, in the presence of Japanese Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Fukuda and Defense Minister of Philippines Lorenzana. The grant of five TC-90 aircraft including the two transferred earlier was then completed. This transfer covers training for Philippine Navy pilots and maintenance support for Philippine Navy maintenance personnel.

In June 2018, Minister Onodera had the Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting with Minister Lorenzana on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue. At the meeting, they exchanged opinions on the North Korea issue. Minister Lorenzana thanked Japan for supporting the Philippines’ stance on the South China Sea. Minister Onodera informed Minister Lorenzana of Japan’s decision to grant parts of GSDF UH-1H utility helicopters which are no longer used in GSDF to the Philippines as requested early. The two ministers agreed to promote Japan-Philippines defense cooperation in a wide range of areas including joint training, and defense equipment and technology cooperation.

As for recent service-to-service cooperation and exchanges, a GSDF unit participated in the U.S.-Philippines joint exercise Kamandag conducted on the Philippine island of Luzon in September and October 2017. In November 2017, the MSDF Chief of Staff visited the Philippines for high-level exchanges including a meeting with Philippine Navy Commander Mercado. In June, September and November 2017 and in February 2018, MSDF aircraft and ships conducted search and rescue, and other friendship exercises with the Philippine Navy to deepen mutual understanding and promote friendship. In June 2017, President Duterte became the first foreign leader to board MSDF destroyer Izumo that called at the Port of Subic Bay. Japan’s defense cooperation with the Philippines is deepening steadily.

(5) Thailand

With Thailand, Japan has a long history of defense cooperation and exchanges based on the traditionally good relationship between the two countries, including the commencement of the dispatch of Defense Attachés and consultations between their defense authorities at an early stage. As for the acceptance of foreign students at the National Defense Academy, a Thai student became the first one to be accepted in 1958. Since then, Thailand has sent the largest cumulative number of students to the academy.

In November 2017, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited Thailand, where he reviewed an international defense equipment exhibition the “Defense and Security 2017” and agreed with the Thai side to promote Japan-Thailand defense equipment and technology cooperation including an early conclusion of the agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology.

Since 2005, the MOD/SDF, has been participating in the multilateral military exercise Cobra Gold cohosted by the United States and Thailand. In Cobra Gold 2018, in January and February 2018, an exercise for rescue of Japanese nationals overseas was conducted in addition to a command post exercise. Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Fukuda reviewed the Cobra Gold 2018.

Concerning recent major service-to-service exchanges, MSDF destroyer Onami participated in the 50th Anniversary of ASEAN International Fleet Review 2017. On this occasion, the MSDF Chief of Staff met with representatives from Australia, India, Malaysia, Peru, the ROK, Singapore and Vietnam to promote mutual understanding and friendship. In November 2017, an ASDF C-2 transport aircraft visited the U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Airfield. In January 2018, an ASDF KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft called at the Don Mueang Air Force Base. Taking these opportunities, ASDF had unit-to-unit exchanges with their Thai counterparts. In May 2018, Srisuwan, Chief of Defense Forces, Royal Thai Armed Forces, visited Japan for talks with State Minister of Defense Yamamoto and the Chief of Joint Staff. In the same month, Royal Thai Air Force Commander Air Chief Marshal John Runswang, a graduate from Japan’s National Defense Academy and Air Staff College, visited Japan for having talks with the ASDF Chief of Staff and paying a courtesy call to Defense Minister Onodera, and agreed with Defense Minister Onodera and the ASDF Chief of Staff to enhance Japan-Thailand relations.

As for capacity building assistance programs, ASDF has implemented seminars on aviation safety and international aviation law for Thailand since 2016. In 2018, GSDF conducted a seminar for the Royal Thai Army planning to send a unit to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), which covered the characteristics of the UNMISS Command, engineering
missions, security, and other matters. Through the seminar, the SDF shared its experiences and the lessons learnt with the Royal Thai Army over five years of deployment to UNMISS.

(6) Cambodia

In 1992, Cambodia became the first country to which Japan sent an SDF unit for UN peacekeeping operations. As indicated by Japan’s capacity building assistance for Cambodia since 2013 and other programs, defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries have made steady progress. At the Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting in December 2013, the bilateral relationship was upgraded to “strategic partnership.” After the summit, then Defense Minister Onodera signed the Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of National Defense of the Kingdom of Cambodia. In September 2017, Defense Minister Onodera held a ministerial meeting with Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Tea Banh. They talked on the regional situation and gave high appreciation to progress in the Japan-Cambodia defense cooperation, including capacity-building assistance and service-to-service exchanges.

As for capacity building assistance programs to Cambodia, GSDF has implemented practical training for road construction and other programs. In July 2017, the GSDF conducted an education program for the engineering unit of the Royal Cambodian Forces to train instructors on land survey.

(7) Myanmar

Japan has been promoting exchanges with Myanmar since Myanmar’s transition from military rule to democratic government in March 2011, including the first visit to the country by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense and the invitation of Myanmar to participate in multilateral conferences hosted by Japan. In November 2013, the two countries’ defense authorities held their first consultation in Myanmar’s capital of Naypyidaw, exchanged opinions on how to proceed with their future defense exchanges...
and agreeing to further promote exchanges. In November 2014, then Defense Minister Eto held a meeting with then Defense Minister Wai Lwin of Myanmar and confirmed their intention to promote defense exchanges, while visiting Myanmar for the Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Roundtable Meeting chaired by Myanmar.

In August 2017, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar Defense Services, visited Japan at the invitation of the Nippon Foundation. He paid a courtesy call on Prime Minister Abe and met with the Chief of Joint Staff to exchange views on the promotion of defense cooperation and other matters. Under the Japan-Myanmar Military Officials Exchange Program sponsored by the Nippon Foundation since 2014, general officers in Myanmar have been invited to visit SDF facilities in Japan. In September 2017, 10 senior Myanmar military officials visited Japan under the program, paying a courtesy call on Defense Minister Onodera.

In part of recent major Japan-Russia military exchanges, the GSDF Chief of Staff visited Myanmar in January 2018 for the first time, exchanging views with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar Defense Services, and other Myanmar military officials on the regional situation, and defense cooperation and exchanges. They confirmed that they would attempt to enhance bilateral relations.

As for recent capacity building assistance, the ASDF implemented support for Myanmar regarding aviation meteorology in July and October 2017. In February 2018, the GSDF conducted a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief seminar for Myanmar.

(8) Laos
Defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Laos have made gradual progress since 2011, when the Defense Attaché to Vietnam was appointed concurrently as Defense Attaché to Laos. In April 2013, the National Defense Academy accepted students from Laos for the first time. In August 2013, the first Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting was held. Since 2014, Japan and Laos have served as co-chairs of the EWG on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief of the ADMM-Plus meeting, while the relationship between the two countries’ defense authorities has made significant strides through cooperation under multilateral frameworks. In November 2016, then Defense Minister Inada became the first Japanese defense minister to visit Laos, exchanging views with Minister of National Defense Lieutenant General Chansamone regarding policies for further defense cooperation such as high-level exchanges and capacity building assistance and agreeing with him to promote defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. In March 2018, the first Lao students at Japan’s National Defense Academy graduated.

With regard to recent capacity building assistance, the GSDF provided practical training on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief for the Lao People’s Army engineering and medical units in November 2017.

(9) Malaysia
Japan signed the agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology with Malaysia in April 2018.

As for capacity building assistance programs to Malaysia, GSDF implemented a seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in Malaysia in November 2017.

(10) Brunei
Regarding Japan’s relations with Brunei, during the Second ADMM-Plus meeting held in Brunei in August 2013, then Defense Minister Onodera held talks with Brunei’s Minister of Energy Mohammad Yasmin Umar and exchanged views on the ADMM-Plus initiatives. At the working level, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited Brunei in February 2018 for talks with Permanent Secretary Rahman of the Ministry of Defense on defense cooperation and exchanges. In February 2018, Japan implemented capacity building assistance programs to Brunei for humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and search and rescue, which contributed bilateral relations.

Defense Exchanges and Cooperation with Other Asia-Pacific Countries

(1) New Zealand
With New Zealand, a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges was signed in August 2013. During a Summit Meeting in July 2014, the two countries agreed to conduct studies on an ACSA.

As for recent service-to-service exchanges, Lieutenant General Timothy Keating, Chief of the New Zealand Defense Force, visited Japan in July 2017 for talks with the Chief of Joint Staff on international and regional situations. They confirmed that Japan and New
Zealand would continue to closely cooperate. In June 2017, the New Zealand Navy’s frigate Te Kaha visited Japan to participate in the Pacific Guardian multilateral exercise along with Japanese and Canadian ships. In November 2017, an ASDF C-2 transport aircraft squadron visited Christ Church International Airport for a unit-to-unit exchange. In May 2018, Vice-Marshall Tony Davies, Chief of Royal New Zealand Air Force visited Japan, agreeing with the ASDF Chief of Staff that Japanese and New Zealand air services should enhance their relationship.

(2) Mongolia
Following the signing of a memorandum on Japan-Mongolia defense cooperation and exchanges in January 2012, Japan and Mongolia have promoted high-level exchanges and worked to strengthen cooperation through capacity building assistance. At the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2015, a Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting was held for an exchange of opinions regarding bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. At a meeting between the Japanese Chief of Joint Staff and the Mongolian Chief of Defense in October of the same year, agreement was reached to promote security cooperation in the area of peacekeeping operations.

As for major service-to-service exchanges, the GSDF had sent observers to the Khaan Quest multilateral exercise, co-hosted by the United States and Mongolia since 2006, and has dispatched a unit to the exercise since 2015 to maintain and improve capabilities for U.N. peacekeeping operations and enhance mutual understanding and confidential relations among the participating countries.

(3) Timor-Leste
In June 2016, for the first time in 14 years, then Defense Minister Nakatani visited Timor-Leste to which the SDF had dispatched a unit for UN peacekeeping operations to support the country’s independence since 2002. Minister Nakatani and Minister Cristovão agreed that the two countries would continue and deepen exchanges between defense authorities through capacity building assistance, the dispatch of students from Timor-Leste to Japan’s National Defense Academy and other schools, and port calls by MSDF vessels.

As for capacity building assistance, Japan has continued educational assistance to the Timor-Leste Defense Force for vehicle maintenance since 2012. The GSDF has participated in Exercise Harii Hamutuk sponsored by the Australian forces in Timor-Leste since 2015, providing technical guidance on civil engineering.

(4) Sri Lanka
In July 2017, Sri Lankan State Minister of Defense Ruwan Wijewardene exchanged views with then Japanese Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyazawa on future defense cooperation and boarded the MSDF destroyer Izumo that was at the Port of Colombo. When the Sri Lankan minister visited Japan in November 2017, he paid a courtesy call on Defense Minister Onodera, exchanging views on cooperation in the improvement of maritime surveillance capabilities and in search and rescue operations.

In part of recent service-to-service exchanges, the Chief of Joint Staff during his first visit to Sri Lanka met with President Sirisena, sharing the recognition of the security environment and exchanging views on the need for deepening Japan-Sri Lanka defense exchanges. The MSDF implemented goodwill exercises in waters close to Sri Lanka in July, August and December 2017 to deepen mutual understanding, friendship, and goodwill.

In April 2018, the MSDF destroyer Akebono in the 30th anti-piracy operations unit called at the Port of Hambantota, providing a capacity building assistance seminar for the Sri Lankan Navy regarding search and rescue.

Europe shares universal values with Japan and plays a central role in working to address common challenges to global security, focusing primarily on non-traditional security areas such as counter-terrorism and combating piracy, as well as international peace cooperation activities. In this regard, promoting defense cooperation and exchanges with European countries provides the foundations for Japan to become actively involved in dealing with these challenges and is important for both Japan and Europe.
The United Kingdom, being a major power that has influence not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world, has historically maintained close relations with Japan. On the security front, Japan shares the same strategic interests as the United Kingdom, as both countries are important allies of the United States. Given this relationship, it is extremely important for Japan to promote cooperation with the United Kingdom by working together on global issues such as international peace cooperation activities, counter-terrorism and counter-piracy operations and by exchanging information on regional situations.

With regard to Japan’s relationship with the United Kingdom, the Memorandum on Defense Cooperation was signed in June 2012. Following this, Agreement on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology came into effect in July 2013 and the Japan-U.K. Information Security Agreement entered into force in January 2014, leading to the development of a foundation for defense equipment and technology cooperation as well as information sharing between the two countries.

At the Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting in May 2014, prime ministers of both countries agreed to hold a Japan-U.K. “2+2” Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting and begin negotiations on the ACSA in order to enhance bilateral cooperation in the security field. Following this, the first “2+2” Meeting was held in January 2015. At the meeting, the two countries agreed to strengthen cooperation in the security and defense fields and shared strategic situational awareness. During the second “2+2” Meeting in January 2016, the two countries agreed to promote joint exercise, cooperate in defense equipment and technology areas and in capacity building assistance to Southeast Asian countries and confirmed that they would aim to conclude ACSA as early as possible. In January 2017, the Japan-U.K. ACSA was signed. After the approval by Japan’s National Diet in April 2017, ACSA entered into force in August. At the same time, relevant domestic laws were developed.

The effectuation of the Japan-U.K. ACSA enables the two countries to implement the mutual provision of goods and services such as water, food, fuel and transportation between the SDF and the British Armed Forces through unified procedures in joint exercises and large-scale disaster relief operations, further facilitating and strengthening the Japan-U.K. strategic partnership. The Japan-U.K. Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, issued during the Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting in August 2017, stipulated that the two countries agreed to develop an action plan with specific measures relating to bilateral security cooperation between the relevant authorities. At the third Japan-U.K. “2+2” Meeting in December 2017, the two countries included the bilateral ground exercises, British naval ships’ deployment to the Asia-Pacific region and joint exercises with the SDF, and prototyping of new air-to-air missiles as a joint research into a joint statement, demonstrating that bilateral security cooperation was steadily deepening.

In June 2018, Defense Minister Onodera conducted the Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting with Defense Minister Williamson on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue. Based on the joint statement at the Japan-U.K. “2+2” Meeting in December 2017, the two ministers agreed to continuously promote Japan-U.K. defense cooperation including the expansion of British warships into the Asia-Pacific region, the joint exercise between Japanese and British ground services planned for autumn 2018, and other service-to-service exchanges and joint exercises. They also exchanged views on defense equipment and technology and agreed to continue defense equipment and technology cooperation, including a Japan-U.K. joint study on potential cooperation regarding

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15 The ACSA applies to the following activities: (1) joint exercises; (2) UN peacekeeping operations; (3) internationally coordinated peace and security operations; (4) humanitarian international relief operations; (5) operations to cope with large-scale disasters; (6) protection measures for or transportation of nationals of either party or others for their evacuation from overseas; (7) communication and coordination or other routine activities; and (8) any other activity in which the provision of supplies and services is permitted under the laws and regulations of the respective countries.
future fighter aircraft. On the North Korea issue, Defense Minister Onodera stated that cooperation between the British Navy and the MSDF in warning and surveillance activities against offshore North Korean ship-to-ship cargo transfers of goods were significant for securing the effectiveness of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, and that such activities had come to lead North Korea to change policies. As Defense Minister Onodera mentioned the need for continuing sanctions on North Korea, Defense Minister Williamson said the United Kingdom would support the Japanese stance.

In part of recent working-level exchanges, the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense visited the United Kingdom in February 2018 and paid a courtesy call to Frederick Curzon, Minister of State for Defense and Deputy Leader of the House of Lords. In part of recent service-to-service exchanges, the Chief of Joint Staff visited the United Kingdom in March 2018 for talks with Peach, Chief of the Defense Staff of the British Armed Forces. They exchanged views on situational awareness and Japan-U.K. defense cooperation and exchanges. In November 2017, the GSDF Chief of Staff visited the United Kingdom and exchanged views with General Carter, Chief of the General Staff of the British Army, on Japan-U.K. cooperation in amphibian operations. In April 2018, the MSDF conducted a joint exercise with the British Navy frigate HMS Sutherland in waters south of Kanto region in Japan. In July 2017, ASDF KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft participated in the Royal International Air Tattoo (RIAT) air show and conducted unit exchanges including a joint goodwill exercise with Typhoon fighters and Voyager aerial refueling aircraft. In December 2017, three ASDF fighter pilots visited the Coningsby Air Force Base for a sister squadron exchange.

(2) France

France is a major power that has influence not only in Europe and Africa, but also in the world. It historically has had a close relationship with Japan and is positioned as Japan’s special partner.

**VOICE**

**Participation in the Royal International Air Tattoo (RIAT)**

404th Tactical Airlift Squadron, 1st Tactical Airlift Wing (Komaki, Aichi), Captain, Yu Shigeoka

I took part in the Royal International Air Tattoo (RIAT) at RAF Fairford, United Kingdom, as a KC-767 crew member. RIAT is the world’s largest airshow and 246 military and commercial aircraft from 26 countries participated in the event. The Air Self-Defense Force KC-767 on static display attracted many visitors both civil and military and there was a long queue to catch a glimpse of it. We could see high interest in the Air Self-Defense Force by the visitors’ enthusiastic look on their faces staring at on-board panel description. In addition, the Air Self-Defense Force taiko drummers performed beside the tanker every day. The taiko performance was a huge success with the audience gathering around the drummers. Some came to see our performance several times and called for encores. What surprised me most was that more visitors than I had imagined visited the UK all the way from Japan just to see the airshow. It was a precious and worthwhile experience that I was involved in the event of a global attention to promote the Air-Self Defense Force and to help deepen the understanding of its roles. I am proud and honored to have this opportunity and hope to join the airshow again in the future.

![ASDF personnel showing taiko (drum) performance at the RIAT.](image_url)
The first Japan-France “2+2” Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting was held in Paris in January 2014, followed by the visit of French Minister of Defense Le Drian to Japan in July of the same year when the Statement of Intent to promote defense cooperation and exchanges was signed. At the second Japan-France “2+2” Meeting held in Tokyo in March 2015, the two countries underscored the threat of terrorism, and confirmed that they would strengthen bilateral intelligence exchanges and cooperation in Africa and the Middle East in fighting against terrorism in cooperation with the international community and enhance bilateral cooperation in the areas of defense equipment and technology and maritime security. Then, the two countries signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. At the third Japan-France “2+2” Meeting in Paris in January 2017, the two countries confirmed that they would: (1) commence negotiations in the Japan-France ACSA; (2) materialize cooperation regarding unmanned underwater vehicles for mine detection, as the first concrete cooperation project in the defense equipment and technology field; and (3) promote joint exercises. The two countries also expressed their expectations for fleshing out their cooperation in the field of space including the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) system. On this basis, in March 2017, the second meeting of the Japan-France Comprehensive Dialogue on Space was held. In the meeting, the “Technical arrangement concerning information sharing regarding SSA between the relevant authority in Japan and the Minister of Defense of the French Republic” was signed to strengthen the Japan-France SSA cooperation, and the two countries agreed to promote specific cooperation.

At the Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting and the fourth bilateral “2+2” Meeting in January 2018, the ministers welcomed the broad agreement in Japan-France ACSA negotiations and agreed to quickly kick-off the cooperative research on the feasibility study for mine countermeasure technology, the first bilateral defense cooperation project. They also welcomed a French naval fleet’s visit to Japan as part of the Jeanne d’Arc 2017 task group and the implementation of the ARC 2017, the first Japan-France-UK-U.S. joint exercise in waters around Japan, Guam, and the Tinian Islands, and agreed to enhance cooperation in capacity building assistance to developing countries. At the Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting in January 2018, the ministers confirmed the abovementioned points and agreed to cooperate in the early conclusion of the bilateral ACSA.

In June 2018, Defense Minister Onodera and his French counterpart Minister for the Armed Forces Parly, held a Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue. They exchanged views on the regional situation covering the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea, and agreed to take various opportunities to implement defense exchanges and cooperation, including joint exercises in line with the agreement at the Japan-France “2+2” Meeting in January 2018. They also confirmed the quick kick-off of the feasibility study for mine countermeasure technology, the first bilateral defense cooperation project, and agreed to deepen bilateral collaboration, including defense equipment and technology cooperation through discussions of further cooperation in the area.

As for recent service-to-service exchanges, the SDF has participated in the Equateur humanitarian and disaster relief exercises hosted by the French Armed forces stationed in New Caledonia since 2014, and took part in Exercise Equateur 17 in September of the year. In November 2017, the GSDF Chief of Staff visited France and exchanged views with French Army Chief of Staff Bosser on the enhancement of future Japan-France defense cooperation and exchanges, based on the achievements of the Japan-France-UK-U.S. joint exercise and others. In February 2018, the SDF implemented a joint exercise with the French naval frigate Vendémiaire in waters south of eastern Japan.

(3) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

When Prime Minister Abe visited Europe in May 2014, he held a meeting with then North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Rasmussen at NATO Headquarters and signed the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP).

Based on the IPCP, female GSDF personnel were dispatched to NATO Headquarters for the first time in December 2014 as part of the Japan-NATO cooperation in the field of women, peace and security. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF has participated in the annual meeting of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP) since 2015.
In January 2017, then Defense Minister Inada visited NATO Headquarters in Brussels for the first time in 10 years and held a meeting with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg. In the meeting, they confirmed the importance of Japan-NATO cooperation in dealing with today’s security issues and agreed to promote cooperation in various fields, such as maritime security including counter-piracy operations, cybersecurity, HA/DR, and mainstreaming women, peace and security. On the dispatch of a Japanese liaison officer to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), which had been proposed by the NATO side, then Defense Minister Inada in the meeting announced Japan’s intention to dispatch a liaison officer. The liaison officer was assigned to SHAPE in February 2017.

In October 2017, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg on his visit to Japan exchanged opinions with Defense Minister Onodera on Japan-NATO defense cooperation and exchanges, and the regional situation and reviewed the MSDF destroyer Teruzuki, attempting to promote the NATO side’s understanding on Japan’s maritime security initiatives. In June 2017, General Denis Mercier, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, visited Japan for the first time. In March 2018, the Chief of Joint Staff visited NATO Headquarters in Belgium and exchanged views with General Petr Pavel, Chairman of the Military Committee, on situational awareness and Japan-NATO defense cooperation and exchanges.

(4) Other European Countries
With Germany, Japan signed the agreement on defense equipment and technology transfer in July 2017. In the same month, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited Germany for the first Japan-Germany defense vice-ministerial strategic dialogue, indicating progress in high-level and other bilateral exchanges.

In June 2018, Defense Minister Onodera held a Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting with German counterpart Von der Leyen on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue. They welcomed progress in Japan-Germany defense cooperation in various areas and agreed to enhance bilateral cooperation through NATO, particularly in the cybersecurity area.

Japan and Italy have been promoting institutional development for facilitating defense cooperation and exchanges, including the entry into force of the Japan-Italy Information Security Agreement in June 2016 and the signing of the Agreement on the Transfer of the Defense Equipment and Technology in May 2017. In the same month, Minister of Defense Pinotti visited Japan to hold a defense ministerial meeting, where the Japanese and Italian ministers agreed to deepen collaboration between the two countries’ defense authorities through cooperation in various areas including equipment and technology.

Spanish Defense Minister De Cospedal visited Japan in January 2018 for a Japan-Spain defense ministerial meeting, where the Japanese and Spanish ministers agreed to further enhance the relationship between the two countries’ defense authorities based on the memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges signed in November 2014.

The Netherlands’ Minister of Defense Hennis-Plasschaert visited Japan in December 2016 for a Japan-Netherlands defense ministerial meeting, where the two ministers signed a memorandum regarding defense cooperation and exchanges.

With Scandinavian and Baltic countries, Japan has tried to enhance relations through high-level and other exchanges, including Military-Military Talks at the director-general level with Finland in September 2017 and with Sweden in October 2017. In January 2018, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited Sweden and agreed with Swedish Defense Minister Hultqvist to further promote defense exchanges and cooperation in areas such as defense equipment and technology.

During his Europe tour in January 2018, Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Ratas confirmed that the two countries will continue to advance cooperation in the cyber domain, utilizing opportunities such as Japan-Estonia Cyber Dialogue, and welcomed the approval of Japan’s participation in the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) located in Estonia. In Latvia, the Japanese leader agreed with Prime Minister Kucinski to further deepen Japan-Latvia talks on security through such opportunities during Latvian Defense Minister Raimonds Bergmanis’s visit to Japan.

In May 2018, then Defense Minister Onodera visited Finland and Estonia. In Finland, Defense Minister Onodera held talks with his Finnish counterpart Niinistö, offering to deepen bilateral defense cooperation in a wide range of areas while citing an MSDF training squadron’s planned
visit to Helsinki in August 2018. They agreed to further enhance bilateral cooperation through consultations between their defense authorities and exchanges between defense squadrons. In Estonia, Defense Minister Onodera met his Estonian counterpart Luik to offer the further development of bilateral cooperation through the dispatch of MOD personnel to the CCDCOE. The two ministers agreed to further strengthen bilateral cooperation in fields including cyberdefense.

Between Japan and Canada, high-level exchanges, talks between defense authorities, and other exchanges have been conducted, with the Japan-Canada ACSA signed in April 2018. Most recently, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto held talks with Canadian Defense Minister Sajjan. They then welcomed progress in Japan-Canada defense cooperation, as indicated by the KAEDEX Japan-Canada joint training in July 2017 and the Canadian Navy submarine Chicoutimi’s visit to Yokosuka in November 2017, and agreed to further promote the defense cooperation. In February 2018, General Vance, Chief of the Defense Staff of the Canadian Armed Forces, visited Japan for talks with the Chief of Joint Staff. They shared the recognition of the security environment and agreed to promote Japan-Canada defense exchanges.

As for recent major service-to-service exchanges, the Canadian Navy sent its ships Winnipeg and Ottawa to Japan in July 2017 and its submarine Chicoutimi from October to December 2017. They and the MSDF participated in the Pacific Guardian Japan-Canada-New Zealand joint exercise in June 2017, a Japan-U.S.-Canada joint exercise in November 2017 and the KAEDEX Japan-Canada joint exercise in July and December 2017. In July 2017, a Canadian rescue and transport aircraft squadron visited the ASDF’s Komaki Base for a squadron-to-squadron exchange. In the same month, ASDF KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft visited Canada’s Comox Air Force Base for another squadron-to-squadron exchange. In September 2017, the ASDF Chief of Staff visited Canada for a high-level exchange with Lieutenant-General Hood, Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force.

In March 2015, Colombia’s Minister of Defense Pinzón visited Japan for the first Japan-Colombia Defense Ministerial Meeting. In December 2016, the Japanese and Colombian ministers signed a memorandum on defense exchanges and agreed to proceed with specific exchanges going forward.

From April to May 2018, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited Brazil for talks with Brazilian Defense Minister Silva e Luna. They exchanged views on bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, and the regional situation and agreed to sign a bilateral memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges at an early date and further develop bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges including high-level exchanges and collaboration in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. State Minister of Defense Yamamoto also encouraged Japanese Brazilian military personnel active in the Brazilian Armed Forces.

Kazakhstan and Japan implemented their first deputy defense minister-level exchange in July 2017 when the Japanese Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kobayashi met with Kazakhstan’s Deputy Defense Minister Skakov in Kazakhstan. They signed a memorandum between the Ministries of Defense of Japan and Kazakhstan.

From Uzbekistan, Japan invited three army medicine experts to training at the MOD and the National Defense Medical College in September 2017 under the first capacity building assistance program for that country. They received briefing on the development of medical officers, the outline of the National Defense Medical College, and viewed education and research achievements of the National Defense Medical College Research Institute.

Japan has also proceeded with defense cooperation and exchanges with Middle Eastern countries. With Djibouti, the only country where an overseas SDF base is located, Japan has been cooperating in counter-piracy operations. During his visit to Djibouti in September 2017, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto paid a courtesy call on Defense Minister Bahdon and thanked the Djiboutian government for its support for the SDF operations base. They exchanged views on such topics as Japan’s support for enhancing disaster response capacity in Djibouti.

With Turkey, Japan’s Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense signed a Statement of Intent to promote defense exchanges and cooperation at his talks with then Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defense Ümit Dündar in July 2012. In March 2013, then Minister of National Defense Yılmaz visited Japan for a Japan-Turkey Defense Ministerial Meeting. At this meeting, the ministers of the two countries agreed to hold a meeting between their defense authorities at the earliest possible
date and promote a variety of defense exchanges.

Between Japan and Jordan, a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges was signed when Jordanian King Abdullah II visited Japan in October 2016. In July 2017, then Defense Minister Inada held talks with Jordanian Prime Minister and Defense Minister Mulki and signed a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges. They appreciated the memorandum as it paved the way for Japan-Jordan defense exchanges and cooperation and agreed to promote concrete defense cooperation initiatives.

With regard to the relations with Egypt, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited the country in September 2017, marking the first high-level visit from the Japan Ministry of Defense. At the meeting between the State Minister and Lieutenant General Mahmoud Ibrahim Mahmoud Hegazy, Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces, welcomed progress in bilateral defense exchanges and agreed to continue exchanges and cooperation in the future. In part of recent major service-to-service exchanges, the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces visited Japan in August 2017 and held a meeting with the Chief of Joint Staff, where they agreed to further developing bilateral defense exchanges.

From Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense, visited Japan in September 2014 to hold a Japan-Saudi Arabia Defense Ministerial Meeting and sign a memorandum on defense exchanges.

Prime Minister Abe visited the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in May 2013, followed by visits to Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar in August of the same year. During the visits, he shared the view with the leaders of the countries on the need for promoting cooperation with those countries in the security and defense fields. Japan signed a memorandum on defense exchanges with Bahrain in April 2012 and with Qatar in February 2015. In November 2017, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Ono visited the UAE to hold dialogues with Vice-Minister of Defence Dhahiri and other officials, and observed the Dubai Air Show 2017. ASDF C-2 transport aircraft, which was on operational training overseas, participated in the show, and a special booth for C-2 aircraft was set up for the first time by the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency. In May 2018, UAE Minister of State for Defense Affairs Bowardi visited Japan and agreed with State Minister of Defense Yamamoto to further promote specific defense cooperation initiatives, based on the Memorandum on

With Oman, Prime Minister Abe held a meeting with Sultan Qaboos bin Said in January 2014 and they agreed to enhance cooperation and promote defense exchanges in the field of maritime security, including counter-piracy measures to ensure the security and safety of sea-lanes.

**VOICE**

My Experience from Japan-ASEAN Ship-Rider Cooperation Program

*Indonesia Navy*

**Lieutenant Junior Grade, Muhammad Alfa Desdianto**

As the representative of Indonesia Navy, getting the chance to board on JS Izumo was an invaluable experience for me because it was a grand opportunity to take a tour on the ship and meet with other participants from different parts of ASEAN countries, while having discussions and exchanging ideas that would help broaden the networks and strengthen our friendships.

Throughout the week of the program, I was fortunate enough to get the chance to participate in various attractive activities such as Search and Rescue exercise and Ship Handling on board. There were also many advanced weapons systems provided in the ship which I was glad I had the opportunity to see. I have learned another valuable experience during the visits. The ship crews provided excellent technical services and hospitality to the participants, this has given me the insight into the roles and responsibilities I have to apply later when having guests to visit our ships. Also, even though there were cultural differences among the participants, everyone was very considerate and respected each other well. They were very open to any suggestions and ideas, therefore created a good atmosphere in the environment.

Overall, I was very happy with the amount of things I have learned and experiences from being the participant in the Japan-ASEAN Ship-Rider Cooperation Program on JS Izumo. I hope to be able to get another chance to participate in other international events like this as the representative of Indonesia.
Section 2 Ensuring Maritime Security

For Japan, a major maritime state, strengthening order on the seas based on such fundamental principles as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as ensuring safe maritime transport, is a foundation of its peace and prosperity, which is extremely important. In cooperation with the relevant countries, the MOD/SDF engages in anti-piracy operations, as well as promotes various initiatives including assistance for capacity building in this field for coastal states, and making the most of various opportunities to enhance joint training and exercises in waters other than those in the immediate vicinity of Japan.

1 Counter-Piracy Operations

Piracy is a grave threat to public safety and order on the seas. In particular, for Japan, which depends on maritime transportation to import most of the resources and food necessary for its survival and prosperity as a maritime nation, it is an important issue that cannot be ignored.

1 Basic Approach

The Japan Coast Guard (JCG), one of the law enforcement agencies in Japan, is primarily responsible for coping with piracy. However, in cases where it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the JCG to cope with piracy by itself, the SDF is to take action as well.

2 Circumstances Surrounding Incidents of Piracy and Initiatives by the International Community

For Japan and the international community, the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden are extremely important, connecting Europe and the Middle East with East Asia. Regarding the waters in this area, successive United Nations Security Council resolutions were adopted, such as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816, which was adopted in June 2008 in response to the frequent occurrence of and rapid increase in the piracy incidents with the purpose of acquiring ransoms by detaining hostages caused by pirates, who are armed with machine guns and rocket launchers.

These resolutions have requested that various countries take actions, particularly the dispatch of warships and military aircraft, to deter piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

To date, approximately 30 countries, including the United States, have dispatched their warships to the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. As part of its counter-piracy initiatives, the European Union (EU) has been conducting Operation Atalanta since December 2008, in addition to the counter-piracy operations conducted by the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) that was established in January 2009. Meanwhile, other countries have been dispatching their assets to the area. The international community continues to have a critical interest in and take actions to tackle the acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

As these initiatives by the international community have proved to be effective, the number of acts of piracy

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2 The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), the headquarters of which is located in Bahrain, announced the establishment of the CTF in January 2009 as a multilateral combined task force for counter-piracy operations.
occurring in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has currently hovered at a low level. However, the assumed root causes of piracy such as terrorism and poverty in Somalia have still remained unsolved. In addition, considering the fact that Somalia’s capability to crack down on piracy is also still insufficient, if the international community reduces its counter-piracy efforts, the situation could be easily reversed. Therefore, there is no great change in the situation in which Japan must carry out its counter-piracy operations.

3 Japanese Initiatives

(1) Legislation Concerning Counter-Piracy Operations
In March 2009, following the order for Maritime Security Operations for the purpose of protecting Japan-affiliated vessels from acts of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, two MSDF destroyers began providing direct escort to Japan-affiliated vessels, while MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft also commenced warning and surveillance operations in June the same year.

In view of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Japan subsequently enacted the Anti-Piracy Measures Act in July the same year in order to deal appropriately and effectively with acts of piracy. This act made it possible to protect the vessels of all

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Footnote:
nations from acts of piracy, regardless of their flag states. Moreover, it also enabled the use of weapons to a reasonable extent, if no other means were available, in order to halt vessels engaging in acts of piracy, such as approaching civilian vessels.

Furthermore, the Act on Special Measures concerning the Security of Japanese Flagged Vessels in Areas that Are Highly Susceptible to Acts of Piracy came into force on November 2013, which made it possible to have security guards on board a Japanese ship provided certain requirements are met, enabling them to carry small arms for the purpose of security operations.

In recent years, while there are still ongoing requests for escort from vessels that are vulnerable to piracy such as tankers with relatively low speed and low broadside, the demand for direct escort has been decreasing. This is partly due to the existence of other initiatives for self-defense of private vessels involving the boarding of private armed security guards.

As this trend was expected to continue, the Government of Japan determined that the SDF would decrease the planned number of direct escorts and carry out zone defense during the period when direct escort is not conducted. Accordingly the Government of Japan changed the number of the deployed MSDF destroyers from two to one for operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden from December 2016: (1) based on the number of destroyers in recent years, the planned number of direct escorts in a month would be decreased, and at the same time, (2) during the period when direct escort is not conducted, zone defense would be carried out instead.

(2) Activities by the Self-Defense Forces

The Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) is a unit that conducts counter-piracy measures using MSDF destroyers. The DSPE strives to ensure the safety of ships navigating in the area in two different manners – direct escort of private vessels across the Gulf of Aden, and zone defense in allocated areas in the Gulf of Aden. In addition, there are JCG officers aboard the MSDF destroyer.4

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b. Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement

The Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DAPE) is a unit conducting counter-piracy activities using the MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft (two aircraft dispatched). The unit conducts warning and
surveillance operations in the flight zone that is determined in coordination with the CTF 151 headquarters and confirms any suspicious boats. At the same time, the unit also provides information to the MSDF destroyers, the naval vessels of other countries and civilian vessels, responding by such means as confirming the safety of the surrounding area immediately, if requested. The information gathered by SDF P-3Cs is constantly shared with other related organizations, and contributes significantly to deterring acts of piracy and disarming vessels suspected of being pirate ships.

c. Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement

In order to improve the operational efficiency and effectiveness of the DAPE, the Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DGPE) carries out activities such as maintenance of the facility set up in the northwest district of Djibouti International Airport. The Ministry decided to lease adjacent land on the eastern side of the site that does not have a structure and is empty, in addition to the site itself, from November 2017 from a standpoint of strengthening security.

d. Transport Unit

The Airlift Squadron regularly operates ASDF transport aircraft to carry out air transport of materials required by the DAPE and the DGPE.

e. Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) Deployed unit at the Headquarters

In order to strengthen coordination with the units of other countries engaged in counter-piracy operations and enhance the effectiveness of the SDF’s counter-piracy operations, the MOD decided to dispatch SDF personnel serving as the CTF 151 commander and the headquarter staff in July 2014, and has dispatched SDF personnel to the CTF 151 Headquarters where an officer from other countries serves as the commander since August 2014. During the period from May to August 2015, the SDF also dispatched a CTF 151 commander for the first time, while between March and June 2017 and March and June 2018 a CTF 151 commander as well as staff were also dispatched to the Headquarters.

f. Achievements

As of May 31, 2018, the DSPE has escorted 3,826 vessels. Under the protection of the SDF destroyers, not a single vessel has come to any harm from pirates and these vessels have all passed safely across the Gulf of Aden.

As for the DAPE, it commenced the counter-piracy operations in June 2009. As of May 31, 2018, the DAPE has conducted the following activities: aircraft have flown 1,951 missions with their flying hours totaling 14,910 hours; and information was provided to vessels navigating the area and other countries engaging in counter-piracy operations on around 13,160 occasions. The activities conducted by the DAPE account for approximately 70-80% of the warning and surveillance operations carried out in the Gulf of Aden by the international community.

4 Praise for Japan’s Endeavors

The counter-piracy operations by the SDF have been highly praised by the international community. For example, national leaders and others have expressed their gratitude and the SDF has also been repeatedly well-received by the United Nations Security Council Resolution. Moreover, the MSDF destroyers, which are engaging in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, has received many messages from the captains and ship owners of the vessels that its units have escorted, expressing their gratitude that the ships were able to cross the Gulf of Aden with peace of mind and asking them to continue escorting ships there. Additionally, The Japanese Shipowners’ Association and other groups expressed appreciation for protection of Japan-related vessels and asked for continuation of efforts in fighting against piracy.

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5 In addition, DAPE has been participating in CTF 151 since February 2014. This participation enabled the force to acquire information that was previously not accessible. Moreover, it became possible to conduct more flexible warning and surveillance activities. For example, aircraft can be deployed as needed even to areas that are highly susceptible to acts of piracy, and as a result, coordination between other countries’ units was further enhanced.

6 No member of the SDF had ever served as a commander of a multinational force since the foundation of the SDF.
2 Contribution to the Maintenance of Public Safety and Order on the Seas through Maritime Training

1 Training Conducted by the SDF and Counter-Piracy Teams from Various Countries in the Gulf of Aden

The SDF’s deployed unit and counter-piracy unit of EU and others have conducted various exercises in the Gulf of Aden with the objective of enhancing their mutual cooperation and tactical skills required for counter-piracy activities.

These training exercises have an essential significance in that they strengthen the cooperation between the SDF and counter-piracy teams from various countries and regional organizations, and contribute to the maintenance of public safety and order on the seas.

2 Participation in the U.S. Hosted International Maritime Exercise and Other Exercises

The MSDF has participated in every multilateral mine countermeasures exercise in the waters around the Arabian Peninsula hosted by the U.S. Navy since its first exercise in 2012. This exercise was renamed International Maritime Exercise \(^7\) since May 2017 and items for the exercise was increased. Participating in these exercises assists in the enhancement of the tactical skills of the MSDF and the strengthening of trust among the participating countries. At the same time, the exercise also contributes to the maintenance of maritime security, while also contributing to the improvement of the global security environment.

3 Strengthening of Cooperation in Maritime Security through Joint Training, etc.

Through the participation in multilateral joint exercises, the MSDF improves its tactical skills as well as advancing mutual understanding and strengthening of trust relationships with other participating countries. It implemented Malabar 2017, a joint training exercise by Japan, the U.S., and India, in India’s eastern waters and carried out joint cruise training by Japan and the U.S., Japan and Australia, and Japan, the U.S., Australia, and Canada in the South China Sea.

Strengthening cooperation with other countries through these joint exercises contributes to the maintenance of maritime security, which has extremely high significance.

3 Initiatives in the Asia-Pacific Region

The National Security Strategy and the National Defense Program Guidelines state that Japan will play a leading role in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Seas,” including maritime security cooperation with other countries.

Accordingly, the MOD/SDF implements capacity building assistance in maritime security for Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia and Philippines, thereby assisting countries such as coastal states enhance their capabilities, and strengthening cooperation with partners that share the same strategic interests as Japan.

The Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, which was approved by a Cabinet decision in May 2018, calls for strengthening cooperation related to maritime security with various countries through security dialogue and defense interaction among defense authorities at bilateral and multilateral levels with the aim of maintaining and advancing “free and open seas” supported by a maritime order defined by laws and rules. In response to this, the MOD has been working on cooperation for maritime security within regional security dialogue frameworks such as the ADMM Plus and the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISMMS).

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\(^7\) The exercise took place in May 2017, and command post exercises were carried out.
The MOD/SDF is proactively undertaking international peace cooperation activities working in tandem with diplomatic initiatives, including the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for resolving the fundamental causes of conflicts, terrorism and other problems.

Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities

The MOD/SDF is proactively undertaking international peace cooperation activities working in tandem with diplomatic initiatives, including the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for resolving the fundamental causes of conflicts, terrorism and other problems.

Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities

Framework of International Peace Cooperation Activities and the Significance of Stipulating such Activities as One of the Primary Missions of the SDF

The international peace cooperation activities undertaken by the MOD/SDF to date are as follows: (1) international peace cooperation operations such as United Nations peacekeeping operations (the so-called UN PKO); (2) international disaster relief operations to respond to large-scale natural disasters overseas; (3) activities based on the former Special Measures Act on Humanitarian Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq; and (4) activities based on the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act, and the former Replenishment Support Special Measures Act. In 2007, international peace cooperation activities, which used to be regarded as supplementary activities, were upgraded to become one of the primary missions of the SDF, alongside the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order. In September 2015, the UN launched the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) so the UN Headquarters to be able to grasp the registered items of each country more specifically in order to ensure the flexibility and readiness of international peacekeeping activities. In light of this change, Japan registered engineering units and staff officers of mission headquarters in March 2016. Additionally, at the Defense Ministers’ Meeting on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) held in November 2017, JAPAN announced that it would make arrangements for additional registration of fixed-wing aircraft for PCRS to enable air transport assistance for rapid PKO deployment.

Continuous Initiatives to Promptly and Accurately Carry Out International Peace Cooperation Activities

To be a proactive contributor to world peace, it is important for the SDF to be fully prepared for any future operation. For this reason, all three branches of the SDF, namely the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, designate dispatch stand-by units, and the designated units are always ready to be deployed.

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Legend

Activities based on permanent acts
Activities based on time-limited acts

See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2 (Framework for operation of Self Defense Forces following implementation of peace and security legislation)

Fig. III-2-3-1 (International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted by the SDF)

Reference 17 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces);
Reference 18 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units); Reference 56 (Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities); Reference 57 (The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities)
Meanwhile, the SDF is enhancing information-gathering abilities and protection abilities, which are required for the SDF units to carry out their missions while ensuring the safety of personnel and unit in international peacekeeping activities, etc. In addition, in order to respond to various environments and prolonged missions, the SDF is improving its capabilities for transport, deployment, and information communication, as well as developing a structure of logistic and medical support for conducting smooth and continuous operations.

With regard to the education necessary for engaging in international peace cooperation activities, the GSDF International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit, which belongs to the Ground Component Command, provides training for GSDF personnel to be deployed to international peace cooperation activities, as well as supports their training. In addition, the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC) of the Joint Staff College offers not only a basic education courses on international peace cooperation activities, but also specialized education to train personnel who can be appointed as contingent commanders of UN PKO missions and staff officers of mission headquarters. These specialized courses are conducted by using UN standard training materials and foreign instructors. Furthermore, since FY2014, the JPC has also provided education for personnel from foreign militaries and other Japanese ministries and agencies. This initiative represents the approach taken by the MOD/SDF, which emphasize the necessity of collaboration and cooperation with other related ministries and foreign countries, based on the current situation of more multi-dimensional and complicated international peace cooperation activities. The initiative aims to contribute to more effective international peace cooperation activities by enhancing the collaboration in the field of education.

SDF personnel are expected to fulfill their assigned duty under severe working conditions while being far away from their home country and their families. Therefore, it is extremely important to make necessary arrangements so that dispatched SDF personnel can effectively carry out their assigned duty while maintaining both their physical and mental health. For this reason, the MOD/SDF has implemented various measures to support families to reduce anxiety for the dispatched SDF personnel and their families.

In addition, the SDF also provides the following mental health checkups on an ongoing basis for all the personnel to be sent: (1) a pre-dispatch course to acquire necessary knowledge on stress reduction; (2) mental health assessment conducted several times during the pre-dispatch to post-dispatch period; (3) counseling on anxiety, trouble and other matters among the dispatched personnel provided by mental health personnel being dispatched; (4) dispatch of mental healthcare support teams from Japan consisting mainly of medical officers with specialized knowledge; (5) education before returning to Japan for reducing stress upon return; (6) temporary health checkups after returning to Japan.

As a means to promote peace and stability in conflict regions around the world, UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) have expanded their missions in recent years to include such duties as the Protection of Civilians (POC), the promotion of political processes, providing assistance in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) into society of former soldiers, Security Sector Reform (SSR), the rule of law, elections, human rights, and other fields, in addition to such traditional missions as ceasefire monitoring. To date, there are 14 UN PKO missions ongoing (as of the end of May 2018).

International organizations, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), respective governments, and non-governmental organizations (NGO) conduct relief and restoration activities for the victims of conflicts and large-scale disasters from a humanitarian perspective and from the viewpoint of stabilizing affected countries.

Japan has been promoting international peace cooperation activities in various regions including Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal, and South Sudan for more than 25 years, and the results of these activities have been highly praised both inside and outside of Japan. From the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, and in light of the appreciation and expectations from the international community, Japan will continue to actively engage in international peace cooperation operations in a multilayered way. In this regard, to maximize the effect of Japan’s contribution to
In light of the preparatory meeting results, State Minister of Defense Yamamoto commented at the UN peacekeeping Defense Ministerial conference held in Vancouver in November 2017 that Japan hopes that capacity gaps in the UN peacekeeping can be harrowed through collaboration by the UN Member Stated and international organizations, that the Triangular Partnership Project of collaboration among the United Nations, supporting UN Member States, TCC/PCC, including the UN Project for African Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities (RDEC) led by Japan is effective, and Japan intends to make further contributions to this project and promote to increase female peacekeepers.

The JGSDF Central Readiness Force Commanding General (then) participated in the UN PKO Military Chiefs Meeting held in July as a related meeting to the Defense Ministerial conference and exchanged opinions regarding the current situation and issues for PKO.

2 United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)

(1) Background to the Decision to Dispatch Personnel to UNMISS

The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in January 2005.

Beginning in October 2008, Japan dispatched two GSDF officers to UNMIS headquarters as staff officers (logistics and database officers), but UNMIS ended its mission in July 2011 following South Sudan’s independence. Meanwhile, with the objective of consolidating peace and security as well as helping establish necessary conditions for the development of South Sudan, the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was established. The Japanese Government was requested by the UN to cooperate with UNMISS, particularly through the dispatch of GSDF engineering units. The Cabinet approved the dispatch of two staff officers (logistics and database officers) to UNMISS in November 2011, and in December it decided to dispatch an SDF engineering unit, Coordination Center, and an additional staff officer (engineering officer). In addition, the Cabinet also approved the dispatch of one staff officer (air operations officer) in October 2014.

South Sudan shares borders with six countries and is positioned in a highly important location, connecting the African continent on all four points of the compass. The peace and stability of South Sudan is not only essential for the country itself; but also for the peace and stability in its neighboring countries, and by extension, Africa as a whole, as well as crucial issue that should

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3 A partnership for supporting the capability building of the personnel from UN PKO troop contributing countries through cooperation among the UN, UN PKO troop contributing countries, and third countries that possess technologies and equipment.

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Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Uno and Mr. Khare, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, United Nations Secretariat, at a preparation meeting for the ministerial meeting on the UN Peacekeeping (August 2017)
be dealt with by the international community. Based on the accumulated experience through past PKO, the MOD/SDF has contributed to the peace and stability of South Sudan by providing personnel-based cooperation in infrastructure development, on which the UN places great expectations.

Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1-3-7 (Situation in South Sudan)

(2) Activities by the SDF

In January 2012, a then Coordination Center of the SDF was established for the first time in the SDF’s participation in UN PKO, both in the South Sudan capital city of Juba and in Uganda, in order for coordination of the activities conducted by the dispatched engineering unit. Since the commencement of its engineering activities within UN facilities in Juba in March 2012, the dispatched engineering unit has steadily expanded its activities. The SDF has continued to dispatch over 300 personnel after the second unit took over in June of the same year, and carried out activities with great significance such as repairing roads and constructing facilities for displaced people while ensuring the safety of the personnel.

On November 15, 2016, the Cabinet approved the changes to the International Peace Cooperation Assignment Implementation Plan for South Sudan after the deliberations by the National Security Council (9-minister meeting). After the 11th rotation took over in December 2016, the dispatched unit was assigned the task of so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations, which was approved by the Legislation for Peace and Security, as well as the task to carry out joint protection of camps.

The deployment of SDF engineering units marked a milestone of five years in January 2017 since the dispatch of the first engineering rotation. In all of the PKOs conducted by Japan, the unit has made a record number of achievements. The major achievements include a total of approximately 260 km of road repair and a total of approximately 500,000 m² of development.

Japan could move on to a new phase regarding engineering activities in Juba that the SDF was in charge of. Considering the above-mentioned issues in a comprehensive manner, on March 10, 2017, the Government of Japan came to the conclusion that the SDF engineering unit would withdraw from Juba around

| Assignment: UNMISS Engineer Staff Officers |
| Rank: Major, Fumiyasu Morishita |

I have been working in Juba as the engineering staff officer in the 9th UNMISS Headquarters since June 2017.

There are four headquarters members at UNMISS — myself, the intelligence officer, the logistics staff officer, and the air operations officer. The Japanese embassy also has two Self Defense Forces members as liaison personnel.

The engineer Division that I belong to is the largest UNMISS organization with about 300 civilians, military people, and local staff. I provide direct support to the engineer Division chief at the group Chief’s office. Specifically, I handle national projects, such as development of main roads in South Sudan.

I am very excited about using knowledge and skills cultivate as a commander in the Ground Self Defense Forces on behalf of South Sudan and the United Nations despite facing numerous issues, such as difficult coordination with local agencies, equipment and materials shortages, rainy season with intense rainfall that cripples work efforts, and poor infrastructure. I also feel responsibility as someone wearing the Japanese uniform to serve as a goodwill ambassador for Japan in the area.
the end of May, 2017, and Minister of Defense Inada issued an assignment termination order for the dispatched engineering unit on March 24, 2017. SDF personnel engaged in withdrawal work, then sequentially withdrew from South Sudan by the end of May 2017, and terminated the operations by the engineering unit in UNMISS.

In response to a request from the UN to transfer items possessed by the dispatched engineering unit such as heavy machinery, vehicles, and residence-related containers, Japan transferred these items to UNMISS with no charge, intending to make Japan’s cooperation with UNMISS more effective. Prior to this transfer of items, the MOD, responding to a request from UNMISS, provided training on the operation and maintenance of heavy machinery to UNMISS personnel, so that UNMISS would be able to conduct engineering activities in a smooth manner using these heavy machinery and other equipment even after the withdrawal of the Japanese unit.

These dedicated activities by the dispatched engineering unit were highly appreciated and valued by the UN and South Sudan. Personnel dispatches to the UNMISS headquarters are continuing. Four JGSDF members (logistics officer, database officer, engineering officer, and air operations officer) currently carry out duties at the UNMISS headquarters. Specifically, the logistics officer procures and transports goods needed in UNMISS activities, the database officer collects and compiles information on security conditions, the engineering officer plans and proposes UNMISS engineering activities, and the air operations officer assists in operation of aircraft run by UNMISS.

Additionally, two liaisons staff have been dispatched to the liaison office in the Embassy of Japan in South Sudan to support activities of the Japanese staff officers. These people help interactions between the South Sudan government and the International Peace Cooperation Corps in South Sudan with the aim of ensuring smooth and efficient cooperation with UNMISS. They will continue to contribute to activities as UNMISS members.

3 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to the UN Secretariat

The Ministry of Defense and Self Defense Forces actively contribute to efforts of the United Nations to achieve international peace and dispatch personnel to the United Nations Secretariat for the purpose of utilizing experiences of dispatched personnel in Japan’s PKO activity. As of June 2018, one Self Defense Forces member (working level) is involved in formulation of United Nations PKO policies and plans at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO). There is also one administrative official (working level) working on activities related to the Triangular Partnership Project at the UN Department of Field Support. Since December 2002, including personnel currently dispatched, Japan has sent six Self Defense Forces members (one manager level, five working level) to the UN DPKO and two administrative officials (working level) to the UN Department of Field Support.

4 Dispatch of Instructors to PKO Centers

To support PKO undertaken by African and other countries, the MOD/SDF has dispatched SDF personnel as instructors to PKO centers in Africa that provide education and training for UN peacekeepers to contribute to peace and stability by enhancing the capacity of the centers. Following the speech by State Minister of Defense Yamamoto that pledged to promote initiatives to increase female peacekeepers at the UN peacekeeping Defense Ministerial conference held in Vancouver (Canada) in November 2017, Japan dispatched two Self Defense Forces personnel, including one female member, as teachers on gender in the PKO field to the Peace Support Training Center in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE-PSTC) in December 2017. It has sent a total of 31 Self Defense Forces members (26 times to eight countries) thus far since November 2008, including the latest dispatch.

Based on experiences and lessons learned in
overseas activities by Self Defense Forces, dispatched Self Defense Forces personnel provide courses on the importance of building relationships with local residents at locations where international peacekeeping activities take place and gender issues.

Abe expressed Japan’s active support at the PKO Summit in September 2014, and it was embodied by the RDEC.

In the RDEC, the UN Department of Field Support (DFS) procures heavy equipment and carries out training for engineers using funds provided by Japan. Japan has been dispatching SDF personnel to the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi, Kenya as instructors since the trial training in September 2015. Training took place twice during May-October 2017, to which SDF personnel were dispatched who provided training regarding the operation of heavy equipment for personnel in the Tanzanian national military and others.

Training has been provided in five sessions to date for a total of approximately 130 members from five East African countries.

The Ministry of Defense plans to actively support
future training, particularly following the speech by State Minister of Defense Yamamoto at the UN peacekeeping
Defense Ministerial conference held in Vancouver (Canada) in November 2017

3 ■ International Disaster Relief Operations

In recent years, the role of military affairs has become more diverse, and opportunities for military to use their capabilities in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are growing. To contribute to the advancement of international cooperation, the SDF has also engaged in international disaster relief operations proactively from the viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and improvement of the global security environment.

To this end, the SDF maintains their readiness to take any necessary action based on prepared disaster relief operation plans. In consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the SDF has been proactively conducting international disaster relief operations, which fully utilize their functions and capabilities, while taking into consideration specific relief requests by the governments of affected countries and disaster situations in these countries.

Reference 57 (International peacekeeping activities conducted by Self Defense Forces)

1 Outline of the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law

Since the enactment of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team (Japan Disaster Relief Team Law) in 1987, Japan has engaged in international disaster relief activities in response to requests from the governments of affected countries and international organizations. In 1992, the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law was partially amended, enabling the SDF to participate in international disaster relief activities and to transport its personnel and equipment for this purpose.

Reference 17 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces)

2 International Disaster Relief Operations by the SDF and SDF’s Posture

Responding to specific relief requests by the governments of affected countries and the scale of disaster situations in these countries, the SDF’s capabilities in international disaster relief operations encompass (1) medical services, such as first-aid medical treatment and epidemic prevention; (2) transport of relief items, patients and personnel by helicopter and other means; and (3) water supply activities using water-purifying devices. In addition, the SDF uses transport aircraft and ships to carry disaster relief personnel and equipment to the affected area.

The Ground Component Command and regional units of the GSDF and other relevant GSDF units maintain their readiness to ensure that they can carry out international disaster relief operations in an independent manner anytime when needed. The Self Defense Fleet of the MSDF and Air Support Command of the ASDF also constantly maintain their readiness to transport personnel and their supplies to disaster affected areas. Furthermore, in April 2015, the MOD/SDF also improved its readiness to be able to swiftly respond to a request for search activities using P-3C patrol aircraft.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and missiles, which serve as their means of delivery, pose a pressing challenge to peace and stability of the international community. Moreover, many countries are working on the regulation of certain conventional weapons, considering the need to maintain a balance between humanitarian perspectives and defensive requirements.

One of the initiatives to deal with these issues is the development of an international framework for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, and Japan is playing an active role in this effort.

Japan actively participates in international initiatives for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation in regard to WMDs, in the form of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as missiles as a means of delivery and associated technologies and materials.

Japan has contributed to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by offering its knowledge in the field of chemical protection since the negotiating stage and dispatching GSDF personnel who are experts on protection against chemical weapons to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which was established to continuously implement verification measures following the entry of the CWC into force. In addition, small quantities of the chemical substances under the regulation of the CWC are synthesized at the GSDF Chemical School (Saitama City), in order to conduct protection research. Thus, the school has undergone inspections ten times in total since its establishment, in accordance with the CWC regulations.

Moreover, the whole of the Japanese Government is also working on projects aimed at disposing of abandoned chemical weapons in China, in accordance with the CWC. The MOD/SDF has seconded eleven personnel, including GSDF personnel, to the Cabinet Office to work on this project, and since 2000, GSDF personnel with expertise in chemicals and ammunitions have been dispatched to conduct excavation and recovery projects on a total of 17 occasions. In addition, the MOD has been cooperating in endeavors aimed at increasing the effectiveness of regulations and decisions, by dispatching MOD officials to major meetings such as those of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), as well as international export control regimes in the form of the Australia Group (AG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). At the same time, SDF personnel were dispatched to training to foster substitute inspectors provided by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

Japan actively participates in international initiatives for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation in regard to WMDs, in the form of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as missiles as a means of delivery and associated technologies and materials.
Japan has signed various conventions on the regulation of conventional weapons such as the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), based on humanitarian perspectives and security needs. In addition, Japan has signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention), which was adopted outside the framework of the CCW. With the entry of this Convention, the disposal of all cluster munitions possessed by the SDF was completed in February 2015.

The Ministry dispatches personnel to government expert meetings related to Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) and other events under the CCW framework.

Furthermore, the MOD has actively cooperated in the initiatives of the international community that focus on the problem of anti-personnel mines by submitting annual reports that include data on Japan’s exceptional stocks to the UN.

In addition, the MOD/SDF participates in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the UN Report on Military Expenditures and other meetings related to Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) with the purpose of increasing the transparency of military preparedness and military expenditure, and provides the requisite reports. It also dispatches personnel as needed to governmental expert meetings and other meetings for reviewing and improving these systems.

### 2 International Initiatives Aimed at Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Deeply concerned about the development of WMDs and missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, the United States announced its Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in May 2003, and sought the participation of other countries therein. Various initiatives are being undertaken based on PSI; PSI interdiction exercises aimed at improving the ability to thwart the proliferation of WMDs and related items and meetings to consider issues on policies and legislations.

Since the 3rd PSI Meeting in Paris (September 2003), the MOD/SDF has collaborated with relevant organizations and countries, dispatching MOD officials and SDF personnel to various meetings, as well as engaging in ongoing participation in these exercises since 2004.

The MOD/SDF has participated in PSI maritime interdiction exercises, hosted by Japan, twice, working in partnership with relevant organizations such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Finance and the Japan Coast Guard, and also participated in the PSI air interdiction exercise in July 2012, which Japan hosted for the first time. Recently, Japan participated in Pacific Protector 17, a PSI maritime prevention exercise organized by Australia, in September 2017 and trained in activities to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction with other participating countries.

Based on the proliferation cases in the areas surrounding Japan, and from the perspectives of preventing the proliferation of WMDs and improving the response capability of the SDF, the MOD/SDF strives to strengthen non-proliferation frameworks including PSI, as well as holding various relevant exercises and meetings and participating in the same kind of activities which other countries hold.

### Fig. III-2-4-2 Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction Exercise (Since 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Exercise</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Participation of MOD/SDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 2012</td>
<td>PSI air interdiction exercise hosted by Japan</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Joint Staff, Ground Staff, Air Staff, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Northern Army, Central Readiness Force, GSDF Seventh Chemical Weapon Defense Unit and Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit, Internal Bureau (including two aircraft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2012</td>
<td>PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>Joint Staff, Maritime Staff, Internal Bureau (including one ship and one aircraft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2013</td>
<td>PSI exercise co-hosted by the U.S. and UAE</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Dispatch of observer (Joint Staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2014</td>
<td>PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Joint Staff (including one ship)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2015</td>
<td>PSI exercise hosted by New Zealand</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2016</td>
<td>PSI exercise hosted by Singapore</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Joint Staff, Yokosuka Fleet Training Group, Internal Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2017</td>
<td>PSI exercise hosted by Australia</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Joint Staff, Ground Staff, Maritime Staff, Internal Bureau (including one aircraft)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 CCW: Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects
3 Major producers and owners of cluster munitions such as the United States, China and Russia have not signed the Oslo Convention.
4 An initiative that seeks to strengthen the relevant domestic laws of respective countries to the maximum possible extent, and considers measures that participating countries can jointly take while complying with existing domestic and international laws, in order to prevent the proliferation of WMDs and related materials.
In order to exert its defense capabilities with the maximum effectiveness, it is essential that the MOD/SDF further enhances and strengthens its human foundation and organization, which supports the defense force.

### 1. Recruitment and Employment

#### 1. Recruitment

It is vital to secure highly qualified personnel for the MOD/SDF to carry out various missions appropriately. Expectations from the public for the MOD/SDF have continued to rise. In Japan, however, due to the recent economic and employment upturn, as well as the advancement of declining birthrate and popularization of higher education, the environment surrounding the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel is severe. In such a situation, it is necessary for the MOD/SDF to recruit excellent human resources with a strong desire to enlist, by explaining sufficiently to them the missions, roles, duties, and working conditions of the SDF.

For this reason, the MOD/SDF holds recruiting meetings at schools and also maintains Provincial Cooperation Offices in 50 locations throughout Japan to respond to the individual needs of applicants, with the understanding of educators and support from recruitment counselors. Moreover, local governments are also carrying out some of the administrative activities regarding the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel and candidates for uniformed SDF personnel, such as announcing the recruitment period and promoting the SDF as a workplace, for which the MOD allocates them the requisite budget.

#### Fig. III-3-1-1 (Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join the SDF)

The number of 18–26 year-olds: About 17 million ⇒ About 11 million (down by about 40%)


Data for FY2005 and FY2010 are the proportionally adjusted populations of unknown age ascertained by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research based on “Population Census,” Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.

Data from FY2015 onward are based on “Population Projection for Japan” (medium estimates in April 2017), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.

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DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2018
2 Employment

(1) Uniformed SDF Personnel

Based on a voluntary system that respects individuals’ free will, uniformed SDF personnel are recruited under various categories.

Fig. III-3-1-2 (Overview of Appointment System for SDF Personnel)

Due to the uniqueness of their duties, personnel management of uniformed SDF personnel differs from that of general civilian government employees, including “Early Retirement System” and “Fixed Term System” to maintain the SDF’s strength.

After employment, uniformed SDF personnel are assigned their branch of service and duties at units all around Japan, in accordance with their choice or aptitude, following basic education and training at respective training units or schools of respective SDF services.

Reference 59 (Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel)
Reference 60 (Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2017))
Fig. III-3-1-3 (Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Personnel)
### Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Mandatory Retirement Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General (GSDF), Vice Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF)</td>
<td>Sho</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), Major General (ASDF)</td>
<td>Shoho</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF)</td>
<td>Issa</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF), Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF)</td>
<td>Nisa</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Major (ASDF)</td>
<td>Issa</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain (ASDF)</td>
<td>Ichi</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF)</td>
<td>Nii</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second Lieutenant (ASDF)</td>
<td>Sanri</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer (GSDF), Warrant Officer (MSDF), Warrant Officer (ASDF)</td>
<td>Juni</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)</td>
<td>Socho</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF)</td>
<td>Issa</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)</td>
<td>Nisa</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF), Staff Sergeant (ASDF)</td>
<td>Sanso</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Airman First Class (ASDF)</td>
<td>Shicho</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Airman Second Class (ASDF)</td>
<td>Isshi</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Airman Third Class (ASDF)</td>
<td>Nishi</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF personnel who hold the rank of General (GSDF and ASDF) or Admiral (MSDF), and serve as Chief of Staff of Joint Staff Office, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, or ASDF Chief of Staff, is 62.
2. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF personnel who hold positions such as physician, dentist, pharmacist, musician, military police officer, or information analyst, is 60.

### Companies Supporting Self Defense Force Reserve Personnel and Others (Cooperating Site for SDF Reserve Personnel and Others)

Muneo Taniguchi, Representative Director & Chairman, Nara Kotsu Bus Lines Co., Ltd.
(Chairman of the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel Employment Cooperating Company Association)

Our company has built a variety of businesses around the mainstay bus operation primarily in Nara Prefecture, including restaurants, real estate, and other related businesses, with a theme of “safe and reliable Nara Kotsu” since its establishment through a merger during the war years in 1943.

It has actively hired retiring uniformed Self Defense Force personnel for many years, totaling over 100 people thus far. The company currently has two SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and nine SDF Reserve Personnel.

Uniformed SDF personnel join our company with a solid sense of responsibility, enthusiasm, and strong psychological wherewithal. Many are both serious-minded and disciplined. They provide a model for other employees and help invigorate the workplace.

Furthermore, uniformed SDF personnel play a major role in social contribution, such as international peace cooperation operation and disaster responses. I believe that hiring many retiring uniformed SDF personnel enhances enterprise value as well.

The company is honored to have received Minister of Defense certification as a “cooperating site for Self Defense Force Reserve Personnel and others.” We intend to pursue hiring of retired uniformed SDF personnel even more actively than in past years and hope to serve as a bridge between the Self Defense Forces and local society and contribute to advances in society through our business efforts.

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2 Many other countries also have reserve personnel systems.
personnel, are appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel after completing the necessary education and training.

Previously, it was stipulated that SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel who received a disaster and other call-up orders would begin their service as SDF personnel five days or later (ten days in the case of a defense call-up order for SDF Reserve Personnel) after the issuance of the order. However, based on the performance of calling up the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel in response to the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016, the Order for Enforcement of the SDF Law was partially revised in August 2016 to make it possible to shorten the number of days, provided that those personnel have no objection.

As SDF Reserve Personnel and others work in their civilian jobs under normal circumstances, they need to adjust their work schedule to participate in periodic training exercises. Therefore, understanding and cooperation from the companies that employ these personnel are essential for the smooth operation of the systems.

For this purpose, the MOD provides a special subsidy to the companies that employ SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and take necessary measures to allow such employees to attend training sessions for 30 days a year, by taking into consideration the burden on such employees to attend training sessions for 30 days.
employ SDF Reserve Personnel. For example, the MOD has been developing a framework that allows the MOD/SDF to provide such information as the scheduled term of a training call-up and scheduled term that SDF Reserve Personnel are called up to perform actual operations and are appointed as uniformed SDF personnel, when requested by their employers. In addition, the MOD has established a new system where the employers are provided with a subsidy if (1) SDF Reserve Personnel or SDF Ready Reserve Personnel respond to a defense operation call-up order, civil protection dispatch call-up order, or disaster relief call-up order, etc. or (2) if they have no choice but to leave their regular occupations due to injuries during their duties, etc. in order to contribute to securing understanding and cooperation of the duties.

Also, the MOD promotes the use of SDF Reserve Personnel in a wide range of fields, such as the appointment of retired SDF pilots, who are to be reemployed in the private sector, to SDF Reserve Personnel through the reemployment system.  

(3) Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Other Civilian Personnel

There are approximately 21,000 civilian personnel — administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others — in addition to uniformed SDF personnel in the MOD/SDF. Civilian personnel are mainly recruited from those who have passed the Recruitment Examination for Comprehensive and General Service National Public Employees conducted by the National Personnel Authority (NPA), and those who have passed the Recruitment Examination for Ministry of Defense Specialists conducted by the MOD. After participating in the common training course, civilian personnel recruited in this process work in a wide range of fields.

Administrative officials are engaged in defense-related policy planning in the Internal Bureaus of the MOD and at the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA); analysis and evaluation at the Defense Intelligence Headquarters; and administrative works at the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout the country.

Technical and engineering officials are working in the Internal Bureaus of the MOD, ATLA, the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout the country. They are engaged in constructing various defense facilities (headquarters, runways, magazines, etc.), carrying out R&D, efficient procurement, maintenance and improvement of a range of equipment, as well as providing mental health care for SDF personnel.

Instructors conduct advanced research on defense and provide high-quality education to SDF personnel at the National Institute for Defense Studies, the National Defense Academy, the National Defense Medical College, and other organizations.

Reference 61 (Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel, etc.)

2 Daily Education and Training

1 Education of Uniformed SDF Personnel

Enhancing the ability of the individual uniformed SDF personnel who comprise SDF units is essential for the execution of the units’ duties. For this purpose, the respective SDF training units and schools provide opportunities for phased and systematic education according to rank and duties to nurture necessary qualities and instill knowledge and skills.

A considerable extent of human, temporal, and economic efforts such as securing instructors with special skills, and improving equipment and educational facilities, are necessary for providing education. In the event that personnel need to further improve their professional knowledge and skills, or that it is difficult for them to acquire such knowledge and skills within the SDF, the MOD/SDF commissions education to external institutions, including those abroad, as well as domestic companies and research institutes.

2 SDF Training

(1) Training by Each SDF

Training conducted by units in each service can be broadly divided into training for individual SDF personnel to improve the necessary proficiency for their respective fields, and training for units to enhance their systematic capabilities. Training for individuals is

6 The reemployment system for SDF pilots aims to prevent the outflow of active young SDF pilots to civil aviation companies in an unregulated manner. This system is also designed to utilize SDF pilots over a certain age as pilots of commercial airlines, and is also significant from the perspective of the development of the airline industry in Japan as a whole.

7 Among the employees of the MOD, special national government employees are called “SDF personnel,” which include administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others in addition to uniformed SDF personnel.
conducted one-on-one in stages based on occupational classification and individual ability. Training for units is conducted depending on the size of unit, from small to large; meanwhile, large-scale comprehensive training including coordination between units is also conducted.

In addition to training for national defense, the MOD is endeavoring to improve training corresponding to the diversified SDF roles required in recent years, such as peacekeeping operations and large-scale disaster relief operations. Moreover, in order to strengthen joint operational capabilities and to respond to various situations, the MOD is making efforts to widen the scope of joint exercises and bilateral and multilateral exercises participated by the individual SDF services.\(^8\)

(2) Training Environment

SDF training has been planned and conducted under conditions that are as close as possible to actual combat situations, yet many restrictions remain. Therefore, the SDF makes maximum use of its limited domestic training areas, including further use of the prime training environment of Hokkaido stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and other guidelines. They also strive to carry out more practical combat training by conducting joint exercises and other training and exercises in the United States and surrounding sea and airspace where they can secure training conditions not available in Japan.

\(^8\) Training includes SDF Joint Exercises, Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercises, and Ballistic Missile Response training which are to prevent and repel direct threats to Japan. Other additional training includes International Peace Cooperation Exercises that assumes SDF’s international peace cooperation activities and Joint International Humanitarian Operation Training, in which the treatment of prisoners of war and other detainees is practiced.

It is greatly regretted that incidents such as these have occurred as they compromise safety of the residents in the regions, cause anxiety to the wide public regarding the SDF’s operation and trainings and puts the lives of SDF personnel at risk. The MOD/SDF as a whole is making its utmost effort to prevent recurrence of such accidents by thoroughly investigating the causes of them and making sure each member has recognized the importance of safety management once again.

3 Measures Aimed at Ensuring Effective Use of Human Resources

1 Measures for Personnel System Reform and for the Improvement of Pay and Conditions

With regard to the personnel structure of the SDF, the fixed number of SDF personnel has been constantly reduced. On the other hand, there has been the need for further skilled and professional personnel in order to respond to the advancement of equipment as well as diversification and internationalization of SDF missions.

In light of such circumstances, it is stated in the NDPG that measures are to be implemented with regard to personnel system reform in order to ensure the robustness of the SDF and to make effective use of human resources under the constrained budget.

Furthermore, due to the harsh environmental circumstances under which uniformed SDF personnel have to perform their duties, the MOD/SDF strives to provide salaries, allowances, welfare and other benefits that reflect the special nature of their duties in order to let uniformed SDF personnel concentrate on their duties with pride, relieved of anxiety. The MOD/SDF also promotes measures relating to awards and honors, beginning with the expansion of the system of Defense Meritorious Badges.

2 Initiatives to Support Families

In addition to exchanges between units and personnel’s families, as well as between the families, the MOD in cooperation with relevant external groups and organizations is also actively working to develop a family support system to be implemented in the event of large-scale natural disasters and other events, which will include receiving cooperation in confirming the safety of the family members of SDF personnel. All of these are conducted as routine initiatives. Furthermore, specific welfare services for SDF personnel deployed overseas include facilitating direct communication with their families in Japan by means such as e-mail and video conference systems. Support for sending comfort items from their families at a later date is also provided. Moreover, briefing sessions for families of the dispatched SDF personnel are held to provide them with a variety of information, and a consultation desk exclusively for families of the dispatched SDF personnel (family support centers), a website for the families of the dispatched SDF personnel and similar facilities have been established to provide consolation for the various questions and concerns raised by the families.

3 Dealing with Retirement and Re-Employment of SDF Personnel

In order to maintain the strength of the SDF, many uniformed SDF personnel retire in their mid-50s (personnel serving under the early retirement system) or in their 20s (most uniformed SDF personnel serving under the fixed-term service system). Therefore, many of them need to find another job after retirement in order to secure their livelihoods.
Since supporting re-employment is the responsibility of the Japanese Government (the MOD) as the employer, and is crucially important both for resolving any concerns that uniformed SDF personnel may have about their future as well as for securing qualified human resources, the MOD conducts support measures such as occupational training useful for their re-employment. The measures to support the re-employment of retired uniformed SDF personnel is also important from the perspective of enabling them to give back to society with their various skills, thereby reinforcing human resources infrastructure.

As the MOD does not have the authority to provide them with employment placement, the Foundation for the SDF Personnel Support Association provides free job consultation services with permission from the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare and the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism.

Retired uniformed SDF personnel have excellent abilities in planning, leadership, faculty, cooperativeness and responsibility gained through their work performance, education, and training. Furthermore, they have various qualifications and licenses acquired through their duties and vocational training. Therefore, they are making positive contributions in a broad range of sectors, including manufacturing and service industries, as well as finance, insurance, real estate, and construction industries, in addition to the areas of disaster prevention and risk management at local governments. Based on the NDPG, the MOD has promoted further utilization of retired uniformed SDF personnel in the areas of disaster prevention and crisis management at local governments, and has provided supports for these retired personnel’s re-employment in the sectors that lack sufficient human resources in collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies. The MOD will make further efforts to improve the re-employment environment for retired SDF personnel.

For the purpose of ensuring an environment where uniformed SDF personnel can devote themselves to their duties without any concerns, the MOD allows uniformed SDF personnel after mandatory retirement to be reappointed for fixed terms within three years before the age of 60 (one year for SDF administration officials and others). The Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) states that the SDF will actively reappoint retiring personnel possessing advanced knowledge, skills and experience where such personnel prove beneficial to the SDF’s strength.

Meanwhile, with regard to the re-employment of SDF personnel, new regulations about re-employment were introduced in October 2015 replacing the former prior approval system. As are the cases in other national government employees, the following three regulations were put in place in order to ensure the trust of the public regarding the fairness of official duties: 1) regulation on requesting re-employment of other personnel and retired personnel and requesting information; 2) regulation on seeking employment opportunities at companies in which retired personnel had a stake whilst in office; and 3) regulation on re-employed personnel making requests. In order to ensure strict observation of these regulations, bodies comprised of academic experts with no history serving as SDF members (Defense Personnel Review Board’s Separate Meeting for Monitoring Reemployment and Cabinet Office’s Reemployment Review Board’s Separate Meeting for Monitoring Reemployment and Cabinet Office’s Reemployment Surveillance Commission) monitor the situation and any violation will be met with penalties. Additionally, for the purpose of appropriate implementation of unified management and disclosure of re-employment information by institutionalizing notification and announcement of such information by the Cabinet, it has been decided that information on the re-employment status of retired SDF personnel who were in managerial positions (equivalent to the position of Senior Coordinator in the MOD or higher) is to be published every fiscal year by the Cabinet. In response to the introduction of this system in FY2015, notifications of re-employment of the retired SDF personnel who were in managerial positions submitted during FY2016 were compiled, and a total of 203 cases were officially announced in September 2017.

4 Initiatives to Maintain Strong Discipline, etc.

1 Initiatives to Maintain Strong Discipline

The MOD/SDF has gained great expectations from the public and in order for the SDF to perform its maximum ability on duty, it is essential to achieve support and trust from the public. To this end, the SDF is required to always maintain strong discipline.

The MOD/SDF has so far strived to foster well-
disciplined personnel by impressing in them an awareness of compliance with the law through setting up such campaign periods as the “MOD Anti-Drug Abuse Month,” “Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Week,” “Self-Defense Personnel Sexual Harassment Prevention Week,” and “Self-Defense Personnel Power Harassment Prevention Week” and implemented various measures such as thorough instructions on service discipline.

However, the number of personnel subjected to disciplinary action has remained high and taking measures to eradicate violation of the law has become a pressing issue in order to achieve support and trust from the public. Based on this situation, in October 2017, Minister of Defense Onodera issued the “Instructions of the Minister of Defense toward Eradication of Violation of the Law,” which included strengthening disciplinary action and expediting the administrative process of disciplinary action as the pillars. Thus, the MOD is proceeding with its effort to eradicate violation of the law.

Over the last few years, in addition to the daily report issues related to the South Sudan PKO, the MOD/SDF has faced issues such as uniformed SDF personnel’s inappropriate remarks toward diet members. Amid a situation where the security environment surrounding Japan is extremely severe, it is necessary to gain understanding and cooperation from the public, perform its duty and respond to the expectations from the public in order to maintain the nation’s peace and security. The MOD/SDF will make its utmost effort to prevent recurrence of such issues with the aim of recovering trust from the public.

SDF personnel suicides was a record 101 in FY2005, and have subsequently increased and decreased, with 90 suicides in FY2017. The suicide of SDF members is truly a great tragedy for both the individuals themselves and their bereaved families. It also represents a great loss to the MOD/SDF in terms of the loss of capable personnel, and the MOD/SDF is taking ongoing measures to prevent suicides, including the following initiatives: (1) Expansion and enhancement of the counseling system (internal/external counselors, a 24-hour telephone counseling hotline, assignment of clinical psychotherapists at camps and bases, etc.); (2) Strengthening of education to raise awareness about mental health for commanders as well as enlisted personnel; and (3) Establishment of a campaign period for enhancing mental health care, close monitoring by commanders of the mental health condition of their subordinates whose working environment has been changed due to personnel transfers, etc., and distribution of various reference materials.

**3 Comme...**

Since the establishment of the National Police Reserve in 1950 and through its evolution via the National Safety Force and the Coastal Safety Force into the SDF today, SDF personnel have been striving to accomplish the noble mission of protecting the peace and independence of Japan. They have been devoting themselves unstintingly to training, day and night, to live up to the expectations and trust of Japanese citizens, regardless of danger, and with a strong sense of responsibility. During this time period, however, more than 1,900 personnel have lost their lives in the line of duty.

In the MOD/SDF, funeral ceremonies in order to express condolences are carried out by each unit to which the personnel who perished in the line of duty belonged. Moreover, in order to eternally recognize the achievements of the SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty, and to express deep honor and condolences, memorial ceremonies are carried out in various forms, such as the Memorial Service for members of the SDF who perished in the line of duty, the Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty, and the MOD/SDF is taking ongoing measures to prevent suicides, including the following initiatives: (1) Expansion and enhancement of the counseling system (internal/external counselors, a 24-hour telephone counseling hotline, assignment of clinical psychotherapists at camps and bases, etc.); (2) Strengthening of education to raise awareness about mental health for commanders as well as enlisted personnel; and (3) Establishment of a campaign period for enhancing mental health care, close monitoring by commanders of the mental health condition of their subordinates whose working environment has been changed due to personnel transfers, etc., and distribution of various reference materials.

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11 See Part III, Chapter 5, Section 2-2 for the results of the special defense inspection and measures to prevent recurrence
12 See Part III, Chapter 5, Section 2-4 for the overview of the cases and measures to prevent recurrence
13 For the final report on this case, see: http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2018/05/08b.html
14 The Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty was constructed in 1962 in Ichigaya. In 1998, the Memorial Zone in its current form was completed by combining this monument with other monuments located in the same area. The MOD holds an annual memorial ceremony for SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty with the attendance of surviving family members, the Prime Minister, high-ranking officials of the MOD/SDF including the Minister of Defense, former Defense Ministers, and others. At the Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty in the Memorial Zone, there is an iron plate containing the names and other information of personnel who perished in the line of duty. When foreign dignitaries such as Defense Ministers visit the MOD, they make offerings of flowers, expressing their respect and condolences to personnel who perished in the line of duty. Memorial ceremonies are also held at individual SDF posts and bases.
Section 2 Promotion of Work-Life Balance and More Active Participation of Female Personnel

The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, and both the number and the duration of situations requiring the MOD/SDF’s commitment are increasing. On the other hand, it is anticipated that a rising number of MOD staff, both male and female, who deal with such situations will face time constraints due to childcare, nursing care and other reasons.

Amid such challenging circumstances, ensuring preparedness to consistently respond to various situations requires creating an environment that enables staff to be sound both mentally and physically, maintain high morale, and fully demonstrate their abilities. On the basis of this view, the MOD/SDF promotes initiatives to achieve work-life balance of its staff members.

Also, the MOD/SDF has been proactively encouraging the active participation of female personnel, and the number of female personnel is on the rise.

The MOD/SDF has been conducting a variety of initiatives in order to promote work-life balance and the further expansion of the recruitment and promotion of female personnel in a unified manner, such as formulating various plans\(^1\) that include three reforms: (1) working style reform; (2) reform to combine a successful career with childrearing and nursing care; and (3) reform for promoting active engagement of female personnel.

### Working Style Reform

**(1) Value and Mentality Reform**

In order to implement working style reform, a focus needs to be placed especially on reforming the values and mentality of staff in managerial positions regarding working style. In FY2017, the MOD/SDF carried out educational initiatives such as seminars and lecture meetings for raising awareness concerning working style reform and the concept of work-life balance. The MOD/SDF also implements the “Take more annual leave” promotional campaign to encourage staff to take a longer leave during holiday seasons, with an intention to reform values related to working style.

**(2) Work Reform in the Workplace**

It is important that initiatives for the promotion of work-life balance are appropriate for the actual circumstances of individual workplaces, and that staff members themselves consider specific measures for improving their workplace environment. This approach will lead to developing effective initiatives and workplace climate. Based on this perspective, during the campaign period for enhancing work-life balance from June to September 2017, the “Competition for initiatives to promote Working Style Reform at the Ministry of Defense” was held. The Minister of Defense and the State Minister of Defense respectively honored particularly excellent initiatives, out of the applications received from various organizations, and used them to help achieve work reform of each workplace.

**(3) Flexible Working Hours and Location**

Realizing more flexible working hours and work locations is necessary in light of factors such as operational fluctuations and time constraints faced by individuals. For this reason, the MOD/SDF introduced the flextime system in 2016 and enabled its staff to choose flexible working hours by dividing early/late shifts into multiple

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periods. In addition, telework, a work style that allows working at home has become available in the Internal Bureau of the MOD in FY2017 after two years of test introduction from FY2015. Organizations other than the Internal Bureau of the MOD aim to begin adopting this work system from FY2019 and are steadily making preparation by beginning to pilot the system.

2 Reform to Combine a Successful Career with Childrearing and Nursing Care

In order for MOD/SDF staff, both male and female, to be successful in their careers while realizing work-life balance, it is necessary to establish a system that enables balancing work with childrearing/nursing care, and to ensure childcare services tailored to the irregular working patterns unique to the SDF.

(1) Development of an Environment that Enables Staff to Realize a Successful Career While Engaging in Childrearing and Nursing Care

The MOD/SDF has developed various schemes, which enable staff to balance work with childrearing/nursing care, such as ensuring substitute personnel for staff who take childcare leave and other leaves. In particular, the ministry is encouraging its male staff to take childcare leave to promote their participation in family life.

The MOD/SDF is also developing an environment that enables staff to balance work life with their family life by distributing e-mail newsletters to help its staff to return to work smoothly after childcare leave and encouraging staff to use a “childcare form” to facilitate managers’ and the human resources department’s thorough and detailed understanding of the situation regarding childcare.

The MOD/SDF has a system to rehire SDF personnel who have previously resigned mid-career. It reassessed the system so that former SDF personnel who had resigned due to childrearing and nursing care could be reemployed from January 2017. Based on this

VOICE

Feelings about working again as a Ground Self Defense Force member

Western Army Medical Unit, First Lieutenant, Tomomi Ikezaki

I joined the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) in 1993 as an officer candidate and worked as a treatment platoon leader in the medical division, but in 1999, in my mid-career, I quit in order to take care of my first daughter. After it, I raised my three children as a care welfare specialist at the same time. My husband, an active member of the Self Defense Forces (SDF), told me about the renewed hiring program for former SDF members. I had not been thinking about coming back to the GSDF at all. Nevertheless, the enthusiasm from my youthful years rekindled my motivation and I immediately decided to volunteer again. Receipt of my appointment certificate after the interviews filled me with the same inspiration as when I first joined the GSDF.

I began working as a GSDF officer again on the 1st January, 2018. There have been many things to learn and remember given significant changes in the environment surrounding the GSDF and its role since I left. While everyday was challenging, I felt that I could be useful even after a blank of 18 years and was happy to be rehired. I greatly appreciate the support from my superiors, peers and family, and will strive to become even more effective for my unit.
system, some previous Ground Self-Defense Force personnel were recruited in January 2018.

(2) Ensuring Childcare Services
To allow SDF personnel who are rearing children to concentrate on their duties, it is important to ensure childcare services tailored to the irregular working patterns unique to the SDF. Since April 2007, the MOD/SDF has set up workplace nurseries at GSDF Camp Mishuku, GSDF Camp Kumamoto, GSDF Camp Makomanai, GSDF Asaka Camp dormitory district, MSDF Yokosuka Naval Base district, and ASDF Iruma Air Base, respectively. Additionally, in April 2017, a workplace nursery was newly opened at Ichigaya district where the MOD is located in April within National Defense Medical College in October 2017.

In addition, in the event of emergency operations such as disaster relief, the MOD promotes measures to provide temporary care within SDF camps and bases for children of SDF personnel who have no alternative but to attend to duties with their children.

3 Reform for Promoting the Careers of Female Personnel
For the further expansion of the recruitment and promotion of female personnel in a unified manner, the MOD/SDF has been making various efforts to advance the careers of motivated and qualified female personnel by setting up specific goals with regard to the recruitment and promotion of female personnel based on the “Action Plan for Promoting the Active Participation of Female Employees and Work-Life Balance.” Moreover, the MOD formulated the “Initiative to Promote Active Engagement of Female SDF Personnel – Aiming for Attractive SDF that Adapts to the Times and Environment” (the “Initiative”) in April 2017 to specify its conceptual policy for promoting the active participation of female SDF personnel.

(1) Significance of Promoting Active Engagement of Female SDF Personnel and Personnel Management Policy
The “Initiative” outlines the significance of promoting the active engagement of female personnel and the MOD/SDF personnel management policy. Specifically, with SDF duties becoming increasingly diverse and complex, SDF personnel are required to have multifaceted capabilities including higher levels of knowledge, decision-making ability, and skills than before. In addition, under a severe recruitment environment due to the declining birthrate and greater advancement into higher education, it is anticipated that the number of SDF personnel with time restraint including those involved in childcare, nursing care, and other responsibilities will significantly increase.

In light of these changes, the SDF is required to evolve from a conventional organization with an emphasis on homogeneity among the members, into an organization that is capable of incorporating diverse human resources in a flexible manner.

At the present moment, the largest human resource that the SDF has not been able to fully utilize is women, who account for half of the population targeted for recruitment. Promoting the active engagement of female SDF personnel has the following significance: (1) securing useful human resources; (2) utilizing diverse perspectives; and (3) reflecting values of the nation. For this reason, the MOD/SDF has decided to open up a path for female personnel with motivation, ability, and aptitude to have opportunities to demonstrate their abilities in various fields, and aim for doubling the ratio of female SDF personnel.

In terms of employing and promoting female SDF personnel, the MOD/SDF sets out a personnel management policy to ensure equal opportunity between men and women and assign the right person to the right place based on the person’s motivation and ability/aptitude.

(2) Removal of the Assignment Restriction of Female SDF Personnel
While the SDF has been accepting female SDF personnel since its establishment in 1954, assignment of female personnel had been restricted in some units, such as the GSDF infantry companies and tank companies. However, the Initiative, formulated in April 2017, virtually removed the restriction on the assignment of female personnel across the SDF.

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2 With regard to part of the GSDF NBC Weapon Defense Unit, the GSDF Tunnel Company, and MSDF submarines, the assignment restriction has not been removed due to reasons in relation to protecting motherhood and the characteristics of the equipment. Also, certain units such as GSDF rifle platoons and tank platoons from which the assignment restriction has been removed, personnel will be assigned successively to the units whose preparation has completed by proceeding with necessary preparation such as making of assignment standards.
(3) Expansion of the Recruitment of Female Personnel

a. Female SDF Personnel

As of the end of March 2018, the number of female SDF personnel is about 15,000 (about 6.5% of total SDF personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March 2008, about 4.9% of total SDF personnel), this is a rise of 1.6 percentage point, indicating that the ratio of female SDF personnel has been on the rise in recent years.

In order to increase the proportion of female SDF personnel among total SDF personnel to over 9% by 2030, the MOD/SDF plans to ensure that women account for more than 10% of total newly employed SDF personnel in and after FY2017. Specifically, the increase in the number of female recruits will be realized by measures such as the elimination of the gender quota and the increase in the scheduled number of female recruits.

In addition, with regard to promotion, the proportion of women among SDF personnel with a rank of field officer or higher will be increased from 3.1%. As for the careers of the personnel anticipated to reach a rank of field officer or higher in the future, an emphasis is given on assigning them to a commander or assistant commander post at the rank of company officer, with the hope of allowing them to gain experience.

Furthermore, in addition to these specific numerical targets, the “Initiative” formulated in April 2017 indicates that the MOD aims to double the percentage of female personnel in the overall SDF personnel and halve the mid-career retirement rate.

b. Female Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Others

As of the end of March 2018, the number of female civilian personnel - administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, and instructors, and others - is approximately 3,200 (about 24.0% of total civilian personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March 2008 when females made up 22.8% of the total civilian personnel), this is a rise of 1.2 percentage point, indicating that the ratio of female civilian personnel is on a rising trend in recent years.

With regard to recruitment, in line with the overall government target, the MOD has set up its goal of ensuring that women account for over 30% of recruits in and after FY2016. Regarding promotion, as a goal to be achieved by the end of FY2020, the proportion of women of the Division-Director level at local organizations and Assistant-Division-Director level at the ministry proper or equivalent should be approximately 5%, and the proportion of women of the Division-Director level at the ministry proper or equivalent should be approximately 2%, and the proportion of women of the Unit-Chief level at the ministry proper or equivalent should be approximately 27%.
Section 3 Enhancement of Medical Functions

For the SDF to perform its mission, SDF personnel must remain in good health through appropriate management of their health. Also, it is important that the SDF always seeks to enhance its capabilities in military medicine, such as first aid capabilities for protecting the lives of the personnel engaging in a variety of services as much as possible.

Under the circumstance where the SDF’s missions are becoming more diverse and internationalized, it is important to appropriately and accurately carry out medical activities such as medical care in disaster relief and international peace cooperation activities.

The MOD/SDF, therefore, is enhancing and strengthening its capabilities in military medicine to be able to appropriately carry out a variety of its missions, including in response to various emergency events and international peace cooperation activities.

1. SDF Hospitals as Hub Hospitals with Enhanced Functions

The role of SDF hospitals is to admit and treat injured SDF personnel and other persons transported from their area of activity in various emergency situations, while in normal circumstances these hospitals provide medical care to SDF personnel and their families, etc. These hospitals also play the role of educational institutions that train medical personnel and maintain and enhance their skills.

Based on the NDPG, etc., the MOD currently aspires to establish a high-quality medical care system through measures such as promoting the consolidation of SDF hospitals with increased performance levels, by reorganizing 16 SDF hospitals located nationwide into roughly 10 locations to develop more efficient and high-quality hospitals. For instance, MOD/SDF is promoting enhancement of medical care by making some SDF hospitals designated as secondary emergency medical institutions by the local municipalities to welcome emergency patients, etc.

2. Strengthening the Function of the National Defense Medical College

As the only educational institution for the training of physicians as well as public health and registered nurses under the jurisdiction of the MOD/SDF, the National Defense Medical College plays the role of training and producing the primary medical staff for the medical activities of the SDF as well as maintaining and improving their skills.

In such a situation, the NDPG, etc. states not only that the MOD/SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care system, including improved management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital, but also that the function of the National Defense Medical College would be strengthened as the training and research center for defense medicine. Based on these, the MOD is strengthening the organizational structure of the National Defense Medical College, enhancing its training and research functions, and strengthening its cooperation with all three branches of the SDF. Furthermore, the National Defense Medical College conducts advanced research on defense medicine by incorporating advanced medical technology in order to utilize specialized medical technology and to contribute to operation of SDF units as well as education and research of the National Defense Medical College.

3. Enhancement of Education of Medical Officers and Nurses

While greater abilities are required of personnel engaged in medical care, such as medical officers, due to the diversification of missions, only 80% of the positions have been filled in the case of medical officers in particular. Such low sufficiency is caused by medical officers leaving the SDF, one of the major reasons of which is the lack of opportunity to engage in medical training and practice. The MOD/SDF continues efforts to implement various measures to prevent medical officers from leaving the SDF by enhancing clinical education after graduation from the National Defense Medical College and other institutions, promoting various
initiatives for ensuring more opportunities for medical officers to engage in medical practice, helping them acquire and improve specialized knowledge and skills in areas such as infectious diseases, as well as increasing their motivation for work.

Furthermore, with the aim of training and securing high-quality public health/registered nurses, a four-year “nursing course” was established in the School of Medicine at the National Defense Medical College in April 2014, which is training public health/registered nurses who are capable of fully responding to the diversification of missions and the sophistication of medical technology. The first batch of students (109 students) graduated from the College in March 2018.

Moreover, medical personnel and medical staff are educated and trained at SDF hospitals, schools and other relevant institutions so that the SDF can perform diverse missions and missions under special circumstances.

4 ■ Enhancement of First Aid Capabilities on the Frontline

Based on the NDPG and other guidelines stating that the MOD “conducts a review on emergency medical treatment on situational responses and improves first aid capabilities on the frontline,” the MOD/SDF has conducted research on relevant initiatives taken by the U.S. Forces and carried out reviews for appropriate and accurate life-saving activities. For the purpose of deepening this review, the “Committee on accurate life-saving for the MOD/SDF first aid activities on the frontline” comprised of external experts, was held at the MOD in April 2015, and a report was prepared in September 2016 based on the discussions in the Committee. The MOD/SDF is working to develop a framework for providing maximum protection for the lives of the personnel injured on the frontline. Specifically, since 2017, the MOD commenced specific education and training for SDF personnel who are certified as both Licensed Practical Nurses and Emergency Life-Saving Technicians to acquire necessary knowledge and skills, so that the SDF personnel with these qualifications will be able to provide specialized relief treatments on the spot to SDF personnel who were injured on the frontline, prior to their transfer to SDF hospitals and other medical facilities. Those who have completed this education and training curriculum have been allocated to units as “Frontline Medics.”

5 ■ Improving the Capabilities to Deal With Infectious Diseases

In light of the response to the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa in 2014, the Ministerial Meeting on Measures on Emerging Infectious Diseases was established in September 2015 under close cooperation among relevant administrative bodies, for the entire government to advance effective and comprehensive measures on infectious diseases that could be a global threat. In the same month of the same year, a decision was made on the Basic Guidelines for Strengthening Measures on Emerging Infectious Diseases. This basic guideline stipulates that, “The Government of Japan will promote the improvement of the ability to address emerging infectious diseases at the Ministry of Defense and the Japan Self-Defense Forces by training human resources who have expertise that is necessary to contribute to the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ overseas activities and by accelerating the establishment of a framework including the National Defense Medical College.” In response to this, the MOD/SDF conducts various reviews on the enhancement of capabilities to respond to infectious diseases, a potential global threat. Based on these reviews as well as other factors, the MOD/SDF is currently improving the necessary facility equipment at the National Defense Medical College Hospital and the SDF Central Hospital. The aims of this improvement are to provide personnel training for the enhancement of capabilities to deal with infectious diseases and develop readiness for offering medical treatment to patients affected by infectious diseases.
Class I infectious diseases, which are classified as the most dangerous category of infectious diseases. The SDF Central Hospital was designated as a medical institution for Class I infectious diseases in April 2017 and has been implementing trainings to deal with infectious diseases.

In addition, the MOD also conducts research on advanced initiatives implemented by various foreign countries, and collects information by seizing opportunities such as defense medicine exchanges for the purpose of contributing to the enhancement of capabilities to deal with infectious diseases.

5 Ebola hemorrhagic fever, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, smallpox, South American hemorrhagic fevers, plague, Marburg disease, and Lassa disease (Article 6, Act on the Prevention of Infectious Diseases and Medical Care for Patients with Infectious Diseases)
While defense equipment has become more advanced and complex, the defense industry in Japan has been exposed to harsh conditions due to a decrease in the number of units procured caused by Japan's severe financial conditions and an increase in imports of foreign-made equipment. In addition, other countries are aiming to acquire advanced military capabilities utilizing the latest technologies. In order to ensure the quality of defense capabilities sufficiently and to enhance deterrence as well as response capabilities amid the situation in which rapid advancements in technological innovation have a significant influence on the global security environment, it is crucial that Japan ensure technological superiority over other countries. Hence, Japan is required to further develop defense equipment and technology policies while also taking into account these points.

Amid such a situation, it is indispensable to work on (1) strategic research and development for ensuring Japan’s technological superiority, (2) maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases, (3) strengthening of project management, and (4) promotion of defense equipment and technology cooperation, in order to maintain an environment in which defense equipment that meets the SDF’s operational needs will be procured into the future.

Section 1 Promotion of Research and Development for Ensuring Technological Superiority

1 Necessity of Ensuring Technological Superiority

As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe, it is necessary to ensure technological superiority by effectively utilizing Japan’s advanced technological strength in order to protect the lives and property of Japanese people in any situation. Particularly in recent years, with the rapid advances in technological innovation, it is forecast that we will see the operationalization of so-called game-changing technology that will completely transform combat aspects in the future, and the United States and other countries are proceeding hastily with research and development.

Thus, as a nation, strategically working on the ways to ensure technological superiority and ensuring advanced technology platforms are important from the perspective of creating superior defense equipment and ensuring Japan’s security, and also, improvement of technology platforms is a pressing issue. The state-of-the-art military technologies in each country are sensitive technologies that shall not be easily shared with other countries. From the perspective of Japan, for the areas, which should strategically maintain their domestic technology platforms, it is necessary to promote research and development domestically. In the cases of defense equipment procurement and technology cooperation such as international joint development, it is important to maintain the leading role by owning important cutting-edge technology (key technology). This requires not only research and development by the MOD, but also the promotion of research and development by both the public and private sectors together.
2 Defense Technology Strategy and related documents

For the purpose of ensuring Japan’s technological superiority, inventing as well as delivering advanced equipment in an effective and efficient manner, and dealing with various policy issues pertaining to defense and civilian technologies, taking account of the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), the MOD formulated the Defense Technology Strategy in August 2016, which presented the specific direction for various measures that should be addressed strategically. Based on this strategy, the MOD promotes various measures.

1 Overview of Defense Technology Strategy

(1) MOD Technology Policy Objectives
The following two objectives of the MOD technology policy are designed to strengthen the technical capabilities, which are the foundation of Japan’s defense capabilities, to make the foundation more robust:
(i) Ensuring technical superiority
(ii) Delivering superior defense equipment through effective and efficient research and development

(2) Specific Measures to be Promoted
The following three measures are promoted to achieve the objectives indicated in the previous paragraph.
(i) Grasping Technological Information
With regard to various scientific technologies that support defense technologies, the MOD grasps the current situation and trends both in and outside of Japan including dual-use technology in the public and private sectors and cutting-edge scientific technology. In addition, the MOD develops and publishes the Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook (see Paragraph 2 below) to identify advanced technology fields, which have the potential to become game changers.
(ii) Development of Technologies
The MOD formulates the “Research and Development Vision” (see Paragraph 3 below) that promotes medium-to long-term research and development. At the same time, it also promotes research and development that serve as the foundation of defense force building and initiatives such as “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security,” which puts into perspective the identification and development of advance technology expected to be used for technology exchange with relevant domestic/overseas agencies and defense purposes.
(iii) Protection of Technologies
The MOD implements technology control for proper technology transfer to prevent situations in which Japan’s technology leaks without the country’s intention, undermining the maintenance of the peace and security of the international community or ensuring Japan’s technological superiority. The MOD also establishes intellectual property management taking into account the transfer of defense equipment and promotes the utilization of intellectual property.

2 Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook

The Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook presents an outlook of the technologies that can be applied to equipment expected to be established in roughly the next 20 years, and indicates technology fields that need to be developed in order to ensure Japan’s technological superiority, with a particular focus on advanced technology fields that have the potential to become game changers. It is expected that making this Outlook, public will facilitate the integration of superior civilian advanced technologies and the development of technologies outside of the ministries aimed at defense equipment applications.

This Outlook selects and makes a comprehensive assessment of 57 cases of “future equipment technologies” and 21 cases of “potential technologies,” and on that basis, identifies the following four technology fields as the focus of research and development going forward:
(i) Efforts for unmanned technology
(ii) Efforts for smart and network technology
(iii) Efforts for high-power energy technology
(iv) Efforts to improve the function and performance of legacy systems

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1 Technology fields with future importance and element technology
2 Technologies, which are in the basic research stage at this point in time, but which will dramatically enhance the function of existing equipment, etc. and have the potential for inventing new equipment, if applied to equipment, etc. in the future
Chapter 4
Measures on Defense Equipment and Technology

3 “Research and Development Vision”

The “Research and Development Vision” provides the direction of medium to long-term research and development by clarifying technical challenges regarding equipment that are deemed to become important, and presenting a concept for defense equipment that looks ahead to the future and a roadmap for research and development to achieve the concept.

The MOD publishes research and development visions and shares them with the defense industry, with the aim of increasing predictability for relevant companies and realizing more effective and efficient research and development. So far, the MOD has prepared and published the “Future Fighter R&D Vision” in August 2010 and the “Research and Development Vision of Future Unmanned Equipment: Focusing on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle” in August 2016. Based on these visions, the MOD is currently conducting various research and study toward technological demonstrations including those for beyond line-of-sight type unmanned aerial vehicles.

The MOD will continue to establish and publish research and development visions for equipment that requires development and enhancement of technological bases while ascertaining trends in defense technologies.

3 Initiatives regarding Research and Development

The MOD invents equipment that meets the needs of the SDF indicated in the Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP), including (1) improvement of air defense capability, (2) enhancement of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, (3) unmanned equipment that can be used flexibly at times of various contingencies including large-scale disasters, and (4) enhancement of the capacity of existing equipment.

The MOD also makes proposals regarding highly promising technologies based on technological trends, as well as adopting advanced technologies and dual-use technologies for prototyping, and conducts testing and evaluation of the prototype equipment. Particularly for improving air defense capability, with regard to future fighters, the MOD conducts strategic studies including research on the large-thrust and compact engines, the advanced sensor system that integrates radars and infrared sensors to enable detecting and tracking of advanced sensor and electronic equipment, and study on EMP protection technology. The MOD also conducts research regarding the element technology of the next generation of night vision devices as well as components of EMP warheads (EMP radiation part), which induce the malfunction and destruction of sensor and electronic equipment, and study on EMP protection technology. The MOD also conducts research regarding the electromagnetic acceleration system that utilizes electric energy to accelerate the speed, extend the range and realize the higher power of projectiles, which are not feasible using conventional gunpowder, research regarding the high-energy laser system that responds to threats such as a large number of small unmanned aerial vehicles and mortar shells that fly high and low in the sky for a low cost and short reaction time, research on element technology of HVGP (Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile) intended for the defense of remote islands.

Furthermore, in the area of advanced research, which has the potential to ensure technological superiority, the MOD conducts research regarding the element technology of the next generation of night vision devices as well as components of EMP warheads (EMP radiation part), which induce the malfunction and destruction of sensor and electronic equipment, and study on EMP protection technology. The MOD also conducts research regarding the electromagnetic acceleration system that utilizes electric energy to accelerate the speed, extend the range and realize the higher power of projectiles, which are not feasible using conventional gunpowder, research regarding the high-energy laser system that responds to threats such as a large number of small unmanned aerial vehicles and mortar shells that fly high and low in the sky for a low cost and short reaction time, research on element technology of HVGP (Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile) intended for the defense of remote islands.

To improve ISR capabilities, the MOD undergoes
which can glide at high velocity and attack a target in order to enable island-to-island firing, and research regarding miniaturization of high-power engines and the entire system design through simulation models in order to improve mobility on the sea for the future amphibious technology. Furthermore, the MOD began development of a new test and evaluation facility “Iwakuni Oceanic Environmental Test and Evaluation Satellite (provisional name)” in Iwakuni City to efficiently and effectively conduct research on unmanned underwater vehicles, etc. using dual-use technologies based on the “Basic Policy on the Relocation of Governmental Organizations.”

### 4  Active Utilization of Civilian Technology

The Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) and domestic research institutions, such as universities and independent administrative institutions, proactively engage in research collaborations and technological information exchanges in order to ensure that advanced civilian technology is incorporated and efficient research and development is conducted. In FY2015 the MOD launched a competitive research funding program called “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” to discover creative research activities conducted in universities, research institutes, companies, etc., which are expected to apply defense equipment in the future and to promote promising research seeds.

While total of 33 research projects were awarded by FY2017, this program was expanded in FY2017 in order to enable the awards of larger-scale and longer-term research projects (total budget of about 11 billion yen). The program will continue to run on a similar scale in FY2018.

In the basic research areas, free thinking of researchers leads to innovative and creative results. For this reason, it is necessary to assign maximum value to freedom of research when sponsoring research, so that, for example, researchers will be able to publish all of their research results to have a wide range of academic discussions. Hence, in this program the MOD will neither restrict contractors’ publication of research results, nor designate research results as confidential, never providing any confidential data to researchers. In actuality, some research results have already been published through oral presentations, publications, etc. From the perspective of smooth implementation of research projects, program officers, who are in charge of managing research progress, are assigned in the same manner as competitive research funding programs being conducted by other government ministries and agencies. The program officers provide support including checking research progress and processing budget execution procedures.

Active utilization of advanced civilian technology through such programs is not only essential for securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of the Japanese people into the future, but is also beneficial for the development of Japan’s science, technology and innovation in non-defense areas as well, similar to how investment in innovative technology by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the United States facilitated advances in science and technology as a whole including civilian technology, such as the development of the Internet and GPS. From this perspective, the MOD intends to promote relevant measures.

Moreover, under the Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (CSTI), the “Council for Innovation Strategy” was launched with the Chief Cabinet Secretary as the chairman in order to coordinate implementation of comprehensive strategies. The Minister of Defense participates in it as a member with the aim of promoting policies of science and technology that directly connect with ensuring safety and security of the public by further strengthening cooperation among industry, government and academia, etc.

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3 Decided at the Advisory Council on Vitalizing Towns, People and Jobs on March 22, 2016

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See Fig. III-4-1-1 (FY2017 Awarded Research Projects for the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” Program
**Fig. III-4-1-1** FY2017 Awarded Research Projects for the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Title</th>
<th>Brief Summary</th>
<th>Representative Institution for the Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fundamental researches of fluid and combustion for the hypersonic flight</td>
<td>This project aims to acquire a method that estimates combustion phenomenon in a hypersonic flow and aerodynamic heating from data obtained by ground-based facilities via wind tunnel tests, flight tests, and simulators for the purpose of enhancing fundamental technology that supports future hypersonic aviation.</td>
<td>Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of a mid-infrared quantum cascade lasers of high beam quality by photonic crystal structures</td>
<td>This project aims to realize a mid-infrared light source with high output and high beam quality by introducing a surface emitting element using photonic crystal to the quantum cascade laser.</td>
<td>National Institute for Quantum Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of innovative material technology for uncooled turbine system</td>
<td>This project aims to make a feasibility study of an uncooled turbine system based on the molybdenum alloy and nickel alloy materials for utilization in an aircraft engine through surveying material technology and manufacturing process.</td>
<td>IHI Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of remote sensing technology for trace hazardous substances in the atmosphere by resonance Raman effect</td>
<td>This project aims to realize the method of identifying the type, volume, and location of the multiple toxic substances immediately from a distance, by radiating the laser and measuring resonance Raman scattering light emitted by substances.</td>
<td>Shikoku Research Institute Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative high-power/high-frequency devices utilizing ultimate quantum confinement effect</td>
<td>This project aims to enhance output power of high-frequency devices dramatically by applying an electron transport channel structure that is realized by means of a strong quantum confinement effect enabled by a new semiconductor material, and by applying a high heat dissipation material.</td>
<td>Fujitsu Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research on improving reliability management technology of composites structure bonding</td>
<td>This project aims to realize technology for high-sensitivity and high precision detection of buried objects under the ocean floor by building an electromagnetic field transmission model with considering the factors in microscopic electromagnetic response in ocean water, with applying this model to the sensor technology.</td>
<td>Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High resolution stereoscopic image estimation of buried material in heterogeneous medium by multi angle 3-D holographic GB-SAR (1)</td>
<td>This project aims to realize a measurement method for estimation of the stereoscan image of buried material from the ground through observation of electromagnetic wave scattering from the buried material with multiple aspects.</td>
<td>Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-situ electrochemical measurement of epoxy equivalent weight at CFRP (2) adhesive interphase</td>
<td>This project aims to realize a new evaluation method to visualize molecular level adhesive imperfection at adhesive interface through electrochemical observation of molecular bonds in CFRP adhesive.</td>
<td>Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The research on seawater microscopic electromagnetic field response and its application for seafloor exploration</td>
<td>This project aims to realize technology for high-sensitivity and high precision detection by applying an electron transport channel structure that is realized by means of a strong quantum confinement effect enabled by a new semiconductor material, and by applying a high heat dissipation material.</td>
<td>National Institute of Information and Communications Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The proposal of rechargeable batteries accumulating electrons in trap levels of semiconductor materials</td>
<td>This project aims to realize a semiconductor solid-state battery which expects excellent safety features because of the need of ion transfer and chemical reaction.</td>
<td>Toshiba Materials Co., Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optical materials and lenses with ultra-wide transmission wavelength from visible to far-infrared</td>
<td>This project aims to realize optical materials and systems with transmittance over an ultra-broadband range from visible to far-infrared through discovery of new optical materials, lens formation process research, and optical design for realizing ultra-broadband resolution.</td>
<td>Panasonic Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of non-volatile and high energy density secondary battery</td>
<td>This project aims to realize an innovative lithium rechargeable battery with excellent safety and high energy density by raising the volatilization temperature of the electrolyte.</td>
<td>Hitachi, Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research on active control of acoustic impedance by MUT(3)-type acoustic metamaterial</td>
<td>This project aims for realization of an acoustic meta-material that actively controls acoustic features using MEMS (4) technology based on an acoustic impedance matching physical model.</td>
<td>Hitachi, Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of ultra-high temperature barrier coating system</td>
<td>This project aims to realize a ceramic coating material for an ultra-high temperature thermal barrier, designed and reviewing an optimal chemical composition and layer structure by theoretical calculation, and optimizing conditions through an actual process.</td>
<td>Japan Fine Ceramics Center</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*1. GB-SAR: Ground-Based Synthetic Aperture Radar
*2. CFRP: Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic
*3. MUT: Micro machined Ultrasonic Transduce
*4. MEMS: Micro Electro Mechanical Systems
**VOICE**

Development of consumer products using the security technology research promotion program

Osaka City University, Graduate School of Engineering, Chemistry and Biology Department, Professor Yusuke Yamada

I have studied heterogeneous catalysts working as well as adsorbents for safety removal of pesticides and other toxic substances released in water and air. The final goal of the research is protecting agricultural workers from exposure to the harmful chemicals by using a developed heterogeneous catalyst that can be applied to an agrochemical protection mask in future. This research is supported by “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security,” which has started one and a half years ago. Regularly scheduled meetings with a program officer during the period are valuable opportunities to receive useful advice from an expert perspective.

![Writer analyzing test results (research representative)](image)

**Commentary**

Technology interaction with the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

In the United States Department of Defense, various research organizations contribute to technology development, and DARPA invests in breakthrough technologies for national security. Investment by DARPA have contributed to the creation of new defense technology such as precision weapons and stealth technology, but also icons of civilian society such as the Internet and Global Positioning System receivers small enough to fit in your hand. DARPA is an important actor in the U.S. innovation ecosystem. The Ministry of Defense has conducted technology exchanges with various defense research organizations, including DARPA, in order to carry out efficient technology development.

![Technical exchange between representatives from DARPA and MOD](image)
Excellent defense production and technological bases are indispensable in inventing superior defense equipment in an effective and efficient manner, while ensuring technological superiority. For this reason, the MOD established the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases in June 2014 to maintain and strengthen the bases.

1 The Current Status of Japan’s Defense Production and Technological Bases

The term “defense production and technological bases” refers to the human, physical and technological bases for development, production, operation, sustainment and maintenance, remodeling, and refurbishment of defense equipment required for the MOD/SDF’s activities. In Japan, most of those bases are covered by companies (the defense industry) that manufacture defense equipment and associated items. Therefore, a broad range of companies, which own special and advanced skills and facilities are involved in the defense production and technological bases. Meanwhile, the degree of defense demand dependence (the ratio of defense-related sales that accounts for the entire company sales) is approximately 3% on average, indicating that defense businesses are not their primary business in many companies. Furthermore, Japanese defense production and technological bases face some issues such as difficulties in maintaining and passing on skills and techniques and withdrawal of some companies from defense businesses because the effect of mass production is hard to expect due to limited demand, and unit costs and maintenance/sustainment costs are increasing due to the advances in recent defense equipment. In addition, while research and development expenditure is increasing, the ratio of research and development expenditure to defense-related expenditure has leveled off.

Furthermore, changes in the international environment such as the realignment of the Western defense industries and advances in international joint development and production projects can be mentioned as the issues that impact on Japan’s defense production and technological bases. There are also new changes emerging in the institutional framework, such as the transfer of defense equipment and technology based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (see Section 4), which was approved by the Cabinet in April 2014.

2 The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases

In light of the current situation, for the purpose of maintaining and strengthening Japan’s defense production and technological bases, which is important and an essential element supporting Japan’s defense capability, the “Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases” was adopted in June 2014. The Strategy responded to the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), replacing “Kokusankahoshin (guideline for domestic development/production).”

1 For example, it is said that there are approximately 1,100 fighter aircraft-related companies, approximately 1,300 tank-related companies, and approximately 8,300 destroyer-related companies.
2 According to the survey on defense demand dependence conducted with 46 defense-related companies based on their sales performance in FY2015. Although relatively small in scale, some companies possess important technologies for supporting the defense industry with over 50% of the defense demand dependence, in which case the scale of defense demand has a significant impact on the management of these companies.
3 The basic guideline for production and development of defense equipment, the development guideline for defense industry, and the stimulation guideline for R&D (Directive July 16, 1970)
Overview of Defense Production and Technological Bases

(1) Significance of Formulation of the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases

“The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases” has made the following three points clear: (1) the context of the formulation of the strategy on defense production and technological bases and the status of this strategy; (2) characteristics of defense production and technological bases; and (3) changes in the security environment surrounding defense production and technological bases.

(2) Goals and Significance of Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases

Through the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases, the MOD intends to (1) ensure sovereignty of security, (2) potentially contribute to deterrence enhancement, and maintain and improve bargaining power, and (3) contribute to the sophistication of the domestic industry in Japan driven by cutting-edge technology.

(3) Basic Stance for Promoting Measures

For the promotion of measures, it is necessary to take into account the following basic viewpoints: (1) establishing long-term partnership between the private and public sectors; (2) strengthening international competitiveness; and (3) ensuring consistency with effective and efficient acquisition of defense equipment.
(4) Methods of Defense Equipment Procurement

With regard to defense equipment procurement, currently multiple methods, such as domestic development, international joint development and production, licensed domestic production, utilization of commercially produced goods, and imports, are adopted. These methods directly affect defense production and technological bases. According to the characteristics of defense equipment, it is necessary to select the acquisition method appropriately, including international joint development and production, which became more agile and flexible due to the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.

(5) Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases

In order to carry out the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases, the MOD will promote the following measures with a focus on variation and efficiency, while considering Japan’s severe financial condition: (1) improvement of the contract system; (2) efforts regarding research and development; (3) promotion of defense equipment and technology cooperation; (4) initiatives regarding defense industrial organizations including the building of a robust production and technology platform through understanding actual conditions of supply chain; (5) strengthening of the MOD’s structure through the establishment of ATLA, etc.; and (6) collaborative measures with other relevant ministries and government agencies.

(6) Courses of Actions for Each Defense Equipment Sectors

With regard to the main defense equipment sectors (such as land equipment, supplies, etc., ships, aircraft, explosives, guided weapons, communications electronics and command control systems, unmanned equipment, space systems and cyber), the MOD will analyze the current situation of defense production and technological bases. At the same time, it will also take the following actions. Based on the priority matters for developing the SDF’s structure indicated in NDPG, the MOD will present the future direction of the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases and the acquisition plan for each defense equipment sectors, and thereby, seek to increase predictability for companies.

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### Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improve contract system</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Utilize negotiated contracts</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Introduce longer-term contracts (multi-year procurements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establish flexible systems for taking orders such as joint ventures</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Decrease procurement cost and improve companies’ incentives to reduce cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Enhance project management throughout equipment’s life-cycle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Measures regarding Research and Development (R&amp;D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Formulate a R&amp;D vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Develop ability to survey technological information including civilian advanced technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strengthen cooperation with universities and research institutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cooperation with and utilizing R&amp;D programs including those that cover dual-use technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fund advanced research with promising output for defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Strengthen cooperation with overseas organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense equipment and technology cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Deepen defense equipment and technology cooperation with the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establish new defense equipment and technology cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Contributing to international logistics systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Improving bases for defense equipment and technology cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Promote application of defense equipment to civilian use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Technology control and information security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures regarding defense industry organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Promote understanding of significance of defense business and industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Maintain resilient supply chains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Defense industrial organizations and applications of contract systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen MOD’s structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Implementation of efforts such as unification of departments associated with equipment acquisition, as a part of MOD reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Implementation of strengthening inspection and audit functions as well as the training of human resources in project management and procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures through cooperation with relevant ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consideration of support measures through the use of policies of other ministries such as Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(1) Past Initiatives

Based on the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases, the MOD has implemented various measures contributing to the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases, such as the improvement of contract system including the Long-term Contract Act, and the establishment of ATLA, which was formed by integrating the organizations involved in the procurement of defense equipment.

In addition, the following new measures are also taken in ATLA.
Defense of Japan

Chapter 4

Measures on Defense Equipment and Technology

Section 2

Fig. III-4-2-4

Direction in the Various Defense Equipment Sectors (Outline)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground equipment</th>
<th>Supplies, etc.</th>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Explosives</th>
<th>Guided weapons</th>
<th>Communications electronics and command control systems</th>
<th>Unmanned equipment</th>
<th>Cyber and space systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grasping the supply chain in the defense industry and making use of its world-class level of strength in this area, the MOD will maintain its production and technological bases to the appropriate level. In addition, production and technological bases for mobile combat vehicles etc., will be built.</td>
<td>Based on factors such as compatibility with the physical characteristics of the Japanese people, the relevant foundations will be maintained, thereby making it possible to continue the procurement of supplies from domestic companies.</td>
<td>With regard to vessels, in order to enable the MOD to respond to the latest technology such as stealth capabilities, production and technological bases will be maintained and strengthened through the entry of multiple prime enterprises.</td>
<td>For the acquisition of F-35A aircraft, the MOD will make efforts to promote the industrial participation of Japanese companies in production and to prepare for the start of Regional MRU5U for F-35 aircraft in the Asia-Pacific region. As for future fighter aircraft, necessary measures including empirical research will be taken so as to maintain the option of the development of future fighter aircraft including the possibility of international joint development of an aircraft to replace the F-2 when it is time to retire it.</td>
<td>A certain scale of procurement from domestic companies will continue to be made possible and bases, which ensure the necessary scale of explosions in various situations, will be maintained.</td>
<td>In order to improve air defense performance, technological considerations regarding future SAMs will be pursued to further strengthen the relevant technological bases. A vision for research and development for the implementation of technological examinations of future guided weapons will be established including propulsion devices such as fixed rocket motors and other technologies required to improve the performance of various types of guided weapons such as the extension of their launch range.</td>
<td>Research and development on cutting-edge technology for the bases required for defense will be implemented with priority, involving the improvement of the detection performance of fixed warning and control radar systems as well as the simultaneous, parallel use of multiple sonar systems. At the same time, the technological bases will be maintained and strengthened by pursuing the applicability of cutting-edge civilian technology.</td>
<td>In light of the trend towards defense technology such as future battle conditions, smarter technologies and networking, a vision for research and development will be established and proactive research will be implemented for the enhancement of technological bases in order to present a direction of unmanned equipment whilst taking the perspective of integrated operation into account.</td>
<td>While cooperating with the MOD’s initiatives to increase its capability to respond to cyber attacks and policies relating to the use of space development, from the perspective of the defense of Japan, the future outlook of defense production and technological bases, which will be required in the future, will be discussed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Formulation of the Acquisition Strategic Plan for promoting project management, and improvement of contract systems (see Section 3).
- Participation of Japanese companies in the international F-35 Program and defense equipment and technology cooperation involving joint research and development with other countries (see Section 4).
- Grasping the supply chain in the defense industry and responses to risks in order to maintain and strengthen defense production and technological bases.
- Adopting a new procurement method for acquiring an escort ship (new destroyer) to ensure future technologies and price competitiveness while maintaining defense production and technological bases, as well as using advanced design and construction technology.

(2) Future Initiatives

With the understanding that defense production and technological bases are an important and indispensable foundation supporting Japan’s defense capabilities, ATLA plays the main role in promoting measures for defense equipment and technology while cooperating with relevant ministries, government agencies, and private companies, etc. These measures include swift application of quickly progressing advanced civilian technologies, promotion of defense equipment and technological cooperation as a package including maintenance, etc., early detection of risks pertaining to supply chains, and promotion of the matching of small and medium sized enterprises with the MOD/SDF.


Section 2
VOICE

Defense industry supporting development of defense capabilities

NANRI Co., Ltd., Representative Director and President, Kazuhiro Nanri

NANRI Co., Ltd., was founded in 1939 and manufactured automobile and special vehicle parts as a supervised plant for the Army Arsenal during the war and as a registered vendor for the U.S. Military Procurement Bureau after the war. Our involvement in defense products began with repairs of underbody parts (trackbelt, track rollers, and sprockets) of tracked vehicles (tanks, armored cars, and others) provided to the Ground Self Defense Forces from the U.S. military. We developed our unique repair technologies by using U.S. military manuals as reference. Now we are mainly conducting repairs of underbody parts of all armored vehicles of the Ground Self Defense Forces as our primary business.

NANRI Co. Ltd is a small company with about 20 employees. We creatively produce machine tools and repair tools necessary for our work so that we can perform almost all processes internally. All employees (including the president) are skilled workers who are engaged in field operations. Given difficulties of technology transmission, which is an issue for small companies, we are making efforts to assure the stable quality through the application of new technologies (such as welding robots).

The business environment for tracked vehicles has been getting severe in recent years. While this raises concerns about continuing our business because we heavily rely on the defense industry, I believe that it is important to keep our repair technology that has been cultivated over many years, and to maintain our pride and sense of responsibility as the only domestic repair company. We will continue to work on maintaining our foundation with manufacturing capabilities that are trusted by customers.
Since defense equipment is becoming more advanced and complex in recent years, the cost of the entire life cycle of the equipment has tended to increase (equipment design, research and development, full rate production and acquisition, and maintenance). For acquiring the necessary number of equipment when it is needed, it is extremely important to streamline the process throughout the life cycle of equipment.

Therefore, the Department of Project Management in ATLA selects important equipment which functions, performance, costs and schedule are managed throughout the life cycle of equipment (project management), and works to realize the most efficient acquisition in accordance with operational needs.

To realize the efficient acquisition of equipment that will enable effective and efficient operation and maintenance, in addition to the 12 equipment for project management selected in November 2015, the MOD selected another equipment for project management as well as 3 equipment for semi-project management\(^1\) in April 2017. The MOD designated a Project Manager (PM) responsible for project management for each equipment. At the same time, the Ministry also established the Integrated Project Team (IPT), which is composed of officials from relevant departments within the Ministry. In 2016 and 2017, for the equipment of project management and the equipment for semi-project management, the MOD prepared the Acquisition Strategy and the Acquisition Plan to state the basic matters necessary to practice project management systematically, such as the purpose of the acquisition program and acquisition policy, and the cost of the life cycle. The MOD practices project management in accordance with these plans and works to realize the most strategically efficient equipment acquisition.

Specifically, in light of acquisition plans prepared by each service and the status of these plans, ATLA checks the progress of each acquisition program and the status of cost from a comprehensive perspective. In 2017, ATLA also carried out a comparison between these statuses and the Acquisition Strategy of the 12 equipment for project management selected in 2016, conducted quantitative and objective analysis and evaluation based on these plans, and reviewed the Acquisition Strategy. Regarding equipment that has not yet been selected for project management or semi-project management, ATLA is also considering designating them as new project and semi-project.

### Initiatives to Promote and Strengthen Project Management

The following initiatives are being conducted to promote and strengthen project management.

#### (1) Cost and Schedule Management Using WBS

For project management of certain kinds of equipment, especially for the management of cost and schedule of...
the equipment, the MOD promotes the introduction of the cost and schedule management method for visualizing the progress by each Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), to detect early the signs of cost increase and schedule delay so that swift measures can be taken.

(2) Method for More Accurate Cost Estimate
Costs such as life cycle cost are estimated based on actual cost data of similar equipment developed or introduced in the past. However, as a larger amount of cost data is needed for a more accurate estimate, the MOD has built a cost database and promotes the collection of cost data. Since accumulating sufficient amount of cost data takes time, using statistical methods is also considered.

(3) Development and Accumulation of Expertise through Strengthened Cooperation with Research and Educational Institutions, etc.
For further improving the management skill as of project managers and for developing human resources among those who engages in project management, the MOD strengthens collaboration with research and educational institutions on project management by regular training sessions on project management methods used overseas and in the private sectors.

3 Effective and Efficient Acquisition from a joint Perspective
Acquisition of defense equipment based on a joint perspective is required to build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force.

So far, based on the, the Ministry has been striving to reduce development, acquisition, and maintenance expenses through (1) making the equipment function integrated, and (2) procuring common equipment and supplies in bulk, standardizing some components, and development of product families, etc.

Hereafter, the Ministry will promote effective and efficient acquisition throughout the life cycle of the defense equipment by adopting perspective of project management from the conceptual phase that is becoming more advanced and complex due to the cutting-edge technology such as systemization and networking technology.

2 Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters

1 Reviewing Acquisition Systems
For the purpose of promoting acquisition reform, which is a prompt response to swiftly changing surroundings, the MOD has been holding meetings of the Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Committee since 2007, besides the Contractual Systems Study Groups has been held since 2010 to review acquisition systems. Since FY2016, a special research officer system has been adopted in order to surely embody the review results.

2 Long-Term Contracts, etc.
The production of defense equipment requires a significant amount of time. Therefore, if a certain set amount is to be procured in bulk, in many cases a contract for more than five years is needed. With regard to defense equipment and services, economies of scale tend not to work mainly due to the following reasons: (1) the annual procurement quantity is small; (2) the MOD is the only customer; and (3) companies that provide such defense equipment, etc., are limited. In addition, it is difficult for companies to systematically move forward with their businesses with a high degree of economies of scale.

Developments of product families
This refers to adding different variations to the functions and performance of equipment to enable them to respond to different operational demands, while standardizing their basic component parts.

KEY WORD

Part Initiaties to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace

Chapter 4 Measures on Defense Equipment and Technology

DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2018

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predictability, which is peculiar to the defense industry.

For these reasons, the upper limit of acts that incur national debt prescribed in the Public Finance Act as within five years in principle was changed to within ten years for specific equipment through the enactment of the Long-term Contract Act. The introduction of this change regarding long-term contracts will make stable procurement possible, leading to the realization of the systematic improvement of defense capability. At the same time, for companies, given that the procurement amount will be assured, the systematic use of personnel and equipment, as well as cost reductions due to bulk orders, will be made possible. Furthermore, this will prevent subcontractors from withdrawing from the defense industry.

In addition, by realizing longer-term multiple-year contracts utilizing the PFI Act, it achieves the planned acquisition and execution of budgets through the standardization of investment amounts of the national expenditure and draws out certain benefits such as cutting equipment procurement costs by reducing risks for those taking orders and by promoting the entry of new suppliers. As projects using the PFI Act, the MOD launched the “project of development and operation of X-band satellite communications” in January 2013 and the “project of operation and management of private ships” in March 2016.

In addition, regarding procurement of certain equipment with which little competitiveness can be expected due to its characteristics, and companies that work on cost reduction using the MOD’s programs, the MOD promotes limited tendering contracts while ensuring transparency and fairness as well as clarifying and putting the subject into patterns, from the perspective of the implementation of smooth and efficient procurement, and the enhancement of the company’s predictability.

Specifically, as a new initiative, in acquiring new destroyers with the combined features of improved capabilities to respond to various missions and a compact hull, the MOD has adopted a procurement method to acquire the new destroyer efficiently equipped with the necessary functions and to maintain and strengthen the construction technology base since February 2017. This is done by selecting a party that has made the best proposal with respect to the MOD’s requirements as a procurement counterparty, with the runner-up also involved in designing and building facilities as a subcontractor. The MOD concluded a proposal agreement in April 2017 and decided on a procurement counterparty and a subcontractor in August 2017.

With regard to the procurement of defense equipment, there is a large variety of equipment without a market price, and therefore, they tend to have high prices. In light of this characteristic, it is necessary to achieve both the reduction of procurement cost and improvement of companies’ incentives to reduce cost simultaneously. Thus, the MOD has been striving to achieve the reduction of procurement prices by confirming the actual costs incurred and ensuring that no excessive business profit will be added after the execution of the contract through cost audit contracts with a special provision requiring respective companies to conduct a review of the contract sum and return any excessive profit (audit contracts incorporating a provision requiring the return of excessive profit).

However, it has also been noted that these contracts diminish the companies’ motivation for cost reduction as they would be required to return excessive profits after the completion of the contract payment at the end of the fiscal year. Therefore, the MOD is developing a new incentive contract system in which public and private sectors jointly carry out the management of contract implementation to minimize the risk of it, and in which a certain percentage will be given back to the companies if the cost reduction has been performed.

In addition, using special research officers and companies with expertise, the MOD conducts examinations of frameworks for reviewing cost reduction measures based on a public-private partnership, and new methods for more efficient and reduced equipment procurement costs by encouraging competition among companies by way of the MOD’s active evaluation of business partners.

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6 “Special Measures Law Concerning the Term of Expenditure Based on the Obligatory Assurance of National Subsidization for Specific Defense Procurement” (enacted in April 2015)
7 Act on Promotion of Private Finance Initiative
3 Initiatives Aimed at Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement, and Other Related Initiatives

1 Effective and Efficient Maintenance and Replenishment

With regard to periodic maintenance checks of defense equipment, the MOD has been working to achieve greater efficiency by extending the interval between the maintenance checks, after making sufficient effort to ensure safety. In addition, the MOD embarks on the introduction of Performance Based Logistics (PBL)\(^8\) from the perspective of improving the equipment availability ratio and long-term cost reductions. In the FY2018 budget, cost savings can be expected due to conclusion of an umbrella agreement regarding maintenance parts for the F110 engine (for fighter (F-2)) and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) and others.

2 Achieving Further Efficiency in the Acquisition of Defense Equipment

When acquiring defense equipment, the MOD aims to reduce development, acquisition, and maintenance expenses by procuring common equipment and supplies in bulk, standardizing some components, and developing product families, etc., in addition to a review of the contract system. The MOD also carries out bulk purchases, seeking greater efficiency by budgeting and entering into contracts for defense equipment, supplies, and components based on the approach of consolidating the quantities required for several years into a single specific fiscal year. In the FY2018 budget, some reduction in expenses is expected due to a bulk purchase of the next-generation IFF equipment for fighters (F-15), computer software licenses, and other equipment.

In addition, the MOD is facilitating the compilation of a database on the breakdown of procurement price and actual price of major equipment in the past. By using this database, the Ministry expects not only to verify the validity of procurement prices, but also to enhance the accuracy and efficiency of life cycle cost estimation for new equipment.

3 Efforts to Increase Fairness and Transparency

The MOD implements measures for making contracts more appropriate and strengthening checking functions to promote the enhancement of fairness and transparency in relation to the acquisition of equipment and materials.

As a part of the effort to “make public procurement more appropriate” across the whole government, the MOD continues to carry out the introduction and expansion of a comprehensive evaluation bidding system\(^9\) and make bidding procedures more efficient. In addition

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\(^8\) PBL is a contract method that involves payment of compensation according to the level of equipment performance achieved, in terms of availability ratio and stable stock. It has achieved positive outcomes upon application to the maintenance and servicing of equipment in Western countries.

\(^9\) Unlike the automatic bid system which focuses only on price, this is a system which the successful bidder is determined on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation that includes both the price and other elements. This method is adopted when it is appropriate to carry out such procedures as evaluating the technological elements.
to these, based on reflection on the past, strengthening system investigation, reviewing penalties, ensuring the effectiveness of supervision and inspection, and other measures have steadily been carried out in order to prevent recurrence of incidents such as overcharging and falsified results of equipment testing by defense-related companies. Through these measures, the MOD strives to surely prevent recurrence of scandals, enhance fairness and transparency, and make contracts more appropriate.

In addition, ATLA carries out multilayered checks through both internal and external checking systems for stricter checks — namely, ATLA conducts internal inspections, by establishing the inspection and audit department, and through deliberations in the Defense Procurement Council, consisting of external experts, and defense inspection conducted by the Inspector General’s Office of Legal Complaints. Moreover, ATLA has also improved its education department and strives to enhance compliance awareness by providing thorough education pertaining to compliance for ATLA personnel.

**Commentary**

**Improvement of FMS related issues**

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is the U.S. security program through which the U.S. allies and others can purchase defense equipment and services from the U.S. government based on the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), so it is different from sales for the purpose of economic profits. Between the Japanese and the U.S. governments, FMS is based on the Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. This program allows Japan to procure equipment with a high level of military confidentiality which cannot be generally purchased through Direct Commercial Sales and the higher performance equipment which is only manufactured by the U.S. This is the reason why FMS is very important in strengthening Japan’s defense capabilities, and Japan’s FMS procurement amount has been increasing in recent years.

Meanwhile, there are FMS-related issues, such as late case closures and cost transparency. Japan and the U.S. have been actively engaged in making improvements in these issues, as the result of repeated requests for improvements to the U.S. side based on points raised by indications from the Board of Audits and requests by Defense Minister Onodera to U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis for cooperation in lowering prices in order to build up the most efficient defense capabilities in the current severe security environment.

On June 2018, Minister Onodera and Secretary Mattis held the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting and the ministers welcomed improvements in challenges regarding Foreign Military Sales such as strengthening efforts to improve cost transparency and late case closures as well as initiating concrete discussion on more efficient multi-year contracts. The ministers affirmed that both countries would continue to make efforts to realize Japan’s smooth and timely procurement of U.S.-made assets.

The Ministry of Defense continues make efforts to improve FMS - related issues in close cooperation with the U.S.

*In the formulation of the FY2018 budget, the MOD held negotiations with the United States regarding FMS costs and made efforts to reduce expenditure by scrutinizing the cost. For example, for tilt-rotor aircraft (V-22 Osprey), in its negotiations with the United States, the MOD sought to leverage economies of scale through joint procurement of Osprey aircraft with the U.S. Navy (40 aircraft) and to scrutinize minimum initial cost necessary for operations. As a result, the MOD was able to realize a cost reduction of 25.5 billion yen, reducing the cost from 97.1 billion yen, as estimated at the FY2018 budget request stage, to 71.6 billion yen in the actual budget.*
Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with other countries in order to contribute to promoting the maintenance and enhancement of defense production and technological bases, as well as contributing to the promotion of our national security, peace and international cooperation.

Japan will continue to realize effective defense equipment and technological cooperation through the strengthening of intelligence gathering such as the needs of its counterparts, cooperation including assistance for maintenance and repair of equipment, and strengthening of cooperative posture between the public and private sectors.

### Section 4 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

#### 1 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

**Purpose of Establishment of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology**

Japan has dealt with arms exports in a careful manner, in accordance with the Three Principles of Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines. On the other hand, in individual cases, such as the participation of domestic companies in the joint development of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) by Japan and the United States, it has taken separate measures in which arms exports are dealt with outside the Three Principles.

Amidst this situation, in April 2014, based on the National Security Strategy, the Government formulated the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology as new principles replacing the Three Principles on Arms Exports etc. and its implementation guidelines. The new principles clarified the concrete standards, procedures and limitation.

#### 2 Main Contents of the New Three Principles

**1 (1) Clarification of Cases Where Transfers are Prohibited (the First Principle)**

The cases where overseas transfers of defense equipment are prohibited are clarified as follows: (1) in the case of violating the obligations based on agreements signed by Japan and other international agreements; (2) in the case of violating the obligations based on the Resolution of the United Nations Security Council; or (3) in the case of transferring to the countries in conflicts.

**2 (2) Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be Permitted As Well As Strict Examination and Information Disclosure (the Second Principle)**

The cases where transfers may be permitted are limited to (1) cases that contribute to the active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, (2) cases that contribute to the security of Japan, or other cases. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user.

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1 In December 2011, the Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc. put in place exemptions from the Three Principles of Arms Exports based on the premise of strict control, with regard to (1) cases related to peace contribution and international cooperation, and (2) cases regarding international joint development and production of defense equipment, etc. that contributes to Japan’s security.

2 The term “defense equipment” is deemed appropriate for the title of “Three Principles for the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” since possible articles of overseas transfers help peace contribution and international cooperation as was seen in the example of the provision of bulldozers and other items belonging to the SDF to disaster-stricken countries. Similarly, due to the fact that there is provision of technology in addition to goods, the term “transfer” was adopted rather than “export.”
whilst ensuring transparency, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan’s security. In addition, it has been decided that important cases would be deliberated at the National Security Council and along with this, information concerning the cases that were deliberated would be disclosed.

Fig. III-4-4-2 (The Second Principle “Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be Permitted”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Specific examples</th>
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| (1) Contribution to the proactive advancement of peace contribution and international cooperation | Overseas transfers that contribute to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of peace contribution and international cooperation and when:  
- the transfer is for the benefit of the United Nations (UN) System or organizations conducting the activities based on a UN resolution. |
| (2) Contribution to the security of Japan | Overseas transfers that contribute to Japan’s security, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of Japan’s security, and that:  
- are related to international joint development and production with countries cooperating with Japan in national security area including the U.S.,  
- contribute to enhancing security and defense cooperation with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S.,  
- are necessary for supporting activities of the governmental agencies including the Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as “the SDF etc.”), which include the activities of foreign governments or private entities etc. related to the activities of the SDF etc., or  
- for ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals, and that are:  
  - temporary export of equipment, return of purchased equipment or provision of technical information related to the activities of the SDF etc. including replacements of items which need repairing with non-defective items,  
  - export of equipment for the protection or self-protection of public officials, or  
  - export of equipment for the self-protection of Japanese nationals operating in danger areas. |
| (3) In cases where the influence is judged extremely limited from the perspective of the security of Japan | Returning of misdirected items  
- Export of sample items on the premise that they will be returned  
- Re-export of equipment brought in by police officers of overseas government agencies |

(3) Ensuring Appropriate Control regarding Extra-Purpose Use or Transfer to Third Parties (the Third Principle)

Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured, and the Government will in principle oblige the government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, in cases where it is judged appropriate for the active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, cases involving participation in the international systems for sharing parts, and cases where parts are delivered to a licenser, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of the control system at the destination.

2 Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

1 Cooperative Research and Development, etc.

Since 1992, Japan has implemented 21 cooperative research projects and 1 cooperative development project with the United States. At present, 4 cooperative research projects (cooperative research on Hybrid Electric Propulsion, cooperative research on High-Speed Multi-Hull Vessel Optimization, cooperative research on Comparison of Operational Jet Fuel and Noise Exposures, cooperative research on Chemical Agent Detector-kit Colorimetric Reader) are in operation. In addition, with regard to the transfer of parts for Patriot PAC-2, software and parts, etc. related to the Aegis System and F100 engine parts that are installed in F-15 and F-16 from Japan to the United States, Japan has affirmed since July 2014 that these overseas transfers fall under the case, which may be permitted, based on deliberations at the National Security Council.

Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3-2 (Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation)  
Reference 23 (Japan–U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects)
(1) Participation of Japanese Industry in the Production of the F-35A and the Establishment of Regional Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul and Upgrade (MRO&U) Capability

In December 2011, Japan selected the F-35A fighter aircraft as the next-generation fighter aircraft to succeed the F-4 fighter aircraft. At the same time, the Government decided to procure 42 aircraft from FY2012 onwards and to have Japanese industries participate in its production, aside from several complete aircraft, which shall be imported. In light of this decision, the Japanese Government has been working to enable the involvement of Japanese industries in the manufacturing process in preparation for the acquisition of F-35A fighter aircraft from FY2013 onwards. So far the Japanese Government has decided on the range of production participation by Japanese industries including the Final Assembly and Check Out (FACO) for airframe and engines, the manufacture of some engine parts (19 items) and radar parts (7 items), and the manufacture of some Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (EODAS) parts (3 items).

Possessing the skills and facilities required for FACO for airframe and engines is important for Japanese companies in implementing effective operational support for the F-35A fighter aircraft such as for the following reasons:

- The ability to offer a swift response within Japan in the event that an airframe and engines suffer damage and require work that cannot be carried out by the SDF unit itself, including the repair or replacement of major structural components, such as main wings, fuselage, and turbines without transporting the airframe and engines overseas; and
- The ability to carry out refurbishment work domestically, in the event that performance improvements to the F-35A fighter aircraft are sought in future.

In addition, participation of Japanese companies in the implementation of FACO and parts production will have significance in that they will be able to come in contact with the system integration technology of stealth fighter as well as the cutting-edge fighter technology and know-how. Therefore, it will also contribute to strengthening of defense production and technological bases. The F-35A fighter aircraft on which FACO was conducted in Japan was deployed to the ASDF Misawa Air Base in January 2018.

As global operation of F-35 fighter aircraft is anticipated, the U.S. Government plans to establish maintenance depot (regional Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul and Upgrade (MRO&U) Capability) mainly for airframe and engine in the North America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific regions. In December 2014, with regard to regional MRO&U in the Asia-Pacific region for F-35, the U.S. Government announced the following decisions:

1. Regional MRO&U Capability for airframe will be provided to Japan and Australia with both capabilities required not later than early 2018.
2. With regard to the regional MRO&U Capability for engine, initial capability will be provided by Australia by early 2018, with Japan providing additional capability at least 3-5 years later.

Establishing a maintenance depot that utilizes the FACO facility for airframe and engine within Japan, and contributing to maintenance in the Asia-Pacific region are significant from the perspectives of securing the operational support system for F-35A fighter aircraft in Japan, maintaining the foundation of the Japanese defense industry, strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and deepening equipment cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

(2) Initiatives towards the Establishment of a Common Maintenance Base of the Japan-U.S. Osprey

As the Planned Maintenance Interval (PMI) of the U.S. Marine Corps Osprey deployed at Futenma was scheduled to commence roughly in 2017, the U.S. Navy carried out a public tender to select a maintenance company and decided to select Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd., as the

3 Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (EODAS), comprising six built-in cutting edge infrared sensors per aircraft, realizes 360-degree spherical situational awareness, and enables missile detection and tracking.
4 The regional MRO&U for airframe in Japan is scheduled to be located at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. (Komaki-minami factory in Aichi Prefecture)
5 The regional MRO&U for engine in Japan is scheduled to be located at IHI Corporation (Mizuho factory in Tokyo)
6 The company was renamed SUBARU Corporation on April 1, 2017.
maintenance company for this purpose in October 2015. From February 2017, the PMI has been performed at GSDF Camp Kisarazu.

The MOD intends to establish common maintenance base for both Japan’s and the United States’ Osprey by allowing the maintenance company to use the hangar at GSDF Camp Kisarazu for aircraft maintenance of the U.S. Marine Corps Osprey and also to implement the future aircraft maintenance of the GSDF Osprey at the same camp.

3 ■ Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

1 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation with Major European Countries, etc.

Defense equipment and technology cooperation with major European countries, which have competitive defense industries, will contribute to the strengthening of security and defense cooperation with these countries as well as the maintenance and strengthening of the defense production and technological base in Japan. Therefore, Japan seeks to establish and deepen relationships with these countries.

(1) United Kingdom

In July 2013, the Governments of Japan and the United Kingdom concluded a bilateral Agreement on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. In the same month, the two countries also started Chemical and Biological Protection Technology cooperative research project, marking the first time that Japan had engaged in such research with a country other than the United States. The joint research resulted in success in July 2017.

Also, in July 2014, technology information on air-to-air missile seeker technology for cooperative research with the United Kingdom was determined by the National Security Council as a case where overseas transfer may be permitted as stipulated in the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. Responding to the said decision, in November of the same year, a Letter of Arrangement was signed on the “co-operative research project on the feasibility of a joint new air-to-air missile” and the cooperative research started. The Cooperative Research on Personnel Vulnerability Evaluation, the Co-operative Research on The Certification Process of Jet Engines, the Cooperative Research on The Feasibility of a Japan and Great Britain Universal Advanced RF System (JAGUAR) were launched in July 2016, February 2018 and March 2018, respectively.

Furthermore, a LOA on the Joint Preliminary Study on Potential Collaborative Opportunities for Future Combat Air System (FCAS) Future Fighter between the defense authorities of the two countries was signed in March 2017. Based on the agreement of this arrangement, the two countries are exchanging information regarding future fighter and the FCAS that are under study by Japan and the United Kingdom respectively, and opinions about the potential for future collaboration. At the Third UK-Japan Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) held in December 2017, in response to the progress of the feasibility study on a Joint New Air-to-Air Missile (JNAAM) Phase 2, the two countries expressed expectations for the early embodiment of the cooperative research project including the research prototyping and the test firing.

(2) France

Japan and France established a committee on cooperation in the field of defense equipment and a on export control respectively in January 2014, and signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in March 2015. Moreover, at the Fourth Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (“2+2”) held in January 2018, the two countries confirmed the intention to quickly start the cooperative research from the following perspectives: (1) Smooth introduction of the GSDF Osprey (V-22); (2) Smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements; and (3) Enhanced efficiency in maintenance. The establishment of common maintenance base at GSDF Camp Kisarazu would be extremely significant in that it will lead to the realization of the reduction of Okinawa’s burden as well as the “Strengthening the basis to repair and maintain common equipment” stated in the new guideline.

7 GSDF will introduce 17 tilt-rotor aircraft (Osprey V-22) that can complement and strengthen the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-7JA) in terms of cruising speed and range. In June 2015, a contract regarding 5 aircraft out of the 17 was signed with the United States Department of the Navy, and these 5 aircraft will be delivered by the end of FY2018.

8 Official name: Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies Necessary to Implement Joint Research, Development and Production of Defence Equipment and Other Related Items

9 A missile component device for searching, detecting and tracking targets.

10 Generic name of the whole future fighter aircraft system in the United Kingdom.

on The Feasibility Study for Mine Countermeasure Technological Activities and started the joint research in the following June.

In addition, State Minister of Defense Wakamiya (then) visited France in June 2017, inspected the “Paris Air Show 2017” in Paris and exchanged opinions with high government officials. The MSDF P-1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft participated in the event and ATLA set up an exhibition booth to exhibit the P-1 aircraft for the first time at international defense equipment exhibition.  

(3) Germany
Japan and Germany signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology\(^\text{12}\) in July 2017.

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Fukuda visited Germany in April 2018, inspected the “Berlin Air Show 2018” held in Berlin, and met with high ranking of the Federal Ministry of Defence of Germany. The MSDF P-1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft participated in the event and ATLA set up an exhibition booth related to the P-1 aircraft.

(4) Italy
At the Japan-Italy Summit Meeting held in March 2017, the two countries agreed to start negotiations on an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technology,\(^\text{13}\) and signed the Agreement in the following May.

Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation, etc., with Partner Countries in the Asia-Pacific Region

As partner countries in the Asia-Pacific region have expressed their interest and expectation regarding defense equipment and technology cooperation with Japan, the MOD proactively seeks to build relationships with these countries.

(1) Australia
With Australia, the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology\(^\text{14}\) was signed in July 2014.

Meanwhile, at the Japan-Australia Defence Ministerial Meeting held in October 2014, it was agreed to seek multifaceted cooperation, including the following: (1) exploration of potential cooperation opportunities in the F-35 program; (2) acquisition reform dialogue with the Defence Material Organisation of Australia; (3) at the request of the Australian side, exploration of the possibility of Japanese cooperation in the Australian Future Submarine Program; (4) defense technology exchanges with the Defence Science and Technology Organization of Australia (in the field of marine hydrodynamics and exchanges among engineers and scientists); and (5) talks between defense industries in both countries. Subsequently, joint research on Marine Hydrodynamics started in December 2015. Moreover, even though Japan had submitted the proposal for the Future Submarine Program in November 2015, the Government of Australia announced in April 2016, that they selected a French company as their partner for the Program.

(2) India
Defence equipment and technology cooperation with India is considered an important field of cooperation based on the special strategic global partnership between Japan and India. At the Japan-India Summit Meeting in December 2015, the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of India concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology\(^\text{15}\) was signed. The discussions on the US-2 amphibian aircraft are underway for cooperation between the two countries.

Other than the US-2, discussions for forming the case of defence equipment and technology cooperation including dual use technologies have been held, including the Third Joint Working Group on Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation held in September 2017. At the Japan-India Defence Ministerial Meeting held in September 2017, the ministers agreed to commence the technical discussions for research collaboration in the area of Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) and Robotics. Moreover, in September 2017, ATLA and the Department of Defence Production, jointly hosted the first-ever Japan-India Defence Industry Forum in Tokyo with attendance of government officials and Japanese and Indian companies, aiming to revitalize cooperation between the defence industries. The said forum was an unprecedented event that showed steady progress of discussions on defence equipment and technology cooperation in both countries.


\(^\text{13}\) Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Italian Republic concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

\(^\text{14}\) Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

\(^\text{15}\) Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of India concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
(3) ASEAN Countries

Between Japan and ASEAN member states, exchanges of views take place regarding defense equipment and technology cooperation in non-traditional security sectors, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and maritime security through the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Meetings and other occasions. Participating countries have expressed their expectation for Japan’s cooperation in effectively dealing with these issues. In the “Vientiane Vision” announced by Japan at the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in November 2016, it is stated that Japan’s defense equipment and technological cooperation with ASEAN countries would be promoted with a focus on the following three points: (1) equipment and technology transfer, (2) human resources development, and (3) holding seminars on defense industries. As a specific initiative with the Philippines, an official agreement was made on the transfer of MSDF’s TC-90 training aircraft to the Philippine Navy at the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting in September 2016, and TC-90 pilot training was conducted for pilots from the Philippine Navy at the MSDF Tokushima Air Base from November of the same year to March 2018. Since April 2017, maintenance and repair assistance by dispatched personnel from a Japanese maintenance company has been provided. Furthermore, two TC-90 aircraft were transferred to the Philippine Navy in March 2017, and the remaining three TC-90 aircraft were transferred in March 2018. This transfer was the first case of application of the provision of the SDF Act that enables the MOD to grant or transfer to the governments of developing states the SDF’s equipment which is no longer used for a lower price than the current price. Based on a proposal from the Philippines, the transfer was confirmed at the Japan-Philippines Defence Ministerial Meeting in June 2018 that parts and maintenance equipment of the UH-1H utility helicopters, that became unnecessary for the SDF would also be donated.

Between Thailand, State Minister of Defense Yamaguchi visited Thailand in November 2017, inspected an international exhibition on defense equipment (Defense and Security 2017), and agreed to promote future defense equipment and technology cooperation between the two countries including early conclusion of the agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology at the meeting with high officials of the Ministry of Defence of Thailand.

Between Vietnam, the Terms of Reference (TOR) for regular consultations concerning defense equipment and technological cooperation was signed during the Japan-Vietnam Defense Vice-ministerial Level Meeting in November 2016.

Japan and Malaysia signed the Japan-Malaysia Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology in April 2018. The MOD will continue to promote cooperation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as the maritime security area through these initiatives.

(4) Middle East

In November 2017, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Ono visited the United Arab Emirates, inspected the “Dubai Air Show 2017” held in Dubai, and met with high government officials of the country including Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Rumaithi. The ASDF C-2 transport aircraft, which was on an overseas flight training, participated in this event and ATLA set up an exhibition booth relating to the C-2 transport aircraft for the first time.
defense have appropriate capabilities. It is also critical to develop a foundation that will serve as the basis for the international community to cooperate towards improving the security environment. Among these friendly nations, some have difficulties in acquiring the adequate level of defense equipment by their own because of their economic and financial situations. Some of these states are requesting to use SDF’s equipment which are no longer used. However, Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Public Finance Act stipulates that the Government shall receive reasonable consideration when transferring or leasing any governmental properties including the SDF’s equipment to other countries. Therefore, a transfer for lower price than the current price is not allowed unless otherwise provided.

Under these circumstances, to respond to the needs of such friendly nations, a special provision to Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Public Finance Act\(^\text{17}\) was created in the SDF Act. This provision enables the MOD to grant or transfer to the governments of developing states the SDF’s equipment which is no longer used for a lower price than the current price. (Legislation for the partial revision of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense and other Acts including this provision was approved in May 2017).

Even in the case of granting or transferring equipment for lower price than the current price pursuant to this provision, whether or not to transfer such equipment and to which government such equipment to be transferred will be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and other regulations. In addition, an international agreement must be concluded between the Governments of Japan and the recipient countries to prevent extra-purpose use and third party transfer of the transferred equipment without the prior consent of Japan.\(^\text{18}\)

### 4. Adapting Defense Equipment for Civilian Use

With regard to aircraft involving many technological bases shared between the defense and the civilian sectors, the MOD has been considering the civilian use of aircraft developed by the MOD from the perspective that taking measures to contribute to the revitalization of the civilian sector will contribute to maintaining and activating the production and technological bases of Japanese aircraft, and by extension, to maintaining and strengthening the defense production and technological base in Japan. In August 2010, the MOD compiled a set of guidelines for the development of a concrete system for converting aircraft to civilian use, while in 2011, it also developed the application procedure for private companies interested in civilian use. So far, technical data related to the civilian use of the US-2 amphibian rescue aircraft and the F7-10 engine that are mounted on P-1 maritime patrol aircraft have been disclosed in response to requests from the implementing companies. In December 2016, ATLA and IHI Corporation, a manufacturing company of F7-10 engine, signed a contract for the civilian use of the F7-10 for sales to JAXA for the first time.

The MOD will consider the possibility of civilian use of equipment other than aircraft based on the intention of defense industry.

### 5. Technology Control

In promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation internationally, the MOD will properly evaluate the sensitivity and strategic value of defense technology and dual-use technology, and protect these technologies that should be protected as strengths of Japan. At the same time, from the perspective of Japan’s security, the MOD will strengthen technology control in cooperation with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, in order to avoid the risk of the diversion of technologies into weapons.

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\(^{17}\) Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Public Finance Act (Act 34 of 1947)

Governmental assets, unless otherwise provided, may not be exchanged and used as other means of payment, or transferred or leased without reasonable consideration.

\(^{18}\) As of June 2018, Japan has signed the agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology with the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, India, the Philippines, France, Italy, Germany, and Malaysia.
Participation in International Defense Equipment Exhibitions

From the viewpoint of promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation, ATLA has participated in international defense equipment exhibitions to introduce Japan’s defense equipment policies and advanced technology. These initiatives help foreign government officials understand regarding Japan’s equipment policies and technology.

ATLA has participated in international defense equipment exhibitions such as Defense and Security Equipment International (DSEI) held in London, United Kingdom and Defense and Security (D&S) held in Bangkok, Thailand as well as air shows held in Paris, France and Dubai, United Arab Emirates in 2017 and an air show held in Berlin, Germany in 2018. At these events, ATLA widely disseminated information on the policy measures taken by ATLA, the outcomes of research and development through exhibitions of P-1 patrol aircraft, C-2 transport aircraft and research prototypes of unmanned equipment developed in Japan, and on advanced technology possessed by Japanese manufacturers.

Moreover, taking this opportunity of government officials gathered from different countries at these events, meetings were held between high officials of various countries including the State Minister of Defense and Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense from Japan. Through these initiatives, ATLA was able to contribute to forming the platform for promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation by deepening other countries’ understanding of measures regarding defense equipment and advanced technology in Japan.

Public-Private Defense Industry Forum

The Public-Private Defense Industry Forum is held with a purpose of promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation with partner countries in the Asia-Pacific region as a joint effort between the public and private sectors. This forum is held to deepen understanding of the relevant parties and facilitate concrete defense equipment and technology cooperation in the future through explanation of various systems surrounding the defense industry in Japan and each country as well as presentations by each company on their products and technology. Most recently, the said forum was held with Indonesia in August 2017, with India in September 2017, with Vietnam in October 2017, and with Australia in March 2018.
Various activities of the MOD/SDF are hard to implement without the understanding and cooperation of each and every person and local governments. Therefore it is necessary to further deepen the trust between local communities and people, and the SDF.

Section 1 Collaboration with Local Communities

1. Activities in Civic Life and Contributions to Society

The MOD/SDF conducts activities to support the lives of citizens in a range of fields, in response to requests from local governments and relevant organizations. Such activities contribute to further deepening the trust in the SDF, and provide SDF personnel with pride and confidence.

The GSDF handles the disposal of unexploded ordnance and other dangerous explosives found throughout Japan. In FY2017, there were approx. 1,611 such cases (approx. 49.5 tons). In particular, cases handled in Okinawa Prefecture accounted for approx. 34% of the total cases. The MSDF clears and disposes of underwater mines and other dangerous explosives, and approx. 15,550 explosives (approx. 7.8 tons) were handled in FY2017.

The SDF camps and bases allow the local residents access to their facilities to the extent that it does not interfere with unit activities, thus striving to foster friendly interaction with local communities. The SDF also provides transportation and other assistance at a variety of athletic events. In addition, it supports regional medical treatment efforts by providing general medical care at some SDF hospitals as well as conducting urgent transport for emergency patients from isolated islands.

Furthermore, based on national policy, the MOD/SDF ensures opportunities for local small and medium sized enterprises to receive orders, while taking efficiency into account, by such measures as the promotion of separated/divided ordering and the securing of competition amongst companies within the same qualification and grade divisions.

2. Cooperation from Local Governments and Other Relevant Organizations for the SDF

Amid the harsh recruitment and employment situation, the cooperation from local governments and relevant organizations is vital to secure highly qualified personnel and to support the reemployment of uniformed SDF personnel who retire at a relatively young age under the SDF’s early retirement system.

The SDF camps and bases maintain close relations with local communities, and therefore, various forms of support and cooperation from the local community are indispensable for the SDF to conduct its diverse activities, including education and training, and disaster relief. Moreover, units dispatched overseas for international peace cooperation operations and other duties receive support and cooperation from the relevant organizations for the procedures involved.

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2 For example, this is a method through which grouping of products, etc. takes place when putting up the order for general competitive bidding, and then a successful bidder for the groups is decided.
3 This means that out of the bidding participation eligibility categorized into grade A-D, there is competition between grade C or D only, which comprise mostly of small and medium enterprises.
Regional Defense Bureaus established in eight locations nationwide make efforts to build cooperative relationships with their respective local communities, through collaboration with SDF units and Provincial Cooperation Offices. Specifically, Regional Defense Bureaus hold seminars on defense issues for local residents and provide explanations about the annual white paper, Defense of Japan, to local governments in order to gain wide understanding on defense policies. They also host Japan-U.S. friendship programs for citizens who live near U.S. Forces facilities and areas in Japan, U.S. Forces personnel, and the families to interact with each other through sports and music. Furthermore, Regional Defense Bureaus provide necessary explanations and conduct coordination for relevant local governments when implementing the realignment of the U.S. Forces, the reorganization of SDF units, deployment of equipment, and training. They also conduct the necessary liaison and coordination in the event of incidents and accidents, or any other emergency situation, such as major earthquakes.

Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas

1. Scale and Features of Defense Facilities

The uses of defense facilities are diverse, and they often require large volumes of land. In addition, as of January 1, 2018, approx. 28% of the land area of the facilities and areas (for exclusive use) of the U.S. Forces in Japan is jointly used by the SDF in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, with the purpose to enhance the diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises. Meanwhile, problems related to restricted establishment and operations of defense facilities have emerged due to the urbanization of areas around many of the defense facilities. Also, another problem is that frequent aircraft operations such as takeoffs and landings cause noise and other issues, impacting the living environment of local residential communities.

Defense facilities, as the foundation that supports the defense capabilities of Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, are indispensable for our country’s security. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain conditions for constant and stable utilization by ensuring harmony

### Scale and Features of Defense Facilities

**Fig. III-5-1-1** Status of SDF Facilities (Land Plots)

- **As of January 1, 2018**
- **Total area:** Approx. 1,090km² accounting for approx. 0.3% of Japan’s land area

#### Distribution by region
- Hokkaido region 42%  Approx. 460km²
- Chubu region 16%  Approx. 178km²
- Tohoku region 13%  Approx. 147km²
- Kyushu region 12%  Approx. 138km²
- Other regions 10%  Approx. 111km²
- Kanto region 5%  Approx. 57km²

#### Distribution by use
- Maneuver Areas 75%  Approx. 814km²
- Airfields 7%  Approx. 81km²
- barracks 5%  Approx. 54km²
- Others 13%  Approx. 141km²

**Notes:** Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

**Fig. III-5-1-2** Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in Japan (Exclusively Used Facilities)

- **As of January 1, 2018**
- **Total area:** Approx. 263km² accounting for 0.07% of Japan’s land area

#### Distribution by region
- Okinawa Prefecture 70%  Approx. 185km²
- Kanto region 12%  Approx. 32km²
- Tohoku region 9%  Approx. 24km²
- Other regions 9%  Approx. 22km²

#### Distribution by use
- Maneuver Areas 86%  Approx. 226km²
- Airfields 7%  Approx. 123km²
- Warehouses 15%  Approx. 40km²
- Others 15%  Approx. 40km²

**Notes:** Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
between the defense facilities and the surrounding areas as well as obtaining the understanding and cooperation of the local residents. For that purpose, the MOD has taken measures to promote harmony between defense facilities and surrounding areas since 1974, based on the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities (Living Environment Improvement Act).

**Fig. III-5-1-3** Measures for Harmony Between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Description of Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preventing Noise Problems</td>
<td>Subsidies to finance sound insulation work</td>
<td>- Educational facilities such as elementary schools, junior high schools, and kindergartens; medical facilities such as hospitals and clinics; and welfare facilities such as nursery centers, day-service centers for the elderly, and special nursing homes for the elderly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compensation for relocations</td>
<td>- Compensation for relocating buildings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improving green belts</td>
<td>- Land procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing Impact Besides Noise</td>
<td>Subsidies to finance impediment prevention work</td>
<td>- Improvement of public facilities such as roads, water-supply systems, and sewage facilities in the area where housing, etc., is to be relocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing Impediment Related to Living and Business</td>
<td>Subsidies for building facilities meant to stabilize people’s lives</td>
<td>- Roads, radio broadcast facilities, nursing homes, fire departments, parks, waste disposal facilities, welfare centers for the elderly, public facilities for learning, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gift to the public</td>
<td>- Agricultural facilities, fishing facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing Impact on Surrounding Areas</td>
<td>Provision of specified defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants</td>
<td>- Improving public facilities such as traffic facilities, recreation centers, and welfare facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance for school buildings, etc.*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Newly added due to the partial revision of the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities (effective as of April 27, 2011)

**Fig. III-5-1-4** FY2018 Costs for Countermeasures in Areas near Bases (Based on Expenditures)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Mainland</th>
<th>Okinawa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Projects for preventing disturbances</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound insulation projects</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures related to relocations</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies for stabilizing people’s livelihoods</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road improvement projects</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environs Improvement Adjustment Grants</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other projects</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the Specified Defense Facilities Environs Improvement Adjustment Grants, the MOD has implemented initiatives such as the PDCA Cycle process since April 2014, aiming to increase the effectiveness of these grants.

**(2) Considerations for Future Harmonization of Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas**

In response to the requests by related local governments, the MOD continues to consider practical ways to achieve more effective and efficient measures to harmonize defense facilities and surrounding areas, in light of the severe fiscal situation.
Chapter 5
Interaction with Local Communities and Japanese Citizens

5 Other Initiatives

1 Response to Cases of Interference against SDF and U.S. Forces Aircraft by Kite Flying and Laser Irradiation

Cases of interference against SDF and U.S. Forces aircraft by kite flying and laser irradiation have frequently occurred in the areas surrounding air stations in Atsugi and Futenma. These are extremely dangerous and malicious acts that may disrupt a pilot’s ability to control aircraft and result in a catastrophe such as a crash. Therefore, the MOD disseminates information regarding the risks involved in those acts to local residents by putting up posters and requests their cooperation in reporting to the police while closely cooperating with relevant local governments. Additionally, the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Civil Aeronautics Act was revised in December 2016, making these interference acts subject to regulation, as well as fines and other penalties.

2 Response to Helicopters and Drones Flying over U.S. Forces Facilities and Surrounding Airspace

Cases of flying a helicopter or a drone over the facilities of the U.S. Forces and its surrounding airspace have been identified. These are very dangerous acts that may cause a collision with U.S. Forces aircraft. In fact, there is negative impact on the safe operations of the U.S. Forces aircraft, including a case where a helicopter of the U.S. Forces had to take a different route to avoid a collision with a drone. Therefore, from the viewpoint of preventing unforeseen accidents in advance, as well as securing the safety of the area and the safe operations of aircraft, the MOD calls on users of a helicopter or drone to refrain from engaging in such an act by handing out leaflets and putting up posters with the cooperation of relevant local governments.

Commentary

Initiatives taken by local authorities in the vicinity of defense facilities

It is imperative to gain cooperation of related local authorities in order to achieve harmony between defense facilities and nearby areas. Local authorities in the vicinity of defense facilities conduct initiatives to improve the living environments utilizing assistance projects funded by the Ministry of Defense to address obstacles resulting from the presence of defense facilities in order to ensure the stability of the lives of local residents and the enhancement of their welfare.

For example, these entities build parks and other venues to facilitate evacuations of residents, using the national subsidy in cases where training sites, airfields, and other facilities affect the lives of local residents.

Additionally, schools, hospitals, and other facilities that require quiet environments are outfitted with noise insulation features that prevent and alleviate noise created by the takeoff and landing of aircraft at airfields used by the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. Forces stationed in Japan and other activities.

Example of noise insulation work

Example of park building

In Ginowan City, where Futenma Air Station is located, a park was built to facilitate smooth evacuations of local residents.
Section 2 Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities

1 Various Public Relations Activities

As the activities of the MOD/SDF cannot be carried out without the understanding and support of the Japanese people, it is important to be proactive in undertaking easily comprehensible public relations activities and to gain the trust and cooperation of the public.

According to a “Public Opinion Survey on the Self-Defense Forces and Defense Issues” conducted by the Cabinet Office (in January 2018), the public expectations and evaluations towards the SDF have been increasing as the scope of MOD/SDF activities has expanded both domestically and internationally. In light of this result, the MOD/SDF will continue to conduct a variety of PR activities, thereby striving to ensure better understanding of the current status of the MOD/SDF.

In addition, given that understanding and support from foreign countries are also of utmost importance for the SDF to conduct its missions successfully, it is essential that the MOD strengthens efforts to provide information to foreign countries about MOD/SDF initiatives, including about SDF activities abroad.

2 Events and PR Facilities

The MOD/SDF conducts activities to widely inform nationals of the current circumstances of the SDF. These activities include the GSDF Fuji Fire Power Exercise, cruises to experience MSDF vessels, and demonstration flights and boarding experiences on aircraft. In addition, at camps and bases throughout the country, events including equipment exhibitions and unit tours are held on occasions such as the anniversary of a unit’s foundation. In some instances, they also hold parades throughout the cities, with cooperation from the local communities. Furthermore, as part of the commemoration of the SDF anniversary, the SDF Marching Festival is held at Nippon Budokan arena every year. The festival attracted approximately 40,000 visitors in total in 2017.

Concerning annual reviews by the SDF, a troop review, a fleet review, and an air review are hosted in rotation by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF respectively. In 2017, an air review was planned to be held by the ASDF at Hyakuri Airbase in commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the reorganization into the MOD.
but was called off due to stormy weather caused by the approaching Typhoon No. 22. In 2018, a troop review by the GSDF is planned to take place.

The MOD/SDF also actively opens PR facilities to the public. For instance, the number of visitors on the facility tour at the PR facilities in the MOD at Ichigaya district (Ichigayadai Tour) reached 420,000 as of the end of March 2018. Each SDF service also has a large-scale PR facility in addition to PR facilities and archives at the SDF camps and bases open to the public. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF provides cooperation for shooting films and TV programs.

3 Trial Enlistment Programs

The MOD/SDF offers SDF Life Experience Tours for undergraduate and graduate students as well as women and Enlistment Experience Programs for groups.

Second Lieutenant Yuki Irie
Last year I won at the Emperor’s Cup All Japan Championship Tournament for the first time in a year and obtained the right to participate in various international tournaments. I am committed to continue training as a member of the Ministry of Defense Self Defense Forces and as a representative of Japan, and I will give back to everyone by winning a Gold medal in the Tokyo Olympics. I appreciate your continued support and encouragement.

Second Lieutenant Naito Ehara
I managed to win a Bronze medal at the Rio Olympics with the support and encouragement of many people. The Japanese team demonstrated its cohesiveness in the relay, however, I discovered the need to foster more resilience in individual races. I am going to dedicate myself to daily training with the goal of winning a medal in not only the relay, but also in individual races at the Tokyo Olympics held in 2020 by fully utilizing the environment provided by the JSDF Physical Training School.

Your continued encouragement is highly appreciated.

2 Information on the Summer Tour/Spring Tour for College Students, Ms. Parsley Tour (trial tour for women in their 20s); and One-Day Visit to SDF for Women, etc. is available on the MOD/SDF website.

The summer tour for university students conducted at the ASDF Misawa Air Base

A scene from the spring tour with university students at the GSDF Camp Omiya
companies and other organizations. These programs are intended to promote participants’ understanding of the SDF by offering opportunities to experience the daily life and training of the SDF, as well as to have direct contact with SDF personnel. In FY2017, approximately 150 people participated in SDF Life Experience Tours. From the private sector, the SDF received approximately 1,900 requests for Enlistment Experience Programs, and approximately 24,000 employees experienced SDF life.

2. Initiatives for Information Disclosure and Document Management

1. Necessity of Appropriate Operation of the Information Disclosure System

Democracy is founded on the principle that the public has access to accurate information, thereby making appropriate judgment and exercise of sovereignty. Administrative documents held by the government are of utmost importance for the public’s access to accurate information, and it is an important responsibility for the government to manage them in an appropriate manner and respond to the public’s information disclosure requests properly. Information held by the MOD/SDF is no exception to this, the MOD/SDF bears this important responsibility under the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs.

See Reference 69 (Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2017))

2. Results of the Special Defense Inspection Regarding Daily Reports of PKO in South Sudan, and Initiatives for Recurrence Prevention

The background of the issue over daily reports written by SDF engineering units dispatched to South Sudan is as follows. Concerning an information disclosure request made on October 3, 2016, the MOD initially refused the request after receiving the response submitted by the Chief of Staff of the GSDF, with the explanation “not disclosed because the corresponding documents do not exist.” Later, however, the daily reports in question were found within the Joint Staff Office through the second search conducted at the instructions from the Defense Minister on December 26, 2016. Therefore, the MOD publicly announced the fact on February 6, 2017, and withdrew its initial decision, issuing a disclosure decision (partial disclosure decision) instead on February 13.

Later, on March 15, the media reported that the daily reports in data format had been retained in the GSDF, but the fact, which was inconsistent with the initial explanation, had never been released, even though disposal of the relevant data was instructed. Based on the decision by the Defense Minister that normal investigation would not be enough considering the situation, a special defense inspection was initiated by the Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance on March 17 and its result was announced on July 28.

The result of the special defense inspection identifies improper conducts, including those leading to a violation of MOD/SDF personnel of the Information Disclosure Act. The MOD/SDF considers this result severe and regrettable and should reflect upon it.

The MOD considers that the underlying causes of these problems were that there were not enough levels of awareness on the importance of information disclosure is within the MOD/SDF, and that there were not enough levels of communication among relevant departments and agencies within the ministry. In order not to repeat such a case ever again, the MOD/SDF will be fully committed to implementing measures to prevent the recurrence of similar cases regarding information disclosure and document management, while encouraging the personnel to change their mindset, fostering transparent and open culture in the organization and further enhancing the collaboration among departments and agencies. In this way, everyone at the MOD/SDF must work together and make the utmost effort to regain the public confidence.

a. Results of the Special Defense Inspection and Relevant Matters

At the instruction of Defense Minister, the Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance had strictly and fairly conducted a thorough investigation on the management status of these daily reports over the period of four months starting from March 17, 2017, from a highly independent standpoint, led by a former superintendent prosecutor of a high public prosecutor’s office and also served by active prosecutors, which ended with the announcement of the result on July 28, 2017.

3 Tours to experience the daily life of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. They are implemented upon request from private companies and other organizations through the Provincial Cooperation Offices.

4 The scope of this special defense inspection is the management status of the daily reports written for a period between July 7 and 12, 2016 (local time) by the engineering unit dispatched to South Sudan, for which information disclosure request in accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Act No. 42 of 1999) was sought on October 3, 2016. To read the body of the report, see http://www.mod.go.jp/jgo/igo/inspection/pdf/special04_report.pdf.
On the same day, the MOD imposed strict disciplinary measures against the relevant persons.

See Reference 70 (Results of the Special Defense Inspection (Overview))

b. Measures to Prevent the Recurrence

In response to what was pointed out in the results of this special defense inspection which was announced on July 28, 2017, the MOD/SDF has taken the following measures to prevent the recurrence of similar cases.

❍ Handling of daily reports
  • Review of the retention period of daily reports (to be retained for 10 years)
    Ensure that all daily reports written by SDF units, including those written by the engineering unit dispatched to South Sudan will be retained for 10 years. After the retention period expires, they will be transferred and archived under the management of the National Archives of Japan.
  • Central management under the Joint Staff Councilor
    Ensure that the Joint Staff Councilor is responsible for central management of these daily reports by organizing and storing them in data format, and also for centrally handling all subsequent information disclosure requests.
  • Strengthening structure attached to the Joint Staff Councilor
    To appropriately respond to information disclosure requests, assign officials in charge of operating information disclosure to the position attached to the Joint Staff Councilor.

❍ Information disclosure operation
  • Strengthening check function by establishing a new post “Information Disclosure Inspector”
    To evaluate the appropriateness of the judgement in a strict manner regarding all cases for which disclosure was rejected due to the absence of requested documents, establish a new post of Information Disclosure Inspector who is responsible for interviewing persons involved and carry out on-site inspection at a division that may possess the said document.
  • Regular verification of the whole information disclosure operation by the Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance
    Ensure that the whole information disclosure operation at the MOD/SDF is regularly inspected and verified by the Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance.
  • Thorough review of all cases for which disclosure was rejected due to the absence of relevant administrative documents

Appoint “a person in charge of information disclosure” at each organization with a document controller in place. Ensure that accurate judgment is made in document identification through multiple reviews and searches, even in cases where it was decided that there was no corresponding document subject to an information disclosure request.

• Ensuring close cooperation and information sharing among each of the Staff Offices, internal bureaus and Administrative Vice Chief of Staff of Joint Staff, etc.
  Considering the possibility that the document subject to a disclosure request might be retained in other organizations, each of the Staff Offices work closely with relevant internal bureaus and try to share information and further improve the accuracy of document search and identification.

• Extensive and improved education and training to raise personnel awareness
  Raise awareness of the personnel by developing subjects regarding information disclosure operation for the personnel (senior officials in particular) in various personnel training programs and make such subjects mandatory, as well as prepare and distribute the “Information Disclosure Handbook” describing the procedures for information disclosure in an easy-to-understand manner.

❍ Management of administrative documents
  • Review of retention period for documents including reports regarding the SDF’s actions
    Retain reports of actions based on various orders, irrespective of domestic or overseas deployment that will contribute to the decisions by the Minister of Defense and senior officers for a period of 3 to 30 years depending on the document type, and after the retention period expires, transfer them to the National Archives of Japan.
  • Ensuring the appropriateness of document management of the entire ministry
    Require each organization to consult with the supervising document controller (Director-General of the Secretariat) about preparing or modifying its guidelines for standard document retention periods. Also implement measures, including appropriate labeling of handling types of administrative documents, thorough management of appropriate access control, clarification of an expiration date of a retention period, and clear definition of a responsible department in the case of administrative documents shared by two or more departments.

5 The Joint Staff Councilor was the title then. It was divided into Principal Joint Staff Councilor and Joint Staff Councilor on April 1, 2018, responsible for centrally managing all documents including daily reports.
• Personnel education
To make these measures fully known and understood by the personnel, prepare the manual for them and hand it out to all of them, as well as provide individual training for senior officials and working-level officials in charge of document management across the organization, including regional organizations.

In addition, as for the management of administrative documents, the MOD also review rules, including the MOD regulations on administrative documents management in light of the revised Guidelines on Administrative Document Management (signed by Prime Minister on April 1, 2011, hereinafter called the “New Guidelines”), and make such rules fully known and understood by the personnel.

3 Initiatives for Appropriate Management of Public Documents
Following the issue over public documents, at the informal meeting of Cabinet members on March 23, 2018, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe instructed the members to immediately work on the following two points: (i) for senior officials to take initiative in ensuring that all officials will understand and abide by strict rules under the New Guidelines effective from April 2018 and (ii) accelerate the transition to an electronic approval system designed for strict management of document history such as update information.

Prior to this instruction, on March 12, at the MOD, Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera instructed senior officials to bear in mind once again the importance of information disclosure, management of administrative documents, and information protection while performing their duties. Then upon the instruction of Prime Minister as mentioned above, the minister reminded them to ensure that all administrative documents would be managed properly in accordance with the New Guidelines, and ensure that all the personnel would be aware of the need to accelerate the transition to an electronic approval system, thereby making efforts to manage all the documents in an appropriate fashion.

4 Daily Reports in Iraq and Relevant issues
In the efforts to achieve centralized management for all regular reports, including daily reports, under the Joint Staff Councilor, as part of the recurrence prevention measures which resulted from reflections on the South Sudan PKO daily report issue. Extremely inappropriate handling over the daily reports in Iraq was also identified.

Among them, with regard to the background of the reports found at the GSDF Ground Research and Development Command (the department of the time, hereinafter the same shall apply.), it has found that the daily reports in Iraq were found on March 27, 2017, to be kept at the GSDF Ground Research and Development Command, just when the re-searching had been underway at the instruction by the Defense Minister from February 22, 2017, and nevertheless, said discovery had not been reported to the Defense Minister (which was announced on April 4, 2018). As there was the possibility that this case entailed a grave problem that might affect civilian control, at the instruction of Defense Minister Onodera, the MOD decided on April 4, 2018 to initiate an investigation by the “investigation team on ‘Daily Reports’ of GSDF in Iraq” which was head by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Ohno Keitaro. Furthermore, in this process, the investigation on the background of the cases in (b), (c) and (d) listed below had also been put in place.

The investigation indicates that the MOD/SDF had not responded to the instruction of Defense Minister in an appropriate manner, made inappropriate responses to questions, document requests, information disclosure requests from the Diet members, and failed to promptly correct such actions thereafter. The MOD regards them as a problem to be reflected upon.

The investigation has not identified any inappropriate intentions in performing paperwork in connection with the instructions by the Defense Minister or questions at the Diet. The daily reports in question were found and publicly announced while taking the recurrence prevention measures under the instruction of the Defense Minister. In addition, it is not considered that there was any conduct that constitutes violation of any resolutions.

6 Regular reports produced for senior officers (including command headquarters) by units carrying out actions based on deployment orders that will contribute to the decisions by the Minister of Defense and the senior officers.
7 See footnote 5.
8 This case was triggered by the fact that a part of the Iraq daily reports were found at the Ground Staff Office’s medical department and the Research and Development Command (which was announced on April 2, 2017), but with regard to the said reports, the Defense Minister previously responded in the Diet that the MOD searched for retained daily reports of the unit in Iraq but failed to find any of them.
9 The Ground Research and Development Command was reorganized into Japan Ground Self Defense Force Training Evaluation Research and Development Command on March 27, 2018.
10 At a later date, the MOD decided to conduct an investigation with assistance from a lawyer, a former superintending prosecutor of the Tokyo High Public Prosecutors Office. The investigation team visited the Japan Ground Self Defense Force Training Evaluation Research and Development Command to collect documents and other materials and check computers of relevant officials and files of administrative documents, in addition, the team conducted interviews with approximately 70 people and questionnaires to approximately 400 people. The team held 34 meetings in total until the investigation team’s report was published.
or approvals in the Diet. With such things considered the MOD concludes that there was no issue that could undermine civilian control itself. That said, the MOD must take it seriously that the case in question gave rise to concerns and distrust for civilian control among the public. The results of each investigation were announced on May 23, 2018, and are summarized as follows:

a. Investigation on Daily Reports in Iraq

When the special defense inspection on the daily reports of the PKO unit in South Sudan had been underway, the existence of the daily reports from Iraq retained at the GSDF Ground Research and Development Command was identified. As for this matter, the investigation found that the e-mail that notices the instructions about researching by the Defense Minister was not clear enough for the recipients to understand the message as intended. In addition, it was also found that sufficient searches had not been conducted in response to the information disclosure request, and appropriate paperwork had not been performed. For such reasons, the existence of the daily reports in Iraq was not reported to the Defense Minister. As a result, this indicates that the MOD/SDF did not properly respond to the instruction of the Defense Minister, and took inappropriate responses to questions, document requests, and information disclosure requests from the Diet, and failed to promptly correct such response thereafter. This is extremely regrettable.

d. Discovery of the Daily Reports from Iraq at the Air Staff Office

Regarding this matter, the investigation concluded that it was considered inappropriate that adequate search had not been conducted in response to the document request from the Diet member, and thus the response was provided to the effect that the MOD did not retain the daily reports; and it was also considered inappropriate that even when the reports were found through the special defense inspection and the information disclosure request, any necessary effort to correct the response provided to the document request or the answers to the Diet questions had not been made thereafter.

e. Measures to prevent the recurrence

Based on the facts made clear through the investigation, the MOD publicly announced the investigation report on May 23, 2018, imposed strict disciplinary measures against Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense and 16 relevant subordinates concerned, and also announced the following measures to prevent the recurrence of similar cases. In the meantime, at the meeting of Cabinet members regarding the ideal management of public documents held on June 8, 2018, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe instructed the Cabinet members to lead the initiative in taking all possible measures to ensure proper management of public documents. Accordingly, the MOD will fully implement these measures to prevent the recurrence and do every effort to regain the public’s confidence in the MOD/SDF.

❖ Strengthening of Structure in Charge of Performing Minister’s Instruction and Order

• Specify in writing important instructions and operational orders, etc. from Defense Minister, and senior officials.
• Require the above instructions, etc., to be notified to the division chief or official in the equivalent position, as well as require relevant responses to be approved by the division chief or official in the equivalent position.
• If such instructions, etc., are made, a responsible department or bureau to notify the Minister’s Secretariat of implementation and coordination status is required.

11 To read the body of this investigation team’s report, see http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2018/05/25a_1.pdf
12 To read the body of the report on (b), (c) and (d) herein, see http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2018/05/25a_2.pdf
13 For the summary of the measures to prevent the recurrence, see http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2018/05/25a_3.pdf
Appropriate response to administrative document management and information disclosure by maintaining such documents as electronic files.

- Accelerate the transition to an electronic approval system
- Require all the personnel to notify a responsible person at a division in charge, etc., of the response status

Reinforce the check system for administrative document management and information disclosure

- Establish a new organization responsible for inspection of administrative document management and information disclosure
- Build a framework to receive instructions and advising from external experts

Reform a mindset of individual SDF personnel regarding administrative document management and information disclosure

- Develop extensive training programs designed to help SDF personnel improve necessary judgment in performing operations
- Consider designating administrative document management and information disclosure as part of criteria for personnel performance appraisal

Create an organization capable of the prompt and accurate response to information disclosure, etc.

- Examine a system to centrally retain and control administrative documents in the electronic format.
- Reinforce exclusive structure, particularly at the Joint Staff Office. As part of this, reemploy retired SDF personnel with expertise on administrative document management and information disclosure for daily reports and other documents as part-time officials.

Reinforce the check system for administrative document management and information disclosure

- Establish a new organization responsible for inspection of administrative document management and information disclosure
- Build a framework to receive instructions and advising from external experts

Reform a mindset of individual SDF personnel regarding administrative document management and information disclosure

- Develop extensive training programs designed to help SDF personnel improve necessary judgment in performing operations
- Consider designating administrative document management and information disclosure as part of criteria for personnel performance appraisal

Initiatives for Policy Evaluation

1. Engagement in Policy Evaluation

The MOD has been conducting the evaluation of various policies based on its policy evaluation system. In FY2017, the MOD conducted policy evaluations of R&D programs and projects concerning taxation special measures as well as the major policies and programs of the NDPG and the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP).

2. Promotion of Evidence-Based Policy Making

In order to promote Evidence-Based Policy Making (EBPM), the MOD has worked on the establishment of the structure for promotion of EBPM within the ministry, including the establishment of a new position, “Director-General for Evidence-based Policymaking,” who plays a central role of the EBPM in FY2018.

3. Initiatives for the Personal Data Protection System

In light of respecting individual rights in line with the Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs, the MOD takes measures to ensure the security of the personal information under its control, and discloses such information upon request.

4. Appropriate Operation of the Whistleblower Protection System

The MOD sets up a system to handle whistleblowing made by its officials, employees and outside workers, establishing internal contact desks to deal with whistleblowing and to protect whistleblower.
Reference
### Reference 1: Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals and Their Major Means of Delivery by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or Region</th>
<th>ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles)</th>
<th>SRBM (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles)</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>400 Minuteman III: 400</td>
<td>336 Trident D-5: 336</td>
<td>78 B-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>313 SS-18 46</td>
<td>192 SS-N-18 48</td>
<td>20 B-52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td>48 Trident D-5: 48</td>
<td>29 Tu-95 (Bear): 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>58 Tu-160 (Blackjack): 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Forces</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Forces</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Approx. 270</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Data is based on “The Military Balance 2018,” the SIPRI Yearbook 2017, etc.
2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2017. The figure in parentheses shows the number of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and is not included in the total figure.
3. In November 2015, the U.K.’s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) stipulated that the number of deployed nuclear warheads is to be no more than 180.
4. According to the SIPRI database, India possesses 120-130 nuclear warheads, Pakistan 130-140, Israel a maximum of 80, and North Korea 10-20.

### Reference 2: Outline of Military Power of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)

#### Ground Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or Region</th>
<th>Ground Forces (10,000 persons)</th>
<th>Country or Region Tonnage (10,000 tons)</th>
<th>Number of Vessels</th>
<th>Country or Region Number of Combat Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>United States 636.8</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>United States 3,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Russia 204.2</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>China 2,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>China 178.7</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>Russia 1,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>United Kingdom 58.0</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>India 950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>India 47.8</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>Republic of Korea 640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>France 39.2</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>China 2,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Indonesia 25.5</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>North Korea 545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Italy 23.6</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>Taiwan 495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Republic of Korea 21.5</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>Pakistan 447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Germany 21.1</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>France 430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Australia 21.0</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>Turkey 377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Turkey 20.8</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia 376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Taiwan 20.5</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>Israel 364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Spain 19.0</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>Iran 340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Brazil 17.8</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>United Kingdom 295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Japan 48.8</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>Japan 400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Reference 3: Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or Region</th>
<th>Military Service System</th>
<th>Regular (10,000 persons)</th>
<th>Reserves (10,000 persons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Conscription / Volunteer</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Conscription</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Conscription</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>Conscription</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Conscription</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Conscription</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.3 (0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ground</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maritime</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Data from “The Military Balance 2018” and other sources.
2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2017. The figure in parentheses shows the number of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and is not included in the total figure.
3. Russia uses a personnel augmentation system which adds a contract employment system (a type of volunteer system) to the preexisting conscription system.
4. In Germany, as a result of the enactment of the Military Law Amendment Act in April 2011, the conscription system was suspended effective July 1, 2011, and the volunteer system was newly introduced as a replacement of the former.
Reference 4  Transition of Military Power in the Area Surrounding Japan

Reference 5  National Security Strategy (Outline)
(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013)

I. Purpose

- As Japan's security environment becomes ever more severe, Japan needs to identify its national interests from a long-term perspective, determine the course it should pursue in the international community, and adopt a whole-government approach for national security policies and measures in order to continue developing a prosperous and peaceful society.
- In a world where globalization continues, Japan should play an even more proactive role as a major global player in the international community.
- The Strategy, as fundamental policies pertaining to national security, presents guidelines for policies in areas related to national security.
- With the National Security Council (NSC) serving as the control tower, as well as with strong political leadership, the Government of Japan will implement national security policies in a more strategic and structured manner through a whole-government approach.
- When implementing policies in other areas, the Government of Japan will give due consideration to national security so that Japan can utilize its strengths, such as its diplomatic ability and defense capability, in a smooth and fully-functional way as a whole, based on the Strategy.
- The Strategy will guide Japan's national security policy over the next decade. Through the implementation of concrete policies, the NSC will regularly carry out systematic evaluation and upgrade the Strategy in a timely and appropriate manner.

II. Fundamental Principle of National Security

Principles Japan Upholds

- Japan is a country with rich culture and tradition, and upholds universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law. Japan has a wealth of highly educated human capital and high cultural standards, and is an economic power with strong economic capacity and high technological capabilities. Japan has achieved its development benefiting from an open international economic system. In addition, Japan as a maritime state has pursued “Open and Stable Seas.”
- Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II, and has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.
- Japan has maintained its security, and contributed to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, by enhancing its alliance with the United States (U.S.), as well as by deepening cooperative relationships with other countries. Japan has also contributed to the realization of stability and prosperity in the international community through initiatives for supporting the economic growth of developing countries and for addressing global issues based on the principle of human security, as well as through trade and investment relations with other countries.
- Complying with the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, Japan has been cooperating with the U.N. and other international organizations, and has actively contributed to their activities. Japan has also continuously participated in international peace cooperation activities. In addition, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan has consistently engaged in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, playing a leading role in international initiatives to realize “a world free of nuclear weapons.”
- Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. This is the fundamental principle of national security that Japan should stand to hold.

2. Japan’s National Interests and National Security Objectives

National Interests

- To maintain its sovereignty and independence; to defend its territorial integrity; to ensure the safety of life, person, and properties of its nationals, and to ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security and preserving its rich culture and tradition.
- To achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic development, thereby consolidating its peace and security (to this end, it is essential that Japan strengthens the free trade regime and realizes an international environment that offers stability, transparency and predictability).
- To maintain and protect international order based on rules and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law.

National Security Objectives

- To strengthen the deterrence necessary for maintaining Japan’s peace and security and for ensuring its survival, thus deterring threats from directly reaching Japan; at the same time, if by any chance a threat should reach Japan, to defeat such threat and to minimize the damage.
- To improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct threats to Japan, through strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside the Asia-Pacific region, and promoting practical security cooperation.
- To improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable, and prosperous international community by strengthening the international order based on universal values and rules, and by playing a leading role in the settlement of disputes, through consistent diplomatic efforts and further personnel contributions.

III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan and National Security Challenges

1. Global Security Environment and Challenges

(1) Shift in the Balance of Power and Rapid Progress of Technological Innovation

- The balance of power between nations is changing due to the rise of emerging countries (e.g., China and India). In particular, China is increasing its presence in the international community. The United States, which has the world’s largest power as a whole, has manifested its policy to shift its emphasis of national security and economic policy towards the Asia-Pacific region.
- The rapid advancement of globalization and technological innovation has increased the relative influence of non-state actors, and the threat of terrorism and crimes committed by non-state actors is expanding.

(2) Threat of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Related Materials

- The issue of the transfer, proliferation, and performance improvement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, such as ballistic missiles, the issue of nuclear and missile development by North Korea, and the nuclear issue of Iran remain major threats to Japan and the international community.

(3) Threat of International Terrorism

- International terrorism has spread and become diverse in its forms due to the advancement of globalization.
- Terrorist attacks against Japanese nationals and interests have
actually taken place overseas. Japan and its people face the threat of international terrorism both at home and abroad.

(4) Risks to Global Commons
☐ In recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access to global commons, such as the sea, outer space, and cyberspace, have been spreading and become more serious.
☐ In the sea, in recent years, there have been an increasing number of cases of unilateral actions in an attempt to change the status quo by coercion with respect to natural resources and the security of respective states.
☐ Due to these cases as well as piracy and other issues, there is a growing risk of the stability of sea lanes and freedom of navigation coming under threat.
☐ There exist risks that could impede the continuous and stable use of outer space, including an increasing amount of space debris caused by satellite collisions amongst others.
☐ Risks of cyber-attacks with the intent to disrupt critical infrastructure and obstruct military systems are becoming more serious.

(5) Challenges to Human Security
☐ Global issues that cannot be dealt with by a single country—namely, poverty, widening inequality, global health challenges including infectious diseases, climate change and other environmental issues, food security, and humanitarian crises caused by civil wars and natural disasters—are emerging as critical and urgent issues of human security, threatening the very survival and dignity of individuals.
☐ These challenges could have repercussions on peace and stability of the international community.

(6) The Global Economy and Its Risks
☐ The risk of the expansion of an economic crisis from one country to the entire global economy is growing.
☐ Signs of protectionism and reluctance towards the creation of new trade rules are becoming apparent.
☐ The rise of resource nationalism in resource rich countries as well as an intensified competition for the acquisition of energy and mineral resources by emerging countries are observed.

2. Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region
(1) Characteristics of the Strategic Environment of the Asia-Pacific Region
☐ The region has various political regimes and a host of countries with large-scale military forces including nuclear-weapon states. Yet a regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized.

(2) North Korea’s Military Buildup and Provocative Actions
☐ North Korea has enhanced the capability of WMDs including nuclear weapons and that of ballistic missiles. At the same time, North Korea has repeatedly taken provocative military actions including the use of provocative rhetoric against Japan and other countries, thereby increasing the tension in the region. The threat to the security of Japan and of other countries is being substantially aggravated.
☐ As Kim Jong-un proceeds to consolidate his regime, the domestic situation in North Korea needs to be closely monitored.
☐ North Korea’s proliferation is a grave issue affecting Japan’s sovereignty as well as the lives and safety of Japanese nationals. It is an urgent issue for the Government of Japan to resolve under its responsibility.

(3) China’s Rapid Rise and Intensified Activities in Various Areas
☐ There is an expectation for China to share and comply with international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role for regional and global issues.
☐ China has been rapidly advancing its military capabilities in a wide range of areas without sufficient transparency.
☐ China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on their own assertions, which are incompatible with the existing order of international law, in the maritime and aerial domains, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea (e.g., intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands, establishment of its own “Air Defense Identification Zone”).
☐ The cross-strait relationship has deepened economically. Meanwhile, the military balance has been changing. Thus, the relationship contains both orientations towards stability and potential instability.

IV. Japan’s Strategic Approaches to National Security
1. Strengthening and Expanding Japan’s Capabilities and Roles
☐ To ensure national security, Japan needs to first and foremost strengthen its own capabilities and the foundation for exercising those capabilities. Japan must also steadily fulfill the role it should play and adapt its capabilities to respond to future developments.
☐ Enriching Japan’s resilience in national security, through reinforcing its diplomatic power and defense force, as well as bolstering its economic strengths and technological capabilities, contributes to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community at large.
☐ In order to overcome national security challenges and achieve national security objectives, as well as to proactively contribute to peace in cooperation with the international community, Japan needs to expand and deepen cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone. At the same time, Japan needs to make effective use of its diverse resources and promote comprehensive policies.

(1) Strengthening Diplomacy for Creating a Stable International Environment
☐ The key of national security is to create a stable and predictable international environment, and prevent the emergence of threats.
☐ It is necessary for Japan to realize an international order and security environment that are desirable for Japan, by playing an even more proactive role in achieving peace and stability of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.
☐ It is necessary to enhance diplomatic creativity and negotiating power to deepen the understanding of and garner support for Japan’s position in the international community.
☐ By highlighting Japan’s attractiveness, Japan needs to strengthen its soft power that would benefit the international community. Japan also needs to strengthen its capacity to promptly and accurately identify the needs of Japanese nationals and firms to support their overseas activities.
☐ Japan will make even more proactive contributions to international organizations such as the U.N., including through increasing the number of Japanese staff in such institutions.

(2) Building a Comprehensive Defense Architecture to Firmly Defend Japan
☐ Amid the severe security environment, Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective joint defense force, adapting to the change in strategic environment with consideration of its national power, and strive to ensure operations with flexibility and readiness based on joint operations.
☐ Japan will advance coordination within the government and with local governments and the private sector. In doing so, even in peacetime, Japan will maintain and improve a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters.
☐ In developing the structure of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF), which plays a central role in these efforts, Japan will enhance its defense structure for deterrence and response to various situations, prioritizing important functions from a joint and comprehensive perspective.
☐ With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence of the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will work closely with the U.S., and take appropriate measures through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people.

(3) Strengthening Efforts for the Protection of Japan’s Territorial Integrity
☐ Japan will enhance the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies responsible for territorial patrol activities and reinforce its maritime surveillance capabilities.
☐ Japan will strengthen coordination among relevant ministries and agencies to be able to respond seamlessly to a variety of unexpected situations.
☐ Japan will proactively engage in the protection, management, and development of remote islands near national borders, and from a national security viewpoint, review issues related to the use of land in areas such as remote islands near national borders and areas surrounding defense facilities.

(4) Ensuring Maritime Security
☐ As a maritime state, Japan will play a leading role, in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Seas,” which are upheld by maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law, ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with relevant international law, rather than by force.
☐ Japan will strengthen its maritime domain awareness capabilities in a comprehensive manner that involves the use of outer space, while paying attention to the establishment of international networks.
☐ Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan.

(5) Strengthening Cyber Security
☐ Japan as a whole will make concerted efforts to defend cyberspace and economy from the threats posed by cyber-attacks, so as to protect cyberspace from malicious activities; to ensure the free and safe use of cyberspace; and to guard Japan’s critical infrastructure against cyber-attacks, including those in which state involvement is suspected.
2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

(7) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities

Japan will fundamentally strengthen its information-gathering capabilities from a diverse range of sources, including human intelligence and open source intelligence.

(10) Strengthening Technological Capabilities

Japan will proactively utilize its internationally outstanding technological capabilities, including dual use technologies, thereby strengthening Japan’s technological capabilities.

(8) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

Japan will cooperate with other partners of the Asia-Pacific region towards ensuring the stability of the region.

3. Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan’s Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community

To improve the security environment surrounding Japan, Japan will engage itself in building trust and cooperative relations with partners both within and outside the region through the following approaches.

(1) Strengthening Diplomacy at the United Nations

Japan will further deepen and develop cooperative relations with the ASEAN countries in all sectors based on the traditional partnership lasting more than 40 years. Japan will also provide further assistance to ASEAN efforts towards maintaining and strengthening its unity.

(2) Strengthening the Rule of Law

Japan will endeavor to achieve a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, such as the abduction, nuclear and missile issues, in accordance with the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and relevant Security Council resolutions.

(3) Strengthening Technological Capabilities

Japan will endeavor to further develop relations with emerging countries, including cooperation with the EU, NATO, and OSCE.

(4) Strengthening Security Environment

Japan will continue to contribute to the development and the consolidation of peace in Africa through various avenues, especially the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process.

(5) Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community

As a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will play an active role for the peace and stability of the international community.

(1) Strengthening Diplomacy at the United Nations

Japan will work with the U.S. to revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, through discussions on a variety of issues such as the concrete manner of defense cooperation and basic concepts of bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, while ensuring consistency with various policies in line with the Strategy.

(2) Strengthening the Rule of Law

In order to establish the rule of law in the international community, Japan will participate proactively in international rule-making from the planning stage, so that Japan’s principles and positions are duly reflected.
Japan will actively engage in realizing the rule of law relating to the sea, outer space and cyberspace, as well as in assistance for the development of legal systems.

(3) Leading International Efforts on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
Japan will carry out vigorous efforts in pursuit of “a world free of nuclear weapons.”
Japan will lead international efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation, including those towards the resolution of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development issues and Iran’s nuclear issues, in a manner consistent with the maintenance of the credibility of extended deterrence under the Japan-U.S. alliance.

(4) Promoting International Peace Cooperation
Japan will further step up its cooperation with U.N. PKO and other international peace cooperation activities.
Japan will promote coordination between PKO and ODA projects, and make further strategic use of ODA and capacity building assistance.
Japan will proactively train peacebuilding experts and PKO personnel in various countries in close consultation with countries or organizations concerned.

(5) Promoting International Cooperation against International Terrorism
Japan will promote consultations and exchanges of views with other countries on the situation on international terrorism and international counter-terrorism cooperation, as well as reinforcement of the international legal framework.
Japan will actively extend assistance to developing countries, etc.

5. Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues

Japan will endeavor to share universal values and reinforce an open international economic system, which form the basis of peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. At the same time, Japan will advance the following measures towards the resolution of development issues and global issues that could hinder peace and stability of the international community.

(1) Sharing Universal Values
Through a partnership with countries with which Japan shares universal values, such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, Japan will conduct diplomacy that contributes to addressing global issues.
Japan will actively utilize its ODA and other schemes in supporting democratization, the development of legal systems, and human rights.
Japan will engage proactively in diplomatic issues on women.

(2) Responding to Global Development and Global Issues and Realizing Human Security
It is necessary to promote global and regional development and security cooperation, as well as to protect the safety of life and property against terrorism.
Japan will advance measures that raise awareness with regard to security on such issues as territory and sovereignty, and that increase understanding of the activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Japan.

(3) Cooperating with Human Resource Development Efforts in Developing Countries
Japan will invite a broad range of personnel from developing countries, including students and administrative officials, and provide them education and training. Japan will further promote human resource development in order to ensure that these personnel can contribute to development in their home countries.

(4) Maintaining and Strengthening the Free Trade System
Japan will promote economic partnership efforts, including through the TPP, the Japan-EU EPA, a Japan-China-ROK FTA, and the RCEP. Through these efforts, Japan will strengthen the vigor and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

(5) Responding to Energy and Environmental Issues
Japan will actively utilize diplomatic tools for efforts to achieve the stable supply of energy and other natural resources.
In the area of climate change, Japan will implement a proactive strategy for countering global warming.

(6) Enhancing People-to-people Exchanges
Japan will expand two-way youth exchanges.
Japan will promote people-to-people exchanges through sport and culture.

6. Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding

In order to fully ensure national security, it is vital to reinforce the domestic foundation for diplomatic power, defense force, and other capabilities to be effectively demonstrated.
It is important to seek a deeper understanding of Japan’s security policies both at home and abroad to ensure national security.

(1) Maintaining and Enhancing Defense Production and Technological Bases
Japan will endeavor to engage in effective and efficient acquisition of defense equipment, and will maintain and enhance its defense production and technological bases, including through strengthening international competitiveness.

(2) Boosting Communication Capabilities
It is imperative that Japan proactively and effectively communicate its national security policy to the world and its people, deepen the understanding among the people of Japan, and build cooperative relations with other countries.
With the Prime Minister’s Office serving as the control tower, Japan will enhance its public relations in an integrated and strategic manner through a government-wide approach. Fully utilizing various information technologies and diverse media, Japan will also strengthen its information dissemination in foreign languages.
Japan will cooperate with educational institutions, key figures, and think tanks, and in doing so, promote Japanese language education overseas and train personnel who are capable of contributing to strategic public relations efforts and other areas.

By precisely and effectively communicating information on Japan’s position based on objective facts, Japan will be able to gain accurate understanding in the form of international opinion.

(3) Reinforcing the Social Base
It is essential that each and every Japanese national hopes to contribute to peace and stability in the region and the world, and to the improvement of the welfare of humanity, as well as that they perceive national security as a familiar and immediate issue for them, and have deep understanding of its importance and complexity.
Japan will foster respect for other countries and their people as well as love for the country and region.
Japan will advance measures that raise awareness with regard to security on such issues as territory and sovereignty, and that increase understanding of the activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Japan.

(4) Enhancing the Intellectual Base
Japan will seek to enhance education on security-related subjects at institutions of higher education.
Exchanges will be deepened between the Government and institutions of higher education, think tanks, etc.
Japan will promote the fostering of private-sector experts and government officials.

Reference 6 NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY2014 and beyond
(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) Stipulations regarding the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond are included in the reference. Accordingly, the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond (approved by the Cabinet on December 17, 2010) are discontinued as of the end of FY2013.
(Additional reference) National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond

I. NDGP’s Objective
In light of the current security environment surrounding Japan, the Government of Japan sets out the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond” as new guidelines for Japan’s national defense, based on “Defense Capability Build-up in FY2013” (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on January 25, 2013) and the “National Security Strategy” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013).

II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan

1. As interdependence among countries expands and deepens, there is a growing risk that unrest in the global security environment or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately develop into a security challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire international community. The multi-polarization of the world continues as a result of shifts in the balance of power due to the further development of countries such as China and India and the relative change of influence of the United States (U.S.). At the same time, the U.S. is expected to continue to play the role in maintaining world peace and stability as it retains the largest national power.

There are ongoing regional conflicts involving various countries as well as an increase in the number of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles continues to be a deep concern despite non-proliferation efforts by the international community. The presence of countries with weak governance and failed states feeds the expansion and spread of international terrorism. These problems continue to pose imminent security challenges.
2. In the Asia-Pacific region, including areas surrounding Japan, countries are enhancing and strengthening their cooperative relationships to resolve security challenges. Specific and practical cooperation and collaboration have progressed to settle challenges particularly in non-traditional security fields. In the meantime, gray-zone situations over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests tend to linger, raising concerns that they may develop into more serious situations.

North Korea is military-focused and deploys a massive military force. It is also proceeding with the development, deployment and proliferation of WMDs including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles which may be used to deliver such weapons, and it maintains a large-scale special operations force. Through these activities, North Korea is maintaining and strengthening its asymmetrical military capabilities.

North Korea has also repeatedly heightened tension in the region by conducting military provocations in the Korean Peninsula and by escalating its provocative rhetoric and behavior against Japan and other countries. Such North Korean military trend constitutes a serious destabilizing factor to the security not only of Japan but of the entire region and the international community. Therefore, Japan needs to pay utmost attention to such activities.

In particular, North Korea’s ballistic missile development has presumably entered a new stage, as technological improvements have been made to extend the range and increase the accuracy of its missiles through a series of missile launches. Also, North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in defiance of calls for restraint from the international community, so the possibility cannot be ruled out that it has successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons for warheads and equipped them on ballistic missiles. North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, coupled with its provocative rhetoric and behavior, such as suggesting a missile attack on Japan, pose a serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security.

As for China, while it is greatly expected to play an active role in a more cooperative manner in the region and the world, it has been continuously increasing its defense expenditures and has been rapidly reinforcing its military in a wide range of areas. As part of such effort, China is believed to be making efforts to strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities to prevent military activity by other countries in the region by denying access and deployment of foreign militaries to its surrounding areas. However, China has not clearly stated the purpose and goals of the military build-up and therefore, transparency concerning its military and security is not fully achieved.

In addition, China is rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains in the region including in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. In particular, China has taken assertive actions with regard to issues of conflicts of interest in the maritime domain, as exemplified by its attempts to change the status quo by coercion. As for the seas and airspace around Japan, China has intruded into Japanese territorial waters frequently and violated Japan’s airspace, and has engaged in dangerous activities that could cause unexpected situations, such as its announcement of establishing an “Air Defense Identification Zone” based on its own assertion thereby infringing the freedom of overflight above the high seas.

China is also expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains farther offshore than before. For example, Chinese military vessels and aircraft routinely enter the Pacific Ocean, and are expanding their operational areas which include areas north of Japan.

As Japan has great concern about these Chinese activities, it will need to pay utmost attention to them, as these activities also raise concerns over regional and global security.

As for Russia, it is observed that the country is proceeding to reform and modernize its military forces mainly by strengthening its readiness and introducing new equipment. The activities of Russian armed forces have been active.

The U.S. has clearly manifested its strategic decision to put greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region (the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region) and is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region despite fiscal and various other constraints in order to maintain the stability and growth of the region while enhancing its relationships with its allies and expanding cooperation with partner countries. In addition, the U.S. has made its stance clear to prevent coercive actions that aim at changing the status quo in the region in cooperation with allies and partners concerning international maritime law, thereby unduly infringing the freedom of the high seas.

Securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace as global commons is becoming a significant security challenge for the international community including Japan against the backdrop of rapid technology innovation and for the first time in history, military strategies in the future are anticipated to be significantly affected by the progress and proliferation of technologies such as those related to precision guided munitions, unmanned vehicles, stealth capability and nanotechnology.

3. Japan is surrounded by the sea, and has a long coastline, numerous remote islands and a vast Exclusive Economic Zone. Japan is a maritime state and dependent largely on international trade for its supply of food and natural resources. Therefore, securing the safety of maritime and air traffic, through strengthening an “Open and Stable Seas” order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, constitutes the basis of peace and prosperity.

Japan also faces security vulnerabilities resulting from concentration of industry, population and information infrastructure in urban areas and from the presence of a large number of key facilities, such as nuclear power plants, in coastal areas. In the event of another massive earthquake like the Great East Japan Earthquake, Japan may suffer enormous damage and the impact may spread not only nationwide but also to other countries. The possibility of future huge earthquakes such as a Nankai Trough earthquake or a Tokyo inland earthquake makes it increasingly necessary to take every possible measure to prepare for large-scale disasters.

4. In light of the above, while the probability of a large-scale military conflict between major countries, which was a concern during the Cold War era, presumably remains low, various security challenges and destabilizing factors are emerging and becoming more tangible and acute. As a result, the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, since the formulation of “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2011 and beyond” (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010). As the security challenges and destabilizing factors are diverse and wide-ranging, it is difficult for a single country to deal with them on its own. Under these circumstances, it is increasingly necessary not only that the military sector cooperate with the non-military sector but also that countries which share interests in responding to shared security challenges cooperate and actively respond to maintain regional and global stability.

III. Japan’s Basic Defense Policy

1. Basic Policy

In light of the National Security Strategy, Japan will strengthen its diplomatic and defense capabilities along the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, thereby expanding the role it can play. At the same time, Japan will contribute even more to promote peace, stability and prosperity of the international community while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region by expanding and deepening cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone.

Under this basic principle, Japan will build a comprehensive defense architecture and strengthen its posture for preparing and responding to various situations. In addition, Japan will strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and actively promote bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with other countries while closely coordinating defense and diplomatic policies. Japan will also seek to establish an infrastructure necessary for its defense forces to fully exercise their capabilities.

When implementing these measures, under the Constitution, Japan will efficiently build a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core, is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will closely cooperate with the U.S. In addition, Japan will take appropriate responses through its own efforts, including its national missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people. At the same time, Japan will play a constructive and active role in international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts so as to achieve the long-term goal of creating a world free of nuclear weapons.

2. Japan’s Own Efforts

Recognizing that a country’s security depends first and foremost on its independent efforts, Japan will make full-scale efforts on its own initiative to prevent various situations and will seamlessly respond to them as the situation evolves with the National Security Council as the control tower, while maintaining cooperation with its ally, partners and other countries concerned.

(1) Building a comprehensive defense architecture

Given the increasingly severe security environment, Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective joint defense force and make efforts to employ it with high level of readiness based on joint operations. Japan will also ensure close regular interagency cooperation in normal times. In the event of various situations, the Government, under strong political leadership, will appropriately and
promptly make decisions. Japan will seamlessly respond to situations as they unfold, in a whole-of-the-government approach, to ensure the protection of the nation’s vital interests, the safety and security of its people and the sovereignty of Japan’s territorial land, waters and airspace, in coordination with local governments, private sectors, and others.

Japan will also continue to develop various systems to respond to a variety of disasters and protect its people and will enhance the capability to quickly evacuate Japanese nationals from foreign countries in an emergency situation and ensure their safety.

In order to take such approaches appropriately, Japan will increase the effectiveness of its situation and disaster response posture by systemizing various related plans and formulating and reviewing them as well as expanding the use of simulations, comprehensive training and exercises.

(2) Japan’s defense forces – building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force

Japan’s defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of national security, and represent Japan’s will and ability to deter threats from directly reaching Japan and defeat them if threats should reach Japan.

In the times of an ever-changing security environment surrounding Japan, defense forces need to be constantly reviewed to adapt to the environment. To this aim, Japan needs to allocate limited resources in a focused and flexible way to prioritize the functions and capabilities from a comprehensive perspective, identified through joint operation-based capability assessments of the Self-Defense Force’s (SDF’s) total functions and capabilities against various situations.

Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the SDF, in addition to its regular activities, needs to respond to various situations, including “gray zone” situations which require SDF commitment. The frequency of such situations and the duration of responses are both increasing. Therefore, Japan will regularly conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (hereinafter “ISR”) activities. Moreover, the SDF will conduct strategic training and exercises in accordance with the development of the situation and swiftly build a response posture including advance deployment of units in response to the security environment and rapid deployment of adequate units. Thus Japan will demonstrate its will and highly developed capability to prevent further escalation. In dealing with situations, depending on their development, minimizing damage by effective response through achieving maritime supremacy and air superiority is essential in safeguarding the lives and property of the Japanese people, and the sovereignty of Japan’s territorial land, waters and airspace.

Therefore, Japan will enhance its deterrence and response capability by improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct tailored activities swiftly and sustainably based on joint operations, as well as by developing defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality that underpin various activities to realize a more robust defense force.

At the same time, from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will strengthen its bilateral and multilateral cooperative relationships in order to ensure the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, which is closely related to its own security. Japan will also engage in international peacekeeping and other similar activities (peacekeeping operations by the United Nations, non-traditional security initiatives including Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and other internationally collaborative activities to improve the international security environment) and other efforts more proactively than before as efforts to address the global security challenges, in light of the diversified roles and increased opportunities of the defense force.

From these viewpoints, given the changes in the security environment, the defense force based on this NDPG should prioritize particularly important functions and capabilities through optimal resource allocation as a whole. The defense force also must be an effective one which enables conducting a diverse range of activities to be seamless as well as dynamic and adapting to situations as they demand. To that end, Japan will build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which emphasizes both soft and hard aspects of readiness, to be seamless as well as dynamic and adapting to situations as they arise.

3. Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s national security. The Japan-U.S. security arrangements function as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.

Under its policy of strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region while enhancing its partnerships and cooperation with Japan and other countries in the Asia-Pacific. The Japan-U.S. Alliance and the alliance’s contingency response capabilities, while strengthening Japan’s own capabilities as a premise for these efforts.

At the same time, in response to the increasingly severe security environment, while increasing the presence of Japan and the U.S. in the western Pacific region, Japan will build seamless cooperation with the U.S. ranging from situations on a day-to-day basis to various situations, including cooperation in responding to “gray-zone” situations.

To that end, Japan will continue to expand joint training and exercises, joint ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas with the U.S. It will also tighten the Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination including contingency response and medium-to-long-term strategies, such as BMD, bilateral planning, and Extended Deterrence Dialogue.

(2) Strengthening and expanding cooperation in a broad range of fields

The Japan-U.S. Alliance will contribute to the peace and stability of the world. Japan will strengthen cooperation not only in the fields of anti-piracy efforts, capacity building assistance, HA/DR, peacekeeping and counter terrorism but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace.

As for disaster response, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation in the field of disaster response between the SDF and the U.S. forces within and outside Japan in light of the fact that the U.S. forces, including its USFJ facilities and areas, greatly contributed to the safety of the Japanese people during the Great East Japan Earthquake.

In addition, Japan will constantly strengthen and expand the Japan-U.S. cooperation on gray-zone security, including efforts for intelligence cooperation and information security, and cooperation in the field of defense equipment and technology, to build a firmer and effective alliance.

(3) Steady implementation of measures relating to the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

Japan will provide stable support for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan through various measures, including Host Nation Support (HNS). At the same time, efforts will be made to steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and mitigate the impact on local communities while maintaining the deterrence principle of the U.S. forces based on Japan’s extended deterrence provided by U.S. forces. In particular, Japan will seek to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, located in a critically important location in terms of national security and where the stationing of U.S. forces significantly contributes to the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, by realignment, consolidation and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas. Japan will conduct training through the Joint Training Initiatives and Marine Corps Air Station Futenma as well as the dispersion of the impact and other measures, in light of the heavy concentration of such facilities and areas there.

4. Active Promotion of Security Cooperation

(1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region

In the Asia-Pacific region, specific cooperative measures have been taken mainly in non-traditional security fields, including disaster relief. Multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) have been developed and the regional integration initiative led by ASEAN has been making progress. However, security challenges are becoming more serious than ever in North East Asia. Japan will promote a variety of further cooperative initiatives in a multi-layered manner to ease the atmosphere of confrontation and the sense of curiosity toward one another in the region.

Japan will promote close cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK), which is in a position to support the U.S. presence in North East Asia together with Japan, and will make efforts to establish a foundation for further cooperation with the ROK, for example by concluding an agreement on security information protection and an acquisition and cross-service agreement.

Japan will further deepen its relationship with Australia, with which Japan shares security interests and security cooperation has been advancing, and strengthen cooperation in fields such as...
It is very difficult for a single country to respond to global security in a multi-layered manner. To this end, Japan will ensure close international peace cooperation activities, including international cooperation, Japan will actively promote various international cooperation activities, including international cooperation, the Russian Federation, China, and Japan’s political and economic relationships with recipient countries.

With regard to international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities in particular, Japan will continue to actively conduct activities utilizing the SDF’s capabilities and will increase the number of SDF personnel it dispatches to assume positions of responsibility in various regions such as the Middle East, the Western Pacific, and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In addition, Japan will conduct a study on various challenges it has to overcome to enable the dispatch of SDF personnel in a broad range of fields, and take necessary measures. Japan will also contribute to the training of domestic and foreign personnel engaging in peacebuilding by making use of the SDF’s experience and knowledge.

IV. Future Defense Forces

1. The Role of the Defense Force
Japan's future defense forces will be developed as described in III. 2 (2) above, and will be capable of effectively fulfilling the expected roles in the following fields, and will maintain the necessary posture.

(a) Effective deterrence of and response to various situations
In order to respond to various situations in a timely and appropriate manner, and certainly protect the lives and property of its people and the sovereignty of its land, sea and airspace, Japan will achieve intelligence superiority through persistent ISR activities in an extensive surrounding area to constantly gain an understanding of military developments in other countries and to detect any signs of development at an early stage.

Through such activities, Japan will clearly express its resolve not to tolerate the change of the status quo by force, thereby preventing various situations from occurring.

At the same time, Japan will swiftly and seamlessly respond to situations including gray zone situations, and will establish the necessary posture to continuously address a protracted situation.

Moreover, Japan will implement an effective response tailored to each situation, even in cases when multiple events occur in a consecutive or concurrent manner.

When implementing the initiatives above, the following points are emphasized in particular:

(a) Ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan
In addition to persistent ISR in an extensive surrounding area around Japan, Japan will immediately take appropriate measures to deal with any incursions into its territorial airspace. Japan will respond effectively and promptly to gray-zone situations or any other acts that may violate its sovereignty. Furthermore, should the acts in question become protracted or escalate, Japan will respond seamlessly as the situation evolves, taking all possible measures for the defense and security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan.

(b) Response to an attack on remote islands
In responding to an attack on remote islands, Japan will intercept and defeat any invasion, by securing maritime supremacy and air superiority, with the necessary SDF units swiftly deployed to interdict, in addition to the units deployed in advance in accordance with the security environment. Moreover, should any remote islands be invaded, Japan will recapture them. In doing so, any ballistic missile or cruise missile attacks will be dealt with appropriately.

(c) Response to ballistic missile attacks
Japan will promptly detect any signs of a ballistic missile launch and facilitate a swift, sustained response by establishing a multi-layered defense posture. Should any damage result, Japan will take steps to minimize it. Moreover, in the event of an attack by guerrillas or special operations forces concurrent with a ballistic missile attack, Japan will protect key facilities including nuclear power plants and search and destroy the infiltrating units.

(d) Responses in outer space and cyberspace
In regard with outer space and cyberspace, Japan will build up persistent ISR capabilities to prevent any acts that could impede efficient action by the SDF. Furthermore, should any situation arise, Japan will identify the event without delay and swiftly repair any damage, while taking necessary steps to contain it. Moreover, in light of society’s growing dependence on outer space and cyberspace, Japan will make effective use of the SDF’s capabilities when endeavoring to strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations and clarify the division of roles, thereby contributing to comprehensive, government-wide initiatives.

(e) Responses to major disasters
Should a major disaster occur, Japan will swiftly transport and deploy the requisite units and take all possible measures as part of its initial response, and maintain its presence in the longer
Japan will attach importance to the following in particular, when working in partnership with its ally and partners, through persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan and the regional cooperative frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region.

As the roles played by military capacity diversify, in order to respond appropriately to global security issues including regional conflicts, the expansion and spread of international terrorism, failed states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Japan will strengthen various initiatives focused on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as actively promote international peace cooperation activities, anti-piracy initiatives and capacity building assistance, thereby working on improvement of the global security environment.

Japan will attach importance to the following in particular, when engaging in the aforementioned initiatives.

a. Holding training and exercises

As well as the timely and appropriate implementation of SDF training and exercises, Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral joint training and exercises in the Asia-Pacific region, proactively and visibly demonstrating our nation’s resolve and advanced capabilities focused on regional stabilization. In addition, it will build and strengthen cooperative relationships with relevant countries.

b. Promoting defense cooperation and exchange

Enhancing mutual understanding and relationships of trust with other countries and international organizations is the cornerstone of efforts to stabilize the security environment. Japan will take further steps to promote multi-layered defense cooperation and exchange, such as building and strengthening cooperative relationships focused on wide-ranging security issues of common interest including HADR and ensuring the stable use of the seas, outer space and cyberspace.

c. Promoting capacity building assistance

Utilizing the capabilities of the SDF, Japan will continuously engage in capacity building assistance such as human resource development and technical support on a regular basis in order to enhance the ability of developing countries themselves, thereby improving the security environment with particular focus on active creation of stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

d. Ensuring maritime security

As it is particularly vital for Japan as a maritime state to maintain an “Open and Stable Seas” order which serves as the cornerstone of peace and prosperity, Japan will take all possible measures to secure the safety of maritime traffic. Japan will also conduct anti-piracy activities in cooperation with countries concerned, and will promote various efforts including capacity building assistance of coastal states in this field and enhancement of joint training and exercises by taking various opportunities in waters other than those surrounding our country.

e. Implementing international peace cooperation activities

Working in partnership with non-governmental organizations and other relevant organizations, Japan will actively engage in international peace cooperation assignments and emergency relief activities to meet diverse needs, from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, placing greater emphasis on playing more of a leading role. In doing so, as well as enhancing its readiness posture to facilitate rapid overseas dispatch according to the situation, Japan will strengthen its sustainable preparedness for a protracted overseas deployment.

f. Cooperating with efforts to promote arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation

Japan will be actively involved in arms control and disarmament activities undertaken by the United Nations and other bodies. In doing so, Japan will make active, effective use of the SDF’s knowledge, including through personnel contribution. Moreover, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that can serve as their means of delivery, as well as the proliferation of arms and related technologies, which could be diverted to military use pose severe threats to the peace and stability not only of Japan but also of the international community as a whole. Thus, Japan will cooperate with relevant countries and international organizations and other relevant bodies in promoting nonproliferation initiatives.

2. Priorities in strengthening architecture of the Self Defense Forces

(1) Basic approach

The SDF will maintain an appropriate structure to effectively fulfill the abovementioned roles of defense forces. As such, Japan has conducted capability assessments based on joint operations in relation to various potential contingencies to identify the functions and capabilities that should be prioritized in order to pursue more effective build-up of the defense force.

Based on the results of the capability assessments, in the defense capability buildup, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response in various situations, including defense posture buildup in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities with a consideration to establishing a wide-ranging logistical support foundation.

At the same time, in terms of preparation for a Cold-War era style invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will possess the minimum necessary level of expertise and skills required to respond to unforeseen changes in the situation in the future and to maintain and inherit them, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization.

(2) Functions and capabilities to be emphasized

From the perspective of efficiently developing an effective defense force, the SDF will selectively strengthen the following functions and capabilities in particular, paying attention to enhance joint functions with interoperability with the U.S. forces.

a. ISR capabilities

In order to ensure effective deterrence and response to various situations, while utilizing unmanned equipment, Japan will implement extensive persistent ISR on objectives such as aircraft and vessels in the seas and airspace surrounding it, and the SDF will adopt a flexible approach to boosting its ISR posture according to the developments of situations.

b. Intelligence capabilities

Japan will strengthen its system for intelligence collection, processing information, and analyzing and sharing the collected information, so that the SDF can promptly detect and swiftly respond to signs of various situations and take necessary measures based on medium-to long-term military trends mainly in its vicinity.

In doing so, the SDF will seek to augment its various information collection capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, as well as persistent ISR capabilities using unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, the SDF will engage in integrated efforts to strengthen its geospatial intelligence capabilities to combine various types of intelligence on images and maps to exploit them in a sophisticated manner, while establishing a framework for the integration and synthesis of highly capable personnel in information gathering analysis.

c. Transport capability

In order to secure swift and large-scale transport and deployment capability, and to swiftly deploy and move necessary units, the SDF will strengthen integrated transport capacity including maritime and airborne transport capacity, with collaboration with the civilian transport sector. In doing so, the SDF will avoid redundancy in functions by clarifying roles and assignments among various means of transport, considering their respective characteristics.

d. Command and control, and information and communications capabilities

In order to establish a command and control system that can manage units nationwide in a mobile, joint integrated manner, the SDF will take steps to deploy the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) personnel in the main headquarters of each service, making effective use of the knowledge and experience held by each respective service. Furthermore, the SDF will facilitate swift, resilient nationwide operation of the GSDF’s units such as basic operational units (division, brigade) through the establishment of a new central headquarters to control all of the regional armies, as well as greater efficiency and streamlining of the command and control function in each regional army headquarters, and other measures.
Moreover, the SDF will strive to enhance and strengthen its information and communications capabilities that are prerequisites for supporting nationwide operation, starting with the communications infrastructure on remote islands and data link functions among the three services.

e. Response to an attack on remote islands

In order to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority which is a prerequisite for effective response to an attack on remote islands, the SDF will strengthen its ability to deal with attacks by aircraft, naval vessels, and missiles, etc.

Moreover, while strengthening the integrated capabilities to seek to interdict any attack on Japan’s remote islands at sea, the SDF will newly develop sufficient amphibious operations capability, which enables the SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay in the case of an invasion of any remote islands.

Furthermore, the SDF will enhance its logistical support capabilities, so that SDF units can swiftly and continuously respond in the event of a situation in the southwestern region.

In addition, the SDF will also examine the desirable air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific.

f. Response to ballistic missile attacks

To counter North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capability, Japan will pursue comprehensive improvement of its response capability against the threat of ballistic missiles.

With regard to the BMD system, Japan will enhance readiness, simultaneous engagement capability and sustainable response capability to strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory.

Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole through enhancement of Japan’s own deterrent and response capability, Japan will study a potential form of response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and take means as necessary.

g. Responses in outer space and cyberspace

While strengthening information collection capability using satellites equipped with a variety of sensors, and reinforcing command, control and telecommunications capabilities, the SDF will secure effective, stable use of outer space so that satellites can continuously utilize their capabilities even in contingencies by enhancing the survivability of satellites through such initiatives as space situational awareness. In implementing such initiatives, the SDF will form organic partnerships with research and development institutions in Japan, as well as with the U.S.

As for cyberspace, Japan will enhance integrated persistent surveillance and response capabilities and expertise and latest equipment will be continuously developed and secured in order to prevent actions that hinder efficient SDF activities.

h. Responses to major disasters, etc.

In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as a Nankai Trough earthquake, or an atypical disaster such as a nuclear emergency, it is of vital importance to respond swiftly from the initial stages of the impact and carry out such tasks as information gathering on the extent and nature of the damage from the air by aircrafts, rescue operations and emergency repairs. In this regard, the SDF will also examine the desirable air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific.

i. Responses focused on international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities

In international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities, the SDF will strengthen the necessary protective capabilities to carry out its operations, ensuring the safety of personnel and units. Moreover, the SDF will work on enhancing transport and deployment capability, information communication capability with a view to long term activities in Africa and other remote locations, and strengthening logistic and medical service structure for smooth and continuous operation.

From the standpoint of carrying out international peace cooperation activities more effectively, Japan will consider measures for $\text{multi-layered}$ defensive and offensive capabilities of the SDF Operational Facility for Deployed Air Force for Anti-Piracy Operation in Djibouti.

Furthermore, while strengthening intelligence gathering capability required for operations, the SDF will enhance its education, training and personnel management systems in order to facilitate the continuous dispatch of adequate personnel for overseas cooperation activities.

3. Architecture of each service of the Self-Defense Forces

The organization, equipment and disposition in each service of the SDF are outlined in (1) to (3) below. The specifics of major organizations and equipment in the future are as shown in the Annex table.

(1) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

a. In order to be able to respond swiftly and deal effectively and nimbly with an attack on offshore islands and various other situations, the GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades and an armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition, the GSDF will maintain mobile operating units sustaining specialized functions in order to effectively perform such operations as airborne operations, amphibious operations, special operations, air transportation, defense against NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons, and international peace cooperation activities.

Keeping in mind that the role of these highly-proficient rapidly deployable basic operational units is to swiftly deploy and move via the integrated transport capacity referred to in 2 (c) above, the GSDF will maintain half of these in Hokkaido, given the excellent training environment there.

The defense posture in the remote islands of the southwestern region will be enhanced and strengthened via the permanent stationing of the units where the SDF is not currently stationed, the deployability of the aforementioned units, and the establishment of organic partnerships and networks with the MSDF and ASDF.

b. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-shall guided missile units in order to prevent invasion of Japan’s remote islands while still at sea, as far as possible.

c. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units in order to effectively provide air defense to protect operational units and key areas, working in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (3) d. below.

d. The GSDF will review the organization and equipment of the basic operational units (divisions and brigades) other than the rapidly deployable ones referred to in a. above, with a particular focus on tanks/howitzers and rockets. Following thorough rationalization and streamlining, these units will be deployed appropriately, according to geographical characteristics.

(2) Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF)

a. The MSDF will maintain destroyer units and ship-based patrol helicopters to enhance their capabilities even in contingencies by increasing numbers of them, in order to effectively conduct persistent ISR and antisubmarine operations etc., thereby facilitating agile response in such areas as the defense of the seas surrounding Japan, the security of maritime traffic, and international peace cooperation activities etc.

Along with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (3) d. below, the destroyer units will maintain Aegis-equipped destroyers capable of providing Japan with multi-layered defense against ballistic missile attacks.

b. The MSDF will maintain submarine units strengthened by increased numbers of them, in order to effectively conduct patrol and defense of the seas surrounding Japan, as well as regularly engage in broad underwater intelligence gathering and warning and surveillance in those seas.

c. The MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units in order to effectively conduct patrol and defense of the seas surrounding Japan, as well as regularly engage in broad maritime intelligence gathering and warning and surveillance in those seas.

d. The MSDF will maintain minesweeper units in order to effectively conduct mine-sweeping operations in the seas surrounding Japan in collaboration with the new destroyers with additional multifunctional capability and with the compact-type hull referred to in a. above.

(3) Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)

a. The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of warning and control units and air warning units. Warning and control units will be equipped with ground-based warning and control radar that can detect and track any ballistic missiles flying into Japanese air space, as well as providing persistent ISR in most air space over Japan and the surrounding areas. Air warning units will be enhanced in order to conduct joint operations together with the ground forces as well as control and warning in the air over long periods in the event of “gray zone” situations.

b. The ASDF will maintain fighter aircraft units reinforced by highly capable fighter aircrafts in order to provide aerial defense for Japan based on a co-ordinated air defense posture that brings together fighter aircrafts and relevant support functions. In addition, the ASDF will maintain enhanced aerial refueling and transport units that will enable fighter aircraft units and air warning units, etc. to carry out various operations sustainably in the air space surrounding Japan.
V. Basic Foundations for SDF

To ensure that the diverse activities required of the SDF are carried out in a timely and appropriate manner, it is not sufficient simply to upgrade the main elements of the organization and its equipment; it is also imperative to strengthen the various foundations underpinning the defense force, in order to ensure that it can function as effectively as possible. The key aspects of this are as follows.

1. Training and Exercises

   Throughout routine training and exercises, the SDF will ceaselessly review and examine various plans for dealing with situations, as well as strive to enhance and strengthen its training and exercises in order to improve the tactical skills in each of its branches. In doing so, as well as making more effective use of the excellent training environment in Hokkaido, the SDF will work in partnership with relevant organizations and the civilian sector, in order to ensure systematic implementation of more practical training and exercises.

   In the southwestern region, where there are limitations on the exercise areas, etc. of the SDF, the SDF will secure a favorable training environment through the joint use of U.S. military facilities and areas, while remaining sensitive to relationships with the local community, so that timely and appropriate training and exercises can be carried out, including Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises.

2. Operational Infrastructure

   The SDF will improve survivability, including the recovery capabilities of military camps and bases, etc., in order to maintain the support functions that serve as the operational infrastructure for units, so that units can be deployed swiftly and respond to various situations effectively.

   Moreover, in light of the fact that some SDF facilities are currently dilapidated, the SDF will implement a steady repair and maintenance program, as well as expansion of the necessary quarters in order to ensure an emergency call-up of personnel in the event of various situations, thereby enhancing readiness.

   The SDF will undertake necessary deliberations concerning civilian airports and ports, including approaches to the various systems on a day-to-day basis, in order to ensure that such facilities can be used as part of the operational infrastructure for the SDF, etc. from an early stage, depending on the situation. Furthermore, it will implement various family support measures, in order to alleviate the anxieties both of troops serving away from home and of their families while they are away.

   The SDF will enhance and strengthen the operational infrastructure in terms of equipment and materials, such as improving the operational availability of equipment, by taking all possible measures to maintain and upgrade SDF equipment, as well as securing and stockpiling the necessary ammunition.

3. Personnel and Education

   Given that equipment has become more advanced and complex, and missions more diverse and internationalized in recent years, the SDF will implement measures to reform the personnel management system, in order to ensure the edge of its troops and the effective use of human resources amid a severe fiscal situation, taking into consideration a variety of elements, including skills, experience, physical strength and morale.

   Accordingly, the SDF will implement measures to ensure an appropriate composition of ranks and age distribution, taking into account the various missions and characteristics of each branch of the SDF.

   The SDF will implement measures to make effective use of human resources, such as more effective use of female SDF personnel and expansion of reappointment, and measures related to honors and privileges. In order to strengthen the joint operations structure, the SDF will enhance education and training, and, through secondments to the Joint Staff and relevant ministries and agencies, retain adequate personnel who have a broad outlook and ideas, as well as wide-ranging experience in Japan’s security-affairs, and who can respond flexibly and rapidly to various situations part of the government.

   In light of the deterioration of the recruiting environment resulting from social factors such as the declining birthrate and popularization of higher education, the SDF will promote a diverse range of recruitment measures to spread the perception that the SDF is an attractive job option.

   Furthermore, as it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan to secure the livelihoods of the SDF personnel, who are compelled to resign at a younger age than ordinary civil servants, the SDF will promote support for re-employment by strengthening collaboration with local governments and relevant organizations.

   In order to support sustainable operation of units in situations that are becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, the SDF will promote utilization of reserve personnel in broad areas, including those with professional skills such as aviators, and will take measures to improve the sufficiency of reserve personnel.

4. Medical

   In order to keep SDF personnel in good health and enhance their ability to engage in a diverse range of missions, such as various situation responses and international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care structure, through endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, and improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. The SDF will also attach greater importance to securing and training of such medical staff as medical officers, nurses and emergency medical technicians.

   The SDF will consider such matters as revisions of regulations of emergency medical treatment on situation responses, and improve first aid capabilities on the frontline, and will put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation that takes into account the viewpoints of enhanced joint capabilities.

5. Defense Production and Technological Bases

   Retaining an adequate level of defense production and technological bases is essential not only for the production, operation, maintenance and upkeep of equipment, but also for research and development of equipment that fits the operational environment, and for the expected potential to contribute to enhancing deterrence.

   At the same time, against the backdrop of the severe fiscal situation and rises in the equipment unit price as it becomes increasingly sophisticated and complex, the numbers of units of procured equipment are on the decline. Moreover, the environment surrounding Japan’s defense production and technological bases is becoming more severe. For instance, the competitiveness of foreign companies is growing, as a result of the advance of large-scale and cross-border restructuring and consolidation of the defense industry.

   In this kind of environment, the Ministry of Defense will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan’s defense production and technological bases as a whole and will promote participation in international joint development and production and adapting defense equipment to civilian use, in order to maintain and reinforce such bases without delay.

   With regard to contribution to peace and international cooperation, there are increasing opportunities to cooperate in a more effective manner through, for example, the utilization and provision to disaster-stricken countries and others of heavy machinery and other defense equipment carried to sites by the SDF. Moreover, internationally, it has become the mainstream to participate in international joint development and production projects in order to improve the performance of defense equipment while dealing with the rising costs of the equipment. In this context, from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to engage more proactively in peacebuilding efforts and international cooperation by utilizing defense equipment in various ways, and to participate in joint development and production of defense equipment and other related items.

   Against this backdrop, while giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment. In this context, considerations will be made with regard to defining cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third party transfer.

6. Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

   In order to achieve effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, including in research and development activities, the Ministry of Defense will strengthen project management throughout the life-cycle of equipment through introducing a project manager system, as well as through considering the possibility of further introducing long-term contracts and further upgrading the contract system to provide cost reduction incentives to companies, aiming to improve cost-effectiveness throughout the life-cycle of equipment.

   Moreover, the Ministry of Defense will try to improve readiness and response capabilities through reforms of the logistics posture through effective use of capacity in the private sector. Furthermore, it will ceaselessly pursue greater transparency in the acquisition process and increased rationalization of the system, and will also aim to achieve more rigorous procedures for the acquisition of equipment.

7. Research and Development

   The Ministry of Defense will ensure consistency with the priorities for upgrading defense capability when commencing research and
The Ministry of Defense will promote education on security-related issues. Given that the presence of SDF units makes a substantial contribution to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities in some areas, and supports community medicine through emergency patient transport using SDF helicopter rescue aircraft, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of units and deployment of military camps and bases, etc., in order to secure the understanding of local governments and residents. At the same time, in operating the military camps and bases, etc., the Ministry of Defense will pay attention to the contribution of the operation to the local economy.

8. Collaboration with Local Communities

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations, including local governments, the police and the fire service, in order to enable the SDF to provide accurate response to various situations. Such close partnerships with local governments, etc., are exceedingly important from the perspective not only of the effective improvement and smooth operation of defense facilities, but also of the recruitment of SDF personnel, as well as the provision of re-employment support for them.

9. Boosting Communication Capabilities

The Ministry of Defense and SDF will strengthen strategic public relations and communication to enhance the dissemination of information via a diverse range of media, in order to secure domestic and overseas understanding which is vital to effectively conduct SDF duties.

10. Enhancing the Intellectual Base

The Ministry of Defense will promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions, in order to enhance understanding of security and crisis management among the populace. Moreover, in addition to strengthening the Ministry of Defense and SDF research systems with a particular focus on the National Institute for Defense Studies, the Ministry of Defense will promote various partnerships, including education and research exchange with other research and educational institutions within the government, as well as universities and think-tanks both within Japan and overseas.

11. Promoting Reform of the Ministry of Defense

The Ministry of Defense will further promote reforms by constantly reviewing its work methods and organization in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, total optimization in building up defense capability, strengthening SDF’s joint operation capabilities and enhancing policy-making and communication functions.

VI. Additional Points

1. These Guidelines set out the form of Japan’s defense force over the next decade or so. The National Security Council will conduct regular, comprehensive reviews of its work methods and organization in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, total optimization in building up defense capability, strengthening SDF’s joint operation capabilities and enhancing policy-making and communication functions.

2. When major changes in the situation are anticipated during the review and verification process, necessary examination of the security environment at that time will be taken into account and these guidelines will be revised adequately.

3. Legislation of the increasingly tough fiscal conditions, Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in the defense capability buildup to curb costs, and harmonize with other initiatives in other fields to ensure that Japan’s defense force as a whole can smoothly fulfill its expected function.

Reference 7 Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013)
The Five-Year Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) has been established as shown in the attached document.

(Attachment)
Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)

I. Program Guidelines

In carrying out the Defense Program for FY2014 to FY2018 in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) (hereinafter “NDPG2013”), Japan will develop a Dynamic Joint Defense Force. It will provide an effective defense which enables the SDF to conduct a diverse range of activities based on joint operations seamlessly and dynamically, adapting to situations as they demand, while prioritizing particularly important functions and capabilities through optimal resource allocation. At the same time, the Dynamic Joint Defense Force will serve as a defense force which emphasizes soft and hard readiness capabilities, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) capabilities, with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support operations by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). In strengthening the SDF structure, a highly effective joint defense force will be efficiently developed by comprehensively prioritizing particularly important functions and capabilities identified through joint operation-based capability assessments of the SDF’s overall functions and capabilities against various situations.

1. The defense forces will seamlessly and dynamically fulfill its responsibilities including providing an effective deterrence and response to a variety of security situations, supporting stability in the Asia-Pacific, and improving the global security environment. With a focus on enhancement of joint operability, the SDF will place particular emphasis on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), intelligence, transport, and C3I capabilities. In addition, defense forces will enhance their capabilities to respond to an attack on remote islands, ballistic missile attacks, outer space and cyberspace threats, large-scale disasters, and international peace cooperation efforts (activities cooperatively carried out by the international society to improve the international security environment such as U.N. Peace Keeping Operations, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and others in the fields of non-traditional security). The SDF will steadily develop the foundations for maximizing the effectiveness of these functions and capabilities.

2. In relevant efforts, the SDF will prioritize the development of capabilities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response to various situations, including defense posture buildup in Japan’s southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities. At the same time, regarding preparation for a Cold-War era style invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will establish the minimum necessary level of expertise and skill required to respond to unforeseen changes in its security situation in the future and to maintain them, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization of its activities.

3. Regarding equipment acquisition and maintenance, by properly combining the introduction of new, high-performance equipment, with life extension and improvement of existing equipment etc., the SDF will efficiently secure defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality. In this effort, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) will strengthen its project management throughout its equipment life-cycle, including during its research and development activities, and reduce the life-cycle costs to improve cost-effectiveness.

4. Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and internationalized missions in recent years, to ensure SDF’s strength and the effective use of defense force personnel, the SDF will implement measures, including the more effective use of female SDF personnel and reserve personnel, in order to fully optimize the capabilities of the government.

5. In order to address an increasingly severe security environment and to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, in conjunction with the U.S. policy of strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will further promote a variety of cooperation and consultations with the United States in a wide range of areas including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. Japan
will also actively facilitate measures for further smoothing and effective
stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.

6. Considering the extremely difficult situation in Japan’s public finance,
Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiencies and streamline the buildup
of its defense forces, while harmonizing these efforts with other measures
taken by the Government.

II. Reorganization of the Major SDF Units

1. Regarding the reorganization of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF),
given the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan, for the
purpose of carrying out swift and flexible nation-wide operations, GSDF
basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions/brigades, an
armed division, and divisions/brigades) and various units under the joint
operations, the GSDF will establish the Ground Central Command. In
addition, the GSDF promote efficiency and rationalize the command and
control function of each regional army headquarters, as well as review
other functions of some regional army headquarters. As part of such
efforts, the Central Readiness Force will be disbanded and its subsidiary
units will be integrated into the Ground Central Command.

In order to be able to respond swiftly to and deal effectively and
nimbly with an attack or remote island and various other situations, the
GSDF will transform two divisions and two brigades respectively into
two rapid deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades
that are furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. By
establishing a coastal observation unit, area security units in charge of
initial response activities and so on, the defense posture of the remote
islands in the southwest region will be strengthened. In a bid to develop
sufficient amphibious operational capabilities, which enable the SDF to
land, recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might
be invaded, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade consisting of
several regiment-scale units specializing in amphibious operations will be
established.

From the perspective of enabling swift and flexible operations, while thoroughly facilitating efficiency and rationalizing preparations
for invasion, such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the GSDF
will steadily implement programs towards successive formation of units
equipped with newly-introduced mobile combat vehicles and removal of
tanks deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other
than Hokkaido and Kyushu. It will also concentrate tanks located in Kyushu
into newly organized tank units under direct command of the Western Army.
In addition, the GSDF will steadily carry out programs that concentrate
helicopters deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other
than Hokkaido into field artillery units to be newly organized under the
direct command of the respective regional armies.

2. For the purpose of defending the seas surrounding Japan and ensuring the
security of maritime traffic in the region, through the effective conduct of
various operations such as persistent ISR operations and anti-submarine
operations, as well as for agile response in international peace cooperation
activities, the Marine Self-Defense Force (MSDF) will retain four flotillas
mainly consisting of one helicopter destroyer (DDH), and two Aegis-
equipped destroyers (DDG). Five divisions will consist of other destroyers
as well. Necessary measures to increase the number of submarines will
also be continued.

3. To enhance the air defense posture in the southwestern region, the Air
Self-Defense Force (ASDF) will relocate one fighter squadron to Naha Air
Base, and newly organize and deploy one airborne early warning squadron
at Naha Air Base.

To prevent the relative decline of Japan’s air defense capabilities and
ensure sustained air superiority, ASDF units equipped with training
support functions will be integrated for further effective enhancement of
advanced tactical skills.

4. The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the end of FY2018
will be approximately 159,000, with approximately 151,000 being active-
duty personnel, and approximately 8,000 being reserve-ready personnel. The
authorized number of active-duty personnel of the MSDF and ASDF
through FY2018 will be approximately at the same levels as at the end of
FY2013.

III. Major Programs regarding SDF’s Capabilities

1. Effective Deterrence and Response to Various Situations

(a) Development of a Persistent ISR Structure

With a view to organizing the structure required to carry out regular
and persistent ISR activities which enable an immediate response in the
case of various contingencies, the SDF will deploy a coastal observation unit to Tonyaguni Island. Considering the
current operational situation of the existing AWACS (E-767)
and airborne early warning aircraft (E-2C), the SDF will procure new
airborne early warning and control aircraft or airborne early
warning aircraft as stated in (1), and establish one squadron
consisting of airborne early warning aircraft (E-2C) in the air
warning unit and deploy it at Naha Air Base as stated in Section
II-3. By preparing a deployment structure for mobile air defense
radar on remote islands in the southwestern region, a fully-
prepared surveillance posture will be maintained.

(b) Obtaining and Securing Air Superiority

For overall improvement of air defense capabilities including
cruise missile defense capability, the SDF will increase the
number of fighter aircraft units at Naha Air Base from one
to two as stated in Section II-3, continue to facilitate
procurement of fighter aircraft (F-35A), modernize its fighter
aircraft (F-15), and improve the air-to-air combat capabilities and
network functions of its fighter aircraft (F-2). In addition, after
considering its options, it will take necessary measures to replace
fighter aircraft (F-15) unsuitable for modernization with more
capable fighter aircraft. Along with continuing to procure middle-
rang surface-to-air guided missiles, the SDF will further improve its
surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT systems by equipping
them with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that
will be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and
for ballistic missile defense (BMD).

The SDF will also procure new aerial refueling/transport aircraft, and continuously work to equip transport aircraft (C-130H) with aerial refueling capabilities and
procure rescue helicopters (UH-60J). In addition, the SDF
will examine what is the appropriate air defense posture in remote
islands in the Pacific.

(c) Obtaining and Securing Maritime Supremacy

In defense of the seas surrounding Japan and to ensure the
security of maritime traffic, the SDF will effectively conduct various
activities including holding persistent ISR and anti-
submarine operations; procuring Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG),
destroyer (DD), submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1)
and patrol helicopters (SH-60K); and conducting service-
extension activities of existing destroyers, fixed-wing patrol aircraft
(P-3C) and patrol helicopters (SH-60J) as stated in (1). At the same time, it will introduce new compact-type
hull destroyers with multifunctional capabilities. In addition, the
SDF will introduce ship-based multipurpose helicopters required for enabling deployed units to sustainably conduct activities as
situations demand, and continue to procure Mine Sweeper Ocean
(MSO) vessels, amphibious rescue aircraft (US-2), and surface-
to-ship guided missiles.

(d) Improvement of Capabilities for Rapid Deployment and Response

In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale
transportation and deployment operations and improve effective
response capabilities, transport aircraft (C-2) and transport
helicopters (CH-47JIA) will continue to be procured. Besides the
ship-based multipurpose helicopters mentioned in (c), the SDF
will introduce tilt-rotor aircraft that complement and strengthen
the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47JIA) in terms of
cruising speed and range. In addition, the SDF will take necessary
measures after considering the possibility of new multipurpose
helicopters that will succeed the existing multipurpose helicopters
(US-1J). In developing such aerial transport capabilities, the SDF
will consider the operational redundancy by clarifying the roles
and assignments among the various means of transportation.

The SDF will reinforce transportation and deployment
capabilities, by such means as acquiring amphibious vehicles
that support units’ amphibious landing efforts on remote islands,
and refitting existing Tank Landing Ships (FDDT). The SDF
will consider what the role should be of a multipurpose vessel with
capabilities for command and control, large-scale transportation,
and aircraft operations, which can be utilized in various operations
such as amphibious operations, and reach a conclusion regarding
Given North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capabilities, the SDF will pursue the comprehensive improvement of its response capabilities against the threat of ballistic missiles. For reinforcing its multi-layered and sustainable defense posture for the entire territory of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, the SDF will procure additional Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and continue to improve the capabilities of its existing DDGs. As stated in (2)(b), the SDF will pursue further improvement of its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT system so as to equip it with new advanced interceptor missiles PAC-3 MSE that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for BMD. In addition, to reinforce its ballistic missile detecting and tracking capabilities, the SDF will promote the improvement of its automated warning and control systems (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment), as well as procurement and improvement of its fixed air defense radar (FPS-7) systems.

Along with the continuous promotion of Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block IIA), the MOD will, after examining options, take necessary measures to improve its ballistic missile detecting and tracking capabilities. The SDF will conduct bilateral training and exercises to enhance the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, capabilities, the MOD will study its possible response capability to the entire territory of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, the SDF will continue to enhance information gathering capabilities through the use of various space satellites equipped with diverse sensors, and strengthen C3I capabilities by continuing to develop and deploy an advanced X-Band satellite communications system. With a view to ensuring the constant availability of these capabilities in a variety of contingencies, the SDF will actively promote space situational awareness efforts, and research on satellite protection, and work to enhance the resiliency of its satellites. In making such efforts, given that relevant domestic organizations and the United States possess the latest technologies and knowledge related to outer space, the MOD will facilitate cooperation including in the area of personnel development with such organizations.

(5) Response to Large-scale Disasters
In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as the Nankai Trough earthquake, or a special disaster such as a nuclear emergency, the SDF will respond by immediately transporting and deploying sufficient numbers of SDF units, as well as establishing a rotating staff posture based on a joint operational approach. These efforts will enable a sustained response over the long term. In these efforts, the SDF will leverage lessons of vital importance learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake, to gather information on the extent and nature of the damage by aircraft from the initial stages of the impact and immediately engage in rescue activities, for the purpose of protecting people’s lives. In addition, it will implement prompt emergency reconstruction activities including elimination of road obstacles indispensable for the private sector’s efforts including the smooth transportation of relief materials. With close coordination and cooperation with relevant government agencies, local governments and private sector organizations, the MOD will promote such measures as to establish contingency planning and to conduct training and exercises, and secure alternative capabilities when the basis for the SDF’s disaster recovery and deployment operations is affected.

(6) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities
Given that advanced intelligence functions lay the foundation for MOD/SDF to sufficiently fulfill their roles, the MOD will strengthen all stages of its intelligence capabilities, including gathering, analyzing, sharing and securing intelligence. With regards to the methods for intelligence gathering and analysis, with a view to flexibly meeting the demands of changes in the security environment, the MOD will promote the development and improvement of its intelligence gathering facilities, and its acquisition. With a view to efficiently conducting large-scale transportation movements in coordination with the SDF’s transportation capacities, the MOD will take necessary measures after considering active utilization of civilian transport capabilities including methods for utilizing the funds and know-how of the private sector and reserve personnel. Mobile combat vehicles transportable by airlift will be introduced in the rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions/brigades) highlighted in Section II-1, and rapid deployment regiments that immediately respond to various situations will be organized. The SDF will also establish area security units in charge of initial responses on remote islands in the southwestern region, as well as conduct maneuver deployment training for prompt unit deployment to remote islands. While improving guidance capability of existing precision-guided bombs and procuring surface-to-ship guided missiles, the SDF will also promote the development of improved capabilities of ship-to-ship guided missiles, such as increasing their firing range. The SDF will conduct bilateral training and exercises to enhance the capabilities for information gathering and research and analysis, and to develop a practical training environment where response capabilities against cyber attacks can be tested. Through its efforts to secure response capabilities in cyberspace where attackers have an overwhelming advantage, the SDF may consider the acquisition of capabilities to prevent them from using cyberspace. In addition, the SDF will strive to keep abreast of the latest risks, response measures and technological trends, including through cooperation with the private sector, and strategic talks and joint exercises with the private sector.

Given that it is essential to employ personnel with expertise on a continuing basis and that methods of cyber attack are increasingly sophisticated and complicated, the SDF plans to develop personnel with strong cyber security expertise, through efforts such as improving the in-house curriculum for specialized education, expanding learning opportunities at institutions of higher education at home and abroad, and cultivating expertise through personnel management efforts. To enable a comprehensive response to cyber attacks through a whole-of-government approach, the SDF will enhance close coordination with relevant agencies by laying the foundation for repeatedly providing expertise and MOD/SDF personnel, and improve training and exercises.
actively utilize the outer space and unmanned aerial vehicles so as to
drastically reinforce its capability to gather intelligence from the
diverse sources mentioned above. In the medium and long term, the MOD will develop the ability to utilize sophisticated GEOINT
by such means as visualization and prediction of situations with a
variety of information and intelligence overload on a map or image,
while promoting the comprehensive and efficient geospatial database
development. The MOD will take measures to enhance its HUMINT
acquisition capabilities by securing SIGINT and SIGINT-type activities
by strengthening information-gathering and equipment protection
capabilities, as well as continue efforts to improve communications,
supplies, military medicine, and support for families of military
personnel. By improving the capacity of the engineer units which are
highly appreciated at the SDF’s activity areas, the SDF will work to
facilitate international peace cooperation activities, effectively meet
the needs of the SDF’s activity areas. Japan will strengthen the development of personnel who can play an active role in
the field of international peace cooperation activity, and will send
more personnel to mission headquarters of the U.N. Peace Keeping
Operation and U.N. Department of peacekeeping operations which
would help Japan in making more contribution in the field.

The Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center will expand
its curriculum and strengthen cooperation with relevant government
agencies, foreign countries, and non-governmental organizations
through efforts such as providing educational opportunities to not only
SDF personnel, but also candidates from various backgrounds.

To correspond to the reality of the U.N. peacekeeping operations,
Japan will continue to consider how it might expand its participation
in such operations.

(6) Cooperating to Promote Arms Control, Disarmament and
Nonproliferation
In order to contribute to various activities in the field of arms control
and disarmament undertaken by the United Nations and other
organizations, Japan will continue its active engagement including its
contribution of personnel to these efforts. Given that proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and missiles that serve as a threat to
security.

2. Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global
Security Environments
From the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the
principle of international cooperation, aimed at stabilizing the Asia-Pacific
region, Japan will enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperative relations
and conduct various activities including training and exercises in a timely
and appropriate manner, as well as actively engage in international peace
cooperation activities to properly address global security challenges. The
following elements will be particularly important to these efforts:

(1) Training and Exercises
In addition to timely and appropriate implementation of SDF training
and exercises, Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral combined
training and exercises in the Asia-Pacific region, proactively and
visibly demonstrating our nation’s resolve and advanced capabilities
focused on regional stabilization. In addition, it will seek to improve
interoperability and build and strengthen practical cooperative
relationships with relevant countries.

(2) Promoting Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
Enhancing mutual understanding and relationships of trust with other
countries and international organizations is important as the cornerstone
of efforts to enhance the security environment. Japan will take the
following steps to promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and
exchanges on various levels not limited to high-level exchanges, but
including unit-level exchanges, such as building and strengthening
capabilities focused on wide-ranging security issues of common interest including HA/DR, maritime security, and ensuring the
stable use of outer space and cyberspace.

(3) Promoting Capacity Building Assistance
By utilizing the capabilities the SDF has accumulated, the MOD will
provide assistance to countries concerned to enhance their military capabilities in such
fields as HA/DR, disposal of landmines and unexploded ordnance,
and military medicine, so as to stabilize the security environment, as
well as strengthen relations with defense authorities of those countries.
Cooperating with partners actively engaged in capacity building
such as the United States and Australia, with due consideration for
coordination with diplomatic policies such as the Official Development
Assistance (ODA), Japan will provide effective and efficient support in
capacity building.

(4) Ensuring Maritime Security
For the purpose of maintaining “Open and Stable Seas,” which serve as
the cornerstone of Japan’s peace and prosperity efforts as a maritime
state, and ensuring security of maritime traffic, the MOD will further
cooperate with allies to engage in anti-piracy activities off the coast of
Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, as well as help Gulf countries improve
their own capabilities. In other ocean not surrounding Japan such as
the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, the SDF will also leverage
a variety of activities in addition to combine training and exercises with
countries which share Japan’s goal of maintaining maritime
security.

(5) Implementing International Peace Cooperation Activities
To immediately commence international peace cooperation
improvement of availability ratio. In addition, given that longer-term contracts raise predictability and enhance cost-effectiveness, the MOD will expand the use of its new contract system, Performance Based Logistics (PBL), under which the price is to be determined according to realized performance.

(3) Personnel and Education

Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and internationalized missions in recent years, the SDF will, from a long-term planning perspective, promote feasible measures to ensure the strength of its troops and the effective use of personnel amid the severe fiscal situation, taking into consideration a variety of elements, including skills, experience, physical strength and morale.

(a) Composition of Ranks and Age Distribution

Given the characteristics of respective units, for the purpose of achieving a composition of ranks that enables the three services to accomplish their respective missions in the most appropriate and sustainable way, the SDF will promote measures to secure and nurture appropriate-numbers of officers, warrant officers and sergeants/petty officers equipped with necessary capabilities, as well as recruit in a planned manner high-quality privates/seaman/airman.

To ensure an appropriate age distribution, in addition to reviewing the retirement age of 60, the SDF will work to adjust the age distribution in the respective officer, warrant officer, sergeant/petty officer, and private/seaman/airman ranks, by encouraging early retirement and more appropriately managing its privates/seaman/airman. While taking into consideration the status guarantee of SDF personnel, the SDF will conduct research on new systems for early retirement including systems used by other countries. With a view to making the appropriate age distribution among airplane pilots, the SDF will take measures to allow them to be re-employed in the private sector. In addition, the SDF will review the final promotion rate of officers, warrant officers and sergeants/petty officers, and manage personnel more appropriately with consideration to personnel’s physical strength so as to maintain SDF’s strength.

(b) Effective Utilization of Human Resources

In order to more effectively make use of its personnel, including its female personnel, the SDF will actively reappoint retiring personnel possessing advanced knowledge, skills and experience where such personnel prove beneficial to the overall SDF’s strength.

To enable SDF personnel to pursue their missions with high morale and a strong feeling of pride, the SDF will promote measures related to honors and privileges including expansion of the Defense Meritorious Badge program.

In order to strengthen the joint operations structure, the SDF will enhance education and training, and, through secondment to the Joint Staff Office and relevant ministries and agencies, retain adequate personnel in the government who have a broad outlook and ideas, as well as wide-ranging experience in Japan’s security affairs, and who can respond flexibly and rapidly to a variety of situations.

(c) Recruitment and Re-employment Support

In light of the deteriorating recruiting environment, resulting from social factors such as the declining birthrate and the increased pursuit of higher education, in order to continue to secure competent personnel in the coming years, the SDF will work to enhance public understanding of national defense and security issues, effectively engage in public relations to adjust to the changing times, and coordinate and cooperate with relevant ministries and agencies and local governments, so as to spread the perception that the SDF is an attractive job option.

As it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan (GOJ) to provide financially for SDF personnel, compelled to resign at a younger age than ordinary civil servants, by strengthening collaboration with local governments and relevant organizations, through sharing the knowledge, skills and experience of retired SDF personnel with society, the GOJ will facilitate such efforts as measures to provide more incentives for companies to employ retired SDF personnel, and encourage employment of retired SDF personnel in the public sector, so as to improve their re-employment environment.

(d) Utilization of Personnel including Reserve Staff

In order to support sustainable unit operations in situations that are becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, the SDF will promote the use of ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel in broad areas. To that end, the SDF will facilitate the appointment of reserve personnel and their assignment to duties commensurate with their specialized knowledge and skills including possible opportunities to work at headquarters, and will also improve training for call-ups. Aiming at active use of the private sector’s transport capabilities, necessary measures will be taken to utilize reserve personnel including those who have retired.

The SDF will also encourage the appointment of reserve personnel equipped with specialized skills, including airplane pilots who the SDF releases to the private sector for re-employment. Other necessary measures will be taken as well with broad consideration to using reserve personnel, including for call-ups in various situations.

Furthermore, in order to ensure the strength of reserve personnel, the SDF will seek to increase public awareness of the reserve program, and take measures to provide more incentives for reserve personnel themselves and companies to employ reserve personnel.

(4) Medical

In order to keep SDF personnel in good health and enhance its military medicine capabilities to enable the SDF to cope with a diverse range of missions in responses to various situations and international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will upgrade its hospitals to hubs with enhanced functions, and promote the formation of networks across hospitals and medical treatment rooms. Along with contributions to medical services in local communities, the SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care structure, including improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital.

By reinforcing education for medical officers, nurses and emergency medical technicians, the SDF will make efforts to secure personnel with more specialized and advanced skills. In addition, the SDF will consider such matters as revision of regulations of emergency medical treatment on situation responses, and improve frontline first aid capabilities, and will put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation that takes into account the need for enhanced joint service capabilities. Furthermore, the SDF will also reinforce the functions of the National Defense Medical College, establishing it as a hub for education, and research in the field of defense medical science.

(5) Defense Production and Technology Base

Retaining an adequate level of defense production and a technology base is essential not only for the production, operation, sustainment of equipment, but also for research and development of equipment that fits the operational environment in Japan, and for the expected potential to contribute to enhancing deterrence. Given that and Japan’s intention to maintain and reinforce above-mentioned base, the MOD will formulate a strategy that sets forth a strategy that sets forth a strategy for creating and enhancing the technological capability and improving productivity of Japan’s defense production and technology base, as well as increasing global competitiveness, Japan will actively promote cooperation on defense equipment and technology development, such as through international joint development and production with other countries including the United States and the United Kingdom, utilizing the technological fields where Japan enjoys an advantage. In coordination with relevant government agencies, the MOD will promote adapting defense equipment, such as aircraft developed by the United States, and for the expected potential to contribute to enhancing deterrence. Given that and Japan’s defense production and technology development, such as through international joint development and production, the MOD will establish a database of past contracts, which it will use to develop a simulation model for price estimation, so as to enable independent estimates of more appropriate acquisition prices. While utilizing the private sector’s knowledge, the MOD will actively train and appoint personnel to positions that require knowledge, skills and specialized expertise in the acquisition of equipment, such as specialists in cost analysis. In addition, the MOD will develop a system that allows for reconsideration, including review of specifications and project plans, when there is a significant discrepancy between the estimated life-cycle cost derived from the analysis concerned and the real value of the life-cycle costs.

To allow for prompt and efficient acquisitions, while ensuring transparency and fairness, parties available for negotiated contracts will be sorted and ranked as necessary so as to be useful. To diversify contract types and allow for the efficient acquisition of various equipment, the MOD will provide the government will take necessary measures after considering further development of its contract system, to incentivize companies to lower prices, introduce longer-term contracts, which raise the predictability for companies and lead to lower costs, and establish a flexible system for accepting orders such as, the use of a
Given that understanding and support from Japanese people and foreign counterparts is essential, the MOD will prioritize R&D projects that best meet the operational needs of the SDF.

In order to strengthen its air defense capabilities, the MOD will promote technical review of next-generation surface-to-air guided missiles in order to replacing the functions both of the GSDF middle-range surface-to-air guided missile and the ASDF PATRIOT surface-to-air guided missiles. In addition, the MOD will promote strategic studies including empirical research to accumulate and enhance fighter aircraft-related technologies in Japan so as to keep an option for development of next-generation fighter aircraft including the possibility of international joint development of an aircraft to replace the F-2 when it is time to retire it. Based on the findings, the MOD will take necessary measures. In an effort to improve ISR capability, the MOD will promote development of SIGINT aircraft as well as research on new fixed air defense radar, and sonars with higher detecting capabilities through simultaneous use of multiple sonars. In addition, the MOD will conduct research on unmanned equipment available for flexible operations in case of various contingencies including large-scale natural disasters, and promote R&D to improve existing equipment including vehicles, ships and aircraft.

With a view to addressing emerging threats and securing technological advantage in the areas of strategically important fields, the MOD will set a vision of future equipment which shows a direction of medium- and long-term R&D with regard to development of major equipment, in order to systematically conduct advanced research from medium and long term perspectives. It will do this while considering the latest trends in science and technology, changes in battle field techniques, the potential for international joint research and development, and availability of effective joint operations among major pieces of equipment.

From a security standpoint, the MOD will also make an effort to actively utilize civilian technologies applicable to defense needs (dual-use technologies) by such means as enhancement of coordination with universities and research institutions, while strengthening the function of technology control to prevent outflow of advanced technologies. In doing so, the MOD will always pay attention to keeping abreast of scientific technological trends including information relevant to technological development and gathering industry-academic-government strengths. In a related effort, the MOD will also promote to have military technologies employed in civilian activities.

In order to achieve effective and efficient R&D in consideration of the items stated above, the MOD will re-examine its research and development posture, and take necessary measures.

Collaboration with Local Communities

As it is essential to closely coordinate with local governments in such efforts as effective response to various contingencies, and recruitment and re-employment support for SDF personnel, in pursuit of facilitated harmonization between defense facilities and their surrounding local communities, the MOD will continue to advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities, as well as engage in various measures such as intensive public relations activities focused on their policies and activities, in order to secure the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities.

Given that the presence of SDF units makes a substantial contribution to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities in some areas, and supports medical services in communities through emergency patient transport by SDF search and rescue aircraft, etc., the MOD/SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of units, and deployment and administration of SDF camps and bases, etc. in order to secure the understanding of local governments and residents. In these efforts, based on the governmental contract policy, the MOD will promote joint projects with policy-making divisions by relocating the institute to the Ichigaya district (where the MOD’s headquarters is located), and to by promoting academic exchanges with foreign research institutions. The MOD will also strive to administer the NIDS in such a way that it is capable of dealing with policy issues that the MOD faces in a timely and appropriate manner.

Promoting Reform of the MOD

The MOD will further promote its reforms by regularly reviewing its work methods and organization in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, and to optimize the build-up of defense capabilities, promote SDF joint operation functions and enhance policy-making and communication functions. In doing so, with the intention of optimizing its defense force build-up, the MOD will establish a planning system for defense build-up with a focus on joint operation-based capability assessments, and take measures to facilitate efficiency and optimization in the operation of equipment, keeping in mind an option to establish a new agency in the MOD. Also, to enhance the prompt and efficient operation of the SDF, by such effort as integration of duties related to actual unit operations into the Joint Staff Office, the MOD will eliminate overlapping duties in the Internal Bureau and the Joint Staff Office, and conduct an organizational review including the reorganization or disbanding of the Bureau of Operational Policy.

IV. Measures for Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

1. Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

In order to maintain and strengthen the U.S. commitment to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region and to ensure Japan’s national security, Japan will continue the revision of and revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation while strengthening Japan’s own capabilities as a premise for these efforts.

Meanwhile, Japan will expand bilateral training and exercises, joint ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas by the SDF and the U.S. forces. In addition, Japan will further deepen various Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and cooperation in areas such as BMD, bi-lateral planning, and bi-lateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue.

Japan will also strengthen cooperation not only in the fields of counter-piracy, capacity building assistance, HA/DR, peacekeeping and counter-terrorism, but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace.

Furthermore, Japan will strengthen and expand Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including intelligence cooperation and information security, and defense equipment and technology cooperation.

2. Measures for furthering Smooth and Effective Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

From the perspective of making the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan more smooth and effective, Japan will steadily ensure the Host Nation Support (HNS).

V. Quantities of Major Procurement

The Annex Table shows details of the quantities of major procurement described in Section III. With a view to developing the defense forces described in the Annex Table of NDP/G2013 over 10-year time frame, this program will focus on build-up of defense forces the best adapted to the current security environment.

VI. Expenditures

1. The expenditures required to implement the defense force developments described in this program amount to approximately ¥24, 670 billion in FY2013 prices.

2. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, approximately ¥700 billion will be secured by means of further streamlining and rationalization through efforts such as equipment procurement reform. The annual defense budgets for the implementation of this program will be allocated within a limit of approximately ¥23, 970 billion over the next five years.

3. This program will be reviewed after three years as necessary, with consideration to such factors at home and abroad as the international security environment, trends in technological standards including information communication technology, and fiscal conditions.

VII. Other

While maintaining the deterrence of U.S. Forces, Japan will steadily implement specific measures including the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related programs to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa.
### Reference 8  Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned  
(As of March 31, 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Recoilless Guns</th>
<th>Mortars</th>
<th>Field Artillery</th>
<th>Rocket Launchers, etc.</th>
<th>Anti-aircraft Machine Guns</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Armored Vehicles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approximate number owned</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Each type of gun, except those of tanks and armored vehicles, includes self-propelled guns.

### Reference 9  Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications  
(As of March 31, 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Use</th>
<th>Number Owned</th>
<th>Maximum Speed (knots)</th>
<th>Crew (number)</th>
<th>Full Length (m)</th>
<th>Full Width (m)</th>
<th>Engine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Fixed-wing</td>
<td>LR-2</td>
<td>Liaison and Reconnaissance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2 (8)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Turboprop, twin-engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>AH-1S</td>
<td>Anti-tank</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Turboprop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>OH-6D</td>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1 (3)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Turboprop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>OH-1</td>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Turboprop, twin-engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UH-1H/J</td>
<td>Utility</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>2 (11)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Turboprop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CH-47J/JA</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>150/140</td>
<td>3 (55)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4/5</td>
<td>Turboprop, twin-engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UH-60JA</td>
<td>Utility</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2 (12)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Turboprop, twin-engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AH-64D</td>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Turboprop, twin-engines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Fixed-wing</td>
<td>P-1</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Turboprop, quadruple-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed-wing</td>
<td>P-3C</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Turboprop, quadruple-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>SH-60J</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Turboprop, twin-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>SH-60K</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Turboprop, twin-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MCH-101</td>
<td>Minesweeping and transport</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Turboprop, triple engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Fixed-wing</td>
<td>F-15J/DJ</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>mach 2.5</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Turboprop, twin-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed-wing</td>
<td>F-4EJ</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>mach 2.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Turbojet, twin-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed-wing</td>
<td>F-2A/B</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>mach 2</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Turboprop, single-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed-wing</td>
<td>F-35A</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>mach 1.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Turboprop, single-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RF-4E/EJ</td>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>mach 2.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Turbojet, twin-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C-1</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>mach 0.76</td>
<td>5 (60)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Turboprop, twin-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C-130H</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>6 (92)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Turboprop, quadruple-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KC-767</td>
<td>Aerial refueling transport</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>mach 0.84</td>
<td>4-6 (200)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Turboprop, twin-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KC-130H</td>
<td>Addition of aerial refueling functions transport</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>6 (92)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Turboprop, quadruple-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>E-2C</td>
<td>Early warning</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Turboprop, twin-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>E-767</td>
<td>Early warning and control</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Turboprop, twin-engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotary-wing</td>
<td>CH-47J</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>5 (48)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Turboprop, twin-engine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Parenthetical figures in the item “Crew” represents the number of people transported.  
2. F-4EJs include 48 improved versions of the F-4EJ.  
3. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2016.
### Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service

(As of March 31, 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Destroyer</th>
<th>Submarine</th>
<th>Mine Warfare Ship</th>
<th>Patrol Combatant Craft</th>
<th>Amphibious Ship</th>
<th>Auxiliary Ship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number (vessels)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.

### Guided Missile Specifications

(As of March 31, 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Weight (kg)</th>
<th>Full Length (m)</th>
<th>Diameter (cm)</th>
<th>Guidance System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-ballistic</td>
<td>Patriot (PAC-3)</td>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Approx. 300</td>
<td>Approx. 5.2</td>
<td>Approx. 26</td>
<td>Program + command + radar homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SM-3</td>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Approx. 1,500</td>
<td>Approx. 6.6</td>
<td>Approx. 35</td>
<td>Command + IR image homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-aircraft and antimissile</td>
<td>Patriot (PAC-2)</td>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Approx. 900</td>
<td>Approx. 5.3</td>
<td>Approx. 41</td>
<td>Program + command + TVM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved Hawk</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 640</td>
<td>Approx. 5.0</td>
<td>Approx. 36</td>
<td>Radar homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile</td>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Approx. 570</td>
<td>Approx. 4.9</td>
<td>Approx. 32</td>
<td>Radar homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (Improved)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 460</td>
<td>Approx. 4.9</td>
<td>Approx. 28</td>
<td>Radar homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (C) (SAM-1C)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 100</td>
<td>2.7/2.9</td>
<td>Approx. 16</td>
<td>Image + IR homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-1)</td>
<td>GSDF/ASDF</td>
<td>Approx. 100</td>
<td>Approx. 2.7</td>
<td>Approx. 16</td>
<td>IR homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (SAM-2)</td>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Approx. 12</td>
<td>Approx. 1.4</td>
<td>Approx. 8</td>
<td>Image + IR homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (B) (SAM-2B)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 13</td>
<td>Approx. 1.5</td>
<td>Approx. 8</td>
<td>IR image homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 12</td>
<td>Approx. 1.4</td>
<td>Approx. 8</td>
<td>Image + IR homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type-11 short-range surface-to-air missile</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 100</td>
<td>Approx. 2.9</td>
<td>Approx. 16</td>
<td>Active radar homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-air missile for base air defense</td>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Approx. 100</td>
<td>Approx. 2.9</td>
<td>Approx. 16</td>
<td>Active radar homing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-ship</td>
<td>Type-88 surface-to-ship missile (SSM-1)</td>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Approx. 660</td>
<td>Approx. 5.1</td>
<td>Approx. 35</td>
<td>Inertial guidance + radar homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type-12 surface-to-ship missile</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 700</td>
<td>Approx. 5.0</td>
<td>Approx. 35</td>
<td>Inertial guidance + radar homing + GPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harpoon (SSM)</td>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Approx. 680</td>
<td>Approx. 4.6</td>
<td>Approx. 34</td>
<td>Inertial guidance + radar homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harpoon (USM)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 680</td>
<td>Approx. 4.6</td>
<td>Approx. 34</td>
<td>Inertial guidance + radar homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type-99 ship-to-ship missile (SSM-1B)</td>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Approx. 530</td>
<td>Approx. 3.8</td>
<td>Approx. 34</td>
<td>Inertial guidance + radar homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type-91 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1C)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 660</td>
<td>Approx. 5.1</td>
<td>Approx. 35</td>
<td>Inertial guidance + radar homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maverick (AGM-65)</td>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Approx. 300</td>
<td>Approx. 2.5</td>
<td>Approx. 31</td>
<td>IR image homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type-80 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 600</td>
<td>Approx. 4.0</td>
<td>Approx. 35</td>
<td>Inertial guidance + IR image homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type-93 air-to-ship missile (ASM-2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 540</td>
<td>Approx. 4.0</td>
<td>Approx. 35</td>
<td>Inertial guidance + IR image homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type-93 air-to-ship missile (B) (ASM-2B)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 530</td>
<td>Approx. 4.0</td>
<td>Approx. 35</td>
<td>Inertial guidance + IR image homing + GPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-tank</td>
<td>Type-79 anti-tank missile</td>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Approx. 12</td>
<td>Approx. 1.1</td>
<td>Approx. 11</td>
<td>Laser homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type-01 light anti-tank missile</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 11</td>
<td>Approx. 0.9</td>
<td>Approx. 12</td>
<td>IR image homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOW</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 18</td>
<td>Approx. 1.2</td>
<td>Approx. 15</td>
<td>IR semi-automatic wire guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-landing craft and antitank</td>
<td>Type-79 anti-landing craft and anti-tank missile</td>
<td>GSDF/MSDF</td>
<td>Approx. 33</td>
<td>Approx. 1.6</td>
<td>Approx. 15</td>
<td>IR semi-automatic wire guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type-96 multipurpose guided missile system (MPMS)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 59</td>
<td>Approx. 2.0</td>
<td>Approx. 16</td>
<td>Inertial guidance + IR image Optic fiber TVM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle range multi-purpose missile</td>
<td></td>
<td>Approx. 26</td>
<td>Approx. 1.4</td>
<td>Approx. 14</td>
<td>IR image homing Laser homing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hellfire</td>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Approx. 47</td>
<td>Approx. 1.6</td>
<td>Approx. 18</td>
<td>Laser homing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Reference 12

**Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)**

(单位：10 亿日元，%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>GNP/GDP (Original Estimates) (A)</th>
<th>Annual Expenditures on General Account (B)</th>
<th>Growth Rate from Previous Year</th>
<th>General Annual Expenditures (C)</th>
<th>Growth Rate from Previous Year</th>
<th>Defense-Related Expenditures (D)</th>
<th>Growth Rate from Previous Year</th>
<th>Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to GNP/GDP (D/A)</th>
<th>Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to Annual Expenditures on General Account (D/B)</th>
<th>Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to General Expenditures (D/C)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>75,590</td>
<td>9,915</td>
<td>△0.6</td>
<td>8,107</td>
<td>△2.8</td>
<td>1,249</td>
<td>△3.3</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>13.61</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>281,600</td>
<td>36,581</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>29,198</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>3,014</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>8.24</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1,585,000</td>
<td>212,888</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>158,408</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>13,273</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3,146,000</td>
<td>524,996</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>325,854</td>
<td>△0.0</td>
<td>31,371</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.997</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4,928,000</td>
<td>709,671</td>
<td>△2.9</td>
<td>421,417</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>47,236</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>6.65</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4,752,000</td>
<td>922,092</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>534,542</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>46,626</td>
<td>△0.4</td>
<td>0.985</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>8.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>4,838,000</td>
<td>924,116</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>540,780</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>47,752</td>
<td>△0.3</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>8.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>4,796,000</td>
<td>903,339</td>
<td>△2.2</td>
<td>512,450</td>
<td>△5.2</td>
<td>46,453</td>
<td>△0.4</td>
<td>0.969</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>9.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4,877,000</td>
<td>926,115</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>527,311</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>47,538</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.960</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>8.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>5,004,000</td>
<td>958,823</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>564,697</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>48,848</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.956</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>8.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>5,049,000</td>
<td>963,420</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>573,555</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>48,221</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.955</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>8.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>5,188,000</td>
<td>967,218</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>578,286</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>48,607</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>8.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>5,355,000</td>
<td>974,547</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>583,591</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>48,996</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.885</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>8.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>5,643,000</td>
<td>977,128</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>588,958</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>49,388</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.875</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>8.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The figures provided show GNP in and before FY1985, and GDP from FY1995 onward, in each case based on original estimates.
2. The lower figures include them.

### Reference 13

**Changes in Major Area of Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis)**

(单位：10 亿日元，%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Annual Expenditures on General Account</th>
<th>National Defense</th>
<th>Social Security</th>
<th>Education and Science</th>
<th>Public Works</th>
<th>Composition Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>922,992</td>
<td>46,826</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>272,666</td>
<td>55,872</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>924,116</td>
<td>46,625</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>287,079</td>
<td>55,100</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>903,339</td>
<td>46,453</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>263,901</td>
<td>54,057</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>926,115</td>
<td>46,694</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>291,224</td>
<td>53,687</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>958,823</td>
<td>47,838</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>305,175</td>
<td>54,421</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>963,420</td>
<td>48,221</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>315,297</td>
<td>53,613</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>967,218</td>
<td>48,607</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>319,738</td>
<td>53,580</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>974,547</td>
<td>48,996</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>324,735</td>
<td>53,567</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>977,128</td>
<td>49,388</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>329,732</td>
<td>53,646</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. The upper figures for Budgets and Composition Ratio exclude the cost for SACO-related expenses (12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, 2.8 billion yen in FY2016, 7.8 billion yen in FY2017, and 5.1 billion yen for FY2018), while the lower figures include them.

5. Maintenance costs include those for housing, clothing and training.

4. Facility improvement expenses include those of airfields and barracks.

3. R&D expenses include those of equipment.

2. Equipment acquisition expenses include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships.

1. Personnel and food provisions expenses include personnel wage and food expenditures.

Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others.

10. In Japan, the figures in the upper row exclude SACO-related expenditures (12.0 billion yen for FY2014, 4.6 billion yen for FY2015, 2.8 billion yen for FY2016, 7.8 billion yen for FY2017, and 5.1 billion yen for FY2018), while the figures in the lower row are based on the initial budget and include them.

8. The figures for the United Kingdom are based on the initial budget in the budget message.

7. The figures for the Republic of Korea are based on the initial budget released on its Ministry of National Defense website.

6. The figures for Australia are based on the initial budget in the Defence Portfolio Budget Statements published by the Australian Department of Defence.

5. Russia's defense expenditure is based on the FY2014-2017 expenditures and the FY2018 budget amount in the Information on Execution of Budgets of the Russian Federation released by the Federal Treasury (initial).

4. The figures for China are based on the initial budget for the central government expenditure in the Finance Budget Report to the National People's Congress (However, since FY2015, only the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure (a portion of the central government expenditure) was released. For FY2015, the defense expenditure of the central government expenditure was calculated by combining the local transfer expenditure, etc. that were separately released). In addition, through FY2015, the rate of growth over the previous year was calculated from the central government expenditure. For FY2016 and FY2018, as only the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure was released, the rate of change was calculated by comparing with the FY2015 and FY2017 defense expenditure (886.9 billion yuan) in the central ministry expenditure.

3. U.S. defense expenditures represent the expense narrowly defined by the Historical Table. Figures for FY2018 are estimated values.

2. Equipment acquisition expenses include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships.

1. Personnel and food provisions expenses include personnel wage and food expenditures.

Reference 14 Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>11,361</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>11,808</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>11,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>1,477</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1,411</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility improvement costs</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction of government aircraft</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The cost for SACO-related projects</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>47,838</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>48,848</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>48,521</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Personnel and food provisions expenses include personnel wage and food expenditures.

2. Equipment acquisition expenses include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships.

3. R&D expenses include those of equipment.

4. Facility improvement expenses include those of airfields and barracks.

5. Maintenance costs include those for housing, clothing and training.

6. Base countermeasures include those for housing, clothing and training.

7. The figures for the United Kingdom are based on the initial budget in the budget message.


9. France's defense expenditure for FY2018 is an estimation.

Reference 15 Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan (100 million yen)</td>
<td>47,838</td>
<td>48,221</td>
<td>48,607</td>
<td>48,996</td>
<td>49,389</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (100 million yen)</td>
<td>48,848</td>
<td>49,801</td>
<td>50,541</td>
<td>51,251</td>
<td>51,911</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. (U.S. 1 million dollar)</td>
<td>577,897</td>
<td>586,499</td>
<td>586,370</td>
<td>578,896</td>
<td>612,542</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (100 million yuan)</td>
<td>8,082</td>
<td>8,886</td>
<td>9,544</td>
<td>10,444</td>
<td>11,070</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (100 million RUB)</td>
<td>24,791</td>
<td>31,814</td>
<td>37,753</td>
<td>26,523</td>
<td>29,530</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea (100 million won)</td>
<td>357,056</td>
<td>357,460</td>
<td>357,995</td>
<td>357,995</td>
<td>341,581</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia (1 million Australian dollar)</td>
<td>29,303</td>
<td>32,695</td>
<td>32,882</td>
<td>35,191</td>
<td>36,231</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (1 million GBP)</td>
<td>34,500</td>
<td>35,200</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (1 million euros)</td>
<td>38,921</td>
<td>36,791</td>
<td>39,939</td>
<td>40,841</td>
<td>42,820</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others.

2. "% represents a rate of growth over the previous year.

3. U.S. defense expenditures represent the expense narrowly defined by the Historical Table. Figures for FY2018 are estimated values.

4. The figures for China are based on the initial budget for the central government expenditure in the Finance Budget Report to the National People's Congress (However, since FY2015, only the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure (a portion of the central government expenditure) was released. For FY2015, the defense expenditure of the central government expenditure was calculated by combining the local transfer expenditure, etc. that were separately released). In addition, through FY2015, the rate of growth over the previous year was calculated from the central government expenditure. For FY2016 and FY2018, as only the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure was released, the rate of change was calculated by comparing with the FY2015 and FY2017 defense expenditure (886.9 billion yuan) in the central ministry expenditure.

5. Russia’s defense expenditure is based on the FY2014-2017 expenditures and the FY2018 budget amount in the Information on Execution of Budgets of the Russian Federation released by the Federal Treasury (initial).

6. The figures for Australia are based on the initial budget in the Defence Portfolio Budget Statements published by the Australian Department of Defence.

7. The figures for the Republic of Korea are based on the initial budget released on its Ministry of National Defense website.

8. The figures for the United Kingdom are based on the initial budget in the budget message.

9. The French defense expenditure for FY2018 is an estimation.
### 1. Response to an Infringement that Does Not Amount to an Armed Attack

- Under the basic policy that relevant agencies including the police and Japan Coast Guard are to respond in close cooperation in accordance with their respective duties and authorities, the Government will further strengthen necessary measures in all areas, including enhancing the respective agency’s response capabilities and strengthening collaboration among agencies. In cases of responding to a situation where police forces are not present nearby or police agencies cannot respond immediately, the Government will consider measures for issuing orders swiftly and accelerating procedures for public security operations or maritime security operations.

- The Government will develop legislation that enables the SDF to carry out very passive and limited “use of weapons” to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. and other countries’ Armed Forces that are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises), in line with the provisions of Article 95 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

### 2. Further Contributions to the Peace and Stability of the International Community

- **So-called Logistics Support and “Integration with the Use of Force” (1)**
  - The Government is of the recognition that Japan’s support activities such as supply and transportation conducted at a place which is not “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by a foreign country and regarded as “Integration with the use of force” of that country. Based on that recognition, the Government will proceed with developing legislation which enables necessary support activities for the armed forces of foreign countries engaging in activities for ensuring Japan’s security or for the peace and stability of the international community.
  - Japan does not conduct support activities in “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by armed forces of a foreign country to which Japan provides support.
  - Japan will immediately pause or cease support activities if the place where Japan is conducting support activities becomes “the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted” due to changes in the situation.

- **Use of Weapons Associated with International Peace Cooperation Activities**
  - Based on the following positions, the Government will proceed with developing legislation in order to enable the SDF’s use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-kei” (coming to the protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent requests and the use of weapons for the purpose of execution of missions) in international peace cooperation activities that do not involve the “use of force,” including U.N. peacekeeping operations, as well as police-like activities that do not involve the “use of force,” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals with the consent from the territorial State.

- **As for U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc., under the framework of the Five Principles for PKOs, “a quasi-state organization” (2)** other than parties to the conflict who have given consent of acceptance is, in principle, not expected to appear as an adversary.

  - When the SDF units conduct police-like activities that do not involve “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals in a foreign country based on the consent of the territorial State’s Government, it is natural that the activities be conducted in the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, i.e., the area within which its authority is maintained. This means that no “quasi-state organization” exists in that area.

- The Cabinet will make a decision on whether the consent of acceptance is stably maintained and whether the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, etc., based on deliberations, etc., at the National Security Council.

### 3. Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution

- The Government understands that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date.

- The aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution could have, under international law, a basis on the right of collective self-defense. Although this “use of force” includes that which is triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, it is permitted under the Constitution only when it is taken as a measure for self-defense which is inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words for defending Japan from being legally evaluated as carrying out by itself the “use of force” which is not permitted under the Constitution because its support activities would form an “integral part” of the use of force (“integration with the use of force”) by other countries.

- The Government will stipulate in the draft legislation that the prior approval of the Diet is in principle required upon issuing orders for operations to the SDF for carrying out “use of force” permitted under the Constitution when an armed attack occurs not against Japan but against a foreign country. In the same manner as the procedures related to defense operations stipulated in the current laws and regulations.

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**Notes:**
1. As for Japan’s support activities, however, legal frameworks limiting the area of such activities to “rear area” or so-called “non-combat area,” etc., have been established in past legislations to ensure that the issue of “integration with the use of force” (forming an “integral part” of the use of force) does not arise, in relation to Article 9 of the Constitution. This is intended to avoid Japan from being legally evaluated as carrying out by itself the “use of force” which is not permitted under the Constitution because its support activities would form an “integral part” of the use of force (“integration with the use of force”) by other countries.

2. Use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-kei” (coming to the aid of geographically distant units or personnel under attack) or “use of weapons for the purpose of the execution of missions” could constitute the “use of force” prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution if such use of weapons is directed against “a state or a quasi-state organization.”
## Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Applicable Situations</th>
<th>Conditions Required for Operations</th>
<th>Main Type of Authorized Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense operation (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 76)</td>
<td>(1) When there is a situation in which armed attack against Japan from outside occurs or when it is considered that there is an imminent and clear danger of armed attack, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against these attacks. (2) When there is a situation in which an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, which in turn poses an imminent and clear danger of Japan's survival to be threatened and fundamentally overturns people's right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against such a situation.</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required</td>
<td>❍ Use of force (only if the case fulfills 3 conditions for exercising the right of self-defense) ❍ Maintenance of public order (same as for public security operation) ❍ Others (including control over the Japan Coast Guard, emergency passage, appropriations of supplies, marine transportation restriction, treatment of prisoners, civil protection, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of defense facilities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-2)</td>
<td>When there are areas in which the deployment of SDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensified and the order for defense operations (only for armed attack situations) is likely to be issued</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister)</td>
<td>❍ Establishment of positions and defense facilities in the intended deployment area ❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures to be taken before a defense operation order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-3 and U.S. and Others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act)</td>
<td>When a defense operation order is expected under a tense situation</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or person delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; Minister of Defense for services (2) Consent of the Diet: not required for supplies; required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister)</td>
<td>❍ Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on U.S. and others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act ❍ Provision of services as a related measure ❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil protection dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-4)</td>
<td>When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: request of prefectural governors or Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief (Prime Minister)</td>
<td>❍ Measures concerning guidance of fleeing residents, emergent pursuant to the provision of the Civil Protection Law ❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law weapons (Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public security operation (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 78)</td>
<td>When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the law enforcement force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergencies</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (to be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order’s issuance) (3) Cabinet decision: required</td>
<td>❍ Application of the Police Duties Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons ❍ Control over the Japan Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information gathering before public security operation order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 79-2)</td>
<td>When situations have intensified and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifles, machine guns, or other weapons are expected; and there is a special need to gather information</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: consultation between the Minister of Defense and the National Public Safety Commission</td>
<td>❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life and body or other personnel on duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public security operation by request (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 81)</td>
<td>When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (4) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission</td>
<td>❍ Application of the Police Duties Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarding operation (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 81-2)</td>
<td>When special measures are deemed necessary to prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the National Public Safety Commission after hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural governor) (4) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense consults with the National Public Safety Commission after hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural governor</td>
<td>❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation; measures such as evacuation, etc.; entry (all only when police officers are not present); crime prevention and control) ❍ Use of weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime security operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82)</td>
<td>When special measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea</td>
<td>(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister)</td>
<td>❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>操作</td>
<td>対応する状況</td>
<td>関与する法</td>
<td>主な実行の措置</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>海外の海上強襲に関与する</td>
<td>特殊法施行法第82-2条及び海軍法</td>
<td>使用武力（自らの生命や身体を保護するため）</td>
<td>特殊法施行法第82-2条及び海軍法の規定に基づき実施</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>保障対策</td>
<td>特殊法施行法第82-3条</td>
<td></td>
<td>特殊法施行法第82-3条の規定に基づき実施</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>地震救援派遣</td>
<td>特殊法施行法第83条</td>
<td>使用武力（自らの生命や身体を保護するため）</td>
<td>特殊法施行法第83条の規定に基づき実施</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>地震危機</td>
<td>地震危機対策本部は、地震危機に伴う緊急措置を必要とする場合</td>
<td>使用武力（自らの生命や身体を保護するため）</td>
<td>特殊法施行法第83条の規定に基づき実施</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>災害派遣</td>
<td>特殊法施行法第83条の規定に基づき実施</td>
<td>使用武力（自らの生命や身体を保護するため）</td>
<td>特殊法施行法第83条の規定に基づき実施</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>国際海賊行為</td>
<td>特殊法施行法第84-4条</td>
<td>使用武力（自らの生命や身体を保護するため）</td>
<td>特殊法施行法第84-4条の規定に基づき実施</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>地震予防</td>
<td>地震予防本部を設置する</td>
<td>使用武力（自らの生命や身体を保護するため）</td>
<td>特殊法施行法第84-4条の規定に基づき実施</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>路線施設の交通管理</td>
<td>特殊法施行法第84-4条の規定に基づき実施</td>
<td>使用武力（自らの生命や身体を保護するため）</td>
<td>特殊法施行法第84-4条の規定に基づき実施</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Defense of Japan** 466
Reference 18 Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Operation</th>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense operation</td>
<td>Article 68, Self-Defense Forces Law</td>
<td>SDF units under defense operations may take necessary military action to defend Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of defense facilities</td>
<td>Article 92 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law</td>
<td>SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent considered necessary depending on the situation if they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other than the use of weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil protection dispatch</td>
<td>Article 92-3 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law</td>
<td>SDF personnel who are ordered into civil protection dispatches only when police officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including assistant coast guard officers, are not present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public security operation</td>
<td>Article 90 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law</td>
<td>SDF personnel engaged in public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other than the use of weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information-gathering duties before public security operation order</td>
<td>Article 92-5, Self-Defense Forces Law</td>
<td>SDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons within the limit judged to be reasonably necessary depending on situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarding operation</td>
<td>Article 91-2 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law</td>
<td>SDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons in execution of their duties to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no other and less appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime security operation</td>
<td>Article 93 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law</td>
<td>SDF personnel engaged in maritime security operations may use weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-piracy operations</td>
<td>Article 8 (2), Anti-Piracy Law</td>
<td>SDF units ordered to combat acts of piracy, including approaching excessively close to a ship or trailing around a ship, continues their acts despite the counter-piracy measures of the other party, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of the ship in question, the use of weapons is permitted to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under “necessary actions.”

**Article 152, Prisoners of War Act**

SDF personnel engaged in evacuation of Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

**Article 37, Maritime Transportation Restriction Act**

SDF personnel ordered to provide services as logistics support activities or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, and those of personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against SDF personnel stationed with personnel from other countries such as the U.S. Forces personnel, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the SDF units and others; and, when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps; (3) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called “safety-ensuring” operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives, bodies or assets, or those of other individuals, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties, in addition to (1) and (2) above; (4) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called “kaihetsukasei” (coming to protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent requests) operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no other means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, or those of other individuals involved in the operations they intend to protect, in addition to (1) and (2) above. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

**Article 25 and 26, International Peace Cooperation Act – International peace cooperation operations**

SDF personnel engaged in duties in international peace cooperation operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, of International Peace Cooperation Corps, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against SDF personnel stationed with personnel from other countries such as the U.S. Forces personnel, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the SDF units and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps; (3) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called “safety-ensuring” operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives, bodies or assets, or those of other individuals, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties, in addition to (1) and (2) above; (4) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called “kaihetsukasei” (coming to protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent requests) operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no other means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, or those of other individuals involved in the operations they intend to protect, in addition to (1) and (2) above. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
I. Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines

In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize:

- seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses;
- synergy across the two governments’ national security policies;
- a whole-of-government Alliance approach;
- cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and
- the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The two governments will continuously enhance the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Each government will maintain its individual defense posture based on its national security policy. Japan will possess defense capability on the basis of the “National Security Strategy” and the “National Defense Program Guidelines.” The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combat-ready forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly.

The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“the Guidelines”) provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination, with a view to improving the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation. In this way, the Guidelines advance peace and security, deter conflict, secure the date for economic prosperity, and promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

II. Basic Premises and Principles

The Guidelines, as well as actions and activities under the Guidelines, are and will be consistent with the following basic premises and principles.

A. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, will remain unchanged.

B. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and its provisions regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality of States, as well as other relevant international agreements.

C. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws, and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.

D. The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the result of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specific policies and measures.

III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies.

The two governments must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral security and defense cooperation. To that end, the two governments will take advantage of all available channels to enhance information sharing and to ensure seamless and effective whole-of-government Alliance coordination that includes all relevant agencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning.

A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism

Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on Japan’s peace and security. In this increasingly complex security environment, the two governments will take measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners.

The two governments recognize that these measures need to be taken based on flexible, timely, and effective bilateral coordination tailored to each situation and that interagency coordination is essential for appropriate Alliance responses. Therefore, the two governments will utilize the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to:

- assess the situation;
- share information; and
- develop ways to implement the appropriate Alliance response, including flexible determent options, as well as actions aimed at de-escalation.

To support these bilateral efforts, the two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels on issues that could potentially affect Japan’s peace and security.

A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime

In order to ensure the maintenance of Japan’s peace and security, the two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, including through diplomatic efforts, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance to prepare for all possible situations. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to, the following:

1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

In order to identify at the earliest possible stage any indications of threats to Japan’s peace and security and to ensure a decisive advantage in any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism. This mechanism will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also will contribute to timely information sharing as well as the development and maintenance of common situational awareness. To ensure effective coordination, the two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises.

The two governments will tailor to the situation the procedures for coordination as well as the exact composition of participating agencies within the Alliance Coordination Mechanism structure. As part of these procedures, contact information will be shared and maintained from peacetime.

B. Enhanced Operational Coordination

Enhanced bilateral operational coordination for flexible and responsive command and control is a core capability of critical importance to Japan and the United States. In this context, the two governments recognize the continued importance of collocating operational coordination functions to strengthen cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination from peacetime to contingencies, and to support international activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in close cooperation and coordination, will take action through their respective chains-of-command.

C. Bilateral Planning

The two governments will continue to develop and update bilateral plans to ensure successful and effective execution of coordinated operations by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. To ensure the effectiveness of the plans and the ability to make flexible, timely, and appropriate responses, the two governments will exchange relevant information, including identifying operational and logistic support requirements and sources in advance, as appropriate.

The two governments will conduct bilateral planning in peacetime for contingencies relevant to Japan’s peace and security through an upgraded Bilateral Planning Mechanism, which includes relevant agencies of the respective governments. Bilateral plans will be developed with input from relevant agencies, as appropriate. The Security Consultative Committee (SCC) will continue to be responsible for presenting directions, validating the progress of the planning under the mechanism, and issuing directives as necessary. The SCC will be assisted by an appropriate subordinate body.

Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments.

IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security

Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on Japan’s peace and security. In this increasingly complex security environment, the two governments will take measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners.

The two governments recognize that these measures need to be taken based on flexible, timely, and effective bilateral coordination tailored to each situation and that interagency coordination is essential for appropriate Alliance responses. Therefore, the two governments will utilize the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to:

- assess the situation;
- share information; and
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Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments.
a mutually supportive manner to ensure persistent coverage of developments that could affect Japan’s peace and security.

2. Air and Missile Defense

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain and strengthen deterrence and their defense posture against ballistic missile launches and aerial incursions. The two governments will cooperate to expand early warning capabilities, interoperability, network coverage, and real-time information exchange and to pursue the comprehensive improvement of capabilities to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles. Moreover, the two governments will continue to coordinate closely in responding to provocative missile launches and other aerial activities.

3. Maritime Security

The two governments will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order based upon international law, including freedom of navigation. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, on various efforts such as maintaining and enhancing bilateral presence in the maritime domain through ISR and training and exercises, while further developing and enhancing shared maritime domain awareness including by coordinating with relevant agencies, as necessary.

4. Asset Protection

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual protection of each other’s assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in a cooperative manner, including during training and exercises.

5. Training and Exercises

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct effective bilateral and multilateral training and exercises both inside and outside of Japan in order to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. Timely and realistic training and exercises will enhance deterrence. To support these activities, the two governments will cooperate to ensure that training areas, facilities, and associated equipment are available, accessible, and modern.

6. Logistic Support

Japan and the United States are primarily responsible for providing logistic support for their respective forces in all phases. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual logistic support where appropriate, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services, for such activities as set forth in the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) and its related arrangements.

7. Use of Facilities

In order to expand interoperability and improve flexibility and resiliency of the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, the two governments will enhance joint/shared use and cooperate in ensuring the security of facilities and areas. Recognizing the importance of being prepared for contingencies, the two governments also will cooperate in conducting site surveys on facilities, including civilian airports and seaports, as appropriate.

8. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security

The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations cannot be defined geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’ respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation. Early recognition and adaptable, resolute decision making on bilateral actions will contribute to deterrence and de-escalation of such situations.

In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to ensure the peace and security of Japan. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to, those listed below:

1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

When Japanese and U.S. noncombatants need to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals, as well as dealing with the authorities of the affected area. As appropriate, the two governments will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out evacuations of Japanese or U.S. noncombatants. These evacuations will be carried out using each country’s capabilities such as transportation means and facilities in a mutually supplementary manner. The two governments may each consider extending evacuation assistance to third-country noncombatants.

The two governments will conduct early-stage coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism as appropriate, to carry out cooperation in fields such as the safety of evacuees, transportation means and facilities, customs, immigration and quarantine processing, safe havens, and medical services. The two governments will enhance coordination in noncombatant evacuation operations from peacetime, as appropriate, including by conducting training and exercises.

2. Maritime Security

Taking into account their respective capabilities, the two governments will cooperate closely to enhance maritime security. Cooperative measures may include, but are not limited to, information sharing and inspection of ships based on a United Nations Security Council resolution or other basis under international law.

3. Measures to Deal with Refugees

If a situation develops such that a flow of refugees into Japan becomes likely or actually begins, the two governments will cooperate to maintain Japan’s peace and security while handling refugees in a humane manner consistent with applicable obligations under international law. Primary responsibility for such refugee response lies with Japan. The United States will provide appropriate support upon a request from Japan.

4. Search and Rescue

The two governments will cooperate and provide mutual support, as appropriate, in search and rescue operations. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will provide support to combat search and rescue operations by the United States, where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

5. Protection of Facilities and Areas

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces are responsible for protecting their own facilities and areas in cooperation with relevant authorities. Upon request from the United States, Japan will provide additional protection for facilities and areas in Japan in close cooperation and coordination with the United States Armed Forces.

6. Logistic Support

The two governments will enhance mutual logistic support (which includes, but is not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services), as appropriate, to enable effective and efficient operations. This includes rapid validation and resourcing of operational and logistic support requirements. The Government of Japan will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies as well as private sector assets. The Government of Japan will provide logistic or other associated support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

7. Use of Facilities

The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, temporary use of facilities, including civilian airports and seaports, in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas.

C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation.

When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will take steps to deter the armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan.

When an armed attack against Japan occurs, the two governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage and to deter any further attacks. The two governments also will take necessary measures including those listed earlier in Chapter IV.

1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated

When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will intensify, through a comprehensive and robust whole-of-government approach, information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to deter the attack and to de-escalate the situation.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will assume appropriate postures for bilateral operations, including the execution of necessary deployments. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for its support of U.S. deployments. The preparations by the two governments may include, but would not be limited to: joint/shared use of facilities and areas; mutual logistic support, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services; and reinforced protection of U.S. facilities and areas in Japan.
2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs

a. Principles for Coordinated Actions

If an armed attack against Japan occurs despite diplomatic efforts and deterrence, Japan and the United States will cooperate to repel promptly the attack and deter any further attacks to return peace and security to Japan. Such coordinated actions will contribute to the reestablishment of peace and security in the region.

Japan will maintain primary responsibility for defending the citizens and territory of Japan and will take actions immediately to repel an armed attack against Japan as expeditiously as possible. The Self-Defense Forces will have the primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations in Japan and its surrounding waters and airspace, as well as its air and maritime approaches. The United States will coordinate closely with Japan and provide appropriate support. The United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces to defend Japan. The United States will take actions to shape the regional environment in a way that supports the defense of Japan and reestablishes peace and security.

Recognizing that all instruments of national power will be required to defend Japan, the two governments respectively will employ a whole-of-government approach, utilizing their respective chains-of-command, to coordinate actions through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism.

The United States will employ forward-deployed forces, including those stationed in Japan, and introduce reinforcements from elsewhere, as required. Japan will establish and maintain the basis required to facilitate these deployments.

The two governments will take actions as appropriate to provide defense of each other’s forces and facilities in response to an armed attack against Japan.

b. Concept of Operations

i. Operations to Defend Airspace

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, defense against attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations.

ii. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange real-time information for early detection of ballistic missile launches. When there is an indication of a ballistic missile attack, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain an effective posture to defend against ballistic missile attacks heading for Japan and to protect forces participating in ballistic missile defense operations.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations.

iii. Operations to Defend Maritime Areas

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, coastal defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, anti-air warfare, and air interdiction.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack.

The effectiveness of these activities will be enhanced through information sharing and other forms of cooperation among relevant agencies.

iv. Operations to Counter Ground Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands. If the need arises, the Self-Defense Forces will conduct operations to retake an island. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, operations to prevent and repel air and seaborne invasions, amphibious operations, and rapid deployment.

The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, also will have primary responsibility for defeating attacks by special operations forces or any other unconventional attack forces, including those that involve infiltration.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations.

v. Cross-Domain Operations

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks. These operations will be designed to achieve effects across multiple domains simultaneously.

Examples of cooperation across domains include the actions described below.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, as appropriate, will strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other’s ISR assets.

The United States Armed Forces may conduct operations involving the use of strike power, to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces. When the United States Armed Forces conduct such operations, the Self-Defense Forces may provide support, as necessary. These operations will be based on close bilateral coordination, as appropriate.

The two governments will cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains in accordance with bilateral cooperation set out in Chapter VI.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces’ special operations forces will cooperate during operations, as appropriate.

c. Operational Support Activities

The two governments will cooperate in the following activities in support of bilateral operations.

i. Communications and Electronics

The two governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will ensure effective communication between the two forces through joint/shared use of communications and other requirements, including those against islands. If the need arises, the Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with related agencies, as appropriate, will provide mutual support.

ii. Search and Rescue

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide mutual support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate.

iii. Logistic Support

When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability.

The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support.

iv. Use of Facilities

The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, additional facilities in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas.

v. Chemical, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection

The Government of Japan will maintain primary responsibility for emergency responses to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents or attacks in Japan. The United States retains primary responsibility for maintaining and restoring the capability of the United States Armed Forces in Japan. At Japan’s request, the United States will support Japan in CBRN incident or attack prevention and response-related activities in an effort to ensure the protection of Japan, as appropriate.
D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan

When Japan and the United States each decide to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks. Bilateral responses will be coordinated through the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism.

Japan and the United States will cooperate as appropriate with other countries taking action in response to the armed attack.

The Self-Defense Forces will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people.

Examples of cooperative operations are outlined below:

1. Asset Protection
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in asset protection, as appropriate. Such cooperation will include, but not be limited to, protection of assets that are engaged in operations such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations or Ballistic Missile Defense.

2. Search and Rescue
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate.

3. Maritime Operations
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in minesweeping, as appropriate, including to secure the safety of sea lines of communication.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in escort operations to protect ships and vessels, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack, as appropriate.

4. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in intercepting ballistic missiles, as appropriate, in accordance with their respective capabilities. The two governments will exchange information to ensure early detection of ballistic missile launches.

5.Logistics Support
When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability.

The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support.

E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan

When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. Recognizing that immediate recovery from a large-scale disaster in Japan is essential for Japan’s peace and security and that such a disaster could affect the activities of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, the United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities. Such support may include search and rescue, transportation, supply, medical services, incident awareness and assessment, and other specialized capabilities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate.

To improve the effectiveness of the United States Armed Forces’ cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities in Japan, the two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. In addition, the United States Armed Forces also may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters.

V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security

In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. For well over half a century, both countries have worked together to deliver effective solutions to challenges in diverse regions of the world.

When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities for the peace and security of the region and beyond, the two governments, including the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below. This cooperation also will contribute to the peace and security of both countries.

A. Cooperation in International Activities
The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable.

The two governments may coordinate the activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, and also will pursue trilateral and multilateral cooperation in these activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will share procedures and best practices, as appropriate, for smooth and effective cooperation. While the two governments will continue to cooperate on a broad array of issues that may not be explicitly included in the Guidelines, common areas for cooperation by the two governments in regional and international activities will include:

1. Peacekeeping Operations
When the two governments participate in peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations (UN) in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate, to maximize interoperability between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The two governments also may cooperate in providing logistic support for and protecting UN and other personnel who participate in the same mission, as appropriate.

2. International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
When the two governments conduct international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale humanitarian and natural disasters, the two governments will cooperate closely to provide mutual support, as appropriate, maximizing interoperability between participating Self-Defense Forces and United States Armed Forces. Examples of cooperative activities may include mutual logistic support and operational coordination, planning, and execution.

3. Maritime Security
When the two governments conduct activities for maritime security, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate. Examples of cooperative activities may include efforts for: safe and secure sea lines of communication such as counter-piracy and minesweeping; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and counterterrorism activities.

4. Partner Capacity Building
Proactive cooperation with partners will contribute to maintaining and enhancing regional and international peace and security. The two governments will cooperate in capacity building activities, as appropriate, by making the best use of their capabilities and experience, with the objective of strengthening the capability of partners to respond to dynamic security challenges. Examples of cooperative activities may include maritime security, military medicine, defense institution building, and improved force readiness for HA/DR or peacekeeping operations.

5. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
In circumstances when international action is required for the evacuation of noncombatants, the two governments will utilize, as appropriate, all possible avenues including diplomatic efforts to ensure the safety of noncombatants, including those who are Japanese or U.S. nationals.

6.Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
When the two governments participate in international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in ISR activities, as appropriate, based on the respective capabilities and availability of their assets.

7. Training and Exercises
In order to enhance the effectiveness of international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct and participate in joint training and exercises, as appropriate, to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. The two governments also will continue to pursue opportunities to work with partners in training and exercises to contribute to enhancing interoperability with the Alliance and the development of common tactics, techniques, and procedures.

8. Logistic Support
When participating in international activities, the two governments will cooperate to provide mutual logistic support. The Government
of Japan will provide logistic support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations.

B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation
The two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space.

As part of such efforts, the two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation. The two governments will provide mutual support, as appropriate, to establish and improve capabilities and will share information about actions and events that might affect the safety and stability of the space domain and impede its use. The two governments also will share information to address emerging threats against space systems and will pursue opportunities for cooperation in maritime domain awareness and in space-related equipment and technology that will strengthen capabilities and resiliency of the space systems, including hosted payloads.

To help ensure the safe and stable use of cyberspace, the two governments will ensure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space.

As part of such efforts, the two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation. The two governments will provide mutual support, as appropriate, to establish and improve capabilities and will share information about actions and events that might affect the safety and stability of the space domain and impede its use. The two governments also will share information to address emerging threats against space systems and will pursue opportunities for cooperation in maritime domain awareness and in space-related equipment and technology that will strengthen capabilities and resiliency of the space systems, including hosted payloads.

To accomplish their missions effectively and efficiently, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate and to contribute to whole-of-government efforts in utilizing space in such areas as: early-warning; ISR; positioning, navigation, and timing; space situational awareness; meteorological observation; command, control, and communications; and ensuring the resiliency of relevant space systems that are critical for mission assurance. In cases where their space systems are threatened, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, in mitigating risk and preventing damage. If damage occurs, they will cooperate, as appropriate, in reconstituting relevant capabilities.

B. Cooperation on Cyberspace
To help ensure the safe and stable use of cyberspace, the two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and routine manner, as appropriate. The two governments also will share, as appropriate, information on the development of various capabilities in cyberspace, including the exchange of best practices on training and education. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions, including through information sharing with the private sector, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will:
- maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems;
- share expertise and conduct educational exchanges in cybersecurity;
- ensure resiliency of their respective networks and systems to achieve mission assurance;
- contribute to whole-of-government efforts to improve cybersecurity; and
- conduct bilateral exercises to ensure effective cooperation for cybersecurity in all situations from peacetime to contingencies.

In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, including those against critical infrastructure and services utilized by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and based on close bilateral coordination, the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. The two governments also will share relevant information expeditiously and appropriately. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, including those that take place when Japan is under an armed attack, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.

VII. Bilateral Enterprise
The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation:

A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
In order to enhance interoperability and to promote efficient acquisition and maintenance, the two governments will:
- cooperate in joint research, development, production, and test and evaluation of equipment and in mutual provision of components of common equipment and services;
- strengthen the basis to repair and maintain common equipment for mutual efficiency and readiness;
- facilitate reciprocal defense procurement to enhance efficient acquisition, interoperability, and defense equipment and technology cooperation; and
- explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on defense equipment and technology.

B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security
- Recognizing that common situational awareness is essential, the two governments will enhance intelligence cooperation and information sharing at all levels, including the national strategic level.
- In order to enable robust intelligence cooperation and information sharing, the two governments will continue to promote cooperation in strengthening policies, practices, and procedures related to the protection of classified information.
- The two governments also will explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on information sharing.

C. Educational and Research Exchanges
Recognizing the importance of intellectual cooperation concerning security and defense, the two governments will deepen exchanges of members of relevant organizations and strengthen communication between each side’s research and educational institutions. Such efforts will serve as the enduring foundation for security and defense officials to share their knowledge and reinforce cooperation.

VIII. Processes for Review
The SCC, assisted by an appropriate subordinate body, will regularly evaluate whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances. The two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan-U.S. Alliance relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time.

Reference 20 United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
(Washington, DC, May 1, 2006)

Overview
On October 29, 2005, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, “U.S. – Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” In that document, the SCC members directed their respective staffs “to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006.” This work has been completed and is reflected in this document.

Finalization of Realignment Initiatives
The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan.

The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will finance their realignment associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities.

Key Implementation Details

1. Realignment on Okinawa
(a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)
- The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a “V”-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter runways. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.
- In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.
- Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.
- Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.
- Facility improvements for contingency use at ASDF bases at Niyutabaru and Tsukur to replace of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary, after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.
- Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.
2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability
(b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam

In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient

- Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a
- In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill.
- Of the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure
development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will
provide $6.09 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including $2.8 billion in
direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on
Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong
desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized
rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and
infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam estimated
in U.S. FY2008 dollars at $3.18 billion in fiscal spending plus approximately $1 billion for a road.

(c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities
- Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAs Futenma,
and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining
facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby
enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air
Base.
- Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March
2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six
candidate facilities will be examined:
  - Camp Kuwae: Total return.
  - Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining
facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.
  - MCAs Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above).
  - Makinamoto Service Area: Total return.
  - aha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including
  - Army POL Depot Kwue Tank Farm No. 1: Total return.
  - All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities
designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in
Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will
occur before the return of designated facilities.
- While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the
recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa
(SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives
may need to be reevaluated.
- Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. Shared use that
requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006.
- ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S.
forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities.

(d) Relationships among Initiatives
- Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment
initiatives are interconnected.
- Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend
on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents
from Okinawa to Guam.
- The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on:
  1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan’s
financial contributions to fund development of required facilities
and infrastructure on Guam.

2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability

- U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be
transformed by U.S. FY2008. The headquarters of the GSDF Central
Readiness Force subsequently will be transferred to Camp Zama by Japan
FY2012. SDF headquarters will have access to Kastner Heliport on
Camp Zama.
- Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a
battle command training center and other support facilities will be
constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.
- In relation to this transformation, the following measures for excellent
and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented:
  - Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local
redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and
underground rail (approximately 2ha). Affected housing units will
be relocated to Sagamihara Housing Area.
  - A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD
will be provided for a local use when not required for contingency or training purposes.
  - Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1ha)
will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected
housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible
additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate.

3. Yokota Air Base and Airspace
- ASDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate
to Yokota Air Base in Japan FY2010. A bilateral master plan for base
use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure
requirements.
- A bilateral joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established
at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense
coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required
equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate
appropriate funding of shared use equipment and systems.
- The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of
civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military
operational requirements.
  - Establish a program in Japan FY2006 to inform commercial
aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.
  - Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September
2008; specific portions will be identified by October 2006.
  - Develop procedures in Japan FY2006 for temporary transfers of air
traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of
Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.
  - Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire
Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related
airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures
that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military (U.S. and Japanese)
demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from
the Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience
and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be
completed in Japan FY2009.
  - The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and
modalities for possible civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base, to be
completed within 12 months from commencement.
  - The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that
dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the
military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.
  - Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will
consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian- military
dual-use.

4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps
Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni
- The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from
Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the
following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of
the carrier's aircraft and facilities to the extent possible.
- The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and
modalities for possible civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base, to be
completed within 12 months from commencement.
- The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that
dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the
military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.
- Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will
consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian- military
dual-use.

5. Missile Defense
- As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their
respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will
continue.
The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as ASDF Shinkii Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006.

The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ.

U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time.

6. Training Relocation

Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan FY2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan FY2006 can be developed.

Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities — Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni — will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future.

The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.

Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training requirements.

In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1–5 aircraft for the duration of 1–7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6–12 aircraft for 8–14 days at a time.

At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained.

The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness.

(Attached conceptual diagram omitted)


Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (Outline)

Preamble

(1) The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee decided to adjust the plans outlined in the May 2006 Readiness Roadmap.

(2) The Ministers decided to delink both the relocation of the Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility.

(3) The Ministers affirmed that the new posture of the U.S. Marine Corps, coupled with the enhancement of Japan’s defense posture and promotion of bilateral dynamic defense cooperation, would strengthen the deterrence capabilities of the overall U.S.-Japan Alliance.

Reference 22 Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2017

Joint Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Ground Self-Defense Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field training with U.S. Army</td>
<td>May 28 - Jun. 30, 2017</td>
<td>Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska and surrounding training area</td>
<td>1st Airborne Brigade</td>
<td>Major units of 4-25 Griffin Combat Team</td>
<td>Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination, enhancement of interoperability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Field training with U.S. Army command post exercise U.S. | Jun 4-13, 2017 | Fort Shafter Army Base, Hawaii | North Eastern Army, Ground Staff Office, etc. | 1 Corps, U.S. Army, Pacific Command, etc. | Capacity maintenance and enhancement for command and staff activities of the Regional Army |

Field training with U.S. in Australia | Jul. 7-19, 2017 | Shoalwater Bay Training Area, Queensland, Australia | 1st Airborne Brigade | Major units of one battalion from 4-25 Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne) | Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination, enhancement of interoperability |

Field training with U.S. Marines | Aug. 10-28, 2017 | Hokkaido-Dai Maneuver Area, Yasukubu Maneuver Area, Kamitakura Maneuver Area, etc. | 28th Infantry Regiment of the 11th Brigade, 11th Artillery Troop, etc. | One battalion from 4th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division; one battalion from 12th Marine Regiment (artillery), etc. | Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination, enhancement of interoperability |
Maritime Self-Defense Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field training with U.S. Army</td>
<td>Sep. 5-22, 2017</td>
<td>Yakima Training Center, Washington</td>
<td>Major units of 20th Infantry Regiment, 6th Division</td>
<td>Major units of 2-3 Infantry Battalion, 1-2st Shyler Brigade Combat Team</td>
<td>Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination, enhancement of interoperability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field training with U.S. Army</td>
<td>Sep. 8-25, 2017</td>
<td>Higashi Fuji Maneuver Area, Ohjihara Maneuver Area, Camp Takijahara, etc.</td>
<td>Major units from 34th Infantry Regiment, 1st Division</td>
<td>Major units from 3-21 Battalion, 1-25 Brigade Combat Team</td>
<td>Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination, enhancement of interoperability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field training with U.S. Marines</td>
<td>Oct. 7-Nov. 4, 2017</td>
<td>Camp Pendleton, California and U.S. naval facility in San Clemente Island</td>
<td>Infantry Regiments, Western Army, etc. Totaling approximately 100 personnel</td>
<td>1st Marine Expeditionary unit, 3rd Fleet</td>
<td>Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination, enhancement of interoperability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S. joint Regional Army command and post exercise</td>
<td>Nov. 29-Dec. 13, 2017</td>
<td>Camp Sendai, etc.</td>
<td>North Eastern Army, GSO, Central Readiness Force, Ground Research and Development Command, etc. Totaling approximately 5,000 personnel</td>
<td>I Corps, 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, U.S. Army Japan HQ, etc. Totaling approximately 1,600 personnel</td>
<td>Capacity maintenance and enhancement for command and staff activities of the Regional Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field training with U.S. Marines</td>
<td>Dec. 8-20, 2017</td>
<td>Ohyano Maneuver Area, Vice-Camp Takabu, etc.</td>
<td>Major units from 43rd Infantry Regiment, 6th Division</td>
<td>Major units of 2-1 Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division Totaling approximately 400 personnel</td>
<td>Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination, enhancement of interoperability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint exercise with U.S. Marines</td>
<td>Feb. 15-Mar. 2, 2018</td>
<td>Ohjihara Maneuver Area, Camp Kasuminome, Camp Tajiyo</td>
<td>Major units of 39th Infantry Regiment, 9th Division Totaling approximately 600 personnel</td>
<td>Major units of 2-1 Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment; major units of C Regiment, 31st Marine Expeditionary Battalion Totaling approximately 550 personnel</td>
<td>Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination, enhancement of interoperability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Maritime Self-Defense Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint cruise training</td>
<td>Apr. 23-29, 2017</td>
<td>Western Pacific</td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
<td>Several vessels</td>
<td>Tactical training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S. joint training</td>
<td>Apr. 25, 2017</td>
<td>Mutsu Bay</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Tactical training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint training with U.S. Navy</td>
<td>May 1-3, 2017</td>
<td>Sea area south of Kanto through sea area east of southwestern islands</td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Tactical training, take off and landing training, mock at-sea oil replenishment training, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint training with U.S. Navy</td>
<td>May 7-10, 2017</td>
<td>South China Sea</td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
<td>Tactical training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S. joint training</td>
<td>May 18, 2017</td>
<td>Waters surrounding the Republic of Singapore</td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
<td>Tactical training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint cruise training</td>
<td>May 26-27, 2017</td>
<td>South China Sea</td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Tactical training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint training with U.S. Navy</td>
<td>Jun. 1-3, 2017</td>
<td>Sea of Japan and airspace over Sea of Japan</td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
<td>Several carriers, etc. / Several carrier-borne aircraft</td>
<td>Tactical training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint training with U.S. Navy</td>
<td>Jun. 3-9, 2017</td>
<td>Sea of Japan through sea area east of Okinawa</td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
<td>Several carriers, etc. / Several carrier-borne aircraft</td>
<td>Tactical training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint cruise training</td>
<td>Jun. 13-15, 2017</td>
<td>South China Sea</td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
<td>Several carriers, etc.</td>
<td>Tactical training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minesweeping special training</td>
<td>Jul. 18-30, 2017</td>
<td>Mutsu Bay</td>
<td>16 vessels / 12 aircraft</td>
<td>2 vessels / 4 aircraft / approximately 10 underwater disposal personnel</td>
<td>Minesweeping training, diving training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint training with U.S. Navy</td>
<td>Jul. 26, 2017</td>
<td>Sea of Japan</td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Anti-submarine warfare training, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint training with U.S. Navy</td>
<td>Jul. 26, 2017</td>
<td>Mutsu Bay</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Communication training, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint training with U.S. Navy</td>
<td>Sep. 6-7, 2017</td>
<td>East China Sea</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>1 aircraft</td>
<td>Information sharing training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint cruise training</td>
<td>Sep. 11-28, 2017</td>
<td>Sea south of Kanto through waters surrounding Okinawa</td>
<td>3 vessels</td>
<td>Several carriers, etc.</td>
<td>Tactical training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint cruise training</td>
<td>Sep. 29-Oct. 1, 2017</td>
<td>Waters and airspace surrounding Okinawa through Bashi Channel</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Several carriers, etc.</td>
<td>Tactical training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint cruise training</td>
<td>Oct. 7-16, 2017</td>
<td>Waters and airspace surrounding Bashi Channel through north of Kyushu via Okinawa</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Several carriers, etc.</td>
<td>Tactical training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medical special training</td>
<td>Oct. 17, 2017</td>
<td>Nagaura G parking at Yokosuka District Hq, Self-Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka, U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka</td>
<td>Yokosuka District Hq, Self-Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka, Base Service Activity Yokosuka, Medical Service Unit Yokosuka</td>
<td>Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka, U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka Totaling approximately 350 personnel</td>
<td>Training and exercise for Japan-U.S. coordination in the medical area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint training with U.S. Navy</td>
<td>Oct. 26-Nov. 12, 2017</td>
<td>Waters and airspace surrounding Sea of Japan, East China Sea and Okinawa</td>
<td>3 vessels</td>
<td>Several carriers, etc. / 2 carrier-borne aircraft</td>
<td>Tactical training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint training with U.S. Navy</td>
<td>Nov. 12-16, 2017</td>
<td>Waters and airspace from the Sea of Japan through the East China Sea and around Okinawa</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
<td>Several carriers, etc.</td>
<td>Tactical training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping special training</td>
<td>Nov. 29-30, 2017</td>
<td>Sea of Hyuga</td>
<td>22 vessels / several aircraft</td>
<td>1 vessel / 2 aircraft / approximately 10 underwater disposal personnel</td>
<td>Minesweeping training, diving training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Air Self-Defense Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Reference</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air defense combat training</td>
<td>Apr. 16-21, 2017</td>
<td>Area and airspace to the west of Hokkaido</td>
<td>13 aircraft</td>
<td>10 aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation and formation training</td>
<td>Apr. 25, 2017</td>
<td>Kyushu area and airspace</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint training with U.S. Navy</td>
<td>Apr. 28, 2017</td>
<td>The eastern area and airspace of Okinawa</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Several carrier, etc. / 2 carrier-borne aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation and formation training</td>
<td>May 1, 2017</td>
<td>Kyushu area and airspace</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loading training</td>
<td>May 17-18, 2017</td>
<td>Kadena Air Base, 1 AMG / approximately 20 personnel</td>
<td>1 aircraft / 1 Patriot / approximately 30 personnel</td>
<td>Enhancement of capability and Japan-U.S. coordination</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Navigation and formation training</td>
<td>May 29, 2017</td>
<td>Kyushu area and airspace</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint training with U.S. Navy</td>
<td>Jun. 1-2, 2017</td>
<td>Sea of Japan and area and airspace over the Sea of Japan</td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>Several carrier-borne aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint training with U.S. Navy</td>
<td>Jun. 6, 2017</td>
<td>The eastern area and airspace of Okinawa</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Several carrier-borne aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation and formation training</td>
<td>Jun. 20, 2017</td>
<td>Kyushu area and airspace</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation and formation training</td>
<td>Jul. 6, 2017</td>
<td>Over the vicinity of the East China Sea</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation and formation training</td>
<td>Jul. 8, 2017</td>
<td>Kyushu area and airspace</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation and formation training</td>
<td>Jul. 30, 2017</td>
<td>Kyushu area and airspace</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation and formation training</td>
<td>Aug. 8, 2017</td>
<td>Kyushu area and airspace</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation and formation training</td>
<td>Aug. 16, 2017</td>
<td>Over the vicinity of the East China Sea</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation and formation training</td>
<td>Aug. 22, 2017</td>
<td>Over the vicinity of Sea of Japan</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation and formation training</td>
<td>Aug. 31, 2017</td>
<td>Kyushu area and airspace</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>6 aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation and formation training</td>
<td>Sep. 9, 2017</td>
<td>Over the vicinity of the East China Sea</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation and formation training</td>
<td>Sep. 18, 2017</td>
<td>Kyushu area and airspace</td>
<td>4 aircraft</td>
<td>6 aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation and formation training</td>
<td>Oct. 10, 2017</td>
<td>Kyushu area and airspace</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation and formation training</td>
<td>Oct 21, 2017</td>
<td>Kyushu area and airspace</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Reference 23**  
**Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Date of conclusion of intergovernmental agreement to implement joint research and development</th>
<th>Completion date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ducted rocket engine, advanced steel technology, fighting vehicle propulsion technology using ceramic materials, eye-safe laser radar, ejection seat, advanced hybrid propulsion technology, shallow water acoustic technology, ballistic missile defense technology, low-vulnerability gun propellant for field artillery, software radio, advanced hull material/structural technology, sea-based radar system, combat system for ship, palm-sized automated chemical agent detector, human effects of exposure to aircraft fuel and their engine exhaust, image gyro for airborne applications</td>
<td>Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills</td>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SM-3 Block IIA</td>
<td>Development of advanced missile interceptor</td>
<td></td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid Electric Propulsion</td>
<td>Research on technologies that enable vehicles to be electrically powered using a motor, and technologies that enable both an engine and a battery to function as power sources for the motor</td>
<td>November 2012</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Speed Multi-Hull Vessel Optimization</td>
<td>Research aiming to design a multi-hull (trimaran, in particular) vessel featuring high-speed, adequate stability and large deck area</td>
<td>March 2014</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison of Operational Jet Fuel and Noise Exposures</td>
<td>Research on the combined effects of exposures to both jet fuel and noise on the risk of hearing loss for flight line personnel</td>
<td>November 2015</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Agent Detector-kit Colorimetric Reader</td>
<td>Research on automatically interpreting the colorimetric response of the Chemical Agent Detector-kit</td>
<td>February 2017</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reference 24**  
**Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2015)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type of Consultation/Place</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Outline and Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Apr. 8, 2015 | Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting, Tokyo | Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter | • Confirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands  
• Agreed that they would continue to oppose any coercive attempt that would alter the status quo in any area, including the East China Sea  
• Confirmed strong intent to further deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance through the process of the revision of the Guidelines  
• The Japanese side explained the status of discussions pertaining to the development of the security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and supported this effort.  
• Instructed their respective authorities to consider establishing a new framework for cooperation related to space between the two defense authorities, bearing in mind that risks to the stable use of space and cyberspace are common security challenges to the two countries  
• Welcomed the progress on the efforts to develop a maintenance base shared by the two countries, namely, the U.S. decision to establish a regional depot for the F-35 in Japan, and agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation on equipment and technology  
• Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma  
• The Japanese side requested continued cooperation to mitigate impact on Okinawa. The U.S. side expressed its commitment to discuss measures to mitigate the impact of the presence of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type of Consultation/Place</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Outline and Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr 27,</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Security</td>
<td>Minister of Defense Nakatani</td>
<td>• Released the new Guidelines, and confirmed that they would further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Security Consultative</td>
<td>Minister for Foreign Affairs Koibita</td>
<td>• Reaffirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands (referred to in the Joint Statement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Committee (“2+2”) Meeting/</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense Carter</td>
<td>• Shared recognition on the importance of “rule of law,” including the recent situation in the South China Sea, and agreed that unilateral attempts to alter the status quo cannot be neglected and they would work with the international community to advance various efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Secretary of State Kerry</td>
<td>• Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Japanese side requested cooperation to mitigate the environmental impact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Confirmed intent to continue negotiation on the ancillary documents of a Supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship as quickly as possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 28,</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense</td>
<td>Minister of Defense Nakatani</td>
<td>• Exchanged views on the situation in the South China Sea, and agreed to continue to strengthening cooperation with Southeast Asian countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Ministerial Meeting/</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense Carter</td>
<td>• Agreed to further advance Japan-U.S.-ROK defense cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Confirmed that the new Guidelines will strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the importance of swiftly implementing the new Guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Japanese side explained the development of the security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and supported Japan’s efforts in this regard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Welcomed the establishment of the “Space Cooperation Working Group” as a framework for cooperation related to space between the two defense authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that it would continue efforts such as realistic baseline plans pertaining to U.S. base consolidation in Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Agreed to seek early agreement on a framework for reciprocal defense procurement and to further deepen equipment and technology cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 30,</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense</td>
<td>Minister of Defense Nakatani</td>
<td>• Agreed to oppose any attempt to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and other areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Ministerial Meeting/</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense Carter</td>
<td>• Agreed to continue strengthening cooperation with Southeast Asian countries in terms of contributing to regional peace and stability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Japanese side explained the recent Cabinet decision on the Legislation for Peace and Security and the commencement of Diet deliberations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Confirmed that they would continue to make steady efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines, such as establishing the new Alliance Coordination Mechanism, developing bilateral plans, and expeditious negotiations on an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Welcomed the fact that the outcome of the discussions in the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group was compiled, and agreed to further strengthen bilateral cooperation on cyberspace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Japanese side stated that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on mitigating the impact on Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Japanese side explained to the Japanese people that the deployment of the CV-22 Osprey to Japan from 2017 would enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and contribute to stability in the Asia-Pacific region but the Japanese side requested provision of necessary information from the viewpoint of ensuring safety. The U.S. side stated that it would provide necessary information and ensure the safe operation of the Osprey, including the MV-22 already deployed to Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 3,</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense</td>
<td>Minister of Defense Nakatani</td>
<td>• Agreed to oppose any attempt to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas. The Japanese side stated that it will support the U.S. Forces’ activities in the South China Sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Ministerial Meeting/</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense Carter</td>
<td>• In light of North Korea’s posture to continue activities for launching long-range ballistic missiles, confirmed that Japan and the United States will closely cooperate on this matter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Agreed to reinforce bilateral defense cooperation with the ROK, Australia, and the Philippines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Japanese side explained the recent enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security, and the U.S. side stated that they support and welcome the enactment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Welcomed the establishment of the new Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) and the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM). Confirmed that they would continue to make steady efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa, and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on mitigating the impact on Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Japanese side expressed its intention to always ensure maximum safety of both the local residents and the U.S. Forces personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Regarding the Host Nation Support (HNS), agreed that they would continue to hold consultations between the two countries, and make efforts to reach an early agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• In light of the establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency, agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation for equipment and technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 4,</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense</td>
<td>Minister of Defense Nakatani</td>
<td>• Regarding the arrest of a member of the U.S. civilian component in Okinawa, confirmed their intention to devise a set of effective prevention measures, including the review of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) implementation practices related to U.S. personnel with SOFA status, including the civilian component.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Ministerial Meeting/</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense Carter</td>
<td>• Agreed to oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td></td>
<td>• With regard to North Korea’s provocative actions, confirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to closely cooperate on this matter, including utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Confirmed their intention to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance under the Legislation for Peace and Security which recently came into force, and also confirmed that they would continue to make efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Welcomed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Reciprocal Defense Procurement (RDP-MOU), and agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation for equipment and technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Japanese side stated that Japan’s position would remain unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. side stated that it fully understands Japan’s position and would maintain close cooperation with Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, including training relocation to outside of Okinawa Prefecture. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate with Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Agreed to address the early return of the facilities and areas south of Kadena Air Base as well as the majority of the Northern Training Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 15,</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense</td>
<td>Minister of Defense Nakatani</td>
<td>• Reconfirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Ministerial Meeting/</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense Nakatani</td>
<td>• Agreed to oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• With regard to North Korea’s provocative actions, confirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to closely cooperate on this matter, including utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Agreed to strengthen bilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral frameworks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Confirmed their intention to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance under the Legislation for Peace and Security which recently came into force, and also confirmed that they would continue to make efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Regarding the arrest of a member of the U.S. civilian component in Okinawa, confirmed that they would continue to hold working-level consultations in light of the joint announcement of July 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Japanese side stated that Japan’s position would remain unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on this matter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Agreed to address the early return of the facilities and areas south of Kadena Air Base as well as the majority of the Northern Training Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Type of Meeting/Place</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Outline and Results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Dec. 7, 2016 | Japan-U.S. Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo  | Minister of Defense Inada, Secretary of Defense Carter                      | • Agreed to oppose North Korea’s nuclear and missile development as well as unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas.  
• Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands.  
• Agreed to strengthen bilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral frameworks.  
• Agreed that Japan and the United States will continue to collaborate closely with the existing strong Japan-U.S. Alliance serving as the foundation.  
• Welcomed the efforts under way based on the new Guidelines and the Legislation for Peace and Security, including the signing of the Japan-U.S. ACSA and the commencement of Japan-U.S. joint training in accordance with the Legislation for Peace and Security.  
• Regarding the appeal of a member of the U.S. civilian component in Okinawa, confirmed that they would continue to hold working-level consultations in light of the joint announcement of July 2016.  
• Confirmed that Japan and the United States will cooperate to realize the return of a majority of the Northern Training Area in December 2016.  
• With regard to the Futenma Replacement Facility, shared the position that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they would continue to cooperate closely on this matter.  
• The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on this matter. |
| Feb. 4, 2017 | Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting Tokyo  | Minister of Defense Inada, Secretary of Defense Mattis                      | • Shared the view that China’s activities in the East and South China Seas pose security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region.  
• Shared the view that advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile development constitute grave security threats to the stability of Japan and the United States and the region.  
• Agreed to strengthen engagement in the East China Sea.  
• Agreed to strengthen bilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral frameworks.  
• The Japanese side stated that it will strengthen its defense capabilities and expand Japan’s role in the Alliance.  
• The U.S. side stated that it will remain committed to the defense of Japan, and underscored that the U.S. commitment to the region will be enhanced through its ongoing presence.  
• Confirmed the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the United States’ unwavering commitment to extended deterrence.  
• Shared the view on the need to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance while taking into account the Guidelines established in 2015.  
• The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the steady progress of the realignment of the U.S. Forces Japan. The U.S. side stated that it seeks to advance the realignment through Japan-U.S. collaboration.  
• With regard to the relocation of MCAS Futenma, shared the position that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they would continue to cooperate closely on this matter.  
• The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the two sides agreed to cooperate to ensure the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan. |
| Jun. 3, 2017 | Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting Singapore  | Minister of Defense Inada, Secretary of Defense Mattis                      | • Shared the view that North Korea’s successive ballistic missile launches and other acts are flagrant provocations against the stability of Japan and the United States and the region and are absolutely intolerable, and that it is important to have close Japan-U.S.-ROK collaboration in addition to Japan-U.S. collaboration.  
• The Japanese side highly praised the United States’ visible commitment to the peace and stability of the region, including the dispatch of its carrier strike group, and stated that it is important to strengthen pressure on North Korea.  
• Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands.  
• Confirmed that Japan and the United States will deepen their cooperation on ensuring peace and stability in the East China Sea and regarding engagement in the South China Sea.  
• Shared the view on the need to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and welcomed the joint training between the SDF and the carrier strike group being conducted in the Sea of Japan as an activity contributing to this end.  
• Agreed that they will continue to coordinate for the prompt holding of a Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting.  
• Agreed to make steady progress on the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and the U.S. side announced its commitment to continue to promote close Japan-U.S. cooperation.  
• Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they would continue to cooperate closely on this matter.  
• The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the two sides agreed to cooperate to ensure the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan. |
| Aug. 17, 2017 | Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) Meeting / New York  | Minister of Defense Onodera, Minister for Foreign Affairs Kono, Secretary of Defense Mattis, Secretary of State Tillerson | • Reaffirmed the two governments’ commitment to bolster the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the Alliance is the cornerstone of the Asia-Pacific region’s peace and security.  
• Reaffirmed the Alliance’s commitment to the security of Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces.  
• Condemned in the strongest terms North Korea’s development of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, and agreed on taking concrete actions to bolster the defense capabilities of the Alliance to deter threats of North Korea while closely coordinating between Japan and the U.S., and the two countries and the Republic of Korea.  
• Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands.  
• Reaffirmed the importance of working together to safeguard the peace and stability of the East China Sea.  
• Underlined the significance of continued engagement in the South China Sea, including through respective activities to support freedom of navigation.  
• Confirmed their shared intention to develop specific measures and actions to further strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance, including through reviewing roles, missions, and capabilities, to ensure seamless Alliance responses across a full spectrum of situations.  
• Japan intends to expand its role in the Alliance and augment its defense capabilities, with an eye on the next planning period for its Mid-Term Defense Program.  
• The United States remains committed to deploying its most advanced capabilities to Japan.  
• Directed respective staffs to proceed with the policy making process based on the guidance given by the ministers.  
• Reaffirmed the two governments’ commitment to implementation of the 2015 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.  
• Welcomed important steps within the Alliance to operationalize mutual asset protection and to bring into force the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA).  
• Reaffirmed the critical role that U.S. extended deterrence plays in ensuring the security of Japan as well as the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.  
• Reaffirmed their commitment to enhance and accelerate cooperation in such areas as bilateral planning, air and missile defense, non-combatant evacuation operations, defense equipment and technology cooperation, intelligence cooperation and information security.  
• Affirmed their desire to expand bilateral cooperation in space and cyber, and called for deepening consultations for such cooperation.  
• Highlighted ongoing efforts to advance bilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation with other partners in the region.  
• Emphasized the need to enhance information-sharing and expand bilateral exercises between Japan, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea.  
• Reaffirmed their intention to further enhance capacity building programs and defense equipment and technology transfers to Southeast Asian nations.  
• Confirmed their shared commitment to launch a whole-of-government dialogue on maritime security capacity building.  
• Reaffirmed the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution.  
• Reaffirmed the two Governments’ commitment to implement the existing arrangements for the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan.  
• Reaffirmed the overall level of Host Nation Support.  
• Reaffirmed the two Governments would promote joint/shared use.  
• Stressed the importance of steadily implementing supplementary agreements to SOFA regarding environmental stewardship and the civilian component. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type of Contact / Place</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Outline and Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
• Exchanged views on issues regarding North Korea. The Japanese side commented that now is the time to increase pressure on the regime and that Japan will take necessary measures to continue to coordinate with the U.S. Forces to fully respond to various contingencies.  
• Reaffirmed close communication and coordination between the two governments is vital in order to respond to issues regarding North Korea.  
• Agreed on putting further pressure on North Korea and working on bolstering the defense capabilities to deter threats posed by North Korea.  
• In light of an increasingly severe security environment, shared their commitment to take initiatives to ensure the effectiveness of the Guidelines and to bolster the capabilities of the Alliance to deter and respond while both Japan and the U.S. work on improving their respective capabilities. |
• The Japanese side commented that North Korean nuclear and missile development is posing an unprecedentedly serious and immediate threat to the security of this region including Japan, and called on the Alliance to ensure the Alliance’s an irrevocable response to any situation. The U.S. side shared this view and reaffirmed its commitment to the security of Japan including a commitment to extended deterrence.  
• Given the increased level of North Korean ballistic missile threat, the two governments agreed on ensuring a reliable defense posture. Also confirmed working together for the introduction of new BMD assets including the Aegis Ashore. Agreed on bringing even closer coordination to the operation of Japanese and U.S. assets including Aegis-equipped ships.  
• Welcomed the high level of communication through telephone meetings on continued provocations by North Korea, and reaffirmed to continue to share information between Japan and the U.S.  
• Confirmed the importance of continuously pressuring North Korea in a visible way and the importance of close cooperation between Japan and the U.S.  
• Reaffirmed the two governments’ intention to promote close cooperation between Japan, the U.S., and the Republic of Korea.  
• Shared the position that Japan and the U.S. will work together for the peace and security of the East China Sea while keeping a close watch on the situations.  
• Agreed on the importance of engagement in the Southeast Asia region while keeping a close watch on the situations in the South China Sea, and welcomed progress in multilateral security cooperation as well as dialogues in the region through the framework of ADMM Plus.  
• The Japanese side mentioned its intention to take initiatives to help ASEAN with capacity building based on the “Vientiane Vision,” Japan’s defense cooperation initiatives with ASEAN.  
• Confirmed that Japan and the U.S. will continue to cooperate closely to provide capacity building assistance to Southeast Asian partners.  
• The Japanese side requested the U.S. Forces to make efforts to operate safely as understanding from the local communities is vital in ensuring the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan. |
| Apr. 20, 2018 | Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington D.C. | Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Mattis | • Held close discussion and agreed on future course of action concerning the North Korea issues, including the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting.  
• Agreed on the need to keep a close watch on North Korea, given no concrete efforts by the North to denuclearize its nuclear and missile capabilities.  
• Reaffirmed its commitment to implement the 2015 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and to pursue further ways to strengthen the Alliance.  
• The Ministers also reaffirmed the Alliance’s commitment to the security of Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces.  
• The Japanese side commended efforts by the MSDF to address the issue of illegal ship-to-ship transfers by North Korean vessels, and showed its commitment to continue these efforts with Japan and other partner nations.  
• Affirmed the importance of cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and the Republic of Korea and other nations through joint training and exercise.  
• Agreed on the importance of continuing close information-sharing to ensure the Alliance’s response capabilities to any situation.  
• Welcomed progress in cooperation between Japan and the U.S. under Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines such as the SDF protecting and providing supplies and services to the U.S. Forces, and reaffirmed the further promotion of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation through the steady advancement of the Legislation and the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.  
• The Japanese side talked about moving forward on the review of the Japan-U.S. Joint Defense Guidelines towards the end of FY2018 and the study of setting forth a new Mid-Term Defense Program, and reaffirmed on sharing information between the ministers.  
• The Japanese side spoke about the need to introduce high-performance equipment including those provided by the U.S. military to bolster Japan’s defense capabilities amid an increasingly severe security environment. The two ministers affirmed to work together to make it possible for Japan to smoothly and swiftly acquire equipment made in the U.S. including the Aegis Ashore by addressing the issues regarding FMS.  
• The Japanese side requested the securing of safe operations by the U.S. Forces, including the CV-22 to be deployed to Yokota Air Base and U.S. Forces aircraft in Okinawa, and the U.S. side acknowledged the importance of ensuring flight safety.  
• The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on the local community of Okinawa and other places, and concurred that the U.S. will continue to cooperate with Japan on efforts to gain the understanding of the local community. |

Reference 25 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee  
(August 17, 2017)  

Begin Text:  
I. Overview  
The U.S.-Japan Alliance (“the Alliance”) is the cornerstone of the Asia-Pacific region’s peace, prosperity, and freedom. This dynamic partnership is also increasingly important in promoting values shared by both nations, including freedom, democracy, peace, human rights, free and fair markets, and the rule of law. The Ministers renewed their resolve to uphold the rules-based international order amid the challenging security environment.  

Today the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (“SCC”) charted a path forward for the Alliance in addressing the ongoing and emerging threats that pose a challenge to regional peace and security, based on the Joint Statement by the leaders of both countries on February 10, 2017. The SCC reaffirmed its commitment to implement the 2015 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and to pursue further ways to strengthen the Alliance. The Ministers also reaffirmed the Alliance’s commitment to the security of Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces.  

II. The Regional Strategic Environment  
The Ministers condemned in the strongest terms North Korea’s recurring provocations and development of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, which have entered a new phase, and pose an increasing threat to regional and international peace and stability. The Ministers committed to bolster the capabilities of the Alliance to deter and respond to these threats. They also concurred on continuing to pressure North Korea, in cooperation with other countries, to compel it to take concrete actions to end its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and to achieve the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Ministers called on the international community to comprehensively and thoroughly implement the United Nations Security Council resolutions including the newly adopted Resolution 2371. The Ministers strongly encourage China to take decisive measures to urge North Korea to change its course of action. The Ministers called on North Korea to end its systematic human rights violations and to immediately release all foreign nationals held in North Korea, including Japanese abductees and U.S. citizens.  

The Ministers expressed continuing concerns about the security environment in the East China Sea. They also recalled the situation in early August 2016. The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of working together to safeguard the peace and stability of the East China Sea and reconfirmed that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and that the United States and Japan oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands.  

The Ministers expressed serious concern about the situation in the South China Sea and reaffirmed their opposition to unilateral coercive actions by claimants, including the reclamation and militarization of disputed features, that alter the status quo and increase tensions. They reiterated the importance of the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes through full respect for legal and diplomatic processes, including arbitration. They also emphasized the importance of compliance with the international law of the sea, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, including respect for freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea. In this regard, the Ministers recalled the award rendered by the Tribunal on July 12, 2016. The Ministers acknowledged the adoption of the framework of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) and look forward to the conclusion of a meaningful, effective and legally binding COC. The Ministers underlined the significance of continued engagement in the South China Sea, including through respective activities to support freedom of navigation, bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, and coordinated capacity building assistance.  

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III. Strengthening Security and Defense Cooperation

(1) Alliance Responses

The Ministers confirmed their shared intent to develop specific measures and actions to further strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance, including through reviewing roles, missions, and capabilities, to ensure seamless Alliance responses across a full spectrum of situations amid an increasingly challenging regional security environment. To that end, Japan intends to expand its role in the Alliance and augment its defense capabilities, with an eye on the next planning period for its Mid-Term Defense Program. The United States remains committed to deploying its most advanced capabilities to Japan. To expedite work already underway in this regard, the Ministers gave the following guidance to their staffs:

- Accelerate implementation of the 2015 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and pursue additional types of cooperation under Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security; and
- Explore new and expanded activities in various areas, such as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), training and exercises, research and development, capacity building, and the joint/shared use of facilities.

(2) Implementation of the 2015 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation

The Ministers reaffirmed the two Governments’ unwavering commitment to continue implementation of the 2015 Guidelines. The Ministers welcomed important steps within the Alliance to operationalize mutual asset protection and to bring into force the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) as measures to enhance bilateral defense cooperation. The Ministers noted the successful use of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) to respond to regional events. The Ministers reaffirmed the critical role that U.S. extended deterrence plays in ensuring the security of Japan as well as the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, and they expressed their intention to further strengthen their engagement on this issue through the Deterrence Dialogue. They also confirmed their shared commitment to enhance and accelerate cooperation in such areas as bilateral planning, air and missile defense, non-combatant evacuation operations, defense equipment and technology cooperation, intelligence cooperation and information security. The Ministers expressed their desire to expand bilateral cooperation in space, particularly in resiliency, Space Situational Awareness, hosted payloads and satellite communications. They called for deepening consultations in a timely manner on Alliance responses to serious cyber incidents, underscoring the critical importance of further enhancing Allied deterrence and defense.

IV. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation

The Ministers highlighted ongoing Alliance efforts to advance trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation with other partners in the region, notably the Republic of Korea, Australia, India and Southeast Asian countries. The Ministers underscored the importance of cooperating to promote a rules-based international order, taking note of the United States’ continued commitment to maintain a strong presence in the region and Japan’s initiatives demonstrated by its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.”

Regarding cooperation with the Republic of Korea, the Ministers emphasized the need to enhance information-sharing and expand trilateral exercises, including missile warning, anti-submarine warfare, and maritime interception operations exercises.

Regarding cooperation with Southeast Asian nations, the Ministers affirmed their shared commitment to further enhance capacity building programs and defense equipment and technology transfers in areas including maritime security, defense institution building, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). Recognizing the importance of upholding the maritime order in the region, the Ministers confirmed their shared commitment to launch a whole-of-government dialogue on maritime security capacity building, which would incorporate existing efforts in this regard.

V. The U.S. Force Presence in Japan

(1) Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan

The Ministers, in view of maintaining a robust U.S. force presence in Japan, reaffirmed the two Governments’ commitment to implement the existing arrangements for the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, which will maintain operational and deterrent capability in an increasingly severe security environment, while also mitigating the impact on local communities and enhancing support from local communities for the presence and operations of U.S. forces in Japan.

As an essential element of this effort, the Ministers welcomed the resumption of Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) construction and confirmed that the plan to construct the FRF at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. The Ministers reaffirmed the two Governments’ unwavering commitment to the plan and underscored their strong determination to achieve its completion as soon as possible and the long-desired return of MCAS Futenma to Japan. In this context, the Ministers called for the steady implementation of the construction plan, noting the adverse impact of further delays on the ability of the Alliance to provide for peace and security.

The Ministers welcomed the return of a major portion of the Northern Training Area in 2016, the single largest land return in Okinawa since 1972. They noted progress on the land returns that were announced in December 2016 and called for further implementation of those returns. The Ministers also reaffirmed the importance of steady implementation of the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa and their commitment to update the plan as soon as possible.

The Ministers also welcomed progress in the relocation of a total of approximately 9,000 U.S. Marine Corps personnel, along with their associated dependents, from MCAS Futenma to Guam. They confirmed the steady implementation of the Guam International Agreement.

The Ministers welcomed Japan’s commitment to make utmost efforts to secure a permanent field carrier landing practice facility as soon as possible.

The Ministers confirmed that the overall level of HNS is to be maintained roughly at the Japanese Fiscal Year 2015 level. The Ministers reaffirmed that the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) funding in the current SMA period is to be no less than a budget of 20.6 billion yen per year.

(3) Other Issues

The Ministers reaffirmed the two Governments would promote joint/shared use to enhance interoperability and deterrence, build stronger relationships with local communities, and strengthen the Self-Defense Forces’ posture, including in Japan’s southwestern islands.

The Ministers underscored the importance of maintaining international order based upon the rule of law.

The two leaders affirmed the commitment of the United States and Japan to the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, to ensure the long-term, sustainable presence of U.S. forces. They affirmed that the United States and Japan are committed to the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab/Henoko area and in adjacent waters. It is the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.

The two leaders affirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covers the Senkaku Islands. They oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands. The United States and Japan will deepen cooperation to safeguard the peace and stability of the East China Sea. The two leaders underscored the importance of maintaining a maritime order based on international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea. The United States and Japan oppose any attempt to assert maritime claims through the use of intimidation, coercion or force. The United States and Japan also call on countries concerned to avoid actions that would escalate tensions in the South China Sea, including the militarization of outposts, and to work together to maintain peace, security and stability in the region.

The United States and Japan strongly urge North Korea to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and not to take any further provocative actions. The U.S.-Japan Alliance is fully capable of ensuring the security of Japan. The United States is fully committed to defending its homeland, forces, and allies, through the full range of U.S. military capabilities. The two leaders affirmed the importance of an early resolution of the abductions...
issue. They also affirmed the importance of trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea. The United States and Japan are also committed to rigorous implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea.

The United States and Japan will strengthen their bilateral technological cooperation on defense innovation to meet the evolving security challenges. The United States and Japan will also expand bilateral security cooperation in the fields of space and cyberspace. The United States and Japan also strongly condemn terrorism in all forms and manifestations and will enhance our cooperation to fight against terrorist groups that pose a global threat.

The two leaders instructed their foreign and defense ministers to convene a Security Consultative Committee (SCC: “2+2”) meeting to identify ways to further strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance, including through the review of the respective roles, missions, and capabilities of the two countries.

**U.S.-Japan Economic Relations**

The United States and Japan represent 30 percent of the world’s GDP and share an interest in sustaining a strong global economy, ensuring financial stability, and growing job opportunities. To advance these interests, the President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their commitments to using the three-pronged approach of mutually-reinforcing fiscal, monetary, and structural policies to strengthen domestic and global economic demand.

The two leaders discussed opportunities and challenges facing each of their economies and the need to promote inclusive growth and prosperity in their countries, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world. They emphasized that they remain fully committed to strengthening the economic relationships between their two countries and across the region, based on rules for free and fair trade. This will include setting high trade and investment standards, reducing market barriers, and enhancing opportunities for economic and job growth in the Asia-Pacific.

The United States and Japan reaffirmed the importance of both deepening their trade and investment relations and of their continued efforts in promoting trade, economic growth, and high standards throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Toward this end, and noting that the United States has withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the leaders pledged to explore how best to accomplish these shared objectives. This will include discussions between the United States and Japan on a bilateral framework as well as Japan continuing to advance regional progress on the basis of existing initiatives.

In addition, the two leaders expressed interest in exploring cooperation across sectors that promote mutual economic benefits to the United States and Japan.

**Invitations to Visit Japan**

Prime Minister Abe invited President Trump for an official visit to Japan during the course of this year, and also welcomed an early visit of Vice President Pence to Tokyo. President Trump accepted these invitations.

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### Outline of 23 Issues

(As of April 1, 2018)

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<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Area (ha)</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tr>
<td>Army POL Depots</td>
<td>1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td>Returned on December 31, 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Zukanran</td>
<td>2. Manhole, etc., for underground communication system (Roborkawa)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on September 30, 1991</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>20. Awase Meadows Golf Course</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on July 31, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Training Area</td>
<td>3. Kunigami-son (Mi. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) district</td>
<td>480</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on March 31, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago-Kunigami line</td>
<td>(256)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Schwab</td>
<td>5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Hinokoru)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on March 31, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makimino Service Area Annex</td>
<td>6. In whole</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>SCC</td>
<td>Returned on December 31, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naha Cold Storage</td>
<td>7. In whole</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on March 31, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunabe Warehouse</td>
<td>8. In whole</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yaedake Communication Site</td>
<td>9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Motobu-cho)</td>
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<td>Returned on November 30, 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onna Communication Site</td>
<td>10. In whole</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on September 30, 1995</td>
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<td></td>
<td>11. Eastern part</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kadena Air Base</td>
<td>12. A part of southern area (Tobaru)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on January 31, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chibana Site</td>
<td>13. In whole</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on December 31, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on December 31, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Hansen</td>
<td>23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City)</td>
<td>162</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on June 30, 2014 (55ha), Returned on June 30, 2017 (107ha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadena Ammunition Storage Area</td>
<td>(22. Eastern side of National Highway 58 (Kino-Hija), Southwestern corner (Yamakasa Area))</td>
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<td></td>
<td>15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58)</td>
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<td>Returned on March 25, 1999</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(22). Kurahama: site for waste incineration facilities</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>Returned on March 31, 2005</td>
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<td>(22). Continuing use area for (GSDF)</td>
<td>58</td>
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<td>Returned on October 31, 2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Torii Communication Station</td>
<td>16. Kadena bypass</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Returned on March 31, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Division Engineer Office</td>
<td>17. In whole</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on September 30, 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Camp Kusae</td>
<td>(19. Southern side of the eastern part)</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Returned on December 31, 1994</td>
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<td></td>
<td>18. Northern part (Hei)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(18. Along Route 58)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCAS Futenma</td>
<td>21. Lands along eastern side (Nakabaru - Ginowan)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Returned on July 31, 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 facilities, 21 issues

977 7 8 3 3
The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance. The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year. The SCC, which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996. The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report. Today, at the U.S. and Japanese Ministerial level, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5.022ha/12,361 acres) will be returned. Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the yearlong SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for relocation of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary.

The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee. The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject. In accordance with the April 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa related issues at the same time.

**Return Land:**
- Futema Air Station — See attached.
- Northern Training Area
  - Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3.987ha/9.852 acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reserves (approx. 155ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions:
    - Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121ha/296 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.
    - Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area.
    - Aha Training Area
      - Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided.
    - Gimbaru Training Area
      - Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
    - Sobe Communication Site
      - Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
    - Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield
      - Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated.
    - Camp Kuwae
      - Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa.
    - Senaha Communication Station
      - Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.
    - Makinamito Service Area
      - Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makinamito Service Area.
    - Naha Port
      - Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha/87 acres).
    - Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran)
      - Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.).

**Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:**
- Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104
- Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese FY1997.
- Parachute drop training
- Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.
— Conditioning hikes on public roads.
Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.

**Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:**

— Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station.
Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented.

— Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft.
Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed.

— Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base.
Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by end of December 1996.

— Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base.
Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998.

— Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station.
Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces.

**Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:**

— Accident reports.
Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996. As part of this agreement, all U.S. forces’ good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to inform timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces’ assets or facilities.

— Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.
Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.

— Visits to U.S. facilities and areas.
Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

— Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles.
Implement the agreement concerning markings on U.S. forces official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all non-tactical U.S. forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997.

— Supplemental automobile insurance.
Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997.

— Payment for claims.
Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:
- Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.
- A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by U.S. authorities.
- In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S. Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount.

— Quarantine procedures.
Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

— Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen.
Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. forces in the United States.

— Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee.

The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station

(Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996)

1. Introduction
a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status of Forces Agreement of September 19, 1995. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield’s critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF). (The SBF will establish a bilateral U.S.–Japan working group under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SACO approval of this plan and the FIG)^, the Joint Committee will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of its work.

2. Decisions of the SCC
a. Pursue construction of an SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station’s flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) — capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations.

b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions.

c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base.

d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities, which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available.

e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.

3. Guiding Principles
a. Futenma Air Station’s critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.

b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station’s operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing U.S. facilities and areas.

c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other U.S. military facilities and housing.

d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF;
safety; and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations.

c. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision.

d. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation.

4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods

Studies have been conducted by a “Technical Support Group” comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a “Technical Advisory Group” comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible.

a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules)—supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed.

b. Pontoon Type—platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater.

c. Semi-Submersible Type—platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.

5. The Next Steps

a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection.

b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility.

c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility.

---

### Reference 29

**State of Progress of the SACO Final Report**

#### 1. Already returned facilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Facility (Project)</th>
<th>State of Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northern Training Area</strong> (Return of major portion)</td>
<td>* April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after seven HLZs are relocated, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aba Training Area</strong> (Return of total area)</td>
<td>* December 1998: Total return completed (release of joint use)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gimbaru Training Area</strong> (Return of total area)</td>
<td>* January 2008: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the helicopter landing zone (HLZ) is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sobe Communication Site</strong> (Return of total area)</td>
<td>* April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after communication systems including communication facilities such as antennas and others are relocated to Camp Hansen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield</strong> (Return of total area)</td>
<td>* October 2011: Total return completed (approximately 123 ha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senaha Communication Station</strong> (Return of most area)</td>
<td>* March 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the Sobe Communication Site is relocated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2. Facilities to be returned as the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Facility (Project)</th>
<th>State of Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MCAS Futenma</strong> (Return of total area)</td>
<td>* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Camp Kuwae</strong> (Return of total area)</td>
<td>* July 2002: Youth Center provided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maximinato Service Area</strong> (Return of partial area)</td>
<td>* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Naha Port Facility</strong> (Return of total area)</td>
<td>* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Housing Consolidation Camp Zukeran (Return of partial area → Return of partial area)*

- **Phase I: Golf Range Area**
  - April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others
  - July 2002: Two high rises were furnished
  - July 2006: An underpass was furnished

- **Phase II: Sada Area**
  - February 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others
  - September 2005: Two high rises, 38 townhouses, and others were furnished

- **Phase III: Eastern Chatan Area**
  - March 2004: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others
  - June 2008: 35 townhouses and others were furnished

- **Phase IV: Futenma and Upper Plaza Area**
  - March 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others
  - February 2010: 24 townhouses constructed in Futenma and Upper Plaza Area were furnished

* May 2006: Camp Zukeran was described as partial return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

* April 2013: It was written in the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa that the OHC plan will be reassessed under SACO, and that 910 family housing (including alternatives for housing that are to be removed in consolidated areas) will be built in addition to 56 housing already agreed to build based on the request for family housing after the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.

### [Adjustment in training or operation]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point</th>
<th>State of Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relocation of Artillery Live-fire Training over Highway 104</td>
<td>Relocated to five maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan in FY1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parachute Drop Training</td>
<td>Relocation training conducted at Iejima Auxiliary Airfield since July 2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### [Implementation of initiatives to reduce noise]

#### 1. Initiatives already taken

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point</th>
<th>State of Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Relocation of the U.S. Navy Ramp at Kadena Air Base | June 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of rinse facility  
  - September 2008: Rinse Facility was furnished  
  - February 2009: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation of Navy Ramp  
  - October 2010: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of area forming and the construction of ramp and taxiway.  
  - April 2011: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of the construction of parking and utility.  
  - February 2013: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of the construction of type II maintenance hangar.  
  - July 2013: Ramp, etc. provided.  
  - July 2014: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of construction of hangars, etc.  
  - December 2016: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the furnishing of maintenance hangar, etc.  
  - January 2017: Relocation completed |
| Installation of Noise Reduction Baffles at Kadena Air Base | July 2008: Furnished |

#### 2. Ongoing initiatives as the U.S. Forces realignment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point</th>
<th>State of Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transfer of KC-130 aircraft</td>
<td>May 2006: United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation stated that the KC-130 squadron would be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and that the aircraft would regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month &amp; Year</td>
<td>Background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1996</td>
<td>Then Prime Minister Hashimoto and then U.S. Ambassador Mandale held a meeting, and the full return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) was announced. SACO Interim Report. → The airfield will be returned within five to seven years, following the completion of an adequate replacement facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1996</td>
<td>SACO Final Report → A maritime facility will be constructed off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa (one that can be dismantled).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1999</td>
<td>Then Governor of Okinawa Inamine stated that he had chosen the Henoko coast region of Nago City as a candidate for the facility relocation on condition that it would be for joint military-civilian use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1999</td>
<td>Then Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF &quot;Government Policy on Relocation of MCAS Futenma&quot; (Cabinet decision) → Construction in the Nago City Henoko coastal region in the water area of Camp Schwab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2002</td>
<td>&quot;Basic Agreement Regarding the Use of Replacement Facilities&quot; concluded between the Director General of Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. &quot;Basic Plan for Replacement Facilities for MCAS Futenma&quot; was prepared. → Scale, construction methods, and specific construction site decided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2003</td>
<td>Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visited Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2004</td>
<td>A U.S. Forces helicopter crashed into a university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>2+2 Joint Statement → Agreement on a new plan (an L shape plan connecting the coastal area of Camp Schwab with the adjacent water area of Oura bay)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2006</td>
<td>&quot;Basic Agreement Regarding the Construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility&quot; concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency, the Mayor of Nago, and the village mayor of Ginowan → Agreement was reached by creating flight paths avoiding overflight of the surrounding region (the V shape plan).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2006</td>
<td>Establishment of &quot;the Council on Measures for Relocation of MCAS Futenma&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2007</td>
<td>The EIA scoping document was sent to the governor, municipal mayors etc. of Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2009</td>
<td>Draft Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2009</td>
<td>Establishment of the Ministerial-Level Working Group on the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station. Japan-U.S. summit meeting → Agreement on relocating the relocation of Futenma Air Station expeditiously through the working group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2009</td>
<td>Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies convened, Exploratory Committee for the Okinawa Bases Issue was established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2010</td>
<td>&quot;2+2&quot; Joint Statement → Confirmed the intention to locate the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas Cabinet approval of “immediate actions by the Government of Japan on items decided by the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee on May 28th, 2010”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2010</td>
<td>Futenma Replacement Facility Bilateral Experts Study Group Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>&quot;2+2&quot; Joint Statement → Confirming the commitment that a replacement plan should be completed as early as possible after 2014, while deciding that the shape of the runway in the replaced facility should be V-shaped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2011–January 2012</td>
<td>The Environmental Impact Statement report was sent to the governor of Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2012</td>
<td>The Japan-U.S. Joint Statement was announced on the realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. → Official discussion was initiated to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2012</td>
<td>&quot;2+2&quot; Joint Statement → The current plan to relocate the air base from Futenma to Henoko was reconfirmed to be the only viable solution. Agreement reached to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2012</td>
<td>Revised Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>Application for approval of public water body reclamation was submitted to the governor of Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2013</td>
<td>Release of “the consolidation plan of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa” → MCAS Futenma can be returned in FY2022 or later through relocation, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2013</td>
<td>&quot;2+2&quot; Joint Statement → Recognition was reaffirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2013</td>
<td>Governor of Okinawa approved reclamation of the public water body related to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2014</td>
<td>Started the construction of replacement facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2014</td>
<td>Joint press release by Japan and the United States → Reaffirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2015</td>
<td>&quot;2+2&quot; Joint Statement → Reconfirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2015</td>
<td>Governor of Okinawa revoked the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility project → The Okinawa Defense Bureau requested the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to review the governor of Okinawa’s revocation of the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility project, and requested the suspension of its execution → The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism recognized the request of the Okinawa Defense Bureau and decided to suspend execution of the revocation of the landfill permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2015</td>
<td>Reconfirmed that constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma → The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed an administrative suit seeking a retraction of revocation of the landfill permit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Reference

**Reference 31**

**Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas Eligible for Immediate Return Upon Completion of Necessary Procedures</th>
<th>Returned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Futemma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)</td>
<td>Returned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)</td>
<td>JFY2014 or later</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Areas Eligible for Return Once the Replacement Facilities in Okinawa are Provided**

| Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester)                                                                 | JFY2025 or later |
| Lower Plaza Housing area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)                                           | JFY2024 or later |
| A part of Kishaba Housing area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)                                     | JFY2024 or later |
| The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)                                             | JFY2024 or later |
| Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area| JFY2025 or later |
| Naha Port                                                                                       | JFY2028 or later |
| Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1                                   | JFY2022 or later |
| Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futemma                                                        | JFY2022 or later |

**Areas Eligible for Return as USMC Forces Relocate from Okinawa to Locations Outside of Japan**

| Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)                                                 |               |
| The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)                                            | JFY2024 or later |

**Notes:**
1. Shirahito River area can be returned at the same timing.
2. Part of the logistics support units in this area are scheduled to be relocated to locations outside of Japan. Efforts will be made to minimize the impact of the relocation on the approximate timing for return. However, the relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation.
3. Area south of the Industrial Corridor (Camp Foster) can be returned at the same timing.
4. Plans for USMC relocation to locations outside of Japan have not yet been determined. The relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation.
# Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 29, 2016</td>
<td>Host Nation Notification and U.S. Department of Defense press release regarding the deployment of the MV-22 Osprey to Okinawa. Deployed a squadron in October 2012 (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in late July). Deployed an additional squadron in summer 2013. The results of the investigation of the crash accident were provided to the Government of Japan; the MV-22 Osprey did not conduct any flights in Japan until the safety of flight operations was reconfirmed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 23, 2016</td>
<td>Off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 19</td>
<td>Released the report “MV-22 Osprey deployment in Okinawa” (that safety was confirmed by the government). The Joint Committee agreed on matters related to the Osprey’s operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 6</td>
<td>Relocation to MCAS Futemma was completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 28, 2013</td>
<td>The Okinawa Citizens’ Council, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, and other organizations sent a statement to the Prime Minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 30, 2015</td>
<td>The MOD provided explanation to the relevant local governments and other organizations regarding the U.S. explanation on the deployment of the MV-22 squadron (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in summer 2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 30, 2016</td>
<td>The second squadron off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 25</td>
<td>Relocation to MCAS Futemma was completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 11, 2015</td>
<td>The U.S. Department of Defense announced that it would deploy the CV-22 Osprey at Yokota Air Base starting in the latter half of 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 13, 2016</td>
<td>Emergency landing of an MV-22 Osprey off the coast of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1, 2017</td>
<td>Periodic aircraft maintenance of the MV-22 Osprey was commenced at Camp Kisarazu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 14, 2017</td>
<td>Informed relevant local governments and other organizations that the U.S. Department of Defense announced the postponement of the arrival of the CV-22 Osprey that were to be deployed at Yokota Air Base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 5, 2017</td>
<td>Accident of a MV-22 attached to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Force (Futenma) off the east coast of Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 3, 2018</td>
<td>United States Forces, Japan announced that five CV-22 Osprey would be deployed to Japan around summer of 2018, and a total of ten Osprey would be deployed gradually over the next few years.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan

## 1. Purpose

It is critically important to realize the realignment of the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ), in order to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in Japan and to mitigate the impact of defense facilities on surrounding residents by all of Japan. In this light, the purpose of this Act is to contribute to the smooth implementation of USFJ realignment by taking the following special measures, etc.

## 2. Special Measures, etc.

1. Realignment grants for municipalities incurring greater impacts

   - In connection with the realignment of USFJ, the national government designs defense facilities for which it is deemed that consideration must be paid to their increasing impacts on the stability of the lives of the residents in the surrounding areas. Realignment grants are awarded to municipalities in the area of such defense facilities, in order to cover the expenses of the projects that contribute to making the residents’ lives more convenient and to developing industries. If the grants are considered necessary to help carry out the USFJ realignment smoothly and entirely.

   - The national government takes into consideration the extent that the stability of the lives of the residents is impacted, and awards the realignment grants based on both the progress of the measures for achieving realignment and the length of time that has passed since the measures were first implemented.

2. Public project special provisions for areas incurring particularly large impacts

   - Designate areas that include municipalities incurring particularly large impacts as Special Area for Development concerning Realignment, and promote the development of these areas by establishing special provisions for cost sharing by local governments when developing roads, ports, and other infrastructure.

   - Set up at the MOD the Council for Local Development concerning Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces comprised of relevant ministers, and at the Council’s meetings discuss matters such as the designation of the Special Area for Development concerning Realignment and the development of the establishment plan for the area (Development Plan for Special Area for Development concerning Realignment).

3. Measures for USFJ local employees

   - Implement skills education and training that contribute to the continuous employment of USFJ local employees.

## 3. Expiration of the Law

This Act expires on March 31, 2027; provided, however, that the realignment grants will be awarded until March 31, 2032 at the latest based on the situation of the realignment.

Notes:

1. At the time of its enactment this Act was set to expire on March 31, 2017. However, the term of validity has been extended by 10 years to March 31, 2027 pursuant to the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017.

2. At the time of its enactment, this Act provided for the special measures, etc. under this Act in 2. (1) to (3) above, as well as for special provisions for the operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation for the implementation of investments and loans for family housing and infrastructure development related to USFJ relocation to the United States of America (Guam) for the promotion of said relocation. However, the said provision was abolished pursuant to the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017, after the 2+2 Joint Statement of April 2012 limited Japan’s financial commitment for the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam to direct cash contribution and it was confirmed that other forms of financial assistance (investments and loans) would not be utilized.
The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the “Parties”; hereinafter referred to as the “United States Government”), the United States of America, as defined in subparagraph (b) of Article I of the Status of Forces Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Civilian Component”); and

Convinced that enhanced cooperation with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian Component consistent with the categories of persons that the Parties shall direct the Joint Committee to develop,

The Parties shall establish a Working Group within the framework of the Joint Committee, to clarify the scope of the Civilian Component, which plays an essential role in fulfilling the United States’ obligations under the Treaty.

1. The United States Government will designate members of the Civilian Component consistent with the categories of persons that the Parties shall direct the Joint Committee to develop.

2. The Parties also shall direct the Joint Committee to develop criteria that the United States Government will use in evaluating contractor employee positions for eligibility to receive designation as members of the Civilian Component. Such criteria are to be established so that those who are eligible to receive designation as members of the Civilian Component have skills or knowledge required for the accomplishment of mission requirements.

3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2 of this Article, either Party may terminate this Agreement by giving one year’s written notice through diplomatic channels to the other Party.

2. This Agreement shall remain in force as long as the Status of Forces Agreement; and

3. The Parties, through the Working Group referred to in Article 2, shall establish procedures for regular reports regarding the Civilian Component. The United States Government is to provide such reports to the Government of Japan.

ARTICLE 6
If any dispute arises between the Parties relating to the implementation of this Agreement, the Parties shall settle it in accordance with the procedures for resolving matters set out in Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement.

ARTICLE 7
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature.

2. This Agreement shall remain in force as long as the Status of Forces Agreement remains in force.

3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2 of this Article, either Party may terminate this Agreement by giving one year’s written notice through diplomatic channels to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed the present Agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Tokyo in the Japanese and English languages, both texts being equally authentic, this sixteenth day of January 2017.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>May 29: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that fell into the Sea of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>August 31: North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the commencement of the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) for parts of the sea-based upper-tier system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Started the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Decision by the United States on the initial deployment of BMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>July 5: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, six of which fell into the Sea of Japan while the other exploded immediately after the launch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>The deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>SM-3 launch tests by Aegis destroyers started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>March 30: Shot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>April 13: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew over the Tohoku region and passed through to the Pacific Ocean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>July 4: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, which fell into the Sea of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>March 2: Two missiles were launched and flew approx. 500 km before landing in the Sea of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>North Korea launched over 20 ballistic missiles including those claimed to be “satellites” in a single year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>March 3: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>North Korea launched ballistic missiles beginning in February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>April 5: Launched a ballistic missile that flew approximately 60 km and fell into the Sea of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>April 14: Launched a ballistic missile that exploded immediately after launch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>April 29: Launched a ballistic missile, which fell inland approximately 50 km from the launch site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>May 14: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 800 km and fell into the Sea of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td>May 21: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td>May 29: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 900 km and fell into the Sea of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>June 22: Conducted a test shot of the SM-3 block IIA at the sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2026</td>
<td>July 4: North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 900 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2027</td>
<td>July 28: North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2028</td>
<td>August 29: North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which flew for approximately 2,700 km over Japan and fell in the Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2029</td>
<td>September 15: North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which flew for approximately 3,700 km over Japan and fell in the Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030</td>
<td>November 29: North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which flew for approximately 1,000 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2031</td>
<td>December 19: NSC and the cabinet meeting approved introducing 2 Aegis Ashore systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reference: History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan

July 26: North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan |

July 13: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan |

July 26: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan |

The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the commencement of the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) for parts of the sea-based upper-tier system.
Regarding fundamental enhancement of ballistic missile defense capabilities

(Approved by the National Security Council and a Cabinet decision on December 19, 2017)

(Building a new ballistic missile defense system)

1. While Japan has been addressing the threat of ballistic missiles based on the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond (approved by the National Security Council and a Cabinet decision on December 17, 2013) and the Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) (approved by the National Security Council and a Cabinet decision on December 17, 2013), North Korea’s nuclear and missile developments have become more severe and pressing threats to Japan’s national security and it is necessary to fundamentally enhance ballistic missile defense capabilities to continuously and sustainably protect Japan in ordinary times.

2. In response, Japan intends to deploy two land-based Aegis systems (Aegis Ashore) that are capable of continuously and sustainably protecting Japan from ballistic missile attacks as a new ballistic missile defense system and having the Ground Self Defense Force possess these systems. This initiative seeks to improve capabilities for multilayer defense of Japan from ballistic missile attacks along with Aegis-equipped warships and the Patriot surface-to-air missile unit.

(Handling costs)

3. Costs required to build the land-based Aegis systems (Aegis Ashore) in fiscal 2017 and 2018 will be covered within the scope of the Medium Term Defense Program’s overall budget.

Reference 37  Efforts in Recent Years by the Ministry of Defense on Cybersecurity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>April: Agreed in a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting to start a comprehensive dialogue on cybersecurity in order to strengthen the engagement of the governments as a whole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June: Cyber Incident Mobile Assistance Team (CYMAT) established in the National Information Security Center (NISC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September: “Towards the Stable and Effective Utilization of Cyberspace by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces” formulated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>May: The First Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue was held in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July: The MOD and defense industry members deeply interested in cybersecurity established the Cyber Defense Council (CDC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August: Agreed at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting to consider a new framework for cooperation between the defense authorities from the perspective of further promoting Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in the cybersecurity area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October: Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) established between the Japanese and U.S. defense authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>March: Cyber Defense Group newly formed under the Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November: The Basic Act on Cybersecurity enacted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>January: Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters established under the Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January: National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) established in the Cabinet Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May: Joint statement issued by the CDPWG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September: Cybersecurity Strategy established by Cabinet Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>April: MOD established Deputy Director-General for Cybersecurity and Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>January: Japan was approved to join the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence located in Estonia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reference 38  Record of Disaster Relief (Past Five Years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Dispatches</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>89,049</td>
<td>66,267</td>
<td>30,035</td>
<td>33,123</td>
<td>814,200</td>
<td>23,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>7,949</td>
<td>9,621</td>
<td>5,170</td>
<td>5,824</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>1,255</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>2,618</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vessels</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Kumamoto Earthquake and Northern Kyushu torrential rains excluded from fiscal 2016 and fiscal 2017 results respectively.
### Reference 39
Record of Participation by the MOD and SDF in Joint Exercises for Civil Protection Implemented by the National and Local Governments (FY2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Exercise</th>
<th>Training content (estimated)</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location (cumulative times)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simulation exercise</td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives</td>
<td>October 30, 2017</td>
<td>Toyama Prefecture (6 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field exercise</td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents</td>
<td>November 7, 2017</td>
<td>Tochigi Prefecture (3 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulation exercise</td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives</td>
<td>November 22, 2017</td>
<td>Fukuoka Prefecture (5 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulation and Field exercise</td>
<td>Falling ballistic missile</td>
<td>November 22, 2017</td>
<td>Nagasaki Prefecture (4 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulation exercise</td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents</td>
<td>November 24, 2017</td>
<td>Saitama Prefecture (4 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field exercise</td>
<td>Terrorism using chemical agents</td>
<td>January 12, 2018</td>
<td>Akita Prefecture (4 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field exercise</td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives</td>
<td>January 18, 2018</td>
<td>Yamanashi Prefecture (3 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field exercise</td>
<td>Terrorism using chemical agents</td>
<td>January 19, 2018</td>
<td>Gunma Prefecture (2 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field exercise</td>
<td>Terrorism using chemical agents</td>
<td>January 24, 2018</td>
<td>Nagoya Prefecture (3 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field exercise</td>
<td>Terrorism using chemical agents</td>
<td>January 25, 2018</td>
<td>Niigata Prefecture (4 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field exercise</td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives</td>
<td>January 26, 2018</td>
<td>Nagano Prefecture (3 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field exercise</td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives</td>
<td>January 30, 2018</td>
<td>Miyazaki Prefecture (5 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field exercise</td>
<td>Terrorism using explosives</td>
<td>January 31, 2018</td>
<td>Tokyo (5 times)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Reference 40
Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years)

**Participation in Security Dialogues in the Asia-Pacific Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dialogue</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Officials’ Meeting Working Group (ADSM Plus WG)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts’ Working Group (EWG)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief EWG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting among defense authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hosted by the private sector**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dialogue</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Security Dialogue hosted by the Ministry of Defense**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dialogue</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
### Reference 41: Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republic of Korea</strong></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indonesia</strong></td>
<td>Agreed to begin negotiations at the “2+2” Meeting in December 2015.</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Zealand</strong></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Agreed to consider at Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting in July 2014.</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>Signed and entered into force in July 2017.</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
<td>Signed in May 2017.</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Signed in April 2018.</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATO</strong></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Malaysia</strong></td>
<td>Signed and entered into force in April 2018.</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UAE</strong></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Signed Memorandum with Singapore, Viet Nam, Mongolia, Bahrain, Cambodia, Sweden, Spain, Qatar, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Colombia, the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, and Czech; signed statement of intent with Turkey.

### Reference 42: Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Laos</th>
<th>Rep</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Sub total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Institute for Defense Studies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense Academy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Self Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Self Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Self Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff College</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>7</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Dialogue</th>
<th>Outline</th>
<th>Recent Situations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum</td>
<td>Hosted by the Ministry of Defense since 2009.</td>
<td>The 5th forum was held in Fukuoka in September 2017, with the participation of vice-ministerial level officials from the defense authorities of ASEAN countries. Candid and constructive opinions were exchanged among participants regarding the following three topics of “50th Anniversary of ASEAN – Achievement and Enhancement of Unity,” “Current Regional Security Status,” and “Vientiane Vision – Status Quo and Prospects for the Future.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)</td>
<td>Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 1996 with Director-General-level officials in charge of defense policy and defense exchanges, all of who are from the Asia-Pacific region, participating. The forum is designed to provide defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on ways to promote confidence building focusing on the defense field.</td>
<td>Having the participation of 27 countries, 25 in the Asia-Pacific region, France and the U.K. with the ASEAN Secretariat, the European Union (EU), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the 22nd Forum was held in March 2018. Opinions were exchanged on 1) Current situations on the Korean Peninsula 2) Response to a wide range of contingencies 3) Facilitating mutual trust between defense authorities – Communication and transparency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Cooperation program in the Asia Pacific (MCAP)</td>
<td>Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 2014, inviting officials from major countries in the Asia-Pacific region to provide them with opportunities to exchange multinational views on concrete cooperation and initiatives toward issues each country in the region has in common.</td>
<td>In November 2017, with the participation of 11 countries from the Asia-Pacific region, the forum gathered officials in charge of actual work of cooperation, to discuss ways of promoting cooperation and initiatives under the theme of “Role of Army Types during Large-Scale Disasters” were held. In addition, training related to the Japan-U.S. joint disaster prevention exercise (TREx) was conducted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS Dialogue (GD)</td>
<td>Hosted by the GSDF for the first time in 2017, this dialogue provides a platform for the army and other services of like-minded countries that has close ties with the GSDF to exchanges views on multilateral engagement in the Asia-Pacific region for the armies to actively contribute to regional peace and stability.</td>
<td>With the participation of 5 service branches from 4 countries to include the U.S. (including the Marines), Australia, the U.K. and France, group discussions under the theme of “Direction of defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region the army should aim for” and held trip to the GSDF Chemical School were carried out.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST)</td>
<td>Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, inviting officials in charge of logistics support from major countries in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on logistics system.</td>
<td>The 21st Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST) meeting was held in November 2017. The participants were working-level officials in charge of logistics sent from army and other services of like-minded countries in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe. Views were exchanged under the theme “Logistics Cooperation in International Emergency Assistance Activities.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Command and General Staff College Seminar</td>
<td>Hosted by the GSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with the participation of army college students from the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on training of military units.</td>
<td>With the participation of students from army colleges in 17 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the seminar was held in August 2017. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Arms’ initiatives and partnership in large-scale disaster and international disaster relief operation.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia Pacific Naval College Seminar</td>
<td>Hosted by the GSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1996 with the participation of naval college staff from the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on the roles of naval forces with a view to encouraging school education/research and contributing to the promotion of defense exchange and mutual understanding between participating countries.</td>
<td>The 21st seminar was held in February 2016 with the participation of navy military personnel from 17 countries, personnel from the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), personnel from Keio University, and personnel from the Canon Institute for Global Studies. Presentations by the participants and active opinion exchanges were conducted on the theme of “Changes in the Role of the Navy.” In addition, unit and cultural study tours were also held to deepen the understanding of the GSDF as well as Japanese culture and history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Pacific naval Exchange Program (WPNS STEP)</td>
<td>Hosted by the MSDF, this programs has been held annually since 2011, with the participation of junior naval officers from the WPNS countries. The program is designed to provide them with opportunities to deepen their understanding of Japan’s security environment, defense policy and buildup, and culture and history.</td>
<td>With the participation of naval officers and other personnel from 25 countries, the 7th WPNS STEP was held in October 2017. Presentations and exchange of candid views were carried out under the theme of “Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific Region of the 21st Century.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Air Self-Defense Force Air Staff College Seminar</td>
<td>Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2015, with the participation of officials related to air staff colleges mainly from the Asia-Pacific region. The conference is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on warfare and security of roles and nations.</td>
<td>With the participation of air staff college students from 22 countries and 1 organization, the 17th seminar was held in October 2017. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Air Power and Multilateral Cooperation.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Air Command and Staff Seminar</td>
<td>Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with the participation of students of air staff college students from the Asia-Pacific region. This program is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on officer’s education. (From 1996 to 2014, this seminar was held as International Air Force Education Seminar.)</td>
<td>Air staff college personnel and researchers from seven countries were invited in November 2017 to provide keynote speeches and presentations and to exchange their views on the theme of “Initiatives on the Gray Zone issues.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Seminar on Defense Science</td>
<td>Hosted by the National Defense Academy since 1996, this seminar provides opportunities to discuss international affairs and security by inviting military academy representatives from the Asia-Pacific regions.</td>
<td>The 21st International Seminar on Defense Science was held in July 2016, inviting 10 countries. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Commitment to national cybersecurity by military academy and services in education and research.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Cadets’ Conference</td>
<td>Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this conference has been held annually since 1998 with the participation of cadets from the Asia-Pacific region. The conference is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on militaries in the 21st century.</td>
<td>In February 2018, 20 countries were invited to the 21st conference, and opinions were exchanged on the theme of “To Become Ideal Leaders.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Symposium on Security Affairs</td>
<td>Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this symposium has been held annually since 1996 with researchers and experts participating. The symposium is designed to provide opportunities to hold debates and offer reports on security in the public for the purpose of promoting public understanding of current security issues.</td>
<td>In July 2017, notable researchers and practitioners from the United States, China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Japan were invited to this symposium to exchange opinions under the theme “Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-Pacific.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Security Colloquium</td>
<td>Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this seminar has been held annually since 1999 with officials at home and abroad knowledgeable about defense being invited. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities for advanced and professional reports and discussions on security issues.</td>
<td>In July 2017, researchers and practitioners from the United States, China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Japan were invited to this seminar to exchange opinions under the theme “Maintaining Maritime Order in the Asia-Pacific.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Forum on War History</td>
<td>Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with participation by military historians. The forum is designed to deepen the mutual understanding of its participants by making concrete comparisons of military history.</td>
<td>In September 2017, researchers from the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Japan were invited to this forum to exchange opinions under the theme “Historical Analysis of Unconventional Wars.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Security Workshop</td>
<td>Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this workshop-style group session has been held annually since 2010 to discuss emerging security trends in the Asia-Pacific region in common.</td>
<td>In January 2018, researchers were invited from Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, China and the United States to exchange opinions on the theme of “Security outside of the Asia-Pacific Region and its implications for the defense sector.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Multilateral Security Dialogue</td>
<td>Overview</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ADMM Plus: Asean Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus</strong></td>
<td>Started in October 2010. This is the only defense ministerial meeting in the Asia-Pacific region hosted by governments, and provides opportunities for exchanging views on issues concerning regional security. It was decided in the 4th ADMM Plus held in October 2017 that this meeting will take place annually instead of biennially.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Japan-Asean Defence Ministerial Meeting</strong></td>
<td>First held in 2014. A platform for defense ministers of all of the Asean nations and Japan to discuss a wide spectrum of security related issues, and to exchange views on concrete action plans to develop future Japan-Asean defense cooperation.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ARF: Asean Regional Forum</strong></td>
<td>A forum that started in 1994, designed to improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific through political and security dialogue and cooperation. Currently 26 countries (10 Asean nations; Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia (since 1995), Myanmar (since 1996), Japan, Australia, Canada, China, India (since 1996), New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the ROK, Russia, the U.S., Mongolia (since 1996), North Korea (since 2003), Pakistan (since 2004), Turkmistan (since 2005), Bangladesh (since 2006), Sri Lanka (since 2007), and 1 organization (EU) are members of the forum. Authorities in charge of diplomacy and defense meet through various government-to-government meetings to discuss the current regional situation and security area.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Asia-Pacim Airpower Symposium</strong></td>
<td>This symposium is held every year and hosted by the U.S. and other participating countries on a rotational basis (it was held twice in 1996 and 1997). It is a platform for the Chiefs of Air Operations in the Pacific Rim to exchange their opinions. Japan has participated in the conference six times since 2000.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GSDF</strong></td>
<td>PACI is a conference hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every other year when PMWS is held. Army chiefs of Asean-Pacific countries and others meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1996. The conference was held in Japan for the first time in 2009.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PACIC Management Seminars (PAMS)</strong></td>
<td>PMWS is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about efficient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Asia-Pacific region can develop their ground troops. The GSDF has participated in PMWS since the 17th meeting in 1993. The 33rd seminar was held in Japan in 2009 at the same time as PACI.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Land Forces Pacific (LANPAC)</strong></td>
<td>LANPAC is a symposium hosted by AUSA, the first event of which was held in April 2013. The GSDF Chief of Staff was officially invited to the second meeting held in 2013 as a guest speaker and he gave a speech on the theme of the &quot;Current situation and the future of Japan-U.S. cooperation&quot; which gathered support from the U.S. Army Pacific Commander and other participants from different countries.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chief of Army’s Exercise (CAEX)</strong></td>
<td>CAEX is an exercise hosted by the Australian Army every other year. Senior officers of the Australian Army as well as the heads of land forces in the Asia-Pacific region and experts attend and exchange a wide range of views on the issues facing the land forces in the region. The GSDF participated in CAEX for the first time in 2012. In September 2014, the GSDF Chief of Staff attended for the first time and delivered an address.</td>
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<tr>
<td>** PACOM Amphibious Leaders Symposium (PALS)**</td>
<td>Held for the first time in May 2015, hosted by the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific from the perspective of contributing to the amphibious operations capacities of friendly countries in the Asia-Pacific region and to contribute to regional stability through strengthening relations with the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and enhancing interoperability. It has been held annually since then. Japan has participated from the first meeting.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Annual Meeting of the Association of U.S. Army (AUSA)</strong></td>
<td>Hosted by AUSA, the annual meeting provides opportunities for exchanging opinions among the General-class officers from the U.S. Army, and since 2014 the Chief of the Staff of the GSDF participated in the meeting twice to deliver speeches.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>International Sea Power Symposium (ISS)</strong></td>
<td>ISS is a symposium hosted by the United States every other year. Navy Chief of Staff of member countries and others meet to exchange views on common issues for their navies. Japan has participated in the symposium since the first meeting in 1969.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNs)</strong></td>
<td>WPNS is a symposium hosted by a member country on a rotational basis every other year when ISS is not held. Senior navy officials and others of Western Pacific countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>International MCM Seminar</strong></td>
<td>This seminar is hosted by a WPNS member country on a rotation basis every year to exchange views on issues concerning around submarine rescue. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2001. The GSDF hosted the conference in October 2006.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Asia Pacific Submarine Conference</strong></td>
<td>This conference is being held every two years hosted by a different participating country on a rotational basis. It is a platform for the Navy Chief of Staff from the Indian Ocean coastal countries to exchange their opinions concerning the maritime security of the Indian Ocean. Japan has participated since the third event in 2012.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Indian Ocean Naval Symposium</strong></td>
<td>This symposium is being held every two years hosted by a different participating country on a rotational basis. It is a platform for the Navy Chief of Staff from the Indian Ocean coastal countries to exchange their opinions concerning the maritime security of the Indian Ocean. Japan has participated since the third event in 2012.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SIPC: RNW Sea Power Conference</strong></td>
<td>Held biennially as part of the Pacific International Maritime Exposition. As many navies send their Chief of Staff or Admirals to this conference, the conference serves as a platform for bilateral and multilateral exchange.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>RNS: Regional Seapower Symposium</strong></td>
<td>Biennially hosted by the Italian Navy. Mostly attended by Chief of Staff of Navy from NATO nations who gather to exchange views on common naval challenges. Japan has participated since the 7th symposium in 2008.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IMSS: International Maritime Security Symposium</strong></td>
<td>Hosted by the Indonesian Navy every other year. Chief of Staff of Navy from mostly Western Pacific nations exchange opinions on maritime security issues. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2008.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Galle Dialogue</strong></td>
<td>Hosted by the Sri Lankan Navy annually. Chief of Staff of Navy from nations around the Indian Ocean exchange views on maritime security challenges. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2010.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASDF</strong></td>
<td>PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States every other year with senior air force officials and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1989.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PACIM Airpower Symposium</strong></td>
<td>This symposium is held every year and hosted by the U.S. and other participating countries on a rotational basis (it was held twice in 1996 and 1997). It is a platform for the Chiefs of Air Operations in the Pacific Rim to exchange their opinions. Japan has participated in this symposium since the first event held in 1995.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Air Power Conference (APC)</strong></td>
<td>APC is a conference hosted by Australia every other year to exchange international views on air power. Japan has participated in this conference six times since 2000.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reference 45 Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN

Introduction
- “Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN” is Japan’s own initiative for the future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation
- Annually follow up the implementation of the specific and practical activities listed in the Vientiane Vision through the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum starting from 2017

Contents

1. Background of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation
   (1) The Asia-Pacific region faces increasingly serious challenges for the security, which makes more difficult for any single country to respond alone
   (2) ASEAN is a hub for the regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region with an increasing importance. Japan and ASEAN have traditionally maintained strong ties; further enhancement of bilateral/multilateral cooperation is crucial in ensuring a stable regional security environment
   (3) Japan welcomes the establishment of ASEAN Community at the end of 2015 and supports its centrality and unity. Since the establishment, ASEAN-Wide multilateral cooperation has become even more important, in addition to bilateral cooperation with its individual member states

2. Evolution of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation: deepening “exchanges” toward “cooperation”
   (1) Starting defense exchanges from 1990s: enhancing mutual understanding and confidence through defense exchanges
   (2) Developing defense cooperation from 2000s: more practical/ operational defense cooperation with ASEAN member states
   (3) Deepening defense cooperation from 2010s: starting new projects such as capacity building cooperation with further specific and practical activities and promoting multilateral cooperation through regional frameworks such as ADMM-Plus

3. Future Direction of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation: Toward the “ASEAN-Wide” Practical Cooperation
   (1) Purpose: In cooperation with “Individual ASEAN Member States,” “ASEAN-Wide” cooperation will be expanded through promoting practical cooperation with a view to 1. respecting and promoting shared principles such as freedom, democracy and basic human rights, 2. promoting and enhancing the rule of law, 3. supporting ASEAN efforts to strengthen its centrality and unity which is a cornerstone of regional cooperation
   (2) Direction: In order to contribute to regional peace, security and prosperity, future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation will be focused on the following three points
      - To consolidate the order based on the principles of international law governing peaceful conduct among states, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to uphold principles of international law, especially in the field of maritime and air space
      - To promote maritime security which is a foundation for the regional peace and prosperity, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to build up capabilities for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Search and Rescue (SAR) at sea and air space
      - To cope with increasingly diversifying and complex security issues, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to build up capabilities in various fields
   (3) Measures: Conducting practical defense cooperation by effectively combining the following diverse measures
      1) Promotion of International Law (PIL): sharing understanding and experience regarding international law, especially in the field of maritime security, through i.e. conducting researches and sponsoring seminars, etc., with a view to its effective implementation.
      2) Capacity Building Cooperation (CBC): conducting CBC in various fields such as HA/DR, PKO, landmine and UXO clearance, cybersecurity, defense buildup planning (sharing know-how), etc.
      3) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation (DETC): transferring equipment and technology, developing human resources regarding DETC, holding seminars on defense industries, etc.
      4) Joint Training and Exercises (JTE): continued participation in multilateral joint training and exercises, inviting ASEAN observers to Self-Defense Forces’ training, etc.
      5) Human Resource Development and Academic Exchange (HRD/AE): Inviting Opinion Leaders from ASEAN, etc.
   (4) The JMOD institutional development to better address “ASEAN-Wide” practical cooperation based on the Vientiane Vision
Reference 46  Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise</th>
<th>Period (Venue)</th>
<th>Participating countries</th>
<th>Participating SDF units, etc.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keris Aman</td>
<td>August 2015 (Malaysia)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, China, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Laos, etc.</td>
<td>Approximately 60 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanti Prays III</td>
<td>March – April 2017 (Malaysia)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, ROK, Nepal, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Australia, etc.</td>
<td>Central Readiness Force 2 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Training (Khaan Quest)</td>
<td>June – July 2015 (Mongolia)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., etc.</td>
<td>Approximately 40 personnel</td>
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<td></td>
<td>May – June 2016 (Mongolia)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., etc.</td>
<td>Approximately 50 personnel including observers</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July - August 2017 (Mongolia)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., etc.</td>
<td>Approximately 50 personnel including observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Army–Hosted Shooting Convention</td>
<td>May 2015 (Australia)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Indonesia, Singapore, ROK, Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Canada</td>
<td>Approximately 30 personnel</td>
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<td></td>
<td>April - May 2016 (Australia)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., ROK, China, Australia, UAE, etc.</td>
<td>Approximately 30 personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April - May 2017 (Australia)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., ROK, Australia, UAE, etc.</td>
<td>Approximately 20 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOMODO Multilateral Joint Naval Exercise organized by the Indonesian Navy</td>
<td>April 2016 (Indonesia)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Indonesia, China, Russia, etc.</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training</td>
<td>December 2015 (Waters around Micronesia)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Australia</td>
<td>1 aircraft / Approximately 25 personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January – February 2016 (Waters around Singapore - India)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Australia</td>
<td>1 aircraft / Approximately 25 personnel</td>
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<td></td>
<td>December 2016 (Waters around Micronesia)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Australia</td>
<td>1 aircraft / Approximately 25 personnel</td>
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<td></td>
<td>September 2017 (Waters around Japan)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Australia</td>
<td>4 vessels / 4 submarines / 30 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December 2017 (Waters around Micronesia)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., ROK</td>
<td>1 aircraft / approximately 25 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Training</td>
<td>June 2016 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Australia</td>
<td>1 aircraft / Approximately 25 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>October 2016 (Waters west of Kyushu)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Australia</td>
<td>1 aircraft / Approximately 25 personnel</td>
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<td>November 2016 (Waters around Japan)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Australia</td>
<td>1 aircraft / Approximately 25 personnel</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>January 2017 (Waters around Japan)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., ROK</td>
<td>1 aircraft / Approximately 25 personnel</td>
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<td>March 2017 (Waters around Japan)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Australia</td>
<td>1 aircraft / Approximately 25 personnel</td>
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<td></td>
<td>April 2017 (Waters west of Kyushu)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Australia</td>
<td>1 aircraft / Approximately 25 personnel</td>
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<td>October 2017 (Waters around Japan)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., ROK</td>
<td>1 aircraft / Approximately 25 personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December 2017 (Waters around Japan)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., ROK</td>
<td>1 aircraft / Approximately 25 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise</td>
<td>Period (Venue)</td>
<td>Participating countries</td>
<td>Participating SDF units, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-Canada Trilateral Training</td>
<td>March 2016 (Waters off the Sanriku Coast)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Canada</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK-Canada Joint Training</td>
<td>September 2016 (Waters around Hawaii)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June 2017 (South China Sea)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-Canada-Singapore Trilateral Training</td>
<td>June 2017 (Waters south of Shikoku)</td>
<td>Japan, Canada, New Zealand</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. and India-Hosted Maritime Joint Exercise (Exercise Malabar)</td>
<td>September – November 2015 (Waters and airspace east of India)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., India</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June 2016 (Waters east of Sasebo - Okinawa)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., India</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June 2017 (Waters and airspace east of India)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., India</td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-India Joint Exercise (Malabar)</td>
<td>November 2017 (Waters around Japan)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., India</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December 2017 (Waters around Japan)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., India</td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 2018 (Waters around Japan)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., India</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Exercise (Kakadu)</td>
<td>September 2016 (Waters around Australia)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Australia, etc.</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia-Hosted Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise</td>
<td>September 2016 (Australia and waters and airspace around Australia)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Australia, etc.</td>
<td>1 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Approximately 20 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-Hosted International Mine Countermeasures Exercise</td>
<td>September 2017 (Waters around the Arabian Peninsula)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., etc.</td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-Hosted International Maritime Exercise</td>
<td>May 2017 (Bahrain)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., etc.</td>
<td>Several personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise</td>
<td>August 2015 (Waters around Singapore and Indonesia)</td>
<td>Japan, Indonesia, Singapore, etc.</td>
<td>3 vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 2016 (Waters around ROK)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise</td>
<td>June 2017 (Waters around Guam)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., etc.</td>
<td>5 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training (Cope North Guam)</td>
<td>February 2016 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Australia</td>
<td>Approximately 20 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February 2017 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Australia</td>
<td>Approximately 20 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February - March 2018 (Guam and its surrounding airspace)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Australia</td>
<td>Approximately 20 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Training with U.S. and Australian Forces in Australia (Exercise Southern Jackaroo)</td>
<td>May 2015, May 2016, May 2017 (Australia)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Australia</td>
<td>Approximately 100 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Northern Rescue 2015)</td>
<td>August 2015 (Hokkaido)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Australia</td>
<td>Northern Army Headquarters, Approximately 3,300 personnel, approximately 300 vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Nankai Rescue 2017)</td>
<td>July 2016 (Central District)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Australia</td>
<td>Middle Army, 5,500 personnel, approximately 700 vehicles, 10 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Joint Exercise)</td>
<td>June – August 2016 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii, and waters around U.S. West Coast)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, ROK, China, Philippines, Malaysia, Australia, Columbia, Chile, etc.</td>
<td>2 vessels, 2 aircraft, Western Army, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand Navy-Hosted Multilateral Training (Ngatlah)</td>
<td>November 2016 (Waters and airspace around New Zealand)</td>
<td>Japan, New Zealand, etc.</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Training hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Croix du Sud)</td>
<td>November 2016 (New Caledonia)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., Singapore, Australia, Tonga, New Zealand, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Canada, Chile, U.K., France</td>
<td>5 personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-France-U.S. Joint Training</td>
<td>May 2015 (Waters west of Kyushu)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., France</td>
<td>1 vessel, 2 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 2017 (Waters west of Kyushu – Guam – Northern Marianas Islands)</td>
<td>Japan, France, U.K., U.S.</td>
<td>220 personnel, 1 vessel, 2 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Training (Aman-17)</td>
<td>February 2017 (Surrounding airspace of Pakistan)</td>
<td>Japan, Pakistan, etc.</td>
<td>2 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysian Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Exercise</td>
<td>March 2017 (Waters around Malaysia)</td>
<td>Japan, Malaysia, U.S., etc.</td>
<td>1 vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Counter-Piracy Joint Training</td>
<td>April 2017 (Gulf of Aden)</td>
<td>Japan, U.S., U.K., ROK</td>
<td>1 vessel, 1 aircraft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (Past Three Years)**  

### High-level talks between heads of state and defense

- **May 2015**  
  Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
  - Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation

- **Jun. 2015**  
  Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
  - Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation

- **Nov. 2015**  
  Visit to Australia by Minister of Defense (6th “2+2” Meeting)
  - Confirmed the importance of joint exercises and further deepening defense equipment and technology cooperation

- **Nov. 2015**  
  Visit to Australia by Prime Minister of Japan (Summit Meeting)
  - 1) Shared grave concern over large-scale land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, and agreed to comply with freedom of navigation and of overflight, 2) Agreed to further enhance joint exercises and promote cooperation in the fields of capacity building assistance, cyber, and outer space

### Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives

- **Oct. 2015**  
  Participation in Japan-Australia Trident exercise 2015

- **Mar. – May 2016**  
  Participation in Japan-U.S.-Australia joint cruising exercise

- **May 2016**  
  Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Army

- **Sep. 2016**  
  Participation in multinational joint exercise Kakadu 2016 hosted by the Australian Navy

- **Dec. 2016**  
  Visit to Chitose Air Base by Australian Air Force aircraft (government plane: B-737) and implementation of exchanges between special airlift troops

- **Feb. 2017**  
  Dispatch of C-2 to Australia (overseas flight training) and implementation of exchanges between troops

### Unit-level exchange, etc.

- **Feb. 2017**  
  Dispatch of C-2 to Australia (overseas flight training) and implementation of exchanges between troops

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See reference 46 for trilateral training and exercise

- **May 2015**  
  Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))

- **Jun. 2015**  
  Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)

- **Jun. 2015**  
  3rd Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Townsville) (GSDF Chief of Staff)

- **Feb. 2016**  
  Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)

- **Oct. 2016**  
  Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)

- **Jun. 2017**  
  Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)

- **Jun. 2017**  
  Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))

- **May 2018**  
  Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)
Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the ROK (Past Three Years)

### High-level talks between heads of state and defense

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2015</td>
<td>Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2015</td>
<td>Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (ROK (Seoul Defense Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2015</td>
<td>Visited the ROK by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2015</td>
<td>Issued first joint press release. Agreed on the importance of Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation regarding issues of concern for the security of the two countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The two ministers agreed to strengthen the system for emergency communication between the MOD and the ROK Ministry of National Defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2016</td>
<td>Visited to the ROK by MSDF Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2016</td>
<td>Visited to Japan by ROK Army Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (ROK (Seoul Defense Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2018</td>
<td>Visited to Japan by Chief of ROK Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2018</td>
<td>Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2015</td>
<td>10th Japan-ROK Security Dialogue (Seoul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 2015</td>
<td>21st Japan-ROK Working-level Defense Dialogue (Seoul)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Unit-level exchange, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2015</td>
<td>Japan-ROK joint search and rescue exercise (MSDF), participation of ROK naval vessels in Fleet Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2015</td>
<td>Participation of the ROK Navy Band in Japan Self-Defense Force Marching Festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2016</td>
<td>Participation of MSDF vessels in Pacific Reach (MSDF) hosted by the ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2016</td>
<td>Visited to the ROK by Western Army Commanding General (GSDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to the ROK by Sasebo District Commandant (MSDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Atsugi Air Base by ROK Navy P-3C (MSDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Commander of the 2nd Operations Command of the ROK (GSDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2017</td>
<td>Port visit to Pyeongtaek by MSDF Training Squadron (MSDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2017</td>
<td>Port visit to Japan by the training squadron of the Korean navy, Japan-ROK joint search and rescue training (Yokosuka) (MSDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to base in Pohang by MSDF P-3C (MSDF)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Japan – U.S.–ROK trilateral Cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2015</td>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Washington, D.C.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff level Meeting (Washington, D.C.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (maritime interdiction exercise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (ballistic missile information sharing exercise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Seoul)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (ballistic missile information sharing exercise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (anti-submarine exercise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Tokyo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Video–Teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Meeting (Washington, D.C.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2018</td>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Reference 49 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (Past Three Years)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2015</td>
<td>Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to India by Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to India by Prime Minister of Japan (Summit Meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to India by MSDF Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to India by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) (Delhi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to India by ASDF Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to India by GDSE Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of India (Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Indian Defense Minister (Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to India by Chief of Staff (to participated in the Raisina Dialogue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to India by Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**High-level talks between heads of state and defense**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2015</td>
<td>Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to India by Prime Minister of Japan (Summit Meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to India by MSDF Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to India by GDSE Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of India (Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Indian Defense Minister (Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to India by Chief of Staff (to participated in the Raisina Dialogue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to India by Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2015</td>
<td>3rd Vice-Minister/Secretary level “2+2” dialogue, 4th Defence Policy Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2016</td>
<td>1st Japan-India Air Component Staff Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2017</td>
<td>4th Vice-Minister/Secretary level “2+2” dialogue, 5th Defence Policy Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2018</td>
<td>7th Japan-India Navy Staff Talks (Delhi)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Unit-level exchange, etc.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2015</td>
<td>Expert-to-expert exchanges in aviation safety (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2016</td>
<td>MSDF Participation in International Fleet Review hosted by the Indian Navy (in waters east of India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2016</td>
<td>Unit-to-unit exchanges between U-4 transport aircraft crews (in India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2016</td>
<td>Unit-to-unit exchanges involving Indian Air Force transport aircraft crews in ASDF bases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2016</td>
<td>ASDF KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft dispatched to India.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-India goodwill exercise (MSDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-India goodwill exercise (MSDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2017</td>
<td>Unit-to-unit exchanges in the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief area (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-India goodwill exercise (MSDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-India goodwill and joint exercise (MSDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2017</td>
<td>Unit-to-unit exchanges in the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief area with Indian Air Force helicopter units (India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2018</td>
<td>Japan-India joint exercise (MSDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Japan-India joint exercise (MSDF)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Reference 50 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>Japan-China Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2015</td>
<td>Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-China Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**High-level talks between heads of defense**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>Japan-China Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2015</td>
<td>Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>2nd Japan-China defense director-general-level consultations (Tokyo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2015</td>
<td>5th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China's defense authorities (Beijing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2016</td>
<td>14th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Foreign Affairs and Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting) (Beijing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2016</td>
<td>6th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China's defense authorities (Tokyo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2018</td>
<td>7th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China's defense authorities (Beijing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Unit-level exchange, etc.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Reference 51 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>Japan-Russia Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Russia (2nd Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff, Russian Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Chief of Joint Staff, Russian Military</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**High-level talks between heads of defense**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>Japan-Russia Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Russia (2nd Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff, Russian Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Chief of Joint Staff, Russian Military</td>
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**Unit-level exchange, etc.**

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<tr>
<td>Jan. 2017</td>
<td>16th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 2017</td>
<td>Port visit to Vladivostok by MSDF Training Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 2017</td>
<td>17th Japan-Russia joint search and rescue training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>May 2015: Visit to Indonesia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs</td>
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<td>Aug. 2015: Visit to Indonesia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs</td>
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<td>Sep. 2015: Visit to Indonesia by GSDF Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>Sep. 2015: Visit to Japan by Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense of Indonesia</td>
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<td>Dec. 2015: Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Indonesia (1st Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
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<td>Dec. 2015: Visit to Japan by Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>Apr. 2016: Visit to Indonesia by MSDF Chief of Staff</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Aug. 2016: Visit to Indonesia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep. 2016: Visit to Japan by Vice Defense Minister of Indonesia (Sendai (9th Japan–ASEAN Vice-Ministerial Meeting))</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct. 2016: Visit to Japan by Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff (AFFJ)</td>
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<td>Nov. 2016: Visit to Indonesia by Chief of Joint Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>May 2015: Visit to Vietnam by ASDF Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>Sep. 2015: Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence</td>
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<td>Oct. 2015: Visit to Japan by Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People’s Army</td>
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<td>Nov. 2015: Visit to Vietnam by Minister of Defense (Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jul. 2016: Visit to Vietnam by Chief of Joint Staff (Pacific Partnership)</td>
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<td>Aug. 2016: Visit to Vietnam by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs</td>
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<td>Jun. 2017: Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence</td>
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<td>Aug. 2017: Visit to Vietnam by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs</td>
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<td>Sep. 2017: Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence (Fukuoka (9th Japan–ASEAN Vice-Ministerial meeting))</td>
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<td>Jan. 2018: Visit to Vietnam by Chief of Joint Staff</td>
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<td>Apr. 2018: Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
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<td>Jun. 2018: Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
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<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>May 2015: Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 2015: Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
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<td>May 2015: Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
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<td>May 2015: Visit to Singapore by Chief of Joint Staff (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)</td>
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<td>Jul. 2015: Visit to Singapore by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs</td>
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<td>Feb. 2016: Visit to Singapore by ASDF Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>Jun. 2016: Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
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<td>Feb. 2018: Visit to Singapore by ASDF Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>May 2018: Visit to Japan by Singaporean Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
<td>May 2015: Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>May 2015: Japan-Philippines Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun. 2015: Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Army</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Jun. 2015: Visit to Japan by President and Philippine Secretary of National Defense</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Aug. 2015: Visit to the Philippines by Chief of Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep. 2015: Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sep. 2015: Visit to the Philippines by GSDF Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 2015: Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus))</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb. 2016: Concluded that the two countries would enhance capacity building assistance and deepen defense equipment and technology cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 2016: Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Teleconference</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep. 2016: Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense (Sendai (8th Japan–ASEAN Vice-Ministerial Meeting))</td>
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<td>Oct. 2016: Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine Air Force (AFF-J)</td>
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<td>Feb. 2017: Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Navy</td>
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<td>Mar. 2017: Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense</td>
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<td>Apr. 2017: Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs</td>
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<td>Sep. 2017: Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense (Sendai (9th Japan–ASEAN Vice-Ministerial Meeting))</td>
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<td>Mar. 2018: Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense</td>
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<td>Jun. 2018: Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>Jun. 2018: Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
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## Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Asia-Pacific Countries (Past Three Years)

### New Zealand

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to New Zealand by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to New Zealand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by New Zealand Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by New Zealand Air Force Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2015</td>
<td>Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to New Zealand by ASDF Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>Visit to New Zealand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to New Zealand by State Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by New Zealand Chief of Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by New Zealand Air Force Commander</td>
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### Mongolia

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Mongolia by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Chief of the General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Mongolia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs</td>
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<td>Jul. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Mongolia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Mongolia by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Mongolia Air Force Commander</td>
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### Timor-Leste

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### Sri Lanka

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Sri Lanka by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Sri Lanka by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Sri Lankan Minister of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Sri Lanka by Chief of Joint Staff</td>
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</tbody>
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### Maldives

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to the Maldives by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the Republic of Fiji Military Force</td>
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### Fiji

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force</td>
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### Papua New Guinea

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sep. 2015</td>
<td>9th Japan-New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Tokyo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb. 2017</td>
<td>10th Japan-New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Wellington)</td>
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###uguay

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jan. 2016</td>
<td>4th Japan-Mongolia Consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and security authorities (Tokyo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 2017</td>
<td>4th Japan-Mongolia Consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and security authorities (Ulanbaatar)</td>
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</table>

### Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 2016</td>
<td>8th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Islamabad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2018</td>
<td>9th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### New Zealand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2015</td>
<td>PSI Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Komaki Air Base by New Zealand Air Force aircraft (C-130H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2016</td>
<td>Participation in international naval review hosted by New Zealand Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2016</td>
<td>Multilateral joint exercise hosted by New Zealand Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2017</td>
<td>Dispatch of ASDF’s KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-New Zealand goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2017</td>
<td>Dispatch of C-2 aircraft to New Zealand (overseas flight training) and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sri Lanka

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2015</td>
<td>Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2015</td>
<td>Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2016</td>
<td>Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-Pakistan bilateral exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-Pakistan goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>Visit to ASDF units, etc. by Pakistan Air Force (Ichigaya, Hamamatsu)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Maldives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2015</td>
<td>Japan-Maldives goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**United Kingdom**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to the U.K. by First Sea Lord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Chief of Join Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to U.K. by Chief of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to the UK by Chief of Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to the U.K. by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Visit to the U.K. by Minister of Armed Forces (4th Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by State Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to France by State Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to France by GSDF Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Visit to France by Chief of Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to France by MSDF Chief of Staff</td>
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</table>

**Germany**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to France by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to France by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Germany by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Germany by Chief of Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Germany by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs (1st Japan-Germany Vice-Ministerial Strategic Dialogue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2017</td>
<td>Signed an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-Germany Defense Minister Teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Germany by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Berlin International Aerospace Show)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Germany by MSDF Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2018</td>
<td>Japan-Germany Defense Minister Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Italy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by U.K. Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>Signed Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2017</td>
<td>Signed a document of exchange between National Institute of Defense Studies and Italian defense research and education organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2018</td>
<td>Signed a memorandum for defense exchange between Japan and Kazakhstan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Netherlands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Netherlands Chief of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Netherlands (Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Spain**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Spain (Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Belgium**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Belgium by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Belgium by Chief of Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Sweden by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Sweden by Chief of Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Sweden by State Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sweden**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Finland by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Finland Air Force Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Finland by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial meeting)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Finland**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Chief of the Navy of Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Estonia by State Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Estonia by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Norway**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Georgia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 2018</td>
<td>Signed memorandum for defense exchange between Japan and Kazakhstan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Estonia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Estonia by State Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Estonia by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bulgaria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Bulgaria by State Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Latvia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Latvia by State Secretary of Defence of Latvia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Poland**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Under-Secretary of State for Defence of Poland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Georgia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 2015</td>
<td>Signed memorandum for defense exchange between Japan and Kazakhstan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Kazakhstan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Kazakhstan by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### High-level Exchanges between Heads of State and Defense

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Dec. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Minister of Defense of Czech Republic (Japan-Czech Republic Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Czech Republic by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Signed memorandum for defense cooperation between Japan and Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Jun. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Chairman of the NATO Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to NATO by Minister of Defense (talks with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Secretary General of NATO (talks with Defense Minister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to NATO by Chief of Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Sep. 2015</td>
<td>14th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct. 2016</td>
<td>15th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 2017</td>
<td>16th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Sep. 2015</td>
<td>18th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul. 2016</td>
<td>19th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 2017</td>
<td>20th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Jun. 2016</td>
<td>Jun. 2016 15th Japan-Germany Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Dec. 2015</td>
<td>3rd Japan-Italy Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep. 2017</td>
<td>4th Japan-Italy Consultation between defense authorities (Rome)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Oct. 2016</td>
<td>1st Japan-Spain Consultation between defense authorities (Madrid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul. 2017</td>
<td>2nd Japan-Spain Consultation between defense authorities (Madrid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Oct. 2015</td>
<td>3rd Japan-Sweden Consultation between defense authorities (Stockholm)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct. 2017</td>
<td>4th Japan-Sweden Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Oct. 2015</td>
<td>1st Japan-Finland Consultation between defense authorities (Helsinki)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep. 2017</td>
<td>2nd Japan-Finland Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Mar. 2016</td>
<td>2nd Japan-Poland Consultation between defense authorities (Warsaw)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Oct. 2015</td>
<td>3rd Japan-Norway Consultation between defense authorities (Oslo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Feb. 2016</td>
<td>14th Japan-NATO High-Level Consultation (Tokyo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Oct. 2016</td>
<td>1st Japan-EU Consultation on Security and Defense (Belgium)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Unit-Level Exchanges between Defense Ministry Representatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Jul. 2015</td>
<td>Dispatch of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to the U.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apr. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-U.K. goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul. 2016</td>
<td>Dispatch of ASDF’s KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to the U.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct.-Nov. 2016</td>
<td>Port call in London by MSDF training squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul. 2017</td>
<td>Dispatch of ASDF KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to the U.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apr. 2018</td>
<td>Implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>Japan-France goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct. 2015</td>
<td>Japan-France goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-France goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun. 2017</td>
<td>Dispatch of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to France (participation in International Paris Air Show)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb. 2018</td>
<td>Japan-France joint exercise (VINEX18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Apr. 2018</td>
<td>Dispatch of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to Germany (participation in Berlin International Aerospace Show)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Jan. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-EU bilateral exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 2016</td>
<td>Japan-EU bilateral exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-EU bilateral exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-EU bilateral exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-EU bilateral exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-EU bilateral exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-EU bilateral exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-EU bilateral exercise</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries (Past Three Years)

**Reference 55**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Visit Dates</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regular discussions between heads of defense and others</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td>Jan. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Canada by MSDF Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apr. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3rd Japan-Canada Foreign and Defense Vice-Ministerial Dialogue (2+2))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apr. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Canada by Joint Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Canada by State Minister of Defense (UN PKO Defense Ministerial Meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Commander, Royal Canadian Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief, Royal Canadian Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brazil</strong></td>
<td>Feb. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Brazil by GSDF Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apr. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Brazil by State Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Turkey by Chief of Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Turkey by GSDF Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Turkey by MSDF Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jordan</strong></td>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Jordan by Chief of Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UAE</strong></td>
<td>May 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by UAE Air Force Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to UAE by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Dubai Air and Space Show)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apr. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by UAE Minister of State for Defence Affairs (Bowardi) (signing ceremony for memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation and exchange, Vice-Ministerial Meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bahrain</strong></td>
<td>Dec. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Manama dialogue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Manama Dialogue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun. 2018</td>
<td>Visit to Bahrain by MSDF Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
<td>May 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Uganda, Djibouti, South Sudan, and Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 2015</td>
<td>Visit to Egypt by Chief of Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Djibouti by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oct. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to South Sudan by Minister of Defense (Defense ministerial meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 2016</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Deputy Chief of Staff (equivalent to commander of Army) of Djibouti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to South Sudan and Bahrain by State Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Qatar by Chief of Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Oman by Chief of Joint Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Djibouti and Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Commander of the Chief of the Army of Chili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Ukraine by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sep. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Djibouti and Egypt by State Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 2017</td>
<td>Visit to Austria, Serbia Montenegro by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td>Apr. 2016</td>
<td>3rd Japan-Canada Vice-Ministerial meeting (2+2) (Tokyo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 2016</td>
<td>9th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities (Tokyo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 2017</td>
<td>10th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities (Ottawa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>Nov. 2017</td>
<td>3rd Japan-Turkey Consultation between defense authorities (Ankara)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jordan</strong></td>
<td>Nov. 2017</td>
<td>2nd Japan-Jordan Consultation between defense authorities (Amman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saudi Arabia</strong></td>
<td>Jun. 2015</td>
<td>1st Japan-Saudi Arabia Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 2016</td>
<td>1st Japan-Saudi Arabia Security Dialogue (Riyadh), 2nd Japan-Saudi Arabia Consultation between defense authorities (Jeddah)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Egypt</strong></td>
<td>Oct. 2015</td>
<td>1st Japan-Egypt Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities (Tyana)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kuwait</strong></td>
<td>Mar. 2016</td>
<td>1st Japan-Kuwait Security Dialogue (Tokyo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UAE</strong></td>
<td>Dec. 2015</td>
<td>1st Japan-UAE Security Dialogue (Abu Dhabi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 2017</td>
<td>1st Japan-UAE Consultation between defense authorities (Abu Dhabi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qatar</strong></td>
<td>Nov. 2015</td>
<td>2nd Japan-Qatar Security Dialogue (Doha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bahrain</strong></td>
<td>Dec. 2015</td>
<td>2nd Japan-Bahrain Security Dialogue (Manama)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td>Jul. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-Canada unit-to-unit exchange (Komaki) (ASDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-Canada bilateral exercise “KADEX” (MSDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-Canada unit-to-unit exchange “Komox” (ASDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-Canada bilateral exercise “KADEX” (MSDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>Jun. 2015</td>
<td>Japan-Turkey goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 2015</td>
<td>Japan-Turkey bilateral exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun. 2016</td>
<td>Japan-Turkey bilateral exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saudi Arabia</strong></td>
<td>Apr. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-Saudi Arabia goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UAE</strong></td>
<td>Jan. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-UAE unit-to-unit exchanges (Al Ain) (ASDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apr. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-UAE goodwill exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jul. 2017</td>
<td>Japan-UAE unit-to-unit exchange (Al Dhafra) (ASDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 2017</td>
<td>Dispatch of ASDF C-2 transport aircraft to UAE (overseas flight training and participation in Dubai International Air and Space Show)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oman</strong></td>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>Japan-Oman goodwill exercise (MSDF)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reference 56  Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community</td>
<td>Proactive contribution to U.N.-centered efforts towards international peace</td>
<td>Proactive contribution to the efforts by the international community to support and encourage the self-reliant efforts by the Iraqi people towards the prompt reconstruction of the State of Iraq</td>
<td>Proactive contribution to the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisions in the SDF Law</td>
<td></td>
<td>Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law</td>
<td>Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law</td>
<td>Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Activities</td>
<td>Cooperation and support activities</td>
<td>International peacekeeping activities</td>
<td>Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities</td>
<td>Replenishment support activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Search and rescue activities</td>
<td>Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security</td>
<td>Support activities for ensuring security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ship inspection operations</td>
<td>International humanitarian assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>International election monitoring activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Supplies cooperation for the abovementioned activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas of Operation</td>
<td>Territories of Japan</td>
<td>Areas excluding Japan (including the high seas)</td>
<td>Territories of Japan</td>
<td>Territories of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration (in such countries) is required)</td>
<td>(A ceasefire agreement between the parties of the dispute and an agreement by the receiving country are required)</td>
<td>Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration is required in such countries and in Iraq)</td>
<td>Territories of foreign countries (limited to the Indian Ocean States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High seas and the airspace above</td>
<td>High seas and the airspace above</td>
<td>High seas and the airspace above</td>
<td>High seas (limited to the Indian Ocean, etc.) and the airspace above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diet Approval</td>
<td>Prior approval required without exception</td>
<td>To be discussed in advance in the Diet</td>
<td>To be discussed in the Diet within 20 days from the day since the SDF initiates such measures</td>
<td>(Note 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diet Report</td>
<td>Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay</td>
<td>Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay</td>
<td>Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay</td>
<td>Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Limited to sites where combat is not taking place.
2. Limited to areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan’s activities are being implemented.
3. Operations shall be conducted in waters where the activities can be clearly distinguished from ship inspection operations carried out by foreign countries.
4. In cases where the Diet is in recess, etc., an approval shall be promptly requested in the Diet at the earliest session.
5. As prescribed by Law, (1) the category and nature of operations shall be limited to supply. (2) As the area of operations is prescribed, including foreign territories, it is not considered necessary to re-obtain the approval of the Diet. Therefore there are no provisions relating to Diet approval.

Reference 57  The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities

(1) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq  
(As of June 30, 2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDF</th>
<th>Place of Dispatch</th>
<th>Period of Dispatch</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Description of Principal Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Southeast Iraq, etc.</td>
<td>Jan. 2004 – Jun. 2006</td>
<td>Approx. 600</td>
<td>Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kuwait, etc.</td>
<td>Jun. – Sep. 2008</td>
<td>Approx. 100</td>
<td>Operations required for evacuation of vessels, equipment and others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Persian Gulf, etc.</td>
<td>Feb. 20 – Apr. 2004</td>
<td>Approx. 330</td>
<td>Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipment required for the GSDF’s activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Kuwait, etc.</td>
<td>Dec. 2003 – Feb. 2009</td>
<td>Approx. 210</td>
<td>Transportation of materials for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDF</th>
<th>Place of Dispatch</th>
<th>Period of Dispatch</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Description of Principal Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>U.S. Forces in Japan, etc.</td>
<td>Nov. 2001 – Nov. 2007</td>
<td>Approx. 320</td>
<td>Materials supplies for foreign vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Transportation of materials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDF</th>
<th>Place of Dispatch</th>
<th>Period of Dispatch</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Description of Principal Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(4) Anti-Piracy Operations (including dispatches as Maritime Security Operations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDF</th>
<th>Place of Dispatch</th>
<th>Period of Dispatch</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Description of Principal Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSDF (Maritime Force)</td>
<td>Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden</td>
<td>Mar. 2009 – Dec. 2016</td>
<td>Approx. 400</td>
<td>Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 2016 –</td>
<td>Approx. 200</td>
<td>Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF (Air Unit)</td>
<td>Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti</td>
<td>May 2009 – Feb. 2011</td>
<td>Approx. 100</td>
<td>Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden and tasks related to general affairs, accounting, public relations, health, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Feb. 2011 – Jun. 2012</td>
<td>Approx. 120</td>
<td>Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti</td>
<td>Jul. 2014 – Jul. 2015</td>
<td>Approx. 70</td>
<td>Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti</td>
<td>Jul. 2015 –</td>
<td>Approx. 60</td>
<td>Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF (Support Unit)</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Jul. 2014 –</td>
<td>Approx. 30</td>
<td>Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF (Combined Task Force 151 Command Unit)</td>
<td>Bahrain, etc.</td>
<td>Aug. 2014 –</td>
<td>Under 20</td>
<td>Communication and coordination with units of various countries participating in CTF151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
International Peace Cooperation Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Dispatch</th>
<th>Period of Dispatch</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Description of Principal Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PKO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceasefire monitors</td>
<td>Sep. 1992 – Sep. 1993</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>• Monitor custody of weapons collected and observation of ceasefire \n• Monitor observance of ceasefire at the border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer unit</td>
<td>Sep. 1992 – Sep. 1993</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>• Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure \n• Supply fuel and water to UNTAC components and other groups \n• Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PKO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters staff</td>
<td>May 1993 – Jan. 1995</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>• Draft mid-and long-term plans, plan and coordinate transport operations at UNUMOZ Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport coordination unit</td>
<td>May 1993 – Jan. 1995</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>• Support customs clearance work and provide other transport related technical coordination in the allocation of transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian aid</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Relief Operations for Rwandan Refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwandan refugee relief unit</td>
<td>Sep. – Dec. 1994</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>• Air transport of Rwandan refugee relief unit personnel and supplies between Nairobi (in Kenya) and Goma (in former Zaire and current Republic of the Congo) \n• Make use of spare capacity to airlift personnel and supplies of humanitarian international organizations engaged in refugee relief operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air transport unit</td>
<td>Sep. – Dec. 1994</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>• Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PKO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (Golan Heights)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters staff</td>
<td>Feb. 1996 – Feb. 2009</td>
<td>1st-3th personnel: 2</td>
<td>• Create PR and budgets for UNDOF operations, plan and coordinate transport, maintenance and other operations at UNDOF Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb. 2009 – Jan. 2013</td>
<td>14th-17th personnel: 3</td>
<td>• Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations at military headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport unit</td>
<td>Feb. 1996 – Aug. 2012</td>
<td>1st-33rd personnel: 43</td>
<td>• Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations at military headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug. 2012 – Jan. 2013</td>
<td>34th personnel: 44</td>
<td>• Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations at military headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian aid</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Relief Operations in Timor-Leste</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air transport unit</td>
<td>Nov. 1999 – Feb. 2000</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>• Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR \n• Make use of spare capacity for the air transportation of UNHCR related personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian aid</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Relief Operations for Afghan Refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air transport unit</td>
<td>Jan. 2001</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>• Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PKO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armies monitors</td>
<td>Mar. 2007 – Jan. 2011</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>• Monitor management of weapons of Maoist soldiers and those of the Nepalese government force \n• Public Welfare Support Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PKO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters staff</td>
<td>Oct. 2009 – Sep. 2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>• MINUSTAH headquarters carries out coordination of overall military logistics, which includes the prioritization of engineering activities such as coordinating facility-related duties, and procurement and transport of military items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PKO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer unit</td>
<td>Feb. 2010 – Jan. 2013</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>• MINUSTAH headquarters carries out coordination of overall military logistics, which includes the prioritization of engineering activities such as coordinating facility-related duties, and procurement and transport of military items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PKO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNITM)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military liaison officer</td>
<td>Sep. 2010 – Sep. 2012</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>• Intelligence gathering on the security situation across Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters staff</td>
<td>Nov. 2011 –</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>• Coordination within the UNMISS units regarding the demand of overall military logistics \n• Management of database \n• Planning and coordination of engineering duties \n• Planning and coordination of aircraft operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PKO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMIS)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Unit</td>
<td>Jan. 2012 – May 2017</td>
<td>1st rotation: 239</td>
<td>• Development of infrastructure such as roads (The following duties were added after 5th personnel) \n• Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities \n• Coordination regarding logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd – 4th rotation: 349</td>
<td>5th and 6th rotation: 401</td>
<td>• Development of infrastructure such as roads (The following duties were added after 5th personnel) \n• Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities \n• Coordination regarding logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7th – 10th rotation: 353</td>
<td>11th rotation: 354</td>
<td>• Development of infrastructure such as roads (The following duties were added after 5th personnel) \n• Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities \n• Coordination regarding logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local support coordination center</td>
<td>Jan. 2012 – Dec. 2013</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>• Development of infrastructure such as roads (The following duties were added after 5th personnel) \n• Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities \n• Coordination regarding logistics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and Timor-Leste) and the ASDF (in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan).
2. An advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part of the Rwandan refugee relief effort.
### International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Dispatch</th>
<th>Number of Personnel</th>
<th>Description of Principal Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **International disaster relief activities in Philippines (typhoon disaster)** | Nov. 12 – Dec. 13, 2013 1,086 | • Coordination with relevant Philippine organizations and others  
• Medical treatment, prevention of epidemics and air transportation of personnel and aid materials  
• Transportation of personnel and relief supplies, etc.  
• Air transportation of personnel and relief supplies, etc. |
| **International disaster relief activities for the missing Malaysian airplane (search)** | Mar. 11– Apr. 28, 2014 137 | • Coordination with relevant Malaysian organizations and relevant countries  
• Rescue operations including searching  
• Rescue operations including searching |
| **International disaster relief activities in response to Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa (infectious disease)** | Dec. 5 – 11, 2014 4 | • Coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JICA, UNMEER, and other relevant organizations engaged in international disaster relief activities  
• Transport activities |
| **International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (airplane accident)** | Apr. 27 – May 22, 2015 10 | • Support for WHO’s epidemiological study and other activities in Sierra Leone  
• Rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501, coordination with relevant organizations and countries |
| **International disaster relief activities in Nepal (earthquake disaster)** | Apr. 27 – May 22, 2015 3 | • Coordination with relevant organizations of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal and relevant countries  
• Medical treatment for affected people  
• Transport of equipment and supplies needed for medical treatment |
| **International disaster relief activities in New Zealand (earthquake disaster)** | Nov. 15 – 18, 2016 Approx. 30 | • Evaluation of damages by aircraft (one P-1 aircraft) |

### Reference 58
Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations

(As of June 30, 2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Dispatch</th>
<th>Position in the Dispatched Organization</th>
<th>Dispatched Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 11, 2005 – Jul. 11, 2009</td>
<td>Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Major)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 9, 2009 – Jan. 8, 2013</td>
<td>Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Major)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27, 2013 – Aug. 31, 2016</td>
<td>Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)</td>
<td>1 GSDF officer (Captain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 28, 2005 – Nov. 27, 2008</td>
<td>Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 18, 2013 – Sep. 17, 2016</td>
<td>Force Generation Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 1, 2015 – Nov. 30, 2017</td>
<td>Senior Military Liaison Officer, Africa I Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 29, 2016 –</td>
<td>Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 11, 2017 –</td>
<td>Strategic Support Service, Logistics Support Division, Department of Field Support, United Nations (New York)</td>
<td>1 administrative official</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The OPCW Inspectorate Division Director served in office until July 2009 after his retirement from the SDF on August 1, 2007.
## Dispatch of Instructors and Others to PKO Centers, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Dispatch</th>
<th>Position in the Dispatched Organization</th>
<th>Dispatched Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 21 – 30, 2008</td>
<td>Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)</td>
<td>2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 22 – June 6, 2009</td>
<td>Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Major General)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 28 – September 5, 2009</td>
<td>Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali)</td>
<td>2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 10 – 17, 2010</td>
<td>Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 14 – 30, 2010</td>
<td>Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 15 – 20, 2011</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 31 – August 5, 2012</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 15 – 19, 2012</td>
<td>Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)</td>
<td>1 ASDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 9 – 14, 2013</td>
<td>South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)</td>
<td>1 MSDF personnel (Captain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 28 – September 1, 2013</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 5 – 9, 2013</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)</td>
<td>1 MSDF personnel (Captain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 8 – 13, 2014</td>
<td>South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)</td>
<td>1 MSDF personnel (Captain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 23 – May 25, 2014</td>
<td>Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 12, 2014</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya) (dispatched to give lecture in South Sudan)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 5 – 9, 2014</td>
<td>International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)</td>
<td>1 MSDF personnel (Captain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 6 – 23, 2014</td>
<td>Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 19 – April 1, 2015</td>
<td>UN Peacekeeping Centre (India)</td>
<td>1 MSDF personnel (Captain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 4 – July 1, 2015</td>
<td>Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 5 – 20, 2015</td>
<td>South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)</td>
<td>1 MSDF personnel (Captain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 22 – November 7, 2015</td>
<td>Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 21 – April 1, 2016</td>
<td>UN Peacekeeping Centre (India)</td>
<td>1 MSDF personnel (Captain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 31 – June 17, 2016</td>
<td>Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 4 – 19, 2016</td>
<td>Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 6 – 19, 2017</td>
<td>Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2 – 18, 2017</td>
<td>Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1 – 15, 2017</td>
<td>Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: First dispatch of female SDF personnel.

### Reference 59 Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel

(As of March 31, 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>GSDF</th>
<th>MSDF</th>
<th>ASDF</th>
<th>Joint Staff etc.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>150,856</td>
<td>45,363</td>
<td>46,942</td>
<td>3,993</td>
<td>247,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>138,126</td>
<td>42,289</td>
<td>42,785</td>
<td>3,589</td>
<td>226,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing Rate (%)</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>91.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Officer Warrant Officer Enlisted (upper) Enlisted (lower)</th>
<th>Fixed-Term Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
<td>45,693</td>
<td>4,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>42,333</td>
<td>(2,196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing Rate (%)</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>93.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value.
2. The number of authorized personnel is determined based on the budget.

### Reference 60 Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Number Applied</th>
<th>Number Recruited</th>
<th>Competition Ratios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer candidates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>2,531 (370)</td>
<td>180 (12)</td>
<td>14.1 (30.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>1,322 (185)</td>
<td>83 (15)</td>
<td>15.9 (12.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>1,583 (327)</td>
<td>54 (11)</td>
<td>29.3 (29.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,436 (882)</td>
<td>317 (38)</td>
<td>17.1 (23.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-commissioned officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Petty Officer</td>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>81 (17)</td>
<td>15 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Sergeant</td>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation students</td>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>878 (92)</td>
<td>81 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>2,309 (227)</td>
<td>68 (5)</td>
<td>34.0 (45.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,187 (319)</td>
<td>149 (10)</td>
<td>21.4 (31.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classification</td>
<td>Number Applied</td>
<td>Number Recruited</td>
<td>Competition Ratios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-commissioned officer candidates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>16,837 ( 2,797 )</td>
<td>2,971 ( 201 )</td>
<td>5.7 ( 13.9 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>3,203 ( 484 )</td>
<td>1,300 ( 112 )</td>
<td>2.5 ( 4.3 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>9,111 ( 1,603 )</td>
<td>773 ( 202 )</td>
<td>11.8 ( 7.9 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29,151 ( 4,884 )</td>
<td>5,044 ( 515 )</td>
<td>5.8 ( 9.5 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uniformed SDF personnel candidates (Privates)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>17,768 ( 2,786 )</td>
<td>5,055 ( 897 )</td>
<td>3.5 ( 3.1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>4,386 ( 893 )</td>
<td>944 ( 173 )</td>
<td>4.6 ( 4.0 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>5,356 ( 934 )</td>
<td>1,514 ( 134 )</td>
<td>3.5 ( 7.0 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27,510 ( 4,413 )</td>
<td>7,513 ( 1,204 )</td>
<td>3.7 ( 3.7 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**National Defense Academy Students**

- **Recommended**
  - Humanity and social science: 154 ( 48 )
  - Science and engineering: 226 ( 25 )
  - Total: 380 ( 73 )

- **Selective exam**
  - Humanity and social science: 107 ( 20 )
  - Science and engineering: 140 ( 12 )
  - Total: 247 ( 32 )

- **General exam (first term)**
  - Humanity and social science: 6,555 ( 2,629 )
  - Science and engineering: 8,452 ( 1,672 )
  - Total: 15,007 ( 4,301 )

- **General exam (second term)**
  - Humanity and social science: 197 ( 48 )
  - Science and engineering: 468 ( 62 )
  - Total: 665 ( 110 )

**National Defense Medical College students**

- 6,622 ( 2,031 )
- Total: 85 ( 19 )
- 77.9 ( 106.9 )

**National Defense Medical College nursing students**

- 2,294 ( 1,823 )
- Total: 75 ( 68 )
- 30.6 ( 26.8 )

**GSDF High Technical School Students**

- Recommended: 142
- General exam: 2,318
- Total: 2,460

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses indicate numbers of females.
2. The numbers are for SDF regular personnel recruited in FY2017.

---

**Reference 61**  
**Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel, and Others**

(As of March 31, 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Service</th>
<th>Authorized Strength</th>
<th>Non-Authorized Strength</th>
<th>Regular Service</th>
<th>Authorized Strength</th>
<th>Non-Authorized Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SDF Personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Administrative Off.,</td>
<td>Part-Time Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Ministry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Defense for</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, and</td>
<td>658</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,075</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>20,285</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,621</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials, and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
<td>247,154</td>
<td>National Defense Academy</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF Regular</td>
<td></td>
<td>students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense Medical College students</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF High Technical School students</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-Time Officials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Number of personnel refers to the numbers specified in the laws and regulations.
2. "Others" in the title includes Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense, Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense, and Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense.
Integrated training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Main Participating Units, etc.</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training for protection measures for overseas Japanese nationals and others</td>
<td>Sep. 25 - Oct. 2, 2017</td>
<td>Camp Utsunomiya, Komaki Airbase, Republic of Djibouti, etc.</td>
<td>Joint Staff, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Central Readiness Force, Air Support Command, etc. Approximately 110 personnel</td>
<td>To enhance ability to deploy units overseas and their operational capabilities relating to transport of overseas Japanese nationals and others, and strengthen coordination between SDF and U.S. Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF joint exercise (command post exercise)</td>
<td>Nov. 6 - 24, 2017</td>
<td>Numazu Kailyn Training Site, Tanegashima Island and waters around Tsushima Island, other SDF facilities and waters and airspace surrounding Japan</td>
<td>Internal Bureaus, each Joint Staff, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Armies of the SDF, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Regional District HQs, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, SDF Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command, SDF Central Hospital etc. Approximately 15,000 personnel, approximately 1,500 vehicles, 6 vessels, approximately 170 aircraft</td>
<td>To maintain and enhance the SDF’s joint operations capabilities through studying and practicing SDF joint operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training for protection measures for overseas Japanese nationals and others</td>
<td>Dec. 11 - 15, 2017</td>
<td>MOD Ichigaya, Soumagahara Training Area, Iruma Airbase, route connecting Soumagahara Training Area to Iruma Airbase</td>
<td>Western Army, Central Readiness Force, MP, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command, AASDF MP, Air Materiel Command, etc. Approximately 390 personnel</td>
<td>To enhance joint operations capabilities relating to protection measures for overseas Japanese nationals and others, and strengthen coordination between SDF and relevant organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GSDF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Main Participating Units, etc.</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Corps field training exercise (Northern Army)</td>
<td>Sep. 16 - 28, 2017</td>
<td>Hokkaido-Dai Maneuver Area, Ysusutemi Maneuver Area, Camp Sapporo, Camp Higashi Chitose, Sapporo city, Otaru city, Kushiro city, wakkanai city, Ishikari city, etc.</td>
<td>Northern Army, etc. Approximately 17,000 personnel, 3,200 vehicles, 50 aircraft, and 2 vessels</td>
<td>To maintain and enhance Army’s capability to respond to various situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Corps field training exercise (Western Army)</td>
<td>Oct. 23 - Nov. 22, 2017</td>
<td>Camps, bases, maneuver areas and privately owned land inside the Western Army District</td>
<td>Western Army, etc. Approximately 14,000 personnel, 3,800 vehicles, 60 aircraft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for divisions)</td>
<td>Jun. 27 - Jul. 31, 2017</td>
<td>Middle-Northern Regional Army Districts (Hamakita Training Area, Ysusutemi Training Area, etc.)</td>
<td>Major units of 10th Division Approximately 2,600 personnel, 1,000 vehicles and 3 aircraft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)</td>
<td>Sep. 2 - 28, 2017</td>
<td>Eastern - Northern Regional Army Districts (Hokkaido-Dai Maneuver Area etc.)</td>
<td>One Infantry Regiment of the 12th Division Approximately 900 personnel, 260 vehicles, and 6 aircraft</td>
<td>To enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)</td>
<td>Nov. 3 - 13, 2016</td>
<td>Northern-Eastern Regional Army Districts (Kita-Fuji Training Area, etc.)</td>
<td>One Infantry Regiment of the 11th Brigade Approximately 410 personnel and 180 vehicles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments) 2nd Division, 5th Division</td>
<td>Oct. 14 - Dec. 4, 2017</td>
<td>Northeastern-Western Regional Army Districts (Hijudai Training Area, etc.)</td>
<td>Major units of one Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division Approximately 1,200 personnel, 400 vehicles, and 4 aircraft Major units of one Infantry Regiment of the 5th Division Approximately 650 personnel, 300 vehicles, and 2 aircraft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MSDF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Main Participating Units, etc.</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSDF exercise (Table Top Exercise)</td>
<td>Oct. 31 - Nov. 9, 2017</td>
<td>Maritime Staff Office, MSDF Staff College and the locations of other participating Units</td>
<td>Commands of the Self-Defense Fleet, Regional District HQs, Maritime Materiel Command, etc. Approximately 3,200 personnel</td>
<td>To conduct drills for unit operations, maritime operations, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF exercise (Field Training Exercise)</td>
<td>Nov. 10 - 28, 2017</td>
<td>Waters and airspace around Japan</td>
<td>Approximately 25 vessels and 60 aircraft</td>
<td>Conduct drills for maritime operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reference 62 Major Exercises Conducted in FY2017

Reference 63 Results of Firing Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2017)
### Main Measures for Re-employment Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Measures for employment support</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupational aptitude testing</td>
<td>Testing aimed to provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with guidance based on individual aptitudes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical training</td>
<td>Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement (large-sized vehicle operation, forklift operation, boiler maintenance, large-sized special vehicle operation, electrician, regular-sized vehicle operation, first-level training for nursing care workers, heavy-duty vehicle operation, chief hazardous material engineer, crane operation, mid-sized vehicle license (new in FY2018), etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures for retiring uniformed SDF personnel</td>
<td>Provide uniformed SDF officer retiring at an early age with technical knowledge on disaster prevention administration and the Civil Protection Plan (attending lectures in this area are a prerequisite for receiving the Cabinet Office’s Regional Disaster Prevention Manager license)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster prevention and risk management training</td>
<td>Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with the capability to acquire public qualifications (hazardous materials engineer, electrician, financial planner, class B), real estate transaction specialist, property administrator, medical clerk, data security officer (new in FY2016), etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence courses</td>
<td>Support uniformed SDF personnel retiring at an early age to cultivate social adaptability, as well as provide necessary knowledge to lead a stable life after reemployment and retirement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business management training</td>
<td>Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with knowhow to choose new occupation and right mindset toward reemployment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career guidance</td>
<td>Outsourcing career counseling, etc. to external experts to meet the needs of each retiring uniformed SDF personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures for internal support personnel</td>
<td>Training of labor administration, support activities, etc. to improve quality of support personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures for promotion outside of SDF</td>
<td>Publicizing to business owners, etc. the effectiveness of retiring uniformed SDF personnel who plan to retire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for publicity aimed at to business owners</td>
<td>Inviting business owners on unit tours</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Prefectural Government Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government

(As of March 31, 2018 432 personnel)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefectural Government</th>
<th>Government employment situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fukushima</td>
<td>Fukushima Prefectural Government, Fukushima City Government (two persons), Koriyama City Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tochigi</td>
<td>Tochigi Prefectural Government, Usunomiyama City Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunma</td>
<td>Gunma Prefectural Government, Maebashi City Government, Utsunomiya City Government, Shibuikawa City Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanagawa</td>
<td>Kanagawa Prefectural Government (three persons), Yokohama City Government (eight persons), Kawasaki City Government (four persons), Sagamihara City Government, Yokosuka City Government, Kamakura City Government, Fujisawa City Government (two persons), Chigasaki City Government, Zushi City Government, Ebina City Government, Zama City Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toyama</td>
<td>Toyama Prefectural Government, Toyama City Government, Hami City Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishikawa</td>
<td>Ishikawa Prefectural Government, Kanazawa City Government, Kaga City Government, Norio City Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukui</td>
<td>Fukui Prefectural Government (two persons), Fukui City Government, Awa City Government, Takahama Town Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamanashi</td>
<td>Yamanashi Prefectural Government (two persons), Fujio Wikipedia City Government, Minami-Alps City Government, Yamansato Town Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagano</td>
<td>Nagano Prefectural Government, Matsumoto City Government, Ina City Government, Chino City Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiga</td>
<td>Shiga Prefectural Government, Koyama City Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reference 64
Reference 65
### Reference 66 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

( Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on April 1, 2014)

The Government has made it its basic policy to deal with overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology in a careful manner in accordance with Prime Minister Eisaku Sato’s remarks at the Diet in 1967 (hereinafter referred to as “the Three Principles on Arms Exports”) and the collateral policy guideline by the Miki administration in 1976. These policy guidelines have played a certain role as Japan has been following the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world community with its national capabilities. Against this backdrop, under the evolving security environment, Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and the world economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.

From the viewpoint of achieving the fundamental principle of national security by implementing concrete policies, the Government, in accordance with the National Security Strategy adopted on December 17, 2013, decided to review the Government’s existing policy guidelines on overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology, and set out clear principles which fit the new security environment while giving due consideration to the roles that the existing policy guidelines have played so far and by consolidating the policy guidelines comprehensively with consideration on the past exemption measures.

An appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology contributes to further active promotion of the maintenance of international peace and security through timely and effective implementation of contribution to peace and international cooperation such as international peace cooperation, international disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, responses to international terrorism and piracy, and capacity building of developing countries (hereinafter referred to as “peace contribution and international cooperation”). Such transfer also contributes to strengthening security and defense cooperation with Japan’s ally, the United States as well as other countries. Furthermore, it contributes to maintaining and enhancing Japan’s defense production and technological bases, thereby contributing to Japan’s enhancement of defense capability, given that international joint development and production projects have become the international mainstream in order to improve the performance of defense equipment and to deal with their rising costs.

On the other hand, since the distribution of defense equipment and technology has significant security, social, economic and humanitarian impact on the international community, the need for each government to control the transfer of defense equipment and technology in a responsible manner while taking various factors into account is recognized.

In light of the above, while maintaining its basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation, Japan will control the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology based on the following three principles. The overseas transfer of facilities related to arms production will continue to be treated in the same manner as defense equipment and technology.

#### 1. Clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited

Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will not be permitted when:

1. the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded,
2. the transfer violates obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions, or
3. the defense equipment and technology is destined for a country party to a conflict (a country against which the United Nations Security Council is taking measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack).

#### 2. Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict examination and information disclosure

In cases not listed above, cases where transfers may be permitted will be limited to the following cases. These cases will be examined strictly while ensuring transparency. More specifically, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted in such cases as the transfer contributes to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, or to Japan’s security from the viewpoint of—implementing international joint development and production projects with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including its ally, the U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefectural Government</th>
<th>Government employment situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>Osaka Prefectural Government (two persons), Osaka City Government, Miki City Government, Higashine City Government, Higashine City Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibaraki</td>
<td>Ibaraki Prefectural Government, Ibaraki City Government, Miki City Government, Kashiwa City Government, Ichikawa City Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunma</td>
<td>Gunma Prefectural Government, Gunma City Government, Takayama City Government, Nagano City Government, Takayama City Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tochigi</td>
<td>Tochigi Prefectural Government, Tochigi City Government, Kashima City Government, Ibaraki City Government, Saitama City Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokushima</td>
<td>Tokushima Prefectural Government, Tokushima City Government, Tokushima City Government, Tokushima City Government, Tokushima City Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>Fukuoka Prefectural Government, Fukuoka City Government, Fukuoka City Government, Fukuoka City Government, Fukuoka City Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>Osaka Prefectural Government (two persons), Osaka City Government, Osaka City Government, Osaka City Government, Osaka City Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shizuoka</td>
<td>Shizuoka Prefectural Government, Shizuoka City Government, Shizuoka City Government, Shizuoka City Government, Shizuoka City Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunma</td>
<td>Gunma Prefectural Government, Gunma City Government, Gunma City Government, Gunma City Government, Gunma City Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Provided by the Ministry of Defense as of March 31, 2018 (part-time personnel included).
(hereinafter referred to as “the ally and partners”), —enhancing security and defense cooperation with the ally and partners, as well as—supporting the activities of the Self-Defense Forces including the maintenance of its equipment and ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan’s security. Then the Government will make a comprehensive judgment in light of the existing guidelines of the international export control regime and based on the information available at the time of export examinations.

Significant cases that require especially careful consideration from the viewpoint of Japan’s security will be examined at the National Security Council (NSC). As for the cases that were deliberated at the NSC, the Government will disclose their information in accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 of 1999).

In cases satisfying 2. above, overseas transfer of defense equipment and ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan’s security. Then the Government will make a comprehensive judgment in light of the existing guidelines of the international export control regime and based on the information available at the time of export examinations.

Significant cases that require especially careful consideration from the viewpoint of Japan’s security will be examined at the National Security Council (NSC). As for the cases that were deliberated at the NSC, the Government will disclose their information in accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 of 1999).

3. Ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-purpose use or transfer to third parties

In cases satisfying 2. above, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured. More concretely, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of control system at the destination in such cases as those where the transfer is judged to be appropriate for active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, when the transfer involves participation in an international system for sharing parts etc., and when the transfer involves delivery of parts etc. to a licensor.

Implementation guidelines for the policy described above will be decided by the NSC. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will implement the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Law No.228 of 1949) appropriately in accordance with the decision.

For the purpose of this policy, “defense equipment and technology” refers to “arms and military technologies”; “arms” refers to items listed in Section 1, Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 378 of 1949), and are to be used by military forces and directly employed in combat; and “military technologies” refers to technologies for the design, production or use of arms.

The Government will contribute actively to the peace and stability of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. Under such policy, it will play a proactive role in the area of controlling defense equipment and technology as well as sensitive dual-use goods and technologies to achieve the early entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty and further strengthen the international export control regimes.

### Reference 67 Activities in Civic Life

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Details of Activities and Their Past Records</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disposal of Unexploded Bombs</td>
<td>❍ The GSDF disposes of such bombs at the request of municipal governments and others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>❍ Disposal operations in FY2016: a total of 1,379 disposal operations (average of approximately 27 operations per week), weighing approximately 42.1 tons in total; in particular, the amount of unexploded bombs that were disposed of in Okinawa Prefecture totaled approximately 25.6 tons, (accounting for about 61% of such bombs removed across the nation). (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible in regard to disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of Underwater Mines</td>
<td>❍ The MSDF undertakes minesweeping operations in waters designated as dangerous areas because underwater mines had been laid there during World War II, as well as removes and disposes of explosives after receiving reports from municipal governments and others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>❍ Mine-sweeping has been almost completed in the dangerous areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>❍ Disposal operations in FY2016: a total 23,590 units were disposed of, weighing approximately 4.2 tons in total (1 underwater mines disposed). (If explosive hazardous materials are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Activities</td>
<td>❍ Medical services are provided to the general public at the National Defense Medical College in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and some hospitals affiliated with the SDF (seven out of 16 such hospitals, including the SDF Central Hospital in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>❍ The National Defense Medical College runs an emergency medical center, which is in charge of providing emergency medical services to seriously injured patients and patients in critical condition. The center is designated as a medical facility providing tertiary emergency services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>❍ In the wake of a disaster, medical units belonging to major SDF units, acting on a request from municipal governments, provide travelling clinics, quarantines and so forth when a disaster occurs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>❍ The GSDF Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo), MSDF Underwater Medical Center (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), and ASDF Aviation Medicine Laboratory (Tachikawa City, Tokyo and Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture) undertake study on outdoor sanitation, underwater medicine, and aviation medicine, respectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>❍ The National Defense Medical College Research Institute (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture) undertakes study on emergency medicine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation in Supporting Athletic Meetings</td>
<td>❍ At the request of concerned organizations, the SDF helps operations of the Olympics and Asian games in Japan as well as national sports meetings in the fields of ceremonies, communications, transportation, music performance, medical services, and emergency medical services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>❍ The SDF provides transportation and communication support to marathon events and ekiden road relays.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchanges with Local Communities</td>
<td>❍ Sports facilities such as grounds, gyms and swimming pools at many of the SDF garrisons and bases are open to general citizens in response to requests from local communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>❍ Participation in various events sponsored by general citizens and municipal governments or taking part as sports referees and instructors on an individual basis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outline of the survey period: January 11 - 21, 2018
Respondents: Japanese citizens aged 18 years or older in Japan
Valid responses (rate): 1,671 (55.7%)
Survey method: Individual interview by survey personnel
For details, refer to <https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h29/h29-bouei/index.html>
The Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance

The Results of the Special Defense Inspection (outline)

July 27, 2017

1. Subject Items
An inspection was conducted regarding “the state of management of “The Daily Reports Prepared between July 7-12, 2016 by the GSDF Engineering Unit Dispatched to South Sudan” (hereinafter referred to as “the Daily Reports”), for which a disclosure request was made pursuant to the provisions of the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Act No.42 of May 14, 1999, hereinafter referred to as “the Information Disclosure Act”).

2. Subject Organizations, etc.
The organizations, etc. of the Ministry of Defense related to the management of the Daily Reports (Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, Internal Bureau, and the Joint Staff (hereinafter referred to as “JS”), the Ground Staff Office (hereinafter referred to as “GSO”), and the Central Readiness Force (hereinafter referred to as “CRF”) Headquarters).

3. Outline of the Inspection Conducted
The special defense inspection began on March 17, 2017, and the acquisition and analysis of the related documents, etc., questionnaire surveys, on-site, etc., confirmation, and interviews were conducted.

4. The Results of the Inspection
(1) Inappropriate response to the disclosure request dated July 19th (July-September 2016)
Regarding the disclosure request dated July 19 that is related to the disclosure request for the Daily Reports, the Vice Commanding General (international), CRF, while recognizing the existence of daily reports as administrative documents, provided guidance with the intent that it was desirable to remove daily reports from such documents and did not disclose existing daily reports. This is inappropriate since the Daily Reports were not disclosed pursuant to their disclosure request by reason of the nonexistence of the documents as the consequence of this response.

(2) Inappropriate response to the disclosure request dated October 5 (October-December 2016)
Regarding the disclosure request for the Daily Reports, it is inappropriate that the GSO and CRF Headquarters staff, while recognizing the existence of daily reports as administrative documents, based on the response to the disclosure request dated July 19, made a non-disclosure determination by reason of the non-existence of the documents and did not disclose the Daily Reports, which existed.

It is also inappropriate that non-disclosure procedures were taken by reason of the non-existence of the documents even though the GSO and JS staff were in a situation where they could recognize the existence of daily reports.

(3) Inappropriate response concerning the management of the Daily Reports (December 2016, February 2017)
In December 2016, the Director of Operations Support & Intelligence Department, GSO gave guidance regarding the appropriate management of bulletin boards on the premise that they would be disposed of after use without taking measures regarding disclosure even though he/she recognized that nondisclosure procedures had been taken regarding the disclosure request for the Daily Reports by reason of the non-existence of the documents. This is inappropriate because it is unavoidable for this to be interpreted that guidance was given to make the facts fit the non-disclosure decision based on the nonexistence of the documents.

In addition, in February 2017, in order to ensure consistency with the fact that only the Daily Reports that exist at the JS had been made public, the Director of Operations Support & Intelligence Department, GSO deemed this appropriate document management, then, among other things, requested the disposal of the daily reports, and the Daily Reports were disposed of. Although this does not directly constitute a violation of the Information Disclosure Act, it was inappropriate because it could be said that a request for disposal, etc. was made to make the facts match the non-disclosure decision by reason of the non-existence of the documents.

(4) Inappropriate response including the delay in reporting to the Ministry of Defense and the public explanation (December 2016-January 2017)
The Director of Operations Support & Intelligence Department, GSO caused confusion in mutual understanding because he/she explained to the Administrative Vice Chief of staff, JS that daily reports existed as personal data while recognizing that the possibility that the daily reports existing at the GSDF were administrative documents. Meanwhile, the Administrative Vice Chief of staff, JS received instructions from the Minister of Defense to search again for the Daily Reports but did not instruct the GSO, etc. to conduct a search again. Later, although he/she confirmed the existence of the Daily Reports, he/she took approximately one month to make a report to the Ministry of Defense. In addition, he/she did not confirm the state of the GSDF daily reports and was unable to grasp them accurately. It is inappropriate that the Ministry of Defense was unable to respond appropriately as the result, having created documents for public explanation that were different from the facts among other things.

(5) Continuing the posture regarding the public explanation (February 2017)
The Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense and the Administrative Vice Chief of staff, JS received the explanation from the Chief of Staff, GSDF and others that the Daily Reports data existed at the CRF Headquarters but it was unclear whether they were being managed as administrative documents. The Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense recognized the data as personal data, did not confirm the state of the GSDF daily reports, and indicated the policy for public explanation to the effect that there were no problems as the response under the Information Disclosure Act since the Ministry of Defense was making the Daily Reports public. In addition, the abovementioned response to the question was explained to the Minister of Defense and approved. On that occasion, it was not mentioned by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense or the Administrative Vice Chief of staff, JS that the Daily Reports existed within the GSDF.

It is inappropriate that because of this, the posture regarding the public explanation to the effect that the Daily Reports were being appropriately handled within the GSDF was maintained by the GSDF even though the opportunity existed to change the posture regarding the public explanation by confirming the state of the GSDF daily reports.

(6) Separately from this, there was an occasion on which an explanation was given to the Minister of Defense regarding the handling of daily reports at the GSDF among other matters. However, although the possibility cannot be denied that there may have been some statements regarding the existence of daily report data at the GSDF as part of the exchange on that occasion, there were no facts to the effect that a report was made by document indicating the existence of daily report data at the GSDF or that a report was made seeking approval for nondisclosure.

In addition, there are no facts to the effect that any decision or approval by the Minister of Defense was made concerning whether or not to make public.

5. Rectification Measures
(1) Implementing appropriate information disclosure operations
A) It is necessary to thoroughly conduct the education, etc. of the related staff to raise their awareness regarding the appropriate implementation of information disclosure operations.

B) In the case where it is to be decided that an administrative document does not exist, it is necessary to conduct multiple searches and to expand the scope of the searches, actually confirm the state of document management, and otherwise thoroughly conduct meticulous searches.
C) It is necessary to attempt to strengthen the confirmation function by such means as implementing the inspection of information disclosure operations by an organization that has no connection to the information disclosure procedures. In addition, strive to confirm the appropriateness of procedures regarding disclosure requests by utilizing regular defense inspections.

(2) Implementing appropriate document management, etc.

A) It is necessary to take measures to clearly grasp the state of administrative documents by such means as appropriate indications of the retention period, etc. on the administrative documents and to take measures to keep the distribution of sensitive documents to the smallest number possible

B) It is necessary to review the management manual for administrative documents such as clarifying the responsibility in the case where multiple document managers possess the same administrative document.

(3) Considering how the retention period for daily reports, etc. should be and the measures to be taken It is necessary for the Ministry of Defense to swiftly consider how the retention period for daily reports, etc. should be after the retention period has lapsed and take measures.

6. Conclusion
It is necessary to recognize that the understanding and support of the Japanese public is essential to the activities of the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces and that it is extremely important to fulfill the responsibility to explain to the Japanese public, swiftly take rectification measures, and do the utmost to secure appropriateness in all types of operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date(s)</th>
<th>Outline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Response to disclosure request related to the Daily Reports</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 19, 2016</td>
<td>• Received disclosure request for all documents (including electronic format) of the exchanges during July 6-15, 2016 (Japan Time) between the Central Readiness Force Headquarters and the GSDF engineering unit dispatched to South Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 20-September 13</td>
<td>• The Vice Commanding General (international), CRF provided guidance with the intent that it was desirable to remove daily reports from such documents when he/she received the report regarding the documents including daily reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The opinion that a partial disclosure should be made of the documents excluding daily reports was submitted to superiors after coordination between the GSO and the CRF Headquarters staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To September 15</td>
<td>• The JS, etc. responded to the opinion inquiry that it had no opinions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 16</td>
<td>• Disclosure decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Response to disclosure request for the Daily Reports</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 3</td>
<td>• Received disclosure request for the Daily Reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 6-November 2</td>
<td>• The GSO and the CRF Headquarters staff coordinated the position to make the same response as for the July 19 disclosure request. The GSO staff submitted to superiors the opinion of non-disclosure by reason of the non-existence of the documents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 29</td>
<td>• The JS responded to the opinion inquiry that it had no opinions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2</td>
<td>• Non-disclosure decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Response regarding the handling of the Daily Reports after the non-disclosure decision</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 12</td>
<td>• The Liberal Democratic Party Administrative Reform Promotion Headquarters demanded documents regarding the non-disclosure decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 13</td>
<td>• A request for administrative review regarding the non-disclosure decision is received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around December 13</td>
<td>• The Director of Operations Support &amp; Intelligence Department, GSO provided guidance regarding the appropriate management of GSDF Command System Bulletin Board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>→ CRF Headquarters disposed of the Daily Reports from the bulletin board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 16</td>
<td>• When reported to the Minister of Defense on the non-disclosure decision, the Minister of Defense gave instructions for a new search.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 26</td>
<td>• The Administrative Vice Chief of staff, JS confirmed the existence of the Daily Reports at JS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 27, 2017</td>
<td>• The Director of Operations Support &amp; Intelligence Department, GSO explained to the Administrative Vice Chief of staff, JS that daily reports existed at the GSDF as personal data. The Administrative Vice Chief of staff, JS based on the determination of the Administrative Vice-Minister that it was unclear whether the daily reports of the GSDF were fit for disclosure, explained to that only the Daily Reports that existed at would be reported to the Minister of Defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 6</td>
<td>• The Daily Reports, etc. were submitted to the Liberal Democratic Party Administrative Reform Promotion Headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 7</td>
<td>• The Daily Reports were disclosed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around February 8</td>
<td>• The Director of Operations Support &amp; Intelligence Department, GSO requested CRF Headquarters, etc. to manage documents appropriately.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>→ CRF Headquarters disposed of the Daily Reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 9</td>
<td>• The request for administrative review is approved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 10</td>
<td>• GSDF began acquiring the Daily Reports and confirming disposal history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 13</td>
<td>• A disclosure decision was made anew.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• The handling of daily reports at GSDF, etc. was explained to the Ministry of Defense by the Deputy Chief of Staff, GSDF, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 15</td>
<td>• The Chief of Staff, GSDF, etc. reported to the Administrative Vice-Minister and the Administrative Vice Chief of staff, JS on the existence of the Daily Reports data at CRF Headquarters, etc. as the interim state of affairs regarding the aforementioned confirmation.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Director of Operations Support &amp; Intelligence Department, GSO explained that it was unclear whether they were being managed as administrative documents.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• The Administrative Vice-Minister explicitly expressed the judgment that it was unnecessary to report the Daily Reports to the Minister of Defense since the state of management of the Daily Reports was unclear.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• The handling of daily reports at the GSDF, etc. was explained to the Ministry of Defense by the Chief of Staff, GSDF, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 16</td>
<td>• The Administrative Vice-Minister explained to the Chief of Staff, GSDF, etc. that the Daily Reports had been disclosed by the Ministry of Defense and there was no problem under the Information Disclosure Act based on the understanding that the Daily Reports of the GSDF were personal data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 21</td>
<td>• The answer was explained to the Minister of Defense regarding the point of contention to the effect that there was no problem under the Information Disclosure Act and was accepted. On this occasion, the Administrative Vice-Minister and the Administrative Vice Chief of staff, JS did not touch on the fact that the Daily Reports existed at the GSDF.</td>
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Defense Chronology

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1950 Apr. 28</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Peace Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty signed (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960 Nov. 10</td>
<td>Nuclear test ban treaty comes into effect.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966 Jan. 14</td>
<td>Israel captures the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the Six-Day War.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976 Mar. 26</td>
<td>First contact between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980 May 29</td>
<td>Dictatorship of the shah is overthrown in a military coup.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981 Nov. 3</td>
<td>United States recognizes the People's Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986 Oct. 27</td>
<td>The Soviet Union launches a nuclear test ban treaty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 Oct. 10</td>
<td>China successfully launches a nuclear missile test.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 Apr. 2</td>
<td>United States recognizes the People's Republic of China.</td>
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Reference

DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2018

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<th>Year</th>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>23rd Jan - 14th Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>7th Jun - Joint ceremony and the First hydrogen bomb test</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>1st Jul - Formation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>25th Sep - Inauguration of second reshuffled Sato Cabinet</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>18th Jan - Prime Minister Minow announces withdrawal of U.S. bases</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>19th Jan - U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft (Enterprise) enters a stand-by</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>23rd Jul - Siege of U.S. naval vessel by North Korea</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>27th Nov - U.S. President visits U.S.S.R. on the occasion of the first</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>19th Dec - U.S. President Nixon announces return of Okinawa to Japan</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>10th Jan - Inauguration of third Tanaka Cabinet</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>14th Jan - Japan–Soviet summit (Moscow)</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>24th Apr - North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) and Warsaw Pact (Warpac)</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>27th Apr - Arms control talks held in Japan</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>15th May - Second and Eastern European troops invade Czechoslovakia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>23rd May - Frame came out its first hydrogen bomb test in the South-</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>19th Jun - U.S. and Germany sign Non-nuclear Technology</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>10th Jan - National Defense Council decides to produce TDF (TOKYO)</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>24th Jun - U.S.S.R. and U.S. agree to exchange general information on</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>3rd Jul - National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>16th Jul - West Germany-US$ sign non-aggression pact</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>10th Oct - Second reshuffled Sato Cabinet</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>27th Oct - Formation of integrated WPO (Warsaw Pact) forces</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>11th Nov - First domestically produced artificial satellite successfully</td>
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<td>27th Nov - First produced military aircraft by Japan</td>
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<td>9th May - Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People</td>
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<td>5th Mar - U.S. and Japan sign SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty</td>
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2000 Mar. 25 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (February 14, May 1, 2000)

2000 Apr. 7 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (May 1, 2000)

2000 Jun. 7 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (May 1, 2000)

2000 Oct. 10 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (May 1, 2000)

2000 Nov. 20 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (May 1, 2000)

2000 Dec. 09 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (May 1, 2000)

2001 Mar. 2 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (May 1, 2000)

2001 Apr. 1 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (May 1, 2000)

2001 May. 0 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (May 1, 2000)

2001 Jun. 2 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (May 1, 2000)

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2003 Oct. 10 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (May 1, 2000)

2003 Nov. 1 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (May 1, 2000)

2003 Dec. 0 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (May 1, 2000)

2004 Jan. 1 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (May 1, 2000)

2004 Feb. 1 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (May 1, 2000)

2004 Mar. 2 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (May 1, 2000)

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2004 Oct. 10 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (May 1, 2000)

2004 Nov. 1 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (May 1, 2000)

2004 Dec. 0 SJF personnel deployed to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Exit Program (May 1, 2000)
2003
Dec. 19
Government decides to introduce ballistic missile defense system.

Feb. 26
Riots and demonstrations in Iraq.

Sep. 20

Oct. 15
First Japan-U.S. joint military exercises in the Indo-Pacific region.

Dec. 30
Relief materials transported by air in response to great earthquake in Iran under the Law concerning the Dispatch of Relief Materials in Connection with the Earthquake in Iran.

2004
Jan. 2
North Korea conducts an underground nuclear test.

Feb. 1
U.S. and Japan agree to the sharing of missile defense technologies to the United States.

May 22
U.S.-Japan Summit held (Pyongyang). Five family members of abductees return to Japan.

Nov. 30
Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 4th Yokota Air Base noise suit.

2005
Feb. 9
MSDF unit for marine transport leaves for Kuwait (return on April 8).

Mar. 14
Demonstration by Buddhist monks in the regional capital.

Jun. 01
SDF units dispatched to Indonesia to conduct international disaster relief activities as its primary mission.

Jun. 29
U.S. and Japan agree to the sharing of missile defense technologies to the United States.

Jul. 04
Koike becomes Minister of Defense.

Jul. 31

Aug. 19
Supreme Court renders judgment on the third and fourth trials for the suit pertaining to noise generated by the Komatsu Air Base.

Nov. 27
Field training under the Civil Protection Law takes place.

Dec. 19
U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution criticizing the abduction of foreign citizens by North Korea.

Dec. 24
Cabinet decisions adopted on "Changes of emergency response procedures for large-scale earthquakes and fire accidents in the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster and the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster."

Dec. 25

Dec. 27
Japan releases a white paper, "China's National Defense Capability" (two volumes).

Dec. 30
Relief materials transported by air in response to great earthquake in Pakistan, etc. (All activities as its primary mission).

2006
Jan. 22
Facilities disposed for missile defense system.

Feb. 03
Departure of first SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian disaster relief activity in Connection with the accident of a small submarine of the Russian Navy off Kamchatka (All disaster relief activity).

Feb. 09
Inauguration of second reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Ohno announces the unloading of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods).

Feb. 10
Yokosuka naval facility.

Jun. 28
Transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government commenced by the navies of three countries, Indonesia, Japan, and Singapore.

Jul. 14

Aug. 09
MSDF personnel attached to the Yokosuka RAMFAC pays a visit to Iraq for the first time.

Aug. 10

Aug. 25
Shimane Prefecture establishes "Takeshima Day."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Major Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Jan. 26</td>
<td>North Korea admires its nuclear program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Jul. 7</td>
<td>Japanese branch of Naha District Court renders judgment in 1st Field Training Exercise Station case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Jul. 30</td>
<td>G-20 leaders of the Group of Twenty meet in Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Jul. 31</td>
<td>Completion of withdrawal of non-American multinational forces from Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Jan. 27</td>
<td>Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on National Defense Program Guidance (NDPG) and Beyond the MD Term-Defense Program (P2011-2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
<td>U.S. President Obama announces review of MD deployments in Europe (through January 30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Dec. 07</td>
<td>Establishment of a governmental committee to review the need for the MD in Japan (through December 26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Feb. 22</td>
<td>Iranian naval ships pass through Suez Canal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Oct. 03</td>
<td>U.S. DoD informs Congress of sale of PAC-3s, AH-64Ds, and E-3 Sentry for Japan (through December 21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Jul. 05</td>
<td>Joint Statement of Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) and Joint Operation Plan (through August 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Jul. 12</td>
<td>Provisional government in Somalia, Ahmed elected as new president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Aug. 01</td>
<td>Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Anti-Piracy Law (through August 15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Sep. 29</td>
<td>Chinese space laboratory &quot;Tiangong 1&quot; launched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Oct. 03</td>
<td>U.S. DoD informs Congress of sale of PAC-3s, AH-64Ds, and E-3 Sentry for Japan (through December 21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Nov. 11</td>
<td>Government Revitalization Unit &quot;project screening&quot; of the job status of SDF recruits (through December 15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reference

Defense of Japan
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Major Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Jul. 13</td>
<td>Chinese naval fleet sail through Soya Strait to the Sea of Okhotsk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Jul. 22</td>
<td>China Coast Guard sign put up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Jul. 24</td>
<td>Chinese early warning aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean for the first time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Aug. 21</td>
<td>Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Aug. 22</td>
<td>Russian fighters intrude into Japan’s airspace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Aug. 27</td>
<td>Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Aug. 30</td>
<td>&quot;Destruction of the MSDF-Reform&quot; released</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Sep. 08</td>
<td>Council on Security and Defense Capabilities holds first meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Sep. 18</td>
<td>Disaster relief teams dispatched after Typhoon No. 26 (through November 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Sep. 23</td>
<td>Three Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific (incorporated into Pacific Fleet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Nov. 06</td>
<td>Typhoon No. 39 hits Ito-Island, Philippines (Japanese National Security Council (NSC) convenes to respond to typhoon in the Philippines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Nov. 10</td>
<td>Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) decides on detailed terms of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons (OPCW decides on destruction of Syria's declared chemical weapons; OPCW's prohibition of chemical weapons enters into effect)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Nov. 22</td>
<td>Revissions of the Self-Defense Forces Act (an expanded category of forces) are enacted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Dec. 04</td>
<td>National Security Council established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Dec. 08</td>
<td>The ROK announces establishment of new Air Defense Identification Zone (in vicinity of DMZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Dec. 13</td>
<td>Act in the Promotion of Specially Designated Secrets Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Dec. 15</td>
<td>Chinese lunar probe successfully achieves soft lunar landing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Dec. 20</td>
<td>Confrontations occur between forces aligned with the former vice president and forces aligned with the former president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Dec. 20</td>
<td>Disaster relief teams dispatched after heavy snowfall disaster (through February 23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Dec. 30</td>
<td>Three Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific (incorporated into Pacific Fleet)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
May 05 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Cyclone Mergui in the Rakhine State of Myanmar
May 21 Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Tokyo)
June 03 Dispatch of rescue teams in response to the crash of a civilian aircraft (light aircraft)
June 04 China conducts a flag raising ceremony for the Support Base in Djibouti
June 05 Japan-U.S.-ROK Cooperation Working Group Meeting and ASEAN-related summit meeting
July 01 Establishment of Southwestern Air Defense Force
July 13 Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly toward the East China Sea
July 19 China-U.S. ship-to-ship refueling exercise
July 24 Chinese vessels sail in Japan’s territorial waters in the southwest of Taiwan Prefecture
July 25 Return of Colors ceremony of JSDF engineering Replacement Facility construction project
Aug. 30 First phase of the curving of the Doklam plains following the confrontation of their forces
Aug. 31 China conducts a completion ceremony of the Support Base in Guangdong Province
Aug. 31 Chinese vessels sail in Japan’s territorial waters near the southwest of Okinawa Prefecture
Aug. 31 Japan-U.S. ROE (rules of engagement) are extended for 10 years, etc.
Aug. 31 Enforcement of the law for partial amendment of the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law (validity is extended for 10 years, etc.)
Dec. 15 Chinese vessels sail in the East China Sea
Dec. 16 China-U.S. joint exercise
Dec. 19 Dec. 18 Japan-U.S. joint exercise
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Defense</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 09</td>
<td>Defense authorities of Japan and China sign the Memorandum on the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 10</td>
<td>Signing of the Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defence of the United Arab Emirates (Tokyo)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 10</td>
<td>2nd Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program (Indonesia-Malaysia (through May 15))</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>May 15</td>
<td>Cabinet decision adopted on “Basic Plan on Ocean Policy”</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>May 18</td>
<td>Cabinet Decisions on revision of the “Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)”</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 21</td>
<td>Cabinet decision on adoption of “Basic Plan on Ocean Policy”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 29</td>
<td>Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 02</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Honolulu)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 02</td>
<td>Defense Minister Onodera attends the 17th Shangri-La Dialogue (hosted by ISST) (through June 3)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 02</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 02</td>
<td>Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 02</td>
<td>Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 02</td>
<td>Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 02</td>
<td>Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 03</td>
<td>Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 03</td>
<td>Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 03</td>
<td>Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 18</td>
<td>Disaster Relief for Northern Osaka Prefecture Earthquake (through June 24)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 29</td>
<td>Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 06</td>
<td>Disaster Relief in Response to July 2018 Flooding Disaster (through August 18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 26</td>
<td>Two Chinese bombers, two fighter jets (probable), an electronic warfare aircraft and an intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. The two fighter jets (probable) turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the continent. The two bombers, electronic warfare aircraft and intelligence gathering aircraft fly toward the Bashi Channel</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr 27</td>
<td>The Inter-Korean Summit, Panmunjom Declaration agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr 28</td>
<td>A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes Tsushima Strait and advances to the Sea of Japan from the East China Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 04</td>
<td>China-North Korea Summit</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 06</td>
<td>U.S. President Trump announces withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 11</td>
<td>Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. Shortly thereafter, the two fighter jets (probable) turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the continent. Two bombers, an intelligence gathering aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island from the Pacific Ocean to the direction of the Bashi Channel and move to the East China Sea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 12</td>
<td>Terror attacks by suicide bombers occur in churches in Surabaya, Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 13</td>
<td>Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. The two bomber aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. Two fighters (probable) turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the continent</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 18</td>
<td>A Chinese H-6K bomber and other aircraft conduct a takeoff and landing training in the South China Sea (pointed out as Woody Island, Paracel Islands)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 21</td>
<td>The United States releases a new Iran strategy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>May 25</td>
<td>The Inter-Korean Summit</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>May 26</td>
<td>Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 27</td>
<td>The Inter-Korean Summit</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>May 27</td>
<td>A U.S. naval destroyer and cruiser conduct the “Freedom of Navigation Operations” within 12 nautical miles of Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (reported)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 03</td>
<td>A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 04</td>
<td>A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and after flying toward the Bashi Channel, it turns around and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 04</td>
<td>A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and moves to the East China Sea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 12</td>
<td>U.S.-North Korea Summit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Location of Principal SDF Units (for illustrative purposes) (As of March 31, 2018)

- Yonagunijima
- Uotsuri Island
- Kuba Island
- Taisho Island
- Senkaku Islands

Ground Component Command Headquarters (and Eastern Army Headquarters)
Army Headquarters
Headquarters District
Southwestern Air Defense Force
Central Air Defense Force
Southwestern Air Defense Force

Northern Air Defense Force
Northern Army
Ominato District

Ministry of Defense; Joint Staff Office; Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Office

Ground Self-Defense Force
- Ground Component Command Headquarters (and Eastern Army Headquarters)
- Army Headquarters
- Division Headquarters Brigade Headquarters
- Airborne Brigades
- Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units
- Helicopter Brigades

Maritime Self-Defense Force
- Self-Defense Fleet Headquarters
- Headquarters District
- Principal Naval Bases
- Principal Air Bases (Fixed-Wing Aircraft Units)
- Principal Air Bases (Helicopter Unit)

Air Self-Defense Force
- Air Defense Command Headquarters
- Air Defense Force Headquarters
- Fighter Units
- Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units
- Aircraft Control and Warning Units (Radar Sites)
Note: Based on information on the U.S. Forces Japan website and other sources.
Locations of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Japan (Excluding Okinawa Prefecture) (As of March 31, 2018)

Source: the U.S. Forces Japan website and other sources.